Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 25378-25432 [2024-06827]
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
IV. Discussion of Public Comments on the
Proposed Rule
V. Section-by-Section Discussion
VI. Procedural Matters
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Land Management
43 CFR Parts 3160 and 3170
I. List of Acronyms
[BLM_HQ_FRN_MO4500174370]
AO = Authorized Officer
APD = Application for Permit to Drill
API = American Petroleum Institute
AVO = Audio, visual, and olfactory
BLM = Bureau of Land Management
CA = Communitization Agreement
CAA = Clean Air Act
CFR = Code of Federal Regulations
EA = Environmental Assessment
EPA = Environment Protection Agency
FLPMA = Federal Land Policy and
Management Act
FMP = Facility measurement point
FOGRMA = Federal Oil and Gas Royalty
Management Act
GAO = Government Accountability Office
GOR = Gas-to-oil ratio
IMDA = Indian Mineral Development Act of
1982
IRA = Inflation Reduction Act of 2022
LDAR = Leak detection and repair
Mcf = thousand cubic feet at standard
conditions
MLA = Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as
amended
NTL = Notice to Lessees
NTL–4A = Notice to Lessees and Operators
of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas
Leases: Royalty or Compensation for Oil
and Gas Lost
OGI = Optical gas imaging
OGOR = Oil and Gas Operations Report
ONRR = Office of Natural Resources Revenue
RIA = Regulatory Impact Analysis
Unit PA = Unit participating area
WMP = Waste Minimization Plan
RIN 1004–AE79
Waste Prevention, Production Subject
to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation
Bureau of Land Management,
Interior.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
On November 30, 2022, the
Department of the Interior, through the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
published in the Federal Register a
proposed rule entitled ‘‘Waste
Prevention, Production Subject to
Royalties, and Resource Conservation.’’
This final rule aims to reduce the waste
of natural gas from venting, flaring, and
leaks during oil and gas production
activities on Federal and Indian leases.
The final rule also ensures that, when
Federal or Indian gas is wasted, the
public and Indian mineral owners are
compensated for that wasted gas
through royalty payments. This final
rule will be codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations and will replace the
BLM’s current requirements governing
venting and flaring, which are more
than four decades old.
DATES: The final rule is effective on June
10, 2024. The incorporation by reference
of certain material listed in this rule is
approved by the Director of the Federal
Register as of June 10, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Yvette M. Fields, Division Chief, Fluid
Minerals Division, telephone: 240–712–
8358, email: yfields@blm.gov, or by mail
to Bureau of Land Management, 1849 C
St. NW, Room 5633, Washington, DC
20240, for information regarding the
substance of this final rule.
Individuals in the United States who
are deaf, deafblind, hard of hearing, or
have a speech disability may dial 711
(TTY, TDD, or TeleBraille) to access
telecommunications relay services.
Individuals outside the United States
should use the relay services offered
within their country to make
international calls to the point-ofcontact in the United States. For a
summary of the final rule, please see the
final rule summary document in docket
BLM–2022–0003 on
www.regulations.gov.
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SUMMARY:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. List of Acronyms
II. Executive Summary
III. Background
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II. Executive Summary
On November 30, 2022, the
Department of the Interior (DOI or
‘‘Department’’), through the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM), published in
the Federal Register a proposed rule
entitled, Waste Prevention, Production
Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation. 87 FR 73588 (Nov. 30,
2022). The BLM has considered the
public comments received on the
proposed rule to develop this final rule.
This final rule aims to reduce the
waste of natural gas from oil and gas
leases administered by the BLM. This
gas is lost during oil and gas exploration
and production activities through
venting, flaring, and leaks. Venting is
the intentional release of gas into the
atmosphere during operations, such as
liquids unloading. Gas that is
combusted in a controlled manner is
flared gas. Leaks are the unintentional
release of gas into the atmosphere from
production equipment. Although some
losses of gas may be unavoidable,
Federal law requires that operators take
reasonable steps to prevent the waste of
gas through venting, flaring and leaks.
The final rule describes the reasonable
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steps that operators of Federal and
Indian oil and gas leases must take to
avoid the waste of natural gas. The final
rule also ensures that, when Federal or
Indian gas is avoidably wasted, the
public and Indian mineral owners are
compensated for the wasted gas through
royalty payments.
The BLM administers a Federal
onshore oil and gas leasing program
pursuant to the requirements of various
statutes, including the Mineral Leasing
Act (MLA), the Federal Oil and Gas
Royalty Management Act (FOGRMA),
the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022
(IRA) Public Law 117–169, and the
Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA). The MLA requires lessees
to ‘‘use all reasonable precautions to
prevent waste of oil or gas developed in
the land,’’ 1 and further requires oil and
gas lessees to observe ‘‘such rules . . .
for the prevention of undue waste as
may be prescribed by [the] Secretary
. . . .’’ 2 Under FOGRMA, oil and gas
lessees are liable for royalty payments
on gas wasted from the lease site.3 In
addition, as discussed further below, the
IRA provides that, for leases issued after
August 16, 2022, royalties are owed on
all gas produced from Federal land,
subject to certain exceptions for gas that
is lost during emergency situations,
used for the benefit of lease operations,
or ‘‘unavoidably lost.’’ FLPMA
authorizes the BLM to ‘‘regulate’’ the
‘‘use, occupancy, and development’’ of
the public lands via ‘‘published rules,’’
while mandating that the Secretary,
‘‘[i]n managing the public lands . . .
shall, by regulation or otherwise, take
any action necessary to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of
the lands.’’ 4 The BLM also regulates oil
and gas operations on trust and
restricted fee lands pursuant to the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C.
396a et seq.; the Act of March 3, 1909,
25 U.S.C. 396; and the Indian Mineral
Development Act (IMDA), 25 U.S.C.
2101 et seq.
In addition to managing the leasing
and production of oil and gas from
Federal lands, the BLM also oversees
operations on many Indian and Tribal
oil and gas leases pursuant to a
delegation of authority from the
Secretary of the Interior.5 The
Secretary’s management and regulation
of Indian mineral interests carries with
1 30
U.S.C. 225.
U.S.C. 187.
3 30 U.S.C. 1756.
4 43 U.S.C. 1732(b).
5 Department of the Interior, Departmental
Manual, 235 DM 1.1K.
2 30
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it the duty to act as a trustee for the
benefit of the Indian mineral owners.
This final rule replaces the BLM’s
current requirements governing natural
gas venting and flaring, which are
contained in Notice to Lessees and
Operators of Onshore Federal and
Indian Oil and Gas Leases: Royalty or
Compensation for Oil and Gas Lost
(NTL–4A).6 NTL–4A was issued more
than 40 years ago, and its policies and
requirements are outdated. To begin,
NTL–4A is ill-suited to address the large
volume of flaring associated with the
rapid development of unconventional
‘‘tight’’ oil and gas resources that has
occurred in recent years. In addition,
NTL–4A does not account for
technological and operational
advancements that can reduce losses of
gas from oil storage tanks and
equipment leaks.
In 2016, the BLM issued a final rule
replacing NTL–4A with new regulations
intended to reduce the waste of gas from
venting, flaring, and leaks.7 That rule
was challenged in Federal court, and the
BLM never fully implemented the rule
due to the resulting litigation.8 In
September 2018, the BLM issued a final
rule effectively rescinding the 2016
Rule, and that rule was itself challenged
in court.9 Eventually, the United States
District Court for the Northern District
of California vacated the 2018 rescission
of the 2016 Rule on various grounds,
including what the Court determined
was the rule’s failure to meet the BLM’s
statutory mandate to prevent waste.10
The U.S. District Court for the District
of Wyoming then vacated the 2016 Rule
on the grounds that, among other things:
(1) the MLA’s ‘‘delegation of authority
does not allow and was not intended to
authorize the enactment of rules
justified primarily upon the ancillary
benefit of a reduction in air pollution’’;
and (2) ‘‘BLM acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in failing to fully assess the
impacts of the [2016 Rule] on marginal
wells, failing to adequately explain and
support the [2016 Rule’s] capture
requirements, and failing to separately
consider the domestic costs and benefits
of the [2016 Rule].’’ 11 The result of
these rulemakings and court decisions is
that NTL–4A continues to govern
venting and flaring from BLM-managed
oil and gas leases.
6 44
FR 76600 (Dec. 27, 1979).
FR 83008 (Nov. 18, 2016).
8 See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 493
F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1052–1057 (D. Wyo. 2020)
(hereinafter, Wyoming court).
9 83 FR 49184 (Sept. 28, 2018).
10 California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573
(N.D. Cal. 2020).
11 See Wyoming court at 1086–87.
7 81
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Based on the lessons of prior
rulemakings and court decisions, the
BLM concludes that this final rule will
reduce the waste of natural gas through
improved regulatory requirements
pertaining to venting, flaring, and leaks,
as well as improve upon NTL–4A in a
variety of significant ways while
eschewing elements of the 2016 Rule
criticized by the District Court.
In brief, the primary components of
this final rule are as follows:
• The final rule better implements the
statutory requirement that the ‘‘lessee
will . . . use all reasonable precautions
to prevent the waste of oil or gas
developed in the land,’’ 12 consistent
with the BLM’s authority to issue rules
implementing that statutory
requirement.13 The final rule requires
operators to take reasonable measures to
prevent waste as conditions of approval
of an Application for Permit to Drill
(APD). Then, after an APD is approved,
the BLM may order an operator to
implement, within a reasonable amount
of time, additional reasonable measures
to prevent waste at ongoing exploration
and production operations. Reasonable
measures to prevent waste may reflect
factors including, but not limited to,
advances in technology and changes in
industry practice.
• The final rule requires operators to
submit either a Waste Minimization
Plan (WMP) or a self-certification
statement as one of five required
attachments to their oil well
applications for permit to drill.14 The
WMP will provide the BLM with the
following information: anticipated oil
and associated-gas production and
anticipated 3-year decline curves;
certification that the operator has an
executed, valid gas sales contract; and
any other steps the operator commits to
take to reduce or eliminate gas losses.
In lieu of a waste-minimization plan,
the operator may choose to provide a
self-certification statement. That
statement would commit the operator to
capturing 100 percent of the associated
gas produced from an oil well and
would obligate the operator to pay
royalties on all lost gas except for gas
lost through emergencies. With the
addition of this new requirement to file
a WMP or the described selfcertification statement for oil-well
APDs, operators must now provide five
attachments with their completed Form
3160–3, including existing requirements
for a drilling plan, a surface use plan of
operations, and evidence of bond
coverage. All five attachments must be
12 30
U.S.C. 225.
30 U.S.C. 187.
14 See § 3162.3–1(d).
13 See
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administratively and technically
complete before the BLM approves the
APD. If the application is not complete,
the BLM will defer action on the APD,
and the operator will have an
opportunity to address BLM-identified
deficiencies. In the case of a WMP or
self-certification statement, the operator
must address the identified deficiencies
within 2 years of receiving notification
from the BLM of the deficiencies or the
BLM may disapprove the application.
• The final rule recognizes the IRA’s
provision that royalties are not owed on
gas that is ‘‘unavoidably lost’’. The final
rule clarifies which lost oil or gas will
qualify as ‘‘unavoidably lost’’: lost oil or
gas will qualify as ‘‘unavoidably lost’’ if,
as stated in the final rule at § 3179.41,
the operator has taken reasonable steps
to avoid waste; the operator has
complied fully with applicable laws,
lease terms, regulations, provisions of a
previously approved operating plan,
and other written orders of the BLM;
and the loss is within the applicable
time or volume limits. The final rule
provides for several circumstances in
which lost oil or gas will be considered
‘‘unavoidably lost,’’ including during
well completions, production testing,
and emergencies. The final rule also
establishes a volumetric threshold based
on oil production on royalty-free flaring
due to pipeline capacity constraints,
midstream processing failures, or other
similar events that may prevent
produced gas from being transported to
market. The volumetric threshold is
based on the total volume of gas flared
in a month divided by the total net
volume of oil produced in a month for
each lease, unit PA, or CA. If an
operator were to exceed the avoidable
loss threshold, then royalties are due on
the amount flared beyond the threshold.
• The final rule includes specific
affirmative obligations that operators
must take to avoid wasting oil or gas. In
particular:
The final rule requires operators on
Federal or Indian leases to maintain a
leak detection and repair (LDAR)
program designed to prevent the waste
of Federal or Indian gas. An operator’s
LDAR program must provide for regular
inspections of all oil and gas
production, processing, treatment,
storage, and measurement equipment on
the lease site.
The requirements of this final rule are
explained in detail in sections III and IV
that follow.
As detailed in the Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) prepared for this final
rule, the BLM estimates that this rule
will have the following economic
impacts:
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• Costs to industry of around $19.3
million per year (annualized at 7
percent);
• Benefits to industry in recovered
gas of $1.8 million per year (annualized
at 7 percent);
• Increases in royalty revenues from
recovered and flared gas of $51 million
per year; and
• Ancillary effects society of $17.9
million per year from reduced
greenhouse gas emissions (using a 3
percent discount rate).
III. Background
A. Waste of Natural Gas During the
Development of Federal and Indian Oil
and Gas Resources
The BLM is responsible for managing
more than 245 million surface acres of
land and 700 million acres of subsurface
mineral estate. The BLM maintains a
program for leasing these lands for oil
and gas development and regulates oil
and gas production operations on
Federal leases. While the BLM does not
manage the leasing of Indian and Tribal
lands for oil and gas production, the
BLM does regulate oil and gas
operations on many Indian and Tribal
leases as part of its Tribal trust
responsibilities.
The BLM’s onshore oil and gas
management program is a significant
contributor to the Nation’s oil and gas
production. Domestic production from
88,887 Federal onshore oil and gas
wells 15 accounts for approximately 8
percent of the Nation’s natural gas
supply and 9 percent of its oil.16 In
Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, operators
produced 473 million barrels of oil and
3.65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
from onshore Federal and Indian oil and
gas leases. The production of this oil
and gas generated more than $4.2 billion
in royalties. Approximately $3.2 billion
of these royalties were shared between
the United States and the States in
which the production occurred.
Approximately $1 billion of these
royalties went directly to Tribes and
Indian allottees for production from
Indian lands.17
In recent years, the United States has
experienced a significant increase in oil
and natural gas production due to
technological advances, such as
hydraulic fracturing combined with
directional drilling. This increase in
production has been accompanied by a
significant waste of natural gas through
venting and flaring. During oil and gas
operations it is sometimes necessary to
vent gas (the intentional release of
natural gas into the atmosphere) or to
flare gas (the combustion of unsold gas).
As the following graph illustrates, the
amount of venting and flaring from
Federal and Indian leases has increased
dramatically from the 1990s to the
2010s, and the upward trend in flaring
suggests that it will continue to be a
problem. Between 1990 and 2000, the
total venting and flaring reported by
Federal and Indian onshore lessees
averaged approximately 11 billion cubic
feet (Bcf) per year. Between 2010 and
2020, in contrast, the total venting and
flaring reported by Federal and Indian
onshore lessees averaged approximately
44.2 Bcf per year.18
Reported Venting and Flaring From Onshore Federal and
Indian Leases
100,000,000
90,000,000
80,000,000
70,000,000
60,000,000
'ti 50,000,000
:E
40,000,000
30,000,000
20,000,000
10,000,000
s s s s s s s s s sen so~o0 .-4 N
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Assuming a $3 per thousand cubic
feet (Mcf) price of gas,19 the Federal and
Indian gas that was vented and flared
from 2010 to 2020 would be valued at
$1.46 billion. The BLM notes that
vented and flared volumes have not
15 BLM Public Lands Statistics, Table 9 (FY 2021
data), available at https://www.blm.gov/programsenergy-and-minerals-oil-and-gas-oil-and-gasstatistics.
16 Bureau of Land Management Budget
Justifications and Performance Information Fiscal
Year 2023, p. V–79, available at https://
www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/fy2023-blmgreenbook.pdf.
17 Production and revenue number derived from
data maintained by the Office of Natural Resources
Revenue at https://revenuedata.doi.gov/.
18 The BLM analysis of ONRR Oil and Gas
Operations Report part B (OGOR–B) data provided
for 1990–2000 and 2010–2020. All venting and
flaring data is nationwide and does not separate
Federal and Indian data. For certain data points,
separating Federal and Indian data would require
a manual review of thousands of venting and flaring
sundry notices since the BLM does not have a
database that tracks this distinction.
19 The average annual Henry Hub spot price for
natural gas from 2010 through 2020 was $3.19. U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA), Henry
Hub Natural Gas Spot Price, available at https://
www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhda.htm.
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increased linearly with production:
according to data maintained by the
Office of Natural Resources Revenue
(ONRR), the average volume of vented
and flared gas as a percentage of total
gas production was 0.42 percent from
1990 to 2000; from 2010 to 2020,
however, vented and flared gas averaged
1.07 percent of total gas production.
This metric reflects a 157 percent
increase in the waste of gas during oil
and gas production from Federal and
Indian lands. Furthermore, the average
amount of vented and flared gas (in Mcf)
per barrel (bbl) of oil production was
0.0815 Mcf/bbl from 1990 to 2000,
while it rose to 0.1642 Mcf/bbl from
2010 to 2020 20—a 102 percent increase
25381
in the waste of gas per barrel of oil
produced. Together, these trends
demonstrate that the requirements
established by NTL–4A are ineffective at
limiting the amount of gas that is vented
or flared from Federal and Indian lands.
BILLING CODE 4331–29–P
Vented/Flared gas as Percentage of Total Gas
Production (Annual Average)
1.20%
1.00%
0.80%
0.60%
0.40%
0.20%
0.00%
1990-2000
2010-2020
Average Gas Vented/Flared (MCF) per Bbl of Oil
Produced
0.18000
0.16000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.14000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.12000
0.10000
0.08000
0.06000 - - 0.04000 - - 0.02000 - - -
20 In the proposed rule, the BLM erroneously
stated that the average amount of vented and flared
gas in thousands of cubic feet (Mcf) per barrel (bbl)
of oil production was 0.8148 Mcf/bbl from 1990 to
2000, which rose to 1.6418 Mcf/bbl from 2010 to
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2010-2020
2020. The correct average amounts are 0.08148 Mcf/
bbl of vented and flared gas from 1990 to 2000,
which rose to 0.16418 Mcf/bbl from 2010 to 2020.
The accompanying graph, which appeared in the
proposed and final rules, is accurate and remains
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unchanged. Accordingly, the BLM is revising the
cited average amounts to reflect the information
provided in the accompanying graph.
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1990-2000
ER10AP24.001
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BILLING CODE 4331–29–C
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Recent studies have identified three
other major sources of gas losses during
the oil and gas production process:
emissions from natural-gas-activated
pneumatic equipment, venting from oil
storage tanks, and equipment leaks.21
The EPA estimates that, nationwide,
36.2 Bcf of methane was emitted from
pneumatic controllers and 4.9 Bcf of
methane was emitted from equipment
leaks at upstream oil and gas production
sites in the United States in 2019.22 The
BLM estimates that 13 Bcf of natural gas
was lost from pneumatic devices on
Federal and Indian lands in 2019. The
BLM estimates that an additional 0.86
Bcf of gas was lost due to equipment
leaks from Federal natural gas
production operations not subject at the
time to State or EPA (LDAR)
requirements. Notably, leakage appears
to be exacerbated in areas where there
is insufficient infrastructure for natural
gas gathering, processing, and
transportation 23—a known issue in
basins such as the Permian and Bakken,
where substantial BLM-managed oil and
gas production occurs. Finally, the BLM
estimates that 17.9 Bcf of natural gas
was emitted from storage tanks on
Federal and Indian lands in 2019.
Losses from pneumatic equipment,
leaks, and storage tanks would be
valued at $53.7 million dollars (at $3/
Mcf) in 2019.
Apart from undue waste, excessive
venting, flaring, and leaks by Federal oil
and gas lessees also impose three
additional harms. First, vented or leaked
gas wastes valuable publicly or Indian
owned resources that could be put to
productive use, and deprives American
taxpayers, Tribes, and States of
substantial royalty revenues. Second,
the wasted gas may harm local
communities and surrounding areas
through visual and noise impacts from
flaring. And third, vented or leaked gas
also contributes to climate change,
because the primary constituent of
natural gas is methane, an especially
powerful greenhouse gas, with climate
impacts roughly 28 to 36 times those of
carbon dioxide (CO2), if measured over
a 100-year period, or 84 times those of
CO2 if measured over a 20-year period.24
21 Alvarez, et al., ‘‘Assessment of methane
emissions from the U.S. oil and gas supply chain,’’
Science 361 (2018); see also 81 FR 83008, 83015–
17 (Nov. 18, 2016).
22 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2019 at 3–73 (2019).
23 Zhang, et al., ‘‘Quantifying methane emissions
from the largest oil-producing basin in the United
States from space,’’ Science Advances 6 (2020).
24 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis, Chapter 8, Anthropogenic and Natural
Radiative Forcing, at 714 (Table 8.7), available at
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Thus, regulatory measures that
encourage operators to conserve gas and
avoid waste could, as a purely
incidental matter, have ancillary effects
on public health and the environment.25
Both the MLA and IRA distinguish an
avoidable loss from an unavoidable loss.
Indeed, some amount of venting and
flaring is unavoidable and expected to
occur during oil and gas exploration and
production operations. For example, an
operator may need to flare gas on a
short-term basis as part of drilling
operations, well completion, or
production testing, among other
situations. Longer-term flaring may
occur in exceptional circumstances,
which might include the drilling of and
production from an exploratory well in
a new field, where gas pipelines have
not yet been built due to a lack of
information regarding expected gas
production.26 In some fields, the overall
quantity of gas produced may be so
small that the development of gaspipeline infrastructure may not be
economically justified.
Although some venting or flaring may
be unavoidable (and thus not waste)
under some circumstances, operators
have an affirmative obligation under
Federal law to use reasonable
precautions to prevent the waste of oil
or gas developed from a lease. As other
technologies and practices on oil and
gas operations have evolved (as
evidenced by changes in State and
Federal regulations, and in industry best
practices), so too measures that are
considered reasonable to prevent waste
should progress over time with
advances in technology and changes in
industry practice.
Further, operators’ immediate
economic interests may not always be
served by minimizing the loss of natural
gas, and BLM regulation is necessary to
discourage operators from venting or
flaring more gas than is operationally
necessary. A prime example is the
flaring of oil-well gas due to pipeline
capacity constraints. Oil wells in certain
fields are known to produce relatively
large volumes of associated natural gas.
Accordingly, natural-gas-capture
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/
wg1/WG1AR5_Chapter08_FINAL.pdf.
25 The BLM notes that the BLM did not rely on
such ancillary effects in developing this final rule.
Rather, with the exception of the safety provisions
in § 3179.50 (which also promotes worker health),
the requirements of this final rule are
independently justified as reasonable measures to
prevent waste that would be expected, regardless of
ancillary effects on public health or the
environment.
26 The BLM notes that, even in such exceptional
circumstances, operators should be expected to take
measures to avoid excessive flaring and this
proposed rule would place limitations on royaltyfree flaring from exploratory wells.
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infrastructure—including pipelines—
has been built out in those fields, and
the BLM expects operators to sell the
associated gas they produce. However, it
is not uncommon for the rate of oil-well
development to outpace the capacity of
the related gas-capture infrastructure.
When the existing gas-capture
infrastructure is overwhelmed, an
operator is faced with a choice: flare the
associated gas in order to continue oil
production unabated or curtail oil
production in order to conserve the
associated gas. Absent clear
requirements in NTL–4A as to whether
a specific operational circumstance is an
avoidable or unavoidable loss, an
operator might conclude that the BLM
would not make any avoidable loss
determination if the operator were to
flare, and thus waste associated gas to
continue oil production—maximizing
the operators’ short-term profits by
providing immediate revenue from oil
production, even accounting for the loss
of gas revenue. But the latter course of
action may often best serve the public’s
interest by maximizing overall energy
production (considering both
production streams rather than
producing oil and flaring gas) and
royalty revenues.
Likewise, maximizing the recovery of
gas by regularly inspecting for leaks may
not always maximize the operator’s
profits. It is in these circumstances—
where an operator’s interest in
maximizing short-term profits diverges
from the public’s interest in maximizing
resource recovery—that BLM regulation
is necessary and appropriate to ensure
that operators take reasonable measures
to prevent waste, as required by statute.
B. Legal Authority
Pursuant to a delegation of Secretarial
authority, the BLM is authorized to
regulate oil and gas exploration and
production activities on Federal and
Indian lands under a variety of statutes,
including the MLA, the Mineral Leasing
Act for Acquired Lands, the IRA,
FOGRMA, the FLPMA, the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, the IMDA,
and the Act of March 3, 1909.27 These
statutes authorize the Secretary of the
Interior to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the statutes’ various purposes.28
27 Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. 188–287;
Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C.
351–360; Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management
Act, 30 U.S.C. 1701–1758; Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1701–1785;
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C.
396a–g; Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982,
25 U.S.C. 2101–2108; Act of March 3, 1909, 25
U.S.C. 396.
28 30 U.S.C. 189 (MLA); 30 U.S.C. 359 (MLAAL);
30 U.S.C. 1751(a) (FOGRMA); 43 U.S.C. 1740
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7. Authority Regarding the Waste of
Natural Gas
The MLA rests on the fundamental
principle that the public should benefit
from mineral production on public
lands.29 An important means of
ensuring that the public benefits from
mineral production on public lands is
minimizing and deterring the waste of
oil and gas produced from the Federal
mineral estate. To this end, the MLA
requires that all oil and gas lessees be
subject to the condition that lessees
‘‘use all reasonable precautions to
prevent waste of oil or gas developed in
the land . . . .’’ 30 The MLA requires oil
and gas lessees to exercise ‘‘reasonable
diligence, skill, and care’’ in their
operations and to observe ‘‘such rules
. . . for the prevention of undue waste
as may be prescribed by [the]
Secretary.’’ 31 Lessees are not only
responsible for taking measures to
prevent waste, but also for making
royalty payments on wasted oil and gas
when waste occurs, in accordance with
the MLA’s assessment of royalties on all
‘‘production removed or sold from the
lease.’’ 32 Furthermore, FOGRMA
expressly makes lessees ‘‘liable for
royalty payments on oil or gas lost or
wasted from a lease site when such loss
or waste is due to negligence on the part
of the operator of the lease, or due to the
failure to comply with any rule or
regulation, order or citation issued
under [FOGRMA] or any mineral leasing
law.’’ 33
In addition, on August 16, 2022,
President Biden signed the IRA into
law. Section 50263 of the IRA, which is
entitled ‘‘Royalties on All Extracted
Methane,’’ provides that, for leases
issued after August 16, 2022, royalties
are owed on all gas produced from
Federal land, including gas that is
consumed or lost by venting, flaring, or
negligent releases through any
equipment during upstream operations.
This section further provides three
exceptions to the general obligation to
pay royalties on produced gas, namely
on: ‘‘(1) gas vented or flared for not
longer than 48 hours in an emergency
situation that poses a danger to human
health, safety, or the environment; (2)
gas used or consumed within the area of
the lease, unit, or communitized area for
the benefit of the lease, unit, or
communitized area; or, (3) gas that is
unavoidably lost.’’ 34
The BLM’s authority to regulate the
waste of Federal oil and gas is not
limited to operations that occur on
Federal lands, but also extends to
operations on non-Federal lands where
Federal oil and gas is produced under
a unit or communitization agreement
(CA). ‘‘For the purpose of more properly
conserving the natural resources of any
oil or gas pool, field, or like area,’’ the
MLA authorizes lessees to operate their
leases under a cooperative or unit plan
of development and operation if the
Secretary of the Interior determines
such an arrangement to be necessary or
advisable in the public interest.35 The
Secretary is authorized, with the
consent of the lessees involved, to
establish or alter drilling, producing,
and royalty requirements and to make
such regulations with respect to the
leases under a cooperative or unit
plan.36 The MLA states that a
cooperative or unit plan of development
may contain a provision authorizing the
Secretary to regulate the rate of
development and the rate of
production.37 Accordingly, the BLM’s
standard form unit agreement provides
that the BLM may regulate the quantity
and rate of production in the interest of
conservation.38 The BLM’s standard
form CA provides that the BLM ‘‘shall
have the right of supervision over all fee
and state mineral operations within the
communitized area to the extent
necessary to monitor production and
measurement, and to assure that no
avoidable loss of hydrocarbons occurs
. . . .’’ 39 As noted earlier, FOGRMA
authorizes the BLM to assess royalties
on gas lost or wasted from a ‘‘lease site.’’
The term ‘‘lease site’’ is broadly defined
in FOGRMA as any lands or submerged
lands, including the surface of a severed
mineral estate, on which exploration
for, or extraction or removal of, oil or
gas is authorized pursuant to a lease.40
The BLM maintains the authority to
34 30
35 30
U.S.C. 1727.
U.S.C. 226(m).
36 Id.
37 Id.
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38 43
(FLPMA); 25 U.S.C. 396d (IMLA); 25 U.S.C. 2107
(IMDA); 25 U.S.C. 396.
29 See, e.g., California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384,
388 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (noting that the MLA was
‘‘intended to promote wise development of . . .
natural resources and to obtain for the public a
reasonable financial return on assets that ‘belong’ to
the public’’).
30 30 U.S.C. 225.
31 30 U.S.C. 187.
32 30 U.S.C. 226(b)(1)(A).
33 30 U.S.C. 1756.
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CFR 3186.1, ¶ 21.
‘‘BLM Manual 3160–9–Communitization,’’
Appendix 1, ¶ 12.
40 See 30 U.S.C. 1702(6); Maralex Resources, Inc.
v. Bernhardt, 913 F.3d 1189, 1200 (10th Cir. 2019)
(‘‘the statutory definition of ‘lease site’ necessarily
includes any lands, including privately-owned
lands, on which [production] of oil or gas is
occurring pursuant to a communitization
agreement’’). Additionally, FOGRMA defines ‘‘oil
and gas’’ broadly to mean ‘‘any oil or gas originating
from, or allocated to, the Outer Continental Shelf,
Federal, or Indian lands.’’ 30 U.S.C. 1702(9)
(emphasis added).
39 See
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25383
regulate the waste of Federal minerals
from operations on those lands by
requiring royalty payments and setting
appropriate rates of development and
production.41
2. Authority Regarding Environmental
Impacts to the Public Lands
In addition to ensuring that the public
receives a pecuniary benefit from oil
and gas production from public lands,
the BLM is also tasked with regulating
the physical impacts of oil and gas
development on public lands. The MLA
directs the Secretary to ‘‘regulate all
surface-disturbing activities conducted
pursuant to any lease’’ and to
‘‘determine reclamation and other
actions as required in the interest of
conservation of surface resources.’’ 42
The MLA requires oil and gas leases
to include provisions ‘‘for the protection
of the interests of the United States . . .
and for the safeguarding of the public
welfare,’’ including lease terms for
purposes other than safeguarding the
public resource of oil and gas.43 The
Secretary may suspend lease operations
‘‘in the interest of conservation of
natural resources,’’ a phrase that
encompasses not just conservation of
mineral deposits, but also preventing
environmental harm.44 The MLA
additionally requires oil and gas leases
to contain ‘‘a provision that such rules
for the safety and welfare of the miners
41 This conclusion is consistent with the
assessment of the BLM’s authority expressed by the
court that vacated the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule.
See Wyoming 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1081–85.
42 30 U.S.C. 226(g).
43 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 936 n.17 (D.D.C. 1978).
The BLM acknowledges that the court that vacated
the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule stated that ‘‘it is
not a reasonable interpretation of BLM’s general
authority under the MLA to ‘safeguard[ ] the public
welfare’ as empowering the agency to regulate air
emissions, particularly when Congress expressly
delegated such authority to the EPA under the
[Clean Air Act].’’ Wyoming 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1067.
The BLM further notes that the court that vacated
the BLM’s rescission of the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule found that the rescission failed to satisfy the
BLM’s ‘‘statutory obligation’’ to ‘‘safeguard[ ] the
public welfare,’’ and stated that the MLA’s ‘‘public
welfare’’ provision supports the BLM’s
consideration of air emissions in promulgating its
waste prevention regulations. See California v.
Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 616 (N.D. Cal.
2020). The BLM need not elaborate on the meaning
of the MLA’s ‘‘public welfare’’ provision in this
rulemaking, as the BLM is proposing requirements
that are independently justified as waste prevention
measures and are not for environmental purposes.
The one exception is § 3179.50, which does serve
an environmental purpose, but is an exercise of the
Secretary’s authority to prescribe ‘‘rules for the
safety and welfare of the miners’’ under 30 U.S.C.
187.
44 30 U.S.C. 209; see also, e.g., Copper Valley
Machine Works v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 601 &
nn.7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hoyl v. Babbitt, 129 F.3d
1377, 1380 (10th Cir. 1997); Getty Oil Co. v. Clark,
614 F. Supp. 904, 916 (D. Wyo. 1985).
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. . . as may be prescribed by the
Secretary shall be observed.’’ 45
Accordingly, the Department’s
regulations governing oil and gas
operations on the public lands have
long required operators to conduct
operations in a manner that is protective
of natural resources, environmental
quality, and the health and safety of
workers.46
FLPMA authorizes the BLM to
‘‘regulate’’ the ‘‘use, occupancy, and
development’’ of the public lands via
‘‘published rules.’’ 47 FLPMA also
mandates that the Secretary, ‘‘[i]n
managing the public lands . . . shall, by
regulation or otherwise, take any action
necessary to prevent unnecessary or
undue degradation of the lands.’’ 48 In
addition, section 102 of FLPMA
declares a policy that the BLM should
both protect the environment, as stated
in paragraph 102(a)(8), and manage the
land in such a manner as to provide for
‘‘domestic sources of minerals’’ and
other resources, as stated in paragraph
102(a)(12).49 With respect to protecting
the environment, paragraph 102(a)(8)
states the policy of the United States
that lands be managed to ‘‘protect the
quality of scientific, scenic, historical,
ecological, environmental, air and
atmospheric, water resources, and
archeological values . . . .’’ 50
FLPMA also requires the BLM to
manage public lands under principles of
multiple use and sustained yield.51 The
statutory definition of ‘‘multiple use’’
explicitly includes the consideration of
environmental resources. ‘‘Multiple
use’’ is a ‘‘combination of balanced and
diverse resource uses that takes into
account the long-term needs of future
generations for renewable and
nonrenewable resources . . . .’’ 52
‘‘Multiple use’’ also requires resources
to be managed in a ‘‘harmonious and
coordinated’’ manner ‘‘without
permanent impairment to the
productivity of the land and the quality
of the environment . . . .’’ 53
Significantly, FLPMA directs the
Secretary to consider ‘‘the relative
values of the resources and not
necessarily . . . the combination of uses
45 30
U.S.C. 187.
43 CFR 3162.5–1, 3162.5–3. The BLM
promulgated those regulations in 1982. 47 FR 47765
(1982).
47 43 U.S.C. 1732(b).
48 Id.
49 43 U.S.C. 1701; Theodore Roosevelt
Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 605 F. Supp. 2d
263, 281–82 (D.D.C. 2009).
50 43 U.S.C. 1701(a)(8); but see 43 U.S.C. 1701(b).
51 Id. at 1702(c), 1732(a).
52 43 U.S.C. 1702(c).
53 Id.
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that will give the greatest economic
return or the greatest unit output.’’ 54
The Secretary’s management and
regulation of Indian mineral interests
carries with it the duty to act as a trustee
for the benefit of the Indian mineral
owners.55 Congress has directed the
Secretary to ‘‘aggressively carry out [her]
trust responsibility in the
administration of Indian oil and gas.’’ 56
In furtherance of her trust obligations,
the Secretary has delegated regulatory
authority for administering operations
on Indian oil and gas leases to the
BLM,57 which has developed
specialized expertise through regulating
the production of oil and gas from
public lands administered by the
Department. In choosing from among
reasonable regulatory alternatives for
Indian mineral development, the BLM is
obligated to adopt the alternative that is
in the best interest of the Tribe and
individual Indian mineral owners.58
What is in the best interest of the Tribe
and individual Indian mineral owners is
determined by a consideration of all
relevant factors, including economic
considerations as well as potential
environmental and social effects.59
C. Regulatory History
The BLM has a long history of
regulating venting and flaring from
onshore oil and gas operations. This
section summarizes the BLM’s historic
practices, as well as the BLM’s
experience in two recent rulemakings
related to venting and flaring.
8. Early Regulation of Surface Waste of
Gas
The Department of the Interior has
maintained regulations addressing the
waste of gas through venting and flaring
from onshore oil and gas leases since
1938. At that time, the Department’s
regulations required the United States to
be compensated ‘‘at full value’’ for ‘‘all
gas wasted by blowing, release, escape
into the air, or otherwise,’’ except where
such disposal was authorized under the
laws of the United States and the State
in which it occurred.60 The regulations
further provided that the production of
oil or gas from the lease was to be
restricted to such amounts as could be
54 Id.
55 See Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Department of
Interior, 47 F.3d 1032, 1038 (10th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
56 30 U.S.C. 1701(a)(4).
57 235 DM 1.1.K.
58 See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy
Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1567 (10th Cir. 1984)
(Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), adopted as majority opinion as modified en
banc, 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986).
59 See 25 CFR 211.3.
60 30 CFR 221.5(h) (1938).
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put to beneficial use and that, in order
to avoid the excessive production of oil
or gas, the Secretary could limit the rate
of production based on the market
demand for oil or the market demand
for gas.61
By 1942, the Department’s regulations
contained a definition of ‘‘waste of oil
or gas.’’ This definition included the
‘‘physical waste of oil or gas,’’ which
was defined as ‘‘the loss or destruction
of oil or gas after recovery thereof such
as to prevent proper utilization and
beneficial use thereof, and the loss of oil
or gas prior to recovery thereof by
isolation or entrapment, by migration,
by premature release of natural gas from
solution in oil, or in any other manner
such as to render impracticable the
recovery of such oil or gas.’’ 62 The
regulations stated that a lessee was
‘‘obligated to prevent the waste of oil or
gas’’ and, in order to avoid the physical
waste of gas, the lessee was required to
‘‘consume it beneficially or market it or
return it to the productive formation.’’ 63
The regulations stated that
‘‘unavoidably lost’’ gas was not subject
to royalty, though the regulations did
not define ‘‘unavoidably lost.’’ 64
In 1974, the Secretary issued NTL–4,
which established the following policy
for royalties on gas production: Gas
production subject to royalty shall
include: (1) that gas (both dry and
casing-head) which is produced and
sold either on a lease basis or that which
is allocated to a lease under the terms
of an approved communitization or
unitization agreement; (2) that gas
which is vented or flared in well tests
(drill-stem, completion, or production)
on a lease, communitized tract, or
unitized area; and, (3) that gas which is
otherwise vented or flared on a lease,
communitized tract, or unitized area
with the prior written authorization of
the Area Oil and Gas Supervisor
(Supervisor).65
NTL–4 thus effectively required
onshore oil and gas lessees to pay
royalties on all gas produced, including
gas that was unavoidably lost or used
for production purposes. Various oil
and gas companies sought judicial
review of NTL–4. In 1978, the U.S.
District Court for the District of
Wyoming overturned NTL–4, holding
that the MLA does not authorize the
collection of royalties on gas production
61 Id.
221.27.
CFR 221.6(n) (1942).
63 Id. 221.35.
64 Id. 221.44.
65 See 44 FR 76600 (Dec. 27, 1979).
62 30
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that is unavoidably lost or used in lease
operations.66
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2. NTL–4A
From January 1980 to January 2017,
the Department of the Interior’s
instructions governing the venting and
flaring of gas from onshore oil and gas
leases were contained in ‘‘Notice to
Lessees and Operators of Onshore
Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases:
Royalty or Compensation for Oil and
Gas Lost’’ (‘‘NTL–4A’’).67 NTL–4A was
issued by the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS), which was the Interior bureau
tasked with oversight of Federal onshore
oil and gas production at the time.
Under NTL–4A, operators were
required to pay royalties on ‘‘avoidably
lost’’ gas—i.e., gas lost due to the
operator’s negligence, failure to take
reasonable precautions to prevent or
control the loss, or failure to comply
with lease terms, regulations, or BLM
orders. NTL–4A expressly authorized
royalty-free venting and flaring ‘‘on a
short-term basis’’ during emergencies,
well purging and evaluation tests, initial
production tests, and routine and
special well tests. NTL–4A prohibited
the flaring of gas from gas wells under
any other circumstances. For gas
produced from oil wells, however,
NTL–4A authorized (but did not
mandate) the BLM to approve flaring
where conservation of the gas was not
‘‘economically justified’’ because it
would ‘‘lead to the premature
abandonment of recoverable oil reserves
and ultimately to a greater loss of
equivalent energy than would be
recovered if the venting or flaring were
permitted to continue . . . .’’ 68 NTL–
4A stated that, ‘‘when evaluating the
feasibility of requiring conservation of
the gas, the total leasehold production,
including oil and gas, as well as the
economics of a field-wide plan,’’ must
be considered. Finally, under NTL–4A,
the loss of gas vapors from storage tanks
was considered ‘‘unavoidably lost,’’
unless the BLM ‘‘determine[d] that the
recovery of such vapors would be
warranted . . . .’’ 69
Soon after issuing NTL–4A, the USGS
issued guidelines and procedures for
implementing NTL–4A, which were
published in the Conservation Division
Manual (CDM) Part 644, Chapter 5.70
Among other things, the CDM provided
66 Marathon Oil Co. v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 548,
553 (D. Wyo. 1978).
67 44 FR 76600 (Dec. 27, 1979).
68 Id. at 76601 (Dec. 27, 1979).
69 Id.
70 Geological Survey Conservation Division
Manual, Part 644 Producing Operations Chapter 5
Waste Prevention/Beneficial Use, 6–23–80 (Release
No. 68).
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guidance regarding applications to flare
oil-well gas. Specifically, the CDM
provided guidance for responding to a
lessee’s contention ‘‘that reserves of
casinghead gas are inadequate to
support the installation of facilities for
gas collection and sale . . . .’’ 71 The
CDM explained that, ‘‘[f]rom an
economic basis, all leasehold
production must be considered; the
major concern is profitable operation of
the lease, not just profitable disposition
of the gas.’’ 72 The CDM further
explained that the ‘‘economics of
conserving gas must be on a field-wide
basis, and the Supervisor must consider
the feasibility of a joint operation
between all other lessees/operators in
the field or area.’’ 73 Thus, the economic
standard for obtaining approval to flare
oil-well gas under NTL–4A was on its
face a demanding one. The fact that the
capture and sale of oil-well gas from an
individual lease would not pay for itself
was not sufficient to justify royalty-free
flaring of the gas.
The CDM also provided guidance for
venting and flaring situations involving
both Federal and non-Federal lands. In
such cases, the BLM was directed to
contact the appropriate State agency to
work jointly for optimum gas
conservation. However, where such a
cooperative effort was not possible, the
BLM was directed to ‘‘proceed
unilaterally to take action to prevent
unnecessary venting or flaring from
Federal lands.’’
Under the plain terms of NTL–4A,
flaring without prior approval (outside
of the short-term circumstances
specified in Sections II and III of NTL–
4A) constituted a royalty-bearing loss of
gas, regardless of the economic
circumstances. The BLM originally
applied NTL–4A to that effect, and this
practice was upheld by the Interior
Board of Land Appeals. See Lomax
Exploration Co., 105 IBLA 1 (1988).
However, the BLM changed this policy
in Instruction Memorandum No. 87–652
(Aug. 17, 1987), which required the
BLM to provide an operator with
an207pportuneity to demonstrate, after
the fact, that capturing the gas was not
economically justified. See Ladd
Petroleum Corp., 107 IBLA 5 (1989).
Even so, the number of applications
for royalty-free flaring received by the
BLM increased dramatically between
2005 and 2016: in 2005, the BLM
received just 75 applications to vent or
flare gas, while in 2015 it received 2,901
71 Id.
at 644.53F.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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applications.74 The following table
shows the number of applications to
vent or flare gas received by the BLM
through 2021, but it does not reflect
when the venting or flaring occurred.75
Year
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Number of
applications
received to
vent or
flare gas
................................
................................
................................
................................
................................
................................
................................
2,900
2,637
2,162
2,095
2,901
2,386
922
Both the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule
and the 2018 Revision Rule would have
dispensed with case-by-case flaring
approvals, but because those rules were
both struck down, post-2016 flaring
application data does not provide a
useful comparison between the 2016
Waste Prevention Rule and NTL–4A. In
addition, there is no useful comparison
because the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule
was never in effect and the 2018
revision rule was in effect for less than
2 years. Most of the applications to flare
royalty-free were submitted to the field
offices in New Mexico, Montana, and
the Dakotas, which oversee Federal and
Indian mineral interests in
unconventional plays where oil
production is accompanied by large
volumes of associated gas. Notably, the
vast majority of these applications
involved wells that were connected to a
gas pipeline but flared due to pipeline
capacity constraints.
3. 2016 Waste Prevention Rule
On November 18, 2016, the BLM
issued a final rule intended to reduce
the waste of Federal and Indian gas
through venting, flaring, and leaks
(‘‘2016 Waste Prevention Rule’’).76 The
2016 Waste Prevention Rule replaced
NTL–4A and became effective on
January 17, 2017. The BLM’s
development of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule was prompted by a
74 Following publication of the proposed rule, the
BLM re-queried the Automated Fluid Minerals
Support System (AFMSS) to obtain the number of
venting and flaring sundry notices in the database.
The number of sundry notices has been updated in
the final rule to reflect the updated query.
75 The BLM applies the venting and flaring rule
that was in effect at the time the flaring occurred,
not when the application was received, which may
be later in time than the flaring, even years later.
See, e.g., Ladd Petroleum Corp., 107 IBLA 5 (1989).
The application, therefore, does not provide for
straightforward comparison of the effects of
regulatory changes, particularly given recent court
orders setting aside the BLM’s rules in this sphere.
76 81 FR 83008 (Nov. 18, 2016).
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combination of factors, including the
substantial increase in flaring over the
previous decade, the growing number of
applications to vent or flare royalty-free,
new information regarding the
quantities of gas lost through venting
and leaks, and concerns expressed by
oversight entities such as the U.S.
Government Accountability Office
(GAO).77
The 2016 Waste Prevention Rule
applied to all onshore Federal and
Indian oil and gas leases, units, and
communitized areas. The key
components of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule were:
• A requirement that APDs be
accompanied by a WMP that would
detail anticipated gas production and
opportunities to conserve the gas;
• A provision specifying the various
circumstances under which a loss of oil
or gas would be ‘‘avoidably lost’’ and
therefore royalty-bearing;
• A requirement that operators
capture (rather than flare) a certain
percentage of the gas they produce;
• Equipment requirements for
pneumatic controllers, pneumatic
diaphragm pumps, and storage vessels
(tanks); and
• LDAR provisions requiring
semiannual lease site inspections, the
use of specified instruments and
methods, and recordkeeping and
reporting.
The rule’s ‘‘capture percentage’’
requirements were intended to address
the routine flaring of gas from oil wells.
The rule required an operator to
capture, rather than flare, a certain
percentage of the gas produced from the
operator’s ‘‘development oil wells.’’ The
required capture percentage would
increase over a 10-year period, starting
at 85 percent in 2018 and ultimately
reaching 98 percent in 2026. Gas flared
in excess of the capture requirements
would be royalty bearing.
In the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule,
the BLM recognized that the EPA had
promulgated emissions limitations for
pneumatic equipment and storage tanks
as well as LDAR requirements for new
and modified sources in the oil and gas
production sector pursuant to its
authority under the Clean Air Act
(CAA). The BLM further recognized that
those EPA requirements would have the
effect of reducing the waste of gas from
leases subject to those requirements. In
order to avoid unnecessary duplication
77 Id. at 83014–83017; GAO, ‘‘Federal Oil and Gas
Leases—Opportunities Exist to Capture Vented and
Flared Gas, Which Would Increase Royalty
Payments and Reduce Greenhouse Gases’’ (Oct.
2010); GAO, ‘‘OIL AND GAS—Interior Could Do
More to Account for and Manage Natural Gas
Emissions’’ (July 2016).
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or conflict between the BLM and EPA
regulations, the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule allowed for operators to comply
with the analogous EPA regulations as
an alternative means of compliance with
BLM’s requirements.78
The capture percentage, pneumatic
equipment, storage tanks, and LDAR
requirements of the 2016 Rule were
each subject to phase-in periods, and
the rule allowed operators to obtain
exemptions or reduced requirements
where compliance would ‘‘cause the
operator to cease production and
abandon significant recoverable oil
reserves under the lease.’’ 79 The BLM’s
RIA for the 2016 Waste Prevention rule
estimated that the rule would impose
costs of between $110 million and $275
million per year, while generating
benefits of between $20 million and
$157 million per year worth of
additional gas captured and between
$189 million and $247 million per year
in quantified social benefits (in the form
of forgone methane emissions).80
Certain States and operators filed
petitions for judicial review of the
Waste Prevention Rule in the U.S.
District Court for the District of
Wyoming.81 Following the change in
Administration in January 2017, the
litigation was effectively paused in
response to the BLM’s administrative
actions to suspend the rule. After those
actions were invalidated by a different
court,82 the Wyoming court stayed
implementation of the capture
percentage, pneumatic equipment,
storage tank, and LDAR requirements,
and stayed the litigation pending
finalization of the BLM’s voluntary
78 See 81 FR 83008, 83018–19, 83085–89 (Nov.
18, 2016).
79 See 81 FR 83082–88 (Nov. 18, 2016).
80 BLM (2016). Regulatory Impact Analysis for:
Revisions to 43 CFR 3100 (Onshore Oil and Gas
Leasing) and 43 CFR 3600 (Onshore Oil and Gas
Operations) Additions of 43 CFR 3178 (Royalty-Free
Use of Lease Production) and 43 CFR 3179 (Waste
Prevention and Resource Conservation). p. 4–5.
Available at https://www.regulations.gov/
document/BLM-2016-0001-9127.
81 Wyoming v. DOI, Case No. 2:16–cv–00285–
SWS (D. Wyo.).
82 See California v. BLM, No. 3:17–CV–03804–
EDL (N.D. Cal.); Sierra Club v. Zinke, No. 3:17–CV–
03885–EDL (N.D. Cal.). On June 15, 2017, the BLM
announced that it would postpone the January 17,
2018, compliance dates to phase-in certain parts of
the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule. Wyoming at 1053.
Several Intervenors-Respondents from the Wyoming
litigation, as well as the Attorney Generals from the
States of California and New Mexico challenged the
BLM’s 2017 postponement decision in the
aforementioned cases in the Northern District of
California. Id. at 1053–54. This California district
court held that the BLM’s 2017 postponement
notice was invalid, thereby resulting in the
reinstatement of the phase-in dates for certain parts
of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule. Id. at 1054.
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revision of the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule.
4. 2018 Revision of Waste Prevention
Rule
On September 28, 2018, the BLM
issued a final rule substantially revising
the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule (‘‘2018
Revision Rule’’).83 In the 2018 Revision
Rule, the BLM rescinded the WMP, gas
capture percentage, pneumatic
equipment, storage tank, and LDAR
requirements of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. The BLM also revised
the remaining provisions of the rule to
largely reflect the language of NTL–4A.
Finally, the BLM established a new
policy of deferring to State regulations
for determining when the routine flaring
of oil-well gas is royalty-free.
In the 2018 Revision Rule, the BLM
concluded that the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule exceeded the BLM’s
statutory authority by imposing
requirements with compliance costs that
exceed the value of the gas that would
be conserved, thus violating the nonstatutory ‘‘prudent operator’’ standard
that some believed to have been
implicitly incorporated into the MLA
when it was adopted in 1920. The BLM
also stated that the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule created a risk of
premature shut-ins of marginal wells,
reasoning that the compliance costs
associated with the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule would represent a
significant proportion of a marginal
well’s revenue. Contrary to what the
BLM had found in 2016, the BLM stated
in the 2018 Revision Rule that existing
State flaring regulations provided
sufficient assurance against excessive
flaring.
The RIA for the 2018 Revision Rule
found that the economic benefits of the
2018 Revision Rule (i.e., reduced
compliance costs) would significantly
outweigh its economic costs (i.e.,
forgone gas production and additional
methane emissions).84 This result was
based in large part on the use of a
narrowly defined ‘‘domestic’’ social cost
of methane metric. That metric
purported to capture domestic methane
costs. However, because it focused on
impacts within U.S. borders, it
underestimated the full benefits of GHG
mitigation accruing to U.S. citizens and
residents and thus drastically reduced
the monetized climate benefits of the
2016 Waste Prevention Rule relative to
83 83
FR 49184 (Sept. 28, 2018).
(2018). Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
Final Rule to Rescind or Revise Certain
Requirements of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule.
p. 2–4. Available at https://www.regulations.gov/
document/BLM-2018-0001-223607.
84 BLM
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what had been estimated in the RIA for
the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule.85
5. Judicial Review of the Revision Rule
In September 2018, a coalition of
organizations and the States of
California and New Mexico filed
lawsuits challenging the 2018 Revision
Rule in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California. On July
15, 2020, the district court ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs. California v. Bernhardt,
472 F. Supp. 3d 573 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
The court found that:
• The BLM’s interpretation of its
statutory authority in the 2018 Revision
Rule was unjustifiably limited, failed to
require lessees to use all reasonable
precautions to prevent waste, and failed
to meet the BLM’s statutory mandate to
protect the public welfare;
• The BLM’s decision to defer to State
flaring regulations was not supported by
sufficient analysis or record evidence;
• The record did not support the
BLM’s claims that the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule posed excessive
regulatory burdens and that its costs
outweighed its benefits; and
• The BLM’s cost-benefit analysis
underlying the rule was flawed for a
variety of reasons, including that the use
of a ‘‘domestic’’ social cost of methane
was unreasonable and not based on the
best available science.
The court ordered that the 2018
Revision Rule be vacated in its
entirety.86
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6. Judicial Review of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule
Following the decision in California
v. Bernhardt, the Wyoming court lifted
the stay on the litigation over the 2016
Waste Prevention Rule. In the briefing,
the Department of the Interior confessed
error on the grounds that the BLM
exceeded its statutory authority and was
‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ in
promulgating the rule. In October 2020,
the district court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, finding that the BLM had
exceeded its statutory authority and had
been arbitrary and capricious in
promulgating the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1046 (D.
Wyo. 2020). Specifically, the court
found that the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule was essentially an air quality
regulation and that the BLM had
usurped the authority to regulate air
emissions that Congress had granted to
EPA and the States in the CAA. The
85 See California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d
573, 611 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
86 However, the court stayed vacatur until
October 13, 2020.
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court found that the rule was not
independently justified as a wasteprevention measure under the MLA.
Rather, in the court’s view, the record
reflected that the BLM’s primary
concern was regulating methane
emissions from existing oil and gas
sources. The court faulted the BLM’s
rulemaking for imposing requirements
beyond what could be expected of a
‘‘prudent operator’’ that develops the
lease for the mutual profit of lessee and
lessor. Finally, the court faulted the
BLM for applying air quality
regulations—as opposed to wasteprevention regulations—to unit and CA
operations on non-Federal lands. The
court ordered that the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule be vacated, thereby
reinstating NTL–4A as the BLM’s
standard for managing venting and
flaring from Federal oil and gas leases.
7. The Inflation Reduction Act
On August 16, 2022, President Biden
signed the IRA into law.87 The IRA
contains a suite of provisions addressing
onshore and offshore oil and gas
development under Federal leases. For
example, section 50265, inter alia,
requires the Department to maintain a
certain level of onshore oil and gas
leasing activity as a prerequisite to
approving renewable energy rights-ofway on Federal lands. Importantly, that
provision of the IRA is accompanied by
other provisions that serve to ensure
that lessees pay fair and appropriate
compensation to the Federal
Government in exchange for the
opportunity to conduct their industrial
activities under Federal leases.
One such provision of the Act is
section 50263, which is entitled,
‘‘Royalties on All Extracted
Methane.’’ 88 Consistent with the MLA’s
assessment of royalties on all gas
‘‘removed or sold from the lease’’ 89 and
FOGRMA’s requirement that lessees pay
royalties on lost or wasted gas,90 section
50263 of the IRA provides that, for
leases issued after the date of enactment
of the Act, royalties are owed on all gas
produced from Federal land, including
gas that is consumed or lost by venting,
flaring, or negligent releases through
any equipment during upstream
operations. Section 50263 further
provides three exceptions to the general
obligation to pay royalties on produced
gas, namely: (1) gas that is vented or
flared for not longer than 48 hours in an
emergency situation that poses a danger
to human health, safety, or the
Law 117–169.
U.S.C. 1727.
89 30 U.S.C. 226(b).
90 30 U.S.C. 1756.
environment; (2) gas used or consumed
within a lease, unit, or communitized
area for the benefit of the lease, unit, or
communitized area; and, (3) gas that is
unavoidably lost.91
The BLM has for decades assessed
royalties on upstream production and
has exempted from royalties gas lost in
emergency situations, ‘‘beneficial use’’
gas, and ‘‘unavoidably lost’’ gas. IRA
section 50263 is consistent with the
BLM’s prior agency practice regarding
emergency situations, beneficial use,
and the unavoidable loss of gas, and it
provides additional support for the
approach set forth in this proposed rule.
Importantly, IRA section 50263
confirms that the concepts of
‘‘avoidable’’ and ‘‘unavoidable’’ loss are
appropriate for assessing royalties.
Section 50263 also confirms that the
United States’ pecuniary interest in
regulating losses extends to those from
upstream equipment. But the IRA leaves
certain questions open, such as what
losses qualify as ‘‘unavoidably lost’’ and
what qualifies as an ‘‘emergency
situation.’’ Congress thus has left it to
the BLM, as an exercise of the agency’s
expertise and judgment, to determine
answers to the specific questions the
IRA leaves open. As set forth below, this
final rule addresses these questions in a
manner that is consistent with the IRA’s
focus on (and the MLA’s and
FOGRMA’s pre-existing emphasis on)
ensuring that Federal lessees pay fair
and appropriate compensation to the
Federal Government in exchange for the
opportunity to conduct their industrial
activities under Federal leases.
D. The Final Rule
The BLM has authority under the
MLA to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary ‘‘for the
prevention of undue waste’’ 92 and to
ensure that lessees ‘‘use all reasonable
precautions to prevent waste of oil or
gas.’’ 93 For many years, the BLM has
implemented this authority through
restrictions on the venting and flaring of
gas from onshore Federal oil and gas
leases. However, as illustrated by the
judicial decisions noted previously,
before the IRA’s enactment, courts
disagreed about the full scope of the
BLM’s authority to regulate venting and
flaring. Requirements that one court
might consider necessary for the BLM to
meet its statutory mandates might have
been seen as regulatory overreach by
another court. Consistent with the
approach outlined in the proposed rule,
and in light of all the statutory
87 Public
88 30
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91 30
U.S.C. 1727.
U.S.C. 187.
93 30 U.S.C. 225.
92 30
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authorities including the IRA, the BLM
has chosen to focus on improving upon
NTL–4A in a variety of ways without
advancing elements of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule that were the subject of
certain judicial criticism.
As explained in more detail below
and in Section IV, the Section-bySection Discussion, this final rule makes
substantial improvements in addressing
the waste of Federal and Indian gas,
while also addressing the Wyoming
court’s criticisms of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. First, the requirements
unambiguously constitute reasonable
waste prevention measures that should
be expected of an operator. The
requirements impose fewer overall costs
than those of the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule and ensure either actual
conservation of gas that would
otherwise be wasted or compensation to
the public and Indian mineral owners
through royalty payments when gas is
wasted. This contrasts with certain
provisions in the 2016 Rule that would
have reduced pollution—but not
necessarily reduced waste—by allowing
operators to comply with analogous
EPA standards in place of the BLM
requirements.
Second, to address the Wyoming
court’s ruling that the BLM’s authority
regarding unit and CA operations on
non-Federal and non-Indian surface is
limited, certain requirements in this
final rule are narrower in scope than
similar requirements in the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. Specifically, the final
rule’s requirements pertaining to safety,
storage tanks, and LDAR apply only to
operations on Federal or Indian surface
estates.
Third, the requirements are consistent
with the ‘‘prudent operator’’ standard as
that term has been applied in the oil and
gas jurisprudence.
Fourth, the final rule has been
developed with an eye towards avoiding
excessive compliance burdens on
marginal wells.
Finally, the BLM is expressly
excluding the social cost of greenhouse
gases from its decisions on any of the
proposed waste prevention
requirements, thereby addressing the
Wyoming court’s concern that the 2016
Rule was inappropriately supported by
‘‘climate change benefits.’’
The provisions of this final rule serve
straightforward waste prevention
objectives by promoting gas
conservation. To avoid situations where
oil-well development outpaces the
capacity of the available gas capture
infrastructure, the BLM is requiring
operators to submit either a WMP,
including certification of a valid,
executed contract to sell the associated
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gas, or a self-certification of 100 percent
capture of associated gas with oil-well
APDs. The BLM recognizes that not all
venting and flaring can be prevented. In
the circumstances in which some
venting or flaring cannot be prevented
(e.g., initial production tests or
emergencies), the BLM is establishing
appropriate time or volume limits on
royalty-free venting or flaring. The BLM
is addressing the problem of
intermittent flaring due to pipeline
capacity constraints by establishing a
volume limit based on oil production
for royalty-free flaring caused by
inadequate capture infrastructure.
Requiring royalty payments on venting
and flaring that exceeds the established
limits will both discourage waste and
ensure that Federal and Indian royalty
revenues are not reduced by an
operator’s wasteful practices. The BLM
estimates that the royalty-free flaring
limits of the final rule would generate
$51 million per year in additional
royalties. See section 7.6 of the RIA for
more information.
This final rule also contains LDAR
provisions intended to reduce losses of
natural gas. Unlike the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule—which extended these
requirements to State and private
surface estates in certain situations—the
requirements in this final rule apply
only to operations on the Federal or
Indian surface estate, where the BLM
has express authority and responsibility
to regulate for safety, the prevention of
waste, and the payment of Federal or
Indian royalties. These requirements
would not apply to operations that
occur on State or private surface tracts
committed to a Federal unit or CA. The
BLM estimates that the requirements of
this final rule regarding LDAR would
result in the conservation of up to 0.5
Bcf of gas each year.
The BLM acknowledges that the
contents of this final rule differ in some
regards from the 2018 Revision Rule’s
narrower interpretation of the BLM’s
statutory authority.94 Consistent with
the BLM’s understanding of its authority
for decades prior to 2018, the BLM has
reconsidered the relevant conclusions of
the 2018 Revision Rule and now rejects
those conclusions for the following
reasons. To begin, nothing in the MLA’s
plain text—which requires lessees to
take ‘‘all reasonable precautions to
prevent waste’’ and to abide by rules
and regulations issued ‘‘for the
prevention of undue waste’’—suggests
that the BLM’s authority is limited to
the promulgation of rules that
effectively pay for themselves (as
measured by balancing compliance
94 See
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Frm 00012
Fmt 4701
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costs against the value of the recovered
gas).95 Consistent with this text, the
BLM’s longstanding policy governing
venting and flaring has assessed the
economic feasibility of gas conservation
in the context of ‘‘the total leasehold
production, including oil and gas, as
well as the economics of a field-wide
plan.’’ See supra, Part III.C.2. As the
CDM made clear, the BLM’s concern
under the MLA for nearly four decades
prior to the 2018 Revision Rule was
‘‘profitable operation of the lease, not
just profitable disposition of the gas.’’
Despite suggestions to the contrary in
the 2018 Revision Rule, the focus of the
final rule on overall ultimate resource
recovery, not lessee profits vis-a`-vis
wasted gas, is consistent with the nonstatutory ‘‘prudent operator’’ standard.
While the prudent operator standard
rests on an expectation of ‘‘mutually
profitable development of the lease’s
mineral resources,’’ 96 it does not follow
that lessees can maximize their profit by
wasting recoverable hydrocarbon
resources without regard for the lessor’s
lost royalty revenues or the lessor’s
interest in conserving the gas for future
disposition. To the contrary, lessees
have an obligation of reasonable
diligence in the development of the
leased resources, rooted in due regard
for the interests of both the lessee and
the lessor.97 And in the MLA, FOGRMA,
and the IRA, Congress enshrined the
United States’ interest, as a mineral
lessor, in avoiding waste and
maximizing royalty revenues.98 The
BLM, in managing oil and gas resources
on behalf of the United States, may
value more production—considering
both oil and gas production—over a
95 30 U.S.C. 187, 225. Indeed, such a requirement
would imperil nearly all operational regulations.
96 Wyoming at 1072.
97 See Id.; see also Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v.
Bishop, 441 P.2d 436, 447 (Okla. 1967)
(‘‘Necessarily, we determine the lessee was acting
prudently when he ascertained that it was illegal
and improper to flare gas in the quantities shown
by the evidence, in order to produce the
unallocated allowable of oil.’’); Tr. Co. of Chicago
v. Samedan Oil Corp., 192 F.2d 282, 284 (10th Cir.
1951) (‘‘A first consideration is the precept that a
prudent operator may not act only for his selfinterest. He must not forget that the primary
consideration to the lessor for the lease is royalty
from the production of the lease free of cost of
development and operation.’’).
98 See 30 U.S.C. 187, 225, 226(m), 1756; see also
California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir.
1961) (‘‘[The Secretary] has a responsibility to
insure that these resources are not physically
wasted and that their extraction accords with
prudent principles of conservation. To protect the
public’s royalty interest he may determine that
minerals are being sold at less than reasonable
value. Under existing regulations he can restrict a
lessee’s production to an amount commensurate
with market demand, and thus protect the public’s
royalty interest by preventing depression of the
market.’’).
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longer time period more highly than
does an operator, who might be more
focused on generating near-term profits.
None of the authorities previously relied
upon by the BLM to interpret the
‘‘prudent operator’’ standard forecloses
any Secretarial action that might
marginally affect lessee profits.99
In contrast to NTL–4A, this final rule
does not allow operators to request that
flared oil-well gas be deemed royaltyfree based on case-by-case economic
assessments. There are a number of
reasons for this approach. In the first
instance, Federal law does not require
the American taxpayers to forgo
royalties on wasted gas due to an
individual operator’s economic
circumstances. Although it was the
BLM’s practice to engage in case-by-case
economic assessments under NTL–4A,
that approach is no longer appropriate,
as the practical realities of oilfield
development have changed dramatically
since 1980. As the U.S. Department of
Energy explained in a recent report,
‘‘flaring has become more of an issue
with the rapid development of
unconventional tight oil and gas
resources over the past two decades’’
that has ‘‘brought online hydrocarbon
resources that vary in their
characteristics and proportions of
natural gas, natural gas liquids and
crude oil.’’ 100 Consistent with these
developments, and as discussed in
Section III.A, the BLM has witnessed a
massive increase in the amount of
venting and flaring from the 1990’s to
the 2010’s. The average amount of
annual venting and flaring from Federal
and Indian leases between 1990 and
2000 was 11 Bcf. Between 2010 and
2020, it quadrupled to an average of
44.2 Bcf per year, with a 157 percent
increase in the amount of vented and
flared gas as a percentage of gas
production, and a 102 percent increase
in the amount of vented and flared gas
per barrel of oil produced. The upward
trend in venting and flaring suggests is
likely to continue.
Based on EIA data from 1990 through
2022, U.S. vented and flared volumes
continue an upward trend that tends to
mirror U.S. oil production,101 which
25389
raises a concern that new exploration
and development is outpacing
infrastructure construction. Oil
production in 2019 reached a record
high level of 4.5 billion barrels of oil
despite a relatively low average annual
spot price of $57 per barrel. Operators
may have increased oil production in
2019 to maintain revenues given the
lower pricing. An increase in oil
production to maintain revenues may
have led to the very high flare volume
in that year. While the vented and flared
volume has decreased since 2019—
likely due to unrepresentative
production during the COVID 19
pandemic that resulted in reduced
drilling and completions during this
time—the data demonstrates that,
generally, venting and flaring has
continued to increase since 1990,
particularly as compared to the
production of oil. This rule will work
toward reducing the waste from Federal
and Indian mineral estates.102
BILLING CODE 4331–29–P
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99 Cf. California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d
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demonstrates on its face that any consideration of
waste management limited to the economics of
individual well-operators would ignore express
statutory mandates concerning BLM’s public
welfare obligations.’’).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:17 Apr 09, 2024
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- - - U.S. Oil Production (MBbl)
100 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil
Energy, Office of Oil and Natural Gas, ‘‘Natural Gas
Flaring and Venting: State and Federal Regulatory
Overview, Trends, and Impacts’’ (June 2019).
https://www.energy.gov/fecm/articles/natural-gasflaring-and-venting-regulations-report.
PO 00000
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101 https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_
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102 For the following tables, see https://
rigcount.bakerhughes.com/na-rig-count/, https://
www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtcA.htm.
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-
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
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ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES2
BILLING CODE 4331–29–C
The related increase in the number of
flaring applications—from 75 in 2005, to
922 in 2021 has created a significant
administrative burden for the BLM.103 It
has also created an estimated
information collection burden of
approximately 23,228 total annual
burden hours potentially incurred by
operators and has led to significant
uncertainty for operators as hundreds of
applications wait to be processed.
Finally, the BLM notes that the bulk
of the recent royalty-free flaring
applications has concerned flaring from
wells that are connected to pipeline
infrastructure. The purpose of the
economic inquiry under NTL–4A, by
103 See
table in the Executive Summary.
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- - -
Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB ($/Bbl)
contrast, was to determine whether the
volumes of associated gas production
would make the installation of gascapture infrastructure economically
viable. CDM 644.5.3E and F. Where the
gas-capture infrastructure has already
been built out, there is no need to
consider the cost and value of its
installation against the volume of
associated gas production. The BLM
understands that, as posited by a
commenter, there may be instances
where a gas pipeline connected to an oil
well is not able to accept that well’s gas
for a time. In those circumstances, an
operator may temporarily curtail
production or shut in the well instead
of wasting the gas. Oil and gas
production should resume when the
pipeline can accept the gas.
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One of the primary concerns
underlying the BLM’s promulgation of
the 2018 Revision Rule was the
compliance burden on ‘‘marginal
wells,’’ i.e., wells that produce
approximately 10 barrels of oil or 60
Mcf of natural gas per day or less.104
The court that vacated the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule faulted the BLM for
failing to adequately assess the impact
of that rule on marginal wells.105 The
court that vacated the 2018 Revision
Rule, however, rejected that concern as
unfounded.106 The BLM does not wish
to impose requirements that
104 83
FR 49184, 49187 (Sept 28, 2018).
493 F. Supp. 3d at 1075–78.
106 California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573,
606 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
105 Wyoming
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U.S. Natural Gas Vented and Flared (MMcf)
ER10AP24.004
-
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inadvertently cause recoverable oil or
gas resources to be stranded due to
premature lease abandonment, but, as
the MLA makes clear, any such
considerations go to whether particular
conservation measures are reasonable
under the MLA, not whether marginal
operations must take reasonable
measures in the first instance. 30 U.S.C.
225. For example, there is no real risk
of premature abandonment by requiring
the operator of a marginal gas well to
minimize the loss of gas during liquids
unloading operations, as required in this
rule. Under the final rule, an operator of
a marginal gas well may vent gas during
liquids unloading operations royaltyfree for 24 hours. If the gas well is not
put into production within 24 hours and
maintenance operations must continue,
the volume of gas vented is likely very
small and the flowing pressure very
low—otherwise, the operator would be
returning the well to production. Thus,
the marginal time that it takes an
operator to continue liquids unloading
beyond the initial 24 hours will not
result in significant vented gas and
corresponding royalty obligation.
Furthermore, the BLM has provisions
for royalty rate reductions in 43 CFR
3103.4–1 to encourage the greatest
ultimate recovery of oil or gas.
Therefore, in the unlikely event that
compliance with the final rule would
lead to an operator’s premature
abandonment of a well, an operator may
seek royalty relief to continue
operations.
The BLM has developed this final rule
to avoid excessive and unreasonable
compliance burdens on marginal wells
when balanced against the need to
reduce waste. In the 2018 Revision Rule,
the BLM noted that the provisions of the
2016 Waste Prevention Rule that placed
a particular burden on marginal wells
were those pertaining to pneumatic
controllers, pneumatic diaphragm
pumps, and LDAR. In this final rule, the
requirements for LDAR only apply to
Federal or Indian minerals produced
from facilities located on a Federal or
Indian surface estate, thereby limiting
the number of operators to which the
LDAR program applies. In addition, the
BLM has not included in this final rule
the provisions in the proposed rule
regarding pneumatic controllers and
diaphragm pumps.
The BLM acknowledges that, in the
2018 Revision Rule, it asserted that
additional restrictions on flaring were
unnecessary because the States with the
most significant BLM-managed oil and
gas production impose regulatory
restrictions on flaring from oil wells and
that these State regulations ‘‘provide[d]
a reasonable assurance . . . that the
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waste of associated gas will be
controlled.’’ 107 This assertion directly
contradicted the BLM’s prior findings
during the promulgation of the 2016
Waste Prevention Rule, and a district
court held that the BLM’s decision to
rely on State flaring regulations was
unjustified based on the record
evidence.108
For this rulemaking, the BLM
analyzed the State regulations governing
flaring, venting, and leaks in the 10
States responsible for 99 percent of
Federal oil and gas production: Alaska,
California, Colorado, Montana, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. Summaries
of these regulations were collected in a
table that is available in the docket for
this rulemaking at www.regulations.gov.
While there have been notable
advancements in some States since the
promulgation of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule—for example, new
comprehensive flaring regulations have
since been adopted in New Mexico and
Colorado, and new requirements for
storage tanks, pneumatic equipment,
and LDAR have been adopted in
Colorado and Utah—State regulations
vary widely in their scope and
stringency.109 And, importantly, many
of the State flaring regulations reserve
substantial discretion to the State
agencies to authorize additional
flaring.110 That discretion creates
significant uncertainty about the extent
to which the BLM can rely on those
regulations to protect the interests of the
United States and Indian mineral
owners in minimizing waste and
maximizing royalty revenues.
In its comments on the proposed rule,
the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission asserts that the BLM
incorrectly characterizes Wyoming’s
regulations regarding flaring and gas
capture plan requirements. Specifically,
Wyoming challenges language in the
proposed rule that ‘‘Wyoming’s gas
capture plan requirements are not
triggered until after flaring becomes a
problem at the well.’’ 111 Specifically,
the State objects to the proposed rule’s
107 83
FR 49184, 49202 (Sept. 28, 2018).
v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573,
601–04 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
109 Examples of variations among State
regulations include the following. Unlike other
States, (1) the States of New Mexico, North Dakota,
Montana, Texas, Alaska, and Oklahoma do not have
regulations to control losses of gas from pneumatic
equipment; (2) Texas’ requirements to inspect for
and repair leaks are focused on storage tanks; (3)
Alaska does not maintain LDAR requirements; and
(4) Wyoming’s requirements for tanks, pneumatic
equipment, and LDAR are limited to the Upper
Green River Basin ozone nonattainment area.
110 These States are Wyoming, Utah, Montana,
Texas, and Oklahoma.
111 87 FR 73588, 73598 (Nov. 30, 2022).
108 California
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25391
description of Wyoming regulations as
triggering a plan only after a flaring
‘‘issue,’’ explaining that, in the
Commission’s view, ‘‘[t]he operator
must submit a gas capture plan, among
other information . . . before flaring or
it would need to limit flaring to 60 mcf/
d or be in violation of the [applicable]
rule.’’ But whether or not these
contingencies are properly characterized
as an ‘‘issue,’’ the BLM’s point—that it
was deemed a plan to be useful when
the APD is submitted—stands. State gas
capture plan requirements, by
themselves, do not provide the BLM, in
its capacity as regulator and steward of
the Federal mineral estate, with an
opportunity to render its own
determinations regarding potential
waste when processing an APD.
North Dakota in its comments on the
proposed rule takes issue with the way
the BLM characterized the allowance for
variances in North Dakota’s gas capture
regulations. Specifically, the State
asserted: ‘‘In its proposed rule
publication, the BLM disingenuously
criticizes North Dakota’s gas capture
regulations for allowing variances, and
then inconsistently proposes a rule that
considers associated natural gas as
unavoidably lost under the same
circumstances as 9 out of 10 [North
Dakota Industrial Commission] variance
allowances. . . .’’ The BLM
acknowledges North Dakota’s
disagreement with the BLM’s
characterization of North Dakota’s gas
capture regulations. Nonetheless, as
discussed in the proposed rule, the BLM
found significant variance in the scope
and stringency of State regulations.
Flaring statistics show that State
regulations, by themselves, have not
been adequate to reduce waste from
Federal oil wells, underscoring the need
for uniformity with respect to Federal
mineral interests. As discussed further
in the section-by-section analysis below,
according to EIA data from 2017
through 2022, North Dakota accounted
for approximately 33 percent of the
volume of gas flared nationwide but
only 11 percent of the volume of oil
produced nationwide. Wyoming
accounted for approximately 11 percent
of the average total flared gas onshore
nationwide and 2 percent of the oil
produced nationwide. State efforts to
reduce venting and flaring, though
important, do not displace the
Secretary’s duty to prevent undue waste
from Federal and Indian wells
nationwide.112 Consequently, the BLM’s
112 https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_
EPG0_VGV_mmcf_a.htm, https://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm.
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application of a uniform national
standard ensures improved royalty
collection and avoidance of waste. In
addition, the Secretary, and not the
States, is responsible for collecting
Federal and Indian royalties. The
Secretary can best do this by not
requiring shifting Federal standards in
response to any changes to State
requirements.
The BLM also recognizes that the EPA
has recently finalized regulations
governing certain aspects of oil and gas
production operations at 40 CFR part
60, subparts OOOOb and OOOOc, and
that these regulations can have the
incidental effect of reducing the waste
of gas during production activities.
Specifically, EPA’s regulations 113
require: (1) capture or flaring of gas that
reaches the surface during well
completion operations with hydraulic
fracturing; 114 (2) storage tanks with
potential methane emissions of 20 tons
or more per year to control those
emissions (including through
combustion); 115 (3) process controllers
to be zero emissions; 116 (4) pumps to be
zero emissions; 117 and (5) operators of
well sites to develop and implement a
fugitive emissions monitoring plan.118
Although operator compliance with
those EPA requirements can reduce the
waste of natural gas from Federal and
Indian leases, they do not supplant the
need for BLM standards that are
adopted pursuant to the BLM’s
independent statutory authority and
duties. The BLM further notes that,
under the CAA, States with one or more
existing sources must develop and
submit State plans to the EPA for
approval. Under this statutory structure,
State plans would implement the
emissions guidelines for existing
113 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb regulates
greenhouse gases (in the form of limitations on
methane) and VOCs from various new, modified,
and reconstructed emission sources across the
Crude Oil and Natural Gas source category for
which construction, reconstruction, or modification
commenced after December 6, 2022. 40 CFR part 60
subpart OOOOc includes presumptive standards for
greenhouse gases (in the form of limitations on
methane, a designated pollutant), for certain
existing emission sources prior to December 6,
2022, across the Crude Oil and Natural Gas source
category.
114 See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at
§ 60.5375b.
115 See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at
§ 60.5395b and 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOc at
§ 60.5396c.
116 See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at
§ 60.5370b and 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOc at
§ 60.5362c(c), § 60.5370c and Table 1.
117 See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at
§ 60.5370b and 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOc at
§ 60.5362c(c), § 60.5370c and Table 1.
118 See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at
§ 60.5370b, and § 60.5397b and 40 CFR part 60
subpart OOOOc at § 60.5362c(c), § 60.5370c, Table
1, and § 60.5397c.
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sources. Also, EPA’s requirements are
not a substitute for BLM standards
because EPA’s requirements are focused
on controlling GHG (in the form of
methane) and VOC emissions, rather
than conserving natural gas, and
compliance with the EPA’s standards
will not always reduce the waste of
natural gas or assure payment of
royalties to the United States or to
Indian mineral owners. For example, an
operator can comply with EPA’s
requirements for storage tanks by
routing the emissions to combustion
(i.e., flaring) and therefore eliminating
venting from the tanks altogether. That
process results in the same loss of gas
as venting the gas from the tank.
Therefore, while that process reduces
air pollution by prioritizing flaring over
venting, it does not reduce waste or
assure payment of royalties because in
either scenario, the same amount of gas
is lost.
Based on its review and analysis of
State and EPA regulations, the BLM
finds that it is necessary to establish a
uniform standard governing the
wasteful losses of Federal and Indian
gas through venting, flaring, and
leaks.119 The BLM cannot rely on a
patchwork of State and EPA regulations
to ensure that operators of Federal oil
and gas leases consistently meet the
waste prevention mandates of the MLA,
that the American public receive a fair
return for the development of the
Federal mineral estate, and that the
Department’s trust responsibility to
Indian mineral owners is satisfied. The
BLM acknowledges that this is a change
in position from what the BLM stated in
the Revision Rule regarding analogous
State and EPA regulations, a change
shown to be necessary by the vast
increase in flaring in recent decades,
which demonstrates the ineffectiveness
of NTL–4A in controlling the waste of
gas through venting and flaring. In
addition, establishing a uniform
119 The BLM acknowledges that the Wyoming
court questioned what it described as the BLM’s
authority to ‘‘hijack’’ the cooperative federalism
framework of the CAA ‘‘under the guise of waste
management.’’ Wyoming 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1066.
However, as noted elsewhere, this final rule is
justified not by any ancillary effects on air quality
or climate change, but solely on the basis of waste
prevention—an arena where the BLM has
independent statutory authority to regulate. See Id.
at 1063 (‘‘The terms of the MLA and FOGRMA
make clear that Congress intended the Secretary,
through the BLM, to exercise rulemaking authority
to prevent the waste of Federal and Indian mineral
resources and to ensure the proper payment of
royalties to Federal, State, and Tribal
governments.’’). On its own terms, therefore, the
Wyoming court’s reference to cooperative
federalism under the Clean Air Act is inapplicable
to this final rule, which does not seek to improve
air quality and does not rely on EPA’s CAA
regulations.
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standard in lieu of case-by-case
avoidable and unavoidable loss
determinations reduces the
administrative burden on the BLM’s
limited resources; avoids inconsistent
application across the States; and
simplifies Federal and Indian
enforcement.
The RIA for this final rule calculates
that this rule would cost operators $19.3
million per year, using a 7 percent
discount rate, for the next 10 years
($19.2 million per year using a 3 percent
discount rate), while generating benefits
to operators of approximately $1.8
million per year, using a 7 percent
discount rate, in the form of 0.45 Bcf of
additional captured gas.120 The RIA
estimates that this final rule would
generate $51 million per year in
additional royalties. The BLM
acknowledges that the estimated costs of
this rule to operators will outweigh the
benefits in terms of the estimated
monetized market value of the gas
conserved. However, these benefits do
not take into account the increase in
royalties that will be received by the
American taxpayer or Indian mineral
owners, or include any increase in
production that could possibly be
received from changes in behavior due
to the avoidable loss threshold, which
would also lead to an increase in
benefits. The BLM notes that the
statutory provisions authorizing the
BLM to regulate oil and gas operations
for the prevention of waste do not
impose a net-benefit requirement.
Separately, the reduced methane
emissions associated with the final rule
provide a monetized benefit to society
(in the form of avoided climate
damages) of $17.9 million per year over
the same time frame, leading to an
overall net monetized benefit from the
rule of $360,000 to $441,000 a year, as
well as additional unquantified benefits.
(See Appendix A of the RIA regarding
unquantified benefits.) The basis for the
BLM’s estimates of social benefits from
reduced methane emissions—namely,
the social cost of greenhouse gases (SC–
GHG)—is explained in detail in
Appendix A of the RIA. To be clear,
although the BLM is reporting its
estimates of the social benefits of
reduced methane emissions here and in
the RIA, the purpose of that reporting is
solely to provide the most complete and
transparent accounting of the costs and
benefits of the rule for the public’s
awareness. The BLM considered but did
not rely on climate-related costs and
120 The cost-benefit analysis contained in the RIA
was generated to comply with Executive Order
12866 and is not required by the statutes
authorizing the BLM to regulate for the prevention
of waste from oil and gas leases.
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benefits when reaching the policy
decisions in this rule. The requirements
of this final rule reflect reasonable
measures to avoid waste, regardless of
any impacts with respect to climate
change.
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IV. Discussion of Public Comments on
the Proposed Rule
This section of the preamble
summarizes the major categories of the
public comments that the BLM received
in response to the proposed rule, as well
as the BLM’s responses. Detailed
discussion regarding the substantive
comments on the proposed rule that the
BLM received, the BLM’s responses to
those comments, and changes that the
BLM made in the final rule are provided
in Section V (Section-by-Section
Discussion) of this preamble.
The public comment period for the
proposed rule ended on January 30,
2023. During the 60-day public
comment period, the BLM received
3,323 total comments submitted from
Federal, State, local governments, local
agencies, Tribal organizations, industry
representatives, individuals, and other
external stakeholders. Of the 3,323
comment letter submissions, 2,892 were
template form letters from seven
different organizations, leaving 134
additional unique commenters. From
these 141 unique commenters, the BLM
identified 1,123 unique comments on
the proposed rule.
Several commenters requested that
the BLM hold meetings to take public
input on the proposed rule before the
comment period ended. The BLM held
additional meetings with the Santa Rosa
Rancheria Tachi-Yokut Tribe on
December 1, 2022; the Mandan, Hidatsa
and Arikara Nation (MHA Nation) on
December 6, 2022, and February 13,
2023; and the Southern Ute Indian Tribe
on April 10, 2023, May 25, 2023, and
June 8, 2023.
All relevant comments are posted at
the Federal eRulemaking portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. To access the
comments at that website, enter 1004–
AE79 in the Searchbox.
Comments on Federalism Implications
Summary of Comments: Several
commenters suggested that the BLM
withdraw the proposed rule on the
grounds that it exceeds Federal statutory
authority or, in the alternative, revise
the proposed rule to reflect a federalism
framework to affirm the States’ authority
over State and local mineral resources
within the State’s boundaries. To that
end, the commenters stated that the
final rule has sufficient federalism
implications to warrant the preparation
of a federalism summary impact
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statement. In support of this position,
the commenters claimed that this rule
unlawfully focuses on air quality
emissions rather than waste, and that
this focus violates the cooperative
federalism framework under the CAA.
The commenters referenced the BLM’s
purported preference for flaring over
venting and claimed that this preference
for flaring is unsupported because the
BLM’s regulatory authority is limited to
waste prevention and does not include
safety as a guise to regulate air quality.
Response: The BLM disagrees with
the commenters. The BLM developed
this rule based on its statutory authority
to prevent and reduce the waste of
natural gas produced from Federal and
Indian (not State) land through
improved regulatory requirements
pertaining to venting, flaring, and leaks,
while ensuring a fair return to the
American public.121 It does not override
the States’ or Tribes’ more stringent
requirements for flaring and gas capture
or waste prevention measures on State
or Indian lands. Operators with leases
on Federal lands must comply with the
Department’s regulations and with State
requirements to the extent that they do
not conflict with the Department’s
regulations. As stated in the Federalism
section of this rule, below, although the
final rule will affect the relationship
between operators, lessees, and the
BLM, it will not directly impact States.
Accordingly, a federalism summary
impact statement is not warranted.
Any claim that this rule violates the
cooperative federalism framework under
the CAA is likewise unfounded. As
discussed below, the waste prevention
rule is intended to prevent the waste of
gas from Federal oil and gas leases and
is, therefore, not an air quality
emissions rule. As noted in the
preamble to the proposed rule, the
Wyoming court questioned the BLM’s
authority to—in the court’s view—
preempt cooperative federalism under
the CAA, using a pretext of waste
prevention. But as consistently
explained throughout this preamble,
this final rule is authorized by the
BLM’s independent statutory authority
to prevent waste of natural gas and is
not focused on achieving any ancillary
effects on air quality or climate change.
As such, cooperative federalism
requirements under the CAA do not
apply to this final rule.122 Moreover, the
Department’s regulations governing oil
and gas operations on the public lands
121 30
U.S.C. 187.
have found no statutory support for the
argument that any regulation that has ancillary
effects on air quality is per se preempted by the
CAA.
122 We
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have long required operators to conduct
operations in a manner that is protective
of natural resources, environmental
quality, and public health and safety.
See 43 CFR 3162.5–1 and 3162.5–3. As
the BLM stated in the proposed rule and
reiterated in the § 3179.50 Safety
discussion in this final preamble,
combusting gas rather than venting it
into the surrounding air is safer for
operations due to the gas’ explosiveness
and the risk to workers from hypoxia
and exposure to various associated
pollutants.
Comments on State or Tribal Variances
Summary of Comments: At least one
commenter said that, as a sovereign
regulatory authority over the State and
private minerals located within the
State’s boundaries, it objected to the
requirement that the State and private
mineral holders must seek variances
from the waste prevention requirements.
This commenter also concluded that the
variance provision was improper
because, according to the commenter,
the rule is an air quality emissions rule.
Response: The BLM decided not to
include the provisions for State or
Tribal requests for variances that were
found in the proposed rule at 43 CFR
3179.401 in part because it concluded
that the proposed variance provision
could lead to regulatory uncertainty. As
stated above in response to comments
regarding federalism implications, the
final rule does not preempt more
stringent requirements for flaring, gas
capture, or waste prevention under State
or Tribal law, as appropriate. Operators
with oil and gas leases on Federal lands
must comply with the Department’s
regulations and with State requirements,
to the extent that they do not conflict
with the Department’s regulations, and
similarly operators of Tribal leases must
comply with both Tribal and
Departmental regulations. Moreover, the
waste prevention rule is intended to
prevent the waste of gas from Federal
and Indian oil and gas leases and is,
therefore, not an air quality emissions
rule, as further discussed below.
Comments on Air Quality
Summary of Comments: Some
commenters claimed that this rule seeks
to address air quality rather than waste
prevention and that the BLM should
defer to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) or State agencies to
regulate air quality under the CAA and
other authorities.
Response: The BLM disagrees. As
discussed above, the rule responds to
the BLM’s statutory obligation to
prevent waste. The MLA requires the
BLM to subject all oil and gas leases to
the condition that the lessee ‘‘use all
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reasonable precautions to prevent the
waste of oil or gas developed in the
land’’ and underscores that ‘‘[v]iolations
of the provisions of this section shall
constitute grounds for the forfeiture of
the lease.’’ 123 The Act also provides the
Secretary with authority to subject
leases to ‘‘such rules . . . for the
prevention of undue waste as may be
prescribed by [the] Secretary.’’ 124 Even
the Wyoming court—which vacated
portions of the 2016 Rule after the court
found it was primarily justified by air
quality benefits—recognized that the
BLM does in fact have authority to
promulgate and impose rules designed
to reduce waste, provided such rules are
‘‘independently justified as waste
prevention measures pursuant to [the
BLM’s] MLA authority.’’ 493 F. Supp.
3d at 1067. As explained below, the
waste prevention provisions of the final
rule are independently justified, and the
air quality comments from oil-and-gas
industry representatives do not
demonstrate otherwise.
Notwithstanding this authority, a
commenter opposed to much of the
proposed rule stated that the BLM
should avoid conflict or duplication
with EPA’s and the States’ exercise of
their ‘‘exclusive authority’’ over air
quality. The commenter added that CAA
regulation and enforcement fall within
other Federal and State agencies’
‘‘exclusive jurisdiction.’’ The
commenter also referred to what it
described as the ‘‘exclusive air quality
purview’’ of EPA and the States, while
arguing that the BLM should not
‘‘assume’’ such authority.
The BLM is not regulating air quality
in this rule. The BLM is regulating to
prevent waste and to assure payment of
royalties pursuant to independent and
express statutory authority. The ability
of EPA and the States to regulate air
pollution does not bar the BLM from
fulfilling its statutory obligation to
regulate waste. Addressing waste may
have some effects on air pollution and
its connection to human health and
welfare, which is the primary
responsibility of the EPA, States, and
local governments.125 But the possibility
that a BLM rule might have incidental
effects on air quality does not strip the
BLM from exercising its clear, express
statutory authority under the MLA to
prevent or reduce waste of gas. Cf.
Wyoming, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1063
(acknowledging that ‘‘a regulation that
prevents wasteful losses of natural gas
from venting and flaring necessarily
U.S.C. 225.
U.S.C. 187.
125 Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d
188, 190 (3d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
reduces emissions of that gas’’). The
MLA is designed to encourage diligent
development of Federal oil and gas
resources, avoid waste, and generate
revenue, see Public Law 66–145,
sections 15, 16, 26, 27, while the CAA
seeks to reduce air pollution to protect
the public health and welfare. 42 U.S.C.
7401(a)(2), (b)(1). The EPA’s regulation
of methane emissions does not excuse
the BLM from its obligation to prevent
waste of and generate revenue from
Federal oil and gas resources. In the
proposed and final rules, the BLM has
explained why it is implementing
certain measures for waste prevention or
other matters attendant to BLM
authority (e.g., safety and royalty
measurement).
Another comment expressed concern
about conflicts between the MLA and
various air quality regulations and
statutes. The commenter specified that
the rule should not ‘‘create potential
conflicts or duplication with EPA and
State requirements promulgated
pursuant to the CAA and State
authorities.’’ Another comment
expressed concern about a ‘‘potentially
conflicting and duplicative BLM
regulatory overlay’’ on existing and
forthcoming regulations on methane and
VOC emissions. As noted, the CAA and
the MLA pursue different statutory
goals, which may, as a general matter,
reduce the possibility of conflict among
specific regulations promulgated by the
BLM and EPA. The successful
prevention of the waste of gas may also
lead to air quality effects. Nonetheless,
we have examined the EPA’s methanerelated regulations and the EPA’s OOOO
series rules 126 and have avoided
conflict by focusing on the BLM’s waste
prevention and royalty measurement
mandates, while acknowledging
ancillary effects to air quality from this
final rule. We have found no provision
of the final rule that prevents
compliance with EPA’s regulations.
Enactment of the CAA did not repeal
any section of the MLA or any of the
BLM’s other statutory authorities. Thus,
neither the CAA, nor the programs of
the EPA, States, or Tribes relieve the
BLM of its statutory obligations to
prevent waste and to assure royalty
accountability. Similarly, nothing in
this final rule interferes with any air
quality regulation of EPA, the States, or
Tribes.
In sum, we conclude that the final
rule is a proper exercise of the agency’s
authority under the MLA and other
statutes (discussed above) to promulgate
123 30
124 30
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126 77 FR 49490, 49542 (Aug. 16, 2012); 81 FR
35824, 35898 (June 3, 2016); 86 FR 63110 (Nov. 15,
2021).
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regulations for the prevention of waste.
Its ancillary effects on air quality are not
disqualifying and, despite commenters’
suggestions to the contrary, do not
defeat the provisions of the MLA
discussed above, as reinforced by the
IRA.
Commenters also suggested that the
BLM’s proposed rule implicates a
‘‘major question’’ as that term is used in
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587
(2022). In that case, the Supreme Court
vacated an EPA rulemaking because,
according to the Court, EPA ‘‘claimed to
discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power representing a
transformative expansion in its
regulatory authority,’’ ‘‘located that
newfound power in the vague language
of an ancillary provision of the Act,’’
and ‘‘adopted a regulatory program that
Congress had conspicuously and
repeatedly declined to enact itself.’’ Id.
At 2610. The Supreme Court went on to
hold that, in such circumstances,
colorable congressional authorization
was insufficient; the agency must
instead point to ‘‘clear congressional
authorization’’ for its actions. Id. At
2614.
The final rule is not the type of
‘‘extraordinary’’ Rule that implicates a
major question. See Id. At 2609. The
BLM has not claimed to discover any
novel authority in the MLA. Rather, a
lessor’s legal capacity to prevent waste
extends back at least to the common law
prudent operator standard. Congress
codified the Secretary’s authority and
obligation to prevent waste in 1920,
when it drafted the MLA to provide that
‘‘[e]ach lease shall contain . . . a
provision that such rules . . . for the
prevention of undue waste as may be
prescribed by said Secretary shall be
observed.’’ 127 Congress affirmed the
BLM’s authority and obligations in
2022, when, in the IRA, it required the
BLM to charge royalties on gas that was
not ‘‘unavoidably lost’’ but did not
otherwise define that term.128 By the
same token, the MLA provisions at issue
here are not ‘‘ancillary:’’ they have been
squarely and explicitly relied upon for
decades in efforts to reduce waste. In
short, the Department’s authority to
regulate waste is—and always has
been—a component of its authority to
lease.
Beyond this longstanding authority,
the BLM’s rule is narrower than the
127 See
30 U.S.C. 187).
previously stated in the preamble, the IRA
provides that, for leases issued after August 16,
2022, royalties are owed on all gas produced from
Federal land, subject to certain exceptions for gas
that is lost during emergency situations, used for
the benefit of lease operations, or ‘‘unavoidably
lost.’’
128 As
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Supreme Court’s characterization of the
rule in West Virginia. That rule,
according to the Court, ‘‘balance[ed] the
many vital considerations of national
policy implicated in deciding how
Americans will get their energy.’’ 142 S.
Ct. at 2612. Accord Biden v. Nebraska,
143 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2023) (striking
down student loan forgiveness program
on the grounds that ‘‘no regulation
premised on [the ostensibly authorizing
statute] has even begun to approach the
size or scope of the Secretary’s
program’’). Here, the BLM is changing
its regulations to marginally adjust
waste prevention—merely one
component of oil and gas production—
under the MLA and the Indian minerals
statutes. Those statutes, in turn, reflect
merely one component of the nation’s
total oil and gas production, which itself
is merely one component of the nation’s
total energy mix.
Nor has Congress considered and
rejected the measures in this final rule.
Commenters did not provide evidence
showing that the most significant
portions of this rule—new requirements
for APDs, clarification of the term
‘‘avoidably lost’’, and leak detection—
have been the subject of congressional
debate. Ultimately, ‘‘common sense’’
indicates that the MLA and the IRA
reflect precisely ‘‘the manner in which
Congress [would have been] likely to
delegate’’ the technical and discrete
issue of waste prevention vis-a`-vis
public minerals. West Virginia at 2609.
The BLM therefore did not make
changes based on these comments.
Comments on Ways To Minimize Waste
of Natural Gas During the Leasing Stage
Summary of Comments: The BLM
requested public comment on how it
can improve its processes pertaining to
the leasing stage of development to
minimize the waste of natural gas
during later stages of development.
Some commenters recommended that
the BLM require WMPs at the land use
planning stage or when an operator
nominates parcels of land for leasing
under an Expression of Interest.
Although at least one commenter
recommended that the BLM require a
WMP during the leasing stage, at least
one other commenter objected to that
proposal. At least one commenter
objected to the BLM’s proposed
requirement that an APD include a
WMP and specifically protested what it
claimed to be vague standards for
approval or denial of the plan. The
commenter further stated that this
proposed provision potentially
duplicates a State’s gas capture plans
and may delay or cause the State permit
to expire if the rule required the
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operator to submit information that
conflicts with the State’s requirements.
Another commenter requested that the
BLM remove any requirement for the
operator to provide confidential
business information or otherwise
unavailable information in the WMP
because the operator does not possess
this information and it is not helpful for
the specific purpose it is intended.
Response: As discussed further in the
Section-by-Section discussion, the BLM
in this final rule has retained the
requirement to submit a WMP with a
Federal or Indian oil and gas APD, or,
in the alternative, submit a selfcertification statement that would
commit the operator to capturing 100
percent of the associated gas produced
from an oil well and would obligate the
operator to pay royalties on all lost gas
except for gas lost through emergencies.
The BLM has reviewed the comments
and changed the provisions for a WMP.
Under the final rule, the operator may
submit either: (1) a self-certification
statement committing the operator to
capture 100 percent of the associated
gas less any on-lease use of associated
gas pursuant to subpart 3178; or (2) a
WMP that includes, among other
requirements, a certification that the
operator has a valid, executed gas sales
contract for the associated gas. A WMP
is subject to the avoidable loss flaring
limit established in final § 3179.70,
while self-certification is a statement
that the operator will be able to capture,
as defined in final § 3179.10, 100
percent of the associated gas. In the case
of self-certification, 100 percent of the
oil-well flared gas has a royalty
obligation from the date of first
production until the well is plugged and
abandoned, less any on-lease use of
associated gas pursuant to subpart 3178.
The BLM has added the selfcertification option to the final rule in
response to comments that the waste
prevention plan requirement is overly
burdensome for industry and provides
little benefit to the BLM. The selfcertification option serves the dual
purposes of providing operators with a
less burdensome alternative, while
simultaneously reducing waste through
the encouragement of capture, a term
defined in the proposed rule and
unchanged in the final rule. The
updated requirement provides the
operator with the flexibility to secure a
valid, executed gas sales contract or
elect to expedite approval of the APD
with a self-certification statement. In
making this decision, operators may
consider, e.g., the time to secure a gas
sales contract, the desired date of the oil
well completion, or the flaring royalty
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25395
obligation associated with either a WMP
or self-certification.
The BLM disagrees with a
commenter’s belief that the WMP
potentially duplicates a State’s gas
capture plans or would delay or cause
a State permit to expire if the rule
requires the operator to provide
confidential or otherwise unavailable
information. In any State or on any
Tribal lands with essentially the same
requirements as this final rule, this rule
has no additional substantive burden on
operators. As previously stated, the final
rule does not preempt any State’s or
Tribe’s requirements that are more
stringent with respect to flaring and gas
capture requirements or for waste
prevention. There is nothing unique
about this rule’s interaction with State
or Tribal law; those laws have always
applied to operations regulated by the
BLM, except on the rare occasion in
which they prevent compliance with
BLM regulations. More stringent State or
Tribal regulations apply of their own
force. Operators with leases on Federal
lands must comply with both the
Department’s regulations and with State
or Tribal requirements, to the extent that
the non-Federal requirements do not
conflict with the Department’s
regulations. None of the commenters
have shown that any portion of the rule
would interfere with the States’ or
Tribes’ ability to regulate oil and gas
operations on Federal lands or that the
operator cannot comply with both the
final rule and State or Tribal
regulations.
After carefully considering the
comments received concerning
confidential information that may be
included in the WMP, as well as
information that is not within the
operator’s purview, the BLM has revised
the required information in the WMP to
align with the BLM’s waste prevention
objectives more closely. For example,
the BLM is not finalizing the proposal
for operators to identify in the WMP the
anticipated daily capacity of the
pipeline at the anticipated date of first
gas sales from the proposed well, or the
proposal to include any plans known to
the operator for expansion of pipeline
capacity for the area that includes the
proposed well. Commenters indicated
that this information could be
confidential and proprietary
information that belongs to midstream
companies and that oil and gas operator
are obligated to keep confidential. We
agree.
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
Comments on Definition of
‘‘Unreasonable and Undue Waste of
Gas’’ in the Loss of Oil or Gas,
Avoidable or Unavoidable
Determination, and the Prudent
Operator Standard
‘‘Unreasonable and undue waste of
gas,’’ avoidable or unavoidable
determination, and the prudent operator
standard are interrelated and warrant a
combined discussion. Accordingly, the
following summary of comments and
the BLM’s response will cover these
three concepts.
Summary of Comments: In the
proposed rule, the BLM requested
public comment on the definition of
‘‘unreasonable and undue waste of gas,’’
which the BLM considers when
determining whether the loss of oil or
gas is avoidable or unavoidable.
Commenters suggested that the
definition include an express reference
to economic feasibility because,
according to the commenters, the rule
will become unwieldy and difficult for
the BLM to administer without this
economic consideration. Commenters
expressed concern that the proposed
avoidable loss threshold ignores
whether the lessee is acting reasonably
and prudently without any evaluation of
the operator’s actual economic
circumstances, and that flaring is not
automatically ‘‘waste.’’
Response: We disagree with the
commenters’ suggestion that the rule
should accommodate economic
feasibility for individual flaring cases. In
the proposed rule, the BLM explained
that ‘‘lessees have an obligation of
reasonable diligence in the development
of the leased resources, rooted in due
regard for the interests of both the lessee
and the lessor.’’ 87 FR 73597. The lessor
has an interest in collecting royalties on
production and in conserving gas for
future disposition. The proposed rule
also explained that the prudent operator
standard looks to the operation of a
lease as a whole and considers the
interests of both the lessees and the
lessors in conserving and developing
the Federal mineral resource. However,
with the final rule, the BLM has decided
to not carry forward the proposed
definition of ‘‘unreasonable and undue
waste of gas’’ and removed the term
from § 3179.10 and references to the
definition in §§ 3179.100 and
3179.70(b). The BLM has determined
that the definition might create
unnecessary confusion and is not
relevant for purpose of carrying out
§§ 3179.100 and 3179.70(b).
Several commenters objected to the
BLM’s discussion of the prudent
operator standard, which focuses on the
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lease as a whole, and argued that the
prudent operator standard forecloses the
BLM from imposing measures for waste
prevention that may, in some situations,
require an operator to spend more than
the value of potentially wasted gas. That
is, the commenters did not contend that
the BLM’s rule would render leases
unprofitable on the whole, but merely
that the prevention of marginal waste
might not, from the individual
operator’s perspective (and particularly
for low volume producers) pay for itself.
In support of this reading, the
commenters cited the BLM’s regulatory
definition of waste as:
any act or failure to act by the operator that
is not sanctioned by the authorized officer as
necessary for proper development and
production and which results in: (1) A
reduction in the quantity or quality of oil and
gas ultimately producible from a reservoir
under prudent and proper operations; or (2)
avoidable surface loss of oil or gas.
43 CFR 3160.0–5 (emphasis added). The
definitions in 43 CFR 3160.0–5
explicitly apply to part 3160 only, and
the BLM notes that most of the
regulations in this final rule appear in
part 3170. In any event, there is no
conceptual inconsistency between the
regulations in that part and the
definitions in part 3160. The definition
of ‘‘waste’’ in part 3160 indicates that
gas is wasted where, inter alia, loss is
avoidable, and the final definitions in
part 3170 explain when loss is
avoidable and, separately, what subset
of ‘‘waste’’ is ‘‘undue.’’ To avoid
confusion, the final rule has deleted the
word ‘‘prudent’’ where it had occurred
in the proposed rule. See § 3179.41(a)
and (b).
It is unclear precisely why
commenters believe this provision is
inconsistent with a fair reading of the
non-statutory prudent operator standard
and why they believe that standard
requires a narrower reading. It is true, as
commenters note (and as discussed
elsewhere in this rule), that NTL–4A
and IBLA caselaw have previously
recognized ‘‘unavoidably lost’’ gas—the
waste implicitly contemplated by 43
CFR 3160.0–5(1)—as excluding those
cases where, in a case-by-case
determination, ‘‘the Supervisor
determines that said loss resulted from
. . . the failure of the lessee or operator
to take all reasonable measures to
prevent and/or control the loss.’’ NTL–
4A. II.A. For the reasons explained
elsewhere in this preamble, such caseby-case determinations are no longer
sufficient for the BLM’s fulfillment of its
obligations to prevent waste. Here, we
explain why the authorities cited by
some commentors do not require
individualized determinations.
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Thus, for example, commenters’
frequent citations to court decisions and
to the IBLA decisions in Ladd
Petroleum Corporation and Rife Oil
Properties are misplaced. Ladd did not
address the meaning of the prudent
operator standard or avoidably lost gas
at all, and instead held that, where the
BLM had chosen to issue certain
guidance detailing case-by-case
feasibility determinations, the substance
of that guidance should govern in
pending administrative appeals. 107
IBLA 5 (1989). Rife Oil, meanwhile,
stands for the proposition that NTL–4A
provided for case-by-case waste
determinations, not that the MLA and
FOGRMA require such determinations.
131 IBLA 357, 373–75 (1994).129 The
same is true for the cases cited by Ladd
and Rife Oil. See Lomax Exploration
Co., 105 IBLA 1 (1988) (concluding that
NTL–4A applied to certain venting or
flaring without passing on the BLM’s
discretion to modify or depart from
NTLA–4A); Mallon Oil Co., 107 IBLA
150, 156 (1989) (same); Maxus
Exploration Co., 122 IBLA 190, 198 n.1
(1992) (‘‘As the word ‘economic’ is used
in NTL–4A, it relates to a lessee’s
argument that conservation of the gas is
not viable from an economic standpoint
. . . .’’) (emphasis added).
Some commenters also concluded
that the IRA essentially codified NTL–
4A’s definitions of ‘‘avoidable’’ and
‘‘unavoidable,’’ reasoning that Congress
must have been aware of the BLM’s pre2016 definitions of those terms. The
IRA, however, did not provide a
statutory definition of ‘‘avoidable’’ or
‘‘unavoidable,’’ and did not prohibit the
Secretary of the Interior from
promulgating a rule to define and
implement those terms under her
existing statutory authorities. See, e.g.,
30 U.S.C. 189.130 The IRA did not
amend the MLA to require the type of
case-by-case evaluations the
commenters seek, and commenters have
129 In dicta, the Rife Oil decision considered a
possible ‘‘read[ing] [of] NTL–4A as barring the
venting of gas . . . without regard to whether it was
avoidably lost’’ within the meaning if NTL–4A, 131
IBLA at 374, hypothesizing that such a reading
‘‘would lead to potential waste of oil where
production of oil was marginally economic but
production of gas was not economic and the
requirement to market the gas caused a premature
abandonment of the well.’’ Id. at 374 n.6 (emphasis
added). This abstract hypothetical says nothing
regarding the United States’ general authority as
lessor to balance by regulation the waste from
potential loss of gas against the waste from potential
loss of oil, much less does it evaluate the specific
balancing the BLM has performed throughout in
this rule.
130 ‘‘The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to
prescribe necessary and proper rules and
regulations and to do any and all things necessary
to carry out and accomplish the purposes of [the
MLA].’’
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not provided ‘‘the sort of overwhelming
evidence of [congressional]
acquiescence’’ to NTL–4A’s definitions
‘‘necessary to support [their] argument
in the face of Congress’s failure to
amend.’’ Sackett v. EPA, 143 S. Ct.
1322, 1343 (2023).131
Commenters also cited FOGRMA’s
provision that lessees are liable for
royalties when ‘‘waste is due to
negligence . . . or . . . failure to
comply with any rule or regulation . . .
under any mineral leasing law.’’ 30
U.S.C. 1756 (emphasis added). This
provision says nothing of the prudent
operator standard and imposes royalty
for failure to comply with any
applicable regulations, including the
regulations at issue in this rule. Some
commenters attempted to downplay this
language by characterizing FOGRMA as
requiring compliance only with
‘‘specific regulatory requirement[s],’’ but
the relevant statute does not include the
word ‘‘specific,’’ and the commenters
provided no explanation as to how that
concept, even if somehow embodied in
FOGRMA, would operate to exclude
from royalty obligations those
regulations—like this final rule—
designed to conserve the Federal and
Indian mineral estates.
Commenters also cited to the District
of Wyoming’s decision addressing the
merits of the 2016 Rule, but that
decision likewise does not compel the
commenters’ preferred reading of the
prudent operator standard or elevate it
to a statutory limit on the Secretary’s
rulemaking authority. The relevant
portion of the decision began by reciting
the history of the BLM’s case-by-case
evaluation of feasibility, citing Rife Oil
and the IBLA’s Ladd Petroleum
decision. See Wyoming, 493 F. Supp. 3d
at 1073–74.132 The Wyoming court then
concluded that although the ‘‘MLA’s
waste provisions leave room for
interpretation,’’ the BLM’s 2016
construction of those provisions was
131 In the context of drainage (the original
problem addressed by the prudent operator
standard) the BLM has promulgated regulations
detailing a lessee’s obligations to avoid
uncompensated drainage or to pay compensatory
royalties. 43 CFR 3162.2–2 to 3162.2–15. Thus, as
in this final rule, the BLM by regulation specifies
the duties of lessees without reliance upon common
law standards, including the prudent operator
standard.
132 In the Wyoming decision, the court
characterized the IBLA’s Ladd holding as
‘‘remanding BLM decision that flared gas was
avoidably lost for determination of ‘whether in fact
it was economically feasible to market the gas’ and
explaining that interpretation of NTL–4A giving
operator opportunity to show gas was not
marketable ‘is consistent with the intent of the
underlying statutory and regulatory authority.’ ’’
This statement is a quote from a headnote in IBLA’s
decision, not the decision itself. Ladd Petroleum
Corp., 107 IBLA 5 (1989).
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unlawful because the BLM had
‘‘primarily’’ sought to ‘‘benefit the
environment and improve air quality,’’
as reflected in the BLM’s reliance on the
2016 Rule’s ancillary effects. Id.
In both its proposed and final rules,
however, the BLM is exclusively
focused on addressing waste and royalty
payments, along with certain safety
provisions, and has disavowed in form
and substance any effort to regulate air
quality in a manner entrusted to EPA
and that agency’s State and Tribal
partners, including by eschewing any
reliance on ancillary effects on the
atmosphere. Instead, the BLM has
promulgated this rule purely to curb the
excessive, accelerating, and nationwide
waste of Federal and Indian gas and to
curb localized hazards to human health
and safety from operations. As it did in
the 2016 Rule, the BLM has
acknowledged its ‘‘decades-long
practice of factoring in operator
economics on a case-by-case basis when
determining whether a loss was
avoidable,’’ explaining in this
rulemaking why the MLA’s waste
provisions—which ‘‘leave room for
interpretation’’—now justify a suite of
nationwide standards and important
flexibilities for specific operators and
leases. Id. Therefore, the final rule does
not conflict with the Wyoming court’s
decision.
In dicta, the Wyoming court also
discussed the prudent operator standard
without reference to considerations like
the social cost of methane. Id. The
District Court cited caselaw and the
MLA for the general proposition that
‘‘[o]il and gas leases—including those
between the Federal Government and its
lessees—are intended to ensure
mutually profitable development of the
lease’s mineral resources.’’ Id.
(emphasis added). Indeed, the cases
cited by the Wyoming court stand for
the proposition that a mineral lease is
fundamentally different from ‘‘a
business into which [the lessee] puts
property, money, and labor exclusively
his own, the profits and losses in which
are of concern only to him, and the
conduct of which may be according to
his own judgment . . . .’’ Brewster v.
Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th
Cir. 1905). Instead, the ‘‘interest in the
subject of the lease . . . make the extent
to which . . . the operations are
prosecuted of immediate concern to the
lessor.’’ Id. As the BLM noted in the
proposed rule and reaffirms here, these
general propositions do not specify
precisely how the United States, as
manager of the Federal mineral estate,
must perform its statutory duty of
preventing waste, and, specifically,
whether it must do so on a case-by-case
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25397
basis or elevate an operator’s profit
maximization over the United States’
duties to the taxpayers and to Indian
mineral owners.
As discussed in Brewster, one way the
lessor may elect to enforce this interest
is by seeking expedited production, so
that the lessee’s failure to develop the
lease does not ‘‘exhaust’’ the oil and gas
‘‘through the operation of wells on
adjoining lands.’’ Id. See also Gerson v.
Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149
F.2d 444, 446 10th Cir. 1945 (‘‘A lease
of this kind contains an implied
covenant that the lessee will exercise
reasonable diligence in the development
of the leasehold and in the protection of
it from undue drainage through wells on
adjacent lands.’’) (emphasis added). The
prudent operator standard chiefly
applies to these drainage cases, in
which it protects the operator from
overbroad allegations of a ‘‘breach of the
covenant for the exercise of reasonable
diligence.’’ Brewster, 140 F. at 814–15
(emphasis added). Given the significant
cost of drilling a new well 133 ‘‘and the
fact that the lessee must bear the loss if
the operations are not successful,’’ the
standard shields the lessee from
demands to drill unprofitable wells
‘‘even if some benefit to the lessor will
result’’ from less drainage. Brewster, 140
F. at 814 (emphasis added). See also
Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F.
Supp. 332, 333 (D. Wyo. 1963) (‘‘the
‘prudent operator’ rule . . . is to the
effect that the lessee has no implied
duty to drill an offset well if reasonably
prudent operators would not drill it’’).
In other words, the prudent operator
standard originally arose in and chiefly
applies to drainage, but the principles
underlying the standard equally enable
the lessor to exercise its ‘‘immediate
concern’’ in the lease by requiring
conservation of the mineral estate.
Brewster at 814. The policy concerns
ordinarily animating application of the
prudent operator standard are not as
salient in the latter case, where there is
materially less risk that the lessor will
seek to reap a profit by asking the lessee
to shoulder a significant net loss. A
lessor requiring the lessee to conserve
marginally more resources generally
does not, for example, seek royalties
from significant capital expenses, borne
by the lessee, ‘‘incident to the work of
exploration,’’ Id., or to ‘‘drill[ing] an
133 According to a 2016 report by the Energy
Information Agency: ‘‘Total capital costs per well in
the onshore regions considered in the study
[ranged] from $4.9 million to $8.3 million,
including average completion costs that generally
fell in the range of $ 2.9 million to $ 5.6 million
per well. However, there is considerable cost
variability between individual wells.’’ Trends in
U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Upstream Costs, p.2 (U.S.
E.I.A. March 2016).
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offset well.’’ Gerson, 149 F.2d at 446.134
Congress essentially codified that
understanding in the MLA,
commanding the Secretary of the
Interior to ‘‘obtain for the public a
reasonable financial return on assets
that ‘belong’ to the public,’’ while
requiring only ‘‘some incentive’’ for
development. Cal. Co. v. Udall, F.2d
384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
In all events—and contrary to the
commenters’ arguments in support of
individualized economic analyses—any
application of the prudent operator
standard considers the profitability of
the entire lease, not whether individual
volumes of potentially wasted gas are
themselves profitable for the lessee. See
Gerson, 149 F.2d at 446 (‘‘the lessee
does not bear an implied obligation . . .
unless, taking into consideration all
existing facts and circumstances, it
would probably produce oil in sufficient
quantity to repay the whole sum
required to be expended, including the
cost of drilling, equipping, and
operating the well, and also pay a
reasonable profit on the entire outlay’’).
For the reasons discussed in this
preamble, the BLM has reached
reasonable determinations, with respect
to each of its waste prevention
measures, that the marginal restrictions
in the final rule will not render a lease
unprofitable.
On this score, some commenters
argued that the draft RIA shows that the
costs of the proposed rule exceed the
benefits, and therefore the rule is
arbitrary and capricious and/or is in
tension with the prudent operator
standard. The BLM disagrees. The RIA
for the final rule provides estimates of
the monetized costs and benefits under
the accounting rules in OMB Circular
A–4, p.38 (2003), and acknowledges that
not all costs and benefits can be
monetized. Comparison of monetized
benefits to monetized costs provides
useful but not complete analysis, and
thus is not determinative with respect to
the non-statutory prudent operator
standard. The final rule requires
operators to incur some expenses from
which they may derive revenue (selling
the gas), or may not gain revenue
(paying royalties on flared gas or
curtailing oil production to limit
flaring). For example, the RIA treats
royalties as ‘‘transfer payments.’’
134 Accord Parker A. Lee, Ming Lei, Dominique J.
Torsiello, ‘‘Reasonably Prudent Operator or Good
and Workmanlike Manner: Does Your Contract
Have the Right Standard of Care?’’ McDermott Will
& Emery, The National Law Review, XIII, Number
27 (‘‘Under the reasonably prudent operator
standard, the lessee or operator is obligated to make
reasonable efforts to develop the interest for the
common advantage of both the lessor and lessee.’’)
(emphasis added).
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Transfer payments do not increase or
decrease the wealth of society as a
whole, and thus are not counted as
benefits of the final rule under the OMB
Circular. For the Federal taxpayers and
Indian mineral owners, though, royalty
payments are income, and as such are
benefits to which they are entitled
under statute, regulations, and the terms
of leases. We also note that some
industry commenters point out that
some of the costs of the proposed rule
projected in the draft RIA are for tasks
that are already required by the EPA in
New Source Performance Standards
subpart OOOOa. The BLM
acknowledges that some projected costs
are for tasks now required in the final
EPA New Source Performance
Standards subparts OOOOa, OOOOb,
and OOOOc rules, as addressed in the
RIA.
Comments on Banning Routine Flaring
and Requiring Gas Capture
Summary of Comments: Some
commenters requested that the BLM’s
final rule include a prohibition on
‘‘routine flaring’’ and that the final rule
should ‘‘require capture of flared gas
where it is both technologically and
economically feasible.’’ The
commenters also assert that the BLM is
‘‘legally required to reduce waste, not
just charge royalties on it.’’ They note
that reducing the waste of avoidably lost
gas through capture requirements will
also benefit ‘‘individual taxpayers and
Tribes and will have the added cobenefits of protecting frontline
communities and the climate from the
effects of wasted gas.’’ Some
commenters specifically noted the
impacts of oil and gas operations and
venting and flaring on environmental
justice communities and asserted that
charging royalties on flaring of
associated gas and requiring WMPs will
not significantly reduce venting and
flaring without a prohibition on routine
flaring.
Response: The BLM disagrees with
those commenters in part. The MLA
does not mandate capture of all gas as
such or place a ban on venting or flaring
as such, but instead requires operators
to ‘‘use all reasonable diligence to
prevent the waste of oil or gas
developed in the land.’’ 135 As
commenters note, the MLA also requires
that all leases include ‘‘a provision that
such rules for . . . the prevention of
undue waste as may be prescribed by
said Secretary shall be observed.’’ 136
Those statutory provisions
accommodate instances where waste is
135 30
136 30
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not preventable, even when operators
employ all reasonable diligence.
Likewise, section 50263 of the IRA does
not mandate capture of gas or place a
ban on venting or flaring as such, but
instead requires, subject to exceptions,
the payment of royalties on gas that is
consumed or lost by venting, flaring, or
negligent releases through any
equipment during upstream
operations.137 In short, Congress could
have banned venting and flaring as such
in the MLA or IRA, but did not.
The final rule implements the
requirement in section 50263 of the IRA
to assess royalties on gas that is lost by
venting and flaring. Although the BLM
believes that the royalty obligation for
flared gas provides some marginal
incentive for operators to make
investments to sell the gas rather than
to pay royalties on flared gas, we agree
with the commenters that the statutory
requirement for operators to use all
reasonable diligence to prevent waste is
a separate though related mandate—one
that the final rule achieves through such
requirements as a WMP.
Some commenters assert that to meet
the MLA’s requirements, the BLM must:
(1) adopt a definition of ‘‘unreasonable
and undue waste’’ that clarifies that
routine flaring constitutes avoidable
loss; (2) ban routine flaring, as some
States have done; and (3) include only
narrow exceptions where there is no
alternative to venting or flaring. The
BLM agrees that much of the historical
flaring was avoidable, and as discussed
below, the final rule includes provisions
that impose limits on what would
otherwise be ‘‘routine flaring,’’
including the definition of
‘‘unavoidably lost’’ in § 3179.41(b). We
disagree, though, that the MLA requires
that all routine flaring be defined as
‘‘avoidable’’ loss. The MLA requires
operators to use ‘‘reasonable diligence’’
to avoid waste, and thus ‘‘reasonable
diligence’’ to prevent undue waste; the
statute does not prohibit all venting and
flaring. Contrary at least one
commenter’s views, therefore, the final
rule is not based on maximizing
operators’ internal profit—that is not the
137 (a) IN GENERAL.—For all leases issued after
the date of enactment of this Act, except as
provided in subsection (b), royalties paid for gas
produced from Federal land and on the outer
Continental Shelf shall be assessed on all gas
produced, including all gas that is consumed or lost
by venting, flaring, or negligent releases through
any equipment during upstream operations.
(b) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply
with respect to—(1) gas vented or flared for not
longer than 48 hours in an emergency situation that
poses a danger to human health, safety, or the
environment; (2) gas used or consumed within the
area of the lease, unit, or communitized area for the
benefit of the lease, unit, or communitized area; or
(3) gas that is unavoidably lost. 30 U.S.C. 1727.
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test for ‘‘reasonable diligence,’’ and the
final rule may require some operators to
incur some costs of compliance. Other
operators may design and operate their
facilities to capture and sell virtually all
oil-well gas at a profit, but that is merely
sufficient—not necessary—for
compliance with the relevant portions
of the rule. Although the MLA does not
authorize the BLM to prohibit all
flaring, State laws or regulations
prohibiting routine flaring apply to
operations on Federal lands.
Some commenters argue that FLPMA
requires the BLM to protect the quality
of the air and atmospheric resources,
citing 43 U.S.C. 1701(a)(8). Section
1701(a)(8) states it is the ‘‘policy of the
United States’’ that ‘‘the public lands be
managed in a manner that will protect
the quality of [various ecologic values,
including] air and atmospheric’’ values.
That statement, however, is ‘‘effective
only as specific statutory authority for
[its] implementation is enacted by
[FLPMA] or by subsequent legislation
and shall then be construed as
supplemental to and not in derogation
of the purposes for which public lands
are administered under other provisions
of law.’’ 138 Here, the BLM’s authority
for its waste prevention and safety
measures is established in the MLA,
FOGRMA, and the IRA. The purposes of
the final rule are waste prevention and
royalty accountability, not air quality
control. The BLM also addresses
impacts on air quality in the EA for the
final rule, as required by statute.
Commenters cited evidence that
continued fossil fuel production is
inconsistent with meeting goals of
limiting climate change and that
communities living near oil and gas
operations suffer disproportionately
high rates of adverse health effects.
Those include several environmental
justice communities near oil and gas
operations on the public lands. Those
issues are discussed in the NEPA
compliance document and the RIA.
However, ending fossil fuel production
is outside the scope of this rulemaking,
the purpose of which is to update the
waste prevention requirements for oil
and gas development on public lands.
Like several other oil and gas
regulations, the final rule may have
some incidental public health and
climate effects, but the BLM does not
have authority to regulate air emissions
for the benefit of public health or the
climate, and the final rule is designed to
address waste prevention and royalty
accountability.
A commenter advocated greater
enforcement by the BLM. The BLM
138 43
U.S.C. 1701(b).
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regularly reviews its enforcement
programs for effective deployment of its
resources. Enforcement plans, however,
are outside the scope of this rulemaking.
A commenter asserted that the BLM
underestimated historical venting and
flaring. The BLM has used the best
available data. That data show that the
current regulation at NTL–4A has failed
to control venting and flaring,
particularly over the last two decades.
Thus, we agree with the commenter that
a more effective regulation is needed to
assure that operators exercise reasonable
diligence to prevent waste.
The BLM also recognizes the benefits
of gas capture, and the final rule
encourages greater capture and sale of
gas from oil wells. In part in response
to these comments, the BLM included in
§ 3162.3–1 of the final rule an option for
operators to self-certify that they will
capture 100 percent of oil-well gas
produced by an oil well as an
alternative to submitting a waste
management plan. If a self-certifying
operator flares gas other than in
response to a defined emergency, the
loss is ‘‘avoidable’’ and fully royalty
bearing. Although the BLM has no firm
estimates for the number of operators
who will self-certify, the option should
both prevent waste and prove attractive
for the reasons set forth elsewhere in
this preamble.
Comments on Impact of the Rule on
Indian Leases
Summary of Comments: Noting that
the proposed rule was generally
intended to apply in equal measure to
Federal leases and Indian leases, one
commenter criticized the rule for not
addressing how flaring limitations and
other features of the rule—given their
potential to cause premature shut-in or
curtailment of oil and gas production—
may disproportionately impact Indian
lessors who rely on production revenues
and may not be as willing as the Federal
Government to curtail or shut-in
production in order to avoid what the
commenter characterized as ‘‘relatively
minor’’ losses of revenue resulting from
venting or flaring. The commenter also
contended that, under the various
Indian leasing statutes—including the
IMDA (25 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.)—the BLM
must assure that the lands are
developed in a manner that maximizes
the ‘‘best economic interests’’ of Indian
lessors.
Response: The BLM’s regulations
apply to oil and gas operations on
Indian trust and restricted fee lands as
provided by 25 CFR 221.1(c), 212.1(d),
225.1(c), and the BLM is the bureau
tasked with regulating oil and gas
operations on those lands by delegations
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25399
to the BLM from the Secretary of the
Interior. The purposes of the regulations
of mineral development on Indian lands
are to maximize the best economic
interest of the Indian mineral owner and
to minimize any adverse environmental
or cultural impact. 25 CFR 221.1(a)
(Tribal leases), 212.1(a) (allotted leases),
225.1(a) (IMDA). ‘‘In considering
whether it is ‘in the best interest of the
Indian mineral owner’ to take a certain
action . . . , the Secretary shall
consider any relevant factor, including,
but not limited to: economic
considerations, such as date of lease
expiration; probable financial effect on
the Indian mineral owner; leasability of
land concerned; need for change in the
terms of the existing lease;
marketability; and potential
environmental, social, and cultural
effects.’’ 25 CFR 211.3, 212.3, 225.3.
Accord, e.g., 25 U.S.C. 2103(b) (IMDA).
Thus, economic considerations, such as
immediate production of oil, are
relevant factors, but they are not the sole
factors; the regulations promulgated in
accordance with the BLM’s statutory
authority give the Secretary broad
discretion. The Secretary thus has
discretion to require operators
producing Indian oil to take reasonable
measures to reduce waste of Indian
resources, to define avoidably lost gas,
and to require payment of royalties to
the Indian lessors on avoidably wasted
gas.
Since the final rule will apply equally
on Indian lands as it does on Federal
lands, there will be no disproportionate
impact on Indian leasing or
development. It might be that on some
leases at some times, Indian royalty
payments would temporarily decrease
as oil production is curtailed while the
operator complies with the final rule.
We have no reason to believe that total
long-term revenues from such leases
would suffer, rather we believe they will
increase as the operators pay royalties
on the gas as well as on the oil. Indeed,
for many leases there is likely to be no
decrease in royalty payments, and most
likely there will be increases in royalty
payments because operators will pay
royalties on captured or flared gas with
little or no interruption of oil sales.
We do not believe that the final rule
will cause premature plugging and
abandonment of otherwise profitable
wells. Every day, oil wells on Indian
lands, as on Federal lands and
elsewhere, are produced at capacity,
curtailed, shut in, or plugged and
abandoned based on a variety of factors,
including production quantity and
quality, costs of production, availability
of transportation, and commodity
prices. Although it is possible that
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compliance with the final rule may
increase net costs for some operators, it
would be only one of many business
costs for operators and is likely not as
determinative for continuing operations
as are the changes in prices for the oil
or gas, either positive or negative. There
is nothing improper in the final rule’s
requirements to reduce waste of Indian
gas and to pay royalties to the Indian
mineral owners on gas that would
otherwise be wasted. The final rule has
not been changed in response to the
comment.
Comments on the RIA
In preparing the final rule, the BLM
updated the numbers in the proposed
RIA. The updated RIA indicates that the
final rule would cost $19.3 million per
year (using a 7 percent discount rate to
annualize capital costs), while
generating private costs savings benefits
of around $1.8 million per year and
ancillary effects on society from reduced
methane emissions of around $17.9
million per year, with total benefits
averaging around $19.7 million per year.
The updated RIA estimates that the final
rule would generate $51 million per
year in royalties. The projected costs
changed from the RIA for the proposed
rule to the RIA for the final rule because
the final rule does not include certain
requirements from the proposed rule,
such as pneumatic control devices,
thereby reducing the rule’s costs.
The BLM received a comment stating
that the BLM’s estimated burden hours
for operators to prepare a WMP was too
low. In response, the BLM notes that
there are significantly fewer
requirements for a WMP in the final rule
as compared with the proposed rule.
Therefore, we believe that our estimate
of 1 hour is appropriate.
One commenter disagreed with the
BLM’s estimate regarding the projected
number of orifice meters that would be
installed the first year. The intent of the
comment is not entirely clear because it
only indicates the commenter’s view
that an estimated installation of 968
meters appears to be inaccurate but does
not specify the nature of the inaccuracy
or how the inaccuracy is a burden to
operators. In the final RIA, the BLM
estimates that there would be a total of
902 meters installed and explains that it
uses the 1,050 Mcf threshold to
determine the number of meters
installed because the final rule requires
all high-pressure flares with more than
1,050 Mcf of flaring per month to
measure flaring.
The BLM received a comment
expressing concern with the
administrative burden resulting from
the proposed rule. The BLM addresses
administrative burdens in the RIA and
the accompanying supporting statement
under the Paperwork Reduction Act. In
the RIA for the final rule, the BLM
estimates that the total annual
administrative burden of the final rule
will be about $8.9 million. The BLM
notes that the requirements for a WMP
have been significantly reduced in the
final rule. In the final rule, the WMP
only requires information operators
would have readily available when
submitting an APD. The information
collection activity associated with the
WMP required for this rule is 1 hour of
additional time to complete an APD.
Further, operators have the option of
self-certifying that they will commit to
capture 100 percent of the gas and thus
avoid the administrative cost of
preparing a WMP. The information
collection activity associated with either
preparing and submitting the WMP or
the self-certification is 1 hour of
administrative time. The BLM believes
operators submitting APDs for multiple
wells on a single well pad will be able
to simply copy and paste the WMP from
one well’s APD into the next well’s
APD. This copying and pasting for a
multi-well pad also has an information
collection burden of 1 hour, which most
likely overestimates the time it will take
operators to copy and paste the
information from one document into
another. And the final rule does not
require ‘‘complete and adequate’’
information in a WMP as proposed, but
does require the WMP to be technically
and administratively complete. The
phrase ‘‘technically and
administratively complete’’ is further
explained in the preamble discussion
for § 3162.3–1.
V. Section-by-Section Discussion
The following table is provided to aid
the reader in understanding the changes
from the proposed rule section numbers
and names to the final rule sections.
TABLE 1 TO IV—SECTION-BY-SECTION CHANGES MADE FROM THE PROPOSED TO THE FINAL RULE
Proposed rule section
Final rule section
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3162.3–1 Drilling applications and plans ...............................................
3179.1 Purpose ......................................................................................
3179.2 Scope ...........................................................................................
3179.3 Definitions and acronyms .............................................................
..............................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................
3179.4 Determining when the loss of oil or gas is avoidable or unavoidable.
3179.5 When lost production is subject to royalty .................................
..............................................................................................................
3179.6 Safety .........................................................................................
3179.7 Gas-well gas ..............................................................................
3179.8 Oil-well gas ................................................................................
3179.9 Measuring and reporting volumes of gas vented and flared .....
..............................................................................................................
3179.10 Determinations regarding royalty-free flaring ..........................
3179.11 Incorporation by reference (IBR) ................................................
3179.12 Reasonable precautions to prevent waste ..............................
3162.3–1 Drilling applications and plans.
3179.1 Purpose.
3179.2 Scope.
3179.10 Definitions and acronyms.
3179.11 Severability.
3179.30 Incorporation by reference (IBR).
3179.40 Reasonable precautions to prevent waste.
3179.41 Determining when a loss of oil or gas is avoidable or unavoidable.
3179.42 When lost production is subject to royalty.
3179.43 Data submission and notification requirements.
3179.50 Safety.
3179.60 Gas-well gas.
3179.70 Oil-well gas.
3179.71 Measurement of flared oil-well gas volume.
3179.72 Reporting and recordkeeping of vented and flared gas volumes.
3179.73 Prior determinations regarding royalty-free flaring.
Renumbered to 3179.30.
Renumbered to 3179.41.
Flaring and Venting Gas During Drilling and Production Operations
3179.101
3179.102
3179.103
3179.104
Well drilling .............................................................................
Well completion and related operations ................................
Initial production testing .........................................................
Subsequent well tests ............................................................
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3179.80 Loss of well control while drilling.
3179.81 Well completion and recompletion flaring allowance.
Removed.
3179.82 Subsequent well test for an existing completion.
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25401
TABLE 1 TO IV—SECTION-BY-SECTION CHANGES MADE FROM THE PROPOSED TO THE FINAL RULE—Continued
Proposed rule section
Final rule section
3179.105 Emergencies ..........................................................................
Gas Flared or Vented from Equipment and During Well Maintenance
Operations.
3179.201 Pneumatic controllers and pneumatic diaphragm pumps .....
3179.203 Oil storage vessels ................................................................
3179.204 Downhole well maintenance and liquids unloading ...............
3179.205 Size of production equipment ................................................
3179.83
Emergencies.
Removed.
3179.90 Oil storage tank vapors.
3179.91 Downhole well maintenance and liquids unloading.
3179.92 Size of production equipment.
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR)
3179.301
3179.302
3179.303
Leak detection and repair program .......................................
Repairing leaks ......................................................................
Leak detection inspection recordkeeping and reporting ........
3179.100 Leak detection and repair program.
3179.101 Repairing leaks.
3179.102 Leak detection inspection recordkeeping and reporting.
State or Tribal Variance
3179.401 State or Tribal requests for variances from the requirements
of this subpart.
Removed.
Immediate Assessments
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A. 43 CFR Part 3160—Onshore Oil and
Gas Operations
Section 3162.3–1 Drilling Applications
and Plans
Existing § 3162.3–1 contains the
BLM’s longstanding requirement for the
operator to submit an APD prior to
conducting any drilling operations on a
Federal or Indian oil and gas lease.
Drilling may only commence following
the BLM’s approval of the APD. The
proposed rule would have added two
new paragraphs to § 3162.3–1, intended
to help operators and the BLM avoid
situations where substantial volumes of
associated gas are flared from oil wells
due to inadequate gas capture
infrastructure.
Proposed § 3162.3–1(j) would have
required an operator to provide a WMP
with its APD for an oil well,
demonstrating how the operator
intended to address the capture of
associated gas from an oil well when
production begins. The purpose of the
proposed WMP was to help the BLM
understand how much associated gas
could be wasted as a result of the
approval of an APD. The proposed
WMP required the inclusion of the
following information with an oil-well
APD: the anticipated completion date of
the oil well; a description of the
anticipated production of both oil and
associated gas; a certification that the
operator has informed at least one
midstream processing company of the
operator’s production plans; and
information regarding the gas pipeline
to which the operator plans to connect.
If an operator was not able to identify
a gas pipeline with sufficient capacity to
accommodate the anticipated associated
gas production, the WMP would have
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been required to also include the
following information: a gas pipeline
system map showing the existing
pipelines within 20 miles of the well
and the location of the closest gas
processing plant; information about the
operator’s flaring from other wells in the
vicinity; and a detailed evaluation of
opportunities for alternative on-site
capture methods, such as compression
of the gas, removal of Natural Gas
Liquids (NGL), or other capture means.
Finally, the operator would have been
required to include any other
information demonstrating the
operator’s plans to avoid the waste of
gas production from any source,
including pneumatic equipment, storage
tanks, and leaks.
The purpose of the proposed WMP
was for the operator to provide the BLM
with information necessary to
understand how much associated gas
would be lost to flaring if the BLM were
to approve the oil-well APD and
whether the loss of that gas would be
reasonable under the circumstances. If
the WMP were to demonstrate that
approving an otherwise administratively
and technically complete APD could
result in undue waste of Federal or
Indian gas, the proposed § 3162.3–1(k)
would have authorized the BLM to take
one of the following actions: the BLM
could have approved the APD subject to
conditions for gas capture and/or
royalty payments on vented and flared
gas; or the BLM could have deferred
action on the APD in the interest of
preventing waste. If the potential for
undue waste had not been addressed
within 2 years of the applicant’s receipt
of the notice of the deferred action,
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under the proposed rule the BLM would
have denied the APD.
The BLM received numerous
comments on the proposed WMP. Based
on those comments, we believe there
was some confusion about when a WMP
would be required. For both the
proposed and final rules, a WMP is
required when a Federal or Indian APD
is required. In both the proposed and
final rules, only wells that are being
drilled to target oil production—in other
words Federal or Indian oil-well
APDs—will require a WMP. The BLM
assumes that if an operator is drilling a
gas well, there is a predetermined
market for the gas or a plan to shut in
wells until gas infrastructure is built.
For this reason, if a well is being drilled
to a known gas formation and will be
producing primarily gas, the Federal or
Indian APD does not require a WMP.
Based on public comment, the BLM
has revised the content of the proposed
WMP in this final rule. Many
commenters said the waste
minimization requirements were overly
burdensome for both the BLM and
operators. In addition, commenters read
the requirements as calling for operators
to provide proprietary, confidential
information belonging to midstream
companies that operators are unable to
provide. Commenters were also
concerned about how the BLM would
evaluate an operator’s WMP, pointing to
subjective language in proposed
§ 3162.3–1(j) indicating that the BLM
could deny an APD if the operator failed
to submit a complete and ‘‘adequate’’
WMP. Many commenters said the
proposed required information for the
WMP failed to meet the BLM’s stated
objectives of understanding associated
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gas capture and reducing waste through
flaring prior to approval of a Federal or
Indian APD.
After evaluating the primary objective
of the WMP, which is to ensure
operators have adequately planned to
reduce associated gas waste prior to
drilling an oil well, the BLM agrees with
commenters that the rule can be
effective without requiring all the
information in the proposed rule. The
proposed rule required 19 pieces of
information for the WMP for the
operator to demonstrate to the BLM that
it had sufficiently planned for the
capture or sale of associated gas from an
oil well. After careful consideration of
the comments and the purpose of a
WMP, the BLM in the final rule is
reducing the information required to 4
pieces in a WMP: (1) initial oil
production estimates and decline, (2)
initial gas production estimates and
decline, (3) certification that the
operator has an executed gas sales
contract to sell 100 percent of the
produced oil-well gas, and (4) any other
information demonstrating the
operator’s plans to avoid the waste of
gas.
The BLM agrees with the commenters
that BLM’s objective—determining if an
operator has a plan to capture the
produced gas—can be accomplished
with less information. And as
mentioned above, the BLM intends to
eschew collection of information that
could be proprietary or confidential.
The final rule also provides operators
with an alternative to the submission of
a WMP with their APDs by allowing
operators to instead submit a selfcertification statement that the operator
will be able to capture, as defined in
final § 3179.10, 100 percent of the oilwell gas that the oil well produces.
The BLM has required the anticipated
initial production rate and 3 years of
production decline because the BLM
has concluded that 3 years of data will
sufficiently cover the ordinarily steep
decline for production for
unconventional reservoirs and the
associated establishment of the
reservoir’s production decline curve.
This information provides the BLM with
an estimate of how much associated gas
could be flared, the size of production
equipment required at initial
production, and the size of production
equipment required when production
has leveled off. The WMP information is
relevant to understand not only the
volume at risk for flaring, but also how
the sizing of the production equipment
affects tank vapors. (If the production
equipment is undersized or there is
insufficient separation upstream of the
production tanks, there will be more gas
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wasted as tank vapors.) Approved APDs
with a WMP will be subject to the
flaring limitations identified in final
§ 3179.70 once the well begins
producing. The BLM believes the
revised waste minimization
requirements reduce the burden on
operators, reduce the review time for the
BLM, eliminate any concern of
providing proprietary or confidential
information, and increase the BLM’s
understanding of the disposition of the
associated gas from an oil well to ensure
the public receives a fair return for its
oil and gas.
As an alternative to the submission of
a WMP with the APD, § 3162.3–1(d)(4)
of the final rule allows operators to
submit a self-certification. Section
3162.3–1(k) provides that a selfcertification is a statement by the
operator that it will be able to capture,
as defined in final § 3179.10, 100
percent of the oil-well gas that the oil
well produces. If the operator elects to
self-certify, all flared oil-well gas, except
for gas flared under emergencies as
identified in § 3179.83, is an avoidable
loss with a royalty obligation and is not
subject to the unavoidable loss
threshold in § 3179.70(a). In the case of
self-certification, 100 percent of the oilwell non-emergency flared gas has a
royalty obligation from the date of first
production until the well is plugged and
abandoned. The BLM offers the selfcertification alternative to accommodate
operators who may consider this option
an advantageous business alternative
while ensuring the public receives a fair
return for its oil and gas. An operator
might choose to avoid having to submit
a WMP because it can be relatively easy
to design, build, and operate its
facilities to capture all of the gas and
sell it. In addition, an operator may
want to accelerate drilling and
development in lieu of waiting for a gas
contract and accept the additional
royalty obligation as a business expense
should the operator need to flare
following drilling and completion.
The BLM’s approval process for the
WMP or the self-certification statement
appears in the new final § 3162.3–1(l).
With this addition, the BLM has
clarified for operators how the Bureau
will evaluate a WMP or self-certification
statement. Upon review of the WMP or
the self-certification, the BLM may take
one of the following actions: (1) approve
an administratively and technically
complete oil-well APD with a WMP,
subject to the conditions for flared gas
described in § 3162.3–1(j); (2) approve
an administratively and technically
complete oil-well APD with a selfcertification statement for associated gas
capture subject to the conditions for
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flared gas described in § 3162.3–1(k); or
(3) defer action on an APD that is not
administratively or technically complete
in the interest of preventing waste until
such time as the operator is able to
amend its APD to comply with the
requirements in either § 3162.3–1
paragraph (j) or (k).
The final rule replaces the subjective
term ‘‘adequate’’ in this section with the
term ‘‘administratively and technically
complete.’’ The concept
‘‘administratively and technically
complete’’ appears in the original
§ 3162.3–1(d), which states that ‘‘[p]rior
to approval, the application shall be
administratively and technically
complete.’’ To be administratively
complete, an APD must contain all the
required components: a drilling plan, a
surface use plan of operations, evidence
of bond coverage, other information as
may be required by applicable orders
and notices, and, with the finalization of
this rule, for an oil well, a WMP or selfcertification. For an APD to be
technically complete, the APD must
fulfill all the requirements of each of the
components and be technically correct
pursuant to any applicable orders and
notices. For example, an APD is not
administratively complete if it does not
include a drilling plan. If the APD does
include a drilling plan, but the drilling
plan fails to include the appropriate
blowout prevention equipment, as
required in 43 CFR subpart 3172, then
the drilling plan is not technically
complete.
A WMP or self-certification will now
be a required component of an APD for
it to be administratively complete. If an
operator does not submit a WMP or a
self-certification statement with the
APD, then the APD will not be
administratively complete. For the
WMP or self-certification to be
technically complete, it must contain
the required information in final
§ 3162.3–1 paragraph (j) or (k). If the
operator submits a WMP that includes
only the anticipated oil production
decline curve for 1 year, then the APD
is not technically complete. If an
operator fails to include a WMP or selfcertification as required or if the WMP
or self-certification fails to meet the
requirements in § 3162.3–1 paragraph (j)
or (k), then the BLM will defer action on
the APD until the operator amends the
APD to comply with the requirements of
administrative and technical
completeness.
Final § 3162.3–1(l)(3) limits the time
in which the operator must address
deficiencies in the WMP or the selfcertification to within 2 years of
submission of the APD. If the operator
does not meet this deadline, then the
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BLM may disapprove the APD. This
change conforms the WMP or selfcertification process with the rest of the
current § 3162.3–1 and review process.
Furthermore, a 2-year limit provides
operators with sufficient time to either
secure a gas sales contract or proceed
with self-certification in the absence of
a sales contract. The 2-year time limit
also ensures that an APD will not
remain in a pending status with the
BLM for an extended period because of
an operator’s lack of diligence or
inability to complete its application. A
2-year limit is reasonable for an operator
who intends to drill on a lease and is
capable of submitting a complete WMP
or self-certification.
B. 43 CFR Part 3170—Onshore Oil and
Gas Production
Section 3179.1
Purpose
Final § 3179.1 has only one change
from the proposed rule. The BLM
changed the name of the Osage Tribe to
the Tribe’s official name, The Osage
Nation, which the Tribe adopted in
2008. The purpose of subpart 3179
remains unchanged in the final rule and
continues to implement and carry out
the purposes of statutes relating to the
prevention of waste from Federal and
Indian oil and gas leases, conservation
of surface resources, and management of
the public lands for multiple use and
sustained yield, including section 50263
of the IRA.
This final rule section continues to
clarify that upon publication, final
subpart 3179 supersedes those portions
of NTL–4A that pertain to, among other
things, flaring and venting of produced
gas, unavoidably and avoidably lot gas,
and waste prevention. Subpart 3178,
published on November 18, 2016 (81 FR
83078), superseded the portions of
NTL–4A that pertain to oil or gas used
on lease for beneficial purposes (see 43
CFR subpart 3178). With the final
publication of subpart 3179, NTL–4A
has been superseded in its entirety.
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Section 3179.2
Scope
Section 3179.2 of the final rule
continues to identify the operations to
which the various provisions of subpart
3179 will apply. Paragraph (a) states
that, in general, the provisions of the
final rule apply to: (1) all onshore
Federal and Indian (other than The
Osage Nation) oil and gas leases, units,
and communitized areas; (2) IMDA
agreements, except in certain
circumstances described in the rule text;
(3) leases and other business agreements
and contracts for the development of
Tribal energy resources under a Tribal
Energy Resource Agreement entered
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into with the Secretary, except under
certain circumstances; and (4) wells,
equipment, and operations on State or
private tracts that are committed to a
federally approved unit or CA. Final
§ 3179.2(a) removes the duplication of
the words ‘‘provided in’’ that appeared
in the proposed rule.
Final paragraph (b) is substantially
the same as proposed paragraph (b). The
only change in the final rule is that the
crossed-referenced sections have been
revised to reflect the new section
numbers. As in the proposed rule, it
provides that certain provisions in
subpart 3179, namely redesignated
§§ 3179.50, 3179.90, and 3179.100
through 102, apply only to operations
and production equipment located on a
Federal or Indian oil and gas surface
estate and do not apply to operations on
State or private tracts, even where such
tracts are committed to a federally
approved unit or CA, sometimes
referred to as ‘‘mixed ownership’’
agreements.
As in the proposed rule, final
§ 3179.2(b) implicates a question
regarding the BLM’s authority raised by
the court that vacated the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. That court stated that
the MLA ‘‘does not provide broad
authorization for the BLM to impose
comprehensive Federal regulations
similar to those applicable to operations
on Federal lands on State or privatelyowned tracts or interests.’’ 139 In that
court’s view, the BLM’s authority to
regulate unit or CA operations on State
and private tracts under the MLA and
FOGRMA may be limited to rates of
development and matters directly
relevant to the BLM’s proprietary
interest in the Federal minerals.140 This
rule does not reach a position on the full
extent of the BLM’s authority to regulate
non-Federal lands. For purposes of this
rule, however, we note that many
provisions in the final rule—including
final §§ 3179.41, 3179.70, 3179.81,
3179.82, and 3179.83 and the final
measurement and reporting
requirements in final §§ 3179.71 and
3179.72—have a direct impact on
royalty revenue and apply to all
operations producing Federal or Indian
gas, whether on a Federal or Indian
lease or as part of a mixed-ownership
agreement. Other requirements—such as
those related to storage tank hatches and
the leak detection-and repair program—
apply when the facilities are located on
Federal or Indian surface estate because
those requirements have a slightly less
direct connection to royalties. While the
BLM does not view that connection as
139 Wyoming
140 Id.
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at 1082–83.
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25403
dispositive of its authority in this
sphere, it has in this rule chosen to limit
application of these programs in light of
the BLM’s recent history of regulation
and the possibility that further
extending these requirements would
generate relatively small marginal gains
in revenue relative to other
requirements.
The final rule redesignates sections
throughout the subpart to standardize
the organization of sections in part 3170
(e.g., section numbers ending in ‘‘30’’
will be the sections that contain
incorporation-by-reference material, as
required, throughout part 3170).
Further, the reorganization of the
sections in part 3170 groups similar
topics together under similar section
designations for ease of use and
readability.
Section 3179.10 Definitions and
Acronyms
This final rule section contains
definitions for 12 terms that are used in
subpart 3179 as opposed to the 13 terms
that appeared in the proposed rule. The
BLM removed the proposed definition
for ‘‘storage vessel.’’ Proposed
§ 3179.203, which pertained to oil
storage vessels, was significantly revised
based on public comment as discussed
further below. Thus, the BLM removed
the definition for ‘‘storage vessel’’ and
substituted the more commonly
understood term ‘‘oil storage tank’’ for
‘‘storage vessel’’ in the remainder of
subpart 3179. The use of the common
term ‘‘oil storage tank’’ brings the final
subpart 3179 into alignment with the
use of ‘‘oil storage tank’’ in current
subpart 3174.
One commenter recommended that,
‘‘for the purposes of this section, where
there is a State definition that applies
for the same BLM term, the BLM will
apply the definition used in the State in
which the applicable gas or oil well is
located.’’ The BLM is charged with
ensuring that the public and Indian
mineral interests receive a fair return for
their oil and gas leases. That obligation
necessarily entails the determination of
a lessee’s royalty obligation, which, in
the case of waste prevention, relies
directly on the BLM’s consistent use of
terms. The BLM would be unable to
implement the requirements of this rule
consistently—and to ensure a uniformly
fair return—if the Bureau were to rely
on multiple, varying, and changeable
State definitions for the terms used in
this regulation. Further, if the BLM were
to adopt this approach, and there was a
conflict between the BLM requirements
and the State definition, there would be
no clear path to resolution of the
conflict. The BLM did not make changes
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to allow for the use of definitions from
State code to apply to Federal and
Indian oil and gas regulations for the
State in which the production occurs.
The BLM received comments on the
definition for ‘‘automatic ignition
system’’ that agree with the BLM’s
approach to not require a specific type
of device. The BLM agrees that the term
‘‘automatic ignition system’’ connotes
the concept of an ignition source
without specifying a particular type of
device. To be clear, any applicable rule
of the EPA, a State, or a Tribe regarding
such equipment and its destruction
efficiency apply to operations regulated
by the BLM.
One commenter stated that requiring
a continuous flame is wasteful and
unnecessary. The BLM disagrees with
this comment because the proposed
definition of ‘‘automatic ignition
system’’ only requires a continuous
pilot flare where needed to ensure
continuous combustion. The BLM
believes the proposed definition allows
for a great deal of operator flexibility
and did not change the ‘‘automatic
ignition system’’ definition based on the
comments.
The BLM did not receive any
comments on the proposed definitions
for ‘‘capture,’’ ‘‘compressor station,’’
‘‘gas-to-oil ratio (GOR),’’ or ‘‘pneumatic
controller.’’ Therefore, these four
definitions remain the same in final rule
as in the proposed rule.
One commenter requested the BLM to
add a definition for ‘‘economic
feasibility.’’ The commenter’s
recommended definition mirrors part of
the definition for ‘‘economically
marginal property’’ found in subpart
3173. For the proposed rule, the BLM
used the term ‘‘economically infeasible’’
in proposed § 3179.203(b), which
addressed vapor recovery systems.
Since the BLM has removed the
requirement for a vapor recovery system
on oil storage tanks in the final rule, the
final rule no longer references the terms
‘‘economically feasible’’ or
‘‘economically infeasible.’’ Therefore,
the BLM has not included a definition
for ‘‘economic feasibility’’ in the final
rule.
Commenters recommended that the
BLM include a definition for the term
‘‘exploratory well.’’ The BLM has a
definition for ‘‘exploratory well’’ in
existing subpart 3172, but that
definition applies within that subpart.
Leaving the term undefined in this rule
could cause confusion. Accordingly, we
are adding the same definition of
‘‘exploratory well’’ to this rule as
appears in 43 CFR 3172.5:
‘‘[e]xploratory well means any well
drilled beyond the known producing
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limits of a pool.’’ Subpart 3179 resides
in part 3170 Onshore Oil and Gas
Production. The definitions that are
used within multiple subparts of part
3170 reside in subpart 3170. Originally
published in 1988 as Onshore Oil and
Gas Order No. 2, subpart 3172 was
codified in the CFR on June 16, 2023 (88
FR 39514). When the BLM revises
subpart 3170, it will remove the
definition for exploratory well from
subpart 3172 and include it in subpart
3170 since the definition now applies to
more than one subpart.
The BLM received numerous
comments on the definition for ‘‘gas
well.’’ The definition that the BLM
included in the proposed rule was taken
from the Conservation Division Manual
644.5. One commenter recommended
including a definition that relied on a
GOR standard throughout the rule and
did not recommend incorporating any
deference to the States’ definitions in
the rule. The commenter did not
provide any recommendation for the
appropriate GOR standard for a gas well.
The BLM is aware that many States
define a gas well in terms of GOR, and
the GOR varies among State definitions.
The BLM has decided not to change the
proposed definition, which relies on
whether the well produces more energy
from gas or oil. The BLM has
implemented that definition in the CDM
for decades. Commenters did not
explain how a GOR based definition
would improve implementation of this
final rule. Conversely, adopting a new
definition—one relying on GOR—could
create implementation conflicts insofar
as the BLM chooses a GOR that differs
from certain State definitions.
Historically, the proposed and final rule
definition has provided the BLM with
regulatory flexibility when interacting
with operators and State regulatory
authorities by allowing BLM to adapt to
reservoir changes throughout the life
cycle of a well that may result in a well
qualifying as an oil well initially and as
a gas well later.
Another commenter recommended
removing the BLM definition for ‘‘gas
well’’ and reminded the BLM that in its
January 11, 2023, virtual information
forum, the BLM stated it uses the gasor oil- well designation assigned by a
State jurisdiction when resolving
controversial issues. The BLM’s
statement at the virtual information
forum was based on IBLA’s
interpretation of NTL–4A.141 The BLM
has determined that consistent
implementation of this rule would be
better served by a uniform definition of
‘‘gas well’’, which it is now
141 See
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promulgating in this final rule for the
first time. The commenter expressed
concerns regarding how any
inconsistencies between State well
designations and the BLM’s ‘‘gas well’’
definition would be reconciled. The
final rule does not affect States’
implementation of their regulatory
programs. Accordingly, the final rule
does not need a mechanism for
reconciling State well designations. The
BLM did not change the definition for
‘‘gas well’’ in the final rule based on the
comments received.
One commenter requested that the
BLM change its definition of ‘‘highpressure flare’’ to mean ‘‘an open-air
flare stack or flare pit that combusts
natural gas at high-pressure volumes
leaving a pressurized vessel greater than
100 psig or more and that in normal
operations would go to a sales line.’’
Based on the BLM’s experience, we
conclude that, by defining ‘‘highpressure flare’’ as ‘‘leaving a pressurized
vessel greater than 100 psig,’’ the rule
would apply to less than 5 percent of
flares at Federal or Indian oil-well
facilities. Excluding 95 percent of flares
would not accomplish the waste
prevention goals of this rule.
Conversely, in this final rule the BLM
intends for any flare carrying gas from
a pressurized vessel to be considered a
high-pressure flare and to include most,
if not all, flares that operate due to
pipeline capacity constraints. The BLM
did not change the definition to one that
includes a pressure threshold to ensure
that most of the associated gas flaring is
regulated with this subpart.
Another commenter suggested the
BLM revise the ‘‘high-pressure flare’’
definition to include any flare that
would normally go to sales and provide
a definition for ‘‘low-pressure flare’’ as
associated gas from separation
equipment that would not normally go
to sales without compression. The BLM
considered the recommended changes
to the definition for ‘‘high-pressure
flare’’ and ‘‘low-pressure flare’’ and
changed the definition of ‘‘high-pressure
flare’’ in response to comments. The
final definition is: ‘‘High-pressure flare
means an open-air flare stack or flare pit
designed for the combustion of natural
gas that would normally go to sales.’’
Under normal operating conditions, the
gas from a pressurized vessel flows
through a gas facility measurement
point (FMP) and into a sales line, but,
due to pipeline capacity constraints, the
gas from the pressurized vessel
sometimes goes to a flare instead. The
BLM disagrees with the commenters
that compression needs to be added to
the ‘‘high-pressure flare’’ definition, and
the BLM believes that defining a low-
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pressure flare as a flare that does not
meet the definition of a high-pressure
flare is sufficient for the requirements of
this rule. A commenter suggested
adding ‘‘with sufficient pressure to
otherwise be injected into the pipeline
without the aid of a compressor.’’ There
are operations producing from Federal
or Indian leases that use compression
on-lease to have enough pressure to
enter the sales line. Locations with
compression also flare due to pipeline
capacity issues. Therefore, the BLM did
not add compression to the final
definition of ‘‘high-pressure flare.’’ The
BLM recognizes and agrees with the
comments that the BLM’s proposed
definition for ‘‘high-pressure flare’’
would include gas from a second- or
third-stage pressurized separation vessel
at a lower pressure than would be
required for sales. That is not the BLM’s
intent, and the definition was changed
based on comments to better reflect that
the requirements for high-pressure flares
are meant for the flared production that
would have gone to sales if there were
adequate pipeline capacity.
A third commenter suggested that the
BLM should define ‘‘high-pressure
flare’’ as combustion of gas that does not
require compression and that could be
transported through the connected sales
line. The BLM agrees with the
commenter that a high-pressure flare
combusts gas that normally flows to
sales and changed the definition in
response to the comment. However, the
BLM did not include the phrase ‘‘does
not require compression’’ in the final
definition because that would
inappropriately limit the definition of
high-pressure flare. Some oil wells
produce gas that would not need
compression to enter a sales line, but if
the gas is not routed to a sales line, it
should be routed to a flare and therefore
subject to the final requirements in
§ 3179.70. Accordingly, tethering the
definition of ‘‘high-pressure flare’’ to the
absence of compression might imply
that a low-pressure flare requires
compression, which is inaccurate as a
matter of practice and does not reflect
the BLM’s intent.
For the proposed definition of ‘‘leak,’’
the BLM received comments suggesting
removal of the three methods and
standards by which a leak or release
may be detected. Other commenters,
though, stated that the definition should
remain as proposed. For the final rule
definition of ‘‘leak,’’ the BLM added the
use of audio, visual, and olfactory
(AVO) means for leak detection and
removed the reference to ‘‘a leaking
vapor recovery unit’’ as an example of
a leak, since the requirements for
installation of a vapor recovery unit
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have been removed from the final rule.
The final rule LDAR program uses AVO
detection methods and does not require
operators to evaluate and possibly
install vapor recovery equipment. See
final §§ 3179.10 and 3179.100.
The BLM amended the final
definition of ‘‘leak’’ to be consistent
with the final rule’s leak LDAR
requirements. Commenters
recommended that the removal of the
detection methods from the definition.
The BLM retained the detection
methods in the definition to provide
clarity for the regulated community and
BLM inspectors. Leaks are not
considered leaks unless they can be
detected by one of the three methods
provided in the definition. Further, the
three identified methods for leak
detection provide operators with facility
inspection flexibility.
The BLM received several comments
suggesting a rewording of the proposed
definition for ‘‘liquids unloading.’’ For
additional clarity, commenters
recommended the following rewording
to the definition, ‘‘removal of liquid
hydrocarbons or water in the wellbore
that accumulated during production of
a completed gas well.’’ The rewording
did not offer any substantive change
from the proposed definition, which
states ‘‘removal of an accumulation of
liquid hydrocarbons or water from the
wellbore of a completed gas well.’’ The
BLM did not change the definition
based on the comments received.
The BLM did not change the final rule
definition for ‘‘lost oil or lost gas’’ based
on comments received. The BLM
received comments suggesting that the
BLM expressly exclude royalty-free use
of produced oil or gas on-lease from the
definition.
The BLM does not consider royaltyfree use of oil or gas on the lease to be
‘‘lost oil or lost gas,’’ but adding an
express exclusion of royalty-free use in
the proposed definition for ‘‘lost oil or
lost gas’’ could have created confusion
or conflict with the implementation of
proposed § 3179.201, regulating
pneumatic equipment. Pneumatic
controllers and pneumatic diaphragm
pumps use gas designated as on-lease
and royalty-free use pursuant to subpart
3178. Subpart 3178, in turn, requires
that any production used on-lease and
royalty-free must be a reasonable
volume, based on the type of equipment
used. In the case of pneumatic
equipment, proposed § 3179.201 would
have limited the bleed rate to 6 scf per
hour. Thus, if a pneumatic controller
had a higher bleed rate than allowed in
proposed subpart 3179 and an operator
were reporting this use as on-lease use,
then the controller would have been in
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25405
compliance with subpart 3178 and out
of compliance with proposed subpart
3179. For this reason, the BLM removed
the pneumatic equipment requirements
in proposed § 3179.201 and did not
change the definition for ‘‘lost oil or lost
gas’’ in this final subpart.
The BLM received comments
recommending a change to the
definition of ‘‘low-pressure flare.’’ The
proposed rule defined a ‘‘low-pressure
flare’’ as any flare that does not meet the
definition of a ‘‘high-pressure flare.’’
Based on comments received, the BLM
changed the definition for a ‘‘highpressure flare’’ to state that it combusts
gas that would normally go to sales.
Multiple commenters suggested
defining the ‘‘low-pressure flare’’ as one
that would not normally go to sales
without compression. Since the
definition for a ‘‘high-pressure flare’’
now requires that the gas stream would
normally go to sales, the proposed
definition for ‘‘low-pressure flare’’ as
one that is not a ‘‘high-pressure flare’’
accomplishes what the commenters
recommended. The BLM did not change
the proposed definition of ‘‘lowpressure flare’’ in the final rule based on
the comments.
One commenter suggested including a
definition for ‘‘oil well.’’ NTL–4A does
not contain a definition for either ‘‘oil
well’’ or ‘‘gas well.’’ However, the 2016
and 2018 rules that have been vacated
by the court did contain a definition for
an ‘‘oil well.’’ The BLM believes that
defining a ‘‘gas well’’ is sufficient for the
purposes of this rule. The BLM
acknowledges that the 2016 and 2018
versions of this rule provide a definition
for ‘‘oil well’’ that mirrors the definition
for a ‘‘gas well.’’ However, this final rule
definition of a ‘‘gas well’’ necessarily
implies that an ‘‘oil well’’ is one that is
not a ‘‘gas well.’’ The final rule
definition for gas well reads, ‘‘Gas well
means a well for which the energy
equivalent of the gas produced,
including its entrained liquefiable
hydrocarbons, exceeds the energy
equivalent of the oil produced. Unless
more specific British thermal unit (Btu)
values are available, a well with a GOR
greater than 6,000 standard cubic feet
(scf) of gas per barrel of oil is a gas
well.’’ Based on the final definition of
‘‘gas well,’’ the BLM believes it
functionally supplies a definition for an
oil well as one that produces more
energy in oil than in gas. The BLM did
not add a definition for an oil well to
the final rule based on this one
comment.
The proposed rule defined
‘‘unreasonable and undue waste of gas’’
to mean a frequent or ongoing loss of gas
that could be avoided without causing
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an ultimately greater loss of equivalent
total energy than would occur if the loss
of gas were to continue unabated. The
BLM requested comment on the
definition of ‘‘unreasonable and undue
waste of gas’’ in the proposed rule as
well as comment on a proposed
alternative definition: ‘‘Unreasonable
and undue waste of gas means a
frequent or ongoing loss of substantial
quantities of gas that could reasonably
be avoided if the operator were to take
prudent steps to plan for and manage
anticipated production of both oil and
associated gas from its operation,
including, where appropriate,
coordination with other nearby
operations.’’ One commenter
specifically suggested the inclusion of
the qualifier ‘‘that is economically
feasible to avoid’’ after ‘‘or the ongoing
loss of gas’’ in the proposed definition,
stating that the BLM has always
considered economics in making the
determination as to whether the loss of
gas is avoidable or unavoidable. The
commenter continued that the removal
of economic considerations makes the
rule ‘‘unwieldy,’’ and ‘‘significantly
reduces the BLM’s ability to efficiently
administer this regulatory program.’’ A
number of commenters recommended
the removal of the term ‘‘unreasonable
and undue waste’’ that was tied to the
proposed WMP, LDAR, and oil-well
flaring requirements. Commenters stated
the proposed definition is inconsistent
and arbitrary and does not provide clear
guidance. Another commenter
recommended modifications to the
proposed alternative definition, which
included the addition of a sentence
stating, ‘‘This includes all venting and
flaring of gas unless it arises due to
circumstances beyond the control of the
operator or due to temporary
operational necessities that render
abatement options infeasible or unsafe.’’
The BLM considered all the comments
received on the proposed and
alternative definitions of unreasonable
and undue waste, as discussed in the
next paragraph.
Oil and gas deposits are
nonrenewable resources and therefore
waste prevention and resource
conservation are reasonable
requirements for producing operations,
as provided for and required by statute.
In the more than 40 years since the
publication of NTL–4A, oil and gas
industry technology has advanced
significantly, the market has shifted
from viewing associated gas as a waste
product to a commodity, yet loss of gas
from Federal and Indian oil wells has
increased in total and on a per barrel
produced basis. An economic feasibility
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analysis is highly dependent on
multiple variables that one may choose
to include in the analysis, while the
more simplified, sensible approach that
the BLM is using here does not require
such a multivariate analysis. With the
final rule, the BLM has decided to not
carry forward the proposed definition of
‘‘unreasonable and undue waste of gas’’
and removed the term from the final
rule definitions and references to the
definition in that appeared in the
proposed rule at § 3162.3–1(k),
§ 3179.8(b), and § 3179.301. The BLM
has determined that the proposed
definition and its alternative proposed
definition might create unnecessary
confusion and, moreover, is not relevant
for purpose of carrying out final
§ 3179.70(b) and § 3179.100. The
proposed definitions would made it
unnecessarily difficult for the BLM to
take enforcement actions given the
multivariate nature of the definition.
Indeed, the final rule does not use the
term ‘‘unreasonable and undue waste of
gas’’ anywhere in the regulatory text.
Therefore, the BLM removed the
definition.
For the final rule, one commenter
suggested that the BLM add a definition
for the term ‘‘vapor recovery tower.’’
Since the BLM removed the provisions
for vapor recovery equipment in the
proposed § 3179.203 in response to
comments, the BLM does not believe the
addition of a definition for a ‘‘vapor
recovery tower’’ serves any purpose in
the final rule. The BLM did not add a
definition to the final rule based on this
comment and the changes made in the
final rule.
Section 3179.11
Severability
This new section describes the legal
principle of ‘‘severability’’ and applies it
to the regulations in subpart 3179. If any
portion of these regulations were found
invalid or unenforceable as to a
particular set of circumstances or
particular people, the remaining
portions of the regulations would
remain in effect and the BLM could
continue to enforce them.
The BLM has included this
severability section in the final rule to
make its intent clear that the various
provisions in the regulation are
independent and that any of the
sections of this final rule may either
stand alone or work together and are
therefore severable. If a court were to
find certain sections invalid, the
remaining sections of the rule would
remain in effect.
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Section 3179.30
Reference (IBR)
Incorporation by
This final rule incorporates one
industry standard without republishing
the standard in its entirety in the CFR,
a practice known as incorporation by
reference. This standard was developed
through a consensus process, facilitated
by the American Petroleum Institute
(API), with input from the oil and gas
industry. The BLM has reviewed this
standard and determined that it will
further the purposes of § 3179.71 of this
final rule. This standard reflects the
industry-accepted standard for the
testing and reporting protocols for a
flare gas meter within a Flare Flow
Meter System. Under § 3179.71(c),
ultrasonic meters used in high-pressure
flare systems must be tested for flare
use. The legal effect of IBR is that the
incorporated standard becomes a
regulatory requirement. This final rule
incorporates the specific version of the
standard listed. The standard referenced
in this section would be incorporated in
its entirety.
The incorporation of the industry
standard follows the requirements
found in 1 CFR part 51. The industry
standard can be incorporated by
reference pursuant to 1 CFR 51.7
because, among other things, it would
substantially reduce the volume of
material published in the Federal
Register; the standard is published,
bound, numbered, and organized; and
the standard proposed for incorporation
is readily available to the general public
through purchase from the standard
organization or through inspection at
any BLM office with oil and gas
administrative responsibilities. 1 CFR
51.7(a)(3) and (4). The language of
incorporation in final 43 CFR 3179.30
meets the requirements of 1 CFR 51.9.
The API material that the BLM is
incorporating by reference is available
for inspection at the Bureau of Land
Management, Division of Fluid
Minerals, U.S. Department of the
Interior, 1849 C Street NW, Washington,
DC 20240, telephone 202–208–3801;
and at all BLM offices with jurisdiction
over oil and gas activities.
The API material is also available for
inspection and purchase from API, 200
Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 100,
Washington, DC 20001–5571; telephone
202–682–8000; online purchase https://
www.apiwebstore.org/Standards. In
addition, the API provides free readonly access to the API standard that the
BLM has incorporated by reference via
an online reading room https://
publications.api.org/.
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The following describes the API
standard that the BLM incorporates by
reference in this final rule:
API Manual of Petroleum
Measurement Standards (MPMS)
Chapter 22.3, Testing Protocol for Flare
Gas Metering; First Edition, August
2015 (‘‘API 22.3’’). This standard covers
the testing and reporting protocols for
natural gas flare meters. This standard
discusses the testing to be performed,
how the test data should be analyzed,
and how measurement uncertainty is
determined based on the test data.
In the proposed rule, the BLM
included two GPA Midstream
Association standards that would have
addressed requirements in proposed
§ 3179.203(c) for sampling and analysis
in the evaluation of the installation of
vapor recovery equipment. Since the
BLM has removed the vapor recovery
equipment requirements from the final
rule, there is no longer a need to
incorporate those two industry
standards and they have been removed.
In response to comments, the BLM in
the final rule has expanded the
acceptable methods for measuring flared
oil-well gas volumes from orifice meters
to also include ultrasonic meters. Since
ultrasonic meters are not an approved
method of measurement at FMPs
pursuant to 43 CFR subpart 3175, the
BLM is including the testing protocol
from API 22.3 to ensure ultrasonic
metering accuracy for high-pressure
flares. Operators who use ultrasonic
meters for flare measurement are
required to ensure that these meters are
tested for flare use pursuant to API 22.3.
The test result report based on API 22.3
must be made available to the AO upon
request.
The BLM received a number of
comments requesting the inclusion of
API MPMS Chapter 14.10 Natural Gas
Fluids Measurement—Measurement of
Flow to Flares, December 2021, in the
industry standards that are incorporated
by reference. The BLM elected not to
include this standard for reasons
outlined in the discussion for § 3179.71
of this preamble.
Section 3179.40 Reasonable
Precautions To Prevent Waste
The BLM redesignated this section
from § 3179.12 in the proposed rule to
§ 3179.40 in the final rule. The BLM
received comments on this section
stating that the section: (1) is vague and
would be difficult for the BLM to
enforce consistently among field offices;
(2) uses the MLA’s ‘‘reasonable
precautions to prevent waste’’ language
absent actionable requirements; and (3)
would allow the BLM to exercise openended discretion divorced from
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regulatory requirements because it
allows the BLM, under proposed
paragraphs (b) and (c), to prescribe
‘‘reasonable measures’’ as conditions of
approval of an APD. One commenter
supported the BLM’s inclusion of the
‘‘reasonable precautions to prevent
waste’’ language in this section and
concurred with the BLM’s conclusion
that what may constitute reasonable
precautions to prevent waste may
change over time.
In response to these comments, the
BLM notes that the proposed section
simply reflects the BLM’s existing
statutory authority—already enshrined
by Congress in the MLA—to require
reasonable precautions for preventing
waste. The BLM cannot ignore that
statutory authority and duty. And
insofar as commenters suggest that the
BLM’s regulation is in tension with
other regulations—such as the
application of royalties to enumerated
categories of ‘‘avoidably lost’’ gas—the
BLM notes that it cannot act contrary to
statute or regulation and, where
regulations provide the BLM with
discretion, it must exercise reasoned
decision making in accordance with the
APA. Against these background
principles, commenters did not provide
specific examples of any conflicts
between § 3179.40 and other regulations
or requirements. Nor did commenters
provide specific examples of how any
conceptual tension between the MLA’s
‘‘reasonable precautions’’ language and
the final regulations would manifest as
an irreconcilable and unworkable
conflict with these or any other
Department regulations.
Indeed, the BLM routinely attaches
conditions to APDs, chiefly to apply
general statutory and regulatory
commands to site-specific conditions,
and to apply lease stipulations to
particular wells. If an operator requests
a variance under § 3170.6, for instance,
which requires the alternative to meet or
exceed the current requirement, the
BLM may grant the variance with
reasonable measures for the
implementation of the variance. To date,
operators have not objected to the
BLM’s reasonable measures included
with Conditions of Approval for APDs
or approvals of measurement variance
requests. Further, any decision the BLM
makes to prescribe ‘‘reasonable
measures’’ that an operator believes
causes harm may be appealed pursuant
to §§ 3165.3 and 3165.4. The BLM did
not change this section in response to
comments and the final rule section
remains the same as the proposed
section, except for redesignating the
section.
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Section 3179.41 Determining When
the Loss of Oil or Gas Is Avoidable or
Unavoidable
The BLM redesignated this section
from § 3179.4 in the proposed rule to
§ 3179.41 in the final rule. In paragraph
(a) of this section, the BLM considers
lost oil as an unavoidable loss when the
operator has taken reasonable steps to
avoid waste and has complied fully
with applicable laws, lease terms,
regulations, provisions of a previously
approved operating plan, and other
written orders of the BLM. Likewise in
paragraph (b) of this section, the BLM
considers lost gas as an unavoidable loss
based on the grounds described in
paragraph (a) for lost oil, but with a list
of operations or sources from which the
gas is lost to qualify as unavoidably lost.
Proposed paragraph (b) in this section
contained 14 operations for which gas
lost would be considered an
unavoidable loss. The final rule section
contains 13 operations for which gas
lost would be considered an
unavoidable loss. The BLM removed
one operation: initial production testing.
The BLM also removed the term
‘‘prudent’’ from the determinations of
unavoidably lost oil and unavoidably
lost gas because it could cause
confusion with the prudent operator
standard discussed above, and it is not
required for those determinations.
One commenter pointed out that the
proposed rule did not address force
majeure, or act-of-God events, such as
extreme weather conditions, and
requested that this type of event should
be included in the list of unavoidable
losses. The commenter explained that,
in its view, force majeure events may
not qualify as ‘‘emergencies,’’ as that
term is defined in the proposed rule and
the IRA. In the BLM’s experience in
considering NTL–4A Sundry Notices, it
has encountered operators who have
claimed that pipeline capacity issues
should be considered force majeure
events since, in the operators’ view, any
gas flared because of a capacity issue is
out of its control. The BLM has
concluded that pipeline capacity issues
are neither force majeure events, nor
outside an operator’s control. As
discussed above, operators have various
options to reduce associated gas flaring
when there are pipeline capacity issues,
such as curtailing oil production until
pipelines become available, and an
operator’s choice to continue oil
production unabated when there is no
available pipeline capacity should not
mean that the public must lose the value
of the royalties for that flared gas. The
BLM disagrees with the comment and
will not include ‘‘force majeure’’ in the
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list of unavoidable losses in final
§ 3179.41(b). The emergency provision
in the final rule will cover most events
that are traditionally thought of as
‘‘force majeure’’ events, but provides
clearer standards focused on situations
that are true emergencies rather than
simply all those arguably beyond the
operator’s control. As discussed below,
final § 3179.83 defines an emergency
situation as a temporary, infrequent, and
unavoidable situation in which the loss
of gas is necessary to avoid a danger to
human health, safety, or the
environment. For the first 48 hours of an
emergency, the lost gas is royalty
free.142 It is worth noting that if a ‘‘force
majeure’’ event prevented production
and sale of oil, there would be little or
no venting or flaring.
Commenters on this proposed section
disagreed with the time or volume
limits set within sections cited in the
unavoidable loss list of operations in
proposed § 3179.4(b). In most instances,
the commenters believed the set limits
to be too low and found them to be
arbitrary. The BLM has addressed the
time or volume limits in final
§§ 3179.70, 3179.81, 3179.82, and
3179.83. Each of these sections
discusses the comments received and
the BLM’s response to the comments
separately.
Numerous commenters objected to the
list of unavoidable loss operations for
lost gas and recommended keeping the
NTL–4A rule established 40 years ago,
under which the BLM evaluates each
event on a case-by-case basis. Under the
commenters’ reading of these
documents, gas may be wasted, royaltyfree, so long as the economics of
production do not justify the funding
and construction, by a single lessee, unit
PA, or CA, of infrastructure, such as a
redundant pipeline system or a gas
plant. As set forth above, nothing in the
MLA requires adoption of commenters’
reading of the prudent operator
standard, and, properly considered,
even if applicable that standard does not
foreclose the BLM from regulating the
massive and increasing volume of waste
generated from the development of
public minerals: as noted in the
proposed rule preamble, the average
amount of flared associated gas per
barrel of oil produced has increased 102
percent between the decade beginning
in 1990 and the decade beginning in
2010.
Even on their own terms, NTL–4A
and the CDM 644.5 were designed to
allow these outcomes. For example,
CDM 644.5 explains that ‘‘economics of
conserving gas must be on a field-wide
142 30
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basis, and the Supervisor must consider
the feasibility of a joint operation
between all other lessees/operators in
the field or area.’’ Because most gas
pipelines or gas plants do not require a
single well to supply them to capacity,
but rather service multiple wells, it is
inappropriate to weight the costs of
infrastructure against the value of the
gas produced by a single well or lease.
The BLM also received comments
suggesting that the proposed rule’s
definition of ‘‘avoidable loss’’ is
inconsistent with 43 CFR 3162.7–1(d).
That section first provides that ‘‘[t]he
operator shall conduct operations in
such a manner as to prevent avoidable
loss of oil and gas.’’ In a separate
sentence, the regulation states that ‘‘[an]
operator shall be liable for royalty
payments on oil or gas lost or wasted
from a lease site . . . when such loss or
waste is due to negligence on the part
of the operator of such lease, or due to
the failure of the operator to comply
with any regulation, order or citation
issued pursuant to’’ 43 CFR part 3160
(emphasis added).
Commenters appear to have read this
regulation as equating ‘‘avoidable loss’’
with negligence or noncompliance with
BLM orders or regulations, such that the
BLM’s proposed rule—which deems gas
‘‘avoidably lost’’ in certain scenarios
where an operator is otherwise
complying with the regulations and is
not negligent—is overbroad and in
tension with the existing regulations.
There is no conflict between the
BLM’s existing regulations and the
proposed rule or this final rule. The
regulation at 43 CFR 3162.7–1(d)
provides two distinct conditions for
when royalties are owed, namely that
operators must pay royalties on losses or
waste resulting from negligence or from
noncompliance with BLM regulations.
This final rule defines avoidable waste
and specifies when wasted gas is royalty
bearing. Thus, it is not in conflict with
§ 3162.–1(d), rather it is the type of
regulation contemplated and referenced
by § 3162.7–1(d).
Paragraph 3162.7–1(d) does not define
such royalty-bearing loss or waste as
‘‘avoidable.’’ Rather, it includes a
separate requirement that operators
must conduct operations in such a
manner as to prevent avoidable loss.
In comparison, NTL–4A includes a
broad definition of ‘‘avoidable loss’’ that
has been in place for four decades and
that the relevant commenters did not
question, contradicting any suggestion
that § 3162.7–1(d) conclusively defines
what qualifies as avoidable loss of gas.
Unlike 43 CFR 3162.7–1(d), but like
NTL–4A, the BLM’s proposed rule and
this final rule in § 3179.41 define when
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lost gas is ‘‘avoidably lost’’ or
‘‘unavoidably lost’’ and apply royalties
to ‘‘avoidably lost’’ gas in § 3179.42.
This final 3179 subpart provides that
lost gas is royalty bearing if it is
avoidably lost—that is, if the operator
has not taken reasonable steps to avoid
waste, has not complied with BLM
directives, and the gas is coming from
sources other than those listed in
§ 3179.42(b), it is royalty bearing. These
final regulations better define the
conditions for when gas is royalty free
and when it is royalty bearing. The BLM
has, however, eliminated the
‘‘negligence’’ component of the
definitions for ‘‘avoidably lost’’ and
‘‘unavoidably lost,’’ since the
definitions already require reasonable
measures to prevent waste, i.e., a higher
bar than negligence. Particularly in light
of this change, there is no tension
between the BLM’s existing regulations
and those finalized in this rule.
Section 3179.42 When Lost Production
Is Subject to Royalty
Proposed § 3179.5 is redesignated
§ 3179.42 in the final rule. The BLM
received several comments on this
section, none of which directly objected
to the two statements made in this
section. The section states that royalty is
due on all avoidably lost oil or gas and
royalty is not due on any unavoidably
lost oil or gas. For example, commenters
objected to the use of the terms
‘‘avoidable’’ and ‘‘unavoidable’’
elsewhere in the subpart. As a further
example, one commenter stated the
BLM should acknowledge that raw
associated gas cannot be marketed,
explaining that, in the commenter’s
view, ‘‘[i]t is improper to assess
royalties on flared gas because that gas
cannot make it to market and has no
value.’’ The commenter appears to argue
that when an operator chooses to flare
gas, that gas has no value to the public.
The BLM disagrees. When an operator
makes the business decision to
prioritize oil production over gas
capture and sale, that operator has
necessarily chosen to deprive the public
or the Indian lessor of return for that
gas. In all events, this comment
addresses concepts addressed elsewhere
in the regulatory language and
preamble. No commenter disagreed that
an avoidable loss has a royalty
obligation and an unavoidable loss has
no royalty obligation. For this reason,
the BLM did not change this section.
Section 3179.43 Data Submission and
Notification Requirements
This is a new section that did not
appear in the proposed rule, but merely
contains three tables that reference
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requirements that appear elsewhere in
the regulations for the benefit of readers.
All the requirements included in these
tables were available for public
comment, even though the tables
themselves did not appear in the
proposed rule. The BLM includes this
section for both BLM inspectors and oil
and gas operators as a quick reference to
Sundry Notice requirements,
information that is required at the
request of the AO, and information
requirements for the LDAR program.
The section creates no new obligations
on operators that are not already
required in other regulations; it is
provided for convenience. The
summaries of the requirements, as
provided in the table, impose no
obligation on operators or on the BLM:
all rights and obligations appear in the
corresponding section of code.
For example, Table 1 to paragraph (a)
informs an operator or a BLM inspector
that subpart 3179 contains seven
Sundry-Notice requirements. Each
Sundry-Notice requirement is briefly
summarized in the left-hand column
with the section number of the specific
Sundry-Notice requirement appearing in
the right-hand column. If a reader wants
further information on the SundryNotice requirements, then the reader
may go to the referenced sections to
understand the requirement more fully
within the context of the section. Table
1 has a Sundry-Notice requirement of
‘‘Delay of leak repair beyond 30
calendar days with good cause’’ with a
corresponding cross reference to
§ 3179.101. The reader may go to
§ 3179.101(a) to learn the full
requirement and conclude that
§ 3179.101(a) requires operators to
repair leaks as soon as practicable, and
in no event longer than 30 calendar days
after discovery unless the operator has
good cause for the delay. Further
reading shows that § 3179.101(b)
requires an operator to submit a Sundry
Notice informing the BLM of the good
cause creating the delay in repair
beyond 30 calendar days. The table
provides a quick guide to a requirement
and provides the corresponding
regulatory reference.
The tables are intended to list all the
requirements in the subpart or a section,
but they are not intended to provide a
comprehensive understanding of the
full requirements. The tables are meant
to serve as a summarized, quick
reference to aid the reader. While this is
a new section in the final rule,
everything contained within the tables
was subject to public comment in the
proposed rule. The tables simply
summarize final rule requirements. In
the event of any conflict, the language
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of the final rule requirements prevails
over the summaries in the table.
Section 3179.50 Safety
Proposed § 3179.6 is redesignated
§ 3179.50 in the final rule. The section
remains largely the same as in the
proposed rule. The BLM received a
number of comments on the use of the
term ‘‘automatic ignition system’’ and
on the proposed immediate assessment
of $1,000 per violation imposed on
operators upon the discovery of a flare
that is not lit. Industry commenters
expressed the view that the definition
for an ‘‘automatic ignition system’’ did
not allow for various types of equipment
to ensure that flares are properly lit
when natural gas is present. The BLM
intends for the term ‘‘automatic ignition
system’’ to require operators to maintain
an ignition source without specifying a
particular type of device, with the goal
that operators will use devices that are
appropriate under the circumstances.
The purpose of flaring is to combust the
gas immediately with no venting from
the flare apparatus, and that is the
function and requirement of the
automatic ignition system.
One commenter interpreted this
section to mean that the BLM would
prohibit venting of associated gas. The
commenter further stated that, in certain
circumstances, a ‘‘no venting’’ standard
is impossible to meet. The BLM agrees
with the commenter, and, for this
reason, the BLM continues to include a
list of exceptions for which flaring is not
possible and venting is anticipated at
final § 3179.50(a)(1) through (8). The
commenter requested the addition of a
de minimis exception in the final rule
on the grounds that flaring is
occasionally technically or
economically infeasible. The proposed
and final sections already include an
exception for technical infeasibility, in
addition to several other exceptions for
small amounts of gas, and the
commenter did not explain why a
general ‘‘de minimis’’ exception would
cover scenarios not already embraced by
the final text. The BLM did not make
any changes to this section in the final
rule based on that commenter’s
suggestions. Royalty-free flaring under
this provision is limited, as indicated in
final § 3179.83, discussed below.
Some commenters contended that the
BLM would exceed its statutory
authority if it imposed an immediate
assessment of $1,000 per violation for
unlit flares. Commenters cited the
Wyoming court’s decision 143 that
concluded, for waste minimization and
143 Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 493 F.
Supp. 3d at 1068.
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resource conservation purposes, that
there is no difference between
eliminating excess methane by venting
or by flaring. But that is not true for
royalties; routing the gas through
metered flaring equipment is essential
for royalty measurement.
Furthermore, as the BLM stated in the
proposed rule, consistent with the
MLA’s requirement that leases contain
provisions for the ‘‘safeguarding of the
public welfare’’ and for the ‘‘safety and
welfare of the miners,’’ combusting gas
rather than venting it into the
surrounding air is safer for operations
due to the gas’s explosiveness and the
risk to workers from hypoxia and
exposure to various associated
pollutants.144 Furthermore, the BLM has
an obligation to protect local public
health and safety in connection with its
oil and gas leases.145 Based on the 2019
ONRR production data, 3 percent of the
flaring locations are flaring more than
30,000 Mcf per month over the
averaging period. Allowing volumes of
this magnitude to be vented because of
failures of flaring equipment would be
a public health and safety threat.146
The BLM also notes, again, that the
preference for flaring over venting is
well established in oilfield operations.
USGS’s implementing guidance for
NTL–4A states that, ‘‘[b]ecause of safety
requirements, gas which cannot be
beneficially used or sold must normally
be flared, not vented.’’ 147
Furthermore, the BLM in the final
rule has limited the scope of this section
to apply only to operations and
production equipment located on a
Federal or Indian surface estate. The
requirements in the final § 3179.50 do
not apply to operations and production
equipment on State or private tracts,
even where those tracts are committed
to a federally approved unit or CA.
In response to comments, the BLM
changed the text of final § 3179.50(a)(4)
by replacing the term ‘‘storage vessel’’
with ‘‘oil storage tank’’ and removing
the reference to the requirement for
vapor recovery equipment in proposed
§ 3179.203, which has been removed
144 ‘‘Health and Safety Risks for Workers Involved
in Manual Tank Gauging and Sampling at Oil and
Gas Extraction Sites,’’ February 2016, available at
https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/OSHA3843.pdf.
145 43 CFR 3162.5–3, 3163.1(a)(3).
146 See ‘‘Flammability of methane, propane, and
hydrogen gases,’’ May 2000, available at https://
www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/UserFiles/works/pdfs/
fompa.pdf and ‘‘Toward an Understanding of the
Environmental and Public Health Impacts of
Unconventional Natural Gas Development: A
Categorical Assessment of the Peer-Reviewed
Scientific Literature, 2009–2015,’’ April 2016,
available at https://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0154164.
147 CDM, 644.5.3G (June 1980) (emphasis added).
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from the final rule. Also, the BLM
amended regulatory text in final
§ 3179.50(b) to state that flares or
combustion devices must be equipped
with either an automatic ignition system
or an on-demand ignition system.
Paragraph (b) has changed slightly from
an immediate assessment for ‘‘discovery
of a flare that is not lit’’ to state that,
upon discovery of a flare that is venting
instead of combusting gas, the BLM may
issue the operator an immediate
assessment of $1,000 per violation. The
BLM changed the language to
underscore that the type of automatic
ignition system is irrelevant, and the
expectation is that gas of sufficient
volume and quality must be flared. The
immediate assessment for a flare that is
venting gas instead of combusting gas
remains fundamentally the same as the
proposed rule and no changes were
made based on comments received.
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Section 3179.60 Gas-Well Gas
The BLM redesignated this section
from § 3179.7 in the proposed rule to
§ 3179.60 in the final rule. The BLM did
not receive any substantive comments
related to this section. The comments
received for this section more directly
relate to the BLM’s definition of a gas
well. These comments are addressed in
the discussion of § 3179.10 of this
preamble. The BLM did not make any
changes to the regulatory text other than
updating a referenced citation to the
final section number.
Section 3179.70 Oil-Well Gas
Proposed § 3179.8 is redesignated
§ 3179.70 in the final rule. This section
covers the limit beyond which oil-well
gas will be considered an avoidable loss
with a royalty obligation when gas is
flared due to pipeline capacity
constraints, midstream processing
failures, or similar events. The proposed
rule included a volumetric limit of
1,050 Mcf per month per lease, unit PA,
or CA. The BLM received numerous
comments explaining why a volumetric
limit of this kind is inappropriate. The
BLM administers many leases that
contain a single producing well and
many units that contain hundreds of
producing wells. Under the proposed
rule, a single-well lease and a multi-well
unit would have been subject to the
same 1,050 Mcf per month volumetric
limit.
The BLM agrees that the volumetric
limit of 1,050 Mcf per lease, unit PA, or
CA per month is unfair due to the
varying number of wells in a lease, unit
PA, or CA, and has discarded that
particular limit, replacing it with a perbarrel volumetric limit. The BLM’s
objective in this rulemaking is to create
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a practical, royalty-based approach to
waste prevention from oil wells that
removes the need for an inefficient caseby-case determination of an avoidable/
unavoidable loss for gas flaring and
allows for some unavoidable flaring,
capped by a practical limit.
Achieving this goal is not
straightforward, and the BLM
considered and ultimately declined to
adopt certain alternate thresholds
proposed by commenters, such as a
time-based limit to flaring.148 In North
Dakota, the BLM encountered
significant obstacles when
implementing the emergency provision
from NTL–4A Section III.A. allowing
operators to flare royalty-free for ‘‘24
hours per incident and to 144 hours
cumulative for the lease during any
calendar month.’’ From that experience,
the BLM learned that the time-limit
approach is difficult to enforce, and
operators learned that they are illprepared to provide flaring volumes
based on time: operators do not
maintain hourly production data that
could be used for NTL–4A emergency
determinations, nor will the
measurement regulations provided for
in this final rule obligate such hourly
measurements for all operators. From
experience, therefore, the BLM decided
against adopting a time-based approach
in the final rule.
The BLM also considered and rejected
commenters’ suggestion that the BLM
require operators to capture certain
percentages of their oil-well gas.
Instead, this final rule requires operators
to submit either a waste-minimization
plan or a self-certification committing
the operator to capture 100 percent of
the gas. In addition, insofar as this rule
flows from lessees’ obligation to
compensate the United States or Indian
mineral owners for their resources, the
BLM’s application of royalties to
avoidably lost gas ensures that the
Federal taxpayer or Indian lessor is
compensated in the same manner as if
the gas were captured and sold. The
royalty approach aligns with Congress’
instruction in the IRA. It also aligns
with the BLM’s historical practice of
curbing waste through royalties, not
capture percentages, and (in the context
of the production rate limits for oil well
gas) with the demonstrated capacity of
industry to conserve Federal gas. And
consistent with this rule’s efforts to
streamline BLM enforcement and
supervision (by, e.g., limiting the need
for Sundry Notices), it forgoes a not
insignificant burden on both operators
and the BLM. For example, forgoing
148 See Marathon Oil Co. v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp.
548, 553 (D. Wyo. 1978).
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capture percentages obviates the need
for the BLM to make case-by-case
determinations to avoid premature shutins, as in the 2016 Rule’s provision for
applications for exceptions to the
capture requirements. Although the
BLM does not here disclaim the
authority to impose capture limits on
Federal gas, the BLM’s objective in this
rule does not necessitate such
percentages.
The flaring thresholds in the final rule
begin at 0.08 Mcf of gas per barrel of oil
produced in the first year of the rule,
0.07 Mcf per barrel produced in the
second year of the rule, 0.06 Mcf per
barrel produced in the third year, and
0.05 Mcf per barrel produced
afterwards. The BLM selected the initial
limit—0.08 Mcf per barrel of oil
produced—because it is the average
amount of gas flared per barrel of oil
produced in 1990 to 2000. Since the
1990s, the industry has witnessed
considerable technological advances in
directional drilling, hydraulic
fracturing, and well completions, but
has failed to adhere to the level of
conservation the industry has already
demonstrated it can achieve. Advances
have been made in the use of skidmounted equipment for the extraction of
natural gas liquids on-lease, equipment
for compressed natural gas on-lease, and
on-lease power generation and these
advances may not be fully used in the
field. Operators also have available to
them older methods for using the gas,
such as reinjection for enhanced oil
recovery, reservoir pressure
maintenance, or simply safe disposal.
The failure to fully implement new and
old techniques to manage gas that is
currently wasted is particularly glaring
given the inclusion of standardized
natural gas contracts with delivery at
Henry Hub in the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) in 1990. Including
natural gas on the New York exchange
provided important pricing information
for the industry and facilitated broader
marketing for natural gas as a
commodity even though the price of gas
fluctuates with the market.
Notwithstanding a national market for
pricing since 1990, Federal lessees have
wasted more of the public’s gas as a
function of oil production. Cf., Cal. Co.
v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir.
1961). For example, when the BLM
evaluated the 2019 operator-reported
production for agreements reporting oil
production and flaring data, the average
agreement produced 11,850 barrels of
oil per month and flared 4,500 Mcf of
associated gas per month or an average
flaring rate of 0.38 Mcf per barrel of oil
produced.
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The BLM determined that the starting
threshold of 0.08 Mcf per barrel of oil
produced would impact the
approximately 62 percent of flaring
locations responsible for approximately
96 percent of the reported flaring, based
on 2019 production data. The 0.08 Mcf
per barrel of oil produced is comparable
to the proposed 1,050 Mcf per lease,
unit PA, or CA in that the final
threshold of 0.08 Mcf per barrel
addresses about 96 percent of the
reported flaring. Thus, the proposed and
final rule limits target only those
locations generating the majority of the
flaring, but, unlike in the proposed rule,
would not apply inequitably across unit
agreements, PAs, and CAs. The BLM
estimates that the proposed limit of 0.08
Mcf per barrel of oil produced would
make 88 percent of the flared volumes
royalty-bearing and generate
approximately $57.7 million in royalty
revenue for the first year. The 0.05 Mcf
per barrel of oil produced threshold, in
the BLM’s estimate, would make about
92 percent of the flared volumes royaltybearing, based on the 2019 production
data.
The proposed rule included a flaring
threshold of 1,050 Mcf per lease, unit
PA, or CA per month that would have
gone into effect 60 days after
publication of the final rule. For the
final rule, the BLM elected to use a
phased-in timeline because of the
changed metric, with an initial
threshold similar in magnitude to
recently reported flaring. A number of
States have implemented a phased-in
gas capture percentage that allows
operators to plan operations and
budgets to meet the capture
requirements. The BLM provides a
similar opportunity for operators to plan
for thresholds decreasing from 0.08 Mcf
to 0.05 Mcf over 4 years. Also, a 4-year
phase-in for the threshold allows for
further advances in technology that may
assist in lowering waste. When BLM
changed to the Mcf per barrel of oil
produced flaring limit from the 1,050
Mcf per lease, unit PA, or CA limit, the
projected aggregate flared volume
beyond the limit increased and,
therefore, projected royalties increased.
Commenters also stated that
regardless of the flaring threshold, the
BLM must include provisions
permitting operators to submit a request
for approval to flare above the
established threshold, and that the
threshold establishes an improper per se
avoidable loss. The BLM disagrees. The
ability for operators to request approval
to flare above the established threshold
defeats the purpose of a threshold and
returns the BLM and operator to an
unworkable case-by-case analysis.
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Commenters suggested a 24-hour time
limit as an alternative to the volumetric
threshold that the BLM had in the
proposed rule. The BLM disagrees, and
the commenters failed to explain how a
time-based limit would not also result
in what the commenters alleged was an
improperly rigid, per se avoidable loss
threshold associated with a volumetric
limit. The BLM has established the
volumetric flaring threshold based on
oil production to allow for some
avoidable oil-well loss flaring while
simultaneously eliminating the timeconsuming and administratively costly
case-by-case determinations required
under NTL–4A.
The State of North Dakota has taken
issue with the BLM’s proposal to use
monthly volume limits. The North
Dakota Industrial Commission contends
that the BLM should use the ‘‘average
percentage of gas captured to ensure
economic viability, better manage
unconventional resources, and
minimize conflict with North Dakota’s
flaring regulations.’’ The BLM has
elected not to use a monthly volume
limit or a gas capture percentage to
determine waste due to the
aforementioned inequities associated
with varying numbers of wells in a
lease, unit PA, or CA; the difficulties
implementing a gas capture percentage
nationwide; and the concern for not
fulfilling the BLM’s Indian trust
obligation.
States such as North Dakota and New
Mexico have implemented a phased-in
gas capture percentage. The final rule’s
limits based on percentages of gas flared
per barrel of oil, however, are a better
means to manage and understand waste
by directly linking oil production with
flared gas.
Wyoming comments that in 2021,
operators only flared or vented 0.18
percent of all gas that was produced in
the State. And North Dakota comments
that ‘‘its regulations resulted in gas
capture rates increasing from 64 percent
in 2014 to total capture of 95 percent in
2022 even with all [of North Dakota’s]
approved variances includ’’d.’’ The
BLM lauds both States for their
advances in lowering flaring, and their
achievements will likely reduce any
additional burdens on operators in those
States from the final rule. However,
according to EIA data from 2017
through 2022, North Dakota accounted
for approximately 33 percent of the
volume of gas flared nationwide while
producing 11 percent of the volume of
oil produced nationwide. Wyoming
accounted for approximately 11 percent
of the average total flared gas onshore
nationwide and 2 percent of the oil
produced nationwide. State efforts to
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reduce venting and flaring, though
important, do not displace the
Secretary’s duty to prevent undue waste
from Federal and Indian wells
nationwide.149 The BLM has written a
rule that will compensate the taxpayer
or the Indian mineral owner for the
waste of flared gas when the operator
chooses to maximize oil production
regardless of the associated gas
disposition.
Some commenters stated that a fixed
threshold for avoidable loss wrongly
fails to account for situations ‘‘beyond
the control of the operator.’’ The largest
sources of flared gas associated with
BLM leases are unconventional oil
reservoirs in North Dakota and New
Mexico, where pipeline capacity issues
have been cited as reasons for extreme
flaring. The BLM has concluded that,
particularly in these cases, the rate of oil
production and its associated gas
production is fully within the control of
the operator: the BLM is well aware, for
example, that operators have shut in
production (whether oil or gas) when
commodity pricing is low and have
begun producing again when the price
rises. The BLM’s threshold simply
applies the operators’ logic in these
circumstances to the BLM’s interest, as
lessor or trustee, in conservation of a
public or Indian resource. For this
reason, the threshold for an avoidable
loss in the final rule is directly tied to
the oil production rate—i.e., a factor
within the operators’ control.
The BLM received comments stating
that the flaring thresholds throughout
the rule are arbitrary and unfounded,
particularly in proposed § 3179.8. One
commenter claimed that the BLM had
failed to identify and make available for
review the information used to
determine the flaring limits. On the
contrary, the BLM clearly noted in the
proposed rule preamble that it relied on
production data that operators reported
to ONRR from 2015 through 2019 to
derive flaring thresholds.150 These data
are available to the public online at the
U.S. Department of the Interior Natural
Resources Revenue Data website,
https://revenuedata.doi.gov/query-data.
The BLM elected to use 2019
production data, even though later
production data were available, in
recognition of the lower (i.e.,
unrepresentative) production in 2020
and 2021 during COVID–19. When the
BLM prepared the proposed rule, 2022
production data were not available. The
2022 production data is now available.
149 https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_
EPG0_VGV_mmcf_a.htm, https://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm.
150 87 FR 73590, 73603 (Nov. 30, 2022).
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The BLM has now reviewed the 2022
data with a flaring rate of 0.11 Mcf of
gas flared per barrel of oil produced.
Accordingly, the BLM has not altered its
approach to flaring limits based on the
updated data.
Another commenter wrote, the
‘‘BLM’s proposed limits in this Section
are much too low, constituting in some
instances mere minutes of flaring.’’ This
comment is inconsistent with the
publicly available ONRR data, which
indicates that the highest reported flared
volumes for any month in 2019 were
662 Mcf per hour or 11 Mcf per minute.
If operators are flaring 1,050 Mcf in
minutes, they are failing to report this
level of flared volumes on their Oil and
Gas Operations Reports (OGOR) to
ONRR. The BLM did not change the
flaring limit based on this comment.
One commenter objected to the
proposed thresholds because, according
to the commenter, the most significant
reason why new production outpaces
infrastructure capacity is the timeconsuming process of obtaining the
necessary pipeline rights-of-way from
the BLM. The commenter outlined the
required steps and associated time to
obtain approval to construct a pipeline
across Federal and Indian land but did
not include the time necessary to obtain
necessary approvals to cross State and
private land. According to the
commenter, the process ordinarily takes
47 weeks. The commenter asserted that
operators have no choice but to flare
associated gas or shut in the wells given
the time necessary to obtain the rightsof way from the BLM. In effect, the
commenter asserted that the BLM is
responsible for the flaring of associated
gas because obtaining rights-of-way
from the BLM is a lengthy process.
Since the rights-of-way process is well
understood—as reflected in the
comment—operators necessarily make a
business decision to accelerate oil
production while flaring associated gas
due to capacity constraints. Conversely,
an operator could begin to plan for the
process for obtaining rights-of-way prior
to drilling the wells—particularly
because many operators plan drilling 5
years into the future—or, alternatively,
leave wells shut in until the pipeline
rights-of-way is approved. As the BLM
notes above, operators routinely make
business decisions that are
advantageous to their self-interest by
electing to shut in wells when the price
of oil is low, and, when the price of oil
is high, operators act on their selfinterest as well by increasing oil
production. In this final rule, the BLM
is merely applying the same logic to the
public’s interest in the conservation of
resources and intends for the flaring
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limitations to encourage operators to
plan ahead for natural gas conservation
before they drill wells or postpone
production until there is adequate
pipeline capacity, thereby reducing the
waste of Federal natural gas resources.
We note that the BLM approves rights
of way for pipelines only where BLM
manages the surface estate, which is
important for some but not all oil and
gas operations.
In any event, as of January 2024, there
are 4,237 approved APDs in New
Mexico, 1,948 in Wyoming, and 333 in
North Dakota. Simultaneously, the BLM
currently has only 314 pending rightsof-way applications for oil or gas
pipelines in New Mexico, 29 in
Wyoming, and none in North Dakota.
This disparity between APDs and rightsof-way applications illustrates that
operators appear uninterested in
obtaining the necessary rights-of-way to
accommodate the need for greater
pipeline capacity. These pending rightsof-way applications may be factors
relating to some of the volume of flared
associated gas that operators have
reported for the past year, but could
have been addressed by earlier planning
for those rights-of-way before drilling
begins. As demonstrated by the
comment, operators are aware of the
process and timeline for BLM approval
of rights-of-way.
The BLM also received comments on
the proposed provision in § 3179.8(b)
that would have allowed the BLM to
exercise its discretion to order the
operator to curtail or shut in production
as necessary to avoid unreasonable and
undue waste of Federal or Indian gas
after confirming that an operator’s
flaring is exceeding 4,000 Mcf of gas for
3 consecutive months. The BLM has
revised the flaring threshold in the final
§ 3179.70(b) to allow 1 Mcf of gas per
barrel of oil produced per month for 3
consecutive months with confirmation
that the flaring is ongoing. The BLM
arrived at this figure by targeting the 3
percent of reporting units with roughly
16 percent of flaring—as it had in the
proposed rule—and simply adjusted the
threshold to correspond to a rate of
production as in paragraph (a).
One commenter criticized the
structure of proposed § 3179.8 for
eliding any inquiry into whether the
lessee is acting reasonably and
prudently in light of the operator’s
actual economic circumstances. The
commenter stated further that flaring is
not automatically ‘‘waste.’’ The BLM
agrees that flaring is not automatically
waste, an understanding reflected in the
proposed and final rules’ distinctions
between avoidable and unavoidable loss
and associated flaring thresholds. The
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BLM uses the unavoidable loss
threshold to allow operators to respond
to operational considerations and
manage both oil production and
associated gas flaring throughout the
month to stay below the unavoidable
loss threshold: operators are capable of
curtailing oil production or shutting in
oil wells to lessen or stop the flaring of
associated gas. And as set forth
elsewhere in this rule, nothing in the
MLA requires that the BLM evaluate the
feasibility of flaring on a case-by-case
basis or without regard to the United
States’ interest in conserving the
mineral estate.
One commenter went further and
provided an example of the economic
value of shutting in a well for flaring in
excess of 4,000 Mcf per month, the
threshold from proposed § 3179.8(b), at
a hypothetical value of $3 per Mcf,
which, at a minimum, would yield a
gross income of $12,000 for the gas and
an associated Federal royalty income of
$1,500. This commenter continued that,
in its view, the BLM failed to explain
‘‘how it is negligent and imprudent for
an operator to flare that minimal value
of gas in lieu of shutting in production
from a CA that in the same month
would produce tens of thousands, if not
hundreds of thousands of dollars, worth
of oil.’’
The BLM does not find the
commenters to be persuasive. The
revenue from oil in the proposed
example is not lost unless the well is
abandoned—otherwise the operator can
simply resume operations later. The
BLM has reasonably concluded that it
would prefer to reap royalties, for the
benefit of the American taxpayers or
Indian mineral owners, from both oil
production and otherwise wasted gas.
The commenter did not provide any
specific data that, in such
circumstances, the well would be
abandoned. Indeed, the example
ultimately buttresses the BLM’s
conclusion that the royalties the BLM
seeks to obtain are in many cases small
relative to the overall value of oil and
the associated profit accruing to the
operator, such that, absent the final rule,
an operator may decide to prioritize its
short-term profits over longer-term
resource recovery.
This final rule section on oil-well gas
applies to all onshore Federal and
Indian oil and gas leases, unit PAs, and
CAs and this section requires operators
to flare (not vent) gas due to pipeline
capacity constraints, midstream
procession failures, or other similar
events that prevent produced gas from
being transported through the connected
pipeline. The BLM has received
comments characterizing the Wyoming
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court decision as explaining that it does
not matter if gas is vented or flared. The
BLM agrees with the relevant passage of
the court’s opinion, which indicates
that, as a matter of volumes of gas
wasted, it is immaterial whether the gas
is vented or flared. But—independent of
the court’s discussion regarding
volumes of potentially wasted gas—
flaring provides benefits to the BLM’s
waste management mandate, namely
accuracy in the measurement of wasted
gas. Oil-well gas with flared volumes
greater than 1,050 Mcf per month over
the averaging period requires accurate
measurement for purposes of calculating
the royalty obligation. The measurement
of vented gas through a flare line does
not meet the BLM’s expectation for
measurement accuracy when there is a
royalty obligation. There are no industry
standards for measurement of vented
gas and no current industry
understanding of measurement accuracy
of vented gas. Therefore, the operator is
expected to flare and measure the flare
volume pursuant to final § 3179.71, as
set forth below.
Section 3179.71 Measurement of
Flared Oil-Well Gas Volume
The BLM has restructured proposed
§ 3179.9, which was entitled,
‘‘Measuring and reporting volumes of
gas vented and flared,’’ by breaking it up
into two sections in the final rule:
§ 3179.71, entitled, ‘‘Measurement of
flared oil-well gas volume,’’ and
§ 3179.72, entitled ‘‘Reporting and
recordkeeping of vented and flared gas
volumes.’’ The BLM made this change
for ease of use for both the regulated
community and BLM inspectors.
One commenter suggested a method
for determining the flaring threshold
limit at commingled facilities. From this
comment, the BLM recognized that it
had not included explicit regulatory text
allowing for the commingling of flared
gas from multiple leases, unit PAs, and
CAs in the proposed rule. The BLM has
rectified this omission by including in
the final rule the ability for operators to
commingle flared gas without BLM
approval in final § 3179.71(a). Proposed
paragraph (d) would have allowed
operators to use an allocation method
approved by the BLM to allocate
production from a commingled flare.
The BLM recognizes the benefit for
operators and the BLM to allow flaring
from more than one lease, unit PA, or
CA in a common high-pressure flare.
Final § 3179.71(a) explicitly allows for
the commingling of flared gas from more
than one lease, unit PA, or CA to a
common flare without BLM approval
and provides the allocation method for
commingled flares in final paragraph
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(h). The BLM requires a standard
allocation methodology for commingled
flared gas based on oil production. The
BLM also included a requirement in this
section for operators to indicate on the
site facility diagram that the highpressure flare is a common, commingled
flare, and to list the leases, unit PAs, or
CAs contributing gas to the common
flare. Indicating that flares are
commingled on the site facility diagram
ensures that BLM inspectors have
accurate information when conducting
production inspections.
In the proposed rule, the BLM would
have required operators to measure
using an orifice meter at all highpressure flares flaring 1,050 Mcf per
month or more within 6 months after
the effective date of the final rule. For
flared gas measured with an orifice
meter, the proposed rule also would
have required the following: (1) orifice
plate inspections once a year; (2) meter
verification once a year; (3) gas
sampling with a C6+ analysis once a
year; (4) flare gas sample taken from: the
flare meter location, the gas FMP when
the flare and FMP gas are the same
quality, or another location approved by
the BLM; (5) measurement uncertainty
within ± 5 percent; (6) radiant heat
considerations for flare placement; and
(7) high-pressure flares that met the
measurement requirements for a lowvolume FMP under subpart 3175. Many
of these requirements that appeared in
the proposed section were taken directly
from the industry standard, API MPMS
Chapter 14, Natural Gas Fluids
Measurement, Section 10, Measurement
of Flow to Flares, Second edition,
December 2021.
The BLM evaluated these
requirements based on comments and
decided to instead require operators in
the final rule to use an orifice metering
system with the low-volume
measurement requirements found in
§ 3175.80, the low-volume electronic gas
measurement system requirements
found in § 3175.100, and the lowvolume gas sampling requirements
found in § 3175.110, with the gas
sampling location requirements
provided in final § 3179.71(d) or (e).
These changes make the accuracy of an
orifice metering system used at a flare
consistent with that of a low-volume gas
FMP. Based on measurement data
received from a commenter, the BLM
agrees with the data analysis and
believes that flare measurement is
unlikely to meet the ±5 percent
uncertainty requirement. The
commenter provided analysis of annual
field data from an orifice measurement
flare system and a linear meter flare
system showing that the overall
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uncertainty of the orifice meter is 6.32
percent and the linear meter is 3.22
percent. Requiring a flare meter to meet
the FMP requirements for a low-volume
gas FMP removes the need to meet the
±5 percent uncertainty level. For this
reason, the BLM removed the
measurement uncertainty requirement
in the final rule. The requirement for the
consideration for radiant heat for flare
installation has been moved to final
§ 3179.71(c)(3).
One commenter requested that the
BLM require flare measurement at all
locations flaring associated gas because
the commenter believes industry grossly
underestimates flared volumes reported
to ONRR. The BLM considered this
approach but abandoned it because
requiring measurement at all flares
places an unnecessary economic burden
on small operators who rarely have
routine flaring due to pipeline capacity
issues. While the BLM understands this
threshold is based on data that may
underestimate the scope of the problem,
the BLM has concluded that requiring
measurement on flared volumes less
than 1,050 Mcf per month over the
averaging period would encompass
flaring operations that would meet the
BLM’s emergency criteria and that are
outside the BLM’s objective for this
section, which is to measure more
frequent gas flaring. The BLM did not
change the high-pressure flare
measurement requirement threshold
based on this comment.
Other commenters requested the BLM
to return to the NTL–4A standard of
estimation and eliminate the
requirement to measure gas-flaring
volumes, relying instead on flaredvolume estimation based on site-specific
information, such as GORs, sales gas
volumes metered for allocations, and
gas sample analysis. One commenter
provided a study indicating that
inefficient and unlit flares account for
five times more methane emissions than
was previously estimated across the
three basins responsible for more than
80 percent of U.S. flaring.151 The study’s
evidence that industry underestimates
the amount of methane lost from flares
supports the final rule requirement to
measure high-pressure flares with
volumes greater than or equal to 1,050
Mcf per month over the averaging
period.
The BLM received numerous
comments requesting the BLM expand
the types of flare measurement systems
that can be used from orifice metering
151 Genevieve Plant et al., ‘‘Inefficient and Unlit
Natural Gas Flares Both Emit Large Quantities of
Methane,’’ Science, vol. 377, pp. 1566 (2022),
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/
science.abq0385.
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only to other systems that are covered
under API MPMS Chapter 14.10 Natural
Gas Fluids Measurement—Measurement
of Flow to Flares, December 2021. The
BLM did not incorporate this API
standard into the final rule because it
includes meters that the BLM does not
regulate in its gas measurement rules
found in subpart 3175. Since royalties
will be owed at most flares that require
measurement, the BLM is requiring
almost the same level of accountability
for flaring measurement as would be
required for production royalty
measurement. The BLM elected to
expand the list acceptable meters in
subpart 3175 to include ultrasonic
meters because the BLM anticipates
allowing for the use of ultrasonic meters
when it updates subpart 3175, but none
of the other meters in API 14.10.
The BLM did not include the use of
thermal flow or thermal mass meters for
several reasons. First, thermal mass
meters are dependent on gas properties,
which are variable with natural gas in
a flare line. Second, open-loop
calibration (as in a flare system), with a
thermal mass meter is only
recommended using air. Any other
application environment will be
inferred indirectly and introduce
uncertainty or less accurate
measurement. Finally, no party
submitted any measurement data to
demonstrate the acceptable performance
of a thermal mass meter for flare use.
For these reasons, the BLM has
expanded the final rule to include
orifice measurement systems and
ultrasonic measurement systems.
Comments highlighted safety
concerns related to the use of orifice
meters on flares and the difficulty in
obtaining accurate measurement, given
that flow to a flare is intermittent with
rates varying considerably at a single
meter. The BLM agrees with both the
safety and measurement accuracy
concerns and changed this section in
the final rule to allow both orifice
metering and ultrasonic meters. In
addition, based on commenters’
concerns for safety with the orifice
metering system, the BLM included a
new provision in § 3179.71(c)(3) that
requires operators to evaluate the
production facility to determine which
type of flare measurement is safe for the
facility.
In the final rule, orifice metering
systems must comply with the lowvolume measurement requirements in
§ 3175.80, low-volume electronic gas
measurement requirements in
§ 3175.100, and the low-volume gas
sampling and analysis requirements in
§ 3175.110, with the exception for gas
sampling requirements in the final rule
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at § 3179.71(d) or (e). Under the new
provisions in § 3179.71(c)(2), ultrasonic
measurement systems must comply
with three requirements. First, each
ultrasonic meter make and model must
be tested for flare use. Ultrasonic meter
testing must be conducted and reported
pursuant to API MPMS Chapter 22.3,
Testing Protocol for Flare Gas Metering,
First Edition, August 2015 (‘‘API 22.3’’)
and the test report must be available to
the AO upon request. Second, ultrasonic
meters must be installed and operated
for flare use according to the
manufacturer’s specifications and those
specifications must be provided to the
AO upon request. Third, ultrasonic
metering systems must comply with the
low-volume electronic gas measurement
requirements in § 3175.100, and lowvolume gas sampling analysis
requirements in § 3175.110 with the
exception for the gas sampling
requirements in § 3179.71(d) or (e).
Two commenters expressed concern
that the measurement system as
required in the proposed rule could not
meet the proposed uncertainty
requirement of ±5 percent, even though
the BLM used the industry standard
value. Section 4.1 of API MPMS Chapter
14.10 Natural Gas Fluids
Measurement—Measurement of Flow to
Flares, December 2021 states, ‘‘Targeted
uncertainty for flare metering
applications shall be ±5 percent of
actual volumetric or mass flow rate,
measured at 30 percent, 60 percent and
90 percent of the full scale for the flare
meter or as defined by regulations or
specific end user requirements.’’ Based
on a commenter’s submission of an
uncertainty analysis of an orifice meter
used in a flare application, the BLM
agrees that a ±5 percent uncertainty for
the flare meters, particularly orifice
meters, will be difficult to achieve.
Therefore, the BLM has removed the
measurement uncertainty requirement
that was in proposed § 3179.9(b)(5)
based on the comment.
The BLM did not receive any
comments on its gas sampling
requirements in the proposed rule.
Since the BLM explicitly allows for
commingling of flared gas without prior
approval in the final rule, it became
necessary to address gas sampling at a
commingled and non-commingled flare.
The final rule at § 3179.71(d) requires
operators to take gas samples from
either the flare meter location, the gas
FMP location, or another location
approved by the AO when measuring
high-pressure flare volumes from a
single lease, unit PA, or CA. When the
gas sample is for a commingled highpressure flare, the final rule at
§ 3179.71(e) requires that the gas sample
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be taken from either the flare meter
location or another location approved
by the AO. High-pressure flare heating
value requirements are in the new
§ 3179.72 in the final rule.
The BLM received comments
regarding a provision in proposed
§ 3179.9(b)(1) that provided a 6-month
compliance timeline from the effective
date of the rule for the measurement
requirements. Industry commenters
recommended a 1-year compliance
deadline for all flare measurement. For
the final rule, the BLM extended the
timeline for compliance based on the
flare flow category. The highest flare
flow category (≥30,000 Mcf per month)
compliance deadline remains at 6months after the effective date of the
rule. The mid-level flow category
(<30,000 Mcf per month and ≥6,000 Mcf
per month) for compliance with
measurement and gas sampling
requirement has been extended to 12
months after the effective date of the
rule. The lowest flare flow category
(<6,000 Mcf per month and ≥1,050 Mcf
per month) for compliance has been
extended to 18 months after the
effective date of the rule. One reason for
the tiered approach to the measurement
compliance timeline is the concern for
the risk to royalties based on the
volumes flared. The shortest compliance
timeline applies to flares producing the
highest volumes. The BLM has extended
the compliance timeline for lower flared
volumes with a lower risk to royalty
measurement.
The BLM also understands current
supply chain difficulties and has taken
those difficulties into consideration in
extending the deadline for compliance
with measurement requirements and
any modifications required for gas
sampling for flares based on the flare
flow category. The BLM retained a 6month compliance deadline in the final
rule at § 3179.71(f) for measurement and
sampling equipment for high-pressure
flares measuring greater than or equal to
30,000 Mcf per month over the
averaging period. Based on the 2019
ONRR production data, the BLM has
concluded that this requirement will
affect approximately 100 locations. Of
those 100 locations, the BLM anticipates
that many will already have
measurement systems in place:
operators flaring above 30,000 Mcf per
month are likely to be interested in
accurate measurements of the volume in
order to make operational decisions.
Moreover, such wells are capable of
generating substantial revenue, allowing
them to more easily overcome supply
chain difficulties. In short, the 6-month
deadline should not be difficult for
those operators to meet.
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The second flare flow category in the
final rule has a deadline for compliance
12 months after the effective date of the
rule and measures flare flow that is less
than 30,000 Mcf per month over the
averaging period and greater than or
equal to 6,000 Mcf per month over the
averaging period. Based on the 2019
ONRR production data used for this
rulemaking, the BLM estimates that the
12-month deadline will affect
approximately 228 locations. The BLM
anticipates some, but not all, of these
locations will already have
measurement equipment in place that
will require some updating based on the
final rule flare measurement
requirements. In the final rule, the BLM
has also extended the timeline for flare
measurement and gas sampling to be in
compliance for flares measuring less
than 6,000 Mcf per month and greater
than or equal to 1,050 Mcf per month
over the averaging period within 18months of the effective date of the rule.
The BLM estimates that approximately
575 locations will be required to comply
with the measurement rules within 18
months of the effective date of the rule.
Diligent operators should be able to be
in compliance by that effective date.
Final § 3179.71(g) provides the
method for estimating the flared
volumes when the flared volume is less
than or equal to 1,050 Mcf per month
over the averaging period. The
estimation method is based on the GORr
calculated from the oil and gas volumes
reported to ONRR for the previous 6
months. The total gas produced is the
sum of the gas reported as sold or
transferred to a gas plant, gas reported
for on-lease use, and gas reported as
vented or flared for the 6 months prior
to the month in which the gas flared
volume is estimated. The GORr is then
multiplied by the total volume of oil
produced from oil wells while flaring
for the reporting month. The estimated
gas volume flared (Vf) equals the GORr
times the volume of oil produced while
flaring (Vop) minus the total gas volume
sold or transferred to a gas plant (Vs).
This method for estimating the flared
volume relies on volumes reported to
ONRR that can be verified by the BLM
without having to rely on production
testing done by the operator. Final
§ 3179.71(g) replaces part of proposed
§ 3179.9(a) with a verifiable method for
flare estimation.
The BLM did not receive any
comments on the concepts of flare
estimation or measurement per se. On
review of the proposed rule, the BLM
realized it did not include the ability for
an operator to commingle flared gas
from multiple sources even though it
has been common practice for the BLM
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to allow this ability with approval. In
the final rule, the BLM allows operators
to commingle flared gas without prior
BLM approval. Since commingling of
flared gas does not require BLM
approval, the BLM included a required
allocation methodology to be used for
the reporting of the flared gas to any
lease, unit PA, or CA included in the
commingled flare. When a flare is
combusting gas that is combined from
more than one lease, unit PA, or CA,
final § 3179.71(h) provides the
allocation methodology for reporting the
allocated flared volume to ONRR. The
allocation methodology is based on the
ratio of the net standard volume of oil
from one of the FMPs that is
contributing flared gas to the
commingled flare divided by the total
net standard volume of oil from all the
FMPs that have gas contributing to the
flare times the total flared volume
measured at the flare. The allocation is
done for each lease, unit PA, or CA
contributing gas to the flare. The flared
volume for each lease, unit PA, or CA
is reported on its respective OGOR.
Final § 3179.71(h) replaces proposed
§ 3179.9(d) with a verifiable method of
allocation from a commingled flare that
follows typical industry practices for
allocation.
Proposed § 3179.9(e) became
§ 3179.71(i) in the final rule. The BLM
did not receive any comments on this
provision. The measurement of flared
volumes is not considered an FMP for
the purpose of subpart 3175 even
though some of the measurement
requirements of subpart 3175 will apply
to flare measurement. Flare
measurement will require the use of an
FMP number on the OGOR when and if
there is a royalty obligation.
Section 3179.72 Required Reporting
and Recordkeeping of Vented and
Flared Gas Volumes
Final § 3179.72 is a new section that
contains all the ONRR reporting
requirements for avoidable and
unavoidable losses and the
recordkeeping requirements for vented
and flared gas volumes. Section 3179.72
begins with paragraph (a), which
requires operators to report all vented
and flared volumes, both avoidable and
unavoidable losses, pursuant to ONRR’s
Minerals Production Reporter
Handbook. This paragraph remains
unchanged from proposed § 3179.9(a) to
final § 3179.72(a). The BLM did not
receive any comments on this paragraph
in the proposed rule.
In the final rule, the BLM allows
operators to commingle flared gas
without prior BLM approval. Gas
royalty determination is based on two
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components: gas volumes and heating
value. Final § 3179.72(b) requires
operators to report the flared gas heating
value based on the gas analysis
requirement in § 3179.71(d) or (e). If
flared gas is commingled, the operator
must report the same heating value from
the common flare on all the leases, unit
PAs, or CAs contributing gas to the flare
based on the gas sample analysis. The
proposed rule had similar gas sampling
analysis requirements but did not
specifically state the requirement to use
this heating analysis for reporting. The
BLM has included this requirement to
clarify the unstated expectation in the
proposed rule.
Based on comments received, the
final rule includes provisions for event
and operational recordkeeping related to
waste prevention. GAO reports (e.g.
GAO 04–809) have also admonished the
BLM that it should exercise better
oversight in the documentation of
waste.
In response to public and GAO
comment, the BLM added paragraph (c)
for recordkeeping of oil- or gas-well
flaring events, emergency events, and
manual downhole liquids unloading
operations or well-purging operations in
this final section. The requirements of
final paragraph (c) apply 3 months after
the effective date of the rule to give
operators time to develop a system of
recordkeeping that complies with the
BLM’s requirements. The BLM
anticipates requesting the records
required in paragraph (c) when
conducting production audits or
investigating excessive avoidable or
unavoidable reported losses.
Section 3179.73 Prior Determinations
Regarding Royalty-Free Flaring
In the final rule, the BLM
redesignated proposed §§ 3179.10 to
3179.73. The provision allows previous
decisions authorizing royalty-free
flaring to continue for 6 months after
this rule’s effective date, after which
time the BLM will determine the
royalty-bearing status of all flaring based
on the new subpart 3179 requirements.
This change accords with lease terms,
which expressly subject all leases to
‘‘regulations hereafter promulgated
when not inconsistent with lease rights
granted or specific provisions of this
lease.’’ See BLM standard lease form
3100–011. We think a 6-month
postponement of the effective date will
foster a successful transition, potentially
reducing or eliminating difficulties for
both operators and the BLM. The BLM
received two comments in support of
including this provision in the final
rule. One commenter from a State
regulatory authority expressed concern
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that some operators may not have
budgeted for the necessary operational
changes and sought additional time for
compliance. No industry commenters,
however, requested an extension of the
6-month provision. Nor did anyone
object to the approach that the BLM is
adopting in the final rule. The BLM did
not make any changes to this section
based on the comments received. The
proposed and final sections contain the
same requirements.
Flaring and Venting Gas During Drilling
and Production Operations
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Section 3179.80
While Drilling
Loss of Well Control
Final § 3179.80 was redesignated from
proposed § 3179.101 and retitled from
‘‘Well drilling’’ in the proposed rule to
‘‘Loss of well control while drilling’’ in
the final rule. The language in the
proposed and final sections remains
largely the same, with one exception.
For consistency with the IRA section
50263, the BLM now requires the
operator to submit a Sundry Notice
within 15 days following the conclusion
of a loss-of-well-control event
describing the loss of well control. From
the details provided in the Sundry
Notice and any other information
available to or obtained by the BLM, the
BLM will determine whether the loss of
well control was due to operator
negligence. If the BLM determines the
loss of well control was due to operator
negligence, then the oil or gas lost is
determined to be an avoidable loss with
a royalty obligation. The BLM will
notify the operator in writing as to
whether such loss will qualify as an
avoidable loss.
One commenter on this section
suggested that the BLM assess ‘‘royalties
on all gas that is vented during well
drilling unless venting is required due
to safety reasons or because flaring or
capture is infeasible.’’ The BLM has
concluded that the Sundry Notice
requirement in the final rule—and the
respective royalty obligation—meets the
commenter’s objective. In the BLM’s
experience, operators work to avoid loss
of well control while drilling and
prepare in advance should a loss of well
control occur. Therefore, the BLM
considers the likelihood of negligence
during the loss of well control to be very
low and adequately canvassed.
The BLM received another comment
requesting that the BLM provide
clarification on the process it will use to
make an avoidable-loss determination,
and whether and how an operator may
appeal a BLM decision of an avoidable
loss. In response to part of this
comment, the final rule requires an
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operator to notify the BLM within 24
hours of the start of a loss of well
control event and to submit a Sundry
Notice containing relevant details of the
loss of circulation to determine if the
loss is an avoidable or unavoidable loss.
The BLM believes this process is
consistent with that in the Notice to
Lessees and Operators of Onshore
Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases
Reporting of Undesirable Events (NTL–
3A). The BLM already has an appeal
process in place that will cover any
BLM decision in this section, see
§§ 3165.3 and 3165.4.
Section 3179.81 Well Completion and
Recompletion Flaring Allowances
In response to comments, the BLM
reorganized, redesignated, and
consolidated concepts from proposed
§§ 3179.102, 3179.103, and 3179.104
into only two final sections, §§ 3179.81
and 3179.82. Proposed § 3179.103,
which was entitled, ‘‘Initial production
testing,’’ has been redesignated as final
§ 3179.81 and is now entitled, ‘‘Well
completion or recompletion flaring
allowances.’’ Comments reflected some
confusion about the BLM’s intent in
proposed § 3179.102, ‘‘Well completion
and related operations,’’ and § 3179.103,
‘‘Initial production testing.’’ The
comments’ core question is whether the
BLM views the period of flowback
following fracturing or refracturing as
the same or different from initial
production testing. In response to those
comments, the BLM eliminated the
concept of initial production testing and
will regulate flaring following well
completion or recompletion as a
separate period in the lifecycle of a
newly producing formation in a well.
Final § 3179.81, ‘‘Well completion or
recompletion flaring allowances,’’
provides for flaring royalty-free under
§§ 3179.41(b)(2) and 3179.42(b) until
one of the following events occurs: (1)
30 days have passed since the beginning
of the flowback following completion or
recompletion, except where an
extension has been granted under
paragraph (b) for flowback delays
caused by well or equipment problems,
or under paragraph (d) for dewatering
and initial evaluation of an exploratory
coalbed methane well for up to two
possible 90-day extensions; (2) the
operator has flared 20,000 Mcf of gas, as
provided in paragraph (a)(2); or (3)
flowback has been routed to the
production separator, as provided in
paragraph (a)(3). Paragraph (e) of this
section of the final rule requires
operators to submit their requests for
extension using a Sundry Notice. One
commenter contended that royalty-free
flaring thresholds for well completion in
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the proposed rule were ‘‘arbitrarily
low.’’ The BLM has increased these
thresholds in the final rule.
This final section includes the
flowback period following a completion
or recompletion. As suggested by some
commenters, the BLM removed the
provision in proposed § 3179.103(a)(1)
allowing the operator to flare royaltyfree until adequate reservoir information
for the well was obtained. Comments
indicated that this provision was an
obsolete vestige of NTL–4A, and
operators no longer initially test wells
for reservoir information. To avoid
confusion about testing and flowback
following completion or recompletion,
the BLM’s final rule includes time and
volumetric flaring limits for well
completion or recompletion for
flowback.
Section 3179.82 Subsequent Well
Tests for an Existing Completion
For the final rule, the BLM
redesignated and retitled this section
from § 3179.104, ‘‘Subsequent well
tests,’’ to § 3179.82, ‘‘Subsequent well
tests for an existing completion.’’ One
commenter argued that since the BLM’s
rule is focused on waste prevention
from a royalty perspective, the BLM
should not allow operators to extend
subsequent well testing without a
royalty obligation beyond 24 hours. The
BLM has always been responsible for
ensuring that oil and gas resources
belonging to the public or to Indian
mineral owners have been produced in
a reasonable manner, measured
accurately, and reported properly. The
allowance for an extension to the 24hour well testing period was part of
NTL–4A. Operators rarely need to
submit well testing extension requests
and, when they do, the AO may deny
the request if the flaring during well
testing would be excessive. Further, this
section also allows for a longer flare
period for any well testing that the BLM
may require of an operator. Accordingly,
the BLM disagrees with the comment
and did not make any changes to this
section.
Another commenter indicated that the
BLM does not provide an appeal process
within this section if an operator would
like to appeal a BLM decision not to
extend the well-testing period. The BLM
allows for appeal of any BLM decision
from an adversely affected party
pursuant to 43 CFR 3165.3. The BLM
did not change this section based on
this comment.
Section 3179.83 Emergencies
The BLM redesignated this section
from § 3179.105 in the proposed rule to
§ 3179.83 in the final rule. One
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commenter stated that the proposed rule
did not indicate who will make the
determination of whether a situation
will be treated as an emergency. The
final rule indicates that the AO will
receive the Sundry Notice and make a
determination of avoidable or
unavoidable loss based on the event
circumstances. In § 3179.83(a), the BLM
defines an emergency situation as a
temporary, infrequent, and unavoidable
situation in which the loss of gas is
necessary to avoid a danger to human
health, safety, or the environment. To
further clarify the definition of an
emergency, the BLM provides in
§ 3179.83(b) common examples of
situations that do not qualify as
emergencies. Given the definition and
the illustrative situations that do not
constitute an emergency, the BLM
believes operators will be able to report
the lost volumes with the appropriate
disposition codes on the OGOR. From
this section, the BLM believes that
operators can measure or estimate lost
volumes appropriately on the OGOR for
the initial 48 hours of the emergency
situation that are royalty-free. Beyond
the initial 48 hours of an emergency,
there may be a royalty obligation and, in
final § 3179.83(c), the BLM included a
description of the type of information
that operators must include on a Sundry
Notice to enable the BLM to make an
avoidable or unavoidable loss
determination. The BLM added this
provision in the final rule for
consistency with section 50263 of the
IRA.
The BLM also received a comment
suggesting that the BLM should
expressly include severe weather events
and natural disasters as emergencies.
Severe weather and natural disasters
were not provisions in NTL–4A. While
the BLM believes that severe weather
and natural disasters may require other
types of safety precautions, such as
temporarily shutting in a well, and if a
well were shut in for severe weather or
natural disasters, then there is no need
to be concerned about associated gas
flaring. If the well continues to produce
oil, then this does not constitute an
emergency for flaring gas royalty-free.
The commenter did not provide
adequate justification for this type of
change to the final rule.
Gas Flared or Vented From Equipment
and During Well Maintenance
Operations
Section 3179.90 Oil Storage Tank
Vapors
Based on comments on the proposed
rule, the BLM changed the requirements
in proposed § 3179.203, which has been
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redesignated as § 3179.90 in the final
rule.
In response to comments, the BLM
changed the term ‘‘oil storage vessels’’
in the proposed section to ‘‘oil storage
tanks’’ in the final rule. This change in
terminology brings this section of the
final rule into alignment with subpart
3174, Measurement of oil. The BLM
received several comments on the
proposed requirements for vapor
recovery equipment and the immediate
assessment of $1,000 per violation for
an oil storage tank hatch left open or
unlatched, and unattended. After
careful consideration of the comments,
the BLM removed the vapor recovery
requirements from § 3179.90 for two
reasons.
First, the BLM’s focus is on waste
prevention, including loss of royalties,
and the proposed vapor recovery
requirement would not increase
royalties with any certainty. Many
commenters stated that the annual
requirement to obtain a sample and
compositional analysis of the tank
vapors was expensive, excessive, and in
their view served no purpose. The BLM
agrees that those requirements would
contribute little to assuring proper
royalty collection.
Second, even if the installation of
vapor recovery equipment might be
economic, there is no guarantee that the
tank vapors collected would have
adequate pressure for a sales line. Under
these circumstances, the BLM would be
requiring operators to incur a capital
expense with no guarantee of sales or
associated royalties for the public, or for
Indian mineral owners. For these main
reasons, the BLM has decided to remove
the vapor-recovery-equipment
requirements in this section.
A commenter pointed out that there
are tank hatches designed to open with
excess pressure, and such openings
might occur prior to or during
inspections, and that there should be no
immediate assessment for open,
unlatched, and unattended tank
hatches. API Standard 2000 Venting
Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage
Tanks (Reaffirmed, April 2020) Section
3.4.2, Emergency Venting, indicates that
a gauge hatch that permits the cover to
lift under abnormal internal pressure is
an acceptable emergency venting
method, among other provisions. While
there are tanks designed and built with
this type of emergency venting gauge
hatch, in the BLM’s experience, this
type of hatch is very uncommon
equipment located on a Federal or
Indian oil and gas lease. If an operator
does have an emergency venting gauge
hatch on the tank, the operator may
request a variance pursuant to § 3170.6.
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25417
Other commenters asserted that the
requirements for the oil storage tank
hatch presented a safety risk.
Commenters specifically referenced
North Dakota Department of
Environmental Quality (NDDEQ)
guidance that, according to the
commenters, ‘‘allows for tank vapor
flares and control devices to be
bypassed when a well is shut in to
minimize the risk. In these cases, the
hatches may need to be left open to
relieve breathing pressure due to
temperature fluctuations throughout the
day.’’ The BLM has been unable to
locate that exact quote from NDDEQ’s
website, but has found guidance for
shut-in, upstream facilities.152 The BLM
confirmed by phone call with NDDEQ
that this memo appears to be that
referenced by the commenter. The BLM
agrees with the NDDEQ guidance that,
if a facility is completely shut-in and
any production to tanks has ceased,
then emissions are expected to be
minimal and operators may be in
compliance with VOC emissions
standards with the hatch left open. With
this final rule, the BLM is regulating
waste prevention from producing oil
and gas wells. The BLM is not
regulating emissions from shut-in
facilities in this final rule.
As a general matter, the requirement
to maintain all hatches and connection
and other access points vapor tight and
capable of holding pressure in excess of
the pressure relieving device has been
in place since the BLM referenced API
12R1 Recommended Practice for
Setting, Connecting, Maintenance and
Operations of Lease Tanks, Third
Edition, May 1986 in Onshore Oil and
Gas Order No. 4, Measurement of Oil.153
The current API Standard 12R1,
Installation, Operation, Maintenance,
Inspection, and Repair of Tanks in
Production Service, Sixth Edition,
March 2020, Section 4.5.2 states, ‘‘All
hatches, connections, and other access
points shall be gasketed and kept closed
during operation to minimize vapor
emissions.’’ One commenter stated that
the closure of a tank hatch was a
prudent operator standard and one that
industry follows diligently. The BLM
thus concludes that, at a producing
facility, latching a tank hatch closed is
the current industry practice, and well
152 https://deq.nd.gov/publications/AQ/policy/
PC/OilGas/20210823StorageTankMemo.pdf.
153 The BLM includes API 12R1, Third edition,
from May 1986 as historical reference that the
requirement for vapor tight connections was an
industry standard included in the BLM’s Onshore
Oil and Gas Order No. 4 later codified at 43 CFR
subpart 3174 Measurement of oil.
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within the capabilities of competent
operators.
An immediate assessment is
appropriate for violating such an
industry standard incorporated into the
final rule. Immediate assessments are
not new. They have ‘‘long been
considered to be in the nature of
liquidated damages, allowing the BLM
to recover the administrative and other
costs incurred as a consequence of the
operator’s noncompliance, where actual
damages are difficult or impracticable to
ascertain, and regardless of whether
there has been any actual threat to
public health, safety, property, or the
environment.’’ Brigham Oil & Gas, 181
IBLA 282, 287 (2011) (citing
authorities). On this understanding of
the MLA, the volumes of gases lost (or
the safety or environmental risks caused
by an improperly opened or leaking
hatch) are impossible to quantify, but
the BLM would nonetheless incur costs
of, inter alia, enforcement actions to
assure the violation is abated. Thus, the
BLM’s statutory authority for such an
assessment in this context flows from 30
U.S.C. 188(a) (providing that the lease
may provide for resort to appropriate
methods for the settlement of disputes
or for remedies for breach of specified
conditions thereof,’’ which conditions
necessarily encompass these
regulations), and the BLM’s waste
prevention authority.
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Section 3179.91 Downhole Well
Maintenance and Liquids Unloading
The BLM redesignated this section
from § 3179.204 in the proposed rule to
§ 3179.91 in the final rule. The BLM
received two comments in support of
this proposed section with one
commenter explicitly agreeing with the
BLM’s inclusion of the requirement for
a person to be on site for well purging
and that the person end the event as
soon as practical. Based on the
comments, the BLM did not make any
substantive changes to this final section.
Section 3179.92 Size of Production
Equipment
This section was designated as
§ 3179.205 in the proposed rule. One
commenter on this section stated that
the requirement to size production and
processing equipment properly based on
the production volume at the facility is
consistent with current industry
practice. Another commenter pointed
out that the States of New Mexico and
Colorado have State requirements
similar to this section. The same
commenter recommended that, if
operators fail to comply with the
requirement to properly size their
production equipment, the BLM should
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deem that failure to constitute
unreasonable and undue waste. The
BLM did not adopt this suggestion,
because it has elected to remove the
term ‘‘unreasonable and undue waste’’
from the final rule.
Under the final rule, an operator who
fails to size the equipment properly will
receive an Incident of Noncompliance
as a major violation with an abatement
period to fix the violation. If an operator
fails to comply within the abatement
period, the BLM may escalate
enforcement to civil penalties. The BLM
did not make any changes to the
regulatory text in this section in
response to the comments received.
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR)
Section 3179.100
Repair Program
Leak Detection and
The BLM redesignated the LDAR
program section from the proposed rule
at § 3179.301 to the final rule at
§ 3179.100. Section 3179.100 provides
the requirements for operators to set up
and maintain programs for detecting
and repairing natural-gas leaks from
their operations and production
equipment. Section 3179.101 gives the
timetable and requirements for repairing
leaks. Section 3179.102 provides the
requirements for recordkeeping. The
LDAR program applies only to
operations and production equipment
located on a Federal or Indian oil and
gas lease. The LDAR program and
requirements do not apply to operations
and production equipment on State or
private tracts, even where those tracts
are committed to a federally approved
unit or CA (see § 3179.2).
The BLM received numerous
comments requesting that the BLM
allow operators to demonstrate their
compliance with BLM requirements by
showing that they already comply with
EPA’s OOOO series rules or State leak
detection rules. The BLM considered
and rejected this alternative approach to
compliance. First, the BLM’s final Waste
Prevention Rule serves a different
statutory purpose (conservation of
resources) than EPA’s rule (protection of
human health and welfare vis-a-vis air
quality). The BLM further declines to
allow compliance with EPA’s OOOOb
and OOOOc to demonstrate compliance
with BLM’s waste prevention rule given
the different statutory goals of each rule
and the acute need to reduce waste or
receive compensation for waste of the
public and Indian mineral resource.
Where the BLM has independently
determined that specific provisions
from EPA are sufficient to accomplish
the BLM’s waste prevention mandate,
the BLM has made limited changes in
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the final rule as set forth below at
§ 3179.100(b)(2).
Second, the BLM’s LDAR program is
limited to operations and production
equipment located on Federal or Indian
oil and gas leases. Since the scope for
this section is limited, it is appropriate
for the BLM to have its own
requirements that would not interfere
with implementation of any EPA final
rule. The BLM’s LDAR program is
focused on monitoring and repairing
leaks as quickly as possible to meet its
waste prevention objective of
maximizing production by keeping it
contained within the system and
flowing through the sales point.
Commenters also suggested that any
final LDAR program cover a larger area
than simply a single lease, unit PA, or
CA. The BLM evaluated its ability to
review individual LDAR programs for
every single lease, unit PA, or CA, and
agrees with the commenters. The BLM
changed its final rule to require
operators to submit LDAR programs
corresponding to the BLMadministrative State. The initial LDAR
programs and the annual reviews and
updates of the originally submitted
LDAR program must be submitted to the
appropriate BLM state office in writing
until such time as the BLM has the
ability to receive the LDAR programs
and annual reviews and update reports
electronically.
In the proposed rule, the BLM
required the operator to submit the
LDAR program no later than 6 months
after the effective date of the final rule.
Commenters believed this timeframe
was too short for submitting the initial
program. The BLM agrees. The BLM
extended the time in which operators
must submit an LDAR program to the
BLM administrative state office because
the BLM adopted commenters’
suggestion to expand the geographic
area for which an operator creates the
LDAR program. In the proposed rule,
LDAR programs were to be submitted to
a BLM Field Office for review; in the
final rule this was changed to a larger
geographic area and therefore BLM
extended the time to prepare the
programs. In this final rule, the BLM
extends this timeframe for compliance
to within 18 months of the effective date
of the final rule. This 18-month
timeframe for compliance is likely to go
into effect prior to standards in state
plans submitted in response to EPA’s
OOOOc rule.
This final section requires operators
to review and update submitted LDAR
programs on an annual basis. The
annual update is due in the same month
in which the operator submitted the
initial LDAR program to the BLM. The
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annual report ensures that information
about the identified leases, unit PAs,
and CAs, leak detection methods,
current operator, and frequency of
inspections is current. If the LDAR
program requires no changes, then the
operator must notify the BLM state
office that the LDAR program submitted
and reviewed remains in effect. The
requirement for an annual update and
review is also cross-referenced in the
section about recordkeeping
requirements for leak detection in final
§ 3179.102.
The BLM received comments that the
requirements for the LDAR program
were vague, with no guidance or
requirements as to what the BLM would
determine as adequate or inadequate
and what additional measures the BLM
might prescribe to address any
identified deficiencies in the program.
The BLM acknowledges the
commenters’ concern, and in the final
rule modified some requirements for the
LDAR program that should avoid
conflict with the EPA’s OOOO series
requirements. In final rule
§ 3179.100(b), the LDAR program
requires the operator to submit the
following information for the LDAR
program: (1) identification of the leases,
unit PAs, and CAs by geographic State
for all States within the BLM’s
administrative State boundaries to
which the LDAR program applies; (2)
identification of the method and
frequency of leak detection inspection
used at the lease, unit PA, or CA. Under
final rule § 3179.100(b)(2), acceptable
inspection methods and frequency
include: (i) well pads with only
wellheads and no production
equipment or storage must include
quarterly AVO inspections for leak
detection; (ii) well pads with any
production and processing equipment
and oil storage must include AVO
inspections every other month and
quarterly OGI for leak detection; and
(iii) other leak detection inspection
methods and frequency acceptable to
the BLM (e.g., continuous monitoring);
(3) identification of the operator’s
recordkeeping process for LDAR
pursuant to final § 3179.102.
Final § 3179.100 requires operators to
directly submit initial LDAR programs
and subsequent annual LDAR reports to
BLM state offices for review. At this
time, the BLM’s Automated Fluid
Minerals Support System is unable to
receive LDAR programs or annual
reports. In the future, the BLM
anticipates having a new electronic
database that will be able to accept
LDAR program requirements. When a
new electronic database is available and
capable of receiving the LDAR program
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requirements, the BLM will notify
operators and give them sufficient time
to prepare for electronic submission of
LDAR program requirements.
Section 3179.101 Repairing Leaks
The final rule redesignated this
section from § 3179.302 in the proposed
rule to § 3179.101 in the final. The BLM
received comments supporting this
section as written in the proposed rule.
One commenter suggested changing the
repair periods to align with their EPA
counterparts to eliminate confusion
between the two agencies’ requirements.
The BLM’s proposed period remains
unchanged because the BLM has
determined that its timeframes are
sufficient to meet the BLM’s waste
prevention needs. Even though EPA is
providing the delay of repair provisions
for up to 2 years under specific
conditions for the enforcement of air
quality, the BLM elects to maintain a
shorter time for repair for the prevention
of waste.
A second commenter suggested that
paragraph (d), which gives operators 15
calendar days to address an ineffective
repair, is an insufficient amount of time.
The BLM reminds the commenter that
this is 15 days for an ineffective repair.
Prior to this point, the operator will
have had 30 calendar days after
discovery of the leak to effectively
repair the leak. The proposed and final
rules provide an additional 15 calendar
days to repair an ineffectively repaired
leak. The repair of leaks in a timely
manner is a maintenance obligation and
demonstrates operator performance in a
good and workmanlike manner. The 15day allowance for an ineffective repair—
45 days in total—should not be cause
for concern for a diligent operator. The
BLM did not make any changes to the
regulatory text of this section based on
comments.
Section 3179.102 Required
Recordkeeping for Leak Dtection
Inspection and Repair
The BLM redesignated this section in
the final rule from § 3179.303 in the
proposed rule to § 3179.102 in the final.
Commenters asked the BLM to remove
the requirement for operators to submit
an annual report to the BLM on March
31 of each calendar year summarizing
the previous year’s inspection activities,
including: (1) the number of sites
inspected; (2) the total number of leaks
identified, categorized by the type of
component that was leaking; (3) the
total number of leaks repaired and (4)
the total number of leaks that were not
repaired as of December 31 of the
previous year due to good cause, along
with an estimated date of repair for each
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25419
leak. The commenters requested this
information be kept on site and be made
available to the AO upon request.
Commenters also contended that the
March 31 and December 31 dates as
arbitrary. The BLM disagrees in part to
the comments. The annual report is an
integral part of informing the BLM as to
whether the LDAR program is beneficial
in reducing leaks and preventing waste,
or, in other words, whether it is an
effective program that is worth
continuing. The BLM agrees in part that
removing the two dates of March 31 and
December 31 from the final rule would
allow an operator to report similar
information to the BLM and EPA on the
same dates. Thus, the BLM removed the
March 31 and December 31 dates that
had been proposed to define the LDAR
program year, and instead the final rule
allows operators to determine the LDAR
program year based on the submission
of their initial LDAR program to the
BLM state office for review within 18
months of the effective date of the rule
pursuant to final § 3179.100. The BLM
also removed the requirement for the
annual report to contain the total
number of leaks repaired in the year.
This information may be determined
from the other information required on
the annual report.
As a reminder, final §§ 3179.100
through 3179.103 apply only to
operations and production equipment
located on a Federal or Indian oil and
gas lease. The aforementioned sections
do not apply to operations and
production equipment on State or
private tracts, even when those tracts
are committed to a federally approved
unit or CA.
Immediate Assessments
Section 3179.200
Assessments
Immediate
The BLM did not include a section on
immediate assessments in the proposed
rule. However, the proposed rule
contained two immediate assessments:
proposed § 3179.6(b) for unlit flares and
proposed § 3179.203(a) for thief hatch
left open and unattended. There are no
new immediate assessments in the final
rule. The immediate assessment for the
unlit flare is found in the redesignated
§ 3179.50(b) and for the hatch left open
and unattended is found in the
redesignated § 3179.90(a).
The BLM included this new section
summarizing the immediate
assessments found elsewhere in final
subpart 3179 for consistency with other
subparts in part 3170 that contain
immediate assessments, such as
§§ 3173.29, 3174.15, and 3175.150. The
BLM believes the tables with immediate
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assessments provided in these subparts
provide the regulated community and
BLM inspectors with a quick reference
for the immediate assessments found
within the respective subparts.
Sections That the BLM Removed
Section 3179.102 Well Completion
and Related Operations
In the final rule, the BLM removed
proposed § 3179.102, ‘‘Well completion
and related operations,’’ and instead
opted for a simpler approach to flaring
following well completion or
recompletion that appears in the final
§ 3179.81. Based on numerous
comments, the BLM elected to eliminate
the distinction made in proposed
§ 3179.102 between a new completion
that is hydraulically fractured and an
existing completion that is hydraulically
refractured. In the proposed rule, the
BLM made this distinction because the
BLM believed that it is more likely for
existing completions that are refractured
to be connected to a sales line to capture
flowback gas to sales sooner and limit
flaring as a result. Comments revealed
that the proposed sections were
confusing. The BLM eliminated
proposed § 3179.102 to simplify and
make the flaring limits more
straightforward.
Based on comments received for the
proposed rule, the BLM removed
proposed § 3179.201 ‘‘Pneumatic
controllers and pneumatic diaphragm
pumps.’’ The rationale for the removal
and reduction of requirements for this
section are discussed below. The
removal of proposed § 3179.201 means
that the subpart 3179 requirements that
apply only to operations on Federal and
Indian surface estate have been reduced
in the final rule.
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Section 3179.201 Pneumatic
Controllers and Pneumatic Diaphragm
Pumps
Proposed § 3179.201 limited the bleed
rate of natural-gas-activated pneumatic
controllers and pneumatic diaphragm
pumps to 6 scf per hour for leases, unit
PAs, and CAs producing greater than
120 Mcf of gas or 20 barrels of oil per
month. The BLM’s intention was to
limit the bleed rate of natural-gasactivated pneumatic diaphragm pumps
to decrease the volume of bleed gas and
simultaneously increase the amount of
gas that would be sold. The BLM’s
proposed RIA indicated the monetary
benefits to industry for this requirement
exceeded the costs. The proposed rule
RIA estimated that operators would
replace up to 52,213 pneumatics
devices, resulting in an estimated 5.93
Bcf of gas conserved annually. The 5.93
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Bcf of gas conserved described in the
proposed RIA was an initial estimate
that assumed that all intermittent bleed
pneumatic controllers would bleed
continuously throughout the year. BLM
recognizes that is not how intermittent
bleed pneumatic controllers are
operated. Rather BLM understands that
this equipment is used in varying ways
based on operating conditions. A more
precise estimate is difficult to ascertain
because the BLM does not track
production equipment of this type. The
proposed RIA also relied on EPA’s U.S.
GHG Emissions data (https://
www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventoryus-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks1990-2021), from which it is inherently
difficult to attribute emissions volumes
to operations on Federal and Indian
surface estate.
After reviewing public comments on
this section and evaluating the practical
implications of enforcement of this
section, the BLM decided to remove this
section in its entirety. The BLM
authorizes royalty-free use of lease
production for operations and
production purposes, including placing
oil or gas in marketable condition on the
same lease, unit PA, or CA prior to
removal from the lease, unit PA, or CA.
The requirements for royalty-free use of
lease production are found in subpart
3178. Subpart 3178 does not limit the
volume of royalty-free use oil or gas so
long as the volume is reasonable for the
operation. To limit the use of pneumatic
controllers and pneumatic diaphragm
pumps to less than 6 scf per hour would
have created a conflict with 43 CFR
subpart 3178. In addition, the BLM
considered the practical difficulty in
inspecting for and enforcing the
requirements of the proposed section,
which would obligate the BLM to
maintain an extensive database of
pneumatic equipment with the
manufacturer’s advertised bleed rate for
enforcement. During a production
inspection, a BLM inspector would
ascertain whether the device exceeded
the required bleed rate and, if it did,
require the operator to replace the
equipment. Proposed 3179.4(b)(7)
would have allowed for normal
operating losses from a natural-gasactivated pneumatic controller or pump
to qualify as an unavoidable loss.
Therefore, during any inspection there
could have been no determination of
avoidably lost gas with a royalty
obligation, making this provision
irrelevant for royalty collection
purposes.
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Section 3179.401 State and Tribal
Requests for Variances From the
Requirements of This Subpart
Proposed § 3179.401 would have
reinstated the State or Tribal variance
provision from the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. The provision would
have allowed States and Tribes to
request a variance under which
analogous State or Tribal rules would
have applied in place of some or all of
the requirements of subpart 3179. With
a variance request, the State or Tribe
would have been required to: identify
the subpart 3179 provision(s) for which
the variance is requested; identify the
State, local, or Tribal rules that would
be applied instead; explain why the
variance is needed; and, demonstrate
how the State, local, or Tribal rules
would be as effective as the subpart
3179 provisions in terms of reducing
waste, reducing environmental impacts,
assuring appropriate royalty payments,
and ensuring the safe and responsible
production of oil and gas.
The BLM State Director would have
been authorized to approve the variance
request or approve it subject to
conditions, after considering all relevant
factors. This decision would have been
entirely at the BLM’s discretion and
would not be subject to administrative
appeals under 43 CFR part 4. If the BLM
were to have approved a variance, the
State or Tribe that requested the
variance would be obligated to notify
the BLM of any substantive
amendments, revisions, or other
changes to the State, local, or Tribal
rules to be applied under the variance.
Finally, if the BLM were to have
approved a variance under this section,
the BLM would have been authorized to
enforce the State, local, or Tribal rules
applied under the variance as if they
were contained in the BLM’s
regulations.
In the proposed rule, the BLM
requested public comment seeking
confirmation that such variances would
be both useful and practical. The BLM
also requested that commenters provide
specific examples of situations where
the variance provision in proposed
§ 3179.401 would improve on existing
practices and administrative tools, such
as Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs), in terms of providing better
environmental protection, better
protection of taxpayer and lessor
interests, administrative efficiencies,
and burden reductions for operators.
Several commenters offered general
support for the BLM’s proposed rule to
allow for State or Tribal variance
requests. Commenters expressed
concerns for the increased need for
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limited State resources for the process
and implementation, for conflict with
the MLA prohibition on the
promulgation of rules ‘‘in conflict with
the laws of the State in which the leased
property is situated,’’ 154 and the lack of
clarity in the proposed requirement that
the State or Tribal regulation would
perform ‘‘at least equally well’’ as the
BLM rule. The BLM agrees with some of
these concerns. However, the BLM did
not receive comments confirming that
the variances would be both useful and
practical or that variances would
improve on existing practices and
administrative tools, such as MOUs.
Commenters expressed support for the
use of MOUs,
In the final rule, the BLM decided not
to carry forward the proposed provision
to allow for State and Tribal variances.
Upon further review, the BLM believes
that the provision would have created a
significant administrative burden for the
agency while not improving on existing
practices and administrative tools.
Operators in States or on Tribal lands
that have more stringent standards than
those contained in this rule are required
to conform to the more stringent State
or Tribal standards, regardless of
whether the State or Tribe receives a
variance under the provision of the
proposed rule. Such situations routinely
arise in the context of other BLM oil and
gas operational regulations, indicating
that a variance provision in this rule is
not useful. Commenters failed to show
that the subpart 3179 provisions would
conflict with any State’s more stringent
requirements. The BLM has also not
identified any such conflict. Thus, with
or without a formal variance, a State or
Tribe may effectively supplement the
BLM’s regulatory requirements by
enacting stricter requirements. That is
consistent with the BLM’s longstanding
practice.
There are benefits associated with
aligning data collection processes or
other potential areas of regulatory
similarity that could bring greater
efficiencies for both operators and
regulators, but MOUs can more
efficiently achieve many of those goals
without the need for a State or Tribal
variance.
Commenters requested that the BLM
pursue a Title V Operating Permit
Program similar to EPA’s under the
CAA and do further work to promote
Tribal self-determination and selfgovernance within this rule. The BLM
lacks EPA’s CAA authority, but
welcomes the opportunity to consult
with Tribes concerning cooperative
agreements.
While the variance provisions are not
in the final rule, the BLM welcomes the
opportunity to enter into MOUs or
similar agreements with States and
Tribes to clarify applicable regulatory
requirements, which is also part of
longstanding practice.
VI. Procedural Matters
A. Regulatory Planning and Review
(E.O. 12866, E.O. 13563)
Executive Order 12866, as amended
by Executive Order 14094, provides that
the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) will
review all significant rules. The OIRA
has determined that this final rule is
significant.
Executive Order 13563 reaffirms the
principles of Executive Order 12866
while calling for improvements in the
Nation’s regulatory system to promote
predictability, to reduce uncertainty,
and to use the best, most innovative,
and least burdensome tools for
achieving regulatory ends. The
Executive Order directs agencies to
25421
consider regulatory approaches that
reduce burdens and maintain flexibility
and freedom of choice for the public
where these approaches are relevant,
feasible, and consistent with regulatory
objectives. Executive Order 13563
emphasizes further that regulations
must be based on the best available
science and that the rulemaking process
must allow for public participation and
an open exchange of ideas. We have
developed this rule in a manner
consistent with these requirements.
This final rule replaces the BLM’s
current rules governing venting and
flaring, which are contained in NTL–4A.
We have developed this final rule in a
manner consistent with the
requirements in Executive Order 12866
and Executive Order 13563.
The monetized costs and benefits of
this rule can be seen in the following
table along with the transfer payments
this rule will provide in the form of
increased royalties from increased gas
sales. The total monetized Net Benefit
on an annualized basis is $360,000 at a
7 percent discount rate and $441,000 at
a 3 percent discount rate. Additional
unquantified benefits from reduced
emissions of VOCs and hazardous air
pollutants are discussed further in the
RIA. The BLM reiterates that, while it
has included benefits associated with
the social cost of greenhouse gases in
this particular presentation of costs and
benefits and in the RIA, this was done
to respond to Executive Orders 12866
and 13563 and in order to present as
complete a picture as possible of the
total costs and benefits of the final rule
for the public. Climate benefits derived
from foregone emissions were not a
factor in the decision to include any of
the individual waste prevention
requirements in this final rule.
COSTS AND BENEFITS SUMMARY
[2024–2033]
7% Discount rate
NPV
($MM)
I
3% Discount rate
Annualized
($MM)
NPV
($MM)
I
Annualized
($MM)
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Costs
Measurements .................................................................................................
$8.46
$1.20
$9.60
$1.13
LDAR ...............................................................................................................
Administrative Burdens ....................................................................................
64.55
62.56
9.19
8.91
78.40
75.98
9.19
8.91
Total Cost .................................................................................................
135.57
19.30
163.98
19.22
154 30
U.S.C. 187.
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
COSTS AND BENEFITS SUMMARY—Continued
[2024–2033]
7% Discount rate
NPV
($MM)
I
3% Discount rate
Annualized
($MM)
NPV
($MM)
I
Annualized
($MM)
Benefits
LDAR ...............................................................................................................
$165.07
19.66
167.74
19.66
Total Benefits ............................................................................................
Net Benefits ..............................................................................................
Transfer Payments ...................................................................................
165.07
29.50
360.04
19.66
0.36
51.26
167.74
3.76
438.59
19.66
0.44
51.42
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The BLM reviewed the requirements
of the final rule and determined that
they will not adversely affect in a
material way the economy, a sector of
the economy, productivity, competition,
jobs, the environment, public health or
safety, or State, local, or Tribal
governments or communities. For more
detailed information, see the RIA
prepared for this final rule. The RIA has
been posted in the docket for the final
rule on the Federal eRulemaking Portal:
https://www.regulations.gov. In the
Searchbox, enter ‘‘RIN 1004–AE79,’’
click the ‘‘Search’’ button, open the
Docket Folder, and look under
Supporting Documents.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) (RFA) requires that
Federal agencies prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis for rules subject to
the notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements under the APA (5 U.S.C.
500 et seq.), if the rule would have a
significant economic impact, whether
detrimental or beneficial, on a
substantial number of small entities. See
5 U.S.C. 601 612. Congress enacted the
RFA to ensure that government
regulations do not unnecessarily or
disproportionately burden small
entities. Small entities include small
businesses, small governmental
jurisdictions, and small not-for-profit
enterprises.
The BLM reviewed the Small
Business Administration (SBA) size
standards for small businesses and the
number of entities fitting those size
standards as reported by the U.S.
Census Bureau in the Economic Census.
The BLM concludes that the vast
majority of entities operating in the
relevant sectors are small businesses, as
defined by the SBA. As such, the final
rule will likely affect a substantial
number of small entities.
The BLM reviewed the final rule and
has determined that, although the final
rule will likely affect a substantial
number of small entities, that effect will
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not be significant. The basis for this
determination is explained in more
detail in the RIA. In brief, the per-entity,
annualized compliance costs associated
with this final rule are estimated to
represent only a small fraction of the
annual net incomes of the companies
likely to be impacted. Because the final
rule will not have a ‘‘significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities,’’ as that phrase
is used in 5 U.S.C. 605, a final
regulatory flexibility analysis and
regulatory compliance guide are not
required. The Secretary of the Interior
certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this
rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
apply to the private sector participating
in a voluntary Federal program. The
costs that the final rule will impose on
the private sector are below the
monetary threshold established at 2
U.S.C. 1532(a). A statement containing
the information required by the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) is
therefore not required for the final rule.
This final rule is also not subject to the
requirements of section 203 of UMRA
because it contains no regulatory
requirements that might significantly or
uniquely affect small governments,
because it contains no requirements that
apply to such governments, nor does it
impose obligations upon them.
C. Congressional Review Act
The statutory provision found at 5
U.S.C. 804(2), the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,
does not apply to this final rule because
it is estimated that the rule will not have
an annual economic impact of $100
million or more. As noted in the Costs
and Benefits Summary earlier, the RIA
that the BLM produced for this rule
calculates that this rule will cost
operators $19.3 million per year (using
a 7 percent discount rate) for the next
10 years, while generating benefits to
operators of approximately $1.8 million
a year (using a 7 percent discount rate)
in the form of 0.45 Bcf of additional
captured gas. The reduced methane
emissions associated with the final rule
will provide a benefit to society of $17.9
million a year over the same time frame,
leading to a net benefit from the rule of
$360,000 to $441,000 a year.
E. Governmental Actions and
Interference With Constitutionally
Protected Property Right-Takings
(Executive Order 12630)
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA)
The final rule will not have a
significant or unique effect on State,
local, or Tribal governments or the
private sector. The final rule contains no
requirements that apply to State, local,
or Tribal governments. The final rule
revises requirements that otherwise
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This final rule will not effect a taking
of private property or otherwise have
taking implications under Executive
Order 12630. A takings implication
assessment is not required. The final
rule will replace the BLM’s current rules
governing venting and flaring, which are
contained in NTL–4A. Therefore, the
final rule will impact some operational
and administrative requirements on
Federal and Indian lands. All such
operations are subject to lease terms
which expressly require that subsequent
lease activities be conducted in
compliance with subsequently adopted
Federal laws and regulations.
This final rule conforms to the terms
of those leases and applicable statutes
and, as such, the rule is not a
government action capable of interfering
with constitutionally protected property
rights. Therefore, the BLM has
determined that the rule will not cause
a taking of private property or require
further discussion of takings
implications under Executive Order
12630.
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F. Federalism (Executive Order 13132)
Under the criteria in section 1 of
Executive Order 13132, this final rule
does not have sufficient federalism
implications to warrant the preparation
of a federalism summary impact
statement. A federalism impact
statement is not required.
The final rule will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
the relationship between the Federal
Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the levels of
government. It will not apply to States
or local governments or State or local
governmental entities. The rule will
affect the relationship between
operators, lessees, and the BLM, but it
will not directly impact the States.
Therefore, in accordance with Executive
Order 13132, the BLM has determined
that this final rule will not have
sufficient federalism implications to
warrant preparation of a Federalism
Assessment.
G. Civil Justice Reform (Executive Order
12988)
This final rule complies with the
requirements of Executive Order 12988.
More specifically, this final rule meets
the criteria of section 3(a), which
requires agencies to review all
regulations to eliminate errors and
ambiguity and to write all regulations to
minimize litigation. This final rule also
meets the criteria of section 3(b)(2),
which requires agencies to write all
regulations in clear language with clear
legal standards.
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H. Consultation and Coordination With
Indian Tribal Governments (Executive
Order 13175 and Departmental Policy)
The Department strives to strengthen
its government-to-government
relationship with Indian Tribes through
a commitment to consultation with
Indian Tribes and recognition of their
right to self-governance and Tribal
sovereignty.
The BLM evaluated this final rule
under the Department’s consultation
policy and under the criteria in
Executive Order 13175 to identify
possible effects of the rule on federally
recognized Indian Tribes. Since the
BLM approves proposed operations on
all Indian (except Osage Tribe) onshore
oil and gas leases, the final rule has the
potential to affect Indian Tribes.
In August of 2021, the BLM sent a
letter to each federally recognized Tribe
informing them of certain rulemaking
efforts, including the development of
this final rule. The letter offered Tribes
the opportunity for individual
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government-to-government consultation
regarding the final rule. Three Tribes
responded to the letter and requested
government-to-government
consultation. The BLM conducted
Tribal consultations with those three
Tribes during the rulemaking process.
requirements. These information
collection requirements are discussed in
detail in the information collection
request submitted to OMB and are
available at https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/PRAMain under OMB control
number 1004–0211 as outlined below.
I. Paperwork Reduction Act
Existing § 3162.3–1 Drilling
Applications and Plans (Application for
Permit To Drill Oil Well and WMP)
The final rule amends § 3162.3–1 to
include the requirement for a WMP
(using Form 3160–3) or selfcertification. In addition, the final rule
adds § 3162.3–1(j), which requires that
when submitting an APD for an oil well,
the operator must also submit a plan to
minimize waste of natural gas from that
well or alternatively, in § 3162.3–1(k), a
self-certification for 100 percent capture
of the associated gas.
A. Overview
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) generally
provides that an agency may not
conduct or sponsor a collection of
information, and, notwithstanding any
other provision of law, a person is not
required to respond to collection of
information unless it has been approved
by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and displays a currently
valid OMB control number. The
information collections requirements
contained in the BLMs waste prevention
standard as contained in 43 CFR parts
3160, 3170, and subpart 3178 have been
approved by OMB under OMB control
number 1004–0211.
This Final rule contains revised and
new information collection (IC)
requirements for BLM regulations and
requires a submission to OMB for
review under the PRA, as outlined in
the PRA implementing regulations at 5
CFR 1320.11. The IC requirements are
necessary to assist the BLM in
preventing venting, flaring, and leaks
that waste the public’s resources and
assets. Respondents are holders of
Federal and Indian oil and gas leases.
The information collection requirements
are outlined in the BLM’s waste
prevention standards as well as on BLM
Forms 3160–3 (‘‘Application for Permit
to Drill or Reenter’’) and 3160–5
(‘‘Sundry Notices and Reports on
Wells’’). Forms 3160–3 and 3160–5 are
used broadly for onshore oil and gas
operations and production purposes
under 43 CFR parts 3160 and 3170 and
are approved under OMB control
number 1004–0137. This final rule does
not introduce any changes to Forms
3160–3 and 3160–5 and the forms will
continue to be approved under OMB
control number 1004–0137; however,
this information collection request (ICR)
seeks to include burdens specific to the
use of Forms 3160–3 and 3160–5 in
regard to the proposed waste prevention
standard subject to this final rule. The
final rule contains the below new and
revised IC requirements.
B. Effects on Existing Information
Collections Requirements
The final rule revises certain existing
information collection requirements and
introduces new information collection
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Request for Approval for Royalty-Free
Uses On-Lease or Off-Lease (43 CFR
3178.5, 3178.7, 3178.8, and 3178.9)
Sections 3178.5, 3178.7, and 3178.9 of
the BLM’s current rules require
submission of a Sundry Notice (Form
3160–5) to request prior written BLM
approval for use of gas royalty-free for
the following operations and production
purposes on the lease, unit or
communitized area. This final rule does
not address nor would change this
existing requirement.
C. New Information Collection
Requirements
The final rule introduces new
information collection requirements in
the new subpart 43 CFR subpart 3179.
These information collection
requirements are discussed in detail in
the information collection request to
submitted to OMB and are available at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAMain under OMB control number
1004–0211, as outlined below.
The final subpart 3179 has
information collection requirements, as
discussed below. The purpose of this
subpart is to implement and carry out
the purposes of statutes to prevent waste
from covered Federal and Indian oil and
gas leases with requirements for flaring
and venting of produced gas,
requirements for the waste of gas from
leaks, and clearly defining unavoidably
and avoidably lost gas.
Section 3179.41 Determining When
the Loss of Oil or Gas Is Avoidable or
Unavoidable (Notifying the BLM Prior
to Flaring)
Section 3179.41 requires that an
operator notify the BLM through a
Sundry Notices and Report on Wells,
Form 3160–5, prior to the flaring of gas
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
from which at least 50 percent of natural
gas liquids have been removed on-lease
and captured for market, that the
operator is conducting such capture and
the inlet of the equipment used to
remove the natural gas liquids will be
an FMP.
Section 3179.71 Measurement of
Flared Oil-Well Gas Volume
Section 3179.71(a) of the rule requires
operators to measure volumes of gas
using orifice meters or ultrasonic meters
for flares measuring greater than 1,050
Mcf per month over the averaging
period from wells, facilities and
equipment on a lease, unit, or CA. The
operator is required to install
measurement for flares, but there are no
information collection activities
associated with the installation of
measurement equipment. Sections
3179.71(d) and (e) provide the sampling
requirements for non-commingled flares
and commingled flares. The gas sample
analysis will determine the Btu value
the operator is required to report to the
Office of Natural Resources Revenue
Form ONRR–4054.
Section 3179.72 Required Reporting
and Recordkeeping of Vented and
Flared Gas Volumes
Section 3179.72 requires operators to
maintain records of venting and flaring
events beginning 3 months following
the effective date of the rule. Operators
are required to keep a record containing
the information specified in this section
and make it available to the BLM upon
request.
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Section 3179.80 Loss of Well Control
While Drilling
Section 3179.80 provides that the
operator must notify the BLM within 24
hours of the start of the loss of well
control event and submit a Sundry
Notice within 15 days following
conclusion of the event to the BLM
describing the loss of well control.
Section 3179.81 Well Completion and
Recompletion Flaring Allowances and
§ 3179.82 Subsequent Well Tests for an
Existing Completion
The final rule allows for royalty-free
flaring following a new completion or
recompletion until one of the following
occurs: (1) 30 days have passed since
beginning of the flowback following
completion or recompletion; (2) 20,000
Mcf of gas have been flared; (3)
flowback has been routed to the
production separator. Section 3179.81
allows an operator to flare gas for 30
days since the beginning of the flowback
under certain conditions and specified
limits. Section 3179.82 permits an
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operator to flare gas for no more than 24
hours during well tests subsequent to
the initial completion or recompletion
flaring. An operator is required to
submit its request for longer test periods
or increased limits under paragraphs (b),
(c), or (d) of this section using a Sundry
Notice.
Section 3179.83 Emergencies
Section 3179.83 requires that within
45 days of the start of the emergency,
the operator is required estimate and
report to the BLM on a Sundry Notice
the volumes flared or vented beyond the
timeframes specified in paragraph (b) of
this section.
Section 3179.90 Oil Storage Tank
Vapors
The final rule for § 3179.90 requires
an operator to only open the tank hatch
to the extent necessary to conduct
production and measurement
operations. This section also requires
the operator to maintain all oil storage
tanks, hatches, connections and other
tank access points in a vapor tight
condition. An immediate assessment is
imposed upon discovery of a hatch that
is open or unlatched, and unattended.
Section 3179.100 Leak Detection and
Repair Program
The rule requires an operator to
maintain an LDAR program designed to
prevent the undue waste of Federal or
Indian gas. The LDAR program must
provide for regular inspections of all oil
and gas production, processing,
treatment, storage, and measurement
equipment on the lease site. Operators
must submit their LDAR programs for
BLM review, and the BLM would notify
the operator if its program was
determined to be inadequate. Operators
are required to submit an annual report
on inspections and repairs. Section
3179.100 requires that the operator of a
Federal or Indian lease must submit the
LDAR program to the BLM state office
with jurisdiction over the production
describing the operator’s LDAR program
for all the production facilities within
the BLM administrative State
boundaries, including the frequency of
inspections and any instruments to be
used for leak detection.
Section 3179.101 Repairing Leaks
Section 3179.101 requires that an
operator repair any leak as soon as
practicable, and in no event later than
30 calendar days after discovery, unless
good cause exists to delay the repair for
a longer period. Good cause for delay of
repair exists if the repair (including
replacement) is technically infeasible
(including unavailability of parts that
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have been ordered), would require a
pipeline blowdown, a compressor
station shutdown, a well shut-in, or
would be unsafe to conduct during
operation of the unit. Paragraph (b) of
this section would require that if there
is good cause for delaying the repair
beyond 30 calendar days, the operator
must notify the BLM of the cause by
Sundry Notice.
Section 3179.102 Leak Detection
Inspection Recordkeeping and
Reporting
Operators are required to keep records
in inspections and repairs and submit
those records to the BLM upon request.
Section 3179.102 requires that an
operator maintain certain records for the
period required under § 3162.4–1(d) of
this title and make them available to the
BLM upon request.
D. Changes From the Proposed to Final
Rule
Below are changes to the information
collections in the final rule that are
different from those in the proposed
rule.
• The final rule includes § 3179.72
adds a new required reporting and
recordkeeping of vented and flared gas
volumes.
• The final rule includes § 3179.80,
Unavoidable/Avoidable loss
determination for drilling with loss of
well control, adds a new Sundry-Notice
requirement in the final rule that was
not in the proposed rule.
• The BLM removed the proposed
Annual compositional analysis for oil
storage vessels that was contained in the
proposed § 3179.203.
• The BLM removed the proposed
State or Tribal requests for variances or
amendments that was contained in the
proposed §§ 3179.401 and 3179.401(e)).
E. Estimated Information Collection
Burdens
Currently, there are 50 responses, 400
annual burden hours, and $0 non-hour
cost burdens approved under this OMB
control number. These burdens pertain
to a Request for Approval for RoyaltyFree Uses On-Lease or Off-Lease (43
CFR 3178.5, 3178.7, 3178.8, and 3178.9)
which are not addressed in this final
rule. The BLM projects that the
information collections as contained in
this final rule are to result in 58,301
new annual responses (from 50 to
58,351), 125,351 new annual burden
hours (from 400 to 125,751); and
$24,175,000 annual non-hour cost
burdens ($0 to $24,175,000). The
increase in annual burdens results from
the Final rule results from the
information collection activities
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contained in the 43 CFR subpart 3179,
a new subpart introduced by this final
rule and a new requirement contained
in 43 CFR 3162.3–1, Application, to
Drill Oil Well and WMP.
Title: Waste Prevention, Production
Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation (43 CFR parts 3160, 3170,
3178 and 3179).
OMB control number: 1004–0211.
Form Number: 3160–5 (OMB control
number 1004–0137).
Type of Review: Revision of a
currently approved collection.
Description of Respondents: Federal
and Indian leases, as well as State and
private tracts committed to a federally
approved lease, unit, or communitized
area.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
1,200.
Estimated Number of Annual
Responses: 58,351.
Estimated Completion Time per
Response: Varies from 1 hour to 8 hours
depending on activity.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 125,751.
Respondents’ Obligation: Required to
obtain or retain a benefit.
Frequency of Collection: On occasion,
Annually, Monthly, or one-time
depending on activity.
Estimated Total Non-Hour Cost:
$24,175,000.
In accordance with the PRA and the
PRA implementing regulations at 5 CFR
1320.11, the BLM has submitted an ICR
to OMB for the new and revised ICs in
this final rule. As part of our continuing
effort to reduce paperwork and
respondent burdens, we invite the
public and other Federal agencies to
comment on any aspect of this
information collection, including:
(1) Whether the collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) The accuracy of our estimate of the
burden for this collection of
information, including the validity of
the methodology and assumptions used;
(3) Ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
(4) Ways to minimize the burden of
the collection of information on those
who are to respond, including through
the use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submission of
response.
If you want to comment on the
information-collection requirements in
this final rule, please send your
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comments and suggestions on this
information-collection request within 30
days of publication of this final rule in
the Federal Register to OMB at
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAmain.
Find this particular information
collection by selecting ‘‘Currently under
Review—Open for Public Comments’’ or
by using the search function.
J. National Environmental Policy Act
The BLM has prepared a final EA to
determine whether this proposed rule
will have a significant impact on the
quality of the human environment
under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.
4321 et seq.). The final EA supports the
issuance of a Finding of No Significant
Impact for the rule, therefore
preparation of an environmental impact
statement pursuant to the NEPA is not
required.
The final EA has been placed in the
file for the BLM’s Administrative
Record for the rule at the address
specified in the ADDRESSES section. The
EA has also been posted in the docket
for the rule on the Federal eRulemaking
Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. In
the Searchbox, enter ‘‘RIN 1004–AE79,’’
click the ‘‘Search’’ button, open the
Docket Folder, and look under
Supporting Documents.
K. Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (Executive Order
13211)
Under Executive Order 13211,
agencies are required to prepare and
submit to OMB a Statement of Energy
Effects for significant energy actions.
This statement is to include a detailed
statement of ‘‘any adverse effects on
energy supply, distribution, or use
(including a shortfall in supply, price
increases, and increase use of foreign
supplies)’’ for the action and reasonable
alternatives and their effects.
Section 4(b) of Executive Order 13211
defines a ‘‘significant energy action’’ as
‘‘any action by an agency (normally
published in the Federal Register) that
promulgates or is expected to lead to the
promulgation of a final rule or
regulation, including notices of inquiry,
advance notices of proposed
rulemaking, and notices of proposed
rulemaking: (1)(i) that is a significant
regulatory action under Executive Order
12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is
likely to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy; or (2) that is designated by the
Administrator of (OIRA) as a significant
energy action.’’
Since the compliance costs for this
rule will represent a small fraction of
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25425
company net incomes, the BLM has
concluded that the rule is unlikely to
impact the investment decisions of
firms. See section 9 of the BLM’s RIA.
Also, any incremental production of gas
estimated to result from the rule’s
enactment would constitute a small
fraction of total U.S. gas production, and
any potential and temporary deferred
production of oil would likewise
constitute a small fraction of total U.S.
oil production. For these reasons, we do
not expect that the final rule will
significantly impact the supply,
distribution, or use of energy. As such,
the rulemaking is not a ‘‘significant
energy action,’’ as defined in Executive
Order 13211.
Authors
The principal authors of this final rule
are: Amanda Fox, Petroleum Engineer,
Santa Fe, NM; Beth Poindexter,
Petroleum Engineer, San Antonio, TX;
and the Office of the Solicitor,
Department of the Interior. Technical
support provided by: Tyson Sackett,
Economist, Cheyenne, WY; Scott
Rickard, Economist, Billings, MT; and
Terry Snyder, Senior Natural Resources
Specialist, Salt Lake City, UT. Assisted
by: Casey Hodges, Petroleum Engineer,
Granby, CO; and Senior Regulatory
Analysts Faith Bremner and Darrin King
of the BLM Washington Office.
List of Subjects
43 CFR Part 3160
Administrative practice and
procedure, Government contracts,
Indians—lands, Mineral royalties, Oil
and gas exploration, Penalties, Public
lands—mineral resources, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
43 CFR Part 3170
Administrative practice and
procedure, Flaring, Immediate
assessments, Incorporation by reference,
Indians—lands, Mineral royalties, Oil
and gas exploration, Oil and gas
measurement, Public lands—mineral
resources, Reporting and record keeping
requirements, Royalty-free use, Venting.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble, the Bureau of Land
Management amends 43 CFR parts 3160
and 2170 as follows:
PART 3160—ONSHORE OIL AND GAS
OPERATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 3160
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 25 U.S.C. 396d and 2107; 30
U.S.C. 189, 306, 359, and 1751; 43 U.S.C.
1732(b), 1733, 1740; and Sec. 107, Pub. L.
114–74, 129 Stat. 599, unless otherwise
noted.
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2. Amend § 3162.3–1 by revising
paragraph (d) and adding paragraphs (j),
(k), and (l) to read as follows:
■
§ 3162.3–1
Drilling applications and plans.
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*
*
*
*
*
(d) The Application for Permit to Drill
process must be initiated at least 30
days before commencement of
operations is desired. Prior to approval,
the application must be administratively
and technically complete. A complete
application consists of Form 3160–3 and
the following attachments:
(1) A drilling plan, which may already
be on file, containing information
required by paragraph (e) of this section
and appropriate orders and notices.
(2) A surface use plan of operations
containing information required by
paragraph (f) of this section and
appropriate orders and notices.
(3) Evidence of bond coverage as
required by the Department of the
Interior regulations.
(4) For an oil well, a Waste
Minimization Plan (WMP), as required
by paragraph (j) or a self-certification
statement, as required by paragraph (k)
(These requirements do not apply to gas
wells); and
(5) Such other information as may be
required by applicable orders and
notices.
*
*
*
*
*
(j) An Application for Permit to Drill
for an oil well with a WMP must
include the following information in the
WMP:
(1) The anticipated initial oil
production rate from the oil well and
the anticipated production decline over
the first 3 years of production;
(2) The anticipated initial oil-well gas
production rate from the oil well and
the anticipated production decline over
the first 3 years of production;
(3) Certification that the operator has
a valid, executed gas sales contract to
sell to a purchaser 100 percent of the
produced oil-well gas, less gas
anticipated for use on-lease pursuant to
43 CFR subpart 3178.
(4) Any other information
demonstrating the operator’s plans to
avoid the waste of gas production from
any source, including, as appropriate,
from pneumatic equipment, storage
tanks, and leaks.
(k) A self-certification is a written
statement that the operator will be able
to capture, as defined in 43 CFR
3179.10, 100 percent of the oil-well gas
that the oil well produces. An approved
Application for Permit to Drill with a
self-certification statement is not subject
to 43 CFR 3179.70(a), and all flared gas
is an avoidable loss with a royalty
obligation, except for emergencies as
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identified in 43 CFR 3179.83. A selfcertification statement applies and is
enforceable from the date of first
production until the well is plugged and
abandoned.
(l) The BLM may take one of the
following actions based on the
operator’s WMP or self-certification:
(1) Approve an administratively and
technically complete oil-well
application with a WMP subject to
conditions for flared gas, as described in
43 CFR 3179.70(a);
(2) Approve an administratively and
technically complete oil-well
application with a self-certification for
oil-well gas capture subject to
conditions for flared gas, as described in
this paragraph;
(3) Defer action on an oil-well
application with a WMP or selfcertification statement that is not
administratively and technically
complete in the interest of preventing
waste until such time as the operator is
able to amend the application to comply
with the requirements in paragraph (j) of
this section or this paragraph, as
applicable. If the applicant does not
address deficiencies in the WMP or the
self-certification to comply with the
applicable requirements within 2 years
of submission of the application, the
BLM will disapprove the application.
PART 3170—ONSHORE OIL AND GAS
PRODUCTION
3. The authority citation for part 3170
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 25 U.S.C. 396d and 2107; 30
U.S.C. 189, 306, 359, and 1751; and 43 U.S.C.
1732(b), 1733, and 1740.
4. Revise subpart 3179 to read as
follows:
■
Subpart 3179—Waste Prevention and
Resource Conservation
Secs.
3179.1 Purpose.
3179.2 Scope.
3179.10 Definitions and acronyms.
3179.11 Severability.
3179.30 Incorporation by Reference (IBR).
3179.40 Reasonable precautions to prevent
waste.
3179.41 Determining when the loss of oil or
gas is avoidable or unavoidable.
3179.42 When lost production is subject to
royalty.
3179.43 Data submission and notification
requirements.
3179.50 Safety.
3179.60 Gas-well gas.
3179.70 Oil-well gas.
3179.71 Measurement of flared oil-well gas
volume.
3179.72 Required reporting and
recordkeeping of vented and flared gas
volumes.
3179.73 Prior determinations regarding
royalty-free flaring.
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Flaring and Venting Gas During Drilling and
Production Operations
3179.80 Loss of well control while drilling.
3179.81 Well completion or recompletion
flaring allowance.
3179.82 Subsequent well tests for an
existing completion.
3179.83 Emergencies.
Gas Flared or Vented From Equipment and
During Well Maintenance Operations
3179.90 Oil storage tank vapors.
3179.91 Downhole well maintenance and
liquids unloading.
3179.92 Size of production equipment.
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR)
3179.100 Leak detection and repair
program.
3179.101 Repairing leaks.
3179.102 Required recordkeeping for leak
detection and repair.
Immediate Assessments
3179.200 Immediate Assessments.
Subpart 3179—Waste Prevention and
Resource Conservation
§ 3179.1
Purpose.
The purpose of this subpart is to
implement and carry out the purposes
of statutes relating to prevention of
waste from Federal and Indian (other
than The Osage Nation) oil and gas
leases, protection of worker safety,
conservation of surface resources, and
management of the public lands for
multiple use and sustained yield. This
subpart supersedes those portions of
Notice to Lessees and Operators of
Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas
Leases, Royalty or Compensation for Oil
and Gas Lost (NTL–4A) pertaining to,
among other things, flaring and venting
of produced gas, unavoidably and
avoidably lost gas, and waste
prevention.
§ 3179.2
Scope.
(a) Except as provided in provided
paragraph (b), this subpart applies to:
(1) All onshore Federal and Indian
(other than The Osage Nation) oil and
gas leases, units, and communitized
areas;
(2) Indian Mineral Development Act
(IMDA) agreements, unless specifically
excluded in the agreement or unless the
relevant provisions of this subpart are
inconsistent with the agreement;
(3) Leases and other business
agreements and contracts for the
development of Tribal energy resources
under a Tribal Energy Resource
Agreement (TERA) entered into with the
Secretary, unless specifically excluded
in the lease, other business agreement,
or TERA;
(4) Wells, equipment, and operations
on State or private tracts that are
committed to a federally approved unit
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or communitization agreement defined
by or established under 43 CFR subpart
3105 or 43 CFR part 3180.
(b) Sections 3179.50, 3179.90, and
3179.100 through 3179.102 apply only
to operations and production equipment
located on a Federal or Indian surface
estate. They do not apply to operations
and production equipment on State or
private tracts, even where those tracts
are committed to a federally approved
unit or communitization agreement.
(c) For purposes of this subpart, the
term ‘‘lease’’ also includes IMDA
agreements.
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§ 3179.10
Definitions and acronyms.
As used in this subpart, the term:
Automatic ignition system means an
automatic ignitor and, where necessary
to ensure continuous combustion, a
continuous pilot flame.
Capture means the physical
containment of natural gas for
transportation to market or productive
use of natural gas and includes
reinjection and royalty-free on-site uses
pursuant to subpart 3178.
Compressor station means any
permanent combination of one or more
compressors that move natural gas at
increased pressure through gathering or
transmission pipelines, or into or out of
storage. This includes, but is not limited
to, gathering and boosting stations and
transmission compressor stations. The
combination of one or more
compressors located at a well site, or
located at an onshore natural gas
processing plant, is not a compressor
station.
Gas-to-oil ratio (GOR) means the ratio
of gas to oil in the production stream
expressed in standard cubic feet of gas
per barrel of oil at standard conditions.
Gas well means a well for which the
energy equivalent of the gas produced,
including its entrained liquefiable
hydrocarbons, exceeds the energy
equivalent of the oil produced. Unless
more specific British thermal unit (Btu)
values are available, a well with a gasto-oil ratio greater than 6,000 standard
cubic feet (scf) of gas per barrel of oil is
a gas well.
High-pressure flare means an open-air
flare stack or flare pit designed for the
combustion of natural gas that would
normally go to sales.
Leak means a release of natural gas
from a component that is not associated
with normal operation of the
component, when such release is:
(1) A hydrocarbon emission detected
by use of an optical-gas-imaging
instrument;
(2) At least 500 ppm of hydrocarbon
detected using a portable analyzer or
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other instrument that can measure the
quantity of the release; or
(3) A hydrocarbon emission detected
via audio, visual, and olfactory means or
visible bubbles detected using soap
solution. Releases due to normal
operation of equipment intended to vent
as part of normal operations, such as
gas-driven pneumatic controllers and
safety-release devices, are not leaks
unless the releases exceed the quantities
and frequencies expected during normal
operations. Releases due to operator
errors or equipment malfunctions or
from control equipment at levels that
exceed applicable regulatory
requirements, such as releases from an
oil storage tank hatch left open, or an
improperly sized combustor, are leaks.
Liquids unloading means the removal
of an accumulation of liquid
hydrocarbons or water from the
wellbore of a completed gas well.
Lost oil or lost gas means produced oil
or gas that escapes containment, either
intentionally or unintentionally, or is
flared before being removed from the
lease, unit, or communitized area, and
cannot be recovered.
Low-pressure flare means any flare
that does not meet the definition of
high-pressure flare.
Pneumatic controller means an
automated instrument used for
maintaining a process condition, such
as liquid level, pressure, delta-pressure,
or temperature.
§ 3179.11
Severability.
If a court holds any provisions of the
regulations in this subpart or their
applicability to any person or
circumstances invalid, the remainder of
this subpart and its applicability to
other people or circumstances will not
be affected.
§ 3179.30
(IBR).
Incorporation by Reference
Certain material is incorporated by
reference into this subpart with the
approval of the Director of the Federal
Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1
CFR part 51. To enforce any edition
other than that specified in this section,
the BLM must publish a rule in the
Federal Register, and the material must
be reasonably available to the public.
All approved incorporation by reference
(IBR) material is available for inspection
at the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) and at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA).
Contact Yvette M. Fields with the BLM
at: Division of Fluid Minerals, 1849 C
Street NW, Washington, DC 20240,
telephone 240–712–8358; email yfields@
blm.gov; https://www.blm.gov/
programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-
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25427
gas. The approved material is also
available for inspection at all BLM
offices with jurisdiction over oil and gas
activities. For information on inspecting
this material at NARA, visit
www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/
ibr-locations.html or email
fr.inspection@nara.gov. The material
may be obtained from the following
source:
(a) American Petroleum Institute
(API), 200 Massachusetts Ave. NW,
Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20001;
telephone 202–682–8000. API offers
free, read-only access to some of the
material at https://publications.api.org.
(1) API Manual of Petroleum
Measurement Standards Chapter 22.3,
Testing Protocol for Flare Gas Metering;
First Edition, August 2015 (‘‘API 22.3’’),
IBR approved for § 3179.71(c).
(2) [Reserved]
(b) [Reserved]
§ 3179.40 Reasonable precautions to
prevent waste.
(a) Operators must use all reasonable
precautions to prevent the waste of oil
or gas developed from the lease.
(b) The Authorized Officer may
specify reasonable measures to prevent
waste as conditions of approval of an
Application for Permit to Drill (APD).
(c) After an APD is approved, the
Authorized Officer may order an
operator to implement, within a
reasonable time, additional reasonable
measures to prevent waste at ongoing
exploration and production operations.
(d) Reasonable measures to prevent
waste may reflect factors including, but
not limited to, relevant advances in
technology and changes in industry
practice.
§ 3179.41 Determining when the loss of oil
or gas is avoidable or unavoidable.
For purposes of this subpart:
(a) Lost oil is ‘‘unavoidably lost’’ if the
operator has taken reasonable steps to
avoid waste, and the operator has
complied fully with applicable laws,
lease terms, regulations, provisions of a
previously approved operating plan,
and other written orders of the BLM.
(b) Lost gas is ‘‘unavoidably lost’’ if
the operator has taken reasonable steps
to avoid waste, the operator has
complied fully with applicable laws,
lease terms, regulations, provisions of a
previously approved operating plan,
and other written orders of the BLM;
and the gas is lost from the following
operations or sources:
(1) Well drilling, subject to the
limitations in § 3179.80;
(2) Well completion and recompletion
flaring allowances in § 3179.81;
(3) Subsequent well tests, subject to
the limitations in § 3179.82;
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(4) Exploratory coalbed methane well
dewatering;
(5) Emergency situations, subject to
the limitations in § 3179.83;
(6) Normal operating losses from a
natural-gas-activated pneumatic
controller or pump;
(7) Normal operating losses from an
oil storage tank or other low-pressure
production vessel that is in compliance
with §§ 3179.90 and 3174.5(b);
(8) Well venting in the course of
downhole well maintenance and/or
liquids unloading performed in
compliance with § 3179.91;
(9) Leaks, when the operator has
complied with the LDAR requirements
in §§ 3179.100 and 3179.101;
(10) Facility and pipeline
maintenance, such as when an operator
must blow-down and depressurize
equipment to perform maintenance or
repairs;
(11) Pipeline capacity constraints,
midstream processing failures, or other
similar events that prevent oil-well gas
from being transported through the
connected pipeline, subject to the
limitations in the WMP or selfcertification for Applications for Permit
to Drill approved after June 10, 2024 or
§ 3179.70, as applicable;
(12) Flaring of gas from which at least
50 percent of natural gas liquids have
been removed on-lease and captured for
market, if the operator has notified the
BLM through a Sundry Notices and
Report on Wells, Form 3160–5 (Sundry
Notice) that the operator is conducting
such capture and the inlet of the
equipment used to remove the natural
gas liquids will be a Facility
Measurement Point (FMP); or
(13) Flaring of gas from a well that is
not connected to a gas pipeline, to the
extent that such flaring was authorized
by the BLM in the approval of the APD.
(c) Lost oil or gas that is not
‘‘unavoidably lost’’ as defined in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section is
‘‘avoidably lost.’’
§ 3179.42 When lost production is subject
to royalty.
(a) Royalty is due on all avoidably lost
oil or gas.
(b) Royalty is not due on any
unavoidably lost oil or gas.
§ 3179.43 Data submission and
notification requirements.
(a) Table 1 is a summary of the
Sundry Notice requirements in this
subpart.
TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (a)—NOTIFICATION VIA SUNDRY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Sundry notice requirements
Reference
Flaring of gas following removal of ≥50 percent of the natural gas liquids from the gas stream on-lease .........
Other gas sample location for flare approved by the AO .....................................................................................
Unavoidable/avoidable determination of loss of oil and/or gas while drilling for loss of well control event .........
Extension of time limit or volumetric limit for well completion or recompletion flaring, or exploratory coalbed
methane dewatering flaring.
Extension of time limit for well testing subsequent to initial completion ...............................................................
Within 45 days of start of an emergency, estimate the volume flared or vented beyond the first 48 hours of
the emergency.
Delay of leak repair beyond 30 calendar days with good cause ..........................................................................
(b) Table 2 summarizes the locations
in this subpart that require an operator
§ 3179.41(b)(12).
§ 3179.71(d)(3) and (e)(2).
§ 3179.80.
§ 3179.81(e).
§ 3179.82.
§ 3179.83(c).
§ 3179.101(b).
to provide information to the authorized
officer upon request.
TABLE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (b)—INFORMATION REQUIRED AT THE REQUEST OF THE AO
Information required at the request of the AO
Reference
Ultrasonic meter flare gas testing report ...............................................................................................................
Ultrasonic meter manufacturer’s specifications including installation and operation specifications .....................
Recordkeeping for vented or flared gas events ....................................................................................................
Recordkeeping for leak detection and repair ........................................................................................................
§ 3179.71(c)(2)(i).
§ 3179.71(c)(2)(ii).
§ 3179.72(c).
§ 3179.102(a).
(c) Table 3 summarizes the initial
LDAR program submission and
subsequent annual reporting.
TABLE 3 TO PARAGRAPH (c)—LDAR PROGRAM
Information required to be sent to the BLM State Office
Reference
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First submission of a leak detection and repair program to the BLM for review ..................................................
Annual review and update of the leak detection and repair program to the BLM ................................................
§ 3179.50
Safety.
(a) The operator must flare, rather
than vent, any gas that is not captured,
except when:
(1) Flaring the gas is technically
infeasible, such as when volumes are
too small to flare;
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(2) Under emergency conditions, the
loss of gas is uncontrollable, or venting
is necessary for safety;
(3) The gas is vented through normal
operation of a natural-gas-activated
pneumatic controller or pump;
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§ 3179.100(b) and (d).
§ 3179.100(e).
(4) The gas is vented from an oil
storage tank;
(5) The gas is vented during downhole
well maintenance or liquids unloading
activities performed in compliance with
§ 3179.91;
(6) The gas is vented through a leak;
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(7) Venting is necessary to allow nonroutine facility and pipeline
maintenance, such as when an operator
must, upon occasion, blow-down and
depressurize equipment to perform
maintenance or repairs; or
(8) A release of gas is necessary and
flaring is prohibited by Federal, State,
local, or Tribal law or regulation, or
enforceable permit term.
(b) All flares or combustion devices
must be equipped with an automatic
ignition system or an on-demand
ignition system. Upon discovery of a
flare that is venting instead of
combusting gas, the BLM may subject
the operator to an immediate assessment
of $1,000 per violation.
(c) The flare must be placed a
sufficient distance from the tanks’
containment area and any other
significant structures or objects so that
the flare does not create a safety hazard.
The prevailing wind direction must be
taken into consideration when locating
the flare.
§ 3179.60
Gas-well gas.
Gas-well gas may not be flared or
vented, except where it is unavoidably
lost pursuant to § 3179.41(b).
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§ 3179.70
Oil-well gas.
(a) Where oil-well gas must be flared
due to pipeline capacity constraints,
midstream processing failures, or other
similar events that prevent produced gas
from being transported through the
connected pipeline, the oil-well gas is
‘‘unavoidably lost’’ for the purposes of
43 CFR 3162.3–1(j), 43 CFR
3179.41(b)(11), and 3179.42, subject to
the following limits:
(1) Flaring of 0.08 Mcf per barrel of oil
produced per month between July 1,
2024 and July 1, 2025.
(2) The flaring limit of 0.07 Mcf per
barrel of oil produced per month will
begin on July 1, 2025.
(3) The flaring limit of 0.06 Mcf per
barrel of oil produced per month will
begin on July 1, 2026.
(4) The flaring limit of 0.05 Mcf per
barrel of oil produced per month will
begin on July 1, 2027, and remain at this
level.
(b) Where substantial volumes of oilwell gas are flared the BLM may order
the operator to curtail or shut-in
production as necessary to avoid the
undue waste of Federal or Indian gas.
The BLM will not issue a shut-in or
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curtailment order under this paragraph
unless the operator has reported flaring
in excess of 1 Mcf per barrel of oil
produced per month for 3 consecutive
months and the BLM confirms that
flaring is ongoing.
(c) If a BLM order under paragraph (b)
of this section would adversely affect
production of oil or gas from nonFederal and non-Indian mineral
interests (e.g., production allocated to a
mix of Federal, State, Indian, and
private leases under a unit agreement),
the BLM may issue such an order only
to the extent that the BLM is authorized
to regulate the rate of production under
the governing unit or communitization
agreement. In the absence of such
authorization, the BLM will contact the
State regulatory authority having
jurisdiction over the oil and gas
production from the non-Federal and
non-Indian interests and request that
that entity take appropriate action to
limit the waste of gas.
§ 3179.71 Measurement of flared oil-well
gas volume.
(a) The operator may commingle
flared gas from more than one lease,
unit PA, or CA to a common highpressure flare without BLM approval,
subject to the allocation requirement in
paragraph (h). The site facility diagram
required under § 3173.11 must indicate
that the high-pressure flare is a
common, commingled flare and list the
leases, unit PAs, or CAs contributing gas
to the common flare.
(b) The operator must measure flared
gas for high-pressure flares for volumes
greater than 1,050 Mcf per month above
the averaging period. For high-pressure
flares measuring less than or equal to
1,050 Mcf per month over the averaging
period and for low-pressure flares,
operators may estimate the volume
flared, as described in paragraph (h) of
this section.
(c) High-pressure flares requiring
measurement must use either orifice
plates and orifice meter tubes, or
ultrasonic meters. High-pressure flare
measurement systems must meet the
following requirements:
(1) Orifice metering systems must
comply with the low-volume
measurement requirements in § 3175.80,
low-volume electronic gas measurement
requirements in § 3175.100, and the
low-volume gas sampling and analysis
requirements in § 3175.110 with the gas
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25429
sampling location requirements
provided in paragraphs (d) or (e) of this
section.
(2) Ultrasonic metering systems must
comply with the following
requirements:
(i) Each ultrasonic meter make and
model must be tested for flare use. Flare
gas meter testing must be conducted and
reported pursuant to API 22.3
(incorporated by reference, see
§ 3179.30) and results must be made
available to the AO upon request.
(ii) Ultrasonic meters must be
installed and operated for flare use
according to the manufacturer’s
specifications and those specifications
must be provided to the AO upon
request.
(iii) Ultrasonic metering systems must
comply with the low-volume electronic
gas measurement requirements in
§ 3175.100, and the low-volume gas
sampling analysis requirements in
§ 3175.110, except for the gas sampling
requirements in (d) or (e) of this section.
(3) Operators must evaluate the
production facility to determine which
type of flare measurement is safe for the
facility.
(d) The gas sample must be taken
from one of the following locations
when the high-pressure flare is
measuring a single lease, unit PA, or
CA:
(1) At the flare meter;
(2) At the gas FMP, if there is a gas
FMP at the well site and the gas
composition is the same as that of the
flare-meter gas; or
(3) At another location approved by
the AO with a Sundry Notice
submission.
(e) The gas sample must be taken from
one of the following locations for a
common high-pressure flare that
measures more than one lease, unit PA,
or CA;
(1) At the flare meter; or
(2) At another location approved by
the AO with a Sundry Notice
submission.
(f) Appropriate meters must be
installed at all high-pressure flares
pursuant to paragraph (c), and gas
sampling must be taken from the
appropriate location pursuant to
paragraphs (d) or (e) according to the
following phase-in timeline:
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (f)—DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH HIGH-PRESSURE FLARE MEASUREMENT, AND GAS
SAMPLING LOCATION
Deadline for measurement compliance for
high-pressure flares and gas sampling location
Equation 1 to Paragraph (g)
6
~ Vg =
LVa
GORr
m=l
Where:
n = the total number of FMPs sending gas to
a common flare
VFi = The volume flared from the ith lease,
unit PA, or CA sent to a common flare
VFt = The total volume flared from a common
flare
NSVFMPi = The net standard volume of oil
from the FMP for the ith lease, unit PA,
or CA
(i) Measurement points for flared
volumes are not FMPs for the purposes
of subpart 3175.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES2
§ 3179.72 Required reporting and
recordkeeping of vented and flared gas
volumes.
(a) The operator must report all flared
volumes, both avoidable and
unavoidable losses, using all applicable
ONRR reporting requirements.
(b) The operator must report the flared
gas quality in Btu on the OGOR based
on the gas analysis required in
§ 3179.71(d) or (e). The operator must
report the same Btu content from a
common flare on the OGOR for all the
leases, unit PAs, or CAs contributing gas
to the flare based on the gas sample
analysis.
(c) Starting on September 10,
2024,operators must maintain the
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Equation 2 to Paragraph (g)
v1 -_ (V,op x GO Rr) - Vs
Where:
m = The previous 6 months of flaring
Vg = The total volume of gas produced from
oil wells in the previous 6 months as
reported on the OGOR
Vo = The total volume of oil produced from
oil wells in the previous 6 months as
reported on the OGOR
GORr = The gas-to-oil ratio for the previous
6 months of production as reported on
the OGOR
Vop = The total oil produced from oil wells
while flaring
following records and make them
available to the AO upon request:
(1) Date and time when oil or gas-well
flaring begins and ends, the reason for
flaring and whether the well, lease, unit
PA, or CA was shut-in or returned to
sales when the flaring stopped;
(2) Date and time when an emergency
begins and ends, the reason for the
emergency, whether the gas was vented
or flared, and whether the well, lease,
unit PA, or CA was shut-in or returned
to sales when the emergency ended;
(3) Date and time when manual
downhole liquids unloading operation
or well purging begins and ends, and
whether the well was shut-in or
returned to sales at the end of the well
maintenance.
§ 3179.73 Prior determinations regarding
royalty-free flaring.
(a) Approvals to flare royalty free,
which are in effect as of the effective
date of this rule, will continue in effect
until November 1, 2024. After that date,
the royalty-bearing status of all flaring
will be determined according to the
provisions of this subpart.
(b) The provisions of this subpart do
not affect any determination made by
the BLM before or after June 10, 2024
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Vs = The total gas volume produced and sent
through a gas FMP from oil wells while
flaring
Vf = The estimated gas flared from oil wells
to be reported on the OGOR
(h) If a flare is combusting gas that is
combined across multiple leases, unit
PAs, or CAs, the operator may measure
the gas at a single point at the flare and
allocate flared volumes based on the oil
production while flaring from each
lease, unit PA, or CA as follows:
Equation 3 to Paragraph (h)
[INSERT EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
FINAL RULE], with respect to the
royalty-bearing status of flaring that
occurred prior to June 10, 2024.
Flaring and Venting Gas During
Drilling and Production Operations
§ 3179.80
drilling.
Loss of well control while
If, during drilling, gas is lost as a
result of loss of well control, the
operator must notify the BLM within 24
hours of the start of the loss of the well
control event and submit to the BLM a
Sundry Notice within 15 days following
the conclusion of the event describing
the loss of well control. The BLM will
determine whether the loss of well
control was due to operator negligence.
Oil or gas lost as a result of loss of well
control is avoidably lost if the BLM
determines that the loss of well control
was due to operator negligence. The
BLM will notify the operator in writing
when it determines whether oil or gas
was lost due to operator negligence, and
whether such loss will qualify as an
avoidable loss.
E:\FR\FM\10APR2.SGM
10APR2
ER10AP24.008
(g) When the flared volume for a highpressure flare is less than or equal to
1,050 Mcf per month and for lowpressure flares, the flared volume may
be estimated, or measured. Estimated
flared gas volumes must be based on
production reported on the ONRR
OGORs over the previous 6 months and
calculated at follows:
December 10, 2024.
June 10, 2025.
December 10, 2025.
Not applicable.
ER10AP24.007
≥30,000 Mcf per month ...................................................................................................................
<30,000 Mcf per month and ≥6,000 Mcf per month .......................................................................
<6,000 Mcf per month and ≥1,050 Mcf per month .........................................................................
<1,050 Mcf per month .....................................................................................................................
ER10AP24.006
Flare flow category
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
§ 3179.81 Well completion or recompletion
flaring allowance.
(a) Gas flared following well
completion or recompletion is royaltyfree under §§ 3179.41(b)(2) and
3179.42(b) until one of the following
occurs:
(1) Thirty days have passed since the
beginning of the flowback following
completion or recompletion, except as
provided in paragraphs (b) and (d) of
this section;
(2) The operator has flared 20,000 Mcf
of gas; or
(3) Flowback has been routed to the
production separator.
(b) The BLM may extend the period
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section, not to exceed an additional 60
days, based on flowback delays caused
by well or equipment problems.
(c) The BLM may increase the limit
specified in paragraph (a)(2) of this
section by up to an additional 30,000
Mcf of gas for exploratory oil wells in
remote locations where additional
flaring may be needed in advance of
construction of pipeline infrastructure.
(d) During the dewatering and initial
evaluation of an exploratory coalbed
methane well, the 30-day period
specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section is extended to 90 days. The BLM
may approve up to two extensions of
this evaluation period, not to exceed 90
days per each approval.
(e) The operator must submit its
request for an extension under
paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of this section
using a Sundry Notice.
§ 3179.82 Subsequent well tests for an
existing completion.
During well tests subsequent to the
initial completion or recompletion, the
operator may flare gas royalty free under
§ 3179.41(b)(3) for no more than 24
hours, unless the BLM approves or
requires a longer period. The operator
must submit any such request using a
Sundry Notice.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES2
§ 3179.83
Emergencies.
(a) An operator may flare or, if flaring
is not feasible due to the emergency
situation, vent gas royalty-free under
§ 3179.41(b)(5) for no longer than 48
hours during an emergency situation.
For purposes of this subpart, an
‘‘emergency situation’’ is a temporary,
infrequent, and unavoidable situation in
which the loss of gas is necessary to
avoid a danger to human health, safety,
or the environment.
(b) The following examples do not
constitute emergency situations for the
purposes of royalty assessment:
(1) Recurring failures of a single piece
of equipment;
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(2) The operator’s failure to install
appropriate equipment of a sufficient
capacity to accommodate the
production conditions;
(3) Failure to limit production when
the production rate exceeds the capacity
of the related equipment, pipeline, or
gas plant, or exceeds sales contract
volumes of oil or gas;
(4) Scheduled maintenance; or
(5) A situation caused by operator
negligence.
(c) Within 45 days of the start of the
emergency, the operator must estimate
and report to the AO by a Sundry Notice
the volumes flared or vented beyond the
timeframe specified in paragraph (a) of
this section, and details describing the
emergency event, measures taken to
prevent the emergency event, and
actions taken to control the emergency
event so that the BLM is able to
determine if the loss of oil or gas is an
unavoidable loss pursuant to § 3179.41.
Gas Flared or Vented From Equipment
and During Well Maintenance
Operations
§ 3179.90
Oil storage tank vapors.
(a) The hatch on an oil storage tank
may be open only to the extent
necessary to conduct production and
measurement operations. All oil storage
tanks, hatches, connections, and other
access points must be vapor tight (i.e.,
capable of holding pressure differential
at the installed pressure-relieving or
vapor-recovery device’s settings). Upon
discovery of an oil storage tank hatch
that has been left open or unlatched,
and unattended, the BLM will impose
an immediate assessment of $1,000 on
the operator.
(b) Where practical and safe, gas
released from an oil storage tank must
be flared rather than vented. An
operator may commingle vapors from
multiple storage tanks to a single flare
without prior approval from the BLM.
§ 3179.91 Downhole well maintenance and
liquids unloading.
(a) Gas vented or flared during
downhole well maintenance and well
purging is royalty free for a period not
to exceed 24 hours per event, provided
that the requirements of paragraphs (b)
through (d) of this section are met. Gas
vented or flared from a plunger lift
system and/or an automated well
control system is royalty free, provided
the requirements of paragraphs (b) and
(c) of this section are met.
(b) The operator must minimize the
loss of gas associated with downhole
well maintenance and liquids
unloading, consistent with safe
operations.
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25431
(c) For wells equipped with a plunger
lift system and/or an automated well
control system, minimizing gas loss
under paragraph (b) of this section
includes optimizing the operation of the
system to minimize gas losses to the
extent possible, consistent with
removing liquids that would inhibit
proper function of the well.
(d) For any liquids unloading by
manual well purging, the operator must
ensure that the person conducting the
well purging remains present on-site
throughout the unloading to end it as
soon as practical, thereby minimizing
any venting to the atmosphere.
(e) For purposes of this section, ‘‘well
purging’’ means blowing accumulated
liquids out of a wellbore by reservoir
pressure, whether manually or by an
automatic control system that relies on
real-time pressure or flow, timers, or
other well data, where the gas is vented
to the atmosphere. Well purging does
not apply to wells equipped with a
plunger lift system.
§ 3179.92
Size of production equipment.
Production and processing equipment
must be of sufficient size to
accommodate the volumes of
production expected to occur at the
lease site.
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR)
§ 3179.100
program.
Leak detection and repair
(a) Pursuant to paragraph (b) of this
section, the operator must maintain a
BLM administrative statewide LDAR
program designed to prevent the waste
of Federal or Indian gas.
(b) Operators must submit a statewide
LDAR program to the BLM state office
with jurisdiction over the production for
review. The LDAR program must cover
operations and production equipment
located on a Federal or Indian oil and
gas lease and not operations and
production equipment located on State
or private tracts, even though those
tracts are committed to a federally
approved unit PA or CA. When there is
a change of operator, the new operator
must update the LDAR program on the
annual update and revision timeline.
Operators must submit the LDAR
program in writing for review until such
time as the BLM’s electronic filing
system is capable of receiving LDAR
program submissions. At minimum, the
LDAR program must contain the
following information, as applicable:
(1) Identification of the leases, unit
PAs, and CAs by geographic State for all
States within BLM’s administrative
State boundaries to which the LDAR
program applies;
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
(2) Identification of the method and
frequency of leak detection inspection
used at the lease, unit PA, or CA.
Acceptable methods, as well as other
methods approved by the BLM, and
frequency include the following:
(i) Well pads with only wellheads and
no production equipment or storage
must include quarterly AVO inspections
for leak detection;
(ii) Well pads with any production
and processing equipment and oil
storage must include AVO inspections
every other month and quarterly optical
gas imaging for leak detection; and
(iii) Other leak detection inspection
methods and frequency acceptable to
the BLM (e.g., continuous monitoring).
(3) Identification of the operator’s
recordkeeping process for leak detection
and repair pursuant to § 3179.102.
(c) The BLM will review the
operator’s LDAR program and notify the
operator if the BLM deems the program
to be inadequate. The notification will
explain the basis for the BLM’s
determination, identify the plan’s
inadequacies, describe any additional
measures that could address the
inadequacies, and provide a reasonable
time frame in which the operator must
submit a revised LDAR program to the
BLM for review.
(d) For leases in effect on June 10,
2024, the operator must submit a
statewide LDAR program to the state
office no later than December 10, 2025.
(e) Operators must review and update
submitted LDAR programs on an annual
basis in the month in which the
operator submitted the first LDAR
program to ensure that the identified
leases, unit PAs, and CAs, leak
detection methods, and frequency of
inspections are current. If the operator’s
LDAR program requires no changes,
then the operator must notify the BLM
state office that the LDAR program
submitted and reviewed by the BLM
remains in effect. Any updates to the
LDAR program must be submitted in
writing to the BLM state office for
review until such time as the BLM’s
electronic system is capable of receiving
the annual LDAR updates.
§ 3179.101
Repairing leaks.
(a) The operator must repair any leak
as soon as practicable, and in no event
later than 30 calendar days after
discovery, unless good cause exists to
delay the repair for a longer period.
Good cause for delay of repair exists if
the repair (including replacement) is
technically infeasible (including
unavailability of parts that have been
ordered), would require a pipeline
blowdown, a compressor station
shutdown, or a well shut-in, or would
be unsafe to conduct during operation of
the unit.
(b) If there is good cause for delaying
the repair beyond 30 calendar days, the
operator must notify the BLM of the
cause by Sundry Notice and must
complete the repair at the earliest
opportunity, such as during the next
compressor station shutdown, well
shut-in, or pipeline blowdown. In no
case will the BLM approve a delay of
more than 2 years.
(c) Not later than 30 calendar days
after completion of a repair, the operator
must verify the effectiveness of the
repair by conducting a follow-up
inspection using an appropriate
instrument or a soap bubble test under
Section 8.3.3 of EPA Method 21—
Determination of Volatile Organic
Compound Leaks (40 CFR Appendix A–
7 to part 60).
(d) If the repair is not effective, the
operator must complete additional
repairs within 15 calendar days and
conduct follow-up inspections and
repairs until the leak is repaired.
§ 3179.102 Required recordkeeping for
leak detection and repair.
(a) The operator must maintain the
following records for the period
required under 43 CFR 3162.4–1(d) and
make them available to the AO upon
request:
(1) For each inspection required
under § 3179.100 of this subpart,
documentation of:
(i) The date of the inspection; and
(ii) The site where the inspection was
conducted;
(2) The monitoring method(s) used to
determine the presence of leaks;
(3) A list of leak components on
which leaks were found;
(4) The date each leak was repaired;
and
(5) The date and result of the followup inspection(s) required under
§ 3179.101(c).
(b) With the annual review and
update of the LDAR program under
§ 3179.100(e) the operator must provide
to the BLM state office an annual
summary report on the previous year’s
inspection activities that includes:
(1) The number of sites inspected;
(2) The total number of leaks
identified, categorized by the type of
component;
(3) The total number of leaks that
were not repaired from the previous
LDAR program year due to good cause
and an estimated date of repair for each
leak.
(c) AVO checks are not required to be
documented unless they find a leak
requiring repair.
Immediate Assessments
§ 3179.200
Immediate assessments
Certain instances of noncompliance
warrant the imposition of immediate
assessments upon the violation, as
prescribed in the following table.
Imposition of any of these assessments
does not preclude other appropriate
enforcement actions under other
applicable regulations.
TABLE 1 TO § 3179.200—VIOLATIONS SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT
Assessment amount
per violation:
Violation:
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES2
1. Flare is not combusting gas sent to flare. As required in § 3179.50(b) ................................................................................
2. Storage tank hatch is open or unlatched, and unattended in violation of § 3179.90 ...........................................................
This action by the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary is taken pursuant to
an existing delegation of authority.
Steven H. Feldgus,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land
and Minerals Management.
[FR Doc. 2024–06827 Filed 4–9–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4331–29–P
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10APR2
$1,000
1,000
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 70 (Wednesday, April 10, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 25378-25432]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-06827]
[[Page 25377]]
Vol. 89
Wednesday,
No. 70
April 10, 2024
Part III
Department of the Interior
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bureau of Land Management
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43 CFR Parts 3160 and 3170
Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 70 / Wednesday, April 10, 2024 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 25378]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Land Management
43 CFR Parts 3160 and 3170
[BLM_HQ_FRN_MO4500174370]
RIN 1004-AE79
Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation
AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: On November 30, 2022, the Department of the Interior, through
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), published in the Federal Register
a proposed rule entitled ``Waste Prevention, Production Subject to
Royalties, and Resource Conservation.'' This final rule aims to reduce
the waste of natural gas from venting, flaring, and leaks during oil
and gas production activities on Federal and Indian leases. The final
rule also ensures that, when Federal or Indian gas is wasted, the
public and Indian mineral owners are compensated for that wasted gas
through royalty payments. This final rule will be codified in the Code
of Federal Regulations and will replace the BLM's current requirements
governing venting and flaring, which are more than four decades old.
DATES: The final rule is effective on June 10, 2024. The incorporation
by reference of certain material listed in this rule is approved by the
Director of the Federal Register as of June 10, 2024.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Yvette M. Fields, Division Chief,
Fluid Minerals Division, telephone: 240-712-8358, email:
[email protected], or by mail to Bureau of Land Management, 1849 C St.
NW, Room 5633, Washington, DC 20240, for information regarding the
substance of this final rule.
Individuals in the United States who are deaf, deafblind, hard of
hearing, or have a speech disability may dial 711 (TTY, TDD, or
TeleBraille) to access telecommunications relay services. Individuals
outside the United States should use the relay services offered within
their country to make international calls to the point-of-contact in
the United States. For a summary of the final rule, please see the
final rule summary document in docket BLM-2022-0003 on
www.regulations.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. List of Acronyms
II. Executive Summary
III. Background
IV. Discussion of Public Comments on the Proposed Rule
V. Section-by-Section Discussion
VI. Procedural Matters
I. List of Acronyms
AO = Authorized Officer
APD = Application for Permit to Drill
API = American Petroleum Institute
AVO = Audio, visual, and olfactory
BLM = Bureau of Land Management
CA = Communitization Agreement
CAA = Clean Air Act
CFR = Code of Federal Regulations
EA = Environmental Assessment
EPA = Environment Protection Agency
FLPMA = Federal Land Policy and Management Act
FMP = Facility measurement point
FOGRMA = Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act
GAO = Government Accountability Office
GOR = Gas-to-oil ratio
IMDA = Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982
IRA = Inflation Reduction Act of 2022
LDAR = Leak detection and repair
Mcf = thousand cubic feet at standard conditions
MLA = Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended
NTL = Notice to Lessees
NTL-4A = Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and
Indian Oil and Gas Leases: Royalty or Compensation for Oil and Gas
Lost
OGI = Optical gas imaging
OGOR = Oil and Gas Operations Report
ONRR = Office of Natural Resources Revenue
RIA = Regulatory Impact Analysis
Unit PA = Unit participating area
WMP = Waste Minimization Plan
II. Executive Summary
On November 30, 2022, the Department of the Interior (DOI or
``Department''), through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), published
in the Federal Register a proposed rule entitled, Waste Prevention,
Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation. 87 FR 73588
(Nov. 30, 2022). The BLM has considered the public comments received on
the proposed rule to develop this final rule.
This final rule aims to reduce the waste of natural gas from oil
and gas leases administered by the BLM. This gas is lost during oil and
gas exploration and production activities through venting, flaring, and
leaks. Venting is the intentional release of gas into the atmosphere
during operations, such as liquids unloading. Gas that is combusted in
a controlled manner is flared gas. Leaks are the unintentional release
of gas into the atmosphere from production equipment. Although some
losses of gas may be unavoidable, Federal law requires that operators
take reasonable steps to prevent the waste of gas through venting,
flaring and leaks. The final rule describes the reasonable steps that
operators of Federal and Indian oil and gas leases must take to avoid
the waste of natural gas. The final rule also ensures that, when
Federal or Indian gas is avoidably wasted, the public and Indian
mineral owners are compensated for the wasted gas through royalty
payments.
The BLM administers a Federal onshore oil and gas leasing program
pursuant to the requirements of various statutes, including the Mineral
Leasing Act (MLA), the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act
(FOGRMA), the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) Public Law 117-169,
and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The MLA
requires lessees to ``use all reasonable precautions to prevent waste
of oil or gas developed in the land,'' \1\ and further requires oil and
gas lessees to observe ``such rules . . . for the prevention of undue
waste as may be prescribed by [the] Secretary . . . .'' \2\ Under
FOGRMA, oil and gas lessees are liable for royalty payments on gas
wasted from the lease site.\3\ In addition, as discussed further below,
the IRA provides that, for leases issued after August 16, 2022,
royalties are owed on all gas produced from Federal land, subject to
certain exceptions for gas that is lost during emergency situations,
used for the benefit of lease operations, or ``unavoidably lost.''
FLPMA authorizes the BLM to ``regulate'' the ``use, occupancy, and
development'' of the public lands via ``published rules,'' while
mandating that the Secretary, ``[i]n managing the public lands . . .
shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.'' \4\ The BLM also
regulates oil and gas operations on trust and restricted fee lands
pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. 396a et seq.; the
Act of March 3, 1909, 25 U.S.C. 396; and the Indian Mineral Development
Act (IMDA), 25 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 30 U.S.C. 225.
\2\ 30 U.S.C. 187.
\3\ 30 U.S.C. 1756.
\4\ 43 U.S.C. 1732(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to managing the leasing and production of oil and gas
from Federal lands, the BLM also oversees operations on many Indian and
Tribal oil and gas leases pursuant to a delegation of authority from
the Secretary of the Interior.\5\ The Secretary's management and
regulation of Indian mineral interests carries with
[[Page 25379]]
it the duty to act as a trustee for the benefit of the Indian mineral
owners.
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\5\ Department of the Interior, Departmental Manual, 235 DM
1.1K.
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This final rule replaces the BLM's current requirements governing
natural gas venting and flaring, which are contained in Notice to
Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases:
Royalty or Compensation for Oil and Gas Lost (NTL-4A).\6\ NTL-4A was
issued more than 40 years ago, and its policies and requirements are
outdated. To begin, NTL-4A is ill-suited to address the large volume of
flaring associated with the rapid development of unconventional
``tight'' oil and gas resources that has occurred in recent years. In
addition, NTL-4A does not account for technological and operational
advancements that can reduce losses of gas from oil storage tanks and
equipment leaks.
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\6\ 44 FR 76600 (Dec. 27, 1979).
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In 2016, the BLM issued a final rule replacing NTL-4A with new
regulations intended to reduce the waste of gas from venting, flaring,
and leaks.\7\ That rule was challenged in Federal court, and the BLM
never fully implemented the rule due to the resulting litigation.\8\ In
September 2018, the BLM issued a final rule effectively rescinding the
2016 Rule, and that rule was itself challenged in court.\9\ Eventually,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California vacated the 2018 rescission of the 2016 Rule on various
grounds, including what the Court determined was the rule's failure to
meet the BLM's statutory mandate to prevent waste.\10\ The U.S.
District Court for the District of Wyoming then vacated the 2016 Rule
on the grounds that, among other things: (1) the MLA's ``delegation of
authority does not allow and was not intended to authorize the
enactment of rules justified primarily upon the ancillary benefit of a
reduction in air pollution''; and (2) ``BLM acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in failing to fully assess the impacts of the [2016 Rule]
on marginal wells, failing to adequately explain and support the [2016
Rule's] capture requirements, and failing to separately consider the
domestic costs and benefits of the [2016 Rule].'' \11\ The result of
these rulemakings and court decisions is that NTL-4A continues to
govern venting and flaring from BLM-managed oil and gas leases.
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\7\ 81 FR 83008 (Nov. 18, 2016).
\8\ See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d
1046, 1052-1057 (D. Wyo. 2020) (hereinafter, Wyoming court).
\9\ 83 FR 49184 (Sept. 28, 2018).
\10\ California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573 (N.D. Cal.
2020).
\11\ See Wyoming court at 1086-87.
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Based on the lessons of prior rulemakings and court decisions, the
BLM concludes that this final rule will reduce the waste of natural gas
through improved regulatory requirements pertaining to venting,
flaring, and leaks, as well as improve upon NTL-4A in a variety of
significant ways while eschewing elements of the 2016 Rule criticized
by the District Court.
In brief, the primary components of this final rule are as follows:
The final rule better implements the statutory requirement
that the ``lessee will . . . use all reasonable precautions to prevent
the waste of oil or gas developed in the land,'' \12\ consistent with
the BLM's authority to issue rules implementing that statutory
requirement.\13\ The final rule requires operators to take reasonable
measures to prevent waste as conditions of approval of an Application
for Permit to Drill (APD). Then, after an APD is approved, the BLM may
order an operator to implement, within a reasonable amount of time,
additional reasonable measures to prevent waste at ongoing exploration
and production operations. Reasonable measures to prevent waste may
reflect factors including, but not limited to, advances in technology
and changes in industry practice.
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\12\ 30 U.S.C. 225.
\13\ See 30 U.S.C. 187.
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The final rule requires operators to submit either a Waste
Minimization Plan (WMP) or a self-certification statement as one of
five required attachments to their oil well applications for permit to
drill.\14\ The WMP will provide the BLM with the following information:
anticipated oil and associated-gas production and anticipated 3-year
decline curves; certification that the operator has an executed, valid
gas sales contract; and any other steps the operator commits to take to
reduce or eliminate gas losses.
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\14\ See Sec. 3162.3-1(d).
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In lieu of a waste-minimization plan, the operator may choose to
provide a self-certification statement. That statement would commit the
operator to capturing 100 percent of the associated gas produced from
an oil well and would obligate the operator to pay royalties on all
lost gas except for gas lost through emergencies. With the addition of
this new requirement to file a WMP or the described self-certification
statement for oil-well APDs, operators must now provide five
attachments with their completed Form 3160-3, including existing
requirements for a drilling plan, a surface use plan of operations, and
evidence of bond coverage. All five attachments must be
administratively and technically complete before the BLM approves the
APD. If the application is not complete, the BLM will defer action on
the APD, and the operator will have an opportunity to address BLM-
identified deficiencies. In the case of a WMP or self-certification
statement, the operator must address the identified deficiencies within
2 years of receiving notification from the BLM of the deficiencies or
the BLM may disapprove the application.
The final rule recognizes the IRA's provision that
royalties are not owed on gas that is ``unavoidably lost''. The final
rule clarifies which lost oil or gas will qualify as ``unavoidably
lost'': lost oil or gas will qualify as ``unavoidably lost'' if, as
stated in the final rule at Sec. 3179.41, the operator has taken
reasonable steps to avoid waste; the operator has complied fully with
applicable laws, lease terms, regulations, provisions of a previously
approved operating plan, and other written orders of the BLM; and the
loss is within the applicable time or volume limits. The final rule
provides for several circumstances in which lost oil or gas will be
considered ``unavoidably lost,'' including during well completions,
production testing, and emergencies. The final rule also establishes a
volumetric threshold based on oil production on royalty-free flaring
due to pipeline capacity constraints, midstream processing failures, or
other similar events that may prevent produced gas from being
transported to market. The volumetric threshold is based on the total
volume of gas flared in a month divided by the total net volume of oil
produced in a month for each lease, unit PA, or CA. If an operator were
to exceed the avoidable loss threshold, then royalties are due on the
amount flared beyond the threshold.
The final rule includes specific affirmative obligations
that operators must take to avoid wasting oil or gas. In particular:
The final rule requires operators on Federal or Indian leases to
maintain a leak detection and repair (LDAR) program designed to prevent
the waste of Federal or Indian gas. An operator's LDAR program must
provide for regular inspections of all oil and gas production,
processing, treatment, storage, and measurement equipment on the lease
site.
The requirements of this final rule are explained in detail in
sections III and IV that follow.
As detailed in the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) prepared for
this final rule, the BLM estimates that this rule will have the
following economic impacts:
[[Page 25380]]
Costs to industry of around $19.3 million per year
(annualized at 7 percent);
Benefits to industry in recovered gas of $1.8 million per
year (annualized at 7 percent);
Increases in royalty revenues from recovered and flared
gas of $51 million per year; and
Ancillary effects society of $17.9 million per year from
reduced greenhouse gas emissions (using a 3 percent discount rate).
III. Background
A. Waste of Natural Gas During the Development of Federal and Indian
Oil and Gas Resources
The BLM is responsible for managing more than 245 million surface
acres of land and 700 million acres of subsurface mineral estate. The
BLM maintains a program for leasing these lands for oil and gas
development and regulates oil and gas production operations on Federal
leases. While the BLM does not manage the leasing of Indian and Tribal
lands for oil and gas production, the BLM does regulate oil and gas
operations on many Indian and Tribal leases as part of its Tribal trust
responsibilities.
The BLM's onshore oil and gas management program is a significant
contributor to the Nation's oil and gas production. Domestic production
from 88,887 Federal onshore oil and gas wells \15\ accounts for
approximately 8 percent of the Nation's natural gas supply and 9
percent of its oil.\16\ In Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, operators produced
473 million barrels of oil and 3.65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
from onshore Federal and Indian oil and gas leases. The production of
this oil and gas generated more than $4.2 billion in royalties.
Approximately $3.2 billion of these royalties were shared between the
United States and the States in which the production occurred.
Approximately $1 billion of these royalties went directly to Tribes and
Indian allottees for production from Indian lands.\17\
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\15\ BLM Public Lands Statistics, Table 9 (FY 2021 data),
available at https://www.blm.gov/programs-energy-and-minerals-oil-and-gas-oil-and-gas-statistics.
\16\ Bureau of Land Management Budget Justifications and
Performance Information Fiscal Year 2023, p. V-79, available at
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/fy2023-blm-greenbook.pdf.
\17\ Production and revenue number derived from data maintained
by the Office of Natural Resources Revenue at https://revenuedata.doi.gov/.
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In recent years, the United States has experienced a significant
increase in oil and natural gas production due to technological
advances, such as hydraulic fracturing combined with directional
drilling. This increase in production has been accompanied by a
significant waste of natural gas through venting and flaring. During
oil and gas operations it is sometimes necessary to vent gas (the
intentional release of natural gas into the atmosphere) or to flare gas
(the combustion of unsold gas). As the following graph illustrates, the
amount of venting and flaring from Federal and Indian leases has
increased dramatically from the 1990s to the 2010s, and the upward
trend in flaring suggests that it will continue to be a problem.
Between 1990 and 2000, the total venting and flaring reported by
Federal and Indian onshore lessees averaged approximately 11 billion
cubic feet (Bcf) per year. Between 2010 and 2020, in contrast, the
total venting and flaring reported by Federal and Indian onshore
lessees averaged approximately 44.2 Bcf per year.\18\
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\18\ The BLM analysis of ONRR Oil and Gas Operations Report part
B (OGOR-B) data provided for 1990-2000 and 2010-2020. All venting
and flaring data is nationwide and does not separate Federal and
Indian data. For certain data points, separating Federal and Indian
data would require a manual review of thousands of venting and
flaring sundry notices since the BLM does not have a database that
tracks this distinction.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.000
Assuming a $3 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) price of gas,\19\ the
Federal and Indian gas that was vented and flared from 2010 to 2020
would be valued at $1.46 billion. The BLM notes that vented and flared
volumes have not
[[Page 25381]]
increased linearly with production: according to data maintained by the
Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR), the average volume of
vented and flared gas as a percentage of total gas production was 0.42
percent from 1990 to 2000; from 2010 to 2020, however, vented and
flared gas averaged 1.07 percent of total gas production. This metric
reflects a 157 percent increase in the waste of gas during oil and gas
production from Federal and Indian lands. Furthermore, the average
amount of vented and flared gas (in Mcf) per barrel (bbl) of oil
production was 0.0815 Mcf/bbl from 1990 to 2000, while it rose to
0.1642 Mcf/bbl from 2010 to 2020 \20\--a 102 percent increase in the
waste of gas per barrel of oil produced. Together, these trends
demonstrate that the requirements established by NTL-4A are ineffective
at limiting the amount of gas that is vented or flared from Federal and
Indian lands.
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\19\ The average annual Henry Hub spot price for natural gas
from 2010 through 2020 was $3.19. U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price, available at
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhda.htm.
\20\ In the proposed rule, the BLM erroneously stated that the
average amount of vented and flared gas in thousands of cubic feet
(Mcf) per barrel (bbl) of oil production was 0.8148 Mcf/bbl from
1990 to 2000, which rose to 1.6418 Mcf/bbl from 2010 to 2020. The
correct average amounts are 0.08148 Mcf/bbl of vented and flared gas
from 1990 to 2000, which rose to 0.16418 Mcf/bbl from 2010 to 2020.
The accompanying graph, which appeared in the proposed and final
rules, is accurate and remains unchanged. Accordingly, the BLM is
revising the cited average amounts to reflect the information
provided in the accompanying graph.
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BILLING CODE 4331-29-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.002
[[Page 25382]]
BILLING CODE 4331-29-C
Recent studies have identified three other major sources of gas
losses during the oil and gas production process: emissions from
natural-gas-activated pneumatic equipment, venting from oil storage
tanks, and equipment leaks.\21\ The EPA estimates that, nationwide,
36.2 Bcf of methane was emitted from pneumatic controllers and 4.9 Bcf
of methane was emitted from equipment leaks at upstream oil and gas
production sites in the United States in 2019.\22\ The BLM estimates
that 13 Bcf of natural gas was lost from pneumatic devices on Federal
and Indian lands in 2019. The BLM estimates that an additional 0.86 Bcf
of gas was lost due to equipment leaks from Federal natural gas
production operations not subject at the time to State or EPA (LDAR)
requirements. Notably, leakage appears to be exacerbated in areas where
there is insufficient infrastructure for natural gas gathering,
processing, and transportation \23\--a known issue in basins such as
the Permian and Bakken, where substantial BLM-managed oil and gas
production occurs. Finally, the BLM estimates that 17.9 Bcf of natural
gas was emitted from storage tanks on Federal and Indian lands in 2019.
Losses from pneumatic equipment, leaks, and storage tanks would be
valued at $53.7 million dollars (at $3/Mcf) in 2019.
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\21\ Alvarez, et al., ``Assessment of methane emissions from the
U.S. oil and gas supply chain,'' Science 361 (2018); see also 81 FR
83008, 83015-17 (Nov. 18, 2016).
\22\ EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2019 at 3-73 (2019).
\23\ Zhang, et al., ``Quantifying methane emissions from the
largest oil-producing basin in the United States from space,''
Science Advances 6 (2020).
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Apart from undue waste, excessive venting, flaring, and leaks by
Federal oil and gas lessees also impose three additional harms. First,
vented or leaked gas wastes valuable publicly or Indian owned resources
that could be put to productive use, and deprives American taxpayers,
Tribes, and States of substantial royalty revenues. Second, the wasted
gas may harm local communities and surrounding areas through visual and
noise impacts from flaring. And third, vented or leaked gas also
contributes to climate change, because the primary constituent of
natural gas is methane, an especially powerful greenhouse gas, with
climate impacts roughly 28 to 36 times those of carbon dioxide
(CO2), if measured over a 100-year period, or 84 times those
of CO2 if measured over a 20-year period.\24\ Thus,
regulatory measures that encourage operators to conserve gas and avoid
waste could, as a purely incidental matter, have ancillary effects on
public health and the environment.\25\
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\24\ See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Chapter 8, Anthropogenic
and Natural Radiative Forcing, at 714 (Table 8.7), available at
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_Chapter08_FINAL.pdf.
\25\ The BLM notes that the BLM did not rely on such ancillary
effects in developing this final rule. Rather, with the exception of
the safety provisions in Sec. 3179.50 (which also promotes worker
health), the requirements of this final rule are independently
justified as reasonable measures to prevent waste that would be
expected, regardless of ancillary effects on public health or the
environment.
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Both the MLA and IRA distinguish an avoidable loss from an
unavoidable loss. Indeed, some amount of venting and flaring is
unavoidable and expected to occur during oil and gas exploration and
production operations. For example, an operator may need to flare gas
on a short-term basis as part of drilling operations, well completion,
or production testing, among other situations. Longer-term flaring may
occur in exceptional circumstances, which might include the drilling of
and production from an exploratory well in a new field, where gas
pipelines have not yet been built due to a lack of information
regarding expected gas production.\26\ In some fields, the overall
quantity of gas produced may be so small that the development of gas-
pipeline infrastructure may not be economically justified.
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\26\ The BLM notes that, even in such exceptional circumstances,
operators should be expected to take measures to avoid excessive
flaring and this proposed rule would place limitations on royalty-
free flaring from exploratory wells.
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Although some venting or flaring may be unavoidable (and thus not
waste) under some circumstances, operators have an affirmative
obligation under Federal law to use reasonable precautions to prevent
the waste of oil or gas developed from a lease. As other technologies
and practices on oil and gas operations have evolved (as evidenced by
changes in State and Federal regulations, and in industry best
practices), so too measures that are considered reasonable to prevent
waste should progress over time with advances in technology and changes
in industry practice.
Further, operators' immediate economic interests may not always be
served by minimizing the loss of natural gas, and BLM regulation is
necessary to discourage operators from venting or flaring more gas than
is operationally necessary. A prime example is the flaring of oil-well
gas due to pipeline capacity constraints. Oil wells in certain fields
are known to produce relatively large volumes of associated natural
gas. Accordingly, natural-gas-capture infrastructure--including
pipelines--has been built out in those fields, and the BLM expects
operators to sell the associated gas they produce. However, it is not
uncommon for the rate of oil-well development to outpace the capacity
of the related gas-capture infrastructure. When the existing gas-
capture infrastructure is overwhelmed, an operator is faced with a
choice: flare the associated gas in order to continue oil production
unabated or curtail oil production in order to conserve the associated
gas. Absent clear requirements in NTL-4A as to whether a specific
operational circumstance is an avoidable or unavoidable loss, an
operator might conclude that the BLM would not make any avoidable loss
determination if the operator were to flare, and thus waste associated
gas to continue oil production--maximizing the operators' short-term
profits by providing immediate revenue from oil production, even
accounting for the loss of gas revenue. But the latter course of action
may often best serve the public's interest by maximizing overall energy
production (considering both production streams rather than producing
oil and flaring gas) and royalty revenues.
Likewise, maximizing the recovery of gas by regularly inspecting
for leaks may not always maximize the operator's profits. It is in
these circumstances--where an operator's interest in maximizing short-
term profits diverges from the public's interest in maximizing resource
recovery--that BLM regulation is necessary and appropriate to ensure
that operators take reasonable measures to prevent waste, as required
by statute.
B. Legal Authority
Pursuant to a delegation of Secretarial authority, the BLM is
authorized to regulate oil and gas exploration and production
activities on Federal and Indian lands under a variety of statutes,
including the MLA, the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, the IRA,
FOGRMA, the FLPMA, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, the IMDA,
and the Act of March 3, 1909.\27\ These statutes authorize the
Secretary of the Interior to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the statutes' various purposes.\28\
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\27\ Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. 188-287; Mineral Leasing Act
for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. 351-360; Federal Oil and Gas Royalty
Management Act, 30 U.S.C. 1701-1758; Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1701-1785; Indian Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. 396a-g; Indian Mineral Development Act of
1982, 25 U.S.C. 2101-2108; Act of March 3, 1909, 25 U.S.C. 396.
\28\ 30 U.S.C. 189 (MLA); 30 U.S.C. 359 (MLAAL); 30 U.S.C.
1751(a) (FOGRMA); 43 U.S.C. 1740 (FLPMA); 25 U.S.C. 396d (IMLA); 25
U.S.C. 2107 (IMDA); 25 U.S.C. 396.
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[[Page 25383]]
7. Authority Regarding the Waste of Natural Gas
The MLA rests on the fundamental principle that the public should
benefit from mineral production on public lands.\29\ An important means
of ensuring that the public benefits from mineral production on public
lands is minimizing and deterring the waste of oil and gas produced
from the Federal mineral estate. To this end, the MLA requires that all
oil and gas lessees be subject to the condition that lessees ``use all
reasonable precautions to prevent waste of oil or gas developed in the
land . . . .'' \30\ The MLA requires oil and gas lessees to exercise
``reasonable diligence, skill, and care'' in their operations and to
observe ``such rules . . . for the prevention of undue waste as may be
prescribed by [the] Secretary.'' \31\ Lessees are not only responsible
for taking measures to prevent waste, but also for making royalty
payments on wasted oil and gas when waste occurs, in accordance with
the MLA's assessment of royalties on all ``production removed or sold
from the lease.'' \32\ Furthermore, FOGRMA expressly makes lessees
``liable for royalty payments on oil or gas lost or wasted from a lease
site when such loss or waste is due to negligence on the part of the
operator of the lease, or due to the failure to comply with any rule or
regulation, order or citation issued under [FOGRMA] or any mineral
leasing law.'' \33\
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\29\ See, e.g., California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C.
Cir. 1961) (noting that the MLA was ``intended to promote wise
development of . . . natural resources and to obtain for the public
a reasonable financial return on assets that `belong' to the
public'').
\30\ 30 U.S.C. 225.
\31\ 30 U.S.C. 187.
\32\ 30 U.S.C. 226(b)(1)(A).
\33\ 30 U.S.C. 1756.
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In addition, on August 16, 2022, President Biden signed the IRA
into law. Section 50263 of the IRA, which is entitled ``Royalties on
All Extracted Methane,'' provides that, for leases issued after August
16, 2022, royalties are owed on all gas produced from Federal land,
including gas that is consumed or lost by venting, flaring, or
negligent releases through any equipment during upstream operations.
This section further provides three exceptions to the general
obligation to pay royalties on produced gas, namely on: ``(1) gas
vented or flared for not longer than 48 hours in an emergency situation
that poses a danger to human health, safety, or the environment; (2)
gas used or consumed within the area of the lease, unit, or
communitized area for the benefit of the lease, unit, or communitized
area; or, (3) gas that is unavoidably lost.'' \34\
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\34\ 30 U.S.C. 1727.
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The BLM's authority to regulate the waste of Federal oil and gas is
not limited to operations that occur on Federal lands, but also extends
to operations on non-Federal lands where Federal oil and gas is
produced under a unit or communitization agreement (CA). ``For the
purpose of more properly conserving the natural resources of any oil or
gas pool, field, or like area,'' the MLA authorizes lessees to operate
their leases under a cooperative or unit plan of development and
operation if the Secretary of the Interior determines such an
arrangement to be necessary or advisable in the public interest.\35\
The Secretary is authorized, with the consent of the lessees involved,
to establish or alter drilling, producing, and royalty requirements and
to make such regulations with respect to the leases under a cooperative
or unit plan.\36\ The MLA states that a cooperative or unit plan of
development may contain a provision authorizing the Secretary to
regulate the rate of development and the rate of production.\37\
Accordingly, the BLM's standard form unit agreement provides that the
BLM may regulate the quantity and rate of production in the interest of
conservation.\38\ The BLM's standard form CA provides that the BLM
``shall have the right of supervision over all fee and state mineral
operations within the communitized area to the extent necessary to
monitor production and measurement, and to assure that no avoidable
loss of hydrocarbons occurs . . . .'' \39\ As noted earlier, FOGRMA
authorizes the BLM to assess royalties on gas lost or wasted from a
``lease site.'' The term ``lease site'' is broadly defined in FOGRMA as
any lands or submerged lands, including the surface of a severed
mineral estate, on which exploration for, or extraction or removal of,
oil or gas is authorized pursuant to a lease.\40\ The BLM maintains the
authority to regulate the waste of Federal minerals from operations on
those lands by requiring royalty payments and setting appropriate rates
of development and production.\41\
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\35\ 30 U.S.C. 226(m).
\36\ Id.
\37\ Id.
\38\ 43 CFR 3186.1, ] 21.
\39\ See ``BLM Manual 3160-9-Communitization,'' Appendix 1, ]
12.
\40\ See 30 U.S.C. 1702(6); Maralex Resources, Inc. v.
Bernhardt, 913 F.3d 1189, 1200 (10th Cir. 2019) (``the statutory
definition of `lease site' necessarily includes any lands, including
privately-owned lands, on which [production] of oil or gas is
occurring pursuant to a communitization agreement''). Additionally,
FOGRMA defines ``oil and gas'' broadly to mean ``any oil or gas
originating from, or allocated to, the Outer Continental Shelf,
Federal, or Indian lands.'' 30 U.S.C. 1702(9) (emphasis added).
\41\ This conclusion is consistent with the assessment of the
BLM's authority expressed by the court that vacated the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. See Wyoming 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1081-85.
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2. Authority Regarding Environmental Impacts to the Public Lands
In addition to ensuring that the public receives a pecuniary
benefit from oil and gas production from public lands, the BLM is also
tasked with regulating the physical impacts of oil and gas development
on public lands. The MLA directs the Secretary to ``regulate all
surface-disturbing activities conducted pursuant to any lease'' and to
``determine reclamation and other actions as required in the interest
of conservation of surface resources.'' \42\
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\42\ 30 U.S.C. 226(g).
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The MLA requires oil and gas leases to include provisions ``for the
protection of the interests of the United States . . . and for the
safeguarding of the public welfare,'' including lease terms for
purposes other than safeguarding the public resource of oil and
gas.\43\ The Secretary may suspend lease operations ``in the interest
of conservation of natural resources,'' a phrase that encompasses not
just conservation of mineral deposits, but also preventing
environmental harm.\44\ The MLA additionally requires oil and gas
leases to contain ``a provision that such rules for the safety and
welfare of the miners
[[Page 25384]]
. . . as may be prescribed by the Secretary shall be observed.'' \45\
Accordingly, the Department's regulations governing oil and gas
operations on the public lands have long required operators to conduct
operations in a manner that is protective of natural resources,
environmental quality, and the health and safety of workers.\46\
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\43\ See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund,
458 F. Supp. 925, 936 n.17 (D.D.C. 1978). The BLM acknowledges that
the court that vacated the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule stated that
``it is not a reasonable interpretation of BLM's general authority
under the MLA to `safeguard[ ] the public welfare' as empowering the
agency to regulate air emissions, particularly when Congress
expressly delegated such authority to the EPA under the [Clean Air
Act].'' Wyoming 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1067. The BLM further notes that
the court that vacated the BLM's rescission of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule found that the rescission failed to satisfy the
BLM's ``statutory obligation'' to ``safeguard[ ] the public
welfare,'' and stated that the MLA's ``public welfare'' provision
supports the BLM's consideration of air emissions in promulgating
its waste prevention regulations. See California v. Bernhardt, 472
F. Supp. 3d 573, 616 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The BLM need not elaborate on
the meaning of the MLA's ``public welfare'' provision in this
rulemaking, as the BLM is proposing requirements that are
independently justified as waste prevention measures and are not for
environmental purposes. The one exception is Sec. 3179.50, which
does serve an environmental purpose, but is an exercise of the
Secretary's authority to prescribe ``rules for the safety and
welfare of the miners'' under 30 U.S.C. 187.
\44\ 30 U.S.C. 209; see also, e.g., Copper Valley Machine Works
v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 601 & nn.7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hoyl v.
Babbitt, 129 F.3d 1377, 1380 (10th Cir. 1997); Getty Oil Co. v.
Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904, 916 (D. Wyo. 1985).
\45\ 30 U.S.C. 187.
\46\ See 43 CFR 3162.5-1, 3162.5-3. The BLM promulgated those
regulations in 1982. 47 FR 47765 (1982).
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FLPMA authorizes the BLM to ``regulate'' the ``use, occupancy, and
development'' of the public lands via ``published rules.'' \47\ FLPMA
also mandates that the Secretary, ``[i]n managing the public lands . .
. shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.'' \48\ In
addition, section 102 of FLPMA declares a policy that the BLM should
both protect the environment, as stated in paragraph 102(a)(8), and
manage the land in such a manner as to provide for ``domestic sources
of minerals'' and other resources, as stated in paragraph
102(a)(12).\49\ With respect to protecting the environment, paragraph
102(a)(8) states the policy of the United States that lands be managed
to ``protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological,
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resources, and archeological
values . . . .'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ 43 U.S.C. 1732(b).
\48\ Id.
\49\ 43 U.S.C. 1701; Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v.
Salazar, 605 F. Supp. 2d 263, 281-82 (D.D.C. 2009).
\50\ 43 U.S.C. 1701(a)(8); but see 43 U.S.C. 1701(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FLPMA also requires the BLM to manage public lands under principles
of multiple use and sustained yield.\51\ The statutory definition of
``multiple use'' explicitly includes the consideration of environmental
resources. ``Multiple use'' is a ``combination of balanced and diverse
resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future
generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources . . . .'' \52\
``Multiple use'' also requires resources to be managed in a
``harmonious and coordinated'' manner ``without permanent impairment to
the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment . . .
.'' \53\ Significantly, FLPMA directs the Secretary to consider ``the
relative values of the resources and not necessarily . . . the
combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the
greatest unit output.'' \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Id. at 1702(c), 1732(a).
\52\ 43 U.S.C. 1702(c).
\53\ Id.
\54\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary's management and regulation of Indian mineral
interests carries with it the duty to act as a trustee for the benefit
of the Indian mineral owners.\55\ Congress has directed the Secretary
to ``aggressively carry out [her] trust responsibility in the
administration of Indian oil and gas.'' \56\ In furtherance of her
trust obligations, the Secretary has delegated regulatory authority for
administering operations on Indian oil and gas leases to the BLM,\57\
which has developed specialized expertise through regulating the
production of oil and gas from public lands administered by the
Department. In choosing from among reasonable regulatory alternatives
for Indian mineral development, the BLM is obligated to adopt the
alternative that is in the best interest of the Tribe and individual
Indian mineral owners.\58\ What is in the best interest of the Tribe
and individual Indian mineral owners is determined by a consideration
of all relevant factors, including economic considerations as well as
potential environmental and social effects.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Department of Interior, 47
F.3d 1032, 1038 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
\56\ 30 U.S.C. 1701(a)(4).
\57\ 235 DM 1.1.K.
\58\ See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d
1555, 1567 (10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), adopted as majority opinion as modified en
banc, 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986).
\59\ See 25 CFR 211.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Regulatory History
The BLM has a long history of regulating venting and flaring from
onshore oil and gas operations. This section summarizes the BLM's
historic practices, as well as the BLM's experience in two recent
rulemakings related to venting and flaring.
8. Early Regulation of Surface Waste of Gas
The Department of the Interior has maintained regulations
addressing the waste of gas through venting and flaring from onshore
oil and gas leases since 1938. At that time, the Department's
regulations required the United States to be compensated ``at full
value'' for ``all gas wasted by blowing, release, escape into the air,
or otherwise,'' except where such disposal was authorized under the
laws of the United States and the State in which it occurred.\60\ The
regulations further provided that the production of oil or gas from the
lease was to be restricted to such amounts as could be put to
beneficial use and that, in order to avoid the excessive production of
oil or gas, the Secretary could limit the rate of production based on
the market demand for oil or the market demand for gas.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ 30 CFR 221.5(h) (1938).
\61\ Id. 221.27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By 1942, the Department's regulations contained a definition of
``waste of oil or gas.'' This definition included the ``physical waste
of oil or gas,'' which was defined as ``the loss or destruction of oil
or gas after recovery thereof such as to prevent proper utilization and
beneficial use thereof, and the loss of oil or gas prior to recovery
thereof by isolation or entrapment, by migration, by premature release
of natural gas from solution in oil, or in any other manner such as to
render impracticable the recovery of such oil or gas.'' \62\ The
regulations stated that a lessee was ``obligated to prevent the waste
of oil or gas'' and, in order to avoid the physical waste of gas, the
lessee was required to ``consume it beneficially or market it or return
it to the productive formation.'' \63\ The regulations stated that
``unavoidably lost'' gas was not subject to royalty, though the
regulations did not define ``unavoidably lost.'' \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ 30 CFR 221.6(n) (1942).
\63\ Id. 221.35.
\64\ Id. 221.44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1974, the Secretary issued NTL-4, which established the
following policy for royalties on gas production: Gas production
subject to royalty shall include: (1) that gas (both dry and casing-
head) which is produced and sold either on a lease basis or that which
is allocated to a lease under the terms of an approved communitization
or unitization agreement; (2) that gas which is vented or flared in
well tests (drill-stem, completion, or production) on a lease,
communitized tract, or unitized area; and, (3) that gas which is
otherwise vented or flared on a lease, communitized tract, or unitized
area with the prior written authorization of the Area Oil and Gas
Supervisor (Supervisor).\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ See 44 FR 76600 (Dec. 27, 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTL-4 thus effectively required onshore oil and gas lessees to pay
royalties on all gas produced, including gas that was unavoidably lost
or used for production purposes. Various oil and gas companies sought
judicial review of NTL-4. In 1978, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Wyoming overturned NTL-4, holding that the MLA does not
authorize the collection of royalties on gas production
[[Page 25385]]
that is unavoidably lost or used in lease operations.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Marathon Oil Co. v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 548, 553 (D. Wyo.
1978).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. NTL-4A
From January 1980 to January 2017, the Department of the Interior's
instructions governing the venting and flaring of gas from onshore oil
and gas leases were contained in ``Notice to Lessees and Operators of
Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases: Royalty or Compensation
for Oil and Gas Lost'' (``NTL-4A'').\67\ NTL-4A was issued by the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), which was the Interior bureau tasked with
oversight of Federal onshore oil and gas production at the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ 44 FR 76600 (Dec. 27, 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under NTL-4A, operators were required to pay royalties on
``avoidably lost'' gas--i.e., gas lost due to the operator's
negligence, failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent or
control the loss, or failure to comply with lease terms, regulations,
or BLM orders. NTL-4A expressly authorized royalty-free venting and
flaring ``on a short-term basis'' during emergencies, well purging and
evaluation tests, initial production tests, and routine and special
well tests. NTL-4A prohibited the flaring of gas from gas wells under
any other circumstances. For gas produced from oil wells, however, NTL-
4A authorized (but did not mandate) the BLM to approve flaring where
conservation of the gas was not ``economically justified'' because it
would ``lead to the premature abandonment of recoverable oil reserves
and ultimately to a greater loss of equivalent energy than would be
recovered if the venting or flaring were permitted to continue . . .
.'' \68\ NTL-4A stated that, ``when evaluating the feasibility of
requiring conservation of the gas, the total leasehold production,
including oil and gas, as well as the economics of a field-wide plan,''
must be considered. Finally, under NTL-4A, the loss of gas vapors from
storage tanks was considered ``unavoidably lost,'' unless the BLM
``determine[d] that the recovery of such vapors would be warranted . .
. .'' \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Id. at 76601 (Dec. 27, 1979).
\69\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soon after issuing NTL-4A, the USGS issued guidelines and
procedures for implementing NTL-4A, which were published in the
Conservation Division Manual (CDM) Part 644, Chapter 5.\70\ Among other
things, the CDM provided guidance regarding applications to flare oil-
well gas. Specifically, the CDM provided guidance for responding to a
lessee's contention ``that reserves of casinghead gas are inadequate to
support the installation of facilities for gas collection and sale . .
. .'' \71\ The CDM explained that, ``[f]rom an economic basis, all
leasehold production must be considered; the major concern is
profitable operation of the lease, not just profitable disposition of
the gas.'' \72\ The CDM further explained that the ``economics of
conserving gas must be on a field-wide basis, and the Supervisor must
consider the feasibility of a joint operation between all other
lessees/operators in the field or area.'' \73\ Thus, the economic
standard for obtaining approval to flare oil-well gas under NTL-4A was
on its face a demanding one. The fact that the capture and sale of oil-
well gas from an individual lease would not pay for itself was not
sufficient to justify royalty-free flaring of the gas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Geological Survey Conservation Division Manual, Part 644
Producing Operations Chapter 5 Waste Prevention/Beneficial Use, 6-
23-80 (Release No. 68).
\71\ Id. at 644.53F.
\72\ Id.
\73\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CDM also provided guidance for venting and flaring situations
involving both Federal and non-Federal lands. In such cases, the BLM
was directed to contact the appropriate State agency to work jointly
for optimum gas conservation. However, where such a cooperative effort
was not possible, the BLM was directed to ``proceed unilaterally to
take action to prevent unnecessary venting or flaring from Federal
lands.''
Under the plain terms of NTL-4A, flaring without prior approval
(outside of the short-term circumstances specified in Sections II and
III of NTL-4A) constituted a royalty-bearing loss of gas, regardless of
the economic circumstances. The BLM originally applied NTL-4A to that
effect, and this practice was upheld by the Interior Board of Land
Appeals. See Lomax Exploration Co., 105 IBLA 1 (1988). However, the BLM
changed this policy in Instruction Memorandum No. 87-652 (Aug. 17,
1987), which required the BLM to provide an operator with
an207pportuneity to demonstrate, after the fact, that capturing the gas
was not economically justified. See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 107 IBLA 5
(1989).
Even so, the number of applications for royalty-free flaring
received by the BLM increased dramatically between 2005 and 2016: in
2005, the BLM received just 75 applications to vent or flare gas, while
in 2015 it received 2,901 applications.\74\ The following table shows
the number of applications to vent or flare gas received by the BLM
through 2021, but it does not reflect when the venting or flaring
occurred.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Following publication of the proposed rule, the BLM re-
queried the Automated Fluid Minerals Support System (AFMSS) to
obtain the number of venting and flaring sundry notices in the
database. The number of sundry notices has been updated in the final
rule to reflect the updated query.
\75\ The BLM applies the venting and flaring rule that was in
effect at the time the flaring occurred, not when the application
was received, which may be later in time than the flaring, even
years later. See, e.g., Ladd Petroleum Corp., 107 IBLA 5 (1989). The
application, therefore, does not provide for straightforward
comparison of the effects of regulatory changes, particularly given
recent court orders setting aside the BLM's rules in this sphere.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
applications
Year received to vent
or flare gas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015................................................. 2,900
2016................................................. 2,637
2017................................................. 2,162
2018................................................. 2,095
2019................................................. 2,901
2020................................................. 2,386
2021................................................. 922
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule and the 2018 Revision Rule
would have dispensed with case-by-case flaring approvals, but because
those rules were both struck down, post-2016 flaring application data
does not provide a useful comparison between the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule and NTL-4A. In addition, there is no useful comparison because the
2016 Waste Prevention Rule was never in effect and the 2018 revision
rule was in effect for less than 2 years. Most of the applications to
flare royalty-free were submitted to the field offices in New Mexico,
Montana, and the Dakotas, which oversee Federal and Indian mineral
interests in unconventional plays where oil production is accompanied
by large volumes of associated gas. Notably, the vast majority of these
applications involved wells that were connected to a gas pipeline but
flared due to pipeline capacity constraints.
3. 2016 Waste Prevention Rule
On November 18, 2016, the BLM issued a final rule intended to
reduce the waste of Federal and Indian gas through venting, flaring,
and leaks (``2016 Waste Prevention Rule'').\76\ The 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule replaced NTL-4A and became effective on January 17,
2017. The BLM's development of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule was
prompted by a
[[Page 25386]]
combination of factors, including the substantial increase in flaring
over the previous decade, the growing number of applications to vent or
flare royalty-free, new information regarding the quantities of gas
lost through venting and leaks, and concerns expressed by oversight
entities such as the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ 81 FR 83008 (Nov. 18, 2016).
\77\ Id. at 83014-83017; GAO, ``Federal Oil and Gas Leases--
Opportunities Exist to Capture Vented and Flared Gas, Which Would
Increase Royalty Payments and Reduce Greenhouse Gases'' (Oct. 2010);
GAO, ``OIL AND GAS--Interior Could Do More to Account for and Manage
Natural Gas Emissions'' (July 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2016 Waste Prevention Rule applied to all onshore Federal and
Indian oil and gas leases, units, and communitized areas. The key
components of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule were:
A requirement that APDs be accompanied by a WMP that would
detail anticipated gas production and opportunities to conserve the
gas;
A provision specifying the various circumstances under
which a loss of oil or gas would be ``avoidably lost'' and therefore
royalty-bearing;
A requirement that operators capture (rather than flare) a
certain percentage of the gas they produce;
Equipment requirements for pneumatic controllers,
pneumatic diaphragm pumps, and storage vessels (tanks); and
LDAR provisions requiring semiannual lease site
inspections, the use of specified instruments and methods, and
recordkeeping and reporting.
The rule's ``capture percentage'' requirements were intended to
address the routine flaring of gas from oil wells. The rule required an
operator to capture, rather than flare, a certain percentage of the gas
produced from the operator's ``development oil wells.'' The required
capture percentage would increase over a 10-year period, starting at 85
percent in 2018 and ultimately reaching 98 percent in 2026. Gas flared
in excess of the capture requirements would be royalty bearing.
In the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule, the BLM recognized that the EPA
had promulgated emissions limitations for pneumatic equipment and
storage tanks as well as LDAR requirements for new and modified sources
in the oil and gas production sector pursuant to its authority under
the Clean Air Act (CAA). The BLM further recognized that those EPA
requirements would have the effect of reducing the waste of gas from
leases subject to those requirements. In order to avoid unnecessary
duplication or conflict between the BLM and EPA regulations, the 2016
Waste Prevention Rule allowed for operators to comply with the
analogous EPA regulations as an alternative means of compliance with
BLM's requirements.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ See 81 FR 83008, 83018-19, 83085-89 (Nov. 18, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The capture percentage, pneumatic equipment, storage tanks, and
LDAR requirements of the 2016 Rule were each subject to phase-in
periods, and the rule allowed operators to obtain exemptions or reduced
requirements where compliance would ``cause the operator to cease
production and abandon significant recoverable oil reserves under the
lease.'' \79\ The BLM's RIA for the 2016 Waste Prevention rule
estimated that the rule would impose costs of between $110 million and
$275 million per year, while generating benefits of between $20 million
and $157 million per year worth of additional gas captured and between
$189 million and $247 million per year in quantified social benefits
(in the form of forgone methane emissions).\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ See 81 FR 83082-88 (Nov. 18, 2016).
\80\ BLM (2016). Regulatory Impact Analysis for: Revisions to 43
CFR 3100 (Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing) and 43 CFR 3600 (Onshore Oil
and Gas Operations) Additions of 43 CFR 3178 (Royalty-Free Use of
Lease Production) and 43 CFR 3179 (Waste Prevention and Resource
Conservation). p. 4-5. Available at https://www.regulations.gov/document/BLM-2016-0001-9127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Certain States and operators filed petitions for judicial review of
the Waste Prevention Rule in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Wyoming.\81\ Following the change in Administration in January 2017,
the litigation was effectively paused in response to the BLM's
administrative actions to suspend the rule. After those actions were
invalidated by a different court,\82\ the Wyoming court stayed
implementation of the capture percentage, pneumatic equipment, storage
tank, and LDAR requirements, and stayed the litigation pending
finalization of the BLM's voluntary revision of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Wyoming v. DOI, Case No. 2:16-cv-00285-SWS (D. Wyo.).
\82\ See California v. BLM, No. 3:17-CV-03804-EDL (N.D. Cal.);
Sierra Club v. Zinke, No. 3:17-CV-03885-EDL (N.D. Cal.). On June 15,
2017, the BLM announced that it would postpone the January 17, 2018,
compliance dates to phase-in certain parts of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. Wyoming at 1053. Several Intervenors-Respondents
from the Wyoming litigation, as well as the Attorney Generals from
the States of California and New Mexico challenged the BLM's 2017
postponement decision in the aforementioned cases in the Northern
District of California. Id. at 1053-54. This California district
court held that the BLM's 2017 postponement notice was invalid,
thereby resulting in the reinstatement of the phase-in dates for
certain parts of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule. Id. at 1054.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. 2018 Revision of Waste Prevention Rule
On September 28, 2018, the BLM issued a final rule substantially
revising the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule (``2018 Revision Rule'').\83\
In the 2018 Revision Rule, the BLM rescinded the WMP, gas capture
percentage, pneumatic equipment, storage tank, and LDAR requirements of
the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule. The BLM also revised the remaining
provisions of the rule to largely reflect the language of NTL-4A.
Finally, the BLM established a new policy of deferring to State
regulations for determining when the routine flaring of oil-well gas is
royalty-free.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ 83 FR 49184 (Sept. 28, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 2018 Revision Rule, the BLM concluded that the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule exceeded the BLM's statutory authority by imposing
requirements with compliance costs that exceed the value of the gas
that would be conserved, thus violating the non-statutory ``prudent
operator'' standard that some believed to have been implicitly
incorporated into the MLA when it was adopted in 1920. The BLM also
stated that the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule created a risk of premature
shut-ins of marginal wells, reasoning that the compliance costs
associated with the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule would represent a
significant proportion of a marginal well's revenue. Contrary to what
the BLM had found in 2016, the BLM stated in the 2018 Revision Rule
that existing State flaring regulations provided sufficient assurance
against excessive flaring.
The RIA for the 2018 Revision Rule found that the economic benefits
of the 2018 Revision Rule (i.e., reduced compliance costs) would
significantly outweigh its economic costs (i.e., forgone gas production
and additional methane emissions).\84\ This result was based in large
part on the use of a narrowly defined ``domestic'' social cost of
methane metric. That metric purported to capture domestic methane
costs. However, because it focused on impacts within U.S. borders, it
underestimated the full benefits of GHG mitigation accruing to U.S.
citizens and residents and thus drastically reduced the monetized
climate benefits of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule relative to
[[Page 25387]]
what had been estimated in the RIA for the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ BLM (2018). Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Rule
to Rescind or Revise Certain Requirements of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. p. 2-4. Available at https://www.regulations.gov/document/BLM-2018-0001-223607.
\85\ See California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 611 (N.D.
Cal. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Judicial Review of the Revision Rule
In September 2018, a coalition of organizations and the States of
California and New Mexico filed lawsuits challenging the 2018 Revision
Rule in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California. On July 15, 2020, the district court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs. California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573 (N.D. Cal.
2020). The court found that:
The BLM's interpretation of its statutory authority in the
2018 Revision Rule was unjustifiably limited, failed to require lessees
to use all reasonable precautions to prevent waste, and failed to meet
the BLM's statutory mandate to protect the public welfare;
The BLM's decision to defer to State flaring regulations
was not supported by sufficient analysis or record evidence;
The record did not support the BLM's claims that the 2016
Waste Prevention Rule posed excessive regulatory burdens and that its
costs outweighed its benefits; and
The BLM's cost-benefit analysis underlying the rule was
flawed for a variety of reasons, including that the use of a
``domestic'' social cost of methane was unreasonable and not based on
the best available science.
The court ordered that the 2018 Revision Rule be vacated in its
entirety.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ However, the court stayed vacatur until October 13, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Judicial Review of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule
Following the decision in California v. Bernhardt, the Wyoming
court lifted the stay on the litigation over the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule. In the briefing, the Department of the Interior confessed error
on the grounds that the BLM exceeded its statutory authority and was
``arbitrary and capricious'' in promulgating the rule. In October 2020,
the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the
BLM had exceeded its statutory authority and had been arbitrary and
capricious in promulgating the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule. Wyoming v.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1046 (D. Wyo. 2020).
Specifically, the court found that the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule was
essentially an air quality regulation and that the BLM had usurped the
authority to regulate air emissions that Congress had granted to EPA
and the States in the CAA. The court found that the rule was not
independently justified as a waste-prevention measure under the MLA.
Rather, in the court's view, the record reflected that the BLM's
primary concern was regulating methane emissions from existing oil and
gas sources. The court faulted the BLM's rulemaking for imposing
requirements beyond what could be expected of a ``prudent operator''
that develops the lease for the mutual profit of lessee and lessor.
Finally, the court faulted the BLM for applying air quality
regulations--as opposed to waste-prevention regulations--to unit and CA
operations on non-Federal lands. The court ordered that the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule be vacated, thereby reinstating NTL-4A as the BLM's
standard for managing venting and flaring from Federal oil and gas
leases.
7. The Inflation Reduction Act
On August 16, 2022, President Biden signed the IRA into law.\87\
The IRA contains a suite of provisions addressing onshore and offshore
oil and gas development under Federal leases. For example, section
50265, inter alia, requires the Department to maintain a certain level
of onshore oil and gas leasing activity as a prerequisite to approving
renewable energy rights-of-way on Federal lands. Importantly, that
provision of the IRA is accompanied by other provisions that serve to
ensure that lessees pay fair and appropriate compensation to the
Federal Government in exchange for the opportunity to conduct their
industrial activities under Federal leases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Public Law 117-169.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One such provision of the Act is section 50263, which is entitled,
``Royalties on All Extracted Methane.'' \88\ Consistent with the MLA's
assessment of royalties on all gas ``removed or sold from the lease''
\89\ and FOGRMA's requirement that lessees pay royalties on lost or
wasted gas,\90\ section 50263 of the IRA provides that, for leases
issued after the date of enactment of the Act, royalties are owed on
all gas produced from Federal land, including gas that is consumed or
lost by venting, flaring, or negligent releases through any equipment
during upstream operations. Section 50263 further provides three
exceptions to the general obligation to pay royalties on produced gas,
namely: (1) gas that is vented or flared for not longer than 48 hours
in an emergency situation that poses a danger to human health, safety,
or the environment; (2) gas used or consumed within a lease, unit, or
communitized area for the benefit of the lease, unit, or communitized
area; and, (3) gas that is unavoidably lost.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ 30 U.S.C. 1727.
\89\ 30 U.S.C. 226(b).
\90\ 30 U.S.C. 1756.
\91\ 30 U.S.C. 1727.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The BLM has for decades assessed royalties on upstream production
and has exempted from royalties gas lost in emergency situations,
``beneficial use'' gas, and ``unavoidably lost'' gas. IRA section 50263
is consistent with the BLM's prior agency practice regarding emergency
situations, beneficial use, and the unavoidable loss of gas, and it
provides additional support for the approach set forth in this proposed
rule. Importantly, IRA section 50263 confirms that the concepts of
``avoidable'' and ``unavoidable'' loss are appropriate for assessing
royalties. Section 50263 also confirms that the United States'
pecuniary interest in regulating losses extends to those from upstream
equipment. But the IRA leaves certain questions open, such as what
losses qualify as ``unavoidably lost'' and what qualifies as an
``emergency situation.'' Congress thus has left it to the BLM, as an
exercise of the agency's expertise and judgment, to determine answers
to the specific questions the IRA leaves open. As set forth below, this
final rule addresses these questions in a manner that is consistent
with the IRA's focus on (and the MLA's and FOGRMA's pre-existing
emphasis on) ensuring that Federal lessees pay fair and appropriate
compensation to the Federal Government in exchange for the opportunity
to conduct their industrial activities under Federal leases.
D. The Final Rule
The BLM has authority under the MLA to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary ``for the prevention of undue waste''
\92\ and to ensure that lessees ``use all reasonable precautions to
prevent waste of oil or gas.'' \93\ For many years, the BLM has
implemented this authority through restrictions on the venting and
flaring of gas from onshore Federal oil and gas leases. However, as
illustrated by the judicial decisions noted previously, before the
IRA's enactment, courts disagreed about the full scope of the BLM's
authority to regulate venting and flaring. Requirements that one court
might consider necessary for the BLM to meet its statutory mandates
might have been seen as regulatory overreach by another court.
Consistent with the approach outlined in the proposed rule, and in
light of all the statutory
[[Page 25388]]
authorities including the IRA, the BLM has chosen to focus on improving
upon NTL-4A in a variety of ways without advancing elements of the 2016
Waste Prevention Rule that were the subject of certain judicial
criticism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ 30 U.S.C. 187.
\93\ 30 U.S.C. 225.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As explained in more detail below and in Section IV, the Section-
by-Section Discussion, this final rule makes substantial improvements
in addressing the waste of Federal and Indian gas, while also
addressing the Wyoming court's criticisms of the 2016 Waste Prevention
Rule. First, the requirements unambiguously constitute reasonable waste
prevention measures that should be expected of an operator. The
requirements impose fewer overall costs than those of the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule and ensure either actual conservation of gas that would
otherwise be wasted or compensation to the public and Indian mineral
owners through royalty payments when gas is wasted. This contrasts with
certain provisions in the 2016 Rule that would have reduced pollution--
but not necessarily reduced waste--by allowing operators to comply with
analogous EPA standards in place of the BLM requirements.
Second, to address the Wyoming court's ruling that the BLM's
authority regarding unit and CA operations on non-Federal and non-
Indian surface is limited, certain requirements in this final rule are
narrower in scope than similar requirements in the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule. Specifically, the final rule's requirements pertaining
to safety, storage tanks, and LDAR apply only to operations on Federal
or Indian surface estates.
Third, the requirements are consistent with the ``prudent
operator'' standard as that term has been applied in the oil and gas
jurisprudence.
Fourth, the final rule has been developed with an eye towards
avoiding excessive compliance burdens on marginal wells.
Finally, the BLM is expressly excluding the social cost of
greenhouse gases from its decisions on any of the proposed waste
prevention requirements, thereby addressing the Wyoming court's concern
that the 2016 Rule was inappropriately supported by ``climate change
benefits.''
The provisions of this final rule serve straightforward waste
prevention objectives by promoting gas conservation. To avoid
situations where oil-well development outpaces the capacity of the
available gas capture infrastructure, the BLM is requiring operators to
submit either a WMP, including certification of a valid, executed
contract to sell the associated gas, or a self-certification of 100
percent capture of associated gas with oil-well APDs. The BLM
recognizes that not all venting and flaring can be prevented. In the
circumstances in which some venting or flaring cannot be prevented
(e.g., initial production tests or emergencies), the BLM is
establishing appropriate time or volume limits on royalty-free venting
or flaring. The BLM is addressing the problem of intermittent flaring
due to pipeline capacity constraints by establishing a volume limit
based on oil production for royalty-free flaring caused by inadequate
capture infrastructure. Requiring royalty payments on venting and
flaring that exceeds the established limits will both discourage waste
and ensure that Federal and Indian royalty revenues are not reduced by
an operator's wasteful practices. The BLM estimates that the royalty-
free flaring limits of the final rule would generate $51 million per
year in additional royalties. See section 7.6 of the RIA for more
information.
This final rule also contains LDAR provisions intended to reduce
losses of natural gas. Unlike the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule--which
extended these requirements to State and private surface estates in
certain situations--the requirements in this final rule apply only to
operations on the Federal or Indian surface estate, where the BLM has
express authority and responsibility to regulate for safety, the
prevention of waste, and the payment of Federal or Indian royalties.
These requirements would not apply to operations that occur on State or
private surface tracts committed to a Federal unit or CA. The BLM
estimates that the requirements of this final rule regarding LDAR would
result in the conservation of up to 0.5 Bcf of gas each year.
The BLM acknowledges that the contents of this final rule differ in
some regards from the 2018 Revision Rule's narrower interpretation of
the BLM's statutory authority.\94\ Consistent with the BLM's
understanding of its authority for decades prior to 2018, the BLM has
reconsidered the relevant conclusions of the 2018 Revision Rule and now
rejects those conclusions for the following reasons. To begin, nothing
in the MLA's plain text--which requires lessees to take ``all
reasonable precautions to prevent waste'' and to abide by rules and
regulations issued ``for the prevention of undue waste''--suggests that
the BLM's authority is limited to the promulgation of rules that
effectively pay for themselves (as measured by balancing compliance
costs against the value of the recovered gas).\95\ Consistent with this
text, the BLM's longstanding policy governing venting and flaring has
assessed the economic feasibility of gas conservation in the context of
``the total leasehold production, including oil and gas, as well as the
economics of a field-wide plan.'' See supra, Part III.C.2. As the CDM
made clear, the BLM's concern under the MLA for nearly four decades
prior to the 2018 Revision Rule was ``profitable operation of the
lease, not just profitable disposition of the gas.''
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\94\ See 83 FR 49184, 49185-86 (Sept. 28, 2018).
\95\ 30 U.S.C. 187, 225. Indeed, such a requirement would
imperil nearly all operational regulations.
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Despite suggestions to the contrary in the 2018 Revision Rule, the
focus of the final rule on overall ultimate resource recovery, not
lessee profits vis-[agrave]-vis wasted gas, is consistent with the non-
statutory ``prudent operator'' standard. While the prudent operator
standard rests on an expectation of ``mutually profitable development
of the lease's mineral resources,'' \96\ it does not follow that
lessees can maximize their profit by wasting recoverable hydrocarbon
resources without regard for the lessor's lost royalty revenues or the
lessor's interest in conserving the gas for future disposition. To the
contrary, lessees have an obligation of reasonable diligence in the
development of the leased resources, rooted in due regard for the
interests of both the lessee and the lessor.\97\ And in the MLA,
FOGRMA, and the IRA, Congress enshrined the United States' interest, as
a mineral lessor, in avoiding waste and maximizing royalty
revenues.\98\ The BLM, in managing oil and gas resources on behalf of
the United States, may value more production--considering both oil and
gas production--over a
[[Page 25389]]
longer time period more highly than does an operator, who might be more
focused on generating near-term profits. None of the authorities
previously relied upon by the BLM to interpret the ``prudent operator''
standard forecloses any Secretarial action that might marginally affect
lessee profits.\99\
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\96\ Wyoming at 1072.
\97\ See Id.; see also Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441
P.2d 436, 447 (Okla. 1967) (``Necessarily, we determine the lessee
was acting prudently when he ascertained that it was illegal and
improper to flare gas in the quantities shown by the evidence, in
order to produce the unallocated allowable of oil.''); Tr. Co. of
Chicago v. Samedan Oil Corp., 192 F.2d 282, 284 (10th Cir. 1951)
(``A first consideration is the precept that a prudent operator may
not act only for his self-interest. He must not forget that the
primary consideration to the lessor for the lease is royalty from
the production of the lease free of cost of development and
operation.'').
\98\ See 30 U.S.C. 187, 225, 226(m), 1756; see also California
Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (``[The Secretary]
has a responsibility to insure that these resources are not
physically wasted and that their extraction accords with prudent
principles of conservation. To protect the public's royalty interest
he may determine that minerals are being sold at less than
reasonable value. Under existing regulations he can restrict a
lessee's production to an amount commensurate with market demand,
and thus protect the public's royalty interest by preventing
depression of the market.'').
\99\ Cf. California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 596 (N.D.
Cal. 2020) (``The statutory language demonstrates on its face that
any consideration of waste management limited to the economics of
individual well-operators would ignore express statutory mandates
concerning BLM's public welfare obligations.'').
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In contrast to NTL-4A, this final rule does not allow operators to
request that flared oil-well gas be deemed royalty-free based on case-
by-case economic assessments. There are a number of reasons for this
approach. In the first instance, Federal law does not require the
American taxpayers to forgo royalties on wasted gas due to an
individual operator's economic circumstances. Although it was the BLM's
practice to engage in case-by-case economic assessments under NTL-4A,
that approach is no longer appropriate, as the practical realities of
oilfield development have changed dramatically since 1980. As the U.S.
Department of Energy explained in a recent report, ``flaring has become
more of an issue with the rapid development of unconventional tight oil
and gas resources over the past two decades'' that has ``brought online
hydrocarbon resources that vary in their characteristics and
proportions of natural gas, natural gas liquids and crude oil.'' \100\
Consistent with these developments, and as discussed in Section III.A,
the BLM has witnessed a massive increase in the amount of venting and
flaring from the 1990's to the 2010's. The average amount of annual
venting and flaring from Federal and Indian leases between 1990 and
2000 was 11 Bcf. Between 2010 and 2020, it quadrupled to an average of
44.2 Bcf per year, with a 157 percent increase in the amount of vented
and flared gas as a percentage of gas production, and a 102 percent
increase in the amount of vented and flared gas per barrel of oil
produced. The upward trend in venting and flaring suggests is likely to
continue.
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\100\ U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy, Office
of Oil and Natural Gas, ``Natural Gas Flaring and Venting: State and
Federal Regulatory Overview, Trends, and Impacts'' (June 2019).
https://www.energy.gov/fecm/articles/natural-gas-flaring-and-venting-regulations-report.
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Based on EIA data from 1990 through 2022, U.S. vented and flared
volumes continue an upward trend that tends to mirror U.S. oil
production,\101\ which raises a concern that new exploration and
development is outpacing infrastructure construction. Oil production in
2019 reached a record high level of 4.5 billion barrels of oil despite
a relatively low average annual spot price of $57 per barrel. Operators
may have increased oil production in 2019 to maintain revenues given
the lower pricing. An increase in oil production to maintain revenues
may have led to the very high flare volume in that year. While the
vented and flared volume has decreased since 2019--likely due to
unrepresentative production during the COVID 19 pandemic that resulted
in reduced drilling and completions during this time--the data
demonstrates that, generally, venting and flaring has continued to
increase since 1990, particularly as compared to the production of oil.
This rule will work toward reducing the waste from Federal and Indian
mineral estates.\102\
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\101\ https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_EPG0_VGV_mmcf_m.htm.
\102\ For the following tables, see https://rigcount.bakerhughes.com/na-rig-count/, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtcA.htm.
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BILLING CODE 4331-29-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.003
[[Page 25390]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.005
BILLING CODE 4331-29-C
The related increase in the number of flaring applications--from 75
in 2005, to 922 in 2021 has created a significant administrative burden
for the BLM.\103\ It has also created an estimated information
collection burden of approximately 23,228 total annual burden hours
potentially incurred by operators and has led to significant
uncertainty for operators as hundreds of applications wait to be
processed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ See table in the Executive Summary.
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Finally, the BLM notes that the bulk of the recent royalty-free
flaring applications has concerned flaring from wells that are
connected to pipeline infrastructure. The purpose of the economic
inquiry under NTL-4A, by contrast, was to determine whether the volumes
of associated gas production would make the installation of gas-capture
infrastructure economically viable. CDM 644.5.3E and F. Where the gas-
capture infrastructure has already been built out, there is no need to
consider the cost and value of its installation against the volume of
associated gas production. The BLM understands that, as posited by a
commenter, there may be instances where a gas pipeline connected to an
oil well is not able to accept that well's gas for a time. In those
circumstances, an operator may temporarily curtail production or shut
in the well instead of wasting the gas. Oil and gas production should
resume when the pipeline can accept the gas.
One of the primary concerns underlying the BLM's promulgation of
the 2018 Revision Rule was the compliance burden on ``marginal wells,''
i.e., wells that produce approximately 10 barrels of oil or 60 Mcf of
natural gas per day or less.\104\ The court that vacated the 2016 Waste
Prevention Rule faulted the BLM for failing to adequately assess the
impact of that rule on marginal wells.\105\ The court that vacated the
2018 Revision Rule, however, rejected that concern as unfounded.\106\
The BLM does not wish to impose requirements that
[[Page 25391]]
inadvertently cause recoverable oil or gas resources to be stranded due
to premature lease abandonment, but, as the MLA makes clear, any such
considerations go to whether particular conservation measures are
reasonable under the MLA, not whether marginal operations must take
reasonable measures in the first instance. 30 U.S.C. 225. For example,
there is no real risk of premature abandonment by requiring the
operator of a marginal gas well to minimize the loss of gas during
liquids unloading operations, as required in this rule. Under the final
rule, an operator of a marginal gas well may vent gas during liquids
unloading operations royalty-free for 24 hours. If the gas well is not
put into production within 24 hours and maintenance operations must
continue, the volume of gas vented is likely very small and the flowing
pressure very low--otherwise, the operator would be returning the well
to production. Thus, the marginal time that it takes an operator to
continue liquids unloading beyond the initial 24 hours will not result
in significant vented gas and corresponding royalty obligation.
Furthermore, the BLM has provisions for royalty rate reductions in 43
CFR 3103.4-1 to encourage the greatest ultimate recovery of oil or gas.
Therefore, in the unlikely event that compliance with the final rule
would lead to an operator's premature abandonment of a well, an
operator may seek royalty relief to continue operations.
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\104\ 83 FR 49184, 49187 (Sept 28, 2018).
\105\ Wyoming 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1075-78.
\106\ California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 606 (N.D.
Cal. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The BLM has developed this final rule to avoid excessive and
unreasonable compliance burdens on marginal wells when balanced against
the need to reduce waste. In the 2018 Revision Rule, the BLM noted that
the provisions of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule that placed a
particular burden on marginal wells were those pertaining to pneumatic
controllers, pneumatic diaphragm pumps, and LDAR. In this final rule,
the requirements for LDAR only apply to Federal or Indian minerals
produced from facilities located on a Federal or Indian surface estate,
thereby limiting the number of operators to which the LDAR program
applies. In addition, the BLM has not included in this final rule the
provisions in the proposed rule regarding pneumatic controllers and
diaphragm pumps.
The BLM acknowledges that, in the 2018 Revision Rule, it asserted
that additional restrictions on flaring were unnecessary because the
States with the most significant BLM-managed oil and gas production
impose regulatory restrictions on flaring from oil wells and that these
State regulations ``provide[d] a reasonable assurance . . . that the
waste of associated gas will be controlled.'' \107\ This assertion
directly contradicted the BLM's prior findings during the promulgation
of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule, and a district court held that the
BLM's decision to rely on State flaring regulations was unjustified
based on the record evidence.\108\
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\107\ 83 FR 49184, 49202 (Sept. 28, 2018).
\108\ California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 601-04 (N.D.
Cal. 2020).
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For this rulemaking, the BLM analyzed the State regulations
governing flaring, venting, and leaks in the 10 States responsible for
99 percent of Federal oil and gas production: Alaska, California,
Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and
Wyoming. Summaries of these regulations were collected in a table that
is available in the docket for this rulemaking at www.regulations.gov.
While there have been notable advancements in some States since the
promulgation of the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule--for example, new
comprehensive flaring regulations have since been adopted in New Mexico
and Colorado, and new requirements for storage tanks, pneumatic
equipment, and LDAR have been adopted in Colorado and Utah--State
regulations vary widely in their scope and stringency.\109\ And,
importantly, many of the State flaring regulations reserve substantial
discretion to the State agencies to authorize additional flaring.\110\
That discretion creates significant uncertainty about the extent to
which the BLM can rely on those regulations to protect the interests of
the United States and Indian mineral owners in minimizing waste and
maximizing royalty revenues.
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\109\ Examples of variations among State regulations include the
following. Unlike other States, (1) the States of New Mexico, North
Dakota, Montana, Texas, Alaska, and Oklahoma do not have regulations
to control losses of gas from pneumatic equipment; (2) Texas'
requirements to inspect for and repair leaks are focused on storage
tanks; (3) Alaska does not maintain LDAR requirements; and (4)
Wyoming's requirements for tanks, pneumatic equipment, and LDAR are
limited to the Upper Green River Basin ozone nonattainment area.
\110\ These States are Wyoming, Utah, Montana, Texas, and
Oklahoma.
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In its comments on the proposed rule, the Wyoming Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission asserts that the BLM incorrectly characterizes
Wyoming's regulations regarding flaring and gas capture plan
requirements. Specifically, Wyoming challenges language in the proposed
rule that ``Wyoming's gas capture plan requirements are not triggered
until after flaring becomes a problem at the well.'' \111\
Specifically, the State objects to the proposed rule's description of
Wyoming regulations as triggering a plan only after a flaring
``issue,'' explaining that, in the Commission's view, ``[t]he operator
must submit a gas capture plan, among other information . . . before
flaring or it would need to limit flaring to 60 mcf/d or be in
violation of the [applicable] rule.'' But whether or not these
contingencies are properly characterized as an ``issue,'' the BLM's
point--that it was deemed a plan to be useful when the APD is
submitted--stands. State gas capture plan requirements, by themselves,
do not provide the BLM, in its capacity as regulator and steward of the
Federal mineral estate, with an opportunity to render its own
determinations regarding potential waste when processing an APD.
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\111\ 87 FR 73588, 73598 (Nov. 30, 2022).
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North Dakota in its comments on the proposed rule takes issue with
the way the BLM characterized the allowance for variances in North
Dakota's gas capture regulations. Specifically, the State asserted:
``In its proposed rule publication, the BLM disingenuously criticizes
North Dakota's gas capture regulations for allowing variances, and then
inconsistently proposes a rule that considers associated natural gas as
unavoidably lost under the same circumstances as 9 out of 10 [North
Dakota Industrial Commission] variance allowances. . . .'' The BLM
acknowledges North Dakota's disagreement with the BLM's
characterization of North Dakota's gas capture regulations.
Nonetheless, as discussed in the proposed rule, the BLM found
significant variance in the scope and stringency of State regulations.
Flaring statistics show that State regulations, by themselves, have not
been adequate to reduce waste from Federal oil wells, underscoring the
need for uniformity with respect to Federal mineral interests. As
discussed further in the section-by-section analysis below, according
to EIA data from 2017 through 2022, North Dakota accounted for
approximately 33 percent of the volume of gas flared nationwide but
only 11 percent of the volume of oil produced nationwide. Wyoming
accounted for approximately 11 percent of the average total flared gas
onshore nationwide and 2 percent of the oil produced nationwide. State
efforts to reduce venting and flaring, though important, do not
displace the Secretary's duty to prevent undue waste from Federal and
Indian wells nationwide.\112\ Consequently, the BLM's
[[Page 25392]]
application of a uniform national standard ensures improved royalty
collection and avoidance of waste. In addition, the Secretary, and not
the States, is responsible for collecting Federal and Indian royalties.
The Secretary can best do this by not requiring shifting Federal
standards in response to any changes to State requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_EPG0_VGV_mmcf_a.htm, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm.
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The BLM also recognizes that the EPA has recently finalized
regulations governing certain aspects of oil and gas production
operations at 40 CFR part 60, subparts OOOOb and OOOOc, and that these
regulations can have the incidental effect of reducing the waste of gas
during production activities. Specifically, EPA's regulations \113\
require: (1) capture or flaring of gas that reaches the surface during
well completion operations with hydraulic fracturing; \114\ (2) storage
tanks with potential methane emissions of 20 tons or more per year to
control those emissions (including through combustion); \115\ (3)
process controllers to be zero emissions; \116\ (4) pumps to be zero
emissions; \117\ and (5) operators of well sites to develop and
implement a fugitive emissions monitoring plan.\118\
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\113\ 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb regulates greenhouse gases
(in the form of limitations on methane) and VOCs from various new,
modified, and reconstructed emission sources across the Crude Oil
and Natural Gas source category for which construction,
reconstruction, or modification commenced after December 6, 2022. 40
CFR part 60 subpart OOOOc includes presumptive standards for
greenhouse gases (in the form of limitations on methane, a
designated pollutant), for certain existing emission sources prior
to December 6, 2022, across the Crude Oil and Natural Gas source
category.
\114\ See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at Sec. 60.5375b.
\115\ See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at Sec. 60.5395b and 40
CFR part 60 subpart OOOOc at Sec. 60.5396c.
\116\ See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at Sec. 60.5370b and 40
CFR part 60 subpart OOOOc at Sec. 60.5362c(c), Sec. 60.5370c and
Table 1.
\117\ See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at Sec. 60.5370b and 40
CFR part 60 subpart OOOOc at Sec. 60.5362c(c), Sec. 60.5370c and
Table 1.
\118\ See 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOb at Sec. 60.5370b, and
Sec. 60.5397b and 40 CFR part 60 subpart OOOOc at Sec.
60.5362c(c), Sec. 60.5370c, Table 1, and Sec. 60.5397c.
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Although operator compliance with those EPA requirements can reduce
the waste of natural gas from Federal and Indian leases, they do not
supplant the need for BLM standards that are adopted pursuant to the
BLM's independent statutory authority and duties. The BLM further notes
that, under the CAA, States with one or more existing sources must
develop and submit State plans to the EPA for approval. Under this
statutory structure, State plans would implement the emissions
guidelines for existing sources. Also, EPA's requirements are not a
substitute for BLM standards because EPA's requirements are focused on
controlling GHG (in the form of methane) and VOC emissions, rather than
conserving natural gas, and compliance with the EPA's standards will
not always reduce the waste of natural gas or assure payment of
royalties to the United States or to Indian mineral owners. For
example, an operator can comply with EPA's requirements for storage
tanks by routing the emissions to combustion (i.e., flaring) and
therefore eliminating venting from the tanks altogether. That process
results in the same loss of gas as venting the gas from the tank.
Therefore, while that process reduces air pollution by prioritizing
flaring over venting, it does not reduce waste or assure payment of
royalties because in either scenario, the same amount of gas is lost.
Based on its review and analysis of State and EPA regulations, the
BLM finds that it is necessary to establish a uniform standard
governing the wasteful losses of Federal and Indian gas through
venting, flaring, and leaks.\119\ The BLM cannot rely on a patchwork of
State and EPA regulations to ensure that operators of Federal oil and
gas leases consistently meet the waste prevention mandates of the MLA,
that the American public receive a fair return for the development of
the Federal mineral estate, and that the Department's trust
responsibility to Indian mineral owners is satisfied. The BLM
acknowledges that this is a change in position from what the BLM stated
in the Revision Rule regarding analogous State and EPA regulations, a
change shown to be necessary by the vast increase in flaring in recent
decades, which demonstrates the ineffectiveness of NTL-4A in
controlling the waste of gas through venting and flaring. In addition,
establishing a uniform standard in lieu of case-by-case avoidable and
unavoidable loss determinations reduces the administrative burden on
the BLM's limited resources; avoids inconsistent application across the
States; and simplifies Federal and Indian enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ The BLM acknowledges that the Wyoming court questioned
what it described as the BLM's authority to ``hijack'' the
cooperative federalism framework of the CAA ``under the guise of
waste management.'' Wyoming 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1066. However, as
noted elsewhere, this final rule is justified not by any ancillary
effects on air quality or climate change, but solely on the basis of
waste prevention--an arena where the BLM has independent statutory
authority to regulate. See Id. at 1063 (``The terms of the MLA and
FOGRMA make clear that Congress intended the Secretary, through the
BLM, to exercise rulemaking authority to prevent the waste of
Federal and Indian mineral resources and to ensure the proper
payment of royalties to Federal, State, and Tribal governments.'').
On its own terms, therefore, the Wyoming court's reference to
cooperative federalism under the Clean Air Act is inapplicable to
this final rule, which does not seek to improve air quality and does
not rely on EPA's CAA regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RIA for this final rule calculates that this rule would cost
operators $19.3 million per year, using a 7 percent discount rate, for
the next 10 years ($19.2 million per year using a 3 percent discount
rate), while generating benefits to operators of approximately $1.8
million per year, using a 7 percent discount rate, in the form of 0.45
Bcf of additional captured gas.\120\ The RIA estimates that this final
rule would generate $51 million per year in additional royalties. The
BLM acknowledges that the estimated costs of this rule to operators
will outweigh the benefits in terms of the estimated monetized market
value of the gas conserved. However, these benefits do not take into
account the increase in royalties that will be received by the American
taxpayer or Indian mineral owners, or include any increase in
production that could possibly be received from changes in behavior due
to the avoidable loss threshold, which would also lead to an increase
in benefits. The BLM notes that the statutory provisions authorizing
the BLM to regulate oil and gas operations for the prevention of waste
do not impose a net-benefit requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ The cost-benefit analysis contained in the RIA was
generated to comply with Executive Order 12866 and is not required
by the statutes authorizing the BLM to regulate for the prevention
of waste from oil and gas leases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Separately, the reduced methane emissions associated with the final
rule provide a monetized benefit to society (in the form of avoided
climate damages) of $17.9 million per year over the same time frame,
leading to an overall net monetized benefit from the rule of $360,000
to $441,000 a year, as well as additional unquantified benefits. (See
Appendix A of the RIA regarding unquantified benefits.) The basis for
the BLM's estimates of social benefits from reduced methane emissions--
namely, the social cost of greenhouse gases (SC-GHG)--is explained in
detail in Appendix A of the RIA. To be clear, although the BLM is
reporting its estimates of the social benefits of reduced methane
emissions here and in the RIA, the purpose of that reporting is solely
to provide the most complete and transparent accounting of the costs
and benefits of the rule for the public's awareness. The BLM considered
but did not rely on climate-related costs and
[[Page 25393]]
benefits when reaching the policy decisions in this rule. The
requirements of this final rule reflect reasonable measures to avoid
waste, regardless of any impacts with respect to climate change.
IV. Discussion of Public Comments on the Proposed Rule
This section of the preamble summarizes the major categories of the
public comments that the BLM received in response to the proposed rule,
as well as the BLM's responses. Detailed discussion regarding the
substantive comments on the proposed rule that the BLM received, the
BLM's responses to those comments, and changes that the BLM made in the
final rule are provided in Section V (Section-by-Section Discussion) of
this preamble.
The public comment period for the proposed rule ended on January
30, 2023. During the 60-day public comment period, the BLM received
3,323 total comments submitted from Federal, State, local governments,
local agencies, Tribal organizations, industry representatives,
individuals, and other external stakeholders. Of the 3,323 comment
letter submissions, 2,892 were template form letters from seven
different organizations, leaving 134 additional unique commenters. From
these 141 unique commenters, the BLM identified 1,123 unique comments
on the proposed rule.
Several commenters requested that the BLM hold meetings to take
public input on the proposed rule before the comment period ended. The
BLM held additional meetings with the Santa Rosa Rancheria Tachi-Yokut
Tribe on December 1, 2022; the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation (MHA
Nation) on December 6, 2022, and February 13, 2023; and the Southern
Ute Indian Tribe on April 10, 2023, May 25, 2023, and June 8, 2023.
All relevant comments are posted at the Federal eRulemaking portal:
https://www.regulations.gov. To access the comments at that website,
enter 1004-AE79 in the Searchbox.
Comments on Federalism Implications
Summary of Comments: Several commenters suggested that the BLM
withdraw the proposed rule on the grounds that it exceeds Federal
statutory authority or, in the alternative, revise the proposed rule to
reflect a federalism framework to affirm the States' authority over
State and local mineral resources within the State's boundaries. To
that end, the commenters stated that the final rule has sufficient
federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a federalism
summary impact statement. In support of this position, the commenters
claimed that this rule unlawfully focuses on air quality emissions
rather than waste, and that this focus violates the cooperative
federalism framework under the CAA. The commenters referenced the BLM's
purported preference for flaring over venting and claimed that this
preference for flaring is unsupported because the BLM's regulatory
authority is limited to waste prevention and does not include safety as
a guise to regulate air quality.
Response: The BLM disagrees with the commenters. The BLM developed
this rule based on its statutory authority to prevent and reduce the
waste of natural gas produced from Federal and Indian (not State) land
through improved regulatory requirements pertaining to venting,
flaring, and leaks, while ensuring a fair return to the American
public.\121\ It does not override the States' or Tribes' more stringent
requirements for flaring and gas capture or waste prevention measures
on State or Indian lands. Operators with leases on Federal lands must
comply with the Department's regulations and with State requirements to
the extent that they do not conflict with the Department's regulations.
As stated in the Federalism section of this rule, below, although the
final rule will affect the relationship between operators, lessees, and
the BLM, it will not directly impact States. Accordingly, a federalism
summary impact statement is not warranted.
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\121\ 30 U.S.C. 187.
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Any claim that this rule violates the cooperative federalism
framework under the CAA is likewise unfounded. As discussed below, the
waste prevention rule is intended to prevent the waste of gas from
Federal oil and gas leases and is, therefore, not an air quality
emissions rule. As noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, the
Wyoming court questioned the BLM's authority to--in the court's view--
preempt cooperative federalism under the CAA, using a pretext of waste
prevention. But as consistently explained throughout this preamble,
this final rule is authorized by the BLM's independent statutory
authority to prevent waste of natural gas and is not focused on
achieving any ancillary effects on air quality or climate change. As
such, cooperative federalism requirements under the CAA do not apply to
this final rule.\122\ Moreover, the Department's regulations governing
oil and gas operations on the public lands have long required operators
to conduct operations in a manner that is protective of natural
resources, environmental quality, and public health and safety. See 43
CFR 3162.5-1 and 3162.5-3. As the BLM stated in the proposed rule and
reiterated in the Sec. 3179.50 Safety discussion in this final
preamble, combusting gas rather than venting it into the surrounding
air is safer for operations due to the gas' explosiveness and the risk
to workers from hypoxia and exposure to various associated pollutants.
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\122\ We have found no statutory support for the argument that
any regulation that has ancillary effects on air quality is per se
preempted by the CAA.
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Comments on State or Tribal Variances
Summary of Comments: At least one commenter said that, as a
sovereign regulatory authority over the State and private minerals
located within the State's boundaries, it objected to the requirement
that the State and private mineral holders must seek variances from the
waste prevention requirements. This commenter also concluded that the
variance provision was improper because, according to the commenter,
the rule is an air quality emissions rule.
Response: The BLM decided not to include the provisions for State
or Tribal requests for variances that were found in the proposed rule
at 43 CFR 3179.401 in part because it concluded that the proposed
variance provision could lead to regulatory uncertainty. As stated
above in response to comments regarding federalism implications, the
final rule does not preempt more stringent requirements for flaring,
gas capture, or waste prevention under State or Tribal law, as
appropriate. Operators with oil and gas leases on Federal lands must
comply with the Department's regulations and with State requirements,
to the extent that they do not conflict with the Department's
regulations, and similarly operators of Tribal leases must comply with
both Tribal and Departmental regulations. Moreover, the waste
prevention rule is intended to prevent the waste of gas from Federal
and Indian oil and gas leases and is, therefore, not an air quality
emissions rule, as further discussed below.
Comments on Air Quality
Summary of Comments: Some commenters claimed that this rule seeks
to address air quality rather than waste prevention and that the BLM
should defer to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or State
agencies to regulate air quality under the CAA and other authorities.
Response: The BLM disagrees. As discussed above, the rule responds
to the BLM's statutory obligation to prevent waste. The MLA requires
the BLM to subject all oil and gas leases to the condition that the
lessee ``use all
[[Page 25394]]
reasonable precautions to prevent the waste of oil or gas developed in
the land'' and underscores that ``[v]iolations of the provisions of
this section shall constitute grounds for the forfeiture of the
lease.'' \123\ The Act also provides the Secretary with authority to
subject leases to ``such rules . . . for the prevention of undue waste
as may be prescribed by [the] Secretary.'' \124\ Even the Wyoming
court--which vacated portions of the 2016 Rule after the court found it
was primarily justified by air quality benefits--recognized that the
BLM does in fact have authority to promulgate and impose rules designed
to reduce waste, provided such rules are ``independently justified as
waste prevention measures pursuant to [the BLM's] MLA authority.'' 493
F. Supp. 3d at 1067. As explained below, the waste prevention
provisions of the final rule are independently justified, and the air
quality comments from oil-and-gas industry representatives do not
demonstrate otherwise.
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\123\ 30 U.S.C. 225.
\124\ 30 U.S.C. 187.
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Notwithstanding this authority, a commenter opposed to much of the
proposed rule stated that the BLM should avoid conflict or duplication
with EPA's and the States' exercise of their ``exclusive authority''
over air quality. The commenter added that CAA regulation and
enforcement fall within other Federal and State agencies' ``exclusive
jurisdiction.'' The commenter also referred to what it described as the
``exclusive air quality purview'' of EPA and the States, while arguing
that the BLM should not ``assume'' such authority.
The BLM is not regulating air quality in this rule. The BLM is
regulating to prevent waste and to assure payment of royalties pursuant
to independent and express statutory authority. The ability of EPA and
the States to regulate air pollution does not bar the BLM from
fulfilling its statutory obligation to regulate waste. Addressing waste
may have some effects on air pollution and its connection to human
health and welfare, which is the primary responsibility of the EPA,
States, and local governments.\125\ But the possibility that a BLM rule
might have incidental effects on air quality does not strip the BLM
from exercising its clear, express statutory authority under the MLA to
prevent or reduce waste of gas. Cf. Wyoming, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1063
(acknowledging that ``a regulation that prevents wasteful losses of
natural gas from venting and flaring necessarily reduces emissions of
that gas''). The MLA is designed to encourage diligent development of
Federal oil and gas resources, avoid waste, and generate revenue, see
Public Law 66-145, sections 15, 16, 26, 27, while the CAA seeks to
reduce air pollution to protect the public health and welfare. 42
U.S.C. 7401(a)(2), (b)(1). The EPA's regulation of methane emissions
does not excuse the BLM from its obligation to prevent waste of and
generate revenue from Federal oil and gas resources. In the proposed
and final rules, the BLM has explained why it is implementing certain
measures for waste prevention or other matters attendant to BLM
authority (e.g., safety and royalty measurement).
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\125\ Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3d
Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
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Another comment expressed concern about conflicts between the MLA
and various air quality regulations and statutes. The commenter
specified that the rule should not ``create potential conflicts or
duplication with EPA and State requirements promulgated pursuant to the
CAA and State authorities.'' Another comment expressed concern about a
``potentially conflicting and duplicative BLM regulatory overlay'' on
existing and forthcoming regulations on methane and VOC emissions. As
noted, the CAA and the MLA pursue different statutory goals, which may,
as a general matter, reduce the possibility of conflict among specific
regulations promulgated by the BLM and EPA. The successful prevention
of the waste of gas may also lead to air quality effects. Nonetheless,
we have examined the EPA's methane-related regulations and the EPA's
OOOO series rules \126\ and have avoided conflict by focusing on the
BLM's waste prevention and royalty measurement mandates, while
acknowledging ancillary effects to air quality from this final rule. We
have found no provision of the final rule that prevents compliance with
EPA's regulations.
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\126\ 77 FR 49490, 49542 (Aug. 16, 2012); 81 FR 35824, 35898
(June 3, 2016); 86 FR 63110 (Nov. 15, 2021).
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Enactment of the CAA did not repeal any section of the MLA or any
of the BLM's other statutory authorities. Thus, neither the CAA, nor
the programs of the EPA, States, or Tribes relieve the BLM of its
statutory obligations to prevent waste and to assure royalty
accountability. Similarly, nothing in this final rule interferes with
any air quality regulation of EPA, the States, or Tribes.
In sum, we conclude that the final rule is a proper exercise of the
agency's authority under the MLA and other statutes (discussed above)
to promulgate regulations for the prevention of waste. Its ancillary
effects on air quality are not disqualifying and, despite commenters'
suggestions to the contrary, do not defeat the provisions of the MLA
discussed above, as reinforced by the IRA.
Commenters also suggested that the BLM's proposed rule implicates a
``major question'' as that term is used in West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.
Ct. 2587 (2022). In that case, the Supreme Court vacated an EPA
rulemaking because, according to the Court, EPA ``claimed to discover
in a long-extant statute an unheralded power representing a
transformative expansion in its regulatory authority,'' ``located that
newfound power in the vague language of an ancillary provision of the
Act,'' and ``adopted a regulatory program that Congress had
conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact itself.'' Id. At 2610.
The Supreme Court went on to hold that, in such circumstances,
colorable congressional authorization was insufficient; the agency must
instead point to ``clear congressional authorization'' for its actions.
Id. At 2614.
The final rule is not the type of ``extraordinary'' Rule that
implicates a major question. See Id. At 2609. The BLM has not claimed
to discover any novel authority in the MLA. Rather, a lessor's legal
capacity to prevent waste extends back at least to the common law
prudent operator standard. Congress codified the Secretary's authority
and obligation to prevent waste in 1920, when it drafted the MLA to
provide that ``[e]ach lease shall contain . . . a provision that such
rules . . . for the prevention of undue waste as may be prescribed by
said Secretary shall be observed.'' \127\ Congress affirmed the BLM's
authority and obligations in 2022, when, in the IRA, it required the
BLM to charge royalties on gas that was not ``unavoidably lost'' but
did not otherwise define that term.\128\ By the same token, the MLA
provisions at issue here are not ``ancillary:'' they have been squarely
and explicitly relied upon for decades in efforts to reduce waste. In
short, the Department's authority to regulate waste is--and always has
been--a component of its authority to lease.
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\127\ See 30 U.S.C. 187).
\128\ As previously stated in the preamble, the IRA provides
that, for leases issued after August 16, 2022, royalties are owed on
all gas produced from Federal land, subject to certain exceptions
for gas that is lost during emergency situations, used for the
benefit of lease operations, or ``unavoidably lost.''
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Beyond this longstanding authority, the BLM's rule is narrower than
the
[[Page 25395]]
Supreme Court's characterization of the rule in West Virginia. That
rule, according to the Court, ``balance[ed] the many vital
considerations of national policy implicated in deciding how Americans
will get their energy.'' 142 S. Ct. at 2612. Accord Biden v. Nebraska,
143 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2023) (striking down student loan forgiveness
program on the grounds that ``no regulation premised on [the ostensibly
authorizing statute] has even begun to approach the size or scope of
the Secretary's program''). Here, the BLM is changing its regulations
to marginally adjust waste prevention--merely one component of oil and
gas production--under the MLA and the Indian minerals statutes. Those
statutes, in turn, reflect merely one component of the nation's total
oil and gas production, which itself is merely one component of the
nation's total energy mix.
Nor has Congress considered and rejected the measures in this final
rule. Commenters did not provide evidence showing that the most
significant portions of this rule--new requirements for APDs,
clarification of the term ``avoidably lost'', and leak detection--have
been the subject of congressional debate. Ultimately, ``common sense''
indicates that the MLA and the IRA reflect precisely ``the manner in
which Congress [would have been] likely to delegate'' the technical and
discrete issue of waste prevention vis-[agrave]-vis public minerals.
West Virginia at 2609. The BLM therefore did not make changes based on
these comments.
Comments on Ways To Minimize Waste of Natural Gas During the Leasing
Stage
Summary of Comments: The BLM requested public comment on how it can
improve its processes pertaining to the leasing stage of development to
minimize the waste of natural gas during later stages of development.
Some commenters recommended that the BLM require WMPs at the land use
planning stage or when an operator nominates parcels of land for
leasing under an Expression of Interest. Although at least one
commenter recommended that the BLM require a WMP during the leasing
stage, at least one other commenter objected to that proposal. At least
one commenter objected to the BLM's proposed requirement that an APD
include a WMP and specifically protested what it claimed to be vague
standards for approval or denial of the plan. The commenter further
stated that this proposed provision potentially duplicates a State's
gas capture plans and may delay or cause the State permit to expire if
the rule required the operator to submit information that conflicts
with the State's requirements. Another commenter requested that the BLM
remove any requirement for the operator to provide confidential
business information or otherwise unavailable information in the WMP
because the operator does not possess this information and it is not
helpful for the specific purpose it is intended.
Response: As discussed further in the Section-by-Section
discussion, the BLM in this final rule has retained the requirement to
submit a WMP with a Federal or Indian oil and gas APD, or, in the
alternative, submit a self-certification statement that would commit
the operator to capturing 100 percent of the associated gas produced
from an oil well and would obligate the operator to pay royalties on
all lost gas except for gas lost through emergencies. The BLM has
reviewed the comments and changed the provisions for a WMP. Under the
final rule, the operator may submit either: (1) a self-certification
statement committing the operator to capture 100 percent of the
associated gas less any on-lease use of associated gas pursuant to
subpart 3178; or (2) a WMP that includes, among other requirements, a
certification that the operator has a valid, executed gas sales
contract for the associated gas. A WMP is subject to the avoidable loss
flaring limit established in final Sec. 3179.70, while self-
certification is a statement that the operator will be able to capture,
as defined in final Sec. 3179.10, 100 percent of the associated gas.
In the case of self-certification, 100 percent of the oil-well flared
gas has a royalty obligation from the date of first production until
the well is plugged and abandoned, less any on-lease use of associated
gas pursuant to subpart 3178.
The BLM has added the self-certification option to the final rule
in response to comments that the waste prevention plan requirement is
overly burdensome for industry and provides little benefit to the BLM.
The self-certification option serves the dual purposes of providing
operators with a less burdensome alternative, while simultaneously
reducing waste through the encouragement of capture, a term defined in
the proposed rule and unchanged in the final rule. The updated
requirement provides the operator with the flexibility to secure a
valid, executed gas sales contract or elect to expedite approval of the
APD with a self-certification statement. In making this decision,
operators may consider, e.g., the time to secure a gas sales contract,
the desired date of the oil well completion, or the flaring royalty
obligation associated with either a WMP or self-certification.
The BLM disagrees with a commenter's belief that the WMP
potentially duplicates a State's gas capture plans or would delay or
cause a State permit to expire if the rule requires the operator to
provide confidential or otherwise unavailable information. In any State
or on any Tribal lands with essentially the same requirements as this
final rule, this rule has no additional substantive burden on
operators. As previously stated, the final rule does not preempt any
State's or Tribe's requirements that are more stringent with respect to
flaring and gas capture requirements or for waste prevention. There is
nothing unique about this rule's interaction with State or Tribal law;
those laws have always applied to operations regulated by the BLM,
except on the rare occasion in which they prevent compliance with BLM
regulations. More stringent State or Tribal regulations apply of their
own force. Operators with leases on Federal lands must comply with both
the Department's regulations and with State or Tribal requirements, to
the extent that the non-Federal requirements do not conflict with the
Department's regulations. None of the commenters have shown that any
portion of the rule would interfere with the States' or Tribes' ability
to regulate oil and gas operations on Federal lands or that the
operator cannot comply with both the final rule and State or Tribal
regulations.
After carefully considering the comments received concerning
confidential information that may be included in the WMP, as well as
information that is not within the operator's purview, the BLM has
revised the required information in the WMP to align with the BLM's
waste prevention objectives more closely. For example, the BLM is not
finalizing the proposal for operators to identify in the WMP the
anticipated daily capacity of the pipeline at the anticipated date of
first gas sales from the proposed well, or the proposal to include any
plans known to the operator for expansion of pipeline capacity for the
area that includes the proposed well. Commenters indicated that this
information could be confidential and proprietary information that
belongs to midstream companies and that oil and gas operator are
obligated to keep confidential. We agree.
[[Page 25396]]
Comments on Definition of ``Unreasonable and Undue Waste of Gas'' in
the Loss of Oil or Gas, Avoidable or Unavoidable Determination, and the
Prudent Operator Standard
``Unreasonable and undue waste of gas,'' avoidable or unavoidable
determination, and the prudent operator standard are interrelated and
warrant a combined discussion. Accordingly, the following summary of
comments and the BLM's response will cover these three concepts.
Summary of Comments: In the proposed rule, the BLM requested public
comment on the definition of ``unreasonable and undue waste of gas,''
which the BLM considers when determining whether the loss of oil or gas
is avoidable or unavoidable. Commenters suggested that the definition
include an express reference to economic feasibility because, according
to the commenters, the rule will become unwieldy and difficult for the
BLM to administer without this economic consideration. Commenters
expressed concern that the proposed avoidable loss threshold ignores
whether the lessee is acting reasonably and prudently without any
evaluation of the operator's actual economic circumstances, and that
flaring is not automatically ``waste.''
Response: We disagree with the commenters' suggestion that the rule
should accommodate economic feasibility for individual flaring cases.
In the proposed rule, the BLM explained that ``lessees have an
obligation of reasonable diligence in the development of the leased
resources, rooted in due regard for the interests of both the lessee
and the lessor.'' 87 FR 73597. The lessor has an interest in collecting
royalties on production and in conserving gas for future disposition.
The proposed rule also explained that the prudent operator standard
looks to the operation of a lease as a whole and considers the
interests of both the lessees and the lessors in conserving and
developing the Federal mineral resource. However, with the final rule,
the BLM has decided to not carry forward the proposed definition of
``unreasonable and undue waste of gas'' and removed the term from Sec.
3179.10 and references to the definition in Sec. Sec. 3179.100 and
3179.70(b). The BLM has determined that the definition might create
unnecessary confusion and is not relevant for purpose of carrying out
Sec. Sec. 3179.100 and 3179.70(b).
Several commenters objected to the BLM's discussion of the prudent
operator standard, which focuses on the lease as a whole, and argued
that the prudent operator standard forecloses the BLM from imposing
measures for waste prevention that may, in some situations, require an
operator to spend more than the value of potentially wasted gas. That
is, the commenters did not contend that the BLM's rule would render
leases unprofitable on the whole, but merely that the prevention of
marginal waste might not, from the individual operator's perspective
(and particularly for low volume producers) pay for itself.
In support of this reading, the commenters cited the BLM's
regulatory definition of waste as:
any act or failure to act by the operator that is not sanctioned by
the authorized officer as necessary for proper development and
production and which results in: (1) A reduction in the quantity or
quality of oil and gas ultimately producible from a reservoir under
prudent and proper operations; or (2) avoidable surface loss of oil
or gas.
43 CFR 3160.0-5 (emphasis added). The definitions in 43 CFR 3160.0-5
explicitly apply to part 3160 only, and the BLM notes that most of the
regulations in this final rule appear in part 3170. In any event, there
is no conceptual inconsistency between the regulations in that part and
the definitions in part 3160. The definition of ``waste'' in part 3160
indicates that gas is wasted where, inter alia, loss is avoidable, and
the final definitions in part 3170 explain when loss is avoidable and,
separately, what subset of ``waste'' is ``undue.'' To avoid confusion,
the final rule has deleted the word ``prudent'' where it had occurred
in the proposed rule. See Sec. 3179.41(a) and (b).
It is unclear precisely why commenters believe this provision is
inconsistent with a fair reading of the non-statutory prudent operator
standard and why they believe that standard requires a narrower
reading. It is true, as commenters note (and as discussed elsewhere in
this rule), that NTL-4A and IBLA caselaw have previously recognized
``unavoidably lost'' gas--the waste implicitly contemplated by 43 CFR
3160.0-5(1)--as excluding those cases where, in a case-by-case
determination, ``the Supervisor determines that said loss resulted from
. . . the failure of the lessee or operator to take all reasonable
measures to prevent and/or control the loss.'' NTL-4A. II.A. For the
reasons explained elsewhere in this preamble, such case-by-case
determinations are no longer sufficient for the BLM's fulfillment of
its obligations to prevent waste. Here, we explain why the authorities
cited by some commentors do not require individualized determinations.
Thus, for example, commenters' frequent citations to court
decisions and to the IBLA decisions in Ladd Petroleum Corporation and
Rife Oil Properties are misplaced. Ladd did not address the meaning of
the prudent operator standard or avoidably lost gas at all, and instead
held that, where the BLM had chosen to issue certain guidance detailing
case-by-case feasibility determinations, the substance of that guidance
should govern in pending administrative appeals. 107 IBLA 5 (1989).
Rife Oil, meanwhile, stands for the proposition that NTL-4A provided
for case-by-case waste determinations, not that the MLA and FOGRMA
require such determinations. 131 IBLA 357, 373-75 (1994).\129\ The same
is true for the cases cited by Ladd and Rife Oil. See Lomax Exploration
Co., 105 IBLA 1 (1988) (concluding that NTL-4A applied to certain
venting or flaring without passing on the BLM's discretion to modify or
depart from NTLA-4A); Mallon Oil Co., 107 IBLA 150, 156 (1989) (same);
Maxus Exploration Co., 122 IBLA 190, 198 n.1 (1992) (``As the word
`economic' is used in NTL-4A, it relates to a lessee's argument that
conservation of the gas is not viable from an economic standpoint . . .
.'') (emphasis added).
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\129\ In dicta, the Rife Oil decision considered a possible
``read[ing] [of] NTL-4A as barring the venting of gas . . . without
regard to whether it was avoidably lost'' within the meaning if NTL-
4A, 131 IBLA at 374, hypothesizing that such a reading ``would lead
to potential waste of oil where production of oil was marginally
economic but production of gas was not economic and the requirement
to market the gas caused a premature abandonment of the well.'' Id.
at 374 n.6 (emphasis added). This abstract hypothetical says nothing
regarding the United States' general authority as lessor to balance
by regulation the waste from potential loss of gas against the waste
from potential loss of oil, much less does it evaluate the specific
balancing the BLM has performed throughout in this rule.
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Some commenters also concluded that the IRA essentially codified
NTL-4A's definitions of ``avoidable'' and ``unavoidable,'' reasoning
that Congress must have been aware of the BLM's pre-2016 definitions of
those terms. The IRA, however, did not provide a statutory definition
of ``avoidable'' or ``unavoidable,'' and did not prohibit the Secretary
of the Interior from promulgating a rule to define and implement those
terms under her existing statutory authorities. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C.
189.\130\ The IRA did not amend the MLA to require the type of case-by-
case evaluations the commenters seek, and commenters have
[[Page 25397]]
not provided ``the sort of overwhelming evidence of [congressional]
acquiescence'' to NTL-4A's definitions ``necessary to support [their]
argument in the face of Congress's failure to amend.'' Sackett v. EPA,
143 S. Ct. 1322, 1343 (2023).\131\
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\130\ ``The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to prescribe
necessary and proper rules and regulations and to do any and all
things necessary to carry out and accomplish the purposes of [the
MLA].''
\131\ In the context of drainage (the original problem addressed
by the prudent operator standard) the BLM has promulgated
regulations detailing a lessee's obligations to avoid uncompensated
drainage or to pay compensatory royalties. 43 CFR 3162.2-2 to
3162.2-15. Thus, as in this final rule, the BLM by regulation
specifies the duties of lessees without reliance upon common law
standards, including the prudent operator standard.
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Commenters also cited FOGRMA's provision that lessees are liable
for royalties when ``waste is due to negligence . . . or . . . failure
to comply with any rule or regulation . . . under any mineral leasing
law.'' 30 U.S.C. 1756 (emphasis added). This provision says nothing of
the prudent operator standard and imposes royalty for failure to comply
with any applicable regulations, including the regulations at issue in
this rule. Some commenters attempted to downplay this language by
characterizing FOGRMA as requiring compliance only with ``specific
regulatory requirement[s],'' but the relevant statute does not include
the word ``specific,'' and the commenters provided no explanation as to
how that concept, even if somehow embodied in FOGRMA, would operate to
exclude from royalty obligations those regulations--like this final
rule--designed to conserve the Federal and Indian mineral estates.
Commenters also cited to the District of Wyoming's decision
addressing the merits of the 2016 Rule, but that decision likewise does
not compel the commenters' preferred reading of the prudent operator
standard or elevate it to a statutory limit on the Secretary's
rulemaking authority. The relevant portion of the decision began by
reciting the history of the BLM's case-by-case evaluation of
feasibility, citing Rife Oil and the IBLA's Ladd Petroleum decision.
See Wyoming, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 1073-74.\132\ The Wyoming court then
concluded that although the ``MLA's waste provisions leave room for
interpretation,'' the BLM's 2016 construction of those provisions was
unlawful because the BLM had ``primarily'' sought to ``benefit the
environment and improve air quality,'' as reflected in the BLM's
reliance on the 2016 Rule's ancillary effects. Id.
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\132\ In the Wyoming decision, the court characterized the
IBLA's Ladd holding as ``remanding BLM decision that flared gas was
avoidably lost for determination of `whether in fact it was
economically feasible to market the gas' and explaining that
interpretation of NTL-4A giving operator opportunity to show gas was
not marketable `is consistent with the intent of the underlying
statutory and regulatory authority.' '' This statement is a quote
from a headnote in IBLA's decision, not the decision itself. Ladd
Petroleum Corp., 107 IBLA 5 (1989).
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In both its proposed and final rules, however, the BLM is
exclusively focused on addressing waste and royalty payments, along
with certain safety provisions, and has disavowed in form and substance
any effort to regulate air quality in a manner entrusted to EPA and
that agency's State and Tribal partners, including by eschewing any
reliance on ancillary effects on the atmosphere. Instead, the BLM has
promulgated this rule purely to curb the excessive, accelerating, and
nationwide waste of Federal and Indian gas and to curb localized
hazards to human health and safety from operations. As it did in the
2016 Rule, the BLM has acknowledged its ``decades-long practice of
factoring in operator economics on a case-by-case basis when
determining whether a loss was avoidable,'' explaining in this
rulemaking why the MLA's waste provisions--which ``leave room for
interpretation''--now justify a suite of nationwide standards and
important flexibilities for specific operators and leases. Id.
Therefore, the final rule does not conflict with the Wyoming court's
decision.
In dicta, the Wyoming court also discussed the prudent operator
standard without reference to considerations like the social cost of
methane. Id. The District Court cited caselaw and the MLA for the
general proposition that ``[o]il and gas leases--including those
between the Federal Government and its lessees--are intended to ensure
mutually profitable development of the lease's mineral resources.'' Id.
(emphasis added). Indeed, the cases cited by the Wyoming court stand
for the proposition that a mineral lease is fundamentally different
from ``a business into which [the lessee] puts property, money, and
labor exclusively his own, the profits and losses in which are of
concern only to him, and the conduct of which may be according to his
own judgment . . . .'' Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814
(8th Cir. 1905). Instead, the ``interest in the subject of the lease .
. . make the extent to which . . . the operations are prosecuted of
immediate concern to the lessor.'' Id. As the BLM noted in the proposed
rule and reaffirms here, these general propositions do not specify
precisely how the United States, as manager of the Federal mineral
estate, must perform its statutory duty of preventing waste, and,
specifically, whether it must do so on a case-by-case basis or elevate
an operator's profit maximization over the United States' duties to the
taxpayers and to Indian mineral owners.
As discussed in Brewster, one way the lessor may elect to enforce
this interest is by seeking expedited production, so that the lessee's
failure to develop the lease does not ``exhaust'' the oil and gas
``through the operation of wells on adjoining lands.'' Id. See also
Gerson v. Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444, 446 10th Cir.
1945 (``A lease of this kind contains an implied covenant that the
lessee will exercise reasonable diligence in the development of the
leasehold and in the protection of it from undue drainage through wells
on adjacent lands.'') (emphasis added). The prudent operator standard
chiefly applies to these drainage cases, in which it protects the
operator from overbroad allegations of a ``breach of the covenant for
the exercise of reasonable diligence.'' Brewster, 140 F. at 814-15
(emphasis added). Given the significant cost of drilling a new well
\133\ ``and the fact that the lessee must bear the loss if the
operations are not successful,'' the standard shields the lessee from
demands to drill unprofitable wells ``even if some benefit to the
lessor will result'' from less drainage. Brewster, 140 F. at 814
(emphasis added). See also Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F.
Supp. 332, 333 (D. Wyo. 1963) (``the `prudent operator' rule . . . is
to the effect that the lessee has no implied duty to drill an offset
well if reasonably prudent operators would not drill it'').
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\133\ According to a 2016 report by the Energy Information
Agency: ``Total capital costs per well in the onshore regions
considered in the study [ranged] from $4.9 million to $8.3 million,
including average completion costs that generally fell in the range
of $ 2.9 million to $ 5.6 million per well. However, there is
considerable cost variability between individual wells.'' Trends in
U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Upstream Costs, p.2 (U.S. E.I.A. March
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In other words, the prudent operator standard originally arose in
and chiefly applies to drainage, but the principles underlying the
standard equally enable the lessor to exercise its ``immediate
concern'' in the lease by requiring conservation of the mineral estate.
Brewster at 814. The policy concerns ordinarily animating application
of the prudent operator standard are not as salient in the latter case,
where there is materially less risk that the lessor will seek to reap a
profit by asking the lessee to shoulder a significant net loss. A
lessor requiring the lessee to conserve marginally more resources
generally does not, for example, seek royalties from significant
capital expenses, borne by the lessee, ``incident to the work of
exploration,'' Id., or to ``drill[ing] an
[[Page 25398]]
offset well.'' Gerson, 149 F.2d at 446.\134\ Congress essentially
codified that understanding in the MLA, commanding the Secretary of the
Interior to ``obtain for the public a reasonable financial return on
assets that `belong' to the public,'' while requiring only ``some
incentive'' for development. Cal. Co. v. Udall, F.2d 384, 388 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Accord Parker A. Lee, Ming Lei, Dominique J. Torsiello,
``Reasonably Prudent Operator or Good and Workmanlike Manner: Does
Your Contract Have the Right Standard of Care?'' McDermott Will &
Emery, The National Law Review, XIII, Number 27 (``Under the
reasonably prudent operator standard, the lessee or operator is
obligated to make reasonable efforts to develop the interest for the
common advantage of both the lessor and lessee.'') (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In all events--and contrary to the commenters' arguments in support
of individualized economic analyses--any application of the prudent
operator standard considers the profitability of the entire lease, not
whether individual volumes of potentially wasted gas are themselves
profitable for the lessee. See Gerson, 149 F.2d at 446 (``the lessee
does not bear an implied obligation . . . unless, taking into
consideration all existing facts and circumstances, it would probably
produce oil in sufficient quantity to repay the whole sum required to
be expended, including the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating
the well, and also pay a reasonable profit on the entire outlay''). For
the reasons discussed in this preamble, the BLM has reached reasonable
determinations, with respect to each of its waste prevention measures,
that the marginal restrictions in the final rule will not render a
lease unprofitable.
On this score, some commenters argued that the draft RIA shows that
the costs of the proposed rule exceed the benefits, and therefore the
rule is arbitrary and capricious and/or is in tension with the prudent
operator standard. The BLM disagrees. The RIA for the final rule
provides estimates of the monetized costs and benefits under the
accounting rules in OMB Circular A-4, p.38 (2003), and acknowledges
that not all costs and benefits can be monetized. Comparison of
monetized benefits to monetized costs provides useful but not complete
analysis, and thus is not determinative with respect to the non-
statutory prudent operator standard. The final rule requires operators
to incur some expenses from which they may derive revenue (selling the
gas), or may not gain revenue (paying royalties on flared gas or
curtailing oil production to limit flaring). For example, the RIA
treats royalties as ``transfer payments.'' Transfer payments do not
increase or decrease the wealth of society as a whole, and thus are not
counted as benefits of the final rule under the OMB Circular. For the
Federal taxpayers and Indian mineral owners, though, royalty payments
are income, and as such are benefits to which they are entitled under
statute, regulations, and the terms of leases. We also note that some
industry commenters point out that some of the costs of the proposed
rule projected in the draft RIA are for tasks that are already required
by the EPA in New Source Performance Standards subpart OOOOa. The BLM
acknowledges that some projected costs are for tasks now required in
the final EPA New Source Performance Standards subparts OOOOa, OOOOb,
and OOOOc rules, as addressed in the RIA.
Comments on Banning Routine Flaring and Requiring Gas Capture
Summary of Comments: Some commenters requested that the BLM's final
rule include a prohibition on ``routine flaring'' and that the final
rule should ``require capture of flared gas where it is both
technologically and economically feasible.'' The commenters also assert
that the BLM is ``legally required to reduce waste, not just charge
royalties on it.'' They note that reducing the waste of avoidably lost
gas through capture requirements will also benefit ``individual
taxpayers and Tribes and will have the added co-benefits of protecting
frontline communities and the climate from the effects of wasted gas.''
Some commenters specifically noted the impacts of oil and gas
operations and venting and flaring on environmental justice communities
and asserted that charging royalties on flaring of associated gas and
requiring WMPs will not significantly reduce venting and flaring
without a prohibition on routine flaring.
Response: The BLM disagrees with those commenters in part. The MLA
does not mandate capture of all gas as such or place a ban on venting
or flaring as such, but instead requires operators to ``use all
reasonable diligence to prevent the waste of oil or gas developed in
the land.'' \135\ As commenters note, the MLA also requires that all
leases include ``a provision that such rules for . . . the prevention
of undue waste as may be prescribed by said Secretary shall be
observed.'' \136\ Those statutory provisions accommodate instances
where waste is not preventable, even when operators employ all
reasonable diligence. Likewise, section 50263 of the IRA does not
mandate capture of gas or place a ban on venting or flaring as such,
but instead requires, subject to exceptions, the payment of royalties
on gas that is consumed or lost by venting, flaring, or negligent
releases through any equipment during upstream operations.\137\ In
short, Congress could have banned venting and flaring as such in the
MLA or IRA, but did not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\ 30 U.S.C. 225 (emphasis added).
\136\ 30 U.S.C. 187 (emphasis added).
\137\ (a) IN GENERAL.--For all leases issued after the date of
enactment of this Act, except as provided in subsection (b),
royalties paid for gas produced from Federal land and on the outer
Continental Shelf shall be assessed on all gas produced, including
all gas that is consumed or lost by venting, flaring, or negligent
releases through any equipment during upstream operations.
(b) EXCEPTION.--Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to--
(1) gas vented or flared for not longer than 48 hours in an
emergency situation that poses a danger to human health, safety, or
the environment; (2) gas used or consumed within the area of the
lease, unit, or communitized area for the benefit of the lease,
unit, or communitized area; or (3) gas that is unavoidably lost. 30
U.S.C. 1727.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule implements the requirement in section 50263 of the
IRA to assess royalties on gas that is lost by venting and flaring.
Although the BLM believes that the royalty obligation for flared gas
provides some marginal incentive for operators to make investments to
sell the gas rather than to pay royalties on flared gas, we agree with
the commenters that the statutory requirement for operators to use all
reasonable diligence to prevent waste is a separate though related
mandate--one that the final rule achieves through such requirements as
a WMP.
Some commenters assert that to meet the MLA's requirements, the BLM
must: (1) adopt a definition of ``unreasonable and undue waste'' that
clarifies that routine flaring constitutes avoidable loss; (2) ban
routine flaring, as some States have done; and (3) include only narrow
exceptions where there is no alternative to venting or flaring. The BLM
agrees that much of the historical flaring was avoidable, and as
discussed below, the final rule includes provisions that impose limits
on what would otherwise be ``routine flaring,'' including the
definition of ``unavoidably lost'' in Sec. 3179.41(b). We disagree,
though, that the MLA requires that all routine flaring be defined as
``avoidable'' loss. The MLA requires operators to use ``reasonable
diligence'' to avoid waste, and thus ``reasonable diligence'' to
prevent undue waste; the statute does not prohibit all venting and
flaring. Contrary at least one commenter's views, therefore, the final
rule is not based on maximizing operators' internal profit--that is not
the
[[Page 25399]]
test for ``reasonable diligence,'' and the final rule may require some
operators to incur some costs of compliance. Other operators may design
and operate their facilities to capture and sell virtually all oil-well
gas at a profit, but that is merely sufficient--not necessary--for
compliance with the relevant portions of the rule. Although the MLA
does not authorize the BLM to prohibit all flaring, State laws or
regulations prohibiting routine flaring apply to operations on Federal
lands.
Some commenters argue that FLPMA requires the BLM to protect the
quality of the air and atmospheric resources, citing 43 U.S.C.
1701(a)(8). Section 1701(a)(8) states it is the ``policy of the United
States'' that ``the public lands be managed in a manner that will
protect the quality of [various ecologic values, including] air and
atmospheric'' values. That statement, however, is ``effective only as
specific statutory authority for [its] implementation is enacted by
[FLPMA] or by subsequent legislation and shall then be construed as
supplemental to and not in derogation of the purposes for which public
lands are administered under other provisions of law.'' \138\ Here, the
BLM's authority for its waste prevention and safety measures is
established in the MLA, FOGRMA, and the IRA. The purposes of the final
rule are waste prevention and royalty accountability, not air quality
control. The BLM also addresses impacts on air quality in the EA for
the final rule, as required by statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ 43 U.S.C. 1701(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters cited evidence that continued fossil fuel production is
inconsistent with meeting goals of limiting climate change and that
communities living near oil and gas operations suffer
disproportionately high rates of adverse health effects. Those include
several environmental justice communities near oil and gas operations
on the public lands. Those issues are discussed in the NEPA compliance
document and the RIA. However, ending fossil fuel production is outside
the scope of this rulemaking, the purpose of which is to update the
waste prevention requirements for oil and gas development on public
lands. Like several other oil and gas regulations, the final rule may
have some incidental public health and climate effects, but the BLM
does not have authority to regulate air emissions for the benefit of
public health or the climate, and the final rule is designed to address
waste prevention and royalty accountability.
A commenter advocated greater enforcement by the BLM. The BLM
regularly reviews its enforcement programs for effective deployment of
its resources. Enforcement plans, however, are outside the scope of
this rulemaking.
A commenter asserted that the BLM underestimated historical venting
and flaring. The BLM has used the best available data. That data show
that the current regulation at NTL-4A has failed to control venting and
flaring, particularly over the last two decades. Thus, we agree with
the commenter that a more effective regulation is needed to assure that
operators exercise reasonable diligence to prevent waste.
The BLM also recognizes the benefits of gas capture, and the final
rule encourages greater capture and sale of gas from oil wells. In part
in response to these comments, the BLM included in Sec. 3162.3-1 of
the final rule an option for operators to self-certify that they will
capture 100 percent of oil-well gas produced by an oil well as an
alternative to submitting a waste management plan. If a self-certifying
operator flares gas other than in response to a defined emergency, the
loss is ``avoidable'' and fully royalty bearing. Although the BLM has
no firm estimates for the number of operators who will self-certify,
the option should both prevent waste and prove attractive for the
reasons set forth elsewhere in this preamble.
Comments on Impact of the Rule on Indian Leases
Summary of Comments: Noting that the proposed rule was generally
intended to apply in equal measure to Federal leases and Indian leases,
one commenter criticized the rule for not addressing how flaring
limitations and other features of the rule--given their potential to
cause premature shut[hyphen]in or curtailment of oil and gas
production--may disproportionately impact Indian lessors who rely on
production revenues and may not be as willing as the Federal Government
to curtail or shut[hyphen]in production in order to avoid what the
commenter characterized as ``relatively minor'' losses of revenue
resulting from venting or flaring. The commenter also contended that,
under the various Indian leasing statutes--including the IMDA (25
U.S.C. 2101 et seq.)--the BLM must assure that the lands are developed
in a manner that maximizes the ``best economic interests'' of Indian
lessors.
Response: The BLM's regulations apply to oil and gas operations on
Indian trust and restricted fee lands as provided by 25 CFR 221.1(c),
212.1(d), 225.1(c), and the BLM is the bureau tasked with regulating
oil and gas operations on those lands by delegations to the BLM from
the Secretary of the Interior. The purposes of the regulations of
mineral development on Indian lands are to maximize the best economic
interest of the Indian mineral owner and to minimize any adverse
environmental or cultural impact. 25 CFR 221.1(a) (Tribal leases),
212.1(a) (allotted leases), 225.1(a) (IMDA). ``In considering whether
it is `in the best interest of the Indian mineral owner' to take a
certain action . . . , the Secretary shall consider any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to: economic considerations, such as
date of lease expiration; probable financial effect on the Indian
mineral owner; leasability of land concerned; need for change in the
terms of the existing lease; marketability; and potential
environmental, social, and cultural effects.'' 25 CFR 211.3, 212.3,
225.3. Accord, e.g., 25 U.S.C. 2103(b) (IMDA). Thus, economic
considerations, such as immediate production of oil, are relevant
factors, but they are not the sole factors; the regulations promulgated
in accordance with the BLM's statutory authority give the Secretary
broad discretion. The Secretary thus has discretion to require
operators producing Indian oil to take reasonable measures to reduce
waste of Indian resources, to define avoidably lost gas, and to require
payment of royalties to the Indian lessors on avoidably wasted gas.
Since the final rule will apply equally on Indian lands as it does
on Federal lands, there will be no disproportionate impact on Indian
leasing or development. It might be that on some leases at some times,
Indian royalty payments would temporarily decrease as oil production is
curtailed while the operator complies with the final rule. We have no
reason to believe that total long-term revenues from such leases would
suffer, rather we believe they will increase as the operators pay
royalties on the gas as well as on the oil. Indeed, for many leases
there is likely to be no decrease in royalty payments, and most likely
there will be increases in royalty payments because operators will pay
royalties on captured or flared gas with little or no interruption of
oil sales.
We do not believe that the final rule will cause premature plugging
and abandonment of otherwise profitable wells. Every day, oil wells on
Indian lands, as on Federal lands and elsewhere, are produced at
capacity, curtailed, shut in, or plugged and abandoned based on a
variety of factors, including production quantity and quality, costs of
production, availability of transportation, and commodity prices.
Although it is possible that
[[Page 25400]]
compliance with the final rule may increase net costs for some
operators, it would be only one of many business costs for operators
and is likely not as determinative for continuing operations as are the
changes in prices for the oil or gas, either positive or negative.
There is nothing improper in the final rule's requirements to reduce
waste of Indian gas and to pay royalties to the Indian mineral owners
on gas that would otherwise be wasted. The final rule has not been
changed in response to the comment.
Comments on the RIA
In preparing the final rule, the BLM updated the numbers in the
proposed RIA. The updated RIA indicates that the final rule would cost
$19.3 million per year (using a 7 percent discount rate to annualize
capital costs), while generating private costs savings benefits of
around $1.8 million per year and ancillary effects on society from
reduced methane emissions of around $17.9 million per year, with total
benefits averaging around $19.7 million per year. The updated RIA
estimates that the final rule would generate $51 million per year in
royalties. The projected costs changed from the RIA for the proposed
rule to the RIA for the final rule because the final rule does not
include certain requirements from the proposed rule, such as pneumatic
control devices, thereby reducing the rule's costs.
The BLM received a comment stating that the BLM's estimated burden
hours for operators to prepare a WMP was too low. In response, the BLM
notes that there are significantly fewer requirements for a WMP in the
final rule as compared with the proposed rule. Therefore, we believe
that our estimate of 1 hour is appropriate.
One commenter disagreed with the BLM's estimate regarding the
projected number of orifice meters that would be installed the first
year. The intent of the comment is not entirely clear because it only
indicates the commenter's view that an estimated installation of 968
meters appears to be inaccurate but does not specify the nature of the
inaccuracy or how the inaccuracy is a burden to operators. In the final
RIA, the BLM estimates that there would be a total of 902 meters
installed and explains that it uses the 1,050 Mcf threshold to
determine the number of meters installed because the final rule
requires all high-pressure flares with more than 1,050 Mcf of flaring
per month to measure flaring.
The BLM received a comment expressing concern with the
administrative burden resulting from the proposed rule. The BLM
addresses administrative burdens in the RIA and the accompanying
supporting statement under the Paperwork Reduction Act. In the RIA for
the final rule, the BLM estimates that the total annual administrative
burden of the final rule will be about $8.9 million. The BLM notes that
the requirements for a WMP have been significantly reduced in the final
rule. In the final rule, the WMP only requires information operators
would have readily available when submitting an APD. The information
collection activity associated with the WMP required for this rule is 1
hour of additional time to complete an APD. Further, operators have the
option of self-certifying that they will commit to capture 100 percent
of the gas and thus avoid the administrative cost of preparing a WMP.
The information collection activity associated with either preparing
and submitting the WMP or the self-certification is 1 hour of
administrative time. The BLM believes operators submitting APDs for
multiple wells on a single well pad will be able to simply copy and
paste the WMP from one well's APD into the next well's APD. This
copying and pasting for a multi-well pad also has an information
collection burden of 1 hour, which most likely overestimates the time
it will take operators to copy and paste the information from one
document into another. And the final rule does not require ``complete
and adequate'' information in a WMP as proposed, but does require the
WMP to be technically and administratively complete. The phrase
``technically and administratively complete'' is further explained in
the preamble discussion for Sec. 3162.3-1.
V. Section-by-Section Discussion
The following table is provided to aid the reader in understanding
the changes from the proposed rule section numbers and names to the
final rule sections.
Table 1 to IV--Section-by-Section Changes Made From the Proposed to the
Final Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed rule section Final rule section
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3162.3-1 Drilling applications and 3162.3-1 Drilling applications
plans. and plans.
3179.1 Purpose......................... 3179.1 Purpose.
3179.2 Scope........................... 3179.2 Scope.
3179.3 Definitions and acronyms........ 3179.10 Definitions and
acronyms.
3179.11 Severability.
3179.30 Incorporation by
reference (IBR).
3179.40 Reasonable precautions
to prevent waste.
3179.4 Determining when the loss of oil 3179.41 Determining when a loss
or gas is avoidable or unavoidable. of oil or gas is avoidable or
unavoidable.
3179.5 When lost production is subject 3179.42 When lost production is
to royalty. subject to royalty.
3179.43 Data submission and
notification requirements.
3179.6 Safety.......................... 3179.50 Safety.
3179.7 Gas-well gas.................... 3179.60 Gas-well gas.
3179.8 Oil-well gas.................... 3179.70 Oil-well gas.
3179.9 Measuring and reporting volumes 3179.71 Measurement of flared
of gas vented and flared. oil-well gas volume.
3179.72 Reporting and
recordkeeping of vented and
flared gas volumes.
3179.10 Determinations regarding 3179.73 Prior determinations
royalty-free flaring. regarding royalty-free
flaring.
3179.11 Incorporation by reference Renumbered to 3179.30.
(IBR).
3179.12 Reasonable precautions to Renumbered to 3179.41.
prevent waste.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flaring and Venting Gas During Drilling and Production Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3179.101 Well drilling................. 3179.80 Loss of well control
while drilling.
3179.102 Well completion and related 3179.81 Well completion and
operations. recompletion flaring
allowance.
3179.103 Initial production testing.... Removed.
3179.104 Subsequent well tests......... 3179.82 Subsequent well test
for an existing completion.
[[Page 25401]]
3179.105 Emergencies................... 3179.83 Emergencies.
Gas Flared or Vented from Equipment and
During Well Maintenance Operations.
3179.201 Pneumatic controllers and Removed.
pneumatic diaphragm pumps.
3179.203 Oil storage vessels........... 3179.90 Oil storage tank
vapors.
3179.204 Downhole well maintenance and 3179.91 Downhole well
liquids unloading. maintenance and liquids
unloading.
3179.205 Size of production equipment.. 3179.92 Size of production
equipment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3179.301 Leak detection and repair 3179.100 Leak detection and
program. repair program.
3179.302 Repairing leaks............... 3179.101 Repairing leaks.
3179.303 Leak detection inspection 3179.102 Leak detection
recordkeeping and reporting. inspection recordkeeping and
reporting.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State or Tribal Variance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3179.401 State or Tribal requests for Removed.
variances from the requirements of
this subpart.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Immediate Assessments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. 43 CFR Part 3160--Onshore Oil and Gas Operations
Section 3162.3-1 Drilling Applications and Plans
Existing Sec. 3162.3-1 contains the BLM's longstanding requirement
for the operator to submit an APD prior to conducting any drilling
operations on a Federal or Indian oil and gas lease. Drilling may only
commence following the BLM's approval of the APD. The proposed rule
would have added two new paragraphs to Sec. 3162.3-1, intended to help
operators and the BLM avoid situations where substantial volumes of
associated gas are flared from oil wells due to inadequate gas capture
infrastructure.
Proposed Sec. 3162.3-1(j) would have required an operator to
provide a WMP with its APD for an oil well, demonstrating how the
operator intended to address the capture of associated gas from an oil
well when production begins. The purpose of the proposed WMP was to
help the BLM understand how much associated gas could be wasted as a
result of the approval of an APD. The proposed WMP required the
inclusion of the following information with an oil-well APD: the
anticipated completion date of the oil well; a description of the
anticipated production of both oil and associated gas; a certification
that the operator has informed at least one midstream processing
company of the operator's production plans; and information regarding
the gas pipeline to which the operator plans to connect. If an operator
was not able to identify a gas pipeline with sufficient capacity to
accommodate the anticipated associated gas production, the WMP would
have been required to also include the following information: a gas
pipeline system map showing the existing pipelines within 20 miles of
the well and the location of the closest gas processing plant;
information about the operator's flaring from other wells in the
vicinity; and a detailed evaluation of opportunities for alternative
on-site capture methods, such as compression of the gas, removal of
Natural Gas Liquids (NGL), or other capture means. Finally, the
operator would have been required to include any other information
demonstrating the operator's plans to avoid the waste of gas production
from any source, including pneumatic equipment, storage tanks, and
leaks.
The purpose of the proposed WMP was for the operator to provide the
BLM with information necessary to understand how much associated gas
would be lost to flaring if the BLM were to approve the oil-well APD
and whether the loss of that gas would be reasonable under the
circumstances. If the WMP were to demonstrate that approving an
otherwise administratively and technically complete APD could result in
undue waste of Federal or Indian gas, the proposed Sec. 3162.3-1(k)
would have authorized the BLM to take one of the following actions: the
BLM could have approved the APD subject to conditions for gas capture
and/or royalty payments on vented and flared gas; or the BLM could have
deferred action on the APD in the interest of preventing waste. If the
potential for undue waste had not been addressed within 2 years of the
applicant's receipt of the notice of the deferred action, under the
proposed rule the BLM would have denied the APD.
The BLM received numerous comments on the proposed WMP. Based on
those comments, we believe there was some confusion about when a WMP
would be required. For both the proposed and final rules, a WMP is
required when a Federal or Indian APD is required. In both the proposed
and final rules, only wells that are being drilled to target oil
production--in other words Federal or Indian oil-well APDs--will
require a WMP. The BLM assumes that if an operator is drilling a gas
well, there is a predetermined market for the gas or a plan to shut in
wells until gas infrastructure is built. For this reason, if a well is
being drilled to a known gas formation and will be producing primarily
gas, the Federal or Indian APD does not require a WMP.
Based on public comment, the BLM has revised the content of the
proposed WMP in this final rule. Many commenters said the waste
minimization requirements were overly burdensome for both the BLM and
operators. In addition, commenters read the requirements as calling for
operators to provide proprietary, confidential information belonging to
midstream companies that operators are unable to provide. Commenters
were also concerned about how the BLM would evaluate an operator's WMP,
pointing to subjective language in proposed Sec. 3162.3-1(j)
indicating that the BLM could deny an APD if the operator failed to
submit a complete and ``adequate'' WMP. Many commenters said the
proposed required information for the WMP failed to meet the BLM's
stated objectives of understanding associated
[[Page 25402]]
gas capture and reducing waste through flaring prior to approval of a
Federal or Indian APD.
After evaluating the primary objective of the WMP, which is to
ensure operators have adequately planned to reduce associated gas waste
prior to drilling an oil well, the BLM agrees with commenters that the
rule can be effective without requiring all the information in the
proposed rule. The proposed rule required 19 pieces of information for
the WMP for the operator to demonstrate to the BLM that it had
sufficiently planned for the capture or sale of associated gas from an
oil well. After careful consideration of the comments and the purpose
of a WMP, the BLM in the final rule is reducing the information
required to 4 pieces in a WMP: (1) initial oil production estimates and
decline, (2) initial gas production estimates and decline, (3)
certification that the operator has an executed gas sales contract to
sell 100 percent of the produced oil-well gas, and (4) any other
information demonstrating the operator's plans to avoid the waste of
gas.
The BLM agrees with the commenters that BLM's objective--
determining if an operator has a plan to capture the produced gas--can
be accomplished with less information. And as mentioned above, the BLM
intends to eschew collection of information that could be proprietary
or confidential. The final rule also provides operators with an
alternative to the submission of a WMP with their APDs by allowing
operators to instead submit a self-certification statement that the
operator will be able to capture, as defined in final Sec. 3179.10,
100 percent of the oil-well gas that the oil well produces.
The BLM has required the anticipated initial production rate and 3
years of production decline because the BLM has concluded that 3 years
of data will sufficiently cover the ordinarily steep decline for
production for unconventional reservoirs and the associated
establishment of the reservoir's production decline curve. This
information provides the BLM with an estimate of how much associated
gas could be flared, the size of production equipment required at
initial production, and the size of production equipment required when
production has leveled off. The WMP information is relevant to
understand not only the volume at risk for flaring, but also how the
sizing of the production equipment affects tank vapors. (If the
production equipment is undersized or there is insufficient separation
upstream of the production tanks, there will be more gas wasted as tank
vapors.) Approved APDs with a WMP will be subject to the flaring
limitations identified in final Sec. 3179.70 once the well begins
producing. The BLM believes the revised waste minimization requirements
reduce the burden on operators, reduce the review time for the BLM,
eliminate any concern of providing proprietary or confidential
information, and increase the BLM's understanding of the disposition of
the associated gas from an oil well to ensure the public receives a
fair return for its oil and gas.
As an alternative to the submission of a WMP with the APD, Sec.
3162.3-1(d)(4) of the final rule allows operators to submit a self-
certification. Section 3162.3-1(k) provides that a self-certification
is a statement by the operator that it will be able to capture, as
defined in final Sec. 3179.10, 100 percent of the oil-well gas that
the oil well produces. If the operator elects to self-certify, all
flared oil-well gas, except for gas flared under emergencies as
identified in Sec. 3179.83, is an avoidable loss with a royalty
obligation and is not subject to the unavoidable loss threshold in
Sec. 3179.70(a). In the case of self-certification, 100 percent of the
oil-well non-emergency flared gas has a royalty obligation from the
date of first production until the well is plugged and abandoned. The
BLM offers the self-certification alternative to accommodate operators
who may consider this option an advantageous business alternative while
ensuring the public receives a fair return for its oil and gas. An
operator might choose to avoid having to submit a WMP because it can be
relatively easy to design, build, and operate its facilities to capture
all of the gas and sell it. In addition, an operator may want to
accelerate drilling and development in lieu of waiting for a gas
contract and accept the additional royalty obligation as a business
expense should the operator need to flare following drilling and
completion.
The BLM's approval process for the WMP or the self-certification
statement appears in the new final Sec. 3162.3-1(l). With this
addition, the BLM has clarified for operators how the Bureau will
evaluate a WMP or self-certification statement. Upon review of the WMP
or the self-certification, the BLM may take one of the following
actions: (1) approve an administratively and technically complete oil-
well APD with a WMP, subject to the conditions for flared gas described
in Sec. 3162.3-1(j); (2) approve an administratively and technically
complete oil-well APD with a self-certification statement for
associated gas capture subject to the conditions for flared gas
described in Sec. 3162.3-1(k); or (3) defer action on an APD that is
not administratively or technically complete in the interest of
preventing waste until such time as the operator is able to amend its
APD to comply with the requirements in either Sec. 3162.3-1 paragraph
(j) or (k).
The final rule replaces the subjective term ``adequate'' in this
section with the term ``administratively and technically complete.''
The concept ``administratively and technically complete'' appears in
the original Sec. 3162.3-1(d), which states that ``[p]rior to
approval, the application shall be administratively and technically
complete.'' To be administratively complete, an APD must contain all
the required components: a drilling plan, a surface use plan of
operations, evidence of bond coverage, other information as may be
required by applicable orders and notices, and, with the finalization
of this rule, for an oil well, a WMP or self-certification. For an APD
to be technically complete, the APD must fulfill all the requirements
of each of the components and be technically correct pursuant to any
applicable orders and notices. For example, an APD is not
administratively complete if it does not include a drilling plan. If
the APD does include a drilling plan, but the drilling plan fails to
include the appropriate blowout prevention equipment, as required in 43
CFR subpart 3172, then the drilling plan is not technically complete.
A WMP or self-certification will now be a required component of an
APD for it to be administratively complete. If an operator does not
submit a WMP or a self-certification statement with the APD, then the
APD will not be administratively complete. For the WMP or self-
certification to be technically complete, it must contain the required
information in final Sec. 3162.3-1 paragraph (j) or (k). If the
operator submits a WMP that includes only the anticipated oil
production decline curve for 1 year, then the APD is not technically
complete. If an operator fails to include a WMP or self-certification
as required or if the WMP or self-certification fails to meet the
requirements in Sec. 3162.3-1 paragraph (j) or (k), then the BLM will
defer action on the APD until the operator amends the APD to comply
with the requirements of administrative and technical completeness.
Final Sec. 3162.3-1(l)(3) limits the time in which the operator
must address deficiencies in the WMP or the self-certification to
within 2 years of submission of the APD. If the operator does not meet
this deadline, then the
[[Page 25403]]
BLM may disapprove the APD. This change conforms the WMP or self-
certification process with the rest of the current Sec. 3162.3-1 and
review process. Furthermore, a 2-year limit provides operators with
sufficient time to either secure a gas sales contract or proceed with
self-certification in the absence of a sales contract. The 2-year time
limit also ensures that an APD will not remain in a pending status with
the BLM for an extended period because of an operator's lack of
diligence or inability to complete its application. A 2-year limit is
reasonable for an operator who intends to drill on a lease and is
capable of submitting a complete WMP or self-certification.
B. 43 CFR Part 3170--Onshore Oil and Gas Production
Section 3179.1 Purpose
Final Sec. 3179.1 has only one change from the proposed rule. The
BLM changed the name of the Osage Tribe to the Tribe's official name,
The Osage Nation, which the Tribe adopted in 2008. The purpose of
subpart 3179 remains unchanged in the final rule and continues to
implement and carry out the purposes of statutes relating to the
prevention of waste from Federal and Indian oil and gas leases,
conservation of surface resources, and management of the public lands
for multiple use and sustained yield, including section 50263 of the
IRA.
This final rule section continues to clarify that upon publication,
final subpart 3179 supersedes those portions of NTL-4A that pertain to,
among other things, flaring and venting of produced gas, unavoidably
and avoidably lot gas, and waste prevention. Subpart 3178, published on
November 18, 2016 (81 FR 83078), superseded the portions of NTL-4A that
pertain to oil or gas used on lease for beneficial purposes (see 43 CFR
subpart 3178). With the final publication of subpart 3179, NTL-4A has
been superseded in its entirety.
Section 3179.2 Scope
Section 3179.2 of the final rule continues to identify the
operations to which the various provisions of subpart 3179 will apply.
Paragraph (a) states that, in general, the provisions of the final rule
apply to: (1) all onshore Federal and Indian (other than The Osage
Nation) oil and gas leases, units, and communitized areas; (2) IMDA
agreements, except in certain circumstances described in the rule text;
(3) leases and other business agreements and contracts for the
development of Tribal energy resources under a Tribal Energy Resource
Agreement entered into with the Secretary, except under certain
circumstances; and (4) wells, equipment, and operations on State or
private tracts that are committed to a federally approved unit or CA.
Final Sec. 3179.2(a) removes the duplication of the words ``provided
in'' that appeared in the proposed rule.
Final paragraph (b) is substantially the same as proposed paragraph
(b). The only change in the final rule is that the crossed-referenced
sections have been revised to reflect the new section numbers. As in
the proposed rule, it provides that certain provisions in subpart 3179,
namely redesignated Sec. Sec. 3179.50, 3179.90, and 3179.100 through
102, apply only to operations and production equipment located on a
Federal or Indian oil and gas surface estate and do not apply to
operations on State or private tracts, even where such tracts are
committed to a federally approved unit or CA, sometimes referred to as
``mixed ownership'' agreements.
As in the proposed rule, final Sec. 3179.2(b) implicates a
question regarding the BLM's authority raised by the court that vacated
the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule. That court stated that the MLA ``does
not provide broad authorization for the BLM to impose comprehensive
Federal regulations similar to those applicable to operations on
Federal lands on State or privately-owned tracts or interests.'' \139\
In that court's view, the BLM's authority to regulate unit or CA
operations on State and private tracts under the MLA and FOGRMA may be
limited to rates of development and matters directly relevant to the
BLM's proprietary interest in the Federal minerals.\140\ This rule does
not reach a position on the full extent of the BLM's authority to
regulate non-Federal lands. For purposes of this rule, however, we note
that many provisions in the final rule--including final Sec. Sec.
3179.41, 3179.70, 3179.81, 3179.82, and 3179.83 and the final
measurement and reporting requirements in final Sec. Sec. 3179.71 and
3179.72--have a direct impact on royalty revenue and apply to all
operations producing Federal or Indian gas, whether on a Federal or
Indian lease or as part of a mixed-ownership agreement. Other
requirements--such as those related to storage tank hatches and the
leak detection-and repair program--apply when the facilities are
located on Federal or Indian surface estate because those requirements
have a slightly less direct connection to royalties. While the BLM does
not view that connection as dispositive of its authority in this
sphere, it has in this rule chosen to limit application of these
programs in light of the BLM's recent history of regulation and the
possibility that further extending these requirements would generate
relatively small marginal gains in revenue relative to other
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ Wyoming court at 1082.
\140\ Id. at 1082-83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rule redesignates sections throughout the subpart to
standardize the organization of sections in part 3170 (e.g., section
numbers ending in ``30'' will be the sections that contain
incorporation-by-reference material, as required, throughout part
3170). Further, the reorganization of the sections in part 3170 groups
similar topics together under similar section designations for ease of
use and readability.
Section 3179.10 Definitions and Acronyms
This final rule section contains definitions for 12 terms that are
used in subpart 3179 as opposed to the 13 terms that appeared in the
proposed rule. The BLM removed the proposed definition for ``storage
vessel.'' Proposed Sec. 3179.203, which pertained to oil storage
vessels, was significantly revised based on public comment as discussed
further below. Thus, the BLM removed the definition for ``storage
vessel'' and substituted the more commonly understood term ``oil
storage tank'' for ``storage vessel'' in the remainder of subpart 3179.
The use of the common term ``oil storage tank'' brings the final
subpart 3179 into alignment with the use of ``oil storage tank'' in
current subpart 3174.
One commenter recommended that, ``for the purposes of this section,
where there is a State definition that applies for the same BLM term,
the BLM will apply the definition used in the State in which the
applicable gas or oil well is located.'' The BLM is charged with
ensuring that the public and Indian mineral interests receive a fair
return for their oil and gas leases. That obligation necessarily
entails the determination of a lessee's royalty obligation, which, in
the case of waste prevention, relies directly on the BLM's consistent
use of terms. The BLM would be unable to implement the requirements of
this rule consistently--and to ensure a uniformly fair return--if the
Bureau were to rely on multiple, varying, and changeable State
definitions for the terms used in this regulation. Further, if the BLM
were to adopt this approach, and there was a conflict between the BLM
requirements and the State definition, there would be no clear path to
resolution of the conflict. The BLM did not make changes
[[Page 25404]]
to allow for the use of definitions from State code to apply to Federal
and Indian oil and gas regulations for the State in which the
production occurs.
The BLM received comments on the definition for ``automatic
ignition system'' that agree with the BLM's approach to not require a
specific type of device. The BLM agrees that the term ``automatic
ignition system'' connotes the concept of an ignition source without
specifying a particular type of device. To be clear, any applicable
rule of the EPA, a State, or a Tribe regarding such equipment and its
destruction efficiency apply to operations regulated by the BLM.
One commenter stated that requiring a continuous flame is wasteful
and unnecessary. The BLM disagrees with this comment because the
proposed definition of ``automatic ignition system'' only requires a
continuous pilot flare where needed to ensure continuous combustion.
The BLM believes the proposed definition allows for a great deal of
operator flexibility and did not change the ``automatic ignition
system'' definition based on the comments.
The BLM did not receive any comments on the proposed definitions
for ``capture,'' ``compressor station,'' ``gas-to-oil ratio (GOR),'' or
``pneumatic controller.'' Therefore, these four definitions remain the
same in final rule as in the proposed rule.
One commenter requested the BLM to add a definition for ``economic
feasibility.'' The commenter's recommended definition mirrors part of
the definition for ``economically marginal property'' found in subpart
3173. For the proposed rule, the BLM used the term ``economically
infeasible'' in proposed Sec. 3179.203(b), which addressed vapor
recovery systems. Since the BLM has removed the requirement for a vapor
recovery system on oil storage tanks in the final rule, the final rule
no longer references the terms ``economically feasible'' or
``economically infeasible.'' Therefore, the BLM has not included a
definition for ``economic feasibility'' in the final rule.
Commenters recommended that the BLM include a definition for the
term ``exploratory well.'' The BLM has a definition for ``exploratory
well'' in existing subpart 3172, but that definition applies within
that subpart. Leaving the term undefined in this rule could cause
confusion. Accordingly, we are adding the same definition of
``exploratory well'' to this rule as appears in 43 CFR 3172.5:
``[e]xploratory well means any well drilled beyond the known producing
limits of a pool.'' Subpart 3179 resides in part 3170 Onshore Oil and
Gas Production. The definitions that are used within multiple subparts
of part 3170 reside in subpart 3170. Originally published in 1988 as
Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 2, subpart 3172 was codified in the CFR
on June 16, 2023 (88 FR 39514). When the BLM revises subpart 3170, it
will remove the definition for exploratory well from subpart 3172 and
include it in subpart 3170 since the definition now applies to more
than one subpart.
The BLM received numerous comments on the definition for ``gas
well.'' The definition that the BLM included in the proposed rule was
taken from the Conservation Division Manual 644.5. One commenter
recommended including a definition that relied on a GOR standard
throughout the rule and did not recommend incorporating any deference
to the States' definitions in the rule. The commenter did not provide
any recommendation for the appropriate GOR standard for a gas well. The
BLM is aware that many States define a gas well in terms of GOR, and
the GOR varies among State definitions. The BLM has decided not to
change the proposed definition, which relies on whether the well
produces more energy from gas or oil. The BLM has implemented that
definition in the CDM for decades. Commenters did not explain how a GOR
based definition would improve implementation of this final rule.
Conversely, adopting a new definition--one relying on GOR--could create
implementation conflicts insofar as the BLM chooses a GOR that differs
from certain State definitions. Historically, the proposed and final
rule definition has provided the BLM with regulatory flexibility when
interacting with operators and State regulatory authorities by allowing
BLM to adapt to reservoir changes throughout the life cycle of a well
that may result in a well qualifying as an oil well initially and as a
gas well later.
Another commenter recommended removing the BLM definition for ``gas
well'' and reminded the BLM that in its January 11, 2023, virtual
information forum, the BLM stated it uses the gas- or oil- well
designation assigned by a State jurisdiction when resolving
controversial issues. The BLM's statement at the virtual information
forum was based on IBLA's interpretation of NTL-4A.\141\ The BLM has
determined that consistent implementation of this rule would be better
served by a uniform definition of ``gas well'', which it is now
promulgating in this final rule for the first time. The commenter
expressed concerns regarding how any inconsistencies between State well
designations and the BLM's ``gas well'' definition would be reconciled.
The final rule does not affect States' implementation of their
regulatory programs. Accordingly, the final rule does not need a
mechanism for reconciling State well designations. The BLM did not
change the definition for ``gas well'' in the final rule based on the
comments received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ See Rife, 131 IBLA 357 (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter requested that the BLM change its definition of
``high-pressure flare'' to mean ``an open-air flare stack or flare pit
that combusts natural gas at high-pressure volumes leaving a
pressurized vessel greater than 100 psig or more and that in normal
operations would go to a sales line.'' Based on the BLM's experience,
we conclude that, by defining ``high-pressure flare'' as ``leaving a
pressurized vessel greater than 100 psig,'' the rule would apply to
less than 5 percent of flares at Federal or Indian oil-well facilities.
Excluding 95 percent of flares would not accomplish the waste
prevention goals of this rule. Conversely, in this final rule the BLM
intends for any flare carrying gas from a pressurized vessel to be
considered a high-pressure flare and to include most, if not all,
flares that operate due to pipeline capacity constraints. The BLM did
not change the definition to one that includes a pressure threshold to
ensure that most of the associated gas flaring is regulated with this
subpart.
Another commenter suggested the BLM revise the ``high-pressure
flare'' definition to include any flare that would normally go to sales
and provide a definition for ``low-pressure flare'' as associated gas
from separation equipment that would not normally go to sales without
compression. The BLM considered the recommended changes to the
definition for ``high-pressure flare'' and ``low-pressure flare'' and
changed the definition of ``high-pressure flare'' in response to
comments. The final definition is: ``High-pressure flare means an open-
air flare stack or flare pit designed for the combustion of natural gas
that would normally go to sales.'' Under normal operating conditions,
the gas from a pressurized vessel flows through a gas facility
measurement point (FMP) and into a sales line, but, due to pipeline
capacity constraints, the gas from the pressurized vessel sometimes
goes to a flare instead. The BLM disagrees with the commenters that
compression needs to be added to the ``high-pressure flare''
definition, and the BLM believes that defining a low-
[[Page 25405]]
pressure flare as a flare that does not meet the definition of a high-
pressure flare is sufficient for the requirements of this rule. A
commenter suggested adding ``with sufficient pressure to otherwise be
injected into the pipeline without the aid of a compressor.'' There are
operations producing from Federal or Indian leases that use compression
on-lease to have enough pressure to enter the sales line. Locations
with compression also flare due to pipeline capacity issues. Therefore,
the BLM did not add compression to the final definition of ``high-
pressure flare.'' The BLM recognizes and agrees with the comments that
the BLM's proposed definition for ``high-pressure flare'' would include
gas from a second- or third-stage pressurized separation vessel at a
lower pressure than would be required for sales. That is not the BLM's
intent, and the definition was changed based on comments to better
reflect that the requirements for high-pressure flares are meant for
the flared production that would have gone to sales if there were
adequate pipeline capacity.
A third commenter suggested that the BLM should define ``high-
pressure flare'' as combustion of gas that does not require compression
and that could be transported through the connected sales line. The BLM
agrees with the commenter that a high-pressure flare combusts gas that
normally flows to sales and changed the definition in response to the
comment. However, the BLM did not include the phrase ``does not require
compression'' in the final definition because that would
inappropriately limit the definition of high-pressure flare. Some oil
wells produce gas that would not need compression to enter a sales
line, but if the gas is not routed to a sales line, it should be routed
to a flare and therefore subject to the final requirements in Sec.
3179.70. Accordingly, tethering the definition of ``high-pressure
flare'' to the absence of compression might imply that a low-pressure
flare requires compression, which is inaccurate as a matter of practice
and does not reflect the BLM's intent.
For the proposed definition of ``leak,'' the BLM received comments
suggesting removal of the three methods and standards by which a leak
or release may be detected. Other commenters, though, stated that the
definition should remain as proposed. For the final rule definition of
``leak,'' the BLM added the use of audio, visual, and olfactory (AVO)
means for leak detection and removed the reference to ``a leaking vapor
recovery unit'' as an example of a leak, since the requirements for
installation of a vapor recovery unit have been removed from the final
rule. The final rule LDAR program uses AVO detection methods and does
not require operators to evaluate and possibly install vapor recovery
equipment. See final Sec. Sec. 3179.10 and 3179.100.
The BLM amended the final definition of ``leak'' to be consistent
with the final rule's leak LDAR requirements. Commenters recommended
that the removal of the detection methods from the definition. The BLM
retained the detection methods in the definition to provide clarity for
the regulated community and BLM inspectors. Leaks are not considered
leaks unless they can be detected by one of the three methods provided
in the definition. Further, the three identified methods for leak
detection provide operators with facility inspection flexibility.
The BLM received several comments suggesting a rewording of the
proposed definition for ``liquids unloading.'' For additional clarity,
commenters recommended the following rewording to the definition,
``removal of liquid hydrocarbons or water in the wellbore that
accumulated during production of a completed gas well.'' The rewording
did not offer any substantive change from the proposed definition,
which states ``removal of an accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or
water from the wellbore of a completed gas well.'' The BLM did not
change the definition based on the comments received.
The BLM did not change the final rule definition for ``lost oil or
lost gas'' based on comments received. The BLM received comments
suggesting that the BLM expressly exclude royalty-free use of produced
oil or gas on-lease from the definition.
The BLM does not consider royalty-free use of oil or gas on the
lease to be ``lost oil or lost gas,'' but adding an express exclusion
of royalty-free use in the proposed definition for ``lost oil or lost
gas'' could have created confusion or conflict with the implementation
of proposed Sec. 3179.201, regulating pneumatic equipment. Pneumatic
controllers and pneumatic diaphragm pumps use gas designated as on-
lease and royalty-free use pursuant to subpart 3178. Subpart 3178, in
turn, requires that any production used on-lease and royalty-free must
be a reasonable volume, based on the type of equipment used. In the
case of pneumatic equipment, proposed Sec. 3179.201 would have limited
the bleed rate to 6 scf per hour. Thus, if a pneumatic controller had a
higher bleed rate than allowed in proposed subpart 3179 and an operator
were reporting this use as on-lease use, then the controller would have
been in compliance with subpart 3178 and out of compliance with
proposed subpart 3179. For this reason, the BLM removed the pneumatic
equipment requirements in proposed Sec. 3179.201 and did not change
the definition for ``lost oil or lost gas'' in this final subpart.
The BLM received comments recommending a change to the definition
of ``low-pressure flare.'' The proposed rule defined a ``low-pressure
flare'' as any flare that does not meet the definition of a ``high-
pressure flare.'' Based on comments received, the BLM changed the
definition for a ``high-pressure flare'' to state that it combusts gas
that would normally go to sales. Multiple commenters suggested defining
the ``low-pressure flare'' as one that would not normally go to sales
without compression. Since the definition for a ``high-pressure flare''
now requires that the gas stream would normally go to sales, the
proposed definition for ``low-pressure flare'' as one that is not a
``high-pressure flare'' accomplishes what the commenters recommended.
The BLM did not change the proposed definition of ``low-pressure
flare'' in the final rule based on the comments.
One commenter suggested including a definition for ``oil well.''
NTL-4A does not contain a definition for either ``oil well'' or ``gas
well.'' However, the 2016 and 2018 rules that have been vacated by the
court did contain a definition for an ``oil well.'' The BLM believes
that defining a ``gas well'' is sufficient for the purposes of this
rule. The BLM acknowledges that the 2016 and 2018 versions of this rule
provide a definition for ``oil well'' that mirrors the definition for a
``gas well.'' However, this final rule definition of a ``gas well''
necessarily implies that an ``oil well'' is one that is not a ``gas
well.'' The final rule definition for gas well reads, ``Gas well means
a well for which the energy equivalent of the gas produced, including
its entrained liquefiable hydrocarbons, exceeds the energy equivalent
of the oil produced. Unless more specific British thermal unit (Btu)
values are available, a well with a GOR greater than 6,000 standard
cubic feet (scf) of gas per barrel of oil is a gas well.'' Based on the
final definition of ``gas well,'' the BLM believes it functionally
supplies a definition for an oil well as one that produces more energy
in oil than in gas. The BLM did not add a definition for an oil well to
the final rule based on this one comment.
The proposed rule defined ``unreasonable and undue waste of gas''
to mean a frequent or ongoing loss of gas that could be avoided without
causing
[[Page 25406]]
an ultimately greater loss of equivalent total energy than would occur
if the loss of gas were to continue unabated. The BLM requested comment
on the definition of ``unreasonable and undue waste of gas'' in the
proposed rule as well as comment on a proposed alternative definition:
``Unreasonable and undue waste of gas means a frequent or ongoing loss
of substantial quantities of gas that could reasonably be avoided if
the operator were to take prudent steps to plan for and manage
anticipated production of both oil and associated gas from its
operation, including, where appropriate, coordination with other nearby
operations.'' One commenter specifically suggested the inclusion of the
qualifier ``that is economically feasible to avoid'' after ``or the
ongoing loss of gas'' in the proposed definition, stating that the BLM
has always considered economics in making the determination as to
whether the loss of gas is avoidable or unavoidable. The commenter
continued that the removal of economic considerations makes the rule
``unwieldy,'' and ``significantly reduces the BLM's ability to
efficiently administer this regulatory program.'' A number of
commenters recommended the removal of the term ``unreasonable and undue
waste'' that was tied to the proposed WMP, LDAR, and oil-well flaring
requirements. Commenters stated the proposed definition is inconsistent
and arbitrary and does not provide clear guidance. Another commenter
recommended modifications to the proposed alternative definition, which
included the addition of a sentence stating, ``This includes all
venting and flaring of gas unless it arises due to circumstances beyond
the control of the operator or due to temporary operational necessities
that render abatement options infeasible or unsafe.'' The BLM
considered all the comments received on the proposed and alternative
definitions of unreasonable and undue waste, as discussed in the next
paragraph.
Oil and gas deposits are nonrenewable resources and therefore waste
prevention and resource conservation are reasonable requirements for
producing operations, as provided for and required by statute. In the
more than 40 years since the publication of NTL-4A, oil and gas
industry technology has advanced significantly, the market has shifted
from viewing associated gas as a waste product to a commodity, yet loss
of gas from Federal and Indian oil wells has increased in total and on
a per barrel produced basis. An economic feasibility analysis is highly
dependent on multiple variables that one may choose to include in the
analysis, while the more simplified, sensible approach that the BLM is
using here does not require such a multivariate analysis. With the
final rule, the BLM has decided to not carry forward the proposed
definition of ``unreasonable and undue waste of gas'' and removed the
term from the final rule definitions and references to the definition
in that appeared in the proposed rule at Sec. 3162.3-1(k), Sec.
3179.8(b), and Sec. 3179.301. The BLM has determined that the proposed
definition and its alternative proposed definition might create
unnecessary confusion and, moreover, is not relevant for purpose of
carrying out final Sec. 3179.70(b) and Sec. 3179.100. The proposed
definitions would made it unnecessarily difficult for the BLM to take
enforcement actions given the multivariate nature of the definition.
Indeed, the final rule does not use the term ``unreasonable and undue
waste of gas'' anywhere in the regulatory text. Therefore, the BLM
removed the definition.
For the final rule, one commenter suggested that the BLM add a
definition for the term ``vapor recovery tower.'' Since the BLM removed
the provisions for vapor recovery equipment in the proposed Sec.
3179.203 in response to comments, the BLM does not believe the addition
of a definition for a ``vapor recovery tower'' serves any purpose in
the final rule. The BLM did not add a definition to the final rule
based on this comment and the changes made in the final rule.
Section 3179.11 Severability
This new section describes the legal principle of ``severability''
and applies it to the regulations in subpart 3179. If any portion of
these regulations were found invalid or unenforceable as to a
particular set of circumstances or particular people, the remaining
portions of the regulations would remain in effect and the BLM could
continue to enforce them.
The BLM has included this severability section in the final rule to
make its intent clear that the various provisions in the regulation are
independent and that any of the sections of this final rule may either
stand alone or work together and are therefore severable. If a court
were to find certain sections invalid, the remaining sections of the
rule would remain in effect.
Section 3179.30 Incorporation by Reference (IBR)
This final rule incorporates one industry standard without
republishing the standard in its entirety in the CFR, a practice known
as incorporation by reference. This standard was developed through a
consensus process, facilitated by the American Petroleum Institute
(API), with input from the oil and gas industry. The BLM has reviewed
this standard and determined that it will further the purposes of Sec.
3179.71 of this final rule. This standard reflects the industry-
accepted standard for the testing and reporting protocols for a flare
gas meter within a Flare Flow Meter System. Under Sec. 3179.71(c),
ultrasonic meters used in high-pressure flare systems must be tested
for flare use. The legal effect of IBR is that the incorporated
standard becomes a regulatory requirement. This final rule incorporates
the specific version of the standard listed. The standard referenced in
this section would be incorporated in its entirety.
The incorporation of the industry standard follows the requirements
found in 1 CFR part 51. The industry standard can be incorporated by
reference pursuant to 1 CFR 51.7 because, among other things, it would
substantially reduce the volume of material published in the Federal
Register; the standard is published, bound, numbered, and organized;
and the standard proposed for incorporation is readily available to the
general public through purchase from the standard organization or
through inspection at any BLM office with oil and gas administrative
responsibilities. 1 CFR 51.7(a)(3) and (4). The language of
incorporation in final 43 CFR 3179.30 meets the requirements of 1 CFR
51.9.
The API material that the BLM is incorporating by reference is
available for inspection at the Bureau of Land Management, Division of
Fluid Minerals, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1849 C Street NW,
Washington, DC 20240, telephone 202-208-3801; and at all BLM offices
with jurisdiction over oil and gas activities.
The API material is also available for inspection and purchase from
API, 200 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 100, Washington, DC 20001-5571;
telephone 202-682-8000; online purchase https://www.apiwebstore.org/Standards. In addition, the API provides free read-only access to the
API standard that the BLM has incorporated by reference via an online
reading room https://publications.api.org/.
[[Page 25407]]
The following describes the API standard that the BLM incorporates
by reference in this final rule:
API Manual of Petroleum Measurement Standards (MPMS) Chapter 22.3,
Testing Protocol for Flare Gas Metering; First Edition, August 2015
(``API 22.3''). This standard covers the testing and reporting
protocols for natural gas flare meters. This standard discusses the
testing to be performed, how the test data should be analyzed, and how
measurement uncertainty is determined based on the test data.
In the proposed rule, the BLM included two GPA Midstream
Association standards that would have addressed requirements in
proposed Sec. 3179.203(c) for sampling and analysis in the evaluation
of the installation of vapor recovery equipment. Since the BLM has
removed the vapor recovery equipment requirements from the final rule,
there is no longer a need to incorporate those two industry standards
and they have been removed.
In response to comments, the BLM in the final rule has expanded the
acceptable methods for measuring flared oil-well gas volumes from
orifice meters to also include ultrasonic meters. Since ultrasonic
meters are not an approved method of measurement at FMPs pursuant to 43
CFR subpart 3175, the BLM is including the testing protocol from API
22.3 to ensure ultrasonic metering accuracy for high-pressure flares.
Operators who use ultrasonic meters for flare measurement are required
to ensure that these meters are tested for flare use pursuant to API
22.3. The test result report based on API 22.3 must be made available
to the AO upon request.
The BLM received a number of comments requesting the inclusion of
API MPMS Chapter 14.10 Natural Gas Fluids Measurement--Measurement of
Flow to Flares, December 2021, in the industry standards that are
incorporated by reference. The BLM elected not to include this standard
for reasons outlined in the discussion for Sec. 3179.71 of this
preamble.
Section 3179.40 Reasonable Precautions To Prevent Waste
The BLM redesignated this section from Sec. 3179.12 in the
proposed rule to Sec. 3179.40 in the final rule. The BLM received
comments on this section stating that the section: (1) is vague and
would be difficult for the BLM to enforce consistently among field
offices; (2) uses the MLA's ``reasonable precautions to prevent waste''
language absent actionable requirements; and (3) would allow the BLM to
exercise open-ended discretion divorced from regulatory requirements
because it allows the BLM, under proposed paragraphs (b) and (c), to
prescribe ``reasonable measures'' as conditions of approval of an APD.
One commenter supported the BLM's inclusion of the ``reasonable
precautions to prevent waste'' language in this section and concurred
with the BLM's conclusion that what may constitute reasonable
precautions to prevent waste may change over time.
In response to these comments, the BLM notes that the proposed
section simply reflects the BLM's existing statutory authority--already
enshrined by Congress in the MLA--to require reasonable precautions for
preventing waste. The BLM cannot ignore that statutory authority and
duty. And insofar as commenters suggest that the BLM's regulation is in
tension with other regulations--such as the application of royalties to
enumerated categories of ``avoidably lost'' gas--the BLM notes that it
cannot act contrary to statute or regulation and, where regulations
provide the BLM with discretion, it must exercise reasoned decision
making in accordance with the APA. Against these background principles,
commenters did not provide specific examples of any conflicts between
Sec. 3179.40 and other regulations or requirements. Nor did commenters
provide specific examples of how any conceptual tension between the
MLA's ``reasonable precautions'' language and the final regulations
would manifest as an irreconcilable and unworkable conflict with these
or any other Department regulations.
Indeed, the BLM routinely attaches conditions to APDs, chiefly to
apply general statutory and regulatory commands to site-specific
conditions, and to apply lease stipulations to particular wells. If an
operator requests a variance under Sec. 3170.6, for instance, which
requires the alternative to meet or exceed the current requirement, the
BLM may grant the variance with reasonable measures for the
implementation of the variance. To date, operators have not objected to
the BLM's reasonable measures included with Conditions of Approval for
APDs or approvals of measurement variance requests. Further, any
decision the BLM makes to prescribe ``reasonable measures'' that an
operator believes causes harm may be appealed pursuant to Sec. Sec.
3165.3 and 3165.4. The BLM did not change this section in response to
comments and the final rule section remains the same as the proposed
section, except for redesignating the section.
Section 3179.41 Determining When the Loss of Oil or Gas Is Avoidable or
Unavoidable
The BLM redesignated this section from Sec. 3179.4 in the proposed
rule to Sec. 3179.41 in the final rule. In paragraph (a) of this
section, the BLM considers lost oil as an unavoidable loss when the
operator has taken reasonable steps to avoid waste and has complied
fully with applicable laws, lease terms, regulations, provisions of a
previously approved operating plan, and other written orders of the
BLM. Likewise in paragraph (b) of this section, the BLM considers lost
gas as an unavoidable loss based on the grounds described in paragraph
(a) for lost oil, but with a list of operations or sources from which
the gas is lost to qualify as unavoidably lost. Proposed paragraph (b)
in this section contained 14 operations for which gas lost would be
considered an unavoidable loss. The final rule section contains 13
operations for which gas lost would be considered an unavoidable loss.
The BLM removed one operation: initial production testing. The BLM also
removed the term ``prudent'' from the determinations of unavoidably
lost oil and unavoidably lost gas because it could cause confusion with
the prudent operator standard discussed above, and it is not required
for those determinations.
One commenter pointed out that the proposed rule did not address
force majeure, or act-of-God events, such as extreme weather
conditions, and requested that this type of event should be included in
the list of unavoidable losses. The commenter explained that, in its
view, force majeure events may not qualify as ``emergencies,'' as that
term is defined in the proposed rule and the IRA. In the BLM's
experience in considering NTL-4A Sundry Notices, it has encountered
operators who have claimed that pipeline capacity issues should be
considered force majeure events since, in the operators' view, any gas
flared because of a capacity issue is out of its control. The BLM has
concluded that pipeline capacity issues are neither force majeure
events, nor outside an operator's control. As discussed above,
operators have various options to reduce associated gas flaring when
there are pipeline capacity issues, such as curtailing oil production
until pipelines become available, and an operator's choice to continue
oil production unabated when there is no available pipeline capacity
should not mean that the public must lose the value of the royalties
for that flared gas. The BLM disagrees with the comment and will not
include ``force majeure'' in the
[[Page 25408]]
list of unavoidable losses in final Sec. 3179.41(b). The emergency
provision in the final rule will cover most events that are
traditionally thought of as ``force majeure'' events, but provides
clearer standards focused on situations that are true emergencies
rather than simply all those arguably beyond the operator's control. As
discussed below, final Sec. 3179.83 defines an emergency situation as
a temporary, infrequent, and unavoidable situation in which the loss of
gas is necessary to avoid a danger to human health, safety, or the
environment. For the first 48 hours of an emergency, the lost gas is
royalty free.\142\ It is worth noting that if a ``force majeure'' event
prevented production and sale of oil, there would be little or no
venting or flaring.
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\142\ 30 U.S.C. 1727.
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Commenters on this proposed section disagreed with the time or
volume limits set within sections cited in the unavoidable loss list of
operations in proposed Sec. 3179.4(b). In most instances, the
commenters believed the set limits to be too low and found them to be
arbitrary. The BLM has addressed the time or volume limits in final
Sec. Sec. 3179.70, 3179.81, 3179.82, and 3179.83. Each of these
sections discusses the comments received and the BLM's response to the
comments separately.
Numerous commenters objected to the list of unavoidable loss
operations for lost gas and recommended keeping the NTL-4A rule
established 40 years ago, under which the BLM evaluates each event on a
case-by-case basis. Under the commenters' reading of these documents,
gas may be wasted, royalty-free, so long as the economics of production
do not justify the funding and construction, by a single lessee, unit
PA, or CA, of infrastructure, such as a redundant pipeline system or a
gas plant. As set forth above, nothing in the MLA requires adoption of
commenters' reading of the prudent operator standard, and, properly
considered, even if applicable that standard does not foreclose the BLM
from regulating the massive and increasing volume of waste generated
from the development of public minerals: as noted in the proposed rule
preamble, the average amount of flared associated gas per barrel of oil
produced has increased 102 percent between the decade beginning in 1990
and the decade beginning in 2010.
Even on their own terms, NTL-4A and the CDM 644.5 were designed to
allow these outcomes. For example, CDM 644.5 explains that ``economics
of conserving gas must be on a field-wide basis, and the Supervisor
must consider the feasibility of a joint operation between all other
lessees/operators in the field or area.'' Because most gas pipelines or
gas plants do not require a single well to supply them to capacity, but
rather service multiple wells, it is inappropriate to weight the costs
of infrastructure against the value of the gas produced by a single
well or lease.
The BLM also received comments suggesting that the proposed rule's
definition of ``avoidable loss'' is inconsistent with 43 CFR 3162.7-
1(d). That section first provides that ``[t]he operator shall conduct
operations in such a manner as to prevent avoidable loss of oil and
gas.'' In a separate sentence, the regulation states that ``[an]
operator shall be liable for royalty payments on oil or gas lost or
wasted from a lease site . . . when such loss or waste is due to
negligence on the part of the operator of such lease, or due to the
failure of the operator to comply with any regulation, order or
citation issued pursuant to'' 43 CFR part 3160 (emphasis added).
Commenters appear to have read this regulation as equating
``avoidable loss'' with negligence or noncompliance with BLM orders or
regulations, such that the BLM's proposed rule--which deems gas
``avoidably lost'' in certain scenarios where an operator is otherwise
complying with the regulations and is not negligent--is overbroad and
in tension with the existing regulations.
There is no conflict between the BLM's existing regulations and the
proposed rule or this final rule. The regulation at 43 CFR 3162.7-1(d)
provides two distinct conditions for when royalties are owed, namely
that operators must pay royalties on losses or waste resulting from
negligence or from noncompliance with BLM regulations. This final rule
defines avoidable waste and specifies when wasted gas is royalty
bearing. Thus, it is not in conflict with Sec. 3162.-1(d), rather it
is the type of regulation contemplated and referenced by Sec. 3162.7-
1(d).
Paragraph 3162.7-1(d) does not define such royalty-bearing loss or
waste as ``avoidable.'' Rather, it includes a separate requirement that
operators must conduct operations in such a manner as to prevent
avoidable loss.
In comparison, NTL-4A includes a broad definition of ``avoidable
loss'' that has been in place for four decades and that the relevant
commenters did not question, contradicting any suggestion that Sec.
3162.7-1(d) conclusively defines what qualifies as avoidable loss of
gas.
Unlike 43 CFR 3162.7-1(d), but like NTL-4A, the BLM's proposed rule
and this final rule in Sec. 3179.41 define when lost gas is
``avoidably lost'' or ``unavoidably lost'' and apply royalties to
``avoidably lost'' gas in Sec. 3179.42. This final 3179 subpart
provides that lost gas is royalty bearing if it is avoidably lost--that
is, if the operator has not taken reasonable steps to avoid waste, has
not complied with BLM directives, and the gas is coming from sources
other than those listed in Sec. 3179.42(b), it is royalty bearing.
These final regulations better define the conditions for when gas is
royalty free and when it is royalty bearing. The BLM has, however,
eliminated the ``negligence'' component of the definitions for
``avoidably lost'' and ``unavoidably lost,'' since the definitions
already require reasonable measures to prevent waste, i.e., a higher
bar than negligence. Particularly in light of this change, there is no
tension between the BLM's existing regulations and those finalized in
this rule.
Section 3179.42 When Lost Production Is Subject to Royalty
Proposed Sec. 3179.5 is redesignated Sec. 3179.42 in the final
rule. The BLM received several comments on this section, none of which
directly objected to the two statements made in this section. The
section states that royalty is due on all avoidably lost oil or gas and
royalty is not due on any unavoidably lost oil or gas. For example,
commenters objected to the use of the terms ``avoidable'' and
``unavoidable'' elsewhere in the subpart. As a further example, one
commenter stated the BLM should acknowledge that raw associated gas
cannot be marketed, explaining that, in the commenter's view, ``[i]t is
improper to assess royalties on flared gas because that gas cannot make
it to market and has no value.'' The commenter appears to argue that
when an operator chooses to flare gas, that gas has no value to the
public. The BLM disagrees. When an operator makes the business decision
to prioritize oil production over gas capture and sale, that operator
has necessarily chosen to deprive the public or the Indian lessor of
return for that gas. In all events, this comment addresses concepts
addressed elsewhere in the regulatory language and preamble. No
commenter disagreed that an avoidable loss has a royalty obligation and
an unavoidable loss has no royalty obligation. For this reason, the BLM
did not change this section.
Section 3179.43 Data Submission and Notification Requirements
This is a new section that did not appear in the proposed rule, but
merely contains three tables that reference
[[Page 25409]]
requirements that appear elsewhere in the regulations for the benefit
of readers. All the requirements included in these tables were
available for public comment, even though the tables themselves did not
appear in the proposed rule. The BLM includes this section for both BLM
inspectors and oil and gas operators as a quick reference to Sundry
Notice requirements, information that is required at the request of the
AO, and information requirements for the LDAR program. The section
creates no new obligations on operators that are not already required
in other regulations; it is provided for convenience. The summaries of
the requirements, as provided in the table, impose no obligation on
operators or on the BLM: all rights and obligations appear in the
corresponding section of code.
For example, Table 1 to paragraph (a) informs an operator or a BLM
inspector that subpart 3179 contains seven Sundry-Notice requirements.
Each Sundry-Notice requirement is briefly summarized in the left-hand
column with the section number of the specific Sundry-Notice
requirement appearing in the right-hand column. If a reader wants
further information on the Sundry-Notice requirements, then the reader
may go to the referenced sections to understand the requirement more
fully within the context of the section. Table 1 has a Sundry-Notice
requirement of ``Delay of leak repair beyond 30 calendar days with good
cause'' with a corresponding cross reference to Sec. 3179.101. The
reader may go to Sec. 3179.101(a) to learn the full requirement and
conclude that Sec. 3179.101(a) requires operators to repair leaks as
soon as practicable, and in no event longer than 30 calendar days after
discovery unless the operator has good cause for the delay. Further
reading shows that Sec. 3179.101(b) requires an operator to submit a
Sundry Notice informing the BLM of the good cause creating the delay in
repair beyond 30 calendar days. The table provides a quick guide to a
requirement and provides the corresponding regulatory reference.
The tables are intended to list all the requirements in the subpart
or a section, but they are not intended to provide a comprehensive
understanding of the full requirements. The tables are meant to serve
as a summarized, quick reference to aid the reader. While this is a new
section in the final rule, everything contained within the tables was
subject to public comment in the proposed rule. The tables simply
summarize final rule requirements. In the event of any conflict, the
language of the final rule requirements prevails over the summaries in
the table.
Section 3179.50 Safety
Proposed Sec. 3179.6 is redesignated Sec. 3179.50 in the final
rule. The section remains largely the same as in the proposed rule. The
BLM received a number of comments on the use of the term ``automatic
ignition system'' and on the proposed immediate assessment of $1,000
per violation imposed on operators upon the discovery of a flare that
is not lit. Industry commenters expressed the view that the definition
for an ``automatic ignition system'' did not allow for various types of
equipment to ensure that flares are properly lit when natural gas is
present. The BLM intends for the term ``automatic ignition system'' to
require operators to maintain an ignition source without specifying a
particular type of device, with the goal that operators will use
devices that are appropriate under the circumstances. The purpose of
flaring is to combust the gas immediately with no venting from the
flare apparatus, and that is the function and requirement of the
automatic ignition system.
One commenter interpreted this section to mean that the BLM would
prohibit venting of associated gas. The commenter further stated that,
in certain circumstances, a ``no venting'' standard is impossible to
meet. The BLM agrees with the commenter, and, for this reason, the BLM
continues to include a list of exceptions for which flaring is not
possible and venting is anticipated at final Sec. 3179.50(a)(1)
through (8). The commenter requested the addition of a de minimis
exception in the final rule on the grounds that flaring is occasionally
technically or economically infeasible. The proposed and final sections
already include an exception for technical infeasibility, in addition
to several other exceptions for small amounts of gas, and the commenter
did not explain why a general ``de minimis'' exception would cover
scenarios not already embraced by the final text. The BLM did not make
any changes to this section in the final rule based on that commenter's
suggestions. Royalty-free flaring under this provision is limited, as
indicated in final Sec. 3179.83, discussed below.
Some commenters contended that the BLM would exceed its statutory
authority if it imposed an immediate assessment of $1,000 per violation
for unlit flares. Commenters cited the Wyoming court's decision \143\
that concluded, for waste minimization and resource conservation
purposes, that there is no difference between eliminating excess
methane by venting or by flaring. But that is not true for royalties;
routing the gas through metered flaring equipment is essential for
royalty measurement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d at
1068.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, as the BLM stated in the proposed rule, consistent
with the MLA's requirement that leases contain provisions for the
``safeguarding of the public welfare'' and for the ``safety and welfare
of the miners,'' combusting gas rather than venting it into the
surrounding air is safer for operations due to the gas's explosiveness
and the risk to workers from hypoxia and exposure to various associated
pollutants.\144\ Furthermore, the BLM has an obligation to protect
local public health and safety in connection with its oil and gas
leases.\145\ Based on the 2019 ONRR production data, 3 percent of the
flaring locations are flaring more than 30,000 Mcf per month over the
averaging period. Allowing volumes of this magnitude to be vented
because of failures of flaring equipment would be a public health and
safety threat.\146\
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\144\ ``Health and Safety Risks for Workers Involved in Manual
Tank Gauging and Sampling at Oil and Gas Extraction Sites,''
February 2016, available at https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/publications/OSHA3843.pdf.
\145\ 43 CFR 3162.5-3, 3163.1(a)(3).
\146\ See ``Flammability of methane, propane, and hydrogen
gases,'' May 2000, available at https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/UserFiles/works/pdfs/fompa.pdf and ``Toward an Understanding of the
Environmental and Public Health Impacts of Unconventional Natural
Gas Development: A Categorical Assessment of the Peer-Reviewed
Scientific Literature, 2009-2015,'' April 2016, available at https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0154164.
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The BLM also notes, again, that the preference for flaring over
venting is well established in oilfield operations. USGS's implementing
guidance for NTL-4A states that, ``[b]ecause of safety requirements,
gas which cannot be beneficially used or sold must normally be flared,
not vented.'' \147\
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\147\ CDM, 644.5.3G (June 1980) (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, the BLM in the final rule has limited the scope of
this section to apply only to operations and production equipment
located on a Federal or Indian surface estate. The requirements in the
final Sec. 3179.50 do not apply to operations and production equipment
on State or private tracts, even where those tracts are committed to a
federally approved unit or CA.
In response to comments, the BLM changed the text of final Sec.
3179.50(a)(4) by replacing the term ``storage vessel'' with ``oil
storage tank'' and removing the reference to the requirement for vapor
recovery equipment in proposed Sec. 3179.203, which has been removed
[[Page 25410]]
from the final rule. Also, the BLM amended regulatory text in final
Sec. 3179.50(b) to state that flares or combustion devices must be
equipped with either an automatic ignition system or an on-demand
ignition system. Paragraph (b) has changed slightly from an immediate
assessment for ``discovery of a flare that is not lit'' to state that,
upon discovery of a flare that is venting instead of combusting gas,
the BLM may issue the operator an immediate assessment of $1,000 per
violation. The BLM changed the language to underscore that the type of
automatic ignition system is irrelevant, and the expectation is that
gas of sufficient volume and quality must be flared. The immediate
assessment for a flare that is venting gas instead of combusting gas
remains fundamentally the same as the proposed rule and no changes were
made based on comments received.
Section 3179.60 Gas-Well Gas
The BLM redesignated this section from Sec. 3179.7 in the proposed
rule to Sec. 3179.60 in the final rule. The BLM did not receive any
substantive comments related to this section. The comments received for
this section more directly relate to the BLM's definition of a gas
well. These comments are addressed in the discussion of Sec. 3179.10
of this preamble. The BLM did not make any changes to the regulatory
text other than updating a referenced citation to the final section
number.
Section 3179.70 Oil-Well Gas
Proposed Sec. 3179.8 is redesignated Sec. 3179.70 in the final
rule. This section covers the limit beyond which oil-well gas will be
considered an avoidable loss with a royalty obligation when gas is
flared due to pipeline capacity constraints, midstream processing
failures, or similar events. The proposed rule included a volumetric
limit of 1,050 Mcf per month per lease, unit PA, or CA. The BLM
received numerous comments explaining why a volumetric limit of this
kind is inappropriate. The BLM administers many leases that contain a
single producing well and many units that contain hundreds of producing
wells. Under the proposed rule, a single-well lease and a multi-well
unit would have been subject to the same 1,050 Mcf per month volumetric
limit.
The BLM agrees that the volumetric limit of 1,050 Mcf per lease,
unit PA, or CA per month is unfair due to the varying number of wells
in a lease, unit PA, or CA, and has discarded that particular limit,
replacing it with a per-barrel volumetric limit. The BLM's objective in
this rulemaking is to create a practical, royalty-based approach to
waste prevention from oil wells that removes the need for an
inefficient case-by-case determination of an avoidable/unavoidable loss
for gas flaring and allows for some unavoidable flaring, capped by a
practical limit.
Achieving this goal is not straightforward, and the BLM considered
and ultimately declined to adopt certain alternate thresholds proposed
by commenters, such as a time-based limit to flaring.\148\ In North
Dakota, the BLM encountered significant obstacles when implementing the
emergency provision from NTL-4A Section III.A. allowing operators to
flare royalty-free for ``24 hours per incident and to 144 hours
cumulative for the lease during any calendar month.'' From that
experience, the BLM learned that the time-limit approach is difficult
to enforce, and operators learned that they are ill-prepared to provide
flaring volumes based on time: operators do not maintain hourly
production data that could be used for NTL-4A emergency determinations,
nor will the measurement regulations provided for in this final rule
obligate such hourly measurements for all operators. From experience,
therefore, the BLM decided against adopting a time-based approach in
the final rule.
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\148\ See Marathon Oil Co. v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 548, 553 (D.
Wyo. 1978).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The BLM also considered and rejected commenters' suggestion that
the BLM require operators to capture certain percentages of their oil-
well gas. Instead, this final rule requires operators to submit either
a waste-minimization plan or a self-certification committing the
operator to capture 100 percent of the gas. In addition, insofar as
this rule flows from lessees' obligation to compensate the United
States or Indian mineral owners for their resources, the BLM's
application of royalties to avoidably lost gas ensures that the Federal
taxpayer or Indian lessor is compensated in the same manner as if the
gas were captured and sold. The royalty approach aligns with Congress'
instruction in the IRA. It also aligns with the BLM's historical
practice of curbing waste through royalties, not capture percentages,
and (in the context of the production rate limits for oil well gas)
with the demonstrated capacity of industry to conserve Federal gas. And
consistent with this rule's efforts to streamline BLM enforcement and
supervision (by, e.g., limiting the need for Sundry Notices), it
forgoes a not insignificant burden on both operators and the BLM. For
example, forgoing capture percentages obviates the need for the BLM to
make case-by-case determinations to avoid premature shut-ins, as in the
2016 Rule's provision for applications for exceptions to the capture
requirements. Although the BLM does not here disclaim the authority to
impose capture limits on Federal gas, the BLM's objective in this rule
does not necessitate such percentages.
The flaring thresholds in the final rule begin at 0.08 Mcf of gas
per barrel of oil produced in the first year of the rule, 0.07 Mcf per
barrel produced in the second year of the rule, 0.06 Mcf per barrel
produced in the third year, and 0.05 Mcf per barrel produced
afterwards. The BLM selected the initial limit--0.08 Mcf per barrel of
oil produced--because it is the average amount of gas flared per barrel
of oil produced in 1990 to 2000. Since the 1990s, the industry has
witnessed considerable technological advances in directional drilling,
hydraulic fracturing, and well completions, but has failed to adhere to
the level of conservation the industry has already demonstrated it can
achieve. Advances have been made in the use of skid-mounted equipment
for the extraction of natural gas liquids on-lease, equipment for
compressed natural gas on-lease, and on-lease power generation and
these advances may not be fully used in the field. Operators also have
available to them older methods for using the gas, such as reinjection
for enhanced oil recovery, reservoir pressure maintenance, or simply
safe disposal. The failure to fully implement new and old techniques to
manage gas that is currently wasted is particularly glaring given the
inclusion of standardized natural gas contracts with delivery at Henry
Hub in the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in 1990. Including
natural gas on the New York exchange provided important pricing
information for the industry and facilitated broader marketing for
natural gas as a commodity even though the price of gas fluctuates with
the market. Notwithstanding a national market for pricing since 1990,
Federal lessees have wasted more of the public's gas as a function of
oil production. Cf., Cal. Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 388 (D.C. Cir.
1961). For example, when the BLM evaluated the 2019 operator-reported
production for agreements reporting oil production and flaring data,
the average agreement produced 11,850 barrels of oil per month and
flared 4,500 Mcf of associated gas per month or an average flaring rate
of 0.38 Mcf per barrel of oil produced.
[[Page 25411]]
The BLM determined that the starting threshold of 0.08 Mcf per
barrel of oil produced would impact the approximately 62 percent of
flaring locations responsible for approximately 96 percent of the
reported flaring, based on 2019 production data. The 0.08 Mcf per
barrel of oil produced is comparable to the proposed 1,050 Mcf per
lease, unit PA, or CA in that the final threshold of 0.08 Mcf per
barrel addresses about 96 percent of the reported flaring. Thus, the
proposed and final rule limits target only those locations generating
the majority of the flaring, but, unlike in the proposed rule, would
not apply inequitably across unit agreements, PAs, and CAs. The BLM
estimates that the proposed limit of 0.08 Mcf per barrel of oil
produced would make 88 percent of the flared volumes royalty-bearing
and generate approximately $57.7 million in royalty revenue for the
first year. The 0.05 Mcf per barrel of oil produced threshold, in the
BLM's estimate, would make about 92 percent of the flared volumes
royalty-bearing, based on the 2019 production data.
The proposed rule included a flaring threshold of 1,050 Mcf per
lease, unit PA, or CA per month that would have gone into effect 60
days after publication of the final rule. For the final rule, the BLM
elected to use a phased-in timeline because of the changed metric, with
an initial threshold similar in magnitude to recently reported flaring.
A number of States have implemented a phased-in gas capture percentage
that allows operators to plan operations and budgets to meet the
capture requirements. The BLM provides a similar opportunity for
operators to plan for thresholds decreasing from 0.08 Mcf to 0.05 Mcf
over 4 years. Also, a 4-year phase-in for the threshold allows for
further advances in technology that may assist in lowering waste. When
BLM changed to the Mcf per barrel of oil produced flaring limit from
the 1,050 Mcf per lease, unit PA, or CA limit, the projected aggregate
flared volume beyond the limit increased and, therefore, projected
royalties increased.
Commenters also stated that regardless of the flaring threshold,
the BLM must include provisions permitting operators to submit a
request for approval to flare above the established threshold, and that
the threshold establishes an improper per se avoidable loss. The BLM
disagrees. The ability for operators to request approval to flare above
the established threshold defeats the purpose of a threshold and
returns the BLM and operator to an unworkable case-by-case analysis.
Commenters suggested a 24-hour time limit as an alternative to the
volumetric threshold that the BLM had in the proposed rule. The BLM
disagrees, and the commenters failed to explain how a time-based limit
would not also result in what the commenters alleged was an improperly
rigid, per se avoidable loss threshold associated with a volumetric
limit. The BLM has established the volumetric flaring threshold based
on oil production to allow for some avoidable oil-well loss flaring
while simultaneously eliminating the time-consuming and
administratively costly case-by-case determinations required under NTL-
4A.
The State of North Dakota has taken issue with the BLM's proposal
to use monthly volume limits. The North Dakota Industrial Commission
contends that the BLM should use the ``average percentage of gas
captured to ensure economic viability, better manage unconventional
resources, and minimize conflict with North Dakota's flaring
regulations.'' The BLM has elected not to use a monthly volume limit or
a gas capture percentage to determine waste due to the aforementioned
inequities associated with varying numbers of wells in a lease, unit
PA, or CA; the difficulties implementing a gas capture percentage
nationwide; and the concern for not fulfilling the BLM's Indian trust
obligation.
States such as North Dakota and New Mexico have implemented a
phased-in gas capture percentage. The final rule's limits based on
percentages of gas flared per barrel of oil, however, are a better
means to manage and understand waste by directly linking oil production
with flared gas.
Wyoming comments that in 2021, operators only flared or vented 0.18
percent of all gas that was produced in the State. And North Dakota
comments that ``its regulations resulted in gas capture rates
increasing from 64 percent in 2014 to total capture of 95 percent in
2022 even with all [of North Dakota's] approved variances includ''d.''
The BLM lauds both States for their advances in lowering flaring, and
their achievements will likely reduce any additional burdens on
operators in those States from the final rule. However, according to
EIA data from 2017 through 2022, North Dakota accounted for
approximately 33 percent of the volume of gas flared nationwide while
producing 11 percent of the volume of oil produced nationwide. Wyoming
accounted for approximately 11 percent of the average total flared gas
onshore nationwide and 2 percent of the oil produced nationwide. State
efforts to reduce venting and flaring, though important, do not
displace the Secretary's duty to prevent undue waste from Federal and
Indian wells nationwide.\149\ The BLM has written a rule that will
compensate the taxpayer or the Indian mineral owner for the waste of
flared gas when the operator chooses to maximize oil production
regardless of the associated gas disposition.
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\149\ https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_EPG0_VGV_mmcf_a.htm, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm.
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Some commenters stated that a fixed threshold for avoidable loss
wrongly fails to account for situations ``beyond the control of the
operator.'' The largest sources of flared gas associated with BLM
leases are unconventional oil reservoirs in North Dakota and New
Mexico, where pipeline capacity issues have been cited as reasons for
extreme flaring. The BLM has concluded that, particularly in these
cases, the rate of oil production and its associated gas production is
fully within the control of the operator: the BLM is well aware, for
example, that operators have shut in production (whether oil or gas)
when commodity pricing is low and have begun producing again when the
price rises. The BLM's threshold simply applies the operators' logic in
these circumstances to the BLM's interest, as lessor or trustee, in
conservation of a public or Indian resource. For this reason, the
threshold for an avoidable loss in the final rule is directly tied to
the oil production rate--i.e., a factor within the operators' control.
The BLM received comments stating that the flaring thresholds
throughout the rule are arbitrary and unfounded, particularly in
proposed Sec. 3179.8. One commenter claimed that the BLM had failed to
identify and make available for review the information used to
determine the flaring limits. On the contrary, the BLM clearly noted in
the proposed rule preamble that it relied on production data that
operators reported to ONRR from 2015 through 2019 to derive flaring
thresholds.\150\ These data are available to the public online at the
U.S. Department of the Interior Natural Resources Revenue Data website,
https://revenuedata.doi.gov/query-data.
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\150\ 87 FR 73590, 73603 (Nov. 30, 2022).
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The BLM elected to use 2019 production data, even though later
production data were available, in recognition of the lower (i.e.,
unrepresentative) production in 2020 and 2021 during COVID-19. When the
BLM prepared the proposed rule, 2022 production data were not
available. The 2022 production data is now available.
[[Page 25412]]
The BLM has now reviewed the 2022 data with a flaring rate of 0.11 Mcf
of gas flared per barrel of oil produced. Accordingly, the BLM has not
altered its approach to flaring limits based on the updated data.
Another commenter wrote, the ``BLM's proposed limits in this
Section are much too low, constituting in some instances mere minutes
of flaring.'' This comment is inconsistent with the publicly available
ONRR data, which indicates that the highest reported flared volumes for
any month in 2019 were 662 Mcf per hour or 11 Mcf per minute. If
operators are flaring 1,050 Mcf in minutes, they are failing to report
this level of flared volumes on their Oil and Gas Operations Reports
(OGOR) to ONRR. The BLM did not change the flaring limit based on this
comment.
One commenter objected to the proposed thresholds because,
according to the commenter, the most significant reason why new
production outpaces infrastructure capacity is the time-consuming
process of obtaining the necessary pipeline rights-of-way from the BLM.
The commenter outlined the required steps and associated time to obtain
approval to construct a pipeline across Federal and Indian land but did
not include the time necessary to obtain necessary approvals to cross
State and private land. According to the commenter, the process
ordinarily takes 47 weeks. The commenter asserted that operators have
no choice but to flare associated gas or shut in the wells given the
time necessary to obtain the rights-of way from the BLM. In effect, the
commenter asserted that the BLM is responsible for the flaring of
associated gas because obtaining rights-of-way from the BLM is a
lengthy process.
Since the rights-of-way process is well understood--as reflected in
the comment--operators necessarily make a business decision to
accelerate oil production while flaring associated gas due to capacity
constraints. Conversely, an operator could begin to plan for the
process for obtaining rights-of-way prior to drilling the wells--
particularly because many operators plan drilling 5 years into the
future--or, alternatively, leave wells shut in until the pipeline
rights-of-way is approved. As the BLM notes above, operators routinely
make business decisions that are advantageous to their self-interest by
electing to shut in wells when the price of oil is low, and, when the
price of oil is high, operators act on their self-interest as well by
increasing oil production. In this final rule, the BLM is merely
applying the same logic to the public's interest in the conservation of
resources and intends for the flaring limitations to encourage
operators to plan ahead for natural gas conservation before they drill
wells or postpone production until there is adequate pipeline capacity,
thereby reducing the waste of Federal natural gas resources. We note
that the BLM approves rights of way for pipelines only where BLM
manages the surface estate, which is important for some but not all oil
and gas operations.
In any event, as of January 2024, there are 4,237 approved APDs in
New Mexico, 1,948 in Wyoming, and 333 in North Dakota. Simultaneously,
the BLM currently has only 314 pending rights-of-way applications for
oil or gas pipelines in New Mexico, 29 in Wyoming, and none in North
Dakota. This disparity between APDs and rights-of-way applications
illustrates that operators appear uninterested in obtaining the
necessary rights-of-way to accommodate the need for greater pipeline
capacity. These pending rights-of-way applications may be factors
relating to some of the volume of flared associated gas that operators
have reported for the past year, but could have been addressed by
earlier planning for those rights-of-way before drilling begins. As
demonstrated by the comment, operators are aware of the process and
timeline for BLM approval of rights-of-way.
The BLM also received comments on the proposed provision in Sec.
3179.8(b) that would have allowed the BLM to exercise its discretion to
order the operator to curtail or shut in production as necessary to
avoid unreasonable and undue waste of Federal or Indian gas after
confirming that an operator's flaring is exceeding 4,000 Mcf of gas for
3 consecutive months. The BLM has revised the flaring threshold in the
final Sec. 3179.70(b) to allow 1 Mcf of gas per barrel of oil produced
per month for 3 consecutive months with confirmation that the flaring
is ongoing. The BLM arrived at this figure by targeting the 3 percent
of reporting units with roughly 16 percent of flaring--as it had in the
proposed rule--and simply adjusted the threshold to correspond to a
rate of production as in paragraph (a).
One commenter criticized the structure of proposed Sec. 3179.8 for
eliding any inquiry into whether the lessee is acting reasonably and
prudently in light of the operator's actual economic circumstances. The
commenter stated further that flaring is not automatically ``waste.''
The BLM agrees that flaring is not automatically waste, an
understanding reflected in the proposed and final rules' distinctions
between avoidable and unavoidable loss and associated flaring
thresholds. The BLM uses the unavoidable loss threshold to allow
operators to respond to operational considerations and manage both oil
production and associated gas flaring throughout the month to stay
below the unavoidable loss threshold: operators are capable of
curtailing oil production or shutting in oil wells to lessen or stop
the flaring of associated gas. And as set forth elsewhere in this rule,
nothing in the MLA requires that the BLM evaluate the feasibility of
flaring on a case-by-case basis or without regard to the United States'
interest in conserving the mineral estate.
One commenter went further and provided an example of the economic
value of shutting in a well for flaring in excess of 4,000 Mcf per
month, the threshold from proposed Sec. 3179.8(b), at a hypothetical
value of $3 per Mcf, which, at a minimum, would yield a gross income of
$12,000 for the gas and an associated Federal royalty income of $1,500.
This commenter continued that, in its view, the BLM failed to explain
``how it is negligent and imprudent for an operator to flare that
minimal value of gas in lieu of shutting in production from a CA that
in the same month would produce tens of thousands, if not hundreds of
thousands of dollars, worth of oil.''
The BLM does not find the commenters to be persuasive. The revenue
from oil in the proposed example is not lost unless the well is
abandoned--otherwise the operator can simply resume operations later.
The BLM has reasonably concluded that it would prefer to reap
royalties, for the benefit of the American taxpayers or Indian mineral
owners, from both oil production and otherwise wasted gas. The
commenter did not provide any specific data that, in such
circumstances, the well would be abandoned. Indeed, the example
ultimately buttresses the BLM's conclusion that the royalties the BLM
seeks to obtain are in many cases small relative to the overall value
of oil and the associated profit accruing to the operator, such that,
absent the final rule, an operator may decide to prioritize its short-
term profits over longer-term resource recovery.
This final rule section on oil-well gas applies to all onshore
Federal and Indian oil and gas leases, unit PAs, and CAs and this
section requires operators to flare (not vent) gas due to pipeline
capacity constraints, midstream procession failures, or other similar
events that prevent produced gas from being transported through the
connected pipeline. The BLM has received comments characterizing the
Wyoming
[[Page 25413]]
court decision as explaining that it does not matter if gas is vented
or flared. The BLM agrees with the relevant passage of the court's
opinion, which indicates that, as a matter of volumes of gas wasted, it
is immaterial whether the gas is vented or flared. But--independent of
the court's discussion regarding volumes of potentially wasted gas--
flaring provides benefits to the BLM's waste management mandate, namely
accuracy in the measurement of wasted gas. Oil-well gas with flared
volumes greater than 1,050 Mcf per month over the averaging period
requires accurate measurement for purposes of calculating the royalty
obligation. The measurement of vented gas through a flare line does not
meet the BLM's expectation for measurement accuracy when there is a
royalty obligation. There are no industry standards for measurement of
vented gas and no current industry understanding of measurement
accuracy of vented gas. Therefore, the operator is expected to flare
and measure the flare volume pursuant to final Sec. 3179.71, as set
forth below.
Section 3179.71 Measurement of Flared Oil-Well Gas Volume
The BLM has restructured proposed Sec. 3179.9, which was entitled,
``Measuring and reporting volumes of gas vented and flared,'' by
breaking it up into two sections in the final rule: Sec. 3179.71,
entitled, ``Measurement of flared oil-well gas volume,'' and Sec.
3179.72, entitled ``Reporting and recordkeeping of vented and flared
gas volumes.'' The BLM made this change for ease of use for both the
regulated community and BLM inspectors.
One commenter suggested a method for determining the flaring
threshold limit at commingled facilities. From this comment, the BLM
recognized that it had not included explicit regulatory text allowing
for the commingling of flared gas from multiple leases, unit PAs, and
CAs in the proposed rule. The BLM has rectified this omission by
including in the final rule the ability for operators to commingle
flared gas without BLM approval in final Sec. 3179.71(a). Proposed
paragraph (d) would have allowed operators to use an allocation method
approved by the BLM to allocate production from a commingled flare. The
BLM recognizes the benefit for operators and the BLM to allow flaring
from more than one lease, unit PA, or CA in a common high-pressure
flare. Final Sec. 3179.71(a) explicitly allows for the commingling of
flared gas from more than one lease, unit PA, or CA to a common flare
without BLM approval and provides the allocation method for commingled
flares in final paragraph (h). The BLM requires a standard allocation
methodology for commingled flared gas based on oil production. The BLM
also included a requirement in this section for operators to indicate
on the site facility diagram that the high-pressure flare is a common,
commingled flare, and to list the leases, unit PAs, or CAs contributing
gas to the common flare. Indicating that flares are commingled on the
site facility diagram ensures that BLM inspectors have accurate
information when conducting production inspections.
In the proposed rule, the BLM would have required operators to
measure using an orifice meter at all high-pressure flares flaring
1,050 Mcf per month or more within 6 months after the effective date of
the final rule. For flared gas measured with an orifice meter, the
proposed rule also would have required the following: (1) orifice plate
inspections once a year; (2) meter verification once a year; (3) gas
sampling with a C6+ analysis once a year; (4) flare gas sample taken
from: the flare meter location, the gas FMP when the flare and FMP gas
are the same quality, or another location approved by the BLM; (5)
measurement uncertainty within 5 percent; (6) radiant heat
considerations for flare placement; and (7) high-pressure flares that
met the measurement requirements for a low-volume FMP under subpart
3175. Many of these requirements that appeared in the proposed section
were taken directly from the industry standard, API MPMS Chapter 14,
Natural Gas Fluids Measurement, Section 10, Measurement of Flow to
Flares, Second edition, December 2021.
The BLM evaluated these requirements based on comments and decided
to instead require operators in the final rule to use an orifice
metering system with the low-volume measurement requirements found in
Sec. 3175.80, the low-volume electronic gas measurement system
requirements found in Sec. 3175.100, and the low-volume gas sampling
requirements found in Sec. 3175.110, with the gas sampling location
requirements provided in final Sec. 3179.71(d) or (e). These changes
make the accuracy of an orifice metering system used at a flare
consistent with that of a low-volume gas FMP. Based on measurement data
received from a commenter, the BLM agrees with the data analysis and
believes that flare measurement is unlikely to meet the 5
percent uncertainty requirement. The commenter provided analysis of
annual field data from an orifice measurement flare system and a linear
meter flare system showing that the overall uncertainty of the orifice
meter is 6.32 percent and the linear meter is 3.22 percent. Requiring a
flare meter to meet the FMP requirements for a low-volume gas FMP
removes the need to meet the 5 percent uncertainty level.
For this reason, the BLM removed the measurement uncertainty
requirement in the final rule. The requirement for the consideration
for radiant heat for flare installation has been moved to final Sec.
3179.71(c)(3).
One commenter requested that the BLM require flare measurement at
all locations flaring associated gas because the commenter believes
industry grossly underestimates flared volumes reported to ONRR. The
BLM considered this approach but abandoned it because requiring
measurement at all flares places an unnecessary economic burden on
small operators who rarely have routine flaring due to pipeline
capacity issues. While the BLM understands this threshold is based on
data that may underestimate the scope of the problem, the BLM has
concluded that requiring measurement on flared volumes less than 1,050
Mcf per month over the averaging period would encompass flaring
operations that would meet the BLM's emergency criteria and that are
outside the BLM's objective for this section, which is to measure more
frequent gas flaring. The BLM did not change the high-pressure flare
measurement requirement threshold based on this comment.
Other commenters requested the BLM to return to the NTL-4A standard
of estimation and eliminate the requirement to measure gas-flaring
volumes, relying instead on flared-volume estimation based on site-
specific information, such as GORs, sales gas volumes metered for
allocations, and gas sample analysis. One commenter provided a study
indicating that inefficient and unlit flares account for five times
more methane emissions than was previously estimated across the three
basins responsible for more than 80 percent of U.S. flaring.\151\ The
study's evidence that industry underestimates the amount of methane
lost from flares supports the final rule requirement to measure high-
pressure flares with volumes greater than or equal to 1,050 Mcf per
month over the averaging period.
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\151\ Genevieve Plant et al., ``Inefficient and Unlit Natural
Gas Flares Both Emit Large Quantities of Methane,'' Science, vol.
377, pp. 1566 (2022), https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abq0385.
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The BLM received numerous comments requesting the BLM expand the
types of flare measurement systems that can be used from orifice
metering
[[Page 25414]]
only to other systems that are covered under API MPMS Chapter 14.10
Natural Gas Fluids Measurement--Measurement of Flow to Flares, December
2021. The BLM did not incorporate this API standard into the final rule
because it includes meters that the BLM does not regulate in its gas
measurement rules found in subpart 3175. Since royalties will be owed
at most flares that require measurement, the BLM is requiring almost
the same level of accountability for flaring measurement as would be
required for production royalty measurement. The BLM elected to expand
the list acceptable meters in subpart 3175 to include ultrasonic meters
because the BLM anticipates allowing for the use of ultrasonic meters
when it updates subpart 3175, but none of the other meters in API
14.10.
The BLM did not include the use of thermal flow or thermal mass
meters for several reasons. First, thermal mass meters are dependent on
gas properties, which are variable with natural gas in a flare line.
Second, open-loop calibration (as in a flare system), with a thermal
mass meter is only recommended using air. Any other application
environment will be inferred indirectly and introduce uncertainty or
less accurate measurement. Finally, no party submitted any measurement
data to demonstrate the acceptable performance of a thermal mass meter
for flare use. For these reasons, the BLM has expanded the final rule
to include orifice measurement systems and ultrasonic measurement
systems.
Comments highlighted safety concerns related to the use of orifice
meters on flares and the difficulty in obtaining accurate measurement,
given that flow to a flare is intermittent with rates varying
considerably at a single meter. The BLM agrees with both the safety and
measurement accuracy concerns and changed this section in the final
rule to allow both orifice metering and ultrasonic meters. In addition,
based on commenters' concerns for safety with the orifice metering
system, the BLM included a new provision in Sec. 3179.71(c)(3) that
requires operators to evaluate the production facility to determine
which type of flare measurement is safe for the facility.
In the final rule, orifice metering systems must comply with the
low-volume measurement requirements in Sec. 3175.80, low-volume
electronic gas measurement requirements in Sec. 3175.100, and the low-
volume gas sampling and analysis requirements in Sec. 3175.110, with
the exception for gas sampling requirements in the final rule at Sec.
3179.71(d) or (e). Under the new provisions in Sec. 3179.71(c)(2),
ultrasonic measurement systems must comply with three requirements.
First, each ultrasonic meter make and model must be tested for flare
use. Ultrasonic meter testing must be conducted and reported pursuant
to API MPMS Chapter 22.3, Testing Protocol for Flare Gas Metering,
First Edition, August 2015 (``API 22.3'') and the test report must be
available to the AO upon request. Second, ultrasonic meters must be
installed and operated for flare use according to the manufacturer's
specifications and those specifications must be provided to the AO upon
request. Third, ultrasonic metering systems must comply with the low-
volume electronic gas measurement requirements in Sec. 3175.100, and
low-volume gas sampling analysis requirements in Sec. 3175.110 with
the exception for the gas sampling requirements in Sec. 3179.71(d) or
(e).
Two commenters expressed concern that the measurement system as
required in the proposed rule could not meet the proposed uncertainty
requirement of 5 percent, even though the BLM used the
industry standard value. Section 4.1 of API MPMS Chapter 14.10 Natural
Gas Fluids Measurement--Measurement of Flow to Flares, December 2021
states, ``Targeted uncertainty for flare metering applications shall be
5 percent of actual volumetric or mass flow rate, measured
at 30 percent, 60 percent and 90 percent of the full scale for the
flare meter or as defined by regulations or specific end user
requirements.'' Based on a commenter's submission of an uncertainty
analysis of an orifice meter used in a flare application, the BLM
agrees that a 5 percent uncertainty for the flare meters,
particularly orifice meters, will be difficult to achieve. Therefore,
the BLM has removed the measurement uncertainty requirement that was in
proposed Sec. 3179.9(b)(5) based on the comment.
The BLM did not receive any comments on its gas sampling
requirements in the proposed rule. Since the BLM explicitly allows for
commingling of flared gas without prior approval in the final rule, it
became necessary to address gas sampling at a commingled and non-
commingled flare. The final rule at Sec. 3179.71(d) requires operators
to take gas samples from either the flare meter location, the gas FMP
location, or another location approved by the AO when measuring high-
pressure flare volumes from a single lease, unit PA, or CA. When the
gas sample is for a commingled high-pressure flare, the final rule at
Sec. 3179.71(e) requires that the gas sample be taken from either the
flare meter location or another location approved by the AO. High-
pressure flare heating value requirements are in the new Sec. 3179.72
in the final rule.
The BLM received comments regarding a provision in proposed Sec.
3179.9(b)(1) that provided a 6-month compliance timeline from the
effective date of the rule for the measurement requirements. Industry
commenters recommended a 1-year compliance deadline for all flare
measurement. For the final rule, the BLM extended the timeline for
compliance based on the flare flow category. The highest flare flow
category (>=30,000 Mcf per month) compliance deadline remains at 6-
months after the effective date of the rule. The mid-level flow
category (<30,000 Mcf per month and >=6,000 Mcf per month) for
compliance with measurement and gas sampling requirement has been
extended to 12 months after the effective date of the rule. The lowest
flare flow category (<6,000 Mcf per month and >=1,050 Mcf per month)
for compliance has been extended to 18 months after the effective date
of the rule. One reason for the tiered approach to the measurement
compliance timeline is the concern for the risk to royalties based on
the volumes flared. The shortest compliance timeline applies to flares
producing the highest volumes. The BLM has extended the compliance
timeline for lower flared volumes with a lower risk to royalty
measurement.
The BLM also understands current supply chain difficulties and has
taken those difficulties into consideration in extending the deadline
for compliance with measurement requirements and any modifications
required for gas sampling for flares based on the flare flow category.
The BLM retained a 6-month compliance deadline in the final rule at
Sec. 3179.71(f) for measurement and sampling equipment for high-
pressure flares measuring greater than or equal to 30,000 Mcf per month
over the averaging period. Based on the 2019 ONRR production data, the
BLM has concluded that this requirement will affect approximately 100
locations. Of those 100 locations, the BLM anticipates that many will
already have measurement systems in place: operators flaring above
30,000 Mcf per month are likely to be interested in accurate
measurements of the volume in order to make operational decisions.
Moreover, such wells are capable of generating substantial revenue,
allowing them to more easily overcome supply chain difficulties. In
short, the 6-month deadline should not be difficult for those operators
to meet.
[[Page 25415]]
The second flare flow category in the final rule has a deadline for
compliance 12 months after the effective date of the rule and measures
flare flow that is less than 30,000 Mcf per month over the averaging
period and greater than or equal to 6,000 Mcf per month over the
averaging period. Based on the 2019 ONRR production data used for this
rulemaking, the BLM estimates that the 12-month deadline will affect
approximately 228 locations. The BLM anticipates some, but not all, of
these locations will already have measurement equipment in place that
will require some updating based on the final rule flare measurement
requirements. In the final rule, the BLM has also extended the timeline
for flare measurement and gas sampling to be in compliance for flares
measuring less than 6,000 Mcf per month and greater than or equal to
1,050 Mcf per month over the averaging period within 18-months of the
effective date of the rule. The BLM estimates that approximately 575
locations will be required to comply with the measurement rules within
18 months of the effective date of the rule. Diligent operators should
be able to be in compliance by that effective date.
Final Sec. 3179.71(g) provides the method for estimating the
flared volumes when the flared volume is less than or equal to 1,050
Mcf per month over the averaging period. The estimation method is based
on the GORr calculated from the oil and gas volumes reported
to ONRR for the previous 6 months. The total gas produced is the sum of
the gas reported as sold or transferred to a gas plant, gas reported
for on-lease use, and gas reported as vented or flared for the 6 months
prior to the month in which the gas flared volume is estimated. The
GORr is then multiplied by the total volume of oil produced
from oil wells while flaring for the reporting month. The estimated gas
volume flared (Vf) equals the GORr times the
volume of oil produced while flaring (Vop) minus the total
gas volume sold or transferred to a gas plant (Vs). This
method for estimating the flared volume relies on volumes reported to
ONRR that can be verified by the BLM without having to rely on
production testing done by the operator. Final Sec. 3179.71(g)
replaces part of proposed Sec. 3179.9(a) with a verifiable method for
flare estimation.
The BLM did not receive any comments on the concepts of flare
estimation or measurement per se. On review of the proposed rule, the
BLM realized it did not include the ability for an operator to
commingle flared gas from multiple sources even though it has been
common practice for the BLM to allow this ability with approval. In the
final rule, the BLM allows operators to commingle flared gas without
prior BLM approval. Since commingling of flared gas does not require
BLM approval, the BLM included a required allocation methodology to be
used for the reporting of the flared gas to any lease, unit PA, or CA
included in the commingled flare. When a flare is combusting gas that
is combined from more than one lease, unit PA, or CA, final Sec.
3179.71(h) provides the allocation methodology for reporting the
allocated flared volume to ONRR. The allocation methodology is based on
the ratio of the net standard volume of oil from one of the FMPs that
is contributing flared gas to the commingled flare divided by the total
net standard volume of oil from all the FMPs that have gas contributing
to the flare times the total flared volume measured at the flare. The
allocation is done for each lease, unit PA, or CA contributing gas to
the flare. The flared volume for each lease, unit PA, or CA is reported
on its respective OGOR. Final Sec. 3179.71(h) replaces proposed Sec.
3179.9(d) with a verifiable method of allocation from a commingled
flare that follows typical industry practices for allocation.
Proposed Sec. 3179.9(e) became Sec. 3179.71(i) in the final rule.
The BLM did not receive any comments on this provision. The measurement
of flared volumes is not considered an FMP for the purpose of subpart
3175 even though some of the measurement requirements of subpart 3175
will apply to flare measurement. Flare measurement will require the use
of an FMP number on the OGOR when and if there is a royalty obligation.
Section 3179.72 Required Reporting and Recordkeeping of Vented and
Flared Gas Volumes
Final Sec. 3179.72 is a new section that contains all the ONRR
reporting requirements for avoidable and unavoidable losses and the
recordkeeping requirements for vented and flared gas volumes. Section
3179.72 begins with paragraph (a), which requires operators to report
all vented and flared volumes, both avoidable and unavoidable losses,
pursuant to ONRR's Minerals Production Reporter Handbook. This
paragraph remains unchanged from proposed Sec. 3179.9(a) to final
Sec. 3179.72(a). The BLM did not receive any comments on this
paragraph in the proposed rule.
In the final rule, the BLM allows operators to commingle flared gas
without prior BLM approval. Gas royalty determination is based on two
components: gas volumes and heating value. Final Sec. 3179.72(b)
requires operators to report the flared gas heating value based on the
gas analysis requirement in Sec. 3179.71(d) or (e). If flared gas is
commingled, the operator must report the same heating value from the
common flare on all the leases, unit PAs, or CAs contributing gas to
the flare based on the gas sample analysis. The proposed rule had
similar gas sampling analysis requirements but did not specifically
state the requirement to use this heating analysis for reporting. The
BLM has included this requirement to clarify the unstated expectation
in the proposed rule.
Based on comments received, the final rule includes provisions for
event and operational recordkeeping related to waste prevention. GAO
reports (e.g. GAO 04-809) have also admonished the BLM that it should
exercise better oversight in the documentation of waste.
In response to public and GAO comment, the BLM added paragraph (c)
for recordkeeping of oil- or gas-well flaring events, emergency events,
and manual downhole liquids unloading operations or well-purging
operations in this final section. The requirements of final paragraph
(c) apply 3 months after the effective date of the rule to give
operators time to develop a system of recordkeeping that complies with
the BLM's requirements. The BLM anticipates requesting the records
required in paragraph (c) when conducting production audits or
investigating excessive avoidable or unavoidable reported losses.
Section 3179.73 Prior Determinations Regarding Royalty-Free Flaring
In the final rule, the BLM redesignated proposed Sec. Sec. 3179.10
to 3179.73. The provision allows previous decisions authorizing
royalty-free flaring to continue for 6 months after this rule's
effective date, after which time the BLM will determine the royalty-
bearing status of all flaring based on the new subpart 3179
requirements. This change accords with lease terms, which expressly
subject all leases to ``regulations hereafter promulgated when not
inconsistent with lease rights granted or specific provisions of this
lease.'' See BLM standard lease form 3100-011. We think a 6-month
postponement of the effective date will foster a successful transition,
potentially reducing or eliminating difficulties for both operators and
the BLM. The BLM received two comments in support of including this
provision in the final rule. One commenter from a State regulatory
authority expressed concern
[[Page 25416]]
that some operators may not have budgeted for the necessary operational
changes and sought additional time for compliance. No industry
commenters, however, requested an extension of the 6-month provision.
Nor did anyone object to the approach that the BLM is adopting in the
final rule. The BLM did not make any changes to this section based on
the comments received. The proposed and final sections contain the same
requirements.
Flaring and Venting Gas During Drilling and Production Operations
Section 3179.80 Loss of Well Control While Drilling
Final Sec. 3179.80 was redesignated from proposed Sec. 3179.101
and retitled from ``Well drilling'' in the proposed rule to ``Loss of
well control while drilling'' in the final rule. The language in the
proposed and final sections remains largely the same, with one
exception. For consistency with the IRA section 50263, the BLM now
requires the operator to submit a Sundry Notice within 15 days
following the conclusion of a loss-of-well-control event describing the
loss of well control. From the details provided in the Sundry Notice
and any other information available to or obtained by the BLM, the BLM
will determine whether the loss of well control was due to operator
negligence. If the BLM determines the loss of well control was due to
operator negligence, then the oil or gas lost is determined to be an
avoidable loss with a royalty obligation. The BLM will notify the
operator in writing as to whether such loss will qualify as an
avoidable loss.
One commenter on this section suggested that the BLM assess
``royalties on all gas that is vented during well drilling unless
venting is required due to safety reasons or because flaring or capture
is infeasible.'' The BLM has concluded that the Sundry Notice
requirement in the final rule--and the respective royalty obligation--
meets the commenter's objective. In the BLM's experience, operators
work to avoid loss of well control while drilling and prepare in
advance should a loss of well control occur. Therefore, the BLM
considers the likelihood of negligence during the loss of well control
to be very low and adequately canvassed.
The BLM received another comment requesting that the BLM provide
clarification on the process it will use to make an avoidable-loss
determination, and whether and how an operator may appeal a BLM
decision of an avoidable loss. In response to part of this comment, the
final rule requires an operator to notify the BLM within 24 hours of
the start of a loss of well control event and to submit a Sundry Notice
containing relevant details of the loss of circulation to determine if
the loss is an avoidable or unavoidable loss. The BLM believes this
process is consistent with that in the Notice to Lessees and Operators
of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases Reporting of
Undesirable Events (NTL-3A). The BLM already has an appeal process in
place that will cover any BLM decision in this section, see Sec. Sec.
3165.3 and 3165.4.
Section 3179.81 Well Completion and Recompletion Flaring Allowances
In response to comments, the BLM reorganized, redesignated, and
consolidated concepts from proposed Sec. Sec. 3179.102, 3179.103, and
3179.104 into only two final sections, Sec. Sec. 3179.81 and 3179.82.
Proposed Sec. 3179.103, which was entitled, ``Initial production
testing,'' has been redesignated as final Sec. 3179.81 and is now
entitled, ``Well completion or recompletion flaring allowances.''
Comments reflected some confusion about the BLM's intent in proposed
Sec. 3179.102, ``Well completion and related operations,'' and Sec.
3179.103, ``Initial production testing.'' The comments' core question
is whether the BLM views the period of flowback following fracturing or
refracturing as the same or different from initial production testing.
In response to those comments, the BLM eliminated the concept of
initial production testing and will regulate flaring following well
completion or recompletion as a separate period in the lifecycle of a
newly producing formation in a well.
Final Sec. 3179.81, ``Well completion or recompletion flaring
allowances,'' provides for flaring royalty-free under Sec. Sec.
3179.41(b)(2) and 3179.42(b) until one of the following events occurs:
(1) 30 days have passed since the beginning of the flowback following
completion or recompletion, except where an extension has been granted
under paragraph (b) for flowback delays caused by well or equipment
problems, or under paragraph (d) for dewatering and initial evaluation
of an exploratory coalbed methane well for up to two possible 90-day
extensions; (2) the operator has flared 20,000 Mcf of gas, as provided
in paragraph (a)(2); or (3) flowback has been routed to the production
separator, as provided in paragraph (a)(3). Paragraph (e) of this
section of the final rule requires operators to submit their requests
for extension using a Sundry Notice. One commenter contended that
royalty-free flaring thresholds for well completion in the proposed
rule were ``arbitrarily low.'' The BLM has increased these thresholds
in the final rule.
This final section includes the flowback period following a
completion or recompletion. As suggested by some commenters, the BLM
removed the provision in proposed Sec. 3179.103(a)(1) allowing the
operator to flare royalty-free until adequate reservoir information for
the well was obtained. Comments indicated that this provision was an
obsolete vestige of NTL-4A, and operators no longer initially test
wells for reservoir information. To avoid confusion about testing and
flowback following completion or recompletion, the BLM's final rule
includes time and volumetric flaring limits for well completion or
recompletion for flowback.
Section 3179.82 Subsequent Well Tests for an Existing Completion
For the final rule, the BLM redesignated and retitled this section
from Sec. 3179.104, ``Subsequent well tests,'' to Sec. 3179.82,
``Subsequent well tests for an existing completion.'' One commenter
argued that since the BLM's rule is focused on waste prevention from a
royalty perspective, the BLM should not allow operators to extend
subsequent well testing without a royalty obligation beyond 24 hours.
The BLM has always been responsible for ensuring that oil and gas
resources belonging to the public or to Indian mineral owners have been
produced in a reasonable manner, measured accurately, and reported
properly. The allowance for an extension to the 24-hour well testing
period was part of NTL-4A. Operators rarely need to submit well testing
extension requests and, when they do, the AO may deny the request if
the flaring during well testing would be excessive. Further, this
section also allows for a longer flare period for any well testing that
the BLM may require of an operator. Accordingly, the BLM disagrees with
the comment and did not make any changes to this section.
Another commenter indicated that the BLM does not provide an appeal
process within this section if an operator would like to appeal a BLM
decision not to extend the well-testing period. The BLM allows for
appeal of any BLM decision from an adversely affected party pursuant to
43 CFR 3165.3. The BLM did not change this section based on this
comment.
Section 3179.83 Emergencies
The BLM redesignated this section from Sec. 3179.105 in the
proposed rule to Sec. 3179.83 in the final rule. One
[[Page 25417]]
commenter stated that the proposed rule did not indicate who will make
the determination of whether a situation will be treated as an
emergency. The final rule indicates that the AO will receive the Sundry
Notice and make a determination of avoidable or unavoidable loss based
on the event circumstances. In Sec. 3179.83(a), the BLM defines an
emergency situation as a temporary, infrequent, and unavoidable
situation in which the loss of gas is necessary to avoid a danger to
human health, safety, or the environment. To further clarify the
definition of an emergency, the BLM provides in Sec. 3179.83(b) common
examples of situations that do not qualify as emergencies. Given the
definition and the illustrative situations that do not constitute an
emergency, the BLM believes operators will be able to report the lost
volumes with the appropriate disposition codes on the OGOR. From this
section, the BLM believes that operators can measure or estimate lost
volumes appropriately on the OGOR for the initial 48 hours of the
emergency situation that are royalty-free. Beyond the initial 48 hours
of an emergency, there may be a royalty obligation and, in final Sec.
3179.83(c), the BLM included a description of the type of information
that operators must include on a Sundry Notice to enable the BLM to
make an avoidable or unavoidable loss determination. The BLM added this
provision in the final rule for consistency with section 50263 of the
IRA.
The BLM also received a comment suggesting that the BLM should
expressly include severe weather events and natural disasters as
emergencies. Severe weather and natural disasters were not provisions
in NTL-4A. While the BLM believes that severe weather and natural
disasters may require other types of safety precautions, such as
temporarily shutting in a well, and if a well were shut in for severe
weather or natural disasters, then there is no need to be concerned
about associated gas flaring. If the well continues to produce oil,
then this does not constitute an emergency for flaring gas royalty-
free. The commenter did not provide adequate justification for this
type of change to the final rule.
Gas Flared or Vented From Equipment and During Well Maintenance
Operations
Section 3179.90 Oil Storage Tank Vapors
Based on comments on the proposed rule, the BLM changed the
requirements in proposed Sec. 3179.203, which has been redesignated as
Sec. 3179.90 in the final rule.
In response to comments, the BLM changed the term ``oil storage
vessels'' in the proposed section to ``oil storage tanks'' in the final
rule. This change in terminology brings this section of the final rule
into alignment with subpart 3174, Measurement of oil. The BLM received
several comments on the proposed requirements for vapor recovery
equipment and the immediate assessment of $1,000 per violation for an
oil storage tank hatch left open or unlatched, and unattended. After
careful consideration of the comments, the BLM removed the vapor
recovery requirements from Sec. 3179.90 for two reasons.
First, the BLM's focus is on waste prevention, including loss of
royalties, and the proposed vapor recovery requirement would not
increase royalties with any certainty. Many commenters stated that the
annual requirement to obtain a sample and compositional analysis of the
tank vapors was expensive, excessive, and in their view served no
purpose. The BLM agrees that those requirements would contribute little
to assuring proper royalty collection.
Second, even if the installation of vapor recovery equipment might
be economic, there is no guarantee that the tank vapors collected would
have adequate pressure for a sales line. Under these circumstances, the
BLM would be requiring operators to incur a capital expense with no
guarantee of sales or associated royalties for the public, or for
Indian mineral owners. For these main reasons, the BLM has decided to
remove the vapor-recovery-equipment requirements in this section.
A commenter pointed out that there are tank hatches designed to
open with excess pressure, and such openings might occur prior to or
during inspections, and that there should be no immediate assessment
for open, unlatched, and unattended tank hatches. API Standard 2000
Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks (Reaffirmed, April
2020) Section 3.4.2, Emergency Venting, indicates that a gauge hatch
that permits the cover to lift under abnormal internal pressure is an
acceptable emergency venting method, among other provisions. While
there are tanks designed and built with this type of emergency venting
gauge hatch, in the BLM's experience, this type of hatch is very
uncommon equipment located on a Federal or Indian oil and gas lease. If
an operator does have an emergency venting gauge hatch on the tank, the
operator may request a variance pursuant to Sec. 3170.6.
Other commenters asserted that the requirements for the oil storage
tank hatch presented a safety risk. Commenters specifically referenced
North Dakota Department of Environmental Quality (NDDEQ) guidance that,
according to the commenters, ``allows for tank vapor flares and control
devices to be bypassed when a well is shut in to minimize the risk. In
these cases, the hatches may need to be left open to relieve breathing
pressure due to temperature fluctuations throughout the day.'' The BLM
has been unable to locate that exact quote from NDDEQ's website, but
has found guidance for shut-in, upstream facilities.\152\ The BLM
confirmed by phone call with NDDEQ that this memo appears to be that
referenced by the commenter. The BLM agrees with the NDDEQ guidance
that, if a facility is completely shut-in and any production to tanks
has ceased, then emissions are expected to be minimal and operators may
be in compliance with VOC emissions standards with the hatch left open.
With this final rule, the BLM is regulating waste prevention from
producing oil and gas wells. The BLM is not regulating emissions from
shut-in facilities in this final rule.
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\152\ https://deq.nd.gov/publications/AQ/policy/PC/OilGas/20210823StorageTankMemo.pdf.
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As a general matter, the requirement to maintain all hatches and
connection and other access points vapor tight and capable of holding
pressure in excess of the pressure relieving device has been in place
since the BLM referenced API 12R1 Recommended Practice for Setting,
Connecting, Maintenance and Operations of Lease Tanks, Third Edition,
May 1986 in Onshore Oil and Gas Order No. 4, Measurement of Oil.\153\
The current API Standard 12R1, Installation, Operation, Maintenance,
Inspection, and Repair of Tanks in Production Service, Sixth Edition,
March 2020, Section 4.5.2 states, ``All hatches, connections, and other
access points shall be gasketed and kept closed during operation to
minimize vapor emissions.'' One commenter stated that the closure of a
tank hatch was a prudent operator standard and one that industry
follows diligently. The BLM thus concludes that, at a producing
facility, latching a tank hatch closed is the current industry
practice, and well
[[Page 25418]]
within the capabilities of competent operators.
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\153\ The BLM includes API 12R1, Third edition, from May 1986 as
historical reference that the requirement for vapor tight
connections was an industry standard included in the BLM's Onshore
Oil and Gas Order No. 4 later codified at 43 CFR subpart 3174
Measurement of oil.
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An immediate assessment is appropriate for violating such an
industry standard incorporated into the final rule. Immediate
assessments are not new. They have ``long been considered to be in the
nature of liquidated damages, allowing the BLM to recover the
administrative and other costs incurred as a consequence of the
operator's noncompliance, where actual damages are difficult or
impracticable to ascertain, and regardless of whether there has been
any actual threat to public health, safety, property, or the
environment.'' Brigham Oil & Gas, 181 IBLA 282, 287 (2011) (citing
authorities). On this understanding of the MLA, the volumes of gases
lost (or the safety or environmental risks caused by an improperly
opened or leaking hatch) are impossible to quantify, but the BLM would
nonetheless incur costs of, inter alia, enforcement actions to assure
the violation is abated. Thus, the BLM's statutory authority for such
an assessment in this context flows from 30 U.S.C. 188(a) (providing
that the lease may provide for resort to appropriate methods for the
settlement of disputes or for remedies for breach of specified
conditions thereof,'' which conditions necessarily encompass these
regulations), and the BLM's waste prevention authority.
Section 3179.91 Downhole Well Maintenance and Liquids Unloading
The BLM redesignated this section from Sec. 3179.204 in the
proposed rule to Sec. 3179.91 in the final rule. The BLM received two
comments in support of this proposed section with one commenter
explicitly agreeing with the BLM's inclusion of the requirement for a
person to be on site for well purging and that the person end the event
as soon as practical. Based on the comments, the BLM did not make any
substantive changes to this final section.
Section 3179.92 Size of Production Equipment
This section was designated as Sec. 3179.205 in the proposed rule.
One commenter on this section stated that the requirement to size
production and processing equipment properly based on the production
volume at the facility is consistent with current industry practice.
Another commenter pointed out that the States of New Mexico and
Colorado have State requirements similar to this section. The same
commenter recommended that, if operators fail to comply with the
requirement to properly size their production equipment, the BLM should
deem that failure to constitute unreasonable and undue waste. The BLM
did not adopt this suggestion, because it has elected to remove the
term ``unreasonable and undue waste'' from the final rule.
Under the final rule, an operator who fails to size the equipment
properly will receive an Incident of Noncompliance as a major violation
with an abatement period to fix the violation. If an operator fails to
comply within the abatement period, the BLM may escalate enforcement to
civil penalties. The BLM did not make any changes to the regulatory
text in this section in response to the comments received.
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR)
Section 3179.100 Leak Detection and Repair Program
The BLM redesignated the LDAR program section from the proposed
rule at Sec. 3179.301 to the final rule at Sec. 3179.100. Section
3179.100 provides the requirements for operators to set up and maintain
programs for detecting and repairing natural-gas leaks from their
operations and production equipment. Section 3179.101 gives the
timetable and requirements for repairing leaks. Section 3179.102
provides the requirements for recordkeeping. The LDAR program applies
only to operations and production equipment located on a Federal or
Indian oil and gas lease. The LDAR program and requirements do not
apply to operations and production equipment on State or private
tracts, even where those tracts are committed to a federally approved
unit or CA (see Sec. 3179.2).
The BLM received numerous comments requesting that the BLM allow
operators to demonstrate their compliance with BLM requirements by
showing that they already comply with EPA's OOOO series rules or State
leak detection rules. The BLM considered and rejected this alternative
approach to compliance. First, the BLM's final Waste Prevention Rule
serves a different statutory purpose (conservation of resources) than
EPA's rule (protection of human health and welfare vis-a-vis air
quality). The BLM further declines to allow compliance with EPA's OOOOb
and OOOOc to demonstrate compliance with BLM's waste prevention rule
given the different statutory goals of each rule and the acute need to
reduce waste or receive compensation for waste of the public and Indian
mineral resource. Where the BLM has independently determined that
specific provisions from EPA are sufficient to accomplish the BLM's
waste prevention mandate, the BLM has made limited changes in the final
rule as set forth below at Sec. 3179.100(b)(2).
Second, the BLM's LDAR program is limited to operations and
production equipment located on Federal or Indian oil and gas leases.
Since the scope for this section is limited, it is appropriate for the
BLM to have its own requirements that would not interfere with
implementation of any EPA final rule. The BLM's LDAR program is focused
on monitoring and repairing leaks as quickly as possible to meet its
waste prevention objective of maximizing production by keeping it
contained within the system and flowing through the sales point.
Commenters also suggested that any final LDAR program cover a
larger area than simply a single lease, unit PA, or CA. The BLM
evaluated its ability to review individual LDAR programs for every
single lease, unit PA, or CA, and agrees with the commenters. The BLM
changed its final rule to require operators to submit LDAR programs
corresponding to the BLM-administrative State. The initial LDAR
programs and the annual reviews and updates of the originally submitted
LDAR program must be submitted to the appropriate BLM state office in
writing until such time as the BLM has the ability to receive the LDAR
programs and annual reviews and update reports electronically.
In the proposed rule, the BLM required the operator to submit the
LDAR program no later than 6 months after the effective date of the
final rule. Commenters believed this timeframe was too short for
submitting the initial program. The BLM agrees. The BLM extended the
time in which operators must submit an LDAR program to the BLM
administrative state office because the BLM adopted commenters'
suggestion to expand the geographic area for which an operator creates
the LDAR program. In the proposed rule, LDAR programs were to be
submitted to a BLM Field Office for review; in the final rule this was
changed to a larger geographic area and therefore BLM extended the time
to prepare the programs. In this final rule, the BLM extends this
timeframe for compliance to within 18 months of the effective date of
the final rule. This 18-month timeframe for compliance is likely to go
into effect prior to standards in state plans submitted in response to
EPA's OOOOc rule.
This final section requires operators to review and update
submitted LDAR programs on an annual basis. The annual update is due in
the same month in which the operator submitted the initial LDAR program
to the BLM. The
[[Page 25419]]
annual report ensures that information about the identified leases,
unit PAs, and CAs, leak detection methods, current operator, and
frequency of inspections is current. If the LDAR program requires no
changes, then the operator must notify the BLM state office that the
LDAR program submitted and reviewed remains in effect. The requirement
for an annual update and review is also cross-referenced in the section
about recordkeeping requirements for leak detection in final Sec.
3179.102.
The BLM received comments that the requirements for the LDAR
program were vague, with no guidance or requirements as to what the BLM
would determine as adequate or inadequate and what additional measures
the BLM might prescribe to address any identified deficiencies in the
program. The BLM acknowledges the commenters' concern, and in the final
rule modified some requirements for the LDAR program that should avoid
conflict with the EPA's OOOO series requirements. In final rule Sec.
3179.100(b), the LDAR program requires the operator to submit the
following information for the LDAR program: (1) identification of the
leases, unit PAs, and CAs by geographic State for all States within the
BLM's administrative State boundaries to which the LDAR program
applies; (2) identification of the method and frequency of leak
detection inspection used at the lease, unit PA, or CA. Under final
rule Sec. 3179.100(b)(2), acceptable inspection methods and frequency
include: (i) well pads with only wellheads and no production equipment
or storage must include quarterly AVO inspections for leak detection;
(ii) well pads with any production and processing equipment and oil
storage must include AVO inspections every other month and quarterly
OGI for leak detection; and (iii) other leak detection inspection
methods and frequency acceptable to the BLM (e.g., continuous
monitoring); (3) identification of the operator's recordkeeping process
for LDAR pursuant to final Sec. 3179.102.
Final Sec. 3179.100 requires operators to directly submit initial
LDAR programs and subsequent annual LDAR reports to BLM state offices
for review. At this time, the BLM's Automated Fluid Minerals Support
System is unable to receive LDAR programs or annual reports. In the
future, the BLM anticipates having a new electronic database that will
be able to accept LDAR program requirements. When a new electronic
database is available and capable of receiving the LDAR program
requirements, the BLM will notify operators and give them sufficient
time to prepare for electronic submission of LDAR program requirements.
Section 3179.101 Repairing Leaks
The final rule redesignated this section from Sec. 3179.302 in the
proposed rule to Sec. 3179.101 in the final. The BLM received comments
supporting this section as written in the proposed rule. One commenter
suggested changing the repair periods to align with their EPA
counterparts to eliminate confusion between the two agencies'
requirements. The BLM's proposed period remains unchanged because the
BLM has determined that its timeframes are sufficient to meet the BLM's
waste prevention needs. Even though EPA is providing the delay of
repair provisions for up to 2 years under specific conditions for the
enforcement of air quality, the BLM elects to maintain a shorter time
for repair for the prevention of waste.
A second commenter suggested that paragraph (d), which gives
operators 15 calendar days to address an ineffective repair, is an
insufficient amount of time. The BLM reminds the commenter that this is
15 days for an ineffective repair. Prior to this point, the operator
will have had 30 calendar days after discovery of the leak to
effectively repair the leak. The proposed and final rules provide an
additional 15 calendar days to repair an ineffectively repaired leak.
The repair of leaks in a timely manner is a maintenance obligation and
demonstrates operator performance in a good and workmanlike manner. The
15-day allowance for an ineffective repair--45 days in total--should
not be cause for concern for a diligent operator. The BLM did not make
any changes to the regulatory text of this section based on comments.
Section 3179.102 Required Recordkeeping for Leak Dtection Inspection
and Repair
The BLM redesignated this section in the final rule from Sec.
3179.303 in the proposed rule to Sec. 3179.102 in the final.
Commenters asked the BLM to remove the requirement for operators to
submit an annual report to the BLM on March 31 of each calendar year
summarizing the previous year's inspection activities, including: (1)
the number of sites inspected; (2) the total number of leaks
identified, categorized by the type of component that was leaking; (3)
the total number of leaks repaired and (4) the total number of leaks
that were not repaired as of December 31 of the previous year due to
good cause, along with an estimated date of repair for each leak. The
commenters requested this information be kept on site and be made
available to the AO upon request. Commenters also contended that the
March 31 and December 31 dates as arbitrary. The BLM disagrees in part
to the comments. The annual report is an integral part of informing the
BLM as to whether the LDAR program is beneficial in reducing leaks and
preventing waste, or, in other words, whether it is an effective
program that is worth continuing. The BLM agrees in part that removing
the two dates of March 31 and December 31 from the final rule would
allow an operator to report similar information to the BLM and EPA on
the same dates. Thus, the BLM removed the March 31 and December 31
dates that had been proposed to define the LDAR program year, and
instead the final rule allows operators to determine the LDAR program
year based on the submission of their initial LDAR program to the BLM
state office for review within 18 months of the effective date of the
rule pursuant to final Sec. 3179.100. The BLM also removed the
requirement for the annual report to contain the total number of leaks
repaired in the year. This information may be determined from the other
information required on the annual report.
As a reminder, final Sec. Sec. 3179.100 through 3179.103 apply
only to operations and production equipment located on a Federal or
Indian oil and gas lease. The aforementioned sections do not apply to
operations and production equipment on State or private tracts, even
when those tracts are committed to a federally approved unit or CA.
Immediate Assessments
Section 3179.200 Immediate Assessments
The BLM did not include a section on immediate assessments in the
proposed rule. However, the proposed rule contained two immediate
assessments: proposed Sec. 3179.6(b) for unlit flares and proposed
Sec. 3179.203(a) for thief hatch left open and unattended. There are
no new immediate assessments in the final rule. The immediate
assessment for the unlit flare is found in the redesignated Sec.
3179.50(b) and for the hatch left open and unattended is found in the
redesignated Sec. 3179.90(a).
The BLM included this new section summarizing the immediate
assessments found elsewhere in final subpart 3179 for consistency with
other subparts in part 3170 that contain immediate assessments, such as
Sec. Sec. 3173.29, 3174.15, and 3175.150. The BLM believes the tables
with immediate
[[Page 25420]]
assessments provided in these subparts provide the regulated community
and BLM inspectors with a quick reference for the immediate assessments
found within the respective subparts.
Sections That the BLM Removed
Section 3179.102 Well Completion and Related Operations
In the final rule, the BLM removed proposed Sec. 3179.102, ``Well
completion and related operations,'' and instead opted for a simpler
approach to flaring following well completion or recompletion that
appears in the final Sec. 3179.81. Based on numerous comments, the BLM
elected to eliminate the distinction made in proposed Sec. 3179.102
between a new completion that is hydraulically fractured and an
existing completion that is hydraulically refractured. In the proposed
rule, the BLM made this distinction because the BLM believed that it is
more likely for existing completions that are refractured to be
connected to a sales line to capture flowback gas to sales sooner and
limit flaring as a result. Comments revealed that the proposed sections
were confusing. The BLM eliminated proposed Sec. 3179.102 to simplify
and make the flaring limits more straightforward.
Based on comments received for the proposed rule, the BLM removed
proposed Sec. 3179.201 ``Pneumatic controllers and pneumatic diaphragm
pumps.'' The rationale for the removal and reduction of requirements
for this section are discussed below. The removal of proposed Sec.
3179.201 means that the subpart 3179 requirements that apply only to
operations on Federal and Indian surface estate have been reduced in
the final rule.
Section 3179.201 Pneumatic Controllers and Pneumatic Diaphragm Pumps
Proposed Sec. 3179.201 limited the bleed rate of natural-gas-
activated pneumatic controllers and pneumatic diaphragm pumps to 6 scf
per hour for leases, unit PAs, and CAs producing greater than 120 Mcf
of gas or 20 barrels of oil per month. The BLM's intention was to limit
the bleed rate of natural-gas-activated pneumatic diaphragm pumps to
decrease the volume of bleed gas and simultaneously increase the amount
of gas that would be sold. The BLM's proposed RIA indicated the
monetary benefits to industry for this requirement exceeded the costs.
The proposed rule RIA estimated that operators would replace up to
52,213 pneumatics devices, resulting in an estimated 5.93 Bcf of gas
conserved annually. The 5.93 Bcf of gas conserved described in the
proposed RIA was an initial estimate that assumed that all intermittent
bleed pneumatic controllers would bleed continuously throughout the
year. BLM recognizes that is not how intermittent bleed pneumatic
controllers are operated. Rather BLM understands that this equipment is
used in varying ways based on operating conditions. A more precise
estimate is difficult to ascertain because the BLM does not track
production equipment of this type. The proposed RIA also relied on
EPA's U.S. GHG Emissions data (https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks-1990-2021), from which
it is inherently difficult to attribute emissions volumes to operations
on Federal and Indian surface estate.
After reviewing public comments on this section and evaluating the
practical implications of enforcement of this section, the BLM decided
to remove this section in its entirety. The BLM authorizes royalty-free
use of lease production for operations and production purposes,
including placing oil or gas in marketable condition on the same lease,
unit PA, or CA prior to removal from the lease, unit PA, or CA. The
requirements for royalty-free use of lease production are found in
subpart 3178. Subpart 3178 does not limit the volume of royalty-free
use oil or gas so long as the volume is reasonable for the operation.
To limit the use of pneumatic controllers and pneumatic diaphragm pumps
to less than 6 scf per hour would have created a conflict with 43 CFR
subpart 3178. In addition, the BLM considered the practical difficulty
in inspecting for and enforcing the requirements of the proposed
section, which would obligate the BLM to maintain an extensive database
of pneumatic equipment with the manufacturer's advertised bleed rate
for enforcement. During a production inspection, a BLM inspector would
ascertain whether the device exceeded the required bleed rate and, if
it did, require the operator to replace the equipment. Proposed
3179.4(b)(7) would have allowed for normal operating losses from a
natural-gas-activated pneumatic controller or pump to qualify as an
unavoidable loss. Therefore, during any inspection there could have
been no determination of avoidably lost gas with a royalty obligation,
making this provision irrelevant for royalty collection purposes.
Section 3179.401 State and Tribal Requests for Variances From the
Requirements of This Subpart
Proposed Sec. 3179.401 would have reinstated the State or Tribal
variance provision from the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule. The provision
would have allowed States and Tribes to request a variance under which
analogous State or Tribal rules would have applied in place of some or
all of the requirements of subpart 3179. With a variance request, the
State or Tribe would have been required to: identify the subpart 3179
provision(s) for which the variance is requested; identify the State,
local, or Tribal rules that would be applied instead; explain why the
variance is needed; and, demonstrate how the State, local, or Tribal
rules would be as effective as the subpart 3179 provisions in terms of
reducing waste, reducing environmental impacts, assuring appropriate
royalty payments, and ensuring the safe and responsible production of
oil and gas.
The BLM State Director would have been authorized to approve the
variance request or approve it subject to conditions, after considering
all relevant factors. This decision would have been entirely at the
BLM's discretion and would not be subject to administrative appeals
under 43 CFR part 4. If the BLM were to have approved a variance, the
State or Tribe that requested the variance would be obligated to notify
the BLM of any substantive amendments, revisions, or other changes to
the State, local, or Tribal rules to be applied under the variance.
Finally, if the BLM were to have approved a variance under this
section, the BLM would have been authorized to enforce the State,
local, or Tribal rules applied under the variance as if they were
contained in the BLM's regulations.
In the proposed rule, the BLM requested public comment seeking
confirmation that such variances would be both useful and practical.
The BLM also requested that commenters provide specific examples of
situations where the variance provision in proposed Sec. 3179.401
would improve on existing practices and administrative tools, such as
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), in terms of providing better
environmental protection, better protection of taxpayer and lessor
interests, administrative efficiencies, and burden reductions for
operators.
Several commenters offered general support for the BLM's proposed
rule to allow for State or Tribal variance requests. Commenters
expressed concerns for the increased need for
[[Page 25421]]
limited State resources for the process and implementation, for
conflict with the MLA prohibition on the promulgation of rules ``in
conflict with the laws of the State in which the leased property is
situated,'' \154\ and the lack of clarity in the proposed requirement
that the State or Tribal regulation would perform ``at least equally
well'' as the BLM rule. The BLM agrees with some of these concerns.
However, the BLM did not receive comments confirming that the variances
would be both useful and practical or that variances would improve on
existing practices and administrative tools, such as MOUs. Commenters
expressed support for the use of MOUs,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ 30 U.S.C. 187.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the final rule, the BLM decided not to carry forward the
proposed provision to allow for State and Tribal variances. Upon
further review, the BLM believes that the provision would have created
a significant administrative burden for the agency while not improving
on existing practices and administrative tools.
Operators in States or on Tribal lands that have more stringent
standards than those contained in this rule are required to conform to
the more stringent State or Tribal standards, regardless of whether the
State or Tribe receives a variance under the provision of the proposed
rule. Such situations routinely arise in the context of other BLM oil
and gas operational regulations, indicating that a variance provision
in this rule is not useful. Commenters failed to show that the subpart
3179 provisions would conflict with any State's more stringent
requirements. The BLM has also not identified any such conflict. Thus,
with or without a formal variance, a State or Tribe may effectively
supplement the BLM's regulatory requirements by enacting stricter
requirements. That is consistent with the BLM's longstanding practice.
There are benefits associated with aligning data collection
processes or other potential areas of regulatory similarity that could
bring greater efficiencies for both operators and regulators, but MOUs
can more efficiently achieve many of those goals without the need for a
State or Tribal variance.
Commenters requested that the BLM pursue a Title V Operating Permit
Program similar to EPA's under the CAA and do further work to promote
Tribal self-determination and self-governance within this rule. The BLM
lacks EPA's CAA authority, but welcomes the opportunity to consult with
Tribes concerning cooperative agreements.
While the variance provisions are not in the final rule, the BLM
welcomes the opportunity to enter into MOUs or similar agreements with
States and Tribes to clarify applicable regulatory requirements, which
is also part of longstanding practice.
VI. Procedural Matters
A. Regulatory Planning and Review (E.O. 12866, E.O. 13563)
Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Order 14094,
provides that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will review all
significant rules. The OIRA has determined that this final rule is
significant.
Executive Order 13563 reaffirms the principles of Executive Order
12866 while calling for improvements in the Nation's regulatory system
to promote predictability, to reduce uncertainty, and to use the best,
most innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory
ends. The Executive Order directs agencies to consider regulatory
approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of
choice for the public where these approaches are relevant, feasible,
and consistent with regulatory objectives. Executive Order 13563
emphasizes further that regulations must be based on the best available
science and that the rulemaking process must allow for public
participation and an open exchange of ideas. We have developed this
rule in a manner consistent with these requirements.
This final rule replaces the BLM's current rules governing venting
and flaring, which are contained in NTL-4A. We have developed this
final rule in a manner consistent with the requirements in Executive
Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563.
The monetized costs and benefits of this rule can be seen in the
following table along with the transfer payments this rule will provide
in the form of increased royalties from increased gas sales. The total
monetized Net Benefit on an annualized basis is $360,000 at a 7 percent
discount rate and $441,000 at a 3 percent discount rate. Additional
unquantified benefits from reduced emissions of VOCs and hazardous air
pollutants are discussed further in the RIA. The BLM reiterates that,
while it has included benefits associated with the social cost of
greenhouse gases in this particular presentation of costs and benefits
and in the RIA, this was done to respond to Executive Orders 12866 and
13563 and in order to present as complete a picture as possible of the
total costs and benefits of the final rule for the public. Climate
benefits derived from foregone emissions were not a factor in the
decision to include any of the individual waste prevention requirements
in this final rule.
Costs and Benefits Summary
[2024-2033]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7% Discount rate 3% Discount rate
---------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Annualized
NPV ($MM) ($MM) NPV ($MM) ($MM)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measurements.................................... $8.46 $1.20 $9.60 $1.13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LDAR............................................ 64.55 9.19 78.40 9.19
Administrative Burdens.......................... 62.56 8.91 75.98 8.91
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total Cost.................................. 135.57 19.30 163.98 19.22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 25422]]
Benefits
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LDAR............................................ $165.07 19.66 167.74 19.66
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Benefits.............................. 165.07 19.66 167.74 19.66
Net Benefits................................ 29.50 0.36 3.76 0.44
Transfer Payments........................... 360.04 51.26 438.59 51.42
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The BLM reviewed the requirements of the final rule and determined
that they will not adversely affect in a material way the economy, a
sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or Tribal
governments or communities. For more detailed information, see the RIA
prepared for this final rule. The RIA has been posted in the docket for
the final rule on the Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. In the Searchbox, enter ``RIN 1004-AE79,'' click
the ``Search'' button, open the Docket Folder, and look under
Supporting Documents.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) (RFA)
requires that Federal agencies prepare a regulatory flexibility
analysis for rules subject to the notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements under the APA (5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.), if the rule would
have a significant economic impact, whether detrimental or beneficial,
on a substantial number of small entities. See 5 U.S.C. 601 612.
Congress enacted the RFA to ensure that government regulations do not
unnecessarily or disproportionately burden small entities. Small
entities include small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions,
and small not-for-profit enterprises.
The BLM reviewed the Small Business Administration (SBA) size
standards for small businesses and the number of entities fitting those
size standards as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau in the Economic
Census. The BLM concludes that the vast majority of entities operating
in the relevant sectors are small businesses, as defined by the SBA. As
such, the final rule will likely affect a substantial number of small
entities.
The BLM reviewed the final rule and has determined that, although
the final rule will likely affect a substantial number of small
entities, that effect will not be significant. The basis for this
determination is explained in more detail in the RIA. In brief, the
per-entity, annualized compliance costs associated with this final rule
are estimated to represent only a small fraction of the annual net
incomes of the companies likely to be impacted. Because the final rule
will not have a ``significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities,'' as that phrase is used in 5 U.S.C. 605, a final
regulatory flexibility analysis and regulatory compliance guide are not
required. The Secretary of the Interior certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b)
that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
C. Congressional Review Act
The statutory provision found at 5 U.S.C. 804(2), the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, does not apply to this
final rule because it is estimated that the rule will not have an
annual economic impact of $100 million or more. As noted in the Costs
and Benefits Summary earlier, the RIA that the BLM produced for this
rule calculates that this rule will cost operators $19.3 million per
year (using a 7 percent discount rate) for the next 10 years, while
generating benefits to operators of approximately $1.8 million a year
(using a 7 percent discount rate) in the form of 0.45 Bcf of additional
captured gas. The reduced methane emissions associated with the final
rule will provide a benefit to society of $17.9 million a year over the
same time frame, leading to a net benefit from the rule of $360,000 to
$441,000 a year.
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
The final rule will not have a significant or unique effect on
State, local, or Tribal governments or the private sector. The final
rule contains no requirements that apply to State, local, or Tribal
governments. The final rule revises requirements that otherwise apply
to the private sector participating in a voluntary Federal program. The
costs that the final rule will impose on the private sector are below
the monetary threshold established at 2 U.S.C. 1532(a). A statement
containing the information required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) is therefore not required for the final
rule. This final rule is also not subject to the requirements of
section 203 of UMRA because it contains no regulatory requirements that
might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, because it
contains no requirements that apply to such governments, nor does it
impose obligations upon them.
E. Governmental Actions and Interference With Constitutionally
Protected Property Right-Takings (Executive Order 12630)
This final rule will not effect a taking of private property or
otherwise have taking implications under Executive Order 12630. A
takings implication assessment is not required. The final rule will
replace the BLM's current rules governing venting and flaring, which
are contained in NTL-4A. Therefore, the final rule will impact some
operational and administrative requirements on Federal and Indian
lands. All such operations are subject to lease terms which expressly
require that subsequent lease activities be conducted in compliance
with subsequently adopted Federal laws and regulations.
This final rule conforms to the terms of those leases and
applicable statutes and, as such, the rule is not a government action
capable of interfering with constitutionally protected property rights.
Therefore, the BLM has determined that the rule will not cause a taking
of private property or require further discussion of takings
implications under Executive Order 12630.
[[Page 25423]]
F. Federalism (Executive Order 13132)
Under the criteria in section 1 of Executive Order 13132, this
final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant
the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. A federalism
impact statement is not required.
The final rule will not have a substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
levels of government. It will not apply to States or local governments
or State or local governmental entities. The rule will affect the
relationship between operators, lessees, and the BLM, but it will not
directly impact the States. Therefore, in accordance with Executive
Order 13132, the BLM has determined that this final rule will not have
sufficient federalism implications to warrant preparation of a
Federalism Assessment.
G. Civil Justice Reform (Executive Order 12988)
This final rule complies with the requirements of Executive Order
12988. More specifically, this final rule meets the criteria of section
3(a), which requires agencies to review all regulations to eliminate
errors and ambiguity and to write all regulations to minimize
litigation. This final rule also meets the criteria of section 3(b)(2),
which requires agencies to write all regulations in clear language with
clear legal standards.
H. Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments
(Executive Order 13175 and Departmental Policy)
The Department strives to strengthen its government-to-government
relationship with Indian Tribes through a commitment to consultation
with Indian Tribes and recognition of their right to self-governance
and Tribal sovereignty.
The BLM evaluated this final rule under the Department's
consultation policy and under the criteria in Executive Order 13175 to
identify possible effects of the rule on federally recognized Indian
Tribes. Since the BLM approves proposed operations on all Indian
(except Osage Tribe) onshore oil and gas leases, the final rule has the
potential to affect Indian Tribes.
In August of 2021, the BLM sent a letter to each federally
recognized Tribe informing them of certain rulemaking efforts,
including the development of this final rule. The letter offered Tribes
the opportunity for individual government-to-government consultation
regarding the final rule. Three Tribes responded to the letter and
requested government-to-government consultation. The BLM conducted
Tribal consultations with those three Tribes during the rulemaking
process.
I. Paperwork Reduction Act
A. Overview
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.)
generally provides that an agency may not conduct or sponsor a
collection of information, and, notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a person is not required to respond to collection of information
unless it has been approved by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and displays a currently valid OMB control number. The
information collections requirements contained in the BLMs waste
prevention standard as contained in 43 CFR parts 3160, 3170, and
subpart 3178 have been approved by OMB under OMB control number 1004-
0211.
This Final rule contains revised and new information collection
(IC) requirements for BLM regulations and requires a submission to OMB
for review under the PRA, as outlined in the PRA implementing
regulations at 5 CFR 1320.11. The IC requirements are necessary to
assist the BLM in preventing venting, flaring, and leaks that waste the
public's resources and assets. Respondents are holders of Federal and
Indian oil and gas leases. The information collection requirements are
outlined in the BLM's waste prevention standards as well as on BLM
Forms 3160-3 (``Application for Permit to Drill or Reenter'') and 3160-
5 (``Sundry Notices and Reports on Wells''). Forms 3160-3 and 3160-5
are used broadly for onshore oil and gas operations and production
purposes under 43 CFR parts 3160 and 3170 and are approved under OMB
control number 1004-0137. This final rule does not introduce any
changes to Forms 3160-3 and 3160-5 and the forms will continue to be
approved under OMB control number 1004-0137; however, this information
collection request (ICR) seeks to include burdens specific to the use
of Forms 3160-3 and 3160-5 in regard to the proposed waste prevention
standard subject to this final rule. The final rule contains the below
new and revised IC requirements.
B. Effects on Existing Information Collections Requirements
The final rule revises certain existing information collection
requirements and introduces new information collection requirements.
These information collection requirements are discussed in detail in
the information collection request submitted to OMB and are available
at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain under OMB control number
1004-0211 as outlined below.
Existing Sec. 3162.3-1 Drilling Applications and Plans (Application
for Permit To Drill Oil Well and WMP)
The final rule amends Sec. 3162.3-1 to include the requirement for
a WMP (using Form 3160-3) or self-certification. In addition, the final
rule adds Sec. 3162.3-1(j), which requires that when submitting an APD
for an oil well, the operator must also submit a plan to minimize waste
of natural gas from that well or alternatively, in Sec. 3162.3-1(k), a
self-certification for 100 percent capture of the associated gas.
Request for Approval for Royalty-Free Uses On-Lease or Off-Lease (43
CFR 3178.5, 3178.7, 3178.8, and 3178.9)
Sections 3178.5, 3178.7, and 3178.9 of the BLM's current rules
require submission of a Sundry Notice (Form 3160-5) to request prior
written BLM approval for use of gas royalty-free for the following
operations and production purposes on the lease, unit or communitized
area. This final rule does not address nor would change this existing
requirement.
C. New Information Collection Requirements
The final rule introduces new information collection requirements
in the new subpart 43 CFR subpart 3179. These information collection
requirements are discussed in detail in the information collection
request to submitted to OMB and are available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain under OMB control number 1004-0211,
as outlined below.
The final subpart 3179 has information collection requirements, as
discussed below. The purpose of this subpart is to implement and carry
out the purposes of statutes to prevent waste from covered Federal and
Indian oil and gas leases with requirements for flaring and venting of
produced gas, requirements for the waste of gas from leaks, and clearly
defining unavoidably and avoidably lost gas.
Section 3179.41 Determining When the Loss of Oil or Gas Is Avoidable or
Unavoidable (Notifying the BLM Prior to Flaring)
Section 3179.41 requires that an operator notify the BLM through a
Sundry Notices and Report on Wells, Form 3160-5, prior to the flaring
of gas
[[Page 25424]]
from which at least 50 percent of natural gas liquids have been removed
on-lease and captured for market, that the operator is conducting such
capture and the inlet of the equipment used to remove the natural gas
liquids will be an FMP.
Section 3179.71 Measurement of Flared Oil-Well Gas Volume
Section 3179.71(a) of the rule requires operators to measure
volumes of gas using orifice meters or ultrasonic meters for flares
measuring greater than 1,050 Mcf per month over the averaging period
from wells, facilities and equipment on a lease, unit, or CA. The
operator is required to install measurement for flares, but there are
no information collection activities associated with the installation
of measurement equipment. Sections 3179.71(d) and (e) provide the
sampling requirements for non-commingled flares and commingled flares.
The gas sample analysis will determine the Btu value the operator is
required to report to the Office of Natural Resources Revenue Form
ONRR-4054.
Section 3179.72 Required Reporting and Recordkeeping of Vented and
Flared Gas Volumes
Section 3179.72 requires operators to maintain records of venting
and flaring events beginning 3 months following the effective date of
the rule. Operators are required to keep a record containing the
information specified in this section and make it available to the BLM
upon request.
Section 3179.80 Loss of Well Control While Drilling
Section 3179.80 provides that the operator must notify the BLM
within 24 hours of the start of the loss of well control event and
submit a Sundry Notice within 15 days following conclusion of the event
to the BLM describing the loss of well control.
Section 3179.81 Well Completion and Recompletion Flaring Allowances and
Sec. 3179.82 Subsequent Well Tests for an Existing Completion
The final rule allows for royalty-free flaring following a new
completion or recompletion until one of the following occurs: (1) 30
days have passed since beginning of the flowback following completion
or recompletion; (2) 20,000 Mcf of gas have been flared; (3) flowback
has been routed to the production separator. Section 3179.81 allows an
operator to flare gas for 30 days since the beginning of the flowback
under certain conditions and specified limits. Section 3179.82 permits
an operator to flare gas for no more than 24 hours during well tests
subsequent to the initial completion or recompletion flaring. An
operator is required to submit its request for longer test periods or
increased limits under paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of this section
using a Sundry Notice.
Section 3179.83 Emergencies
Section 3179.83 requires that within 45 days of the start of the
emergency, the operator is required estimate and report to the BLM on a
Sundry Notice the volumes flared or vented beyond the timeframes
specified in paragraph (b) of this section.
Section 3179.90 Oil Storage Tank Vapors
The final rule for Sec. 3179.90 requires an operator to only open
the tank hatch to the extent necessary to conduct production and
measurement operations. This section also requires the operator to
maintain all oil storage tanks, hatches, connections and other tank
access points in a vapor tight condition. An immediate assessment is
imposed upon discovery of a hatch that is open or unlatched, and
unattended.
Section 3179.100 Leak Detection and Repair Program
The rule requires an operator to maintain an LDAR program designed
to prevent the undue waste of Federal or Indian gas. The LDAR program
must provide for regular inspections of all oil and gas production,
processing, treatment, storage, and measurement equipment on the lease
site. Operators must submit their LDAR programs for BLM review, and the
BLM would notify the operator if its program was determined to be
inadequate. Operators are required to submit an annual report on
inspections and repairs. Section 3179.100 requires that the operator of
a Federal or Indian lease must submit the LDAR program to the BLM state
office with jurisdiction over the production describing the operator's
LDAR program for all the production facilities within the BLM
administrative State boundaries, including the frequency of inspections
and any instruments to be used for leak detection.
Section 3179.101 Repairing Leaks
Section 3179.101 requires that an operator repair any leak as soon
as practicable, and in no event later than 30 calendar days after
discovery, unless good cause exists to delay the repair for a longer
period. Good cause for delay of repair exists if the repair (including
replacement) is technically infeasible (including unavailability of
parts that have been ordered), would require a pipeline blowdown, a
compressor station shutdown, a well shut-in, or would be unsafe to
conduct during operation of the unit. Paragraph (b) of this section
would require that if there is good cause for delaying the repair
beyond 30 calendar days, the operator must notify the BLM of the cause
by Sundry Notice.
Section 3179.102 Leak Detection Inspection Recordkeeping and Reporting
Operators are required to keep records in inspections and repairs
and submit those records to the BLM upon request. Section 3179.102
requires that an operator maintain certain records for the period
required under Sec. 3162.4-1(d) of this title and make them available
to the BLM upon request.
D. Changes From the Proposed to Final Rule
Below are changes to the information collections in the final rule
that are different from those in the proposed rule.
The final rule includes Sec. 3179.72 adds a new required
reporting and recordkeeping of vented and flared gas volumes.
The final rule includes Sec. 3179.80, Unavoidable/
Avoidable loss determination for drilling with loss of well control,
adds a new Sundry-Notice requirement in the final rule that was not in
the proposed rule.
The BLM removed the proposed Annual compositional analysis
for oil storage vessels that was contained in the proposed Sec.
3179.203.
The BLM removed the proposed State or Tribal requests for
variances or amendments that was contained in the proposed Sec. Sec.
3179.401 and 3179.401(e)).
E. Estimated Information Collection Burdens
Currently, there are 50 responses, 400 annual burden hours, and $0
non-hour cost burdens approved under this OMB control number. These
burdens pertain to a Request for Approval for Royalty-Free Uses On-
Lease or Off-Lease (43 CFR 3178.5, 3178.7, 3178.8, and 3178.9) which
are not addressed in this final rule. The BLM projects that the
information collections as contained in this final rule are to result
in 58,301 new annual responses (from 50 to 58,351), 125,351 new annual
burden hours (from 400 to 125,751); and $24,175,000 annual non-hour
cost burdens ($0 to $24,175,000). The increase in annual burdens
results from the Final rule results from the information collection
activities
[[Page 25425]]
contained in the 43 CFR subpart 3179, a new subpart introduced by this
final rule and a new requirement contained in 43 CFR 3162.3-1,
Application, to Drill Oil Well and WMP.
Title: Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and
Resource Conservation (43 CFR parts 3160, 3170, 3178 and 3179).
OMB control number: 1004-0211.
Form Number: 3160-5 (OMB control number 1004-0137).
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Description of Respondents: Federal and Indian leases, as well as
State and private tracts committed to a federally approved lease, unit,
or communitized area.
Estimated Number of Respondents: 1,200.
Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 58,351.
Estimated Completion Time per Response: Varies from 1 hour to 8
hours depending on activity.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 125,751.
Respondents' Obligation: Required to obtain or retain a benefit.
Frequency of Collection: On occasion, Annually, Monthly, or one-
time depending on activity.
Estimated Total Non-Hour Cost: $24,175,000.
In accordance with the PRA and the PRA implementing regulations at
5 CFR 1320.11, the BLM has submitted an ICR to OMB for the new and
revised ICs in this final rule. As part of our continuing effort to
reduce paperwork and respondent burdens, we invite the public and other
Federal agencies to comment on any aspect of this information
collection, including:
(1) Whether the collection of information is necessary for the
proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether
the information will have practical utility;
(2) The accuracy of our estimate of the burden for this collection
of information, including the validity of the methodology and
assumptions used;
(3) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; and
(4) Ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on
those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate
automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection
techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting
electronic submission of response.
If you want to comment on the information-collection requirements
in this final rule, please send your comments and suggestions on this
information-collection request within 30 days of publication of this
final rule in the Federal Register to OMB at www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAmain. Find this particular information collection by selecting
``Currently under Review--Open for Public Comments'' or by using the
search function.
J. National Environmental Policy Act
The BLM has prepared a final EA to determine whether this proposed
rule will have a significant impact on the quality of the human
environment under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). The final EA supports the issuance of a
Finding of No Significant Impact for the rule, therefore preparation of
an environmental impact statement pursuant to the NEPA is not required.
The final EA has been placed in the file for the BLM's
Administrative Record for the rule at the address specified in the
ADDRESSES section. The EA has also been posted in the docket for the
rule on the Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. In
the Searchbox, enter ``RIN 1004-AE79,'' click the ``Search'' button,
open the Docket Folder, and look under Supporting Documents.
K. Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use (Executive Order 13211)
Under Executive Order 13211, agencies are required to prepare and
submit to OMB a Statement of Energy Effects for significant energy
actions. This statement is to include a detailed statement of ``any
adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or use (including a
shortfall in supply, price increases, and increase use of foreign
supplies)'' for the action and reasonable alternatives and their
effects.
Section 4(b) of Executive Order 13211 defines a ``significant
energy action'' as ``any action by an agency (normally published in the
Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to lead to the
promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including notices of
inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices of
proposed rulemaking: (1)(i) that is a significant regulatory action
under Executive Order 12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is likely
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or
use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the Administrator of (OIRA)
as a significant energy action.''
Since the compliance costs for this rule will represent a small
fraction of company net incomes, the BLM has concluded that the rule is
unlikely to impact the investment decisions of firms. See section 9 of
the BLM's RIA. Also, any incremental production of gas estimated to
result from the rule's enactment would constitute a small fraction of
total U.S. gas production, and any potential and temporary deferred
production of oil would likewise constitute a small fraction of total
U.S. oil production. For these reasons, we do not expect that the final
rule will significantly impact the supply, distribution, or use of
energy. As such, the rulemaking is not a ``significant energy action,''
as defined in Executive Order 13211.
Authors
The principal authors of this final rule are: Amanda Fox, Petroleum
Engineer, Santa Fe, NM; Beth Poindexter, Petroleum Engineer, San
Antonio, TX; and the Office of the Solicitor, Department of the
Interior. Technical support provided by: Tyson Sackett, Economist,
Cheyenne, WY; Scott Rickard, Economist, Billings, MT; and Terry Snyder,
Senior Natural Resources Specialist, Salt Lake City, UT. Assisted by:
Casey Hodges, Petroleum Engineer, Granby, CO; and Senior Regulatory
Analysts Faith Bremner and Darrin King of the BLM Washington Office.
List of Subjects
43 CFR Part 3160
Administrative practice and procedure, Government contracts,
Indians--lands, Mineral royalties, Oil and gas exploration, Penalties,
Public lands--mineral resources, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
43 CFR Part 3170
Administrative practice and procedure, Flaring, Immediate
assessments, Incorporation by reference, Indians--lands, Mineral
royalties, Oil and gas exploration, Oil and gas measurement, Public
lands--mineral resources, Reporting and record keeping requirements,
Royalty-free use, Venting.
For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Bureau of Land
Management amends 43 CFR parts 3160 and 2170 as follows:
PART 3160--ONSHORE OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 3160 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 25 U.S.C. 396d and 2107; 30 U.S.C. 189, 306, 359,
and 1751; 43 U.S.C. 1732(b), 1733, 1740; and Sec. 107, Pub. L. 114-
74, 129 Stat. 599, unless otherwise noted.
[[Page 25426]]
0
2. Amend Sec. 3162.3-1 by revising paragraph (d) and adding paragraphs
(j), (k), and (l) to read as follows:
Sec. 3162.3-1 Drilling applications and plans.
* * * * *
(d) The Application for Permit to Drill process must be initiated
at least 30 days before commencement of operations is desired. Prior to
approval, the application must be administratively and technically
complete. A complete application consists of Form 3160-3 and the
following attachments:
(1) A drilling plan, which may already be on file, containing
information required by paragraph (e) of this section and appropriate
orders and notices.
(2) A surface use plan of operations containing information
required by paragraph (f) of this section and appropriate orders and
notices.
(3) Evidence of bond coverage as required by the Department of the
Interior regulations.
(4) For an oil well, a Waste Minimization Plan (WMP), as required
by paragraph (j) or a self-certification statement, as required by
paragraph (k) (These requirements do not apply to gas wells); and
(5) Such other information as may be required by applicable orders
and notices.
* * * * *
(j) An Application for Permit to Drill for an oil well with a WMP
must include the following information in the WMP:
(1) The anticipated initial oil production rate from the oil well
and the anticipated production decline over the first 3 years of
production;
(2) The anticipated initial oil-well gas production rate from the
oil well and the anticipated production decline over the first 3 years
of production;
(3) Certification that the operator has a valid, executed gas sales
contract to sell to a purchaser 100 percent of the produced oil-well
gas, less gas anticipated for use on-lease pursuant to 43 CFR subpart
3178.
(4) Any other information demonstrating the operator's plans to
avoid the waste of gas production from any source, including, as
appropriate, from pneumatic equipment, storage tanks, and leaks.
(k) A self-certification is a written statement that the operator
will be able to capture, as defined in 43 CFR 3179.10, 100 percent of
the oil-well gas that the oil well produces. An approved Application
for Permit to Drill with a self-certification statement is not subject
to 43 CFR 3179.70(a), and all flared gas is an avoidable loss with a
royalty obligation, except for emergencies as identified in 43 CFR
3179.83. A self-certification statement applies and is enforceable from
the date of first production until the well is plugged and abandoned.
(l) The BLM may take one of the following actions based on the
operator's WMP or self-certification:
(1) Approve an administratively and technically complete oil-well
application with a WMP subject to conditions for flared gas, as
described in 43 CFR 3179.70(a);
(2) Approve an administratively and technically complete oil-well
application with a self-certification for oil-well gas capture subject
to conditions for flared gas, as described in this paragraph;
(3) Defer action on an oil-well application with a WMP or self-
certification statement that is not administratively and technically
complete in the interest of preventing waste until such time as the
operator is able to amend the application to comply with the
requirements in paragraph (j) of this section or this paragraph, as
applicable. If the applicant does not address deficiencies in the WMP
or the self-certification to comply with the applicable requirements
within 2 years of submission of the application, the BLM will
disapprove the application.
PART 3170--ONSHORE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
0
3. The authority citation for part 3170 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 25 U.S.C. 396d and 2107; 30 U.S.C. 189, 306, 359,
and 1751; and 43 U.S.C. 1732(b), 1733, and 1740.
0
4. Revise subpart 3179 to read as follows:
Subpart 3179--Waste Prevention and Resource Conservation
Secs.
3179.1 Purpose.
3179.2 Scope.
3179.10 Definitions and acronyms.
3179.11 Severability.
3179.30 Incorporation by Reference (IBR).
3179.40 Reasonable precautions to prevent waste.
3179.41 Determining when the loss of oil or gas is avoidable or
unavoidable.
3179.42 When lost production is subject to royalty.
3179.43 Data submission and notification requirements.
3179.50 Safety.
3179.60 Gas-well gas.
3179.70 Oil-well gas.
3179.71 Measurement of flared oil-well gas volume.
3179.72 Required reporting and recordkeeping of vented and flared
gas volumes.
3179.73 Prior determinations regarding royalty-free flaring.
Flaring and Venting Gas During Drilling and Production Operations
3179.80 Loss of well control while drilling.
3179.81 Well completion or recompletion flaring allowance.
3179.82 Subsequent well tests for an existing completion.
3179.83 Emergencies.
Gas Flared or Vented From Equipment and During Well Maintenance
Operations
3179.90 Oil storage tank vapors.
3179.91 Downhole well maintenance and liquids unloading.
3179.92 Size of production equipment.
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR)
3179.100 Leak detection and repair program.
3179.101 Repairing leaks.
3179.102 Required recordkeeping for leak detection and repair.
Immediate Assessments
3179.200 Immediate Assessments.
Subpart 3179--Waste Prevention and Resource Conservation
Sec. 3179.1 Purpose.
The purpose of this subpart is to implement and carry out the
purposes of statutes relating to prevention of waste from Federal and
Indian (other than The Osage Nation) oil and gas leases, protection of
worker safety, conservation of surface resources, and management of the
public lands for multiple use and sustained yield. This subpart
supersedes those portions of Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore
Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases, Royalty or Compensation for Oil
and Gas Lost (NTL-4A) pertaining to, among other things, flaring and
venting of produced gas, unavoidably and avoidably lost gas, and waste
prevention.
Sec. 3179.2 Scope.
(a) Except as provided in provided paragraph (b), this subpart
applies to:
(1) All onshore Federal and Indian (other than The Osage Nation)
oil and gas leases, units, and communitized areas;
(2) Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA) agreements, unless
specifically excluded in the agreement or unless the relevant
provisions of this subpart are inconsistent with the agreement;
(3) Leases and other business agreements and contracts for the
development of Tribal energy resources under a Tribal Energy Resource
Agreement (TERA) entered into with the Secretary, unless specifically
excluded in the lease, other business agreement, or TERA;
(4) Wells, equipment, and operations on State or private tracts
that are committed to a federally approved unit
[[Page 25427]]
or communitization agreement defined by or established under 43 CFR
subpart 3105 or 43 CFR part 3180.
(b) Sections 3179.50, 3179.90, and 3179.100 through 3179.102 apply
only to operations and production equipment located on a Federal or
Indian surface estate. They do not apply to operations and production
equipment on State or private tracts, even where those tracts are
committed to a federally approved unit or communitization agreement.
(c) For purposes of this subpart, the term ``lease'' also includes
IMDA agreements.
Sec. 3179.10 Definitions and acronyms.
As used in this subpart, the term:
Automatic ignition system means an automatic ignitor and, where
necessary to ensure continuous combustion, a continuous pilot flame.
Capture means the physical containment of natural gas for
transportation to market or productive use of natural gas and includes
reinjection and royalty-free on-site uses pursuant to subpart 3178.
Compressor station means any permanent combination of one or more
compressors that move natural gas at increased pressure through
gathering or transmission pipelines, or into or out of storage. This
includes, but is not limited to, gathering and boosting stations and
transmission compressor stations. The combination of one or more
compressors located at a well site, or located at an onshore natural
gas processing plant, is not a compressor station.
Gas-to-oil ratio (GOR) means the ratio of gas to oil in the
production stream expressed in standard cubic feet of gas per barrel of
oil at standard conditions.
Gas well means a well for which the energy equivalent of the gas
produced, including its entrained liquefiable hydrocarbons, exceeds the
energy equivalent of the oil produced. Unless more specific British
thermal unit (Btu) values are available, a well with a gas-to-oil ratio
greater than 6,000 standard cubic feet (scf) of gas per barrel of oil
is a gas well.
High-pressure flare means an open-air flare stack or flare pit
designed for the combustion of natural gas that would normally go to
sales.
Leak means a release of natural gas from a component that is not
associated with normal operation of the component, when such release
is:
(1) A hydrocarbon emission detected by use of an optical-gas-
imaging instrument;
(2) At least 500 ppm of hydrocarbon detected using a portable
analyzer or other instrument that can measure the quantity of the
release; or
(3) A hydrocarbon emission detected via audio, visual, and
olfactory means or visible bubbles detected using soap solution.
Releases due to normal operation of equipment intended to vent as part
of normal operations, such as gas-driven pneumatic controllers and
safety-release devices, are not leaks unless the releases exceed the
quantities and frequencies expected during normal operations. Releases
due to operator errors or equipment malfunctions or from control
equipment at levels that exceed applicable regulatory requirements,
such as releases from an oil storage tank hatch left open, or an
improperly sized combustor, are leaks.
Liquids unloading means the removal of an accumulation of liquid
hydrocarbons or water from the wellbore of a completed gas well.
Lost oil or lost gas means produced oil or gas that escapes
containment, either intentionally or unintentionally, or is flared
before being removed from the lease, unit, or communitized area, and
cannot be recovered.
Low-pressure flare means any flare that does not meet the
definition of high-pressure flare.
Pneumatic controller means an automated instrument used for
maintaining a process condition, such as liquid level, pressure, delta-
pressure, or temperature.
Sec. 3179.11 Severability.
If a court holds any provisions of the regulations in this subpart
or their applicability to any person or circumstances invalid, the
remainder of this subpart and its applicability to other people or
circumstances will not be affected.
Sec. 3179.30 Incorporation by Reference (IBR).
Certain material is incorporated by reference into this subpart
with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. To enforce any edition other than that
specified in this section, the BLM must publish a rule in the Federal
Register, and the material must be reasonably available to the public.
All approved incorporation by reference (IBR) material is available for
inspection at the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and at the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Contact Yvette M. Fields
with the BLM at: Division of Fluid Minerals, 1849 C Street NW,
Washington, DC 20240, telephone 240-712-8358; email [email protected];
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas. The
approved material is also available for inspection at all BLM offices
with jurisdiction over oil and gas activities. For information on
inspecting this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html or email [email protected]. The
material may be obtained from the following source:
(a) American Petroleum Institute (API), 200 Massachusetts Ave. NW,
Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20001; telephone 202-682-8000. API offers
free, read-only access to some of the material at https://publications.api.org.
(1) API Manual of Petroleum Measurement Standards Chapter 22.3,
Testing Protocol for Flare Gas Metering; First Edition, August 2015
(``API 22.3''), IBR approved for Sec. 3179.71(c).
(2) [Reserved]
(b) [Reserved]
Sec. 3179.40 Reasonable precautions to prevent waste.
(a) Operators must use all reasonable precautions to prevent the
waste of oil or gas developed from the lease.
(b) The Authorized Officer may specify reasonable measures to
prevent waste as conditions of approval of an Application for Permit to
Drill (APD).
(c) After an APD is approved, the Authorized Officer may order an
operator to implement, within a reasonable time, additional reasonable
measures to prevent waste at ongoing exploration and production
operations.
(d) Reasonable measures to prevent waste may reflect factors
including, but not limited to, relevant advances in technology and
changes in industry practice.
Sec. 3179.41 Determining when the loss of oil or gas is avoidable or
unavoidable.
For purposes of this subpart:
(a) Lost oil is ``unavoidably lost'' if the operator has taken
reasonable steps to avoid waste, and the operator has complied fully
with applicable laws, lease terms, regulations, provisions of a
previously approved operating plan, and other written orders of the
BLM.
(b) Lost gas is ``unavoidably lost'' if the operator has taken
reasonable steps to avoid waste, the operator has complied fully with
applicable laws, lease terms, regulations, provisions of a previously
approved operating plan, and other written orders of the BLM; and the
gas is lost from the following operations or sources:
(1) Well drilling, subject to the limitations in Sec. 3179.80;
(2) Well completion and recompletion flaring allowances in Sec.
3179.81;
(3) Subsequent well tests, subject to the limitations in Sec.
3179.82;
[[Page 25428]]
(4) Exploratory coalbed methane well dewatering;
(5) Emergency situations, subject to the limitations in Sec.
3179.83;
(6) Normal operating losses from a natural-gas-activated pneumatic
controller or pump;
(7) Normal operating losses from an oil storage tank or other low-
pressure production vessel that is in compliance with Sec. Sec.
3179.90 and 3174.5(b);
(8) Well venting in the course of downhole well maintenance and/or
liquids unloading performed in compliance with Sec. 3179.91;
(9) Leaks, when the operator has complied with the LDAR
requirements in Sec. Sec. 3179.100 and 3179.101;
(10) Facility and pipeline maintenance, such as when an operator
must blow-down and depressurize equipment to perform maintenance or
repairs;
(11) Pipeline capacity constraints, midstream processing failures,
or other similar events that prevent oil-well gas from being
transported through the connected pipeline, subject to the limitations
in the WMP or self-certification for Applications for Permit to Drill
approved after June 10, 2024 or Sec. 3179.70, as applicable;
(12) Flaring of gas from which at least 50 percent of natural gas
liquids have been removed on-lease and captured for market, if the
operator has notified the BLM through a Sundry Notices and Report on
Wells, Form 3160-5 (Sundry Notice) that the operator is conducting such
capture and the inlet of the equipment used to remove the natural gas
liquids will be a Facility Measurement Point (FMP); or
(13) Flaring of gas from a well that is not connected to a gas
pipeline, to the extent that such flaring was authorized by the BLM in
the approval of the APD.
(c) Lost oil or gas that is not ``unavoidably lost'' as defined in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section is ``avoidably lost.''
Sec. 3179.42 When lost production is subject to royalty.
(a) Royalty is due on all avoidably lost oil or gas.
(b) Royalty is not due on any unavoidably lost oil or gas.
Sec. 3179.43 Data submission and notification requirements.
(a) Table 1 is a summary of the Sundry Notice requirements in this
subpart.
Table 1 to Paragraph (a)--Notification Via Sundry Notice Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sundry notice requirements Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flaring of gas following removal of >=50 percent of the Sec. 3179.41(b)(12).
natural gas liquids from the gas stream on-lease.
Other gas sample location for flare approved by the AO. Sec. 3179.71(d)(3) and (e)(2).
Unavoidable/avoidable determination of loss of oil and/ Sec. 3179.80.
or gas while drilling for loss of well control event.
Extension of time limit or volumetric limit for well Sec. 3179.81(e).
completion or recompletion flaring, or exploratory
coalbed methane dewatering flaring.
Extension of time limit for well testing subsequent to Sec. 3179.82.
initial completion.
Within 45 days of start of an emergency, estimate the Sec. 3179.83(c).
volume flared or vented beyond the first 48 hours of
the emergency.
Delay of leak repair beyond 30 calendar days with good Sec. 3179.101(b).
cause.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Table 2 summarizes the locations in this subpart that require
an operator to provide information to the authorized officer upon
request.
Table 2 to Paragraph (b)--Information Required at the Request of the AO
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information required at the request of the AO Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultrasonic meter flare gas testing report.............. Sec. 3179.71(c)(2)(i).
Ultrasonic meter manufacturer's specifications Sec. 3179.71(c)(2)(ii).
including installation and operation specifications.
Recordkeeping for vented or flared gas events.......... Sec. 3179.72(c).
Recordkeeping for leak detection and repair............ Sec. 3179.102(a).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Table 3 summarizes the initial LDAR program submission and
subsequent annual reporting.
Table 3 to Paragraph (c)--LDAR Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information required to be sent to the BLM State Office Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First submission of a leak detection and repair program Sec. 3179.100(b) and (d).
to the BLM for review.
Annual review and update of the leak detection and Sec. 3179.100(e).
repair program to the BLM.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 3179.50 Safety.
(a) The operator must flare, rather than vent, any gas that is not
captured, except when:
(1) Flaring the gas is technically infeasible, such as when volumes
are too small to flare;
(2) Under emergency conditions, the loss of gas is uncontrollable,
or venting is necessary for safety;
(3) The gas is vented through normal operation of a natural-gas-
activated pneumatic controller or pump;
(4) The gas is vented from an oil storage tank;
(5) The gas is vented during downhole well maintenance or liquids
unloading activities performed in compliance with Sec. 3179.91;
(6) The gas is vented through a leak;
[[Page 25429]]
(7) Venting is necessary to allow non-routine facility and pipeline
maintenance, such as when an operator must, upon occasion, blow-down
and depressurize equipment to perform maintenance or repairs; or
(8) A release of gas is necessary and flaring is prohibited by
Federal, State, local, or Tribal law or regulation, or enforceable
permit term.
(b) All flares or combustion devices must be equipped with an
automatic ignition system or an on-demand ignition system. Upon
discovery of a flare that is venting instead of combusting gas, the BLM
may subject the operator to an immediate assessment of $1,000 per
violation.
(c) The flare must be placed a sufficient distance from the tanks'
containment area and any other significant structures or objects so
that the flare does not create a safety hazard. The prevailing wind
direction must be taken into consideration when locating the flare.
Sec. 3179.60 Gas-well gas.
Gas-well gas may not be flared or vented, except where it is
unavoidably lost pursuant to Sec. 3179.41(b).
Sec. 3179.70 Oil-well gas.
(a) Where oil-well gas must be flared due to pipeline capacity
constraints, midstream processing failures, or other similar events
that prevent produced gas from being transported through the connected
pipeline, the oil-well gas is ``unavoidably lost'' for the purposes of
43 CFR 3162.3-1(j), 43 CFR 3179.41(b)(11), and 3179.42, subject to the
following limits:
(1) Flaring of 0.08 Mcf per barrel of oil produced per month
between July 1, 2024 and July 1, 2025.
(2) The flaring limit of 0.07 Mcf per barrel of oil produced per
month will begin on July 1, 2025.
(3) The flaring limit of 0.06 Mcf per barrel of oil produced per
month will begin on July 1, 2026.
(4) The flaring limit of 0.05 Mcf per barrel of oil produced per
month will begin on July 1, 2027, and remain at this level.
(b) Where substantial volumes of oil-well gas are flared the BLM
may order the operator to curtail or shut-in production as necessary to
avoid the undue waste of Federal or Indian gas. The BLM will not issue
a shut-in or curtailment order under this paragraph unless the operator
has reported flaring in excess of 1 Mcf per barrel of oil produced per
month for 3 consecutive months and the BLM confirms that flaring is
ongoing.
(c) If a BLM order under paragraph (b) of this section would
adversely affect production of oil or gas from non-Federal and non-
Indian mineral interests (e.g., production allocated to a mix of
Federal, State, Indian, and private leases under a unit agreement), the
BLM may issue such an order only to the extent that the BLM is
authorized to regulate the rate of production under the governing unit
or communitization agreement. In the absence of such authorization, the
BLM will contact the State regulatory authority having jurisdiction
over the oil and gas production from the non-Federal and non-Indian
interests and request that that entity take appropriate action to limit
the waste of gas.
Sec. 3179.71 Measurement of flared oil-well gas volume.
(a) The operator may commingle flared gas from more than one lease,
unit PA, or CA to a common high-pressure flare without BLM approval,
subject to the allocation requirement in paragraph (h). The site
facility diagram required under Sec. 3173.11 must indicate that the
high-pressure flare is a common, commingled flare and list the leases,
unit PAs, or CAs contributing gas to the common flare.
(b) The operator must measure flared gas for high-pressure flares
for volumes greater than 1,050 Mcf per month above the averaging
period. For high-pressure flares measuring less than or equal to 1,050
Mcf per month over the averaging period and for low-pressure flares,
operators may estimate the volume flared, as described in paragraph (h)
of this section.
(c) High-pressure flares requiring measurement must use either
orifice plates and orifice meter tubes, or ultrasonic meters. High-
pressure flare measurement systems must meet the following
requirements:
(1) Orifice metering systems must comply with the low-volume
measurement requirements in Sec. 3175.80, low-volume electronic gas
measurement requirements in Sec. 3175.100, and the low-volume gas
sampling and analysis requirements in Sec. 3175.110 with the gas
sampling location requirements provided in paragraphs (d) or (e) of
this section.
(2) Ultrasonic metering systems must comply with the following
requirements:
(i) Each ultrasonic meter make and model must be tested for flare
use. Flare gas meter testing must be conducted and reported pursuant to
API 22.3 (incorporated by reference, see Sec. 3179.30) and results
must be made available to the AO upon request.
(ii) Ultrasonic meters must be installed and operated for flare use
according to the manufacturer's specifications and those specifications
must be provided to the AO upon request.
(iii) Ultrasonic metering systems must comply with the low-volume
electronic gas measurement requirements in Sec. 3175.100, and the low-
volume gas sampling analysis requirements in Sec. 3175.110, except for
the gas sampling requirements in (d) or (e) of this section.
(3) Operators must evaluate the production facility to determine
which type of flare measurement is safe for the facility.
(d) The gas sample must be taken from one of the following
locations when the high-pressure flare is measuring a single lease,
unit PA, or CA:
(1) At the flare meter;
(2) At the gas FMP, if there is a gas FMP at the well site and the
gas composition is the same as that of the flare-meter gas; or
(3) At another location approved by the AO with a Sundry Notice
submission.
(e) The gas sample must be taken from one of the following
locations for a common high-pressure flare that measures more than one
lease, unit PA, or CA;
(1) At the flare meter; or
(2) At another location approved by the AO with a Sundry Notice
submission.
(f) Appropriate meters must be installed at all high-pressure
flares pursuant to paragraph (c), and gas sampling must be taken from
the appropriate location pursuant to paragraphs (d) or (e) according to
the following phase-in timeline:
[[Page 25430]]
Table 1 to Paragraph (f)--Deadline for Compliance With High-Pressure
Flare Measurement, and Gas Sampling Location
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deadline for measurement
compliance for high-
Flare flow category pressure flares and gas
sampling location
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>=30,000 Mcf per month....................... December 10, 2024.
<30,000 Mcf per month and >=6,000 Mcf per June 10, 2025.
month.
<6,000 Mcf per month and >=1,050 Mcf per December 10, 2025.
month.
<1,050 Mcf per month......................... Not applicable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(g) When the flared volume for a high-pressure flare is less than
or equal to 1,050 Mcf per month and for low-pressure flares, the flared
volume may be estimated, or measured. Estimated flared gas volumes must
be based on production reported on the ONRR OGORs over the previous 6
months and calculated at follows:
Equation 1 to Paragraph (g)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.006
Equation 2 to Paragraph (g)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.007
Where:
m = The previous 6 months of flaring
Vg = The total volume of gas produced from oil wells in the previous
6 months as reported on the OGOR
Vo = The total volume of oil produced from oil wells in the previous
6 months as reported on the OGOR
GORr = The gas-to-oil ratio for the previous 6 months of production
as reported on the OGOR
Vop = The total oil produced from oil wells while flaring
Vs = The total gas volume produced and sent through a gas FMP from
oil wells while flaring
Vf = The estimated gas flared from oil wells to be reported on the
OGOR
(h) If a flare is combusting gas that is combined across multiple
leases, unit PAs, or CAs, the operator may measure the gas at a single
point at the flare and allocate flared volumes based on the oil
production while flaring from each lease, unit PA, or CA as follows:
Equation 3 to Paragraph (h)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10AP24.008
Where:
n = the total number of FMPs sending gas to a common flare
VFi = The volume flared from the ith lease,
unit PA, or CA sent to a common flare
VFt = The total volume flared from a common flare
NSVFMPi = The net standard volume of oil from the FMP for
the ith lease, unit PA, or CA
(i) Measurement points for flared volumes are not FMPs for the
purposes of subpart 3175.
Sec. 3179.72 Required reporting and recordkeeping of vented and
flared gas volumes.
(a) The operator must report all flared volumes, both avoidable and
unavoidable losses, using all applicable ONRR reporting requirements.
(b) The operator must report the flared gas quality in Btu on the
OGOR based on the gas analysis required in Sec. 3179.71(d) or (e). The
operator must report the same Btu content from a common flare on the
OGOR for all the leases, unit PAs, or CAs contributing gas to the flare
based on the gas sample analysis.
(c) Starting on September 10, 2024,operators must maintain the
following records and make them available to the AO upon request:
(1) Date and time when oil or gas-well flaring begins and ends, the
reason for flaring and whether the well, lease, unit PA, or CA was
shut-in or returned to sales when the flaring stopped;
(2) Date and time when an emergency begins and ends, the reason for
the emergency, whether the gas was vented or flared, and whether the
well, lease, unit PA, or CA was shut-in or returned to sales when the
emergency ended;
(3) Date and time when manual downhole liquids unloading operation
or well purging begins and ends, and whether the well was shut-in or
returned to sales at the end of the well maintenance.
Sec. 3179.73 Prior determinations regarding royalty-free flaring.
(a) Approvals to flare royalty free, which are in effect as of the
effective date of this rule, will continue in effect until November 1,
2024. After that date, the royalty-bearing status of all flaring will
be determined according to the provisions of this subpart.
(b) The provisions of this subpart do not affect any determination
made by the BLM before or after June 10, 2024 [INSERT EFFECTIVE DATE OF
THE FINAL RULE], with respect to the royalty-bearing status of flaring
that occurred prior to June 10, 2024.
Flaring and Venting Gas During Drilling and Production Operations
Sec. 3179.80 Loss of well control while drilling.
If, during drilling, gas is lost as a result of loss of well
control, the operator must notify the BLM within 24 hours of the start
of the loss of the well control event and submit to the BLM a Sundry
Notice within 15 days following the conclusion of the event describing
the loss of well control. The BLM will determine whether the loss of
well control was due to operator negligence. Oil or gas lost as a
result of loss of well control is avoidably lost if the BLM determines
that the loss of well control was due to operator negligence. The BLM
will notify the operator in writing when it determines whether oil or
gas was lost due to operator negligence, and whether such loss will
qualify as an avoidable loss.
[[Page 25431]]
Sec. 3179.81 Well completion or recompletion flaring allowance.
(a) Gas flared following well completion or recompletion is
royalty-free under Sec. Sec. 3179.41(b)(2) and 3179.42(b) until one of
the following occurs:
(1) Thirty days have passed since the beginning of the flowback
following completion or recompletion, except as provided in paragraphs
(b) and (d) of this section;
(2) The operator has flared 20,000 Mcf of gas; or
(3) Flowback has been routed to the production separator.
(b) The BLM may extend the period specified in paragraph (a)(1) of
this section, not to exceed an additional 60 days, based on flowback
delays caused by well or equipment problems.
(c) The BLM may increase the limit specified in paragraph (a)(2) of
this section by up to an additional 30,000 Mcf of gas for exploratory
oil wells in remote locations where additional flaring may be needed in
advance of construction of pipeline infrastructure.
(d) During the dewatering and initial evaluation of an exploratory
coalbed methane well, the 30-day period specified in paragraph (a)(1)
of this section is extended to 90 days. The BLM may approve up to two
extensions of this evaluation period, not to exceed 90 days per each
approval.
(e) The operator must submit its request for an extension under
paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of this section using a Sundry Notice.
Sec. 3179.82 Subsequent well tests for an existing completion.
During well tests subsequent to the initial completion or
recompletion, the operator may flare gas royalty free under Sec.
3179.41(b)(3) for no more than 24 hours, unless the BLM approves or
requires a longer period. The operator must submit any such request
using a Sundry Notice.
Sec. 3179.83 Emergencies.
(a) An operator may flare or, if flaring is not feasible due to the
emergency situation, vent gas royalty-free under Sec. 3179.41(b)(5)
for no longer than 48 hours during an emergency situation. For purposes
of this subpart, an ``emergency situation'' is a temporary, infrequent,
and unavoidable situation in which the loss of gas is necessary to
avoid a danger to human health, safety, or the environment.
(b) The following examples do not constitute emergency situations
for the purposes of royalty assessment:
(1) Recurring failures of a single piece of equipment;
(2) The operator's failure to install appropriate equipment of a
sufficient capacity to accommodate the production conditions;
(3) Failure to limit production when the production rate exceeds
the capacity of the related equipment, pipeline, or gas plant, or
exceeds sales contract volumes of oil or gas;
(4) Scheduled maintenance; or
(5) A situation caused by operator negligence.
(c) Within 45 days of the start of the emergency, the operator must
estimate and report to the AO by a Sundry Notice the volumes flared or
vented beyond the timeframe specified in paragraph (a) of this section,
and details describing the emergency event, measures taken to prevent
the emergency event, and actions taken to control the emergency event
so that the BLM is able to determine if the loss of oil or gas is an
unavoidable loss pursuant to Sec. 3179.41.
Gas Flared or Vented From Equipment and During Well Maintenance
Operations
Sec. 3179.90 Oil storage tank vapors.
(a) The hatch on an oil storage tank may be open only to the extent
necessary to conduct production and measurement operations. All oil
storage tanks, hatches, connections, and other access points must be
vapor tight (i.e., capable of holding pressure differential at the
installed pressure-relieving or vapor-recovery device's settings). Upon
discovery of an oil storage tank hatch that has been left open or
unlatched, and unattended, the BLM will impose an immediate assessment
of $1,000 on the operator.
(b) Where practical and safe, gas released from an oil storage tank
must be flared rather than vented. An operator may commingle vapors
from multiple storage tanks to a single flare without prior approval
from the BLM.
Sec. 3179.91 Downhole well maintenance and liquids unloading.
(a) Gas vented or flared during downhole well maintenance and well
purging is royalty free for a period not to exceed 24 hours per event,
provided that the requirements of paragraphs (b) through (d) of this
section are met. Gas vented or flared from a plunger lift system and/or
an automated well control system is royalty free, provided the
requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section are met.
(b) The operator must minimize the loss of gas associated with
downhole well maintenance and liquids unloading, consistent with safe
operations.
(c) For wells equipped with a plunger lift system and/or an
automated well control system, minimizing gas loss under paragraph (b)
of this section includes optimizing the operation of the system to
minimize gas losses to the extent possible, consistent with removing
liquids that would inhibit proper function of the well.
(d) For any liquids unloading by manual well purging, the operator
must ensure that the person conducting the well purging remains present
on-site throughout the unloading to end it as soon as practical,
thereby minimizing any venting to the atmosphere.
(e) For purposes of this section, ``well purging'' means blowing
accumulated liquids out of a wellbore by reservoir pressure, whether
manually or by an automatic control system that relies on real-time
pressure or flow, timers, or other well data, where the gas is vented
to the atmosphere. Well purging does not apply to wells equipped with a
plunger lift system.
Sec. 3179.92 Size of production equipment.
Production and processing equipment must be of sufficient size to
accommodate the volumes of production expected to occur at the lease
site.
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR)
Sec. 3179.100 Leak detection and repair program.
(a) Pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, the operator must
maintain a BLM administrative statewide LDAR program designed to
prevent the waste of Federal or Indian gas.
(b) Operators must submit a statewide LDAR program to the BLM state
office with jurisdiction over the production for review. The LDAR
program must cover operations and production equipment located on a
Federal or Indian oil and gas lease and not operations and production
equipment located on State or private tracts, even though those tracts
are committed to a federally approved unit PA or CA. When there is a
change of operator, the new operator must update the LDAR program on
the annual update and revision timeline. Operators must submit the LDAR
program in writing for review until such time as the BLM's electronic
filing system is capable of receiving LDAR program submissions. At
minimum, the LDAR program must contain the following information, as
applicable:
(1) Identification of the leases, unit PAs, and CAs by geographic
State for all States within BLM's administrative State boundaries to
which the LDAR program applies;
[[Page 25432]]
(2) Identification of the method and frequency of leak detection
inspection used at the lease, unit PA, or CA. Acceptable methods, as
well as other methods approved by the BLM, and frequency include the
following:
(i) Well pads with only wellheads and no production equipment or
storage must include quarterly AVO inspections for leak detection;
(ii) Well pads with any production and processing equipment and oil
storage must include AVO inspections every other month and quarterly
optical gas imaging for leak detection; and
(iii) Other leak detection inspection methods and frequency
acceptable to the BLM (e.g., continuous monitoring).
(3) Identification of the operator's recordkeeping process for leak
detection and repair pursuant to Sec. 3179.102.
(c) The BLM will review the operator's LDAR program and notify the
operator if the BLM deems the program to be inadequate. The
notification will explain the basis for the BLM's determination,
identify the plan's inadequacies, describe any additional measures that
could address the inadequacies, and provide a reasonable time frame in
which the operator must submit a revised LDAR program to the BLM for
review.
(d) For leases in effect on June 10, 2024, the operator must submit
a statewide LDAR program to the state office no later than December 10,
2025.
(e) Operators must review and update submitted LDAR programs on an
annual basis in the month in which the operator submitted the first
LDAR program to ensure that the identified leases, unit PAs, and CAs,
leak detection methods, and frequency of inspections are current. If
the operator's LDAR program requires no changes, then the operator must
notify the BLM state office that the LDAR program submitted and
reviewed by the BLM remains in effect. Any updates to the LDAR program
must be submitted in writing to the BLM state office for review until
such time as the BLM's electronic system is capable of receiving the
annual LDAR updates.
Sec. 3179.101 Repairing leaks.
(a) The operator must repair any leak as soon as practicable, and
in no event later than 30 calendar days after discovery, unless good
cause exists to delay the repair for a longer period. Good cause for
delay of repair exists if the repair (including replacement) is
technically infeasible (including unavailability of parts that have
been ordered), would require a pipeline blowdown, a compressor station
shutdown, or a well shut-in, or would be unsafe to conduct during
operation of the unit.
(b) If there is good cause for delaying the repair beyond 30
calendar days, the operator must notify the BLM of the cause by Sundry
Notice and must complete the repair at the earliest opportunity, such
as during the next compressor station shutdown, well shut-in, or
pipeline blowdown. In no case will the BLM approve a delay of more than
2 years.
(c) Not later than 30 calendar days after completion of a repair,
the operator must verify the effectiveness of the repair by conducting
a follow-up inspection using an appropriate instrument or a soap bubble
test under Section 8.3.3 of EPA Method 21--Determination of Volatile
Organic Compound Leaks (40 CFR Appendix A-7 to part 60).
(d) If the repair is not effective, the operator must complete
additional repairs within 15 calendar days and conduct follow-up
inspections and repairs until the leak is repaired.
Sec. 3179.102 Required recordkeeping for leak detection and repair.
(a) The operator must maintain the following records for the period
required under 43 CFR 3162.4-1(d) and make them available to the AO
upon request:
(1) For each inspection required under Sec. 3179.100 of this
subpart, documentation of:
(i) The date of the inspection; and
(ii) The site where the inspection was conducted;
(2) The monitoring method(s) used to determine the presence of
leaks;
(3) A list of leak components on which leaks were found;
(4) The date each leak was repaired; and
(5) The date and result of the follow-up inspection(s) required
under Sec. 3179.101(c).
(b) With the annual review and update of the LDAR program under
Sec. 3179.100(e) the operator must provide to the BLM state office an
annual summary report on the previous year's inspection activities that
includes:
(1) The number of sites inspected;
(2) The total number of leaks identified, categorized by the type
of component;
(3) The total number of leaks that were not repaired from the
previous LDAR program year due to good cause and an estimated date of
repair for each leak.
(c) AVO checks are not required to be documented unless they find a
leak requiring repair.
Immediate Assessments
Sec. 3179.200 Immediate assessments
Certain instances of noncompliance warrant the imposition of
immediate assessments upon the violation, as prescribed in the
following table. Imposition of any of these assessments does not
preclude other appropriate enforcement actions under other applicable
regulations.
Table 1 to Sec. 3179.200--Violations Subject to Immediate Assessment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assessment amount
Violation: per violation:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Flare is not combusting gas sent to flare. As $1,000
required in Sec. 3179.50(b)....................
2. Storage tank hatch is open or unlatched, and 1,000
unattended in violation of Sec. 3179.90........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This action by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary is taken
pursuant to an existing delegation of authority.
Steven H. Feldgus,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management.
[FR Doc. 2024-06827 Filed 4-9-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4331-29-P