Airworthiness Directives; CFM International, S.A. Engines, 33211-33215 [2024-09110]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 83 / Monday, April 29, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
(g) Required Actions
(1) Within 30 months after the effective
date of this AD, remove from service an
auxiliary motor and pump having part
number (P/N) 782655–3 (Aerocontrolex P/N
4122–006009) and replace with an auxiliary
motor and pump having P/N 782655–4
(Aerocontrolex P/N 4122–056000) in
accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs 3.B., 3.C., and 3.E. of
Hamilton Sundstrand Service Bulletin (SB)
14SF–61–168, Revision 1, dated December
21, 2016 (Hamilton Sundstrand SB 14SF–61–
168, Revision 1).
(2) After replacement of the auxiliary
motor and pump, perform a post-installation
system test in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 3.F.
of Hamilton Sundstrand SB 14SF–61–168,
Revision 1.
(h) Installation Prohibition
After the effective date of this AD, do not
install an auxiliary motor and pump having
P/N 782655–3 (Aerocontrolex P/N 4122–
006009) on any propeller identified in
paragraph (c) of this AD.
(i) No Return of Parts
Where the service information referenced
in the Accomplishment Instructions,
paragraph 3.B. of Hamilton Sundstrand SB
14SF–61–168, Revision 1, specifies returning
certain parts to the manufacturer for
modification, this AD does not include that
requirement.
(j) Credit for Previous Actions
You may take credit for the actions
required by paragraph (g) of this AD if you
performed those actions before the effective
date of this AD using Hamilton Sundstrand
SB 14SF–61–168, Original Issue, dated
December 14, 2016.
Issued on March 26, 2024.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2024–09142 Filed 4–26–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
(k) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
(1) The Manager, East Certification Branch,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs
for this AD, if requested using the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with
14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your
principal inspector or local Flight Standards
District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the
branch office, send it to the attention of the
person identified in paragraph (l)(1) of this
AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-AVSAIR-BACO-COS@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
Federal Aviation Administration
(l) Additional Information
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(m) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
(IBR) of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation
Service Bulletin 14SF–61–168, Revision 1,
dated December 21, 2016.
Note 2 to paragraph (m)(2)(i): Hamilton
Sundstrand Corporation is a UTC Aerospace
Systems Company. This service information
is identified as both Hamilton Sundstrand
Corporation and UTC Aerospace Systems.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Hamilton Sundstrand, One
Hamilton Road, Windsor Locks, CT 06096–
1010, phone: (877) 808–7575; email: CRC@
collins.com.
(4) You may view this service information
at FAA, Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District
Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110.
(5) You may view this material at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA,
visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/
ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov.
(1) For more information about this AD,
contact Isabel Saltzman, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, 1701 Columbia Avenue,
College Park, GA 30337; phone: (781) 238–
7649; email: 9-AVS-AIR-BACO-COS@faa.gov.
(2) Service information identified in this
AD that is not incorporated by reference is
available at the addresses specified in
paragraphs (m)(3) and (4) of this AD.
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15:46 Apr 26, 2024
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14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2023–1991; Project
Identifier AD–2023–00700–E; Amendment
39–22727; AD 2024–07–06]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; CFM
International, S.A. Engines
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The FAA is adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model
LEAP–1A23, LEAP–1A24, LEAP–
1A24E1, LEAP–1A26, LEAP–1A26CJ,
LEAP–1A26E1, LEAP–1A29, LEAP–
1A29CJ, LEAP–1A30, LEAP–1A32,
LEAP–1A33, LEAP–1A33B2, and
LEAP–1A35A engines. This AD was
prompted by a report of multiple
aborted takeoffs and air turn-backs
SUMMARY:
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33211
(ATBs) caused by high-pressure
compressor (HPC) stall, which was
induced by high levels of nonsynchronous vibration (NSV).
Additional manufacturer investigation
revealed that wear on the No. 3 bearing
spring finger housing can lead to high
levels of NSV. This AD requires initial
and repetitive calculations of the levels
of NSV, inspection of the stage 2 highpressure turbine (HPT) nozzle assembly
honeycomb and HPT stator stationary
seal honeycomb and, depending on the
results of the calculations and
inspections, replacement of certain
parts. This AD also requires
replacement of certain No. 3 bearing
spring finger housings at a certain time.
The FAA is issuing this AD to address
the unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective June 3, 2024.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain publication listed in this AD
as of June 3, 2024.
ADDRESSES:
AD Docket: You may examine the AD
docket at regulations.gov under Docket
No. FAA–2023–1991; or in person at
Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this final rule, any comments
received, and other information. The
address for Docket Operations is U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
20590.
Material Incorporated by Reference:
• For service information, contact
CFM International, S.A., GE Aviation
Fleet Support, 1 Neumann Way, M/D
Room 285, Cincinnati, OH 45215;
phone: (877) 432–3272; email:
aviation.fleetsupport@ge.com.
• You may view this service
information at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety
Branch, 1200 District Avenue,
Burlington, MA 01803. For information
on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call (817) 222–5110.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mehdi Lamnyi, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street,
Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: (781)
238–7743; email: mehdi.lamnyi@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would
apply to certain CFM Model LEAP–
1A23, LEAP–1A24, LEAP–1A24E1,
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 83 / Monday, April 29, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
LEAP–1A26, LEAP–1A26CJ, LEAP–
1A26E1, LEAP–1A29, LEAP–1A29CJ,
LEAP–1A30, LEAP–1A32, LEAP–1A33,
LEAP–1A33B2, and LEAP–1A35A
engines. The NPRM published in the
Federal Register on October 11, 2023
(88 FR 70409). The NPRM was
prompted by a manufacturer’s report of
three aborted takeoffs and two ATBs
caused by HPC stall. Additional
manufacturer investigation revealed that
wear on the No. 3 bearing spring finger
housing can lead to high levels of NSV,
which could induce HPC stall. As a
result of its investigation, the
manufacturer published service
information that specifies procedures
for addressing this situation. In the
NPRM, the FAA proposed to require
repetitive calculations of the levels of
NSV and, depending on the results of
the calculations, replacement of the No.
3 bearing spring finger housing. The
FAA also proposed to require, following
the removal and replacement of the No.
3 bearing spring finger housing,
inspection of the stage 2 HPT nozzle
assembly honeycomb and HPT stator
stationary seal honeycomb for rubs and,
depending on findings, replacement of
the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly
honeycomb and HPT stator stationary
seal. This FAA also proposed to require
replacement of the No. 3 bearing spring
finger housing regardless of calculated
level of NSV at a certain time. The FAA
is issuing this AD to address the unsafe
condition on these products.
Discussion of Final Airworthiness
Directive
Comments
The FAA received comments from
four commenters. Commenters included
the Air Line Pilots Association,
International (ALPA), American
Airlines (AA), Avianca Airlines (AVA),
and CFM International (CFM). ALPA
supported the NPRM without change.
The following presents the comments
received from AA, AVA, and CFM on
the NPRM and the FAA’s response to
each comment.
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Request To Allow Automated
Monitoring
AA requested that the FAA allow for
the use of automated condition
monitoring solutions as an alternative to
the accomplishment of the manual
review every 125 cycles required by
paragraph (g)(1) of the proposed AD. AA
noted that automated monitoring
solutions have already been accepted to
replace previously FAA required MRB
tasks, and allowing automated condition
monitoring will provide a safer, more
robust solution that exceeds the
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15:46 Apr 26, 2024
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minimum requirements outlined in
CFM Service Bulletin (SB) LEAP–1A–
72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue 001,
dated June 14, 2023, and the NPRM.
The FAA disagrees with the
commenter’s request to add automated
monitoring solutions as an alternative in
the final rule. However, if any operator
prefers to address the unsafe condition
by means other than those specified in
the referenced service information, they
may request approval for an alternative
method of compliance (AMOC) in
accordance with paragraph (j) of this AD
and, if approved, may use it instead of
the procedures specified in the service
information and the final rule. The FAA
did not change this AD as a result of this
comment.
Request To Include Customer
Notification Report (CNR) in AD
Avianca requested that the CNR for
exceedance of NSV thresholds be
included in the NPRM as an additional
method of compliance for all operators
who have active CFM Diagnostics
Monitoring. Avianca noted that under
the CFM Diagnostics Program, the
parameter NSV TCF Max Vibe Fleeting
Event is actively monitored and if any
exceedance is detected, a CNR is
triggered for NSV exceedance.
The FAA disagrees with the
commenter’s request to add CNR for
NSV thresholds exceedance as an
additional method of compliance in the
final rule. However, if any operator
prefers to address the unsafe condition
by means other than those specified in
the referenced service information, they
may request approval for an AMOC in
accordance with paragraph (j) of this AD
and, if approved, may use it instead of
the procedures specified in the service
information and the final rule. The FAA
did not change this AD as a result of this
comment.
Request To Clarify Replacement
Language in Summary
CFM requested that the FAA update
the Summary section of the proposed
AD to read: ‘‘This proposed AD would
also require replacement of the No. 3
bearing spring finger housing having P/
N 2629M62G01 and a serial number
identified in Table 1 of CFM SB LEAP–
1A–72–00–0504–01A–93 0A–D.’’ CFM
noted that the focus of the proposed AD
should be on NSV monitoring and the
actions required when NSV is present.
CFM also noted that service bulletins
LEAP–1A–72–00–0505–01A–93 0A–D,
Issue 001, dated June 05, 2023, and
LEAP–1A–72–00–0498–01A–93 0A–D,
Issue 001, dated June 05, 2023, include
the shop visit workscope
recommendations for engines with
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potential No. 3 bearing spring finger
housing wear, regardless of the signs of
NSV vibrations.
The FAA partially agrees with the
request. The FAA agrees to edit the
Summary section of this AD to clarify
that only certain No. 3 bearing spring
finger housings require replacement.
The FAA disagrees with the request to
specify the part number and serial
number of the affected parts in the
Summary section of this AD because
that level of specificity is not
appropriate for the Summary section.
The FAA acknowledges the presence of
service bulletins LEAP–1A–72–00–
0505–01A–93 0A–D, Issue 001, dated
June 05, 2023, and LEAP–1A–72–00–
0498–01A–93 0A–D, Issue 001, dated
June 05, 2023, and notes that neither of
those SBs are incorporated by reference
in this AD.
Request To Update Proposed AD
Requirements
CFM requested that the FAA update
the Proposed AD Requirements in This
NPRM section to read: ‘‘This proposed
AD would also require replacement of
the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing
having P/N 2629M62G01 and a serial
number identified in Table 1 of CFM SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D,
regardless of calculated level of NSV, at
a certain time.’’
The FAA agrees with the requested
language. However, this section is not
included in the final rule. Therefore, the
FAA did not change this AD as a result
of this comment.
Request To Update Background and
Unsafe Condition
CFM requested that the FAA update
the Background and Unsafe Condition
sections of the proposed AD to include
that CFM experience to date has shown
that NSV has led to self-recovering HPC
stalls. CFM also requested to remove the
following portion from paragraph (e):
‘‘The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent
HPC stall.’’ CFM acknowledged that the
manufacturer investigation revealed that
wear on the No. 3 bearing spring finger
housing can lead to high levels of NSV,
which could induce HPC stall.
The FAA disagrees with the request to
include information regarding selfrecovering HPC stalls in this AD. The
FAA also disagrees with the requested
change to paragraph (e) of this AD. The
FAA notes that the field experience to
date does not provide conclusive
evidence that NSV-induced HPC stalls
will always be self-recovering. The FAA
did not change this AD as a result of this
comment.
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 83 / Monday, April 29, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
Request To Update Interim Action
CFM requested that the FAA update
the Interim Action section of the
proposed AD to reflect that this AD is
the closing action of paragraph (e)
Unsafe Condition of the proposed AD
and although there are additional
hardware modifications that are being
developed by the design approval
holder, those modifications are not
necessary to address the unsafe
condition.
The FAA disagrees with this request.
Although at this time the required
actions of this AD address the unsafe
condition, additional hardware
modifications, when developed and
FAA-approved, could also address the
unsafe condition for the long-term.
Therefore, the FAA considers that the
monitoring and corresponding actions
required by this AD would be an interim
action to address the unsafe condition,
and the FAA may consider additional
rulemaking on this subject. The FAA
did not change this AD as a result of this
comment.
Request To Update Service Information
Incorporated by Reference
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CFM requested that the FAA change
the SB referenced in the NPRM from
‘‘LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D,
Issue 001, dated June 14, 2023’’ to
‘‘LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D,
Issue 002, dated October 17, 2023.’’
CFM noted that SB LEAP–1A–72–00–
0504–01A–930A–D, Issue 002, dated
October 17, 2023, contains the following
revisions that are pertinent to the
NPRM;
(1) A note that NSV monitoring can be
performed on-wing.
(2) Correction to data labels used in
the alternative procedure for NSV
Monitoring with ACMS Takeoff Reports.
(3) Correction to vibration units used
in the alternative procedure for NSV
Monitoring with ACMS Takeoff Reports.
The FAA agrees and has updated the
service information incorporated by
reference from ‘‘LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–
01A–930A–D, Issue 001, dated June 14,
2023’’ to ‘‘LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–
930A–D, Issue 002, dated October 17,
2023.’’ Requiring this updated service
bulletin does not increase the scope of
the AD or increase the burden on any
operator over that already proposed in
the NPRM.
Request To Remove ‘‘At the Next Piecepart Exposure’’ From Required Actions
CFM requested that the FAA remove
the reference to ‘‘At the next piece-part
exposure’’ in paragraph (g)(5) of the
proposed AD. CFM stated that NSV
monitoring and actions required when
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NSV is present are the focus of the
proposed AD. CFM noted that the
statement related to ‘‘At the next piecepart exposure’’ was taken from SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0498–01A–930A–D,
Issue 001, dated June 05, 2023, for shop
visit work scope recommendations for
engines with potential No. 3 bearing
spring finger housing wear. CFM also
noted that this is already referenced in
Chapter 05 of the LEAP–1A Engine
Shop Manual LEAP–1A–05–11–03–
01A–0B1B–C.
The FAA disagrees with the request
because the commenter did not provide
an adequate justification for changing
the compliance time. The FAA notes
that decision to include a mandatory
action to remove all affected parts at the
next piece-part exposure was not taken
from SB LEAP–1A–72–00–0498–01A–
930A–D, Issue 001, dated June 05, 2023.
The FAA did not change this AD as a
result of this comment.
Request To Add Credit for Previous
Actions
CFM requested that the FAA add the
following language to the NPRM to
allow customers to take credit for NSV
monitoring that was performed prior to
the effective date of the proposed AD, in
accordance with section 5.A of SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D,
Issue 001, dated June 14, 2023;
‘‘Evaluation of the NSV of an engine,
accomplished before the effective date
of this AD in accordance with the
instructions of section 5.A of SB LEAP–
1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D original
issue (Issue 001) and, as applicable,
accomplishment of corrective actions in
accordance with the instructions of SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D
original issue (Issue 001) are acceptable
to comply with the requirements of
paragraphs (1) and (2), as applicable, of
this AD for that engine (see Note 1 of
this AD). Note 1: Evaluation of the NSV
of an engine, accomplished in
accordance with the instructions of
section 5.B (‘Alternative Procedure—
NSV Monitoring with ACMS Takeoff
Reports’) of SB LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–
01A–930A–D original issue (Issue 001)
is not acceptable to comply with the
requirements of paragraphs (1) of this
AD.’’
The FAA disagrees with the request
because the FAA does not believe it is
necessary to provide such credit
because NSV monitoring is required
initially at 125 flight cycles after the
effective date of the AD and repetitively
at intervals of 125 flight cycles.
Therefore, there would be no advantage
of taking credit for NSV monitoring
done before the effective date of this
AD. Once the NSV data calculation
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33213
exceeds the specified limits, then the
affected No. 3 bearing spring finger
housing must be removed from the
engine and replaced with a part eligible
for installation, and the AD applicability
no longer applies to that engine. The
FAA did not change this AD as a result
of this comment.
Request To Update Compliance Time
for Removal From Service
CFM requested that the FAA change
compliance time language in paragraph
(g)(2) of the proposed AD from, ‘‘within
150 FCs of performing the calculation’’
to ‘‘within 150 FCs of the flight when
this threshold is exceeded.’’ CFM noted
that there is a discrepancy in the
removal compliance time language
between the NPRM and CFM SB LEAP–
1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D if NSV
data exceeds the limits listed in CFM SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D.
The FAA agrees to update the
language in paragraph (g)(2) of this AD
from, ‘‘within 150 FCs of performing the
calculation’’ to ‘‘within 150 FCs of the
flight when these limits are exceeded.’’
Conclusion
The FAA reviewed the relevant data,
considered any comments received, and
determined that air safety requires
adopting this AD as proposed.
Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD
to address the unsafe condition on these
products. Except for minor editorial
changes, and any other changes
described previously, this AD is
adopted as proposed in the NPRM.
None of the changes will increase the
economic burden on any operator.
Related Service Information Under 1
CFR Part 51
The FAA reviewed CFM SB LEAP–
1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue
002, dated October 17, 2023. This
service information identifies affected
No. 3 bearing spring finger housings and
specifies procedures for monitoring
NSV during engine operation. This
service information also specifies
procedures for replacing the No. 3
bearing spring finger housings,
inspecting the stage 2 HPT nozzle
assembly honeycomb and HPT stator
stationary seal honeycomb, and
replacing the stage 2 HPT nozzle
assembly honeycomb and HPT stator
stationary seal. This service information
is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it
through their normal course of business
or by the means identified in the
ADDRESSES section.
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 83 / Monday, April 29, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
Interim Action
The FAA considers this AD to be an
interim action. This unsafe condition is
still under investigation by the
manufacturer and, depending on the
results of that investigation, the FAA
may consider further rulemaking action.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD
affects 48 engines installed on airplanes
of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates that
33 engines installed on airplanes of U.S.
registry require replacement of the No.
3 bearing spring finger housing.
The FAA estimates the following
costs to comply with this AD:
ESTIMATED COSTS
Action
Labor cost
Calculate NSV data ........................................
Replace No. 3 bearing spring finger housing
1 work-hours × $85 per hour = $85 ...............
17 work-hours × $85 per hour = $1,445 ........
The FAA estimates the following
costs to do any necessary replacement
and inspection that would be required
Parts cost
based on the results of the calculation.
The agency has no way of determining
Cost per
product
$0
64,590
Cost on U.S.
operators
$85
66,035
$4,080
2,179,155
the number of aircraft that might need
these replacements and inspections:
ON-CONDITION COSTS
Labor cost
Inspect stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb
and HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb.
Replace stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb ...
Replace HPT stator stationary seal .............................
4 work-hours × $85 per hour = $340 ...........................
$0
$340
8 work-hours × $85 per hour = $680 ...........................
8 work-hours × $85 per hour = $680 ...........................
58,536
6,855
59,216
7,535
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking
under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section
44701: General requirements. Under
that section, Congress charges the FAA
with promoting safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and
procedures the Administrator finds
necessary for safety in air commerce.
This regulation is within the scope of
that authority because it addresses an
unsafe condition that is likely to exist or
develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation
in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
The Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
This AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that this AD:
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15:46 Apr 26, 2024
Jkt 262001
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive:
■
2024–07–06 CFM International, S.A.:
Amendment 39–22727; Docket No.
FAA–2023–1991; Project Identifier AD–
2023–00700–E.
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is
effective June 3, 2024.
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Parts cost
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to CFM International, S.A.
(CFM) Model LEAP–1A23, LEAP–1A24,
LEAP–1A24E1, LEAP–1A26, LEAP–1A26CJ,
LEAP–1A26E1, LEAP–1A29, LEAP–1A29CJ,
LEAP–1A30, LEAP–1A32, LEAP–1A33,
LEAP–1A33B2, and LEAP–1A35A engines
with an installed No. 3 bearing spring finger
housing having part number (P/N)
2629M62G01 and a serial number identified
in Table 1 or Table 2 of CFM Service Bulletin
(SB) LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D,
Issue 002, dated October 17, 2023 (CFM SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue
002).
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)
Code 7230, Turbine Engine Compressor
Section.
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
Regulatory Findings
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with RULES
Cost per
product
Action
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by a report of
multiple aborted takeoffs and air turn-backs
caused by high-pressure compressor (HPC)
stall, which was induced by high levels of
non-synchronous vibration (NSV), and an
additional manufacturer investigation that
revealed wear on the No. 3 bearing spring
finger housing. The FAA is issuing this AD
to prevent HPC stall. The unsafe condition,
if not addressed, could result in engine
power loss at a critical phase of flight such
as takeoff or climb, loss of engine thrust
control, reduced controllability of the
airplane, and loss of the airplane.
E:\FR\FM\29APR1.SGM
29APR1
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 83 / Monday, April 29, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
installation, as specified in paragraphs
(g)(2)(i) and (g)(5) of this AD, constitutes
terminating action for the calculations
required by paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
(g) Required Actions
(1) Within 125 flight cycles (FCs) after the
effective date of this AD and thereafter at
intervals not to exceed 125 FCs, calculate the
NSV data in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs
5.A.(1) and 5.A.(3), or 5.B.(1) and 5.B.(3) of
CFM SB LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–
D, Issue 002.
(2) If, during any calculation required by
paragraph (g)(1) of this AD, the NSV data
exceeds the limits specified in the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph
5.A.(4)(a)1 or 5.B.(4)(a)1 of CFM SB LEAP–
1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue 002,
discontinue the calculations required by
paragraph (g)(1) of this AD and within 150
FCs of the flight when these limits are
exceeded:
(i) Remove from service the No. 3 bearing
spring finger housing having P/N
2629M62G01 and a serial number identified
in Table 1 or Table 2 of CFM SB LEAP–1A–
72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue 002, and
replace with a part eligible for installation.
(ii) Inspect the stage 2 high-pressure
turbine (HPT) nozzle assembly honeycomb
for rubs in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs
5.A.(4)(a)3b1) or 5.B.(4)(a)3b1) of CFM SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue
002.
(iii) Inspect the HPT stator stationary seal
honeycomb for rubs in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs
5.A.(4)(a)3b2) or 5.B.(4)(a)3b2) of CFM SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue
002.
(3) If, during the inspection required by
paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this AD, the stage 2
HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb fails to
meet the serviceability criteria referenced in
the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs
5.A.(4)(a)3b1) or 5.B.(4)(a)3b1) of CFM SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue
002, before further flight, replace the stage 2
HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb.
(4) If, during the inspection required by
paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of this AD, the HPT
stator stationary seal honeycomb fails to meet
the serviceability criteria referenced in the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs
5.A.(4)(a)3b2) or 5.B.(4)(a)3b2) of CFM SB
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue
002, before further flight, replace the HPT
stator stationary seal.
(5) At the next piece-part exposure after the
effective date of this AD, but before
exceeding 9,900 cycles since new, replace the
No. 3 bearing spring finger housing having P/
N 2629M62G01 and a serial number
identified in Table 1 of CFM SB LEAP–1A–
72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue 002, with a
part eligible for installation.
(i) Definition
For the purpose of this AD, a ‘‘part eligible
for installation’’ is a No. 3 bearing spring
finger housing that does not have P/N
2629M62G01 and a serial number identified
in Table 1 or Table 2 of CFM SB LEAP–1A–
72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue 002.
(h) Terminating Action
Replacement of the No. 3 bearing spring
finger housing having P/N 2629M62G01 and
a serial number identified in Table 1 or Table
2 of CFM SB LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–
930A–D, Issue 002 with a part eligible for
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:46 Apr 26, 2024
Jkt 262001
(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, AIR–520 Continued
Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the Manager, AIR–520 Continued
Operational Safety Branch, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (k) of this AD and email it to: ANEAD-AMOC@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
(3) For service information that contains
steps that are labeled as Required for
Compliance (RC), the following provisions
apply.
(i) The steps labeled as RC, including
substeps under an RC step and any figures
identified in an RC step, that are required by
paragraph (g) of this AD must be done to
comply with this AD. An AMOC is required
for any deviations to RC steps required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, including substeps
and identified figures.
(ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be
deviated from using accepted methods in
accordance with the operator’s maintenance
or inspection program without obtaining
approval of an AMOC, provided the RC steps,
including substeps and identified figures, can
still be done as specified, and the airplane
can be put back in an airworthy condition.
(k) Additional Information
For more information about this AD,
Mehdi Lamnyi, Aviation Safety Engineer,
FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines,
WA 98198; phone: (781) 238–7743; email:
mehdi.lamnyi@faa.gov.
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
(IBR) of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) CFM International, S.A. Service Bulletin
LEAP–1A–72–00–0504–01A–930A–D, Issue
002, dated October 17, 2023.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For service information, contact CFM
International, S.A., GE Aviation Fleet
Support, 1 Neumann Way, M/D Room 285,
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
33215
Cincinnati, OH 45215; phone: (877) 432–
3272; email: aviation.fleetsupport@ge.com.
(4) You may view this service information
at FAA, Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District
Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110.
(5) You may view this material at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA,
visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/
ibr-locationsoremailfr.inspection@nara.gov.
Issued on March 29, 2024.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2024–09110 Filed 4–26–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2024–0771; Project
Identifier AD–2023–01251–E; Amendment
39–22720; AD 2024–06–15]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; General
Electric Company Engines
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
The FAA is adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
General Electric Company (GE) Model
GE90–110B1 and GE90–115B engines.
This AD was prompted by a report of an
aborted takeoff due to left engine failure
caused by liberation of the interstage
high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor seal
rim. This AD requires repetitive
ultrasonic inspections (USIs) of the
interstage HPT rotor seal for cracks and
removal from service if necessary. As a
mandatory terminating action to the
repetitive USIs of the interstage HPT
rotor seal, this AD also requires
replacement of the interstage HPT rotor
seal. The FAA is issuing this AD to
address the unsafe condition on these
products.
SUMMARY:
This AD is effective May 14,
2024.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain publication listed in this AD
as of May 14, 2024.
The FAA must receive comments on
this AD by June 13, 2024.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments,
using the procedures found in 14 CFR
DATES:
E:\FR\FM\29APR1.SGM
29APR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 83 (Monday, April 29, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 33211-33215]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-09110]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2023-1991; Project Identifier AD-2023-00700-E;
Amendment 39-22727; AD 2024-07-06]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; CFM International, S.A. Engines
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model LEAP-1A23, LEAP-1A24, LEAP-
1A24E1, LEAP-1A26, LEAP-1A26CJ, LEAP-1A26E1, LEAP-1A29, LEAP-1A29CJ,
LEAP-1A30, LEAP-1A32, LEAP-1A33, LEAP-1A33B2, and LEAP-1A35A engines.
This AD was prompted by a report of multiple aborted takeoffs and air
turn-backs (ATBs) caused by high-pressure compressor (HPC) stall, which
was induced by high levels of non-synchronous vibration (NSV).
Additional manufacturer investigation revealed that wear on the No. 3
bearing spring finger housing can lead to high levels of NSV. This AD
requires initial and repetitive calculations of the levels of NSV,
inspection of the stage 2 high-pressure turbine (HPT) nozzle assembly
honeycomb and HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb and, depending on
the results of the calculations and inspections, replacement of certain
parts. This AD also requires replacement of certain No. 3 bearing
spring finger housings at a certain time. The FAA is issuing this AD to
address the unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective June 3, 2024.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of June 3,
2024.
ADDRESSES:
AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2023-1991; or in person at Docket Operations between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD
docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other
information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Material Incorporated by Reference:
For service information, contact CFM International, S.A.,
GE Aviation Fleet Support, 1 Neumann Way, M/D Room 285, Cincinnati, OH
45215; phone: (877) 432-3272; email: [email protected].
You may view this service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 1200
District Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mehdi Lamnyi, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; phone:
(781) 238-7743; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain CFM Model LEAP-
1A23, LEAP-1A24, LEAP-1A24E1,
[[Page 33212]]
LEAP-1A26, LEAP-1A26CJ, LEAP-1A26E1, LEAP-1A29, LEAP-1A29CJ, LEAP-1A30,
LEAP-1A32, LEAP-1A33, LEAP-1A33B2, and LEAP-1A35A engines. The NPRM
published in the Federal Register on October 11, 2023 (88 FR 70409).
The NPRM was prompted by a manufacturer's report of three aborted
takeoffs and two ATBs caused by HPC stall. Additional manufacturer
investigation revealed that wear on the No. 3 bearing spring finger
housing can lead to high levels of NSV, which could induce HPC stall.
As a result of its investigation, the manufacturer published service
information that specifies procedures for addressing this situation. In
the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require repetitive calculations of the
levels of NSV and, depending on the results of the calculations,
replacement of the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing. The FAA also
proposed to require, following the removal and replacement of the No. 3
bearing spring finger housing, inspection of the stage 2 HPT nozzle
assembly honeycomb and HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb for rubs
and, depending on findings, replacement of the stage 2 HPT nozzle
assembly honeycomb and HPT stator stationary seal. This FAA also
proposed to require replacement of the No. 3 bearing spring finger
housing regardless of calculated level of NSV at a certain time. The
FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these
products.
Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive
Comments
The FAA received comments from four commenters. Commenters included
the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), American
Airlines (AA), Avianca Airlines (AVA), and CFM International (CFM).
ALPA supported the NPRM without change. The following presents the
comments received from AA, AVA, and CFM on the NPRM and the FAA's
response to each comment.
Request To Allow Automated Monitoring
AA requested that the FAA allow for the use of automated condition
monitoring solutions as an alternative to the accomplishment of the
manual review every 125 cycles required by paragraph (g)(1) of the
proposed AD. AA noted that automated monitoring solutions have already
been accepted to replace previously FAA required MRB tasks, and
allowing automated condition monitoring will provide a safer, more
robust solution that exceeds the minimum requirements outlined in CFM
Service Bulletin (SB) LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 001, dated
June 14, 2023, and the NPRM.
The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request to add automated
monitoring solutions as an alternative in the final rule. However, if
any operator prefers to address the unsafe condition by means other
than those specified in the referenced service information, they may
request approval for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in
accordance with paragraph (j) of this AD and, if approved, may use it
instead of the procedures specified in the service information and the
final rule. The FAA did not change this AD as a result of this comment.
Request To Include Customer Notification Report (CNR) in AD
Avianca requested that the CNR for exceedance of NSV thresholds be
included in the NPRM as an additional method of compliance for all
operators who have active CFM Diagnostics Monitoring. Avianca noted
that under the CFM Diagnostics Program, the parameter NSV TCF Max Vibe
Fleeting Event is actively monitored and if any exceedance is detected,
a CNR is triggered for NSV exceedance.
The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request to add CNR for NSV
thresholds exceedance as an additional method of compliance in the
final rule. However, if any operator prefers to address the unsafe
condition by means other than those specified in the referenced service
information, they may request approval for an AMOC in accordance with
paragraph (j) of this AD and, if approved, may use it instead of the
procedures specified in the service information and the final rule. The
FAA did not change this AD as a result of this comment.
Request To Clarify Replacement Language in Summary
CFM requested that the FAA update the Summary section of the
proposed AD to read: ``This proposed AD would also require replacement
of the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing having P/N 2629M62G01 and a
serial number identified in Table 1 of CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-93
0A-D.'' CFM noted that the focus of the proposed AD should be on NSV
monitoring and the actions required when NSV is present. CFM also noted
that service bulletins LEAP-1A-72-00-0505-01A-93 0A-D, Issue 001, dated
June 05, 2023, and LEAP-1A-72-00-0498-01A-93 0A-D, Issue 001, dated
June 05, 2023, include the shop visit workscope recommendations for
engines with potential No. 3 bearing spring finger housing wear,
regardless of the signs of NSV vibrations.
The FAA partially agrees with the request. The FAA agrees to edit
the Summary section of this AD to clarify that only certain No. 3
bearing spring finger housings require replacement. The FAA disagrees
with the request to specify the part number and serial number of the
affected parts in the Summary section of this AD because that level of
specificity is not appropriate for the Summary section. The FAA
acknowledges the presence of service bulletins LEAP-1A-72-00-0505-01A-
93 0A-D, Issue 001, dated June 05, 2023, and LEAP-1A-72-00-0498-01A-93
0A-D, Issue 001, dated June 05, 2023, and notes that neither of those
SBs are incorporated by reference in this AD.
Request To Update Proposed AD Requirements
CFM requested that the FAA update the Proposed AD Requirements in
This NPRM section to read: ``This proposed AD would also require
replacement of the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing having P/N
2629M62G01 and a serial number identified in Table 1 of CFM SB LEAP-1A-
72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, regardless of calculated level of NSV, at a
certain time.''
The FAA agrees with the requested language. However, this section
is not included in the final rule. Therefore, the FAA did not change
this AD as a result of this comment.
Request To Update Background and Unsafe Condition
CFM requested that the FAA update the Background and Unsafe
Condition sections of the proposed AD to include that CFM experience to
date has shown that NSV has led to self-recovering HPC stalls. CFM also
requested to remove the following portion from paragraph (e): ``The FAA
is issuing this AD to prevent HPC stall.'' CFM acknowledged that the
manufacturer investigation revealed that wear on the No. 3 bearing
spring finger housing can lead to high levels of NSV, which could
induce HPC stall.
The FAA disagrees with the request to include information regarding
self-recovering HPC stalls in this AD. The FAA also disagrees with the
requested change to paragraph (e) of this AD. The FAA notes that the
field experience to date does not provide conclusive evidence that NSV-
induced HPC stalls will always be self-recovering. The FAA did not
change this AD as a result of this comment.
[[Page 33213]]
Request To Update Interim Action
CFM requested that the FAA update the Interim Action section of the
proposed AD to reflect that this AD is the closing action of paragraph
(e) Unsafe Condition of the proposed AD and although there are
additional hardware modifications that are being developed by the
design approval holder, those modifications are not necessary to
address the unsafe condition.
The FAA disagrees with this request. Although at this time the
required actions of this AD address the unsafe condition, additional
hardware modifications, when developed and FAA-approved, could also
address the unsafe condition for the long-term. Therefore, the FAA
considers that the monitoring and corresponding actions required by
this AD would be an interim action to address the unsafe condition, and
the FAA may consider additional rulemaking on this subject. The FAA did
not change this AD as a result of this comment.
Request To Update Service Information Incorporated by Reference
CFM requested that the FAA change the SB referenced in the NPRM
from ``LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 001, dated June 14, 2023''
to ``LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002, dated October 17,
2023.'' CFM noted that SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002,
dated October 17, 2023, contains the following revisions that are
pertinent to the NPRM;
(1) A note that NSV monitoring can be performed on-wing.
(2) Correction to data labels used in the alternative procedure for
NSV Monitoring with ACMS Takeoff Reports.
(3) Correction to vibration units used in the alternative procedure
for NSV Monitoring with ACMS Takeoff Reports.
The FAA agrees and has updated the service information incorporated
by reference from ``LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 001, dated
June 14, 2023'' to ``LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002, dated
October 17, 2023.'' Requiring this updated service bulletin does not
increase the scope of the AD or increase the burden on any operator
over that already proposed in the NPRM.
Request To Remove ``At the Next Piece-part Exposure'' From Required
Actions
CFM requested that the FAA remove the reference to ``At the next
piece-part exposure'' in paragraph (g)(5) of the proposed AD. CFM
stated that NSV monitoring and actions required when NSV is present are
the focus of the proposed AD. CFM noted that the statement related to
``At the next piece-part exposure'' was taken from SB LEAP-1A-72-00-
0498-01A-930A-D, Issue 001, dated June 05, 2023, for shop visit work
scope recommendations for engines with potential No. 3 bearing spring
finger housing wear. CFM also noted that this is already referenced in
Chapter 05 of the LEAP-1A Engine Shop Manual LEAP-1A-05-11-03-01A-0B1B-
C.
The FAA disagrees with the request because the commenter did not
provide an adequate justification for changing the compliance time. The
FAA notes that decision to include a mandatory action to remove all
affected parts at the next piece-part exposure was not taken from SB
LEAP-1A-72-00-0498-01A-930A-D, Issue 001, dated June 05, 2023. The FAA
did not change this AD as a result of this comment.
Request To Add Credit for Previous Actions
CFM requested that the FAA add the following language to the NPRM
to allow customers to take credit for NSV monitoring that was performed
prior to the effective date of the proposed AD, in accordance with
section 5.A of SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 001, dated June
14, 2023; ``Evaluation of the NSV of an engine, accomplished before the
effective date of this AD in accordance with the instructions of
section 5.A of SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D original issue (Issue
001) and, as applicable, accomplishment of corrective actions in
accordance with the instructions of SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D
original issue (Issue 001) are acceptable to comply with the
requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2), as applicable, of this AD for
that engine (see Note 1 of this AD). Note 1: Evaluation of the NSV of
an engine, accomplished in accordance with the instructions of section
5.B (`Alternative Procedure--NSV Monitoring with ACMS Takeoff Reports')
of SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D original issue (Issue 001) is not
acceptable to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (1) of this
AD.''
The FAA disagrees with the request because the FAA does not believe
it is necessary to provide such credit because NSV monitoring is
required initially at 125 flight cycles after the effective date of the
AD and repetitively at intervals of 125 flight cycles. Therefore, there
would be no advantage of taking credit for NSV monitoring done before
the effective date of this AD. Once the NSV data calculation exceeds
the specified limits, then the affected No. 3 bearing spring finger
housing must be removed from the engine and replaced with a part
eligible for installation, and the AD applicability no longer applies
to that engine. The FAA did not change this AD as a result of this
comment.
Request To Update Compliance Time for Removal From Service
CFM requested that the FAA change compliance time language in
paragraph (g)(2) of the proposed AD from, ``within 150 FCs of
performing the calculation'' to ``within 150 FCs of the flight when
this threshold is exceeded.'' CFM noted that there is a discrepancy in
the removal compliance time language between the NPRM and CFM SB LEAP-
1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D if NSV data exceeds the limits listed in CFM
SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D.
The FAA agrees to update the language in paragraph (g)(2) of this
AD from, ``within 150 FCs of performing the calculation'' to ``within
150 FCs of the flight when these limits are exceeded.''
Conclusion
The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments
received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as
proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe
condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, and
any other changes described previously, this AD is adopted as proposed
in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on
any operator.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
The FAA reviewed CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002,
dated October 17, 2023. This service information identifies affected
No. 3 bearing spring finger housings and specifies procedures for
monitoring NSV during engine operation. This service information also
specifies procedures for replacing the No. 3 bearing spring finger
housings, inspecting the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb and HPT
stator stationary seal honeycomb, and replacing the stage 2 HPT nozzle
assembly honeycomb and HPT stator stationary seal. This service
information is reasonably available because the interested parties have
access to it through their normal course of business or by the means
identified in the ADDRESSES section.
[[Page 33214]]
Interim Action
The FAA considers this AD to be an interim action. This unsafe
condition is still under investigation by the manufacturer and,
depending on the results of that investigation, the FAA may consider
further rulemaking action.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD affects 48 engines installed on
airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates that 33 engines installed
on airplanes of U.S. registry require replacement of the No. 3 bearing
spring finger housing.
The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calculate NSV data.................... 1 work-hours x $85 per $0 $85 $4,080
hour = $85.
Replace No. 3 bearing spring finger 17 work-hours x $85 per 64,590 66,035 2,179,155
housing. hour = $1,445.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary
replacement and inspection that would be required based on the results
of the calculation. The agency has no way of determining the number of
aircraft that might need these replacements and inspections:
On-Condition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per
Action Labor cost Parts cost product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspect stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb 4 work-hours x $85 per hour = $0 $340
and HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb. $340.
Replace stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb. 8 work-hours x $85 per hour = 58,536 59,216
$680.
Replace HPT stator stationary seal............ 8 work-hours x $85 per hour = 6,855 7,535
$680.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
2024-07-06 CFM International, S.A.: Amendment 39-22727; Docket No.
FAA-2023-1991; Project Identifier AD-2023-00700-E.
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective June 3, 2024.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model LEAP-
1A23, LEAP-1A24, LEAP-1A24E1, LEAP-1A26, LEAP-1A26CJ, LEAP-1A26E1,
LEAP-1A29, LEAP-1A29CJ, LEAP-1A30, LEAP-1A32, LEAP-1A33, LEAP-
1A33B2, and LEAP-1A35A engines with an installed No. 3 bearing
spring finger housing having part number (P/N) 2629M62G01 and a
serial number identified in Table 1 or Table 2 of CFM Service
Bulletin (SB) LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002, dated
October 17, 2023 (CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002).
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 7230, Turbine Engine
Compressor Section.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by a report of multiple aborted takeoffs
and air turn-backs caused by high-pressure compressor (HPC) stall,
which was induced by high levels of non-synchronous vibration (NSV),
and an additional manufacturer investigation that revealed wear on
the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing. The FAA is issuing this AD
to prevent HPC stall. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could
result in engine power loss at a critical phase of flight such as
takeoff or climb, loss of engine thrust control, reduced
controllability of the airplane, and loss of the airplane.
[[Page 33215]]
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Required Actions
(1) Within 125 flight cycles (FCs) after the effective date of
this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 125 FCs, calculate
the NSV data in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions,
paragraphs 5.A.(1) and 5.A.(3), or 5.B.(1) and 5.B.(3) of CFM SB
LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002.
(2) If, during any calculation required by paragraph (g)(1) of
this AD, the NSV data exceeds the limits specified in the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 5.A.(4)(a)1 or 5.B.(4)(a)1 of
CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002, discontinue the
calculations required by paragraph (g)(1) of this AD and within 150
FCs of the flight when these limits are exceeded:
(i) Remove from service the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing
having P/N 2629M62G01 and a serial number identified in Table 1 or
Table 2 of CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002, and
replace with a part eligible for installation.
(ii) Inspect the stage 2 high-pressure turbine (HPT) nozzle
assembly honeycomb for rubs in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs 5.A.(4)(a)3b1) or 5.B.(4)(a)3b1) of CFM SB
LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002.
(iii) Inspect the HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb for rubs
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs
5.A.(4)(a)3b2) or 5.B.(4)(a)3b2) of CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-
930A-D, Issue 002.
(3) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (g)(2)(ii)
of this AD, the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb fails to meet
the serviceability criteria referenced in the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs 5.A.(4)(a)3b1) or 5.B.(4)(a)3b1) of CFM SB
LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002, before further flight,
replace the stage 2 HPT nozzle assembly honeycomb.
(4) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (g)(2)(iii)
of this AD, the HPT stator stationary seal honeycomb fails to meet
the serviceability criteria referenced in the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs 5.A.(4)(a)3b2) or 5.B.(4)(a)3b2) of CFM SB
LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002, before further flight,
replace the HPT stator stationary seal.
(5) At the next piece-part exposure after the effective date of
this AD, but before exceeding 9,900 cycles since new, replace the
No. 3 bearing spring finger housing having P/N 2629M62G01 and a
serial number identified in Table 1 of CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-
01A-930A-D, Issue 002, with a part eligible for installation.
(h) Terminating Action
Replacement of the No. 3 bearing spring finger housing having P/
N 2629M62G01 and a serial number identified in Table 1 or Table 2 of
CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002 with a part eligible
for installation, as specified in paragraphs (g)(2)(i) and (g)(5) of
this AD, constitutes terminating action for the calculations
required by paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
(i) Definition
For the purpose of this AD, a ``part eligible for installation''
is a No. 3 bearing spring finger housing that does not have P/N
2629M62G01 and a serial number identified in Table 1 or Table 2 of
CFM SB LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-01A-930A-D, Issue 002.
(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, AIR-520 Continued Operational Safety Branch,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the Manager, AIR-520 Continued Operational
Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in
paragraph (k) of this AD and email it to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(3) For service information that contains steps that are labeled
as Required for Compliance (RC), the following provisions apply.
(i) The steps labeled as RC, including substeps under an RC step
and any figures identified in an RC step, that are required by
paragraph (g) of this AD must be done to comply with this AD. An
AMOC is required for any deviations to RC steps required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, including substeps and identified figures.
(ii) Steps not labeled as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection
program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the RC
steps, including substeps and identified figures, can still be done
as specified, and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy
condition.
(k) Additional Information
For more information about this AD, Mehdi Lamnyi, Aviation
Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198;
phone: (781) 238-7743; email: [email protected].
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) CFM International, S.A. Service Bulletin LEAP-1A-72-00-0504-
01A-930A-D, Issue 002, dated October 17, 2023.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For service information, contact CFM International, S.A., GE
Aviation Fleet Support, 1 Neumann Way, M/D Room 285, Cincinnati, OH
45215; phone: (877) 432-3272; email: [email protected].
(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 1200 District Avenue,
Burlington, MA 01803. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/[email protected]">www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/[email protected].
Issued on March 29, 2024.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2024-09110 Filed 4-26-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P