Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 404/1 Kozhevnicheskiy Land, Moscow, Russia; Moscow, Russia; Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges, 78280-78283 [2024-21949]
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 25, 2024 / Notices
All comments will be available for
public inspection online at the Federal
eRulemaking Portal (https://
www.regulations.gov).
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Darren G. Kaihlanen, Acting Director,
Civil Rights Office, USDA/Rural
Development, 1400 Independence Ave.
SW, Washington, DC 20250, Cell Phone:
(405) 446–2619 (voice/text).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Title: 7 CFR 1901–E, Civil Rights
Compliance Requirements.
OMB Number: 0575–0018.
Expiration Date of Approval: January
31, 2025.
Type of Request: Extension of a
Currently Approved Information
Collection.
Abstract: The information collection
under OMB Number 0575–0018 enables
the RHS, RBS, and RUS, to effectively
monitor a recipient’s compliance with
the civil rights laws, and to determine
whether service and benefits are being
provided to beneficiaries on an equal
opportunity basis.
The RBS, RHS, and RUS are required
to provide Federal financial assistance
through its housing and community and
business programs on an equal
opportunity basis. The laws
implemented in 7 CFR part 1901,
subpart E, require the recipients of RBS,
RHS, and RUS Federal financial
assistance to collect various types of
information, including information on
participants in certain of these agencies’
programs, by race, color, and national
origin.
The information collected and
maintained by the recipients of certain
programs from RBS, RHS, and RUS is
used internally by these agencies for
monitoring compliance with the civil
rights laws and regulations. This
information is made available to USDA
officials, officials of other Federal
agencies, and to Congress for reporting
purposes. Without the required
information, RBS, RHS, RUS and its
recipients will lack the necessary
documentation to demonstrate that their
programs are being administered in a
nondiscriminatory manner, and in full
compliance with the civil rights laws. In
addition, the RBS, RHS, RUS and their
recipients would be vulnerable in
lawsuits alleging discrimination in the
affected programs of these agencies and
would be without appropriate data and
documentation to defend themselves by
demonstrating that services and benefits
are being provided to beneficiaries on
an equal opportunity basis.
Estimate of Burden: Public reporting
burden for this collection of information
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17:28 Sep 24, 2024
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is estimated to average 7.5 hours per
response.
Respondents: Recipients of RBS, RHS,
and RUS Federal financial assistance,
loan, and loan guarantee programs.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
27,000.
Estimated Number of Responses per
Respondent: 2.72.
Estimated Number of Responses:
73,559.
Estimated Total Annual Burden on
Respondents: 550,276.
Copies of this information collection
can be obtained from Crystal Pemberton,
Rural Development Innovation Center—
Regulations Management Division, at
(202) 202–260–8621. Email:
Crystal.Pemberton@usda.gov.
Comments are invited on:
(a) Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
Rural Development, including whether
the information will have practical
utility;
(b) the accuracy of the Agencies’
estimate of the burden of the proposed
collection of information including the
validity of the methodology and
assumptions used;
(c) ways to enhance the quality, utility
and clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(d) ways to minimize the burden of
the collection of information on those
who are to respond, including through
the use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.
Copies of this information collection
can be obtained from Crystal Pemberton,
Rural Development Innovation Center—
Regulations Management Division, at
(202) 260–8621. Email:
Crystal.Pemberton@usda.gov.
All responses to this notice will be
summarized and included in the request
for OMB approval. All comments will
also become a matter of public record.
Darren Kaihlanen,
Acting Civil Rights Director, Rural
Development.
[FR Doc. 2024–21922 Filed 9–24–24; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 404/1
Kozhevnicheskiy Land, Moscow,
Russia; Moscow, Russia; Order
Renewing Temporary Denial of Export
Privileges
Pursuant to section 766.24 of the
Export Administration Regulations, 15
CFR parts 730–774 (‘‘EAR’’ or ‘‘the
Regulations’’),1 I hereby grant the
request of the Office of Export
Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’) to renew the
temporary denial order (‘‘TDO’’) issued
in this matter on September 23, 2023. I
find that renewal of this order is
necessary in the public interest to
prevent an imminent violation of the
Regulations and that renewal for an
extended period is appropriate because
Azur Air (‘‘Azur’’) has engaged in a
pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or
continuous apparent violations of the
EAR.
I. Procedural History
On April 7, 2022, I signed an order
denying Azur export privileges for a
period of 180 days on the ground that
issuance of the order was necessary in
the public interest to prevent an
imminent violation of the Regulations.
The order was issued ex parte pursuant
to section 766.24(a) of the Regulations
and was effective upon issuance.2 The
temporary denial order was
subsequently renewed on October 3,
2022,3 March 29, 2023,4 and September
1 On August 13, 2018, the President signed into
law the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which
includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50
U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While section 1766 of
ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 2401 et seq.
(‘‘EAA’’), (except for three sections which are
inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides,
in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations,
and other forms of administrative action that were
made or issued under the EAA, including as
continued in effect pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s
date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue
in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action
undertaken pursuant to the authority provided
under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA
authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5).
2 The TDO was published in the Federal Register
on April 12, 2022 (87 FR 21614).
3 The October 3, 2022 renewal order was
published in the Federal Register on October 7,
2022 (87 FR 60983).
4 The March 29, 2023 renewal order was
published in the Federal Register on April 4, 2023
(88 FR 19908).
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23, 2023 5 in accordance with section
766.24(d) of the Regulations.6
On August 27, 2024, BIS, through
OEE, submitted a written request for a
fourth renewal of the TDO. The written
request was made more than 20 days
before the TDO’s scheduled expiration
and, given the temporary suspension of
international mail service to Russia,
OEE has attempted to deliver a copy of
the renewal request to Azur by
alternative means in accordance with
sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the
Regulations. No opposition to the
renewal of the TDO has been received.
II. Renewal of the TDO
A. Legal Standard
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Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may
issue an order temporarily denying a
respondent’s export privileges upon a
showing that the order is necessary in
the public interest to prevent an
‘‘imminent violation’’ of the
Regulations, or any order, license or
authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR
766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation
may be ‘imminent’ either in time or
degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR
766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that
a violation is about to occur, or that the
general circumstances of the matter
under investigation or case under
criminal or administrative charges
demonstrate a likelihood of future
violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of
future violations, BIS may show that the
violation under investigation or charge
‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than
technical or negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of
information establishing the precise
time a violation may occur does not
preclude a finding that a violation is
imminent, so long as there is sufficient
reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.’’ Id.
If BIS believes that renewal of a denial
order is necessary in the public interest
to prevent an imminent violation, it may
file a written request for renewal, with
any modifications if appropriate. 15
CFR 766.24(d)(1). The written request,
which must be filed no later than 20
days prior to the TDO’s expiration,
should set forth the basis for BIS’s belief
that renewal is necessary, including any
5 The September 23, 2023 renewal order was
published in the Federal Register on September 28,
2023 (88 FR 66805).
6 Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek
renewal of a temporary denial order for additional
180-day renewal periods if it believes that renewal
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an
imminent violation. In cases demonstrating a
pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous
apparent violations, BIS may request the renewal of
a temporary denial order for an additional period
not exceeding one year.
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additional or changed circumstances. Id.
‘‘In cases demonstrating a pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous
apparent violations, BIS may request the
renewal of a temporary denial order for
an additional period not exceeding one
year.’’ 7 Id.
B. The TDO and BIS’s Request for
Renewal
The U.S. Commerce Department,
through BIS, responded to the Russian
Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further
invasion of Ukraine by implementing a
sweeping series of stringent export
controls that severely restrict Russia’s
access to technologies and other items
that it needs to sustain its aggressive
military capabilities. These controls
primarily target Russia’s defense,
aerospace, and maritime sectors and are
intended to cut off Russia’s access to
vital technological inputs, atrophy key
sectors of its industrial base, and
undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to
exert influence on the world stage.
Effective February 24, 2022, BIS
imposed expansive controls on aviationrelated (e.g., Commerce Control List
Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia,
including a license requirement for the
export, reexport or transfer (in-country)
to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts
specified in Export Control
Classification Number (‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991
(section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).8 BIS
will review any export or reexport
license applications for such items
under a policy of denial. See section
746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS
excluded any aircraft registered in,
owned, or controlled by, or under
charter or lease by Russia or a national
of Russia from being eligible for license
exception Aircraft, Vessels, and
Spacecraft (‘‘AVS’’) (section 740.15 of
the EAR).9 Accordingly, any U.S.-origin
aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes
more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin
content, and that is registered in,
owned, or controlled by, or under
charter or lease by Russia or a national
of Russia, is subject to a license
requirement before it can travel to
Russia.
OEE’s request for renewal for a period
of one year is based upon the facts
underlying the issuance of the TDO and
the renewal orders subsequently issued
7 88
FR 59791 (Aug. 30, 2023).
FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS
published a final rule effective April 8, 2022 which
imposed licensing requirements on items controlled
on the Commerce Control List (‘‘CCL’’) under
Categories 0–2 that are destined for Russia or
Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require
export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses
if destined for or within Russia or Belarus. 87 FR
22130 (Apr. 14, 2022).
9 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022).
8 87
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78281
in this matter on October 3, 2022, March
29, 2023, and September 23, 2023, as
well as other evidence developed during
this investigation. This evidence
demonstrates that Azur has continued,
and continues, to act in blatant
disregard for U.S. export controls and
the terms of previously issued TDOs.
Specifically, the initial TDO, issued on
April 7, 2022, was based on evidence
that Azur engaged in conduct prohibited
by the Regulations by operating
multiple aircraft subject to the EAR and
classified under ECCN 9A991.b on
flights into Russia after March 2, 2022
from destinations including, but not
limited to, Nha Trang, Vietnam, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates (‘‘UAE’’), and
Antalya, Turkey, without the required
BIS authorization.10 Further evidence
indicated that Azur also operated
aircraft subject to the EAR on domestic
flights within Russia, potentially in
violation of section 736.2(b)(10) of the
Regulations.
As discussed in the prior renewal
orders, BIS presented evidence
indicating that, after the initial TDO
issued, Azur continued to operate
aircraft subject to the EAR and classified
under ECCN 9A991.b on flights both
into and out of Russia, in violation of
the Regulations and the TDO itself.11
The October 3, 2022 renewal order
detailed flights into and out of Russia
from/to Antalya, Turkey, Dalaman,
Turkey, and Bodrum, Turkey.12 The
March 29, 2023 order detailed flights
into and out of Russia from/to Sharm elSheikh, Egypt, Goa, India, Male,
Maldives, Rayong, Thailand, and
Adana, Turkey.13 Similarly, the
September 23, 2023 order detailed
flights into and out of Russia from/to
Hurghada, Egypt, Sharm el-Sheikh,
10 Publicly available flight tracking information
shows that on March 6, 2022, serial number (SN)
27612 flew from Nha Trang, Vietnam to Moscow,
Russia and on March 10, 2022, SN 27909 flew from
Dubai, UAE to Vladivostok, Russia. In addition, on
March 17, 2022, SN 21614 flew from Antalya,
Turkey to Kazan, Russia.
11 Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial
order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and
(k).
12 Publicly available flight tracking information
shows that SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to
Moscow, Russia on September 21, 2022. In
addition, on September 20, 2022, SN 26271 flew
from Bodrum, Turkey to Moscow, Russia and SN
30045 flew from Dalaman, Turkey to Yekaterinburg,
Russia.
13 Publicly available flight tracking information
shows that SN 29377 flew from Adana, Turkey to
Moscow, Russia on March 13, 2023 and from Sharm
el-Sheikh, Egypt to Moscow, Russia on March 14,
2023. In addition, SN 30045 flew from Goa, India
to Perm, Russia on March 3, 2023 and from Rayong,
Thailand to Kemerovo, Russia on March 6, 2023.
On February 18, 2023, SN 24947 flew from Male,
Maldives to Moscow, Russia.
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 25, 2024 / Notices
subject to the EAR and classified under
ECCN 9A991.b, both on flights into and
within Russia, in violation of the
September 23, 2023 renewal order and/
or the Regulations. Specifically, BIS’s
evidence and related investigation
demonstrates that Azur continues to
Egypt, Phuket, Thailand, Antalya
Turkey, and Dalaman, Turkey.14
Since that time, Azur has continued
to engage in conduct prohibited by the
applicable TDO and Regulations. In its
August 27, 2024 request for renewal of
the TDO, BIS submitted evidence that
Azur continues to operate aircraft
Tail No.
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RA–73071
RA–73071
RA–73071
RA–73071
RA–73071
RA–73075
RA–73075
RA–73075
RA–73075
RA–73075
RA–73077
RA–73077
RA–73077
RA–73077
RA–73077
RA–73079
RA–73079
RA–73079
RA–73079
RA–73079
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Serial No.
29377
29377
29377
29377
29377
26271
26271
26271
26271
26271
30045
30045
30045
30045
30045
24947
24947
24947
24947
24947
operate aircraft subject to the EAR,
including, but not limited to, on flights
into and out of Russia from/to
Hurghada, Egypt, Antalya, Turkey, and
Dalaman, Turkey. Information about
those flights includes, but is not limited
to, the following:
Aircraft type
Departure/arrival cities
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
757–2Q8 (B752) .................
767–3Y0 (ER) (B763) ........
767–3Y0 (ER) (B763) ........
767–3Y0 (ER) (B763) ........
767–3Y0 (ER) (B763) ........
767–3Y0 (ER) (B763) ........
Antalya, TR/Sochi, RU ..............................
Hurghada, EG/Samara, RU ......................
Antalya, TR/Perm, RU ..............................
Perm, RU/Antalya, TR ..............................
Hurghada, EG/Perm, RU ..........................
Perm, RU/Hurghada, EG ..........................
Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU .........................
Antalya, TR/Sochi, RU ..............................
Surgut, RU/Antalya, TR ............................
Hurghada, EG/Samara, RU ......................
Antalya, TR/Moscow RU ..........................
Sharm el-Sheikh, EG/Ufa, RU ..................
Antalya, TR/Astrakhan, RU ......................
Perm, RU/Hurghada, EG ..........................
Novosibirsk, RU/Moscow, RU ..................
Moscow, RU/Antalya, TR .........................
Dalaman, TR/Yekaterinburg, RU ..............
Moscow, RU/Antalya, TR .........................
Sharm el-Sheikh, EG/Kazan, RU .............
Dalaman, TR/Kazan, RU ..........................
Dates
September 13, 2024.
September 5, 2024.
August 14, 2024.
August 12, 2024.
August 2, 2024.
September 13, 2024.
September 10, 2024.
August 14, 2024.
August 9, 2024.
July 14, 2024.
September 11, 2024.
September 7, 2024.
August 31, 2024.
August 12, 2024.
July 2, 2024.
September 13, 2024.
September 3, 2024.
August 14, 2024.
August 13, 2024.
August 11, 2024.
IV. Order
It is therefore ordered:
First, Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport,
404/1 Kozhevnicheskiy Lane, Moscow,
Russia, when acting for or on their
behalf, any successors or assigns, agents,
or employees may not, directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any
transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter
collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’)
exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR,
or in any other activity subject to the
EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license (except directly related to
safety of flight), license exception, or
export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR except directly
related to safety of flight and authorized
by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of
the Regulations, or engaging in any
other activity subject to the EAR except
directly related to safety of flight and
authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the EAR, or from any
other activity subject to the EAR except
directly related to safety of flight and
authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly
or indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) to or on behalf of Azur any
item subject to the EAR except directly
related to safety of flight and authorized
by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of
the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
Azur of the ownership, possession, or
control of any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing
or other support activities related to a
transaction whereby Azur acquires or
attempts to acquire such ownership,
possession or control except directly
related to safety of flight and authorized
by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of
the Regulations;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from Azur of any item
subject to the EAR that has been
14 Publicly available flight tracking information
shows that SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to
Moscow, Russia on September 19, 2023 and from
Phuket, Thailand to Vladiovostok, Russia on August
15, 2023. In addition, SN 26271 flew from
Hurghada, Egypt to Moscow, Russia on August 31,
2023 and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to Perm, Russia
on September 20, 2023. On September 12, 2023, SN
24947 flew from Dalaman, Turkey to Yekaterinburg,
Russia.
III. Findings
Under the applicable standard set
forth in section 766.24 of the
Regulations and my review of the entire
record, I find that the evidence
presented by BIS convincingly
demonstrates that Azur has acted in
violation of the Regulations and the
TDO; that such violations have been
significant and deliberate; and that
given the foregoing and the nature of the
matters under investigation, there is a
likelihood of imminent violations.
Moreover, I find that renewal for an
extended period is appropriate because
Azur has engaged in a pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous
apparent violations of the EAR.
Therefore, renewal of the TDO for one
year is necessary in the public interest
to prevent imminent violation of the
Regulations and to give notice to
companies and individuals in the
United States and abroad that they
should avoid dealing with Azur, in
connection with export and reexport
transactions involving items subject to
the Regulations and in connection with
any other activity subject to the
Regulations.
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 25, 2024 / Notices
exported from the United States except
directly related to safety of flight and
authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
D. Obtain from Azur in the United
States any item subject to the EAR with
knowledge or reason to know that the
item will be, or is intended to be,
exported from the United States except
directly related to safety of flight and
authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by Azur, or
service any item, of whatever origin,
that is owned, possessed or controlled
by Azur if such service involves the use
of any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States except directly related to
safety of flight and authorized by BIS
pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the
Regulations. For purposes of this
paragraph, servicing means installation,
maintenance, repair, modification, or
testing.
Third, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
person, firm, corporation, or business
organization related to Azur by
ownership, control, position of
responsibility, affiliation, or other
connection in the conduct of trade or
business may also be made subject to
the provisions of this Order.
In accordance with the provisions of
sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Azur
may, at any time, appeal this Order by
filing a full written statement in support
of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South
Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–
4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
seek renewal of this Order by filing a
written request not later than 20 days
before the expiration date. A renewal
request may be opposed by Azur as
provided in section 766.24(d), by filing
a written submission with the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement, which must be received
not later than seven days before the
expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided
to Azur, and shall be published in the
Federal Register.
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21:17 Sep 24, 2024
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This Order is effective immediately
and shall remain in effect for one year.
Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2024–21949 Filed 9–24–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
PJSC Aeroflot, 1 Arbat St., 119019,
Moscow, Russia; Order Renewing
Temporary Denial of Export Privileges
Pursuant to section 766.24 of the
Export Administration Regulations, 15
CFR parts 730–774 (‘‘EAR’’ or ‘‘the
Regulations’’),1 I hereby grant the
request of the Office of Export
Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’) to renew the
temporary denial order (‘‘TDO’’) issued
in this matter on April 7, 2022. I find
that renewal of this order is necessary
in the public interest to prevent an
imminent violation of the Regulations
and that renewal for an extended period
is appropriate because PJSC Aeroflot
(‘‘Aeroflot’’) has engaged in a pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous
apparent violations of the EAR.
I. Procedural History
On April 7, 2022, I signed an order
denying Aeroflot export privileges for a
period of 180 days on the ground that
issuance of the order was necessary in
the public interest to prevent an
imminent violation of the Regulations.
The order was issued ex parte pursuant
to section 766.24(a) of the Regulations
and was effective upon issuance.2 The
temporary denial order was
subsequently renewed on October 3,
1 On August 13, 2018, the President signed into
law the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which
includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50
U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While section 1766 of
ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export
Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. sec. 2401 et seq.
(‘‘EAA’’), (except for three sections which are
inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides,
in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations,
and other forms of administrative action that were
made or issued under the EAA, including as
continued in effect pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq. (‘‘IEEPA’’), and were in effect as of ECRA’s
date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue
in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action
undertaken pursuant to the authority provided
under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA
authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5).
2 The TDO was published in the Federal Register
on April 12, 2022 (87 FR 21611).
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
78283
2022,3 March 29, 2023,4 and September
23, 2023 5 in accordance with section
766.24(d) of the Regulations.6
On August 27, 2024, BIS, through
OEE, submitted a written request for a
fourth renewal of the TDO. The written
request was made more than 20 days
before the TDO’s scheduled expiration
and, given the temporary suspension of
international mail service to Russia,
OEE has attempted to deliver a copy of
the renewal request to Aeroflot by
alternative means in accordance with
sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the
Regulations. No opposition to the
renewal of the TDO has been received.
II. Renewal of the TDO
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may
issue an order temporarily denying a
respondent’s export privileges upon a
showing that the order is necessary in
the public interest to prevent an
‘‘imminent violation’’ of the
Regulations, or any order, license or
authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR
766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation
may be ‘imminent’ either in time or
degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR
766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that
a violation is about to occur, or that the
general circumstances of the matter
under investigation or case under
criminal or administrative charges
demonstrate a likelihood of future
violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of
future violations, BIS may show that the
violation under investigation or charge
‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than
technical or negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of
information establishing the precise
time a violation may occur does not
preclude a finding that a violation is
imminent, so long as there is sufficient
reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.’’ Id.
If BIS believes that renewal of a denial
order is necessary in the public interest
to prevent an imminent violation, it may
file a written request for renewal, with
3 The October 3, 2022 renewal order, which was
effective upon issuance, was published in the
Federal Register on October 7, 2022 (87 FR 60985).
4 The March 29, 2023 renewal order, which was
also effective upon issuance, was published in the
Federal Register on April 3, 2023 (88 FR 19609).
5 The September 23, 2023 renewal order, which
was effective upon issuance, was published in the
Federal Register on September 28, 2023 (88 FR
66807).
6 Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek
renewal of a temporary denial order for additional
180-day renewal periods, if it believes that renewal
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an
imminent violation. In cases demonstrating a
pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous
apparent violations, BIS may request the renewal of
a temporary denial order for an additional period
not exceeding one year.
E:\FR\FM\25SEN1.SGM
25SEN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 186 (Wednesday, September 25, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78280-78283]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-21949]
=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 404/1 Kozhevnicheskiy Land, Moscow,
Russia; Moscow, Russia; Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export
Privileges
Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (``EAR'' or ``the Regulations''),\1\
I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement
(``OEE'') to renew the temporary denial order (``TDO'') issued in this
matter on September 23, 2023. I find that renewal of this order is
necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of
the Regulations and that renewal for an extended period is appropriate
because Azur Air (``Azur'') has engaged in a pattern of repeated,
ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C.
4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While section 1766 of ECRA repeals the
provisions of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. sec.
2401 et seq. (``EAA''), (except for three sections which are
inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent
part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of
administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA,
including as continued in effect pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (``IEEPA''),
and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018),
shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5)
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 50
U.S.C. 4820(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Procedural History
On April 7, 2022, I signed an order denying Azur export privileges
for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was
necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of
the Regulations. The order was issued ex parte pursuant to section
766.24(a) of the Regulations and was effective upon issuance.\2\ The
temporary denial order was subsequently renewed on October 3, 2022,\3\
March 29, 2023,\4\ and September
[[Page 78281]]
23, 2023 \5\ in accordance with section 766.24(d) of the
Regulations.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The TDO was published in the Federal Register on April 12,
2022 (87 FR 21614).
\3\ The October 3, 2022 renewal order was published in the
Federal Register on October 7, 2022 (87 FR 60983).
\4\ The March 29, 2023 renewal order was published in the
Federal Register on April 4, 2023 (88 FR 19908).
\5\ The September 23, 2023 renewal order was published in the
Federal Register on September 28, 2023 (88 FR 66805).
\6\ Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a
temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods if it
believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent
an imminent violation. In cases demonstrating a pattern of repeated,
ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may request the
renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional period not
exceeding one year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 27, 2024, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request
for a fourth renewal of the TDO. The written request was made more than
20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration and, given the temporary
suspension of international mail service to Russia, OEE has attempted
to deliver a copy of the renewal request to Azur by alternative means
in accordance with sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No
opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.
II. Renewal of the TDO
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent
violation'' of the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization
issued thereunder. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A violation may
be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.'' 15 CFR
766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to occur,
or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or
case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood
of future violations.'' Id. As to the likelihood of future violations,
BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge ``is
significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather
than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A ``lack of information
establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a
finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient
reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.'' Id.
If BIS believes that renewal of a denial order is necessary in the
public interest to prevent an imminent violation, it may file a written
request for renewal, with any modifications if appropriate. 15 CFR
766.24(d)(1). The written request, which must be filed no later than 20
days prior to the TDO's expiration, should set forth the basis for
BIS's belief that renewal is necessary, including any additional or
changed circumstances. Id. ``In cases demonstrating a pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may
request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional
period not exceeding one year.'' \7\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 88 FR 59791 (Aug. 30, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal
The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian
Federation's (``Russia's'') further invasion of Ukraine by implementing
a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict
Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to
sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily
target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are
intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs,
atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's
strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage. Effective
February 24, 2022, BIS imposed expansive controls on aviation-related
(e.g., Commerce Control List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia,
including a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer
(in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in
Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 9A991 (section
746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).\8\ BIS will review any export or reexport
license applications for such items under a policy of denial. See
section 746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS excluded any aircraft
registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by
Russia or a national of Russia from being eligible for license
exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (``AVS'') (section 740.15
of the EAR).\9\ Accordingly, any U.S.-origin aircraft or foreign
aircraft that includes more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin content,
and that is registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or
lease by Russia or a national of Russia, is subject to a license
requirement before it can travel to Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS published a
final rule effective April 8, 2022 which imposed licensing
requirements on items controlled on the Commerce Control List
(``CCL'') under Categories 0-2 that are destined for Russia or
Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require export, reexport,
and transfer (in-country) licenses if destined for or within Russia
or Belarus. 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022).
\9\ 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OEE's request for renewal for a period of one year is based upon
the facts underlying the issuance of the TDO and the renewal orders
subsequently issued in this matter on October 3, 2022, March 29, 2023,
and September 23, 2023, as well as other evidence developed during this
investigation. This evidence demonstrates that Azur has continued, and
continues, to act in blatant disregard for U.S. export controls and the
terms of previously issued TDOs. Specifically, the initial TDO, issued
on April 7, 2022, was based on evidence that Azur engaged in conduct
prohibited by the Regulations by operating multiple aircraft subject to
the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into Russia after
March 2, 2022 from destinations including, but not limited to, Nha
Trang, Vietnam, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (``UAE''), and Antalya,
Turkey, without the required BIS authorization.\10\ Further evidence
indicated that Azur also operated aircraft subject to the EAR on
domestic flights within Russia, potentially in violation of section
736.2(b)(10) of the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on March 6, 2022, serial number (SN) 27612 flew from Nha Trang,
Vietnam to Moscow, Russia and on March 10, 2022, SN 27909 flew from
Dubai, UAE to Vladivostok, Russia. In addition, on March 17, 2022,
SN 21614 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Kazan, Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in the prior renewal orders, BIS presented evidence
indicating that, after the initial TDO issued, Azur continued to
operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b
on flights both into and out of Russia, in violation of the Regulations
and the TDO itself.\11\ The October 3, 2022 renewal order detailed
flights into and out of Russia from/to Antalya, Turkey, Dalaman,
Turkey, and Bodrum, Turkey.\12\ The March 29, 2023 order detailed
flights into and out of Russia from/to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, Goa,
India, Male, Maldives, Rayong, Thailand, and Adana, Turkey.\13\
Similarly, the September 23, 2023 order detailed flights into and out
of Russia from/to Hurghada, Egypt, Sharm el-Sheikh,
[[Page 78282]]
Egypt, Phuket, Thailand, Antalya Turkey, and Dalaman, Turkey.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates
the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).
\12\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on September
21, 2022. In addition, on September 20, 2022, SN 26271 flew from
Bodrum, Turkey to Moscow, Russia and SN 30045 flew from Dalaman,
Turkey to Yekaterinburg, Russia.
\13\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
SN 29377 flew from Adana, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on March 13, 2023
and from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to Moscow, Russia on March 14, 2023.
In addition, SN 30045 flew from Goa, India to Perm, Russia on March
3, 2023 and from Rayong, Thailand to Kemerovo, Russia on March 6,
2023. On February 18, 2023, SN 24947 flew from Male, Maldives to
Moscow, Russia.
\14\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on September
19, 2023 and from Phuket, Thailand to Vladiovostok, Russia on August
15, 2023. In addition, SN 26271 flew from Hurghada, Egypt to Moscow,
Russia on August 31, 2023 and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to Perm, Russia
on September 20, 2023. On September 12, 2023, SN 24947 flew from
Dalaman, Turkey to Yekaterinburg, Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since that time, Azur has continued to engage in conduct prohibited
by the applicable TDO and Regulations. In its August 27, 2024 request
for renewal of the TDO, BIS submitted evidence that Azur continues to
operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b,
both on flights into and within Russia, in violation of the September
23, 2023 renewal order and/or the Regulations. Specifically, BIS's
evidence and related investigation demonstrates that Azur continues to
operate aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on
flights into and out of Russia from/to Hurghada, Egypt, Antalya,
Turkey, and Dalaman, Turkey. Information about those flights includes,
but is not limited to, the following:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Departure/
Tail No. Serial No. Aircraft type arrival cities Dates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ September 13, 2024.
Sochi, RU.
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Hurghada, EG/ September 5, 2024.
Samara, RU.
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ August 14, 2024.
Perm, RU.
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Perm, RU/ August 12, 2024.
Antalya, TR.
RA-73071...................... 29377 757-2Q8 (B752).. Hurghada, EG/ August 2, 2024.
Perm, RU.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Perm, RU/ September 13, 2024.
Hurghada, EG.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ September 10, 2024.
Moscow, RU.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ August 14, 2024.
Sochi, RU.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Surgut, RU/ August 9, 2024.
Antalya, TR.
RA-73075...................... 26271 757-2Q8 (B752).. Hurghada, EG/ July 14, 2024.
Samara, RU.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ September 11, 2024.
Moscow RU.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Sharm el-Sheikh, September 7, 2024.
EG/Ufa, RU.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Antalya, TR/ August 31, 2024.
Astrakhan, RU.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Perm, RU/ August 12, 2024.
Hurghada, EG.
RA-73077...................... 30045 757-2Q8 (B752).. Novosibirsk, RU/ July 2, 2024.
Moscow, RU.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Moscow, RU/ September 13, 2024.
(B763). Antalya, TR.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Dalaman, TR/ September 3, 2024.
(B763). Yekaterinburg,
RU.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Moscow, RU/ August 14, 2024.
(B763). Antalya, TR.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Sharm el-Sheikh, August 13, 2024.
(B763). EG/Kazan, RU.
RA-73079...................... 24947 767-3Y0 (ER) Dalaman, TR/ August 11, 2024.
(B763). Kazan, RU.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Findings
Under the applicable standard set forth in section 766.24 of the
Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the
evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that Azur has acted
in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that such violations have
been significant and deliberate; and that given the foregoing and the
nature of the matters under investigation, there is a likelihood of
imminent violations. Moreover, I find that renewal for an extended
period is appropriate because Azur has engaged in a pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.
Therefore, renewal of the TDO for one year is necessary in the public
interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to give
notice to companies and individuals in the United States and abroad
that they should avoid dealing with Azur, in connection with export and
reexport transactions involving items subject to the Regulations and in
connection with any other activity subject to the Regulations.
IV. Order
It is therefore ordered:
First, Azur Air, Sharypovo Airport, 404/1 Kozhevnicheskiy Lane,
Moscow, Russia, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or
assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly,
participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as
``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR
including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly
related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control
document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to
safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2)
of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the
EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS
pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly
related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of
Azur any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of
flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the
Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by Azur of the ownership, possession, or control of any
item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the
United States, including financing or other support activities related
to a transaction whereby Azur acquires or attempts to acquire such
ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of
flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the
Regulations;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from Azur of any item subject to the EAR that
has been
[[Page 78283]]
exported from the United States except directly related to safety of
flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the
Regulations;
D. Obtain from Azur in the United States any item subject to the
EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is
intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related
to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section
764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by Azur, or service any item, of
whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Azur if such
service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been
or will be exported from the United States except directly related to
safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2)
of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means
installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to Azur by ownership, control, position
of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of
trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this
Order.
In accordance with the provisions of sections 766.24(e) of the EAR,
Azur may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written
statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be
opposed by Azur as provided in section 766.24(d), by filing a written
submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before
the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided to Azur, and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
one year.
Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2024-21949 Filed 9-24-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P
