Constellation Energy Generation LLC; Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2; Exemption, 89052-89056 [2024-26075]
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89052
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2024 / Notices
Document description
ADAMS accession No.
Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50–397, License Amendment Request to Revise
Columbia Generating Station Emergency Plan, dated January 30, 2024.
Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50–397, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Columbia Generating Station Emergency Plan, dated March 20, 2024.
Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50–397, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Columbia Emergency Plan, dated September 10,
2024.
Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50–397, Supplement to Response to Request for
Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Columbia Emergency Plan, dated
September 24, 2024.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘‘Criteria for Preparation
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness,’’ NUREG–0654/FEMA–REP–1,
Revision 2, dated December 2019.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Nuclear Energy Institute, ‘‘Alternative Guidance for Licensee
Emergency Response Organizations,’’ dated June 12, 2018.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear
Plants: Regarding Columbia Generating Station,’’ NUREG–1437, Supplement 47, Volume 1, dated April 2012.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear
Plants: Regarding Columbia Generating Station,’’ NUREG–1437, Supplement 47, Volume 2, dated April 2012.
Dated: November 5, 2024.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mahesh Chawla,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch IV,
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2024–26109 Filed 11–8–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–352; 50–353; NRC–2024–
0194]
Constellation Energy Generation LLC;
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1
and 2; Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption in response to letter dated
February 17, 2023, as supplemented by
letters dated July 21, 2023, July 31,
2023, August 16, 2023, and May 28,
2024. Constellation Energy Generation
LLC (Constellation, the licensee) has
requested exemption from specific
requirements for reduction of risk from
anticipated transients without scram
(ATWS) events for light-water-cooled
nuclear power plants. Constellation is
the holder of the Renewed Facility
Operating License Nos. NPF–39 and
NPF–85, which authorize the operation
of Limerick Generating Station, Units 1
and 2 (Limerick).
DATES: This document was published in
the Federal Register on November 12,
2024.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2024–0194 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
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SUMMARY:
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information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2024–0194. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301–415–0624; email:
Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at
301–415–4737, or by email to
PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS
accession number for each document
referenced (if it is available in ADAMS)
is provided the first time that it is
mentioned in this document.
• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you
may examine and order copies of
publicly available documents, is open
by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please
send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov
or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415–
4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern
time (ET), Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael Marshall, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415–
2871; email: Michael.Marshall@nrc.gov.
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ML24030A844.
ML24081A193.
ML24254A366.
ML24269A254.
ML19347D139.
ML18022A352.
ML12096A334.
ML12096A336 (Package).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Constellation is the holder of the
Renewed Facility Operating License
Nos. NPF–39 and NPF–85, which
authorize the operation of Limerick
Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The
facilities consist of boiling water
reactors (BWRs) located in Montgomery
County, Pennsylvania and is located
next to the Schuylkill River.
By letter dated February 17, 2023, as
supplemented by letters dated July 21,
2023, July 31, 2023, August 16, 2023,
and May 28, 2024, Constellation has
requested exemption from specific
requirements of section 50.62 of title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR), ‘‘Requirements for reduction of
risk from anticipated transients without
scram (ATWS) events for light-watercooled nuclear power plants.’’ A
publicly available version of each letter
is in ADAMS under Accession Nos.
ML23052A023, ML23202A219,
ML23212B105, ML23228A094, and
ML24149A211, respectively.
Constellation specifically requests an
exemption from the requirements of 10
CFR 50.62(c)(3) and the automatic
activation requirements of 10 CFR
50.62(c)(4) and (c)(5) for a period of 30
days before the calendar year 2027
refueling outage for Unit 2 and for a
period of 30 days before the calendar
year 2026 refueling outage for Unit 1. In
conjunction with this exemption request
the licensee submitted an associated
license amendment request (ADAMS
Accession No. ML23052A023) to add
operational constraints to the limiting
conditions of operations in the technical
specifications (TSs) for each Limerick
unit to be in effect during each
respective exemption period to ensure
that there is no increase in the potential
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2024 / Notices
consequences of an ATWS. In the
license amendment request, the licensee
also described additional ATWS
mitigation strategies (i.e., compensatory
measures) they will implement in
addition to the TS changes. Specifically,
in Attachment 7 of the license
amendment request, the licensee stated,
‘‘With the additional compensatory
measures being taken, the same level
ATWS mitigation protection will be
achieved during the 30-day RRCS
demolition period when the automatic
systems designed to meet compliance
with 10 CFR 50.62 ATWS requirements
are out of service.’’
II. Request/Action
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.62, the
Commission’s regulations establish
specific ATWS mitigation requirements
for nuclear power plants, with
paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5)
applicable to BWRs like Limerick Units
1 and 2. The systems that are required
are to be operational are the alternate
rod injection (ARI) system, the
automatic activation of the standby
liquid control system (SLCS), and
equipment to trip the reactor coolant
recirculation pumps automatically
under conditions of an ATWS.
Constellation requested an exemption
from all requirements for ARI capability
in 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3) and only from the
automatic response capability in 10 CFR
50.62(c)(4) for SLCS and in 10 CFR
50.62(c)(5) recirculation pumps trip
(RPT) for a period of 30-days prior to the
calendar year 2027 refueling outage for
Unit 2 and the calendar year 2026
refueling outage for Unit 1. During each
30-day period prior to the refueling
outage, referred to by Constellation as
the 30-day redundant reactivity control
system (RRCS) demolition period,
Constellation will begin upgrading the
RRCS by demolishing the existing
analog system and replacing it with a
new digital system which will be
completed during the refueling outage.
To support RRCS demolition period,
Constellation submitted a license
amendment request to temporarily
modify certain TS limiting conditions
for operation to: (1) not require
operability of certain automatic
initiation features of ATWS equipment
89053
that are in the scope of work being
performed, and (2) establish operating
condition that ensure that there would
be no increase in the consequences of an
ATWS event should one occur during
the 30-day RRCS demolition period. In
addition, they also requested that
certain surveillance requirements
related to the ATWS features within the
scope of work not be required during
the RRCS demolition period. The
limiting condition for operation changes
temporarily limit the maximum reactor
thermal power during the 30-day RRCS
demolition period based on
combination of operating parameters.
Specifically, the maximum power at
which the plant is limited based on the
number of out of safety relief valves, the
ability to manually initiate SLCS within
five minutes, a minimum suppression
pool water level, and the operability of
the reactor water level 3 recirculation
runback system. The operational
constraints identified by Constellation
for each identified maximum thermal
power limit are listed in the following
table.
EXEMPTION’S OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS FOR A PERIOD OF 30-DAYS
Maximum reactor thermal
power
90% ..................................
87% ..................................
84% ..................................
0
0
1
In addition, as stated in their license
amendment request, as evaluated by
NRC staff in the safety evaluation (SE)
to the license amendment request (LAR)
to reduce the risk from a potential
ATWS event during the 30-day period,
the licensee will implement additional
ATWS mitigation strategies to provide
an equivalent level of ATWS protection
to their normal automatic ATWS
mitigation capability.
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III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the
Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when:
(1) the exemptions are authorized by
law, (2) will not present an undue risk
to public health or safety, (3) are
consistent with the common defense
and security; and (4) when special
circumstances are present, as defined in
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2). This exemption
would allow Constellation to
temporarily disable the ARI, and the
automatic activation of the SLCS and
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Manual initiation time for
SLCS
(minutes)
Maximum number of
SRVs out of service
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Minimum suppression
pool water level
(feet)
5
5
5
23
22
22
recirculation pumps at Limerick so that
digital upgrades can be made leading up
to the refueling outages of each unit.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, does not require any specific
systems to reduce the risk from ATWS
events. These systems are required by
NRC regulation. The intent of the
regulations requires systems to mitigate
the ATWS conditions, should they
occur. The NRC staff has determined
that granting the exemption will not
result in a violation of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, NRC
regulations, or any other laws.
Therefore, the requested exemption is
authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents no Undue
Risk to Public Health and Safety
The NRC requires that an exemption
demonstrate that it does not present
undue risk to public health and safety
if it is granted. Constellation provided
an analysis that with the proposed
systems offline, the lower power limit,
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Additional system credited
Level 3 Recirculation Runback.
Level 3 Recirculation Runback.
Level 3 Recirculation Runback.
the manual activation of the SLCS and
the recirculation runback pumps, that
the disabling of the ATWS mitigation
measures will not present undue risk to
public health and safety. The disabling
of automatic ATWS mitigation systems
for 30-days potentially increases the
severity of an ATWS event should it
occur within the window. An ATWS
that is not successfully mitigated could
result in core damage due to excessive
heat generation. ATWS events are
unlikely events that are expected to
occur once or more during an operating
reactor’s service life. The proposed
changes to the reactor systems do not
change the likelihood of an ATWS event
occurring. The consequences of an
ATWS can vary from a minor event that
can be addressed with the available
protection systems, to more severe that
require more significant measures
leading to a sudden shutting down of a
nuclear reactor, if necessary to protect
the core from damage.
The proposed ATWS mitigation
strategies and TS limits presented by the
licensee in the analysis in its LAR in
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attachment 4 (propriety) and attachment
5 (non-proprietary) demonstrate an
effective strategy to mitigate the
potential severity increase caused by
disabling some of the automatic
functions of the reactor protection
system so that there is no net increase
in the consequences of an ATWS during
the 30-day RRCS demolition period. The
NRC staff verified in the SE to the LAR
that the analysis demonstrates that the
consequences of the ATWS are not
increased with the associated
operational constraints included in the
temporary modifications to the limiting
conditions for operation (LCOs)
proposed in the associated LAR to this
exemption during the 30-day RRCS
demolition period. Based on a review of
the licensee’s analysis as documented in
the SE to the associated LAR to this
exemption, the NRC staff has
determined that the requested
temporary exemption, with the
licensee’s compliance with the TS
limiting conditions of operation
requested by the licensee in the LAR,
presents no undue risk to public health
and safety.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the
Common Defense and Security
The requested exemption does not
change safeguards and security
programs at Limerick. Constellation
stated those programs will remain in
full effect during the 30-day RRCS
demolition period exemption time
periods in calendar year 2027 for Unit
2 and in calendar year 2026 for Unit 1.
Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the
action is consistent with the common
defense and security.
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D. Special Circumstances
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
special circumstances are present when
application of the regulation in the
particular circumstances is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule. The underlying
purpose of 10 CFR 50.62 is that there are
systems available to operators to
sufficiently mitigate the consequences
of an ATWS event, that are reliable,
independent and diverse from the
reactor trip system. This is made clear
in 49 FR 26040 as it states ‘‘The
equipment required by this amendment
(10 CFR 50.62(c)) is for the purpose of
reducing the probability of unacceptable
consequences following anticipated
operational occurrences.’’ The systems
that are required by 10 CFR 50.62 at
BWRs are an alternative rod insertion
system, automatic SLCS, and automatic
reactor coolant recirculation pump trip
system.
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In 49 FR 26041, the Commission
provided that some operating nuclear
power plants licensed to operate prior to
August 22, 1969, may be granted a
permanent exemption from these
requirements if they can demonstrate
that their risk from an ATWS is
sufficiently low. The Commission
provided guidance for the factors that it
determined to be important to this such
as, power level, unique design features
that could prevent or mitigate the
consequences of an ATWS, or the
remaining plant lifetime. The
Commission has granted these
exemptions for plants licensed to
operate prior to 1969 based on the
finding that the risk from an ATWS is
sufficiently low and therefore was not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule for Haddam Neck
(55 FR 10124) and Yankee Nuclear
Power Station (53 FR 20704). While
Limerick Units 1 and 2 were licensed to
operate after August 22, 1969, they are
seeking a temporary, not a permanent
exemption from these requirements. The
NRC staff notes that this 30-day RRCS
demolition period is temporary in
nature, one time per unit, and that the
resulting RRCS modifications to
upgraded, digital systems will restore
permanent, full compliance with 10
CFR 50.62(c)(3)–(5) afterwards. This
temporary nature of the exemption
aligns with the factor the Commission
considered to be important to grant a
permanent exemption of ‘‘the remaining
plant lifetime.’’ In addition, the licensee
has proposed in the associated LAR to
impose operational controls including
restrictions on the power level of the
plant during the 30-day RRCS
demolition period, which in part is used
by the licensee in its analysis to
demonstrate that there is no net increase
in the severity of an ATWS. This aligns
with the factor of ‘‘power level’’
identified by the Commission as an
important factor in granting such an
exemption from the ATWS rules
because the power level of Limerick
Units 1 and 2 will be limited by the
plant’s TS during their respective 30day RRCS demolition period. Finally,
while the licensee has not identified any
unique design features at Limerick Units
1 and 2, it has proposed unique limiting
conditions of operations such as reactor
power less than or equal to 90% RTP,
all 14 SRVs operable, and suppression
pool water level greater than or equal to
23 feet. If suppression pool water level
is less than 23 feet, but greater than 22
feet, reactor power must be reduced to
less than 87%. If one SRV becomes out
of service reactor power must be further
reduced to less than or equal to 84%
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Sfmt 4703
RTP. If two SRVs become inoperable or
suppression pool water level drops
below 22 feet then LCO 3.3.4.1 would
apply, and the licensee would have one
hour to restore at least one ATWS
Recirculation Pump trip system to
operable status within one hour or place
the plant in Startup Mode within the
next six hours as required by Limerick
TS Action 3.3.4.1.e. The licensee has
demonstrated in its analysis that by
implementing these limiting conditions
for operations, results in no net increase
in the severity of an ATWS event.
Finally, while the rule requires
automatic systems, the licensee has
demonstrated that the relevant human
factors can sufficiently mitigate an
ATWS event in the analysis, as
documented by NRC staff in the SE to
the associated LAR. The NRC staff finds
that the relevant human factors are
appropriate for a temporary exemption
from the requirement for automatic
systems because the licensee has
demonstrated that the temporary
limiting conditions for operation
provide sufficient time margin in the
event of an ATWS for manual actuation
of these systems to provide the same
level of ATWS mitigation as the
automatic systems required by 10 CFR
50.62(c)(3)–(5), as evaluated by NRC
staff in the SE to the LAR associated
with this exemption. Therefore, the NRC
staff finds that the risk of an ATWS is
sufficiently low in support of this
temporary exemption request, using the
factors the Commission identified for
certain nuclear power plants, not
including Limerick Units 1 and 2, to be
granted permanent exemptions from the
ATWS requirements in 10 CFR 50.62(c).
Specific to the application of the rule
to Limerick, NRC staff notes that the
Limerick updated final safety analysis
report (UFSAR) and Tech Spec Bases
provides specific descriptions of each
system. As described in the UFSAR
Section 4.6.1.2.5.4 for Limerick, the
purpose of the alternative rod insertion
system as required by 10 CFR
50.62(c)(3) is to provide independent
solenoid valves to bleed air from the
scram valve pilot air header on low
water level or high dome pressure in the
reactor pressure vessel when detected
by the RRCS to increase the reliability
of control rod insertion. As described in
the UFSAR Section 9.3.5 and TS 3/4.1.5
and associated TS basis for Limerick,
the purpose of the automatic SLCS as
required by 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) is to
provide a backup capability for bringing
the reactor from full power to a cold,
Xenon-free shutdown, assuming that the
withdrawn control rods remain fixed in
the rated power pattern. As described in
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the UFSAR Section 7.1 and 7.6 and TS
3/4.3.4 and associated TS basis for
Limerick, the purpose of the automatic
reactor coolant recirculation pump trip
system as required by 10 CFR
50.62(c)(5) is to provide a means of
limiting the consequences of the
unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram
during an anticipated transient.
The NRC staff notes that for 10 CFR
50.62(c)(3), the specific application of
the rule over these temporary 30-day
exemption periods is not necessary to
achieve the purpose as stated in
Limerick’s UFSAR section 4.6.1.2.5.4
here because the compensatory actions
to manually start the SLCS will provide
the required negative reactivity to
mitigate the ATWS. For 10 CFR
50.62(c)(4)–(5), the NRC staff notes that
the licensee has demonstrated that the
reactor operator’s manual actuation of
these systems will be able to provide the
same level of ATWS mitigation as the
automatic systems during the 30-day
RRCS demolition period with the
associated limiting conditions for
operation, as evaluated by NRC staff in
Section 3.4 ‘‘Walkthroughs’’ in its SE to
the LAR associated with this exemption.
Therefore, the specific application for
automatic actuation of the systems
required by the rule over these
temporary 30-day exemption periods is
not necessary to achieve the purposes as
stated in Limerick’s UFSAR sections
9.3.5, and TS 3/4.1.5 for 10 CFR
50.62(c)(4) and as stated in Limerick’s
UFSAR Section 7.1, 7.6, and TS 3/4.3.4
for 10 CFR 50.62(c)(5).
Application of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3)–(5)
during 30-day RRCS demolition period
is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule as
Constellation stated that since the
provided analysis shows that when the
operational constraints of the lower
power limit, a higher number of
operable safety relief valves, an
additional non-credited automatic
action (recirculation pump runback),
and manual activation of the SLCS
system within a 5-minute time frame, an
ATWS condition can be successfully
mitigated using existing procedures.
The NRC staff’s independent review of
the analysis provided that the
comparable level of ATWS mitigation
protection to the required systems in 10
CFR 50.62(c)(3)–(5) can be achieved
with these proposed operational
constraints and that the mitigation
measures provide sufficient time margin
for an operator to respond to an ATWS
event in place of the required automatic
systems for the limited period of the 30day RRCS demolition period. Therefore,
the underlying purpose of 10 CFR
50.62(c)(3)–(5), including the specific
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underlying purposes of each system as
described in the Limerick UFSAR and
Tech Spec Bases, are achieved by the
licensee’s implementation of additional
ATWS mitigation strategies identified in
the LAR associated with this exemption
and compliance with the TS limiting
conditions of operations proposed in
LAR while the licensee turns off the
ACI, automatic SLCS, and automatic
RTP during the 30-day RRCS demolition
period. Accordingly, compliance with
the specific requirements of 10 CFR
50.62 is not necessary during the
proposed 30-day RRCS demolition
period to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule. The NRC staff finds
that special circumstances are present
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii).
Constellation also proposed that 10
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(vi) as additional special
circumstances that are applicable to the
exemption request. The NRC staff has
considered their applicability but found
that the circumstances discussed above
in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) were adequate
to address the necessity of special
circumstances for the exemption
request.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC’s approval of the exemption
to 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5)
belongs to a category of actions that the
NRC, by rule or regulation, has declared
to be a categorical exclusion, after first
finding that the category of actions does
not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded
from further environmental analysis
under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), the
issuance of an amendment to a license
for a reactor under part 50 or part 52
that changes a requirement or issuance
of an exemption from the requirement of
any regulation of 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that:
• The proposed action involves the
exemption from a requirement for the
use of a facility component located
within the restricted area, as defined in
10 CFR part 20;
• The exemption involves no
significant hazards consideration. The
basis for the NRC staff’s determination
is discussed in the no significant
hazards consideration published in the
Federal Register on October 27, 2023
(88 FR 73883);
• There is no significant change in
the types or significant increase in the
amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite. There are no additional
quantities nor changes in effluents
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
89055
proposed to be released based on the
proposed action;
• There is no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. All
manual actions are proposed to be
conducted from the main control room
and no local actions are required based
on information provided by
Constellation in its letter dated August
16, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML23228A094). The main control room
is shielded and staffed 24 hours a day
under normal circumstances;
Therefore, NRC staff has determined
that these exemptions are categorically
excluded from environmental review
pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), and
therefore no environmental assessment
or environmental impact statement
needs to be prepared in connection with
the proposed exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the NRC has determined
that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the
exemption is authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to public health
and safety, and is consistent with the
common defense and security. Special
circumstances are also present at
Limerick to justify the exemption.
Therefore, the NRC hereby grants
Constellation exemptions from all
requirements for ARI capability under
section 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3) and only
from the automatic response capability
of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) for SLCS and 10
CFR 50.62(c)(5) for RPT for a period of
30-days prior to the 2027 refueling
outage for Unit 2 and the 2026 refueling
outage for Unit 1 (also referred to by
Constellation as the 30-day RRCS
demolition period) while operating each
respective Unit in accordance with the
TS limiting conditions for operation and
the additional ATWS mitigation
strategies requested in the associated
LAR to this exemption request dated
February 17, 2023, as supplemented by
letters dated July 21, 2023, July 31,
2023, August 16, 2023, and May 28,
2024. The exemption is authorized by
law, will not present an undue risk to
the public health and safety, and is
consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special
circumstances are present. Therefore,
the Commission hereby grants
Constellation a one-time exemption
from 10 CFR part 50, section 50.62(c)(3)
and only the automatic response
capability of sections 50.62(c)(4) and
50.62(c)(5) during the 30-day RRCS
demolition period to support the
installation of the digital upgrade at
Limerick.
Dated: November 5, 2024.
E:\FR\FM\12NON1.SGM
12NON1
89056
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2024 / Notices
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Bo Pham,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2024–26075 Filed 11–8–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 72–26; NRC–2024–0185]
Pacific Gas and Electric Company;
Diablo Canyon Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation; Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is considering the
renewal of Special Nuclear Materials
(SNM) License No. SNM–2511 for the
Diablo Canyon (DC) Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) located
in San Luis Obispo County, California.
If approved, under the renewed license
SNM–2511, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (PG&E) will be able to
continue to operate the DC ISFSI for an
additional 40 years. The NRC staff has
prepared an environmental assessment
(EA) for this proposed license renewal
in accordance with its regulations.
Based on the EA, the NRC has
concluded that a finding of no
significant impact (FONSI) is
appropriate. Therefore, in accordance
with NRC regulations, preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS) is
not warranted for the proposed action.
The NRC staff also is conducting a
safety evaluation of the proposed
license renewal.
DATES: The EA and FONSI referenced in
this document are available on
November 12, 2024.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2024–0185 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2024–0185. Address
questions about Docket IDs to Stacy
Schumann; telephone: 301–415–0624;
email: Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:35 Nov 08, 2024
Jkt 265001
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at
301–415–4737, or by email to
PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS
accession number for each document
referenced in this document (if it is
available in ADAMS) is provided in the
‘‘Availability of Documents’’ section.
• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you
may examine and order copies of
publicly available documents, is open
by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please
send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov
or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415–
4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern
time (ET), Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Isaac Johnston, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–5649, email: Isaac.Johnston@
nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
The NRC is considering a request
from PG&E to renew license SNM–2511
for the DC specifically-licensed ISFSI
located in San Luis Obispo County,
California. PG&E is requesting to renew
license SNM–2511 for the DC ISFSI for
an additional 40-year period. The
current license expiration date was
March 22, 2024, and PG&E submitted
the license renewal application in
accordance with paragraphs 72.42(b)
and (c) of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR). Accordingly, the
license is in timely renewal. If
approved, PG&E would be able to
continue to possess and store spent
nuclear fuel at the DC ISFSI in
accordance with the requirements in 10
CFR part 72, ‘‘Licensing Requirements
for the Independent Storage of Spent
Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive
Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater than
Class C Waste’’ for an additional 40
years.
The NRC staff has prepared an EA as
part of its review of this license renewal
request in accordance with the
requirements of 10 CFR part 51,
‘‘Environmental Protection Regulations
for Domestic Licensing and Related
Regulatory Functions.’’ Based on the
PO 00000
Frm 00107
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
EA, the NRC staff has determined that
an EIS is not required for this proposed
action and a FONSI is appropriate. The
NRC staff is also conducting a safety
evaluation of the proposed license
renewal request pursuant to 10 CFR part
72 and the results will be documented
in a separate Safety Evaluation Report
(SER).
II. Summary of Environmental
Assessment
Description of the Proposed Action
The proposed action is the review and
approval, if appropriate, of PG&E’s
request to renew the SNM–2511 license
for the DC specifically-licensed ISFSI
for a 40-year period. The ISFSI consists
of storage pads, a cask transfer facility,
an onsite cask transporter, and the
Holtec International HI–STORMTM 100
dry cask storage system. License SNM–
2511 allows PG&E to use four different
multipurpose canisters (MPC), which
are part of HI–STORMTM 100 System, to
store the spent nuclear fuel from the
Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP).
Currently, only the MPC–32 is in use at
the DC ISFSI.
Purpose and Need for the Proposed
Action
The purpose and need for the
proposed action is to provide an option
for continued temporary dry storage of
spent nuclear fuel generated by
operations of two nuclear power
generating units (Units 1 and 2) at the
DCPP. This dry storage option would be
needed until an interim or a permanent
facility (or facilities) is available for
offsite disposition of the spent nuclear
fuel.
The DC ISFSI was constructed to store
spent nuclear fuel associated with DCPP
Units 1 and 2 through the current
operating licenses, which expire in
November 2024 and August 2025,
respectively. License SNM–2511
currently allows PG&E to store up to
4,400 spent nuclear fuel assemblies in
up to 140 HI–STORMTM 100SA
overpacks at the DC ISFSI. This is
sufficient space for all spent nuclear
fuel that would be generated by Units 1
and 2 through their current license
terms. However, this approved amount
of storage does not include any fuel that
would be generated by Units 1 and 2
beyond their current license terms. The
DCPP is currently in timely renewal and
would operate past the current license
term dates while the NRC considers
PG&E’s DCPP license renewal request.
Regardless of the NRC’s ultimate
decision on the DCPP license renewal
request, the storage capacity of the DC
ISFSI would not change unless PG&E
E:\FR\FM\12NON1.SGM
12NON1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 218 (Tuesday, November 12, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 89052-89056]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-26075]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-352; 50-353; NRC-2024-0194]
Constellation Energy Generation LLC; Limerick Generating Station,
Units 1 and 2; Exemption
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption in response to letter dated February 17, 2023, as
supplemented by letters dated July 21, 2023, July 31, 2023, August 16,
2023, and May 28, 2024. Constellation Energy Generation LLC
(Constellation, the licensee) has requested exemption from specific
requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated transients without
scram (ATWS) events for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants.
Constellation is the holder of the Renewed Facility Operating License
Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85, which authorize the operation of Limerick
Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 (Limerick).
DATES: This document was published in the Federal Register on November
12, 2024.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2024-0194 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2024-0194. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information
Contact section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Marshall, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-2871; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Constellation is the holder of the Renewed Facility Operating
License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85, which authorize the operation of
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The facilities consist of
boiling water reactors (BWRs) located in Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania and is located next to the Schuylkill River.
By letter dated February 17, 2023, as supplemented by letters dated
July 21, 2023, July 31, 2023, August 16, 2023, and May 28, 2024,
Constellation has requested exemption from specific requirements of
section 50.62 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
``Requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated transients
without scram (ATWS) events for light-water-cooled nuclear power
plants.'' A publicly available version of each letter is in ADAMS under
Accession Nos. ML23052A023, ML23202A219, ML23212B105, ML23228A094, and
ML24149A211, respectively. Constellation specifically requests an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3) and the automatic
activation requirements of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) and (c)(5) for a period
of 30 days before the calendar year 2027 refueling outage for Unit 2
and for a period of 30 days before the calendar year 2026 refueling
outage for Unit 1. In conjunction with this exemption request the
licensee submitted an associated license amendment request (ADAMS
Accession No. ML23052A023) to add operational constraints to the
limiting conditions of operations in the technical specifications (TSs)
for each Limerick unit to be in effect during each respective exemption
period to ensure that there is no increase in the potential
[[Page 89053]]
consequences of an ATWS. In the license amendment request, the licensee
also described additional ATWS mitigation strategies (i.e.,
compensatory measures) they will implement in addition to the TS
changes. Specifically, in Attachment 7 of the license amendment
request, the licensee stated, ``With the additional compensatory
measures being taken, the same level ATWS mitigation protection will be
achieved during the 30-day RRCS demolition period when the automatic
systems designed to meet compliance with 10 CFR 50.62 ATWS requirements
are out of service.''
II. Request/Action
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.62, the Commission's regulations establish
specific ATWS mitigation requirements for nuclear power plants, with
paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5) applicable to BWRs like Limerick
Units 1 and 2. The systems that are required are to be operational are
the alternate rod injection (ARI) system, the automatic activation of
the standby liquid control system (SLCS), and equipment to trip the
reactor coolant recirculation pumps automatically under conditions of
an ATWS. Constellation requested an exemption from all requirements for
ARI capability in 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3) and only from the automatic
response capability in 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) for SLCS and in 10 CFR
50.62(c)(5) recirculation pumps trip (RPT) for a period of 30-days
prior to the calendar year 2027 refueling outage for Unit 2 and the
calendar year 2026 refueling outage for Unit 1. During each 30-day
period prior to the refueling outage, referred to by Constellation as
the 30-day redundant reactivity control system (RRCS) demolition
period, Constellation will begin upgrading the RRCS by demolishing the
existing analog system and replacing it with a new digital system which
will be completed during the refueling outage. To support RRCS
demolition period, Constellation submitted a license amendment request
to temporarily modify certain TS limiting conditions for operation to:
(1) not require operability of certain automatic initiation features of
ATWS equipment that are in the scope of work being performed, and (2)
establish operating condition that ensure that there would be no
increase in the consequences of an ATWS event should one occur during
the 30-day RRCS demolition period. In addition, they also requested
that certain surveillance requirements related to the ATWS features
within the scope of work not be required during the RRCS demolition
period. The limiting condition for operation changes temporarily limit
the maximum reactor thermal power during the 30-day RRCS demolition
period based on combination of operating parameters. Specifically, the
maximum power at which the plant is limited based on the number of out
of safety relief valves, the ability to manually initiate SLCS within
five minutes, a minimum suppression pool water level, and the
operability of the reactor water level 3 recirculation runback system.
The operational constraints identified by Constellation for each
identified maximum thermal power limit are listed in the following
table.
Exemption's Operational Constraints for a Period of 30-Days
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum number of SRVs Manual initiation time Minimum suppression
Maximum reactor thermal power out of service for SLCS (minutes) pool water level (feet) Additional system credited
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
90%....................................... 0 5 23 Level 3 Recirculation Runback.
87%....................................... 0 5 22 Level 3 Recirculation Runback.
84%....................................... 1 5 22 Level 3 Recirculation Runback.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, as stated in their license amendment request, as
evaluated by NRC staff in the safety evaluation (SE) to the license
amendment request (LAR) to reduce the risk from a potential ATWS event
during the 30-day period, the licensee will implement additional ATWS
mitigation strategies to provide an equivalent level of ATWS protection
to their normal automatic ATWS mitigation capability.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemption from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: (1) the exemptions are
authorized by law, (2) will not present an undue risk to public health
or safety, (3) are consistent with the common defense and security; and
(4) when special circumstances are present, as defined in 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2). This exemption would allow Constellation to temporarily
disable the ARI, and the automatic activation of the SLCS and
recirculation pumps at Limerick so that digital upgrades can be made
leading up to the refueling outages of each unit.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, does not require any
specific systems to reduce the risk from ATWS events. These systems are
required by NRC regulation. The intent of the regulations requires
systems to mitigate the ATWS conditions, should they occur. The NRC
staff has determined that granting the exemption will not result in a
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, NRC
regulations, or any other laws. Therefore, the requested exemption is
authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents no Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
The NRC requires that an exemption demonstrate that it does not
present undue risk to public health and safety if it is granted.
Constellation provided an analysis that with the proposed systems
offline, the lower power limit, the manual activation of the SLCS and
the recirculation runback pumps, that the disabling of the ATWS
mitigation measures will not present undue risk to public health and
safety. The disabling of automatic ATWS mitigation systems for 30-days
potentially increases the severity of an ATWS event should it occur
within the window. An ATWS that is not successfully mitigated could
result in core damage due to excessive heat generation. ATWS events are
unlikely events that are expected to occur once or more during an
operating reactor's service life. The proposed changes to the reactor
systems do not change the likelihood of an ATWS event occurring. The
consequences of an ATWS can vary from a minor event that can be
addressed with the available protection systems, to more severe that
require more significant measures leading to a sudden shutting down of
a nuclear reactor, if necessary to protect the core from damage.
The proposed ATWS mitigation strategies and TS limits presented by
the licensee in the analysis in its LAR in
[[Page 89054]]
attachment 4 (propriety) and attachment 5 (non-proprietary) demonstrate
an effective strategy to mitigate the potential severity increase
caused by disabling some of the automatic functions of the reactor
protection system so that there is no net increase in the consequences
of an ATWS during the 30-day RRCS demolition period. The NRC staff
verified in the SE to the LAR that the analysis demonstrates that the
consequences of the ATWS are not increased with the associated
operational constraints included in the temporary modifications to the
limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) proposed in the associated LAR
to this exemption during the 30-day RRCS demolition period. Based on a
review of the licensee's analysis as documented in the SE to the
associated LAR to this exemption, the NRC staff has determined that the
requested temporary exemption, with the licensee's compliance with the
TS limiting conditions of operation requested by the licensee in the
LAR, presents no undue risk to public health and safety.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemption does not change safeguards and security
programs at Limerick. Constellation stated those programs will remain
in full effect during the 30-day RRCS demolition period exemption time
periods in calendar year 2027 for Unit 2 and in calendar year 2026 for
Unit 1. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the action is consistent
with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are
present when application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.62 is that there are systems
available to operators to sufficiently mitigate the consequences of an
ATWS event, that are reliable, independent and diverse from the reactor
trip system. This is made clear in 49 FR 26040 as it states ``The
equipment required by this amendment (10 CFR 50.62(c)) is for the
purpose of reducing the probability of unacceptable consequences
following anticipated operational occurrences.'' The systems that are
required by 10 CFR 50.62 at BWRs are an alternative rod insertion
system, automatic SLCS, and automatic reactor coolant recirculation
pump trip system.
In 49 FR 26041, the Commission provided that some operating nuclear
power plants licensed to operate prior to August 22, 1969, may be
granted a permanent exemption from these requirements if they can
demonstrate that their risk from an ATWS is sufficiently low. The
Commission provided guidance for the factors that it determined to be
important to this such as, power level, unique design features that
could prevent or mitigate the consequences of an ATWS, or the remaining
plant lifetime. The Commission has granted these exemptions for plants
licensed to operate prior to 1969 based on the finding that the risk
from an ATWS is sufficiently low and therefore was not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for Haddam Neck (55 FR
10124) and Yankee Nuclear Power Station (53 FR 20704). While Limerick
Units 1 and 2 were licensed to operate after August 22, 1969, they are
seeking a temporary, not a permanent exemption from these requirements.
The NRC staff notes that this 30-day RRCS demolition period is
temporary in nature, one time per unit, and that the resulting RRCS
modifications to upgraded, digital systems will restore permanent, full
compliance with 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3)-(5) afterwards. This temporary
nature of the exemption aligns with the factor the Commission
considered to be important to grant a permanent exemption of ``the
remaining plant lifetime.'' In addition, the licensee has proposed in
the associated LAR to impose operational controls including
restrictions on the power level of the plant during the 30-day RRCS
demolition period, which in part is used by the licensee in its
analysis to demonstrate that there is no net increase in the severity
of an ATWS. This aligns with the factor of ``power level'' identified
by the Commission as an important factor in granting such an exemption
from the ATWS rules because the power level of Limerick Units 1 and 2
will be limited by the plant's TS during their respective 30-day RRCS
demolition period. Finally, while the licensee has not identified any
unique design features at Limerick Units 1 and 2, it has proposed
unique limiting conditions of operations such as reactor power less
than or equal to 90% RTP, all 14 SRVs operable, and suppression pool
water level greater than or equal to 23 feet. If suppression pool water
level is less than 23 feet, but greater than 22 feet, reactor power
must be reduced to less than 87%. If one SRV becomes out of service
reactor power must be further reduced to less than or equal to 84% RTP.
If two SRVs become inoperable or suppression pool water level drops
below 22 feet then LCO 3.3.4.1 would apply, and the licensee would have
one hour to restore at least one ATWS Recirculation Pump trip system to
operable status within one hour or place the plant in Startup Mode
within the next six hours as required by Limerick TS Action 3.3.4.1.e.
The licensee has demonstrated in its analysis that by implementing
these limiting conditions for operations, results in no net increase in
the severity of an ATWS event. Finally, while the rule requires
automatic systems, the licensee has demonstrated that the relevant
human factors can sufficiently mitigate an ATWS event in the analysis,
as documented by NRC staff in the SE to the associated LAR. The NRC
staff finds that the relevant human factors are appropriate for a
temporary exemption from the requirement for automatic systems because
the licensee has demonstrated that the temporary limiting conditions
for operation provide sufficient time margin in the event of an ATWS
for manual actuation of these systems to provide the same level of ATWS
mitigation as the automatic systems required by 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3)-(5),
as evaluated by NRC staff in the SE to the LAR associated with this
exemption. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the risk of an ATWS is
sufficiently low in support of this temporary exemption request, using
the factors the Commission identified for certain nuclear power plants,
not including Limerick Units 1 and 2, to be granted permanent
exemptions from the ATWS requirements in 10 CFR 50.62(c).
Specific to the application of the rule to Limerick, NRC staff
notes that the Limerick updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR)
and Tech Spec Bases provides specific descriptions of each system. As
described in the UFSAR Section 4.6.1.2.5.4 for Limerick, the purpose of
the alternative rod insertion system as required by 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3)
is to provide independent solenoid valves to bleed air from the scram
valve pilot air header on low water level or high dome pressure in the
reactor pressure vessel when detected by the RRCS to increase the
reliability of control rod insertion. As described in the UFSAR Section
9.3.5 and TS 3/4.1.5 and associated TS basis for Limerick, the purpose
of the automatic SLCS as required by 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) is to provide a
backup capability for bringing the reactor from full power to a cold,
Xenon-free shutdown, assuming that the withdrawn control rods remain
fixed in the rated power pattern. As described in
[[Page 89055]]
the UFSAR Section 7.1 and 7.6 and TS 3/4.3.4 and associated TS basis
for Limerick, the purpose of the automatic reactor coolant
recirculation pump trip system as required by 10 CFR 50.62(c)(5) is to
provide a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence
of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient.
The NRC staff notes that for 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3), the specific
application of the rule over these temporary 30-day exemption periods
is not necessary to achieve the purpose as stated in Limerick's UFSAR
section 4.6.1.2.5.4 here because the compensatory actions to manually
start the SLCS will provide the required negative reactivity to
mitigate the ATWS. For 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4)-(5), the NRC staff notes that
the licensee has demonstrated that the reactor operator's manual
actuation of these systems will be able to provide the same level of
ATWS mitigation as the automatic systems during the 30-day RRCS
demolition period with the associated limiting conditions for
operation, as evaluated by NRC staff in Section 3.4 ``Walkthroughs'' in
its SE to the LAR associated with this exemption. Therefore, the
specific application for automatic actuation of the systems required by
the rule over these temporary 30-day exemption periods is not necessary
to achieve the purposes as stated in Limerick's UFSAR sections 9.3.5,
and TS 3/4.1.5 for 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) and as stated in Limerick's UFSAR
Section 7.1, 7.6, and TS 3/4.3.4 for 10 CFR 50.62(c)(5).
Application of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3)-(5) during 30-day RRCS demolition
period is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule
as Constellation stated that since the provided analysis shows that
when the operational constraints of the lower power limit, a higher
number of operable safety relief valves, an additional non-credited
automatic action (recirculation pump runback), and manual activation of
the SLCS system within a 5-minute time frame, an ATWS condition can be
successfully mitigated using existing procedures. The NRC staff's
independent review of the analysis provided that the comparable level
of ATWS mitigation protection to the required systems in 10 CFR
50.62(c)(3)-(5) can be achieved with these proposed operational
constraints and that the mitigation measures provide sufficient time
margin for an operator to respond to an ATWS event in place of the
required automatic systems for the limited period of the 30-day RRCS
demolition period. Therefore, the underlying purpose of 10 CFR
50.62(c)(3)-(5), including the specific underlying purposes of each
system as described in the Limerick UFSAR and Tech Spec Bases, are
achieved by the licensee's implementation of additional ATWS mitigation
strategies identified in the LAR associated with this exemption and
compliance with the TS limiting conditions of operations proposed in
LAR while the licensee turns off the ACI, automatic SLCS, and automatic
RTP during the 30-day RRCS demolition period. Accordingly, compliance
with the specific requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 is not necessary during
the proposed 30-day RRCS demolition period to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule. The NRC staff finds that special circumstances are
present pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii).
Constellation also proposed that 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(vi) as additional special circumstances that are applicable
to the exemption request. The NRC staff has considered their
applicability but found that the circumstances discussed above in 10
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) were adequate to address the necessity of special
circumstances for the exemption request.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of the exemption to 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3), (c)(4),
and (c)(5) belongs to a category of actions that the NRC, by rule or
regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after first
finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from further
environmental analysis under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), the issuance of an amendment to a license
for a reactor under part 50 or part 52 that changes a requirement or
issuance of an exemption from the requirement of any regulation of 10
CFR is a categorical exclusion provided that:
The proposed action involves the exemption from a
requirement for the use of a facility component located within the
restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR part 20;
The exemption involves no significant hazards
consideration. The basis for the NRC staff's determination is discussed
in the no significant hazards consideration published in the Federal
Register on October 27, 2023 (88 FR 73883);
There is no significant change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
There are no additional quantities nor changes in effluents proposed to
be released based on the proposed action;
There is no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. All manual
actions are proposed to be conducted from the main control room and no
local actions are required based on information provided by
Constellation in its letter dated August 16, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML23228A094). The main control room is shielded and staffed 24 hours a
day under normal circumstances;
Therefore, NRC staff has determined that these exemptions are
categorically excluded from environmental review pursuant to 10 CFR
51.22(c)(9), and therefore no environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement needs to be prepared in connection with the proposed
exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the NRC has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12,
the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to
public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and
security. Special circumstances are also present at Limerick to justify
the exemption. Therefore, the NRC hereby grants Constellation
exemptions from all requirements for ARI capability under section 10
CFR 50.62(c)(3) and only from the automatic response capability of 10
CFR 50.62(c)(4) for SLCS and 10 CFR 50.62(c)(5) for RPT for a period of
30-days prior to the 2027 refueling outage for Unit 2 and the 2026
refueling outage for Unit 1 (also referred to by Constellation as the
30-day RRCS demolition period) while operating each respective Unit in
accordance with the TS limiting conditions for operation and the
additional ATWS mitigation strategies requested in the associated LAR
to this exemption request dated February 17, 2023, as supplemented by
letters dated July 21, 2023, July 31, 2023, August 16, 2023, and May
28, 2024. The exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Constellation a one-time
exemption from 10 CFR part 50, section 50.62(c)(3) and only the
automatic response capability of sections 50.62(c)(4) and 50.62(c)(5)
during the 30-day RRCS demolition period to support the installation of
the digital upgrade at Limerick.
Dated: November 5, 2024.
[[Page 89056]]
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Bo Pham,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2024-26075 Filed 11-8-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P