United States v. Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 66442-66452 [2024-18240]
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 158 / Thursday, August 15, 2024 / Notices
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
[Investigation No. 337–TA–1396]
Certain Medical Programmers With
Printed Circuit Boards, Components
Thereof, and Products and Systems for
Use With the Same; Notice of
Commission Determination Not To
Review an Initial Determination
Granting Complainants’ Motion To
Amend the Complaint and Notice of
Investigation
U.S. International Trade
Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
Notice is hereby given that
the U.S. International Trade
Commission has determined not to
review an initial determination (‘‘ID’’)
(Order No. 11) of the presiding
administrative law judge (‘‘ALJ’’)
granting complainants’ motion to amend
the complaint to correct a typographical
error on the cover page and the notice
of investigation (‘‘NOI’’) to change the
plain language description of the
accused products in the abovecaptioned investigation.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Richard P. Hadorn, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, U.S. International
Trade Commission, 500 E Street SW,
Washington, DC 20436, telephone (202)
205–3179. Copies of non-confidential
documents filed in connection with this
investigation may be viewed on the
Commission’s electronic docket (EDIS)
at https://edis.usitc.gov. For help
accessing EDIS, please email
EDIS3Help@usitc.gov. General
information concerning the Commission
may also be obtained by accessing its
internet server at https://www.usitc.gov.
Hearing-impaired persons are advised
that information on this matter can be
obtained by contacting the
Commission’s TDD terminal, telephone
(202) 205–1810.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Commission instituted this investigation
on April 3, 2024, based on a complaint
filed by Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic
Logistics, LLC, and Medtronic USA,
Inc., all of Minneapolis, Minnesota, and
Medtronic Puerto Rico Operations Co. of
Juncos, Puerto Rico (collectively,
‘‘Medtronic’’). 89 FR 23043–44 (Apr. 3,
2024). The complaint, as supplemented,
alleges violations of section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19
U.S.C. 1337, based on the importation
into the United States, the sale for
importation, and the sale within the
United States after importation of
certain medical programmers with
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SUMMARY:
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printed circuit boards, components
thereof, and products and systems for
use with the same by reason of the
infringement of certain claims of U.S.
Patent Nos. 8,712,540 and 9,174,059. Id.
at 23043. The complaint further alleges
that a domestic industry exists. Id. The
NOI named one respondent: Axonics,
Inc. (‘‘Axonics’’) of Irvine, California. Id.
at 23044. The Office of Unfair Import
Investigations (‘‘OUII’’) is also named as
a party. Id.
On June 25, 2024, Medtronic filed a
motion to amend the complaint and NOI
to (i) correct a typographical error on the
cover page of the complaint by
substituting ‘‘UNITED’’ in place of
‘‘MUNITED,’’ and (ii) change the NOI’s
plain language description of the
accused products—which presently
reads ‘‘sacral neuromodulation systems
to control neurostimulators surgically
implanted into a human patient,
incorporating medical programmers and
printed circuit boards used in same’’—
by substituting ‘‘components thereof,
and’’ in place of ‘‘incorporating.’’ On
July 5, 2024, Axonics filed a response to
the motion opposing the amendment to
the NOI, but not opposing the
amendment to the complaint. Also on
July 5, 2024, OUII filed a response in
support of the motion.
On July 11, 2024, the ALJ issued the
subject ID granting the motion. The ID
finds that, in accordance with
Commission Rule 210.14(b) (19 CFR
210.14(b)), good cause exists for
amending the complaint and NOI as
requested by Medtronic and neither the
parties nor the public interest will be
prejudiced. ID at 1, 3. No petitions for
review of the subject ID were filed.
The Commission has determined not
to review the subject ID. The complaint
is amended to substitute ‘‘UNITED’’ in
place of ‘‘MUNITED,’’ and the NOI is
amended so that the plain language
description of the accused products
reads ‘‘sacral neuromodulation systems
to control neurostimulators surgically
implanted into a human patient,
components thereof, and medical
programmers and printed circuit boards
used in same.’’
The Commission vote for this
determination took place on August 12,
2024.
The authority for the Commission’s
determination is contained in section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended (19 U.S.C. 1337), and in Part
210 of the Commission’s Rules of
Practice and Procedure (19 CFR Part
210).
By order of the Commission.
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Issued: August 12, 2024.
Lisa Barton,
Secretary to the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2024–18313 Filed 8–14–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States v. Legends Hospitality
Parent Holdings, LLC; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that a proposed
Final Judgment, Stipulation, and
Competitive Impact Statement have
been filed with the United States
District Court for the Southern District
of New York in United States of
America v. Legends Hospitality Parent
Holdings, LLC, Civil Action No. 1:24–
cv–05927–JPC (S.D.N.Y.). On August 5,
2024, the United States filed a
Complaint alleging that Legends
violated section 7A of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. 18a, also commonly known as
the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 (‘‘section
7A’’ or ‘‘HSR Act’’) in connection with
its proposed acquisition of ASM Global,
Inc. The Complaint alleges Legends
assumed unlawful control of ASM
Global, Inc. prior to the expiration of the
mandatory waiting period imposed by
the HSR Act, and that Legends was
continually in violation of the HSR Act
each day beginning at least on December
7, 2023, until the waiting period ended
on May 29, 2024.
The proposed Final Judgment, filed at
the same time as the Complaint,
requires Legends Hospitality to pay a
$3.5 million civil penalty for violation
of the HSR Act and bars recurrence of
the challenged conduct on penalty of
contempt. It additionally requires
Legends to appoint an antitrust
compliance officer at its expense, to
conduct compliance training, to certify
compliance with the Final Judgment, to
maintain a whistleblower protection
policy, and to provide the United States
inspection and interview rights to assess
compliance with the Final Judgment.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed
Final Judgment, and Competitive Impact
Statement are available for inspection
on the Antitrust Division’s website at
https://www.justice.gov/atr and at the
Office of the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the Southern District
of New York. Copies of these materials
may be obtained from the Antitrust
Division upon request and payment of
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the copying fee set by Department of
Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60
days of the date of this notice. Such
comments, including the name of the
submitter, and responses thereto, will be
posted on the Antitrust Division’s
website, filed with the Court, and, under
certain circumstances, published in the
Federal Register. Comments should be
submitted in English and directed to
Owen Kendler, Chief, Financial
Services, FinTech, and Banking Section,
Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530 (email address:
owen.kendler@usdoj.gov).
Suzanne Morris,
Deputy Director Civil Enforcement
Operations, Antitrust Division.
United States District Court Southern
District of New York
United States of America, Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street
NW, Washington, DC 20530, Plaintiff, v.
Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC, 61
Broadway, 24th Floor, New York, New York
10006, Defendant.
Case No. 1:24–cv–5927–JPC
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Complaint
The United States of America brings
this civil action to obtain equitable and
monetary relief in the form of civil
penalties against the Defendant,
Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings,
LLC (‘‘Legends’’) for violating the
premerger notification and waiting
period requirements of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976 (‘‘HSR Act’’), and alleges as
follows:
I. Introduction
1. The HSR Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, is an
essential part of modern antitrust
enforcement. It requires the buyer and
seller of voting securities or assets in
excess of a certain value to notify the
Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission prior to
consummating the acquisition, and to
observe a suspensory waiting period
after the notification is filed. A buyer
could ‘‘acquire’’ assets without taking
formal legal title, for instance by
exerting operational control over the
assets or otherwise obtaining ‘‘beneficial
ownership.’’ The HSR Act’s advance
notice and waiting period requirements
ensure that the parties to a proposed
transaction continue to operate
separately and independently during
review, preventing anticompetitive
acquisitions from harming consumers
before the United States has had the
opportunity to review them according to
the procedures established by Congress
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in the Clayton Act. A buyer that
prematurely takes beneficial ownership
of assets, sometimes referred to as ‘‘gun
jumping,’’ is subject to statutory
penalties for each day it is in violation.
II. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Interstate
Commerce
2. This Complaint is filed and these
proceedings are instituted under Section
7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a,
added by Title II of the HSR Act, to
recover civil penalties for violations of
that section and other relief.
3. This Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this action pursuant to
Section 7A(g) of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 18a(g), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1331, 1337(a), 1345 and 1355.
4. The Defendant has consented to
personal jurisdiction and venue in the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York for
purposes of this action.
5. Legends is engaged in commerce, or
in activities affecting commerce, within
the meaning of Section 7A(a)(1) of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(a)(1).
III. The Defendant
6. Defendant Legends is a global
venue services company headquartered
in New York, New York. It is majorityowned by Sixth Street Partners, its
minority owners include the New York
Yankees and the Dallas Cowboys, and it
has a strategic partnership with The
Kroenke Group. Legends focuses
predominantly on food and beverage
services, feasibility studies, project
development, and sales.
IV. Waiting Period Requirements of the
HSR Act
7. The HSR Act requires certain
acquiring persons, and certain persons
whose voting securities are acquired, to
file notifications with the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission
and to observe a waiting period before
consummating certain acquisitions of
voting securities or assets. 15 U.S.C. 18a
(a) and (b). Of relevance here, the notice
and waiting requirements apply if, as a
result of the acquisition, the acquiring
person will ‘‘hold’’ assets or voting
securities above the HSR Act’s size of
transaction threshold.
8. Pursuant to Section (d)(2) of the
HSR Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(d)(2), the
Federal Trade Commission promulgated
rules to carry out the purpose of the
HSR Act. 16 CFR 801–803.
9. Section 801. 1(c) of the HSR Rules,
16 CFR 801.1(c) defines ‘‘hold’’ to mean
‘‘beneficial ownership, whether direct,
or indirect through fiduciaries, agents,
controlled entities or other means.’’
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10. Section 7A(g)(1) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(g)(1), states that any
person, or any officer, director, or
partner thereof, who fails to comply
with any provision of the HSR Act is
liable to the United States for a civil
penalty for each day during which the
person is in violation. Pursuant to the
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act Improvements Act of
2015, Pub. L. 114–74, 701 (further
amending the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990), and
Federal Trade Commission Rule 1.98, 16
CFR 1.98, 89 FR 1,445 (Jan. 10, 2024),
the maximum amount of civil penalty
relevant to this Complaint is $51,744
per day.
V. The Acquisition and the Defendant’s
Unlawful Conduct
11. Legends and ASM Global, Inc.
(‘‘ASM’’) began acquisition discussions
in January 2023. ASM is a venue
services company primarily focused on
venue management, i.e. providing
services related to the day-to-day
operations of a venue like event
booking, operations, sanitation, and
security among other services. On
November 3, 2023, Legends agreed to
purchase ASM for $2.325 billion
(‘‘Acquisition’’). On November 6, 2023,
Legends filed its HSR notice with the
Department of Justice.
12. The Acquisition exceeded
thresholds established by the HSR Act
and did not qualify for any of the HSR
Act’s exemptions. Consequently, the
Acquisition was subject to the
premerger and notification requirements
of the HSR Act. The applicable waiting
period, which was extended by the
issuance of requests for additional
information on January 8, 2024, expired
on May 29, 2024.1 During this statutory
waiting period, the HSR Act 2 required
Legends and ASM to continue to
operate as separate and independent
entities while the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice conducted a
pre-consummation antitrust review of
the Acquisition. Legends, however,
failed to adhere to its statutory
obligation and assumed unlawful
control of ASM prior to the expiration
of the HSR waiting period.
13. In May 2023, Legends won the
right to manage a city-owned arena in
California upon the expiration of ASM’s
management lease on July 31, 2024.
ASM also competed for this
opportunity. As part of its bid for the
California arena, Legends submitted a
1 Legends and ASM agreed to not close the
Acquisition during the pendency of the Department
of Justice’s investigation.
2 Other antitrust laws also can apply to preclosing conduct of transaction parties.
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detailed transition plan that included
key milestone dates for booking,
operations, human resources,
engineering, sanitation, production,
security, event staffing and other
services. Absent the Acquisition,
Legends was planning to provide those
services itself to the arena.
14. Due to the Acquisition with ASM,
however, Legends decided to have ASM
provide those services instead. After
submitting its HSR filing, but before the
expiration of the HSR waiting period,
Legends decided that ASM would
continue to operate the California arena.
For example, on December 7, 2023,
Legends and ASM signed an initial
agreement whereby ASM would book
third-party events for the California
arena instead of Legends. Further, on
April 9, 2024, Legends decided that
ASM would continue providing venue
management services for the California
arena instead of transitioning the arena
to Legends.
15. The purpose and intent of
Legends’ pre-closing conduct in
connection with the California arena
also are informed by aspects of Legends’
course of conduct in connection with
ASM, including conduct before and
after submitting the HSR filing.
16. For example, while Legends and
ASM were in discussions around the
Acquisition, but before the HSR filing,
Legends sought to discuss competitive
bidding strategies with ASM. In August
2023, Legends learned that a city in
North Carolina was planning to issue an
RFP for management of an existing
entertainment complex, including an
arena and other venues. A senior
Legends executive emailed Legends’
then-CEO noting, ‘‘I assume we would
rather have ASM chase this?’’ The thenCEO informed another executive, ‘‘we
will find out if ASM is bidding as don’t
want to both be bidding,’’ and set a
calendar reminder for himself to speak
with a senior ASM executive about the
North Carolina RFP.
17. In addition, in early 2023, Legends
and ASM learned that a university was
planning to develop a new arena. Both
Legends and ASM initially took steps to
form separate, independent bids for the
new arena. However, after Legends and
ASM were in discussions around the
Acquisition, their posture changed, such
that in May 2023 they decided that they
would instead try to bid together. While
constructing their joint bid, Legends and
ASM exchanged competitively sensitive
information surrounding the arena
development project.
18. Legends and ASM engaged in
similar behavior for a different proposed
university arena. Prior to Acquisition
negotiations, Legends and ASM were
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pursuing independent actions to try to
win the development of the new arena.
This posture changed in 2024, when,
during the HSR waiting period, Legends
and ASM pursued plans to submit a
joint bid and exchange related
information.
VI. Violation of Section 7A of the
Clayton Act
19. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates
paragraphs 1 through 18 as if set forth
fully herein.
20. Legends’ acquisition of ASM was
subject to Section 7A premerger
notification and waiting-period
requirements.
21. Legends obtained beneficial
ownership of ASM prior to observing
the applicable waiting period in
violation of Section 7A.
22. Accordingly, Defendant was
continuously in violation of the
requirements of the HSR Act each day
beginning at least on December 7, 2023,
until the waiting period was terminated
on May 29, 2024.
VII. Request for Relief
Wherefore, Plaintiff requests:
(a) that the Court adjudge and decree
that Defendant violated the HSR Act
and was in violation during the period
of 175 days beginning on December 7,
2023, and ending on May 29, 2024;
(b) order that Defendant pay to the
United States an appropriate civil
penalty as provided by the HSR Act, 15
U.S.C. 18(a)(g)(1), the Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act
Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–
74, 701 (further amending the Federal
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment act
of 1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note), and 16
CFR 1.98(a);
(c) that the Court enjoin Defendant
from any future violations of the HSR
Act;
(d) that the Court award the Plaintiff
its costs of this suit; and,
(e) that the Court order such other and
further relief as the Court may deem just
and proper to redress and prevent
recurrence of the alleged violations and
to dissipate their anticompetitive
effects.
Dated this 5th day of August, 2024.
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff United States of America
Jonathan S. Kanter,
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.
Doha G. Mekki,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Antitrust.
Andrew J. Forman,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
Hetal J. Doshi,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
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Ryan Danks,
Director of Civil Enforcement.
Catherine K. Dick,
Acting Director of Litigation.
Owen M. Kendler,
Chief, Financial Services, Fintech & Banking
Section.
Meagan K. Bellshaw,
Assistant Chief, Financial Services, Fintech &
Banking Section.
Sarah H. Licht,
Assistant Chief, Financial Services, Fintech &
Banking Section.
lllllllllllllllllllll
Collier T. Kelley
Aseem Chipalkatti
Alex Cohen
William H. Jones II
Brittney Dimond
Michael G. Mclellan
Trial Attorneys
United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite
4000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone:
(202) 445–9737, Facsimile: (202) 514–7308,
Email: Collier.Kelley@usdoj.gov.
Attorneys for the United States
United States District Court Southern
District of New York
United States of America, Plaintiff, v.
Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:24–cv–5927
[Proposed] Final Judgment
Whereas, Plaintiff, United States of
America, filed its Complaint on August
5, 2024, alleging that Defendant Legends
Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC
violated Section 7A of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. 18a, commonly known as the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 (the ‘‘HartScott-Rodino Act’’);
And whereas, the United States and
Defendant have consented to the entry
of this Final Judgment without the
taking of testimony, without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law,
and without this Final Judgment
constituting any evidence against or
admission by any party relating to any
issue of fact or law;
And whereas, Defendant agrees to
undertake certain actions and refrain
from certain conduct for the purpose of
resolving the claims alleged in the
Complaint;
And whereas, Defendant represents
that the relief required by this Final
Judgment can and will be made and that
Defendant will not later raise a claim of
hardship or difficulty as grounds for
asking the Court to modify any
provision of this Final Judgment;
Now therefore, it is ordered, adjudged,
and decreed:
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I. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of and each of the parties
to this action. The Complaint states a
claim upon which relief may be granted
against Defendant under Section 7A of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a).
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II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ‘‘Legends’’ or ‘‘Defendant’’ means
Defendant Legends Hospitality Parent
Holdings, LLC, a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters in New York, New
York, its successors and assigns,
subsidiaries, divisions, groups,
partnerships, joint ventures, and
officers, managers, and employees. For
the avoidance of doubt: (1) ‘‘Legends’’
shall include ASM Global Parent, Inc.,
following its acquisition by Legends
Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC; and
(2) this provision applies only to
subsidiaries, partnerships, or joint
ventures in which Legends has a partial
(more than 50%) or total ownership or
control. Any ownership or control
interest held jointly by Legends and any
parent or owner of Legends shall be
attributed to Legends and aggregated
with Legends’ ownership or control.
B. ‘‘Agreement’’ means any
agreement, contract, or mutual
understanding, whether formal or
informal, written, or unwritten.
C. ‘‘Bid’’ or ‘‘Bidding’’ means any
offer or response to a Request for
Proposal, Request for Submission,
Request for Information, Request for
Qualifications, or any other similar
request, relating to a contract or other
arrangement (including extensions or
renewals of any existing contract or
other arrangement) to provide services
to an existing or potential venue.
D. ‘‘Collaboration Agreement’’ means
any Agreement by and among Defendant
and any Competitor to collaborate or
team in offering or providing Venue
Development Services or to act as the
Venue Manager. ‘‘Collaboration
Agreement’’ does not include
contracting for services where Legends
is acting as the agent of a client or acting
pursuant to a contract with a client.
E. ‘‘Communicate’’ or
‘‘Communicating’’ and
‘‘Communication(s)’’ means to provide,
send, discuss, circulate, exchange,
request, or solicit information, whether
directly or indirectly, and regardless of
the means by which it is accomplished,
including orally or by written or
recorded means of any kind, including
electronic communications, emails,
chats or other ephemeral messages,
facsimiles, telephone communications,
voicemails, text messages, audio
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recordings, meetings, interviews,
correspondence, exchange of written or
recorded information, face-to-face
meetings, or social media.
F. ‘‘Competitively Sensitive
Information’’ means any non-public
information of Defendant or any
Competitor, including information
relating to negotiating positions, tactics,
or strategy; pricing or pricing strategies;
Bids or Bidding strategies; intentions to
Bid or not to Bid; decisions to Bid;
whether a Bid was or was not
submitted; and costs, revenues, profits,
or margins.
G. ‘‘Competitor’’ means any Person
(other than Defendant) engaged in, or
that Defendant’s executives or senior
managers know is considering engaging
in, any of Defendant’s present or future
lines of business, including food and
beverage or hospitality services, venue
management, project management,
sponsorship, and/or sales of premium
seating.
H. ‘‘Covered Person’’ means: (i) any
employee or agent of Defendant whose
principal job responsibilities include
the sales, client outreach, or the
negotiation of terms or development of
f Bids or proposals for services to
Venues (other than employees or agents
whose responsibilities are entirely
clerical or limited to document
preparation); (ii) all General Managers of
any Venue managed by Defendant (iii)
Defendant’s Chief Executive Officer and
each of his or her direct reports; (iv)
members of Defendant’s Board of
Directors; and (v) designated Board
observers.
I. ‘‘Including’’ means including, but
not limited to.
J. ‘‘Negotiation and Interim Period’’
means the period between the
commencement of negotiations with
respect to an offer to enter into a
Transaction, and the date when
negotiations are abandoned or when any
resulting Transaction is consummated
or abandoned.
K. ‘‘Person’’ means any natural
person, corporation, company,
partnership, joint venture, firm,
association, sole proprietorship, agency,
board, authority, commission, office,
institution, university, municipality,
governmental entity, or other business
or legal entity, whether private or
governmental.
L. ‘‘Transaction’’ means any
Agreement to acquire any voting
securities, assets, or non-corporate
interests, form a joint venture, settle
litigation, or license intellectual
property with any Person where such
Agreement is reportable under the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976.
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M. ‘‘Venue’’ means a facility that
hosts publicly ticketed live events,
including stadiums, arenas, convention
centers, amphitheaters, clubs, and
theaters.
N. ‘‘Venue Development Services’’
means managing, investing, or financing
the development, construction, or
renovation of venues. ‘‘Venue
Development Services’’ does not
include feasibility or market studies.
O. ‘‘Venue Manager’’ means the
primary entity that manages a venue,
including by providing services
necessary to operate the venue, such as
administration, operations, concert and
live event booking, finance and
accounting, marketing, human
resources, housekeeping, security,
parking, and/or production services.
III. Applicability
This Final Judgment applies to
Defendant, as defined above, and all
other Persons in active concert or
participation with Defendant who
receive actual notice of this Final
Judgment.
IV. Civil Penalty Under Section 7A of
the Clayton Act
A. Within thirty (30) days of entry of
this Final Judgment, Defendant must
pay a civil penalty in the amount of
$3,500,000. Payment of the civil penalty
must be made by wire transfer of funds
or cashier’s check. Prior to making a
wire transfer, Defendant must contact
the Budget and Fiscal Section of the
Antitrust Division’s Executive Office at
ATR.EXO-Fiscal-Inquiries@usdoj.gov for
instructions. A payment made by
cashier’s check, must be made payable
to the United States Department of
Justice—Antitrust Division and
delivered to: Chief, Budget & Fiscal
Section Executive Office, Antitrust
Division United States Department of
Justice Liberty Square Building, 450 5th
Street NW, Room 3016, Washington, DC
20530.
B. In the event of a default or delay
in payment, interest at the rate of
eighteen (18) percent per annum will
accrue from the date of the default to the
date of payment.
V. Prohibited Conduct
A. Defendant may not, directly or
indirectly, during any Negotiation and
Interim Period of a Transaction or in
connection with an actual or potential
Collaboration Agreement:
1. Share Competitively Sensitive
Information with any Competitor;
2. Communicate with any Competitor
concerning any Competitively Sensitive
Information relating to a Bid or Bidding,
including whether to Bid or not to Bid;
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3. Agree with any Competitor to
participate in any joint Bid,
collaborative Bid, cooperative Bid, or
shared Bid for any contract,
opportunity, or arrangement or for a part
of any contract, opportunity, or
arrangement; or
4. Agree with any Competitor that
Defendant or any Competitor will not
Bid for any contract, opportunity, or
arrangement or for a part of any
contract, opportunity, or arrangement.
B. The prohibitions in Paragraph V.A.
apply to Defendant’s Communicating,
Agreeing, or sharing through any thirdparty agent or third-party consultant
working at Defendant’s instruction,
direction, or request.
Notwithstanding the foregoing,
nothing in this Final Judgment prohibits
Defendant from engaging in conduct in
Paragraphs V.A.1–4 above in connection
with a Collaboration Agreement if
Defendant first secures advice of
antitrust counsel and consults with the
Antitrust Compliance Officer, see infra
Section VI, and obtains advanced
written permission from Defendant’s
Chief Executive Officer or General
Counsel. For avoidance of doubt,
nothing in the Final Judgment,
including compliance with this
Paragraph V.C., precludes the United
States from investigating or, if
appropriate, bringing action against
Defendant or any other person for
violations of any antitrust law.
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VI. Required Conduct
A. Within ten (10) days of entry of
this Final Judgment, Defendant must
appoint or employ an Antitrust
Compliance Officer, and identify to the
United States the Antitrust Compliance
Officer’s name, business address,
telephone number, and email address.
Within forty-five (45) days of a vacancy
in Defendant’s Antitrust Compliance
Officer position, Defendant shall
appoint a replacement, and shall
identify to the United States the
Antitrust Compliance Officer’s name,
business address, telephone number,
and email address.
Defendant’s initial and replacement
appointment of an Antitrust Compliance
Officer is subject to the approval of the
United States in its sole discretion.
Defendant is responsible for all costs
and expenses related to the Antitrust
Compliance Officer.
B. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for
the first 120 days following entry of the
Final Judgment, Defendant may retain
outside counsel as an Antitrust
Compliance Officer, subject to the
approval of the United States in its sole
discretion.
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C. Unless otherwise agreed by the
United States, the Antitrust Compliance
Officer must have the following
minimum qualifications:
1. be an active member in good
standing of the bar in any U.S.
jurisdiction; and
2. at least five years’ experience in
legal matters, including at least five
years’ experience with antitrust matters.
D. Defendant may appoint or retain
one or more Reserve Antitrust
Compliance Officers meeting the
qualifications set forth in VI.C to
perform duties of the Antitrust
Compliance Officer when the Antitrust
Compliance Officer is not available.
Defendant’s initial and replacement
appointment of a Reserve Antitrust
Compliance Officer is subject to the
approval of the United States in its sole
discretion.
E. The Antitrust Compliance Officer
must, directly or through employees or
counsel working at the Antitrust
Compliance Officer’s direction:
1. within thirty (30) days of entry of
this Final Judgment, furnish to each
Covered Person a copy of this Final
Judgment, the Competitive Impact
Statement filed by the United States
with the Court, and an explanatory
cover letter prepared by Defendant
providing reasonable notice of the
meaning and requirements of this Final
Judgment, with notice provided to the
United States;
2. brief and distribute a copy of this
Final Judgment and the Competitive
Impact Statement to any Person who
succeeds to a position of a Covered
Person, and provide reasonable notice of
the meaning and requirements of this
Final Judgment and the antitrust laws,
within sixty (60) days of such
succession;
obtain from each Covered Person,
within thirty (30) days of that Person’s
receipt of this Final Judgment, a
certification that he or she (i) has read
and, to the best of his or her ability,
understands and agrees to abide by the
terms of this Final Judgment; (ii) is not
aware of any violation of this Final
Judgment that has not been reported to
the Antitrust Compliance Officer; and
(iii) understands that any Person’s
failure to comply with this Final
Judgment may result in an enforcement
action for civil or criminal contempt of
court against Defendant and/or any
Person who violates this Final
Judgment;
3. provide an Annual Antitrust
Compliance Training to all Covered
Persons and members of Defendant’s
Board of Directors on the meaning and
requirements of this Final Judgment, the
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antitrust laws, and guidelines
governing:
i. Sharing of Competitively Sensitive
Information with any Competitor;
ii. Communication with any
Competitor concerning any
Competitively Sensitive Information
relating to a Bid or Bidding, including
whether to Bid or not to Bid;
iii. Agreeing with any Competitor to
participate in any joint Bid,
collaborative Bid, cooperative Bid, or
shared Bid for any contract,
opportunity, or arrangement or for a part
of any contract, opportunity, or
arrangement; or
iv. Agreeing with any Competitor that
Defendant or any Competitor will not
Bid for any contract, opportunity, or
arrangement or for a part of any
contract, opportunity, or arrangement.
Successors to Covered Persons must
be provided an Annual Antitrust
Compliance Training within sixty (60)
days of such succession.
4. obtain from each Covered Person or
successor, within thirty (30) days of that
person’s Annual Antitrust Compliance
Training, a certification that he or she
(i) attended the training and reviewed
the training materials, and (ii) is not
aware of any violation of this Final
Judgment that has not been reported to
the Antitrust Compliance Officer;
5. maintain until four years following
the expiration of this Final Judgment
and furnish to the United States within
ten days if requested to do so:
i. a list identifying all employees
having received the notices and
compliance training required under
Paragraphs VI.E.2, VI.E.3, and VI.E.5,
and the dates on which the employees
received the notices and training;
ii. copies of all Annual Antitrust
Compliance Training materials; and
iii. copies of all certifications and
other materials required to be issued
under Paragraph VI.E;
iv. a record of certifications received
pursuant to this Section;
v. a copy of Defendant’s
whistleblower policy; and
vi. a record of all reports received
pursuant to Paragraph VI.F. and VI.G.
6. annually communicate to all
Covered Persons and all other
employees that they must disclose to the
Antitrust Compliance Officer, without
reprisal, information concerning any
potential violation of this Final
Judgment or the antitrust laws; and
7. by not later than ninety (90)
calendar days after entry of this Final
Judgment and annually thereafter, file
written reports with the United States
affirming that Defendant is in
compliance with its obligations under
this Final Judgment, including the
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training requirements under Paragraph
VI.E.5;
F. If an officer, director, or executive
of Defendant or a member of its Board
of Directors learns of a potential
violation of this Final Judgment or the
antitrust laws by Defendant, he or she
must promptly notify the Antitrust
Compliance Officer.
G. Immediately upon the Antitrust
Compliance Officer’s learning of any
violation or potential violation of any of
the terms of this Final Judgment or the
antitrust laws, Defendant must
investigate and, in the event of a
violation, must cease or modify the
activity to comply with this Final
Judgment and the antitrust laws.
Defendant must maintain all documents
as kept in the ordinary course discussed
with, provided to, reviewed, or
requested by the Antitrust Compliance
Officer in connection with any reported
violation or potential violation of this
Final Judgment or in connection with
any violation or potential violation of
the antitrust laws reported to the
Antitrust Compliance Officer pursuant
to Paragraph VI.F. for four years
following the expiration of this Final
Judgment.
H. Within thirty (30) calendar days of
the Antitrust Compliance Officer’s
learning of any potential violation of
any of the terms of this Final Judgment,
Defendant must file with the United
States a statement describing the
potential violation, including a
description of all steps taken by
Defendant to remedy the potential
violation.
I. Defendant must have its Chief
Executive Officer and its General
Counsel certify in writing to the United
States, no later than ninety (90) calendar
days after this Final Judgment is entered
and then annually on the anniversary of
the date of the entry of this Final
Judgment, that Defendant has complied
with the provisions of this Final
Judgment.
J. Defendant must maintain a
whistleblower protection policy that
provides any employee may disclose,
without reprisal or adverse
consequences for such disclosure, to the
Antitrust Compliance Officer
information concerning any violation or
potential violation by Defendant of this
Final Judgment or the antitrust laws.
VII. Compliance Inspection
A. For the purposes of determining or
securing compliance with this Final
Judgment or of any related orders such
as the Stipulation and Order, or of
determining whether this Final
Judgment should be modified or
vacated, upon written request of an
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17:25 Aug 14, 2024
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authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division, and reasonable
notice to Defendant, Defendant must
permit, from time to time and subject to
legally recognized privileges, authorized
representatives, including agents
retained by the United States:
1. to have access during Defendant’s
office hours to inspect and copy, or at
the option of the United States, to
require Defendant to provide electronic
copies of all books, ledgers, accounts,
records, data, and documents in the
possession, custody, or control of
Defendant relating to any matters
contained in this Final Judgment; and
2. to interview, either informally or on
the record, or depose Defendant’s
officers, employees, or agents, who may
have their individual counsel present,
relating to any matters contained in this
Final Judgment. The interviews must be
subject to the reasonable convenience of
the interviewee and without restraint or
interference by Defendant.
B. Upon the written request of an
authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division, Defendant must
submit written reports or respond to
written interrogatories, under oath if
requested, relating to any matters
contained in this Final Judgment.
VIII. Public Disclosure
A. No information or documents
obtained pursuant to any provision this
Final Judgment may be divulged by the
United States to any person other than
an authorized representative of the
executive branch of the United States,
except in the course of legal proceedings
to which the United States is a party,
including grand-jury proceedings, for
the purpose of securing compliance
with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
B. In the event of a request by a third
party, pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, for
disclosure of information obtained
pursuant to any provision of this Final
Judgment, the Antitrust Division will
act in accordance with that statute, and
the Department of Justice regulations at
28 CFR part 16, including the provision
on confidential commercial information,
at 28 CFR 16.7. Defendant submitting
information to the Antitrust Division
should designate the confidential
commercial information portions of all
applicable documents and information
under 28 CFR 16.7. Designations of
confidentiality expire 10 years after
submission, ‘‘unless the submitter
requests and provides justification for a
longer designation period.’’ See 28 CFR
16.7(b).
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66447
C. If at the time that Defendant
furnishes information or documents to
the United States pursuant to any
provision of this Final Judgment,
Defendant represents and identifies in
writing information or documents for
which a claim of protection may be
asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Defendant marks each pertinent page of
such material, ‘‘Subject to claim of
protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,’’ the
United States must give Defendant 10
calendar days’ notice before divulging
the material in any legal proceeding
(other than a grand jury proceeding).
IX. Retention of Jurisdiction
The Court retains jurisdiction to
enable any party to this Final Judgment
to apply to the Court at any time for
further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out or
construe this Final Judgment, to modify
any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of
its provisions.
X. Enforcement of Final Judgement
A. The United States retains and
reserves all rights to enforce the
provisions of this Final Judgment,
including the right to seek an order of
contempt from the Court. Defendant
agrees that in a civil contempt action, a
motion to show cause, or a similar
action brought by the United States
relating to an alleged violation of this
Final Judgment, the United States may
establish a violation of this Final
Judgment and the appropriateness of a
remedy therefor by a preponderance of
the evidence, and Defendant waives any
argument that a different standard of
proof should apply.
B. This Final Judgment should be
interpreted to give full effect to the
procompetitive purposes of the antitrust
laws, including Section 7A of the
Clayton Act, and to restore the
competition the United States alleges
was harmed by Defendant. Defendant
agrees that it may be held in contempt
of, and that the Court may enforce, any
provision of this Final Judgment that, as
interpreted by the Court in light of these
procompetitive principles and applying
ordinary tools of interpretation, is stated
specifically and in reasonable detail,
whether or not it is clear and
unambiguous on its face. In any such
interpretation, the terms of this Final
Judgment should not be construed
against either party as the drafter.
C. In an enforcement proceeding in
which the Court finds that Defendant
has violated this Final Judgment, the
United States may apply to the Court for
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an extension of this Final Judgment,
together with other relief that may be
appropriate. In connection with a
successful effort by the United States to
enforce this Final Judgment against
Defendant, whether litigated or resolved
before litigation, Defendant agrees to
reimburse the United States for the fees
and expenses of its attorneys, as well as
all other costs including experts’ fees,
incurred in connection with that effort
to enforce this Final Judgment,
including in the investigation of the
potential violation.
D. For a period of four years following
the expiration of this Final Judgment, if
the United States has evidence that
Defendant violated this Final Judgment
before it expired, the United States may
file an action against Defendant in this
Court requesting that the Court order:
(1) Defendant to comply with the
terms of this Final Judgment for an
additional term to be determined by the
Court; (2) all appropriate contempt
remedies; (3) additional relief needed to
ensure the Defendant complies with the
terms of this Final Judgment; and (4)
fees or expenses as called for by this
Section X.
XI. Expiration of Final Judgement
Unless the Court grants an extension,
this Final Judgment will expire seven
(7) years from the date of its entry if
Defendant has paid the civil penalty in
full, except that if Defendant is found to
violate this Final Judgment, either by
the Court or by stipulation of the
parties, the United States may move to
extend the Final Judgment.
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XII. Reservation of Rights
This Final Judgment addresses only
the claims stated in the Complaint
against Defendant, which solely alleges
violations of 7A of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. 18a). The United States reserves
all rights for any other claims against
the Defendant. This Final Judgment thus
does not in any way affect or address
any other charges or claims that may be
filed by the United States.
XIII. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the
public interest. The parties have
complied with the requirements of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16, including by making
available to the public copies of this
Final Judgment and the Competitive
Impact Statement, public comments
thereon, and any response to comments
by the United States. Based upon the
record before the Court, which includes
the Competitive Impact Statement and,
if applicable, any comments and
response to comments filed with the
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United States v. Morgan Stanley, 881 F.
Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
United States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F.
Date: llllllllllllllllllll Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007)
[Court approval subject to procedures of
United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F.
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15
Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. 2014)
U.S.C. 16]
Other Authorities
llllllllllllllllllll
119 Cong. Rec. 24, 598 (1973) (statement of
Hon. John P. Cronan,
Sen. Tunney)
United States District Judge.
Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in
the public interest.
United States District Court Southern
District of New York
United States of America, Plaintiff, v.
Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:24–cv–5927–JPC
Competitive Impact Statement
Table of Contents
I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE
PROCEEDING
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS GIVING
RISE TO THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
A. Background
B. Legends’ Alleged Unlawful Conduct
III. EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSED
FINAL JUDGMENT
A. Civil Penalty
B. Prohibited Conduct
C. Required Conduct
D. Enforcement of Final Judgment
IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO POTENTIAL
PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
V. PROCEDURES AVAILABLE FOR
MODIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED
FINAL JUDGMENT
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED
FINAL JUDGMENT
VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE
APPA FOR THE PROPOSED FINAL
JUDGMENT
VIII. DETERMINATIVE DOCUMENTS
Table of Authorities
Statutes
15 U.S.C. 15
15 U.S.C. 16
15 U.S.C. 18a
Cases
United States v. Abitibi-Consolidated Inc.,
584 F. Supp. 2d 162 (D.D.C. 2008)
United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc.,
963 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)
United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d
623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
United States v. ArcherDaniels-Midland Co.,
272 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003)
United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660
(9th Cir. 1981)
United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08–
1965, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787
(D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009)
United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 163
F.3d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1998)
United States v. Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F.
Supp. 3d 146, 152–53 (D.D.C. 2016)
United States v. Keyspan, 763 F. Supp. 2d
633, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d
1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
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In accordance with the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(b)–(h) (the ‘‘APPA’’ or ‘‘Tunney
Act’’), the United States of America files
this Competitive Impact Statement
related to the proposed Final Judgment
filed in this civil antitrust proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
On November 3, 2023, defendant
Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings,
LLC (‘‘Legends’’) announced it had
agreed to acquire ASM Global, Inc.
(‘‘ASM’’) for $2.35 billion
(‘‘Acquisition’’). The transaction
exceeded the thresholds established by
Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a, also commonly known as the
Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 (‘‘Section
7A’’ or ‘‘HSR Act’’), and therefore
required Legends and ASM to notify the
federal antitrust agencies of the
Acquisition and observe a waiting
period before Legends could take
control of ASM’s business. The HSR
Act 3 required Legends and ASM to
continue operating separately and
independently during the postnotification waiting period while the
Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice conducted a pre-consummation
antitrust review of the Acquisition. The
waiting period did not expire until May
29, 2024.4
Instead of preserving ASM as an
independent business, however, the
Complaint alleges that Legends engaged
in ‘‘gun-jumping’’ by assuming unlawful
control of ASM prior to the expiration
of the HSR waiting period, in violation
of 15 U.S.C. 18a, and that Legends was
continually in violation of the HSR Act
each day beginning at least on December
7, 2023, until the waiting period ended
on May 29, 2024.
The United States and the defendant
have reached a proposed settlement that
eliminates the need for a trial in this
case. To resolve the HSR Act violation,
the proposed Final Judgment requires
Legends to pay a civil penalty of $3.5
million. The proposed Final Judgment
also enjoins Legends from engaging in
certain behavior and requires Legends to
3 Other antitrust laws also can apply to preclosing conduct of transaction parties.
4 Legends and ASM agreed to not close the
Acquisition during the pendency of the Department
of Justice’s investigation.
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implement behavioral changes to deter
future HSR Act violations.
The United States and Legends have
stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered after
compliance with the APPA. Entry of the
proposed Final Judgment will terminate
this action, except that the Court will
retain jurisdiction to construe, modify,
or enforce the provisions of the
proposed Final Judgment and to punish
violations thereof.
II. Description of the Events Giving Rise
to the Alleged Violation
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A. Background
Legends is headquartered in New
York, New York and primarily focuses
on providing food and beverage
services, feasibility studies, project
development, and sales services to
venues. ASM, in turn, primarily
provides venue management services
(i.e. a bundle of related services
necessary to operate a venue) 5 to
venues that outsource management
responsibilities to a third party. While
Legends and ASM’s core offerings are
different, certain lines of business
overlap. Both Legends and ASM
conduct business throughout the United
States and globally.
Venue owners (or owners of planned
venues) often issue bid solicitations
when seeking vendors or managers to
develop, provide services to, or operate
the venue. Vendors (including ASM and
Legends) respond to these solicitations,
creating a competitive bidding process.
Depending on the nature of the
services solicited, vendors submitting
bids in response to an RFP or similar
solicitation may respond either
individually or as part of a team whose
members offer complementary products
necessary to fulfill the RFP. For
example, architects, developers, venue
managers and others may create a team
to provide a comprehensive response to
an RFP seeking both development and
management services. Competition
between individual firms or teams leads
to increased revenue, lower costs, and
higher quality services for venues.
B. Legends’ Alleged Unlawful Conduct
In May 2023, Legends won the rights
to provide venue management services
to a city-owned arena in California.
Legends’ work would begin after the
July 31, 2024, expiration of incumbent
ASM’s management lease. ASM also
competed for this opportunity. Legends’
5 Core venue management services include
concert and live event booking, finance and
accounting, marketing, human resources,
housekeeping, security, parking, event services,
production services, and technology services.
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winning bid contained a detailed
transition plan outlining key milestone
dates for tasks necessary to effectuate
the management shift. Absent the
Acquisition, Legends was planning to
provide those services itself to the
arena. Due to the Acquisition of ASM,
however, Legends decided to have ASM
provide those services instead. After
submitting its HSR filing, but before the
expiration of the HSR waiting period,
Legends decided that ASM would
continue to operate the California arena.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2023,
Legends and ASM signed an initial
agreement whereby ASM would book
third-party events for the arena. Further,
on April 9, 2024, Legends decided that
ASM would continue providing venue
management services for the California
arena instead of transitioning the arena
to Legends.
The purpose and intent of Legends’
pre-closing conduct in connection with
the California arena also are informed
by aspects of Legends’ course of conduct
in connection with ASM, including
conduct before and after submitting the
HSR filing.
For example, while Legends and ASM
were in discussions around the
Acquisition but before the HSR filing,
Legends sought to discuss competitive
bidding strategies with ASM. In August
2023, Legends learned that a city in
North Carolina was planning to issue an
RFP for management of an existing
entertainment complex, including an
arena and other venues. A senior
Legends executive emailed Legends’
then-CEO noting, ‘‘I assume we would
rather have ASM chase this?’’ The thenCEO informed another executive, ‘‘we
will find out if ASM is bidding as don’t
want to both be bidding,’’ and set a
calendar reminder for himself to speak
with a senior ASM executive about the
North Carolina RFP.
In addition, in early 2023, Legends
and ASM learned that a university was
planning to develop a new arena. Both
Legends and ASM initially took steps to
form separate independent bids for the
new arena. However, after Legends and
ASM were in discussions around the
Acquisition, their posture changed, such
that in May 2023 they decided that they
would instead try to bid together. While
constructing their joint bid, Legends and
ASM exchanged competitively sensitive
information surrounding the arena
development project.
Legends and ASM engaged in similar
behavior in 2024 for a different
proposed university arena. Prior to the
Acquisition negotiations, Legends and
ASM took independent actions to win
the development of the new arena. This
posture changed in 2024, when, during
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66449
the HSR waiting period, Legends and
ASM pursued plans to submit a joint
bid and exchange related information.
III. Explanation of the Proposed Final
Judgement
The relief required by the proposed
Final Judgment will appropriately
address the violation alleged in the
Complaint, penalize Legends, and deter
others from violating the HSR Act. The
proposed Final Judgment imposes a
civil penalty for violation of the HSR
Act and bars recurrence of the
challenged conduct on penalty of
contempt. It additionally requires
Legends to appoint an antitrust
compliance officer at its expense, to
conduct compliance training, to certify
compliance with the Final Judgment, to
maintain a whistleblower protection
policy, and to provide the United States
inspection and interview rights to assess
compliance with the Final Judgment.
A. Civil Penalty
Under Section 7A(g)(1) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(g)(1), any person who
fails to comply with the HSR Act is
liable to the United States for a civil
penalty of not more than $51,744 for
each day that person is in violation of
the act.6 The Complaint alleges that
defendant was in violation of the HSR
Act beginning at least on December 7,
2023, until the expiration of the
statutory waiting period on May 29,
2024. The United States accepted $3.5
million—an amount that is less than the
maximum penalty permitted under the
HSR Act—as an appropriate civil
penalty for settlement purposes. A
lower penalty is appropriate because of
Legends’ demonstrated willingness to
take corrective internal action and
because it is willing to resolve the
matter by the proposed Final Judgment,
thereby avoiding the risks and costs
associated with a prolonged
investigation and litigation.
B. Prohibited Conduct
Paragraphs V(A) & V(B) of the Final
Judgment are designed to prevent future
violations of the antitrust laws during a
pending transaction. Under these
provisions, Legends is prohibited from,
during any negotiation and interim
6 Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act
Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–74, 701
(further amending the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990), and Federal
Trade Commission Rule 1.98, 16 CFR 1.98, 89 FR
1,445 (Jan. 10, 2024) (increasing maximum penalty
to $51,744 per day).
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period 7 of a transaction 8 or in
connection with an actual or potential
collaboration agreement,9 and except as
otherwise permitted by the Final
Judgment:
• Sharing competitively sensitive
information with any competitor;
• Communicating with any
competitor concerning any
competitively sensitive information
relating to a bid or bidding, including
whether to bid or not to bid;
• Agreeing with any competitor to
participate in any joint bid,
collaborative bid, cooperative bid, or
shared bid for any contract, opportunity,
or arrangement or for a part of any
contract, opportunity, or arrangement;
or
• Agreeing with any competitor that
Legends or any competitor will not bid
for any contract, opportunity, or
arrangement or for a part of any
contract, opportunity, or arrangement.
Paragraphs V(A) & V(B) apply to
communicating, agreeing, or sharing
directly, indirectly, and through any
third-party agent or consultant working
at Legends’ instruction, direction, or
request.
Paragraph V(C) provides a limited
exception permitting Legends to engage
in the conduct prohibited by Paragraph
V(A) in connection with a collaboration
agreement, provided that Legends first
secures advice of antitrust counsel,
consults with the antitrust compliance
officer (see § III(C), infra), and obtains
advance written permission from its
CEO or General Counsel. Although
certain communications in connection
with a collaboration agreement may be
permissible under certain
circumstances, this internal review and
approval provision ensures that, in light
of Defendant’s conduct, it will not take
future actions that may reduce
competition without first conducting a
thorough antitrust review. Finally,
Paragraph V(C) explains that nothing in
the proposed Final Judgment precludes
the United States from investigating or,
if appropriate, bringing action against
Legends or anyone else for violating the
antitrust laws.
C. Required Conduct
Under Paragraphs VI(A)–VI(D) of the
proposed Final Judgment, Legends must
appoint or employ, at its expense, an
experienced antitrust lawyer to serve as
Legends’ antitrust compliance officer.
Legends will identify its proposed
antitrust compliance officer or any
replacement officer to the United States,
which will have sole discretion to
approve or disapprove the designation.
Paragraphs VI(E)–VI(H) outline the
antitrust compliance officer’s required
duties, which include providing all
covered persons 10 with copies of the
Final Judgment (as entered) and of this
Competitive Impact Statement; ensuring
that all covered persons receive training
on the requirements of the Final
Judgment and certify that they have
done so; filing written reports affirming
Legends’ compliance with the Final
Judgment; and disclosing to the United
States any violations of the Final
Judgment or of the antitrust laws and
the steps Legends took to remedy the
potential violation.
In addition, Paragraph VI(J) of the
Final Judgment obligates Legends to
maintain an antitrust whistleblower
program through which employees may
identify potential violations of the Final
Judgment or of the antitrust laws
without fear of reprisal.
To ensure compliance, Paragraph VI(I)
requires both Legends’ CEO and its
General Counsel to annually certify
Legends’ compliance with the Final
Judgment. Paragraph VII(A) grants
authorized personnel from the United
States the right to access Legends’ files
and interview its personnel upon
request.
D. Enforcement of Final Judgment
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7 ‘‘Negotiation
and Interim Period’’ means the
period between the commencement of negotiations
with respect to an offer to enter into a Transaction,
and the date when negotiations are abandoned or
when any resulting Transaction is consummated or
abandoned. Final Judgement, ¶ II(J).
8 ‘‘Transaction’’ means any Agreement to acquire
any voting securities, assets, or non-corporate
interests, form a joint venture, settle litigation, or
license intellectual property with any Person where
such Agreement is reportable under the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. Final
Judgement, ¶ II(L).
9 ‘‘Collaboration Agreement’’ means any
Agreement by and among Defendant and any
Competitor to collaborate or team in offering or
providing Venue Development Services or to act as
the Venue Manager. ‘‘Collaboration Agreement’’
does not include contracting for services where
Legends is acting as the agent of a client or acting
pursuant to a contract with a client. Final Judgment,
¶ II(D).
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The proposed Final Judgment also
contains provisions designed to make
enforcement of the Final Judgment as
effective as possible. Paragraph X(A)
provides that the United States retains
and reserves all rights to enforce the
10 Paragraph II(H) of the Final Judgment defines
covered persons as ‘‘(i) any employee or agent of
Defendant whose principal job responsibilities
include the sales, client outreach, or the negotiation
of terms or development of Bids or proposals for
services to Venues (other than employees or agents
whose responsibilities are entirely clerical or
limited to document preparation); (ii) all General
Managers of any Venue managed by Defendant (iii)
Defendant’s Chief Executive Officer and each of his
or her direct reports; (iv) members of Defendant’s
Board of Directors; and (v) designated Board
observers.’’
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Final Judgment, including the right to
seek an order of contempt from the
Court, and Section IX retains this
Court’s jurisdiction over any
enforcement proceedings. Under the
terms of Paragraph X(A), Legends has
agreed that, in any civil contempt
action, any motion to show cause, or
any similar action brought by the United
States regarding an alleged violation of
the Final Judgment, the United States
may establish the violation and the
appropriateness of any remedy by a
preponderance of the evidence and that
Legends has waived any argument that
a different standard of proof should
apply. This provision aligns the
standard for compliance with the Final
Judgment with the standard of proof
that applies to the underlying offense
that the Final Judgment addresses.
Paragraph X(D) entitles the United
States to file an enforcement action up
to four years after the expiration of the
Final Judgment (if, for example, the
United States discovers a violation after
the Final Judgment’s expiration). In
addition, to compensate American
taxpayers for any costs associated with
the investigation and enforcement of
violations of a proposed Final Judgment,
Paragraph X(C) obligates Legends to
reimburse the United States for any
attorneys’ fees, experts’ fees, or costs
incurred in connection with any
successful enforcement effort, including
enforcement efforts resolved before
litigation.
To further aid enforcement, Paragraph
X(B) underscores that the proposed
Final Judgment is intended to remedy
the loss of competition the United States
alleges was harmed by Legends’
conduct. Legends agrees that it will
abide by the proposed Final Judgment
and that it may be held in contempt of
the Court for failing to comply with any
provision of the proposed Final
Judgment that is stated specifically and
in reasonable detail, as interpreted in
light of this procompetitive purpose.
Finally, Section XI of the proposed
Final Judgment provides that the Final
Judgment will expire seven years from
the date of its entry if Legends has paid
the civil penalty in full, but also
authorizes the United States to move to
extend the Final Judgment’s term if
Legends is found by the Court to have
violated the Final Judgment (or
stipulates that it has done so).
IV. Remedies Available to Potential
Private Plaintiffs
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 15, provides that any person who
has been injured as a result of conduct
prohibited by the antitrust laws may
bring suit in federal court to recover
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three times the damages the person has
suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. Entry of the proposed
Final Judgment neither impairs nor
assists the bringing of any private
antitrust damage action. Under the
provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final
Judgment has no prima facie effect in
any subsequent private lawsuit that may
be brought against Defendant.
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V. Procedures Available for
Modification of the Proposed Final
Judgement
The United States and Legends have
stipulated that the proposed Final
Judgment may be entered by the Court
after compliance with the provisions of
the APPA, provided that the United
States has not withdrawn its consent.
See Stipulation and Proposed Order,
¶ II(A). The APPA conditions entry
upon the Court’s determination that the
proposed Final Judgment is in the
public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at
least 60 days preceding the effective
date of the proposed Final Judgment
within which any person may submit to
the United States written comments
regarding the proposed Final Judgment.
Any person who wishes to comment
should do so within 60 days of the date
of publication of this Competitive
Impact Statement in the Federal
Register, or within 60 days of the first
date of publication in a newspaper of
the summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement, whichever is later. All
comments received during this period
will be considered by the U.S.
Department of Justice, which remains
free to withdraw its consent to the
proposed Final Judgment at any time
before the Court’s entry of the Final
Judgment. The comments and the
response of the United States will be
filed with the Court. In addition, the
comments and the United States’
responses will be published in the
Federal Register unless the Court agrees
that the United States instead may
publish them on the U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division’s internet
website.
Written comments should be
submitted in English to: Owen M.
Kendler, Chief, Financial Services,
Fintech & Banking Section, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of
Justice, 450 Fifth St. NW, Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530.
Section IX of the proposed Final
Judgment provides that the Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, and that
the parties may apply to the Court for
any order necessary or appropriate for
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the modification, interpretation, or
enforcement of the Final Judgment.
VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final
Judgment
As an alternative to the proposed
Final Judgment, the United States
considered a full trial on the merits
involving the alleged HSR Act violation
against Defendant. The United States is
satisfied, however, that the relief
required by the proposed Final
Judgment is important and meaningful
while also avoiding the time, expense,
and uncertainty of a full trial on the
merits.
VII. Standard of Review Under the
APPA for the Proposed Final Judgement
Under the Clayton Act and APPA,
proposed Final Judgments, or ‘‘consent
decrees,’’ in antitrust cases brought by
the United States are subject to a 60-day
comment period, after which the Court
shall determine whether entry of the
proposed Final Judgment ‘‘is in the
public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1); see
also United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach.
Corp., 163 F.3d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1998).
In making that determination, the Court,
in accordance with the statute as
amended in 2004, is required to
consider:
(A) the competitive impact of such
judgment, including termination of alleged
violations, provisions for enforcement and
modification, duration of relief sought,
anticipated effects of alternative remedies
actually considered, whether its terms are
ambiguous, and any other competitive
considerations bearing upon the adequacy of
such judgment that the court deems
necessary to a determination of whether the
consent judgment is in the public interest;
and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment
upon competition in the relevant market or
markets, upon the public generally and
individuals alleging specific injury from the
violations set forth in the complaint
including consideration of the public benefit,
if any, to be derived from a determination of
the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B); see
generally United States v. Keyspan, 763
F. Supp. 2d 633, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(discussing Tunney Act standards). In
considering these statutory factors, the
Court’s inquiry is necessarily a limited
one as the government is entitled to
‘‘broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the
public interest.’’ United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461
(D.C. Cir. 1995); accord United States v.
Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp.
235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Bleznak, 153 F.3d 16
(2d Cir. 1998) (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d
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66451
at 1460); Keyspan, 763 F. Supp. 2d at
637 (same).
Under the APPA a court considers,
among other things, the relationship
between the remedy secured and the
specific allegations set forth in the
government’s complaint, whether the
decree is sufficiently clear, whether
enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively
harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458–62. With respect to the
adequacy of the relief secured by the
decree, ‘‘ ‘[t]he Court’s function is not to
determine whether the proposed
[d]ecree results in the balance of rights
and liabilities that is the one that will
best serve society, but only to ensure
that the resulting settlement is ‘within
the reaches of the public interest.’ ’ ’’
United States v. Morgan Stanley, 881 F.
Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citing Alex. Brown & Sons, 963 F.
Supp. at 238) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis in original). In
making this determination, ‘‘ ‘[t]he
[c]ourt is not permitted to reject the
proposed remedies merely because the
court believes other remedies are
preferable. [Rather], the relevant inquiry
is whether there is a factual foundation
for the government’s decisions such that
its conclusions regarding the proposed
settlement are reasonable.’ ’’ Morgan
Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (citing
United States v. Abitibi-Consolidated
Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (D.D.C.
2008)); see also United States v. Apple,
Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 (S.D.N.Y.
2012); Alex. Brown & Sons, 963 F. Supp.
at 238.11 The government’s predictions
about the efficacy of its remedies are
entitled to deference. Apple, 889 F.
Supp. 2d at 631 (citation omitted);
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the
need for courts to be ‘‘deferential to the
government’s predictions as to the effect
of the proposed remedies’’); United
States v. ArcherDaniels-Midland Co.,
272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003)
(noting that the court should grant due
respect to the United States’ prediction
as to the effect of proposed remedies, its
perception of the market structure, and
its views of the nature of the case);
United States v. Iron Mountain, Inc.,
217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 152–53 (D.D.C.
2016) (‘‘In evaluating objections to
settlement agreements under the
11 See also United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648
F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981) (‘‘The balancing of
competing social and political interests affected by
a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in
the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney
General.’’); see generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461
(discussing whether ‘‘the remedies [obtained in the
decree are] so inconsonant with the allegations
charged as to fall outside of the ‘reaches of the
public interest’ ’’).
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Tunney Act, a court must be mindful
that [t]he government need not prove
that the settlements will perfectly
remedy the alleged antitrust harms[;] it
need only provide a factual basis for
concluding that the settlements are
reasonably adequate remedies for the
alleged harms.’’) (internal quotations
omitted).
‘‘[A] proposed decree must be
approved even if it falls short of the
remedy the court would impose on its
own, as long as it falls within the range
of acceptability or is ‘within the reaches
of public interest.’ ’’ United States v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,
151 (D.D.C. 1982); Apple, 889 F. Supp.
2d at 637 n.10; see also United States v.
U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d
69, 74 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that room
must be made for the government to
grant concessions in the negotiation
process for settlements) (citing
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461); Morgan
Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 568
(approving the consent decree even
though the court may have imposed a
greater remedy). To meet this standard,
‘‘it is necessary only that the
submissions provide an ample ‘factual
foundation for the government’s
decisions such that its conclusions
regarding the proposed settlement are
reasonable.’ ’’ Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at
639 (citing Keyspan, 763 F. Supp. 2d at
637–38).
Moreover, a court’s role under the
APPA is limited to reviewing the
remedy in relationship to the violations
that the United States has alleged in its
Complaint and the APPA does not
authorize a court to ‘‘construct [its] own
hypothetical case and then evaluate the
decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459; see also Morgan Stanley,
881 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (‘‘A court must
limit its review to the issues in the
complaint and give ‘due respect to the
[Government’s] perception of . . . its
case.’ ’’) (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d at
1461); United States v. InBev N.V./S.A.,
No. 08–1965, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84787, at *20 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009)
(‘‘[T]he ‘public interest’ is not to be
measured by comparing the violations
alleged in the complaint against those
the court believes could have, or even
should have, been alleged.’’). Because
the ‘‘court’s authority to review the
decree depends entirely on the
government’s exercising its
prosecutorial discretion by bringing a
case in the first place,’’ it follows that
‘‘the court is only authorized to review
the decree itself,’’ and not to ‘‘effectively
redraft the complaint’’ to inquire into
other matters that the United States did
not pursue. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459–
60. Courts cannot look beyond the
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complaint in making the public interest
determination unless the complaint
underlying the decree is drafted so
narrowly such that its entry would
appear ‘‘ ‘to make a mockery of judicial
power.’ ’’ Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 631
(citing United States v. SBC Commc’ns,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C.
2007)).
In its 2004 amendments to the APPA,
Congress made clear its intent to
preserve the practical benefits of
utilizing consent decrees in antitrust
enforcement, adding the unambiguous
instruction that ‘‘[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to require the
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
or to require the court to permit anyone
to intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see
also Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 633
(declining to hold evidentiary hearing
and finding ‘‘[a] hearing would serve
only to delay the proceedings
unnecessarily.’’); U.S. Airways, 38 F.
Supp. 3d at 75 (indicating that a court
is not required to hold an evidentiary
hearing or to permit intervenors as part
of its review under the Tunney Act).
The language wrote into the statute
what Congress intended when it enacted
the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator
Tunney explained: ‘‘[t]he court is
nowhere compelled to go to trial or to
engage in extended proceedings which
might have the effect of vitiating the
benefits of prompt and less costly
settlement through the consent decree
process.’’ 119 Cong. Rec. 24, 598 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Tunney). Rather, the
procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of
the court, with the recognition that the
court’s ‘‘scope of review remains
sharply proscribed by precedent and the
nature of Tunney Act proceedings.’’
SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11;
see also Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 632
(‘‘[P]rosecutorial functions vested solely
in the executive branch could be
undermined by the improper use of the
APPA as an antitrust oversight
provision.’’) (citation omitted). A court
can make its public interest
determination based on the competitive
impact statement and response to public
comments alone. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d
at 633; U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at
75.
Collier T. Kelley
Meagan K. Bellshaw
Michael G. McLellan
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, 450 5th St. NW, Suite 4000,
Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202)
445–9737, Email: Collier.Kelley@usdoj.gov.
[FR Doc. 2024–18240 Filed 8–14–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–11–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Agency Information Collection
Activities; Submission for OMB
Review; Comment Request;
Respiratory Protection Program at
Coal Mines
Notice of availability; request
for comments.
ACTION:
The Department of Labor
(DOL) is submitting this Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA)sponsored information collection
request (ICR) to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA). Public comments on the ICR are
invited.
DATES: The OMB will consider all
written comments that the agency
receives on or before September 16,
2024.
SUMMARY:
Written comments and
recommendations for the proposed
information collection should be sent
within 30 days of publication of this
notice to www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAMain. Find this particular
information collection by selecting
‘‘Currently under 30-day Review—Open
for Public Comments’’ or by using the
search function.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael Howell by telephone at 202–
693–6782, or by email at DOL_PRA_
PUBLIC@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
purpose of this information collection is
to collect four types of information from
coal mine operators: revised standard
operating procedures (SOPs), American
Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) recordkeeping, fit test records,
and emergency respirator inspection
records. The mine operator uses the
VIII. Determinative Documents
information to properly issue
There are no determinative materials
respiratory protection to coal miners
or documents within the meaning of the
who need to use personal protective
APPA that were considered by the
equipment where accepted engineering
United States in formulating the
controls measures have not been
proposed Final Judgment.
developed or when necessary, by the
Dated: August 9, 2024
nature of work involved (for example,
Respectfully submitted,
while establishing controls or
llllllllllllllllllll occasional entry into hazardous
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ADDRESSES:
E:\FR\FM\15AUN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 158 (Thursday, August 15, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66442-66452]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-18240]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States v. Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC;
Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment,
Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
United States of America v. Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC,
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-05927-JPC (S.D.N.Y.). On August 5, 2024, the
United States filed a Complaint alleging that Legends violated section
7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, also commonly known as the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (``section 7A'' or
``HSR Act'') in connection with its proposed acquisition of ASM Global,
Inc. The Complaint alleges Legends assumed unlawful control of ASM
Global, Inc. prior to the expiration of the mandatory waiting period
imposed by the HSR Act, and that Legends was continually in violation
of the HSR Act each day beginning at least on December 7, 2023, until
the waiting period ended on May 29, 2024.
The proposed Final Judgment, filed at the same time as the
Complaint, requires Legends Hospitality to pay a $3.5 million civil
penalty for violation of the HSR Act and bars recurrence of the
challenged conduct on penalty of contempt. It additionally requires
Legends to appoint an antitrust compliance officer at its expense, to
conduct compliance training, to certify compliance with the Final
Judgment, to maintain a whistleblower protection policy, and to provide
the United States inspection and interview rights to assess compliance
with the Final Judgment.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection on the Antitrust
Division's website at https://www.justice.gov/atr and at the Office of
the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. Copies of these materials may be obtained from the
Antitrust Division upon request and payment of
[[Page 66443]]
the copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this
notice. Such comments, including the name of the submitter, and
responses thereto, will be posted on the Antitrust Division's website,
filed with the Court, and, under certain circumstances, published in
the Federal Register. Comments should be submitted in English and
directed to Owen Kendler, Chief, Financial Services, FinTech, and
Banking Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 450 Fifth
Street NW, Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530 (email address:
[email protected]).
Suzanne Morris,
Deputy Director Civil Enforcement Operations, Antitrust Division.
United States District Court Southern District of New York
United States of America, Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, 450 Fifth Street NW, Washington, DC 20530, Plaintiff, v.
Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC, 61 Broadway, 24\th\ Floor,
New York, New York 10006, Defendant.
Case No. 1:24-cv-5927-JPC
Complaint
The United States of America brings this civil action to obtain
equitable and monetary relief in the form of civil penalties against
the Defendant, Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC (``Legends'')
for violating the premerger notification and waiting period
requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976 (``HSR Act''), and alleges as follows:
I. Introduction
1. The HSR Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, is an essential part of modern
antitrust enforcement. It requires the buyer and seller of voting
securities or assets in excess of a certain value to notify the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission prior to
consummating the acquisition, and to observe a suspensory waiting
period after the notification is filed. A buyer could ``acquire''
assets without taking formal legal title, for instance by exerting
operational control over the assets or otherwise obtaining ``beneficial
ownership.'' The HSR Act's advance notice and waiting period
requirements ensure that the parties to a proposed transaction continue
to operate separately and independently during review, preventing
anticompetitive acquisitions from harming consumers before the United
States has had the opportunity to review them according to the
procedures established by Congress in the Clayton Act. A buyer that
prematurely takes beneficial ownership of assets, sometimes referred to
as ``gun jumping,'' is subject to statutory penalties for each day it
is in violation.
II. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Interstate Commerce
2. This Complaint is filed and these proceedings are instituted
under Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, added by Title II
of the HSR Act, to recover civil penalties for violations of that
section and other relief.
3. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
action pursuant to Section 7A(g) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(g),
and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a), 1345 and 1355.
4. The Defendant has consented to personal jurisdiction and venue
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York for purposes of this action.
5. Legends is engaged in commerce, or in activities affecting
commerce, within the meaning of Section 7A(a)(1) of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 18a(a)(1).
III. The Defendant
6. Defendant Legends is a global venue services company
headquartered in New York, New York. It is majority-owned by Sixth
Street Partners, its minority owners include the New York Yankees and
the Dallas Cowboys, and it has a strategic partnership with The Kroenke
Group. Legends focuses predominantly on food and beverage services,
feasibility studies, project development, and sales.
IV. Waiting Period Requirements of the HSR Act
7. The HSR Act requires certain acquiring persons, and certain
persons whose voting securities are acquired, to file notifications
with the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission and to
observe a waiting period before consummating certain acquisitions of
voting securities or assets. 15 U.S.C. 18a (a) and (b). Of relevance
here, the notice and waiting requirements apply if, as a result of the
acquisition, the acquiring person will ``hold'' assets or voting
securities above the HSR Act's size of transaction threshold.
8. Pursuant to Section (d)(2) of the HSR Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(d)(2),
the Federal Trade Commission promulgated rules to carry out the purpose
of the HSR Act. 16 CFR 801-803.
9. Section 801. 1(c) of the HSR Rules, 16 CFR 801.1(c) defines
``hold'' to mean ``beneficial ownership, whether direct, or indirect
through fiduciaries, agents, controlled entities or other means.''
10. Section 7A(g)(1) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(g)(1),
states that any person, or any officer, director, or partner thereof,
who fails to comply with any provision of the HSR Act is liable to the
United States for a civil penalty for each day during which the person
is in violation. Pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74, 701 (further
amending the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990),
and Federal Trade Commission Rule 1.98, 16 CFR 1.98, 89 FR 1,445 (Jan.
10, 2024), the maximum amount of civil penalty relevant to this
Complaint is $51,744 per day.
V. The Acquisition and the Defendant's Unlawful Conduct
11. Legends and ASM Global, Inc. (``ASM'') began acquisition
discussions in January 2023. ASM is a venue services company primarily
focused on venue management, i.e. providing services related to the
day-to-day operations of a venue like event booking, operations,
sanitation, and security among other services. On November 3, 2023,
Legends agreed to purchase ASM for $2.325 billion (``Acquisition''). On
November 6, 2023, Legends filed its HSR notice with the Department of
Justice.
12. The Acquisition exceeded thresholds established by the HSR Act
and did not qualify for any of the HSR Act's exemptions. Consequently,
the Acquisition was subject to the premerger and notification
requirements of the HSR Act. The applicable waiting period, which was
extended by the issuance of requests for additional information on
January 8, 2024, expired on May 29, 2024.\1\ During this statutory
waiting period, the HSR Act \2\ required Legends and ASM to continue to
operate as separate and independent entities while the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice conducted a pre-consummation
antitrust review of the Acquisition. Legends, however, failed to adhere
to its statutory obligation and assumed unlawful control of ASM prior
to the expiration of the HSR waiting period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Legends and ASM agreed to not close the Acquisition during
the pendency of the Department of Justice's investigation.
\2\ Other antitrust laws also can apply to pre-closing conduct
of transaction parties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. In May 2023, Legends won the right to manage a city-owned arena
in California upon the expiration of ASM's management lease on July 31,
2024. ASM also competed for this opportunity. As part of its bid for
the California arena, Legends submitted a
[[Page 66444]]
detailed transition plan that included key milestone dates for booking,
operations, human resources, engineering, sanitation, production,
security, event staffing and other services. Absent the Acquisition,
Legends was planning to provide those services itself to the arena.
14. Due to the Acquisition with ASM, however, Legends decided to
have ASM provide those services instead. After submitting its HSR
filing, but before the expiration of the HSR waiting period, Legends
decided that ASM would continue to operate the California arena. For
example, on December 7, 2023, Legends and ASM signed an initial
agreement whereby ASM would book third-party events for the California
arena instead of Legends. Further, on April 9, 2024, Legends decided
that ASM would continue providing venue management services for the
California arena instead of transitioning the arena to Legends.
15. The purpose and intent of Legends' pre-closing conduct in
connection with the California arena also are informed by aspects of
Legends' course of conduct in connection with ASM, including conduct
before and after submitting the HSR filing.
16. For example, while Legends and ASM were in discussions around
the Acquisition, but before the HSR filing, Legends sought to discuss
competitive bidding strategies with ASM. In August 2023, Legends
learned that a city in North Carolina was planning to issue an RFP for
management of an existing entertainment complex, including an arena and
other venues. A senior Legends executive emailed Legends' then-CEO
noting, ``I assume we would rather have ASM chase this?'' The then-CEO
informed another executive, ``we will find out if ASM is bidding as
don't want to both be bidding,'' and set a calendar reminder for
himself to speak with a senior ASM executive about the North Carolina
RFP.
17. In addition, in early 2023, Legends and ASM learned that a
university was planning to develop a new arena. Both Legends and ASM
initially took steps to form separate, independent bids for the new
arena. However, after Legends and ASM were in discussions around the
Acquisition, their posture changed, such that in May 2023 they decided
that they would instead try to bid together. While constructing their
joint bid, Legends and ASM exchanged competitively sensitive
information surrounding the arena development project.
18. Legends and ASM engaged in similar behavior for a different
proposed university arena. Prior to Acquisition negotiations, Legends
and ASM were pursuing independent actions to try to win the development
of the new arena. This posture changed in 2024, when, during the HSR
waiting period, Legends and ASM pursued plans to submit a joint bid and
exchange related information.
VI. Violation of Section 7A of the Clayton Act
19. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 18 as
if set forth fully herein.
20. Legends' acquisition of ASM was subject to Section 7A premerger
notification and waiting-period requirements.
21. Legends obtained beneficial ownership of ASM prior to observing
the applicable waiting period in violation of Section 7A.
22. Accordingly, Defendant was continuously in violation of the
requirements of the HSR Act each day beginning at least on December 7,
2023, until the waiting period was terminated on May 29, 2024.
VII. Request for Relief
Wherefore, Plaintiff requests:
(a) that the Court adjudge and decree that Defendant violated the
HSR Act and was in violation during the period of 175 days beginning on
December 7, 2023, and ending on May 29, 2024;
(b) order that Defendant pay to the United States an appropriate
civil penalty as provided by the HSR Act, 15 U.S.C. 18(a)(g)(1), the
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of
2015, Pub. L. 114-74, 701 (further amending the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note), and 16 CFR
1.98(a);
(c) that the Court enjoin Defendant from any future violations of
the HSR Act;
(d) that the Court award the Plaintiff its costs of this suit; and,
(e) that the Court order such other and further relief as the Court
may deem just and proper to redress and prevent recurrence of the
alleged violations and to dissipate their anticompetitive effects.
Dated this 5th day of August, 2024.
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff United States of America
Jonathan S. Kanter,
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.
Doha G. Mekki,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.
Andrew J. Forman,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
Hetal J. Doshi,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
Ryan Danks,
Director of Civil Enforcement.
Catherine K. Dick,
Acting Director of Litigation.
Owen M. Kendler,
Chief, Financial Services, Fintech & Banking Section.
Meagan K. Bellshaw,
Assistant Chief, Financial Services, Fintech & Banking Section.
Sarah H. Licht,
Assistant Chief, Financial Services, Fintech & Banking Section.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Collier T. Kelley
Aseem Chipalkatti
Alex Cohen
William H. Jones II
Brittney Dimond
Michael G. Mclellan
Trial Attorneys
United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth
Street NW, Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 445-
9737, Facsimile: (202) 514-7308, Email: [email protected].
Attorneys for the United States
United States District Court Southern District of New York
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Legends Hospitality
Parent Holdings, LLC, Defendant.
Case No. 1:24-cv-5927
[Proposed] Final Judgment
Whereas, Plaintiff, United States of America, filed its Complaint
on August 5, 2024, alleging that Defendant Legends Hospitality Parent
Holdings, LLC violated Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a,
commonly known as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976 (the ``Hart-Scott-Rodino Act'');
And whereas, the United States and Defendant have consented to the
entry of this Final Judgment without the taking of testimony, without
trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and without this
Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or admission by any
party relating to any issue of fact or law;
And whereas, Defendant agrees to undertake certain actions and
refrain from certain conduct for the purpose of resolving the claims
alleged in the Complaint;
And whereas, Defendant represents that the relief required by this
Final Judgment can and will be made and that Defendant will not later
raise a claim of hardship or difficulty as grounds for asking the Court
to modify any provision of this Final Judgment;
Now therefore, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed:
[[Page 66445]]
I. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of
the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which
relief may be granted against Defendant under Section 7A of the Clayton
Act (15 U.S.C. 18a).
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ``Legends'' or ``Defendant'' means Defendant Legends Hospitality
Parent Holdings, LLC, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in
New York, New York, its successors and assigns, subsidiaries,
divisions, groups, partnerships, joint ventures, and officers,
managers, and employees. For the avoidance of doubt: (1) ``Legends''
shall include ASM Global Parent, Inc., following its acquisition by
Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings, LLC; and (2) this provision
applies only to subsidiaries, partnerships, or joint ventures in which
Legends has a partial (more than 50%) or total ownership or control.
Any ownership or control interest held jointly by Legends and any
parent or owner of Legends shall be attributed to Legends and
aggregated with Legends' ownership or control.
B. ``Agreement'' means any agreement, contract, or mutual
understanding, whether formal or informal, written, or unwritten.
C. ``Bid'' or ``Bidding'' means any offer or response to a Request
for Proposal, Request for Submission, Request for Information, Request
for Qualifications, or any other similar request, relating to a
contract or other arrangement (including extensions or renewals of any
existing contract or other arrangement) to provide services to an
existing or potential venue.
D. ``Collaboration Agreement'' means any Agreement by and among
Defendant and any Competitor to collaborate or team in offering or
providing Venue Development Services or to act as the Venue Manager.
``Collaboration Agreement'' does not include contracting for services
where Legends is acting as the agent of a client or acting pursuant to
a contract with a client.
E. ``Communicate'' or ``Communicating'' and ``Communication(s)''
means to provide, send, discuss, circulate, exchange, request, or
solicit information, whether directly or indirectly, and regardless of
the means by which it is accomplished, including orally or by written
or recorded means of any kind, including electronic communications,
emails, chats or other ephemeral messages, facsimiles, telephone
communications, voicemails, text messages, audio recordings, meetings,
interviews, correspondence, exchange of written or recorded
information, face-to-face meetings, or social media.
F. ``Competitively Sensitive Information'' means any non-public
information of Defendant or any Competitor, including information
relating to negotiating positions, tactics, or strategy; pricing or
pricing strategies; Bids or Bidding strategies; intentions to Bid or
not to Bid; decisions to Bid; whether a Bid was or was not submitted;
and costs, revenues, profits, or margins.
G. ``Competitor'' means any Person (other than Defendant) engaged
in, or that Defendant's executives or senior managers know is
considering engaging in, any of Defendant's present or future lines of
business, including food and beverage or hospitality services, venue
management, project management, sponsorship, and/or sales of premium
seating.
H. ``Covered Person'' means: (i) any employee or agent of Defendant
whose principal job responsibilities include the sales, client
outreach, or the negotiation of terms or development of f Bids or
proposals for services to Venues (other than employees or agents whose
responsibilities are entirely clerical or limited to document
preparation); (ii) all General Managers of any Venue managed by
Defendant (iii) Defendant's Chief Executive Officer and each of his or
her direct reports; (iv) members of Defendant's Board of Directors; and
(v) designated Board observers.
I. ``Including'' means including, but not limited to.
J. ``Negotiation and Interim Period'' means the period between the
commencement of negotiations with respect to an offer to enter into a
Transaction, and the date when negotiations are abandoned or when any
resulting Transaction is consummated or abandoned.
K. ``Person'' means any natural person, corporation, company,
partnership, joint venture, firm, association, sole proprietorship,
agency, board, authority, commission, office, institution, university,
municipality, governmental entity, or other business or legal entity,
whether private or governmental.
L. ``Transaction'' means any Agreement to acquire any voting
securities, assets, or non-corporate interests, form a joint venture,
settle litigation, or license intellectual property with any Person
where such Agreement is reportable under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.
M. ``Venue'' means a facility that hosts publicly ticketed live
events, including stadiums, arenas, convention centers, amphitheaters,
clubs, and theaters.
N. ``Venue Development Services'' means managing, investing, or
financing the development, construction, or renovation of venues.
``Venue Development Services'' does not include feasibility or market
studies.
O. ``Venue Manager'' means the primary entity that manages a venue,
including by providing services necessary to operate the venue, such as
administration, operations, concert and live event booking, finance and
accounting, marketing, human resources, housekeeping, security,
parking, and/or production services.
III. Applicability
This Final Judgment applies to Defendant, as defined above, and all
other Persons in active concert or participation with Defendant who
receive actual notice of this Final Judgment.
IV. Civil Penalty Under Section 7A of the Clayton Act
A. Within thirty (30) days of entry of this Final Judgment,
Defendant must pay a civil penalty in the amount of $3,500,000. Payment
of the civil penalty must be made by wire transfer of funds or
cashier's check. Prior to making a wire transfer, Defendant must
contact the Budget and Fiscal Section of the Antitrust Division's
Executive Office at [email protected] for
instructions. A payment made by cashier's check, must be made payable
to the United States Department of Justice--Antitrust Division and
delivered to: Chief, Budget & Fiscal Section Executive Office,
Antitrust Division United States Department of Justice Liberty Square
Building, 450 5th Street NW, Room 3016, Washington, DC 20530.
B. In the event of a default or delay in payment, interest at the
rate of eighteen (18) percent per annum will accrue from the date of
the default to the date of payment.
V. Prohibited Conduct
A. Defendant may not, directly or indirectly, during any
Negotiation and Interim Period of a Transaction or in connection with
an actual or potential Collaboration Agreement:
1. Share Competitively Sensitive Information with any Competitor;
2. Communicate with any Competitor concerning any Competitively
Sensitive Information relating to a Bid or Bidding, including whether
to Bid or not to Bid;
[[Page 66446]]
3. Agree with any Competitor to participate in any joint Bid,
collaborative Bid, cooperative Bid, or shared Bid for any contract,
opportunity, or arrangement or for a part of any contract, opportunity,
or arrangement; or
4. Agree with any Competitor that Defendant or any Competitor will
not Bid for any contract, opportunity, or arrangement or for a part of
any contract, opportunity, or arrangement.
B. The prohibitions in Paragraph V.A. apply to Defendant's
Communicating, Agreeing, or sharing through any third-party agent or
third-party consultant working at Defendant's instruction, direction,
or request.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this Final Judgment
prohibits Defendant from engaging in conduct in Paragraphs V.A.1-4
above in connection with a Collaboration Agreement if Defendant first
secures advice of antitrust counsel and consults with the Antitrust
Compliance Officer, see infra Section VI, and obtains advanced written
permission from Defendant's Chief Executive Officer or General Counsel.
For avoidance of doubt, nothing in the Final Judgment, including
compliance with this Paragraph V.C., precludes the United States from
investigating or, if appropriate, bringing action against Defendant or
any other person for violations of any antitrust law.
VI. Required Conduct
A. Within ten (10) days of entry of this Final Judgment, Defendant
must appoint or employ an Antitrust Compliance Officer, and identify to
the United States the Antitrust Compliance Officer's name, business
address, telephone number, and email address. Within forty-five (45)
days of a vacancy in Defendant's Antitrust Compliance Officer position,
Defendant shall appoint a replacement, and shall identify to the United
States the Antitrust Compliance Officer's name, business address,
telephone number, and email address.
Defendant's initial and replacement appointment of an Antitrust
Compliance Officer is subject to the approval of the United States in
its sole discretion. Defendant is responsible for all costs and
expenses related to the Antitrust Compliance Officer.
B. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for the first 120 days following
entry of the Final Judgment, Defendant may retain outside counsel as an
Antitrust Compliance Officer, subject to the approval of the United
States in its sole discretion.
C. Unless otherwise agreed by the United States, the Antitrust
Compliance Officer must have the following minimum qualifications:
1. be an active member in good standing of the bar in any U.S.
jurisdiction; and
2. at least five years' experience in legal matters, including at
least five years' experience with antitrust matters.
D. Defendant may appoint or retain one or more Reserve Antitrust
Compliance Officers meeting the qualifications set forth in VI.C to
perform duties of the Antitrust Compliance Officer when the Antitrust
Compliance Officer is not available. Defendant's initial and
replacement appointment of a Reserve Antitrust Compliance Officer is
subject to the approval of the United States in its sole discretion.
E. The Antitrust Compliance Officer must, directly or through
employees or counsel working at the Antitrust Compliance Officer's
direction:
1. within thirty (30) days of entry of this Final Judgment, furnish
to each Covered Person a copy of this Final Judgment, the Competitive
Impact Statement filed by the United States with the Court, and an
explanatory cover letter prepared by Defendant providing reasonable
notice of the meaning and requirements of this Final Judgment, with
notice provided to the United States;
2. brief and distribute a copy of this Final Judgment and the
Competitive Impact Statement to any Person who succeeds to a position
of a Covered Person, and provide reasonable notice of the meaning and
requirements of this Final Judgment and the antitrust laws, within
sixty (60) days of such succession;
obtain from each Covered Person, within thirty (30) days of that
Person's receipt of this Final Judgment, a certification that he or she
(i) has read and, to the best of his or her ability, understands and
agrees to abide by the terms of this Final Judgment; (ii) is not aware
of any violation of this Final Judgment that has not been reported to
the Antitrust Compliance Officer; and (iii) understands that any
Person's failure to comply with this Final Judgment may result in an
enforcement action for civil or criminal contempt of court against
Defendant and/or any Person who violates this Final Judgment;
3. provide an Annual Antitrust Compliance Training to all Covered
Persons and members of Defendant's Board of Directors on the meaning
and requirements of this Final Judgment, the antitrust laws, and
guidelines governing:
i. Sharing of Competitively Sensitive Information with any
Competitor;
ii. Communication with any Competitor concerning any Competitively
Sensitive Information relating to a Bid or Bidding, including whether
to Bid or not to Bid;
iii. Agreeing with any Competitor to participate in any joint Bid,
collaborative Bid, cooperative Bid, or shared Bid for any contract,
opportunity, or arrangement or for a part of any contract, opportunity,
or arrangement; or
iv. Agreeing with any Competitor that Defendant or any Competitor
will not Bid for any contract, opportunity, or arrangement or for a
part of any contract, opportunity, or arrangement.
Successors to Covered Persons must be provided an Annual Antitrust
Compliance Training within sixty (60) days of such succession.
4. obtain from each Covered Person or successor, within thirty (30)
days of that person's Annual Antitrust Compliance Training, a
certification that he or she
(i) attended the training and reviewed the training materials, and
(ii) is not aware of any violation of this Final Judgment that has not
been reported to the Antitrust Compliance Officer;
5. maintain until four years following the expiration of this Final
Judgment and furnish to the United States within ten days if requested
to do so:
i. a list identifying all employees having received the notices and
compliance training required under Paragraphs VI.E.2, VI.E.3, and
VI.E.5, and the dates on which the employees received the notices and
training;
ii. copies of all Annual Antitrust Compliance Training materials;
and
iii. copies of all certifications and other materials required to
be issued under Paragraph VI.E;
iv. a record of certifications received pursuant to this Section;
v. a copy of Defendant's whistleblower policy; and
vi. a record of all reports received pursuant to Paragraph VI.F.
and VI.G.
6. annually communicate to all Covered Persons and all other
employees that they must disclose to the Antitrust Compliance Officer,
without reprisal, information concerning any potential violation of
this Final Judgment or the antitrust laws; and
7. by not later than ninety (90) calendar days after entry of this
Final Judgment and annually thereafter, file written reports with the
United States affirming that Defendant is in compliance with its
obligations under this Final Judgment, including the
[[Page 66447]]
training requirements under Paragraph VI.E.5;
F. If an officer, director, or executive of Defendant or a member
of its Board of Directors learns of a potential violation of this Final
Judgment or the antitrust laws by Defendant, he or she must promptly
notify the Antitrust Compliance Officer.
G. Immediately upon the Antitrust Compliance Officer's learning of
any violation or potential violation of any of the terms of this Final
Judgment or the antitrust laws, Defendant must investigate and, in the
event of a violation, must cease or modify the activity to comply with
this Final Judgment and the antitrust laws. Defendant must maintain all
documents as kept in the ordinary course discussed with, provided to,
reviewed, or requested by the Antitrust Compliance Officer in
connection with any reported violation or potential violation of this
Final Judgment or in connection with any violation or potential
violation of the antitrust laws reported to the Antitrust Compliance
Officer pursuant to Paragraph VI.F. for four years following the
expiration of this Final Judgment.
H. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the Antitrust Compliance
Officer's learning of any potential violation of any of the terms of
this Final Judgment, Defendant must file with the United States a
statement describing the potential violation, including a description
of all steps taken by Defendant to remedy the potential violation.
I. Defendant must have its Chief Executive Officer and its General
Counsel certify in writing to the United States, no later than ninety
(90) calendar days after this Final Judgment is entered and then
annually on the anniversary of the date of the entry of this Final
Judgment, that Defendant has complied with the provisions of this Final
Judgment.
J. Defendant must maintain a whistleblower protection policy that
provides any employee may disclose, without reprisal or adverse
consequences for such disclosure, to the Antitrust Compliance Officer
information concerning any violation or potential violation by
Defendant of this Final Judgment or the antitrust laws.
VII. Compliance Inspection
A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this
Final Judgment or of any related orders such as the Stipulation and
Order, or of determining whether this Final Judgment should be modified
or vacated, upon written request of an authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, and reasonable
notice to Defendant, Defendant must permit, from time to time and
subject to legally recognized privileges, authorized representatives,
including agents retained by the United States:
1. to have access during Defendant's office hours to inspect and
copy, or at the option of the United States, to require Defendant to
provide electronic copies of all books, ledgers, accounts, records,
data, and documents in the possession, custody, or control of Defendant
relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; and
2. to interview, either informally or on the record, or depose
Defendant's officers, employees, or agents, who may have their
individual counsel present, relating to any matters contained in this
Final Judgment. The interviews must be subject to the reasonable
convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or interference by
Defendant.
B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, Defendant must
submit written reports or respond to written interrogatories, under
oath if requested, relating to any matters contained in this Final
Judgment.
VIII. Public Disclosure
A. No information or documents obtained pursuant to any provision
this Final Judgment may be divulged by the United States to any person
other than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the
United States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the
United States is a party, including grand-jury proceedings, for the
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as
otherwise required by law.
B. In the event of a request by a third party, pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, for disclosure of information
obtained pursuant to any provision of this Final Judgment, the
Antitrust Division will act in accordance with that statute, and the
Department of Justice regulations at 28 CFR part 16, including the
provision on confidential commercial information, at 28 CFR 16.7.
Defendant submitting information to the Antitrust Division should
designate the confidential commercial information portions of all
applicable documents and information under 28 CFR 16.7. Designations of
confidentiality expire 10 years after submission, ``unless the
submitter requests and provides justification for a longer designation
period.'' See 28 CFR 16.7(b).
C. If at the time that Defendant furnishes information or documents
to the United States pursuant to any provision of this Final Judgment,
Defendant represents and identifies in writing information or documents
for which a claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Defendant marks each
pertinent page of such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under
Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' the United
States must give Defendant 10 calendar days' notice before divulging
the material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury
proceeding).
IX. Retention of Jurisdiction
The Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final
Judgment to apply to the Court at any time for further orders and
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce
compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.
X. Enforcement of Final Judgement
A. The United States retains and reserves all rights to enforce the
provisions of this Final Judgment, including the right to seek an order
of contempt from the Court. Defendant agrees that in a civil contempt
action, a motion to show cause, or a similar action brought by the
United States relating to an alleged violation of this Final Judgment,
the United States may establish a violation of this Final Judgment and
the appropriateness of a remedy therefor by a preponderance of the
evidence, and Defendant waives any argument that a different standard
of proof should apply.
B. This Final Judgment should be interpreted to give full effect to
the procompetitive purposes of the antitrust laws, including Section 7A
of the Clayton Act, and to restore the competition the United States
alleges was harmed by Defendant. Defendant agrees that it may be held
in contempt of, and that the Court may enforce, any provision of this
Final Judgment that, as interpreted by the Court in light of these
procompetitive principles and applying ordinary tools of
interpretation, is stated specifically and in reasonable detail,
whether or not it is clear and unambiguous on its face. In any such
interpretation, the terms of this Final Judgment should not be
construed against either party as the drafter.
C. In an enforcement proceeding in which the Court finds that
Defendant has violated this Final Judgment, the United States may apply
to the Court for
[[Page 66448]]
an extension of this Final Judgment, together with other relief that
may be appropriate. In connection with a successful effort by the
United States to enforce this Final Judgment against Defendant, whether
litigated or resolved before litigation, Defendant agrees to reimburse
the United States for the fees and expenses of its attorneys, as well
as all other costs including experts' fees, incurred in connection with
that effort to enforce this Final Judgment, including in the
investigation of the potential violation.
D. For a period of four years following the expiration of this
Final Judgment, if the United States has evidence that Defendant
violated this Final Judgment before it expired, the United States may
file an action against Defendant in this Court requesting that the
Court order:
(1) Defendant to comply with the terms of this Final Judgment for
an additional term to be determined by the Court; (2) all appropriate
contempt remedies; (3) additional relief needed to ensure the Defendant
complies with the terms of this Final Judgment; and (4) fees or
expenses as called for by this Section X.
XI. Expiration of Final Judgement
Unless the Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment will
expire seven (7) years from the date of its entry if Defendant has paid
the civil penalty in full, except that if Defendant is found to violate
this Final Judgment, either by the Court or by stipulation of the
parties, the United States may move to extend the Final Judgment.
XII. Reservation of Rights
This Final Judgment addresses only the claims stated in the
Complaint against Defendant, which solely alleges violations of 7A of
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a). The United States reserves all rights
for any other claims against the Defendant. This Final Judgment thus
does not in any way affect or address any other charges or claims that
may be filed by the United States.
XIII. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including by making available to the
public copies of this Final Judgment and the Competitive Impact
Statement, public comments thereon, and any response to comments by the
United States. Based upon the record before the Court, which includes
the Competitive Impact Statement and, if applicable, any comments and
response to comments filed with the Court, entry of this Final Judgment
is in the public interest.
Date:
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[Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures
and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16]
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Hon. John P. Cronan,
United States District Judge.
United States District Court Southern District of New York
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Legends Hospitality
Parent Holdings, LLC, Defendant.
Case No. 1:24-cv-5927-JPC
Competitive Impact Statement
Table of Contents
I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE PROCEEDING
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS GIVING RISE TO THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
A. Background
B. Legends' Alleged Unlawful Conduct
III. EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT
A. Civil Penalty
B. Prohibited Conduct
C. Required Conduct
D. Enforcement of Final Judgment
IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO POTENTIAL PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
V. PROCEDURES AVAILABLE FOR MODIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED FINAL
JUDGMENT
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT
VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE APPA FOR THE PROPOSED FINAL
JUDGMENT
VIII. DETERMINATIVE DOCUMENTS
Table of Authorities
Statutes
15 U.S.C. 15
15 U.S.C. 16
15 U.S.C. 18a
Cases
United States v. Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 162
(D.D.C. 2008)
United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)
United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
United States v. ArcherDaniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2003)
United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1981)
United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08-1965, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84787 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009)
United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 163 F.3d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
1998)
United States v. Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 152-53
(D.D.C. 2016)
United States v. Keyspan, 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y.
2011)
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
United States v. Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y.
2012)
United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007)
United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C.
2014)
Other Authorities
119 Cong. Rec. 24, 598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney)
In accordance with the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15
U.S.C. Sec. 16(b)-(h) (the ``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), the United
States of America files this Competitive Impact Statement related to
the proposed Final Judgment filed in this civil antitrust proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
On November 3, 2023, defendant Legends Hospitality Parent Holdings,
LLC (``Legends'') announced it had agreed to acquire ASM Global, Inc.
(``ASM'') for $2.35 billion (``Acquisition''). The transaction exceeded
the thresholds established by Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 18a, also commonly known as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 (``Section 7A'' or ``HSR Act''), and therefore
required Legends and ASM to notify the federal antitrust agencies of
the Acquisition and observe a waiting period before Legends could take
control of ASM's business. The HSR Act \3\ required Legends and ASM to
continue operating separately and independently during the post-
notification waiting period while the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice conducted a pre-consummation antitrust review of
the Acquisition. The waiting period did not expire until May 29,
2024.\4\
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\3\ Other antitrust laws also can apply to pre-closing conduct
of transaction parties.
\4\ Legends and ASM agreed to not close the Acquisition during
the pendency of the Department of Justice's investigation.
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Instead of preserving ASM as an independent business, however, the
Complaint alleges that Legends engaged in ``gun-jumping'' by assuming
unlawful control of ASM prior to the expiration of the HSR waiting
period, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 18a, and that Legends was continually
in violation of the HSR Act each day beginning at least on December 7,
2023, until the waiting period ended on May 29, 2024.
The United States and the defendant have reached a proposed
settlement that eliminates the need for a trial in this case. To
resolve the HSR Act violation, the proposed Final Judgment requires
Legends to pay a civil penalty of $3.5 million. The proposed Final
Judgment also enjoins Legends from engaging in certain behavior and
requires Legends to
[[Page 66449]]
implement behavioral changes to deter future HSR Act violations.
The United States and Legends have stipulated that the proposed
Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of
the proposed Final Judgment will terminate this action, except that the
Court will retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the
provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations
thereof.
II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation
A. Background
Legends is headquartered in New York, New York and primarily
focuses on providing food and beverage services, feasibility studies,
project development, and sales services to venues. ASM, in turn,
primarily provides venue management services (i.e. a bundle of related
services necessary to operate a venue) \5\ to venues that outsource
management responsibilities to a third party. While Legends and ASM's
core offerings are different, certain lines of business overlap. Both
Legends and ASM conduct business throughout the United States and
globally.
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\5\ Core venue management services include concert and live
event booking, finance and accounting, marketing, human resources,
housekeeping, security, parking, event services, production
services, and technology services.
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Venue owners (or owners of planned venues) often issue bid
solicitations when seeking vendors or managers to develop, provide
services to, or operate the venue. Vendors (including ASM and Legends)
respond to these solicitations, creating a competitive bidding process.
Depending on the nature of the services solicited, vendors
submitting bids in response to an RFP or similar solicitation may
respond either individually or as part of a team whose members offer
complementary products necessary to fulfill the RFP. For example,
architects, developers, venue managers and others may create a team to
provide a comprehensive response to an RFP seeking both development and
management services. Competition between individual firms or teams
leads to increased revenue, lower costs, and higher quality services
for venues.
B. Legends' Alleged Unlawful Conduct
In May 2023, Legends won the rights to provide venue management
services to a city-owned arena in California. Legends' work would begin
after the July 31, 2024, expiration of incumbent ASM's management
lease. ASM also competed for this opportunity. Legends' winning bid
contained a detailed transition plan outlining key milestone dates for
tasks necessary to effectuate the management shift. Absent the
Acquisition, Legends was planning to provide those services itself to
the arena. Due to the Acquisition of ASM, however, Legends decided to
have ASM provide those services instead. After submitting its HSR
filing, but before the expiration of the HSR waiting period, Legends
decided that ASM would continue to operate the California arena.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2023, Legends and ASM signed an initial
agreement whereby ASM would book third-party events for the arena.
Further, on April 9, 2024, Legends decided that ASM would continue
providing venue management services for the California arena instead of
transitioning the arena to Legends.
The purpose and intent of Legends' pre-closing conduct in
connection with the California arena also are informed by aspects of
Legends' course of conduct in connection with ASM, including conduct
before and after submitting the HSR filing.
For example, while Legends and ASM were in discussions around the
Acquisition but before the HSR filing, Legends sought to discuss
competitive bidding strategies with ASM. In August 2023, Legends
learned that a city in North Carolina was planning to issue an RFP for
management of an existing entertainment complex, including an arena and
other venues. A senior Legends executive emailed Legends' then-CEO
noting, ``I assume we would rather have ASM chase this?'' The then-CEO
informed another executive, ``we will find out if ASM is bidding as
don't want to both be bidding,'' and set a calendar reminder for
himself to speak with a senior ASM executive about the North Carolina
RFP.
In addition, in early 2023, Legends and ASM learned that a
university was planning to develop a new arena. Both Legends and ASM
initially took steps to form separate independent bids for the new
arena. However, after Legends and ASM were in discussions around the
Acquisition, their posture changed, such that in May 2023 they decided
that they would instead try to bid together. While constructing their
joint bid, Legends and ASM exchanged competitively sensitive
information surrounding the arena development project.
Legends and ASM engaged in similar behavior in 2024 for a different
proposed university arena. Prior to the Acquisition negotiations,
Legends and ASM took independent actions to win the development of the
new arena. This posture changed in 2024, when, during the HSR waiting
period, Legends and ASM pursued plans to submit a joint bid and
exchange related information.
III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgement
The relief required by the proposed Final Judgment will
appropriately address the violation alleged in the Complaint, penalize
Legends, and deter others from violating the HSR Act. The proposed
Final Judgment imposes a civil penalty for violation of the HSR Act and
bars recurrence of the challenged conduct on penalty of contempt. It
additionally requires Legends to appoint an antitrust compliance
officer at its expense, to conduct compliance training, to certify
compliance with the Final Judgment, to maintain a whistleblower
protection policy, and to provide the United States inspection and
interview rights to assess compliance with the Final Judgment.
A. Civil Penalty
Under Section 7A(g)(1) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(g)(1), any
person who fails to comply with the HSR Act is liable to the United
States for a civil penalty of not more than $51,744 for each day that
person is in violation of the act.\6\ The Complaint alleges that
defendant was in violation of the HSR Act beginning at least on
December 7, 2023, until the expiration of the statutory waiting period
on May 29, 2024. The United States accepted $3.5 million--an amount
that is less than the maximum penalty permitted under the HSR Act--as
an appropriate civil penalty for settlement purposes. A lower penalty
is appropriate because of Legends' demonstrated willingness to take
corrective internal action and because it is willing to resolve the
matter by the proposed Final Judgment, thereby avoiding the risks and
costs associated with a prolonged investigation and litigation.
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\6\ Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act
Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74, 701 (further amending the
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990), and
Federal Trade Commission Rule 1.98, 16 CFR 1.98, 89 FR 1,445 (Jan.
10, 2024) (increasing maximum penalty to $51,744 per day).
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B. Prohibited Conduct
Paragraphs V(A) & V(B) of the Final Judgment are designed to
prevent future violations of the antitrust laws during a pending
transaction. Under these provisions, Legends is prohibited from, during
any negotiation and interim
[[Page 66450]]
period \7\ of a transaction \8\ or in connection with an actual or
potential collaboration agreement,\9\ and except as otherwise permitted
by the Final Judgment:
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\7\ ``Negotiation and Interim Period'' means the period between
the commencement of negotiations with respect to an offer to enter
into a Transaction, and the date when negotiations are abandoned or
when any resulting Transaction is consummated or abandoned. Final
Judgement, ] II(J).
\8\ ``Transaction'' means any Agreement to acquire any voting
securities, assets, or non-corporate interests, form a joint
venture, settle litigation, or license intellectual property with
any Person where such Agreement is reportable under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. Final Judgement, ] II(L).
\9\ ``Collaboration Agreement'' means any Agreement by and among
Defendant and any Competitor to collaborate or team in offering or
providing Venue Development Services or to act as the Venue Manager.
``Collaboration Agreement'' does not include contracting for
services where Legends is acting as the agent of a client or acting
pursuant to a contract with a client. Final Judgment, ] II(D).
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Sharing competitively sensitive information with any
competitor;
Communicating with any competitor concerning any
competitively sensitive information relating to a bid or bidding,
including whether to bid or not to bid;
Agreeing with any competitor to participate in any joint
bid, collaborative bid, cooperative bid, or shared bid for any
contract, opportunity, or arrangement or for a part of any contract,
opportunity, or arrangement; or
Agreeing with any competitor that Legends or any
competitor will not bid for any contract, opportunity, or arrangement
or for a part of any contract, opportunity, or arrangement.
Paragraphs V(A) & V(B) apply to communicating, agreeing, or sharing
directly, indirectly, and through any third-party agent or consultant
working at Legends' instruction, direction, or request.
Paragraph V(C) provides a limited exception permitting Legends to
engage in the conduct prohibited by Paragraph V(A) in connection with a
collaboration agreement, provided that Legends first secures advice of
antitrust counsel, consults with the antitrust compliance officer (see
Sec. III(C), infra), and obtains advance written permission from its
CEO or General Counsel. Although certain communications in connection
with a collaboration agreement may be permissible under certain
circumstances, this internal review and approval provision ensures
that, in light of Defendant's conduct, it will not take future actions
that may reduce competition without first conducting a thorough
antitrust review. Finally, Paragraph V(C) explains that nothing in the
proposed Final Judgment precludes the United States from investigating
or, if appropriate, bringing action against Legends or anyone else for
violating the antitrust laws.
C. Required Conduct
Under Paragraphs VI(A)-VI(D) of the proposed Final Judgment,
Legends must appoint or employ, at its expense, an experienced
antitrust lawyer to serve as Legends' antitrust compliance officer.
Legends will identify its proposed antitrust compliance officer or any
replacement officer to the United States, which will have sole
discretion to approve or disapprove the designation. Paragraphs VI(E)-
VI(H) outline the antitrust compliance officer's required duties, which
include providing all covered persons \10\ with copies of the Final
Judgment (as entered) and of this Competitive Impact Statement;
ensuring that all covered persons receive training on the requirements
of the Final Judgment and certify that they have done so; filing
written reports affirming Legends' compliance with the Final Judgment;
and disclosing to the United States any violations of the Final
Judgment or of the antitrust laws and the steps Legends took to remedy
the potential violation.
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\10\ Paragraph II(H) of the Final Judgment defines covered
persons as ``(i) any employee or agent of Defendant whose principal
job responsibilities include the sales, client outreach, or the
negotiation of terms or development of Bids or proposals for
services to Venues (other than employees or agents whose
responsibilities are entirely clerical or limited to document
preparation); (ii) all General Managers of any Venue managed by
Defendant (iii) Defendant's Chief Executive Officer and each of his
or her direct reports; (iv) members of Defendant's Board of
Directors; and (v) designated Board observers.''
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In addition, Paragraph VI(J) of the Final Judgment obligates
Legends to maintain an antitrust whistleblower program through which
employees may identify potential violations of the Final Judgment or of
the antitrust laws without fear of reprisal.
To ensure compliance, Paragraph VI(I) requires both Legends' CEO
and its General Counsel to annually certify Legends' compliance with
the Final Judgment. Paragraph VII(A) grants authorized personnel from
the United States the right to access Legends' files and interview its
personnel upon request.
D. Enforcement of Final Judgment
The proposed Final Judgment also contains provisions designed to
make enforcement of the Final Judgment as effective as possible.
Paragraph X(A) provides that the United States retains and reserves all
rights to enforce the Final Judgment, including the right to seek an
order of contempt from the Court, and Section IX retains this Court's
jurisdiction over any enforcement proceedings. Under the terms of
Paragraph X(A), Legends has agreed that, in any civil contempt action,
any motion to show cause, or any similar action brought by the United
States regarding an alleged violation of the Final Judgment, the United
States may establish the violation and the appropriateness of any
remedy by a preponderance of the evidence and that Legends has waived
any argument that a different standard of proof should apply. This
provision aligns the standard for compliance with the Final Judgment
with the standard of proof that applies to the underlying offense that
the Final Judgment addresses.
Paragraph X(D) entitles the United States to file an enforcement
action up to four years after the expiration of the Final Judgment (if,
for example, the United States discovers a violation after the Final
Judgment's expiration). In addition, to compensate American taxpayers
for any costs associated with the investigation and enforcement of
violations of a proposed Final Judgment, Paragraph X(C) obligates
Legends to reimburse the United States for any attorneys' fees,
experts' fees, or costs incurred in connection with any successful
enforcement effort, including enforcement efforts resolved before
litigation.
To further aid enforcement, Paragraph X(B) underscores that the
proposed Final Judgment is intended to remedy the loss of competition
the United States alleges was harmed by Legends' conduct. Legends
agrees that it will abide by the proposed Final Judgment and that it
may be held in contempt of the Court for failing to comply with any
provision of the proposed Final Judgment that is stated specifically
and in reasonable detail, as interpreted in light of this
procompetitive purpose.
Finally, Section XI of the proposed Final Judgment provides that
the Final Judgment will expire seven years from the date of its entry
if Legends has paid the civil penalty in full, but also authorizes the
United States to move to extend the Final Judgment's term if Legends is
found by the Court to have violated the Final Judgment (or stipulates
that it has done so).
IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Plaintiffs
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover
[[Page 66451]]
three times the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment
neither impairs nor assists the bringing of any private antitrust
damage action. Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect
in any subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against
Defendant.
V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final
Judgement
The United States and Legends have stipulated that the proposed
Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the
provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not
withdrawn its consent. See Stipulation and Proposed Order, ] II(A). The
APPA conditions entry upon the Court's determination that the proposed
Final Judgment is in the public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at least 60 days preceding the
effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person
may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed
Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within 60
days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in
the Federal Register, or within 60 days of the first date of
publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact
Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period
will be considered by the U.S. Department of Justice, which remains
free to withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time
before the Court's entry of the Final Judgment. The comments and the
response of the United States will be filed with the Court. In
addition, the comments and the United States' responses will be
published in the Federal Register unless the Court agrees that the
United States instead may publish them on the U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division's internet website.
Written comments should be submitted in English to: Owen M.
Kendler, Chief, Financial Services, Fintech & Banking Section,
Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth St.
NW, Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530.
Section IX of the proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court
retains jurisdiction over this action, and that the parties may apply
to the Court for any order necessary or appropriate for the
modification, interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.
VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment
As an alternative to the proposed Final Judgment, the United States
considered a full trial on the merits involving the alleged HSR Act
violation against Defendant. The United States is satisfied, however,
that the relief required by the proposed Final Judgment is important
and meaningful while also avoiding the time, expense, and uncertainty
of a full trial on the merits.
VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for the Proposed Final Judgement
Under the Clayton Act and APPA, proposed Final Judgments, or
``consent decrees,'' in antitrust cases brought by the United States
are subject to a 60-day comment period, after which the Court shall
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1); see also United States v. Int'l
Bus. Mach. Corp., 163 F.3d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1998). In making that
determination, the Court, in accordance with the statute as amended in
2004, is required to consider:
(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including
termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and
modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are
ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the
adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a
determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public
interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth
in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if
any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B); see generally United States v.
Keyspan, 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing Tunney
Act standards). In considering these statutory factors, the Court's
inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the government is entitled to
``broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the reaches of
the public interest.'' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448,
1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons,
Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Bleznak, 153 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1460); Keyspan, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (same).
Under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the
relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations
set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree is
sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and
whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by
the decree, `` `[t]he Court's function is not to determine whether the
proposed [d]ecree results in the balance of rights and liabilities that
is the one that will best serve society, but only to ensure that the
resulting settlement is `within the reaches of the public interest.' '
'' United States v. Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (citing Alex. Brown & Sons, 963 F. Supp. at 238) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). In making this
determination, `` `[t]he [c]ourt is not permitted to reject the
proposed remedies merely because the court believes other remedies are
preferable. [Rather], the relevant inquiry is whether there is a
factual foundation for the government's decisions such that its
conclusions regarding the proposed settlement are reasonable.' ''
Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (citing United States v.
Abitibi-Consolidated Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (D.D.C. 2008)); see
also United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 (S.D.N.Y.
2012); Alex. Brown & Sons, 963 F. Supp. at 238.\11\ The government's
predictions about the efficacy of its remedies are entitled to
deference. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 631 (citation omitted); Microsoft,
56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for courts to be ``deferential to the
government's predictions as to the effect of the proposed remedies'');
United States v. ArcherDaniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court should grant due respect to the
United States' prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its
perception of the market structure, and its views of the nature of the
case); United States v. Iron Mountain, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 152-
53 (D.D.C. 2016) (``In evaluating objections to settlement agreements
under the
[[Page 66452]]
Tunney Act, a court must be mindful that [t]he government need not
prove that the settlements will perfectly remedy the alleged antitrust
harms[;] it need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the
settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'')
(internal quotations omitted).
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\11\ See also United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666
(9th Cir. 1981) (``The balancing of competing social and political
interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be
left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney
General.''); see generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing
whether ``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant
with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the `reaches of
the public interest' '').
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``[A] proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of
the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls
within the range of acceptability or is `within the reaches of public
interest.' '' United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,
151 (D.D.C. 1982); Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 637 n.10; see also United
States v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 74 (D.D.C. 2014)
(noting that room must be made for the government to grant concessions
in the negotiation process for settlements) (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d
at 1461); Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (approving the consent
decree even though the court may have imposed a greater remedy). To
meet this standard, ``it is necessary only that the submissions provide
an ample `factual foundation for the government's decisions such that
its conclusions regarding the proposed settlement are reasonable.' ''
Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (citing Keyspan, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 637-
38).
Moreover, a court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing the
remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has
alleged in its Complaint and the APPA does not authorize a court to
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also Morgan
Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (``A court must limit its review to the
issues in the complaint and give `due respect to the [Government's]
perception of . . . its case.' '') (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461);
United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08-1965, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84787, at *20 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (``[T]he `public interest' is not
to be measured by comparing the violations alleged in the complaint
against those the court believes could have, or even should have, been
alleged.''). Because the ``court's authority to review the decree
depends entirely on the government's exercising its prosecutorial
discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' it follows that
``the court is only authorized to review the decree itself,'' and not
to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire into other matters
that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459-60.
Courts cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest
determination unless the complaint underlying the decree is drafted so
narrowly such that its entry would appear `` `to make a mockery of
judicial power.' '' Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 631 (citing United States
v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2007)).
In its 2004 amendments to the APPA, Congress made clear its intent
to preserve the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in
antitrust enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that
``[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require the court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone
to intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2); see also Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at
633 (declining to hold evidentiary hearing and finding ``[a] hearing
would serve only to delay the proceedings unnecessarily.''); U.S.
Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (indicating that a court is not required
to hold an evidentiary hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its
review under the Tunney Act). The language wrote into the statute what
Congress intended when it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator
Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or
to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of
vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the
consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24, 598 (1973) (statement of
Sen. Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest
determination is left to the discretion of the court, with the
recognition that the court's ``scope of review remains sharply
proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC
Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11; see also Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 632
(``[P]rosecutorial functions vested solely in the executive branch
could be undermined by the improper use of the APPA as an antitrust
oversight provision.'') (citation omitted). A court can make its public
interest determination based on the competitive impact statement and
response to public comments alone. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 633; U.S.
Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 75.
VIII. Determinative Documents
There are no determinative materials or documents within the
meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in
formulating the proposed Final Judgment.
Dated: August 9, 2024
Respectfully submitted,
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Collier T. Kelley
Meagan K. Bellshaw
Michael G. McLellan
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 5th St. NW,
Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 445-9737, Email:
[email protected].
[FR Doc. 2024-18240 Filed 8-14-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P