Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) Reporting Requirements, 23644-23776 [2024-06526]
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Table of Contents
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency
6 CFR Part 226
[Docket No. CISA–2022–0010]
RIN 1670–AA04
Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) Reporting
Requirements
Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, DHS
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
The Cyber Incident Reporting
for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022
(CIRCIA), as amended, requires the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) to promulgate
regulations implementing the statute’s
covered cyber incident and ransom
payment reporting requirements for
covered entities. CISA seeks comment
on the proposed rule to implement
CIRCIA’s requirements and on several
practical and policy issues related to the
implementation of these new reporting
requirements.
DATES: Comments and related material
must be submitted on or before June 3,
2024.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments,
identified by docket number CISA–
2022–0010, through the Federal
eRulemaking Portal available at https://
www.regulations.gov.
Instructions: All comments received
must include the docket number for this
rulemaking. All comments received will
be posted to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided. If you
cannot submit your comment using
https://www.regulations.gov, contact the
person in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this proposed rule
for alternate instructions. For detailed
instructions on sending comments and
additional information on the types of
comments that are of particular interest
to CISA for this proposed rulemaking,
see the ‘‘Public Participation’’ heading
of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document.
Docket: For access to the docket and
to read background documents
mentioned in this proposed rule and
comments received, go to https://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Todd Klessman, CIRCIA Rulemaking
Team Lead, Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, circia@
cisa.dhs.gov, 202–964–6869.
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SUMMARY:
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I. Public Participation
II. Executive Summary
A. Purpose and Summary of the Regulatory
Action
B. Summary of Costs and Benefits
III. Background and Purpose
A. Legal Authority
B. Current Cyber Incident Reporting
Landscape
C. Purpose of Regulation
i. Purposes of the CIRCIA Regulation
ii. How the Regulatory Purpose of CIRCIA
Influenced the Design of the Proposed
CIRCIA Regulation
D. Harmonization Efforts
E. Information Sharing Required by CIRCIA
F. Summary of Stakeholder Comments
i. General Comments
ii. Comments on the Definition of Covered
Entity
iii. Comments on the Definition of Covered
Cyber Incident and Substantial Cyber
Incident
iv. Comments on Other Definitions
v. Comments on Criteria for Determining
Whether the Domain Name System
Exception Applies
vi. Comments on Manner and Form of
Reporting, Content of Reports, and
Reporting Procedures
vii. Comments on the Deadlines for
Submission of CIRCIA Reports
viii. Comments on Third-Party Submitters
ix. Comments on Data and Records
Preservation Requirements
x. Comments on Other Existing Cyber
Incident Reporting Requirements and the
Substantially Similar Reporting
Exception
xi. Comments on Noncompliance and
Enforcement
xii. Comments on Treatment and
Restrictions on Use of CIRCIA Reports
IV. Discussion of Proposed Rule
A. Definitions
i. Covered Entity
ii. Cyber Incident, Covered Cyber Incident,
and Substantial Cyber Incident
iii. CIRCIA Reports
iv. Other Definitions
v. Request for Comments on Proposed
Definitions
B. Applicability
i. Interpreting the CIRCIA Statutory
Definition of Covered Entity
ii. Determining if an Entity Is in a Critical
Infrastructure Sector
iii. Clear Description of the Types of
Entities That Constitute Covered Entities
Based on Statutory Factors
iv. Explanation of Specific Proposed
Applicability Criteria
v. Other Approaches Considered To
Describe Covered Entity
vi. Request for Comments on Applicability
Section
C. Required Reporting on Covered Cyber
Incidents and Ransom Payments
i. Overview of Reporting Requirements
ii. Reporting of Single Incidents Impacting
Multiple Covered Entities
D. Exceptions to Required Reporting on
Covered Cyber Incidents and Ransom
Payments
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i. Substantially Similar Reporting
Exception
ii. Domain Name System (DNS) Exception
iii. Exception for Federal Agencies Subject
to Federal Information Security
Modernization Act Reporting
Requirements
E. Manner, Form, and Content of Reports
i. Manner of Reporting
ii. Form for Reporting
iii. Content of Reports
iv. Timing of Submission of CIRCIA
Reports
v. Report Submission Procedures
vi. Request for Comments on Proposed
Manner, Form, and Content of Reports
F. Data and Records Preservation
Requirements
i. Types of Data That Must Be Preserved
ii. Required Preservation Period
iii. Data Preservation Procedural
Requirements
iv. Request for Comments on Proposed
Data Preservation Requirements
G. Enforcement
i. Overview
ii. Request for Information
iii. Subpoena
iv. Service of an RFI, Subpoena, or Notice
of Withdrawal
v. Enforcement of Subpoenas
vi. Acquisition, Suspension, and
Debarment Enforcement Procedures
vii. Penalty for False Statements and
Representations
viii. Request for Comments on Proposed
Enforcement
H. Protections
i. Treatment of Information and
Restrictions on Use
ii. Protection of Privacy and Civil Liberties
iii. Digital Security
iv. Request for Comments on Proposed
Protections
I. Severability
V. Statutory and Regulatory Analyses
A. Regulatory Planning and Review
i. Number of Reports
ii. Industry Cost
iii. Government Cost
iv. Combined Costs
v. Benefits
vi. Accounting Statement
vii. Alternatives
B. Small Entities
C. Assistance for Small Entities
D. Collection of Information
E. Federalism
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
G. Taking of Private Property
H. Civil Justice Reform
I. Protection of Children
J. Indian Tribal Governments
K. Energy Effects
L. Technical Standards
M. National Environmental Policy Act
VI. Proposed Regulation
List of Tables
Table 1: Affected Population, by Criteria
Table 2: Number of CIRCIA Reports, Primary
Estimate
Table 3: Number of CIRCIA Reports
Table 4: Familiarization Cost by Entity Type,
Primary Estimate
Table 5: Total Familiarization Costs ($
Millions, Undiscounted)
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Table 6: Cost of CIRCIA Reporting
Table 7: Data and Record Preservation Costs
Table 8: Industry Cost Range, ($ Millions,
Undiscounted)
Table 9: Total Industry Cost, Primary
Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 10: Cost by Covered Entity Criteria, ($
Millions, Undiscounted)
Table 11: Government Cost ($ Millions)
Table 12: Combined Industry and
Government Cost, Primary Estimate ($
Millions)
Table 13: Combined Industry and
Government Cost Range, ($ Millions)
Table 14: Summary of Cyber Event Losses
and Counts, IRIS 2022
Table 15: OMB A–4 Accounting Statement ($
Millions, 2022 Dollars)
Table 16: Alternative 1 Industry Cost,
Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 17: Alternative 1 Combined Industry
and Government Cost, Primary Estimate,
($ Millions)
Table 18: Alternative 2 Industry Cost,
Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 19: Alternative 2 Combined Industry
and Government Cost, Primary Estimate
($ Millions)
Table 20: Alternative 3 Industry Cost,
Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 21: Alternative 3 Combined Industry
and Government Cost, Primary Estimate
($ Millions)
Table 22: Affected Population by Critical
Infrastructure Sector
Table 23: Alternative 4 Industry Cost,
Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 24: Alternative 4 Combined Industry
and Government Costs, Primary Estimate
($ Millions)
Table 25: Alternatives Summary, Combined
Industry and Government Cost, Primary
Estimate ($ Millions)
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
Frequently Used in This Document
ARIN American Registry for Internet
Numbers
ATO Authority to Operate
BES Bulk Electric System
CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading
Commission
CHS U.S. House Committee on Homeland
Security
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Availability
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIRC Cyber Incident Reporting Council
CIRCIA Cyber Incident Reporting for
Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, as
amended
CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency
CSP Cloud Service Provider
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DNS Domain Name System
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESA Educational Service Agency
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
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FCC Federal Communications Commission
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization
Management Program
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
FHFA Federal Housing Finance Agency
FICU Federally Insured Credit Union
FISMA Federal Information Security
Modernization Act of 2014
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FRB Federal Reserve Board
GAO Government Accountability Office
GCC Government Coordinating Council
GSA General Services Administration
gTLD Generic Top-Level Domain
HHS Department of Health and Human
Services
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996
HITECH Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health
HSGAC U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers
ICT Information and Communications
Technology
IHE Institute of Higher Education
IP Internet Protocol
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis
Center
IT Information Technology
K–12 Kindergarten through 12th Grade
LEA Local Educational Agency
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security
Act
NAICS North American Industry
Classification System
NCF National Critical Function
NCUA National Credit Union
Administration
NERC North American Electric Reliability
Corporation
NIPP National Infrastructure Protection
Plan
NIST National Institute of Standards and
Technology
NORS Network Outage Reporting System
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSA National Security Agency
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OT Operational Technology
OTRB Over-the-Road Bus
POTW Publicly Owned Treatment Works
PPD Presidential Policy Directive
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
PTPR Public Transportation and Passenger
Railroads
RFI Request for Information
RIR Regional Internet Registry
RTR Research and Test Reactor
RSO Root Server Operator
SBA Small Business Administration
SCC Sector Coordinating Council
SEA State Educational Agency
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SLTT State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial
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SRMA Sector Risk Management Agency
SSP Sector-Specific Plan
TLD Top-Level Domain
TSA Transportation Security
Administration
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USCG United States Coast Guard
USDA United States Department of
Agriculture
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
I. Public Participation
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) views public
participation as essential to effective
rulemaking and invites interested
persons to participate by submitting
data, comments, and other information
on the content and assumptions made in
this proposed rule. Your comments can
help shape the outcome of this
rulemaking. CISA is particularly
interested in comments on the
following:
a. Proposed Definitions. The proposed
definition of covered cyber incident and
the other definitions CISA is proposing
to include in the regulation (see
proposed § 226.1 and Section IV.A in
this document);
b. Applicability. The proposed
description of covered entity, the scope
of entities to whom this regulation
applies (see proposed § 226.2 and
Section IV.B in this document);
c. Examples of Reportable Covered
Cyber Incidents. The examples of
substantial cyber incidents included in
this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) (see Section IV.A.ii.3.e in this
document);
d. CIRCIA Reporting Requirements
and Procedures. The proposed reporting
requirements and procedures for
CIRCIA Reports, specifically the
manner, form, and content of CIRCIA
Reports (see proposed §§ 226.6 through
226.12 and Section IV.E.i–iii in this
document), including CISA’s proposal
to use a single, dynamic, web-based
form as the primary means of
submission for all CIRCIA Reports (see
Section IV.E.i.2 in this document);
e. Proposed CIRCIA Report
Submission Deadlines. The proposed
deadlines for submitting CIRCIA
Reports and CISA’s proposed
interpretations of these submission
deadline requirements (see proposed
§ 226.5 and Section IV.E.iv in this
document);
f. Data and Records Preservation
Requirements. The proposed data and
records preservation requirements and
preservation period (see proposed
§ 226.13 and Section IV.F in this
document);
g. Enforcement Procedures. The
proposed enforcement procedures,
including the procedures related to
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issuance of a Request for Information
(RFI) or subpoena and the proposed
subpoena withdrawal and appeals
process (see proposed §§ 226.14 through
226.17 and Section IV.G in this
document);
h. Treatment of Information and
Restrictions on Use. The proposed rules
governing the protections and
restrictions on the use of CIRCIA
Reports, information included in such
reports, and responses to RFIs (see
proposed § 226.18 and Section IV.H.i in
this document); and
i. Procedures for Protecting Privacy
and Civil Liberties. The proposed
procedures governing the protection of
personal information contained in
CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs
(see proposed § 226.19 and Section
IV.H.ii in this document), which are
further described in the draft Privacy
and Civil Liberties Guidance for CIRCIA
(this draft document is available in the
docket for this proposed regulatory
action (CISA–2022–0010)).
CISA is including in the docket a draft
privacy and civil liberties guidance
document that would apply to CISA’s
retention, use, and dissemination of
personal information contained in a
CIRCIA Report and guide other Federal
departments and agencies with which
CISA will share CIRCIA Reports. CISA
encourages interested readers to review
this draft guidance and to submit
comments on it. Commenters should
clearly identify which specific
comment(s) concern the draft guidance
document.
CISA will accept comments no later
than the date provided in the DATES
section of this document. Interested
parties may submit data, comments, and
other information using any of the
methods described in the ADDRESSES
section of this document. To ensure
appropriate consideration of your
comment, indicate the specific section
of this proposed rule and, if applicable,
the specific comment request number
associated with the topic to which each
comment applies; explain a reason for
any suggestion or recommendation; and
include data, information, or authority
that supports the recommended course
of action. Comments submitted in a
manner other than those described
above, including emails or letters sent to
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) or CISA officials, will not be
considered comments on the proposed
rule and may not receive a response
from CISA.
Instructions to Submit Comments. If
you submit a comment, you must
submit it to the docket associated with
CISA Docket Number CISA–2022–0010.
All submissions may be posted, without
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change, to the Federal eRulemaking
Portal at www.regulations.gov and will
include any personal information that
you provide. You may choose to submit
your comment anonymously.
Additionally, you may upload or
include attachments with your
comments. Do not upload any material
in your comments that you consider
confidential or inappropriate for public
disclosure. Do not submit comments
that include trade secrets, confidential
commercial or financial information,
Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information, Sensitive Security
Information, or any other protected
information to the public regulatory
docket. Please submit comments
containing protected information
separately from other comments by
contacting the individual listed in the
Frequently Asked Questions page also
explains how to subscribe for email
alerts that will notify you when
comments are posted or if another
Federal Register document is
published. CISA will review all
comments received. CISA may choose to
withhold information provided in
comments from public viewing or to not
post comments that CISA determines
are off-topic or inappropriate.
Public meeting. CISA does not plan to
hold additional public meetings at this
time, but may consider doing so if CISA
determines from public comments that
a meeting would be helpful. If CISA
decides to hold a public meeting, a
notice announcing the date, time, and
location for the meeting will be issued
in a separate Federal Register notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
II. Executive Summary
section of this document for instructions
on how to submit comments that
include protected information. CISA
will not place comments containing
protected information in the public
docket and will handle them in
accordance with applicable safeguards
and restrictions on access. CISA will
hold such comments in a separate file
to which the public does not have
access and place a note in the public
docket documenting receipt. If CISA
receives a request for a copy of any
comments submitted containing
protected information, CISA will
process such a request consistent with
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
5 U.S.C. 552, and the Department’s
FOIA regulation found in part 5 of title
6 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR).
To submit a comment, go to
www.regulations.gov, type CISA–2022–
0010 in the search box and click
‘‘Search.’’ Next, look for this Federal
Register notice of proposed rulemaking
in the Search Results column, and click
on it. Then click on the Comment
option. If you cannot submit your
comment by using https://
www.regulations.gov, call or email the
point of contact in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document for alternate instructions.
Viewing material in docket. For access
to the docket and to view documents
mentioned in this NPRM as being
available in the docket, go to https://
www.regulations.gov, search for the
docket number provided in the previous
paragraph, and then select ‘‘Supporting
& Related Material’’ in the Document
Type column. Public comments will
also be placed in the docket and can be
viewed by following instructions on the
Frequently Asked Questions web page
https://www.regulations.gov/faq. The
A. Purpose and Summary of the
Regulatory Action
On March 15, 2022, the Cyber
Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) was
signed into law. See 6 U.S.C. 681–681g;
Public Law 117–103, as amended by
Public Law 117–263 (Dec. 23, 2022).
CIRCIA requires covered entities to
report to CISA within certain prescribed
timeframes any covered cyber incidents,
ransom payments made in response to
a ransomware attack, and any
substantial new or different information
discovered related to a previously
submitted report. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)–
(3). CIRCIA further requires the Director
of CISA to implement these new
reporting requirements through
rulemaking, by issuing an NPRM no
later than March 15, 2024, and a final
rule within 18 months of publication of
the NPRM. 6 U.S.C. 681b(b). CISA is
issuing this NPRM to solicit public
comment on proposed regulations that
would codify these reporting
requirements.
This NPRM is divided into six
sections. Section I—Public Participation
describes the process for members of the
public to submit comments on the
proposed regulations and lists specific
topics on which CISA is particularly
interested in receiving public comment.
Section II—Executive Summary
contains a summary of the proposed
regulatory action and the anticipated
costs and benefits of the proposed
regulations. Section III—Background
and Purpose contains a summary of the
legal authority for this proposed
regulatory action; an overview of the
current regulatory cyber incident
reporting landscape; a description of the
purpose of the proposed regulations; a
discussion of efforts CISA has taken to
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harmonize these proposed regulations
with other Federal cyber incident
reporting regulations; a discussion of
information sharing activities related to
the proposed regulations; and a
summary of the comments CISA
received in response to an RFI issued by
CISA on approaches to the proposed
regulations and during listening
sessions hosted by CISA on the same
topic. Section IV—Discussion of
Proposed Rule includes a detailed
discussion of the proposed rule, the
justification for CISA’s specific
proposals, and the alternatives
considered by CISA. Section V—
Statutory and Regulatory Analyses
contains the analyses that CISA is
required by statute or Executive Order
to perform as part of the rulemaking
process prior to issuance of the final
rule, such as the Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis and Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act analysis. Section
VI contains the proposed regulatory
text.
The proposed rule is comprised of 20
sections, §§ 226.1 through 226.20,
beginning with a section containing
definitions for a number of key terms
used throughout the proposed
regulation. Among other definitions,
§ 226.1 includes proposed definitions
for the terms used to describe and
ultimately scope what types of incidents
must be reported to CISA (i.e., cyber
incident, covered cyber incident,
ransom payment, and substantial cyber
incident) and the term used to describe
the different types of reports that must
be submitted (i.e., CIRCIA Reports).
The next section of the proposed rule,
§ 226.2, describes the applicability of
the proposed rule to certain entities in
a critical infrastructure sector, i.e., those
entities that are considered covered
entities and to whom the operative
provisions of the rule would apply.
The next section of the proposed rule,
§ 226.3, describes the circumstances
under which a covered entity must
submit a CIRCIA Report to CISA. This
includes when a covered entity
experiences a covered cyber incident,
makes a ransom payment, has another
entity make a ransom payment on its
behalf, or acquires substantial new or
different information after submitting a
previous CIRCIA Report. See § 226.3;
Section IV.C in this document. CISA is
proposing three exceptions to these
reporting requirements for covered
entities, which are in § 226.4 of the
proposed regulation and described in
Section IV.D in this document. These
exceptions include when a covered
entity reports substantially similar
information in a substantially similar
timeframe to another Federal agency
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pursuant to an existing law, regulation,
or contract when a CIRCIA Agreement is
in place between CISA and the other
Federal agency; when an incident
impacts certain covered entities related
to the Domain Name System (DNS); and
when Federal agencies are required by
the Federal Information Security
Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) to
report incidents to CISA. See § 226.4 of
the proposed regulation and Section
IV.D of this document.
Section 226.5 of the proposed
regulation contains the submission
deadlines for the four different types of
CIRCIA Reports (i.e., Covered Cyber
Incident Reports; Ransom Payment
Reports; Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Reports;
Supplemental Reports). These
deadlines, including how to calculate
them, are discussed further in Section
IV.E.iv in this document. Section 226.6
of the proposed regulation sets forth the
proposed manner and form of reporting,
which CISA proposes to be through a
web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting
Form available on CISA’s website or in
any other manner and form of reporting
approved by the Director. Additional
details on the proposed manner and
form of reporting and related
submission procedures are contained in
Sections IV.E.i, ii and v in this
document. The information CISA
proposes that covered entities must
include in each of the four types of
CIRCIA Reports is enumerated in
§§ 226.7 through 226.11 and expanded
upon in Section IV.E.iii in this
document.
A covered entity may use a third party
to submit a CIRCIA Report to CISA on
the covered entity’s behalf to satisfy the
covered entity’s reporting obligations.
See 6 U.S.C. 681b(d). The proposed
procedures and requirements for using a
third party to submit a CIRCIA Report
on behalf of the covered entity are
contained in § 226.12 of the proposed
regulations and discussed in detail in
Section IV.E.v.3 in this document. The
proposed regulation also affirms the
statutorily mandated obligation for a
third party to advise the covered entity
of its ransom payment reporting
obligations under CIRCIA when the
third party knowingly makes a ransom
payment on behalf of a covered entity.
See 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(4), § 226.12(d) of
the proposed regulations, and Section
IV.E.v.3.e of the NPRM.
Section 226.13 of the proposed
regulation sets forth the proposed data
and records preservation requirements.
It includes a recitation of the types of
data and records that a covered entity
must preserve; the required preservation
period; the format or form in which the
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data and records must be preserved; and
the storage, protection, and allowable
uses of the preserved data and records.
See § 226.13 and Section IV.F in this
document.
CIRCIA authorizes CISA to use
various mechanisms to obtain
information from a covered entity about
a covered cyber incident or ransom
payment that was not reported in
accordance with CISA’s proposed
regulatory reporting requirements. 6
U.S.C. 681d. These mechanisms include
the issuance of an RFI; the issuance of
a subpoena; a referral to the Attorney
General to bring a civil action in District
Court to enforce a subpoena; and
acquisition, suspension, and debarment
enforcement procedures. The proposed
procedures for each of these
enforcement mechanisms are contained
in §§ 226.14 through 226.17 of the
proposed regulation and discussed in
Section IV.G.i–vi in this document.
CIRCIA provides a variety of
requirements related to the treatment
and restrictions on the use of CIRCIA
Reports, information contained in such
reports, as well as information
submitted in response to an RFI. See 6
U.S.C. 681e(b), 681e(a)(1), (5). CIRCIA
also provides liability protection for the
submission of a CIRCIA Report in
compliance with the reporting
requirements established in the CIRCIA
regulation. 6 U.S.C. 681e(c). To ensure
that such requirements related to the
treatment and restrictions on the use of
CIRCIA Reports are applied
consistently, CISA proposes to include
them in § 226.18, as discussed in
Section IV.H.i in this document. CISA
additionally proposes steps to minimize
the collection of unnecessary personal
information in CIRCIA Reports and
additional procedures for protecting
privacy and civil liberties related to the
submission of CIRCIA Reports and
responses to RFIs. These proposed
procedures for protecting privacy and
civil liberties are contained in § 226.19
of the proposed regulation and
discussed further in Section IV.H.ii in
this document as well as in the
guidance document posted to the docket
for this proposed rule.
The final section of the proposed
regulation, § 226.20, proposes two
distinct procedural provisions. The first
proposed provision provides that any
person who knowingly and willfully
makes a materially false or fraudulent
statement or representation in
connection with, or within, a CIRCIA
Report, RFI response, or reply to an
administrative subpoena is subject to
penalties under 18 U.S.C. 1001.
§ 226.20(a). The second proposed
provision is a severability clause, which
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states CISA intends the various
provisions of this part to be severable
from each other to the extent
practicable, such that if a court of
competent jurisdiction were to vacate or
enjoin any one provision, the other
provisions remain in effect unless they
are dependent upon the vacated or
enjoined provision. § 226.20(b). These
are discussed in Sections IV.G.vii and
IV.I in this document, respectively.
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B. Summary of Costs and Benefits
CISA estimates the cost of this
proposed rule would be $2.6 billion
over the period of analysis 1
(undiscounted). CISA estimates that
there will be 316,244 entities potentially
affected by the proposed rule (i.e.,
covered entities) who collectively will
submit an estimated total of 210,525
CIRCIA Reports over the period of
analysis, resulting in $1.4 billion
(undiscounted) in cost to industry and
$1.2 billion (undiscounted) in cost to
the Federal Government. The cost over
the period of analysis discounted at 2%
would be $2.4 billion ($1.3 billion for
industry, $1.1 billion for government),
with an annualized cost of $244.6
million, as presented in the Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)
included in the docket. The main
industry cost drivers of this proposed
rule are the initial costs associated with
becoming familiar with the proposed
rule, followed by the recurring data and
records preservation requirements, and
then reporting requirements. Other
industry costs include those associated
with help desk calls and enforcement
actions. Government costs include costs
CISA anticipates incurring associated
with the creation, implementation, and
operation of the government
infrastructure needed to run the CIRCIA
program. This includes both personnel
and technology costs necessary to
support the receipt, analysis, and
sharing of information from CIRCIA
Reports submitted to CISA.
The Preliminary RIA also discusses
the qualitative benefits of the proposed
rule. From a qualitative benefits
perspective, the proposed reporting
requirements, analytical activities, and
information sharing will lead to Federal
and non-Federal stakeholders having
the ability to adopt an enhanced overall
level of cybersecurity and resiliency,
1 CISA used an 11-year period of analysis
spanning from 2023–2033 to reflect that CISA began
incurring costs related to CIRCIA implementation in
2023, one year prior to the publication of the
NPRM. See the Executive Summary section of the
CIRCIA Regulation Proposed Rulemaking
Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for additional detail
on the period of analysis.
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resulting in direct, tangible benefits to
the nation. For example:
• By supporting CISA’s ability to
share information that will enable nonFederal and Federal partners to detect
and counter sophisticated cyber
campaigns earlier with the potential for
significant avoided or minimized
negative impacts to critical
infrastructure or national security,
CIRCIA’s mandatory reporting
requirements reduce the risks associated
with those campaigns.
• By facilitating the identification and
sharing of information on exploited
vulnerabilities and measures that can be
taken to address those vulnerabilities,
incident reporting enables entities with
unremediated and unmitigated
vulnerabilities on their systems to take
steps to remedy or mitigate those
vulnerabilities before they also fall
victim to cyberattack.
• By supporting sharing of
information about common threat actor
tactics, techniques, and procedures with
the IT community, cyber incident
reporting will enable software
developers and vendors to develop more
secure products or send out updates to
add security to existing products, better
protecting end users.
• By enabling rapid identification of
ongoing incidents and increased
understanding of successful mitigation
measures, incident reporting increases
the ability of impacted entities and the
Federal government to respond to
ongoing campaigns faster and mitigate
or minimize the consequences that
could result from them.
• Law enforcement entities can use
the information submitted in reports to
investigate, identify, capture, and
prosecute perpetrators of cybercrime,
getting malicious cyber actors off the
street and deterring future actors.
• By contributing to a more accurate
and comprehensive understanding of
the cyber threat environment, incident
reporting allows for CISA’s Federal and
non-Federal stakeholders to more
efficiently and effectively allocate
resources to prevent, deter, defend
against, respond to, and mitigate
significant cyber incidents.
These benefits, which stem from CISA
receiving cyber incident and ransom
payment reporting for aggregation,
analysis, and information sharing,
directly contribute to a reduction in
economic, health, safety, and security
consequences associated with cyber
incidents by reducing the number of
cyber incidents successfully perpetrated
and mitigating the consequences of
those cyber incidents that are successful
by catching them earlier. It is worth
noting that these benefits are not limited
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to covered entities required to report
under CIRCIA, but also inure to entities
not subject to CIRCIA’s reporting
requirements as they too will receive the
downstream benefits of enhanced
information sharing, more secure
technology products, and an ability to
better defend their networks based on
sector-specific and cross-sector
understandings of the threat landscape.
CISA also anticipates qualitative
benefits stemming from the data and
record preservation requirements of this
proposed rule. The preservation of data
and records in the aftermath of a
covered cyber incident serves a number
of critical purposes, such as supporting
the ability of analysts and investigators
to understand how a cyber incident was
perpetrated and by whom.
III. Background and Purpose
A. Legal Authority
On March 15, 2022, the Cyber
Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) was
signed into law. See 6 U.S.C. 681–681g;
Public Law 117–103, as amended by
Public Law 117–263 (Dec. 23, 2022).
CIRCIA requires covered entities to
report to CISA covered cyber incidents
within 72 hours after the covered entity
reasonably believes that the covered
cyber incident has occurred and ransom
payments made in response to a
ransomware attack within 24 hours after
the ransom payment has been made. 6
U.S.C. 681b(a). Among other benefits,
this new authority will enhance CISA’s
ability to identify trends and track cyber
threat activity across the cyber threat
landscape beyond the Federal agencies
that are already required to report
information on certain cyber incidents
to CISA pursuant to the FISMA, 44
U.S.C. 3554(b)(7)(C)(ii) and 6 U.S.C.
652(c)(3). CIRCIA requires the Director
of CISA to implement these new
reporting requirements through
rulemaking, by issuing a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking no later than
March 15, 2024, and a final rule within
18 months of the NPRM’s publication. 6
U.S.C. 681b(b).
CIRCIA also authorizes CISA to
request information and engage in
administrative enforcement actions to
compel a covered entity to disclose
information if it has failed to comply
with its reporting obligations. 6 U.S.C.
681d. CIRCIA establishes information
treatment requirements and restrictions
on use, including certain protections
against liability and exemptions from
public disclosure, for required reports
and information submitted to CISA. 6
U.S.C. 681e, 681d(b)(2), 681c(c). CIRCIA
also provides for Federal interagency
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coordination and sharing of information
on cyber incidents, including
ransomware attacks, reported to Federal
departments and agencies, and covered
cyber incidents and ransom payments
reported to CISA. 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(10),
(b), 681g.
Although CIRCIA requires CISA to
implement new reporting requirements
through regulation, CISA’s rulemaking
authority under CIRCIA does not
supersede, abrogate, modify, or
otherwise limit any authority to regulate
or act with respect to the cybersecurity
of an entity vested in any United States
Government officer or agency. 6 U.S.C.
681b(h). Therefore, covered entities that
are obligated to report covered cyber
incidents or ransom payments pursuant
to another Federal regulatory
requirement, directive, or similar
mandate will remain obligated to do so
even if the reporting requirements differ
from those established by CIRCIA.
Where CIRCIA imposes regulatory
requirements that may overlap or
duplicate other Federal regulatory
requirements, CISA is committed to
working with other Federal partners to
explore options to minimize
unnecessary duplication between
CIRCIA’s reporting requirements and
other Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements and welcomes public
comment regarding options to minimize
unnecessary duplication or
identification of specific Federal cyber
incident reporting requirements where
such duplication is likely to occur.
Additionally, CIRCIA does not permit or
require a provider of a remote
computing service or electronic
communication service to the public to
disclose information not otherwise
permitted or required to be disclosed
under 18 U.S.C. 2701–2713 (commonly
known as the ‘‘Stored Communications
Act’’). 6 U.S.C. 681e(e).
CIRCIA also provides that entities
may voluntarily report cyber incidents
or ransom payments to CISA that are not
required to be reported under the
CIRCIA regulations, and applies the
same information treatment
requirements on use (including liability
protections) and restrictions on use to
such voluntarily submitted reports. 6
U.S.C. 681c(a), (c); 681e. CISA is not,
however, proposing to address entirely
voluntary reporting (e.g., how such
reports may be submitted) in this
rulemaking.
B. Current Cyber Incident Reporting
Landscape
The cyber incident reporting
landscape currently consists of dozens
of Federal and state, local, tribal, or
territorial (SLTT) cyber incident
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reporting requirements that may apply
to entities operating within the United
States, depending on where an entity or
its customers are located and the type of
business in which the entity is engaged.
At the Federal level alone, more than
three dozen different cyber incident
reporting requirements currently are in
effect, with a number of additional
proposed regulatory reporting
requirements in various stages of
development. At the SLTT level, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, and all 50 states
have laws that require reporting and/or
public disclosure of at least some cyber
incidents that result in data breaches.
Despite these myriad Federal and
SLTT reporting requirements, prior to
the enactment of CIRCIA, there was no
Federal statute or regulation supporting
a comprehensive and coordinated
approach to understanding cyber
incidents across critical infrastructure
sectors. Nor was there a Federal
department or agency charged with
coordinating cross-sector sharing of
information related to cyber incidents
with Federal and non-Federal
stakeholders. Indeed, during the lead up
to the passage of CIRCIA, Congress
stated ‘‘[t]oday no one U.S. Government
agency has visibility into all cyberattacks occurring against U.S. critical
infrastructure on a daily basis. This bill
would change that—enabling a
coordinated, informed U.S. response to
the foreign governments and criminal
organizations conducting these attacks
against the U.S.’’ 2 The enactment of
CIRCIA authorized CISA to fill these key
gaps in the current cyber incident
reporting landscape.
There are a number of different
reasons why a government entity may
establish cyber incident reporting
requirements. A recent DHS report to
Congress based on the work of the Cyber
Incident Reporting Council (CIRC) 3
titled Harmonization of Cyber Incident
Reporting to the Federal Government
suggests that these reasons generally can
be organized into two primary
categories.4 The first category consists of
2 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC), Cyber Incident
Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act at 1 (Dec.
17, 2021), available at https://www.hsgac.
senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/
Overview%20of%20Cyber%20
Incident%20Reporting%20Legislation.pdf
(hereinafter, ‘‘HSGAC Fact Sheet’’).
3 CIRCIA established an intergovernmental Cyber
Incident Reporting Council. Chaired by the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the CIRC is
responsible for coordinating, deconflicting, and
harmonizing Federal incident reporting
requirements, including those issued through
regulations. 6 U.S.C. 681f.
4 Department of Homeland Security,
Harmonization of Cyber Incident Reporting to the
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regulations primarily focused on
national security, economic security,
public health and safety, and/or the
resiliency of National Critical Functions
(NCFs). A majority of Federal reporting
regimes appear to be solely or primarily
animated by these concerns. The
remaining Federal cyber incident
reporting regimes, as well as virtually
all SLTT cyber incident reporting
regimes, are designed primarily to
address privacy, consumer protection,
or investor protection considerations.
This second category includes all the
reporting regimes often referred to as
data breach notification laws.
Outside of state data breach
notification laws, most existing cyber
incident reporting requirements target
specific communities with common
characteristics. Some focus on entities
within a specific industry or sector (e.g.,
commercial nuclear power reactors;
financial services institutions) while
others cover entities across sectors that
possess certain shared characteristics
(e.g., entities possessing threshold
quantities of certain chemicals of
interest that render those entities highrisk of being targeted by terrorists;
entities located upon navigable bodies
of water where they present the risk of
a transportation security incident;
entities that maintain personal healthrelated records).
Central aspects of cyber incident
reporting regimes, such as what
constitutes a reportable incident, the
process for reporting an incident, which
entity receives the report, what
information must be reported, and how
long an entity has to report the incident,
can vary widely from regime to regime,
with the purpose of the regime
frequently impacting these variables.
For instance, reporting regimes focused
on national or economic security tend to
have shorter deadlines for reporting
than those regimes focused on privacy
or consumer protections. Similarly,
reporting regimes focused on national or
economic security almost universally
require reporting to a Federal
department or agency, while regimes
with a primary purpose of privacy or
consumer protections often require
reporting to the impacted individual
and sometimes credit reporting
agencies, instead of, or in addition to,
reporting to the governing Federal or
SLTT entity.
Given the number and variety of
different cyber incident reporting
regimes, and their continued evolution,
Federal Government at 5 (Sept. 19, 2023), available
at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/harmonizationcyber-incident-reporting-federal-government
(hereinafter, ‘‘the DHS Report’’).
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CISA does not intend to describe each
one of them as part of this section.
Instead, CISA is providing the following
brief summaries of some of the major
regulatory programs that require
reporting of cyber incidents and that are
concerned at least in part with national
security, economic security, public
safety, and/or the resiliency of NCFs: 5
• Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards (CFATS). CISA’s CFATS
program worked for the prior 16 years
to identify and regulate high-risk
chemical facilities to ensure security
measures are in place to reduce the risk
of certain chemicals of interest from
being weaponized by terrorists. See 6
CFR part 27. Under CFATS Risk-Based
Performance Standard 15, CFATScovered facilities were expected to
establish protocols governing the
identification and reporting of
significant cyber incidents to the
appropriate facility personnel, local law
enforcement, and/or CISA. On July 28,
2023, the statutory authority for the
CFATS program expired, but CISA
anticipates that CFATS will be
reauthorized prior to the publication of
the CIRCIA Final Rule.
• Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS).
Pursuant to 32 CFR 236.1–236.7 and 48
CFR 252.204–7012, Department of
Defense (DOD) contractors must report
to DOD all cyber incidents (1) involving
covered defense information on their
covered contractor information systems
or (2) affecting the contractor’s ability to
provide operationally critical support.
Contractors subject to these
requirements, who are members of the
Defense Industrial Base sector, must
report cyber incidents to DOD at https://
dibnet.dod.mil.
• Department of Energy (DOE) DOE–
417 reporting requirements. DOE’s
Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security,
and Emergency Response requires
certain Energy Sector entities to report
certain cybersecurity incidents to DOE
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 772(b). Entities
subject to the reporting requirements
include Balancing Authorities,
Reliability Coordinators, some
Generating Entities, and Electric
Utilities, including those located in
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,
or other U.S. possessions.
• Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC) Network Outage
Reporting System (NORS)
Requirements. Under 47 CFR part 4,
5 Individuals interested in learning more about
existing Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements are encouraged to review the Federal
Cyber Incident Reporting Requirements Inventory
contained in Appendix B of the DHS Report, supra
note 4.
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providers of telecommunications
services and Voice over internet
Protocol (VoIP) providers are required to
report to the FCC communications
service outages, including those caused
by cyber incidents, that meet certain
minimum requirements for duration and
magnitude. The goal of this regulation,
which applies to wireline, wireless,
VoIP, cable, satellite, Signaling System
7, submarine cable, covered 911 service,
and covered 988 service providers, is to
provide rapid, complete, and accurate
information on service disruptions that
could affect homeland security, public
health or safety, and the economic wellbeing of the Nation and help ensure the
public’s access to emergency services.
• Federal Information Security
Modernization Act of 2014. FISMA
requires Federal civilian departments
and agencies to report cybersecurity
incidents to CISA within one hour of
discovery.6 CISA uses information
received in FISMA incident reports to,
among other things, provide technical
assistance to victims of cyber incidents,
compile and analyze incident
information to identify cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, and share guidance with
others on how to detect, handle, and
prevent similar incidents.7 Federal
agencies are also required to report
major incidents under FISMA and
pursuant to OMB Guidance, including
those that implicate personal
information.8
• Federal Risk and Authorization
Management Program (FedRAMP).
FedRAMP requires any cloud service
providers (CSPs) with a Federal agencyissued Authority to Operate (ATO) or a
FedRAMP-issued provisional ATO to
report suspected and confirmed
information security incidents to the
FedRAMP Program Management Office
within the General Services
Administration (GSA), CISA, and the
affected agency.9
• Financial Services Sector
Regulations. Most of the primary
Financial Services Sector regulators
have adopted cyber incident reporting
requirements for their regulated
communities. Among other things, these
reporting requirements have been
established to help promote early
awareness of emerging threats to
banking organizations and the broader
financial system, and to help the
regulating entities react to these threats
before they can cause systemic impacts
U.S.C. 3554(b)(7)(C)(ii).
U.S.C. 3556(a).
8 44 U.S.C. 3554(b)(7)(C)(iii).
9 See FedRAMP, GSA, https://www.gsa.gov/
technology/government-it-initiatives/fedramp (last
visited Nov. 27, 2023).
across the financial system. Included
among these are cyber incident
reporting requirements managed by the
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) (12 CFR part 53), the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) (12 CFR
part 225), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) (12 CFR part 304),
the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) (see, e.g., 17 CFR
38.1051 (designated contract markets);
17 CFR 37.1401 (swap execution
facilities); 17 CFR 39.18 (derivatives
clearing organizations); 17 CFR 49.24
(swap data repositories); 17 CFR 23.603
(swap dealers)), the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA) (12 CFR
part 748), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) (see, e.g., 17 CFR
parts 229, 232, 239, 240, 242, and 249),
and the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) (Advisory Bulletin
2020–05).
• Maritime Transportation Security
Act (MTSA). Under MTSA (33 CFR parts
104, 105, or 106) entities that own
vessels or facilities, including outer
continental shelf facilities, subject to
MTSA must report cyber incidents to
the U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) National
Response Center. These cyber incident
reporting requirements are part of a
larger suite of security requirements for
vessels and facilities to identify, assess,
and prevent transportation security
incidents (TSIs) in the marine
transportation system. USCG is also in
the process of updating its maritime
security regulations by adding
cybersecurity requirements to existing
Maritime Security regulations.10
• North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard
CIP–008–6: Cyber Security—Incident
Reporting and Response Planning.
Certain electric grid entities, designated
as ‘‘responsible entities,’’ are required to
report cyber incidents to both CISA and
the Electricity Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC), a component of
NERC. See 18 CFR part 40 and CIP–008–
6. The goal of these reporting
requirements, which were developed
pursuant to the authority granted NERC
in Section 215 of the Federal Power Act
(16 U.S.C. Ch 12, as amended through
Pub. L. 115–325) to develop mandatory
and enforceable reliability standards
subject to Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) review and
approval, is to mitigate the risk to the
reliable operation of the Bulk Electric
6 44
7 44
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10 See Office of Management and Budget, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs Unified
Agenda, available at https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202304&
RIN=1625-AC77.
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System (BES) as the result of a
cybersecurity incident.
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) Cyber Security Event Notification
Regulation. Owners and operators of
commercial nuclear power reactors are
required to report cyber incidents
impacting safety, security, or emergency
preparedness functions to the NRC.11
• The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) Medical Device Regulations.
Under section 519 of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360i),
as implemented by the Medical Device
Reporting Regulations (21 CFR part 803)
and the Medical Device Reports of
Corrections and Removals Regulations
(21 CFR part 806), manufacturers and
importers must report certain devicerelated adverse events and product
problems, including those caused by
cyber incidents, to the FDA. For
example, medical device manufacturers
are required to report to the FDA when
they learn that any of their devices may
have caused or contributed to a death or
serious injury. Manufacturers must also
report to the FDA when they become
aware that their device has
malfunctioned and would be likely to
cause or contribute to a death or serious
injury if the malfunction were to recur.
Medical device manufacturers and
importers also must report to FDA any
correction or removal of a medical
device initiated to reduce a risk to
health posed by the device or to remedy
a violation of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, including those
caused by cyber incidents, caused by
the device that may present a risk to
health. A report must be made even if
the event was caused by user error.
• Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Security
Directives and Security Program
Amendments. TSA has issued several
Security Directives and Security
Program Amendments requiring various
Transportation Systems Sector entities
to report cybersecurity incidents to
CISA.12 These include, among other
provisions, reporting requirements for
certain passenger railroad carrier and
rail transit systems, hazardous and
natural gas pipeline owners and
operators, freight railroad carriers,
airport operators, aircraft operators,
indirect air carriers, and Certified Cargo
Screening Facilities. TSA is also in the
process of codifying the requirements
for surface transportation through a
rulemaking (TSA’s regulations provide
11 10
CFR 73.77.
e.g., TSA Security Directive Pipeline2021–01 series, Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity;
TSA Security Directive 1580–21–01 series,
Enhancing Rail Cybersecurity, available at https://
www.tsa.gov/sd-and-ea.
12 See,
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for changes to aircraft operator security
programs through an amendment
process).13
C. Purpose of Regulation
While the legislative history and
statutory text shed some light on the
goals that Congress hoped to achieve
through this regulation, Congress did
not include an explicit statement of
purpose in CIRCIA. CISA believes
considering the specific intended
purpose behind a cyber incident
reporting regulation during the
development of the regulations is
important as the purpose likely impacts
key aspects of the regulation, such as
what entities are required to report,
what types of incidents must be
reported, how quickly incidents must be
reported, what information must be
included in incident reports, and to
whom the reports must be provided.
Many stakeholders echoed this belief
in remarks made during CIRCIA
listening sessions or through comments
provided in response to the CIRCIA RFI,
which encouraged CISA to articulate the
goals of the regulation to help inform
the best regulatory proposal.14 This
section of the NPRM is intended to
provide insight into what CISA
interprets to be the purposes of the
regulation that has informed the
development of CISA’s proposed
regulation.
i. Purposes of the CIRCIA Regulation
CIRCIA’s legislative history indicates
that the primary purpose of CIRCIA is
to help preserve national security,
economic security, and public health
and safety. For example, in December
2021, HSGAC issued a fact sheet on the
proposed legislation acknowledging the
‘‘serious national security threat’’ posed
by cyberattacks and stating that CIRCIA
would help enable a coordinated,
13 See Office of Management and Budget, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs Unified
Agenda, available at https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202304&
RIN=1652-AA74.
14 See 87 FR 55833 (Sept. 12, 2022); comments
submitted by Information Technology Industry
Council, CISA–2022–0010–0097 (‘‘[I]t is vital that
CISA articulate its tactical goals and/or plan for
actualizing CIRCIA, as only upon understanding
what CISA hopes to accomplish with these reports
can industry stakeholders provide more specific
commentary on key scoping and reporting
threshold questions.’’); National Grain and Feed
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0104 (‘‘CISA should
also identify the specific purpose of reporting an
incident. For example, if the data will be used by
the government for trend identification.’’); G.
Rattray, CISA–2022–0010–0159 (‘‘[CISA] will have
to decide whether it is reporting that serves the
purpose of characterizing threats or you’re trying to
understand risks and vulnerability. Both are
probably viable analytically, but those would lead
to different sort of reporting requirements.’’).
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informed U.S. response to the foreign
governments and criminal organizations
conducting these attacks against the
United States.15 Similarly, the U.S.
House Committee on Homeland
Security (CHS) issued a fact sheet on the
proposed legislation stating that CIRCIA
would provide CISA and its Federal
partners the visibility needed to bolster
cybersecurity, identify malicious cyber
campaigns in early stages, identify
longer-term threat trends, and ensure
actionable cyber threat intelligence is
getting to the first responders and
Federal officials who need it.16
The plain language that Congress used
throughout CIRCIA reflects the purpose
discussed in CIRCIA’s legislative
history. For example, CIRCIA requires
CISA to review covered cyber incidents
that are ‘‘likely to result in demonstrable
harm to the national security interests,
foreign relations, or economy of the
United States or to the public
confidence, civil liberties, or public
health and safety of the people of the
United States’’ and to ‘‘identify and
disseminate ways to prevent or mitigate
similar incidents in the future.’’ 6 U.S.C.
681(9); 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(6). CIRCIA also
requires CISA to ‘‘assess potential
impact of cyber incidents on public
health and safety,’’ and to consider,
when describing covered entities, both
‘‘the consequences that disruption to or
compromise of [a covered entity] could
cause to national security, economic
security, or public health and safety’’
and ‘‘the extent to which damage,
disruption, or unauthorized access to
such an entity . . . will likely enable
the disruption of the reliable operation
of critical infrastructure.’’ 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(1); 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)(A),
681b(c)(1)(C).
Both CIRCIA’s legislative history and
statutory text highlight a number of
more discrete purposes within the
broader goals of enhancing national and
economic security, and public health
and safety. Some examples of these
purposes include trend and threat
analysis (i.e., the performance of
cybersecurity threat and incident trend
analysis and tracking, to include the
analysis and identification of adversary
tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs)); 17 vulnerability and mitigation
15 HSGAC
Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1.
The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act at 1, 3 (Aug. 2021), available at
https://democrats-homeland.house.gov/download/
incident-reporting-bill-draft-fact-sheet (hereinafter,
‘‘CHS Fact Sheet’’).
17 See, e.g., id. at 3; Stakeholder Perspectives on
the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2021 Before the Subcomm. on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Innovation of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security,
16 CHS,
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assessment (i.e., the identification of
cyber vulnerabilities and the assessment
of countermeasures that might be
available to address them); 18 the
provision of early warnings (i.e., the
rapid sharing of information on cyber
threats, vulnerabilities, and
countermeasures through the issuance
of cybersecurity alerts or other
means); 19 incident response and
mitigation (i.e., rapid identification of
significant cybersecurity incidents and
offering of assistance—e.g., personnel,
services—in incident response,
mitigation, or recovery); 20 supporting
Federal efforts to disrupt threat actors; 21
117th Cong. 64 (2021), available at https://
www.congress.gov/event/117th-congress/houseevent/114018/text (hereinafter, ‘‘Stakeholder
Perspectives Hearing’’) (statement of Rep. Yvette
Clarke) (‘‘One of the goals in drafting this legislation
was to provide CISA with enough information to
analyze and understand threats . . . .’’); 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(1) (CISA must aggregate and analyze reports
to identify TTPs adversaries use and to enhance
situational awareness of cyber threats across critical
infrastructure sectors).
18 See, e.g., Responding to and Learning from the
Log4Shell Vulnerability Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
117th Cong. 2 (2022) (statement of Sen. Gary Peters,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs), available at https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/responding-to-andlearning-from-the-log4shell-vulnerability/
(hereinafter, ‘‘Log4Shell Vulnerability Hearing
Peters Statement’’) (‘‘This legislation will help our
lead cybersecurity agency better understand the
scope of attacks, including from vulnerabilities like
Log4j. . . .’’); 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(1) (CISA must
aggregate and analyze reports to assess the
effectiveness of security controls).
19 See, e.g., Log4Shell Vulnerability Hearing
Peters Statement, supra note 18, at 2 (‘‘This
legislation will help our lead cybersecurity agency
. . . warn others of the threat, prepare for potential
impacts. . . .’’); Minority Staff of S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
117th Cong., America’s Data Held Hostage: Case
Studies in Ransomware Attacks on American
Companies vi (Comm. Print 2022), available at
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/
americas-data-held-hostage-case-studies-inransomware-attacks-on-american-companies/
(‘‘This legislation will enhance the Federal
Government’s ability to combat cyberattacks, mount
a coordinated defense, hold perpetrators
accountable, and prevent and mitigate future
attacks through the sharing of timely and actionable
threat information.’’); 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(3)(B) (CISA
must provide entities with timely, actionable, and
anonymized reports of cyber incident campaigns
and trends, including, to the maximum extent
practicable, cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures); 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(5)–(7) (CISA must
identify and disseminate ways to prevent or
mitigate cyber incidents, and must review reports
for cyber threat indicators that can be anonymized
and disseminated, with defensive measures, to
stakeholders).
20 See, e.g., HSGAC Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at
1 (‘‘This information will allow CISA to provide
additional assistance to avoid cyber-attacks against
our critical infrastructure, like the attacks on
Colonial Pipeline and JBS Foods.’’); Log4Shell
Vulnerability Hearing Peters Statement, supra note
18 (‘‘This legislation will help our lead
cybersecurity agency . . . help affected entities
respond and recover.’’).
21 See, e.g., Press Release, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Portman, Peters
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and advancing cyber resiliency (i.e.,
developing and sharing strategies for
improving overall cybersecurity
resilience; facilitating use of cyber
incident data to further cybersecurity
research; engagement with software/
equipment manufacturers on
vulnerabilities and how to close
them).22
ii. How the Regulatory Purpose of
CIRCIA Influenced the Design of the
Proposed CIRCIA Regulation
Based on CISA’s understanding of the
purposes of CIRCIA, CISA identified
two fundamental principles that
influenced the design of the proposed
CIRCIA regulation in key areas. First, to
achieve many of the desired goals of the
proposed regulation—such as
conducting analysis to identify
adversary TTPs and providing early
warnings to enhance situational
awareness of cyber threats across critical
infrastructure sectors—CISA needs to
receive a sufficient quantity of Covered
Cyber Incident Reports and Ransom
Payment Reports from across the
spectrum of critical infrastructure. As
noted by the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission, the government’s cyber
incident situational awareness, its
ability to detect coordinated cyber
campaigns, and its cyber risk
identification and assessment efforts
rely on comprehensive data and, prior
to the passage of CIRCIA, the Federal
government lacked a mandate to
systematically collect cyber incident
information reliably and at the scale
Introduce Bipartisan Legislation Requiring Critical
Infrastructure Entities to Report Cyberattacks (Sept.
28, 2021), available at https://www.hsgac.
senate.gov/media/dems/peters-and-portmanintroduce-bipartisan-legislation-requiring-criticalinfrastructure-entities-to-report-cyber-attacks/ (‘‘As
cyber and ransomware attacks continue to increase,
the federal government must be able to quickly
coordinate a response and hold these bad actors
accountable.’’); Letter from Sen. Rob Portman,
Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, to Vanessa Countryman,
Secretary, SEC, Re: RE: SEC Proposed Rule on
Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy,
Governance, and Incident Disclosure, File No. S7–
09–22, 3 (May 9, 2022), available at https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-22/s70922-20128391291294.pdf (‘‘When considering the legislation,
Congress noted if the FBI is ‘provided information
from reports under the process outlined in the
statute, [it] may, as appropriate, use information
contained in the reports and derived from them’ for
a range of investigatory activities. This is consistent
with the statute which states incident reports can
be used for ‘the purpose [of] preventing,
investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting an offense
arising out of a cyber incident’ reported under the
law. This allows law enforcement agencies to
disrupt and deter hostile cyber actors. . . .’’
(footnotes omitted)).
22 See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(9) (CISA must
proactively identify opportunities to leverage and
utilize data on cyber incidents to enable and
strengthen cybersecurity research carried out by
academia and private sector organizations).
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necessary.23 Sufficient data also is
central to being able to differentiate
campaigns from isolated incidents and
support the development of more
generalizable conclusions.24
If CISA designs the proposed
regulations in a way that overly limits
the quantity and variety of reports it
receives from across critical
infrastructure sectors, CISA will lack
sufficient information to support
reliable trend analysis, vulnerability
identification, provision of early
warnings, and other key purposes of the
proposed regulation as indicated by
CIRCIA. This fundamental principle
was particularly important for CISA as
it considered different options related to
which entities should be required to
report, what types of cyber incidents
should be reported, and the scope and
amount of technical detail necessary in
CIRCIA Reports to enable CISA to
conduct threat analysis, track
campaigns, and provide early warnings
as required by CIRCIA.
Many stakeholders provided
comments in response to the RFI issued
in September 2022 cautioning CISA that
collecting too many reports could result
in data overload and hinder CISA’s
ability to identify important trends and
vulnerabilities. While CISA agrees that
there could be some point at which the
number of reports submitted begins to
yield diminishing marginal returns,
CISA believes that, due to advances in
technology and strategies for managing
large data sets, the potential challenges
associated with receiving large volumes
of reports can be mitigated through
technological and procedural strategies.
Additionally, as discussed in Section
IV.E.ii in this document, CISA proposes
to design the reporting form in a manner
that is easy for a covered entity or thirdparty submitter to complete, encourages
the submission of useful information,
23 Cyberspace Solarium Commission, Cyberspace
Solarium Commission Report at 103 (Mar. 2020),
available at https://cybersolarium.org/march-2020csc-report/march-2020-csc-report/ (hereinafter
‘‘Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report’’); see
also Sandra Schmitz-Berndt, ‘‘Defining the
Reporting Threshold for a Cybersecurity Incident
under the NIS Directive and the NIS 2 Directive,’’
Journal of Cybersecurity at 2 (Apr. 5, 2023) (‘‘[L]ow
reporting levels result in a flawed picture of the
threat landscape, which in turn may impact
cybersecurity preparedness.’’), available at https://
academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/9/1/
tyad009/7160387.
24 See, e.g., CISA, Cost of a Cyber Incident:
Systematic Review and Cross-Validation at 49 (Oct.
26, 2020) (reliance on limited data sources such as
those based on convenience samples ‘‘means that
no statistical representativeness can be claimed
[which] limits the ability to support inference for
generalizing results beyond the studied samples.’’),
available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/
resources/cost-cyber-incident-systematic-reviewand-cross-validation.
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and provides information to CISA in a
manner that facilitates analysis and
review. As a result, CISA is less
concerned about receiving too many
reports and more concerned about not
receiving enough reports to support the
intended regulatory purposes of the
CIRCIA regulations. As noted by
Microsoft President Brad Smith during
his testimony in front of the U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence during
a hearing on the ‘‘Hack of U.S. Networks
by a Foreign Adversary,’’ in the wake of
the supply chain compromise of the
SolarWinds Orion product, ‘‘one of the
challenges in this space is the nature of
all threat intelligence, whether it’s
cyber-based or physically based, is that
it’s always about connecting dots. So the
more dots you have, the more likely you
are to see a pattern and reach a
conclusion. . . . And then they’re
spread out across different parts of the
public sector as well. So this notion of
aggregating them is key.’’ 25
CISA is cognizant of the fact that
reporting does not come without costs,
however, so CISA is not seeking simply
to capture the maximum number of
reports possible under the statutory
language (i.e., by scoping both the
applicability of the rule and covered
cyber incidents as broadly as legally
permissible). CISA’s goal is to identify
and achieve the proper balance among
the number of reports being submitted,
the benefits resulting from their
submission, and the costs to both the
reporting entities and the government of
the submission, analysis, and storage of
those reports.
The second major principle CISA
identified that influenced aspects of the
proposed regulation was the importance
of timeliness in both the receipt of
reports and in CISA’s ability to analyze
and share information gleaned from
those reports. To achieve the very
important early visibility and warning
aspects of this regulatory regime and
increase the likelihood that entities
across the critical infrastructure
community will be able to address
identified vulnerabilities and secure
themselves against the latest adversary
TTPs before falling victim to them, time
is of the essence. CISA kept this second
principle in mind as CISA considered
options for when a covered entity’s
reporting obligations begin under the
proposed regulation and the manner,
form, and procedures for reporting.
25 Testimony of Brad Smith to the U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘‘Hearing on Hack
of U.S. Networks by a Foreign Adversary’’ (Feb. 23,
2021), available at https://www.intelligence.
senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-hearing-hack-usnetworks-foreign-adversary.
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Similar to the first principle, CISA
recognizes that potential drawbacks to
overprioritizing timely reporting exist,
such as potentially impacting a covered
entity’s ability to conduct preliminary
incident response and mitigation. CISA
also recognizes that a covered entity
may not have all the information in the
early aftermath of incident discovery,
and that some preliminary
determinations made at the outset of an
incident response process may later be
determined to be inaccurate when the
entity is afforded time to conduct
further investigation and analysis.
Accordingly, CISA has sought to
balance the critical need for timely
reporting with the potential challenges
associated with rapid reporting in the
aftermath of a covered cyber incident.
For example, CISA recognizes that
covered entities may require some
limited time to conduct preliminary
analysis before establishing a reasonable
belief that a covered cyber incident has
occurred and thereby triggering the 72hour timeframe for reporting. See
Section IV.E.iv.1 in this document.
Additionally, to the extent that
information that is required to be
reported under the regulation is
evolving or unknown within the initial
reporting deadline for a covered cyber
incident, CISA is proposing to allow
covered entities to submit new or
updated information in a Supplemental
Report as additional information
becomes known about the covered cyber
incident. See Section IV.E.iii.4 in this
document.
D. Harmonization Efforts
Given the number of existing cyber
incident reporting requirements at the
Federal and SLTT levels, CISA
recognizes that covered entities may be
subject to multiple, potentially
duplicative requirements to report cyber
incidents. In an attempt to minimize the
burden on covered entities potentially
subject to both CIRCIA and other
Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements, CISA is committed to
exploring ways to harmonize this
regulation with other existing Federal
reporting regimes, where practicable
and seeks comment from the public on
how it can further achieve this goal.
CISA is already engaged in several
efforts in furtherance of harmonization
of cyber incident reporting, including:
(1) serving as a member of the CIRC and
participating in the CIRC’s efforts to
coordinate, deconflict, and harmonize
Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements; (2) participating in the
Cybersecurity Forum for Independent
and Executive Branch Regulators; (3)
performing extensive outreach with
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Federal and non-Federal entities to gain
a fulsome understanding of the existing
cyber incident reporting regulatory
landscape and gather perspectives on
how to harmonize existing cyber
incident reporting requirements; and (4)
engaging with other Federal
departments and agencies that
implement cyber incident reporting
requirements to determine whether
covered entities could potentially take
advantage of the proposed substantially
similar reporting exception to CIRCIA
reporting (discussed further in Section
IV.D.i in this document).
CISA actively participated in the CIRC
to help identify potential approaches to
harmonizing Federal cyber incident
reporting requirements and to support
the identification of recommended
practices that could be considered by
CISA and other Federal departments
and agencies as they develop or update
their respective cyber incident reporting
regimes. Specifically, CISA participated
in various DHS-led working groups to
identify potential recommended
practices and areas of harmonization
related to Federal cyber incident
reporting requirements, many of which
are reflected in the DHS Report.26 CISA
considered the DHS Report and its
recommendations as it developed this
proposed rule and attempted to leverage
the model definition and reporting form
recommended in the DHS Report to the
extent practicable and consistent with
the unique regulatory authority granted
to CISA under CIRCIA and the purpose
of the CIRCIA regulation (described in
Sections III.A and C in this document).
CISA has also been an active
participant in the Cybersecurity Forum
for Independent and Executive Branch
Regulators. The goal of this forum,
which was initially launched in 2014, is
to increase the overall effectiveness and
consistency of Federal regulatory
authorities related to cybersecurity by
enhancing communication among
regulatory agencies, sharing best
practices, and exploring ways to align,
leverage, and deconflict approaches to
cybersecurity regulation.27 Current
participants in the Forum include,
among others, FCC, CISA, CFTC,
Consumer Product Safety Commission,
Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), DHS, Department of the
Treasury, FERC, FHFA, FRB, Federal
Trade Commission, FDA, NRC, OCC,
SEC, TSA, USCG, and the Office of the
National Cyber Director.
26 DHS
Report, supra note 4, at 5.
Cybersecurity Forum for Independent and
Executive Branch Regulators Charter (2014),
available at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1501/
ML15014A296.pdf.
27 See
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Additionally, CISA has performed,
and as required by CIRCIA, plans on
continuing to perform, outreach to both
Federal partners and non-Federal
stakeholders to learn about existing and
proposed cyber incident reporting
regulations and ways in which CISA
may be able to design and implement
the CIRCIA requirements to harmonize
with those reporting requirements to the
extent practicable. In addition to the RFI
and listening sessions described in
Section III.F in this document, CISA
held a series of consultations with each
Sector Risk Management Agency
(SRMA), all Federal departments and
agencies that currently oversee cyber
incident reporting requirements, and
various other Federal departments and
agencies with equities in cyber incident
and ransom payment reporting. During
these engagements, CISA has sought to
learn about existing and proposed
Federal regimes that require the
reporting of cyber incidents or ransom
payments and discuss areas where CISA
and its Federal counterparts might want
to, and be able to, harmonize their
respective reporting requirements. CISA
leveraged the information gained via the
RFI, listening sessions, and Federal
consultations in the development of this
NPRM, and intends to continue to
engage Federal partners during the
development and implementation of the
final rule in an attempt to harmonize
reporting requirements and reduce the
burden on potential covered entities,
where practicable.
Finally, CISA intends to work with
other Federal departments and agencies
to explore opportunities to reduce
duplicative reporting of covered cyber
incidents through a proposed
substantially similar reporting exception
to CIRCIA. Under this exception, which
is authorized under 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(5)(B), a covered entity that is
required by law, regulation, or contract
to report information to another Federal
entity that is substantially similar to the
information that must be reported under
CIRCIA and is required to submit the
report in a substantially similar
timeframe to CIRCIA’s reporting
deadlines, may be excepted from
reporting it again under CIRCIA. Per the
statute, for covered entities to be able to
leverage this specific exception, CISA
and the respective Federal entity must
enter into an interagency agreement,
referred to as a CIRCIA Agreement, and
establish an information sharing
mechanism to share reports. To the
extent practicable, CISA is committed to
working in good faith with its Federal
partners to have CIRCIA Agreements
finalized before the effective date of the
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final rule. Additional details on the
substantially similar reporting exception
to CIRCIA are discussed in Section
IV.D.i in this document.
CISA welcomes all comments on all
aspects of harmonizing CIRCIA’s
regulatory reporting requirements with
other cyber incident and ransom
payment reporting requirements,
including:
1. Potential approaches to
harmonizing CIRCIA’s regulatory
reporting requirements with other
existing Federal or SLTT laws,
regulations, directives, or similar
policies that require reporting of cyber
incidents or ransom payments.
2. How to reduce actual, likely, or
potential duplication or conflict
between other Federal or SLTT laws,
regulations, directives, or policies and
CIRCIA’s reporting requirements.
E. Information Sharing Required by
CIRCIA
Sharing information on cyber
incidents, ransomware attacks, and the
broader cyber threat landscape is central
to CIRCIA. In fact, CIRCIA imposes
several requirements upon CISA and
other Federal departments and agencies
related to the sharing of information
received through cyber incident and
ransom payment reporting programs,
including the CIRCIA proposed
regulations. As Congress imposed these
obligations solely on Federal
departments and agencies, they are not
included in the CIRCIA proposed rule;
however, information sharing will be an
integral part of the overall CIRCIA
implementation, and CISA is committed
to working with its Federal partners to
share cyber threat information across
the Federal government and, as
appropriate, with non-Federal
stakeholders.
As required by 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(10)
and (b), CISA will make information
received via CIRCIA Reports or in
response to an RFI or subpoena
available to appropriate SRMAs and
other appropriate Federal departments
and agencies, as determined by the
President or a designee of the President,
within 24 hours of receipt. CIRCIA also
includes a reciprocal requirement,
where any Federal department or
agency that receives a report of a cyber
incident shall provide the report to
CISA within 24 hours of receiving the
report. See 6 U.S.C. 681g(a)(1). Upon
receipt of a report from another Federal
agency pursuant to this requirement,
CISA must share the report with other
Federal agencies as it would any other
report submitted to CISA under CIRCIA.
6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(10), 681a(b), 681g(a)(1).
In addition to any otherwise generally
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applicable laws (such as the Privacy Act
of 1974 28 and the E-Government Act of
2002 29), pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681g(a)(3),
CISA must protect the reports it receives
from Federal partners under these
provisions in accordance with any
privacy, confidentiality, or information
security requirements imposed upon the
originating Federal department or
agency. CIRCIA also requires CISA to
‘‘coordinate and share information with
appropriate Federal departments and
agencies to identify and track ransom
payments.’’ 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(2).
CIRCIA imposes requirements on
CISA related to sharing cyber threat
information with non-Federal
stakeholders as well. For example, 6
U.S.C. 681a(a)(7) requires CISA to
immediately review Covered Cyber
Incident Reports or voluntary reports
submitted to CISA pursuant to 6 U.S.C.
681c to the extent they involve ongoing
cyber threats or security vulnerabilities
for cyber threat indicators that can be
anonymized and disseminated, with
defensive measures, to appropriate
stakeholders. Similarly, for a covered
cyber incident or group of covered cyber
incidents that satisfies the definition of
a significant cyber incident, CISA must
conduct a review of the details
surrounding the incident(s) and identify
and disseminate ways to prevent or
mitigate similar incidents in the future.
6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(6). CISA must also
‘‘publish quarterly unclassified, public
reports that describe aggregated,
anonymized observations, findings, and
recommendations’’ based on Covered
Cyber Incident Reports. 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(8). In addition to limiting
sharing of information as may otherwise
be required by laws that are generally
applicable to information received by
the Federal government, such as the
Trade Secrets Act,30 when sharing with
critical infrastructure owners and
operators and the general public any
information received via CIRCIA
Reports or responses to RFIs, CISA must
anonymize information related to the
victim who reported the incident. See 6
U.S.C. 681e(d).
F. Summary of Stakeholder Comments
While developing this NPRM, CISA
sought feedback from an array of public
and private sector stakeholders in an
effort to identify the most effective
potential approach to implementing
CIRCIA’s reporting requirements. CISA
published an RFI in the Federal
28 See
5 U.S.C. 552a.
44 U.S.C. 3501 note, Public Law 107–347.
30 18 U.S.C. 1905.
29 See
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Register; 31 held in-person, public
listening sessions around the country; 32
conducted virtual, sector-specific
listening sessions; 33 and consulted with
SRMAs and other relevant Federal
departments and agencies, all with the
goal of receiving meaningful input from
entities that will potentially be
impacted by this regulation. CISA has
considered this feedback when
developing the proposals set forth in
this NPRM. A summary of the most
salient points received in response to
the RFI and during the CIRCIA listening
sessions follows. All comments received
in response to the RFI, as well as
transcripts from all the public and
sector-specific listening sessions, are
available in the electronic docket for
this rulemaking.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
i. General Comments
In general, several commenters told
CISA that the regulations should be easy
to comply with, such that individuals
who are not cybersecurity professionals
can complete the required reporting,
and avoid overly burdensome
requirements.34 Commenters
recommended that compliance with the
regulation be incentive-based and
31 The RFI, which was published in the Federal
Register on September 12, 2022, solicited inputs on
potential aspects of the proposed regulation prior to
the publication of this NPRM. CISA did not limit
the type of feedback commenters could submit in
response to the RFI, but did specifically request
comments on definitions for and interpretations of
the terminology to be used in the proposed
regulation; the form, manner, content, and
procedures for submission of reports required under
CIRCIA; information regarding other incident
reporting requirements including the requirement
to report a description of the vulnerabilities
exploited; and other policies and procedures, such
as enforcement procedures and information
protection policies, that will be required for
implementation of the regulation. The comment
period was open through November 14, 2022, and
CISA received 131 individual comments in
response to the RFI. 87 FR 55833.
32 Between September 21, 2022, and November
16, 2022, CISA hosted ten listening sessions in Salt
Lake City, Utah; Chicago, Illinois; Fort Worth,
Texas; New York, New York; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Washington, DC; Oakland, California;
Boston, Massachusetts; Seattle, Washington; and
Kansas City, Missouri. 87 FR 55830; 87 FR 60409.
33 Because CIRCIA defines covered entities with
reference to critical infrastructure sectors, CISA
held sector-specific listening sessions for each of
the 16 critical infrastructure sectors identified in
Presidential Policy Directive 21, see https://
www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-securityand-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors, as
well as a separate session for the Aviation
Subsector. Transcripts from these sessions can be
viewed in the docket for this rulemaking by going
to www.regulations.gov and searching for CISA–
2022–0010.
34 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Confidentiality Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0030;
Credit Union National Association, CISA–2022–
0010–0050; SAP, CISA–2022–0010–0114;
Federation of American Hospitals, CISA–2022–
0010–0063; Epic, CISA–2022–0010–0090.
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supportive, rather than punitive,35 and
commenters also expressed concerns
about the confidentiality of reported
information.36 Commenters also urged
CISA to consider the landscape of
existing cyber incident reporting
requirements and expressed general
concern about the potential negative
impacts of unharmonized, complex, and
duplicative reporting regimes.37
ii. Comments on the Definition of
Covered Entity
Several commenters provided
suggestions on how to define the term
covered entity under this regulation.
While some commenters thought the
definition of covered entity was
straightforward and already
understood,38 others pointed to
different criteria or frameworks CISA
could use to scope the definition more
effectively. These included, among
others, a size-based threshold,39 a riskbased approach,40 or a focus on the
degree to which an entity supported a
NCF.41 Commenters also suggested
leveraging existing lists, standards, or
definitions, such as the list of critical
infrastructure ‘‘where a cybersecurity
incident could reasonably result in
catastrophic regional or national effects
on public health or safety, economic
security, or national security,’’ as
determined pursuant to Section 9(a) of
Executive Order 13636; 42 the NERC CIP
standard; 43 the National Institute of
Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s)
35 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Arizona
Cyber Threat Response Alliance and Arizona
Technical Council, CISA–2022–0010–0022;
SolarWinds, CISA–2022–0010–0027.
36 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Google
Cloud, CISA–2022–0010–0109; Tenable, CISA–
2022–0010–0032; NCTA—The Internet & Television
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0102.
37 See, e.g., Comments submitted by CTIA, CISA–
2022–0010–0070; R Street Institute, CISA–2022–
0010–0125; IBM, CISA–2022–0010–0069;
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0105.
38 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Arizona
Cyber Threat Response Alliance and Arizona
Technical Council, CISA–2022–0010–0022.
39 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Computing Technology Industry Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0122; BlackBerry Corporation,
CISA–2022–0010–0036; Cyber Threat Alliance,
CISA–2022–0010–0019; SolarWinds, CISA–2022–
0010–0027.
40 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Information Technology Industry Council, CISA–
2022–0010–0097; U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
CISA–2022–0010–0075; American Property
Casualty Insurance Association, CISA–2022–0010–
0064.
41 See, e.g., Comment submitted by Mitchell
Berger, CISA–2022–0010–0004.
42 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
UnityPoint Health, CISA–2022–0010–0107;
National Retail Federation, CISA–2022–0010–0092;
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0025.
43 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Powder
River Energy Corporation, CISA–2022–0010–0099.
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definition; 44 or definitions used by
other countries.45 Others suggested
considering the unique qualities of
particular industries and sectors and
either creating sector-based definitions
or excluding certain sectors and
industries from the definition
altogether.46
iii. Comments on the Definition of
Covered Cyber Incident and Substantial
Cyber Incident
Many commenters provided thoughts
on how to define covered cyber incident
and substantial cyber incident,
including some who offered their own
definitions for CISA to consider.47
Multiple commenters indicated a desire
for a high threshold for reporting to
minimize burdens on regulated entities,
avoid duplicative reporting, and prevent
CISA from being inundated with
reports,48 although at least one
commenter noted that a narrow
definition could leave CISA with an
incomplete understanding of the threat
landscape.49 In recommending high
thresholds, commenters suggested that
CISA could bound the definition of
covered cyber incident in a variety of
ways, such as by limiting reporting to
‘‘confirmed incidents’’; 50 incidents that
cause ‘‘actual harm’’; 51 only incidents
that impact business operations; 52 only
44 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Credit
Union National Association, CISA–2022–0010–
0050.
45 See, e.g., Comment submitted by SAP, CISA–
2022–0010–0114.
46 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Rural
Wireless Association, Inc., CISA–2022–0010–0093
(recommending excluding small
telecommunications carriers); TechNet, CISA–
2022–0010–0072 (discussing the ‘‘innovation
economy’’); American Property Casualty Insurance
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0064
(recommending exclusion of insurance agencies);
NAFCU, CISA–2022–0010–0076 (recommending
exclusion of the credit union industry).
47 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0105;
Microsoft Corporation, CISA–2022–0010–0058.
48 See, e.g., Comments submitted by The
Associations: BPI, ABA, IIB, SIFMA, CISA–2022–
0010–0046; American Council of Life Insurers,
CISA–2022–0010–0095; UnityPoint Health, CISA–
2022–0010–0107; Cloudflare, Inc., CISA–2022–
0010–0074; American Property Casualty Insurance
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0064; Jim
Wollbrinck, CISA–2022–0010–0151.
49 See, e.g., Comment submitted by NERC, CISA–
2022–0010–0049.
50 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Mandiant,
CISA–2022–0010–0120; Edison Electric Institute,
CISA–2022–0010–0079; Connected Health
Initiative, CISA–2022–0010–0130; ACT | The App
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0129.
51 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the internet
Infrastructure Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0055;
Independent Community Bankers of America,
CISA–2022–0010–0080; Institute of International
Finance, CISA–2022–0010–0060.
52 See, e.g., Comments submitted by IBM, CISA–
2022–0010–0069; Edison Electric Institute, CISA–
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incidents that impact an entity’s critical
infrastructure functions; 53 incidents
that directly impact U.S. companies,
citizens, economies or national
security; 54 and/or those resulting only
from malicious intent.55 Several
commenters also advocated for
considering definitions that already
exist, such as the definition created by
NIST that is used in FISMA,56 or
definitions that are already used among
the 16 critical infrastructure sectors.57
Comments received on the potential
definition of substantial cyber incident
echoed those received on the potential
definition of covered cyber incident,
though a few commenters noted that the
term substantial cyber incident does not
have existing legal definitions as does
covered cyber incident.58 One
commenter noted that CISA should
2022–0010–0079; Fidelity National Information
Services, CISA–2022–0010–0033; National
Technology Security Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–
0061.
53 See, e.g., Comments submitted by IBM, CISA–
2022–0010–0069; CrowdStrike, CISA–2022–0010–
0128; Microsoft Corporation, CISA–2022–0010–
0058; Professional Services Council, CISA–2022–
0010–0044; Alliance for Automotive Innovation
(Auto Innovators), CISA–2022–0010–0082;
Telecommunications Industry Association, CISA–
2022–0010–0132.
54 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Airlines for
America, CISA–2022–0010–0066; U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, CISA–2022–0010–0075; Express
Association of America, CISA–2022–0010–0038;
The Associations: AFPM, AGA, API, APGA,
INGAA, LEPA, CISA–2022–0010–0057.
55 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Cloudflare,
Inc., CISA–2022–0010–0074; The Associations: BPI,
ABA, IIB, SIFMA, CISA–2022–0010–0046; internet
Infrastructure Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0055.
56 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the National
Technology Security Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–
0061; The Associations: BPI, ABA, IIB, SIFMA,
CISA–2022–0010–0046; Mandiant, CISA–2022–
0010–0120; Glenn Herdrich, CISA–2022–0010–
0158.
57 See, e.g., Comments submitted by NCTA—The
Internet & Television Association, CISA–2022–
0010–0102 (generally advocating for a sector-based
approach to the definition); Financial Services
Sector Coordinating Council, CISA–2022–0010–
0094; The Associations: BPI, ABA, IIB, SIFMA,
CISA–2022–0010–0046; The Clearing House, CISA–
2022–0010–0086 (advocating for alignment with the
FDIC’s Computer-Security Incident Notification
Rule); HIMSS Electronic Health Record Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0040 (advocating for alignment
with the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act requirements); Nuclear Energy
Institute, CISA–2022–0010–0029; Rich Mogavero,
CISA–2022–0010–0139 (advocating alignment with
the definition used by the NRC); Electric Power
Supply Association, CISA–2022–0010–0045; Edison
Electric Institute, CISA–2022–0010–0079
(advocating for alignment with the reporting
standards used by the NERC); NTCA—The Rural
Broadband Association, CISA–2022–0010–0100
(recommending consideration of the FCC’s
reporting requirements in developing the
definition).
58 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, CISA–
2022–0010–0088; U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
CISA–2022–0010–0075; Fidelity National
Information Services, CISA–2022–0010–0033.
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clarify whether ‘‘substantial cyber
incidents’’ are separate from ‘‘covered
cyber incidents,’’ 59 and another
commenter recommended covered cyber
incidents and substantial cyber
incidents should be synonymous
terms.60
iv. Comments on Other Definitions
CISA received a small number of
comments on other definitions. A few
commenters provided feedback on the
meaning of the terms ransom payment
and ransomware attack, with several
noting that the definitions of ransom
payment and ransomware attack were
understood as defined in CIRCIA and
recommending no changes to these
terms in the regulation.61
A few commenters offered input on
the meaning of supply chain
compromise, with those who did often
acknowledging the statutory definition
of the term (see 6 U.S.C. 650(28)),62 and
recommending that CISA align this term
as closely as possible with similar,
existing terms, such as ‘‘supply chain
attack’’ used by NIST or the definition
of ‘‘supply chain compromise’’ used by
MITRE.63 Several commenters
emphasized a need for clarity regarding
when a customer or end user would be
expected to report on an incident
caused somewhere above them in the
supply chain, noting that in many cases
the impacted covered entity may have
limited visibility into what happened
along the supply chain to cause the
incident.64
v. Comments on Criteria for
Determining Whether the Domain Name
System Exception Applies
The few comments received relating
to whether an entity is a multistakeholder organization that develops,
implements, and enforces policies
concerning the DNS reflected different
views. One commenter recommended
that CISA clarify that domain name
registries and registrars are ‘‘governed
59 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the
Professional Services Council, CISA–2022–0010–
0044.
60 See, e.g., Comment submitted by Gideon
Rasmussen, CISA–2022–0010–0011.
61 See, e.g., Comments submitted by (ISC)2,
CISA–2022–0010–0112; Exelon Corp., CISA–2022–
0010–0043; SAP, CISA–2022–0010–0114.
62 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0105.
63 See id.; see, e.g., Comment submitted by the
Information Technology Industry Council, CISA–
2022–0010–0097.
64 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the American
Water Works Association, CISA–2022–0010–0127;
Edison Electric Institute, CISA–2022–0010–0079;
NCTA—The Internet & Television Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0102; Exelon Corp., CISA–2022–
0010–0043.
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by a multistakeholder organization.’’ 65
Another commenter opined that it
would not be appropriate to exempt
domain name registrars. The same
commenter recommended that CISA
identify exempted organizations by
name in the final rule, listing Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) and the Regional
Internet Registries for consideration.66
vi. Comments on Manner and Form of
Reporting, Content of Reports, and
Reporting Procedures
Numerous commenters provided
recommendations on the manner and
form of reporting, with many of those
concurring with the use of a web-based
form for reporting or other means of
electronic reporting.67 Some explicitly
recommended that CISA make a mobile
application or otherwise make the form
available via a mobile device as well.68
Several commenters recommended
alternative or additional methods of
reporting to include phone or email.69
Multiple commenters emphasized that
reporting should not require the
download or purchase of new
technology.70 A number of commenters
recommended that the same portal be
used for Supplemental Reports as for
the original reports.71
Overall, commenters emphasized the
need for a user-friendly reporting form.
While several commenters
recommended that the reporting form be
65 Comment submitted by the Internet
Infrastructure Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0055.
66 See Comment submitted by the Energy Transfer
LP, CISA–2022–0010–0037. Regional Internet
Registries include ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE NCC,
AFRINIC, and APNIC (see Regional Internet
Registries | The Number Resource Organization
(nro.net)).
67 See, e.g., Comments submitted by American
Council of Life Insurers, CISA–2022–0010–0095;
HIMSS Electronic Health Record Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0040; Epic, CISA–2022–0010–
0090; Cyber Threat Alliance, CISA–2022–0010–
0019; League of Southeastern Credit Unions, CISA–
2022–0010–0121; Marty Reynolds, CISA–2022–
0010–0135; Patrick Thornton, CISA–2022–0010–
0144.
68 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Cyber
Threat Alliance, CISA–2022–0010–0019;
Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, CISA–
2022–0010–0041; OCHIN, CISA–2022–0010–0039;
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0105.
69 See, e.g., Comments submitted by CHIME,
CISA–2022–0010–0035; Business Roundtable,
CISA–2022–0010–0115; CTIA, CISA–2022–0010–
0070; The Clearing House, CISA–2022–0010–0086.
70 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Operational Technology Cybersecurity Coalition,
CISA–2022–0010–0108; NTCA—The Rural
Broadband Association, CISA–2022–0010–0100;
Tenable, CISA–2022–0010–0032.
71 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0105;
Information Technology Industry Council, CISA–
2022–0010–0097; Credit Union National
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0050.
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standardized for all covered entities,72
at least one commenter noted that a
uniform reporting format could
unintentionally limit the type of
information CISA receives.73 Many
commenters recommended that any
reporting form include drop-down
menus, check-boxes, or other fields that
could be pre-populated for ease of
submission.74 Other commenters
recommended that the incident
reporting form generate questions
pertinent to the type of incident being
reported, including an indication of
which fields were required for each type
of report.75 Several commenters also
recommended that CISA assign
reference numbers to each report, which
would allow entities to more easily
locate and return to a specific CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form at a later
point.76 Commenters also recommended
existing reporting or submission
procedures that CISA could emulate.
Some commenters recommended CISA
rely on a standardized approach, noting
examples such as the National
Information Exchange Model 77 or
Structured Threat Information
eXpression (STIX) and Trusted
Automated Exchange of Intelligence
Information (TAXII).78 Other
commenters recommended CISA align
its reporting approach to that of other
72 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Alliance
for Automotive Innovation, CISA–2022–0010–0082;
Lucid Motors, CISA–2022–0010–0078;
USTelecom—The Broadband Association, CISA–
2022–0010–0067; Palo Alto Networks, CISA–2022–
0010–0089.
73 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the
Association of American Railroads, CISA–2022–
0010–0117.
74 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, CISA–
2022–0010–0041; CTIA, CISA–2022–0010–0070;
Anonymous, CISA–2022–0010–0012; National
Grain and Feed Association, CISA–2022–0010–
0104; Mitchell Berger, CISA–2022–0010–0004;
League of Southeastern Credit Unions, CISA–2022–
0010–0121; NERC, CISA–2022–0010–0049.
75 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Municipal Information Systems Association of
California, CISA–2022–0010–0118; City of
Roseville, CISA–2022–0010–0111; City of Cerritos,
CISA–2022–0010–0084; Cyber Threat Alliance,
CISA–2022–0010–0019; (ISC)2, CISA–2022–0010–
0112.
76 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Arizona
Cyber Threat Response Alliance and Arizona
Technical Council, CISA–2022–0010–0022;
Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, CISA–
2022–0010–0041.
77 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Cyber
Threat Alliance, CISA–2022–0010–0019;
SolarWinds, CISA–2022–0010–0027; MITRE, CISA–
2022–0010–0073.
78 See, e.g., Comments submitted by ACT | The
App Association, CISA–2022–0010–0129;
Connected Health Initiative, CISA–2022–0010–
0130; Cyber Threat Alliance, CISA–2022–0010–
0019; HIMSS, CISA–2022–0010–0119.
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Federal departments and agencies such
as USCG,79 TSA,80 or DOD.81
When proposing suggestions for the
content of CIRCIA reports, many
commenters recommended that CISA
require minimal detail at the 72-hour
reporting deadline to not divert
resources from response efforts,82
emphasizing that covered entities
should be required to report only what
is absolutely needed.83 Several
commenters recommended a core set of
questions be asked for every covered
entity,84 while others suggested the
question set could be sector-specific.85
Many commenters offered their
thoughts on specific pieces of data that
CISA should consider collecting via the
CIRCIA reporting form, many, if not
most, of which covered entities are
statutorily required to include in either
Covered Cyber Incident Reports or
Ransom Payment Reports.86 Some non79 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the American
Association of Port Authorities, CISA–2022–0010–
0126.
80 See, e.g., Comment submitted by Energy
Transfer LP, CISA–2022–0010–0037.
81 See, e.g., Comment submitted by Trustwave
Government Solutions, CISA–2022–0010–0096.
82 See, e.g., Comments submitted by BSA | The
Software Alliance, CISA–2022–0010–0106; SAP,
CISA–2022–0010–0114; Arizona Cyber Threat
Response Alliance and Arizona Technical Council,
CISA–2022–0010–0022; American Chemistry
Council, CISA–2022–0010–0098; U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, CISA–2022–0010–0075.
83 See, e.g., Comments submitted by CHIME,
CISA–2022–0010–0035; Google Cloud, CISA–2022–
0010–0109; The Clearing House, CISA–2022–0010–
0086; Information Technology-ISAC, CISA–2022–
0010–0048.
84 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Institute
of International Finance, CISA–2022–0010–0060;
National Association of Chemical Distributors,
CISA–2022–0010–0056; UnityPoint Health, CISA–
2022–0010–0107; Powder River Energy
Corporation, CISA–2022–0010–0099.
85 See, e.g., Comments submitted by HIMSS,
CISA–2022–0010–0109; CHIME, CISA–2022–0010–
0035; CTIA, CISA–2022–0010–0070.
86 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, CISA–2022–0010–0075
(recommending that CISA focus on the ten elements
listed in CISA’s Sharing Cyber Event Information:
Observe, Act, Report document, namely: incident
date and time, incident location, type of observed
activity; detailed narrative of the event; number of
people or systems affected; company/organization
name; point of contact details; severity of event;
critical infrastructure sector; and anyone else the
entity informed.); Cyber Threat Alliance, CISA–
2022–0010–0019 (recommending that the form
include three ‘‘layers,’’ containing fields applicable
to all incidents (victim information, incident type,
incident information, and threat actor information),
incident specific fields (with different fields each
for business email compromise, ransomware or
other extortion, data theft, financial theft such as
banking trojans, service theft, denial of service,
disruptive or destructive attack, data manipulation
or integrity loss, branding/reputation attack, or
unauthorized access), and an optional layer for the
provision of technical information (such as victim
IP addresses, threat actor groups, MITRE ATT&CK
mapping, exploited vulnerabilities)); Municipal
Information Systems Association of California,
CISA–2022–0010–0118 (recommending that the
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statutorily required fields that
commenters suggested included:
identification of critical infrastructure
sector, anyone else that the entity
informed, severity of the event, and
victim IP addresses.87
vii. Comments on the Deadlines for
Submission of CIRCIA Reports
Although the 72-hour reporting
deadline for the reporting of a covered
cyber incident is codified in the text of
CIRCIA itself, several commenters
offered thoughts on how to interpret this
requirement. Many commenters
suggested that CISA provide flexibility
in initiating the 72-hour clock due to the
challenges entities face in identifying a
‘‘reasonable belief’’ and responding to
covered cyber incidents.88 Similarly,
commenters urged that CISA adopt
certain flexibilities in considering the
deadline to have been met, such as
allowing entities to omit fields on a
form when information is not yet
known 89 or provide extensions to the
72-hour deadline when covered entities
are experiencing an external event, such
as a natural disaster or pandemic.90 A
few commenters noted that it may not
be objective or clear in the moment
when a covered entity has a ‘‘reasonable
belief,’’ and recommended that CISA
consider determining whether a
reasonable belief exists on a case-bycase basis.91 Many commenters stated
that ‘‘reasonable belief’’ should be
defined as a confirmed or validated
form include impacted ‘‘[a]gency,’’ date of incident,
date incident discovered, indicators of compromise,
type of data compromised (if applicable), other
compliance agencies mandated to receive this
report, a description of the incident, steps taken so
far, and logs); City of Roseville, CISA–2022–0010–
0111 (same); City of Cerritos, CISA–2022–0010–
0084 (same); Palo Alto Networks, CISA–2022–
0010–0089 (recommending that the template
reporting form include the attack vector or vectors
that led to the compromise; tactics or techniques
used by threat actor; indicators of compromise;
information on the affected systems, devices, or
networks; information relevant to the identification
of the threat actor or actors involved; a point of
contact from the affected entity; and impact, earliest
known time, and duration of compromise); Mitchell
Berger, CISA–2022–0010–0004 (suggesting that
CISA include a list of the 16 critical infrastructure
sectors, 55 national critical functions, or similar
items with boxes to check).
87 See id.
88 See, e.g., Comments submitted by
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0105;
TechNet, CISA–2022–0010–0072; Federation of
American Hospitals, CISA–2022–0010–0063;
National Association of Manufacturers, CISA–2022–
0010–0087; American Council of Life Insurers,
CISA–2022–0010–0095.
89 See, e.g., Comment submitted by Google Cloud,
CISA–2022–0010–0109.
90 See, e.g., Comment submitted by HIMSS,
CISA–2022–0010–0119.
91 See, e.g., Comments submitted by NCTA—The
Internet & Television Association, CISA–2022–
0010–0102; SAP, CISA–2022–0010–0114; CTIA,
CISA–2022–0010–0070.
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cyber incident from the perspective of
the covered entity and that the 72-hour
clock should therefore begin at that
time.92
Similarly, several commenters
recommended specific interpretations
for the point at which the 24-hour clock
deadline for submission of a Ransom
Payment Report should begin. For
instance, commenters recommended
that the 24-hour clock should begin after
the ransom payment is sent,93 when
‘‘funds or items of value are transmitted
to the extorting party,’’ 94 or as soon as
‘‘any part’’ of the ransom payment is no
longer in possession of the impacted
entity or any of its affiliated third
parties.95
In regards to Supplemental Reports,
while some commenters recommended
flexibility, including no deadline for
timing of submission of Supplemental
Reports,96 others recommended CISA
provide a separate deadline for the
submission of Supplemental Reports.97
Recommended deadlines varied from as
short as 12 hours after discovering
substantially new or different
information 98 to as long as one year
after the incident.99 On the question of
what should constitute substantially
new or different information that would
necessitate filing a Supplemental
Report, many commenters
recommended that covered entities be
permitted to decide when new findings
necessitate a Supplemental Report.100
Other commenters suggested the types
92 See, e.g., Comments submitted by National
Electrical Manufacturers Association, CISA–2022–
0010–0026; League of Southeastern Credit Unions,
CISA–2022–0010–0121; The Associations: AFPM,
AGA, API, APGA, INGAA, LEPA, CISA–2022–
0010–0057; Trustwave Government Solutions,
CISA–2022–0010–0096; Microsoft Corporation,
CISA–2022–0010–0058.
93 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Exelon Corp.,
CISA–2022–0010–0043; Cybersecurity Coalition,
CISA–2022–0010–0105; Credit Union National
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0050; National
Association of Chemical Distributors, CISA–2022–
0010–0056.
94 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0105.
95 See, e.g., Comment submitted by Sophos, Inc,
CISA–2022–0010–0047.
96 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Airlines
for America, CISA–2022–0010–0066; SAP, CISA–
2022–0010–0114.
97 See, e.g., Comments submitted by SolarWinds,
CISA–2022–0010–0027; Workgroup for Electronic
Data Interchange, CISA–2022–0010–0041;
Telecommunications Industry Association, CISA–
2022–0010–0132.
98 See, e.g., Comment submitted by Sophos, Inc,
CISA–2022–0010–0047.
99 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the
Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, CISA–
2022–0010–0041.
100 See, e.g., Comments submitted by
USTelecom—The Broadband Association, CISA–
2022–0010–0067; Institute of International Finance,
CISA–2022–0010–0060; Exelon Corp., CISA–2022–
0010–0043.
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of material changes that could be
considered substantial new or different
information, such as changes to the
types of data stolen or altered; changes
to the number or type of systems
impacted; or updates to information
regarding the TTPs used in the
incident.101
viii. Comments on Third-Party
Submitters
Of the commenters who offered
feedback on the third-party submissions
of CIRCIA Reports, most seemed to
support the framework already
contemplated by statute. For instance,
one commenter stated that organizations
should be able to identify a third party
to submit on their behalf,102 and more
than one stated that the reporting
mechanisms, guidelines, and
procedures should be the same for the
third-party submitter as for the covered
entity.103 Many commenters
recommend that CISA clarify that the
duty to comply with the regulation falls
on the covered entity,104 and that thirdparty submitters have no obligation to
report on the covered entity’s behalf.105
Some commenters recommended
additional safeguards for covered
entities using third-party reporters. A
few commenters recommended that
CISA clarify the types of third parties
authorized to submit reports on behalf
of the covered entity.106 One commenter
recommended that CISA consider
entities like ISACs to be suitable thirdparty reporters.107 Multiple commenters
also recommended that CISA allow
third-party submitters to register with
101 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Institute
of International Finance, CISA–2022–0010–0060;
League of Southeastern Credit Unions, CISA–2022–
0010–0121; Payments Leadership Council, CISA–
2022–0010–0031.
102 See, e.g., Comment submitted by American
Chemistry Council, CISA–2022–0010–0098.
103 See, e.g., Comments submitted by American
Chemistry Council, CISA–2022–0010–0098;
CrowdStrike, CISA–2022–0010–0128.
104 See, e.g., Comments submitted by BlackBerry;
CISA–2022–0010–0036; American Property
Casualty Insurance Association, CISA–2022–0010–
0064; Computing Technology Industry Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0122.
105 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Cyber
Threat Alliance, CISA–2022–0010–0019; Airlines
for America, CISA–2022–0010–0066; Operational
Technology Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA–2022–
0010–0108; Information Technology-ISAC, CISA–
2022–0010–0048; BlackBerry, CISA–2022–0010–
0036.
106 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Exelon
Corp., CISA–2022–0010–0043; The Associations:
AFPM, AGA, API, APGA, INGAA, LEPA, CISA–
2022–0010–0057.
107 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, CISA–
2022–0010–0088.
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CISA as a known third-party
submitter.108
ix. Comments on Data and Records
Preservation Requirements
Very few commenters offered
recommendations related to data and
records preservation requirements.
Several of those that did recommended
CISA not impose additional data and
records preservation requirements on
covered entities via the CIRCIA
regulation, and instead defer to covered
entities’ existing legal obligations or
specific requests from law
enforcement.109 Only one commenter
offered suggestions on the type of
information that covered entities should
preserve,110 while a small number of
commenters recommended lengths of
time for how long CISA should require
information to be preserved.111
x. Comments on Other Existing Cyber
Incident Reporting Requirements and
the Substantially Similar Reporting
Exception
Many commenters offered feedback
on the breadth of existing Federal,
SLTT, and international cyber incident
reporting requirements, and the
potential for overlap, conflict, or
alignment between CIRCIA and those
requirements. CISA will not summarize
the specific reporting requirements that
commenters mentioned, because CISA
provides a high-level summary of these
existing reporting requirements in
Section III.B in this document.
To avoid duplicative and burdensome
reporting, several commenters
recommended that CISA align its
reporting requirements with existing
Federal and SLTT requirements.112
108 See, e.g., Comments submitted by BSA √ The
Software Alliance, CISA–2022–0010–0106; SAP,
CISA–2022–0010–0114; Information Technology
Industry Council, CISA–2022–0010–0097.
109 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Mandiant,
CISA–2022–0010–0120; Accenture, CISA–2022–
0010–0077; USTelecom—The Broadband
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0067.
110 See, e.g., Comment submitted by Sophos, Inc,
CISA–2022–0010–0047 (recommending that
information preserved should include at least all
logs containing data related to the incident, such as
network logs, system logs, and access logs; all
correspondence with attackers, including any notes
taken during any unrecorded interactions; all
identified TTPs and indicators of compromise; all
data related to any ransomware payment; and
contact information of individuals and entities that
provided tactical support in the incident response
and investigation process).
111 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Sophos,
Inc., CISA–2022–0010–0047; SAP, CISA–2022–
0010–0114; National Association of Chemical
Distributors, CISA–2022–0010–0056.
112 See, e.g., Comments submitted by National
Association of Secretaries of State, CISA–2022–
0010–0054; OCHIN, CISA–2022–0010–0039; HIMSS
Electronic Health Record Association, CISA–2022–
0010–0040; Alliance for Automotive Innovation,
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Commenters frequently recommended
that CISA consult with other Federal
departments and agencies with preexisting regulatory authority in the
commenters’ particular sectors to avoid
duplicative requirements in the CIRCIA
regulation. Numerous commenters
recommended that, alongside
harmonization efforts, CISA should
establish a single, national point of
contact or process for mandatory cyber
incident reporting,113 suggesting that
DHS or CISA serve as the primary or
sole entity for receiving and
disseminating cyber incident report
information.114 Many commenters,
noting the language in CIRCIA to this
effect, encouraged CISA to implement
the reporting exemption for covered
entities that submit cyber incident
reports with substantially similar
information to other Federal
departments and agencies, within a
substantially similar timeframe.115 A
few commenters offered criteria for
determining whether a report submitted
to another Federal entity constitutes
‘‘substantially similar reported
information.’’ 116 Commenters also
offered suggestions on which existing
reporting obligations should be
considered to include substantially
similar information. These suggestions
CISA–2022–0010–0082; Lucid Motors, CISA–2022–
0010–0078; Center for Democracy & Technology,
CISA–2022–0010–0068.
113 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Indiana
Municipal Power Agency, CISA–2022–0010–0018;
HIMSS, CISA–2022–0010–0119; Exelon Corp.,
CISA–2022–0010–0043; MITRE, CISA–2022–0010–
0073; Options Security Corporation, CISA–2022–
0010–0160; Airport Council International North
America, CISA–2022–0010–0135; Cameron Braatz,
CISA–2022–0010–0154.
114 See, e.g., Comments submitted by The
Associations, CISA–2022–0010–0057: AFPM, AGA,
API, APGA, INGAA, LEPA; Google Cloud, CISA–
2022–0010–; Express Association of America,
CISA–2022–0010–0038; Workgroup for Electronic
Data Interchange, CISA–2022–0010–0041; internet
Infrastructure Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–0055;
American Council of Life Insurers, CISA–2022–
0010–0095; Business Roundtable, CISA–2022–
0010–0115.
115 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
American Public Power Association and the Large
Public Power Council, CISA–2022–0010–0028;
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0025; California Special Districts
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0042; Professional
Services Council, CISA–2022–0010–0044;
American Association of Port Authorities, CISA–
2022–0010–0126; Virginia Port Authority, CISA–
2022–0010–0052; CHIME, CISA–2022–0010–0035;
AHIP, CISA–2022–0010–0091.
116 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Payments
Leadership Council, CISA–2022–0010–0031
(recommending CISA consider a report to include
substantially similar information if ‘‘the material
essence of the incident is reflected in the
information contained within the report to the other
federal entity’’); BSA | The Software Alliance,
CISA–2022–0010–0106 (recommending that there
be a ‘‘rebuttable presumption that a report provided
by a covered entity to another federal entity is
substantially similar’’).
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included the Cyber Incident Notification
Requirements for Federally Insured
Credit Unions (FICUs), located at 12
CFR 748.1; 117 the DFARS incident
reporting requirement, located at 48
CFR 252.204–7012; 118 Cyber Security
Event Notifications for Commercial
Nuclear Power Reactors, located at 10
CFR 73.77; TSA Security Directive
Pipeline-2021–01 series, Enhancing
Pipeline Cybersecurity; 119 and the
Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
Breach Notification Rule, located at 45
CFR 164.400–414, and corresponding
Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
Act Health Breach Notification Rule,
located at 16 CFR part 318, which
applies to entities not subject to the
HIPAA Breach Notification Rule.120
xi. Comments on Noncompliance and
Enforcement
A small number of commenters
offered recommendations related to
noncompliance and enforcement of the
CIRCIA regulations. These commenters
encouraged CISA to keep in mind that
covered entities are victims of an
incident 121 and recommended that
CISA focus on collaboration, not
enforcement.122 Similarly, a number of
commenters recommended that CISA
not penalize entities for reporting in
good faith under the rule.123 Such
possible penalties that commenters
recommended CISA avoid included
pursuing enforcement under CIRCIA or
allowing CIRCIA Reports to be the basis
for enforcement actions by other Federal
departments and agencies under
separate regulations.124 One commenter
suggested that non-profit, selfincorporated fire and Emergency
Management Service departments be
excluded from enforcement in the same
117 See, e.g., Comment submitted by NAFCU,
CISA–2022–0010–0076.
118 See, e.g., Comments submitted by U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, CISA–2022–0010–0075;
National Defense ISAC, CISA–2022–0010–0144.
119 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Energy
Transfer LP, CISA–2022–0010–0037
120 See Comment submitted by Nuclear Energy
Institute, CISA–2022–0010–0029; see also comment
submitted by Blue Cross Blue Shield Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0103.
121 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the National
Technology Security Coalition, CISA–2022–0010–
0061; The Associations: BPI, ABA, IIB, SIFMA,
CISA–2022–0010–0046.
122 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Airlines for
America, CISA–2022–0010–0066; Connected Health
Initiative, CISA–2022–0010–0130; ACT—The App
Association CISA–2022–0010–0129.
123 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Association of American Railroads, CISA–2022–
0010–0117; SolarWinds, CISA–2022–0010–0027;
NTCA—The Rural Broadband Association, CISA–
2022–0010–0100.
124 Id.
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manner as SLTT Government
Entities.125
xii. Comments on Treatment and
Restrictions on Use of CIRCIA Reports
Numerous commenters provided
recommendations on the treatment and
restrictions on use of CIRCIA Reports
and information therein. One consistent
theme throughout the comments on this
topic was the notion that CISA should
take steps to ensure the confidentiality
of the information, including the
identity of the victims of reported cyber
incidents, included in CIRCIA
Reports.126 Some of the procedural
strategies recommended by commenters
to achieve this include having CISA
anonymize and aggregate cyber incident
report information prior to sharing it
with others,127 exempting CIRCIA
Reports and/or the information
contained therein from release under
FOIA and similar state laws,128 and
considering treating CIRCIA Reports as
Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information, ‘‘confidential,’’ or
‘‘secret.’’ 129 Numerous commenters also
stressed the need for CISA to protect
information submitted in CIRCIA
Reports through strong data protection
standards, data security practices, and
data privacy safeguards.130
Commenters also suggested several
different limitations on the use of the
information contained in CIRCIA
Reports. A number of commenters
recommended CISA include adequate
liability protections in the proposed
regulation.131 Other commenters
recommended CISA clarify that
reporting does not result in the waiver
125 See, e.g., Comment submitted by the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, CISA–
2022–0010–0081.
126 See, e.g., Comments submitted by IBM, CISA–
2022–0010–0069; Gideon Rasmussen, CISA–2022–
0010–0011; Institute of International Finance,
CISA–2022–0010–0060; Powder River Energy
Corporation, CISA–2022–0010–0099.
127 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Fidelity
National Information Services, CISA–2022–0010–
0033; UnityPoint Health, CISA–2022–0010–0107;
Institute of International Finance, CISA–2022–
0010–0060.
128 See,e.g., Comments submitted by Edison
Electric Institute, CISA–2022–0010–0079; HIMSS,
CISA–2022–0010–0119; National Grain and Feed
Association, CISA–2022–0010–0104; NAFCU,
CISA–2022–0010–0076.
129 See, e.g., Comments submitted by NCTA,
CISA–2022–0010–0102; SAP, CISA–2022–0010–
0114.
130 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council,
CISA–2022–0010–0094; The Clearing House, CISA–
2022–0010–0086; Payments Leadership Council,
CISA–2022–0010–0031.
131 See, e.g., Comments submitted by American
Chemistry Council, CISA–2022–0010–0098;
SolarWinds, CISA–2022–0010–0027; The
Associations: BPI, ABA, IIB, SIFMA, CISA–2022–
0010–0046.
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of attorney-client privilege, trade secret
protections, or other privileges or
protections.132 A few commenters
recommended that information
contained in CIRCIA Reports be
protected from discovery in civil or
criminal actions.133 One commenter
recommended that the various
protections afforded to CIRCIA Reports
still apply even in the event that a
CIRCIA Report is compromised (i.e.,
accessed by an unauthorized individual
or made public in an unauthorized
manner).134
IV. Discussion of Proposed Rule
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A. Definitions
Section 226.1 of the proposed rule
contains proposed definitions for
certain terms used within the rule.
These proposed definitions are intended
to help clarify the meaning of various
terms used throughout the proposed
rule and promote consistency in
application of the regulatory
requirements.
For a number of the terms, CISA
proposes using, either verbatim or with
minor adjustments, definitions provided
in the Definitions sections of CIRCIA, as
amended (6 U.S.C. 681). For several
other terms where CIRCIA does not
include a CIRCIA-specific definition,
CISA proposes using, either verbatim or
with minor adjustments, definitions
provided in the Definitions sections at
Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) or at the
beginning of Title XXII of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650), each
as amended, since definitions in those
sections also apply to CIRCIA. Proposed
definitions that are derived from these
legal authorities include: cloud service
provider; cyber incident; Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency or
CISA; cybersecurity threat; Director;
information system; managed service
provider; ransom payment; ransomware
attack; supply chain compromise; and
virtual currency.
Additionally, CISA is proposing
definitions for a variety of terms that
will have a specific meaning within the
proposed regulation. These include
CIRCIA; CIRCIA Agreement; CIRCIA
Report; covered cyber incident; Covered
Cyber Incident Report; covered entity;
132 See, e.g., Comments submitted by
CrowdStrike, CISA–2022–0010–0128; U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, CISA–2022–0010–0075; Connected
Health Initiative, CISA–2022–0010–0130.
133 See, e.g., Comments submitted by Connected
Health Initiative, CISA–2022–0010–0130; ACT | The
App Association, CISA–2022–0010–0129.
134 See Comment submitted by submitted by
Health-ISAC and the Healthcare and Public Health
Sector Coordinating Council Cybersecurity Working
Group, CISA–2022–0010–0123.
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Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report; personal
information; Ransom Payment Report;
State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial
Government entity or SLTT Government
entity; substantial cyber incident; and
Supplemental Report. The basis for each
of these proposed definitions is
discussed in their respective subsection
below.
i. Covered Entity
Covered entity is a key term in the
proposed regulation as, among other
things, it is the operative term used to
describe the regulated parties
responsible for complying with the
covered cyber incident and ransom
payment reporting and data and records
preservation requirements in the
proposed CIRCIA regulation. While the
statute includes a definition for the term
covered entity, the statute explicitly
requires CISA to further clarify the
meaning of that term through
description in the CIRCIA rulemaking.
Specifically, the statute defines covered
entity to mean ‘‘an entity in a critical
infrastructure sector, as defined in
Presidential Policy Directive 21, that
satisfies the definition established by
the Director in the final rule issued
pursuant to section 681b(b) of this title.’’
6 U.S.C. 681(4). CIRCIA also requires
CISA to include a ‘‘clear description of
the types of entities that constitute
covered entities’’ in the final rule based
on various specified factors. 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1).
CISA proposes to provide the criteria
for covered entities in an Applicability
section at § 226.2 of the regulation with
a cross-reference to the Applicability
section in the Definitions section under
the term covered entity. See Section
IV.B below and § 226.2 for a detailed
discussion of the proposed covered
entity criteria and the ‘‘clear description
of the types of entities that constitute
covered entities,’’ required by 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1).
ii. Cyber Incident, Covered Cyber
Incident, and Substantial Cyber Incident
1. Cyber Incident
CISA is proposing to include in the
regulation a definition of the term cyber
incident. The definition of cyber
incident is important as it will help
bound the types of incidents that trigger
reporting requirements for covered
entities under the proposed regulation.
CIRCIA states that the term cyber
incident ‘‘(A) has the meaning given the
term ‘incident’ in section 2209; and (B)
does not include an occurrence that
imminently, but not actually,
jeopardizes—(i) information on
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information systems; or (ii) information
systems.’’ See 6 U.S.C. 681(5). Section
2209’s definition of ‘‘incident’’ has since
been moved to Section 2200 and defines
the term ‘‘incident’’ as ‘‘an occurrence
that actually or imminently jeopardizes,
without lawful authority, the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of
information on an information system,
or actually or imminently jeopardizes,
without lawful authority, an
information system.’’ See 6 U.S.C.
650(12).135
CISA is proposing to define cyber
incident to mean an occurrence that
actually jeopardizes, without lawful
authority, the integrity, confidentiality,
or availability of information on an
information system, or actually
jeopardizes, without lawful authority,
an information system. The definition
would use the 6 U.S.C. 650 definition
verbatim other than striking the
‘‘imminently jeopardizes’’ clause in that
definition, as required by 6 U.S.C.
681(5)(B).
2. Covered Cyber Incident
CIRCIA requires CISA to include
within the proposed rule a definition for
the term covered cyber incident. See 6
U.S.C. 681(3). Because CIRCIA requires
covered entities to report only those
cyber incidents that qualify as covered
cyber incidents to CISA, this definition
is essential for triggering the reporting
requirement. CISA is proposing to
define the term covered cyber incident
to mean a substantial cyber incident
experienced by a covered entity. CISA
also proposes definitions for both
substantial cyber incident and covered
entity within this NPRM.
Within CIRCIA, Congress defined a
covered cyber incident as ‘‘a substantial
cyber incident experienced by a covered
entity that satisfies the definition and
135 The definition of ‘‘incident’’ was moved from
Section 2209 of the Homeland Security Act (6
U.S.C. 659) to Section 2200 of the Homeland
Security Act (6 U.S.C. 650(12)) as part of the
consolidation of definitions in Section 7143 (CISA
Technical Corrections and Improvements) of the
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (hereinafter, ‘‘CISA
Technical Corrections’’). Public Law 117–263, Div.
G, Title LXXI, § 7143, Dec. 23, 2022. Section (f)(2)
of the CISA Technical Corrections includes a rule
of construction that provides that ‘‘[a]ny reference
to a term defined in the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) on the day before the
date of enactment of this Act that is defined in
section 2200 of that Act pursuant to the
amendments made under this Act shall be deemed
to be a reference to that term as defined in section
2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as
added by this Act.’’ Pursuant to this rule of
construction, the cross-reference in CIRCIA’s
definition of ‘‘cyber incident’’ to the definition of
‘‘incident’’ in Section 2209 of the Homeland
Security Act (6 U.S.C. 659) is deemed a reference
to the definition of ‘‘incident’’ in Section 2200 of
the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. 650).
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criteria established by the Director in
the final rule issued pursuant to section
681b(b) of this title.’’ See 6 U.S.C.
681(3). CISA believes that defining a
covered cyber incident to include all
substantial cyber incidents experienced
by a covered entity rather than some
subset thereof is both consistent with
the statutory definition of covered cyber
incident and is the least complicated
approach to defining covered cyber
incidents.
Under this approach, a covered entity
simply needs to determine if a cyber
incident is a substantial cyber incident
for it to be reported, rather than having
to perform an additional analysis to
determine if a substantial cyber incident
meets some narrower criteria for a
covered cyber incident. As the term
substantial cyber incident is not used in
CIRCIA other than to help define a
covered cyber incident, CISA does not
see any benefit to having one set of
requirements for what constitutes a
substantial cyber incident and a
separate set of requirements for which
substantial cyber incidents experienced
by a covered entity qualify as covered
cyber incidents.
3. Substantial Cyber Incident
CISA is proposing to include within
the rule a definition for the term
substantial cyber incident. Given CISA’s
proposal to define a covered cyber
incident as a substantial cyber incident
experienced by a covered entity, the
term substantial cyber incident is
essential to the CIRCIA regulation as it
identifies the types of incidents that,
when experienced by a covered entity,
must be reported to CISA.
While CIRCIA does not define the
term substantial cyber incident, it
provides minimum requirements for the
types of substantial cyber incidents that
qualify as covered cyber incidents. See
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A). Consistent with
these minimum requirements, CISA
proposes the term substantial cyber
incident to mean a cyber incident that
leads to any of the following: (a) a
substantial loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of a covered
entity’s information system or network;
(b) a serious impact on the safety and
resiliency of a covered entity’s
operational systems and processes; (c) a
disruption of a covered entity’s ability
to engage in business or industrial
operations, or deliver goods or services;
or (d) unauthorized access to a covered
entity’s information system or network,
or any nonpublic information contained
therein, that is facilitated through or
caused by either a compromise of a
cloud service provider, managed service
provider, other third-party data hosting
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provider, or a supply chain
compromise. CISA is further proposing
that a substantial cyber incident
resulting in one of the listed impacts
include any cyber incident regardless of
cause, including, but not limited to, a
compromise of a cloud service provider,
managed service provider, or other
third-party data hosting provider; a
supply chain compromise; a denial-ofservice attack; a ransomware attack; or
exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability.
Finally, CISA is proposing the term
substantial cyber incident does not
include (a) any lawfully authorized
activity of a United States Government
entity or SLTT Government entity,
including activities undertaken
pursuant to a warrant or other judicial
process; (b) any event where the cyber
incident is perpetrated in good faith by
an entity in response to a specific
request by the owner or operator of the
information system; or (c) the threat of
disruption as extortion, as described in
6 U.S.C. 650(22).136
In developing this proposed
definition, CISA examined how other
Federal departments and agencies that
regulate cyber incident reporting define
similar terminology for their reporting
regimes, reviewed the Model Definition
for a Reportable Cyber Incident
proposed by the Secretary of Homeland
Security in the CIRC-informed DHS
Report to Congress (the ‘‘CIRC Model
Definition’’), and considered the many
comments received on this topic from
stakeholders both at CIRCIA listening
sessions and in written comments
submitted in response to the CIRCIA
RFI. CISA considered those various
perspectives and approaches both
within the constraints explicitly
imposed by CIRCIA and in light of the
purposes for which CISA believes
CIRCIA was created as described in
Section III.C in this document.
The proposed definition contains the
following elements: (1) a set of four
threshold impacts which, if one or more
occur as the result of a cyber incident,
would qualify that cyber incident as a
substantial cyber incident; (2) an
explicit acknowledgment that
substantial cyber incidents can be
136 The definition of ransomware attack contained
in Section 2240(14)(A) was originally codified in 6
U.S.C. 681(14) but was moved from 6 U.S.C. 681(14)
to 6 U.S.C. 650(22) as part of the consolidation of
definitions in the CISA Technical Corrections,
supra note 135. The CISA Technical Corrections,
however, did not update this cross-reference in
CIRCIA. Nevertheless, pursuant to the rule of
construction in Section (f)(2) of the CISA Technical
Corrections, the cross reference in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(C)(ii) to part of the definition of
ransomware attack in 6 U.S.C. 681(14) is deemed
a reference to the definition of ransomware attack
now in 6 U.S.C. 650 (Section 2200 of the Homeland
Security Act).
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caused through compromises of thirdparty service providers or supply
chains, as well as various techniques
and methods; and (3) three separate
types of incidents that, even if they were
to meet the other criteria contained
within the substantial cyber incident
definition, would be excluded from
treatment as a substantial cyber
incident. Each of these elements is
addressed in turn below.
a. Minimum Requirements for a Cyber
Incident To Be a Substantial Cyber
Incident
While Congress did not define the
term substantial cyber incident in
CIRCIA, Congress did include minimum
requirements for the types of substantial
cyber incidents that constitute covered
cyber incidents. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A).137 Because CISA is
proposing that a covered cyber incident
mean any substantial cyber incident
experienced by a covered entity (see
Section IV.A.ii.2 in this document),
CISA interprets the minimum
requirements enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A) as the minimum
requirements an incident must meet to
be considered a substantial cyber
incident (as opposed to a subset of
substantial cyber incidents that
constitute covered cyber incidents).
Thus, while CISA has discretion to raise
the threshold required for something to
be a substantial cyber incident, resulting
in a reduction of the number of
incidents that would qualify as
substantial, CISA may not lower the
threshold below the requirements
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A).
CISA believes that the minimum
requirements enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A) create a sufficiently high
threshold to prevent overreporting by
making it clear that routine or minor
cyber incidents do not need to be
reported. Accordingly, CISA is
proposing to use those requirements as
the basis for the first part of the
definition of substantial cyber incident,
137 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A) states that the types of
substantial cyber incidents that constitute covered
cyber incidents must, ‘‘at a minimum, require the
occurrence of (i) a cyber incident that leads to
substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of such information system or network,
or a serious impact on the safety and resiliency of
operational systems and processes; (ii) a disruption
of business or industrial operations, including due
to a denial-of-service attack, ransomware attack, or
exploitation of a zero day vulnerability, against (I)
an information system or network; or (II) an
operational technology system or process; or (iii)
unauthorized access or disruption of business or
industrial operations due to loss of service
facilitated through, or caused by, a compromise of
a cloud service provider, managed service provider,
or other third-party data hosting provider or by a
supply chain compromise.’’
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with minor modifications for clarity and
for greater consistency with the CIRC
Model Definition of a reportable cyber
incident. Ultimately, CISA is proposing
four types of impacts that, if
experienced by a covered entity as a
result of a cyber incident, would result
in the incident being classified as a
substantial cyber incident and therefore
reportable under the CIRCIA regulation.
Each of these impact types is described
in its own prong of the substantial cyber
incident definition.
i. Impact 1: Substantial Loss of
Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability
Under the first proposed threshold
impact, a cyber incident would be
considered a substantial cyber incident
if it resulted in a substantial loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of a covered entity’s information system
or network. See § 226.1 of the proposed
regulation. This impact reflects the
substantive criteria contained in the first
part of 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(i), which
states ‘‘a cyber incident that leads to
substantial loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of such
information system or network.’’
Although this prong does not explicitly
mention operational technology (OT)),
CISA is using the term ‘‘information
system,’’ (which, per the proposed
definition, as described in Section
IV.A.iv.7 in this document, includes
OT) in this threshold and proposes to
interpret this aspect of the regulation to
also specifically cover cyber incidents
that lead to substantial loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of a covered entity’s OT.
The concepts of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (CIA), often
referred to as the ‘‘CIA triad,’’ represent
the three pillars of information
security.138 ‘‘Confidentiality’’ refers to
‘‘preserving authorized restrictions on
information access and disclosure,
including means for protecting personal
privacy and proprietary
information.’’ 139 ‘‘Integrity’’ refers to
‘‘guarding against improper information
modification or destruction and
ensuring information non-repudiation
and authenticity.’’ 140 ‘‘Availability’’
refers to ‘‘ensuring timely and reliable
access to and use of information.’’ 141
The loss of CIA of an information
system, including OT, or network can
occur in many ways. For example, if an
138 See, e.g., NIST, Data Integrity: Identifying and
Protecting Assets Against Ransomware and Other
Destructive Events, NIST Special Publication 1800–
25 Vol. A at 1 (Dec. 2020), available at https://
csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/1800/25/final.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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unauthorized individual steals
credentials or uses a brute force attack
to gain access to a system, they have
caused a loss of the confidentiality of a
system. If that unauthorized individual
uses that access to modify or destroy
any information on the system, they
have caused a loss of the integrity of the
system and potentially a loss of the
availability of the information contained
therein. A denial-of-service attack that
renders a system or network
inaccessible is another example of an
incident that leads to a loss of the
availability of the system or network.
These are just some of the many types
of incidents that can lead to a loss of
CIA and would be reportable if the
impacts are ‘‘substantial.’’
Whether a loss of CIA constitutes a
‘‘substantial’’ loss will likely depend on
a variety of factors, such as the type,
volume, impact, and duration of the
loss. One example of a cyber incident
that typically would meet the
‘‘substantial’’ threshold for this impact
type is a distributed denial-of-service
attack that renders a covered entity’s
service unavailable to customers for an
extended period of time. Similarly, a
ransomware attack or other attack that
encrypts one of a covered entity’s core
business or information systems
substantially impacting the
confidentiality, availability, or integrity
of the entity’s data or services likely also
would meet the threshold of a
substantial cyber incident under this
first impact type and would need to be
reported under the CIRCIA regulation.
Persistent access to information systems
by an unauthorized third party would
typically be considered a substantial
loss of confidentiality. By contrast, even
time-limited access to certain high-value
information systems, such as access to
privileged credentials or to a domain
controller, could also be considered a
substantial loss of confidentiality. A
large-scale data breach or otherwise
meaningful exfiltration of data typically
would also be considered a substantial
cyber incident as it would reflect a
substantial loss of the confidentiality of
an information system. A theft of data
that may or may not itself meet the
‘‘substantial’’ impact threshold by
nature of the data theft alone (based on
the type or volume of data stolen) could
become a substantial cyber incident if
the theft is followed by a data leak or
a credible threat to leak data.
Conversely, CISA would not expect a
denial-of-service attack or other incident
that results in a covered entity’s publicfacing website being unavailable for a
few minutes to typically rise to the level
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of a substantial cyber incident under
this impact.142
ii. Impact 2: Serious Impact on Safety
and Resiliency of Operational Systems
and Processes
The second impact type of the
proposed substantial cyber incident
definition would require a covered
entity to report a cyber incident that
results in a serious impact on the safety
and resiliency of a covered entity’s
operational systems and processes. This
impact reflects the threshold
enumerated in the second part of 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(i), which states ‘‘a
cyber incident that leads to . . . a
serious impact on the safety and
resiliency of operational systems and
processes.’’ Safety is a commonly
understood term, which NIST defines as
‘‘[f]reedom from conditions that can
cause death, injury, occupational
illness, damage to or loss of equipment
or property, or damage to the
environment.’’ 143 NIST defines
resilience as ‘‘[t]he ability to prepare for
and adapt to changing conditions and
withstand and recover rapidly from
disruption,’’ and operational resilience
as ‘‘[t]he ability of systems to resist,
absorb, and recover from, or adapt to an
adverse occurrence during operation
that may cause harm, destruction, or
loss of the ability to perform missionrelated functions.’’ 144
Similar to the interpretation of the
word ‘‘substantial’’ in the first impact
type, whether an impact on the safety
and resiliency of an operational system
or process is ‘‘serious’’ will likely
depend on a variety of factors, such as
the safety or security hazards associated
with the system or process, and the
scale and duration of the impact. For
example, a cyber incident that
noticeably increases the potential for a
release of a hazardous material used in
chemical manufacturing or water
purification likely would meet this
142 The examples provided in this paragraph and
elsewhere in this section of what typically might or
might not be considered a substantial cyber
incident are simply a few sample scenarios meant
to provide context around this discussion. The
examples are not meant as an exhaustive or
definitive list of what is and is not a substantial
cyber incident. Whether something is or is not a
substantial cyber incident is fact-dependent and
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. For
example, while, as noted, an incident resulting in
a brief unavailability of a public-facing website
would typically not qualify as a substantial loss of
availability, such an incident may be significant for
a covered entity whose public-facing website is a
core part of its service offering (such as a webmail
provider).
143 NIST, Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems,
NIST Special Publication 800–160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1, at
67 (Dec. 2021), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/
pubs/sp/800/160/v2/r1/final.
144 Id. at 65–66.
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definition. Similarly, a cyber incident
that compromised or disrupted a BES
cyber system that performs one or more
reliability tasks would also likely meet
this prong of the substantial cyber
incident definition. Further, a cyber
incident that disrupts the ability of a
communications service provider to
transmit or deliver emergency alerts or
911 calls, or results in the transmission
of false emergency alerts or 911 calls,
would meet this definition. While CISA
anticipates that the types of incidents
that will actually lead to a serious
impact to the safety and resilience of
operational systems and processes may
frequently involve OT, CISA does not
interpret ‘‘operational systems and
processes’’ to be a reference to OT.
Congress used the specific phrase
‘‘operational technology’’ elsewhere in
CIRCIA—including in the immediate
next provision—and therefore certainly
could have used it in this provision if
that was the intent. Compare 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(i) with 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(ii)(II)). Accordingly, CISA
interprets this prong broadly as not
being limited to only incidents
impacting OT, and covered entities
should report incidents that are covered
cyber incidents under this prong of the
definition even if the impacts that meet
the threshold are not to OT.
iii. Impact 3: Disruption of Ability To
Engage in Business or Industrial
Operations
The third impact of the proposed
substantial cyber incident definition
would require a covered entity to report
an incident that results in a disruption
of a covered entity’s ability to engage in
business or industrial operations, or
deliver goods or services. This prong
reflects criteria enumerated by Congress
in both 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(ii) and
(iii), which provides that one type of
incident that could qualify as a
substantial cyber incident that
constitutes a covered cyber incident is
a cyber incident that causes a disruption
of business or industrial operations,
including due to a denial-of-service
attack, ransomware attack, or
exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability,
against (I) an information system or
network; or (II) an operational
technology system or process; or
unauthorized access or disruption of
business or industrial operations due to
loss of service facilitated through, or
caused by, a compromise of a CSP,
managed service provider, or other
third-party data hosting provider or by
a supply chain compromise.
In drafting this prong, CISA has added
two clauses to the statutory criteria
relating to an entity’s ability to engage
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in business operations or deliver goods
or services. CISA proposes adding these
clauses to this prong of the substantial
cyber incident definition to clarify
CISA’s understanding of the statutory
language. CISA understands that a
disruption of business operations
includes a disruption to an entity’s
ability to engage in business operations
and the ability to deliver goods or
services. CISA considers this language
to be a clarification of the statutory
language, and not an expansion.
NIST defines a disruption as ‘‘[a]n
unplanned event that causes a . . .
system to be inoperable for a length of
time (e.g., minor or extended power
outage, extended unavailable network,
or equipment or facility damage or
destruction).’’ 145 As opposed to the
statutory source for the first two prongs
of this definition, the portion of CIRCIA
from which this prong is drawn does
not contain a qualifier such as
‘‘substantial’’ or ‘‘serious.’’
Nevertheless, because this prong is part
of the threshold for a ‘‘substantial’’
cyber incident, CISA believes it is
appropriate to read into the prong some
level of significance. Like the previous
prongs, whether a disruption rises to the
level of reportability may depend on a
variety of factors and circumstances,
such as the scope of the disruption and
what was disrupted. A relatively minor
disruption to a critical system or
network could rise to a high level of
substantiality, while a significant
disruption to a non-critical system or
network might not. Generally speaking,
incidents that result in minimal or
insignificant disruptions are unlikely to
rise to the level of a substantial cyber
incident reportable under this prong;
however, the specific circumstances of
the disruption should be taken into
consideration.
While 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(ii)
provides that this category includes
disruptions of business or industrial
operations ‘‘due to a denial of service
attack, ransomware attack, or
exploitation of a zero day
vulnerability,’’ CISA is not proposing to
include this language in this third
prong, as CISA reads this language as
being illustrative of the types of
incidents that might lead to a disruption
of business or industrial operations,
rather than a limitation on the types of
incidents that can be reportable under
this prong. To that end, examples of
cyber incidents that would meet this
prong include the exploitation of a zero145 NIST, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal
Information Systems, NIST Special Publication
800–34 Rev. 1, Appendix G, (May 2010), available
at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/34/r1/upd1/
final.
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day vulnerability resulting in the
extended downtime of a covered entity’s
information system or network, a
ransomware attack that locks a covered
entity out of its industrial control
system, or a distributed denial-ofservice attack that prevents customers
from accessing their accounts with a
covered entity for an extended period of
time. Another example would be where
a critical access hospital is unable to
operate due to a ransomware attack on
a third-party medical records software
company on whom the critical access
hospital relies; the critical access
hospital, and perhaps the medical
records software company as well if it
also is a covered entity, would need to
report the incident. Cyber incidents that
result in minor disruptions, such as
short-term unavailability of a business
system or a temporary need to reroute
network traffic, typically would not be
considered substantial under this prong.
iv. Impact 4: Unauthorized Access
Facilitated Through or Caused by a: (1)
Compromise of a CSP, Managed Service
Provider, or Other Third-Party Data
Hosting Provider, or (2) Supply Chain
Compromise
The fourth prong of the proposed
substantial cyber incident definition
would require a covered entity to report
an incident that results in unauthorized
access to a covered entity’s information
system or network, or any nonpublic
information contained therein, that is
facilitated through or caused by a
compromise of a CSP, managed service
provider, other third-party data hosting
provider, or by a supply chain
compromise. This prong reflects criteria
enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(iii).
NIST defines unauthorized access as
occurring when an individual ‘‘gains
logical or physical access without
permission to a network, system,
application, data, or other resource.’’ 146
Unauthorized access causes actual
jeopardy to information systems and the
information therein by compromising
the first pillar of the CIA triad—
confidentiality—and by providing an
adversary with a launching off point for
additional penetration of a system or
network. Much like the third prong, the
source language in CIRCIA does not
contain any qualifier such as
‘‘substantial’’ or ‘‘serious.’’ However,
unlike that prong, CISA understands the
absence of a qualifier here to be a
reflection of the seriousness of
146 NIST, Guide to Industrial Control Systems
Security, NIST Special Publication 800–82 Rev. 3,
at 168 (Sept. 2023), available at https://
csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final.
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unauthorized access through a third
party (such as a managed service
provider or CSP) or a supply chain
compromise. Such cyber incidents
uniquely have the ability to cause
significant or substantial nation-level
impacts, even if the impacts at many of
the individual covered entities are
relatively minor. The legislative intent
makes clear that supply chain
compromises such as the ‘‘SUNBURST’’
malware that compromised legitimate
updates of customers using the
SolarWinds Orion product, and thirdparty incidents like the compromise of
the managed service provider Kaseya,
were major drivers of the passage of
CIRCIA.147 CISA therefore understands
that this prong reflects a recognition that
CISA needs visibility into the breadth of
a third-party incident or supply chain
compromise to adequately meet its
obligations under CIRCIA.
Examples of cyber incidents that CISA
typically would consider meeting this
prong include a detected, unauthorized
intrusion into an information system or
the exfiltration of information as a result
of a supply chain compromise (see
Section IV.A.iv.13 for further discussion
on the meaning of supply chain
compromise). Similarly, unauthorized
access that was achieved through
exploitation of a vulnerability in the
cloud services provided to a covered
entity by a CSP or by leveraging access
to a covered entity’s system through a
managed service provider would meet
this prong. Conversely, because the
statute requires the unauthorized access
to have been facilitated through or
caused by a compromise of a third-party
service provider or supply chain
compromise, unauthorized access that
results from a vulnerability within
147 See, e.g., CHS Fact Sheet, supra note 16,
(referencing the SolarWinds supply chain
compromise); Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Staff Report: America’s Data
Held Hostage: Case Studies in Ransomware Attacks
on American Companies, 25–27 (Mar. 2022)
(discussing the Kaseya ransomware attacks),
available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/
files/americas-data-held-hostage-case-studies-inransomware-attacks-on-american-companies/;
Business Meeting, Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, Opening Remarks
by Ranking Member Rob Portman (Oct. 6, 2021),
(citing SolarWinds as an example of an event that
shows why greater transparency of these types of
events through cyber incident reporting to CISA is
needed), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
hearings/10-06-2021-business-meeting/;
Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing, supra note 17, at
55 (Statement of Rep. James Langevin) (‘‘The
SolarWinds breach has brought new attention to the
issue of incident reporting, and for good reason.’’);
168 Cong. Rec. S1149 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2022)
(statement of Sen. Mark Warner) (‘‘The SolarWinds
breach demonstrated how broad the ripple effects
of these attacks can be, affecting hundreds or even
thousands of entities connected to the initial
target.’’).
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proprietary code developed by the
covered entity or a gap in the covered
entity’s access control procedures that
allows an unauthorized employee
administrative access to the system
would not constitute a substantial cyber
incident under this prong (though could
still qualify as a substantial cyber
incident under one of the first three
prongs if it resulted in the requisite
impact levels).
b. Guidance for Assessing Whether an
Impact Threshold Is Met
When evaluating whether a cyber
incident meets one of the four proposed
impact thresholds that would qualify it
as a substantial cyber incident, a
covered entity should keep in mind
several principles. First, an incident
needs to meet only one of the four
prongs, not all four of the prongs, for it
to be a substantial cyber incident. CISA
believes Congress’s use of the word ‘‘or’’
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A) was intentional
and was meant to confer the fact that for
an incident to be a substantial cyber
incident that meets the threshold of a
covered cyber incident it only had to
meet one of the enumerated criteria, not
all the enumerated criteria. CISA’s
proposed definition for substantial
cyber incident follows this example,
using ‘‘or’’ intentionally to indicate that
if an incident meets any of the
enumerated criteria within the
definition it is a substantial cyber
incident. This approach is also
consistent with the CIRC Model
Definition, with which, for the reasons
discussed below, CISA attempted to
align to the extent practicable.
Second, for an incident to qualify as
a substantial cyber incident, CISA
interprets CIRCIA to require the
incident to actually result in one or
more of the impacts described above. A
number of other cyber incident
reporting regulations do not require
actual impacts for an incident to have to
be reported; rather, some require
reporting if an incident results in
imminent or potential harm, or
identification of a vulnerability. While
good policy rationales exist for both
approaches in various contexts, CISA
believes the phrase ‘‘require the
occurrence of’’ in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)
limits reportable incidents under
CIRCIA to those that have actually
resulted in at least one of the impacts
described in that section of CIRCIA.
Likewise, CIRCIA’s definition of cyber
incident (of which substantial cyber
incidents are a subset) specifically omits
occurrences imminently, but not
actually, jeopardizing information
systems or information on information
systems. 6 U.S.C. 681(5). Consequently,
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if a cyber incident jeopardizes an entity
or puts the entity at imminent risk of
threshold impacts but does not actually
result in any of the impacts included in
the proposed definition, the cyber
incident does not meet the definition of
a substantial cyber incident. Similarly,
if malicious cyber activity is thwarted
by a firewall or other defensive or
mitigative measure before causing the
requisite level of impact, it would not
meet the proposed definition of a
substantial cyber incident and would
not have to be reported. Consequently,
blocked phishing attempts, failed
attempts to gain access to systems,
credentials reported missing but that
have not been used to access the system
and have since been rendered inactive,
and routine scanning that presents no
evidence of penetration are examples of
events or incidents that typically would
not be considered substantial cyber
incidents. To both convey this intention
and to more closely align with the
language used in the CIRC Model
Definition, CISA is proposing ‘‘a cyber
incident that leads to’’ as the
introductory language before the
enumerated threshold prongs. CISA
believes the phrase ‘‘leads to’’
satisfactorily conveys that a covered
entity must have experienced one of the
enumerated impacts for an incident to
be considered a substantial cyber
incident.
Third, the type of TTP used by an
adversary to perpetrate the cyber
incident and cause the requisite level of
impact is typically irrelevant to the
determination of whether an incident is
a substantial cyber incident.148 CISA
believes that the specific attack vector or
TTP used to perpetrate the incident
(e.g., malware, denial-of-service,
spoofing, phishing) should not be
relevant to determining if an incident is
a substantial cyber incident if one of the
impact threshold prongs are met. One of
the primary purposes of the CIRCIA
regulation is to allow CISA the ability to
identify TTPs being used by adversaries
to cause cyber incidents. Limiting
reporting to a specific list of TTPs that
CISA currently is aware of would
inhibit CISA’s ability to fully
understand the dynamic cyberthreat
landscape as it evolves over time or be
able to warn infrastructure owners and
148 The primary exception is the fourth prong,
which is limited to instances where unauthorized
access was facilitated through or caused by a
compromise of a CSP, managed service provider, or
another third-party data hosting provider, or by a
supply chain compromise. However, even within
this vector-specific prong, the specific TTPs used by
the threat actor to compromise a third-party
provider or the supply chain is not relevant to
whether the incident is reportable.
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operators of novel or reemerging TTPs.
(See further discussion in Section
IV.A.ii.3.f of this document describing
why CISA is proposing not to use the
sophistication or novelty of the tactics
used to narrow the definition of
substantial cyber incidents.) This is also
consistent with CIRCIA’s statutory
language, which references certain types
of TTPs, such as denial-of-service
attacks or exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability, as only examples, rather
than a limitation on reportable covered
cyber incidents. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(ii).
Fourth, for similar reasons, CISA has
elected not to limit the definition of
substantial cyber incident to impacts to
specific types of systems, networks, or
technologies. A number of commenters
suggested that CISA should only require
reporting of incidents that impact
critical systems. CISA is proposing that
under CIRCIA, if a cyber incident
impacting a system, network, or
technology that an entity may not
believe is critical nonetheless results in
actual impacts that meet the level of one
or more of the threshold impact prongs,
then the incident should be reported to
CISA. In addition to helping ensure
CISA receives reports on substantial
cyber incidents even if they were
perpetrated against a system, network,
or technology deemed non-critical by
the impacted covered entity, this
approach also has the benefit of
alleviating the need for a covered entity
to proactively determine which systems,
networks, or technologies it believes are
‘‘critical’’ and instead focus solely on
the actual impacts of an incident as the
primary determining factor as to
whether a cyber incident is a reportable
substantial cyber incident. For similar
reasons, CISA is proposing to include,
but not specifically distinguish, cyber
incidents with impacts to OT. While it
may be the case that cyber incidents
affecting OT are more likely to meet the
impact thresholds in the definition of
substantial cyber incident, CISA did not
want to artificially scope out cyber
incidents that primarily impact business
systems but nevertheless result in many
of the same type of impacts that could
result from a cyber incident affecting
OT.
Fifth, CISA is aware that in some
cases, a covered entity will not know for
certain the cause of the incident within
the first few days following the
occurrence of the incident. As is
discussed in greater detail in Section
IV.E.iv on the timing of submission of
CIRCIA Reports, a covered entity does
not need to know the cause of the
incident with certainty for it to be a
reportable substantial cyber incident.
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For incidents where the covered entity
has not yet been able to confirm the
cause of the incident, the covered entity
must report the incident if it has a
‘‘reasonable belief’’ that a covered cyber
incident occurred. If an incident meets
any of the impact-based criteria, it
would be reportable if the covered
entity has a ‘‘reasonable belief’’ that the
threshold impacts occurred as a result of
activity without lawful authority, even
if the specific cause is not confirmed.
For the fourth prong, a reasonable belief
that unauthorized access was caused by
a third-party provider or a supply chain
compromise would be sufficient to
trigger a reporting obligation, even if the
cause of the cyber incident was not yet
confirmed. As discussed in Section
III.C.ii on the purposes of the regulation,
timely reporting is of the essence for
CISA to be able to quickly analyze
incident reports, identify trends, and
provide early warnings to other entities
before they can become victims.
Accordingly, CISA believes its ability to
achieve the regulatory purposes of
CIRCIA would be greatly undermined if
covered entities were allowed to delay
reporting until an incident has been
confirmed to have been perpetrated
without lawful authority. Therefore, an
incident whose cause is undetermined,
but for which the covered entity has a
reasonable belief that the incident may
have been perpetrated without lawful
authority, must be reported if the
incident otherwise meets the reporting
criteria. If, however, the covered entity
knows with certainty the cause of the
incident, then the covered entity only
needs to report the incident if the
incident was perpetrated without lawful
authority.
Finally, CISA expects a covered entity
to exercise reasonable judgment in
determining whether it has experienced
a cyber incident that meets one of the
substantiality thresholds. If a covered
entity is unsure as to whether a cyber
incident meets a particular threshold,
CISA encourages the entity to either
proactively report the incident or reach
out to CISA to discuss whether the
incident needs to be reported.
c. Reportability of Cyber Incidents
Regardless of Cause
As noted in Section IV.A.ii.3.a.iv of
this document, the CIRCIA statute limits
which cyber incidents only involving
unauthorized access can be considered
a substantial cyber incident.
Specifically, the statute states that to be
considered a substantial cyber incident
based on unauthorized access alone
(without any of the impacts listed in the
first three prongs, such as where the
unauthorized access does not result in
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a ‘‘substantial’’ loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability under the first
prong), a cyber incident must be
facilitated through or caused by a
compromise of a CSP, managed service
provider, another third-party data
hosting provider, or by a supply chain
compromise. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(iii). Cyber incidents
resulting in impacts other than
unauthorized access and described in
the first three impact prongs are not
limited by the source or cause in the
same manner. Similarly, as noted in
Section IV.A.ii.3.a.iii of this document,
CISA does not view the language in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(ii) regarding denialof-service attacks, ransomware attacks,
or exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability as suggesting a limitation
on the vector or type of incidents in the
third prong, or to suggest that denial-ofservice attacks, ransomware attacks, or
exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability
that leads to the impacts described in
the first two prongs would not be
reportable if the impact thresholds are
otherwise met. To ensure it is clear that
cyber incidents resulting in threshold
impacts other than unauthorized access
should be reported regardless of cause
or vector, including whether they were
or were not facilitated through or caused
by a compromise of a third-party service
provider or supply chain compromise,
denial-of-service attack, ransomware
attack, or exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability, CISA is proposing to
include in the definition of substantial
cyber incident explicit language to that
effect. Specifically, CISA is proposing to
include in the definition of substantial
cyber incident the statement that a
substantial cyber incident resulting in
any of the threshold impacts identified
in the first three prongs includes any
cyber incident regardless of cause. See
proposed § 226.1. As indicated in the
proposed regulatory text, CISA
interprets the phrase ‘‘regardless of
cause’’ to include, but not be limited to,
incidents caused by a compromise of a
CSP, managed service provider, or other
third-party data hosting provider; a
supply chain compromise; a denial-ofservice attack; a ransomware attack; or
exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability.
In today’s complex cyber
environment, entities frequently rely on
third parties for various IT-related
services, such as hosting, administering,
managing, or securing networks,
systems, applications, infrastructure,
and digital information. Depending on
what services are being provided, these
third-party service providers—be they
CSPs, managed service providers, or
other third-party data hosting
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providers—via the systems and
networks they manage, may provide an
additional avenue through which
nefarious individuals can seek to impact
a service provider’s customer’s
information systems or the information
contained therein, which may also
impact a covered entity. Similarly,
adversaries may seek to impact covered
entities by exploiting elements of the
supply chain that a covered entity may
rely upon.
This part of the substantial cyber
incident definition is intended, in part,
to ensure that a covered entity reports
cyber incidents experienced by the
covered entity that rise to the level of
substantiality that warrants reporting
even if the cyber incident in question
was caused by a compromise of a
product or service managed by someone
other than the covered entity. This
clause is important to prevent the
creation of a ‘‘blind spot’’ where the
covered entity experiences a substantial
cyber incident but escapes required
reporting based on the manner in which
the incident was initiated or
perpetrated. Congress recognized the
importance of this approach, and
explicitly authorized it in CIRCIA for
incidents that resulted in ‘‘unauthorized
access or disruption of business or
industrial operations due to loss of
service facilitated through, or caused by,
a compromise of a cloud service
provider, managed service provider, or
other third-party data hosting provider
or by a supply chain compromise.’’ 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(iii).
CISA believes the policy rationale for
applying this provision to incidents
resulting in unauthorized access or
disruption of business or industrial
operations (the third and fourth
threshold prongs) applies equally to
incidents resulting in a substantial loss
of CIA, or a serious impact on the safety
and resiliency of operational systems
and processes (the first and second
prongs). Accordingly, CISA proposes
including this clause as a full part of the
substantial cyber incident definition, so
that it applies to cyber incidents that
result in impacts meeting any of the four
impact threshold prongs.
While a covered entity must report
qualifying incidents that are the result
of a compromise of a CSP, managed
service provider, or other third-party
data hosting provider, or by a supply
chain compromise, it is important to
note that this imposes reporting
requirements solely on the covered
entity that the incident impacts at a
threshold level. Accordingly, a CSP,
managed service provider, or other
third-party service provider is not
obligated, by virtue of this provision, to
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report an incident that causes threshold
level impacts to one of its customers
even if the impacts are the result of a
compromise of the third-party’s
services, network, software, etc. A thirdparty service provider only needs to
report a cyber incident if (a) the thirdparty service provider independently
meets the definition of covered entity,
and (b) the third-party service provider
itself experiences impacts that rise to
the level of a substantial cyber incident.
Note, however, a covered entity thirdparty provider could experience a
reportable substantial cyber incident
without the third-party service provider
experiencing direct impacts from a
cyber incident that exploits or
compromises their information
networks or systems. This would be the
case where a cyber incident facilitated
through or caused by a compromise of
the third-party service provider meeting
the definition of a covered entity caused
enough impacts to one or more of the
provider’s customers that the
cumulative effect of the incident
resulted in a substantial disruption of
the third-party service provider’s
business operations.
This part of the proposed substantial
cyber incident definition is also
intended to emphasize that the first
three prongs of the definition of
substantial cyber incident are also TTP,
incident type, and vector agnostic.
While denial-of-service attack,
ransomware attack, and exploitation of
a zero-day vulnerability are specifically
listed in this part of the definition in
light of their inclusion in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(ii), their inclusion in the
statute and this part of the definition are
as examples only. Any cyber incident
experienced by a covered entity,
regardless of cause, that meets the
impact thresholds in the first three
prongs of the definition of substantial
cyber incident would be considered a
substantial cyber incident. This
includes, for example, exploitation of a
previously known vulnerability, and not
just exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability. For further examples of
incidents that typically would and
would not be considered a substantial
cyber incident, see Section IV.A.ii.3.e of
this document.
d. Exclusions
In 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(C), Congress
identified two types of events that CISA
must exclude from the types of
incidents that constitute covered cyber
incidents. Specifically, Congress stated
that CISA was to ‘‘exclude (i) any event
where the cyber incident is perpetrated
in good faith by an entity in response to
a specific request by the owner or
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operator of the information system; and
(ii) the threat of disruption as extortion,
as described in section 2240(14)(A).’’ 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(C). In addition, CISA
is proposing excluding any lawfully
authorized U.S. Government or SLTT
Government entity activity including
activities undertaken pursuant to a
warrant or other judicial process.
CISA is proposing to incorporate
these exclusions into the definition of
substantial cyber incident by proposing
a statement reiterating these exclusions
at the end of the definition itself. The
statement added to the proposed
definition of substantial cyber incident
is taken almost verbatim from the CIRC
Model Definition which itself includes
both of the exclusions contained in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(C). Additional
information on each of the prongs of
this exclusory statement are contained
in the following three subsections.
i. Lawfully Authorized Activities of a
United States Government Entity or
SLTT Government Entity
CISA proposes excluding from the
definition of substantial cyber incident
any lawfully authorized United States
Government entity or SLTT Government
entity activity, including activities
undertaken pursuant to a warrant or
other judicial process. This exception,
which is similar to an exception
contained in the CIRC Model Definition,
is intended to except from reporting any
incident that occurs as the result of a
lawful activity of a Federal or SLTT law
enforcement agency, Federal
intelligence agency, or other Federal or
SLTT Government entity. This
exception does not, however, allow a
covered entity to delay or forgo
reporting a covered cyber incident to
CISA because it has reported a covered
cyber incident to, or is otherwise
working with, law enforcement. It
simply says that a lawful activity
conducted by a Federal or SLTT
governmental entity, such as a search or
seizure conducted pursuant to a
warrant, is not itself a substantial cyber
incident.
CISA believes this exception is
warranted as reports on lawful Federal
or SLTT government activity would in
no meaningful way further the
articulated purposes of the regulation,
such as analyzing adversary TTPs and
enabling a better understanding of the
current cyber threat environment. This
exception provides further clarity on the
scope of cyber incident, which is
defined as an occurrence ‘‘without
lawful authority.’’ Moreover, failure to
exclude such incidents from required
reporting could negatively impact a
covered entity’s willingness to work
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with Federal or SLTT law enforcement,
intelligence, or other government
agencies if such cooperation could
result in new regulatory reporting
obligations.
ii. Incidents Perpetrated in Good Faith
by an Entity in Response to a Specific
Request by the Owner or Operator of the
Information System
Section 681b(c)(2)(C)(i) of title 6,
United States Code, states that the
description of the types of substantial
cyber incidents that constitute covered
cyber incidents shall exclude ‘‘any
event where the cyber incident is
perpetrated in good faith by an entity in
response to a specific request by the
owner or operator of the information
system.’’ CISA is proposing
incorporating this exclusion verbatim
into the proposed definition of
substantial cyber incident.
There are a variety of situations in
which a cyber incident could occur at
a covered entity as the result of an entity
acting in good faith to a request of the
owner or operator of the information
system through which the cyber
incident was perpetrated. One example
of this would be if a third-party service
provider acting within the parameters of
a contract with the covered entity
unintentionally misconfigures one of
the covered entity’s devices leading to a
service outage. Another example would
be a properly authorized penetration
test that inadvertently results in a cyber
incident with actual impacts. Congress
intended that such incidents, when the
result of good faith actions conducted
pursuant to a specific request by the
owner or operator of the information
system at issue, be excluded from the
CIRCIA reporting requirements.
In addition to the examples provided
above, CISA interprets this exclusion to
also exclude from reporting cyber
incidents that result from security
research testing conducted by security
researchers who have been authorized
by the covered entity or the owner or
operator of the impacted information
system to attempt to compromise the
system, such as in accordance with a
vulnerability disclosure policy or bug
bounty programs published by the
owner or operator. However, because
the exception only applies to ‘‘cyber
incident[s] perpetrated in good faith
. . . in response to a specific request
by’’ the information system owner or
operator, this exception would only
apply to this type of research where the
bug bounty program, vulnerability
disclosure policy, or other form of
authorization preceded the discovery of
the incident. That said, CISA anticipates
that this example would occur rarely, as
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good faith security research should
generally stop at the point the
vulnerability can be demonstrated and
should not typically engage in activity
that would result in a covered cyber
incident.149
Regarding this exclusion, the request
that causes the incident need not
necessarily come from the impacted
covered entity itself, but rather from the
owner or operator of the information
system at issue. While the owner or
operator of the information system
through which the incident was caused
will often be the covered entity, that
may not always be the case. For
example, in some situations involving a
CSP or managed service provider, the
service provider may duly authorize a
penetration test on its own systems or
software. If such testing inadvertently
resulted in a cyber incident at the
service provider, it could have
downstream effects on one or more of
the service provider’s customers (such
as by taking out of operation a key
cloud-based software that the customers
rely upon for core operations). Such
downstream effects could themselves
constitute substantial cyber incidents,
and, absent this exclusion, could be
considered a covered cyber incident,
subject to reporting under the proposed
CIRCIA regulation if an impacted
customer was a covered entity.
However, because such a substantial
cyber incident would have been
perpetrated in good faith pursuant to a
penetration test duly authorized by the
information system’s owner or operator
(even if the owner or operator is not the
sole impacted entity), neither the
covered entity nor the service provider
would be required to report the
incident.
Conversely, circumstances could
occur where a covered entity or the
information system’s owner or operator
authorizes an action that results in a
reportable impact despite the
immediately precipitating action being
approved by the covered entity or
information system’s owner or operator.
For instance, if a covered entity, in
response to a ransomware attack or
other malicious incident, decides to take
an action itself resulting in reportable
level impacts, such as shutting down a
portion of its system or operations, to
prevent possibly more significant
impacts, this would still be considered
149 See, e.g., CISA, Vulnerability Disclosure Policy
Template (‘‘Only use exploits to the extent
necessary to confirm a vulnerability’s presence. Do
not use an exploit to compromise or exfiltrate data,
establish persistent command line access, or use the
exploit to pivot to other systems.’’), available at
https://www.cisa.gov/vulnerability-disclosurepolicy-template-0.
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a reportable substantial cyber incident.
In such a case, because the cyber
incident itself was not perpetrated in
good faith, and the threshold level
impacts would not have occurred but
for the initial cyber incident, CISA
would not consider the covered entity’s
actions to meet the ‘‘good faith’’
exception even though the covered
entity directed the immediately
precipitating action in a good faith
attempt to minimize the potential
impacts of a cyber incident.
iii. The Threat of Disruption as
Extortion, as Described in 6 U.S.C.
650(22)
Section 681b(c)(2)(C)(ii) of title 6,
United States Code, provides that the
description of the types of substantial
cyber incidents that constitute covered
cyber events shall exclude ‘‘the threat of
disruption as extortion, as described in
section 2240(14)(A).’’ CISA is proposing
incorporating this exclusion verbatim
into the proposed definition of
substantial cyber incident with a minor
technical correction to include the
updated citation to the definition for
ransomware attack in CIRCIA.150
Section 650(22) of title 6, United
States Code, defines ‘‘ransomware
attack’’ as ‘‘an incident that includes the
use or threat of use of unauthorized or
malicious code on an information
system, or the use or threat of use of
another digital mechanism such as a
denial of service attack, to interrupt or
disrupt the operations of an information
system or compromise the
confidentiality, availability, or integrity
of electronic data stored on, processed
by, or transiting an information system
to extort a demand for a ransom
payment.’’ While, as noted above, the
definition of cyber incident excludes
incidents where jeopardy is ‘‘imminent’’
but not ‘‘actual,’’ the definition of
ransomware attack includes threatened
disruptions as a means of extortion.
This exclusion clarifies that the threat of
disruption of a system to extort a
ransom payment that does not result in
the actual disruption of a system is an
‘‘imminent,’’ but not ‘‘actual,’’ event,
and is therefore not required to be
reported as a covered cyber incident.
However, if a covered entity makes a
ransom payment in response to such a
150 The definition of ransomware attack contained
in Section 2240(14)(A) moved locations within the
U.S. Code as part of the consolidation of definitions
in the CISA Technical Corrections, supra note 135.
While the CISA Technical Corrections did not
update this cross-reference in CIRCIA, pursuant to
the rule of construction in Section (f)(2) of the CISA
Technical Corrections, CISA considers 6 U.S.C. 650
as the proper citation for the definition of
‘‘ransomware attack’’ for purposes of the proposed
regulation.
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threat, even if the disruption never
materializes into a substantial cyber
incident subject to covered cyber
incident reporting required by this Part,
the payment itself would still be subject
to ransom payment reporting required
by this Part. Only such a threat where
no ransom payment is made and the
disruption never materializes into a
substantial cyber incident would remain
excluded from mandatory reporting.
Additionally, as noted in Section
IV.A.ii.3.a.i above, this exclusion would
not prevent a cyber incident involving
a threat to disclose information obtained
from an information system without
authorization from being a reportable
substantial cyber incident if the cyber
incident otherwise meets the threshold
for being a substantial cyber incident,
e.g., under prong (a)(1) of the substantial
cyber incident definition due to the
initial loss of confidentiality of the
information system.
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e. Examples of Cyber Incidents That
Meet the Definition of Substantial Cyber
Incident
To help covered entities determine
what might and might not be considered
a substantial cyber incident under the
proposed definition, CISA is providing
the following examples of (a) cyber
incidents that are likely to be
considered substantial cyber incidents,
and (b) cyber incidents that are unlikely
to be considered substantial cyber
incidents. Both of these lists are for
exemplary purposes only and are not
intended to be exhaustive. Moreover,
inclusion on either list is not a formal
declaration that a similar incident
would or would not be a substantial
cyber incident if the agency were to
finalize the definition as proposed.
Inclusion here simply indicates the
relative likelihood that such an incident
would or would not rise to the level of
a reportable substantial cyber incident.
Determinations as to whether a cyber
incident qualifies as a substantial cyber
incident would need to be made on a
case-by-case basis considering the
specific factual circumstances
surrounding the incident. Note, CISA
continues to encourage reporting or
sharing of information about all cyber
incidents, even if it would not be
required under the proposed
regulations.
Examples of Incidents That Likely
Would Qualify as Substantial Cyber
Incidents
(1) A distributed denial-of-service
attack that renders a covered entity’s
service unavailable to customers for an
extended period of time.
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(2) Any cyber incident that encrypts
one of a covered entity’s core business
systems or information systems.
(3) A cyber incident that significantly
increases the potential for a release of a
hazardous material used in chemical
manufacturing or water purification.
(4) A cyber incident that compromises
or disrupts a BES cyber system that
performs one or more reliability tasks.
(5) A cyber incident that disrupts the
ability of a communications service
provider to transmit or deliver
emergency alerts or 911 calls, or results
in the transmission of false emergency
alerts or 911 calls.
(6) The exploitation of a vulnerability
resulting in the extended downtime of
a covered entity’s information system or
network.
(7) A ransomware attack that locks a
covered entity out of its industrial
control system.
(8) Unauthorized access to a covered
entity’s business systems caused by the
automated download of a tampered
software update, even if no known data
exfiltration has been identified.
(9) Unauthorized access to a covered
entity’s business systems using
compromised credentials from a
managed service provider.
(10) The intentional exfiltration of
sensitive data in an unauthorized
manner for an unauthorized purpose,
such as through compromise of identity
infrastructure or unauthorized
downloading to a flash drive or online
storage account.
Examples of Incidents That Likely
Would Not Qualify as Substantial Cyber
Incidents
(1) A denial-of-service attack or other
incident that only results in a brief
period of unavailability of a covered
entity’s public-facing website that does
not provide critical functions or services
to customers or the public.
(2) Cyber incidents that result in
minor disruptions, such as short-term
unavailability of a business system or a
temporary need to reroute network
traffic.
(3) The compromise of a single user’s
credential, such as through a phishing
attempt, where compensating controls
(such as enforced multifactor
authentication) are in place to preclude
use of those credentials to gain
unauthorized access to a covered
entity’s systems.
(4) Malicious software is downloaded
to a covered entity’s system, but antivirus software successfully quarantines
the software and precludes it from
executing.
(5) A malicious actor exploits a
known vulnerability, which a covered
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entity has not been able to patch but has
instead deployed increased monitoring
for TTPs associated with its
exploitation, resulting in the activity
being quickly detected and remediated
before significant additional activity is
undertaken.
f. Considerations
In 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(B), Congress
identified three considerations for CISA
in deciding what types of substantial
cyber incidents constitute covered cyber
incidents. Specifically, Congress
instructed CISA to consider ‘‘(i) the
sophistication or novelty of the tactics
used to perpetrate such a cyber incident,
as well as the type, volume, and
sensitivity of the data at issue; (ii) the
number of individuals directly or
indirectly affected or potentially
affected by such a cyber incident; and
(iii) potential impacts on industrial
control systems, such as supervisory
control and data acquisition systems,
distributed control systems, and
programmable logic controllers.’’ 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(B).
Throughout the process of analyzing
what types of cyber incidents should
constitute a substantial cyber incident,
CISA kept in mind the considerations
enumerated by Congress in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(B). Some of the
considerations are directly reflected in
what CISA believes will be a substantial
cyber incident under the proposed
definition. For instance, as discussed
above, factors such as the type, volume,
and sensitivity of the data at issue, or
the number of individuals directly or
indirectly affected by an incident, will
impact whether an incident should be
considered a substantial cyber incident.
Incidents where less data is impacted,
the impacted data is not particularly
sensitive, and/or the number of
individuals directly or indirectly
affected, are less likely to be considered
substantial cyber incidents. Conversely,
incidents involving large volumes of
impacted data, sensitive data, or large
numbers of impacted individuals are
more likely to be considered substantial
cyber incidents. Similarly, incidents
that impact industrial control systems
are much more likely to result in the
second prong of the substantial cyber
incident definition being met than
incidents that solely impact business
systems.
There is one consideration listed in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(B), however, that CISA
considered, but ultimately determined
should not affect whether a cyber
incident rises to the level of a
substantial cyber incident in this
proposed rule. That is the consideration
listed in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(B)(i), ‘‘the
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sophistication or novelty of the tactics
used to perpetrate such a cyber
incident.’’ CISA believes there is value
in receiving reports on all types of
substantial cyber incidents, whether the
tactics used are sophisticated or not,
novel or not. If an unsophisticated TTP
is being used to cause substantial
impacts to covered entities, CISA
believes there is value in knowing that
so CISA and its Federal partners can
warn other potential victims that this
tactic is being used and can identify and
share new or previously identified
methods to mitigate vulnerabilities that
allow this tactic to be effective.
Similarly, if there is a resurgence in
adversary use of a TTP that has
previously been reported upon, there is
value in CISA knowing that so it can
alert entities to make sure they are
maintaining effective defensive
measures to counter that tactic. In fact,
CISA routinely adds older
vulnerabilities to the Known Exploited
Vulnerability database that CISA
publishes based on the fact that the
previously identified vulnerabilities are
actively being exploited. This allows
CISA and others to emphasize with the
public the importance of addressing
those vulnerabilities.
Finally, it is possible that neither
CISA nor the reporting entity might
know the sophistication or novelty of
the TTP at the time or reporting. CISA
and/or the reporting entity may need
time to assess the incident before being
able to determine its sophistication and
novelty, and CISA does not believe
reporting should be delayed simply to
evaluate the tactics used to perpetrate a
cyber incident. For the aforementioned
reasons, CISA is proposing that the
relative sophistication or novelty of a
TTP used in perpetrating a cyber
incident should not influence whether
that incident meets the definition of a
substantial cyber incident.
g. Harmonization of Definition With the
CIRC Model Definition and Other
Regulatory Definitions
As discussed in Section III.B of this
document, a number of different Federal
departments and agencies oversee
regulations, directives, or other
programs that require certain entities to
report cyber incidents. CISA has
received many comments from
stakeholders encouraging CISA to
harmonize the CIRCIA reporting
requirements with the requirements in
other regulations, to include the
definition of what is a reportable
incident. See Section III.F.x of this
document. CISA fully supports the
harmonization of regulatory
requirements where practicable and has
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been an active participant in the CIRC’s
efforts to identify potential approaches
to harmonizing Federal regulatory cyber
incident reporting requirements. One of
the specific recommendations made by
the Department in its CIRC-informed
Report to Congress is for departments
and agencies to consider adopting a
model definition for a reportable cyber
incident where practicable.151
Cognizant of that recommendation
and the value in seeking harmonization
where practical, CISA considered the
CIRC Model Definition for a reportable
cyber incident during the development
of the proposed CIRCIA definition for a
substantial cyber incident. Ultimately,
CISA did elect to incorporate many
aspects of the CIRC Model Definition
into the proposed CIRCIA definition for
a substantial cyber incident, some
verbatim. CISA did not propose using
the CIRC Model Definition in its
entirety, however, due in part to specific
statutory requirements imposed within
CIRCIA and the specific purposes
CIRCIA is designed to achieve.
One example of where CISA’s
proposed definition differs from the
CIRC Model Definition due to specific
language contained in CIRCIA is in the
sentence used to introduce the
threshold criteria that elevate an
incident to the level of a reportable or
substantial cyber incident. Specifically,
the first sentence of the CIRC Model
Definition states ‘‘[a] reportable cyber
incident is an incident that leads to, or,
if still under the covered entity’s
investigation, could reasonably lead to
any of the following [impacts].’’ 152 The
section of CIRCIA related to substantial
cyber incidents states that for a cyber
incident to be a substantial cyber
incident, it ‘‘requires the occurrence of’’
one of the enumerated impacts. 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A). Because CIRCIA requires
actual occurrence of the impacts, CISA
does not propose including the phrase
‘‘or, if still under the covered entity’s
investigation, could reasonably lead to
any of the following’’ in the initial
sentence of the CIRCIA definition for
substantial cyber incident. For similar
reasons, CISA did not propose inclusion
of the CIRC Model Definition’s fourth
threshold prong ‘‘potential operational
disruption’’ (emphasis added), as CISA
interprets CIRCIA to require actual
impact, not potential impact, for an
151 DHS Report, supra note 4, at 25
(‘‘Recommendation 1: The Federal Government
should adopt a model definition of a reportable
cyber incident wherever practicable. Federal
agencies should evaluate the feasibility of adapting
current and future cyber incident reporting
requirements to align to a model definition of a
reportable cyber incident.’’).
152 Id. at 26.
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incident to be a substantial cyber
incident.
Another substantive difference
between the CIRC Model Definition and
the CIRCIA proposed definition for
substantial cyber incident is the
inclusion in the CIRCIA proposed
definition of a separate threshold prong
based on a serious impact to safety and
resiliency of a covered entity’s
operational systems and processes.
While the CIRC Model Definition does
not include a similar threshold prong,
this threshold is specifically listed in
CIRCIA as one of the minimum types of
impacts that would qualify a cyber
incident for inclusion as a covered cyber
incident. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(i).
Accordingly, CISA determined it was
important to include that impact as a
basis for coverage in its definition of
substantial cyber incident despite its
absence in the CIRC Model Definition.
CISA also occasionally modified the
language used in the CIRC Model
Definition to terminology that is
consistent with CIRCIA and other
portions of the proposed CIRCIA
regulation. For example, CISA proposes
using the term ‘‘covered entity’s
information system’’ instead of the CIRC
Model Definition’s construction ‘‘a
covered information system’’ in the first
threshold prong of the definition.
Because CIRCIA does not distinguish
between covered and not covered
information systems, networks, or
technologies, the use of the word
‘‘covered’’ in this manner would be
inconsistent.
In addition to the CIRC Model
Definition, CISA also considered how
other Federal regulations defined
reportable cyber incidents. While many
of the regulations CISA reviewed have
some similarities in how they define
and interpret what is a reportable cyber
incident, the specific language,
structure, examples, and actual
requirements varied greatly based on the
specific agency mission and purpose of
the regulation. As the CIRC was
established to make recommendations
on how to harmonize these disparate
regulations, and the DHS Report
specifically recommends that agencies
evaluate the feasibility of adapting
current and future cyber incident
reporting requirements to align with a
model definition of a reportable cyber
incident,153 CISA ultimately felt that the
path that would most effectively
support harmonization across the
various Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements was to align the definition
of covered cyber incident, to the extent
153 Id.
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practicable, with the CIRC Model
Definition.
other pieces of information), rather than
the submission as a whole.
iii. CIRCIA Reports
2. Covered Cyber Incident Report
CISA is proposing to include in the
regulation a definition of the term
Covered Cyber Incident Report. CIRCIA
requires a covered entity that
experiences a covered cyber incident to
report that incident to CISA. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(1). CISA is proposing to refer to
this type of report as a Covered Cyber
Incident Report and to define that term
to mean a submission made by a
covered entity or a third party on behalf
of a covered entity to report a covered
cyber incident as required by this Part.
CISA is further proposing that a Covered
Cyber Incident Report also includes any
additional, optional information
submitted as part of a Covered Cyber
Incident Report.
As noted in the definition, a Covered
Cyber Incident Report may be submitted
by a covered entity or by a third party
on behalf of a covered entity.
Additionally, a covered entity may
voluntarily include within a Covered
Cyber Incident Report additional
information pursuant to 6 U.S.C.
681c(b). Voluntarily provided
information will be considered part of
the Covered Cyber Incident Report.
Additional requirements related to the
manner, form, content, and other
aspects of a Covered Cyber Incident
Report are described in Sections IV.E.i–
iii of this document and §§ 226.6, 226.7,
and 226.8 of the proposed regulation.
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1. CIRCIA Report
CISA is proposing to include in the
regulation a definition of the term
CIRCIA Report. CIRCIA requires a
covered entity to submit (either directly
or through a third party) a report to
CISA when it reasonably believes a
covered cyber incident occurred, makes
a ransom payment, or experiences one
of a number of circumstances that
requires the covered entity to update or
supplement a previously submitted
Covered Cyber Incident Report. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(1)–(3). These reports are called
Covered Cyber Incident Reports,
Ransom Payment Reports, and
Supplemental Reports, respectively.
CIRCIA additionally allows covered
entities that make a ransom payment
associated with a covered cyber incident
to submit a single report to satisfy both
the covered cyber incident and ransom
payment reporting requirements. 6
U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A). CISA is proposing
to call this joint submission a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom
Payment Report.
CISA is proposing a term CIRCIA
Report to be an umbrella term that
encompasses all four types of covered
entity reports collectively. Accordingly,
CISA is proposing to define CIRCIA
Report to mean a Covered Cyber
Incident Report, Ransom Payment
Report, Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Report, or
Supplemental Report.
In some instances, CIRCIA refers to
‘‘reports,’’ and at other times refers to
‘‘information’’ (either information
contained in a CIRCIA Report or
information about cyber incidents,
covered cyber incidents, or ransom
payments). CISA understands Congress’
use of these different terms in different
contexts within CIRCIA to be
intentional, and therefore replicates
these distinctions in the proposed rule.
Specifically, references to a CIRCIA
Report or any individual report (i.e., a
Covered Cyber Incident Report, Ransom
Payment Report, Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report,
or Supplemental Report) throughout
this NPRM are intended to refer to the
submission as a whole. By contrast,
references to information (either in a
CIRCIA Report or about cyber incidents,
covered cyber incidents, or ransom
payments) are intended to refer to
discrete pieces of facts and ideas (which
sometimes may be contained within a
CIRCIA Report, perhaps along with
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3. Ransom Payment Report
CISA is proposing to include in the
regulation a definition of the term
Ransom Payment Report. CIRCIA
requires a covered entity that makes a
ransom payment, or has another entity
make a ransom payment on the covered
entity’s behalf, to report that payment to
CISA. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2)(A). CISA is
proposing to refer to this type of report
as a Ransom Payment Report and to
define that term to mean a submission
made by a covered entity or a third
party on behalf of a covered entity to
report a ransom payment as required by
this Part. CISA is further proposing for
a Ransom Payment Report to also
include any additional, optional
information submitted as part of a
Ransom Payment Report.
As noted in the definition, a Ransom
Payment Report may be submitted by a
covered entity or by a third party on
behalf of a covered entity. Additionally,
a covered entity may voluntarily
include within a Ransom Payment
Report additional information submitted
pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681c(b).
Voluntarily provided information will
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be considered part of the Ransom
Payment Report. Additional
requirements related to the manner,
form, content, and other aspects of a
Ransom Payment Report are described
in Sections IV.E.i–iii of this document
and §§ 226.6, 226.7, and 226.9 of the
proposed regulation. If the ransom
payment being reported is the result of
a covered cyber incident that the
covered entity or a third party acting on
its behalf has already reported to CISA,
then the Ransom Payment Report also
would be considered a Supplemental
Report and must meet any requirements
associated with Supplemental Reports
as well.
4. Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report
CISA is proposing to include in the
regulation a definition of the term Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom
Payment Report. Pursuant to 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(5)(A), covered entities that make
a ransom payment associated with a
covered cyber incident prior to the
expiration of the 72-hour reporting
timeframe for reporting the covered
cyber incident may submit a single
report to satisfy both the covered cyber
incident and ransom payment reporting
requirements. CISA is proposing to call
this joint submission a Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report and to define that term to mean
a submission made by a covered entity
or a third party on behalf of a covered
entity to simultaneously report both a
covered cyber incident and ransom
payment related to the covered cyber
incident being reported. CISA is
proposing that a Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report
also include any additional, optional
information submitted as part of the
report.
As noted in the definition, a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom
Payment Report may be submitted by a
covered entity or by a third party on
behalf of a covered entity. Additionally,
a covered entity may voluntarily
include within a Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report
additional information pursuant to 6
U.S.C. 681c(b). Voluntarily provided
information will be considered part of
the Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report. Additional
requirements related to the manner,
form, and content of a Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report are described in Sections IV.E.i–
iii of this document and §§ 226.6, 226.7,
and 226.10 of the proposed regulation.
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5. Supplemental Report
CISA is proposing to include in the
regulation a definition of the term
Supplemental Report. CIRCIA requires a
covered entity to promptly submit an
update or supplement to a previously
submitted Covered Cyber Incident
Report under certain circumstances. 6
U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). CISA is proposing to
refer to this type of report as a
Supplemental Report. CISA is proposing
that the term Supplemental Report be
used to describe a submission made by
a covered entity or a third party on
behalf of a covered entity to update or
supplement a previously submitted
Covered Cyber Incident Report or to
report a ransom payment made by the
covered entity after submitting a
Covered Cyber Incident Report as
required by this Part. CISA is further
proposing that a Supplemental Report
also include any additional, optional
information submitted as part of a
Supplemental Report.
As noted in the definition, a
Supplemental Report may be submitted
by a covered entity or by a third party
on behalf of a covered entity.
Additionally, a covered entity may
voluntarily include within a
Supplemental Report additional
information pursuant to 6 U.S.C.
681c(b). Voluntarily provided
information is considered part of the
Supplemental Report. Additional
requirements related to the manner,
form, content, and other aspects of a
Supplemental Report are described in
Sections IV.E.i–iii of this document and
§§ 226.6, 226.7, and 226.11 of the
proposed regulation.
iv. Other Definitions
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1. CIRCIA
CISA is proposing to define the term
CIRCIA to mean the Cyber Incident
Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act
of 2022, as amended. This will simplify
the regulatory text by allowing CISA to
refer to CIRCIA without having to use
the full title of the statute or full legal
citation throughout the regulation.
2. CIRCIA Agreement
CISA is proposing to create the term
CIRCIA Agreement and define it as an
agreement between CISA and another
Federal agency that meets the
requirements of § 226.4(a)(2), that has
not expired or been terminated, and
which, when publicly posted in
accordance with § 226.4(a)(5), indicates
the availability of a substantially similar
reporting exception. CISA believes the
establishment and defining of this term
will allow covered entities to better
identify circumstances where they can
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leverage the substantially similar
reporting exception and avoid
potentially duplicative reporting to
another Federal department or agency
and CISA. Additional details on both
the CIRCIA Agreement and the
substantially similar reporting exception
can be found in Section IV.D.i of this
document.
3. Cloud Service Provider
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term cloud service
provider. CISA believes defining this
term is important to ensure that covered
entities understand the meaning of an
unauthorized access or disruption of
business or industrial operations due to
a loss of service facilitated through, or
caused by, a compromise of a CSP, as
that is one example of a substantial
cyber incident provided in CIRCIA. 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(iii). Section 650 of
title 6, United States Code, defines the
term CSP as ‘‘an entity offering products
or services related to cloud computing,
as defined by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology in NIST
Special Publication 800–145 and any
amendatory or superseding document
relating thereto.’’ 6 U.S.C. 650(3).
Because this definition applies to all of
Title XXII of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, as amended, including CIRCIA,
CISA is proposing to use this definition
in the regulation.
4. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA)
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency or
CISA. This term is used repeatedly
throughout the proposed regulation to
describe the Federal entity responsible
for the oversight of the proposed CIRCIA
regulation and with whom covered
entities and other stakeholders will
engage on various activities required
under the regulation. CISA is proposing
to define Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency or CISA
as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency as established under
section 2202 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 652), as amended
by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency Act of 2018 and
subsequent laws, or any successor
organization.
5. Cybersecurity Threat
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term cybersecurity
threat. Defining the term cybersecurity
threat is a streamlined approach that
provides needed context for the
requirement in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(D)
that CISA include in the final rule
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procedures for, among other things,
protecting privacy and civil liberties, for
certain personal information received in
CIRCIA Reports that is not directly
related to a cyber threat. For the reasons
explained below, CISA is proposing to
use and define the term cybersecurity
threat instead of ‘‘cyber threat.’’
CIRCIA defines the term ‘‘cyber
threat’’ as ‘‘ha[ving] the meaning given
the term ‘cybersecurity threat’ in section
2200 [6 U.S.C. 650]’’ of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended.
Section 650 of title 6, United States
Code, defines ‘‘cybersecurity threat’’ as
‘‘an action, not protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, on or through an
information system that may result in an
unauthorized effort to adversely impact
the security, availability,
confidentiality, or integrity of an
information system or information that
is stored on, processed by, or transiting
an information system,’’ other than ‘‘any
action that solely involves a violation of
a consumer term of service or a
consumer licensing agreement.’’ 6
U.S.C. 650(8). Rather than using the
term ‘‘cyber threat,’’ CISA is proposing
to use the term ‘‘cybersecurity threat,’’
with this definition effectively verbatim,
because CISA believes it is most
consistent with CIRCIA.
6. Director
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term Director and to
define it as the Director of CISA, any
successors to that position, or any
designee. CISA is proposing to include
this definition as CIRCIA assigns the
Director specific responsibilities related
to implementation of the CIRCIA
regulation.
7. Information System
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term information
system. This term is a key term for the
proposed regulation as, among other
things, it is used within the definition
of ransomware attack and substantial
cyber incident as well as to help
identify the types of information that a
covered entity must provide in reports
required under the regulation.
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980
(PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3502, defines
information system as ‘‘a discrete set of
information resources organized for the
collection, processing, maintenance,
use, sharing, dissemination, or
disposition of information.’’ 154 Section
650 of title 6, United States Code,
defines information system as having
the meaning given the term in the PRA,
154 44
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44 U.S.C. 3502, specifically including
‘‘industrial control systems, such as
supervisory control and data acquisition
systems, distributed control systems,
and programmable logic controllers.’’ 6
U.S.C. 650(14).
Because the 6 U.S.C. 650 definition
applies to all of Title XXII of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as
amended, including CIRCIA, CISA is
proposing defining Information using
the language contained in the definition
in 6 U.S.C. 650(14) with the addition of
an explicit acknowledgment that OT is
included within the definition of
information system. CISA believes OT is
encompassed in the definition of
information system contained within 6
U.S.C. 650(14) by reference to industrial
control systems, such as supervisory
control and data acquisition systems,
distributed control systems, and
programmable logic controllers;
however, CISA is proposing to explicitly
include the words ‘‘operational
technology systems’’ within the
definition in light of the common
industry use of this term to avoid any
potential misinterpretations about
whether OT is encompassed by the
proposed CIRCIA definition of
information systems.
8. Managed Service Provider
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term managed service
provider. CISA believes it is important
to define this term to ensure that
covered entities understand the
meaning of an unauthorized access or
disruption of business or industrial
operations due to a loss of service
facilitated through, or caused by, a
compromise of a managed service
provider, as that is one example of a
substantial cyber incident provided in
CIRCIA. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(iii). The
term managed service provider is
defined in 6 U.S.C. 650(18) and sets out
three criteria that must be met to qualify
as a managed service provider. The
definition reads, ‘‘an entity that delivers
services, such as network, application,
infrastructure, or security services, via
ongoing and regular support and active
administration on the premises of a
customer, in the data center of the entity
(such as hosting), or in a third party data
center.’’ 6 U.S.C. 650(18). Because this
definition applies to all of Title XXII of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as
amended, including CIRCIA, CISA is
proposing to use this same definition of
managed service provider in the
regulation.
9. Personal Information
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term personal
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information. Personal information is a
key term in the proposed regulation as
CIRCIA requires CISA to undertake
certain steps to protect personal
information. See e.g., 6 U.S.C.
681e(a)(3). CISA is proposing to define
the term personal information to mean
information that identifies a specific
individual or information associated
with an identified or identifiable
individual. Under this definition,
personal information would include,
but are not limited to, both identifying
information such as photographs,
names, home addresses, direct
telephone numbers, and Social Security
numbers as well as information that
does not directly identify an individual
but is nonetheless personal, nonpublic,
and specific to an identified or
identifiable individual. Examples would
include medical information, personal
financial information (e.g., an
individual’s wage or earnings
information; income tax withholding
records; credit score; banking
information), contents of personal
communications, and personal web
browsing history. This proposed
definition would include ‘‘personally
identifiable information,’’ as defined in
OMB Memorandum M–17–12 as
referring to information that can be used
to distinguish or trace an individual’s
identity, either alone or when combined
with other information that is linked or
linkable to a specific individual, but
also proposes to include information
that might not be clearly linkable to an
individual but would nonetheless relate
to a specific individual and be
considered personal and nonpublic,
such as an individual’s web browsing
history or the content of an email. CISA
is proposing this definition to
encompass the broad range of
personally sensitive information that a
cybersecurity incident might implicate,
including the content of personal
communications, which might not be
able to be used on its own to identify
an individual, to ensure that all
personally sensitive information is
handled appropriately.
CISA is not proposing to include in
this definition information that does not
relate to a specific individual.
Therefore, information such as general
business telephone numbers or business
financial information would generally
not be considered personal information
under this definition.
This proposed definition of ‘‘personal
information’’ would be different and
broader than the approach taken by the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
of 2015, (6 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.). 6 U.S.C.
1503(d)(2) more narrowly requires
removal of information that is ‘‘known
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at the time of sharing’’ to be ‘‘personal
information’’ that identifies a specific
person or belongs to a specific person
rather than information that is linked or
linkable to a specific person. CISA
welcomes public comment on this
proposed definition of ‘‘personal
information’’ and whether CISA should
instead adopt the approach taken by the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
of 2015 to defining personal
information.
10. Ransom Payment
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term ransom payment.
Ransom payment is a key term in the
proposed regulation as CIRCIA requires
that covered entities report ransom
payments to CISA within 24 hours of
the payment being made. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(2). CISA is proposing to use the
definition of the term ransom payment
from CIRCIA in the regulation verbatim.
11. Ransomware Attack
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term ransomware
attack. CIRCIA requires a covered entity
that makes a ransom payment as the
result of a ransomware attack to report
the ransom payment to CISA within 24
hours of making the payment. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(2). CISA believes including a
definition for the term ransomware
attack will help covered entities
determine whether they are required to
submit a Ransom Payment Report to
CISA.
Section 650(22) of title 6, United
States Code, defines the term
ransomware attack as ‘‘(A) [ ] an
incident that includes the use or threat
of use of unauthorized or malicious
code on an information system, or the
use or threat of use of another digital
mechanism such as a denial of service
attack, to interrupt or disrupt the
operations of an information system or
compromise the confidentiality,
availability, or integrity of electronic
data stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system to
extort a demand for a ransom payment;
and (B) does not include any such event
where the demand for payment is (i) not
genuine; or (ii) made in good faith by an
entity in response to a specific request
by the owner or operator of the
information system.’’ 6 U.S.C. 650(22).
Because this definition applies to all of
Title XXII of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, as amended, including CIRCIA,
CISA is proposing to use this definition
with a few minor modifications
described below.
First, in defining the term
ransomware attack, CISA is proposing to
replace the term ‘‘incident’’ (which is
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used in the statutory definition of
ransomware attack) with the full
definition of ‘‘incident’’ as found in
section 2200(12) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended (6
U.S.C. 650(12)) (i.e., ‘‘an occurrence that
actually or imminently jeopardizes,
without lawful authority, the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of
information on an information system,
or actually or imminently jeopardizes,
without lawful authority, an
information system’’). The definition of
‘‘incident’’ in 6 U.S.C. 650(12) applies to
the term ‘‘incident’’ throughout Title
XXII of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as amended, including to the term
‘‘incident’’ within the statutory
definition of ransomware attack at 6
U.S.C. 650(22).155
Using this definition of ‘‘incident’’ is
not only consistent with the statute, but
it also avoids CISA specifically defining
the term ‘‘incident’’ in the regulation,
which CISA believes could create
confusion in light of the inclusion in the
proposed regulation of a definition for
the term cyber incident.
CISA considered, but ultimately
decided against, proposing the use of
the term ‘‘cyber incident’’ in place of
‘‘incident’’ in the definition of
ransomware attack. As noted earlier in
the discussion of the proposed
definition for cyber incident, CIRCIA
removed the ‘‘imminently jeopardizes’’
clause found in the Homeland Security
Act’s definition of ‘‘incident’’ from
CIRCIA’s definition of cyber incident,
instead opting to require ‘‘actual
jeopardy’’ for an event to qualify as a
cyber incident under CIRCIA.
Consequently, using the term ‘‘cyber
incident’’ in lieu of ‘‘incident’’ in the
definition of ransomware attack would
have a substantive impact on the
definition. CISA believes that Congress
intentionally used the term ‘‘incident’’
(in lieu of the term ‘‘cyber incident’’) in
the definition of ransomware attack to
account for the fact that a ransomware
attack may involve a threat of disruption
(i.e., imminent jeopardy) and that such
155 As originally enacted, CIRCIA explicitly
included a definition of both ‘‘cyber incident’’ and
‘‘incident.’’ See Public Law 117–103. However,
when the definition of ‘‘incident’’ was moved as
part of the consolidation of definitions in the CISA
Technical Corrections to the beginning of Title XXII
of the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. 650(12)),
the definition of ‘‘incident’’ in CIRCIA was struck
as a conforming edit to remove the redundancy. See
CISA Technical Corrections, supra note 135,
Section (b)(2)(N)(v). Further, in the original asenacted version of CIRCIA, both uses of the term
‘‘incident’’ (as opposed to the CIRCIA term ‘‘cyber
incident’’) were in definitions that were moved to
6 U.S.C. 650 as part of the CISA Technical
Corrections, namely the definitions of ransomware
attack and supply chain compromise. See 6 U.S.C.
650(22) and (28).
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a threat—without the disruption ever
occurring—may be sufficient to extort a
ransom payment. Moreover, Congress
specifically included incidents where
jeopardy is ‘‘imminent’’ but not ‘‘actual’’
in its definition of ransomware attack,
including both threatened and realized
interruptions as means of extortion.
Therefore, to avoid a substantive change
to the meaning of the term ransomware
attack (which would also narrow the
scope of reportable ransom payments),
while also avoiding the confusion that
could be caused by similarly defining
both ‘‘cyber incident’’ and ‘‘incident’’ in
the proposed rule, the proposed rule
relies on 6 U.S.C. 650(12)’s definition of
the word ‘‘incident’’ in lieu of the word
‘‘incident’’ within the definition of the
term ransomware attack.
Second, the NPRM replaces the word
‘‘includes’’ with ‘‘involves, but need not
be limited to, the following.’’ This
change was made to avoid the
implication that the term ransomware
attack includes some other category of
incidents not otherwise described here
(i.e., that ‘‘includes’’ means ‘‘includes,
but is not limited to’’). At the same time,
the definition is not intended to suggest
that any occurrence that includes more
than the three listed elements is no
longer considered a ransomware attack.
The ‘‘need not be limited to’’ clause is
intended to convey that, as long as the
three listed elements are involved in the
occurrence in question, any additional
facts about the occurrence would not
cause it to be outside of the definition
of a ransomware attack.
Third, CISA is proposing to delete the
phrase ‘‘a demand’’ from the third prong
of the statutory definition, thus
modifying it from ‘‘to extort a demand
for a ransom payment’’ to ‘‘to extort a
ransom payment.’’ This is intended to
clarify that this prong requires that the
threat actor extort the ransom payment
itself from the victim (consistent with
the common understanding of a typical
ransomware attack), and not a process
where the extortion is a demand for the
victim entity to demand a ransom
payment from a third entity. This
interpretation is supported by the
legislative history of CIRCIA showing
that Congress understood this term to
encompass the traditional ransomware
attacks that the country was
experiencing at a significantly
increasing frequency in the months and
years prior to CIRCIA’s passage 156 and
156 See, e.g., Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing,
supra note 17, at 12–13 (statement of Rep. Andrew
Garbino, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
innovation of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security)
(‘‘Everyone here remembers the ransomware attacks
on Colonial Pipeline and JBS Meats . . . We must
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not a novel two-step extortion of a
demand that, to CISA’s knowledge, has
never occurred. Numerous canons of
statutory interpretation, to include the
Absurdity Doctrine, the HarmoniousReading Canon, and the canon of
Purposive Construction, further support
this interpretation.
CISA’s proposed definition also
includes two minor, non-substantive
changes to improve the readability of
the definition. First, CISA is proposing
to separate the statutory description of
the type of incident that constitutes a
ransomware attack into three subparts,
one for each of the three prongs of the
definition. Second, in the portion of the
statutory definition contained in the
newly delineated paragraph (1), CISA is
proposing to eliminate the second
instance of the phrase ‘‘use or threat of
use’’ and instead insert roman numerals
and the conjunction ‘‘or’’ to make clear
that the ‘‘use or threat of use’’ phrase
applies to both (i) unauthorized or
malicious code on an information
system or (ii) another digital mechanism
such as a denial-of-service attack.
The proposed definition of
ransomware attack contains language
mirroring language in the CIRCIA
authorizing legislation that excludes
from the definition any event where the
demand for a ransom payment is ‘‘not
genuine’’ or is ‘‘made in good faith by
an entity in response to a specific
request by the owner or operator of the
information system.’’ Circumstances in
which an entity may determine a
ransom demand is ‘‘not genuine’’
include if the demand is a known hoax
or the demand lacks necessary
information for the receiving entity to
comply, such as an amount demanded
or payment instructions. Ransom
ensure that CISA has the visibility it needs to help
defend our Federal networks and to help our
critical infrastructure owners and operators protect
themselves.’’), (statement of Rep. John Katko,
Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Homeland Security)
(‘‘Every single day, entities, large and small, are
affected by the scourge of ransomware. . . .’’); 168
Cong. Rec. S1149–50 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2022)
(statement of Sen. Mark Warner) (‘‘[R]ansomware
attacks are a serious national security threat that
have affected everything from our energy sector to
the Federal Government and Americans’ own
sensitive information . . . As . . . ransomware
attacks continue to increase, the Federal
Government must be able to quickly coordinate a
response and hold bad actors accountable.’’);
HSGAC Minority Staff Report, America’s Data Held
Hostage: Case Studies in Ransomware Attacks on
American Companies at iii (‘‘Ransomware is a type
of malware that encrypts victims’ computer systems
and data, rendering the systems unusable and the
data unreadable. Perpetrators then issue a ransom
demand . . . If the victim pays, hackers may
provide the victim with a key to decrypt their
systems and data. . . .’’ (italics in original)),
available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/
files/americas-data-held-hostage-case-studies-inransomware-attacks-on-american-companies/.
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demands ‘‘made in good faith by an
entity in response to a specific request
by the owner or operator of the
information system’’ typically would
include those that are part of red
teaming, penetration testing,
vulnerability analysis, training
exercises, or other authorized activities
designed to test prevention, detection,
response, or other capabilities of the
requesting entity. In both exclusions,
while there may facially be a demand
that would otherwise meet the
definition of ransomware attack, the
demand is made without expectation or
desire to actually receive a ransom
payment from the covered entity.
Similar to the parallel ‘‘good faith’’
exclusion in the definition of substantial
cyber incident (as discussed in Section
IV.A.ii.3.d.ii of this document), because
the exception only applies to instances
where the demand for ransom payment
was made ‘‘in response to a specific
request by’’ the information system
owner or operator, this exception would
only apply to situations where the
request or authorization preceded the
demand for ransom payment.
It is noteworthy that, though the
definition of a ransomware attack
specifically addresses cyber incidents
involving interruption or disruption of
operations and threats to do the same,
it does not include other forms of
extortionate cyber incidents that are
similar to ransomware attacks;
specifically, extortionate demands for
payment based on threats to leak
sensitive information obtained without
authorization from an information
system. While such incidents (without
more) do not fall within the definition
of a ransomware attack, they would still
be reportable under CIRCIA, if the
incident otherwise qualifies as a
covered cyber incident, as proposed to
be defined in § 226.1, e.g., if the
underlying incident (including any
actual disclosure in line with those
threats) leads to the substantial loss of
confidentiality of an information system
or network.
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12. State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial
Government Entity
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term State, Local,
Tribal, or Territorial Government entity.
This term has significance in the
regulation for two primary reasons.
First, the term is used within the
proposed definition of covered entity to
describe certain entities that would be
subject to CIRCIA’s reporting
requirements. Second, pursuant to 6
U.S.C. 681d(f), the section of CIRCIA on
noncompliance with required reporting
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does not apply to a SLTT Government
entity.
The U.S. Census Bureau defines a
government entity as ‘‘an organized
entity which, in addition to having
governmental character, has sufficient
discretion in the management of its own
affairs to distinguish it as separate from
the administrative structure of any other
governmental unit.’’ 157 The Homeland
Security Act definition for the term
‘‘State’’ includes both States and
territories, defining the term ‘‘State’’ to
mean ‘‘any State of the United States,
the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa,
the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, and any possession of
the United States.’’ 6 U.S.C. 101(17).
The Homeland Security Act definition
for the term ‘‘Local Government’’
includes both local and tribal
government entities, defining the term
‘‘Local Government’’ to mean ‘‘(a) A
county, municipality, city, town,
township, local public authority, school
district, special district, intrastate
district, council of governments
(regardless of whether the council of
governments is incorporated as a
nonprofit corporation under State law),
regional or interstate government entity,
or agency or instrumentality of a Local
government; (b) An Indian tribe or
authorized tribal organization, or in
Alaska, a Native village or Alaska
Regional Native Corporation; and (c) A
rural community, unincorporated town
or village, or other public entity.’’ 6
U.S.C. 101(13).
To create its proposed definition for
the term SLTT Government entity, CISA
is proposing to create an umbrella term
that merges the three definitions
referenced in the previous paragraph,
and include the definition of Indian
tribe that is referenced in the Homeland
Security Act. This approach will allow
CISA to leverage existing, accepted
definitions for each element that
composes the term SLTT Government
entity—i.e., State, local, territorial,
tribal, and government entity—within a
single, consolidated definition. CISA
believes this is also appropriate because
SLTT Government Entities are treated
the same throughout the proposed
regulation, and this umbrella term
simplifies this task.
13. Supply Chain Compromise
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term supply chain
157 U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Classification
Manual (Oct. 2006), available at https://
www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/
technical-documentation/classificationmanuals.html.
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compromise. This term has significance
in the regulation as CIRCIA explicitly
states that unauthorized access
facilitated through or caused by a
supply chain compromise can be a
substantial cyber incident. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(iii).
Section 650 of title 6, United States
Code defines ‘‘supply chain
compromise’’ as ‘‘an incident within the
supply chain of an information system
that an adversary can leverage, or does
leverage, to jeopardize the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of the information system or the
information the system processes,
stores, or transmits, and can occur at
any point during the life cycle.’’ 6
U.S.C. 650(28). NIST defines a ‘‘supply
chain’’ as the ‘‘linked set of resources
and processes between and among
multiple levels of organizations, each of
which is an acquirer, that begins with
the sourcing of products and services
and extends through their life cycle.’’ 158
The supply chain for an information
system is typically considered to be the
multiple layers of software and
hardware that are integrated to perform
the various functions of the information
system. Examples of items in the supply
chain of an information system, which
are acquired often from multiple
vendors, include hardware items like
microchips (and the components that
comprise the microchips), operating
systems (and the code libraries that
comprise the operating systems), and
other types of software (and the code
libraries that compromise the software).
Information systems—including both
ICT and OT—‘‘rely on a complex,
globally distributed, extensive, and
interconnected supply chain ecosystem
that . . . consists of multiple levels of
outsourcing. This ecosystem is
comprised of public and private sector
entities (e.g., acquirers, suppliers,
developers, system integrators, external
service providers, and other ICT/OTrelated service providers) that interact to
research, develop, design, manufacture,
acquire, deliver, integrate, operate,
maintain, dispose of, and otherwise
utilize or manage ICT/OT products and
services.’’ 159
CISA is proposing to use the
definition of the term supply chain
compromise contained in 6 U.S.C. 650
verbatim for the definition of the term
in the regulation with one exception:
the definition in the proposed
regulation replaces the term ‘‘incident’’
158 NIST, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk
Management Practices for Systems and
Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800–161
Rev.1, at 1 (May 2022), available at https://
csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/161/r1/final.
159 See id.
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with the term ‘‘cyber incident.’’ As
noted in the earlier discussion on the
term cyber incident, Congress narrowed
the types of incidents CISA could
require reporting on under CIRCIA by
explicitly stating the term cyber
incident did not include an incident
that imminently jeopardizes, but does
not actually jeopardize, an information
system or the information contained
therein. As the use of the term supply
chain compromise in the regulation is
limited to the definition of certain
substantial cyber incidents, the actual
(versus imminent) jeopardy requirement
is built into the broader requirements
already, thus making the end result the
same regardless of whether the
definition of supply chain compromise
uses the term incident or cyber incident.
Rather than introducing potential
confusion into the regulation by
defining incident and cyber incident,
CISA is proposing to use the term cyber
incident in the definition of supply
chain compromise.
As noted in the definition, a supply
chain compromise can occur anywhere
in the lifecycle of an information
system. This can include design,
development and production,
distribution, acquisition and
deployment, maintenance, or
disposal.160 For example, a supply
chain compromise can occur when a
cyber threat actor infiltrates a software
vendor’s network and deploys malicious
code to compromise the software before
the vendor sends it to their customers,
which then compromises the customer’s
data or systems.161 Newly acquired
software or hardware may be
compromised from the outset, or a
compromise may occur through other
means like a patch or a hotfix.162
Common techniques for software supply
chain compromises include hijacking
updates, undermining code signing, and
compromising open source code.163
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14. Virtual Currency
CISA is proposing to include a
definition for the term virtual currency.
CISA is proposing to define this term
because CIRCIA requires covered
entities to include in any Ransom
Payment Report ‘‘the type of virtual
currency or other commodity
requested’’ as part of the ransom
demand. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(G). CISA
160 CISA, Defending Against Software Supply
Chain Attacks at 3, available at https://
www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/defendingagainst-software-supply-chain-attacks-0 (Apr.
2021).
161 Id. at 2.
162 See id.
163 Id. at 4.
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wants to ensure that covered entities
understand this requirement.
CIRCIA defines virtual currency as
‘‘the digital representation of value that
functions as a medium of exchange, a
unit of account, or a store of value.’’ 6
U.S.C. 681(10). CISA understands this
definition as equivalent to a ‘‘value that
substitutes for currency or funds’’ in 31
U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(J), and ‘‘virtual
currency’’ as defined in guidance from
the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN).164 Therefore, CISA
is proposing to clarify the relationship
between these terms by adding a
sentence to the definition in CIRCIA
noting that virtual currency includes
any form of value that substitutes for
currency or funds.
v. Request for Comments on Proposed
Definitions
CISA seeks comments on all the
proposed definitions. In addition, CISA
seeks specific comments on the
following questions:
3. The proposed definitions of cyber
incident, covered cyber incident, and
substantial cyber incident, to include
the appropriateness and clarity of the
thresholds contained in the proposed
definition of substantial cyber incident,
the three exclusions to the proposed
definition of substantial cyber incident,
and the guiding principles described in
Section IV.A.ii.b of this document
regarding how to determine if an
incident was a substantial cyber
incident.
4. Whether CISA should specifically
add the term ‘‘significant,’’
‘‘substantial,’’ or any other appropriate
word at the beginning of subparagraph
3 of the definition of substantial cyber
incident to clarify the impact level
required.
5. The proposed examples of
incidents that likely would or would not
qualify as a substantial cyber incident,
to include whether the examples
provided by CISA are accurate and
whether there are other types of
incidents that it would be useful to
include in the list of examples to
incidents that likely would or would not
qualify as a substantial cyber incident.
6. Anticipated challenges for covered
entities related to understanding or
reporting a covered cyber incident if
such incident stemmed from a
disruption of a third-party vendor or
164 FinCEN Guidance, FIN–2019–G001,
Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain
Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual
Currencies at 7 (May 9, 2019), available at https://
www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/
guidance/application-fincens-regulations-certainbusiness-models.
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service provider that is itself not a
covered entity.
7. As noted in the preamble, CISA
believes there is value in CISA receiving
reports on all types of cyber incidents
that meet the substantial cyber incident
impact thresholds, regardless of whether
the TTPs used are sophisticated or not,
or novel or not. Therefore, CISA
proposes that the ‘‘sophistication or
novelty of the tactics’’ should not
influence whether an individual
incident or category of incidents
qualifies as a substantial cyber incident.
Do you agree with this proposal, or
should the sophistication or novelty of
a tactic influence whether an individual
incident or category of incidents meets
one of the substantial cyber incident
thresholds? Similarly, should CISA use
sophistication or novelty of a tactic as
a justification for including or excluding
any specific categories of incidents from
the population of cyber incidents
required to be reported? How does this
intersect with the minimum
requirements enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)?
8. Should exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability as a general matter be
considered to meet one of the threshold
impacts in the definition of substantial
cyber incident? Please provide data or
information specifically regarding (1)
whether exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability provides an indication of a
malicious actor’s sophistication, (2)
whether exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability results in a different level
of risk to a victim entity than
exploitation of a known vulnerability,
and (3) benefits that reporting on the
exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities
might provide to CISA’s understanding
of the cyber threat landscape, CISA’s
ability to warn entities about emerging
threats, and the federal government’s
awareness of victim entities targeted in
cyber incidents utilizing zero-day
vulnerabilities.
9. Whether there are any terms for
which CISA did not propose a
definition but should consider
including to improve the clarity of the
regulation.
B. Applicability
As noted in Section IV.A.i. above, due
to the operative significance and impact
of the term, CISA proposes to define
covered entity to mean any entity that
meets the criteria established in the
Applicability Section, § 226.2. CISA
believes that § 226.2 also satisfies the
statutory requirement that CISA include
in the final rule a ‘‘clear description of
the types of entities that constitute
covered entities.’’ See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1).
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The proposed Applicability section
includes two primary means by which
an entity in a critical infrastructure
sector qualifies as a covered entity, the
first based on the size of the entity and
the second based on whether the entity
meets any of the enumerated sectorbased criteria. An entity in a critical
infrastructure sector only needs to meet
one of the criteria to be considered a
covered entity. For example, an entity in
a critical infrastructure sector that
exceeds the size standard and meets
none of the § 226.2(b) sector-based
criteria will be considered a covered
entity. Conversely, an entity that meets
one or more of the sector-based criteria
will be a covered entity regardless of
whether it exceeds the § 226.2(a) size
standard. An entity in a critical
infrastructure sector does not have to
meet both the size-based criterion and
one of the sector-based criteria to be
considered a covered entity.
i. Interpreting the CIRCIA Statutory
Definition of Covered Entity
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In developing this proposed
Applicability section, CISA first looked
at the parameters imposed by CIRCIA.
See 6 U.S.C. 681(4). Specifically, in the
definition of covered entity provided by
CIRCIA, Congress limits what may be a
covered entity to ‘‘an entity in a critical
infrastructure sector, as defined in
Presidential Policy Directive 21.’’ See 6
U.S.C. 681(4).
PPD–21 does not define the word
‘‘entity’’ but instead adopts a systems
and assets approach when referring to
critical infrastructure. However, this
does not fit within the regulatory
scheme required by CIRCIA. Therefore,
CISA interprets the word ‘‘entity’’ to be
a broad term, generally including any
person, partnership, business,
association, corporation, or other
organization (whether for-profit, not-forprofit, nonprofit, or government)
regardless of governance model that has
legal standing and is uniquely
identifiable from other entities.165 The
organizational structure or
nomenclature chosen by the entity does
not matter as long as it is a structure that
imports legal presence or standing in
165 Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘‘entity’’ as ‘‘[a]
generic term inclusive of person, partnership,
organization, or business [that] can be legally bound
[and] is uniquely identifiable from any other
entity.’’ See Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed., as
found on www.thelawdictionary.org. Black’s also
contains a separate definition for ‘‘legal entity,’’
defining it as ‘‘[a] lawful or legally standing
association, corporation, partnership,
proprietorship, trust, or individual [that h]as legal
capacity to (1) enter into agreements or contracts,
(2) assume obligations, (3) incur and pay debts, (4)
sue and be sued in its own right, and (5) to be
accountable for illegal activities.’’ Id.
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the United States. CISA does not,
therefore, interpret or understand the
word ‘‘entity’’ to mean a system or asset,
and some of the things that would not
be considered entities include software,
hardware, and other equipment;
buildings and facilities; and systems.
CISA believes this interpretation is both
consistent with the plain language
meaning of the term ‘‘entity’’ and
appropriate given the purposes of
CIRCIA, which require CISA to collect
sufficient reports to develop analysis
and understand cyber threat trends
across the entire critical infrastructure
landscape.
The second limitation contained in
the statutory definition is that the entity
must be ‘‘in a critical infrastructure
sector, as defined in Presidential Policy
Directive 21.’’ Presidential Policy
Directive 21 (PPD–21) does not actually
contain a definition for ‘‘critical
infrastructure sector,’’ but it does
specifically enumerate 16 critical
infrastructure sectors.166 PPD–21 also
does not specifically define the
composition of the individual critical
infrastructure sectors; however, PPD–21
required the Secretary of Homeland
Security to update the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP),
which is intended to guide the national
effort to manage risks to the Nation’s
critical infrastructure. The NIPP
included a ‘‘Call to Action’’ which
required each critical infrastructure
sector to update its Sector-Specific Plan
(SSP) as part of an overall joint planning
effort and to update the SSP every four
years thereafter.167 The SSPs are
developed jointly by representatives of
the private sector, referred to as Sector
Coordinating Councils (SCCs),168 and
representatives of the government,
referred to as Government Coordinating
166 The 16 critical infrastructure sectors
enumerated in PPD–21 are Chemical; Commercial
Facilities; Communications; Critical Manufacturing;
Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency Services;
Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture;
Government Facilities; Healthcare and Public
Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors,
Materials, and Waste; Transportation Systems; and
Water and Wastewater Systems.
167 The NIPP states that SSPs are supposed to be
updated every four years, but to date, none of these
plans have been updated. See National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (2013), available at
https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/
2013-national-infrastructure-protection-plan.
168 The SCCs are self-organized and self-governed
councils that enable critical infrastructure owners
and operators, their trade associations, and other
industry representatives to interact on a wide range
of sector-specific strategies, policies, and activities.
The SCCs coordinate and collaborate with SRMAs
and related Government Coordinating Councils to
address the entire range of critical infrastructure
security and resilience policies and efforts for that
sector. See https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/
groups/sector-coordinating-councils (last visited
Nov. 28, 2023).
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Councils (GCCs).169 Each SSP 170
includes a ‘‘sector profile,’’ which
describes entities that are in the
respective critical infrastructure sector.
These profiles do not limit the
descriptions of the entities that
comprise each critical infrastructure
sector identified in PPD–21 to entities
that own systems and assets that meet
the statutory definition of ‘‘critical
infrastructure’’ set forth by 42 U.S.C.
5195c(e).171 Rather, in implementing
PPD–21, the SSPs make clear that a
wide variety of entities, including at
least some entities that do not own or
operate systems or assets that meet the
definition of critical infrastructure in
PPD–21 but are active participants in
critical infrastructure sectors and
communities, are considered ‘‘in a
critical infrastructure sector.’’
For example, according to the 2015
Food and Agriculture SSP, among the
variety of entities that composed the
Food and Agriculture Sector in 2014
were more than 935,000 restaurants and
institutional food service
establishments; an estimated 114,000
supermarkets, grocery stores, and other
food outlets; over 81,000 domestic food
facilities (e.g., warehouses;
manufacturers; processors); and roughly
2.1 million farms.172 Similarly,
according to the 2015 Healthcare and
Public Health SSP, the array of entities
that composed the Healthcare and
Public Health Sector included entities
that provide direct patient care (e.g.,
hospitals, urgent care clinics, doctor and
dentist offices); medical research
institutions; medical record system
vendors; health insurance companies;
local and State health departments;
169 GCCs are formed as the government
counterpart for each SCC to enable interagency and
cross-jurisdictional coordination. The GCCs are
comprised of representatives from across various
levels of government (federal, state, local, or tribal),
as appropriate to the operating landscape of each
individual sector. See https://www.cisa.gov/
resources-tools/groups/government-coordinatingcouncils (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
170 CISA’s website has a web page for each critical
infrastructure sector, each of which includes a link
to the sector’s respective SSP. These web pages are
available at https://www.cisa.gov/topics/criticalinfrastructure-security-and-resilience/criticalinfrastructure-sectors (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
The current versions of the SSPs are also
collectively located at https://www.cisa.gov/2015sector-specific-plans (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
171 PPD–21 defines ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ as
‘‘having the meaning provided in section 1016(e) of
the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)),
namely systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters.’’
172 DHS, Food and Agriculture SSP at 3 (2015),
available at https://www.cisa.gov/publication/nippssp-food-ag-2015.
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cemeteries, crematoriums, morgues, and
funeral homes; pharmaceutical and
other medical supply manufacturers and
distributors; medical laboratories; drug
store chains; and blood banks.173 As a
third example, the 2015 Commercial
Facilities SSP defines the Commercial
Facilities Sector to include a mix of
entities, such as the nation’s 1.1 million
malls, shopping centers, and other retail
establishments; over 52,000 hotel-based
properties; nearly 1,400 casinos and
associated resorts; 1 million office
buildings; 5.6 million multi-family
rental buildings, and nearly 125,000
establishments designed for public
assembly, such as stadiums, arenas,
movie theaters, museums, zoos,
libraries, and other performance
venues.174 CISA considered the variety
of entities described in the sector
profiles in the SSPs when determining
the scope of the Applicability section.
CISA has determined it is appropriate
to define entities within a critical
infrastructure sector consistently with
SSP sector profiles that were developed
through a collaborative public-private
partnership, as these sector profiles
reflect a mutual understanding of what
types of entities are in a critical
infrastructure sector. This interpretation
was supported by many commenters
whose comments reflected the breadth
of entities that are within a critical
infrastructure sector.175 Accordingly,
CISA proposes to include an
equivalently wide variety of types of
entities within the scope of the CIRCIA
regulatory description of ‘‘covered
entity’’ to reflect the same diversity of
entities that are in a critical
infrastructure sector within the context
of PPD–21, the NIPP, and each sector’s
SSP. This is also why CISA is not
proposing to limit the scope of the
173 DHS, Healthcare and Public Health SSP at 5
(May 2016), available at https://www.cisa.gov/
resources-tools/resources/healthcare-and-publichealth-sector-specific-plan-2015 (hereinafter
‘‘Healthcare and Public Health SSP’’).
174 DHS, Commercial Facilities SSP: An Annex to
the NIPP 2013, at 3 (2015), available at https://
www.cisa.gov/publication/nipp-ssp-commercialfacilities-2015.
175 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the National
Retail Federation, CISA–2022–0010–0092–0001
(stating that food and beverage retailers and
restaurants fall within the definitions of the
Commercial Facilities Sector and/or the Food and
Agriculture Sector); National Electrical
Manufacturers Association, CISA–2022–0010–
0026–0001 (noting in an example that shopping
malls are part of the Commercial Facilities Sector);
Rural Wireless Association, CISA–2022–0010–
0093–0001 (acknowledging the entire
communications sector may be included in the
covered entity definition’’); Center for Democracy
and Technology, CISA–2022–0010–0068–0001
(citing the NIPP and Education Facilities SSP to
show that all K–12 schools could be included as
covered entities).
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Applicability section to owners and
operators of critical infrastructure.
A number of commenters have
recommended that CISA limit the
definition of covered entity to critical
infrastructure or a subset thereof. CISA
believes that interpretation is neither
consistent with the authorization
granted to CISA by Congress in CIRCIA,
nor would it enable CISA to achieve the
intended purposes of the regulation. To
the first point, a plain language reading
of CIRCIA’s statutory definition of
covered entity indicates that CISA has
the authority to include within the
scope of the regulation more than just
entities that own or operate critical
infrastructure. As demonstrated by the
broad sector profiles in SSPs described
above, CISA views the language used by
Congress in CIRCIA bounding the scope
of who could be a covered entity as
simply ‘‘an entity in a critical
infrastructure sector, as defined in
Presidential Policy Directive 21’’ as
representative of a much broader set of
entities than just owners and operators
of critical infrastructure. Had Congress
wanted to limit CISA’s regulatory
authority to critical infrastructure
owners and operators, it could have
easily done so, as PPD–21 includes a
definition for the term ‘‘critical
infrastructure’’ itself that could have
been used for this purpose.176
More importantly, such a narrowing
scope of the term covered entity would
severely hinder CISA’s ability to achieve
CIRCIA’s regulatory purposes. As
discussed earlier, CISA identified a
number of purposes that the regulation
is designed to facilitate. See Section
III.C.i. Many of these purposes require a
sufficient amount of data to achieve.
These purposes include the
identification of commonly exploited
vulnerabilities and effective
countermeasures; trend analysis and
threat tracking, both generally and in
relation to specific sectors, industries, or
geographic regions; and the issuance of
cybersecurity alerts and early warnings.
See Section III.C.ii. Reporting from a
broad range of entities is necessary to
provide adequate visibility of the cyber
landscape across critical infrastructure
sectors, which CIRCIA is meant to
facilitate. 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(1).
Furthermore, the products and analysis
CISA is able to produce in support of
these goals are likely to significantly
improve in quality in proportion with
increases in the amount of data
176 See PPD–21, ‘‘Definitions’’ at 12, available at
https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/
presidential-policy-directive-ppd-21-criticalinfrastructure-security-and.
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available to CISA to support its
analytical activities.
To receive a sufficient number of
reports to achieve these regulatory goals,
CISA believes a broad interpretation of
the term covered entity is essential. See
Section III.C.ii. This is particularly
necessary in light of the limitations
Congress imposed on the term covered
cyber incident which defines the types
of incidents that must be reported under
the proposed rule. As discussed later in
this document, CISA interprets the
Congressional language related to
substantial cyber incident and, by
proxy, the definition of covered cyber
incident, to limit the types of incidents
for which CISA can mandate reporting.
As the number of CIRCIA Reports CISA
will receive is a function of both
whether an entity meets the description
of a covered entity and whether the
incident experienced meets the
definition of covered cyber incident,
narrowly interpreting both would
severely restrict the number of incidents
about which CISA receives information.
Because CISA’s discretion to define a
covered cyber incident is more limited
by CIRCIA itself, CISA believes it is
important to scope covered entity,
where it has greater discretion under
CIRCIA, more broadly.
CISA is not, however, proposing to
scope the term covered entity so broadly
as to include virtually every entity
within one of the critical infrastructure
sectors within the description of
covered entity. CISA believes that this is
just the starting threshold at which
Congress intended that CISA consider
describing the contours of entities that
should be included as covered entities.
Rather, CISA’s proposed Applicability
section is designed to focus the
reporting requirements primarily on
entities that own or operate systems or
assets considered critical infrastructure
under the PPD–21 definition, while still
requiring reporting from a small subset
of entities that might not own or operate
critical infrastructure but that could
impact critical infrastructure to help
ensure CISA receives an adequate
number of reports overall, including
reports of substantial cyber incidents
from entities that are most likely to own
or operate critical infrastructure. To
achieve this, CISA is proposing a
description for covered entity that
would capture both entities of a
sufficient size (based on number of
employees or annual revenue) as well as
smaller entities that meet specific
sector-based criteria.
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ii. Determining if an Entity Is in a
Critical Infrastructure Sector
As a threshold matter, to be a covered
entity, an entity must be ‘‘an entity in
a critical infrastructure sector, as
defined in Presidential Policy Directive
21.’’ 6 U.S.C. 681. As noted above, PPD–
21 does not actually include a definition
for ‘‘critical infrastructure sector,’’ but
rather provides a list of the sixteen
critical infrastructure sectors and
directed updates to the NIPP and the
public-private partnership model (i.e.,
SSPs).177
CISA anticipates that the process for
an entity to determine if it is within a
critical infrastructure sector will usually
be a relatively straightforward exercise.
CISA has strong public-private
partnerships with the critical
infrastructure community, and will be
leveraging these relationships as part of
the outreach and education campaign
that is required by CIRCIA to inform
entities that are likely covered entities
of the regulatory reporting requirements
associated with this proposed rule.178
CISA expects that entities will be able
to obtain informational materials as part
of this outreach and education
campaign that will simplify the process
of determining whether an entity is a
covered entity. However, CISA has
attempted to propose a population of
entities in a critical infrastructure sector
that would typically expect themselves
to be included in a critical infrastructure
sector, which will enable an entity to
easily self-identify whether or not it is
a covered entity. For example, entities
engaged in or facilitating transportation,
such as airplane or car manufacturers,
airport and train station operators, and
trucking companies, can readily selfidentify as in the Transportation
Services Sector. Similarly, entities
engaged in the production, storage, and
distribution of food, such as farms, food
packagers and distributers, and grocery
stores can readily self-identify as in the
Food and Agriculture Sector. Banks,
credit unions, credit card companies,
registered broker-dealers, and other
entities providing financial services can
similarly self-identify as in the
Financial Services Sector, while
drinking water and wastewater
treatment facilities can also readily
identify as in the Water and Wastewater
Systems Sector. Moreover, many of
these same entities are members of the
177 Id.
at 10–11.
6 U.S.C. 681b(e)(1); see also CISA’s
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
(CIPAC) website describing CISA’s partnership and
forum with the critical infrastructure community at
https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/
critical-infrastructure-partnership-advisory-councilcipac (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
178 See
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SCC for their respective critical
infrastructure sectors and on this basis
would be able to accurately self-identify
which critical infrastructure sector(s)
they would fall within.179
In some cases, however, it may be less
obvious to an entity whether it falls into
one or more of the critical infrastructure
sectors. Examples include mine tailings
and navigation locks (Dams Sector);
nursing homes and cemeteries
(Healthcare and Public Health Sector);
and schools and elections infrastructure
(Government Facilities Sector). The
scope of types of entities that are
considered part of a sector are described
in the sector profiles in each sector’s
SSP. As noted above in Section IV.B.i,
SSPs are documents developed jointly
by each sector’s SCC and GCC to help
implement PPD–21 and the NIPP. The
current versions of SSPs for all 16
sectors can be found on the CISA
website at https://www.cisa.gov/2015sector-specific-plans. The overwhelming
majority of entities, though not all, are
considered part of one or more critical
infrastructure sectors. Illustrative
examples of entities that generally are
not considered part of one or more
critical infrastructure sector include
advertising firms, law firms, political
parties, graphic design firms, think
tanks, and public interest groups.
If an entity is unsure as to whether or
not it is part of a critical infrastructure
sector, CISA recommends the entity
review the SSP for the sector or sectors
that most closely align with the line of
activities in which the entity is engaged.
Once the final rule has issued, entities
will also be able to reference
informational materials that will be
published as part of CISA’s outreach
and education campaign. If after taking
these steps, an entity still is unsure as
to whether it is in a critical
infrastructure sector, CISA recommends
the entity contact CISA so that CISA can
assist the entity in determining if it is
in a critical infrastructure sector.
iii. Clear Description of the Types of
Entities That Constitute Covered
Entities Based on Statutory Factors
Section 681b(c)(1) of title 6, United
States Code, requires CISA to include in
the final rule ‘‘A clear description of the
types of entities that constitute covered
entities, based on—(A) the
consequences that disruption to or
compromise of such an entity could
cause to national security, economic
security, or public health and safety; (B)
179 See CISA’s Sector Coordinating Councils
website for information on SCCs and membership
for each sector’s SCC at https://www.cisa.gov/
resources-tools/groups/sector-coordinating-councils
(last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
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the likelihood that such an entity may
be targeted by a malicious cyber actor,
including a foreign country; and (C) the
extent to which damage, disruption, or
unauthorized access to such an entity,
including the accessing of sensitive
cybersecurity vulnerability information
or penetration testing tools or
techniques, will likely enable the
disruption of the reliable operation of
critical infrastructure.’’
The first part of this requirement is
that CISA must provide ‘‘[a] clear
description of the types of entities that
constitute covered entities . . .’’ For the
reasons described in this section, CISA
believes that the criteria contained
within the proposed Applicability
section are easily understandable and
clearly explain the types of entities that
constitute covered entities. Accordingly,
CISA believes that the Applicability
section satisfies CIRCIA’s ‘‘clear
description’’ requirement.
In developing this clear description of
what is a covered entity, 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) requires CISA to base this
clear description on the three factors
enumerated within that section. CISA
understands 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) not as
imposing minimum requirements on
what may be a covered entity, but rather
simply as providing lenses through
which CISA is to consider what entities
it should seek to include in the
description of covered entity. For
example, CISA is to consider ‘‘the
likelihood’’ an entity will be targeted,
but 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) does not require
that entities be included in the
description of covered entity only if
they have a ‘‘high likelihood’’ or ‘‘very
high likelihood’’ of being targeted.
Further, while 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
uses the word ‘‘and,’’ CISA does not
interpret 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) as requiring
that all three factors be relevant to each
entity or category of entities included in
the description of covered entity; rather,
CISA reads the ‘‘and’’ as indicating that
CISA must consider, as part of its
process of determining the description
of covered entity, all three factors. For
example, an entity could be considered
a covered entity if it maintains sensitive
intellectual property, the compromise of
which could cause significant national
security or economic security
consequences (factor A), even if
unauthorized access to that information
would not likely enable the disruption
of reliable operation of critical
infrastructure (factor C).
This interpretation is also consistent
with the specifics of the 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) factors themselves, which,
collectively, address different aspects of
risk. ‘‘Risk’’ is generally understood to
be a measure of the extent to which an
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entity is threatened by a potential
circumstance or event, determined
based on a function of (1) the
consequences, or adverse impacts, that
could arise if the circumstances or event
occurs, and (2) the threat or
vulnerabilities, or the likelihood of
occurrence.180 In the cybersecurity
context specifically, risk is often
understood to refer to those
consequences and threats or
vulnerabilities caused by or resulting
from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction of information or
information systems. See 6 U.S.C.
650(7). This risk ‘‘equation’’ is often
summarized as Risk = Consequence ×
Threat × Vulnerability. Viewed through
this framing, CISA interprets the three
factors listed in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) to
each represent a different aspect of the
risk equation: factor A (the consequence
of disruption or compromise) addresses
the ‘‘consequence’’ prong of the
equation; factor B (the likelihood that
such an entity may be targeted)
addresses the ‘‘threat’’ prong; and factor
C (the extent to which compromise of an
entity could enable the disruption of
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure) speaks, albeit indirectly,
to vulnerability, i.e., the extent to which
compromise of this entity could
increase the vulnerability of critical
infrastructure. Read through this lens,
CISA understands the 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) factors to be direction to
CISA to consider specific aspects of the
three prongs of cybersecurity risk—
consequence, threat, and vulnerability—
in assessing who should be deemed a
covered entity. While the risk equation
recognizes that an extremely low
consequence can balance out a moderate
threat to result in a generally low overall
risk, a very high threat combined with
even a moderate consequence, or a very
high consequence combined with a
moderately low threat can still lead to
a moderate to high cybersecurity risk.
With this understanding in mind, CISA
interprets these factors not to limit the
possible scope of covered entities to
those entities that achieve high scores
on each prong of the risk equation, but
rather to use these factors to consider
the various identified aspects of
cybersecurity risk in determining which
entities in a critical infrastructure sector
should be covered entities. Moreover, if
CISA were to interpret these three
factors as requiring CISA only to deem
180 See, e.g., NIST, Minimum Security
Requirements for Federal Information and
Information Systems, Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 200 (March 2006)
at 48, https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.200 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2024).
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entities that meet all three as covered
entities, this could result in CISA not
receiving sufficient reporting across any
given critical infrastructure sector to
competently fulfill its statutory
responsibilities under CIRCIA to
aggregate and analyze information. As
reflected in the discussion throughout
this section, CISA considered all three
factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) as it analyzed how to
describe covered entity.
All three factors—i.e., (A) the
consequences that disruption to or
compromise of such an entity could
cause to national security, economic
security, or public health and safety; (B)
the likelihood that such an entity may
be targeted by a malicious cyber actor,
including a foreign country; and (C) the
extent to which damage, disruption, or
unauthorized access to such an entity,
including the accessing of sensitive
cybersecurity vulnerability information
or penetration testing tools or
techniques, will likely enable the
disruption of the reliable operation of
critical infrastructure—were particularly
central to the determination of the
sector-based criteria being proposed by
CISA to augment the group of entities
that would be considered covered
entities under the first prong of the
criteria contained in the Applicability
section based on their size. These
factors also drove CISA’s proposal to
exclude entities in a critical
infrastructure sector that fall below the
size standards (unless they meet a
sector-based criteria) while including
entities in a critical infrastructure sector
that are larger (even if not otherwise a
covered entity based on the sector-based
criteria).
While the discussion below is focused
largely on the reasons why CISA is
proposing to include entities in the
description of covered entity based on
the extent to which these factors apply
in the context of covered cyber incident
reporting requirements, the rationale
generally holds true for ransom payment
reporting requirements as well. CIRCIA
provides one term—‘‘covered entity’’—
to describe the scope of entities subject
to both reporting requirements, and,
consistent with this framing, CISA is
proposing to apply the covered cyber
incident reporting requirements and the
ransom payment reporting requirements
to the same universe of covered entities.
This is also consistent with the three
statutory factors described above, the
current threat landscape related to
ransomware attacks, and CISA’s
responsibilities under CIRCIA. If a
covered entity pays a ransom payment,
it is likely that it has experienced a
ransomware attack from which it has
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not been able to recover quickly (e.g.,
through the use of backup systems and
data). To the extent a covered cyber
incident against a particular entity
would justify its inclusion in the
description of covered entity due to the
factors above (e.g., the consequences
that disruption to or compromise of
such an entity could cause), so too
would a ransomware attack from which
an entity cannot quickly recover, as this
would likely involve the very disruption
or compromise envisioned by these
factors. Further, in light of the rise of
ransomware attacks as a proportion of
cyber incidents,181 the rise of
ransomware attacks targeting entities in
critical infrastructure sectors
specifically,182 and CISA’s statutory
charge under CIRCIA to ‘‘coordinate and
share information with appropriate
Federal departments and agencies to
identify and track ransom payments,’’ 6
U.S.C. 681a(a)(2), it is critical that CISA
receive a sufficient number of Ransom
Payment Reports from a breadth of
entities in critical infrastructure sectors.
iv. Explanation of Specific Proposed
Applicability Criteria
1. Size-Based Criterion
a. Overview
The first group of entities that CISA
is proposing to include as covered
entities are entities within a critical
181 See, e.g., Verizon, Data Breach Investigations
Report at 7 (2022) (hereinafter, ‘‘Verizon 2022
DBIR’’), available at https://www.verizon.com/
about/news/ransomware-threat-rises-verizon-2022data-breach-investigations-report.
182 See, e.g., CISA, FBI, NSA, Australian Cyber
Security Centre, and United Kingdom National
Cyber Security Centre, Joint Cybersecurity Advisory:
2021 Trends Show Increased Globalized Threat of
Ransomware, AA22–040A (Feb. 9, 2022), available
at https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurityadvisories/aa22-040a (‘‘The [FBI], [CISA], and
[NSA] observed incidents involving ransomware
against 14 of the 16 U.S. critical infrastructure
sectors, including the Defense Industrial Base,
Emergency Services, Food and Agriculture,
Government Facilities, and Information Technology
Sectors. The Australian Cyber Security Centre
(ACSC) observed continued ransomware targeting
of Australian critical infrastructure entities,
including in the Healthcare and Medical, Financial
Services and Markets, Higher Education and
Research, and Energy Sectors. The United
Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC–
UK) recognizes ransomware as the biggest cyber
threat facing the United Kingdom. Education is one
of the top UK sectors targeted by ransomware
actors, but the NCSC–UK has also seen attacks
targeting businesses, charities, the legal profession,
and public services in the Local Government and
Health Sectors.’’); FBI internet Crime Complaint
Center, internet Crime Report at 14 (2022), available
at https://www.ic3.gov/Home/AnnualReports
(noting that the internet Crime Complaint Center
received 870 voluntary complaints that indicated
organizations belonging to a critical infrastructure
sector were victims of a ransomware attack,
including at least 1 member of every critical
infrastructure sector except Dams and Nuclear
Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sectors).
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infrastructure sector that exceed the
U.S. Small Business Administration’s
(SBA) small business size standard
based on either number of employees or
annual revenue, depending on the
industry. For a number of reasons CISA
believes a sensible approach is to
require larger entities within a critical
infrastructure sector to report cyber
incidents while generally excluding
smaller entities from those same
reporting requirements.
In assessing whether to propose a
size-based criterion as a basis for
scoping which entities in a critical
infrastructure sector should be
considered covered entities, CISA took
into consideration the three factors
described in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1). CISA
believes that each of these factors
support the inclusion of the very small
percentage of businesses in the United
States that exceed the small business
size standards in the description of
‘‘covered entity.’’
The first factor Congress identified in
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) is the consequences
that disruption to or compromise of an
entity could cause to national security,
economic security, or public health and
safety. While size is not alone indicative
of criticality, larger entities’ larger
customer bases, market shares, number
of employees, and other similar sizebased characteristics mean that cyber
incidents affecting them typically have
greater potential to result in
consequences impacting national
security, economic security, or public
health and safety than cyber incidents
affecting smaller companies. For
example, a successful cyber incident
affecting a national drug store chain is
much likelier to have significant
national security, economic security, or
public health and safety impacts than a
similar incident affecting a ‘‘mom-andpop’’ drug store. Similarly, there is a
substantially higher likelihood of
significant impacts resulting from a
successful cyber incident affecting a
large industrial food conglomerate, a
multinational hotel chain, or a large
hospital system than one affecting a
small independent farm, a singlelocation bed and breakfast, or a small
doctor’s office, respectively. Countless
other similar examples exist.
At least one other regulator has used
the likelihood of greater consequences
at larger facilities to justify imposing
regulatory requirements based on
company size. Specifically, the Food
and Drug Administration’s Mitigation
Strategies to Protect Food Against
Intentional Adulteration regulations at
21 CFR part 121 imposes less stringent
regulatory requirements on small and
very small businesses, stating that
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larger, more well-known businesses ‘‘are
likely to have larger batch sizes, [with
attacks on them] potentially resulting in
greater human morbidity and mortality.
Further, an attack on a well-recognized,
trusted brand is likely to result in
greater loss of consumer confidence in
the food supply and in the government’s
ability to ensure its safety and,
consequently, cause greater economic
disruption than a relatively unknown
brand that is distributed regionally.’’ 183
By requiring reporting from large
entities, CISA is more likely to rapidly
be informed about incidents impacting
the largest number of people and
creating the most significant national
security, economic security, or public
health and safety impacts.
The second factor Congress identified
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) for CISA to
consider as part of scoping the
description of covered entity is the
likelihood that an entity may be targeted
by a malicious cyber actor. Recent
studies show that large entities
disproportionately experience cyber
incidents. Per the 2022 Verizon DBIR,
from November 2021 through October
2022, entities with more than 1,000
employees experienced 23.5%, of the
cyber security incidents analyzed by
Verizon for which the size of the
organization was known,184 despite
entities with more than 1,000 employees
accounting for less than 1% of U.S.
businesses.185 That percentage actually
increased the following year, with the
2023 Verizon DBIR stating that entities
with more than 1,000 employees
experienced 41% of the cybersecurity
incidents analyzed by Verizon for which
the size of the organization was known
during the relevant timeframe.186 This is
consistent with the belief that terrorist
organizations and other bad actors
frequently target larger, more wellknown entities.187 The desire to target
183 78
FR 78033 (Dec. 24, 2013).
2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50 (for
the 2,701 incidents analyzed by Verizon that
occurred between November 1, 2021 and October
31, 2022 and for which Verizon knew the impacted
organization’s size, 636 had more than 1,000
employees).
185 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2021,
only 8,365 out of 8,148,606 (or .1%) of companies
with one or more employees had 1,000 or more
employees. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2021 County
Business Patterns, available at https://
www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/data.html.
186 Verizon, Data Breach Investigations Report at
50 (2023) (for the 1,183 incidents analyzed by
Verizon that occurred between November 1, 2021
and October 31, 2022 and for which Verizon knew
the impacted organization’s size, 489 had more than
1,000 employees) (hereinafter, ‘‘Verizon 2023
DBIR’’), available at https://www.verizon.com/
business/resources/reports/dbir/2023/masterguide/.
187 See, e.g., Focused Mitigation Strategies To
Protect Food Against Intentional Adulteration, 78
184 Verizon
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large entities has been noted specifically
in regards to cyber incidents as well. For
instance, per the 2024 Homeland
Security Threat Assessment, based on
trends from the first half of the year, the
year 2023 was expected to be the second
most profitable year ever for
ransomware attackers due in part to ‘‘big
game hunting,’’ i.e., the targeting of
large organizations.188
The third and final factor Congress
identified in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) for
CISA to consider as part of scoping the
description of covered entity is the
extent to which damage, disruption, or
unauthorized access to such an entity
will likely enable the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure. The majority of critical
infrastructure is owned and operated by
the private sector.189 Although the
percentage of critical infrastructure
owned and operated by larger entities
versus small businesses is unknown,
given that the less than 1% of
businesses in America that are not
considered small businesses account for
56% of the United States’ gross
domestic product and employ nearly
54% of all private sector employees,190
these entities are likely to own or
FR 78014, 78033 (Dec. 24, 2013) (‘‘It is our
assessment that [a desire to maximize public health
harm and, to a lesser extent, economic disruption]
are likely to drive terrorist organizations to target
the product of relatively large facilities, especially
those for which the brand is nationally or
internationally recognizable. An attack on such a
target would potentially provide the widescale
consequences desired by a terrorist organization
and the significant public attention that would
accompany an attack on a recognizable brand.’’).
188 Department of Homeland Security, 2024
Homeland Security Threat Assessment at 26
(‘‘Ransomware attackers extorted at least $449.1
million globally during the first half of 2023 and are
expected to have their second most profitable year.
This is due to the return of ‘big game hunting’—the
targeting of large organizations—as well as cyber
criminals’ continued attacks against smaller
organizations.’’), available at https://www.dhs.gov/
publication/homeland-threat-assessment
(hereinafter, ‘‘2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment’’); see also Dimitry Dontov, What
Businesses are the Most Vulnerable to Cyberattacks,
Forbes.com (Jan. 19, 2021) (‘‘[M]ature hacking
groups like Evil Corp are going after large
businesses, including Fortune 500 companies.
Cybercriminals have their sights set on ‘big fish’ in
various industries, as seen with attacks on Garmin,
Blackbaud, Magellan Health and others.’’), available
at https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2021/01/19/
what-businesses-are-the-most-vulnerable-tocyberattacks/?sh=331f38bf3534.
189 See, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO), GAO–22–104279: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: CISA Should
Improve Priority Setting, Stakeholder Involvement,
and threat Information Sharing at 1 (Mar. 2022)
(‘‘The majority of critical infrastructure is owned
and operated by the private sector.’’), available at
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104279.
190 U.S. Small Business Administration Office of
Advocacy, Frequently Asked Questions (Mar. 2023),
available at https://advocacy.sba.gov/2023/03/07/
frequently-asked-questions-about-small-business2023/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
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operate a disproportionate percentage of
the nation’s critical infrastructure.
Moreover, in light of the
interconnectedness of the world today,
incidents at entities in critical
infrastructure sectors that are not
themselves owners and operators of
critical infrastructure can have
cascading effects that end up impacting
critical infrastructure. Based on this,
CISA believes that substantial cyber
incidents (which, as described below,
are the types of incidents that covered
entities are required to report) at larger
entities routinely will have a high
likelihood of disrupting the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure.
In addition to the rationales provided
based on CISA’s consideration of the 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) factors, CISA believes
there are additional reasons justifying
the proposed sized-based criteria to
scope covered entity. For instance,
larger entities also are likely to have
more mature cybersecurity capabilities
or be better situated to bring in outside
experts to assist during an incident.191
These capabilities make larger entities
more likely to identify early signs of
compromise than smaller entities. By
including large entities in the
description of covered entity, the
likelihood that an incident is noticed
and reported is increased, while the
timeframe between initiation of an
incident and its reporting is likely to be
decreased.
For similar reasons, CISA believes
larger entities also frequently will be
better situated to simultaneously report
and respond to or mitigate an incident,
which is a situation many, if not most,
reporting entities will be faced with
given the statutorily mandated 72-hour
reporting requirement for Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and 24-hour reporting
requirement for Ransom Payment
Reports. Finally, larger entities generally
will be better situated to absorb costs
associated with reporting, even if perreport costs are relatively minimal,
which CISA believes they will be. Given
this, to the extent that CISA is offering
regulatory relief to a portion of the
community that Congress included in
the statutory definition of covered entity
191 Verizon 2023 DBIR, supra note 186, at 65 (‘‘In
certain prior reports, we have compared and
contrasted small and medium businesses (SMBs)
against large organizations to determine whether
the attack surface differed significantly between
them. Increasingly, both SMBs and large companies
are using similar services and infrastructure, and
that means that their attack surfaces share more in
common than ever before. This has led to a
convergence of attack profiles regardless of the size
of the organization. However, what is very different
is the ability of organizations to respond to threats
due to the number of resources they can deploy in
the event that they are attacked.’’).
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(the regulatory relief being not including
certain entities as covered entities in the
proposed Applicability section in
§ 226.2), CISA believes that relief should
be provided to smaller businesses that
may be less capable of absorbing costs
associated with incident reporting to the
extent they do not fit within the sectorbased criteria described below. Such an
approach is also consistent with the
goals of the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, which
Congress enacted in large part to ensure
departments and agencies explore
options for reducing any significant
economic impact on small businesses
that, based on their more limited
resources, may have greater difficulty
understanding and complying with
regulations.192
CISA believes that this proposed
approach has ancillary benefits as well.
First, employee- and revenue-based
criteria have a long history of use for
other purposes, including regulatory
purposes.193 CISA additionally believes
that most entities should be able to
relatively easily determine if they meet
the size-based requirements for
inclusion as a covered entity. The desire
for definitional clarity was a common
refrain raised by stakeholders during
CIRCIA listening sessions and in
comments submitted in response to the
RFI. CISA believes this aspect of the
Applicability Section (as well as the
Applicability section as a whole)
achieves that clarity. Second, while
CISA believes the costs incurred by an
individual entity associated with
reporting an incident under the
proposed regulation are relatively low,
by removing small businesses from the
description of covered entity unless
they meet a specific sector-based reason
for inclusion, CISA will significantly
lower the aggregated costs associated
with this regulatory program.
In response to the CIRCIA RFI, several
commenters advocated for CISA to use
a size-based threshold that would allow
CISA to broadly capture entities above
a certain size. Multiple commenters
recommended the definition of covered
entity include all entities with 50 or
more employees,194 with some also
192 See
5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
e.g., 7 CFR 205.236(d)(1) (provides certain
exceptions to small businesses as determined by 13
CFR part 121 for requirements applicable to foods
labeled as organic); 40 CFR 86.1801–12(j) (exempts
small businesses meeting the SBA size standards
from certain vehicle greenhouse gas emission
standards); 40 CFR part 1033 (provides different
locomotive emissions standards for ‘‘small
railroads’’ which, among other things, must meet
the SBA size standards to qualify).
194 See e.g., Comments submitted by the
Computing Technology Industry Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0122, Cyber Threat Alliance,
193 See,
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recommending it include entities with
more than 1,000 customers or $5 million
in revenue.195 One commenter
suggested exempting from coverage
entities that meet the SBA definition of
a small business for certain North
American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) codes.196
Contrarily, a number of stakeholders
recommended against using a size
threshold for identifying covered
entities because the size of an entity
does not necessarily equate to
criticality.197 These stakeholders argued
that using a size threshold would: (a)
cause CISA to miss reports from entities
that own, or provide products or
services to, critical infrastructure that
fell below the chosen threshold; and (b)
require reporting of incidents from
entities that do not own or operate
systems or assets that are critical
infrastructure, which a number of the
commenters asserted is not in line with
the purposes of the regulation. While
CISA agrees with commenters that the
size of an entity does not necessarily
equate to that entity’s criticality, it does
not believe the two outcomes the
commenters suggest will occur or have
the negative impact suggested based on
how CISA has proposed to scope the
description of covered entity.
Regarding the first concern, that using
a size-based standard would cause CISA
to miss reports from critical
infrastructure entities that fall below the
size standard, CISA would agree with
this if a size-based standard was the
only way in which an entity could
become a covered entity. To address this
CISA–2022–0010–0019, and SolarWinds, CISA–
2022–0010–0027.
195 See Comments submitted by the Cyber Threat
Alliance, CISA–2022–0010–0019; SolarWinds,
CISA–2022–0010–0027.
196 See Comment submitted by the National Grain
and Feed Association, CISA–2022–0010–0104.
197 See, e.g., Comments submitted by the
Information Technology-ISAC, CISA–2022–0010–
0048 (‘‘Focusing on the incident’s impact on critical
infrastructure might also provide a path to defining
the term ‘covered entity.’ For example, if the goal
of the program is to manage risks and disruptions
to critical infrastructure, CISA could define
‘‘covered entities’’ based on the products or services
companies provide to critical infrastructure. In this
way, a covered entity is not determined by its size,
but by the criticality of the products or services it
provides to other critical infrastructure.’’); (ISC)2,
CISA–2022–0010–0112 (‘‘Each of the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors has varying risk profiles
which should be considered when considering this
definition. We suggest basing the definition on the
nature of those services and the effect it could have
on customers instead of employees and revenue.’’);
NCTA—The Internet & Television Association,
CISA–2022–0010–0102 (‘‘Covered entity eligibility
criteria that are size- and sector-neutral are critical
because the online ecosystem consists of a broad
range of interdependent entities, including
communications networks, cloud services, CDN
providers, software and security vendors, and ecommerce platforms and applications.’’).
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concern and ensure that most entities
that own or operate critical
infrastructure are included within the
covered entity description regardless of
size, CISA has included additional
sector-based criteria in the Applicability
section which, if met by an entity in a
critical infrastructure sector, would
make that entity a covered entity, even
if the entity’s size is below the
applicable size standard. Many of the
sector-based criteria are specifically
designed to target entities that own or
operate critical infrastructure, and these
criteria are independent of the size
standard for determining applicability
of the proposed regulations. In other
words, an entity in a critical
infrastructure sector is a covered entity
if it meets any of the criteria included
in the Applicability section, be it the
size-based standard or one of the sectorbased criteria. As noted earlier, an entity
in a critical infrastructure sector does
not have to meet both the size-based
standard and one of the sector-based
criteria for inclusion as a covered entity.
As to the second concern, that sizebased thresholds will result in reporting
of incidents from entities that do not
own or operate systems or assets that
constitute critical infrastructure and that
those reports would not advance the
purposes of the regulation, CISA agrees
with the first part of the comment, but
not the latter. CISA agrees that size is
not always indicative of criticality, and
thus, including all entities of a certain
size that are within a critical
infrastructure sector as covered entities
will result in CISA receiving some
reporting from entities that are in
critical infrastructure sectors, but do not
own or operate systems or assets that
constitute critical infrastructure. CISA,
however, disagrees that CISA requiring
reporting from those entities that do not
own or operate critical infrastructure
would not support the purposes of this
regulation. Incidents that occur at
entities in critical infrastructure sectors
reveal valuable information on TTPs
and trends that can be used to help
better protect other entities in those
specific sectors and others, regardless of
whether the reporting entities own or
operate systems or assets that constitute
critical infrastructure. If CISA were to
require reporting on only significant
incidents from entities that own or
operate critical infrastructure, CISA’s
ability to identify adversary trends and
campaigns, identify vulnerabilities that
are being exploited, and issue early
warnings would be significantly more
limited. It is much more in line with the
purpose of the regulation for CISA to
learn about new or novel vulnerabilities,
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trends, or tactics sooner and be able to
share early warnings before additional
entities within a critical infrastructure
sector, whether or not they own or
operate critical infrastructure, can fall
victim to them.
Additionally, in light of the
interconnectedness of the world today,
incidents at entities in a critical
infrastructure sector, even if that the
entity does not own or operate critical
infrastructure, can have unexpected,
cascading effects that end up impacting
critical infrastructure.198 Requiring
reporting from entities in critical
infrastructure sectors, whether or not
they own or operate systems or assets
that are critical infrastructure, can
enable response and mitigation
activities that may help prevent
incidents from causing cascading
impacts to critical infrastructure or
hamper the delivery of NCFs.
b. Proposed Size-Based Criterion
CISA is proposing that the description
of covered entity include any entity in
a critical infrastructure sector that
exceeds the small business size standard
specified by the applicable North
American Industry Classification
System Code in the SBA Size Standards,
which are codified in 13 CFR part 121.
These standards ‘‘define whether a
business is small and, thus, eligible for
Government programs and preferences
reserved for ‘small business’
concerns.’’ 199 While designed in large
part for determining eligibility to
participate in certain Federal
government contracts, procurements,
grants, and other similar purposes, the
Small Business Size Regulations
indicate that the SBA Size Standards are
for general use by Federal departments
and agencies promulgating regulations
that include size criteria.200 If a Federal
department or agency wants to use
different size criteria, it is required to
consult with the SBA in writing during
the rulemaking process and explain why
the SBA’s existing size standards would
not satisfy program requirements.201
SBA Size Standards vary by industry
(as designated by NAICS 202 code) and
198 See, e.g., CISA, A Guide to Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience at 6 (Nov.
2019) (‘‘Connections and interdependencies
between infrastructure elements and sectors means
that damage, disruption, or destruction to one
infrastructure element can cause cascading effects,
impacting continued operation of another.’’),
available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/
resources/guide-critical-infrastructure-security-andresilience (hereinafter ‘‘Guide to Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience’’).
199 See 13 CFR 121.101(a).
200 See 13 CFR 121.903(a).
201 Id.
202 NAICS is the standard used by Federal
statistical departments and agencies in classifying
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are generally based on the number of
employees or the amount of annual
receipts (i.e., annual revenue) the
business has. SBA reviews and updates
the Size Standards every five years via
rulemaking. The current SBA Size
Standards are contained in the SBA’s
Table of Small Business Size Standards,
effective January 1, 2022, which can be
found at both 13 CFR 121.201 and
https://www.sba.gov/document/supporttable-size-standards. Currently, the
threshold for those industries where
small business status is determined by
number of employees is between 100
and 1,500 employees depending on the
industry. The threshold for those
industries where small business status
is determined by annual revenue is
between $2.25 million and $47 million
depending on the industry. It is
estimated that, as of 2022, there are
more than 32 million small businesses
in the United States, and that small
businesses comprise 99.9% of all
American businesses.203
In establishing its Size Standards, the
SBA considers economic characteristics
comprising the structure of an industry,
such as degree of competition, average
firm size, and distribution of firms by
size, as well as competition from other
industries, growth trends, historical
activity within an industry, and unique
factors occurring in the industry which
may distinguish small firms from other
firms.204 As the establishment of the
SBA Size Standards is done via
regulation, the public is afforded the
opportunity to review and provide
comments on any proposed
modifications to existing SBA Size
Standards before they go into effect. In
light of the comprehensive and
transparent process through which the
SBA establishes its Size Standards, and
the successful use of these standards as
size-based thresholds for various
Federal programs, CISA believes the
SBA Size Standards are well-suited for
use as the size-based threshold aspect of
the CIRCIA Applicability section.
In determining the approach to
propose for the covered entity
description’s size threshold, CISA also
considered working with the SBA to
business establishments for the purpose of
collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data
related to the U.S. business economy. Additional
information on NAICS, to include a listing of
current NAICS codes, can be found at https://
www.census.gov/naics/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
203 See, e.g., Kelly Main, Small Business Statistics
of 2023, Forbes (Dec. 7, 2022), available at https://
www.forbes.com/advisor/business/small-businessstatistics/); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Small
Business Statistics, https://
www.chamberofcommerce.org/small-businessstatistics/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
204 13 CFR 121.102(a).
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establish a size standard for entities in
critical infrastructure sectors tailored to
the CIRCIA program. In exploring this
option, CISA assessed whether a clear
justification existed for using higher or
lower thresholds than those established
by the SBA Size Standards. CISA also
considered whether a single threshold
for all entities, rather than industryspecific thresholds, might be warranted.
Ultimately, CISA, based in part on
conversations with SBA, did not believe
sufficient justification existed to deviate
from the existing SBA Size Standards in
any of these manners.
The first alternative CISA considered
was the use of higher thresholds than
those established in the SBA Size
Standards. By raising the threshold—
i.e., increasing the minimum number of
employees or amount of annual receipts
an entity has to have before qualifying
as a covered entity—CISA would be
further reducing the number of entities
that would qualify as covered entities.
Considering the significant number of
entities for whom using the SBA Size
Standards as the threshold would
provide regulatory relief, CISA believes
that there is no need to generally
exclude additional entities. Conversely,
for the reasons discussed earlier
supporting the need for broad collection
of reports, CISA is concerned that any
further reduction in the number of
covered entities could make it difficult
for CISA to achieve the goals of the
regulation. See Section III.C.ii.
The second alternative CISA
considered was the use of lower
thresholds than those established in the
SBA Size Standards. By lowering the
threshold—i.e., decreasing the
minimum number of employees or
amount of annual receipts an entity has
to have before qualifying as a covered
entity—CISA would be expanding the
number of entities that would qualify as
covered entities under this threshold.
For the reasons discussed above, CISA
believes it does not need to collect
reports from the entire possible universe
of covered entities allowed under the
statutory language and that it is prudent
to provide regulatory relief to smaller
entities where possible. To the extent
that some categories of entities from
whom CISA believes reporting is
important fall below the size threshold,
CISA will be able to include those
entities in the description of covered
entity using the proposed sector-based
criteria.
Finally, CISA explored whether there
might be some benefit to using a single
size-based threshold (or two—i.e., one
each for number of employees and
annual receipts), as opposed to the SBA
Size Standards approach that
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establishes bespoke thresholds for more
than 1,000 individual industries based
on their NAICS codes. CISA does
believe that using a single size-based
threshold (or two) that would be
consistent across all industries would be
a simpler, clearer approach; however,
the SBA has consistently determined
that using size thresholds tailored by
industry is important to respecting
relevant and significant distinctions
across different industries. Not only
does the SBA use that approach in its
own Size Standards, the Small Business
Size Regulations require the SBA
Administrator to ensure that any size
standard approved by the SBA for use
by other Federal regulators under the 13
CFR 121.903 process ‘‘varies from
industry to industry to the extent
necessary to reflect the differing
characteristics of the various industries,
and consider other relevant factors.’’ 205
In light of this, CISA believes the best
approach would be to use the SBA Size
Standards as the basis for the CIRCIA
size threshold.
c. How To Determine Whether an Entity
Meets the Size Threshold
To determine if an entity in a critical
infrastructure sector meets the proposed
size threshold, an entity will need to
determine which NAICS code should be
applied to the entity and whether the
entity meets the applicable employeebased or annual receipts-based
threshold. The SBA’s Small Business
Size Regulations provide requirements
for how to determine if an entity
qualifies as a small business under SBA
regulations.206 This includes, among
other things, requirements for
determining which NAICS code applies
to a given entity (13 CFR 121.101), how
to calculate number of employees (13
CFR 121.106), and how to calculate
annual receipts (i.e., annual revenue)
(13 CFR 121.104). CISA does not see any
reason to deviate from this wellestablished approach to determining an
entity’s size and thus is proposing to use
the instructions found in the SBA’s
Small Business Size Regulations as the
methodology to be used to determine if
an entity meets the CIRCIA covered
entity size threshold. Accordingly, CISA
is proposing that when an entity is
determining whether it meets the size
threshold provided in the Applicability
section, the entity should follow the
instructions contained in the Small
Business Size Regulations, 13 CFR part
121, or any successor thereto.
CISA recognizes that entity size and
other characteristics can be dynamic,
205 13
CFR 121.903(b).
13 CFR 121.103–121.107.
206 See
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and whether an entity meets the sizebased threshold or other criteria for
being a covered entity may vary
depending on when the entity assesses
if they meet the criteria set forth in
§ 226.2. See discussion on reporting
requirements in Section IV.C.i in this
document for more information.
2. Sector-Based Criteria
CISA is also proposing to include as
part of the description of covered entity
in the Applicability section a series of
criteria that are based on characteristics
typically associated with entities in one
or more specific critical infrastructure
sectors or subsectors. Specifically, CISA
is proposing to include in the scope of
covered entity any entity that meets one
or more of a set of specified sector-based
criteria, each of which is described
below. These criteria apply regardless of
the specific critical infrastructure sector
of which the entity considers itself to be
part.
CISA is proposing these additional,
sector-based criteria for a variety of
reasons. First, as noted in the discussion
regarding the size-based criterion, an
entity’s size does not necessarily reflect
its criticality. Some entities in a critical
infrastructure sector that fall below the
proposed size-based thresholds own or
operate systems or assets that would be
likely to meet the definition of critical
infrastructure set forth by 42 U.S.C.
5195c(e). One of the main purposes of
this regulatory program authorized by
CIRCIA is to enhance the security and
resiliency of critical infrastructure, and
therefore receiving Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and Ransom Payment
Reports from as many entities that own
or operate critical infrastructure as
possible is imperative to meet this
directive.
Another designated purpose of the
CIRCIA regulation is for CISA to
develop and share information on
cybersecurity trends and threats. CISA
believes that in addition to cross-sector
cybersecurity threat and trend analysis,
there is great value to being able to
produce sector-specific threat and trend
analysis. To achieve the latter, it is
essential for the Federal government to
have sufficient reporting from each
critical infrastructure sector. For some
sectors or subsectors, such as the Water
and Wastewater Systems Sector, there
currently is little or no required
reporting of cyber incidents to the
Federal government, making it very
difficult for CISA or other Federal
partners to provide reliable, incidentbased, sector-specific trend and threat
analysis. CISA believes the proposed
sector-based criteria will help ensure
the Federal government has sufficient
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reporting within each sector to support
this type of analysis.
Third, consistent with the factors in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1), CISA believes that
broader coverage may be warranted for
those sectors, subsectors, or industries
that have historically been inordinately
targeted by malicious cyber actors,
including by foreign countries, or for
which there is a greater likelihood of
significant national security, economic
security, or public health and safety
consequences or disruption to the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure. By ensuring CISA
receives CIRCIA Reports from entities,
regardless of size, in these more
frequently or likely targeted sectors,
subsectors, or industries, and entities
against whom a covered cyber incident
is more likely to result in significant
consequences or disruptions to critical
infrastructure, CISA and its partners
will be better situated to identify new
TTPs, campaigns, and vulnerabilities
and share early warnings and
prevention measures to help entities in
those communities address the potential
heightened threat for them of cyber
incidents.
Based on the above rationales, CISA is
proposing sector-based criteria for
entities operating in each of the critical
infrastructure sectors listed below.
During the development of these
proposed criteria, CISA engaged each of
the SRMAs to consult on potential
criteria for their respective sector, as
well as other Federal agencies with
cybersecurity-related regulatory
authorities focused on specific sectors.
CISA also considered the inputs
received from the public through both
the CIRCIA listening sessions and in
response to the CIRCIA RFI.
For the proposed sector-based criteria,
CISA proposes to cover entities that
own or operate certain types of facilities
or entities that perform certain functions
as covered entities. For example, the
Chemical Sector sector-based criteria
proposes capturing within the
description of covered entity any entity
that owns or operates a CFATS-covered
chemical facility, and the Healthcare
and Public Health sector-based criteria
would include, among others, entities
that manufacture any Class II or III
medical device. See Section IV.B.iv.2.a
and i in this document. While these
criteria are focused on certain facility
types or functions as the basis of
determining whether an entity is a
covered entity, CISA is proposing that
the entire entity (e.g., corporation,
organization), and not the individual
facility or function, is the covered
entity. Thus, for example, if an entity
owns 20 chemical distribution facilities,
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only five of which are CFATS-regulated
facilities, the entire entity is the covered
entity, and not simply the five CFATSregulated facilities. Accordingly, if that
entity experiences a substantial cyber
incident or makes a ransom payment,
the entity would need to report that
incident or payment to CISA regardless
of whether the underlying incident
impacted any of the five CFATSregulated facilities. Similarly, if an
entity manufactures Class II or III
medical devices, in addition to other
functions that do not meet one of the
sector-based criteria, the entire entity is
the covered entity, and any substantial
cyber incident experienced by any part
of the entity would need to be reported,
regardless of whether the underlying
incident impacted the manufacturing of
Class II or III medical devices. CISA
believes this is consistent with CIRCIA’s
entity-based approach, and will ensure
that adequate reporting is provided to
CISA to perform sector-specific
cybersecurity threat and trend analysis,
which might not be possible if reporting
was limited only to incidents that
actually impact the specific facilities or
functions identified in the sector-based
criteria. Considering the entire entity
(e.g., corporation, organization), and not
an individual facility or function, as the
covered entity will also avoid delays in
reporting that could be caused if entities
had to wait to specifically determine
whether particular facilities or functions
were impacted by a substantial cyber
incident.
a. Chemical Sector
CISA is proposing to include in the
description of covered entity any entity
in a critical infrastructure sector that
owns or operates a covered chemical
facility subject to the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards.207 CISA
proposes including this criterion to
ensure that entities that own or operate
a covered chemical facility that presents
a high risk of significant adverse
consequences for human life or health,
national security, and/or critical
economic assets if subjected to terrorist
attack, compromise, infiltration, or
207 See 6 CFR part 27. CISA is aware that, at the
time of publication of this NPRM, Congress has
allowed statutory authority for the CFATS program
to expire. CISA believes that by the time the CIRCIA
final rule is issued, CFATS will be reauthorized by
Congress. Should CFATS not be reauthorized by the
time the CIRCIA final rule is ready for publication,
CISA proposes to replace the proposed CFATSbased Chemical Sector criterion in this NPRM with
an alternate Chemical Sector criterion focused on
owners and operators of facilities regulated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under its
Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations. That
alternative is discussed at the end of this
subsection.
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exploitation are required to report
substantial cyber incidents to CISA.
Under CFATS, any facility that
possesses a threshold quantity of one of
more than 300 chemicals of interest
must provide information to CISA to
enable CISA to conduct a risk
assessment of the facility. See 6 CFR
27.200. If CISA determines that the
facility is high-risk based on this
assessment, the facility is required to
develop and implement a site security
plan, which must include appropriate
cybersecurity measures. See 6 CFR
27.210(a)(3). These facilities are referred
to under the CFATS regulations as
covered chemical facilities.
Consideration of the three factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) also
supports the inclusion of entities that
own or operate CFATS covered
chemical facilities within the
description of covered entity. To
determine if a chemical facility is highrisk and thus subject to CFATS, CISA
conducts a risk assessment on the
facility that considers the potential
consequences of a successful attack on
the facility, the level of threat facing the
facility, and the vulnerability of the
facility to an attack.208 Only chemical
facilities that have the potential to cause
significant consequences to public
health and safety if compromised by
terrorism (i.e., the first factor identified
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1), which relates to
consequence) and face a high potential
threat (i.e., the second factor identified
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1), which relates to
likelihood of threat) will meet the
criteria to be designated a CFATS
covered chemical facility. As such,
CISA believes that the first two factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
support the inclusion of entities that
own or operate CFATS covered
chemical facilities within the
description of covered entity. The third
factor enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1), which refers to the extent to
which damage, disruption, or
unauthorized access to such an entity
will likely enable the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure, similarly supports
inclusion of these entities, as most, if
not all, CFATS covered chemical
facilities would meet the definition of
critical infrastructure based on the
potential national security or public
health and safety consequences
associated with a successful attack on
the facility.
208 See CISA, CFATS Tiering Methodology Fact
Sheet, available at https://www.cisa.gov/resourcestools/programs/chemical-facility-anti-terrorismstandards-cfats/cfats-tiering-methodology) (last
visited Oct. 15, 2023).
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As noted in the previous section of
this document, while CFATS security
requirements apply only to the covered
chemical facilities themselves, CISA is
proposing in this NPRM that the CIRCIA
cyber incident reporting requirements
apply to the entire corporate entity that
owns or operates the CFATS-covered
chemical facility and are not limited to
substantial cyber incidents that impact
a CFATS-covered chemical facility.
CISA believes this is consistent with
CIRCIA’s entity-based approach and
will ensure that adequate reporting is
provided to CISA to perform chemical
sector cyber threat and trend analysis,
which might not be possible if reporting
were limited only to incidents that
actually impact CFATS-covered
chemical facilities.
Because CFATS currently requires
covered chemical facilities to report
certain incidents, including potential
cyber incidents, to CISA, CISA
recognizes that this proposed criteria
likely will result in two different legal
obligations for certain entities to report
cyber incidents to CISA under certain
circumstances, depending on whether it
is reporting a covered cyber incident or
not. To avoid the same entity having to
report the same incident to CISA twice,
CISA is proposing that submission of a
cyber incident report to CISA under
either one of these authorities will
satisfy the incident reporting obligations
for both regulations for the incident,
assuming the single submission
includes all the information required to
comply with both CFATS and CIRCIA,
independently. However, if a covered
entity reports an incident to CISA per
CFATS requirements and intends for
this report to also meet its reporting
obligations under CIRCIA, it would
need to indicate that intent in the
submission. Otherwise, a separate
CIRCIA Report would need to be filed
to meet the entity’s reporting
obligations.
Finally, CISA also is aware that a
number of high-risk chemical facilities
may not be subject to CFATS under one
of the statutory exemptions in the
legislation authorizing CFATS.
Specifically, CFATS does not apply to
facilities regulated under MTSA; public
water systems, as that term is defined in
42 U.S.C. 300f; Treatment Works, as that
term is defined in 33 U.S.C. 1292; or
facilities subject to regulation by the
NRC. 6 CFR 27.110(b). As a result, many
entities that own high-risk chemical
facilities would not be required to report
cyber incidents to CISA either under
CFATS or under this proposed sectorbased criteria. CISA is proposing to
require each of these categories of
entities to file a CIRCIA Report under
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various other sector-based criteria,
however, so CISA ultimately is
proposing that all entities that own or
operate a high-risk chemical facility
must report covered cyber incidents and
ransom payments under one of the
sector-based criteria.
As noted in an earlier footnote, CISA
is aware that, at the time of publication
of this NPRM, Congress allowed the
statutory authority for CFATS to expire.
CISA believes that by the time the
CIRCIA final rule is issued, CFATS will
be reauthorized, but also recognizes that
it is prudent to include for public
consideration a proposed alternative
Chemical Sector sector-based criterion
should CFATS not be reauthorized.
Accordingly, CISA proposes that if
CFATS is not reauthorized by the time
the CIRCIA final rule is ready for
publication, CISA instead would replace
the CFATS-based Chemical Sector
criterion with a Chemical Sector sectorbased criterion that description
identifies owners and operators of
facilities subject to the EPA RMP rule as
covered entities.
The EPA RMP rule, which is
authorized by Section 112(r) of the
Clean Air Act,209 requires facilities that
use certain extremely hazardous
substances to develop a risk
management plan for chemical accident
prevention purposes.210 For similar
reasons as those provided above in
relation to the proposed CFATS-focused
Chemical Sector sector-based criterion,
a consideration of the 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) factors would also support
the inclusion of entities that own or
operate facilities that are required to
comply with EPA RMP requirements in
the description of covered entity.
According to the EPA, such chemical
accidents that occur at such facilities
can pose significant consequence and
potential threat to national security and
public health and safety because
‘‘[f]acilities subject to the RMP
regulation pose significant risks to the
public and the environment. These risks
stem from potential accidental chemical
releases that can cause fires, explosions,
and harmful vapor clouds.’’ 211
Furthermore, according to the U.S.
GAO, ‘‘[t]housands of high-risk
chemical facilities may be subject to the
209 See
40 CFR part 68.
EPA, Risk Management Program (RMP)
Rule Overview, https://www.epa.gov/rmp/riskmanagement-program-rmp-rule-overview (last
visited Nov. 28, 2023).
211 Reconsideration of the 2017 Amendments to
the Accidental Release Prevention Requirements:
Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air
Act, Section 112(r)(7), Regulatory Impact Analysis
at 76 (Nov. 18, 2019), available at https://
www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OEM2015-0725-2089.
210 See
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risk posed by cyber threat adversaries—
terrorists, criminals, or nations. These
adversaries could potentially
manipulate facilities’ information and
control systems to release or steal
hazardous chemicals and inflict mass
causalities to surrounding
populations.’’ 212 Moreover, as part of
the development of the CFATS
program’s regulations, DHS drew from
information and sources available
through EPA RMP, including the list of
substances used by EPA RMP to regulate
facilities, due to the overlapping safety
and security concerns associated with
many chemicals.213
For the reasons described above, CISA
believes entities owning facilities
subject to EPA RMP would be a
satisfactory alternate criterion for
ensuring CISA receives reporting under
CIRCIA from entities within the
Chemical Sector, and is supported by
the three factors in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1);
however, CISA believes the CFATStargeted criterion would be a better
criterion for the Chemical Sector, if
permissible, for a few reasons. First,
regulation under the EPA RMP rule is
limited to facilities that only present
toxic or flammable release concerns
because they impact public health and
safety, whereas CFATS regulates
facilities that are high risk due to other
chemical security related concerns.
Additional security concerns posed by
CFATS includes coverage of chemicals
that pose risks related to theft or
diversion of explosives or weapons of
mass effect, in addition to toxic and
flammable release hazards. Second,
whereas EPA RMP determines coverage
primarily based on the potential
consequences of a chemical release,
CFATS additionally is required to take
into account threat when determining if
a facility is a CFATS covered chemical
facility. Finally, because CFATS
imposes cyber incident reporting
requirements, using CFATS as a basis
for the CIRCIA cyber incident reporting
requirements coverage promotes
harmonization of Federal cyber incident
reporting regulations by aligning
reporting requirements for the same
population of entities. For these reasons,
CISA is proposing to include a criterion
capturing entities that own or operate
facilities regulated under EPA RMP
within the description of covered entity
only if CFATS is not authorized at the
time of the issuance of the CIRCIA final
rule.
212 U.S. GAO, GAO–20–453: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: Actions Needed
to Enhance DHS Oversight of Cybersecurity at HighRisk Chemical Facilities (May 2020), available at
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-453.
213 See 72 FR 17688 (Apr. 9, 2007).
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CISA is interested in receiving
comments on these two alternatives, to
include:
10. The decision to solely use the
CFATS-based criterion if CFATS is in
effect at the time of the issuance of the
CIRCIA final rule.
11. Other possible alternatives that
CISA should consider as a sector-based
criterion for the Chemical Sector if
CFATS is not reauthorized by Congress.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
b. Communications Sector
CISA is proposing to include in the
description of covered entity any entity
that provides communications services
by wire or radio communications, as
defined in 47 U.S.C. 153(40), 153(59), to
the public, business, or government.
This criterion would also require
reporting from both one-way
communications service providers (e.g.,
radio and television broadcasters, cable
television and satellite operators) and
two-way communications service
providers (e.g., telecommunications
carriers; submarine cable licensees;
fixed and mobile wireless service
providers; VoIP providers; internet
service providers), irrespective of
whether they are subject to FCC
regulatory reporting or other FCC
requirements.
Consideration of the factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of both one-way
and two-way communications service
providers within the description of
covered entity. First, the disruption or
compromise of either one-way or twoway communications systems could
significantly impact national security,
economic security, and public health
and safety. As noted in the 2015
Communications SSP, ‘‘[v]irtually every
element of modern life is now
dependent on cyber infrastructure. As a
result, our Nation’s economic and
national security relies on the security
of the assets and operations of critical
communications infrastructure.’’ 214
Executive Order 13618—Assignment of
National Security and Emergency
Preparedness Communications
Functions reinforces the importance of
these entities to national security,
stating that ‘‘[t]he Federal Government
must have the ability to communicate at
all times and under all circumstances to
carry out its most critical and time
sensitive missions. . . . Such
communications must be possible under
all circumstances to ensure national
security, effectively manage
214 See Communications SSP: An Annex to the
NIPP 2013 at 3 (2015), available at https://
www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans
(hereinafter ‘‘Communications SSP’’).
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emergencies, and improve national
resilience.’’ 215
One-way communications services
providers are the primary providers of
information, including emergency
alerts, to the public. Therefore, a
covered cyber incident affecting oneway communications service providers
has the potential to significantly
jeopardize public health and national
security by crippling the government’s
ability to distribute important
information quickly. Two-way
communications services are essential
to the operation of the nation’s public
safety answering points and 911
emergency call system for transmission
of both voice and data.216 These risks
exist regardless of a provider’s size, as
small service providers may serve
critical infrastructure operators, and
wireless service providers, broadcasters,
and cable providers of all sizes are
responsible for providing emergency
alerts.
Second, Communications Sector
assets historically have been targeted by
malicious cyber actors. Per the 2023
IBM Security X Force Threat
Intelligence Index, ‘‘Media and
Telecom’’ entities have consistently
experienced cyber incidents over the
years, with the industry peaking as the
industry experiencing the fourth most
incidents in 2019.217 Additionally, per
the 2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment, the telecommunications
industry is likely to remain a target of
foreign government-affiliated cyber
actors from foreign countries such as
Russia and China.218
Finally, communications services also
are essential to the operations of every
other critical infrastructure sector. As
noted in the Communications SSP, ‘‘the
Communications Sector is one of the
few sectors that can affect all other
sectors. At a minimum, each sector
depends on services from the
215 E.O. 13618—Assignment of National Security
and Emergency Preparedness Communications
Functions, 77 FR 40779 (July 6, 2012).
216 Public safety answering points are required to
report outages to the FCC pursuant to 47 CFR part
4, which the FCC then shares with CISA.
217 IBM, 2023 IBM Security X-Force Threat
Intelligence Index at 42, available at https://
www.ibm.com/reports/threat-intelligence
(hereinafter, ‘‘IBM 2023 Threat Index’’).
218 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment at
20, supra note 188, at 20 (‘‘Russian governmentaffiliated cyber espionage likely will remain a
persistent threat to federal, state, and local
governments, as well as entities in the defense,
energy, nuclear, aviation, transportation, healthcare,
education, media, and telecommunications
industries. Chinese government cyber actors likely
will continue to target key critical infrastructure
sectors in the United States, including healthcare
and public health, financial services, the defense
industrial base, government facilities, and
communications.’’).
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Communications Sector to support its
operations. . . .’’ 219 Damage,
disruption, or unauthorized access to
these communications providers has a
high likelihood of disrupting the
reliable operation of other critical
infrastructure assets, which can cause
potentially cascading impacts to NCFs.
This criticality to other sectors is
reinforced by the fact that
communications is one of four
designated lifeline functions, indicating
that the reliable operations of this sector
is so critical that a disruption or loss of
this function will directly affect the
security and resilience of critical
infrastructure within and across
numerous sectors.220
c. Critical Manufacturing Sector
CISA is proposing to include in the
description of a covered entity any
entity that owns or has business
operations that engage in one or more of
the listed categories of manufacturing,
which are the four manufacturing
industries that together currently
constitute the Critical Manufacturing
Sector. The Critical Manufacturing
Sector subsectors, which were identified
by DHS after a study of the
manufacturing sector, are Primary Metal
Manufacturing (NAICS Subsector 331);
Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS
Subsector 333); Electrical Equipment,
Appliance, and Component
Manufacturing (NAICS Subsector 335);
and Transportation Equipment
Manufacturing (NAICS Subsector
336).221 In 2008, DHS combined these
four subsectors into a new Critical
Manufacturing Sector based largely on
the fact that the failure or disruption of
any of these industries could cause,
among other things, a large number of
fatalities, significant national economic
impact, or an inability of the
government to provide necessary
services to the public.222
Consideration of the factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of the entities
comprising the Critical Manufacturing
Sector within the description of covered
entity. First, as noted in the previous
paragraph, the President designated
entities within these NAICS codes as the
Critical Manufacturing Sector due in
219 Communications
SSP, supra note 214, at 9.
Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience, supra note 198, at 4 (‘‘There are four
designated lifeline functions—transportation, water,
energy, and communications, which means that
their reliable operations are so critical that a
disruption or loss of one of these functions will
directly affect the security and resilience of critical
infrastructure within and across numerous
sectors.’’).
221 See 73 FR 23476 (Apr. 30, 2008).
222 Id.
220 See
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large part to the potential that
disruption or compromise of such
entities could impact national security,
economic security, or public health and
safety.223 Moreover, the entities within
this sector often focus on efficiency, not
redundancy, with lean inventories and
just-in-time practices that can increase
vulnerability to cascading disruptions
and decrease agility in response with
potentially damaging financial
implications,224 increasing the
likelihood that a cyber incident could
negatively impact economic security.
Second, the manufacturing industry
historically have been targeted by
malicious cyber actors, and the
expectation is for that targeting to
continue. According to the IBM Security
X-Force Threat Intelligence Index for
2023 (IBM 2023 Threat Index), the
manufacturing industry experienced the
most cyber incidents in both 2021 and
2022.225
Third, damage or disruption to a
Critical Manufacturing Sector entity has
the potential to disrupt the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure. As
noted in the Designation of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan Critical
Manufacturing Sector, ‘‘[b]ecause of the
importance of the manufacturing
industry in sustaining cross-sector
interdependencies, the Critical
Manufacturing Sector also includes
systems and operations that, if attacked
or disrupted, would cause major
interruptions to the essential functions
of one or more other [critical
infrastructure] sectors and result in
national-level impacts.’’ 226 Moreover,
local or regional disruptions to entities
within the Critical Manufacturing Sector
can have cascading impacts across wide
geographic regions and industries.227
Given the overall criticality of the
entities within this sector, the reliance
of NCFs on the items manufactured by
entities within this sector, the relative
lack of substitutability of many of the
products produced by the sector, and
the history of cyber incidents impacting
manufacturing entities, CISA believes it
is appropriate for all entities operating
in any of the four Critical Manufacturing
Sector subsectors to be required to
report covered cyber incidents and
ransom payments to CISA.
223 Id.
224 See
Critical Manufacturing SSP: An Annex to
the NIPP 2013 at 4 (2015), available at https://
www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans
(hereinafter ‘‘Critical Manufacturing SSP’’).
225 See IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217,
at 42; see also Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181,
at 50 (listing Manufacturing as experiencing the
fifth most cyber incidents of any industry in 2022).
226 73 FR 23476, 23477 (Apr. 30, 2008).
227 See Critical Manufacturing SSP, supra note
224, at v.
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d. Defense Industrial Base Sector
CISA proposes including within the
description of covered entity any entity
that is a contractor or subcontractor
required to report cyber incidents to
DOD pursuant to the definitions and
requirements of the DFARS
Safeguarding Covered Defense
Information and Cyber Incident
Reporting clause located at 48 CFR
252.204–7012. This proposed sectorbased criteria would require reporting
from DOD contractors and
subcontractors that provide
operationally critical support to DOD, as
well as DOD contractors and
subcontractors that utilize unclassified
information systems that are owned, or
operated by or for, the contractor to
process, store, or transmit covered
defense information.228
DOD’s contractor cyber incident
reporting requirements apply to the
subset of contractors that process, store,
or transmit ‘‘covered defense
information’’ or that DOD has
determined provide ‘‘operationally
critical support.’’ ‘‘Covered defense
information’’ includes things such as
controlled technical information,
critical information related to operations
security, and information concerning
certain items, commodities, technology,
or software whose export could
reasonably be expected to adversely
affect the United States national security
and nonproliferation objectives.229
Contractors that provide ‘‘operationally
critical support’’ include those that
provide ‘‘supplies or services designated
by the Government as critical for airlift,
sealift, intermodal transportation
services, or logistical support that is
essential to the mobilization,
deployment, or sustainment of the
Armed Forces in a contingency
operation.’’ 230 CISA acknowledges that
contractors that provide operationally
critical support also includes entities in
one or more critical infrastructure
sectors, and are not generally
considered as part of the Defense
Industrial Base, as described in the
Defense Industrial Base SSP.231 For the
228 See
48 CFR 252.204–7012.
CFR 204.7301.
230 48 CFR 252.204–7012(a).
231 The Defense Industrial Base Sector ‘‘consists
of government and private sector organizations that
can support military operations directly; perform
R&D; design, manufacture, and integrate systems;
and maintain depots and service military weapons
systems, subsystems, components, subcomponents,
or parts—all of which are intended to satisfy U.S.
military national defense requirements.’’ Defense
Industrial Base Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan at 15
(2015), available https://www.cisa.gov/topics/
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/
229 48
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purposes of the CIRCIA rule, CISA
proposes grouping these entities under
the Defense Industrial Base Sector
sector-based criteria to provide these
entities an easier means of identifying
whether they are a covered entity. CISA
also recognizes that certain contractors
that provide operationally critical
support may fall under other proposed
Applicability criteria, including other
sector-based criteria (e.g. for the
Transportation Sector).
As both DOD and their prime
contractors frequently contract with
small businesses to meet small business
contracting and subcontracting goals
and requirements, many of the entities
covered under these criteria would not
be captured by the size threshold
contained in the proposed Applicability
section. In developing the final rule
requiring these contractors to report
cyber incidents to DOD, DOD
specifically addressed the need to
include small businesses in the
regulated population, stating in part that
the costs to the nation in lost
intellectual property and lost
technological advantage over potential
adversaries is much greater than the
costs of implementation of the
regulation and that ‘‘[t]he value of the
information (and impact of its loss) does
not diminish when it moves to
contractors (prime or sub, large or
small).’’ 232
Consideration of the factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of these entities
within the description of covered entity.
First, cyber incidents perpetrated
against contractors covered under the
DFARS regulation ‘‘may cause harm to
the Government through the
compromise of covered defense
information or other Government data,
or the loss of operationally critical
support capabilities, which could
directly impact national security.’’ 233
Second, members of the U.S.
intelligence community have concluded
that malicious cyber actors, to include
foreign countries, are likely to continue
to target members of the Defense
Industrial Base Sector.234 Finally,
damage, disruption, or unauthorized
access to these entities, including the
accessing of sensitive cybersecurity
critical-infrastructure-sectors/defense-industrialbase-sector.
232 81 FR 72986, 72987 (Oct. 21, 2016).
233 See 80 FR 51739 (Aug. 26, 2015).
234 See 2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment at 20, supra note 188, at 20 (‘‘Russian
government-affiliated cyber espionage likely will
remain a persistent threat to . . . entities in the
defense . . . industr[y]. Chinese government cyber
actors likely will continue to target key critical
infrastructure sectors in the United States,
including . . . the defense industrial base. . . .’’).
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vulnerability information, may enable
the disruption of the reliable operation
of critical infrastructure because of its
interdependency with critical defense
infrastructure. As noted earlier, the
entities proposed for inclusion under
this sector-based criterion are regulated
under the DFARS because they provide
‘‘operationally critical support’’ or
process, store, or transmit ‘‘covered
defense information.’’ Disruption of
operationally critical support
definitionally disrupts the reliable
operation of critical defense
infrastructure, and the compromise of
covered defense information could be
used to enable the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure.
CISA recognizes that entities required
to report under these criteria are, by
definition, already required to report
certain cyber incidents to DOD. Given
their criticality to national security,
however, CISA nevertheless is
proposing to include them within the
CIRCIA Applicability section. This will
ensure that the Federal government
receives information necessary to
identify cyber threats, exploited
vulnerabilities, and TTPs that affect
entities in this community and in other
interdependent critical infrastructure
sectors, even if changes are made to
what must be reported pursuant to the
DFARS regulation, over which CISA has
no authority. CISA acknowledges the
potential this creates for duplicative
reporting and is committed to working
with DOD to explore the applicability of
the substantially similar reporting
exception to enable entities subject to
both CIRCIA and DFARS cyber incident
reporting requirements to be able to
comply with both regulatory reporting
regimes through the submission of a
single report to the Federal government
to the extent practicable. Additional
information on the substantially similar
reporting exception can be found in
Section IV.D.i in this document.
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e. Emergency Services Sector
CISA proposes including within the
description of covered entity any entity
that provides one or more of five listed
emergency services or functions to a
population equal to or greater than
50,000 individuals. These five
disciplines—law enforcement, fire and
rescue services, emergency medical
services, emergency management, and
public works that contribute to public
health and safety—and the types of
entities that provide these services are
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described in the 2015 Emergency
Services SSP.235
Consideration of the factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of these entities
within the description of covered entity.
Regarding the first and third
enumerated factors (consequence and
disruption of reliable operation of
critical infrastructure), as noted in the
Emergency Services SSP, this sector’s
operations provide the first line of
support for nearly all critical
infrastructure, and a failure or
disruption in these services could result
in significant harm or loss of life, major
public health impacts, long term
economic loss, and cascading
disruptions to other critical
infrastructure.236 Similarly, members of
the broader public rely on these entities
to provide assistance in the times of
greatest need.
Regarding the second factor
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1),
which relates to threat, Emergency
Services Sector entities routinely are
targeted by malicious cyber actors. As
noted in the 2012 Emergency Services
Sector Cyber Risk Assessment Fact
Sheet, Emergency Services Sector
entities ‘‘face[ ] threats from criminals,
hackers, terrorists, and nation-states, all
of whom have demonstrated varying
degrees of capability and intention to
attack [Emergency Services Sector]
cyber infrastructure.’’ 237 Malicious
cyber activity targeting law enforcement
and other Emergency Services Sector
entities has continued to be a problem
in more recent years.238 Given
Emergency Services Sector entities’
critical role in the nation’s public health
and security and their continued
targeting by malicious cyber actors, it is
essential that CISA, as the SRMA for
this sector, have an adequate
235 DHS, Emergency Services SSP: An Annex to
the NIPP 2013 (2015), available at https://
www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/emergencyservices-sector-specific-plan-2015.
236 See id. at 3–7.
237 DHS, 2012 Emergency Services Sector Cyber
Risk Assessment Fact Sheet, available at https://
www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/emergencyservices-sector-cyber-risk-assessment.
238 See, e.g., Resecurity, Cybercriminals Are
Targeting Law Enforcement Agencies Worldwide
(Aug. 19, 2022) (‘‘Resecurity registered an increase
in malicious activity targeting law enforcement
agencies at the beginning of Q2 2022.’’), available
at https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/
cybercriminals-are-targeting-law-enforcementagencies-worldwide; J.J. Green, Cyberterrorists
Targeting First Responders (Sept. 6, 2017) (‘‘A U.S.
intelligence community collaborative warned first
responders in late July about escalating efforts to
target them and their missions by cyberterrorists.’’),
available at https://wtop.com/national-security/
2017/09/cyber-terrorists-targeting-first-responders/.
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understanding of emerging cyber threats
and trends impacting this sector.
Generally speaking, entities within
the Emergency Services Sector are not
subject to any Federal cyber incident
reporting requirements. While most of
the entities within this sector are SLTT
entities likely to be captured by the
SLTT Government Facilities Sector
sector-based criterion (see Section
IV.B.iv.2.h in this document), without
this sector-based criterion, CISA would
not receive reports from those
Emergency Services Sector entities
within the private sector that fall under
the SBA Size Standards referenced in
the sized-based standard in the
Applicability section. Accordingly, to
ensure CISA has both visibility into
cyber incidents impacting privately
owned Emergency Services Sector
entities as well sufficient reporting from
this sector overall, CISA is proposing
this sector-based criteria.
Much like any other sector, entities
within the Emergency Services Sector
can vary greatly in size and resources.
For the same reasons provided above as
support for the proposal to use a sizebased threshold, CISA believes that it
makes sense to focus CIRCIA covered
cyber incident and ransom payment
reporting requirements on the larger,
better-resourced entities within the
Emergency Services Sector. To achieve
that, CISA is proposing that the
reporting requirements only apply to
those entities that support populations
equal to or greater than 50,000
individuals. CISA based its decision to
propose 50,000 individuals as the
threshold as that is consistent with the
definition of a ‘‘small government
jurisdiction’’ under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, which is the primary
law requiring Federal departments and
agencies to consider the effects of their
regulations on small businesses and
other small entities. 5 U.S.C. 601(5).
CISA believes this is an appropriate
basis for reporting under CIRCIA for the
same reasons described in Section
IV.B.iv.1.a as support for the size-based
criterion.
f. Energy Sector
CISA proposes including within the
description of covered entity any entity
that is required to report cybersecurity
incidents under NERC’s CIP Reliability
Standards or required to file an Electric
Emergency Incident and Disturbance
Report OE–417 form, or any successor
form, to DOE. This criterion proposes to
require reporting from entities registered
with NERC who are part of the BES and
identified as ‘‘Responsible Entities’’
under CIP–003–8 (Cyber Security—
Security Management Controls) or CIP–
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008–6 (Cyber Security—Incident
Reporting and Response Planning) and
any successor standards. The goal of the
CIP Cyber Security Standards is to
mitigate the risk to the reliable
operation of the BES as the result of a
cybersecurity incident. This criterion
would also require reporting from
Electric Utilities, Balancing Authorities,
Reliability Coordinators, and Generating
Entities that are subject to electric
emergency incident and disturbance
reporting requirements via Form OE–
417. DOE uses Form OE–417 to collect
information from the electric power
industry relevant to DOE’s overall
national security and National Response
Framework responsibilities. CISA is
proposing to include this specific
criterion in light of the importance of
these Energy Sector assets and the
frequency with which the energy
industry is impacted by cyber incidents.
Consideration of the factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of these entities
within the description of covered entity.
Regarding the first and third
enumerated factors (consequence and
disruption of reliable operation of
critical infrastructure), the reliable
operation of the U.S. electric energy
supply systems and BES is essential, as
infrastructure within all 16 critical
infrastructure sectors relies on
electricity to function. As noted in the
2015 Energy SSP, ‘‘[t]he energy
infrastructure provides essential fuel to
all critical infrastructure sectors, and
without energy, none of them can
operate properly. Thus the Energy
Sector serves one of the four lifeline
functions, which means that its reliable
operation is so critical that a disruption
or loss of energy function will directly
affect the security and resilience of
other critical infrastructure sectors.’’ 239
Cyber incidents affecting entities that
own or operate the Energy Sector assets
identified in the proposed criterion
could result in cascading impacts
affecting the nation’s ability to carry out
a multitude of NCFs, with significant
consequences to economic security and
public health and safety.
Regarding the second factor
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
relating to threat, Energy Sector entities
routinely are targeted by malicious
cyber actors, including foreign actors.
According to the IBM 2023 Threat
Index, the energy industry experienced
the fourth most cyber incidents between
2018 and 2022.240 The energy industry
also is one of the industries noted in the
239 Energy SSP at 19 (2015), available at https://
www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans.
240 IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42.
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2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment as likely to remain a target
of Russian government-affiliated cyber
espionage.241
The criterion proposed captures a
wide variety of Energy Sector entities, to
include both energy generators and
distributors across the spectrum of coal,
natural gas, hydroelectric, wind, and
solar. Many additional Energy Sector
entities would be required to report
under the proposed size-based threshold
or other proposed sector-based criteria,
such as the criteria requiring reporting
from owners and operators of
commercial nuclear power reactors and
certain pipelines (see Sections
IV.B.iv.2.k and l in this document).
CISA acknowledges the potential for
the inclusion of this criterion to create
an additional reporting obligation on
entities already required to report cyber
incidents to the Federal government.
CISA is committed to working with
DOE, FERC, and NERC to explore the
applicability of the substantially similar
reporting exception to enable, to the
extent practicable, entities subject to
both CIRCIA and CIP Reliability
Standards or Form OE–417 reporting
requirements to be able to comply with
both regulatory reporting regimes
through the submission of a single
report to the Federal government.
Additional information on the
substantially similar reporting exception
can be found in Section IV.D.i in this
document.
When developing the sector-based
criteria for the Energy Sector, CISA also
considered developing a criterion
focused on entities within the Energy
Sector’s Oil and Natural Gas Subsector.
The Oil and Natural Gas Subsector
includes entities engaged in the
production, gathering, processing,
transmission, distribution, and storage
of oil and gas, such as wells, processing
plants and refineries, gathering and
boosting stations, and natural or
manmade storage facilities.242 CISA
anticipates that many Oil and Natural
Gas Subsector entities will be
considered covered entities through the
size-based threshold, and that many
others will be captured under any of a
number of other proposed sector-based
criteria, such as the Chemical Sector
sector-based criterion covering entities
that own or operate CFATS facilities,
the Transportation Systems Sector
sector-based criterion covering entities
that own or operate MTSA facilities,
241 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment,
supra note 188, at 20.
242 See EPA, Overview of the Oil and Natural Gas
Industry, https://www.epa.gov/natural-gas-starprogram/overview-oil-and-natural-gas-industry (last
visited on Nov. 28, 2023).
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and the Transportation Systems Sector
sector-based criterion covering entities
that own or operate certain designated
pipelines (see Sections IV.B.iv.2.a and l
in this document). In light of the
number of Oil and Natural Gas
Subsector entities that CISA anticipates
will be covered through these other
criteria, CISA is not proposing a specific
sector-based criterion for this subsector.
However, if as a result of public
comment, CISA determines that it must
modify or eliminate any aspect of the
description of covered entity through
which Oil and Natural Gas Subsector
entities currently would be included as
part of this proposed rule, including the
size-based criterion, CISA may
incorporate a sector specific criterion or
multiple criteria focused on Oil and
Natural Gas Subsector entities in the
final rule to ensure these entities remain
covered entities.
If CISA were to include a specific Oil
and Natural Gas Subsector sector-based
criterion, it would likely set a threshold
for Oil and Natural Gas Subsector
entities and only those entities that
exceed a specific size threshold would
be considered a covered entity. Such a
threshold would be set by CISA to
ensure that the largest Subsector entities
would be required to report, similar to
the scope of entities that would be
required to report under the proposed
SBA size-based criterion, and could
likely leverage the SBA Table of Size
Standards employee or annual revenue
thresholds using NAICS codes
applicable to the Subsector to create an
average that would become the
threshold. CISA may also consider
creating a threshold based on metrics
specific to entities that are part of the
Oil and Natural Gas Subsector, such as
those entities exceeding specified
refinery production capacity or
liquefied natural gas terminal storage
capacity.
CISA is interested in receiving
comments from the public on the
following topics:
12. CISA’s proposal to incorporate Oil
and Natural Gas Subsector entities
primarily through the size-based
threshold instead of developing one or
more criteria specifically targeting Oil
and Natural Gas Subsector entities—and
whether this size threshold will capture
the correct population of entities in this
subsector.
13. The potential alternative criteria
that could be included if any of the
current proposed criteria that would
otherwise capture Oil and Natural Gas
Subsector entities were modified or not
included in the final rule.
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CISA proposes to include in the
description of covered entity various
Financial Services Sector entities that, if
victimized in a covered cyber incident,
have the potential to impact the
economic security of the nation.
Specifically, CISA is proposing to
include in the description of covered
entity (1) all of the Financial Services
Sector entities that are required to report
cybersecurity incidents to their
respective primary Federal regulator
(e.g., national banks; savings and loans
holding companies; FICUs), (2)
Financial Services Sector entities for
whom the primary Federal regulator has
indicated an intention to require
cybersecurity incident reporting (e.g.,
futures commission merchants; 243
security-based swap data repositories),
and (3) Financial Services Sector
entities encouraged or expected to
report cybersecurity incidents to their
primary Federal regulator pursuant to
an Advisory Bulletin (e.g., Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac; 244 money services
businesses).245
CISA believes the inclusion of these
entities in the description of covered
entity is supported by consideration of
the factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1). As noted by many of the
regulatory agencies currently requiring
cyber incident reporting from Financial
Services Sector entities, requiring the
proposed entities to report helps
promote early awareness of emerging
threats to the financial system, and
allows entities and their primary
regulators to react to any such threats
before they become systemic and
threaten the nation’s economic
security.246 This is especially important
243 See Testimony of CFTC Chairman Rostin
Behnam on the ‘‘State of the CFTC,’’ U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Agriculture (Mar. 31,
2022), available at https://agriculture.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/behnam_testimony_house_ag_3-312022.pdf.
244 Pursuant to Advisory Bulletin 2020–05, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are expected to report certain
cybersecurity incidents to the FHFA. See AB 2020–
05: Enterprise Cybersecurity Incident Reporting
(Aug. 21, 2020), available at https://www.fhfa.gov/
SupervisionRegulation/AdvisoryBulletins/Pages/
Enterprise-Cybersecurity-Incident-Reporting.aspx.
245 Pursuant to Advisory Bulletin FIN–2016–A005,
money services businesses are expected to report
certain cybersecurity incidents to the Department of
the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network. See FIN–2016–A005, Advisory to
Financial Institutions on Cyber-Events and CyberEnabled Crime (Oct. 25, 2016), available at https://
www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincenadvisory-fin-2016-a005.
246 See, e.g., 86 FR 66424, 66424 (Nov. 23, 2021)
(‘‘This requirement will help promote early
awareness of emerging threats to banking
organizations and the broader financial system.
This early awareness will help the agencies react to
these threats before they become systemic.’’); 88 FR
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given the continued targeting of
Financial Services Sector entities by
malicious cyber actors, as relevant to the
second factor enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) related to threat. According to
the IBM 2023 Threat Index, Financial
Services Sector entities have
experienced either the most or second
most cyber incidents for each of the past
five years,247 while the 2024 Homeland
Security Threat Assessment highlights
financial services as one of the sectors
Chinese government cyber actors are
likely to continue targeting.248 As to the
third factor, i.e., the extent to which
damage, disruption, or unauthorized
access will likely enable the disruption
of the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure, systemic impacts to the
Financial Services Sector has the
potential to disrupt the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure in
light of virtually every critical
infrastructure sectors’ reliance on
financial services entities for the
conduct of day-to-day business
operations.
As with several other proposed sectorbased criteria, CISA recognizes that
entities that would be required to report
under these criteria are, for the most
part, already required to report to
another Federal regulatory agency.
Given their importance to the nation’s
economy and the frequency with which
they are targeted, CISA nevertheless is
proposing to include them within the
CIRCIA Applicability section ensure
that the Federal government is able to
receive information necessary to
identify cyber threats against, exploited
vulnerabilities of, and TTPs used to
effect entities in this community
without reliance on other authorities
whose primary focus may not be
security, and who might not currently or
in the future require the submission of
information necessary for CISA to
achieve the purposes for which CIRCIA
was enacted. CISA acknowledges the
potential this creates for duplicative
12811, 12811 (Mar. 1, 2023) (‘‘[G]iven the growing
frequency and severity of cyber incidents within the
financial services industry, it is important that the
NCUA receive timely notice of cyber incidents that
disrupt a FICU’s operations, lead to unauthorized
access to sensitive data, or disrupt members’ access
to accounts or services.’’); 88 FR 23146, 23147 (Apr.
14, 2023) (‘‘[T]he regulation requires that SCI
entities have policies and procedures reasonably
designed to ensure that their systems have levels of
capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and
security, adequate to maintain their operational
capability and promote the maintenance of fair and
orderly markets. . . .’’).
247 IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42;
see also Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50
(noting the Finance industry had the third highest
number of incidents in 2022).
248 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment,
supra note 188, at 20.
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reporting and is committed to working
with the respective Financial Services
Sector Federal regulatory agencies to
explore the applicability of the
substantially similar reporting exception
to enable, to the extent practicable,
entities subject to both CIRCIA and
another reporting requirement to be able
to comply with both regulatory
reporting regimes through the
submission of a single report to the
Federal government. Additional
information on the substantially similar
reporting exception can be found in
Section IV.D.i in this document.
h. Government Facilities Sector
CISA proposes to include three
different sector-based criteria for entities
in the Government Facilities Sector, one
focused on SLTT Government Entities,
one focused on Education Subsector
entities, and one focused on Elections
Infrastructure Subsector entities. First,
CISA proposes to include in the
description of covered entity any SLTT
Government entity for a jurisdiction
with a population equal to or greater
than 50,000 individuals. Second, CISA
proposes to include in the description of
covered entity any entity that qualifies
as either (A) a local educational agency
(LEA), educational service agency
(ESA), or state educational agency
(SEA), as defined under 20 U.S.C. 7801,
with a student population of 1,000 or
more students; or (B) an institute of
higher education (IHE) that receives
funding under Title IV of the Higher
Education Act. Third, CISA is proposing
to include in the description of covered
entity any entity that manufactures,
sells, or provides managed service for
information and communications
technology specifically used to support
election processes or report and display
results on behalf of SLTT governments,
including but not limited to voter
registration databases; voting systems;
and information and communication
technologies (ICT) used to report,
display, validate, or finalize election
results. As discussed in greater detail in
Section IV.D.iii in this document, CISA
is proposing to except from required
reporting Federal agencies already
required to report incidents to CISA
under FISMA, such that these sectorbased criteria are focused on SLTT and
private sector members of the
Government Facilities sector.
With the first of these three criteria,
CISA is seeking reporting from SLTT
Government Entities from jurisdictions
over a certain size. Consideration of the
factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) supports the inclusion of
larger SLTT Government Entities in the
description of covered entity. Regarding
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the first factor, it is likely that the
disruption or compromise of only some
of the largest SLTT Government Entities
have the potential to cause significant
consequences on a large enough scale to
impact national security, economic
security, and, especially, public health
and safety. SLTT Government Entities
are responsible for numerous NCFs
within their jurisdictions, overseeing
functions such as developing and
maintaining public works and services,
preparing for and managing
emergencies, and preserving
constitutional rights. Similarly, along
with their Federal counterparts, SLTT
Government Entities like State
Departments of Health provide a wide
variety of services that are critical to the
public health and well-being of their
citizenry.
As to the second factor CISA is to
consider, i.e., the likelihood that such
an entity will be targeted by a malicious
cyber actor, SLTT Government Entities
are frequently impacted by cyber
incidents.249 Furthermore, the 2024
Homeland Security Threat Assessment
indicates that SLTT Government
Entities are likely to remain the targets
of foreign governments, such as Russia
and China.250
Third, damage or disruption to
various SLTT Government Entities have
the potential to disrupt the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure.
SLTT Government Entities own or
operate critical infrastructure across
various sectors, to include energy,
water, transportation, and emergency
services among others. Damage or
disruption of these entities has potential
to directly impact the reliable operation
of critical infrastructure and to create
the potential for cascading impacts
affecting the reliable operations of other
critical infrastructure as well.
For the same reasons that CISA is
proposing to limit the Emergency
Services Sector sector-based criteria to
entities that serve populations equal to
or greater than 50,000 individuals (see
Section IV.B.iv.2.e), CISA is proposing
to use the same small government
jurisdiction threshold to demark which
SLTT jurisdictions’ government entities
249 See, e.g., Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181,
at 50 (public administration entities experienced
the second largest number of reported incidents);
IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42
(listing Government as the eighth most impacted
industry).
250 See 2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment, supra note 188, at 20 (‘‘Russian
government-affiliated cyber espionage likely will
remain a persistent threat to federal, state, and local
governments [and] Chinese government cyber actors
likely will continue to target key critical
infrastructure sectors in the United States,
including . . . government facilities.’’).
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will be required to report. CISA believes
that this line of demarcation, which
would provide regulatory relief to more
than two-thirds of counties and over
95% of cities from which CISA could
require reporting under the statutory
definition of covered entity, should
cover enough entities to provide
sufficient data for CISA to perform cyber
incident trend and threat analysis for
this vital community.
With the second of these criteria—
covering LEAs, ESAs, and SEAs with
student populations of 1,000 or more
students, as well as IHE that receive
funding under Title IV of the Higher
Education Act—CISA seeks to ensure
reporting from a sufficient cross-sector
of entities to understand and be able to
share information on threats to our
nation’s education facilities.
Consideration of the factors enumerated
in 6 U.S.C 681b(c)(1) supports the
inclusion of these entities within the
description of covered entity, especially
the second factor related to threat.
As noted in the 2024 Homeland
Security Threat Assessment,
‘‘[Kindergarten through 12th grade (K–
12)] school districts have been a near
constant ransomware target due to
school systems’ IT budget constraints
and lack of dedicated resources, as well
as ransomware actors’ success at
extracting payment from some schools
that are required to function within
certain dates and hours.’’ 251 The
Verizon 2022 DBIR and the IBM 2023
Threat Index both identified education
facilities as the sixth most frequently
impacted industry in 2022.252 A recent
U.S. GAO report on cybersecurity at K–
12 schools echoed this conclusion,
stating that ‘‘research from several
federal and private sector sources
indicate that cyber threats [against K–12
schools] have escalated over time, and
are becoming more sophisticated and
pervasive.’’ 253 Many Education
Subsector entities, primarily IHE, also
own infrastructure or perform activities
that support national security, public
health and safety, and the reliable
operations of critical infrastructure,
such as hospitals, first responder
organizations, water and wastewater
treatment facilities, energy facilities,
and research facilities.
To obtain reporting from a
representative cross-section of
251 See 2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment, supra note 188, at 18.
252 Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50; IBM
2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42.
253 U.S. GAO, GAO–23–105480, Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Additional Federal
Coordination is Needed to Enhance K–12
Cybersecurity at 12 (2022), available at https://
www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105480.
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Education Subsector entities, CISA
proposes two prongs to the criterion for
this subsector, one focused on the K–12
community and one focused on IHE. For
the K–12 community, CISA proposes to
require reporting from LEAs, ESAs, and
SEAs, as defined in 20 U.S.C. 7801 (part
of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, as amended (20 U.S.C.
6301 et seq.)), with a student population
of 1,000 or more students. LEAs, more
commonly referred to as school
districts, are the public authorities
legally constituted within a State for
administrative control or direction of
public schools in a city, county,
township, school district, or other
political subdivision of a State.254 SEAs
are the Statewide board of education or
other agency or officer primarily
responsible for the supervision of
schools within a state.255 ESAs are stateauthorized regional service centers that
often provide direct education service
delivery to schools and districts in their
respective regions.
CISA proposes to require reporting
from LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs with
student populations of 1,000 or more
students. This threshold would capture
in the description of covered entities all
SEAs, approximately half of all LEAs,
and some percentage of ESAs, with
smaller LEAs and ESAs excluded from
the reporting population.256
CISA is proposing this threshold,
which is limited to LEAs, SEAs, and
ESAs, with larger student populations,
for three primary reasons. First, studies
show that ‘‘larger school districts (as
defined by student enrollment) appear
to be at a significantly greater risk for
experiencing a cyber incident than
small school districts.’’ 257 Second,
covered cyber incidents impacting
education agencies with larger student
populations will, on average, have a
greater likelihood of impacting more
individuals, thus potentially causing
more substantial impacts than incidents
perpetrated against education agencies
with smaller student populations.
Finally, similar to the use of the small
government jurisdiction definition as a
254 34
CFR 303.23.
CFR 300.41.
256 All SEAs (56 of 56) and approximately 52%
of LEAs (6,911 of 13,318) have student populations
of 1,000 or more students. See National Center for
Education Statistics, 2022 Digest of Education
Statistics, Table 214.20, available at https://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d22/tables/dt22_
214.20.asp. As the student population covered by
each ESA is not readily available, to be
conservative, for purposes of the CIRCIA RIA, CISA
is assuming all 553 ESAs serve student populations
of 1,000 or more students.
257 Douglas Levin, The State of K–12
Cybersecurity: Year in Review—2022 Annual Report
at 15, available at https://www.k12six.org/thereport.
255 34
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threshold line of demarcation for other
SLTT Government Entities, CISA
believes this approach will afford
regulatory relief to smaller entities that
are likely to have fewer resources with
which to comply with CIRCIA’s
incident reporting requirements, while
still requiring reporting from a broad
enough population to provide sufficient
data for CISA to perform cyber incident
trend and threat analysis for this
community.
In developing this criterion and
threshold, CISA considered various
alternatives, including (1) covering
LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs with student
populations of 2,500 students or more;
(2) using the same small government
jurisdiction threshold CISA is proposing
to use for other SLTT Government
Entities and entities required to report
under the Emergency Services Sector
sector-based criteria (i.e., entities
serving jurisdictions with a population
of 50,000 or more individuals); and (3)
requiring reporting from all LEAs, SEAs,
and ESAs.
The first alternative CISA considered
was establishing a higher threshold
based on student population,
specifically one that would require
reporting from LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs
with 2,500 or more students. Setting the
threshold at 2,500 students would result
in approximately 30% of all LEAs,
SEAs, and ESAs collectively qualifying
as covered entities.258 The primary
benefit of this threshold, in comparison
to the proposed 1,000 student threshold,
would be the lower costs to the K–12
community resulting from having fewer
entities qualify as covered entities.
However, an analysis conducted by the
Department of Education based on cyber
incidents impacting the K–12
community that were voluntarily
reported to CISA in 2023 showed that
the greatest percentage of incidents
impacting the K–12 community
impacted school districts with between
1,000 and 2,500 students (around
approximately 30% of all incidents).
This represents the largest percentage of
incidents experienced by any of the
size-based segments of the K–12
community analyzed by the Department
of Education.259 Given the large
percentage of cyber incidents impacting
school districts with between 1,000 and
2,500 students, CISA believes the small
additional burden imposed on the sector
by requiring reporting from education
agencies with between 1,000 and 2,500
students that experience a substantial
cyber incident or make a ransom
payment is outweighed by the benefit of
the additional insight into cybersecurity
threats targeting the K–12 community
that this additional coverage would
provide. Thus, CISA has elected to
propose setting the student population
threshold at 1,000 students, and not
2,500 students. CISA acknowledges that
it may be possible to set this threshold
at 2,500 students and get some reporting
that would be informative to the overall
subsector; however, CISA does not
believe this will result in representative
or adequate reporting for the subsector
because it would not include the
population that is most likely to be
targeted by malicious actors based on
the Department of Education’s analysis.
Nonetheless, CISA is interested in
receiving comments on the proposal to
set the threshold at 1,000 students
versus 2,500 students for this subsector,
and what benefits or disadvantages may
exist for selecting one threshold over
another.
Regarding the second alternative
considered—i.e., using the same
jurisdiction-based threshold that CISA
is proposing for other SLTT Government
Entities—CISA sees value in using the
same threshold across all SLTT
Government Entities, which includes
LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs. Doing so would
avoid potential confusion resulting from
having different thresholds for different
types of SLTT Government Entities.
However, based on consultations with
the Department of Education, CISA
understands that school districts
frequently do not follow typical county,
city, or other jurisdictional lines, with
many LEAs and ESAs covering schools
that are located in multiple
jurisdictions. As a result, the number of
individuals within a given LEA’s or
ESA’s ‘‘jurisdiction’’ may not be readily
available or discernable, causing many
LEAs and ESAs to have difficulties in
determining if they meet a criterion
258 All SEAs (56 of 56) and approximately 28%
of LEAs (3,726 of 13,318) have student populations
of 2,500 or more students. See National Center for
Education Statistics, 2022 Digest of Education
Statistics, Table 214.20, available at https://
nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d22/tables/dt22_
214.20.asp. As the student population covered by
each ESA is not readily available, to be
conservative, for purposes of the CIRCIA RIA, CISA
is assuming all 553 ESAs serve student populations
of 2,500 or more students.
259 Department of Education analyzed the
incidents experienced by K–12 school districts with
the following size-based segments: 25,000 or more
students; 10,000–24,999 students; 5,000–9,999
students; 2,500–4,999 students; 1,000–2,499
students; 600–999 students; 300–599 students; 1–
299 students; and no size reported. Even combining
some of the other segments, the 1,000–2,499
students segment still experienced a greater
percentage of the analyzed incidents than other
segments (e.g., more than all of the smaller
segments combined, more than the 2,500–4,999 and
5,000–9,999 students segments combined, and more
than the 10,000–24,999 and 25,000 or more
students segments combined).
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based on the number of individuals
located within their ‘‘jurisdiction.’’
Conversely, student population is a
standard metric used within the K–12
community for various purposes and is
a metric with which every LEA, SEA,
and ESA should be very familiar. As an
entity’s ability to determine whether it
is a covered entity is crucial to
implementation of the proposed
regulation, CISA believes it is preferable
to use a student population-based
metric for the K–12 community rather
than the jurisdictional population-based
metric CISA is proposing for the sectorbased criteria for other SLTT
Government Entities.
Regarding the final alternative
considered—i.e., covering all LEAs,
SEAs, and ESAs—there are some
arguments in favor of broader reporting
requirements, such as the frequency
with which educational entities are
subjected to cyber incidents and the
absence of any other nationwide cyber
incident reporting requirements for this
community. Ultimately, however, CISA
decided that, for the same reasons CISA
is proposing a size threshold for the
sector-based criteria for other SLTT
Government Entities and several other
sectors and subsectors, proposing a size
threshold for the sector-based criteria
for the K–12 community is the most
well-supported approach. Doing so not
only supports general consistency in
approach across the SLTT Government
Entities’ community, but also promotes
the correct balance between burden and
ensuring sufficient reporting from this
community.
CISA is interested in receiving
comments on this prong of the proposed
sector-based criteria, to include:
14. Whether CISA should include a
size threshold for education agencies
that would be required to report and, if
so, what metric (e.g., student
population; number of individuals
within the jurisdiction) should be used
as the unit or measurement for the
threshold.
15. If CISA were to include a criterion
for education agencies using a size
threshold based on student population,
whether 1,000 students, 2,500 students,
or another number of students would be
the optimal threshold for this subsector
criterion and why.
16. Whether CISA should include a
criterion to require reporting from some
or all private schools operating in the
K–12 space, as cyber incidents
impacting K–12 private schools would
not be subject to reporting under the
current proposal (unless they qualify as
a covered entity under the general sizebased threshold) since LEAs, SEAs, and
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ESAs do not have authority over private
schools.
The Government Facilities Education
Subsector sector-based criteria would
also include in the description of
covered entity those IHE that receive
funding under Title IV of the Higher
Education Act (Title IV). In addition to
being part of a routinely targeted
subsector, given the diverse roles IHE
can play in various NCFs, the
consequences of a covered cyber
incident impacting an IHE could be
significant. For example, some IHE
provide research or other support to
national security entities such as DOD
and DHS, others are high-risk chemical
facilities regulated under CFATS. While
some IHE might be covered by the
Applicability section based on other
sector-based criteria, CISA believes it is
important to require reporting from IHE
more broadly.
IHE that receive funding under Title
IV include any IHE—be it a college or
university that offers a 2-year or 4-year
degree, a trade school, or other type of
IHE—that offers Federal financial aid to
its students. This includes the majority
of IHE, ensuring that CISA will receive
adequate reporting to identify
cybersecurity trends for the entire IHE
community. Title IV-funded IHE also
already are subject to cybersecurity
incident reporting requirements under
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, but that is
limited to reporting to the Department
of Education cybersecurity incidents
resulting in unauthorized access to
student information. This proposal will
expand the scope of reporting required
of these IHE to reporting on a broader
range of cybersecurity incidents and any
ransom payments made by these
entities.
With the third proposed Government
Facilities Sector sector-based criteria—
entities that manufacture, sell, or
provide managed service for
information and communications
technology specifically used to support
election processes or report and display
results on behalf of SLTT governments,
including but not limited to voter
registration databases; voting systems;
and ICT used to report, display,
validate, or finalize election results—
CISA is seeking to ensure sufficient
reporting to understand cyberthreats to
our nation’s elections infrastructure and
assist SLTT election officials and their
private sector partners to prevent,
respond to, and mitigate impacts of
cyber incidents impacting elections
infrastructure. In January 2017, DHS
officially designated election
infrastructure as a critical infrastructure
subsector of the Government Facilities
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Sector.260 In this designation, the
Department stated that the United
States’ election infrastructure is vital to
our national interest and must be a
priority for cybersecurity assistance and
protections provided by the
Department.261
Election infrastructure refers to
storage facilities, polling places, and
centralized vote tabulation locations
used to support the election process,
and ICT systems used to manage the
election process and report and display
results on behalf of SLTT governments.
Such ICT systems include, but are not
limited to, voter registration databases
and other systems used to manage the
voter registration process and maintain
voter registration data; electronic poll
books; voting systems, election
management systems, and other systems
used to create, print, facilitate the voting
of, and tabulate ballots, including
electronic ballot delivery, marking, and
return systems, as well as systems used
to validate, audit, certify, or otherwise
finalize election results; and public
information systems used to display
election information and results to the
public, including SLTT election
websites and election night reporting
systems. These and other types of
technologies used to manage the
election process are described in greater
detail in the Election Infrastructure
SSP.262
Currently, entities that manufacture,
sell, or provide managed services for
ICT specifically used to support election
processes are not subject to any Federal
cyber incident reporting requirements.
Consequently, in conjunction with the
first Government Facilities Sector
sector-based criterion, which would
require reporting from SLTT election
entities for jurisdictions with
populations greater than 50,000
individuals, CISA believes this third
Government Facilities Sector sectorbased criterion focused on private sector
members of the Election Infrastructure
Subsector is necessary to ensure CISA
and its Federal partners receive
sufficient reporting from both public
and private sector entities within the
Elections Infrastructure Subsector to
260 See Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the
Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical
Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6, 2017), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statementsecretary-johnson-designation-electioninfrastructure-critical (hereinafter ‘‘Statement by
Secretary Jeh Johnson’’).
261 Id.
262 Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific
Plan: An Annex to the NIPP 2013 (2020), available
at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/election_infrastructure_subsector_
specific_plan.pdf.
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understand the cyber threats to elections
infrastructure.
CISA believes that including these
entities in the description of covered
entity is supported by a consideration of
the three factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) (i.e., consequence, threat, and
disruption of reliable operation of
critical infrastructure). While damage or
disruption of election infrastructure
may not directly produce national
security, economic security, or public
health and safety consequences, the
impact of eroded public confidence in
our election system may indirectly lead
to such consequences.263 Damage,
destruction, or unauthorized access to
elections infrastructure would impact
the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure as certain systems and
assets of election infrastructure
themselves are critical infrastructure.264
Finally, malicious cyber actors have
targeted and are expected to continue to
target elections infrastructure.265
CISA recognizes that many standard
ICT, such as laptops, cell phones, email,
staff management and payroll software,
and business and data management
software may be used by entities
responsible for the conduct and
management of elections. CISA does not
intend for this sector-based criterion to
capture entities that manufacture, sell,
or provide managed services related to
those types of ICT, except to the extent
that they are specifically used for
election processes. Thus, for example,
while an entity that develops, sells, or
provides managed services related to
software specifically designed to
facilitate the management of temporary
election workers would be considered a
covered entity under this proposed
criterion, a standard staff management
and payroll software provider would not
be considered a covered entity simply
263 See Final Report of the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol (Dec. 22, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-J6-REPORT/.
264 Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson, supra
note 260 (‘‘Given the vital role elections play in this
country, it is clear that certain systems and assets
of election infrastructure meet the definition of
critical infrastructure, in fact and in law.’’).
265 See 2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment, supra note 188, at 19 (‘‘Our electoral
processes remain an attractive target for many
adversaries, and we expect many of them will seek
to influence or interfere with the 2024 election . . .
Cyber actors likely will seek to exploit electionrelated networks and data, including state, local,
and political parties’ networks and election
officials’ personal devices and email accounts. . . .
Though we continue to strengthen the integrity of
our elections infrastructure, cyber actors, both
government-affiliated and cyber criminals, likely
will remain opportunistic in their targeting of
election-related networks and data, routinely
attempting to exploit misconfigured or vulnerable
public-facing websites, webservers, and electionrelated information technology systems.’’).
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because an SLTT election office uses the
software to conduct routine business.
i. Healthcare and Public Health Sector
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CISA proposes to include in the
description of covered entity 266
multiple sector-based criteria related to
the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.
As its name implies, entities within the
Healthcare and Public Health Sector,
along with Federal and SLTT
Departments of Health and similar
government entities that are part of the
Government Facilities Sector, are
essential to the maintenance of the
public health of the nation, providing
goods and services that are integral to
maintaining local, national, and global
health security. Entities within the
sector provide various services, to
include direct patient care, medical
equipment and materials, laboratory
support, health IT, health plans, and
mass fatality management services.267
Unfortunately, entities within this
sector routinely experience cyber
incidents, with U.S. healthcare entities
experiencing the seventh most cyber
incidents of any industry in 2022.268
Many entities within the sector
currently are required to report certain
cyber incidents to HHS under the
HIPAA Breach Notification Rule (45
CFR 164.400–414) and to the Federal
Trade Commission under the HITECH
Act Health Breach Notification Rule (16
CFR 318); however, those requirements
are generally focused solely on data
breaches and do not require reporting of
other types of cyber incidents that do
not involve unauthorized acquisition of
or access to personal health information.
Device manufacturers, importers,
distributors, and user facilities must
establish and maintain records, make
such reports, and provide such
information, as the Secretary of Health
and Human Services may by regulation
reasonably require to assure that such
device is not adulterated or misbranded
and to otherwise assure its safety and
effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. 360i(a). FDA’s
regulations at 21 CFR part 803 require
device manufacturers and importers, to
report certain device-related adverse
266 CISA is aware that covered entity also is a
defined term in the HIPAA regulations. As noted in
the proposed § 226.1, the definitions included in
this proposed rule are ‘‘[f]or the purposes of this
Part.’’ Whenever the term covered entity is used in
this document, it is referring to the statutory term
in CIRCIA and/or the proposed definition of
covered entity in the CIRCIA proposed rule, and not
to entities that meet the existing HIPAA regulatory
definition of covered entity or any other existing
definition of the term covered entity.
267 See Healthcare and Public Health SSP, supra
note 173.
268 See IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217,
at 42; Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50.
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events and product problems, including
those caused by cyber incidents, to the
FDA, but that reporting requirement is
limited to situations where a device is
likely to or has caused or contributed to
a death or serious injury or for medical
device manufacturers and importers
when they initiate a correction or
removal of a medical device to reduce
a risk to health posed by the device. In
light of the sector’s broad importance to
public health, the diverse nature of the
entities that compose the sector, the
historical targeting of the sector, and the
current lack of required reporting
unrelated to data breaches or medical
devices, CISA proposes requiring
reporting from multiple parts of this
sector.
The first criterion CISA proposes
related to this sector will mean that
certain entities providing direct patient
care will be considered covered entities.
Specifically, CISA proposes including
in the description of covered entity any
entity that owns or operates (1) a
hospital, as defined by 42 U.S.C.
1395x(e), with 100 or more beds, or (2)
a critical access hospital, as defined by
42 U.S.C. 1395x(mm)(1). Many different
types of entities provide direct care to
patients, such as hospitals, clinics,
urgent care facilities, medical offices,
surgical centers, rehabilitation centers,
nursing homes, and hospices. The size
of the facilities, the number of patients
cared for daily, and the types of services
provided can vary dramatically across
these entities. While all of these various
types of entities contribute to the
nation’s public health and well-being,
CISA does not believe it is prudent or
cost-effective to require covered cyber
incident and ransom payment reporting
from every individual provider of
patient care. Rather, CISA is proposing
to focus on hospitals, as they routinely
provide the most critical care of these
various types of entities, and patients
and communities rely on them to
remain operational, including in the
face of cyber incidents affecting their
devices, systems, and networks to keep
them functioning.
Currently, there are approximately
6,000 hospitals in the United States.269
CISA is proposing requiring reporting
from larger hospitals (i.e., those with
more than 100 beds) and critical access
hospitals. CISA believes it is
worthwhile to focus on larger hospitals
for required reporting, as they are more
likely than smaller hospitals to
experience substantial impacts if they
fall victim to a covered cyber incident
269 See American Hospital Association, Fast Facts
on U.S. Hospitals, https://www.aha.org/statistics/
fast-facts-us-hospitals (last visited July 31, 2023).
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given their size and the correspondingly
greater number of patients they are
caring for on any given day.
Additionally, focusing on larger
hospitals is supported by much of the
same rationale behind CISA’s decision
to propose an overall size-based
criterion based on the SBA small
business size standards in the
Applicability section (e.g., larger
hospitals are more likely to have inhouse or access to cyber expertise; larger
hospitals are likely to be better
equipped to simultaneously respond to
and report a cyber incident).
While CISA is not generally proposing
to require reporting from smaller
hospitals, CISA is proposing to require
reporting from critical access hospitals.
Critical access hospitals are facilities
that have been certified by the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services as
meeting certain criteria, including that
they are located in a state that has
established a Medicare rural hospital
flexibility program, and that they are
designated as a critical access hospital
by the State in which they are located,
among other requirements.270 CISA is
proposing to include these in the
reporting requirements as they typically
are the only source of emergency
medical care for individuals living
within certain rural areas. As a result, a
substantial cyber incident at a critical
access hospital may have
disproportionate impacts to its size
given the limited alternative emergency
health care options for individuals
within its service area.
The second public health and
healthcare sector sector-based criterion
CISA is proposing would require
reporting from manufacturers of drugs
listed in Appendix A of the report
Essential Medicines Supply Chain and
Manufacturing Resilience Assessment,
sponsored by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)
Administration for Strategic
Preparedness and Response (ASPR).271
In this report, ASPR, in collaboration
with governmental and nongovernmental entities, prioritized 86
essential medicines identified as either
critical for minimum patient care in
acute settings or important for acute
care or important for acute care of
respiratory illnesses/conditions, with no
270 See section 1820(e) of the Social Security Act
and 42 CFR 485.601 et seq.
271 ARMI, Essential Medicines Supply Chain and
Manufacturing Resilience Assessment (May 2022),
available at https://www.armiusa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2022/07/ARMI_Essential-Medicines_
Supply-Chain-Report_508.pdf; see also ASPR,
Essential Medicines Report Now Available (May 23,
2022), available at https://aspr.hhs.gov/newsroom/
Pages/Essential-Medicines-May22.aspx.
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comparable alternative available. The
report was published in response to a
commitment by the Biden
Administration, in its June 2021 100day review of the pharmaceutical
supply chain as tasked in Executive
Order 14017, to ‘‘assemble a consortium
of public health experts (including
emergency medicine and critical care)
in the government, non-profit, and
private sector to review [a previous list
of Essential Medicines, Medical
Countermeasures, Critical Inputs
developed by FDA in response to
Executive Order 13944], and
recommend 50–100 drugs that are most
critical to have available at all times for
U.S. patients because of their clinical
need and lack of therapeutic
redundancy.’’ 272 Given the importance
of these products, CISA believes it is
appropriate to include manufacturers of
these products among the CIRCIA
covered entity population in order to
enable the Federal government to more
quickly identify any emerging
cyberthreats against them.
Third, CISA is proposing to require
reporting from manufacturers of Class II
(moderate risk) and Class III (high risk)
devices, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 360c.
FDA has established classifications for
approximately 1,700 different generic
types of devices, each of which is
assigned to one of three regulatory
classes based on the level of control
necessary to provide reasonable
assurance of the safety and effectiveness
of the device.273 These classifications
are risk-based, with Class I devices
presenting the lowest risk and Class III
devices presenting the greatest risk.274
Based on discussions with FDA, CISA
believes that requiring reporting from
manufacturers of Class II and III devices
provides a risk-based means balancing
reporting from medical device
manufacturers while supporting the
collection of an adequate amount of
reporting to understand cyber threats,
vulnerabilities, and TTPs for this
industry segment.
CISA believes that the inclusion of all
three Healthcare and Public Health
Sector sector-based criteria is supported
by a consideration of the three factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) (i.e.,
consequence, threat, and disruption of
the reliable operation of critical
272 Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Review of
Pharmaceuticals and Active Pharmaceutical
Ingredients at 243 (June 2021), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/
100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf.
273 See FDA, Classify Your Medical Device,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overviewdevice-regulation/classify-your-medical-device (last
visited July 24, 2023).
274 See id.
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infrastructure). Regarding the first
factor, consequence, disruption or
compromise at any of these key sector
assets has the potential for significant
impacts to public health and safety. All
hospitals play an important role in
public health, but disruption or
compromise impacting any of the
hospitals CISA proposes to cover could
have especially significant impacts on
public health given the number of
patients and types of services provided
at large hospitals, and the fact that
critical access hospitals may be the only
source of emergency care in their
immediate vicinity, sometimes for
hundreds of miles. Similarly, a
compromise or disruption resulting in
unavailability, supply shortages, or
compromise of essential medicines,
medical countermeasures, or Class II
and III medical devices has a significant
potential for creating public health
consequences on a scale that could
impact all Americans. Regarding the
second factor, threat, entities within the
Healthcare and Public Health sector
routinely experience cyber incidents.275
The DHS 2024 Homeland Security
Threat Assessment indicates that threats
against this sector include Russian and
Chinese government-affiliated actors,
who are likely to continue to target the
healthcare and public health sector.276
Finally, regarding the third factor, the
disruption of the reliable operation of
critical infrastructure, the entities that
would be covered under the criteria—
large hospitals; critical access hospitals;
manufacturers of essential medicines;
and manufacturers of Class II and III
medical devices—typically themselves
are considered critical infrastructure.
Moreover, as the COVID–19 pandemic
demonstrated, significant events
impacting the public health can have
cascading affects that threaten the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure across multiple sectors.
In establishing these proposed
criteria, CISA also considered including
criteria related to health insurance
companies, health IT providers, and
entities operating laboratories or other
medical diagnostics facilities.
Ultimately, CISA determined it was not
necessary to include specific sectorbased criteria for any of those three
industry segments. In the case of health
insurance companies and entities
operating laboratories or other medical
diagnostics facilities, CISA believes a
sufficient number of entities already
will be captured under the size-based
275 See
IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217,
at 42; Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50.
276 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment,
supra note 188, at 20.
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criterion that applies across all critical
infrastructure sectors. However, if as a
result of public comment, CISA
determines that it must modify or
eliminate any aspect of the description
of covered entity through which health
insurance companies and entities
operating laboratories or other medical
diagnostics facilities are currently
captured as part of this proposed rule,
including the size-based criterion, CISA
may incorporate a sector-based criterion
or multiple criteria focused on criteria
capturing these entities as part of the
final rule to ensure that they remain
covered entities. If CISA were to include
one or more sector-based criteria that
would cover health insurance
companies and laboratories and other
medical diagnostics facilities, it would
likely set a threshold based on annual
revenue, number of employees, or some
other metric and only entities that
exceed the threshold would be
considered covered entities. Such a
threshold would be set by CISA to
ensure that the largest of these types of
entities would be considered covered
entities and CISA likely would look at
the SBA Size Standards for context and
to develop relevant averages using
NAICS codes applicable to such entities
and may consult with the Healthcare
and Public Health SRMA to develop the
final criterion or criteria. Regarding the
health IT community, CISA believes
that the most common type of cyber
incident such entities will face are data
breaches. As data breaches are not the
primary focus of CIRCIA, and those
entities already are required to report
data breaches of unsecured protected
health information under the HIPAA
Breach Notification Rule and personal
health records under the HITECH Act
Health Breach Notification Rule, CISA
does not believe it is necessary to
include a specific criterion focused on
entities in the health IT industry.
CISA would be interested in receiving
comments on:
17. The scope of entities that would
and would not be considered covered
entities based on the three criteria
proposed by CISA, whether the scoping
is appropriate, and what, if any, specific
refinements should CISA consider
related to any of the criteria.
18. The proposal to forgo including
specific criteria focused on health
insurance companies, health IT
providers, and entities operating
laboratories or other medical diagnostics
facilities.
j. Information Technology Sector
CISA proposes including within the
description of covered entity any entity
that meets one or more of four proposed
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Information Technology (IT) Sector
sector-based criteria. First, CISA
proposes including within the
description of covered entity any entity
that knowingly provides IT hardware,
software, systems, or services to the
Federal government. Second, CISA
proposes including within the
description of covered entity any entity
that has developed and continues to
sell, license, or maintain any software
that meets the definition of ‘‘critical
software’’ as that term was defined by
NIST pursuant to Executive Order
14028—Improving the Nation’s
Cybersecurity (May 12, 2021). Third,
CISA proposes to include within the
description of covered entity, any entity
that is an original equipment
manufacturer (OEM), vendor, or
integrator of OT hardware or software
components. Fourth, CISA proposes to
include within the description of
covered entity any entity that performs
functions related to domain name
operations.
To conduct a cyber incident,
malicious cyber actors seek to exploit
some aspect of the IT Sector, through IT
hardware, software, systems, or services.
Moreover, given many IT providers’
positions in the critical infrastructure
supply chain, their roles as cyber
service providers (e.g., CSPs, managed
service providers) to other entities, and
their important role in the functioning
of the internet, a covered cyber incident
impacting a member of the IT Sector has
the potential to cause significant
cascading impacts to tens, hundreds, or
even thousands of other entities. As a
result, requiring incident reporting from
a broad range of IT Sector entities is
essential to developing a complete
picture of the cyber threat landscape,
identifying vulnerabilities that
adversaries are exploiting, and sharing
early warnings to better protect entities
from across all critical infrastructure
sectors.
The IT Sector is comprised of
hundreds of thousands of companies,
ranging from small businesses to large,
multinational enterprises. While some
of these companies are likely to be
captured by the proposed CIRCIA sizebased threshold, many will not be.
Additionally, as opposed to many other
critical infrastructure sectors with a
primary regulatory agency providing
oversight or a small number of clearly
identifiable subsectors, industry
segments, or entity types, the IT sector
to a large extent lacks any of these easy
means of categorization or
segmentation. Given these
characteristics, CISA believes it is
necessary to take a multi-criteria
approach including a general criterion
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focused on entities that knowingly
provide IT hardware, software, systems,
or services to the Federal government,
as well as criteria designed to capture
critical software, OT, and DNS services
that are not used by the Federal
government.
For the first IT Sector sector-based
criterion, CISA is proposing to include
any entity that knowingly provides or
supports IT hardware, software,
systems, or services to the Federal
government either directly or through a
reseller. CISA believes this proposed
approach will be beneficial in several
ways. First, in light of both the essential
services provided to the nation by
various Federal entities, as well as the
symbolic value of the Federal
government, Federal entities often are
desired targets for attack, and a covered
cyber incident impacting a Federal
entity can result in significant
consequences. Second, because an
entity selling a good or service to the
Federal government typically will know
if it has provided a product or service
to the Federal government, the proposed
criterion is intended to create a clear
and easy manner for an entity within
the IT sector to determine if it is a
covered entity. This criterion also
would include, for example, some
entities that provide IT hardware,
software, systems, or services to the
Federal government through a reseller
or by providing software development
services, such as a code repository
service. It is for this reason CISA
proposes capturing in this criterion IT
hardware, software, system, or service
providers that provide their products to
the Federal government only if they
knowingly do so, e.g., if they provide
goods to the Federal government
through a procurement contract or
another agreement or transaction. Third,
given the breadth of the Federal
government and the large number of
different IT products and services it
employs, CISA expects this criterion to
cover a broad spectrum of entities from
the IT sector, which will help ensure
CISA receives adequate reporting to
achieve its responsibilities under
CIRCIA as they relate to the IT sector
and beyond.
Note, however, while CISA is
proposing to use the provision of
software, hardware, systems, or services
to the Federal government as a criterion
for determining who must report,
reporting for those entities that meet
this sector-based covered entity criteria
is not limited to incidents impacting the
products or services they provide to the
U.S. Government. Rather, an entity that
meets this sector-based criteria must
report any covered cyber incident it
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experiences regardless of whether it
impacts any of their Federal customers
or the specific products or services used
by their Federal customers.
CISA acknowledges that entities
routinely change their offerings and
customers over time, and that there will
be entities who have provided software,
hardware, systems, or services to the
Federal government at one point but no
longer do so (either because they no
longer offer or support that software,
hardware, system, or service at all, or
because their arrangement with their
Federal customer(s) has ended). In
recognition of this, CISA is proposing
that an entity would be captured under
this criterion only for as long as the
entity continues to sell, provide, or
provide support for the product or
service they have sold to the
government, or any updated versions
thereof. If a software, hardware, or
system manufacturer or supplier no
longer sells or supports the software,
hardware, or system that it previously
sold to the government, or any updated
versions thereof, then it would no
longer be considered a covered entity
based on this criterion in relation to that
particular software, hardware, or
system. Similarly, if an IT service
provider no longer provides any
services to the Federal government, it
would not remain a covered entity
simply on the basis of having previously
provided IT services to the Federal
government.
In the second IT sector-based
criterion, CISA proposes covering any
entity that has developed and continues
to sell, license, or maintain any software
that meets the definition of ‘‘critical
software’’ established by NIST pursuant
to Executive Order 14028. On May 12,
2021, President Biden issued Executive
Order 14028, with the goal of improving
government efforts to identify, deter,
protect against, detect, and respond to
the persistent and increasingly
sophisticated malicious cyber
campaigns that threaten the public
sector, private sector, and the American
people’s security and privacy. Section 4
of Executive Order 14028 is focused on
software supply chain security, with
Section 4(g) instructing NIST, in
consultation with designated Federal
partners, to develop a definition of the
term ‘‘critical software.’’ The Federal
government would then use the
definition of critical software to support
the development of a list of software
categories and products that would be
subject to the additional security
activities set forth in the Executive
Order, including how the Federal
government purchases and manages
deployed critical software. In particular,
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the Executive Order seeks to limit
Federal acquisition to software that has
met security measures such as use of a
secure development process and
integrity checks defined in Section 4(e)
of the Executive Order.
To develop the definition of critical
software, NIST solicited position papers
from the IT community, hosted a virtual
workshop to gather input, and consulted
with CISA, the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, and
the National Security Agency (NSA).
Ultimately, NIST defined critical
software to be ‘‘any software that has, or
has direct software dependencies upon,
one or more components with at least
one of these attributes: (1) is designed to
run with elevated privilege or manage
privileges; (2) has direct or privileged
access to networking or computing
resources; (3) is designed to control
access to data or operational technology;
(4) performs a function critical to
trust; 277 or, (5) operates outside of
normal trust boundaries with privileged
access.’’ 278 The definition applies to
software of all forms (e.g., standalone
software; software integral to specific
devices or hardware components; cloudbased software) purchased for, or
deployed in, production systems and
used for operational purposes.279 Other
use cases, such as software solely used
for research or testing that is not
deployed in production systems, are
outside of the scope of this
definition.280
Given the purposes for which this
definition of critical software was
developed (i.e., to support the
enhancement of software supply chain
security), the informed process that led
to its development, and its familiarity to
the IT community, CISA believes it to be
an appropriate basis for narrowing
down the scope of entities engaged in
software development for non-Federal
government customers included within
the description of covered entity.
However, because the ‘‘critical
software’’ definition has not been
formally codified into law or regulation,
CISA is proposing to incorporate the
277 According to NIST, the term ‘‘critical to trust’’
covers ‘‘categories of software used for security
functions such as network control, endpoint
security, and network protection.’’ NIST, Critical
Software Definition—FAQs, FAQ 3, https://
www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improvingnations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definitionfaqs#Ref_FAQ3 (last visited Jan. 26, 2024).
278 See NIST, Critical Software—Definition &
Explanatory Material, https://www.nist.gov/itl/
executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/
critical-software-definition-explanatory (last visited
July 24, 2023).
279 Id.
280 Id.
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definition of ‘‘critical software’’
developed by NIST directly into the
regulatory text rather than by reference,
to provide potential covered entities
with certainty on the scope of this prong
of the IT Sector sector-based criteria.281
CISA is also proposing to limit this
criterion to entities that continue to sell,
license, or maintain critical software.
While CISA intends to capture under
this criterion entities that continue to be
in the business of providing critical
software, CISA does not intend to
capture former critical software
developers in perpetuity if they no
longer produce the software. However,
to the extent that a critical software
developer continues to sell (directly or
indirectly), license, or otherwise
maintain previously developed critical
software, it would continue to be a
covered entity under this prong.
For the third IT Sector sector-based
criterion, CISA is proposing to include
in the description of covered entity any
entity that is an OEM, vendor, or
integrator of OT hardware or software
components. According to NIST,282 OT
is defined as ‘‘Programmable systems or
devices that interact with the physical
environment (or manage devices that
interact with the physical environment).
These systems or devices detect or cause
a direct change through the monitoring
or control of devices, processes, and
events. Examples include industrial
control systems, building management
systems, Fire control systems, and
physical access control
mechanisms.’’ 283
OT components are considered vital
to the operation of U.S. critical
infrastructure, and the security of OT is
essential for the achievement of a secure
and resilient infrastructure for the
American people.284 The increasing
convergence of IT and OT creates
281 Additional information on the software
categories considered to be critical software, the
types of products typically included, and the
rationale for their inclusion, can be found at https://
www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improvingnations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definitionexplanatory (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
282 In various places throughout this document,
CISA references definitions and guidance found in
materials published by NIST. CISA believes it is
appropriate to use NIST publications as source
references given NIST’s status as a widely
recognized and accepted source of cybersecurity
information and best practices by and for both
industry and government.
283 NIST, Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A
Systems Security Engineering Approach, NIST
Special Publication 800–160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1, at 65
(Dec. 2021), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/
sp/800/160/v2/r1/final.
284 See id. at 1; see also CISA, Securing Industrial
Control Systems: A Unified Initiative—FY 2019–
2023, at 2 (July 2020) (hereinafter, ‘‘Securing
Industrial Control Systems’’), available at https://
www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/securingindustrial-control-systems.
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opportunities for exploitation that could
result in catastrophic consequences,
including loss of life, economic damage,
and disruption of the NCFs upon which
society relies.285 In light of this, CISA
believes it is important to understand
the cyberthreat environment related to
OT and to receive reports on cyber
incidents involving manufacturers or
developers of OT products.
OT is typically used in manufacturing
and distribution industries, such as
electric, water and wastewater, oil and
natural gas, chemical, and
pharmaceutical manufacturing and
distribution. Consequently, the first IT
sector-based criterion—focusing on
entities that provide hardware, software,
systems, or services to the Federal
government—may not capture many OT
OEMs, vendors, or integrators, resulting
in the need for this third criterion.
For the fourth IT Sector sector-based
criteria, CISA proposes to include in the
description of covered entity certain
entities that perform functions related to
domain name operations. These are
entities whose activities are key to the
fabric of the internet, enabling users to
access resources on the internet and
organizations to provide services online.
The criterion is intended to capture
entities that perform these functions for
the benefit of their customers, business
partners, or internet users generally. A
successful covered cyber incident
perpetuated against such entities could
have significant potential consequences
not just to the entity itself but also
entities across all critical infrastructure
sectors that rely upon domain name
resolution for their business operations
and for the provision of their resources
online. In addition, the significance of
these entities to enabling navigation of
the internet and the potential for
compromising one entity in order to
impact multiple internet users makes
these entities a target for malicious
cyber activity. Given their importance to
the use of the internet and therefore the
potential impacts—to national security,
economic security, and public health
and safety, as well as to disruption of
the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure—of a cyber incident
perpetrated against such entities, and
the attractiveness of such entities to
malicious cyber actors, CISA is
proposing to include these entities
within the definition of covered entities.
CISA believes the inclusion of these
four IT sector-based criteria is supported
by an analysis of the three factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) (i.e.,
consequence, threat, and likelihood of
285 Securing Industrial Control Systems, supra
note 284, at ii.
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disruption of the reliable operation of
critical infrastructure). First, the
disruption to or compromise of any of
the entities covered by the proposed
criteria for the IT sector has the
potential to cause national security,
economic security, or public health and
safety. This is particularly true for
entities that provide or support
hardware, software, or services to the
Federal government, given the essential
role the Federal government has in
national security, economic security,
and public health and safety. This same
rationale is also applicable to entities
that develop, license, or sell ‘‘critical
software’’; entities that serve as OEMs,
vendors, or integrators of OT; and
entities that perform functions related to
domain name operations. Critical
software and OT frequently are used by
entities and systems in a wide variety of
critical infrastructure, such as water
systems, commercial nuclear power
reactors, telecommunications facilities,
power grids, airports, and hospitals,
that, if disrupted or compromised
through the supply chain for these
software and technologies, could
directly impact national security,
economic security, and public health
and safety. By definition, critical
software operates in a position that
provides the software extensive
privileges, access, or trust, the
compromise of which could be
significantly consequential to the
systems and networks where they are
used, including critical infrastructure
systems and networks. OT is used to
directly perform a multitude of critical
infrastructure functions, such as
generating electricity, monitoring and
controlling water, and distributing
natural gas. As described above, entities
that perform functions related to
domain name operations play a key role
in ensuring the accessibility and
security of online services used by
entities in a critical infrastructure
sector, which may include critical
services that depend on those services.
For these same reasons, consideration of
the third statutory factor—the extent to
which damage, disruption, or
unauthorized access to such an entity
will likely enable the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure—strongly supports the
inclusion of these entities within the
description of covered entity. Finally, in
terms of the threats targeting the IT
sector, these entities have been
frequently targeted by malicious cyber
actors, which is the second factor
identified in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1). The
three primary NAICS segments where IT
sector entities are found (i.e., the
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Manufacturing Sector (for hardware);
the Information Sector (for software);
and the Professional, Scientific, and
Technical Services Sector (for IT
services)) routinely rank near the top of
the list when it comes to sectors or
industries experiencing the most cyber
incidents.286
In addition to the four criteria
described previously in this section,
CISA considered a variety of other
potential criteria for inclusion, to
include different criteria that would
address some of the risks associated
with open source code and open source
software. Open source software is
defined by NIST as ‘‘[s]oftware that can
be accessed, used, modified, and shared
by anyone.’’ 287 Open source code and
open source software are, by their very
nature, accessible and modifiable by
everyone. This means that anyone can
identify vulnerabilities, including both
good-faith security researchers who
report and help fix the vulnerability as
well as bad actors who take advantage
of their findings to manipulate the
software instead of reporting the
vulnerability. And while many open
source projects are well maintained,
resource constraints or limited
developer knowledge in some cases lead
to vulnerabilities in open source
projects. As the practice of integrating
open source code with proprietary code
and using open source code in
downstream software/services has
expanded, so has the potential for the
incorporation of vulnerabilities into
information systems with limited
tracking of where the open source
software is integrated, making
vulnerability management increasingly
challenging. With the potential for
widespread use or integration of a
vulnerable code, and the lack of insight
into the full distribution of the code or
software in which the code has been
integrated, such an inherited
vulnerability may be present in millions
of instances and difficult to identify
potential victims. The potential
compromise of a code repository that
houses and shares open source code
could also lead to largescale
downstream effects.
To better understand these threats
associated with open source code and
open source software, CISA considered
including in the description of covered
entity any managed service provider or
CSP that utilizes open source software
286 See Verizon 2023 DBIR, supra note 186, at 50;
Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50; IBM 2023
Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42.
287 See NIST Suborder 6106.01 Ver. 1, Open
Source Code at 1 (Dec. 6, 2018), available at https://
www.nist.gov/open/policies-directives-and-nistspublic-access-plan.
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within its proprietary software library.
CISA also considered including in the
description of covered entity specific
criteria to cover any code repository
platform that hosts open source code or
open source software for public use. At
this time, CISA has elected not to
include specific criteria in the proposed
rule, but, as explained earlier, CISA
interprets the first proposed IT Sector
sector-based criterion to capture
software development services, such as
a code repositories hosting open source
code, that know their services are being
used by the Federal government.
CISA is interested in receiving
comments on:
19. The scope of entities that would
and would not be considered covered
entities based on the four unique criteria
proposed by CISA, whether the scoping
is appropriate, and what, if any, specific
refinements should CISA consider
related to any of the four criteria.
20. The types of entities that are
‘‘related to domain name operations’’
and what type of relationship such
entities may have with relevant multistakeholder organizations, such as the
internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers. Please also see
Section IV.D.ii in this document for
additional requests for comment on the
proposed DNS Exception.
21. Whether CISA should include in
the final rule specific criteria to cover
managed service providers or CSPs
utilizing open source software or
additional, specific criteria that would
require reporting related to open source
code, open source software, or code
repositories.
22. How the proposed IT Sector
sector-based criteria might apply to
members of the open-source ecosystem,
including whether entities that may
provide IT hardware, software, systems,
or services to the Federal government
know or could determine whether they
are providing such goods or services to
the Federal government, and, if so, the
level of effort in making such a
determination.
k. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and
Waste Sector
The Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and
Waste Sector is composed of nearly 100
commercial nuclear power reactors;
over 30 Research and Test Reactors
(RTRs); approximately ten fuel cycle
facilities; thousands of licensees of
radioactive materials for medical,
research, and industrial purposes; and
the millions of radioactive packages
transported yearly.288 Of these entities,
288 See DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and
Waste SSP: An Annex to the NIPP 2013 (2015),
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CISA proposes to include in the
description of covered entity any entity
that owns or operates a commercial
nuclear power reactor or fuel cycle
facility. Commercial nuclear power
reactors are subject to regulations that
require them to report cyber incidents
impacting safety, security, or emergency
preparedness functions to the NRC;
however, other Nuclear Reactors,
Materials, and Waste Sector
infrastructure typically are not subject
to similar cyber incident reporting
requirements.
Consideration of the factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of commercial
nuclear power reactors and fuel cycle
facilities within the description of
covered entity. The first factor, which
relates to consequence, the disruption or
compromise of a commercial nuclear
power reactor may present a significant
risk to public health, economic security,
and national security, as validated by
the extensive security regulations
imposed by the NRC on these
facilities.289 Similarly, in the latest
Update to the U.S. NRC Cyber Security
Roadmap, the NRC staff stated that the
nuclear material and hazardous
chemicals at fuel cycle facilities
‘‘present safety and security concerns
that could lead to potential
consequences of concern . . . as a result
of a cyber attack.’’ 290
The second factor enumerated in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) is the likelihood that
an entity may be targeted by a malicious
cyber actor, including a foreign country.
According to the NRC, ‘‘[c]yber threats
to NRC licensees are dynamic due to
emerging technologies and the
continuing evolving capabilities of
potential adversaries.’’ 291 Foreign
countries remain interested in
perpetrating cyber incidents at U.S.
nuclear entities, with DHS recently
stating that ‘‘Russian governmentaffiliated cyber espionage likely will
remain a persistent threat to . . .
entities in the . . . nuclear
industry[y].’’ 292
The third factor enumerated in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) is the extent to which
damage, disruption, or unauthorized
access to such an entity is likely to
enable the disruption of the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure. As
available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/nipp-ssp-nuclear-2015-508.pdf.
289 See, e.g., 10 CFR part 73.
290 U.S. NRC, Update to the U.S. NRC Cyber
Security Roadmap, SECY–17–0034, at 5 (Feb. 28,
2017), available at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/
ML1635/ML16354A282.html.
291 Id. at 2.
292 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment,
supra note 188, at 20.
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commercial nuclear power reactors
themselves are critical infrastructure,
damage, disruption, or unauthorized
access at a plant likely would result in
the disruption of critical infrastructure.
Additional infrastructure beyond the
commercial nuclear power reactor or
fuel cycle facility could also be
impacted by a successful cyber incident
at one of these entities either through
the loss of power provided by the
commercial nuclear power reactor or the
emission of radiation rendering nearby
critical infrastructure generally not
safely accessible for some period of
time.
In developing this sector-based
criteria, CISA also explored including
RTRs in the description of a covered
entity. However, the security risks
associated with RTRs are significantly
lower than the risks associated with
commercial nuclear power reactors.293
Based on this lower risk assessment,
CISA is not proposing to include a
specific Nuclear Sector sector-based
criteria capturing RTRs within the
description of covered entity. An owner
or operator of an RTR nevertheless may
be a covered entity based on the sizebased threshold or other sector-based
criteria, such as the Government
Facilities Sector sector-based criteria for
the education subsector.
l. Transportation Systems Sector
CISA proposes to include a number of
different sector-based criteria for entities
in the Transportation Systems Sector.
First, CISA is proposing to include
criteria related to owners and operators
of various non-maritime transportation
system infrastructure, such as freight
railroad, public transportation and
passenger railroads (PTPR), pipeline
facilities and systems, over-the-road bus
(OTRB) operations, passenger and allcargo aircraft, indirect air carriers,
airports, and Certified Cargo Screening
Facilities. Additionally, CISA is
proposing to include in the description
of covered entity any entity that owns
or operates a vessel, facility, or outer
continental shelf facility subject to 33
CFR parts 104, 105, or 106.
Transportation is one of four
designated lifeline functions, meaning
the reliable operation of this function is
so critical that a disruption or loss of
this function will directly affect the
security and resilience of critical
infrastructure within and across
numerous sectors.294 Transportation
293 See id.; U.S. NRC, Backgrounder on RTRs
(2020), available at https://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/research-reactorsbg.html.
294 See Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience, supra note 198, at 4.
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entities have long been targeted by
terrorists and other malicious actors, so
it is no surprise that as the cyberthreat
has evolved, transportation entities are
routinely experiencing cyber
incidents.295 In light of this evolving
and pervasive threat, TSA has identified
and imposed heightened cybersecurity
requirements on critical entities across
the various transportation modes. CISA
is proposing to include within the
description of covered entity those
entities identified by TSA as requiring
cyber incident reporting and (in some
cases) enhanced cybersecurity measures
for primarily the same reasons TSA
relied upon in determining that these
entities warranted such requirements.
Those specific rationales for the
proposed inclusion of each of the
different Transportation Systems Sector
criteria are provided in the following
paragraphs. CISA believes that aligning
CIRCIA’s Applicability section with the
population of entities that TSA requires
cyber incident reporting from or the
implementation of enhanced
cybersecurity measures at is appropriate
for CIRCIA and consistent with the
factors contained in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
(i.e., (1) the consequences that a
disruption or compromise of one of
those entities could cause to national
security, economic security, or public
health and safety; (2) the likelihood that
one of those entities may be targeted by
a malicious cyber actor; and (3) the
extent to which damage, disruption, or
unauthorized access to such an entity
will likely enable the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure). CISA recognizes that
some of the criteria proposed below is
based on TSA’s Enhancing Surface
Cyber Risk Management NPRM, and
CISA will continue to coordinate with
TSA throughout the rulemaking process
to harmonize CIRCIA’s Applicability
section with TSA, to the maximum
extent practicable.
In the rail subsector, CISA is
proposing to require reporting from
owners and operators of freight railroad
carriers identified under 49 CFR
1580.1(a)(1), (4), and (5) and PTPR
identified in 49 CFR 1582.1. This is
consistent with the factors contained in
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1),), as TSA determined
these entities should be required to
report cyber incidents, with the higherrisk PTPR also warranting enhanced
cybersecurity requirements, ‘‘due to the
ongoing cybersecurity threat to surface
transportation systems and associated
infrastructure to prevent against the
295 See, e.g., IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note
217, at 42; Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at
50.
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significant harm to the national and
economic security of the United States
that could result from the ‘degradation,
destruction, or malfunction of systems
that control this infrastructure.’ ’’ 296 The
scope of applicability for surface
transportation is broader than in TSA’s
Security Directives, but aligns with
TSA’s ongoing rulemaking to codify
these requirements that is based on a
more long-term and strategic view of
risk as applied to these modes as well
as the applicability for requirements to
report physical security incidents in
current 49 CFR 1570.203. This scope
includes PTPR and OTRB owner/
operators upon whom TSA does not
impose enhanced cybersecurity
requirements but is seeking to impose
cyber incident reporting requirements in
their ongoing rulemaking efforts. While
TSA has determined it is not necessary
at this time to impose requirements to
implement more robust cybersecurity
measures on certain PTPR and OTRBs,
TSA and CISA believe it is important
that these entities be required to report
cyber incidents when they occur. While
the costs of the imposition of robust
cybersecurity measures upon these
PTPRs and OTRBs may not be justified
at this time based on known risks, TSA
and CISA believe that the improved
understanding of the threat environment
to the broader transportation sector that
would result from the reporting of
substantial cyber incidents experienced
by any of these entities outweighs the
minimal costs of such reporting
requirements. In the case of PTPRs, the
additional costs of this requirement
would be particularly minimal as all
PTPRs already are required to report
security incidents to TSA pursuant to 49
CFR 1570.203.
CISA is also proposing to require
reporting from owners and operators of
the critical pipeline facilities and
systems, as identified in in 49 CFR part
1586 in TSA’s rulemaking, Surface
Cybersecurity Risk Management. The
scope of applicability includes gas,
hazardous liquid, carbon monoxide, and
liquefied natural gas pipelines, pipeline
systems, and facilities that TSA has
determined warrant additional
cybersecurity measures to ‘‘reduce the
risk of operational disruption should the
Information and/or Operational
296 See, e.g., TSA Security Directive 1580–21–01
series, Enhancing Rail Cybersecurity; TSA Security
Directive 1582–21–01 series, Enhancing Public
Transportation and Passenger Railroad
Cybersecurity; TSA Security Directive 1580/82–
2021–01 series, Rail Cybersecurity Mitigation
Actions and Testing. TSA’s Security Directives
imposing cybersecurity requirements on surface
transportation modes are available at https://
www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportationcybersecurity-toolkit.
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Technology system of a gas or liquid
pipeline be affected by a cybersecurity
incident.’’ 297 Following a determination
that a pipeline is critical, TSA informs
the owners and operators of the pipeline
of that determination and the additional
cybersecurity requirements that thus
apply to it.298 This is similarly
consistent with the factors contained in
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) as, to determine
which pipelines were critical, TSA
considered factors such as the volume of
product transported and whether the
pipeline serves other critical sectors.
Additionally, malicious cyber actors
continue to target this industry, with the
2023 Verizon DBIR noting nearly 150
cyber incidents for the mining,
quarrying, and oil and gas extraction
and utilities segment during the year
covered by the report.299
Additionally, CISA is proposing to
include in the description of covered
entity any entity that is required to
implement a TSA-approved security
program under 49 CFR parts 1542, 1544,
1548, and 1549. This requirement
applies to airports, passenger and allcargo aircraft operators, indirect air
carriers, and Certified Cargo Screening
Facilities, respectively. In November
2021, TSA issued security program
changes requiring these entities to
report cybersecurity incidents to CISA.
A subset of these entities were
subsequently required to implement
additional cybersecurity measures in
what TSA described as ‘‘the latest in
TSA’s efforts to require that critical
transportation sector operators continue
to enhance their ability to defend
against cybersecurity threats.’’ 300 As
specifically applied to all-cargo aircraft
operators, the air cargo system faces
emerging risks, including a proliferation
of cyber threats.301 Adversaries continue
to threaten the air cargo system and seek
to use the aviation domain to carry out
terrorist plots, including through the use
of the air cargo supply chain to ship
297 See, e.g., TSA Security Directive Pipeline2021–01 series, Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity
and TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021–02
series, Pipeline Cybersecurity Mitigation Actions,
Contingency Planning, and Testing, available at
https://www.tsa.gov/sd-and-ea.
298 Of note, this means that, for at least this prong
of the Transportation Systems Sector sector-based
criteria, entities will clearly know that they are
covered entities.
299 Verizon 2023 DBIR, supra note 186, at 59.
300 TSA Press Release, TSA Issues New
Cybersecurity Requirements for Airport and Aircraft
Operators (Mar. 7, 2023), available at https://
www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2023/03/07/tsaissues-new-cybersecurity-requirements-airport-andaircraft (hereinafter ‘‘TSA Press Release’’).
301 TSA, Air Cargo Security Roadmap (Dec. 2021),
available at https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/
releases/2021/12/09/tsa-publishes-new-roadmapaddress-vision-improving-air-cargo.
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dangerous and potentially deadly items
for pre-operational planning.302 The
focus on these ‘‘critical transportation
sector operators’’ in light of the
‘‘persistent cybersecurity threats against
U.S. critical infrastructure, including
the aviation sector’’ 303 is consistent
with the three factors enumerated in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1).
Most, if not all, of the entities that
would be captured under these criteria
already are required to report
cybersecurity incidents to CISA
pursuant to these requirements.
Including these entities within the
description of covered entity would
further align the CIRCIA requirements
with TSA’s requirements to support
reducing duplication and avoid
unintended gaps in reporting. For
example, while this approach
technically creates two legal
requirements for these entities to report
cyber incidents, CISA does not believe
that this is likely to result in any actual
duplicative reporting because TSA’s
existing requirement requires these
entities to report to CISA. CISA is
committed to working with TSA to
ensure that Transportation Services
Sector entities that are required to report
to CISA under both CIRCIA and a
separate TSA authority can do so in a
single report where legally possible. If
necessary to do so, CISA and TSA will
explore leveraging the substantially
similar reporting exception to formalize
the ability to comply with CIRCIA and
TSA cyber incident reporting
requirements through the submission of
a single cyber incident report.
Additional information on the
substantially similar reporting exception
can be found in Section IV.D.i in this
document.
With the final Transportation Systems
Sector sector-based criterion, CISA is
proposing to cover those entities that
own or operate assets subject to MTSA.
MTSA, which is designed to protect the
nation’s ports and waterways from a
terrorist attack, requires certain vessels,
facilities, and outer continental shelf
facilities to perform various securityrelated activities. The goal of MTSA is
to prevent a transportation security
incident, which is defined as an
incident that results in significant loss
of life, environmental damage,
transportation system disruption, or
economic disruption to a particular
area.304 This goal is consistent with the
first and third factors enumerated in 6
302 See
id.
Press Release, supra note 300.
304 See U.S. Coast Guard, Operations Home—
ISPS/MTSA, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/ISPS-MTSA/
(last visited Nov. 28, 2023); 33 CFR 101.100.
303 TSA
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U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)—i.e., the
consequences that disruption to or
compromise of an entity could cause to
national security, economic security, or
public health and safety, and the extent
damage or disruption to an entity will
likely enable the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure. Including MTSAregulated facilities is also consistent
with the second factor enumerated in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)—the likelihood that an
entity may be targeted by a malicious
cyber actor, including a foreign
country—given the recent assessment in
the 2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment identifying an increased
risk from Chinese government cyber
actors to target ports for disruption.305
The MTSA-regulated population is
generally considered to include all
critical maritime assets. Considering
that, CISA, after consultation with the
USCG, the SRMA for the Transportation
Systems Sector Maritime Subsector and
regulatory agency responsible for
MTSA, believes that entities that own or
operate vessels, facilities, or outer
continental shelf facilities subject to
MTSA should be required to report
cyber incidents under CIRCIA. To
achieve that, CISA proposes that the
description of covered entity include
any entity that owns or operates a
vessel, facility, or outer continental
shelf facility subject to 33 CFR parts
104, 105, or 106.
CISA and USCG recognize that this
proposed approach will result in two
separate cyber incident reporting
requirements for entities that are subject
to both MTSA and CIRCIA. CISA and
USCG are committed to exploring the
substantially similar reporting exception
or other mechanisms to allow entities
that are subject to both MTSA and
CIRCIA cyber incident reporting
requirements to comply with both
requirements through the submission of
a single cyber incident report.
Additional information on the
substantially similar reporting exception
can be found in Section IV.D.i in this
document.
m. Water and Wastewater Systems
Sector
CISA proposes including within the
description of covered entity any entity
that owns or operates a Community
Water System, as defined in 42 U.S.C.
300f(15), or a Publicly Owned
Treatment Works (POTWs), as defined
in 40 CFR 403.3(q), that serve more than
3,300 people. Inclusion of water and
wastewater systems in the description of
305 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment,
supra note 188, at 20.
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covered entity is supported by a review
of how the three factors enumerated in
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) apply to these
entities. First, as noted in the 2015
Water and Wastewater Systems SSP,
safe drinking water is essential to public
health and all human activity, and
properly treated wastewater is vital for
preventing disease and protecting the
environment.306 According to the EPA,
‘‘[t]he collection and treatment of . . .
wastewater is vital to public health and
clean water.’’ 307 The 2015 Water and
Wastewater Systems SSP further notes
that drinking water and wastewater
treatment are essential to modern life
and the Nation’s economy.308 Second,
as noted in a March 3, 2023
memorandum issued by the EPA related
to public water system cybersecurity,
water systems are increasingly facing
cyberattacks.309 This assessment is
supported by the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission, which stated in its March
2020 report that the ‘‘water supply is
known to be a target for malign
actors.’’ 310 Third, other critical services,
such as fire protection, healthcare, and
heating and cooling, are dependent on,
and would be disrupted by, the
interruption or cessation of drinking
water services.311 This criticality to
other sectors is reinforced by water
having been designated one of four
designated lifeline functions, indicating
that the sector’s reliable operation is so
critical that a disruption or loss of this
function will directly affect the security
and resilience of critical infrastructure
within and across numerous sectors.312
No cyber incident reporting
requirements currently exist for water
and wastewater infrastructure, creating
a significant gap in understanding of the
cyber threats to and visibility into
emerging TTPs used against water and
wastewater infrastructure. This
proposed sector-based criterion is
intended to close this gap and provide
the Federal government with sufficient
reporting to better understand the Water
306 See DHS, Water and Wastewater Systems SSP
at 1 (2015), available at https://www.cisa.gov/2015sector-specific-plans (hereinafter ‘‘Water and
Wastewater Systems SSP’’).
307 See EPA, Municipal Wastewater, https://
www.epa.gov/npdes/municipal-wastewater (last
visited Nov. 28, 2023).
308 Water and Wastewater Systems SSP, supra
note 306, at i.
309 Assistant Administrator Fox, Addressing PWS
Cybersecurity in Sanitary Surveys or an Alternate
Process (Mar. 3, 2023), available at https://
www.epa.gov/waterresilience/cybersecuritysanitary-surveys.
310 Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report,
supra note 23, at 62.
311 See Water and Wastewater Systems SSP, supra
note 306, at 2.
312 See Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience, supra note 198, at 4.
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and Wastewater Systems Sector’s cyber
threat environment.
In developing this sector-based
criterion, CISA considered whether a
minimum size threshold, such as
population served, should be included
in the criterion. Following consultations
with the EPA, the SRMA for this sector,
CISA has determined that the proposed
criterion should only include
Community Water Systems and POTWs
that serve populations of more than
3,300 people. In regards to Community
Water Systems, this threshold, which
has been used as the line of demarcation
to distinguish small and very small
water systems from medium, large, and
very large water systems,313 is the
threshold for the risk and resilience
assessment requirements established by
Congress in 42 U.S.C. 300i–2(a)(1).314
Section 300i–2(a)(1) and (b) of title 42
of the United States Code requires
Community Water Systems serving a
population of more than 3,300 people to
conduct risk and resilience assessments
and to prepare an emergency response
plans that incorporate the findings of
the assessments performed.315 CISA
interprets Congress’s decision to limit
the 42 U.S.C. 300i–2(a)(1) risk and
resilience assessment requirements to
facilities serving more than 3,300
individuals as an indication of
Congress’s assessment of the relative
risk associated with these facilities, and
CISA agrees with this assessment for the
reasons stated above. This interpretation
is consistent with the fact that, generally
speaking, Community Water Systems
that serve larger populations will de
facto present greater potential risks to
public health and safety, if
compromised, in light of the
significantly larger populations that rely
on their water service. Similar logic
supports the application of the 3,300population-served threshold for POTWs,
as does the rationale discussed in
Section IV.B.iv.1.a for the proposed
inclusion of larger entities in the
covered entity population. By setting
the threshold for coverage of water and
wastewater treatment systems at a
population served of more than 3,300
individuals, this criterion would be
limiting required reporting to
approximately the largest 20% of water
313 See, e.g., Water and Wastewater Systems SSP,
supra note 306, at 3.
314 42 U.S.C. 300i–2(a)(1).
315 See id.; see also EPA, America’s Water
Infrastructure Act Section 2013: Risk and Resilience
Assessments and Emergency Response Plans,
https://www.epa.gov/waterresilience/awia-section2013 (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
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and wastewater treatment systems by
population served.316
In establishing this proposed
criterion, CISA, in consultation with
EPA, did consider not including a size
threshold and instead requiring
reporting from all water systems and
POTWs. CISA believes that including all
water systems and POTWs as a criteria
is a reasonable alternative. A cyber
incident that results in a compromise of
water treatment even for smaller
communities arguably is a significant
enough potential public health concern
that it should warrant reporting to the
Federal government. Moreover, because
this sector is predominantly composed
of smaller entities, reporting of
incidents from smaller entities in this
sector could be essential to CISA
receiving a sufficient volume of reports
to identify trends, TTPs, and
vulnerabilities that can be used to
provide early warnings to water and
wastewater facilities of all sizes. Cutting
against the argument to include all
water and wastewater systems in the
covered entity definition is the fact that
many of the smallest water systems and
POTWs, such as hand pump operated
wells at a campground or other small
facility, do not currently utilize
information systems, and thus, could
not be the target of malicious cyber
activity or experience a covered cyber
incident. Additionally, given that there
are more than 150,000 combined Public
Water Systems (which includes both
Community Water Systems and noncommunity water systems) and POTWs,
were CISA to include all of those
entities in the description of covered
entity, it would dramatically increase
the scope and burden of the proposed
regulations, with water and wastewater
facilities accounting for nearly 40% of
all covered entities.
After weighing these considerations,
CISA ultimately concluded that
proposing limiting reporting required by
CIRCIA to medium, large, and very large
Community Water Systems and POTWs
entities is the optimal approach. CISA
would be interested in comments on:
23. The proposed Water and
Wastewater Systems Sector sector-based
criterion.
24. The alternative criterion for the
Water and Wastewater Systems Sector
that was considered.
n. Sectors for Which CISA Is Not
Proposing Any Sector-Based Criteria
CISA is not proposing any sectorbased criteria for three sectors: the
Commercial Facilities Sector, the Dams
316 See Water and Wastewater Systems SSP, supra
note 306, at 3, 6.
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Sector, and the Food and Agriculture
Sector. CISA’s rationale for proposing to
not include sector-based criteria for
each of these sectors is described below.
Instead, CISA proposes to rely on the
Applicability section’s size-based
criterion or other sector-based criteria to
capture the largest entities in these
critical infrastructure sectors for the
reasons described below.
The Commercial Facilities Sector is
made up of an extremely diverse range
of physical and virtual sites where large
numbers of people congregate to
conduct business, purchase retail
products, and enjoy recreational events
and accommodations. It is divided into
eight subsectors—Entertainment and
Media, Gaming, Lodging, Outdoor
Events, Public Assembly, Real Estate,
Retail, and Sports Leagues. While
members of certain subsectors are at
higher risk of cyber incidents, such as
the Entertainment and Media, Gaming,
and Lodging subsectors, the results of a
cyber incident impacting an individual
small entity in those industries are
unlikely to affect national security,
economic security, or public health and
safety. To the extent that a Commercial
Facilities entity is large enough where
there is the potential that a cyber
incident affecting it could result in
impacts to national security, economic
security, or public health and safety,
CISA believes it likely the entity would
be captured by the Applicability
section’s size-based criterion. As a
result, CISA is not proposing a sectorbased criteria for the Commercial
Facilities Sector.
The Dams Sector consists of, among
other things, over 100,000 dams, an
estimated 100,000 miles of levees,
nearly 250 locks, and 150,000 mine
tailings. The majority of these do not
have integrated information systems and
thus do not warrant coverage under the
CIRCIA regulations at this time. Those
assets that do have significant integrated
information systems, such as large
dams, hydroelectric power dams, and
locks, frequently are owned by Federal
entities or, in the case of certain
hydroelectric or other dams, are likely
to be covered entities under the
proposed Energy Sector or Water and
Wastewater Systems Sector sector-based
criteria. CISA, therefore, is not
proposing a sector-based criteria for the
Dams Sector.
The Food and Agriculture Sector
covers a broad landscape of entities,
including more than 2 million farms;
nearly 1 million restaurants; over
100,000 supermarkets, grocery stores,
and other food outlets; and thousands of
meat, poultry, egg, and imported food
processors, warehousers, and
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distributors. Based on consultations
with the FDA and the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), who serve as coSRMAs for this sector, CISA believes
that given the scale of this sector and
the general substitutability of the
products that entities within the sector
produce, the Food and Agriculture
Sector entities with the greatest
potential to experience a cyber incident
resulting in significant consequences are
the largest entities in this sector. For
this reason, FDA regulations focused on
food defense incorporate a size-based
threshold, applying more stringent
regulatory requirements to the largest
entities.317 Based on this, and after
consultation with the FDA and USDA,
CISA believes that the size standard
proposed by CIRCIA will capture a
sufficient number of Food and
Agriculture Sector entities, including
the most critical Food and Agriculture
Sector entities, within the description of
covered entity, and that additional Food
and Agriculture Sector sector-based
criteria are unnecessary for the purposes
of CIRCIA.
CISA believes that it can rely on other
criteria for adequate reporting from
these three sectors. However, if as a
result of public comment CISA
determines that it must modify or
eliminate any aspect of the
Applicability section’s description of a
covered entity such that coverage of
these three sectors is no longer deemed
adequate, CISA may incorporate sectorbased criteria for these three sectors in
the final rule.
For the Commercial Facilities sector,
CISA is relying on the proposed sizebased threshold criterion for reporting.
Were that criterion to be modified or
eliminated prior to the issuance of the
final rule, one alternative sector-based
criterion CISA likely would consider
would be to capture certain sector
317 See Mitigation Strategies To Protect Food
Against Intentional Adulteration, 21 CFR part 121.
As FDA explained in the NPRM for those
regulations, ‘‘[The FDA assesses] that the goal of
terrorist organizations is to maximize public health
harm and, to a lesser extent, economic disruption.
It is our assessment that such goals are likely to
drive terrorist organizations to target the product of
relatively large facilities, especially those for which
the brand is nationally or internationally
recognizable. An attack on such a target would
potentially provide the wide-scale consequences
desired by a terrorist organization and the
significant public attention that would accompany
an attack on a recognizable brand. Such facilities
are likely to have larger batch sizes, potentially
resulting in greater human morbidity and mortality.
Further, an attack on a well-recognized, trusted
brand is likely to result in greater loss of consumer
confidence in the food supply and in the
government’s ability to ensure its safety and,
consequently, cause greater economic disruption
than a relatively unknown brand that is distributed
regionally.’’ 78 FR 78033.
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entities that exceed one or more
designated annual revenue or number of
employees thresholds. This could be
structured as a single threshold for all
Commercial Facilities Sector entities, or
it could vary based on subsectors or
industry segments. If a single threshold
were to be used for all entities in the
sector, CISA likely would use the SBA
Size Standards to inform that decision
and develop a possible average
threshold, but would not use the SBA
Size Standards alone since the
applicable size thresholds in the SBA
Size Standards for Commercial
Facilities Sector entities vary depending
on the type of entity and associated
NAICS code. An alternative approach to
developing a single size threshold for
the sector-based criterion for this sector
would be to simply use the SBA Size
Standards themselves (i.e., an entity in
the Commercial Facilities sector that
exceeds the applicable SBA Size
Standard), which is how entities in this
sector would be considered covered
entities under the current proposal. In
either case, CISA would attempt to set
any threshold to cover the same larger
entities in the sector which would be
required to report under the proposed
size-based criterion.
Coverage of entities in the Food and
Agriculture Sector in the current
proposed approach similarly is reliant
on the size-based threshold criterion. If
as a result of public comment CISA
determines that it must eliminate or
modify the size-based criterion, CISA
likely would propose multiple different
Food and Agriculture Sector sectorbased criteria to ensure that these
entities remain covered entities. This is
likely to include one criterion targeting
larger food manufacturers, processors,
warehouses, and similar entities; one
criterion targeting larger food producers
(e.g., farms, orchards, groves, ranches,
hatcheries, fisheries); and one criterion
larger targeting groceries, supermarkets,
and other food outlets. For food
manufacturers, processors, warehouses,
and similar entities, a potential
approach to developing this criterion
would be to mirror the approach used
in the Food Safety Modernization Act’s
International Adulteration rule (21 CFR
part 121), which regulates food
manufacturers, processors, warehouses,
and similar entities that have more than
500 employees. For food producers,
CISA could leverage the SBA size
standards table to set a size threshold
for this criterion based on annual
revenue. As the SBA Size Standards use
slightly different revenue thresholds for
different types of food producers, CISA
could elect to use the mean, median, or
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mode of the different revenue amounts
used in this industry segment or simply
have entities refer to the applicable size
standard for their industry in the SBA
Size Standards table. For the final
group, i.e., supermarkets, groceries, and
other food outlets, CISA could use a
similar approach to set a size threshold
for this criterion, except for these types
of entities, the SBA Size Standards tend
to use number of employees as opposed
to annual revenue to distinguish
between small and large entities. Thus,
this criterion is likely to be a size
threshold based on the mean, median,
or mode of number of employees across
such entities.
As noted above, the only Dams Sector
assets that are likely to have integrated
information systems warranting
coverage under CIRCIA are large dams,
hydroelectric power dams, and locks.
With the Federal government
responsible for 80% of the largest dams
and all navigation locks,318 the only
segment of this sector where CISA might
not have insight into incidents without
CIRCIA reporting would be the 2,600
non-Federal hydroelectric dams. Unlike
the Commercial Facilities and Food and
Agriculture Sector entities, CISA is
currently not proposing a separate
standard for this sector because CISA
believes these entities are sufficiently
covered in the proposed covered entity
description not by the size-based
criterion, but by other sector-based
criteria, namely the Energy Sector
sector-based criterion and, to a lesser
extent, the Water and Wastewater
Systems Sector sector-based criterion.
Accordingly, if as a result of public
comment CISA determines that it must
modify or eliminate the proposed sizebased criterion from the final rule, but
the proposed Energy Sector sector-based
criterion remained, CISA does not
believe it would need to propose a
separate Dams Sector sector-based
criterion. If, however, either the Energy
Sector or Water and Wastewater
Systems Sector sector-based criterion
were modified or eliminated as a result
of public comment, CISA may need to
add a Dams Sector sector-based criterion
to the final rule to ensure reporting from
appropriate non-Federal hydroelectric
dams. In such a case, CISA would
consult with FERC and the Dams SRMA
to identify an appropriate criterion for
this industry segment. A possible
alternative criterion could be based on
energy generating capacity.
318 See Dams SSP: An Annex to the NIPP 2013
at v (2015), available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-dams-2015508.pdf.
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CISA is interested in receiving
comments on:
25. The proposed approach to the
Commercial Facilities Sector, Dams
Sector, and Food and Agriculture
Sector.
26. Potential alternative sector-based
criteria for each of those three sectors if
CISA modifies or removes the general
size-based threshold criterion, the
Energy Sector sector-based criterion, or
the Water and Wastewater Systems
Sector sector-based criterion in the final
rule.
o. Interpretation of Sector-Based Criteria
Coverage
When an entity is assessing whether
it is a covered entity based on any of the
sector-based criteria, the entity should
not factor into its assessment the critical
infrastructure sector of which the entity
considers itself to be a part. By
definition, each of the sector-based
criterion include entities that are in a
critical infrastructure sector, and
entities should therefore assume they
meet this threshold requirement of
being ‘‘in a critical infrastructure sector’’
if they meet one or more sector-based
criteria, without needing to undertake
any determination described in Section
IV.B.ii, above. CISA will determine
whether an entity is a covered entity
based on whether the entity meets any
of the specified criteria in § 226.2 of the
proposed rule. Whether or not the entity
considers itself part of the specific
critical infrastructure sector that the
sector-based criteria targets or is based
upon on is irrelevant for the purposes of
determining whether the entity is a
covered entity. For example, if a
pharmaceutical manufacturer owns a
covered chemical facility subject to
CFATS (or, if CFATS is not reauthorized
by the publication of the final rule, the
EPA RMP), it would qualify as a covered
entity regardless of whether or not the
pharmaceutical manufacturer considers
itself part of the Chemical Sector.
Similarly, if an SLTT Government entity
owns or operates a Community Water
System as defined in 42 U.S.C. 300f(15),
it would qualify as a covered entity
regardless of its Title IV status even if
it considers itself a member of the
Government Facilities Sector, and not
the Water and Wastewater Systems
Sector. Thus, an entity may qualify as a
covered entity under a sector-based
criterion for a sector with which it does
not typically identify, and an entity may
qualify as a covered entity under two
different sector-based criteria. However,
an entity only needs to meet one of the
sector-based criteria proposed in the
Applicability section to qualify as a
covered entity.
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As noted throughout this section,
CISA recognizes that a number of the
entities that are captured under the
Applicability section already are, or in
the future will be, required to report
cyber incidents to a different Federal
department or agency pursuant to
another existing or proposed regulation.
CISA could have attempted to design
the sector-based criteria in a manner to
avoid designating entities that may be
subject to other Federal cyber incident
reporting requirements as covered
entities. With one exception, however,
CISA has no authority over those other
regulations.319 If CISA were to carve
those entities out of CIRCIA’s
Applicability section, CISA would have
no control over what incidents the
entities must report or what information
must be included in those reports.320
CISA also would be unable to guarantee
it would receive such reports in a timely
manner. To ensure that CISA continues
to receive reports from entities
containing the information needed to
support the CIRCIA mission in a manner
and timeframe that support CIRCIA
implementation, CISA proposes not to
use other existing regulatory coverage as
a disqualifying factor for inclusion
within the description of covered entity.
As noted earlier, CISA is committed to
working with its Federal partners to
explore the implementation of the
substantially similar reporting exception
where practicable to minimize
duplicative reporting. Moreover, this
approach is consistent with
Congressional intent behind the CIRCIA
legislation, which included providing
CISA, as the newly minted central
repository for cyber incident reporting,
visibility into significant cyber incidents
being conducted across U.S. critical
infrastructure sectors and enabling
coordinated, informed Federal
government action against perpetrators
of cyberattacks.321
319 CISA is responsible for implementation of the
CFATS, 6 CFR part 27, which requires CFATScovered chemical facilities to report certain cyber
incidents to CISA, although CISA acknowledges
that at the time of publication of this NPRM,
Congress has allowed the statutory authority for
CFATS to lapse.
320 CISA recognizes that CISA proposes to use
regulations that CISA does not administer to help
scope what entities meet the CIRCIA Applicability.
If following the publication of a final rule
implementing CIRCIA the population covered by
those other regulations changes, CISA will review
the change and may seek to update the CIRCIA
regulations if the existing regulatory citation no
longer reflects the population from which CISA
seeks to receive reporting under CIRCIA.
321 See, e.g., HSGAC Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at
1 (‘‘Today no one U.S. Government agency has
visibility into all cyber-attacks occurring against
U.S. critical infrastructure on a daily basis. This bill
would change that—enabling a coordinated,
informed U.S. response to the foreign governments
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v. Other Approaches Considered To
Describe Covered Entity
In addition to the proposed approach,
CISA considered various other options
for how to describe covered entity.
Among other approaches, CISA
considered simply using the statutory
definition contained in CIRCIA (i.e., any
entity in a critical infrastructure sector);
aligning the Applicability section to an
existing definition of ‘‘critical
infrastructure;’’ and describing covered
entity as the entities identified pursuant
to Section 9 of Executive Order 13636—
Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity (78 FR 11737). CISA
opted against using any of these
approaches either as a standalone
approach or, where it would not make
the other prongs redundant, as a third
prong to the proposed approach for the
reasons described below.
1. Alternative A: Any Entity in a Critical
Infrastructure Sector
One alternative approach CISA
considered for describing covered entity
was to scope the term as broadly as
permissible under the statute—i.e., to
include ‘‘any entity in a critical
infrastructure sector, as defined in PPD–
21.’’ As discussed earlier, while the
term ‘‘critical infrastructure sector’’ is
not defined in PPD–21, public and
private sector partners for each of the
critical infrastructure sectors identified
in PPD–21 jointly developed SSPs for
their respective sectors that set out goals
and priorities for the sector to address
its current risk environment.322 Each of
those SSPs includes a description of the
entities that compose the sector in
Sector Profiles. As the examples
provided earlier demonstrate, most of
these sectors are quite expansive, and
entities ‘‘in a critical infrastructure
sector’’ are not limited to—and are often
broader than—entities that own or
operate systems or assets that meet the
statutory definition of ‘‘critical
infrastructure.’’ See Section IV.B.ii in
this document. Based on a consolidated
reading of these sector-developed
descriptions in the various SSP Sector
Profiles, CISA believes that the
overwhelming majority of entities in the
United States—though not all—fit
within one or more of the critical
infrastructure sectors and thus would
meet the definition of ‘‘an entity in a
critical infrastructure sector.’’
According to Census Bureau records,
there are more than 8 million employers
and criminal organizations conducting these attacks
against the U.S.’’).
322 See CISA, 2015 Sector Specific Plans,
available https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specificplans (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
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in the United States and another
approximately 27 million legal
establishments that do not have any
employees.323 Combined, that would
indicate the existence of approximately
35 million entities with legal standing
within the United States. Given that
very few types of entities are not part of
one of the 16 critical infrastructure
sectors, CISA believes that the vast
majority of these 35 million entities
would qualify as an ‘‘entity in a critical
infrastructure sector.’’
Although CISA anticipates the perreport cost of this regulation to be
relatively low, the aggregate cost of
reportable incidents across tens of
millions of entities has the potential to
be extremely large and burdensome.
Additionally, while CISA believes
receiving a large number of reports is
necessary to achieve the goals of the
CIRCIA regulation, CISA acknowledges
that there likely is some point at which
the marginal returns provided by each
additional report will be outweighed by
the cost of its submission. Although it
is difficult to pinpoint with precision
that point of diminishing marginal
returns, CISA is confident that it would
be surpassed were CISA to require
reporting from tens of millions of
entities.
2. Alternative B: Removal of Size-Based
Threshold
A second alternative CISA considered
was to use the same general framework
as in the current proposed approach, but
without the size-based criterion. Under
this approach, CISA would only rely
upon sector-based criteria to cover the
desired population of entities in each
critical infrastructure sector. As the
existing sector-based criteria do not
cover all of the sectors and subsectors
from which CISA believes reporting is
necessary, were CISA to eliminate the
size-based criterion, CISA would have
to propose adding new sector-based
criteria to ensure appropriate coverage
of covered entities. Sectors or subsectors
for which CISA would need to add new
sector-based criteria include the
Commercial Facilities Sector, the Dams
Sector, the Food and Agriculture Sector,
certain parts of the Healthcare and
Public Health Sector (e.g., medical
insurers; laboratories and other
diagnostic facilities), and the Oil and
Natural Gas Subsector.
323 See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, County Business
Patterns First Look Report for 2021, available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2021/econ/
cbp/2021-first-look.html; U.S. Census Bureau,
Nonemployer Statistics Tables for 2019, available at
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/
nonemployer-statistics/data/tables.html.
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Removing the size-based criterion and
replacing it with some number of new
sector-based criteria would have two
primary effects. First, the total number
of covered entities likely would be
slightly reduced as there are some
entities currently captured by the sizebased criterion that would not meet any
of the current proposed or potential
additional sector-based criteria. CISA
believes that such entities would be
relatively few, however, as CISA
estimates that the majority of entities
that currently meet the size-based
criterion either also meet one of the
current sector-based criteria or would be
brought into the covered entity
definition by a new sector-based
criterion.
Second, CISA believes that this
alternative could slightly reduce
familiarization costs associated with the
regulation, as entities that would have
had to expend resources to determine if
they exceeded the SBA Size Standard
for their respective industry no longer
would have to do so. CISA believes that
this impact would also be fairly limited
as: (a) only a portion of potentially
covered entities would need to expend
resources to make such a determination
since many already know if they exceed
the small business size standard for
their respective industry, (b) the amount
of resources necessary to do so typically
are relatively minimal, and (c) a portion
of the resources certain entities would
save by the elimination of the size-based
criterion would instead be expended by
those or other entities to determine if
they meet one of the new sector-based
criteria.
Contrary to the minimum benefits
likely to be gained by elimination of the
size-based criterion, CISA believes there
are significant reasons to include the
criterion in the proposal. First, as
described at length in Section IV.B.iv.1
above, there are a number of reasons
why CISA believes requiring reporting
from large entities is beneficial. Second,
the size-based criterion allows CISA to
capture adequate reporting populations
from multiple sectors and subsectors
using a single threshold. As noted
above, without the size-based criterion,
CISA would need to establish one or
more new sector-based criteria for each
of at least five critical infrastructure
sectors or subsectors. In total, while
CISA believes it could achieve the
purposes of the CIRCIA statute without
a size-based criterion, CISA believes
that the benefits of including the sizebased criterion far exceed the almost
certainly minimal cost savings
associated with an alternative where
additional sector-based criteria are used
in lieu of the size-based criterion.
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3. Alternative C: Definition of Critical
Infrastructure
CISA also explored potentially
limiting the scope of the covered entity
description to critical infrastructure
only and using an existing definition of
critical infrastructure, such as the one at
42 U.S.C. 5195c(e).324 As discussed
earlier, however, CISA believes that
such a narrow scope of applicability
would severely limit, and perhaps
prevent, CISA’s ability to achieve
CIRCIA’s regulatory purposes. See
Section III.C.ii. Additionally, the 42
U.S.C. 5195c(e) definition of ‘‘critical
infrastructure’’ includes some ambiguity
that can make it difficult for certain
entities to know definitively whether
they meet the definition. For example,
it is not readily apparent what level of
impact would constitute a ‘‘debilitating
impact on security, national economic
security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those
matters.’’ 325 Moreover, even if a clear
definition of that level of impact
existed, it would be unreasonable to
expect most private sector entities to be
able determine if an incident impacting
one of their systems would have a
debilitating impact on national security,
national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any
combination thereof. Because the
description of covered entity will
impose regulatory requirements on
entities, it is important that the
description be easily understandable
and allow different individuals
interpreting the description to routinely
come to the same conclusion.
4. Alternative D: Section 9 List
In comments submitted in response to
the RFI, a number of commenters
recommended that CISA use the list of
entities developed pursuant to Section
9(a) of Executive Order 13636
(hereinafter referred to as the Section 9
List) as either a starting point for
identifying, or the complete list of,
covered entities.326 The Section 9 List
contains ‘‘critical infrastructure where a
cybersecurity incident could reasonably
result in catastrophic regional or
national effects on public health or
safety, economic security, or national
324 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e) defines ‘‘critical
infrastructure’’ as ‘‘systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters.’’
325 Id.
326 See, e.g., Comments submitted by UnityPoint
Health, CISA–2022–0010–0107; National Retail
Federation, CISA–2022–0010–0092; National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association, CISA–2022–0010–
0025.
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23705
security.’’ 327 Pursuant to Executive
Order 13636, DHS is to review and
update this list annually.
Given that the Section 9 List consists
of entities against which a cybersecurity
incident could result in catastrophic
effects on national security, economic
security, or public health, CISA agrees
that the entities on the Section 9 List are
entities that CISA would want to report
covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments under CIRCIA. CISA
anticipates, however, that all of the
entities on the Section 9 List would be
covered entities under either the
proposed size-based criterion or sectorbased criteria in the proposed
Applicability section, rendering any
benefits of using the Section 9 List as a
basis for coverage under CIRCIA
extremely limited. CISA further believes
that the limited benefits of potentially
requiring reporting from a few Section
9 List entities who would not already be
required to report under other proposed
criteria are outweighed by the
significant potential downsides
associated with using the Section 9 List
in this manner.
First, CISA is concerned that using
the Section 9 List, which relies in part
on nominations to identify entities for
inclusion, as the basis for imposing
regulatory requirements would chill
nominations to the list and reduce
voluntary participation in cybersecurity
efforts targeted at Section 9 List entities.
Depending on how much the use of the
Section 9 List for regulatory purposes
disincentivizes cooperation in the
development of the list and
participation in voluntary cybersecurity
activities targeted at Section 9 List
entities, using the list for CIRCIA could
result in a net overall negative impact to
national cybersecurity efforts.
Second, because of the requirement
that CISA update the list annually,
entities would lack certainty regarding
their future regulatory status under
CIRCIA. This would not only be
frustrating to entities, but it could also
result in some entities wasting resources
to establish regulatory reporting
processes and procedures that they end
up not needing or, conversely, result in
some entities foregoing establishing
reporting processes and procedures with
the thought that they might not be
subject to regulatory requirements the
following year. The annual updates to
the list would also present logistical
challenges for CISA, which would need
to inform entities whenever they are
327 E.O. 13636 Section 9(a), available at https://
www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/executiveorder-eo-13636-improving-critical-infrastructurecybersecurity.
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added to, or removed from, the list for
the entities to be aware of their
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vi. Request for Comments on
Applicability Section
CISA seeks comments on all aspects
of the Applicability Section, to include
comments on the following specific
topics:
27. CISA’s interpretation of the terms
‘‘entity’’ and ‘‘in a critical infrastructure
sector.’’
28. Potential challenges for an entity
determining whether it is ‘‘in a critical
infrastructure sector’’ and any specific
changes that can be made to the
proposed § 226.2 (Applicability) that
would provide additional clarity for an
entity to make this determination.
29. The scope of entities that would
only be considered covered entities
because of the size-based criterion and
would not meet any of the sector-based
criteria.
30. The use of both a size-based
criterion and sector-based criteria as
criteria in the description of covered
entity.
31. The proposed decision to include
a size-based criterion.
32. The proposal to use the SBA Size
Standards as the basis for the size-based
criterion and the Small Business Size
Regulations instructions for determining
if an entity exceeds the size threshold
for purposes of determining
applicability of these regulations to
certain entities.
33. The proposed sector-based criteria
used in the Applicability Section to
identify certain entities as covered
entities.
34. Any additional sector-based
criteria that would be necessary to
capture entities who are only
considered covered entities because of
the size-based criterion if the size-based
criterion was removed the Final Rule.
35. The use of the EPA RMP rule as
an alternative Chemical Sector sectorbased criteria should CFATS not be
reauthorized at the time of the issuance
of the CIRCIA final rule.
36. The proposed decision to forgo
inclusion of sector-based criteria for
certain critical infrastructure sectors,
subsectors, industries, or entity types,
and the alternative proposed criteria for
those sectors, subsectors, industries, and
entity types.
37. Whether there are other lists of
entities in a critical infrastructure sector
that should be included as covered
entities (either instead of the
applicability criteria for covered entity
proposed in this NPRM or in addition
to the proposed applicability criteria), to
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the extent that those listed entities fall
within a critical infrastructure sector.
C. Required Reporting on Covered Cyber
Incidents and Ransom Payments
i. Overview of Reporting Requirements
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)–(3),
four proposed circumstances exist that
require covered entities (or third parties
on their behalf) to submit a report to
CISA, subject to certain proposed
exceptions or limitations discussed in
Sections IV.D and IV.E.ii of this
document. First, CIRCIA requires a
covered entity that experiences a
covered cyber incident to report that
incident to CISA. 6 U.S.C. 681(a)(1)(A).
Second, CIRCIA requires a covered
entity that makes a ransom payment as
the result of a ransomware attack against
the covered entity to report that
payment to CISA. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(2)(A). Third, CIRCIA requires
that, until a covered entity notifies CISA
that the covered cyber incident in
question has concluded and been fully
mitigated and resolved, a covered entity
must submit an update or supplement to
a previously submitted report on a
covered cyber incident if substantial
new or different information becomes
available. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). Finally,
CIRCIA requires that a covered entity
submit an update or supplement to a
previously submitted report on a
covered cyber incident if the covered
entity makes a ransom payment after
submitting a Covered Cyber Incident
Report. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). CISA is
proposing to incorporate these
requirements in § 226.3 of the proposed
regulation. Other parts of the proposed
regulation discuss the report submission
deadlines (§ 226.5; IV.D.iv), manner and
form (§ 226.6; IV.D.i and ii), and
information required (§§ 226.7 through
226.11; IV.D.iii) for all of these types of
reports.
CISA is proposing to include the first
reporting requirement, the requirement
for a covered entity to report a covered
cyber incident, in § 226.3(a). A covered
entity would comply with this
requirement by submitting, or having a
third-party submit on the covered
entity’s behalf, a Covered Cyber Incident
Report or a Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Report pursuant
to § 226.3(c). Cyber incidents do not
occur in a single moment in time, but
span from the initial moment of
compromise until the cyber incident is
fully mitigated and resolved. Because of
this, CISA interprets the word
‘‘experiences’’ (in the statutory phrase
‘‘a covered entity that experiences a
covered cyber incident’’) to include the
full lifecycle of a cyber incident, such
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that this reporting requirement applies
to any entity that qualifies as a covered
entity at any point during the
occurrence of the covered cyber
incident. For example, this means that
if an entity discovers that it experienced
a covered cyber incident two years ago
that has continued to the present, and
that entity is a covered entity at the time
of discovery, the entity would be
required to submit a Covered Cyber
Incident Report under the proposed rule
because the incident has not concluded
and been fully mitigated and resolved.
Conversely, if that same entity was not
a covered entity at the time of discovery,
but was one year ago (i.e., during the
period when the covered cyber incident
was ongoing but not yet discovered), the
entity would be required to submit a
Covered Cyber Incident Report under
the proposed rule because the entity
experienced at least part of the covered
cyber incident while it was a covered
entity.
CISA is proposing to include the
second reporting requirement, the
requirement for a covered entity to
report a ransom payment it has made, in
§ 226.3(b).328 CISA understands CIRCIA
as requiring a covered entity to report a
ransom payment regardless of whether
the ransomware attack that led to the
ransom payment is a covered cyber
incident. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2)(B).
Additionally, CISA interprets 6 U.S.C.
681b(d)(3) to require a covered entity to
report a ransom payment regardless of
whether the covered entity itself makes
the ransom payment or has a third-party
make the ransom payment on the
covered entity’s behalf. Because this
reporting requirement is tied to a single
action that occurs at a specific moment
in time—the making of a ransom
payment—CISA interprets the word
‘‘makes’’ (in the statutory language ‘‘a
covered entity that makes a ransom
payment’’) to apply this reporting
requirement to any entity that qualifies
as a covered entity at the moment in
time that it makes a ransom payment as
the result of a ransomware attack.
Depending on the circumstances
surrounding and timing of the ransom
payment, including whether the
ransomware attack is a covered cyber
incident, the type of CIRCIA Report a
covered entity (or third party on behalf
328 While the proposed rule includes reporting of
ransom payments to CISA, as CIRCIA requires,
CISA notes that ‘‘[t]he U.S. government strongly
discourages all private companies and citizens from
paying ransom or extortion demands and
recommends focusing on strengthening defensive
and resilience measures to prevent and protect
against ransomware attacks.’’ Department of the
Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control, Updated
Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for
Facilitating Ransomware Payments (Sept. 21, 2021).
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of a covered entity) might use to comply
with proposed § 226.3(b) may vary. For
example, if the ransom payment was
made as the result of an incident that
did not qualify as a covered cyber
incident, the covered entity would
submit a Ransom Payment Report under
§ 226.3(b). If the ransom payment was
made as the result of a covered cyber
incident that has not yet been reported,
the covered entity may opt to submit a
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report under
§ 226.3(c) instead of a Covered Cyber
Incident Report under § 226.3(a) and a
separate Ransom Payment Report under
§ 226.3(b). Alternatively, if the ransom
payment was made as the result of a
covered cyber incident that the covered
entity has previously reported to CISA,
then the covered entity would use a
Supplemental Report under § 226.3(d)
to report the ransom payment to CISA.
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A), a
covered entity that makes a ransom
payment associated with a covered
cyber incident prior to the expiration of
the 72-hour reporting timeframe for
reporting the covered cyber incident
may submit a single report to satisfy
both the covered cyber incident and
ransom payment reporting
requirements. CISA is proposing to
include this option in § 226.3(c).
Additional details on this type of joint
report, which CISA is proposing to call
a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report, can be found
in Section IV.A.iii.4 and IV.E.ii.1 of this
document.
Lastly, CISA is proposing to include
in § 226.3(d) the statutory reporting
requirements that mandate a covered
entity provide CISA with updates or
supplements in certain circumstances.
As discussed in Section IV.A.iii.5 of this
document, CIRCIA refers to these types
of reports as Supplemental Reports,
which a covered entity is obligated to
provide unless and until it has notified
CISA that the underlying covered cyber
incident has concluded and been fully
mitigated and resolved. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(3). CISA’s proposed
interpretation for ‘‘concluded’’ and
‘‘fully mitigated and resolved’’ and the
process for informing CISA of the belief
that the covered cyber incident at issue
has concluded and been fully mitigated
and resolved are discussed in further
detail in Sections IV.E.iv.3.c and
IV.E.v.2 of this document, respectively.
Notifying CISA that the covered entity
believes the underlying covered cyber
incident has concluded and been fully
mitigated and resolved is optional.
The first scenario resulting in the
requirement to submit a Supplemental
Report is when substantial new or
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different information becomes available
to a covered entity. As with the covered
cyber incident reporting requirement
described above, CISA interprets this
requirement as applying to an entity
that is a covered entity during any point
in the incident lifecycle, such that any
entity that qualifies as a covered entity
for the purposes of the covered cyber
incident reporting requirement is also
subject to the supplemental reporting
requirement to the extent new or
different information becomes available.
The second scenario resulting in the
requirement to submit a Supplemental
Report is when a covered entity makes
a ransom payment related to a covered
cyber incident for which the covered
entity has already submitted a Covered
Cyber Incident Report. As with the
ransom payment reporting requirement
described above, CISA interprets this
requirement as applying to an entity
that is a covered entity at the time a
ransom payment is made, assuming they
also were subject to the covered cyber
incident reporting requirement
described above.
These two scenarios that require the
submission of a Supplemental Report
are enumerated in §§ 226.3(d)(1)(i) and
(ii), respectively.
ii. Reporting of Single Incidents
Impacting Multiple Covered Entities
CISA anticipates that occasions will
occur where a single cyber incident
causes substantial cyber incident-level
impacts to multiple covered entities.
Who must report and the number of
reports that must be submitted in those
situations may vary depending on the
relationship between the impacted
entities.
In cases where a single cyber incident
impacts multiple unaffiliated covered
entities, each covered entity that
experiences substantial cyber incidentlevel impacts must submit a Covered
Cyber Incident Report to CISA. For
example, if a compromise of a CSP
causes substantial cyber incident levelimpacts at multiple unaffiliated
customers of the CSP, more than one of
whom is a covered entity, then each of
the impacted customers that are covered
entities are responsible for submitting
(or having a third party submit on their
behalf) a Covered Cyber Incident Report.
The covered entity customers could,
however, authorize the CSP to submit
Covered Cyber Incident Reports on their
behalf under § 226.12(a) if the CSP has
or is provided with sufficient
information to complete the Covered
Cyber Incident Reports. The CSP may
also have to separately submit a Covered
Cyber Incident Report if it is itself a
covered entity and it experiences
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23707
threshold impacts that meet the
definition of a substantial cyber
incident.
Conversely, in cases where a single
cyber incident causes substantial cyber
incident-level impacts at multiple
affiliated covered entities, the covered
entities can meet their reporting
obligations through either (a) the
submission of a single Covered Cyber
Incident Report that provides the
required information on all of the
impacted entities, or (b) multiple
Covered Cyber Incident Reports, with
one or more covered entities submitting
their own reports. Examples of scenarios
where multiple affiliated covered
entities may experience impacts from a
single substantial cyber incident include
a substantial cyber incident that impacts
a parent corporation and one or more of
its subsidiaries; a cyber incident that
impacts a number of SLTT Government
Entities within the same jurisdiction
(e.g., an incident that impacts a single
county’s general government network,
the county’s 911 system, and the
county’s school district network); or a
cyber incident affecting a jointly
operated venture that impacts
downstream systems that are
individually owned by members of the
joint venture. In these and similar cases,
the impacted covered entities may
satisfy their reporting requirements
under CIRCIA through the submission
of a single Covered Cyber Incident
Report so long as that report details the
impacts experienced by each of the
affected covered entities, any other
required covered entity-specific details,
and point(s) of contact who individually
or collectively represent all of the
covered entities on whose behalf the
Covered Cyber Incident Report is being
submitted.
Similarly, in cases where a cyber
incident impacts a facility that has
separate owners and operators, both of
whom qualify as a covered entity, only
a single Covered Cyber Incident Report
is required. Thus, for example, if a cyber
incident impacts a critical access
hospital or a Community Water System
that is owned by one entity and
operated by another, the reporting
obligations of both the owner and
operator can be met by a single Covered
Cyber Incident Report submitted by (or
on behalf of) either the owner or the
operator. However, both are separately
obligated to ensure that at least one
Covered Cyber Incident Report is
submitted.
While the examples provided above
focus on Covered Cyber Incident
Reports, the principles being described
apply equally to all types of CIRCIA
Reports. Accordingly, if a ransom
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payment is made on behalf of multiple
affiliated entities, a single Ransom
Payment Report can be submitted on
their collective behalf. Similarly,
affiliated entities may opt to submit a
single Supplemental Report detailing
substantial new or different information
that impacts multiple affiliated covered
entities. By contrast, if a supply chain
compromise results in multiple covered
entity customers of a single service
provider experiencing a ransomware
attack and each paying a ransom
payment, each covered entity that
makes a ransom payment is responsible
for submitting a Ransom Payment
Report.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
D. Exceptions to Required Reporting on
Covered Cyber Incidents and Ransom
Payments
Section 681b(a)(5) of title 6, United
States Code, contains three scenarios in
which a covered entity is excepted from
having to report a separate covered
cyber incident or ransom payment. The
first of these exceptions authorizes a
covered entity to submit a single CIRCIA
Report containing information on both a
covered cyber incident and ransom
payment when the covered entity makes
a ransom payment related to a covered
cyber incident within the 72-hour
window for reporting the covered cyber
incident. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A). The
second exception allows a covered
entity to forgo providing an otherwise
required CIRCIA Report to CISA if it is
legally required to report substantially
similar information within a
substantially similar timeframe to
another Federal agency with whom
CISA has an information sharing
agreement and mechanism. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(5)(B). The third exception states
that CIRCIA reporting requirements
shall not apply to certain covered
entities, or specific functions of those
entities, that are owned, operated, or
governed by multi-stakeholder
organizations that develop, implement,
and enforce policies concerning the
DNS. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(C). CISA
additionally is proposing a fourth
exception that would except Federal
agencies from having to submit a
CIRCIA Report to CISA if the Federal
agency is required to report the incident
in question to CISA pursuant to FISMA,
44 U.S.C. 3551 et seq.
The first exception, which requires
the submission of a Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report,
is discussed in Section IV.E.ii of this
document. The following subsections
discuss the remaining three exceptions.
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i. Substantially Similar Reporting
Exception
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B), a
covered entity that is required by law,
regulation, or contract to report
substantially similar information on a
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment to another Federal agency in a
substantially similar timeframe as that
required under CIRCIA does not have to
submit a covered cyber incident Report
or Ransom Payment Report to CISA on
that covered cyber incident or ransom
payment if CISA has an information
sharing agreement and mechanism in
place with that Federal agency. Under
that same provision of CIRCIA, a
covered entity is excepted from having
to submit a Supplemental Report to
CISA if the entity is required to provide
to another Federal agency substantially
similar information to that which the
entity would otherwise be obligated to
provide to CISA in a Supplemental
Report, must do so in a substantially
similar timeframe as that required under
CIRCIA, and CISA has both an
information sharing agreement and
mechanism in place with the other
Federal agency. This reporting
exception (hereinafter the substantially
similar reporting exception) will allow
covered entities subject to more than
one Federal cyber incident reporting
requirement to avoid having to report
duplicative information to both CISA
and another Federal agency when
certain conditions are met.
CISA interprets the statutory language
to require five criteria for the
application of the substantially similar
reporting exception to apply: (1) the
report must be required to contain
substantially similar information to that
required to be included in the
applicable CIRCIA report; (2) the report
must be required to be provided to the
other Federal agency in a timeframe that
allows CISA to receive the report in a
substantially similar timeframe to that
which the covered entity would
otherwise have been obligated to
provide the report to CISA pursuant to
CIRCIA; (3) CISA and the Federal
agency to which the covered entity
submits the report must have an
information sharing agreement in place
that satisfies the requirements of 6
U.S.C. 681g(a) (hereinafter a CIRCIA
Agreement); (4) CISA and the Federal
agency to which the covered entity
submits the report must have a
mechanism in place by which the
Federal agency can share the report with
CISA within the required timeframe;
and (5) the covered entity must have
submitted the report to the other Federal
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agency pursuant to a legal, regulatory, or
contractual obligation.
CISA is proposing to only enter into
a CIRCIA Agreement when CISA has
determined that the Federal agency with
whom CISA is entering into the
agreement receives cyber incident
reports from one or more CIRCIA
covered entities pursuant to a legal,
regulatory, or contractual obligation,
and the reporting obligation requires the
submission of substantially similar
information in a substantially similar
timeframe.329 When assessing whether
another reporting obligation requires
reporting of substantially similar
information in a substantially similar
timeframe to CIRCIA, CISA intends to
coordinate with the Federal department
or agency responsible for the nonCIRCIA reporting obligation which will
inform CISA’s decision making process.
If and when CISA has entered into a
CIRCIA Agreement, CISA will announce
and catalogue the existence of the
CIRCIA Agreement on a public-facing
website. In accordance with 6 U.S.C.
681g(a)(5)(B), to the extent practicable,
CISA will publish the full CIRCIA
Agreement. The listing of a CIRCIA
Agreement by CISA demonstrates that
CISA has determined that the applicable
law, regulation, or contractual
obligation requires a covered entity to
report substantially similar information
related to a covered cyber incident or
ransom payment within a substantially
similar timeframe and that the Federal
agency has committed to providing the
covered entity’s report to CISA within
the relevant deadlines under this Part. If
a covered entity submits a report related
to a covered cyber incident or ransom
payment to another Federal agency with
which CISA has an active and published
CIRCIA Agreement, the covered entity’s
report qualifies for the exception under
this section. If no CIRCIA Agreement is
listed for a Federal agency, this
exception does not apply, and reporting
to that Federal agency will not exempt
a covered entity from having to report
directly to CISA in accordance with this
part. A covered entity is responsible for
confirming that a CIRCIA Agreement is
applicable to both it and the specific
CIRCIA reporting obligation that it is
seeking to satisfy. CISA generally
anticipates that each CIRCIA Agreement
will describe or otherwise identify the
329 CISA may enter into other information sharing
agreements with Federal agencies that do not meet
the substantially similar reporting exception
criteria; however, such agreements would not be
considered CIRCIA Agreements and would not
indicate the applicability of the substantially
similar reporting exception to entities submitting
reports to the Federal entity with which CISA
entered into the agreement.
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scope of entities and/or reporting
obligations that are the subject of the
CIRCIA Agreement.
If a law, regulation, or contract that
serves as the basis for a CIRCIA
Agreement is modified in any way,
CISA may reassess if the respective law,
regulation, or contract continues to meet
the requirements necessary for that law,
regulation, or contract to serve as the
basis for application of the substantially
similar reporting exception. CISA may
terminate a CIRCIA Agreement at any
time as long as doing so would not
violate any aspect of the agreement
itself. If CISA terminates a CIRCIA
Agreement for any reason, CISA will
provide notice of the termination on the
public-facing website where the catalog
of active CIRCIA Agreements is
maintained.
1. Substantially Similar Information
To qualify for the substantially similar
reporting exception, the information
reported by a covered entity on a
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment to another Federal agency must
be substantially similar to the
information that the covered entity
would be required (but for the
exception) to report to CISA under this
Part. CISA does not intend to define
what constitutes substantially similar
information in the final rule. Rather,
CISA proposes to retain discretion in
making this determination. In
determining whether information is
substantially similar, CISA will consider
whether the information required by the
fields in CISA’s CIRCIA Report forms is
functionally equivalent to the
information required to be reported by
the covered entity to another Federal
agency. CISA views functionally
equivalent as meaning that the
information or data serves the same
function or use, provides the same
insights or conclusions, and enables the
same analysis as the information or data
requested in the relevant CIRCIA Report
form fields.
CISA does not believe that the
substantially similar information
qualifier requires information to be
reported in the same format to the other
Federal agency. Other Federal agency
reporting forms are unlikely to precisely
mirror the CIRCIA Report. A covered
entity could submit information in
another Federal agency’s reporting form
that, while not directly aligning with a
specify query in a CIRCIA Report form,
nonetheless provides functionally
equivalent data. CISA’s determination
that information is substantially similar
will hinge on whether the data and
information required to be submitted in
a CIRCIA Report form are substantively
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included in the report to the other
Federal agency.
2. Substantially Similar Timeframe
To qualify for this exception, the
covered entity must also be required to
report this information to another
Federal agency under law, regulation, or
contractual provision in a substantially
similar timeframe. In interpreting this
requirement, CISA has to keep in mind
the limitations related to sharing of
reports pursuant to a CIRCIA
Agreement, as set forth in 6 U.S.C.
681g(a)(5)(C). Specifically, that section
requires that Federal agencies who share
reports with CISA pursuant to a CIRCIA
Agreement must do so ‘‘in such time as
to meet the overall timeline for covered
entity reporting of covered cyber
incidents and ransom payments.’’ 6
U.S.C. 681g(a)(5)(C).
When read together, CISA interprets
these statutory requirements to render
the substantially similar reporting
exception available only if CISA
receives the report on a covered cyber
incident or ransom payment from the
other Federal agency within the same
timeframe in which the covered entity
would have been required to submit the
report to CISA under CIRCIA had the
covered entity reported directly to CISA.
Thus, for a law, regulation, or
contractual provision to require
reporting within a ‘‘substantially similar
timeframe’’ of CIRCIA, it must require a
covered entity to report a covered cyber
incident within 72 hours from when the
covered entity reasonably believes that
the covered cyber incident has occurred
and a ransom payment within 24 hours
after the ransom payment has been
disbursed, leaving the Federal agency
time to share the report with CISA,
unless a mechanism is in place that
allows CISA to receive the report at the
same time as the other Federal agency.
For example, a law, regulation, or
contractual provision that requires a
covered entity to report a covered cyber
incident to a Federal agency within 36
hours after discovery would have a
substantially similar timeframe for the
purpose of this exception. The Federal
agency would have an additional 36
hours in which to share the report with
CISA to meet the CIRCIA deadline for
Covered Cyber Incident Reports.330 If a
330 Of note, CIRCIA separately provides that any
Federal agency, including any independent
establishment, that receives a report from an entity
of a cyber incident, including a ransomware attack,
shall provide the report to CISA as soon as possible,
but not later than 24 hours after receiving the
report, unless a shorter period is required by a
CIRCIA Agreement between CISA and the recipient
Federal agency. 6 U.S.C. 681g. This requirement
would apply to reports that are subject to the
substantially similar reporting exception as well,
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law, regulation, or contractual provision
required a covered entity to report a
covered cyber incident to a Federal
agency within 72 hours of the covered
entity reasonably believing a qualifying
cyber incident occurred, the Federal
agency would need to have a
mechanism in place to share the report
with CISA instantaneously upon receipt
for it to be received by CISA in a
substantially similar timeframe in
compliance with the deadline for a
Covered Cyber Incident Report under
this part.
As discussed in Section IV.E.iv.1 of
this document, a covered entity must
report a covered cyber incident within
72 hours after it ‘‘reasonably believes’’
a covered cyber incident occurred. CISA
recognizes that not all incident
reporting requirements in law, contract,
or regulation have the same trigger for
‘‘starting the clock’’ on when an
incident becomes reportable, and that
different triggers could result in
dramatically different reporting
timeframes even if the numerical
timeframes were substantially similar.
For instance, a regulation that requires
reporting within 24 hours of
confirmation of a reportable incident
could in fact have a reportable
timeframe that effectively is
substantially longer than CIRCIA’s 72hour reporting timeframe as
‘‘confirmation’’ of a reportable incident
could occur days or weeks after a
‘‘reasonable belief’’ that a reportable
incident occurred is established. In
determining whether to enter into a
CIRCIA Agreement with another Federal
agency, CISA will take into account
when the reporting timeframe is
triggered under the governing law,
regulation, or contract.
3. Supplemental Reporting
Supplemental Reports may also
qualify for the substantially similar
reporting exception, provided that the
supplemental report provided to the
other Federal agency meets the relevant
requirements. As with a Covered Cyber
Incident Report or Ransom Payment
Report, the exception is only available
if the covered entity is required to
submit substantially similar information
in a substantially similar timeframe to
another Federal agency under law,
regulation, or contract and CISA and the
other agency have a CIRCIA Agreement
and information sharing mechanism in
place to meet the CIRCIA Report
deadlines. CIRCIA requires
and would therefore be relevant in determining
whether a reporting timeframe is substantially
similar while allowing for sufficient time for CISA
to receive the report from the recipient Federal
agency.
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Supplemental Reports be submitted
‘‘promptly,’’ which CISA interprets as
within 24 hours of the triggering event.
See 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3) and Section
IV.E.iv.3.a of this document. A covered
entity remains responsible for
submitting Supplemental Reports to
CISA as required under this Part unless
the covered entity submits any
substantial new or different information
to another Federal agency and CISA has
published a CIRCIA Agreement with
that Federal agency that specifically
covers Supplemental Reports.
4. Communications With CISA
The exception under this section does
not prevent CISA from contacting the
covered entity about the information it
provided to the other Federal agency. 6
U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B)(iii). Moreover,
nothing in this section prohibits a
covered entity from also submitting a
CIRCIA Report to CISA even if the
CIRCIA Report is qualified for an
exception. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B)(iii)).
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
5. Request for Comments
CISA seeks comments on its proposed
approach to implementing the
substantially similar reporting
exception, to include:
38. CISA’s proposed interpretations of
what constitutes substantially similar
information and a substantially similar
timeframe.
39. The application of the
substantially similar reporting exception
to Supplemental Reports.
40. The manner in which CISA
proposes informing the public of the
availability of this exception.
41. Any other aspects of the
substantially similar reporting
exception.
ii. Domain Name System (DNS)
Exception
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(C), the
CIRCIA reporting requirements ‘‘shall
not apply to a covered entity or the
functions of a covered entity that the
Director determines constitute critical
infrastructure owned, operated, or
governed by multi-stakeholder
organizations that develop, implement,
and enforce policies concerning the
Domain Name System, such as the
internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers or the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority.’’ Based
on this language, CISA is proposing to
create an exception from CIRCIA
reporting requirements for ICANN, the
American Registry for Internet Numbers
(ARIN), and affiliates of those entities.
CISA additionally proposes to create a
limited exception from CIRCIA
reporting requirements for the DNS Root
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Server Operator (RSO) function of a
covered entity.
To qualify for the reporting exception
provided in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(C), a
covered entity must have been
determined by the Director to meet two
criteria. First, the Director must have
determined that the covered entity
constitutes critical infrastructure.
Second, the Director must have
determined that the covered entity, or a
specific function of that entity, is
owned, operated, or governed by a
multi-stakeholder organization that
develops, implements, and enforces
policies concerning the DNS. As very
few entities meet the second criterion, it
is more efficient to begin CISA’s
analysis on this topic by considering the
second criterion first.
To determine what covered entities
might meet the second criterion, CISA
assessed the DNS ecosystem to identify
multi-stakeholder organizations that
develop, implement, and enforce
policies concerning the DNS and to
identify entities that are wholly owned,
operated, or governed by such multistakeholder organizations. Based on this
assessment, CISA believes that two
specific entities meet this criterion, and
a third category of entities meet the
criterion as well.
The first entity that CISA has assessed
is a multi-stakeholder organization that
develops, implements, and enforces
DNS policies is ICANN. ICANN is a notfor-profit, multi-stakeholder
organization that leads the development
of bottom-up, consensus policies and
guidelines that help advance the stable
and secure operation of the internet’s
unique identifier systems and help
define how the DNS functions.331
The second entity that CISA has
assessed as meeting this criterion is
Public Technical Identifiers (PTI). PTI is
a 501(c)(3) non-profit whose specific
purpose is to operate exclusively to
carry out the purposes of ICANN, which
is a multi-stakeholder organization.332
PTI is an affiliate of ICANN that is
wholly controlled by ICANN, akin to
complete ownership, thus meeting the
‘‘owned, operated, or governed by’’ a
multi-stakeholder organization clause
contained within CIRCIA’s statutory
reporting exception.
The third group of covered entities
that are multi-stakeholder organizations
331 See ICANN, Policy Mission, https://
www.icann.org/resources/pages/mission-2012-0827-en (last visited July 24, 2023); see also ICANN,
ICANN For Beginners, https://www.icann.org/getstarted (last visited July 24, 2023).
332 See PTI Articles of Incorporation Sections II
and III. The PTI Articles of Incorporation are
available at https://pti.icann.org/articles-ofincorporation (last visited Nov. 13, 2023). See also
later discussion of the IANA functions.
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with responsibilities related to the
development, implementation, and
enforcement of DNS policies are
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs
are multi-stakeholder organizations
responsible for managing, distributing,
and registering internet number
resources (IPv4 and IPv6 address space
and Autonomous System (AS) Numbers)
within their respective regions.333
Currently, there are five RIRs in the
world: (1) the African Network
Information Centre (AFRINIC), which
services Africa and the Indian Ocean;
(2) the Asia-Pacific Network Information
Centre (APNIC), which services Asia
and the Pacific; (3) ARIN, which
services the United States, Canada, and
many Caribbean and North Atlantic
Islands; (4) the Latin American and
Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry
(LACNIC), which services Latin
America and the Caribbean; and (5) the
Re´seaux IP Europe´ens Network
Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), which
services Europe, the Middle East, and
parts of Central Asia.334 Since ARIN is
the only RIR with a legal presence in the
United States, CISA has assessed that
ARIN is the only relevant RIR for
purposes of CIRCIA.
Finally, CISA assessed whether the
CIRCIA reporting exception should
apply to any specific function of a
covered entity that is owned, operated,
or governed by a multi-stakeholder
organization that develops, implements,
and enforces policies concerning the
DNS. Given the RSO’s role in
operationalizing a specific, critical
IANA function of overseeing operation
of the internet root server system, CISA
has assessed that the DNS RSO function
also meets this criterion.
The Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority functions (IANA functions)
are administered by PTI, which is
owned by ICANN, a multi-stakeholder
organization responsible for
development, implementation, and
enforcement of policies concerning the
DNS.335 One of the key IANA functions
is the management of the DNS root
zone.336 The ‘‘root zone’’ is the uppermost part of the DNS hierarchy.337 The
root zone management function uses the
Root Server System (RSS) for
publication of the root zone. The RSS is
333 See NRO, Regional Internet Registries, https://
www.nro.net/about/rirs/ (last visited July 24, 2023).
334 Id.
335 See U.S.C./ICANN Transition Agreement,
ICANN, available at https://www.icann.org/
resources/unthemed-pages/usc-icann-transition2012-02-25-en.
336 See IANA, Root Zone Management, https://
www.iana.org/domains/root (last visited Nov. 14,
2023).
337 See IANA, Domain Name Services, https://
www.iana.org/domains (last visited Nov. 15, 2023).
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administered collectively by the RSOs,
which serve as the authorities for each
of the A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L,
and M root servers. The root servers
operated by the RSOs act exclusively as
a mechanism by which the content of
the root zone database is made publicly
available. This activity is largely viewed
by the DNS ecosystem as an
operationalization of the historic IANA
root zone management function on
behalf of ICANN.338 ICANN manages
matters related to the operation,
administration, security, and integrity of
the internet root server system through
the Root Server System Advisory
Committee (RSSAC), which is an
advisory committee created by ICANN
to advise the ICANN community and
board.339 As part of RSSAC’s advice, it
has also defined a set of service
expectations that RSOs have agreed to
satisfy.340
CISA has assessed that the RSO
function is an operationalization of
ICANN’s responsibility to operate the
internet root server system and thus
qualifies as a ‘‘function[ ] of a covered
entity . . . owned, operated, or
governed by multi-stakeholder
organizations that develop, implement,
and enforce policies concerning the
Domain Name System, such as the
Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers or the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority.’’
Accordingly, CISA has assessed that the
RSO function of a covered entity that
has been recognized by ICANN as
responsible for operating one of the 13
root identities and agrees to follow the
service expectations established by the
RSSAC and ICANN may qualify for the
DNS Exception, if the second criterion
for the DNS Exception is met, (i.e.,
338 See IANA, Root Zone Management, https://
www.iana.org/domains/root (last visited Nov. 14,
2023); see also ICANN, Brief Overview of the Root
Server System, at 4 (May 6, 2020), available at
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/octo010-06may20-en.pdf (‘‘The 13 root services respond
to the queries they receive either with information
found in the root zone as it is managed by the IANA
Functions operated by ICANN. . .’’).
339 You can find more information about the
RSSAC at https://www.icann.org/groups/rssac#:∼:
text=Root%20Server%20System%20Advisory
%20Committee%20%20%20,
31%20December%202024%20%208%20
more%20rows%20 (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
340 RSSAC001, Service Expectations of Root
Servers, Version 1 (Dec. 4, 2015) available at
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/rssac001-root-service-expectations-04dec15-en.pdf.
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whether the function also constitutes
critical infrastructure).341
Note, to the extent the proposed DNS
Exception may apply to a covered entity
that is an RSO, it would only apply to
the RSO function of the entity. Other
functions performed by an RSO that are
not the RSO function would not qualify
for the proposed DNS Exception under
CIRCIA. Accordingly, should an RSO
that is also a covered entity experience
a covered cyber incident or make a
ransom payment as the result of a
ransomware attack that impacts the
entity’s activities or business streams
that are separate from, or in addition to,
its RSO function, the covered entity
would be required to report that covered
cyber incident or ransom payment
under this proposed regulation.
For a covered entity to be eligible for
an exception from CIRCIA reporting
requirements under the proposed DNS
Exception, it must also meet the first
criterion included in the statutory
language—i.e., be determined by the
Director to constitute critical
infrastructure. The USA Patriot Act
(Pub. L. 107–56) and, by reference, both
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as
amended, and PPD–21 define ‘‘critical
infrastructure’’ as ‘‘systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.’’ 342 Given
their roles in ensuring the functioning of
the DNS around the world, and the
debilitating impacts a significant failure
of the DNS would have on national
security, economic security, or public
health, and safety, the Director has
determined that ICANN, ARIN, and
their affiliates 343 (such as PTI) meet the
341 There currently are 12 RSOs that perform the
IANA root zone management function: Verisign,
Inc.; the University of Southern California,
Information Sciences Institute; Cogent
Communications; the University of Maryland;
NASA; Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.; the U.S.
Department of Defense (NIC); the U.S. Army
Research Lab; Netnod; RIPE NCC; ICANN; and
WIDE Project. Verisign, Inc. manages two of the root
identities. See IANA, Root Servers, https://
www.iana.org/domains/root/servers (last visited
Nov. 14, 2023).
342 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e).
343 ‘‘Affiliates’’ in this context is meant to reflect
entities that have been recognized by ICANN or
IANAARIN as an affiliate and are so significantly
controlled by ICANN or ARIN that the average non-
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23711
definition of critical infrastructure for
purposes of applying this statutory
exception. The Director also has
determined that, given the criticality of
the DNS root zone to the operation of
the internet, the RSO function
performed by a covered entity qualifies
as critical infrastructure as well.
Based on the aforementioned analysis,
ICANN, ARIN, any affiliates of ICANN
or ARIN (such as PTI), and the RSO
function of covered entities meet both
criteria contained in the statute for the
DNS Exception. Accordingly, CISA
proposes in § 226.4(b) that ICANN,
ARIN, and their affiliates do not need to
report to CISA covered cyber incidents
that they experience or ransom
payments they make as the result of a
ransomware attack. CISA further
proposes to exempt a covered entity
from CIRCIA reporting requirements for
covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments made as a result of a
ransomware attack that solely relate to
the entity’s RSO function.
Given the complexities of the DNS, as
well as the long-standing U.S.
Government policy goal of support of
the multi-stakeholder approach to
internet governance that may impact
other entities in this space, CISA
recognizes the importance of public
feedback on the scoping of this
reporting exception consistent with the
legal requirements in 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(5)(C) and the purposes for
which CIRCIA has been established. In
particular, CISA welcomes comments
on all aspects of this topic. Among other
things, CISA welcomes comments on
the possible application of the DNS
exception to domain name registries and
registrars, and of all associated
questions of law and policy. CISA will
give extreme careful consideration to
alternative views, including the possible
application of the DNS exception to
domain name registries and registrars.
Consistent with Executive Order 13563,
CISA is strongly committed to public
participation, to maintaining openness,
and to serious assessment of alternative
approaches that might better balance the
relevant interests. CISA invites
submission of views, information, data,
and comments on the following policy
and legal questions that are unique to
the DNS community:
technical individual might actually consider them
to be part of ICANN or ARIN.
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42. The covered entities which CISA
proposes this exception apply to,
including whether any additional
covered entities involved in DNS
operations, such as domain name
registries and registrars, should be
considered by CISA for this reporting
exception. If so, how do those covered
entities, or specific functions thereof,
meet the statutory requirements,
including specifically how the entity or
its functions may ‘‘constitute critical
infrastructure owned, operated, or
governed by multi-stakeholder
organizations that develop, implement,
and enforce policies concerning the
Domain Name System, such as the
internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers or the internet
Assigned Numbers Authority’’?
43. Information, facts, or other views
that describe or explain the relationship
between ICANN and domain name
registries and registrars, as well as
specific cyber incident and ransom
payment information that must be
reported to ICANN by entities
accredited by ICANN.
44. What types of covered cyber
incidents could be unique to, or have a
unique impact on, the covered entities
that would be exempt from reporting
under CIRCIA based on the scoping of
the proposed DNS Exception?
45. What are the potential
consequences of covered cyber
incidents that would not be reported to
CISA based on the proposed DNS
Exception (e.g., impacts to the
functionality of the internet or to
services offered to critical
infrastructure)?
46. What are the specific technical
functions that DNS entities perform or
provide in order to support the DNS
versus related, but separate commercial
offerings? How would this apply to
different DNS entities such as root
server operators, domain name
registries, and domain name registrars?
47. What cyber incident reporting
requirements, either in the United States
or internationally, are DNS entities
currently subject to? To what
government agency or other entity must
those entities report cyber incidents?
Please describe the specific cyber
incident reporting requirement (e.g.,
timing and trigger requirements; details
that must be reported; mechanism for
reporting; supplemental reporting
requirements).
48. How should the U.S. government’s
support for the multi-stakeholder
system of internet governance inform
the DNS Exception?
49. Any other aspects of CISA’s
proposed approach to the DNS
Exception.
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iii. Exception for Federal Agencies
Subject to Federal Information Security
Modernization Act Reporting
Requirements
CISA also is proposing to exempt
Federal agencies required by FISMA (44
U.S.C. 3551 et seq.) to report incidents
to CISA from reporting those incidents
as covered cyber incidents under
CIRCIA. FISMA requires Federal
agencies (as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502),
except for systems identified in 44
U.S.C. 3553(d) and (e), to notify CISA
regarding information security incidents
involving their information and
information systems, whether managed
by a Federal agency, contractor, or other
source.
While the definition for substantial
cyber incident under the CIRCIA
regulation will not be finalized until
CISA completes the rulemaking process,
CISA anticipates that all incidents that
ultimately will constitute substantial
cyber incidents would also be
considered reportable incidents under
FISMA if experienced by a Federal
agency. Similarly, CISA anticipates that
the content that Federal agencies must
submit in reports required under FISMA
will be substantially similar to the
information required in CIRCIA Covered
Cyber Incident Reports. Finally, FISMA
requires reporting by Federal agencies to
CISA in a shorter timeframe—one hour
from the time of identification of the
incident—than is required under
CIRCIA. In light of this, CISA expects to
already be receiving substantially
similar information from FISMAcovered Federal agencies on all
substantial cyber incidents within a
shorter timeframe than required by
CIRCIA. For these reasons, CISA is
proposing to exempt FISMA-covered
Federal agencies that are required by
FISMA to report incidents to CISA from
having to submit a CIRCIA Report for
those incidents that constitute covered
cyber incidents. Per the terms of this
exception, as proposed in § 226.4(c),
this exception only applies to Federal
agencies, and does not exempt
government contractors or
subcontractors from any otherwiserequired CIRCIA reporting.
Other cyber incident reporting
regulations may exist for which entities
may be required to provide other
Federal departments or agencies with
similar information about substantial
cyber incidents in a similar or shorter
timeframe than that which is required
under CIRCIA. CISA is not offering a
similar exclusion to entities based on
those reporting requirements. CISA is
proposing to exclude Federal agencies
subject to cyber incident reporting
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under FISMA, but not entities subject to
other Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements, because CISA believes
FISMA differs from those other
regulations in two important ways.
First, because CISA is the Federal entity
responsible for implementing FISMA,
CISA has control (within the boundaries
of any limitations established by
Congress in the FISMA authorizing
legislation) over the types of incidents
that must be reported, the content that
must be included in those reports, and
the timeframe for submission of those
reports. CISA does not have similar
control over those aspects of reporting
required by other regulatory programs.
As a result, CISA has no ability to
ensure that those regulatory programs
continue to require incident reports
with substantially similar information
for substantial cyber incidents in a
substantially similar timeframe. Second,
because the statutory requirements for
using the substantially similar reporting
exception—e.g., the information is
required to be reported ‘‘to another
Federal agency’’—explicitly address
situations involving CISA and a
different Federal regulator, CISA is
unable to leverage the substantially
similar reporting exception to avoid
duplicative reporting for requirements
such as FISMA where CISA is the entity
responsible for overseeing the reporting
requirement. To avoid duplicative
reporting requirements in situations
where CISA is the entity receiving
reports under two requirements, CISA
needs to specifically exempt entities
subject to those requirements from
CIRCIA reporting requirements or
otherwise make it clear in either the
CIRCIA regulations or the other
reporting requirements that submission
of a CIRCIA Report satisfies both
reporting requirements. For reporting
requirements that require reporting to a
different Federal agency, the
substantially similar reporting exception
is the proper approach for seeking to
avoid duplicative reporting
requirements.
To the extent other regulations exist
that require a covered entity to submit
cyber incident reports containing
substantially similar information to that
required in CIRCIA Reports to another
Federal entity in a substantially similar
timeframe to that required under
CIRCIA, CISA intends to work with that
Federal entity to explore the possibility
of enabling the covered entity’s
submission to the other Federal entity to
satisfy the covered entity’s CIRCIA
incident reporting requirements. This
would be done consistent with the
substantially similar reporting exception
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authorized in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B) of
CIRCIA. Additional information on the
substantially similar reporting
exception, and the process CISA will
undertake to implement it, can be found
in Section IV.D.i of this document.
CISA seeks comments on its proposed
exception for Federal agencies subject to
FISMA reporting requirements, to
include:
50. The establishment of the FISMA
reporting exception.
51. Any aspects of CISA’s proposed
approach to implementing the FISMA
reporting exception.
E. Manner, Form, and Content of
Reports
i. Manner of Reporting
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
1. Overview
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(6) of
CIRCIA, covered entities must make
CIRCIA Reports in the manner and form
prescribed in the final rule. CIRCIA
requires CISA to include procedures for
submitting these reports in the final
rule, including the manner and form
thereof. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(A). CIRCIA
gives CISA broad discretion in
determining the manner and form for
submission of CIRCIA Reports, although
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(A) requires CISA to
‘‘include, at a minimum, a concise, userfriendly web-based form’’ as one
manner for submission of required
reports.
CISA has direct experience using a
web-based form to receive cyber
incident reports, as that is the primary
manner in which CISA has been
receiving cyber incident reports from
external stakeholders for a number of
years. CISA also has experience
receiving voluntarily submitted cyber
incident reports from stakeholders
telephonically and via email.
A variety of means for submitting
cyber incident reports are currently in
effect across the numerous Federal
departments and agencies that require
entities to report cyber incidents to
them. A number of Federal departments
and agencies use a web-based form or
similar online submission system as the
sole mechanism or one option for
submitting required cyber incident
reports. These include, among others,
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DOD,344 DOE,345 TSA,346 SEC,347 and
the NRC.348 Other commonly allowed
methods for the submission of cyber
incident reports include telephone,
email, and automated (i.e., machine-tomachine) reporting.349 At least one
344 See DOD—Defense Industrial Base Cyber
Security Activities, 32 CFR 236.4(b)(2) (reports
must be made electronically through https://
dibnet.dod.mil). DOD does offer reporting
telephonically if the dibnet is unavailable. See
Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Portal
Frequently Asked Questions, available at https://
dibnet.dod.mil/portal/intranet/#faq-4.
345 DOE has established mandatory reporting
requirements for electric emergency incidents and
disturbances, to include those caused by cyber
incidents. Entities within the electric power
industry that have reportable incidents must use
Form DOE–417 to report those incidents. DOE
prefers that the form be submitted online through
the DOE–417 Online System at https://
www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417/, although DOE will
also accept submissions via fax, telephone, or
email. See DOE–417 Electric Emergency Incident
and Disturbance Report (OMB No.: 1901–0288) at
1, available at https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/
oe417.aspx.
346 See, e.g., Security Directive 1580–21–01—
Enhancing Rail Cybersecurity, Section B.3 (‘‘Reports
required by this section must be made to CISA
Central using CISA’s Reporting System form at:
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/report or by calling
(888) 282–0870.’’); Security Directive 1582–21–01—
Enhancing Public Transportation and Passenger
Railroad Cybersecurity, Section B.3 (‘‘Reports
required by this section must be made to CISA
Central using CISA’s Reporting System form at:
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/report or by calling
(888) 282–0870.’’); Security Directive Pipeline–
2021–01—Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity,
Section C (‘‘Reports must be made to CISA Central
using CISA’s Reporting System form at: https://uscert.cisa.gov/forms/report or by calling (888) 282–
0870.’’). Copies of these security directives are
available at https://www.tsa.gov/sd-and-ea.
347 Regulation SCI Entities are required to use the
Form SCI to notify the SEC of reportable incidents.
A pdf version of Form SCI can be found at https://
www.sec.gov/files/form-sci.pdf (last visited Nov. 28,
2023). Form SCI can be filed in an electronic format
through the Electronic Form Filing System, a secure
website operated by the SEC that can be accessed
at https://tts.sec.gov/effs/do/Index.
348 The NRC’s Cyber Security Event Notifications
regulations require covered licensees to provide the
NRC with initial notifications of cybersecurity
events telephonically to the NRC Headquarters
Operations Center via the Emergency Notification
System. 10 CFR 73.77(c). For certain types of cyber
security events, licensees must provide the NRC
with written security follow-up reports using NRC
Form 366. 10 CFR 73.77(d)(3). A copy of the webbased version of NRC Form 366 can be found at
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1308/
ML13083A106.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
349 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, ComputerSecurity Incident Notification Requirements, 12
CFR 225.302 (‘‘A banking organization must notify
the appropriate Board-designated point of contact
about a notification incident through email,
telephone, or other similar methods that the Board
may prescribe.’’); Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Computer-Security Incident Notification
Requirements, 12 CFR 53.3 (‘‘A banking
organization must notify the appropriate OCC
supervisory office, or OCC-designated point of
contact, about a notification incident through email,
telephone, or other similar methods that the OCC
may prescribe.’’); Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Computer-Security Incident
Notification Requirements, 12 CFR 304.23 (‘‘A
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23713
regulator does not articulate specific
manners in which regulated entities
must submit reports to it, leaving the
manner up to the discretion of the
reporting party.350
A majority of comments on this topic
provided by stakeholders in response to
the CIRCIA RFI and at CIRCIA listening
sessions indicated support for the use of
a web-based portal as a means for
submission of reports to CISA. Some
commenters recommended offering a
web-based portal as either the only
means or the preferred means of
submission, while others suggested
offering the web-based portal as simply
one means of submission. One reason
often provided by commenters
advocating for the web-based portal to
be one of multiple mechanisms for
reporting was to ensure the existence of
an alternative method of reporting
should a covered cyber incident have
rendered it difficult for the covered
entity to submit a report via a web-based
portal. Commenters expressing this
rationale often suggested telephonic
reporting as the recommended
alternative option. A small number of
commenters recommended that CISA
offer the ability for covered entities to
use automated (i.e., machine-tomachine) reporting, email, or submit
through other Federal departments or
agencies’ field office locations. See
Section III.F.vi in this document for a
summary of stakeholder comments on
the manner and form of submission of
CIRCIA Reports.
2. Proposed Approach
Section 226.6 of the proposed rule
contains CISA’s proposal for the manner
of submission of CIRCIA Reports. CISA
is proposing that a covered entity must
banking organization must notify the appropriate
FDIC supervisory office, or an FDIC-designated
point of contact, about a notification incident
through email, telephone, or other similar methods
that the FDIC may prescribe.’’); NCUA, Cyber
Incident Notification Requirements for Federally
Insured Credit Unions Proposed Rule, 87 FR 45029
(proposed rule would require ‘‘[e]ach federally
insured credit union must notify the appropriate
NCUA-designated point of contact of the occurrence
of a reportable cyber incident via email, telephone,
or other similar methods that the NCUA may
prescribe.’’); see also FCC–NORS, 47 CFR part 4
(regulated entities can submit reports automatically
through an approved NORS Application
Programming Interface).
350 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Designated Contract Markets System
Safeguards regulations, 17 CFR 38.1051(e)(2)
(requires designated contract markets to promptly
notify CFTC staff of certain cybersecurity incidents,
but does specify how notifications must be
provided), 39.18(g) (requires derivatives clearing
organizations to promptly notify CFTC staff of
certain security incidents). While the CFTC’s
regulations do not specify how notifications must
be provided, the CFTC has a portal for such
notifications that is available to registrants.
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submit CIRCIA Reports through the
web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting
Form available on CISA’s website or in
any other manner approved by the
Director.
As noted earlier, CIRCIA requires
CISA to offer a web-based form as one
manner of submission of CIRCIA
Reports. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(A). Not
only does CISA intend to offer a webbased form as a manner of submission
of CIRCIA Reports, for several reasons
CISA agrees with those commenters
who suggested that an electronic, webbased form is the preferred manner for
submission of CIRCIA Reports. First, a
web-based form is a cost-effective way
to gather information from large
numbers of submitters both
simultaneously and over time. If
designed properly, it allows for
significant standardization of data (in
both form and content) and tailoring of
circumstance-specific questions using
dynamic prompts and responses
incorporating conditional logic filters
and conditional or branching questions.
A web-based form can also reduce the
likelihood of human error during the
data submission process in various
ways. For example, submission methods
such as via telephone call require at
least two individuals to facilitate the
submission (i.e., one person from the
covered entity to provide CISA with
information on the incident and another
person from CISA to transcribe the
information into CISA’s information
management system) and create the
possibility of human error if one
individual mishears, misspeaks,
erroneously transcribes, or otherwise
unintentionally enters incorrect data
into the system. This is especially
problematic for some of the data that
CISA expects covered entities may often
need to report, such as malware hashes
or IP addresses, which typically are long
strings of numbers and/or letters. A
web-based form only requires the
involvement of a single individual (i.e.,
the person entering the information into
the form on behalf of the covered entity)
and allows for that individual to review
information after entry but prior to
submission, greatly reducing the
potential for such errors.
Similarly, by using drop-down
menus, radio buttons, or other limited
response options where feasible and
appropriate, a web-based form reduces
the likelihood of human error resulting
from the submitter not understanding
the types of responses a question is
seeking or CISA not understanding a
narrative answer provided by a
submitter. Third, a web-based form both
allows for greater standardization of
responses and does so in a machine-
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readable format, and, in doing so, it
facilitates a number of activities that are
much more challenging when data is
submitted in other manners. These
activities include automated triage of
reports; rapid, large-scale trend analysis;
timely information sharing; and longterm storage, many of which CISA is
required by CIRCIA to perform. Finally,
a web-based form enables the
submission of digital artifacts (e.g.,
malware samples), which cannot be
transmitted verbally.
Conversely, web-based forms present
only a small number of potential
drawbacks, each of which CISA believes
are easily addressed. First, the
government will incur costs to develop,
maintain, and implement a web-based
form. Depending on the options
selected, existing resources, and other
factors, the governmental costs
associated with developing,
maintaining, and implementing a webbased form may be greater or less than
other potential methods of submission.
In this case, however, the issue is
effectively moot because, as noted
earlier, CIRCIA requires that CISA offer
a web-based form as a manner of
submission. Consequently, CISA will
have to incur the costs associated with
a web-based form regardless of whether
it is the sole, primary, or one of many
options.
Second, a cyber incident at a covered
entity could make it impossible or
insecure for a covered entity to use its
own information system(s) to report via
a web-based form. CISA believes that
this is a relatively minor concern,
however, as organizations and
individuals today typically have a
variety of ways to access the internet.
Additionally, CISA intends to make the
web-based form available via a web
browser so that incident reports can be
submitted from any internet-connected
device. This should allow covered
entities various ways to access the form
even if the entity’s IT system is rendered
inoperable by a cyber incident.
Furthermore, CIRCIA permits a third
party to submit CIRCIA Reports on a
covered entity’s behalf, such that even
if the covered entity itself cannot report
via a web-based form using its own
information system(s) or any other
internet connected device, any number
of third parties should be able to submit
the CIRCIA Report on the covered
entity’s behalf.
Third, there is the potential that an
incident at CISA could render the webform unavailable for use by covered
entities for a period of time. CISA has
extensive experience building systems
that operate with high availability and
intends to build in redundancy to
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ensure the 24/7 availability of the
reporting system. CISA also intends to
maintain a capability to support
reporting via telephone as a back-up
option so that, in the unlikely event of
an extended interruption of the
availability of the web-based form, any
impacted covered entities will have an
alternative mechanism available to
submit CIRCIA Reports in a timely
manner. This or any other approved
alternative mechanism also may be used
in lieu of the web-based reporting
system should a covered entity wish to
submit a CIRCIA Report during any
short-term unavailability of the system,
such as if CISA must temporarily
restrict access to the web-based form for
routine maintenance.
On balance, CISA believes that the
web-based form is the most useful and
cost-effective manner for the submission
and receipt of CIRCIA Reports and is
proposing that as the sole explicitly
identified option for submission of
CIRCIA Reports.351 CISA is also
proposing to include in the rule the
statement that covered entities may also
submit CIRCIA Reports in any other
manner and form of reporting approved
by the Director. This provision would
allow CISA to operate a telephonic
reporting capability as a backup system
and maintain flexibility to offer
alternative manners of submission in
the future on a short- or long-term basis.
CISA believes that this flexibility is
important for several reasons.
First, as mentioned in the previous
paragraph, in the unlikely event of an
extended interruption of the availability
of the web-based form or other situation
that renders it impossible for an entity
to submit via the web-based form, this
phrase would allow CISA the flexibility
to establish other means to accept
CIRCIA Reports in a rapid fashion.
Second, as discussed further below,
CISA believes that automated (i.e.,
machine-to-machine) reporting has the
potential to be a cost-effective method
for some covered entities to submit
CIRCIA Reports in the future. The ‘‘any
other manner and form of reporting
approved by the Director’’ clause will
allow CISA the agility to more rapidly
authorize entities to submit CIRCIA
Reports via machine-to-machine
reporting should CISA determine that is
a viable, cost-effective approach in the
future without having to undertake
additional rulemaking. Similarly, this
351 For similar reasons, CISA is considering
encouraging entities that submit voluntary reports
to CISA to do so through the CIRCIA web-based
form; however, as noted in Section III.A, CISA is
not proposing to address entirely voluntary
reporting, including how such reports may be
submitted, in this rulemaking.
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provision will allow CISA the flexibility
to consider and adopt new submission
mechanisms that may become feasible
as technology advances. CISA will
publicize any additional manners of
submission on its website and through
notifications to stakeholders should the
CISA Director approve any.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
3. Additional Reporting Methods
Options Considered
In deciding upon this proposed
approach, CISA considered numerous
options in addition to a web-based form.
The additional options CISA considered
are detailed in the following
subsections. Each option has drawbacks
that led CISA to determine not to offer
them as a manner of submission at this
time with the potential exception of a
backup capability should the web-based
form become unavailable for a period of
time.
a. Telephone
One alternative manner CISA
considered was telephonic submission
of reports. Under this approach, a
covered entity would be able to call
CISA and verbally report the incident to
CISA via telephone. To ensure that all
of the necessary information is
submitted and that the information is
stored and made available to CISA in a
manner consistent with the web-based
form manner of submission, a CISA
representative would ask the caller all of
the pertinent questions in the web-based
form and simultaneously fill out the
web-based form on the caller’s behalf.
The primary benefits of this approach
include the ubiquity of and familiarity
individuals have with telephones, their
ease of use, the ability for a covered
entity and a CISA representative to
directly engage during the reporting
process, the ability for CISA to ensure
all necessary information is being
submitted (including by asking real-time
follow up questions), and the ability for
CISA to ultimately capture information
in a manner compatible with the
statutorily required web-based form
submissions. A few significant
downsides with this approach exist,
however. The first is the potentially
significant additional cost to the
government of manning a 24/7
telephone operation at a scale large
enough to handle the receipt of all
CIRCIA Reports. The second drawback
is the added layer of potential
transcription error introduced by
requiring an individual other than the
covered entity representative to
physically enter the information into the
web-based form. Beyond the potential
for transcription error, it would likely
take more time for a CISA telephone
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operator to solicit, transcribe, and
validate the information with the
covered entity than to have a covered
entity enter the same information
directly into a web-based form.
In light of these drawbacks, CISA is
not proposing to include telephonic
reporting as a primary option. CISA
does, however, intend to maintain
telephonic reporting capabilities as a
back-up option in case a covered entity
is unable to submit a CIRCIA Report
using the web-based form for some
legitimate reason, such as an outage
affecting the availability of the webbased form.
b. Email
CISA also considered the submission
of CIRCIA Reports via email. Email
could be used in two primary ways for
the submission of reports. First, CISA
could allow covered entities to use
email to submit a standardized form
(e.g., a fillable PDF form or a paper form
that an entity could scan and attach to
an email). Second, CISA could allow
covered entities to submit required
information via text contained in the
body of the email itself without
requiring any specific format or
template be used.
Offering either manner of email
submissions would provide a number of
benefits. For instance, given the
ubiquity of email in today’s society and
its availability on mobile devices,
employees of covered entities are likely
to have both familiarity with and access
to email even if a cyber incident has
rendered a covered entity’s information
systems inoperable. Similarly, email is a
standard part of CISA operations, so
CISA would be able to easily establish
a mechanism to receive email
submissions without having to expend
significant upfront costs. Email
generally also comes with automated
tracking (via sent email folders), which
can help the covered entity provide
proof that a report has been submitted
and the time and date of the submission.
There are, however, several major
drawbacks associated with email
submissions. First, as opposed to a webbased form where CISA could require
certain questions be answered for the
form to be submitted, or a telephone
submission where a CISA employee
could directly interact with the
submitter to ensure all necessary
information is provided, email does not
provide a means for CISA to ensure that
all required information is submitted
before the report is made. Consequently,
CISA envisions email submissions
would result in a potentially significant
number of cases in which CISA would
need to follow up with the covered
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entity to obtain required information.
Limiting the use of email as a
mechanism for the submission only of a
fillable reporting form might somewhat
reduce the need for follow-up when
compared to allowing unbound email
submissions; however, CISA believes
this likely still would occur frequently.
Second, regardless of which email
submission approach is used, CISA
would be required to establish and
implement processes to transfer data
from the email submissions into an
online case management system so that
CIRCIA Reports submitted via email
could be consolidated, analyzed, stored,
etc., in a similar way as CIRCIA Reports
submitted via the web-form or other
subsequently approved mechanisms.
These additional activities are likely to
result in significant additional
implementation costs for CISA, increase
the amount of time it takes for CISA to
receive necessary details about cyber
incidents and ransom payments, and
introduce an additional vector for error
during the transcription or conversion
of the data.
Third, email generally is not a secure
form of transmission. Using unsecured
email would increase the likelihood that
an individual outside of the covered
entity and CISA could gain access to
potentially sensitive information on the
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment being reported, especially if
the threat actor has compromised the
covered entity’s email system. CISA also
would not be able to ensure that email
submissions are protected at the level
required by 6 U.S.C. 681e. Another
challenge is the potential security
concerns associated with receiving an
email attachment from an entity that is
compromised at the time of sending the
email. CISA would be unable to
guarantee the safety of the attachment
and could be opening itself up to a
security risk by accepting the email.
Security measures CISA may implement
to protect itself from such risks, as well
as cybersecurity measures CISA has in
place as a matter of routine, have the
potential to block an email or
attachment from making it to CISA,
creating the possibility that a covered
entity could take all steps intended to
comply with their reporting obligation
with CISA not receiving the CIRCIA
Report.
Given these significant operational
challenges, potentially substantial
additional costs, and limited benefit
associated with email submission above
other options, CISA is not proposing
email as a submission option at this
time.
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c. Fax
A fourth potential mechanism for
covered entities to submit CIRCIA
Reports would be via fax, which could
be done by completing a report on paper
and submitting it to CISA via fax
machine or by submitting a fax
electronically via an online faxing
service or application. The primary
benefit of offering faxing as a means of
submission is that for many
organizations, fax machines are separate
from an organization’s IT systems and
thus may be available even when a
cyber incident renders reporting via a
web-based form or company email
system unavailable. This benefit is
somewhat limited these days, however,
as fewer entities maintain actual fax
machines as a means of
communications, and online faxing
services or applications are presumably
no more likely to be an available and
secure mechanism for an entity
experiencing a cyber incident than
reporting via a web-based form or
company email system.352
Moreover, much like with email
submissions, CIRCIA Reports submitted
via fax would not provide a means for
CISA to ensure that all required
information is provided at the time of
the submission. Consequently, CISA
expects this could result in a large
number of cases where CISA would
need to follow up with the covered
entity to obtain required information or
validate the information received (e.g.,
in the event that handwriting is
illegible). CISA also would have to
manually review and upload all
submissions into an online case
management system so that CIRCIA
Reports submitted via fax could be
consolidated, analyzed, stored, etc. in a
similar way as CIRCIA Reports
submitted via the web-form or other
approved submission mechanisms.
These additional activities are likely to
result in additional implementation
costs for CISA, increase the amount of
time it takes for CISA to receive
necessary details about the cyber
incident or ransom payment, and
introduce an additional vector for
human error during the transcription or
conversion of the data. Finally, faxing is
generally considered insecure, with
outdated protocols, and data that is
352 See, e.g., Ashifa Kassam, The Outdated
Machine Hampering the Fight Against Covid–19,
BBC Future (Sept. 5, 2021) (‘‘By 2000, fax’s role in
business was declining as companies switched to
email and the internet to share information. But in
other sectors, such as healthcare and real estate, the
fax machine has stubbornly clung on.’’), available
at https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20210903how-covid-19-could-finally-be-the-end-of-the-faxmachine.
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typically transmitted without
encryption.353 For these reasons, CISA
is not proposing faxes as a means for
submitting CIRCIA Reports.
d. U.S. Mail or Other Physical Delivery
Service
Another potential means for covered
entities to submit CIRCIA Reports could
be the delivery of physical, written
reports using the U.S. Mail or other
physical delivery service (e.g., United
Parcel Service, Federal Express, or a
local courier). While this approach has
the potential benefit of remaining
available when a covered entity’s
information systems have been rendered
unavailable or insecure due to the
reportable incident, there are significant
drawbacks associated with this
mechanism of submission that likely
would outweigh any associated benefits.
Chief among these is the significant
increase in the amount of time it likely
would take for CISA to physically
receive the submission from the covered
entity. Depending on the service and
postage used, it can take days for
something sent via U.S. Mail or other
delivery services to arrive at its
destination. Even if overnight delivery
service or local courier services were
used, items delivered to a Federal
agency such as CISA typically have to
undergo security screening that
frequently delays delivery to the
intended office. These resulting delays
could significantly impact the ability of
CISA to achieve some of its statutory
requirements, such as providing
appropriate entities with timely,
actionable, and anonymized reports of
cyber incident campaigns and trends
and immediately reviewing certain
reports for cyber threat indicators that
can be anonymized and disseminated,
with defensive measures, to appropriate
stakeholders. See 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(3)(B),
681a(a)(7).
Much like with email and fax
submissions, mail submission also does
not provide a means for CISA to ensure
that all required information is provided
at the time of the submission.
Consequently, CISA expects this would
result in a number of cases where CISA
would need to follow up with the
covered entity to obtain required
information. CISA also would have to
manually review and upload all
submissions into an online case
management system so that CIRCIA
Reports received by mail could be
consolidated, analyzed, stored, etc. in
353 See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Fax Machines Are
Still Everywhere, and Wildly Insecure, Wired (Aug.
12, 2018), available at https://www.wired.com/
story/fax-machine-vulnerabilities/.
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similar way as all other CIRCIA Reports.
These additional activities are likely to
result in significant additional
implementation costs for CISA, increase
the amount of time it takes for CISA
analysts to receive necessary details
about the cyber incident or ransom
payment, and introduce an additional
vector for human error during the
transcription or conversion of the data.
For these reasons, CISA is not proposing
U.S. Mail or similar delivery services as
an acceptable mechanism for submitting
CIRCIA Reports.
e. Automated/Machine-to-Machine
Reporting
Automated (i.e., machine-to-machine
or application programming interface
(API)-based) reporting presents many
potential benefits. If designed properly,
automated reporting could provide
nearly real-time, secure reporting of
high volumes of incidents, in a manner
and format tailored for analysis and
incorporation into CISA’s online case
management system. Automated
reporting could assure the use of
consistent terminology and reduce the
potential introduction of human error
by eliminating the need for humans to
enter or transcribe the data.
Automated cyber incident and ransom
payment reporting does, however,
potentially present some significant
challenges. These challenges include
potentially significant upfront costs to
design a system and develop the
associated standard; the costs for users
to implement the standard, including
any costs necessary to integrate it with
their existing systems to feed the data
exchange; and potentially significant
amounts of overreporting if the
automated reporting thresholds are not
set properly by the covered entity.
Given the potentially significant
benefits that could result from
automated reporting, and the success
that some other Federal regulators have
had with automated reporting, this is an
approach that CISA would be interested
in exploring further once the CIRCIA
final rule is issued and all necessary
systems to support CIRCIA Reports are
developed and deployed. CISA can
envision this becoming an additional
manner of submission approved by the
Director in the future. At this time,
however, CISA is not proposing
automated reporting as a means for
submission of CIRCIA Reports for a few
reasons. First, CISA believes it is
prudent to focus the finite technical and
financial resources CISA has available
for CIRCIA implementation on the
development of the user-friendly, webbased form which CISA is required to
offer as a means for submission of
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CIRCIA Reports. Second, until the rule
is finalized and reporting begins, CISA
will not know definitively the volume of
reports CISA will be receiving or the
number of covered entities that might be
interested in using machine-to-machine
reporting to comply with CIRCIA. Prior
to expending potentially significant
resources on the development of
machine-to-machine reporting
capabilities, CISA would want to better
understand the utility and demand for
such a reporting mechanism and the
potential return on investment of
offering it as a means of reporting.
f. In-Person Reporting
One other method CISA considered is
in-person reporting, either verbally or
through provision of a written report, to
a CISA staff member, such as a CISA
Cybersecurity Advisor, Protective
Security Advisor, Chemical Security
Inspector, or a member of CISA’s
Cybersecurity Threat Hunting team. All
of these individuals are trained security
professionals who work daily with
owners and operators of entities within
the critical infrastructure sectors.
In-person reporting would have the
benefit of facilitating direct engagement
between an entity experiencing a cyber
incident and CISA staff who might not
only be able to receive a report, but also
provide or direct the covered entity to
assistance in responding to or mitigating
the impacts of the incident. Direct
engagement between CISA and the
entity experiencing the incident may
also help ensure that the most pertinent
information is provided to CISA, and
CISA may be able to get clarifications or
answers to follow-up questions in real
time, particularly for verbal reporting.
In-person provision of a written report
would also revert some of the
downsides of mail-in reporting, such as
by ensuring timeliness and real-time
confirmation of receipt by CISA.
The downsides of in-person reporting
include the increased burden required
to broadly train CISA staff on the
protocols for receiving in-person
reports, the need for the individual
receiving the report to subsequently
input the information received into
CISA’s online case management system,
and the additional likelihood of human
error that these engagements would add
into the process (though perhaps
moderately less so than with telephone
reporting as the parties could review the
transcribed report with the reporting
individual in real time). There also are
logistical challenges that likely would
limit the utility of this option as it
would require the reporting individual
and the CISA representative to be in the
same physical location. This approach
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would almost certainly require either a
representative of a covered entity to
travel to meet the CISA representative or
vice versa, both delaying the time before
reporting could be completed and
increasing the cost of reporting (due to
both the direct costs of travel and the
indirect wage-related costs of the
individual required to travel).
Additionally, at least for verbal
reporting, the CISA staff most likely to
receive in-person reports are highly
trained security professionals whose
jobs are to engage with owners and
operators of critical infrastructure. As
these individuals already have
significant, important day-to-day
responsibilities, receiving and
uploading CIRCIA Reports may not be
the most cost-efficient use of their
taxpayer-funded time in support of
CISA’s mission. In light of these
drawbacks, CISA is not proposing to use
direct, in-person reporting as a
mechanism for receiving CIRCIA
Reports.
ii. Form for Reporting
Section 681b(a)(6) of title 6, United
States Code, states that Covered Cyber
Incident Reports, Ransom Payment
Reports, and Supplemental Reports
‘‘shall be made in the manner and form
. . . prescribed in the final rule.’’ As
discussed in the previous section, CISA
is proposing to use the ‘‘concise, userfriendly web-based form’’ CISA is
required by 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8) to offer
as a means for submission as the
primary authorized means for
submitting CIRCIA Reports. CISA
proposes naming this web-based form
the ‘‘CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form.’’
For the reasons discussed below,
CISA is proposing to use the same user
interface for the CIRCIA Incident
Reporting Form regardless of which of
the four types of discrete mandatory
reports identified in CIRCIA (i.e.,
Covered Cyber Incident Report; Ransom
Payment Report; Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report;
and Supplemental Report) that must be
submitted by a covered entity.
Additionally, CISA is proposing to use
the same user interface regardless of
whether a covered entity itself is
submitting a CIRCIA Report or if a third
party is submitting a report on behalf of
a covered entity. To facilitate this
approach, CISA is proposing to use a
dynamic, user-friendly, web-based form
with conditional logic filters, with
questions that adjust based on the
answers to gateway or filtering
questions used throughout the form. For
instance, an early question might ask
the submitter to indicate what type of
report is being submitted—e.g., a
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Covered Cyber Incident Report, a
Ransom Payment Report, a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom
Payment Report, a Supplemental
Report—and the questions that follow
will be tailored based on the response
provided by the submitter.
CISA believes that numerous benefits
exist in using the same user interface for
all CIRCIA Reports (and potentially for
voluntarily provided reports as well).
First, this approach would allow all
entities to go to a single location to
comply with their CIRCIA reporting
obligations regardless of what type of
CIRCIA Report they need to submit.
Second, it would prevent the covered
entity from having to choose from
multiple different forms to determine
which is the correct set of questions for
their particular reporting situation.
There are a variety of circumstances
under which a covered entity may be
submitting a CIRCIA Report, such as a
covered cyber incident that does not
involve a ransom payment, a covered
cyber incident for which a ransom
payment has been made, a ransom
payment being reported via a
Supplemental Report after a covered
cyber incident has been submitted, or a
ransom payment made in response to a
cyber incident that does not meet the
criteria of a covered cyber incident.
Instead of creating unique forms for
each possible reporting scenario and
requiring the covered entity to correctly
identify which one applies, having a
single user interface that can be used to
address any potential reporting
circumstance eliminates both the need
for the covered entity to expend
resources identifying the correct form
and the possibility of the covered entity
selecting the incorrect form.
Finally, a single user interface also
reduces the burden in situations where
the covered entity’s reporting
requirements change during the
preparation of the report. For instance,
a covered entity may begin to report a
covered cyber incident and, before
submitting it to CISA, the entity makes
a ransom payment as part of its response
to the incident. Having a dynamic user
interface may make it possible to allow
the covered entity to modify its
responses to certain questions and/or
add the additional information related
to the ransom payment rather than
recreate all of its previous work in a
separate form designed specifically for
submitting a Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report.
The dynamic nature of the concise,
user-friendly, web-based form being
proposed by CISA has additional
benefits beyond the facilitation of a
single form model. A dynamic user
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interface supports the tailoring of
questions even within a single type of
report (e.g., a Covered Cyber Incident
Report), allowing CISA to present only
those secondary or tertiary questions
applicable to the covered entity’s
unique circumstances, thus minimizing
the overall number of questions asked of
each submitter.354 Similarly, in addition
to appropriately modifying whether a
question is asked at all, a dynamic
approach also allows CISA to vary
whether responding to specific
questions is required or optional based
on the report type and other answers
provided by the submitter.
In the user interface, CISA intends to
use a mixture of input options, such as
radio buttons, drop-down menus, and
text boxes. Tailoring the response
format and options for individual
questions will allow CISA to advance
various goals simultaneously, to include
reducing the burden of completing the
report, supporting consistency in
terminology to facilitate analysis of data,
facilitating the logic-flow based tailoring
of questions, and offering opportunities
for covered entities to provide
additional pertinent details via
narratives where useful.
As discussed in the previous section,
CISA intends to maintain the ability to
receive telephonic reports as a back-up
option and, in the future, may offer
alternative mechanisms for a covered
entity to submit a report beyond the
web-based user interface, such as
automated (i.e., machine-to-machine)
reporting. If CISA offers, and a covered
entity elects to use, a mechanism other
than the web-based user interface to
submit a report, CISA will establish
procedures to ensure all mandatory
questions are answered and the benefits
of a single, dynamic form are preserved
to the maximum extent practicable. For
example, if CISA were to allow
telephonic reporting in the future, CISA
could have an operator complete the
web-based form for the caller by
verbally talking the caller through the
form, asking them every pertinent
question, typing the responses into the
form, and then transmitting the covered
354 For instance, for a hypothetical first-level
question on what type of entity a covered entity is
(e.g., individual, corporation, State or local
government), a covered entity that indicates it is a
State or local government might receive a secondary
question asking it to identify what State it
represents and a tertiary question asking it to
identify the State department or agency. If the
covered entity instead indicated it was a
corporation, it would not be asked those specific
secondary or tertiary questions, but rather might be
asked different questions that would not be visible
to an entity that indicated it was a State or local
government, such as the State in which the
corporation was incorporated and the corporation’s
Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number.
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entity a copy of the completed report for
its records. Similarly, if a fillable PDF or
paper-based format is offered, CISA
could design that paper-based form in a
manner similar to forms used by the
Internal Revenue Service for filing of
taxes, where the provision of specific
answers to questions on the universal
section of the form direct the preparer
of the form to annexes or addendums
that they should complete and include
with their submission given their casespecific circumstances.355
Consistent with what has been
discussed above, 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A)
requires that CISA offer a means to
comply with reporting requirements for
both a covered cyber incident and a
ransom payment using a single report if
a covered entity makes a ransom
payment prior to the 72-hour
requirement for submitting a Covered
Cyber Incident Report.356 CISA’s
proposed approach of using a dynamic
reporting user interface for all CIRCIA
Reports would enable a covered entity
to submit information on both a covered
cyber incident and ransom payment at
the same time using the same form, thus
satisfying this statutory requirement. As
discussed in Section IV.A.iii.4 in this
document, CISA is proposing to call this
report a Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Report. To
complete this type of report, a covered
entity should follow the processes
described herein that apply to all
CIRCIA Reports and include all content
required in both a Covered Cyber
Incident Report and Ransom Payment
Report, as set out in the following
section and §§ 226.7 through 226.10 of
the proposed regulation.
iii. Content of Reports
Sections 681b(c)(4) and (5) of title 6,
United States Code, require CISA to
include in the final rule a ‘‘clear
description of the specific required
contents’’ of a Covered Cyber Incident
Report and Ransom Payment Report,
respectively. Sections 226.7 through
355 For example, an individual only needs to
complete Schedule B to Form 1040 if they received
certain interest or ordinary dividends during a
given tax year (see https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/
about-schedule-b-form-1040 (last visited Nov. 28,
2023)) or Schedule C if they need to report income
or loss from a business operated or profession
practiced as a sole proprietor (see https://
www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-schedule-c-form1040 (last visited Nov. 28, 2023)).
356 Specifically, 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A) states ‘‘If a
covered entity is the victim of a covered cyber
incident and makes a ransom payment prior to the
72 hour requirement under paragraph (1), such that
the reporting requirements under paragraphs (1)
and (2) both apply, the covered entity may submit
a single report to satisfy the requirements of both
paragraphs in accordance with procedures
established in the final rule issued pursuant to
subsection (b).’’
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226.11 of the proposed regulation
contain a description of the content
required in those reports, as well as the
other two types of CIRCIA Reports.
In determining what content covered
entities should be required to include in
either a Covered Cyber Incident Report
or Ransom Payment Report, CISA
considered a variety of sources. First
and foremost, CISA considered 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4) and (5), as those sections
contain extensive lists of the specific
types and categories of information that
submitters must include in Covered
Cyber Incident Reports and Ransom
Payment Reports, respectively.
Second, CISA examined what data is
required for CISA to perform the
activities Congress assigned to CISA
within CIRCIA and evaluated whether
that data is captured within the content
categories enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4) and (5). Based on that
evaluation, CISA determined that
certain data CISA will need to perform
its statutory mandates will not
necessarily be captured by any of the
categories of content specified by
Congress in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4) and (5).
Accordingly, CISA is proposing to make
that content required in one or more
types of CIRCIA Report. For example, 6
U.S.C. 681a(a)(3)(B) of CIRCIA requires
CISA to ‘‘provide appropriate entities
. . . with timely, actionable, and
anonymized reports of cyber incident
campaigns and trends, including . . .
related contextual information, cyber
threat indicators, and defensive
measures.’’ To comply with this
requirement, CISA needs to collect
information on cyber threat indicators
from victims of cyber incidents.
Accordingly, while some of the
categories enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4) and (5) would likely elicit the
submission of some information that
would qualify as cyber threat indicators
(as defined in 6 U.S.C. 650(5)), CISA is
proposing including additional
mandatory content for CIRCIA Reports
for CISA to collect a broader range of
cyber threat indicators.
Third, CISA engaged with
stakeholders from across the Federal
government to determine what data
related to cyber incidents might be
useful to them to accomplish their
respective missions or, for those with
their own cyber incident reporting
programs, what data they have found to
be the most useful and other
information that might be helpful to
have in the future. Among the groups
CISA consulted were:
• the SRMAs responsible for
coordinating critical infrastructure
security efforts across the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors;
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• members of the law enforcement
and intelligence communities, such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), the U.S. Secret Service, the
Department of the Treasury’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network, and the
NSA; and
• Federal departments and agencies
that oversee cyber incident reporting
regulations or directives, such as DOE,
NRC, SEC, FCC, TSA, and the
Department of the Treasury’s OCC.
In this vein, CISA also considered
what incident-related information CISA
has found to be the most useful in
executing non-CIRCIA responsibilities,
including CISA’s asset response
authorities under 6 U.S.C. 652(c)(1) and
659(f)(1) and as further described in
Presidential Policy Directive—41,
United States Cyber Incident
Coordination.
CISA also solicited the perspective of
the public and members of the private
sector on this topic through the issuance
of an RFI and the hosting of more than
two dozen listening sessions. CISA
received numerous comments on
contents of reports, which have been
considered by CISA in developing the
proposed content of reports. More
information on the comments received
by CISA in response to the RFI and
during the CIRCIA listening sessions
can be found in Section III.F in this
document.
Finally, CISA reviewed the Model
Reporting Form developed by DHS
through the CIRC effort. As part of the
CIRC’s mandate to promote
harmonization of Federal cyber incident
reporting regulations and minimize the
burden on entities that may need to
comply with more than one cyber
incident reporting requirement, DHS,
informed by close collaboration with the
CIRC, developed a Model Reporting
Form. CISA fully supports harmonizing
cyber incident reporting requirements
where practicable and has sought to
align the CIRCIA reporting form
required content with the content
recommendations in the Model
Reporting Form where practical and
consistent with the CIRCIA statutory
requirements related to both the content
of CIRCIA Reports and CISA’s
obligations with respect to information
received through CIRCIA Reports.
Based on the above, CISA is
proposing certain content be submitted
by a covered entity regardless of the
type of CIRCIA Report being submitted,
while other content will be required
only in certain types of CIRCIA Reports.
The following subsections discuss the
categories of content that CISA is
proposing be required for inclusion in
(a) all CIRCIA Reports, (b) Covered
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Cyber Incident Reports (and subsequent
Supplemental Reports as necessary)
only, (c) Ransom Payment Reports only,
and (d) Supplemental Reports only.
1. Proposed Content To Be Included in
All CIRCIA Reports
This subsection describes the content,
such as contact information for the
covered entity, that CISA is proposing
must be included regardless of the type
of CIRCIA Report a covered entity is
submitting. Other categories of content
that CISA is proposing for inclusion in
a specific type of report, such as the
date and amount of the ransom
payment, follow, organized by report
type.
The majority of the content proposed
for inclusion is explicitly required by
CIRCIA. Where this is the case, the
discussion below will include a
reference to the specific statutory
provision in CIRCIA requiring the
inclusion of the proposed content.
Where CISA is proposing to seek
content beyond what is explicitly set
out in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4) and (5), the
rationale supporting that proposal is
included.
a. Report Type
At or near the beginning of the
reporting user interface will be
questions related to what type of report
an entity wants to submit. This will
help identify if a report is a Covered
Cyber Incident Report, a Ransom
Payment Report, a Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report,
or a Supplemental Report. The answer
submitted in response to these questions
will help determine the spectrum of
additional content the reporting entity
will be asked to provide and may be
used to streamline reporting in other
ways, such as by supporting the prepopulation of previously submitted data
when submitting a Supplemental
Report, to the extent pre-population is
available for the covered entity’s chosen
manner of submission. This section of
the form also may include some
optional questions such as whether this
information is being additionally
submitted to meet any other reporting
requirements. If a covered entity is
reporting an incident to CISA per
another regulatory requirement and
intends for this report to also meet its
reporting obligations under CIRCIA, the
covered entity would need to indicate
both requirements on the form.
Otherwise, a separate CIRCIA Report
would need to be filed.
b. Identity of the Covered Entity
All CIRCIA Reports are statutorily
required to include information
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23719
sufficient to clearly identify the c
making the report or on whose behalf
the report is being made. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4)(E) and (5)(D). This must
include, as applicable, the State of
incorporation or formation of the
covered entity, trade names, legal
names, or other identifiers. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4)(E) and (5)(D). Other types of
information that CISA intends on
requesting in this section of the form
include the entity type (e.g., Federal,
State, local, Territorial, Tribal, ISAC,
private sector); physical address;
organization’s website; any internal
incident tracking number used by the
entity for the reported event (if one
exists); any applicable business
numerical identifiers, such as a NAICS
code, General Services AdministrationIssued Unique Entity Identifier (GSA–
UEI), Dun & Bradstreet Data Universal
Numbering System (D–U–N–S) Number,
Tax ID Number, EPA Facility ID
number; Chemical Security Assessment
Tool (CSAT) ID Number, or MTSA
Facility ID Number; the name of the
covered entity’s parent corporation or
organization, if applicable; and the
critical infrastructure sector or sectors of
which the covered entity considers itself
a part. This additional information will
help ensure that CISA has the correct
identity of the covered entity (including
understanding the corporate familial
relationship between the covered entity
or covered entities that experienced the
substantial cyber incident and any
subsidiary, parent, or sister corporation
or organization that may be reporting on
behalf of affected subsidiaries, parents,
or sisters), facilitate information sharing
with appropriate partners, and support
trend and threat analysis by specific
geographic regions, entity types, critical
infrastructure sectors, and other
characteristics.
c. Contact Information
All CIRCIA Reports are statutorily
required to include contact information,
such as telephone number or email
address, that CISA may use to contact
the covered entity, an authorized agent
thereof, or, where applicable, an
authorized third party acting with the
express permission and at the direction
of the covered entity to assist with
compliance with CIRCIA reporting
requirements. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(F) and
(5)(E). To satisfy this statutory
requirement, CISA is proposing
requiring a covered entity to provide the
name, phone number, email, and title of
the reporting party and, if different, the
point of contact for the covered entity.
CISA is also proposing requiring a
covered entity to provide the name,
phone number, email address, and title
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of the covered entity’s registered agent,
if that individual is different than the
identified point of contact. CISA also is
proposing that in cases where a third
party is submitting a report on behalf of
a covered entity, the aforementioned
contact information must be provided
for both the third-party submitter and
the covered entity point of contact.
CISA additionally is proposing to
include an optional field through which
contact information for a 24/7 point of
contact could be provided to better
enable incident response support and
emergency follow-up engagement. CISA
may also include optional fields for
additional contact information elements
such as a classified phone number or
classified email account where the 24/
7 point of contact or another identified
individual(s) can be reached, if
applicable.
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d. Third Party Authorization To Submit
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(1), a
covered entity may use a third party to
submit a CIRCIA Report on behalf of the
covered entity. As discussed in greater
detail in Section IV.E.v.3.a in this
document, CISA is proposing requiring
a third party that submits a report on
behalf of a covered entity to include in
the submission an attestation that it has
been expressly authorized by the
covered entity to submit the report.
CISA is proposing to require this
indication of authorization in any
CIRCIA Report submitted by a third
party on behalf of a covered entity,
regardless of the type of report. This
requirement is set forth in § 226.7(d) of
the proposed regulation. Additional
details on third-party submissions and
the proposed requirement for thirdparty submitters to confirm their
authority to submit a CIRCIA Report on
a covered entity’s behalf can be found
in Section IV.E.v.3 in this document.
2. Covered Cyber Incident Report
Specific Content
CISA is proposing requiring
submission of information in the
following categories of content in a
Covered Cyber Incident Report. As
noted in the individual content
categories, CISA is proposing that some
of the proposed data elements within
the individual content categories are
required while other proposed data
elements are optional. CISA intends to
ask for all the required information in
an initial Covered Cyber Incident
Report; however, CISA understands that
a covered entity may not know all of the
required information within the initial
72-hour reporting timeframe.
Accordingly, answers of ‘‘unknown at
this time’’ or something similar will be
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considered acceptable for certain
questions in initial reporting. A covered
entity must, however, comply with its
Supplemental Reporting requirements
and provide previously unknown
information promptly to CISA once
discovered if the information meets the
‘‘substantial new or different
information’’ threshold. That includes
any information required to be
submitted in an initial Covered Cyber
Incident or Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Report that a
covered entity subsequently learns after
initially responding that the information
was unknown at the time of reporting.
See Section IV.E.iv.3.b in this document
for a more fulsome discussion on what
CISA is proposing constitutes
‘‘substantial new or different
information.’’ CISA is proposing that a
covered entity ultimately must provide
all applicable required content in either
the initial Covered Cyber Incident
Report or a Supplemental Report to be
considered fully compliant with its
reporting obligations under CIRCIA.
a. Description of the Covered Incident
The first category of content required
by CIRCIA is focused on ensuring CISA
receives information on the systems
affected by the incident and the impacts
of the incident. Specifically, 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4)(A) requires covered entities
to include in a Covered Cyber Incident
Report a ‘‘description of the covered
cyber incident’’ containing, among other
things, an identification and description
of the affected information systems,
networks, or devices; a description of
the unauthorized access with
substantial loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the affected
information system or network or
disruption of business or industrial
operations; the estimated date range of
the incident; and the impact to the
operations of the covered entity. To
collect this information, CISA is
proposing including a combination of
one or more text boxes where entities
can provide a narrative description of
the incident or specific aspects of the
incident along with a series of questions
containing radio buttons, drop-down
menus, or limited data fields (e.g., dates)
to ensure the provision of certain
information.
For the first statutorily enumerated
element under this category—
identification and a description of the
function of the affected information
systems, networks, or devices—CISA is
interested in the name and a description
of the impacted systems, networks, and/
or devices, to include technical details
and physical locations of the impacted
systems, networks, and/or devices. CISA
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also would like to know if any of the
impacted systems, networks, and/or
devices contain or process information
created by or for any element of the
Intelligence Community or contain
information that has been determined
by the United States Government
pursuant to an Executive Order or
statute to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of
national defense or foreign relations, or
any restricted data, as defined in 42
U.S.C. 2014(y).
For the second statutorily enumerated
element under this category—
description of the unauthorized access
with substantial loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the affected
information system or network or
disruption of business or industrial
operations—CISA is interested in
whether the incident involved any
unauthorized access (whether or not the
access involves an attributed or
unattributed cyber intrusion), whether
there were any informational impacts,
or whether any information was
compromised. If the answer to any of
those questions is ‘‘yes,’’ CISA proposes
requiring the covered entity to answer a
small number of follow-up questions to
elicit additional details. CISA also
intends to request information regarding
what network location(s) the activity
was observed in. While the statutorily
enumerated element incorporates the
‘‘substantial loss’’ standard from the
first prong of the definition of
substantial cyber incident, CISA is
proposing to require covered entities to
describe any unauthorized access once
an incident meets the reportable
threshold so that CISA and other
Federal agencies can have a broader
understanding of potential impacts to
the CIA of information systems,
networks, or the information therein.
CISA believes the ‘‘disruption of
business or industrial operations’’
portion of this statutorily enumerated
element is sufficiently addressed by the
fourth statutorily enumerated element,
discussed below.
For the third statutorily enumerated
element under this category—incident
date range—CISA is proposing to seek
information on the date the covered
cyber incident was detected, the date
the covered cyber incident began (if
known), the date the covered cyber
incident was fully mitigated and
resolved (if it has been), and the
timeline of compromised system
communications with other systems.
For incidents involving unauthorized
access, CISA also proposes asking about
the suspected duration of the
unauthorized access prior to detection
and reporting. While CISA is proposing
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to ask for more details than just the
incident date range (i.e., the beginning
and end of the incident), understanding
the key timeline of events that
comprised the incident is key to
enhancing the Federal government’s
understanding of the incident as a
whole.
In describing this category of
information, the proposed regulatory
text refers to the incident as the
‘‘covered cyber incident’’ to refer to the
incident that is subject to the CIRCIA
reporting requirement. CISA does not
interpret the use of that term to import
any threshold definitional triggers. For
example, in requiring that the Covered
Cyber Incident Report include the date
that the covered cyber incident began,
CISA is not asking for the date on which
the covered entity began experiencing
impact levels that met the definition of
a substantial cyber incident, and
therefore a covered cyber incident.
Rather, once a covered entity has
determined it has experienced a covered
cyber incident, it should report all
relevant dates related to the underlying
cyber incident. As such, the date that
the covered cyber incident began would
be the earliest date of identified
unauthorized activity associated with
the cyber incident that would ultimately
become the covered cyber incident.
For the final statutorily enumerated
element under this category—impacts to
the operations of the covered entity—
CISA proposes asking various questions
to understand both the level of impact
and specific impacts, such as whether
any known or suspected physical or
informational impacts occurred. CISA is
also proposing to include questions
related to the nature of the impact, i.e.,
was the system, network, device, or data
accessed, manipulated, exfiltrated,
destroyed, or rendered unavailable. To
satisfy some of the requirements
imposed upon CISA by CIRCIA, CISA
also needs information on impacts of
the incident beyond simply the
operations of the covered entity. For
instance, among other things, 6 U.S.C.
681a(a) requires CISA to analyze
Covered Cyber Incident Reports to
assess potential impacts of cyber
incidents on public health and safety.
Similarly, 6 U.S.C. 681a(c) requires
CISA to periodically brief certain
members of Congress on the national
cyber threat landscape. Likewise, 6
U.S.C. 681a(a)(6) requires CISA to
review any covered cyber incidents or
group of incidents that are likely to
result in demonstrable harm to the
economy of the United States and
identify and disseminate ways to
prevent similar incidents in the future.
In support of these and other
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requirements, CISA also envisions
asking questions that will help CISA
assess the economic impacts of the
incident and the potential impacts of
the incident on public health and safety,
national security, economic security,
and any of the NCFs.
CIRCIA also requires a covered entity
to include in its Covered Cyber Incident
Report the ‘‘category or categories of
information that were, or are reasonably
believed to have been, accessed or
acquired by an unauthorized person.’’ 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(D). CISA proposes
including questions related to this topic
in the Covered Cyber Incident Report
form.
b. Vulnerabilities, Security Defenses,
and TTPs
The second statutorily required block
of content is focused on how the
incident was carried out. Specifically, 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(B) requires covered
entities to include in a Covered Cyber
Incident Report ‘‘[w]here applicable, a
description of the vulnerabilities
exploited and security defenses in
place, as well as the tactics, techniques,
and procedures used to perpetrate the
covered cyber incident.’’ This
information will enable CISA to carry
out its core statutory responsibilities
related to identifying and sharing
information on cyber incident trends,
TTPs, vulnerability exploitations,
campaigns, and countermeasures that
may be useful in preventing others from
falling victim to similar incidents and
preventing similar vulnerability classes
in the future.
CISA is proposing to codify the need
to submit information to address this
statutory requirement in five
consecutive regulatory subsections.
First, proposed § 226.8(c) would require
the submission of information on the
vulnerabilities exploited, including but
not limited to the specific products or
technologies and versions in which the
vulnerabilities were found. Next,
proposed § 226.8(d) would require the
submission of information on the
covered entity’s security defenses,
including but not limited to any
controls or measures that resulted in
detection or mitigation of the incident.
As part of this, CISA is likely to ask
what, if any, security controls or control
families (e.g., NIST Special Pub 800–171
controls 357; NIST Cybersecurity
Framework measures 358; CISA
357 See
NIST, Protecting Controlled Unclassified
Information in Nonfederal Systems and
Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800–171
Rev. 2, (Feb. 2020), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/
pubs/sp/800/171/r2/upd1/final.
358 See NIST, Cybersecurity Framework 2.0,
available at https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework.
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Cybersecurity Performance Goal
activities 359) the covered entity had in
place on the compromised system, and,
to the extent known, which controls or
control families failed, were
insufficient, or not implemented that
may have been a factor in this incident.
CISA also is likely to include questions
aimed at helping CISA understand how
the covered entity identified the
incident; what, if any, detection
methods were used to discover the
incident; and if the covered entity has
identified the initially affected
device(s).
Finally, proposed § 226.8(e), (f) and
(g) would require information on the
type of incident (e.g., denial-of-service;
ransomware attack; multi-factor
authentication interception); the TTPs
used to cause the incident, to include
any TTPs that were used to gain initial
access to the covered entity’s system;
indicators of compromise observed in
connection with the covered cyber
incident; and a description and copy or
sample of any malicious software the
covered entity believes is connected
with the covered cyber incident.
Questions CISA may ask to obtain this
information potentially include what, if
any, attack vectors did the covered
entity identify; to the covered entity’s
knowledge, were any advanced
persistent threat actors involved; were
any malicious software, malicious
scripts, or other indicators of
compromise found, and, if so, what
specific variants or strains were used. In
addition to a description of any malware
samples or indicators of compromise
observed or captured by the covered
entity, CISA is proposing to require
covered entities provide indicators of
compromise identified as well as copies
of any malware samples related to the
covered cyber incident that the covered
entity has in its possession. While 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(B) uses the term
‘‘description,’’ obtaining actual
indicators of compromise and copies of
malware samples, rather than a mere
description, is important to enable CISA
to perform the activities assigned to
CISA under CIRCIA (including
identifying, developing, and
disseminating actionable cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures), and
is also consistent with key requests in
other incident reporting programs.360
359 See CISA, Cross-Sector Performance Goals,
available at https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sectorcybersecurity-performance-goals.
360 See, e.g., 48 CFR 252.204–7012(d)
(requirement in DFARS incident reporting
requirement for contractors to submit copies of
malicious software to DOD when they have
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In cases where the covered cyber
incident involves a ransomware attack
but the covered entity did not make a
ransom payment and is thus not
obligated to submit a Ransom Payment
Report, pursuant to proposed § 226.8(e),
CISA intends to ask specific questions
related to ransomware attack-specific
TTPs, such as information on the
ransom payment demand and
instructions, that a covered entity would
otherwise have been required to provide
in a Ransom Payment Report were one
required. This information will help
CISA and its partners on the Joint
Ransomware Task Force established
pursuant to CIRCIA more fully
understand and combat existing threats
related to ransomware attacks.
To assist in the development of
responses to these questions and the use
of common terminology, CISA
anticipates providing drop-down menus
or other selection options tied to the
MITRE ATT&CK® framework 361 or
another broadly recognized cyber
incident reporting framework. CISA
may also ask whether the entity has any
applicable logs (e.g., network logs;
system logs; memory captures)
available.
CISA recognizes that some of the
information requested in this section of
the form may be unavailable at the time
a covered entity is submitting the initial
Covered Cyber Incident Report.
Nevertheless, to assist CISA in
conducting analysis and providing early
warnings in as timely a manner as
possible, CISA does intend to ask for
this information in Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and expects covered
entities to provide that information
when they possess it with some degree
of confidence; however, good faith
answers of ‘‘unknown at this time’’ or
something similar generally will be
acceptable responses to these questions
in an initial Covered Cyber Incident
Report. If this information is not
submitted in the initial report, to the
extent the information is applicable to
the incident and knowable, a covered
entity will be required to include that
information in a Supplemental Report
before its reporting obligations are
considered met under the regulation. A
covered entity should keep in mind its
obligation to report ‘‘substantial new
and different information’’ to CISA
‘‘promptly’’ upon discovery and should
not be waiting until all unknown
information is gathered before
discovered and isolated malicious software in
connection with a reported cyber incident).
361 MITRE ATT&CK® is a globally accessible
knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques
based on real-world observations, available at
https://attack.mitre.org/.
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submitting a Supplemental Report to
CISA.
c. Information Related to the Identity of
the Perpetrator of the Incident
Section 681b(c)(4)(C) of title 6, United
States Code, requires covered entities to
include in a Covered Cyber Incident
Report ‘‘[w]here applicable, any
identifying or contact information
related to each actor reasonably believed
to be responsible for such cyber
incident.’’ CISA is proposing to include
in this section questions seeking any
attribution-related information the
covered entity may possess.
Additionally, CISA is proposing to
include in this section questions
regarding whether the covered entity
believes they can attribute the cyber
incident, what evidence supports their
attribution assessment, and how
confident they are in their attribution
assessment.
d. Mitigation/Response
Although not included among the
specifically required contents
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4), CISA
is proposing a small number of
questions regarding the mitigation and
response activities a covered entity is
taking or has taken in response to a
covered cyber incident. Under 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(3)(B) and (7), CISA is required
to, among other things, leverage
information gathered about cyber
incidents to provide appropriate entities
with defensive measures, and, with
respect to Covered Cyber Incident
Reports involving an ongoing
cybersecurity threat or security
vulnerability, immediately review those
reports and disseminate defensive
measures. Further, under 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(6), CISA is required to conduct
a review of details surrounding each
covered cyber incident or group of such
incidents that satisfy the definition of a
significant cyber incident to identify
and disseminate ways to prevent or
mitigate similar incidents in the future.
Understanding the mitigation and
response activities taken by a covered
entity will be key to CISA’s ability to
identify or develop defensive measures
that can be leveraged by other entities,
as well as to evaluate and identify ways
to mitigate similar incidents in the
future.
The questions CISA is proposing to
ask to support this analysis include
what mitigation measures the covered
entity had in place, what responsive
actions the covered entity has taken,
what phase of incident response (e.g.,
detection, analysis, containment,
eradication, recovery, and post-incident
activity) the covered entity is currently
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in, and what is the covered entity’s
assessment of the efficacy of those
mitigation and response activities.362 As
part of this, CISA is also proposing to
ask about engagement with law
enforcement agencies, if the covered
entity reached out to another entity for
mitigation or response assistance, and, if
so, to whom.363 CISA will also provide
an opportunity for the covered entity to
indicate that it would like to request
assistance from CISA related to the
incident. This information will facilitate
CISA’s coordination with its Federal
partners, including law enforcement,
and non-Federal partners who may
already be engaged in responding to the
incident.
e. Additional Data or Information
CISA is proposing to require a
covered entity to include in a Covered
Cyber Incident Report any other data or
information required by the web-based
CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form or
other authorized manner and form of
reporting. CISA recognizes that cyber
incidents are dynamic in nature and
that, over time, CISA may identify
additional data or information that
would be useful or necessary to meet
the purposes of the CIRCIA regulations.
CISA may also identify ways to
streamline reporting in response to
particular circumstances, such as by
allowing covered entities to check a box
to indicate if their Covered Cyber
Incident Report is related to a specific
known campaign, supply chain
compromise, or compromise of a thirdparty service provider. CISA is
proposing to include § 226.8(j) to ensure
that covered entities would be required
to include any additional required data
or information that CISA subsequently
determines is necessary and consistent
with CISA’s authorities under CIRCIA.
Additionally, CISA may include
optional requests for data and
information that apply to the type of
covered cyber incident reported and
that may help clarify the covered
entity’s responses to information
required by § 226.8. CISA is proposing
to include similar language in § 226.9(n)
for Ransom Payment Reports and
362 See NIST, Computer Security Incident
Handling Guide, NIST Special Publication 800–61
Rev. 2, at 21–45 (Aug. 2012), available at https://
csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r2/final (hereinafter
‘‘NIST SP 800–61r2’’).
363 In response to this topic and the related topic
in the required content for Ransom Payment
Reports, covered entities do not need to include
every vendor from whom they have sought a quote
but did not ultimately use. However, covered
entities should not necessarily limit their response
to entities from whom they have actually received
assistance, particularly as some requests for
assistance may remain outstanding at the time the
report is submitted.
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§ 226.11(a)(4) for Supplemental Reports.
CIRCIA exempts any action required to
carry out 6 U.S.C. 681b, including the
reporting requirements in 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(1)-(3), from compliance with the
PRA requirements codified in 44 U.S.C.
3506(c), 3507, 3508, and 3509. 6 U.S.C.
681b(f). This exemption includes
actions taken by CISA to make changes
to the questions included in the CIRCIA
web-based Incident Reporting Form as
described above and to solicit for
optional information and data as part of
CIRCIA Reports.
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3. Ransom Payment Report Specific
Content
Section 681b(c)(5) of title 6, United
States Code, enumerates specific
content that is to be included in a
Ransom Payment Report. Two of the
enumerated items, information
identifying the covered entity that made
the ransom payment (or on whose
behalf the ransom payment was made)
and contact information for the covered
entity or an authorized agent thereof,
were discussed previously and are part
of the categories of information that
must be included regardless of report
type. The remaining items enumerated
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5) are specific to
Ransom Payment Reports and are
discussed in the following subsections.
a. Description of the Ransomware
Attack
Section 681b(c)(5)(A) of title 6, United
States Code, requires a covered entity to
include in its Ransom Payment Report
a ‘‘description of the ransomware attack,
including the estimated date range of
the attack.’’ For those ransom payments
that are the result of a covered cyber
incident and for which a Covered Cyber
Incident Report has been submitted, the
information necessary to address this
category will have been contained in the
Covered Cyber Incident Report. For
those ransom payments that are not the
result of a covered cyber incident, or for
which a Ransom Payment Report is
being submitted prior to the submission
of a Covered Cyber Incident Report,
CISA is proposing requiring the covered
entity to include in its Ransom Payment
Report questions similar to those asked
in § 226.8(a) of the regulation and
described in Section IV.E.iii.2.a in this
document. While 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(A)
includes much more specific detailed
requirements as to what must be
included in a description of a covered
cyber incident than the parallel 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(5)(A) includes for the required
description of ransomware attacks, CISA
is proposing to ask similar questions for
this topic because, for the reasons
described in Section IV.E.iii.2.a in this
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document, these questions would
provide CISA with relevant information
to understand the incident and its
impact.
b. Vulnerabilities, Security Defenses,
and TTPs
Section 681b(c)(5)(B) of title 6, United
States Code, requires a covered entity to
include in its Ransom Payment Report,
‘‘where applicable, a description of the
vulnerabilities, tactics, techniques, and
procedures used to perpetrate the
ransomware attack.’’ For those ransom
payments that are the result of a covered
cyber incident and for which a Covered
Cyber Incident Report has been
submitted, the information necessary to
address this category will have been
contained in the Covered Cyber Incident
Report or a previously submitted
Supplemental Report. For those ransom
payments that are not the result of a
covered cyber incident, or for which a
Ransom Payment Report is being
submitted prior to the submission of a
Covered Cyber Incident Report, CISA is
proposing requiring the covered entity
to include in its Ransom Payment
Report questions similar to those asked
in § 226.8(c)–(f) of the regulation and
described in Section IV.E.iii.2.b in this
document. While 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(B)
does not include reference to the
security defenses, as is included in the
parallel 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(B), CISA is
proposing to ask similar questions about
security defenses in Ransom Payment
Reports. This information will enable
CISA to carry out its core statutory
responsibilities related to identifying
and sharing information on cyber
incident trends, TTPs, vulnerability
exploitations, campaigns, and
countermeasures that may be useful in
preventing others from falling victim to
similar incidents, and preventing
similar vulnerability classes in the
future, regardless of whether the
ransomware attack that precipitated the
ransom payment was a covered cyber
incident or not. This information would
be particularly useful to CISA in
preventing others from falling victim to
similar ransomware attacks that could
rise to the level of being a covered cyber
incident in the event those security
defenses were the reason why a
particular ransomware attack did not
rise to the level of a substantial cyber
incident.
c. Information Related to the
Identification of the Perpetrator of the
Attack
Section 681b(c)(5)(C) of title 6, United
States Code, requires a covered entity to
include in its Ransom Payment Report,
‘‘where applicable, any identifying or
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contact information related to the actor
or actors reasonably believed to be
responsible for the ransomware attack.’’
For those ransom payments that are the
result of a covered cyber incident and
for which a Covered Cyber Incident
Report has been submitted, the
information necessary to address this
category will have been contained in the
Covered Cyber Incident Report. For
those ransom payments that are not the
result of a covered cyber incident, or for
which a Ransom Payment Report is
being submitted prior to the submission
of a Covered Cyber Incident Report,
CISA is proposing requiring the covered
entity to include in its Ransom Payment
Report questions similar to those asked
in § 226.8(h) of the regulation and
described in Section IV.E.iii.2.c in this
document.
d. Information on the Ransom Payment
Sections 681b(c)(5)(F)–(I) of title 6,
United States Code, require a covered
entity to submit a variety of information
related to any ransom payment it makes
or that gets made on its behalf. This
information includes the date of the
ransom payment (6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(5)(F)); the ransom payment
demand, including the type of virtual
currency or other commodity requested
(6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(G)); the ransom
payment instructions, including
information regarding where to send the
payment (6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(H)); and
the amount of the ransom payment (6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(I)). CISA is proposing
including questions in the Ransom
Payment Report sufficient to elicit
submission of these statutorily required
data elements, including details to help
contextualize these elements (such as
the type of assets used in the ransom
payment, which is necessary to
understand the value of the amount of
the ransom payment), as well as
information useful to identify the
completed transaction, such as any
transaction identifier or hash.
To ensure completeness in the
response and a full understanding of the
ransom demand, CISA is proposing to
require the covered entity to provide
either the verbatim text of the demand
or, where available, a screenshot or copy
of the actual ransom demand.
Additionally, if multiple demands were
made during a single incident, CISA
expects the covered entity to provide
the required information on each such
demand. Similarly, if multiple ransom
payments were made in response to a
single incident, a covered entity is
required to report each such ransom
payment.
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e. Results of Ransom Payment
CISA is proposing to require a
covered entity to include in a Ransom
Payment Report information regarding
what occurred as the result of the
covered entity making the ransom
payment. Examples of information that
CISA would expect a covered entity to
provide under this heading would be
whether any data that had been
exfiltrated was returned or, in cases
where the perpetrator encrypted any of
the covered entity’s systems or
information, whether a decryption
capability was provided. If a decryption
capability was provided, CISA would
seek specific information on that
capability, to include whether or not it
was effective.
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f. Additional Data or Information
CISA is proposing to require a
covered entity to include in a Ransom
Payment Report three additional items,
all of which CISA is proposing to
require in a Covered Cyber Incident
Report as well. First, CISA is proposing
to ask whether the covered entity
requested assistance from another entity
in responding to the ransomware attack
or making the ransom payment and, if
so, the identity of such entity or entities.
This information will help CISA
understand the capabilities covered
entities typically do and do not possess
to respond to a ransomware attack,
where assistance may be beneficial, and
the broader ecosystem of activities
related to ransomware attacks. This will
also help CISA have a better
understanding of the universe of entities
who may be subject to the
responsibilities to advise a covered
entity pursuant to § 226.12(d) (discussed
further in Section IV.E.v.3.e in this
document).
Second, CISA is proposing to require
a covered entity to provide information
on any engagement the covered entity
has had with any law enforcement
agency related to the ransom payment or
underlying ransomware attack. Such
information would be extremely
beneficial to effective operations of the
Joint Ransomware Task Force
established by CIRCIA and help the
Federal government minimize the
potential for uncoordinated law
enforcement activities.
Finally, CISA is proposing to require
a covered entity to include in a Ransom
Payment Report any other data or
information required by the web-based
CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form or any
other authorized manner and form of
reporting. Cyber incidents involving
ransom payments are dynamic in nature
and, over time, CISA may identify
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additional data or information that
would be useful or necessary to meet
the purposes of CIRCIA. CISA is
proposing to include § 226.9(n) to
ensure that covered entities would be
required to include any additional
required data or information that CISA
subsequently determines is necessary
and consistent with CISA’s authorities
under CIRCIA. Additionally, CISA may
include optional requests for data and
information that may help clarify the
covered entity’s responses to
information required by § 226.9. CISA is
proposing to include similar language in
§ 226.8(j) for Covered Cyber Incident
Reports and § 226.11(a)(4) for
Supplemental Reports.
CIRCIA exempts any action required
to carry out the reporting requirements
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)–(3) from
compliance with PRA requirements
codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(c), 3507,
3508, and 3509. 6 U.S.C. 681b(f). This
exemption includes actions taken by
CISA to make changes to the questions
included in the CIRCIA web-based
Incident Reporting Form as described
above and to solicit for optional
information and data as part of CIRCIA
reports.
4. Supplemental Report Specific
Content
While CIRCIA includes some specific
categories of content that a covered
entity must include in a Covered Cyber
Incident Report or Ransom Payment
Report, CIRCIA does not contain any
similar requirements regarding what
content must be included in a
Supplemental Report. Given that the
purpose of a Supplemental Report is to
provide CISA with additional or
updated information regarding a
previously reported covered cyber
incident, the content required in a
Supplemental Report generally will be a
subset of the content required to be
reported and optional content in a
Covered Cyber Incident Report and/or
Ransom Payment Report, tailored to the
reason for the submission of the
Supplemental Report and the
information previously provided by the
covered entity in the previously
submitted CIRCIA Report.
A unique content request proposed to
be contained in a Supplemental Report
is information on the purpose for filing
the Supplemental Report. CISA
envisions providing a list of possible
answers for this question, which may
include (a) providing CISA with newly
discovered information that makes a
previously submitted Covered Cyber
Incident Report or Supplemental Report
more complete, (b) providing CISA with
information that corrects or amends a
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previously submitted Covered Cyber
Incident Report or Supplemental
Report, (c) informing CISA that the
covered entity has made a Ransom
Payment related to a previously
reported covered cyber incident, or (d)
informing CISA that the covered entity
considers a previously reported covered
cyber incident concluded and fully
mitigated and resolved. CISA is also
proposing to require that a
Supplemental Report include the case
identification number provided by CISA
for the covered cyber incident with
which the Supplemental Report is
associated. This will facilitate prepopulation of the Supplemental Report
form and help CISA ensure that the
Supplemental Report is properly
assigned and maintained.
For Supplemental Reports being
submitted by a covered entity for the
purposes of informing CISA that the
covered entity considers a previously
reported covered cyber incident
concluded and fully mitigated and
resolved, CISA proposes including
optional questions in the form that
would allow a covered entity to provide
information on the actual recovery date
and time, and an estimate of the costs
incurred to fully mitigate the incident,
as well as any other financial losses
(e.g., losses in productivity; losses in
revenue) incurred due to the incident.
This data would help inform
assessments of the risks associated with
and impacts of cyber incidents and will
assist CISA in meeting some of the
briefing and reporting requirements
assigned to CISA under CIRCIA.
A small number of commenters
requested a mechanism for a covered
entity to ‘‘de-escalate’’ an incident (i.e.,
inform CISA when the covered entity
discovers additional information that
causes the entity to believe an incident
for which it had previously submitted a
Covered Cyber Incident Report does not
actually meet the criteria for a covered
cyber incident). CISA believes this
scenario is simply one variation that a
Supplemental Report may take and
proposes to include questions tailored
to this within the Supplemental Report
portion of the user interface for
occasions where a covered entity is
using a Supplemental Report for this
purpose. CIRCIA exempts any action
required to carry out the reporting
requirements in 6 U.S.C. 681b,
including 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)–(3), from
compliance with PRA requirements
codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(c), 3507,
3508, and 3509. 6 U.S.C. 681b(f). This
exemption includes actions taken by
CISA to make changes to the questions
included in the CIRCIA web-based
Incident Reporting Form as described
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above and to solicit for optional
information and data as part of CIRCIA
Reports.
5. Content in the DHS-Developed Model
Reporting Form Not Included in
Proposed CIRCIA Reporting Forms
As noted earlier, as part of its efforts
to promote harmonization of Federal
cyber incident reporting regulations and
minimize the burden on entities that
may need to comply with more than one
cyber incident reporting requirement,
DHS, informed by conversations with
the CIRC, developed a Model Reporting
Form. In support of harmonization of
Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements, CISA carefully considered
the Model Reporting Form during the
development of the proposed CIRCIA
reporting form and strove to align the
content required by the two forms
where possible while still meeting the
requirements, needs, and limitations
imposed by CIRCIA. Consequently, the
majority of the content that CISA is
proposing be submitted via its reporting
form is also requested in the Model
Reporting Form and vice versa (i.e., the
majority of the content requested by the
Model Reporting Form is proposed for
inclusion in the CIRCIA reporting
forms).
CISA ultimately determined that a
small number of items contained in the
Model Reporting Form were not
appropriate for inclusion in the CIRCIA
reporting forms or were only
appropriate for inclusion on an optional
basis. First, the Model Reporting Form
includes a section where a reporting
entity is afforded the opportunity to
indicate if it believes one or more FOIA
exemptions should apply to the
information being submitted. CIRCIA
Reports are statutorily exempt from
disclosure under FOIA and any similar
State, Local, and Tribal freedom of
information laws, open government
laws, sunshine laws, or similar laws
requiring disclosure of information or
records. 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(2).
Accordingly, the CIRCIA reporting form
does not contain a similar section on
FOIA exemptions that may apply under
other authorities; however, it will
contain a statement acknowledging this
protection from disclosure under FOIA
or similar laws pursuant to CIRCIA.
Second, the Model Reporting Form
includes a number of questions related
to whom the reporting entity has
notified about the incident. This
includes questions regarding whether
the reporting entity has notified any
governmental entities (e.g., regulators or
other departments or agencies, law
enforcement, Congress) and, in the case
of consumer data breaches or privacy
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breaches, if the reporting entity has
notified impacted individuals and
provided them with guidance on how to
take steps to protect themselves during
an ongoing incident. CISA is proposing
to include as required content in
CIRCIA Reports information on a
covered entity’s notification or other
form of engagement with law
enforcement agencies. CISA, however, is
not proposing to require that covered
entities report whether they have
notified other stakeholders, such as nonlaw enforcement government entities,
Congress, or individuals potentially
impacted by the incident. While some of
these additional notifications may be of
general interest to CISA and support
more effective or efficient information
sharing among partners, none are
required for CISA to meet its obligations
under CIRCIA. Accordingly, CISA is not
proposing requiring that covered
entities report any of this information in
a CIRCIA Report. CISA may include
optional questions on some of these
topics so that covered entities who are
interested in voluntarily providing this
information to CISA may do so.
iv. Timing of Submission of CIRCIA
Reports
1. Timing for Submission of Covered
Cyber Incident Reports
Under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)(A), a
covered entity that experiences a
covered cyber incident must submit a
Covered Cyber Incident Report to CISA
‘‘not later than 72 hours after the
covered entity reasonably believes that
the covered cyber incident has
occurred.’’ CISA has included proposed
language in the regulation establishing
this timeframe in § 226.5(a).
CISA acknowledges that the point at
which a covered entity should have
‘‘reasonably believed’’ a covered cyber
incident occurred is subjective and will
depend on the specific factual
circumstances related to the particular
incident. Accordingly, CISA is not
proposing a specific definition for the
term ‘‘reasonably believes,’’ nor is CISA
attempting to prescribe a specific point
in the incident life cycle at which a
‘‘reasonable belief’’ will always be
realized. Rather, CISA is providing the
following guidance to help covered
entities understand when a ‘‘reasonable
belief’’ generally is expected to have
occurred.
CISA does not expect a covered entity
to have reached a ‘‘reasonable belief’’
that a covered cyber incident occurred
immediately upon occurrence of the
incident, although this certainly may be
true in some cases (e.g., an entity
receives a ransom demand
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simultaneously with discovery that it
has been locked out of its system).
Oftentimes, an entity may need to
perform some preliminary analysis
before coming to a ‘‘reasonable belief’’
that a covered cyber incident occurred.
This preliminary analysis may be
necessary, for instance, to quickly rule
out certain potential benign causes of
the incident or determine the extent of
the incident’s impact. CISA believes
that in most cases, this preliminary
analysis should be relatively short in
duration (i.e., hours, not days) before a
‘‘reasonable belief’’ can be obtained, and
generally would occur at the subject
matter expert level and not the
executive officer level. As time is of the
essence, CISA expects a covered entity
to engage in any such preliminary
analysis as soon as reasonably
practicable after becoming aware of an
incident and is proposing including
such a requirement in the regulatory
text.
A number of stakeholders submitted
comments in response to the RFI
suggesting that a ‘‘reasonable belief’’
occurs when an entity has confirmed,
determined, or otherwise definitively
established that an incident was a
covered cyber incident. CISA does not
agree with those commenters, and
instead interprets ‘‘reasonable belief’’ to
be a much lower threshold than
‘‘confirmation.’’ CISA additionally
believes that if Congress had intended
the timeframe for reporting to begin at
confirmation of an incident, it would
have used specific language making that
clear. CISA believes few, if any,
circumstances will occur where an
extended investigation must be
undertaken and concluded before an
entity can form a ‘‘reasonable belief’’
that a covered cyber incident occurred.
2. Timing for Submission of Ransom
Payment Reports
Under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2)(A), a
covered entity that makes a ransom
payment must submit a Ransom
Payment Report to CISA ‘‘not later than
24 hours after the ransom payment has
been made.’’ CISA has included
proposed language in the regulation
reflecting this timeframe in § 226.5(b).
Different regulations have taken
different approaches to when a payment
is considered to have been ‘‘made’’ by
a party. Some regulations interpret a
payment to have been made on the date
the payment is disbursed (e.g., sent,
transmitted, submitted).364 Others
364 Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 CFR
52.232–25 (‘‘The Government considers payment as
being made on the day a check is dated or the date
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interpret a payment to have been made
on the date the payment is received by
the payee or otherwise becomes
available to the payee.365 For some
regulations, when the payment is made
varies based on the method of
payment.366
For purposes of this provision of the
regulation, CISA proposes interpreting
payment to have been made upon
disbursement of the payment by the
covered entity or a third party directly
authorized to make a payment on the
covered entity’s behalf. CISA is
proposing this approach for two main
reasons. First, when disbursement of a
payment was made is easier for a
covered entity to determine than when
a payment has cleared, settled, posted,
or otherwise been made available to the
payee. Selecting payment disbursement
instead of payment settlement or
clearance as the trigger for when the
reporting timeline begins provides
greater clarity and prevents a covered
entity from having to try to determine
when a payment has actually been
received by or otherwise made available
to the payee. Second, as discussed
earlier in Section III.C.ii in this
document, it is imperative that CISA
receive reports of covered cyber
incidents and ransom payments in a
timely manner so CISA can more
quickly identify adversary trends, TTPs,
and vulnerabilities being exploited to be
able to provide other entities early
warnings and mitigation strategies to
help them avoid becoming victims to
similar attacks. By interpreting when a
payment is made to be at the earlier
point of payment disbursement, rather
than the later point of payment receipt,
posting, or settlement, CISA will be able
to receive reports of ransom payments
earlier and be better situated to achieve
some of the ultimate goals that Congress
authorized the regulation to achieve.
CISA recognizes that in certain
situations, more than one third party
may be involved in the disbursement of
of an electronic funds transfer.’’); IRS Tax
Regulations, 26 CFR 301.7502–1 (‘‘[I]f the
requirements of that section are met, a document or
payment is deemed to be filed or paid on the date
of the postmark stamped on the envelope or other
appropriate wrapper (envelope) in which the
document or payment was mailed.’’).
365 IRS Employment Tax Regulations, 26 CFR
31.3406(a)–4 (‘‘Amounts are considered paid when
they are credited to the account of, or made
available to, the payee. Amounts are not considered
paid solely because they are posted (e.g., an
informational notation on the payee’s passbook) if
they are not actually credited to the payee’s account
or made available to the payee.’’).
366 Prompt Payment Act Regulations, 5 CFR
1315.4(h) (‘‘Payment will be considered to be made
on the settlement date for an electronic funds
transfer payment or the date of the check for a
check payment.’’).
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a ransom payment. For instance, a
covered entity might send funds to an
intermediate third party, who might
then transmit the funds to a financial
institution, who then transfers the
payment to the account specified by the
party demanding the ransom payment.
In interpreting this regulatory provision,
the reporting timeline shall be deemed
to be initiated at the earliest instance of
disbursement. Thus, in the example
provided, disbursement has occurred
and the timeline for reporting would be
triggered when the covered entity sent
funds to the intermediate third party. In
a case where a covered entity authorizes
an intermediate third party to transmit
funds on its behalf to make a ransom
payment but does not actually disburse
funds itself at that time, the reporting
timeline shall be deemed to be initiated
when the intermediate third party
disburses funds.
3. Timing for Submission of
Supplemental Reports
Under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3), a covered
entity that has previously submitted a
Covered Cyber Incident Report must
‘‘promptly’’ submit to CISA an update
or supplement to that report if either: (a)
‘‘substantial new or different
information becomes available’’; or (b)
‘‘the covered entity makes a ransom
payment after submitting a covered
cyber incident report.’’ A covered entity
is subject to these supplemental
reporting obligations unless and until
the covered entity notifies CISA that the
incident that is the subject of the
original Covered Cyber Incident Report
‘‘has concluded and has been fully
mitigated and resolved.’’ Section
226.5(d) of the proposed regulation
contains these Supplemental Reporting
requirements.
a. Meaning of ‘‘Promptly’’
CISA is proposing to use the statutory
language contained in 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(3) verbatim in the regulation to
identify the timeframe and associated
trigger for providing Supplemental
Reports to CISA. As opposed to the
statutory language for Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and Ransom Payment
Reports that contain specific numerical
timeframes, CIRCIA requires
Supplemental Reports to be submitted
‘‘promptly’’ upon the occurrence of
either of the two identified triggering
events. CISA interprets ‘‘promptly’’ to
generally mean what it means
colloquially, i.e., without delay or as
soon as possible.
CISA notes that one of the two
potential triggering events for a
Supplemental Report has a separate
timeframe for reporting mandated in
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CIRCIA. Specifically, making a ransom
payment following the submission of a
Covered Cyber Incident Report triggers
a requirement for the covered entity to
submit a Supplemental Report. See 6
U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). Given that CIRCIA
requires covered entities to submit
Ransom Payment Reports within 24
hours of making the ransom payment,
CISA believes it is appropriate to
interpret ‘‘promptly’’ to mean no longer
than 24 hours after disbursement of the
payment. Any other interpretation
would result in a logical inconsistency
where a covered entity would be able to
extend the timeframe for reporting a
ransom payment by filing a separate
Covered Cyber Incident Report prior to
making the ransom payment.
b. Meaning of ‘‘Substantial New or
Different Information’’
CISA proposes interpreting
‘‘substantial new or different
information’’ as meaning information
that (1) is responsive to a required data
field in a Covered Cyber Incident Report
that the covered entity was unable to
substantively answer at the time of
submission of that report or any
Supplemental Report related to that
incident, or (2) shows that a previously
submitted Covered Cyber Incident
Report or Supplemental Report is
materially incorrect or incomplete in
some manner. Together, these two
provisions will help ensure that a
covered entity has provided to CISA all
required information related to a
covered cyber incident in a timely
fashion and that any material
inaccuracies in a previously submitted
Covered Cyber Incident Report or
Supplemental Report are promptly
corrected.
The first prong of the interpretation—
information that is responsive to a
required data field in a Covered Cyber
Incident Report that the covered entity
was unable to substantively answer at
the time of submission of that report or
any Supplemental Report related to that
incident—is focused on filling
informational gaps from prior reporting.
For instance, if an entity stated in its
Covered Cyber Incident Report that the
vulnerability exploited in perpetrating
the incident was ‘‘unknown at this
time,’’ discovery of the exploited
vulnerability would be information that
meets this prong and would need to be
reported promptly in a Supplemental
Report. This prong is focused solely on
completion of required data fields for
which a covered entity previously did
not have responsive or complete
information at the time of filing a
Covered Cyber Incident Report. CISA
considers newly discovered information
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for any previously unaddressed required
data field to be substantial and to meet
the meaning of ‘‘substantial new or
different information.’’ If a covered
entity discovers new information related
to a question it has previously
responded to, that information should
be evaluated under the second prong,
and would only be considered
‘‘substantial new or different
information’’ that must be reported if it
meets a materiality threshold.
The second prong of the
interpretation—information that shows
that a previously submitted Covered
Cyber Incident Report or Supplemental
Report is materially incorrect or
incomplete in some manner—is focused
on amendments or additions to content
previously provided by a covered entity
about a covered cyber incident. To
reduce the burden of supplemental
reporting on covered entities, CISA is
proposing to limit supplemental
reporting requirements under this prong
to times when the amendment or
addition would result in a material
change in CISA’s understanding of the
covered cyber incident. Limiting this
prong to material changes will help
ensure that CISA gets material updates
in a timely manner while avoiding
making a covered entity submit a
Supplemental Report every time it
learns anything new about the incident.
Examples of the types of information
that CISA believes typically should be
considered material include updated or
corrected information on the TTPs used
to perpetrate the incident; the discovery
or identification of additional indicators
of compromise; additional or corrected
information related to the identity of the
individual or individuals who
perpetrated the incident; or
identification of significant new
consequences. Changes to the covered
entity’s point of contact information
should also be considered material and
reported promptly. Additionally, while
newly discovered information that is
responsive to an ‘‘optional’’ question
need not be reported, material
corrections to previously submitted
information must be reported even if the
originally submitted information was
submitted in response to an ‘‘optional’’
question.
Examples that generally would not be
considered material include minor
technical corrections or changes to the
extent, but not the type, of the impact
(unless the changes to the extent of the
impact were orders of magnitude higher
than what was previously reported).
CISA encourages covered entities to
provide that information to CISA, but
covered entities are not required to do
so. Similarly, CISA encourages covered
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entities to voluntarily provide
additional information that is not
required by CIRCIA Reports but
‘‘enhances the situational awareness of
cyber threats’’ consistent with 6 U.S.C.
681c(b).
While covered entities are not
expected to submit Supplemental
Reports for Ransom Payment Reports
(unless the Ransom Payment Report is
associated with a Covered Cyber
Incident Report), CISA expects a
covered entity to correct material
inaccuracies. For example, if a covered
entity submitted the incorrect phone
number for its point of contact, the
covered entity should correct its
Ransom Payment report submission.
new or different information, the
covered entity is responsible for
submitting a Supplemental Report. In
such a situation, CISA will consider the
prior notification that the incident is
concluded and fully mitigated and
resolved to be rendered void and the
covered cyber incident ongoing and
active. The covered entity remains
responsible for submitting
Supplemental Information until such
time as the covered cyber incident is
concluded and fully mitigated and
resolved and no new or different
information indicates that the covered
cyber incident is ongoing.
c. Meaning of ‘‘Concluded’’ and ‘‘Fully
Mitigated and Resolved’’
A covered entity’s supplemental
reporting requirements remain in effect
until the covered entity notifies CISA
‘‘that the covered cyber incident at issue
has concluded and has been fully
mitigated and resolved.’’ 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(3). Although the point at which
an incident is concluded and fully
mitigated and resolved may vary based
on the specific facts of the incident,
reaching the following milestones is a
good indication that an incident has
been concluded and fully mitigated and
resolved: (1) the entity has completed an
investigation of the incident, gathered
all necessary information, and
documented all relevant aspects of the
incident; and (2) the entity has
completed steps required to address the
root cause of the incident (e.g.,
completed any necessary containment
and eradication actions; identified and
mitigated all exploited vulnerabilities;
removed any unauthorized access). The
completion of a lessons learned analysis
(i.e., after action report) is a valuable
part of incident response, but CISA does
not believe that such analysis needs to
be completed for an incident to be
considered concluded and fully
mitigated and resolved. Similarly, CISA
does not believe that all damage caused
by the incident must have been fully
addressed and remediated for an
incident to be considered concluded
and fully mitigated and resolved.
For an incident to be concluded and
fully mitigated and resolved, a covered
entity should have a good-faith belief
that further investigation would not
uncover any substantial new or different
information about the covered cyber
incident. If, following the provision of a
notification to CISA that the covered
entity believes the covered cyber
incident to be concluded and fully
mitigated and resolved, the covered
entity becomes aware of any substantial
1. Submission of CIRCIA Reports to
CISA
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v. Report Submission Procedures
As discussed above, CISA is
proposing that covered entities or third
parties submitting CIRCIA Reports on
behalf of a covered entity are required
to do so using the web-based user
interface or other mechanism
subsequently approved by the Director.
To submit a report using the web-based
user interface, the submitter will need to
have completed all required fields, to
include, in the case of a third-party
submitter, an attestation that the third
party has been expressly authorized by
the covered entity to submit the report
on the covered entity’s behalf. In
recognition that a covered entity may
not have all the required information
within the 72-hour time limit for
submission of a Covered Cyber Incident
Report, CISA may accept submission of
a report where the response to some
required answers is ‘‘unknown at this
time,’’ ‘‘pending the results of
additional investigation,’’ or some other
similar option to submit the initial
report.
CISA is proposing that, upon receipt
of a report, CISA issue the covered
entity (and, in the cases of a third-party
submitter, the third party) a
confirmation of receipt along with a
unique case management number. The
confirmation of receipt is simply meant
to inform the covered entity that the
report has been properly submitted to
and received by CISA; the confirmation
is not, however, an indication that a
covered entity has necessarily met all of
its reporting requirements. The case
identification number is meant to
facilitate tracking and performance of
future actions related to the specific
incident or ransom payment, to include
supporting pre-population of data fields
during the preparation of Supplemental
Reports.
CISA intends to provide covered
entities the opportunity to register with
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Registration would allow a covered
entity to pre-populate a number of the
required data fields, such as entity
identifying information, on the
proposed web-based CIRCIA Incident
Reporting Form. Registering with CISA
would allow a covered entity to submit
certain information to CISA for use in
future CIRCIA reporting. Any covered
entity that had previously submitted a
CIRCIA Report would also have the
information they submitted stored for
future use. CISA believes that allowing
this optional registration, which is
completely voluntary, would reduce the
time burden associated with submitting
a CIRCIA Report when required due to
the advanced submission and prepopulation of certain information that is
required in a CIRCIA Report.
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2. Process for Notifying CISA That an
Incident Has Concluded and Been Fully
Mitigated and Resolved
Covered entities have the option of
notifying CISA that a previously
reported covered cyber incident has
concluded and has been fully mitigated
and resolved. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3).
Although notifying CISA that a
previously reported covered cyber
incident has concluded and been fully
mitigated and resolved is not required,
doing so terminates the covered entity’s
responsibility to provide Supplemental
Reports.367
CISA is proposing that the process for
notifying CISA that a previously
reported covered cyber incident has
concluded and been fully mitigated and
resolved is through the submission of a
Supplemental Report. A covered entity
or a third party submitting a notification
on a covered entity’s behalf simply
would indicate in the Supplemental
Report that the purpose (or one of the
purposes) of the Supplemental Report is
to notify CISA that the covered entity
believes the incident has concluded and
been fully mitigated and resolved. The
process for doing so would be the same
as for the submission of any other
Supplemental Report, which is
described in § 226.6 of the regulation,
although the submitter may be asked
certain questions related to how the
incident was concluded, mitigated, and
resolved.
367 As noted in Section IV.D.iv.3.c, CISA
interprets notification to terminate the requirement
to submit Supplemental Reports only if no
substantial new or different information is
subsequently discovered by the covered entity.
CISA believes the discovery of such information
would indicate that the covered entity’s belief that
the incident was concluded, fully mitigated, and
resolved, was inaccurate, rendering the declaration
of closure void.
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3. Third-Party Submission of CIRCIA
Reports
CIRCIA authorizes covered entities to
use third parties to submit Covered
Cyber Incident Reports or Ransom
Payment Reports on behalf of the
covered entity. Specifically, 6 U.S.C.
681b(d)(1) states ‘‘[a] covered entity that
is required to submit a covered cyber
incident report or a ransom payment
report may use a third party, such as an
incident response company, insurance
provider, service provider, Information
Sharing and Analysis Organization, or
law firm, to submit the required report
under subsection (a).’’ The following
subsections address various aspects of
third-party submission of CIRCIA
Reports.
a. Who May Serve as a Third-Party
Submitter
In response to the RFI, a number of
commenters requested that CISA clarify
the types of third parties authorized to
submit CIRCIA Reports on behalf of a
covered entity. A few commenters
encouraged CISA to allow anyone
approved by a covered entity to be able
to submit a report on their behalf, while
others encouraged CISA take the
opposite approach and limit the types of
entities that could serve as a third-party
submitter. Some commenters provided
specific types of entities that they
believe CISA should authorize to serve
as third-party submitters, including, but
not limited to, ISACs, incident
management firms, external legal
representatives, state water associations,
and SLTT jurisdictions to whom an
entity is also obligated to report.
In 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(1), Congress
provides a list of entities that covered
entities might use to report Covered
Cyber Incident Reports or Ransom
Payment Reports on the covered entity’s
behalf. Specifically, 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(1)
states a covered entity that is required
to submit a Covered Cyber Incident
Report or a Ransom Payment Report
‘‘may use a third party, such as an
incident response company, insurance
provider, service provider, Information
Sharing and Analysis Organization, or
law firm,’’ to submit the required report.
As Congress preceded this list with the
phrase ‘‘such as,’’ CISA interprets the
list to be illustrative examples and not
a closed list of which categories of third
parties a covered entity may use to
submit CIRCIA Reports on its behalf.
The few comments CISA received on
this topic demonstrate that there may be
a wide variety of types of organizations
or individuals that a covered entity may
wish to have submit a report on the
covered entity’s behalf. CISA does not at
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this time see any policy rationales for
limiting the types of organizations or
individuals that a covered entity can
choose to submit a report on the covered
entity’s behalf, especially considering
that the responsibility for complying
with the regulation remains with the
covered entity even if it uses a third
party to submit a report on its behalf. 6
U.S.C. 681b(d)(3). On the contrary, CISA
sees value in allowing the covered
entity the flexibility to determine which
party is best situated to submit CIRCIA
Reports on its behalf. Accordingly, CISA
is proposing that a covered entity may
use any organization or individual it
chooses to submit a CIRCIA Report on
its behalf.
While CISA is proposing that a
covered entity may select any
organization or individual it chooses to
submit a report on its behalf, the third
party must be expressly authorized by
the covered entity to submit a report on
the covered entity’s behalf for the report
to be accepted by CISA for purposes of
compliance with the regulation. As the
requirement to submit a timely and
accurate report under CIRCIA remains
in all cases with the covered entity
itself, it is imperative that the covered
entity have expressly authorized a third
party to submit a report on its behalf.
Express authorization can be granted in
any number of ways, including verbally
or in writing. Any report submitted by
a third party that has not been expressly
authorized by the covered entity to
submit the report will not be imputed to
the covered entity or considered by
CISA for purposes of CIRCIA
compliance.368
To better ensure that a report being
submitted by a third party is being
submitted subject to the express
authorization of the covered entity,
CISA is proposing requiring the third
party to include in the submission an
attestation that it has been expressly
368 Historically, CISA has on occasion received
reports from individuals or organizations not
directly affiliated with the entity experiencing the
impact or otherwise not authorized to report the
incident on behalf of the affected entity. This may
occur, for instance, where an individual or
organization is directly experiencing an incident
that is causing cascading effects on another entity’s
information systems, where an individual or
organization has become aware of what it believes
to be an incident on another entity’s cyber system,
or where an employee of an organization that is
experiencing a cyber incident elects to report an
incident despite not having authority from the
entity to report on its behalf. In these and other
situations where an individual wants to submit a
report about an incident without the consent of the
covered entity experiencing the incident, it may do
so through CISA’s voluntary reporting portal;
however, the information contained in that report
will not be imputed to the entity experiencing the
incident, nor will it be considered a report
submitted for the purposes of CIRCIA compliance.
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authorized by the covered entity to
submit the report. This likely would be
accomplished by requiring a third party
to check a box in the online form
attesting to this, or some other similar
electronic mechanism. As a general
legal prohibition against knowingly
providing false information to the
Federal government exists (see 18 U.S.C.
1001), CISA believes that requiring this
attestation from the third party is a
sufficient deterrent to prevent
individuals or organizations from
seeking to submit a CIRCIA Report on
behalf of a covered entity without
express authorization.
CISA considered requiring a third
party to provide some sort of evidence
verifying its claim of authorization, such
as a contract or email clearly conferring
the authority. CISA believes, however,
that the deterrent value of requiring the
third party to attest in the reporting
form that they have the express
authority to submit on behalf of the
covered entity is sufficient to prevent
most cases of unauthorized
submissions, and that the marginal
benefit provided by requiring evidence
of such express authorization is
exceeded by the burden of providing
specific evidence. Additionally, CISA
believes requiring evidence beyond an
attestation has the potential to
disincentivize the use of third-party
submitters, which CISA believes may be
detrimental to organizations seeking to
leverage third parties to assist with
incident response and recovery.
Some commenters suggested that a
third party must be in a formal,
contractual relationship with the
covered entity to submit on the entity’s
behalf. CISA believes this level of
formality is not necessary and may not
be practical in certain arrangements,
such as where an entity is using an
ISAC or an SLTT Government entity to
submit on the entity’s behalf.
Accordingly, CISA is not proposing that
a covered entity and third party must
have entered into a formal, contractual
agreement for the third party to be
authorized to submit on the covered
entity’s behalf.
b. Types of CIRCIA Reports a Third
Party May Submit
Section 681b(d)(1) of title 6, United
States Code, states ‘‘[a] covered entity
that is required to submit a covered
cyber incident report or a ransom
payment report may use a third party,
such as an incident response company,
insurance provider, service provider,
Information Sharing and Analysis
Organization, or law firm, to submit the
required report under subsection (a).’’
The subsection that clause refers to is 6
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U.S.C. 681b(a) which, among other
things, sets forth the general
requirements related to Covered Cyber
Incident Reports, Ransom Payment
Reports, and Supplemental Reports.
Although the first part of 6 U.S.C.
681b(d)(1) only mentions Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and Ransom Payment
Reports, CISA interprets the phrase
‘‘submit the required report under
subsection (a)’’ to cover not only
Covered Cyber Incident Reports and
Ransom Payment Reports, but
Supplemental Reports as well.
CISA is not aware of any persuasive
policy reasons for allowing a covered
entity to use a third party to submit a
Covered Cyber Incident Report or
Ransom Payment Report on the entity’s
behalf, but not allow a third party to
submit a Supplemental Report to CISA
on the covered entity’s behalf; nor does
CISA believe that was Congress’s intent.
Conversely, CISA believes that there
would be benefits to allowing a covered
entity to use a third party to submit a
Supplemental Report on the covered
entity’s behalf, especially in cases where
a covered entity used the same third
party to submit a previous report on the
covered entity’s behalf. Accordingly,
CISA is proposing that covered entities
be allowed to use a third party to submit
and update any type of CIRCIA Report—
i.e., a Covered Cyber Incident Report,
Ransom Payment Report, Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report, or Supplemental Report—on
behalf of the covered entity, so long as
any other regulatory requirements
related to using a third party to submit
a CIRCIA Report on a covered entity’s
behalf are met. CISA further proposes
that a covered entity need not have used
a third party to submit its initial report
(be it a Covered Cyber Incident Report
or a Ransom Payment Report) to use a
third party to submit a Supplemental
Report or vice versa. Similarly, a
covered entity can use different thirdparty submitters for subsequent CIRCIA
Reports. Whether a covered entity
submits a report itself or uses a third
party, and who the third-party submitter
is if one is used, is something the
covered entity may decide each time it
submits a CIRCIA Report.
CISA also is proposing to allow third
parties to submit a single report on
behalf of multiple covered entities if the
circumstances leading to the reporting
requirement for the various covered
entities is similar enough to be reported
collectively. For example, if a single
cyber incident perpetrated against a
CSP, managed service provider, or other
third-party service provider impacts a
number of the service provider’s
customers in a similar fashion, and
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those impacted customers are covered
entities, the service provider may be
well situated to submit a single report
on behalf of itself and some or all of its
affected customers. In such a situation,
the rules regarding third party
submissions still would apply, with the
third-party service provider needing to
have the authorization to report on
behalf of any customer on whose behalf
it is reporting, as well as the ability to
provide all of the information that the
covered entity customer would have has
to submit on its own, were it submitting
its own CIRCIA Report. CISA believes
this proposed approach will help reduce
reporting burden while still providing a
complete picture of the covered cyber
incident.
c. Process for Submission of CIRCIA
Reports by Third Parties
CISA is proposing that the process for
the submission of a report by a third
party on behalf of the covered entity be
the same process as that which exists for
the submission of a report by the
covered entity itself, with two minor
modifications. First, as noted in Section
IV.E.iii.1.d in this document, CISA is
proposing that a third-party submitter
must attest in the reporting form to the
fact that it has been authorized by the
covered entity to submit the report on
behalf of the covered entity. Second, as
noted in Section IV.E.iii.4 in this
document, CISA is proposing that any
CIRCIA Report submitted by a third
party include a small number of
additional questions to ensure that CISA
has a name and point of contact
information for both the third-party
submitter and the covered entity on
whose behalf the report is being
submitted. CISA’s rationale for these
two minor modifications are discussed
in the respective sections of this
document cited earlier in this
paragraph.
d. Burden of Compliance When a
Covered Entity Uses a Third Party To
Submit a Report
A number of comments received by
CISA in response to the RFI encourage
CISA to confirm that the responsibilities
for complying with the CIRCIA
regulatory requirements do not shift
from the covered entity to a third party
when the covered entity uses a third
party to submit a CIRCIA Report on the
covered entity’s behalf. CISA interprets
the statutory language to affirm that use
of a third party does not shift
compliance responsibilities from the
covered entity to the third party. While
the statute authorizes a covered entity to
use a third party to submit a report on
the covered entity’s behalf, it does not
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at any point authorize CISA to hold a
third-party submitter accountable for a
covered entity’s reporting
responsibilities, nor does it at any point
absolve the covered entity of its
reporting obligations. In fact, 6 U.S.C.
681b(d)(3) indicates the contrary, stating
third-party reporting ‘‘does not relieve a
covered entity from the duty to comply
with the requirements for covered cyber
incident report or ransom payment
report submission.’’ While 6 U.S.C.
681b(d)(3) does not mention
Supplemental Reports, there similarly is
nothing in the statute absolving a
covered entity of the responsibility for
submitting Supplemental Reports as
required or shifting that responsibility
to a third party, and CISA is unaware of
any policy rationales for treating
Supplemental Reports differently in this
circumstance from Covered Cyber
Incident Reports or Ransom Payment
Reports.
Additional support for the
interpretation that the burden does not
shift to the third party when a covered
entity uses a third party to submit on its
behalf is found in 6 U.S.C. 681d(a),
which explicitly refers to covered
entities as the entity to which CISA is
authorized to issue an RFI or a subpoena
when it believes a covered entity has
failed to submit a required CIRCIA
Report. Likewise, the venue provision
contained in 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)(B)
focuses on where the covered entity
resides, is found, or does business for
purposes of determining where a civil
action may be brought. These sections
make clear that any enforcement action
for noncompliance is to be brought
against the covered entity, not a third
party that submitted (or failed to
submit) a report on the covered entity’s
behalf. Consistent with this
understanding, CISA interprets it to be
the covered entity’s responsibility to
ensure that any CIRCIA Report
submitted by a third-party on the
covered entity’s behalf is accurate and
to correct any inaccurate or update
incomplete information through the
submission of a Supplemental Report.
e. Third Party Ransom Payments and
Duty To Advise
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(2), a
third party that makes a ransom
payment on behalf of a covered entity
impacted by a ransomware attack is not
required to submit a Ransom Payment
Report on behalf of itself for such
ransom payment. The obligation to
report that ransom payment remains
with the covered entity, although the
covered entity may authorize the third
party who made the ransom payment, or
a different third party, to submit a
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Ransom Payment Report to CISA on the
covered entity’s behalf. Accordingly,
CISA proposes reflecting this in the
proposed regulation by stating in
§ 226.12(d) that a third party that makes
a ransom payment on behalf of a
covered entity impacted by a
ransomware attack is not required to
submit a Ransom Payment Report on
behalf of itself for the ransom payment.
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(4),
however, a third party that knowingly
makes a ransom payment on behalf of a
covered entity impacted by a
ransomware attack does have a duty to
advise that covered entity of its
obligation to report the ransom payment
to CISA. CISA proposes codifying this
in the regulation in § 226.12(d). CISA
recognizes that there may be situations
where a chain of third parties is
involved in making a ransom payment
on behalf of a covered entity. CISA
intends the duty to advise the covered
entity of its reporting obligations to
apply only to a third party who is
directly engaging with the covered
entity knowingly for the purposes of
making the ransom payment. Third
parties involved in the payment of the
ransom who do not have a direct
relationship with the covered entity or
who are not aware that the funds being
transmitted are for the purpose of
paying a ransom payment are not
obliged to inform the covered entity of
CIRCIA reporting requirements.
Payment Reports, Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Reports,
and Supplemental Reports, respectively,
as well as additional content CISA is
proposing to require when a third-party
submitter is used to submit a CIRCIA
Report on behalf of a covered entity.
55. The proposals CISA is making
related to the timing of reports,
including the proposed interpretation of
‘‘reasonable belief,’’ the proposed
interpretation for when a ransom
payment ‘‘has been made,’’ the
proposed meaning of ‘‘promptly,’’ the
proposed meaning of ‘‘substantial new
or different information,’’ and the
proposed meaning of ‘‘concluded’’ and
‘‘fully mitigated and resolved.’’
56. The proposed CIRCIA Report
submission procedures, to include the
process for notifying CISA that an
incident has concluded and been fully
mitigated and resolved.
57. The proposed rules regarding the
submission of a report by a third party
on behalf of a covered entity, to include
who may serve as a third-party
submitter, the types of CIRCIA Reports
a third party may submit on behalf of a
covered entity, the burden of
compliance when a covered entity uses
a third party to submit a report, and a
third party’s duty to advise a covered
entity of the covered entity’s CIRCIA
reporting requirements when the third
party makes a ransom payment on
behalf of a covered entity.
vi. Request for Comments on Proposed
Manner, Form, and Content of Reports
CISA seeks comments on all aspects
of the proposed manner, form, and
content of CIRCIA Reports, and the
proposed procedures for submitting
CIRCIA Reports, to include the
following:
52. The proposed use of a web-based
form as the primary means of
submission of CIRCIA Reports, the
proposed maintenance of telephonic
reporting as a back-up reporting option,
assumptions used in evaluating
different possible manners of
submission, and the possibility of
allowing automated (i.e., machine-tomachine) reporting or other manners of
submission in the future at the
discretion of the Director.
53. The proposal to use a single,
dynamic, web-based form for the
submission of all types of CIRCIA
Reports, regardless of whether the report
is submitted by a covered entity or a
third party on the covered entity’s
behalf.
54. The content CISA is proposing be
included in all CIRCIA Reports and the
specific proposed content for Covered
Cyber Incident Reports, Ransom
F. Data and Records Preservation
Requirements
Under CIRCIA, any covered entity
that submits a CIRCIA Report must
preserve data relevant to the reported
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment in accordance with procedures
established in the final rule. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(4). To implement this
requirement, CISA is to include in the
final rule, a clear description of the
types of data that covered entities must
preserve, the period of time for which
the data must be preserved, and
allowable uses, processes, and
procedures. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(6).
As noted earlier, a covered entity’s
use of a third party to submit a CIRCIA
Report on behalf of the covered entity
does not shift compliance
responsibilities from the covered entity
to the third party. See IV.D.v.3.d. That
principle holds true for data
preservation requirements as well. A
covered entity will retain responsibility
for complying with the data
preservation requirements established
in the final rule even when the covered
entity has a third party submit a
required CIRCIA Report to CISA on
behalf of the covered entity.
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i. Types of Data That Must Be Preserved
The preservation of data and
records 369 in the aftermath of a covered
cyber incident serves a number of
critical purposes, such as supporting the
ability of analysts and investigators to
understand how a cyber incident was
perpetrated and by whom. Access to
forensic data, such as records and logs,
can help analysts uncover how
malicious cyber activity was conducted,
what vulnerabilities were exploited,
what tactics were used, and so on,
which can be essential to preventing
others from falling victim to similar
incidents in the future. How an incident
was perpetrated may not be
immediately identifiable upon
discovery, and the failure to properly
preserve data or records during the
period of initial incident response can
render it difficult to subsequently
perform this analysis. This can
especially be true in incidents involving
zero-day vulnerabilities or highly
complex malicious cyber activity by
nation state threat actors, such as the
‘‘SUNBURST’’ malware that
compromised legitimate updates of
customers using the SolarWinds Orion
product or the Hafnium campaign on
Exchange servers, with the full extent,
cause, or attribution of an incident often
not being known until months after the
initial discovery.370
Preservation of data is also central to
law enforcement’s ability to investigate
and prosecute the crime. As stated by
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
guidance for Federal prosecutors
entitled Searching and Seizing
Computers and Obtaining Electronic
Evidence in Criminal Investigations,
‘‘Electronic records such as computer
network logs, email, word processing
369 The section in CIRCIA addressing this topic,
6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(4), uses the terms ‘‘data’’ and
‘‘information’’ at different times to characterize
what a covered entity must preserve. CIRCIA does
not, however, define either term. Rather than add
to, or attempt to select from, the numerous
definitions that have been proffered for both terms
in a wide variety of cyber-related resources, CISA
is proposing instead to include in the regulation a
list of items that a covered entity will be required
to preserve. See proposed § 226.13(b). The proposed
list includes data and information in various forms,
such as logs, images, registry entries, and reports.
To better reflect the spectrum of information CISA
is proposing to require entities to preserve, and in
recognition of the fact that the term ‘‘records’’ is
commonly used in the area of data or records
retention, CISA is proposing to use the term ‘‘data
and records’’ instead of simply ‘‘data’’ or
‘‘information.’’
370 See, e.g., Adam J. Hart, Evidence Preservation:
The Key to Limiting the Scope of a Breach,
American Bar Association Cybersecurity and Data
Privacy Committee Newsletter (Spring 2021),
available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
tort_trial_insurance_practice/committees/cyberdata-privacy/evidence-preservation/ (hereinafter
‘‘Evidence Preservation’’).
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files, and image files increasingly
provide the government with important
(and sometimes essential) evidence in
criminal cases.’’ 371 Failure to properly
preserve relevant data and other
forensic evidence can make
identification and prosecution of the
perpetrators of a cyber incident
significantly harder, if not impossible.
In order to support these activities,
and consistent with the authorities
provided to CISA in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(4)
and 681(c)(6), CISA is proposing
requiring covered entities to preserve a
variety of data and records related to
any covered cyber incidents or ransom
payments reported to CISA in a CIRCIA
Report. Specifically, CISA is proposing
to require covered entities preserve data
and records relating to communications
between the covered entity and the
threat actor; indicators of compromise;
relevant log entries, memory captures,
and forensic images; network
information or traffic related to the
cyber incident; the attack vector; system
information that may help identify
vulnerabilities that were exploited to
perpetrate the incident; information on
any exfiltrated data; 372 data and records
related to any ransom payment made;
and any forensic or other reports about
the cyber incident produced or procured
by the covered entity. See § 226.13(b).
CISA developed the proposed list of
data and records to be preserved based
upon its own experience with
conducting incident detection,
response, prevention, and analysis; by
reviewing both best practices related to
incident management, data
preservation, and post-incident forensic
analysis and stakeholder
recommendations provided in response
to the CIRCIA RFI and at the CIRCIA
listening sessions; and following
consultations with various Federal
partners, to include the FBI and DOJ.
Each of the proposed categories of data
and records contains information
directly relevant to questions and
reporting elements of incident reports,
as well as potentially helps CISA or
other investigators identify and
understand the TTPs used to perpetrate
the incident, the vulnerabilities
exploited in doing so, and potentially
the identity of the perpetrator of the
incident. The data and records proposed
371 Department of Justice Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section, Searching and Seizing
Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in
Criminal Investigations at ix (2009), available at
https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-ccips/
ccips-documents-and-reports.
372 CISA is not proposing that a covered entity be
required to preserve copies of all of the exfiltrated
data; rather, CISA is proposing that a covered entity
preserve information related to the data, such as the
type and amount of data exfiltrated.
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for preservation additionally may be
useful in subsequent law enforcement
investigations and prosecution of the
individual or individuals who
perpetrated the incident.
A covered entity that has any of the
data or records listed above must
preserve those data or records regardless
of what format they are in, whether they
are electronic or not, located onsite or
offsite, found in the network or in the
cloud, etc. A covered entity is not,
however, required to create any data or
records it does not already have in its
possession based on this regulatory
requirement. The requirement for a
covered entity to preserve data or
records applies only to the extent the
entity already has created, or would be
creating them, irrespective of CIRCIA.
CISA is aware that retaining data and
records is not without cost. In
recognition of this, CISA attempted to
reduce or focus the list of items to be
retained to those that CISA believes
would most likely be of value in support
of future analysis or investigation. For
instance, rather than require covered
entities retain all log entries or memory
captures from the time of the incident
in case any of them may have contained
pertinent data, CISA is proposing to
limit this to log entries, memory
captures, or forensic images that the
covered entity believes in good faith are
relevant to the incident. Similarly, CISA
is not proposing that a covered entity be
required to preserve copies of all data
that was exfiltrated during an incident,
but rather simply proposes that a
covered entity preserve information
sufficient to understand what type of
and how much data was exfiltrated.
ii. Required Preservation Period
CISA is proposing that covered
entities that submit CIRCIA Reports
must begin preserving the required data
at the earlier of either (a) the date upon
which the entity establishes a
reasonable belief that a covered cyber
incident has occurred, or (b) the date
upon which a ransom payment was
disbursed, and must preserve the data
for a period of no less than two years
from the submission of the latest
required CIRCIA Report submitted
pursuant to § 226.3, to include any
Supplemental Reports. Accordingly, if a
covered entity only submits a single
CIRCIA Report to CISA on a covered
cyber incident or ransom payment, then
the data preservation obligation is two
years from the submission of the
Covered Cyber Incident Report, Ransom
Payment Report, or Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report.
If, however, a covered entity submits
one or more Supplemental Reports on a
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single covered cyber incident or ransom
payment, the two-year retention period
restarts at the time of submission of
each Supplemental Report.
In establishing this proposed two-year
timeframe, CISA considered existing
best practices regarding preservation of
information related to cyber incidents,
data retention or preservation
requirements from comparable
regulatory programs, and comments
received on this issue from stakeholders
in response to the CIRCIA RFI and at
CIRCIA listening sessions. In Section
3.4.3 of its Computer Security Incident
Handling Guide,373 NIST discusses best
practices for retaining evidence in the
aftermath of a cybersecurity incident.
Specifically, NIST Special Publication
800–61 Revision 2 (NIST SP 800–61r2)
encourages organizations to establish
policies regarding retention of evidence
from an incident and states that ‘‘[m]ost
organizations choose to retain all
evidence for months or years after the
incident ends.’’ In determining how
long an entity should choose to preserve
evidence, NIST recommends entities
consider three factors. First, NIST notes
that evidence may be needed in order to
prosecute the threat actor which, in
some cases, may take several years. On
this point, NIST also notes that
sometimes evidence that seems
insignificant at the time of the incident
will become more important in the
future. The second factor NIST suggests
entities consider is any existing internal
data retention policies. As a point of
reference, NIST notes that the General
Records Schedule for Information
Systems Security Records requires
Federal departments and agencies to
maintain computer security incident
handling, reporting, and follow-up
records for three years after all
necessary follow-up actions have been
completed.374 The final factor NIST
mentions as something that should be
considered is cost. NIST notes that
certain items preserved as evidence
generally may be inexpensive
individually, but costs can be
substantial if an organization stores
such items for years. Outside of noting
the three-year retention period included
in the General Records Schedule, NIST
SP 800–61r2 does not recommend a
specific timeframe as a best practice for
data preservation.
While most existing cyber incident
reporting requirements do not include
timeframes specifically targeted at
373 NIST
SP 800–61r2, supra note 362, at 41.
Archives, General Records Schedule
3.2: Information Systems Security Records, Item 020
(Jan. 2023), available at https://www.archives.gov/
records-mgmt/grs.html.
374 National
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preservation of records related to a
cyber incident, many do have broader
recordkeeping requirements that
frequently apply to cyber incident
reports and/or other data or records
related to a reportable cyber incident.
For instance, facilities subject to CFATS
are required to maintain records on
incidents and breaches of security for
three years.375 The NRC similarly
requires regulated entities to maintain a
copy of any written report submitted to
the NRC on a cyber incident for three
years.376 MTSA requires covered
facilities to retain all records related to
MTSA, including those related to
cybersecurity incidents, for at least two
years.377 And while not a regulation, M–
21–31, ‘‘Improving the Federal
Government’s Investigative and
Remediation Capabilities Related to
Cybersecurity Incidents,’’ requires
Federal government entities subject to
Executive Order 14028, ‘‘Improving the
Nation’s Cybersecurity,’’ to retain most
logs and certain other items related to
cybersecurity incidents for a period of
30 months.378
CISA did not receive many comments
from stakeholders on the topic of data
preservation in response to the RFI or at
CIRCIA listening sessions, but those
stakeholders who did comment on the
length of preservation generally
recommended timeframes consistent
with those identified above.
Specifically, one commenter
recommended requiring data be
preserved for no longer than two
years,379 one commenter recommended
requiring data be preserved for no
longer than three years,380 one
commenter recommended being
consistent with M–21–31,381 and one
commenter stated that data should be
preserved for as long as needed, but not
in perpetuity.382 While not providing
specific recommendations on the
duration of preservation requirements,
at least two commenters did note that
data preservation can be costly, and
encouraged CISA to develop
375 6
CFR 27.255(a).
CFR 73.77(d)(12).
377 33 CFR 105.225(a).
378 See Office of Management and Budget, M–21–
31, Improving the Federal Government’s
Investigative and Remediation Capabilities Related
to Cybersecurity Incidents (Aug. 27, 2021), available
at https://www.fedramp.gov/2023-07-14-fedrampguidance-for-m-21-31-and-m-22-09/.
379 Comments submitted by SAP, CISA–2022–
0010–0114.
380 Comments submitted by the National
Association of Chemical Distributors, CISA–2022–
0010–0056.
381 Comments submitted by Sophos, Inc., CISA–
2022–0010–0047.
382 Comments submitted by the American
Chemistry Council, CISA–2022–0010–0098.
376 10
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preservation requirements that are not
overly burdensome and limited in scope
and duration.383
Based on the above, CISA believes
that a data preservation requirement
typically lasting anywhere between two
and three years would be consistent
with existing best practices across
industry and the Federal government,
would be implementable by the
regulated community, and would
achieve the purposes for which data
preservation is intended under CIRCIA.
Recognizing that the costs for preserving
data increase the longer the data must
be retained, and wanting to limit costs
of compliance with CIRCIA where
possible without sacrificing the ability
to achieve the purposes of the
regulation, CISA thus is proposing that
covered entities must preserve the
required data and records for the lower
end of the spectrum of best practice for
data preservation, i.e., a period of two
years, unless substantial new or
different information is discovered or
additional actions occur that require the
submission of a Supplemental Report
and a commensurate extension of the
data preservation timeframe.
iii. Data Preservation Procedural
Requirements
Section 681b(c)(6) of title 6, United
States Code, requires CISA to include in
the final rule a clear description of the
processes and procedures a covered
entity must follow when preserving
data. In light of the different manners in
which the various required data and
records can be stored, CISA is proposing
to give covered entities significant
flexibility in determining how to
preserve the data and records, so long as
the preservation method retains all
salient details. This may include
electronic or non-electronic (i.e., hard
copy) storage, onsite or offsite storage,
network or cloud storage, and active or
cold (i.e., archived) storage. CISA
believes that this flexibility will allow a
covered entity to determine the most
cost-effective way to preserve the data
and records given the entity’s specific
circumstances and the nature and
format of the data and records being
preserved.
CISA is proposing to impose two
limitations on this flexibility, however.
First, CISA is proposing that the covered
entity must store the data and records in
a manner that allows the data and
records to be readily accessible and
retrievable by the covered entity in
383 See, e.g., Comments Submitted by CTIA,
CISA–2022–0010–0070, and the Information
Technology Industry Council, CISA–2022–0010–
0097.
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response to a lawful government
request. CISA does not intend for this
provision to require entities to maintain
the data onsite and have it immediately
available upon request. Rather, CISA
expects a covered entity to be able to
retrieve and provide the data and
records in response to a lawful
government request within a reasonable
amount of time.
Second, CISA is proposing to require
covered entities to employ reasonable
safeguards to protect the data and
records against unauthorized access or
disclosure, deterioration, deletion,
destruction, and alteration. These
safeguards must include protections
against both natural and man-made,
intentional and unintentional events,
including cyber incidents. NIST Special
Publication 1800–25, ‘‘Data Integrity:
Identifying and Protecting Assets
Against Ransomware and Other
Destructive Events,’’ provides examples
of the types of best practices that a
covered entity might employ to meet
this proposed requirement.
iv. Request for Comments on Proposed
Data Preservation Requirements
CISA seeks comments on the
proposed data preservation
requirements, to include:
58. The types of data CISA is
proposing covered entities preserve.
59. The proposed length of time
covered entities must preserve data for.
60. The proposed procedural
requirements governing the preservation
of data.
61. Any other aspect of the proposed
data preservation requirements.
G. Enforcement
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i. Overview
CIRCIA provides a variety of
mechanisms for CISA to use if CISA
believes that a covered entity has failed
to submit a CIRCIA Report in
accordance with CIRCIA regulatory
requirements. See 6 U.S.C. 681d. The
potential approaches CISA has to
address noncompliance include
issuance of an RFI (6 U.S.C. 681d(b)),
issuance of a subpoena (6 U.S.C.
681d(c)(1)), referral to the Attorney
General to bring a civil action to enforce
the subpoena and/or pursue a potential
contempt of court (6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)),
and other enforcement mechanisms to
include potential acquisition penalties,
suspension, and debarment (6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(8)(B)(ii)). Section 681b(c)(8)(B)
of title 6, United States Code, requires
CISA to include in the final rule
procedures to carry out these
enforcement provisions. Sections 226.14
through 226.17 of the proposed rule
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contain CISA’s proposed procedures for
each of these enforcement mechanisms,
each of which is described in greater
detail below.
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681d(e), CISA
must consider certain factors when
determining whether to exercise any of
these enforcement authorities.
Specifically, CIRCIA mandates the
Director take into consideration the
complexity of determining whether a
covered cyber incident occurred, and
the covered entity’s prior interaction
with CISA or its understanding of the
policies and procedures for reporting for
covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments, as part of the process for
evaluating whether to exercise an
enforcement mechanism. CISA is
proposing to include this statutory
requirement essentially verbatim in
§ 226.14(b) of the proposed regulation.
CISA will develop policies and
procedures to ensure that the factors
stated above are applied similarly to
covered entities in similar
circumstances.
CIRCIA additionally states that its
enforcement provisions do not apply to
SLTT Government Entities. 6 U.S.C.
681d(f). CISA proposes including this
SLTT exclusion in § 226.14(a). What
qualifies as a SLTT Government entity
is defined in proposed § 226.1 and
discussed in Section IV.A.iv.12 in this
document.
ii. Request for Information
CIRCIA authorizes the Director to
request information from a covered
entity if the Director has reason to
believe that the covered entity has
experienced a covered cyber incident or
made a ransom payment but failed to
report the covered cyber incident or
ransom payment in accordance with
CIRCIA regulation. 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(1).
Through an RFI, the Director may
request additional information from the
covered entity to confirm whether or not
a covered cyber incident or ransom
payment occurred. 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(1).
Proposed § 226.14(c) contains the
language CISA is proposing regarding
CISA’s authority to issue an RFI, the
form and content of an RFI,
requirements a covered entity must
follow to adequately respond to the RFI,
the treatment of information included in
a response to an RFI, and the inability
for the issuance of an RFI to be
appealed.
1. Issuance of Request
Proposed § 226.14(c) begins with a
description of CISA’s authority to issue
an RFI. The proposed language starts
first with the acknowledgement that the
Director has the authority to delegate
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the issuance of an RFI, and then
identifies the two different scenarios
that may be the basis of the issuance of
an RFI.
Although CIRCIA prohibits the
delegation of the Director’s subpoena
authority to another individual, CIRCIA
does not similarly restrict who may
issue an RFI. To provide CISA with
additional flexibility regarding who may
be able to issue an RFI, CISA is
proposing to allow an RFI to be issued
by either the Director or a designee of
the Director. This would allow the
Director to formally designate another
individual (or more than one
individual) as having the authority to
issue an RFI. CISA believes this
flexibility will help ensure CISA’s
ability to issue RFIs in a timely manner,
which may be essential in a rapidly
unfolding, potentially substantial cyber
incident. Accordingly, CISA proposes
defining the Director in § 226.1 to
include the Director of CISA or any
designee.
Section 681d(b)(1) of title 6, United
States Code, authorizes CISA to issue an
RFI when CISA has reason to believe
that a covered entity has experienced a
covered cyber incident or made a
ransom payment, but failed to report it
‘‘in accordance’’ with 6 U.S.C. 681b(a).
CISA proposes including this authority
in § 226.14(c)(1), which would authorize
the issuance of an RFI to a covered
entity when CISA has reason to believe
that the entity experienced a covered
cyber incident or made a ransom
payment but failed to report the
incident or payment in accordance with
section 226.3. CISA interprets this
language to allow CISA to issue an RFI
in two distinct circumstances. First,
CISA interprets this to allow CISA to
issue an RFI when it believes a covered
entity failed to report a covered cyber
incident it experienced or a ransom
payment it made. Second, CISA
interprets this to allow issuance of an
RFI to receive additional information
following a covered entity’s submission
of a report that CISA believes is
deficient or otherwise noncompliant.
This second scenario includes when
CISA believes a covered entity failed to
submit a Supplemental Report as
required.
A plain reading of 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(1)
makes it clear that CISA is authorized to
issue an RFI when CISA believes a
covered entity experienced a covered
cyber incident or ransom payment but
failed to report it. That section of
CIRCIA also provides additional context
for what the Director, or Director’s
designee, may use to determine that a
covered entity failed to submit a
required CIRCIA Report. Specifically,
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CIRCIA states that CISA may base its
decision to issue an RFI (or subpoena,
if necessary) on public reporting or
information in the possession of the
Federal government. CISA proposes
including this in § 226.14(c)(1) of the
proposed regulation. CISA construes
‘‘information in the possession of the
Federal government’’ broadly, to
include, among other categories,
information derived by CISA analysis,
information reported by the covered
entity, information from other sources
typically used or shared by the
government, or any combination of such
information.
CISA interprets the language of 6
U.S.C. 681d(b)(1) to also authorize CISA
to issue an RFI in cases where a covered
entity submitted a report, but the report
was deficient or otherwise
noncompliant. For a number of reasons,
CISA believes this to be the correct
interpretation. First, CISA interprets the
phrase ‘‘in accordance’’ to not only
require that a covered entity submitted
a report, but that it did so in a manner
that complies with all the CIRCIA
regulatory requirements for a report of
the type in question. CISA believes that
the use of the phrase ‘‘to confirm
whether or not a covered cyber incident
or ransom payment has occurred’’ in 6
U.S.C. 681d(b)(1) also supports this
interpretation. CISA interprets
‘‘confirm’’ to include verification, thus
allowing CISA to request information
from a covered entity necessary for
CISA to confirm (i.e., verify) that an
incident or payment discussed in an
incomplete report submitted by the
covered entity was in fact a covered
cyber incident or reportable ransom
payment. Finally, CISA believes this
interpretation also is supported by the
fact that CIRCIA authorizes CISA to
issue a subpoena to ‘‘obtain the
information required to be reported
pursuant to section 681b of this title.’’
6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(1). As the enforcement
process requires the issuance of an RFI
prior to the issuance of a subpoena, it
is only logical that CISA would be able
to issue an RFI for information it has the
authority to request through a
subsequent enforcement mechanism.
For the same reason, CISA interprets the
language to allow for the issuance of an
RFI when CISA believes an entity has
failed to submit a Supplemental Report
as required.
RFI will help ensure that a covered
entity receives information explaining
why the RFI is being issued and the
necessary elements for the covered
entity’s response to be adequate. CISA
proposes that an RFI must include the
covered entity’s contact information; a
summary of the facts describing CISA’s
reason to believe that the covered entity
failed to report a covered event in
compliance with the regulation; a
description of other requested
information to allow CISA to confirm
whether a reportable event occurred; the
form in which information must be
provided; and the date the information
is due. As set forth in proposed
§ 226.14(c)(2), CISA interprets
‘‘information’’ broadly, including,
among other things, tangible items,
electronically stored information, and
verbal or written responses.
In certain cases, CISA may want to
issue an RFI based on facts that are
derived from nonpublic, confidential, or
classified information, sources, or
processes. CISA is proposing in
§ 226.14(c)(2)(ii) and (f) that, in such a
case, CISA will not reveal the
nonpublic, confidential, or classified
information, sources, or processes, and
may limit the summary of the facts to
a statement that CISA is aware of facts
indicating that the covered entity has
failed to report a covered cyber incident
or ransom payment as required.
2. Form and Contents of the RFI
Proposed § 226.14(c)(2) contains
CISA’s proposal regarding the content
CISA will include in an RFI. While not
required to do so by the statute, CISA
believes that enumerating the minimum
content that CISA must include in an
4. Treatment of Information Received
Under 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(2),
information provided to CISA in
response to an RFI is to be treated as if
it was submitted through the standard
reporting procedures established for
submission of a CIRCIA Report. As a
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3. RFI Response
Proposed § 226.14(c)(3) states that a
covered entity must reply in the manner
and format, and within the deadline, set
forth in the RFI. If the covered entity’s
response to the RFI is inadequate, the
Director, or Director’s designee, may
request additional information from the
covered entity to determine whether a
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment occurred, or the Director may
issue a subpoena to compel the
provision of information. Examples of
an inadequate response to an RFI
include, but are not limited to, failing to
respond to the RFI, providing a response
with insufficient information for CISA
to confirm that a covered cyber incident
or ransom payment occurred, or a
covered entity’s continued failure to
comply with the mandatory covered
cyber incident, ransom payment, and/or
Supplemental Report reporting
obligations set forth in § 226.3.
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result, information submitted by a
covered entity in response to an RFI
receives the protections afforded by
§ 226.18 as well as the privacy and civil
liberties procedures of § 226.19, to
information submitted in a CIRCIA
Report. This includes information
provided to CISA in response to a
request for additional information
following a covered entity’s inadequate
response to an RFI. CISA has included
language in § 226.14(c)(4) of the
proposed regulation confirming that the
information protections that apply to
information contained in CIRCIA
Reports applies to information
submitted in response to an RFI. As
discussed below, however, these
protections do not apply to information
provided by the covered entity in
response to a subpoena.
5. Unavailability of Appeal
CISA does not consider an RFI to
constitute a final agency action. RFIs
have no immediate regulatory
implications for the entity, but rather
are an interim step in CISA’s
compliance communications with an
entity and are not final agency action
that has legal consequences for a
party.384
In other words, the substance of any
enforceable requirements triggering
legal liability are not established by the
RFI—any such requirements, if they are
imposed, will not be established until
CISA issues a subpoena for information.
Consequently, the RFI is not final
agency action. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 704,
only final agency actions are subject to
judicial review. Accordingly, as an RFI
is not a final agency action, the issuance
of an RFI cannot be appealed. CISA
proposes including § 226.14(c)(5) to
provide notice that the issuance of an
RFI is not appealable.
iii. Subpoena
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(1), if the
Director has not received an adequate
response to an RFI within 72 hours of
issuance of the RFI, the Director may
issue to the covered entity a subpoena
to compel disclosure of information
deemed necessary to determine whether
a covered cyber incident or ransom
payment has occurred and obtain the
information required within the
applicable CIRCIA Report, as well as
information necessary to assess
potential impacts of the incident to
384 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)
(agency action may not be interlocutory in nature,
but must represent the ‘‘consummation of the
agency’s decision making process’’ and be an action
‘‘by which rights or obligations have been
determined or from which legal consequences will
flow’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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national security, economic security, or
public health and safety. CISA views the
use of the word ‘‘may’’ in 6 U.S.C.
681d(c)(1) as providing the Director
discretion in determining whether or
not to issue a subpoena, and there could
be times that the Director issues a
second RFI if the covered entity’s reply
was incomplete or unclear such that
CISA cannot confirm whether or not a
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment has occurred. Proposed
§ 226.14(d)(1) codifies this in the
regulation, articulating that the Director
may issue a subpoena to compel
disclosure of information from a
covered entity if the entity fails to reply
to an RFI or provides an inadequate
response. CISA interprets ‘‘inadequate
response’’ to mean the submission of a
response to the RFI with omitted,
incomplete, unclear, or otherwise
insufficient answers to the Director’s, or
Director’s designee’s, RFI. CISA also
interprets ‘‘inadequate response’’ as
including the covered entity’s continued
failure to comply with the mandatory
Covered Cyber Incident, Ransom
Payment, and/or Supplemental Report
reporting obligations set forth in 226.3.
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1. Timing of Subpoena
Section 681d(c)(1) of title 6, United
States Code, provides that the Director
may issue a subpoena if a covered entity
fails to respond to an RFI within 72
hours. CISA interprets this timeframe as
the minimum period after which the
Director may issue a subpoena. Thus,
CISA is proposing to state in
§ 226.14(d)(2) that the Director may not
issue a subpoena earlier than 72 hours
after the date of service of an RFI. There
is no deadline by which the Director
must issue a subpoena; the Director may
issue a subpoena any time after 72 hours
from the date on which the Director
issues an RFI.
2. Form and Contents of Subpoena
Proposed § 226.14(d)(3) contains
CISA’s proposal regarding the content
CISA will include in a subpoena.
Similar to the form and content of an
RFI, CISA believes that enumerating the
minimum required content that must be
included in a subpoena will help ensure
that a covered entity receives
information explaining why the
subpoena is being issued and the
requirements for an adequate response.
CISA proposes a subpoena must include
the name and address of the covered
entity, an explanation of the basis for
issuing the subpoena and a copy of the
relevant RFI, a description of the
information requested, the date by
which the covered entity must reply,
and the manner and form in which the
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covered entity must provide the
information to CISA. As in regard to the
information that may be required in
response to an RFI, CISA interprets
‘‘information’’ broadly here, including,
among other things, tangible items,
electronically stored information, and
verbal or written responses.
In certain cases, CISA may want to
issue a subpoena based on facts that are
derived from nonpublic, confidential, or
classified information, sources, or
processes. CISA is proposing in
§ 226.14(d)(3)(ii) and (f) that, in such a
case, CISA will not reveal the
nonpublic, confidential, or classified
information, sources, or processes, and
may limit the summary of the facts to
a statement that CISA is aware of facts
indicating that the covered entity has
failed to report a covered cyber incident,
ransom payment, or substantial new or
different information as required.
3. Reply to the Subpoena
Proposed § 226.14(d)(4) sets forth the
subpoena response requirements for a
covered entity. It states that the
subpoenaed covered entity must
respond by the deadline identified in
the subpoena, and in the manner and
format specified in the subpoena by the
Director.
If the covered entity’s response to the
subpoena is inadequate, the Director
may request or subpoena additional
information from the covered entity or
request civil enforcement of the
subpoena. Examples of inadequate
response include, but are not limited to,
a complete failure to respond, providing
a response that does not allow CISA to
determine whether a covered cyber
incident or ransom payment occurred,
providing a response that does not fully
comply with the regulatory reporting
requirements, or providing a response
that is otherwise insufficient to assess
the potential impacts to national
security, economic security, or public
health and safety. As further discussed
below, information provided in
response to a subpoena may be referred
to the Attorney General for criminal
prosecution or the head of a regulatory
enforcement agency for enforcement if
the Director believes that there is a basis
for such action based on the information
received.
CISA considers any responses to
CISA’s subsequent engagement with a
subpoenaed entity related to the covered
cyber incident or ransom payment as
subpoenaed information for the purpose
of referral to the Attorney General or
head of a regulatory agency and
application of information protections.
Thus, this information may be provided
to the Attorney General or head of a
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regulatory enforcement agency as
discussed in § 226.14(d)(6)(ii) and is not
entitled to the protections set forth in
§ 226.18. The Director will take into
account the covered entity’s engagement
and cooperation with CISA when
determining whether to provide
information to the Attorney General or
head of a regulatory agency for criminal
prosecution or regulatory enforcement,
respectively, or to pursue civil
enforcement.
4. Authentication Requirement for
Electronic Subpoenas
Section 681d(c)(4)(A) of title 6, United
States Code, states that any
electronically issued subpoena must be
authenticated with a cryptographic
digital signature of an authorized
representative of CISA, or other
comparable technology, that allows
CISA to demonstrate that CISA issued
the subpoena and that the subpoena has
not been altered or modified since its
issuance. CISA will make available, for
example on its website, information by
which subpoena recipients can verify
that the signature was provided by an
authorized representative of CISA. A
recipient of any electronically issued
subpoena without the required
authentication does not need to
consider the subpoena to be valid. See
6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(4)(A). Proposed
§ 226.14(d)(5) reflects this requirement
essentially verbatim. This
authentication requirement applies
solely to electronically issued
subpoenas.
5. Treatment of Information Received in
Response to a Subpoena
CIRCIA provides a number of
protections to information submitted to
CISA voluntarily, as part of a compliant
CIRCIA Report, or in response to an RFI.
These protections, all of which are
mandated by CIRCIA, are set forth in
§ 226.18 of the proposed regulation and
described in Section IV.H.i in this
document. CIRCIA does not explicitly
require similar protections be afforded
to information provided in response to
a subpoena issued under CIRCIA. CISA
is proposing to explicitly note in
§ 226.14(d)(6) of the regulation that
these protections do not apply to
information submitted in response to a
subpoena. Similarly, CIRCIA does not
require that the privacy and civil
liberties procedures apply to
information provided in response to a
subpoena issued under CIRCIA, and
thus CISA proposes to note explicitly in
the regulatory text that these procedures
do not apply to information submitted
in response to a subpoena. The reason
CISA is proposing that the CIRCIA-
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specific privacy and civil liberties
procedures would not apply to
responses to subpoenas is that such
information is subject to different
handling limitations and authorized
uses than information received in a
CIRCIA Report or in response to an RFI.
Of note, subpoenaed information may
be shared with certain law enforcement
and regulatory officials. Although the
CIRCIA-specific privacy and civil
liberties procedures that CISA is
proposing would not apply, CISA notes
that any personal information contained
in responses to subpoenas would still be
handled in accordance with the Privacy
Act of 1974 385 and the E-Government
Act of 2002.386
CISA is proposing this approach in
the hopes that the unavailability of
these protections for information
submitted in response to a subpoena
will serve as an incentive for covered
entities to comply with the applicable
regulation or an RFI, thus preventing the
need for issuance of a subpoena. The
RFI provides a window for covered
entities that have failed to submit a
CIRCIA Report, as required, to comply
with their legal obligations. If the
covered entity remedies their
noncompliance at that time, the covered
entity is entitled to protections under
§ 226.18 and procedures under § 226.19.
If the entity remains noncompliant and
CISA elects to issue a subpoena, any
subsequent information provided by the
covered entity in response to the
subpoena will not benefit from those
protections.
This section of the proposed
regulation also includes language
related to the Director’s authority under
6 U.S.C. 681d(d)(1) to provide
information submitted by a covered
entity in response to a subpoena to the
Attorney General or head of a Federal
regulatory agency if the Director
determines that the facts relating to the
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment may constitute grounds for
criminal prosecution or regulatory
enforcement action. As part of the
decision-making process related to the
exercise of this authority, the Director is
allowed to consult with the Attorney
General or the head of the appropriate
Federal regulatory agency. See 6 U.S.C.
681d(d)(2). For reasons similar to those
discussed in Section IV.G.ii.5 in this
document above regarding the
appealability of the issuance of an RFI,
CISA proposes including in
§ 226.14(d)(6)(ii) a statement that any
decision by the Director to execute this
385 See
386 See
5 U.S.C. 552a.
44 U.S.C. 3501 note, Public Law 107–347.
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authority is not a final agency action
and cannot be appealed.
6. Withdrawal and Appeals of Subpoena
Issuance
Section 226.14(d)(7)(i) provides that
CISA, in its discretion, may withdraw a
subpoena. If CISA withdraws a
subpoena, CISA will serve the notice of
withdrawal as set forth in § 226.14(e).
Section 226.14(d)(7)(ii) addresses
appeals of a subpoena issuance. CISA is
proposing to allow covered entities to
appeal the issuance of a subpoena
within seven calendar days after the
date of service by providing a written
request to the Director to withdraw the
subpoena. CISA is proposing requiring a
Notice of Appeal to contain, at a
minimum, the name of the covered
entity appealing the subpoena issuance,
the request that the Director withdraw
the subpoena, the rationale for the
request (e.g., why the entity believes it
is not a covered entity; why the entity
believes that the incident is not a
covered cyber incident), and any
additional information the covered
entity would like the Director to
consider.
iv. Service of an RFI, Subpoena, or
Notice of Withdrawal
Proposed § 226.14(e) sets forth the
service process for an RFI, subpoena, or
notice of withdrawal of a subpoena.
CISA is proposing that these documents
may be served on an officer, managing
or general agent, or any other agent
authorized by appointment or law to
receive service or process, and that they
may be served through a reasonable
electronic or non-electronic means that
demonstrates receipt, such as certified
mail with return receipt, express
commercial courier delivery, or
electronic delivery. CISA further is
proposing that the date of service of any
RFI, subpoena, or notice of withdrawal
of a subpoena shall be the date on
which the document is mailed,
electronically transmitted, or delivered
in person, whichever is applicable.
These proposed processes are consistent
with standard processes used for service
of legal documents.
v. Enforcement of Subpoenas
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)(A), if
a covered entity fails to comply with a
subpoena, the Director may refer the
matter to the Attorney General to bring
a civil action in a district court of the
United States to enforce the subpoena.
A civil action to enforce a subpoena
under CIRCIA may be brought in any
judicial district in which the covered
entity against whom the action is
brought resides, is found, or does
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business. 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)(B). A court
may punish a failure to comply with a
CIRCIA subpoena as contempt of court.
6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)(C). CISA has
proposed language reflecting these
statutory authorities in § 226.15 of the
proposed regulation.
The Director’s referral of a subpoena
to the Attorney General is discretionary.
As discussed above, prior to making
such a referral, the Director must
consider, among other things, the
covered entity’s prior engagement with
CISA.
vi. Acquisition, Suspension, and
Debarment Enforcement Procedures
Section 681b(c)(8)(B)(ii) of title 6,
United States Code, requires CISA to
include in the final rule procedures
related to ‘‘other available enforcement
mechanisms including acquisition,
suspension and debarment procedures.’’
CISA is proposing procedures to
effectuate this clause in §§ 226.16 and
226.17 of the proposed regulation.
Proposed § 226.16 would require the
Director to refer all circumstances
concerning a covered entity’s
noncompliance that may warrant
suspension and debarment action to the
DHS Suspension and Debarment
Official. Suspension and debarment are
meant to help protect the Federal
government from fraud, waste and abuse
by supporting the Federal government’s
ability to avoid doing business with
non-responsible contractors.387 By
including this requirement in CIRCIA,
Congress has provided CISA with an
enforcement mechanism to both
discourage and, when necessary, punish
noncompliance by making it more
difficult for entities who meet the
standard for suspension and debarment
to do business with the Federal
government.
Proposed § 226.17 address the
‘‘acquisition’’ portion of 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(8)(B)(ii), by authorizing the
Director to provide information
regarding a noncompliant entity who
has a procurement contract with the
Federal government to the contracting
official responsible for oversight of the
contract in question and to the Attorney
General. Whether or not any action can
or should be taken against the entity
who is the subject of the referred
information is up to the contracting
official’s Department or Agency or the
Attorney General, not CISA.
387 See GSA, Frequently Asked Questions:
Suspension & Debarment, https://www.gsa.gov/
policy-regulations/policy/acquisition-policy/officeof-acquisition-policy/gsa-acq-policy-integrityworkforce/suspension-debarment-and-agencyprotests/frequently-asked-questions-suspensiondebarment (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
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vii. Penalty for False Statements and
Representations
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Any person that knowingly and
willfully makes a materially false or
fraudulent statement or representation
in connection with, or within, a CIRCIA
Report, RFI Response, or reply to an
administrative subpoena is subject to
penalties under 18 U.S.C. 1001. CISA
interprets materially false or fraudulent
statements or representations relating to
CIRCIA to potentially include, but not
be limited to, knowingly and willfully
doing any of the following: submitting
a CIRCIA Report for an incident that did
not occur, claiming to be a
representative of a covered entity whom
you do not in fact represent, certifying
you are a third party authorized to
submit on behalf of a covered entity
when you do not have authorization,
and including false information within
a CIRCIA Report, RFI Response, or
response to an administrative subpoena.
CISA would not consider scenarios
where a covered entity reports
information that it reasonably believes
to be true at the time of submission, but
later learns through investigation that it
was not correct and submits a
Supplemental Report reflecting this new
information, to constitute a false
statement or representation. Penalties
for making false statements and
representations under 18 U.S.C. 1001
include a fine or imprisonment for not
more than five years. The maximum
penalty for making false statements and
penalties increases to eight years
imprisonment if the false statement is
related to international or domestic
terrorism or certain sexual offenses. As
part of implementing this proposed
provision, CISA would refer potential
violations of this proposed provision to
DOJ, and DOJ would determine whether
to prosecute violators of 18 U.S.C. 1001.
Further, the inclusion of materially false
or fraudulent statements or
representations in submissions to CISA
would not receive the protections and
restrictions on use enumerated in
§ 226.18 because they would be
inaccurate, incomplete, or invalid
submissions that do not satisfy the
regulatory reporting obligations and
requirements proposed by this Part.
viii. Request for Comments on Proposed
Enforcement
CISA seeks comments on its proposed
approach to enforcement and
noncompliance, including the
following:
62. The proposed approach for RFIs,
to include the delegation of authority to
issue an RFI; the circumstances in
which an RFI should be issued; the form
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and content of an RFI; the manner, form,
and timeline for responding to an RFI;
the treatment of information received in
response to an RFI; and the lack of
availability of an appeal for an RFI;
63. The proposed approach for
subpoenas, to include the circumstances
in which a subpoena should be issued;
the timing of issuance of a subpoena;
the form and content of a subpoena; the
manner, form, and timeline for
responding to a subpoena; the treatment
of information received in response to a
subpoena; and the withdrawal and
appeal of a subpoena;
64. The proposed service process for
an RFI, Subpoena, or Notice of
Withdrawal;
65. The proposed process for
enforcement of subpoenas, to include
the referral of the matter to the Attorney
General to bring a civil action; and
66. The proposed acquisition,
suspension, and debarment enforcement
procedures.
H. Protections
i. Treatment of Information and
Restrictions on Use
1. Overview
CIRCIA applies a variety of
information protections and restrictions
on the use of CIRCIA Reports, as well
as information submitted in response to
an RFI. See 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(2), 681e(b),
681e(a)(1) and (5). CIRCIA also provides
liability protection for any person or
entity that submits a CIRCIA Report in
compliance with the reporting
requirements established in the CIRCIA
regulation or in a response to an RFI, as
described in greater detail below. See 6
U.S.C. 681e(c). To ensure that the full
suite of information protections and
restrictions on use of CIRCIA Reports
authorized by CIRCIA applies
consistently to CIRCIA Reports or
information in CIRCIA reports (as
applicable), as well as responses to RFIs,
CISA proposes to include them in
§ 226.18 of the proposed rule. However,
as discussed in the section on Treatment
of Information Received in Response to
a Subpoena (Section IV.G.iii.5 in this
document), CIRCIA does not require
similar protections to be afforded to
information provided in response to a
subpoena issued under CIRCIA.
Therefore, CISA proposes to specifically
exclude all information and reports
submitted in response to a subpoena
from receiving any of the protections
provided under § 226.18 of the proposed
rule.
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e,
§ 226.18 generally includes protections
governing how CIRCIA Reports or the
information submitted therein and
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responses to RFIs must be treated within
the U.S. Government and restricts how
CIRCIA Reports or the information
submitted therein and responses to RFIs
may be used. The proposed rule
separates these protections into two
broad categories with the specific
protections afforded to (1) CIRCIA
Reports or information submitted in
CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs
and (2) reporting entities and persons
detailed under each. Specifically, CISA
proposes under the first category,
Treatment of Information, the following
protections which are consistent with 6
U.S.C. 681e: (a) Designation as
Commercial, Financial, and Proprietary
Information, (b) Exemption from
Disclosure under FOIA, (c) No Waiver of
Privilege or Protection Provided by Law,
and (d) an Ex Parte Communications
Waiver. Under Restrictions on Use,
CISA proposes the following restrictions
consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e: (a)
Prohibition on Use in Regulatory
Actions, (b) Liability Protection and
Evidentiary and Discovery Bar for
CIRCIA Reports, and (c) Authorized
Uses. CISA’s understanding and
interpretation of each of these
protections and restrictions is provided
in more detail below. Consistent with 6
U.S.C. 681e, § 226.18(a) notes that each
provision of § 226.18 applies to CIRCIA
Reports or the information in CIRCIA
Reports, as stated in the respective
subsection.
2. Treatment of Information
a. Designation as Commercial,
Financial, and Proprietary Information
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(1),
§ 226.18(b)(1) provides that a covered
entity may designate a CIRCIA Report,
a response to an RFI, or any portion
thereof, as commercial, financial, and
proprietary information by clearly
designating the report or a portion
thereof as such with appropriate
markings at the time of submission.
CISA intends to enable covered entities
or third parties to easily perform this
designation when submitting a CIRCIA
Report by including in the web-based
form for all CIRCIA Reports a
mechanism such as a check box through
which such a designation can be made.
Upon a covered entity or third-party
submitter making the designation, CISA
will treat the CIRCIA Report, or the
designated portions thereof, as
commercial, financial, and proprietary
information belonging to the covered
entity.
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b. Exemption From Disclosure Under
FOIA
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(2),
§ 226.18(b)(2) provides that CIRCIA
Reports and responses to RFIs submitted
in compliance with the CIRCIA
regulation are exempt from disclosure
under section 552(b)(3) of the FOIA and
any State, Local, or Tribal government
freedom of information law, open
government law, open meetings law,
open records law, sunshine law, or
similar law requiring disclosure of
information or records. CISA proposes
that, in the event CISA receives a FOIA
request for which a CIRCIA Report or
response to RFI would be responsive,
CISA would assert that this exemption
from disclosure under FOIA applies to
such CIRCIA Report or response to RFI
if submitted by a covered entity or thirdparty submitter in conformance with the
manner, form, and content requirements
described in §§ 226.6 through 226.11.
CISA does not see any compelling
policy reason or legal rationale to
interpret this CIRCIA statutory
exemption from disclosure under the
FOIA any differently than as the plain
language states and interprets the
CIRCIA FOIA exemption to protect
against disclosure of CIRCIA Reports
and responses to RFIs. Further, if CISA
receives a FOIA request for a CIRCIA
Report, response to RFI, or information
contained therein, CISA will apply any
other applicable exemptions, consistent
with DHS FOIA regulations.
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c. No Waiver of Privilege
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(3),
§ 226.18(b)(3) provides that a covered
entity does not waive any applicable
privilege or protection provided by law,
including trade secret protection, as a
consequence of submitting a CIRCIA
Report or response to an RFI in
conformance with the CIRCIA
regulations. Accordingly, to the extent
that any claim of a waiver is based on
disclosure of the information to the
Federal government, CISA proposes to
interpret the CIRCIA provisions to cover
all circumstances where state or Federal
privileges and protections may attach,
including privileges or protections such
as the attorney-client and work-product
privileges, as well as others recognized
under common law.
d. Ex Parte Communications Waiver
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(4),
§ 226.18(b)(4) provides that CIRCIA
Reports and responses to RFIs submitted
in conformance with the CIRCIA
regulation are not subject to the rules or
procedures of any Federal agency or
department or any judicial doctrine
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regarding ex parte communications with
a decision-making official, including
any concerns about ex parte
communications related to rulemaking
or other processes under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
553 et seq. Consistent with this
understanding, CISA proposes that the
ex parte communications waiver offered
by CIRCIA also extends to the
procedures of any Federal agency or
department regarding ex parte
communications as CISA notes that not
all Federal departments and agencies
have rules that govern this issue.
3. Restrictions on Use
a. Prohibition on Use in Regulatory
Actions
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(5),
proposed § 226.18(c)(1) provides that
Federal and SLTT governments are
prohibited from using information
obtained solely through a CIRCIA
Report submitted pursuant to the
CIRCIA regulation or in a response to an
RFI to regulate, including through an
enforcement proceeding, the activities
of a covered entity or any entity that
made a ransom payment on behalf of a
covered entity.388 CISA also proposes
two exceptions to this prohibition that
track 6 U.S.C. 681(a)(5)(A) and
681(a)(5)(B), respectively. First, CISA is
proposing that information in CIRCIA
Reports and responses to RFIs may be
used to regulate if a Federal or SLTT
Government entity expressly allows the
covered entity to meet any separate
regulatory reporting requirement that
Federal or SLTT Government entity has
in place through submission of CIRCIA
Reports to CISA. Second, CISA is
proposing that CIRCIA Reports and
responses to RFIs may be used
consistent with Federal or State
authority specifically relating to the
prevention and mitigation of
cybersecurity threats to information
systems to inform the development or
implementation of regulation relating to
such systems.
CISA views the first exception
described above as applying to
situations where a Federal or SLTT
Government entity has independent
regulatory authority to mandate
reporting of covered cyber incidents or
388 CISA notes that cyber incident reporting that
another agency separately obtains pursuant to
reporting requirements issued under its own
authorities, even if subsequently shared with CISA
under an approved information sharing agreement
(such as a CIRCIA Agreement), is not a ‘‘CIRCIA
Report’’ as proposed to be defined in § 226.1.
Therefore, such information is not obtained
‘‘solely’’ through a CIRCIA Report (even if
separately obtained through a CIRCIA Report), and
therefore is not subject to this bar.
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ransom payments but has elected to
streamline its own independent
regulatory reporting requirements by
allowing covered entities to submit such
reports to CISA to satisfy both
regulatory reporting requirements. Both
currently and prior to the passage of
CIRCIA, a small number of Federal
regulators either direct or permit
regulated entities to meet the respective
regulator’s cyber incident reporting
requirements via reporting to CISA. For
example, entities subject to TSA’s cyber
incident reporting requirements must
report cybersecurity incidents to CISA
via the internet reporting form or by
telephone, and certain entities within
the BES are required to provide cyber
incident reports to both CISA and the
Electricity ISAC. Pursuant to this
exception, reports such as these, which
are submitted to CISA by a covered
entity in part to satisfy another
independent regulatory reporting
requirement, are permitted to be used by
Federal and SLTT regulators for
regulatory purposes, notwithstanding
the otherwise generally applicable bar
on regulatory use in § 226.18(c).
CISA notes that the second exception
to the general prohibition on regulatory
use of CIRCIA Reports and responses to
RFIs is that they can provide Federal
and SLTT government regulators with
information to better understand the
cyber threat landscape and the threats
and trends that may be impacting the
particular community that they are
responsible for regulating.
b. Liability Protection
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(c)(1),
proposed § 226.18(c)(2)(i) provides that
no cause of action shall lie or be
maintained in any court by any person
for the submission of a CIRCIA Report
submitted in conformance with the
requirements of the CIRCIA regulation
or response to an RFI and must be
promptly dismissed by the court.
Section 226.18(c)(2)(i) also clarifies the
extent of this liability protection, which
only applies to or affects civil litigation
that is solely based on the submission
of a CIRCIA Report or response to an
RFI. This liability protection does not
serve to shield covered entities from
liability for the underlying covered
cyber incident, ransomware attack, or
ransom payment, should there be a
separate basis for liability (e.g., a
violation of state consumer protection
laws that was exploited by the cyber
incident). Nor does the provision shield
covered entities from liability for
associated criminal acts. Additionally,
§ 226.18(c)(2)(iii) creates an exception
that is consistent with 6 U.S.C.
681e(c)(3), which exempts actions taken
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by the Federal government to enforce
CIRCIA’s reporting requirements as
described in the enforcement Section
IV.G in this document. Therefore, civil
actions brought by the Federal
government to enforce a subpoena are
exempt from liability protection
afforded under CIRCIA and may
proceed in court.
Finally, § 226.18(c)(2)(ii) creates an
evidentiary and discovery bar that
prohibits CIRCIA Reports, responses to
RFIs, and any communication,
document, material, or other record,
created for the sole purpose of
preparing, drafting, or submitting
CIRCIA Reports or responses to RFIs
from being received in evidence, subject
to discovery, or otherwise used in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, regulatory body, or
other authority of the United States, a
State, or a political subdivision thereof.
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(c)(3),
§ 226.18(c)(2)(ii) clarifies that the
evidentiary and discovery bar created by
CIRCIA does not create a defense to
discovery or otherwise affect the
discovery of any communication,
document, material, or other record not
created for the sole purpose of
preparing, drafting, or submitting a
CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI.
While the scope of the liability
protection offered by CIRCIA is limited
to litigation solely based on the
submission of a CIRCIA Report, the
submitted CIRCIA Report or response to
an RFI itself is subject to a broad
evidentiary and discovery bar. The
scope of settings and venues for which
this bar applies is broad—evidence,
discovery, or other uses in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding in or before
any court, regulatory body, or other
authority of the United States, a State,
or any political subdivision. However,
CISA notes that the scope of materials
subject to this bar is narrow. Legislative
history also makes clear that the intent
was for this evidentiary and discovery
bar to be limited to CIRCIA Reports,
responses to RFIs, and the underlying
materials created solely for the purpose
of preparing, drafting, or submitting a
CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI,
but does not apply to the underlying
information contained in the report or
response. Based on this understanding
of legislative intent and a plain reading
of CIRCIA, CISA understands this to
mean that while a CIRCIA Report or
response to an RFI could not, for
example, be attached to a warrant
application, the underlying information
contained in the CIRCIA Report or
response to an RFI could be used to
support the warrant application.
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Further, CISA cannot provide a
CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI in
response to a third-party discovery
request. Similarly, the protection for
other records is limited only to those
created solely to facilitate preparing,
drafting, or submitting a report; this
would include, for example, a draft
submission, or an email seeking to
verify information for the express
purpose of populating a CIRCIA Report
or response to an RFI. However, a
forensic incident report that was
developed for the purpose of
investigating the underlying incident,
which happened to have been used in
populating a CIRCIA Report or response
to an RFI, would not be ‘‘created for the
sole purpose of preparing, drafting, or
submitting’’ a CIRCIA Report or
response to an RFI. Therefore, CISA’s
view is that this bar would not create a
defense to discovery for a record, such
as the forensic record example above,
that was not created for the sole purpose
of preparing, drafting, or submitting a
CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI.
c. Limitations on Authorized Uses
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(1),
CISA proposes including a section in
the regulations identifying the statutory
limitations on the uses of information
provided to CISA in a CIRCIA Report or
response to an RFI. Specifically,
proposed § 226.18(c)(3) generally states
that information provided to CISA in a
CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI
may be disclosed to, retained by, and
used by, consistent with otherwise
applicable provisions of Federal law,
any Federal agency or department,
component, officer, employee, or agent
of the Federal government solely for the
delineated purposes. These purposes are
generally consistent with the authorized
use limitations for cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures
shared with the Federal government
under the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (6
U.S.C. 1501–1533), with the additional
authorized purpose of preventing,
investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting
an offense arising out of events required
to be reported in accordance with
§ 226.3.389 This additional authorized
purpose would allow, for example,
information provided to CISA in a
CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI to
be used by Federal law enforcement
agencies to investigate, identify,
capture, and prosecute perpetrators of
cybercrime. In light of the often
389 This includes, for example, the purpose of
responding to, or otherwise preventing or
mitigating, a specific threat of death, serious bodily
harm, or serious economic harm, which CISA
interprets to include a terrorist act or use of a
weapon of mass destruction.
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23739
interconnected nature of cyber incidents
and cyber campaigns, and the resulting
holistic response actions that the
Federal government may take to
respond to such cyber incidents and
campaigns, CISA views the proposed
term ‘‘events’’ in proposed
§ 226.18(c)(3)(v)(A) to broadly to
include events such as campaigns,
individual cyber incidents, or otherwise
related cyber incidents. CISA therefore
interprets the statutory provision as
authorizing the Federal government to
use all of the information about cyber
incidents provided to CISA in
accordance with proposed § 226.3 or
voluntarily for this additional
authorized purpose. While not
separately defined in the regulation,
CISA understands ‘‘cybersecurity
purpose’’ and ‘‘security vulnerability’’
to have the meaning given those terms
in the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
as amended, specifically at 6 U.S.C.
650.390
ii. Protection of Privacy and Civil
Liberties
CIRCIA requires that the rule include
procedures for protecting privacy and
civil liberties consistent with processes
adopted pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 1504(b)
and for anonymizing and safeguarding,
or no longer retaining information
received through CIRICA Reports that is
known to be personal information that
is not directly related to a cybersecurity
threat. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(D). CISA
is proposing to include these procedures
in § 226.19, and they would apply to
personal information in CIRCIA Reports,
as well as in information submitted in
response to an RFI. CISA is proposing
to place privacy controls and safeguards
at the point of receipt of a CIRCIA
Report as well as for the retention, use,
and dissemination of a CIRCIA Report.
CISA proposes that the procedures
proposed in this section will not apply,
however, to information and reports
submitted in response to a subpoena.
Although the CIRCIA-specific privacy
and civil liberties procedures that CISA
is proposing would not apply to
subpoenaed information, CISA notes
that information contained in responses
390 6 U.S.C. 650(6) defines ‘‘cybersecurity
purpose’’ as ‘‘the purpose of protecting an
information system or information that is stored on,
processed by, or transiting an information system
from a cybersecurity threat or security
vulnerability.’’ 6 U.S.C. 650(25) defines ‘‘security
vulnerability’’ as ‘‘any attribute of hardware,
software, process, or procedure that could enable or
facilitate the defeat of a security control.’’ In turn,
6 U.S.C. 650(24) defines ‘‘security control’’ as ‘‘the
management, operational, and technical controls
used to protect against an unauthorized effort to
adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of an information system or its
information.’’
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to subpoenas would still be handled in
accordance with the Privacy Act of
1974 391 and the E-Government Act of
2002.392
1. Instructions for Personal Information
CISA is proposing steps to minimize
the collection of unnecessary personal
information in CIRCIA Reports and in
responses to RFIs. First, CISA is
proposing that covered entities should
only include personal information that
is requested in the reporting form or in
the RFI and should exclude any
unnecessary personal information. CISA
would include on the CIRCIA Incident
Reporting Form instructions and
guidance on when personal information
should and should not be included in a
CIRCIA Report. While some personal
information, such as the contact
information for the covered entity and
information about the identity of the
actor perpetrating the incident (if
known), will be required for the CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form, CISA will
endeavor to provide clear guidance to
help covered entities avoid submitting
extraneous personal information. For
example, while the CIRCIA Report
would require categories of information
that were believed to have been
accessed or acquired by an
unauthorized person, CISA would
provide guidance that CIRCIA Reports
should not include any specific
personal information that was accessed.
Thus, while a covered entity might
indicate whether, for example, medical
or driver’s license information was
accessed in the incident, the covered
entity should not provide the medical
information itself nor a list of the
compromised driver’s license numbers
or images.
CISA would also include privacypreserving measures in the CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form tool itself to
help prevent covered entities from
including unnecessary personal
information. Such measures could
include limiting the number of fields
requiring open-ended responses, as well
as mechanisms to scan for indicators
that unnecessary personal information
might be included (e.g., information in
standard social security number format)
and prompts for the covered entity to
verify whether the information is
necessary to submit before proceeding
with the report submission.
CISA considered, but is not
proposing, prohibiting submission of
unnecessary personal information in
CIRCIA Reports. The Cybersecurity Act
of 2015 includes a provision that
391 See
392 See
5 U.S.C. 552a.
44 U.S.C. 3501 note, Public Law 107–347.
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requires non-Federal entities to review
cyber threat indicators before
submission to CISA to assess whether
those indicators contain any
information not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat that the entity
knows at the time of sharing to be
personal information of a specific
individual or information that identifies
a specific individual and remove such
information. See 6 U.S.C. 1502(b).
Although a requirement to remove
irrelevant personal information would
likely reduce the amount of personal
information collected through CIRCIA
Reports, CISA is not proposing this
option due to the increased burden such
a requirement would likely place on
compliance with CIRCIA reporting
requirements. Because such a
prohibition would likely have required
that CISA reject reports that include
such information or otherwise
determine that the report was not
correctly submitted, such a prohibition
would place a greater burden on
covered entities to comply with CIRCIA
reporting requirements and would likely
make meeting the required report
submission timelines more difficult.
CISA welcomes comment on these and
any other steps that could reduce the
collection of unnecessary personal
information.
2. Assessment of Personal Information
CISA is proposing to review each
CIRCIA Report to determine if the report
contains personal information other
than the personal information
specifically requested. Because some
fields in the CIRCIA Incident Reporting
Form specifically ask for personal
information, such as covered entity
contact information and certain
information about the threat actor (if
known), CISA would assume that those
fields in a submitted CIRCIA Report
contain personal information, and
would not necessarily review those
fields, though CISA may do so to
determine if extraneous personal
information might have been included.
CISA would then assess the personal
information to determine if it is directly
related to a cybersecurity threat, as that
term is proposed to be defined in
proposed § 226.1. personal information
that is necessary to detect, prevent, or
mitigate a cybersecurity threat would be
considered directly related to a
cybersecurity threat. Examples of
personal information directly related to
a cybersecurity threat would include
malicious IP addresses, spoofed email
addresses, domains that contain names
from which malicious emails were sent,
compromised usernames, and spoofed
identities in malicious emails. Examples
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of personal information that would
typically not be directly related to a
cybersecurity threat would include
contact information of the victim or
entity reporting on behalf of the victim,
and the name of a recipient of a
malicious email.
CISA would automate its reviews for
personal information be automated to
the extent practicable taking into
consideration costs, technical
complexities, and any other challenges
associated with automation, and to use
human review when necessary. Privacy
controls and safeguards include the
internal administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards that CISA employs
to ensure compliance with privacy
requirements and manage privacy risks.
Examples of the controls CISA would
employ include ensuring only those
who have a need to know can access,
retain, or disseminate covered reports;
ensuring those with a need to know are
trained on proper handling procedures;
and that activities using CIRCIA Reports
are solely used for purposes in which
the CIRCIA Report was first collected.
When CISA determines that personal
information submitted in a CIRCIA
Report is not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat, CISA proposes to
delete the information, unless it is
necessary contact information. For
personal information necessary for
contacting the covered entity or the
report submitter, CISA proposes to
safeguard and anonymize the
information prior to sharing the report
outside of the Federal government,
unless CISA receives the consent of the
individual to share their personal
information and the personal
information can be shared without
revealing the identity of the covered
entity. CISA proposes to retain personal
information that is directly related to a
cybersecurity threat and may share such
personal information consistent with
the provisions of section 226.18 and the
privacy and civil liberties guidance,
which is described below.
Consistent with the approach to
privacy and civil liberties protections in
6 U.S.C. 1504(b), CISA is proposing to
develop and publish privacy and civil
liberties guidance that would apply to
CISA’s retention, use, and
dissemination of personal information
contained in a CIRCIA Report, and
which would also provide guidance to
other Federal departments and agencies
with which CISA shares CIRCIA
Reports. The guidance is not intended to
place any requirements on regulated
entities. CISA would draft the guidance
to be consistent with the need to protect
personal information from unauthorized
use or disclosure and mitigate
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cybersecurity threats; thus, in the
guidance, CISA would endeavor to
balance the privacy and civil liberties
concerns relating to the handling of
personal information with the need,
where applicable, for personal
information to address cybersecurity
threats.
In the guidance, CISA would describe
how CISA would review reports to
identify personal information and to
determine whether the information is or
is not related to a cybersecurity threat.
CISA would also plan to describe in the
guidance the use of technical
capabilities to remove or anonymize
personal information not directly
related to a cybersecurity threat. CISA
would also describe a process for the
timely destruction of personal
information that is not directly related
to a cybersecurity threat and that is not
contact information needed to contact
the submitter or covered entity.
CISA would make the guidance
publicly available, likely by publishing
the guidance on its website at the same
time as the publication of the final rule
for this rulemaking. CISA proposes to
review the effectiveness of the guidance
one year after publication to ensure it is
appropriate to the needs for retention,
use, and dissemination of personal
information for mitigation and
protection against cybersecurity threats
and appropriately protect privacy and
civil liberties of individuals. CISA
proposes to conduct periodic
subsequent reviews after the initial
review. The CISA Chief Privacy Officer
will also conduct an initial review of
CISA’s compliance with the guidance
after one year and subsequent periodic
reviews not less than every three (3)
years. Where reviews result in a change
needed to the guidance, CISA would
publish updated guidance on its
website.
CISA has included draft guidance in
the docket for this proposed rule and is
accepting public comment on any
aspect of the draft guidance.
iii. Digital Security
CISA recognizes that reports
submitted under CIRCIA and responses
to RFIs often will include sensitive
security, business, or other confidential
information. In addition to the legal
protections described above that exist in
part to ensure that sensitive information
submitted in CIRCIA Reports and
responses to RFIs is only shared with
appropriate individuals or entities,
CISA is committed to maintaining
physical and cybersecurity measures in
place to prevent illicit unauthorized
access to the information CISA receives
in CIRCIA Reports and responses to
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RFIs. At a minimum, and consistent
with 6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(4), CISA will
ensure that CIRCIA Reports, responses
to RFIs, and any information contained
therein are collected, stored, and
protected in accordance with the
requirements for moderate impact
Federal information systems, as
described in Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 199,
or any successor document.
iv. Request for Comments on Proposed
Protections
CISA seeks comments on its proposed
approach to the treatment of
information, restrictions of use, and
applicable protections, including the
following:
67. The proposed approach to
designating CIRCIA Reports, responses
to RFIs, or the information contained
therein as commercial, financial, and
proprietary information;
68. The proposed application of the
exemption from disclosure under FOIA
and similar freedom of information
laws;
69. The proposed implementation of
the statement that submission of a
CIRCIA Report or response to RFI does
not waive any applicable privilege or
protection;
70. The proposal that CIRCIA Reports
and responses to RFIs are not subject to
the rules governing ex parte
communications;
71. The proposed restrictions on the
use of information obtained solely
through CIRCIA Reports or response to
RFIs in regulatory actions or as
independent causes of liability;
72. The proposed restrictions on the
receipt of CIRCIA Reports or responses
to RFIs in evidence, their
discoverability, or their other use in any
trial, hearing, or similar proceeding; and
73. The proposed privacy and civil
liberties protections, to include the
steps proposed by CISA to minimize the
collection of unnecessary personal
information in CIRCIA Reports, the
assessment of personal information
contained therein, and the draft
guidance CISA is proposing to create.
I. Severability
To the extent that any portion of this
proposed rule becomes final and is
declared unenforceable by a court, CISA
has structured the proposed rule so that
all remaining provisions are severable
from each other to the extent practicable
and remain in effect unless they are
dependent on the vacated or enjoined
provision. Thus, even if a court decision
invalidating or vacating a portion of the
CIRCIA final rule results in a partial
amendment to the regulation or a
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reversion to the statutory language itself,
CISA intends that the rest of the rule
continue to operate.
V. Statutory and Regulatory Analyses
A. Regulatory Planning and Review
Executive Orders 12866, Regulatory
Planning and Review,393 as amended by
Executive Order 14094, Modernizing
Regulatory Review,394 and 13563,
Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review,395 direct agencies to assess the
costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, if regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and
equity). Executive Order 13563
emphasizes the importance of
quantifying both costs and benefits,
reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and
promoting flexibility.
The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has designated this rule a
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as
defined under section 3(f)(1) of E.O.
12866, as amended by Executive Order
14094, because its annual effects on the
economy would exceed $200 million in
at least one year of the analysis.
Accordingly, OMB has reviewed this
proposed rule.
CISA has prepared a Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) which
can be found in the docket for this
proposed rule. CISA welcomes
comment on the Preliminary RIA, and
includes a summary of findings below.
Through this NPRM, CISA proposes
the following reporting requirements,
collectively known as CIRCIA Reports:
• A covered entity that experiences a
covered cyber incident must report that
incident to CISA no later than 72 hours
after the covered entity reasonably
believes that the covered cyber incident
has occurred.
• A covered entity that makes a
ransom payment, or has another entity
make a ransom payment on its behalf,
as the result of a ransomware attack
against the covered entity must report
that payment to CISA no later than 24
hours after the ransom payment has
been disbursed.
• A covered entity that experiences a
covered cyber incident and makes a
393 See E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and
Review, 58 FR 190 (Oct. 4, 1993), available at https://
www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf.
394 See E.O. 14094, Modernizing Regulatory
Review, 88 FR 21879 (Apr. 11, 2023), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-0411/pdf/2023-07760.pdf.
395 See E.O. 13563, Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review (Jan. 18, 2011), available at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_
13563.pdf.
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ransom payment, or has another entity
make a ransom payment on its behalf,
that is related to the covered cyber
incident may report both events to CISA
in a joint report no later than 72 hours
after the covered entity reasonably
believes that the covered cyber incident
has occurred.
• A covered entity must promptly
submit a Supplemental Report about a
previously reported covered cyber
incident if substantial new or different
information becomes available.
• A covered entity must submit a
Supplemental Report if the covered
entity makes a ransom payment, or has
another entity make a ransom payment
on its behalf, that relates to a covered
cyber incident that was previously
reported. The covered entity must
submit the Supplemental Report to
CISA no later than 24 hours after the
ransom payment has been disbursed.
In addition to reporting, CISA
proposes data and records preservation
requirements, which would require that
certain data and records related to
reported covered cyber incidents and
ransom payments be maintained
beginning on the date upon which the
covered entity establishes reasonable
belief that a covered cyber incident
occurred or the date upon which a
ransom payment was disbursed and
until two years following the last report
submitted to CISA. This data and
records preservation is essential to
enabling investigation of cyber
incidents.
CISA estimates that the total affected
population of this proposed rule would
be 351,383 covered entities based on the
above criteria. However, due to overlap
across the sector criteria as well as
overlap between the entities covered
under both the sector-based criteria and
the size-based criterion (i.e., all large
entities that are also captured under the
sector-based criteria), CISA believes that
this affected population represents an
overestimate of the number of covered
entities. As such, CISA assumes that
there would be a 10% overlap, which
has been removed from the total number
of the affected population. Table 1
below presents the total affected
population by covered entity 396 criteria
and the 10% reduction for the affected
population.397 For the rest of this
analysis, CISA based its estimates on
316,244 covered entities, accounting for
the 10% overlap.
TABLE 1—AFFECTED POPULATION, BY CRITERIA
Affected population
Criteria
Total
Non-Small Entities ...................................................................................................................................................
Excluding the
10% overlap
35,152
31,637
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Sector-Based Criteria
Owns or Operates a Covered Chemical Facility .....................................................................................................
Provides Wire or Radio Communications Service ..................................................................................................
Owns or Operates Critical Manufacturing Sector Infrastructure .............................................................................
Provides Operationally Critical Support to the DoD or Processes, Stores, or Transmits Covered Defense Information ...................................................................................................................................................................
Performs an Emergency Service or Function .........................................................................................................
Bulk Electric and Distribution System Entities ........................................................................................................
Owns or Operates Financial Services Sector Infrastructure ...................................................................................
Qualifies as an SLTT Government Entity ................................................................................................................
Qualifies as an Education Facility ...........................................................................................................................
Involved with Information and Communications Technology to Support Election Processes ................................
Provides Essential Public Health-Related Services ................................................................................................
IT Entities .................................................................................................................................................................
Owns or Operates a Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor or Fuel Cycle Facility ..................................................
Transportation System Entities ................................................................................................................................
Subject to Regulation Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act .................................................................
Owns or Operates a Qualifying Community Water System or Publicly Owned Treatment Works ........................
3,249
71,250
42,728
2,924
64,125
38,455
80,000
9,257
4,214
42,965
3,231
13,421
106
14,418
6,708
107
5,752
4,530
14,295
72,000
8,331
3,793
38,669
2,908
12,079
95
12,976
6,037
95
5,177
4,077
12,866
Total 398 .............................................................................................................................................................
351,383
316,244
The Preliminary RIA estimates the
costs of complying with the proposed
requirements for an affected population
of 316,244 covered entities over the
period of analysis.399 The main industry
cost drivers of this proposed rule are the
costs associated with becoming familiar
with the rule, data and records
preservation, and reporting
requirements. Other costs include those
associated with help desk calls and
enforcement actions. Although this
analysis uses a base year of 2024, CISA
estimates industry costs beginning in
2025 upon the expected publication of
the Final Rule. The combined cost of the
NPRM is based on an 11-year period of
analysis, as CISA estimates government
costs starting in 2023 to account for
costs incurred before the expected
publication of the final rule, which is
covered under the pre-regulatory
396 This table identifies the covered entities that
would be required to comply with the rule. In
addition to these entities, CISA estimates that an
additional approximately 13 million entities would
not actually be covered entities but would still
incur some burden to determine they are not
covered entities. This is detailed in Section 2 of the
Preliminary RIA.
397 CISA does not expect there to be a 10%
overlap uniformly across all sectors, but the overlap
is applied uniformly for presentational purposes.
Since the costs do not differ across criteria or
covered entities, there is no difference in applying
the overlap to each sector as opposed to applying
it to the total number of affected covered entities.
398 As discussed in Section 2.3 of the Preliminary
RIA, CISA anticipates the total number of covered
entities is an overestimate as some of the not-small
entities would also be captured by the sector-based
criteria. In addition, CISA anticipates there to be
overlap across the sector-based criteria. For
example, the 80,000 DoD contractors likely include
entities also captured under the critical
manufacturing, transportation, and IT sectors. Other
examples include likely overlap between the
communications service providers and IT entities,
and between CFATS and Maritime Transportation
Security Act populations.
399 For the purposes of this analysis, CISA
presents a static affected population over the period
of analysis.
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ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
baseline costs, as discussed in the
preliminary RIA.
Under this proposed rule,
familiarization costs include the time
spent by an entity in a critical
infrastructure sector to review the rule
and/or other materials to help the entity
determine if it is a covered entity
subject to the rule, as well as time spent
by a covered entity reading the rule to
understand the requirements imposed
by the rule. Familiarization costs also
include an annual burden for covered
entities to review any necessary CIRCIA
documents to ensure proper
compliance. For the reporting
requirements, covered entities would
have to submit a CIRCIA Report if they
experience a covered cyber incident or
make a ransom payment as the result of
a ransomware attack. The costs
associated with these reporting
requirements are the opportunity cost of
time spent completing the forms,
including preparation time to gather the
necessary information to complete the
forms. Data and records preservation
costs include the time burden for data
and information to be collected and
placed into appropriate storage, either
physical or digital, and storage costs the
entity incurs that they would not have
incurred but for the proposed CIRCIA
data and records preservation
requirements.
i. Number of Reports
CISA expects the Final Rule to
publish in late 2025. In order to comply
with Administrative Procedure Act and
Congressional Review Act requirements,
CISA would be required to delay the
effective date of the rule for a total of 60
days, which would likely push the
effective date to 2026. Due to this
required delay and uncertainty
surrounding the publication date,
covered entities will likely not begin
submitting CIRCIA reports until 2026.
As such, reporting costs, and other
associated costs, other than
familiarization costs, will be estimated
starting in 2026.400 Because there is a
great deal of uncertainty regarding the
number of CIRCIA Reports that would
be required to be submitted upon
implementation of this proposed rule,
CISA presents a range for industry costs.
As presented in the Preliminary RIA,
CISA developed a sensitivity analysis
for the range of expected number of
CIRCIA Reports based on several
sources, including current CISA
400 For this analysis, CISA uses 2024 as Year 1 to
account for initial government costs to implement
the CIRCIA regulatory program, making 2026 year
3 of the analysis. CISA also includes government
costs from 2023 as part of the pre-regulatory
baseline.
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voluntary reporting through CISA’s
web-based Incident Reporting Form,
reporting under DOD and DOE
mandatory reporting programs, and
cyber loss data from the Information
Risk Insights Study (IRIS) 2022 by the
Cyentia Institute,401 which was
sponsored by CISA. Using these sources
to inform the percentage of covered
entities expected to submit CIRCIA
Covered Cyber Incident Reports, CISA
applies percentages of 2%, 5%, and
10% to the total affected population to
conduct our low, primary, and high
estimates for the number of cyber
incidents that would need to be
reported. These percentages were
determined using the reporting rates
from CISA, DoD, DOE, and the Cyentia
Institute ranges as reference points. As
none of the reporting populations
discussed above are fully representative
of the CIRCIA population of covered
entities, CISA developed reporting
percentages that present a reasonable
range of possible outcomes. This takes
into account the low reporting estimate
of 0.725% for DoD DFARS reporting as
well as the higher reporting ranges
presented by Cyentia. Recognizing that
the majority of entities that are proposed
to be subject to the CIRCIA reporting
requirements are small businesses
through the sector-based criteria,402
CISA determined that it was appropriate
to present reporting percentages in line
with the lowest revenue categories
presented by Cyentia and not the high
end of their range.
The number of Ransom Payment
Reports is based on data from Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) annual
internet crime reports regarding the
number of ransomware attacks for
which complaints are received
annually. In the 2021 and 2022 reports,
the FBI reports the number of voluntary
complaints that indicated organizations
in one of the 16 critical infrastructure
sectors had been victims of a
ransomware attack. The internet Crime
Complaint Center received 649 such
complaints in 2021,403 and 870 in
2022.404
401 Cyentia Institute, Information Risk Insights
Study 2022, tbl. 3, Loss Summary, available at
https://www.cyentia.com/iris-2022/.
402 According to the SBA, over 99% of all
businesses are small businesses (see Section 2.1 of
the Preliminary RIA). Additionally, the size
standard criteria for covered entities represent
approximately 6% of the regulated population,
further supporting the assumption that the vast
majority of covered entities would be considered
small businesses.
403 FBI, Internet Crime Complaint Center, Internet
Crime Report 2021, available at https://
www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2021_
IC3Report.pdf.
404 FBI, Internet Crime Complaint Center. Internet
Crime Report 2022, available at https://
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Based on this limited data, CISA
forecast the number of ransomware
attacks in critical infrastructure sectors
by estimating the linear trend in the
data based on available data from 2021
and 2022.405 This results in an
estimated 1,312 ransomware attacks that
would be reported in 2024, which is
Year 1 for this analysis, and an
estimated 1,754 ransomware attacks in
2026, which is likely the first year in
which covered entities would begin
incurring reporting costs. CISA
recognizes that not all ransomware
attacks will result in a ransom payment
being made; however, given the lack of
a consensus regarding what percentage
of ransomware attacks do result in a
ransom payment, CISA has elected to
provide a very conservative estimate
and assume that all ransomware attacks
result in ransom payments.
CISA bases the estimated number of
Ransom Payment Reports on these
values on the FBI internet Crime
Complaint Center data.406 For the
purposes of this analysis, CISA
anticipates receiving Ransom Payment
Reports from 2026 to 2033, which
would be a total of 20,220 Ransom
Payment Reports. CISA also makes
assumptions regarding the number of
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Reports. For the
purposes of this analysis, CISA assumes
a low estimate of 1%, a primary
estimate of 2%, and a high estimate of
3% of covered entities submitting a
Ransom Payment Report would submit
a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report.407
In addition to the ranges presented for
Covered Cyber Incident Reports, CISA
also developed a range of estimates for
Supplemental Reports. CISA assumes
the number of Supplemental Reports
would be based on a percentage of
entities submitting Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Reports. Due to the lack of available
data on how many Supplemental
www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2022_
IC3Report.pdf.
405 CISA conducted the forecast using Microsoft
Excel’s TREND function, which forecasts a linear
trend based on the available data.
406 As reporting to the FBI internet Crime
Complaint Center is voluntary, this may be an
underestimate to the extent that it does not capture
any non-reported ransomware attacks in critical
infrastructure sectors; however, it may be an
overestimate to the extent that it is capturing
ransomware attacks that did not result in ransom
payments.
407 The percentage of ransomware attacks that
would be part of or would themselves be a covered
cyber incident are based on CISA subject matter
expertise. CISA requests comment on the number
of Joint covered cyber incident and Ransom
Payment Reports that would be filed.
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Reports would need to be filed, CISA
assumes 25% of entities submitting
Covered Cyber Incident Reports and
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Reports for the low
estimate, 50% for the primary estimate,
and 75% for the high estimate.408 These
percentages for Supplemental Reports
are applied to the range of covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Reports resulting in a Supplemental
Report across the range of estimates.409
In Table 2, CISA presents the
estimated number of CIRCIA Reports, by
report type for the primary estimate,
which is 210,525.
entities submitting Covered Cyber
Incident Reports. For example, for each
estimate in the range of covered cyber
incidents (2%, 5%, and 10%), CISA
applies the range of percentages of
Supplemental Reports. Table 2 presents
the range of Supplemental Reports for
the primary estimate for this analysis,
which applies the 50% of Covered
TABLE 2—NUMBER OF CIRCIA REPORTS, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
Covered cyber
incident
reports
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Joint covered
cyber incident
and ransom
payment
reports
Ransom
payment
reports
Supplemental
reports
Total
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
.......................................................................................
0
0
15,812
15,812
15,812
15,812
15,812
15,812
15,812
15,812
0
0
1,754
1,975
2,196
2,417
2,638
2,859
3,080
3,301
0
0
35
40
44
48
53
57
62
66
0
0
7,906
7,921
7,924
7,926
7,928
7,930
7,932
7,935
0
0
25,507
25,748
25,976
26,203
26,431
26,659
26,886
27,114
Total ................................................................................
126,498
20,220
404
63,403
210,525
In Table 3, CISA presents the
estimated range for the number of
CIRCIA Reports that would be
submitted over the period of analysis,
with a low estimate of 83,760, a primary
estimate of 210,525, and a high estimate
of 463,850 over the period of
analysis.410
TABLE 3—NUMBER OF CIRCIA REPORTS
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Low estimate
Primary estimate
High estimate
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
0
0
9,681
9,905
10,129
10,353
10,577
10,800
11,024
11,291
0
0
25,507
25,748
25,976
26,203
26,431
26,659
26,886
27,114
0
0
57,149
57,377
57,639
57,872
58,104
58,337
58,570
58,802
Total ....................................................................................................................
83,760
210,525
463,850
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
ii. Industry Cost
The main costs to industry associated
with this proposed rule are those
associated with covered entities and
entities that fall within a critical
infrastructure sector that are not covered
entities (hereinafter, ‘‘non-covered
entities’’) becoming sufficiently familiar
with the rule to determine whether they
are covered, and if it is determined that
they meet one or more of the criteria for
a covered entity, becoming familiar with
408 CISA requests comments on the number of
Supplemental Reports that would be filed.
409 Section 3.1 of the Preliminary RIA presents
the number of Supplemental Reports in greater
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how to comply with the requirements.
The second largest cost associated with
this rule would be data and records
preservation costs, followed by the cost
for covered entities to complete the
forms for the CIRCIA Reports (including
preparation time). Covered Entitles
would also potentially incur costs
associated with help desk calls and
enforcement actions. For this analysis,
all cost estimates are based on 2022
dollars.
Familiarization costs are estimated
based on the opportunity cost of reading
some or all of the rule or related
materials to determine whether or not
an entity is a covered entity, and if so,
how to comply with the proposed rule.
CISA estimates that covered entities
would begin to incur familiarization
costs upon publication of the Final
Rule, with familiarization costs divided
equally across years 2 and 3 of the
detail, breaking down the ranges for the low,
primary, and high estimates for the number of
reports submitted.
410 Due to the high degree of uncertainty, CISA
requests comment on the number of reports
submitted, as well as the ranges used in this
sensitivity analysis.
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period of analysis.411 The Preliminary
RIA presents a primary estimate of
$33.58 for a non-covered entity to
determine that they are not a covered
entity, and a primary estimate of
$1,587.49 for a covered entity to
13 hours per covered entity to review
the rule or related materials. This per
entity cost and the total cost is
presented in Table 4.
familiarize themselves with the
proposed rule. This cost per entity is
based on personnel in either the lawyer
or general manager labor category (or
some combination thereof) spending
0.275 hours per non-covered entity and
TABLE 4—FAMILIARIZATION COST BY ENTITY TYPE, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
Non-covered entities
Covered entities
Hourly Time Burden ...............................................................................................................................
Weighted Average Cost per Entity ........................................................................................................
Number of Entities .................................................................................................................................
0.275
$33.58
12,864,239
13
$1,587.49
316,244
Total Cost .......................................................................................................................................
$432,000,574
$502,034,650
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
In addition to initial familiarization
costs for the affected population to read
the rulemaking documents, CISA
estimates an annual familiarization cost
for covered entities to review CIRCIA
program information. CISA bases this
cost on each covered entity having a
staff member equivalent to a General
and Operations Manager spending 30
minutes (0.5 hours) reviewing the
CIRCIA reporting forms, CIRCIA
definitions, or any other information to
ensure they are prepared to comply with
the requirements if necessary. At an
hourly compensation rate of $102.42,
the per-entity cost is estimated to be
$51.21.412
Combining the primary cost estimate
for initial familiarization with the
annual familiarization costs results in a
total cost of $1.1 billion over the period
of analysis, as presented in Table 5.
TABLE 5—TOTAL FAMILIARIZATION COSTS
[$ Millions, undiscounted]
Initial familiarization
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Non-covered
entities
Annual
familiarization
Covered
entities
Total
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
$0
251.0
251.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
$0
216.0
216.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
$0
0.0
8.1
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
$0
467.0
475.1
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
Total ....................................................................................................
502.0
432.0
121.5
1,055.5
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
The reporting cost is estimated based
on the time spent completing the
CIRCIA Reports. CISA estimates that
both Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Reports would take
three hours to complete, a Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report would take 4.25 hours to
complete, and a Supplemental Report
would take 7.5 hours to complete. As
described in the Preliminary RIA, CISA
assumes a weighted average
compensation rate of $86.29 for the
personnel responsible for completing
the report. Multiplying this
compensation rate by the time burden
and number of reports from the primary
estimate results in an estimated cost of
$79.1 million for CIRCIA Reports, as
presented in Table 6.
411 Some covered entities could begin reviewing
and familiarizing themselves with the Final Rule
upon publication in late 2025, before the effective
date, which would likely not be until 2026 due to
required delays for major rules associated with the
Administrative Procedure Act and Congressional
Review Act. Other covered entities could wait until
the effective date.
412 $51.21 per entity = 0.5 hours × $102.42 per
hour. Information on the hourly compensation rates
used is contained in Section 3.2 of the Preliminary
RIA.
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TABLE 6—COST OF CIRCIA REPORTING
Covered cyber
incident
reports
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Supplemental
reports
Incremental cost
of joint covered
cyber incident
and ransom
payment reports
Ransom
payment
reports
Total
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
.............................................................................
$0
0
4,093,099
4,093,099
4,093,099
4,093,099
4,093,099
4,093,099
4,093,099
4,093,099
$0
0
5,116,373
5,126,294
5,127,724
5,129,154
5,130,584
5,132,015
5,133,445
5,134,875
$0
0
454,035
511,242
568,449
625,657
682,864
740,071
797,279
854,486
$0
0
3,784
4,260
4,737
5,214
5,691
6,167
6,644
7,121
$0
0
9,667,290
9,734,895
9,794,009
9,853,123
9,912,237
9,971,352
10,030,466
10,089,580
Total ......................................................................
32,744,788
41,030,464
5,234,082
43,617
79,052,951
CISA also estimates costs associated
with Data and Records Preservation.
CISA estimates that a covered entity
would spend six hours per submission
to collect, store, and maintain records in
the first year of the preservation
period.413 The cost of this provision is
based on an hourly compensation rate of
$35.19, which is the rate for Office and
Administrative Support.414 Based on six
hours per year, at $35.19 per hour, the
annual labor cost of data and record
preservation would be $211.12.
CISA also estimates costs associated
with acquiring additional storage to save
records related to CIRCIA Reports.
According to CISA Cybersecurity
Division, a cyber incident generates four
terabytes of data, on average.415 To
estimate the cost of storage for this
amount of data, CISA conducted market
research to determine the cost of
sufficient cloud storage to store and
access the data. Based on this research,
the price of cloud storage for four
terabytes of data would have an annual
cost ranging from under $700 to almost
$1,300.416 Based on this range, CISA
assumes that all covered entities that
submit a CIRCIA Report would spend
$1,000 per year on cloud storage for two
years.417 Applying the $1,000 cost for
data and record preservation for the
number of reports for two years results
in a storage cost range of $132.4 million
to $512.6 million, with a primary
estimate of $275.1 million over the
period of analysis.
Combining the labor and storage costs
results in a total data and record
preservation cost range from $147.4
million to $570.4 million, with a
primary estimate of $306.1 million, as
presented in Table 7.
TABLE 7—DATA AND RECORD PRESERVATION COSTS
Year
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2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Low estimate
Primary estimate
High estimate
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
$0
0
9,805,715
18,172,475
18,666,018
19,159,562
19,653,105
20,146,648
20,640,191
21,133,735
$0
0
21,317,218
39,191,526
39,689,956
40,188,386
40,686,816
41,185,246
41,683,675
42,182,105
$0
0
40,488,895
74,195,639
74,698,955
75,202,271
75,705,588
76,208,904
76,712,220
77,215,537
Total ....................................................................................................................
147,377,449
306,124,929
570,428,009
The cost associated with the help
desk is the opportunity cost for
personnel in the General and Operations
Manager occupation at covered entities
to call the help desk. CISA assumes that,
on average, each covered entity that
submits a report would call the help
desk one time for each report submitted.
The number of help desk calls is based
on the number of reports, although a
help desk call could be for any aspect
of CIRCIA compliance such as
413 ICR 1670–0007 includes a burden of six hours
per month to conduct electronic recordkeeping for
CSAT. CISA applied the same six hours per month
for CIRCIA, but only applies the burden to one
month, as the covered entity is expected to undergo
the recordkeeping burden only once, not on a
recurring basis as with CSAT.
414 Information on the hourly compensation rates
used is contained in Section 3.2 of the Preliminary
RIA. CISA requests comment on this cost,
specifically on the level of burden required to
compile the data and the appropriate personnel to
complete the task.
415 The estimate of four terabytes is based on the
average of all incident response activities that CISA
Threat Hunting engaged in in FY 2022 and FY 2023,
and includes incidents across Federal, SLTT,
critical infrastructure and non-critical infrastructure
private entities.
416 Enterprise Storage Forum, Cloud Storage
Pricing in 2023: Everything You Need to Know,
available at https://www.enterprisestorage
forum.com/cloud/cloud-storage-pricing/.
417 CISA recognizes that the data retention period
may be longer than two years, particularly for the
estimated 50% of covered entities that submit one
or more Supplemental Reports for a covered cyber
incident. CISA assumes that covered entities
currently retain data under normal business
practices, and as such, only estimates the marginal
cost of an additional two years over the current
retention practices. CISA requests comment on this
assumption.
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registration, reporting, or data and
record preservation. Based on similar
costs for CSAT, CISA estimates an
average time of ten minutes for a help
desk call.418 CISA estimates the cost per
call by multiplying the time burden by
the hourly compensation rate for the
General and Operations Manager
occupation of $102.42. Multiplying this
hourly compensation rate by ten
minutes (0.17 hours) results in an
average cost of a help desk call of $17.07
for covered entities. Applying this cost
issuance of 100 RFIs, five subpoenas,
and one appeal per year.
CISA estimates the undiscounted cost
to industry could range from $1.2
billion to $3.2 billion, with a primary
estimate of $1.4 billion. Discounted at
2%, the primary cost would be $1.3
billion, with an annualized cost of
$148.8 million. Table 8 presents the
industry cost range for this analysis for
the period from 2024 through 2033.
to the number of calls, CISA estimates
the cost for help desk calls ranging from
$1.4 million to $7.9 million, with a
primary estimate of $3.6 million.
The Preliminary RIA also details
potential enforcement costs based on
the opportunity cost for a covered entity
to respond to a Request for Information
or a subpoena issued by CISA, including
costs associated with a potential appeal
of a subpoena. CISA estimates a total 10year enforcement cost of $237,573,
undiscounted. This is based on the
TABLE 8—INDUSTRY COST RANGE
[$ Millions, undiscounted]
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Low estimate
Primary estimate
High estimate
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
$0.0
467.0
488.1
37.6
38.1
38.7
39.2
39.8
40.3
40.9
$0.0
467.0
506.6
65.6
66.2
66.7
67.3
67.8
68.4
69.0
$0.0
1,171.6
1,244.3
114.5
115.1
115.7
116.2
116.8
117.4
117.9
Total ....................................................................................................................
1,229.8
1,444.5
3,229.6
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Table 9 presents the primary industry
cost estimate for the period of analysis.
TABLE 9—TOTAL INDUSTRY COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Familiarization
costs
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Reporting
costs
Data
preservation
costs
Help desk
costs
Enforcement
costs
Total
Discounted
2%
.............................................
.............................................
.............................................
.............................................
.............................................
.............................................
.............................................
.............................................
.............................................
.............................................
$0.0
467.0
475.1
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
$0.0
0.0
9.7
9.7
9.8
9.9
9.9
10.0
10.0
10.1
$0.0
0.0
21.3
39.2
39.7
40.2
40.7
41.2
41.7
42.2
$0.00
0.00
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.46
0.46
$0.00
0.00
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
$0.0
467.0
506.6
65.6
66.2
66.7
67.3
67.8
68.4
69.0
$0.0
448.9
477.3
60.6
59.9
59.2
58.6
57.9
57.2
56.6
Total ......................................
Annualized ............................
1,055.5
........................
79.1
....................
306.1
........................
3.59
....................
0.24
........................
1,444.5
....................
1,336.2
148.8
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Table 10 presents the total
undiscounted industry cost by affected
population.
418 CISA, ICR 1670–0007 Supporting Statement A,
uploaded May 23, 2019, available at https://
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?
ref_nbr=201905-1670-001. See Table 2, Estimated
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Annual Burden Hours and Costs by Reporting by
Instrument. CISA uses the previous ICR estimate of
ten minutes for the help desk burden rather than
the most recent estimate of seven minutes, since
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CFATS is a more mature program and has been able
to reduce help desk call times over time.
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TABLE 10—COST BY COVERED ENTITY CRITERIA
[$ Millions, undiscounted]
Total 10-year
cost,
undiscounted
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
Affected population
Not Covered Entities ..........................................................................................................................................................................
Non-Small Entities .............................................................................................................................................................................
Owns or Operates a Covered Chemical Facility ...............................................................................................................................
Provides Wire or Radio Communications Service ............................................................................................................................
Owns or Operates Critical Manufacturing Sector Infrastructure .......................................................................................................
Provides Operationally Critical Support to the Department of Defense or Processes, Stores, or Transmits Covered Defense Information ........................................................................................................................................................................................
Performs an Emergency Service or Function ...................................................................................................................................
Bulk Electric and Distribution System Entities ..................................................................................................................................
Owns or Operates Financial Services Sector Infrastructure .............................................................................................................
Qualifies as a State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial Government Entity ................................................................................................
Qualifies as an Education Facility .....................................................................................................................................................
Entities Involved with Information and Communication Technologies Used to Support Core Election Processes .........................
Provides Essential Public Health-Related Services ..........................................................................................................................
Information Technology Entities ........................................................................................................................................................
Owns or Operators a Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor or Fuel Cycle Facility ...........................................................................
Transportation System Entities ..........................................................................................................................................................
Subject to Regulation Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act ...........................................................................................
Owns or Operates a Qualifying Community Water System or Publicly Owned Treatment Works ..................................................
$432.0
101.3
9.4
205.3
123.1
Total ............................................................................................................................................................................................
1,444.5
As discussed throughout Section 4 of
the Preliminary RIA, there is a great deal
of uncertainty in the cost estimates
presented in this analysis. Because this
would be a completely new regulatory
program, it is difficult to predict
precisely how the regulated population
would respond. A number of
assumptions used to estimate the costs
have significant uncertainty around
them, which has led CISA to develop a
sensitivity analysis in the Preliminary
RIA to account for this uncertainty. The
main areas of uncertainty are:
• Number of CIRCIA Report
Submissions—The number of reports is
difficult to predict, as a mandatory
reporting program with this scope does
not currently exist, nor does a truly
comparable program that CISA could
use as a proxy. As such, CISA presents
a range of possible outcomes for the
number of reports submitted with
percentages of entities reporting based
on several data sources.
• Time Burden for Familiarization—
Particularly as it relates to non-covered
entities, CISA has no way to predict
what level of effort such entities would
invest in reading the rulemaking
documents, nor can CISA predict the
number of entities that would read all
or some of the rulemaking documents,
yet ultimately not be a covered entity.
CISA also recognizes that there is a
significant uncertainty regarding the
time burden associated with a covered
entity familiarizing themselves with the
requirements. In this analysis, CISA
estimates the cost based on the time
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necessary to read the NPRM, which is
expected to be similar to that of reading
the Final Rule. There is additional
uncertainty regarding the number of
non-covered entities that would incur
costs associated with familiarization.
The current analysis estimates that
approximately 12.9 million entities in
critical infrastructure sectors would
incur some costs associated with
familiarization. However, it is unclear
how many such entities would
familiarize themselves with the rule,
and whether or not entities outside
critical infrastructure would potentially
incur some familiarization costs to
confirm that they are not covered
entities (e.g., by reading the
Applicability section and assessing
whether they are or not in a critical
infrastructure sector).
• Means for Data and Records
Preservation—The analysis currently
assumes that all covered entities that
submit a report will comply with the
Data and Records Preservation
requirements by storing and
maintaining digital records. CISA
acknowledges that there may be some
instances where hard copy records or
data are maintained either in lieu of or
in addition to at least some digital
records, but does not estimate the
potential cost of physical records. CISA
expects that the cost of preserving
physical records would replace, and be
comparable to, the costs for digital
records, rather be an additional cost of
this provision.
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230.5
26.7
12.1
123.8
9.3
38.7
0.3
41.5
19.3
0.3
16.6
13.1
41.2
• Number of Enforcement Actions—
While CIRCIA empowers CISA to take
enforcement action against covered
entities that have not submitted
required CIRCIA Reports, it is unclear
how many of these actions CISA would
take and which mechanisms would be
leveraged. There is a great deal of
uncertainty regarding how CISA would
identify potentially non-compliant
entities, as that would require CISA to
be aware of an event that was not
reported, or for CISA to be aware that
an entity that reported has subsequently
uncovered substantial new or different
information than that which was
previously reported. Until CISA
operationalizes this program, it is
unable to accurately predict the number
or nature of enforcement actions that
would be needed.
There may also be implementation
costs to the government and cost savings
to the affected population associated
with CIRCIA’s substantially similar
reporting exception, as discussed earlier
in this NPRM. This reporting exception
will allow covered entities subject to
more than one Federal cyber incident
reporting requirement to avoid having to
report duplicative information to both
CISA and another Federal agency when
certain conditions are met. CISA
believes that this exception would
provide an overall cost savings, with the
potential cost savings to the affected
population through the avoidance of
duplicative reporting requirements
outweighing the implementation costs
the government would incur (e.g., the
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costs associated with drafting,
negotiating, and entering into CIRCIA
Agreements, as defined in § 226.1 of the
proposed rule). Because CIRCIA
Agreements cannot be fully developed,
and this exception cannot be fully
implemented, until the final rule stage
or after implementation of the
regulatory program, at this time, CISA is
unable to estimate what the impact of
this exception would be on either
government costs or industry savings.419
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
iii. Government Cost
CISA anticipates incurring significant
costs associated with the creation,
implementation, and operation of the
government infrastructure to run the
CIRCIA program. Implementing and
operationalizing CIRCIA as statutorily
mandated would require significant new
government investment. This
investment is necessary to develop and
maintain the infrastructure, in both
technology and personnel, necessary to
receive, analyze, and share information
from CIRCIA Reports submitted to CISA.
While CISA exercised some discretion
in the description of covered entities,
this description was scoped in such a
way that reducing the number of the
entities subject to the rule in a manner
that would materially impact the
government cost (i.e., by materially
reducing the number of CIRCIA Reports
received) would also sacrifice the extent
to which the proposed rule would
achieve the purpose of CIRCIA and the
proposed rule, as described in section
III.C.420 This is particularly true for the
government costs, where much of the
costs would be incurred regardless of
the scope of covered entities (e.g., the
different aspects of the technology
infrastructure). Further, as noted in
section III.C, CISA believes that, due to
advances in technology and strategies
for managing large data sets, the
potential challenges associated with
receiving large volumes of reports can
be mitigated through technological and
procedural strategies.
CISA also has discretion in the period
for Data and Records Preservation.
However, this would not impact the
419 While CISA does not estimate the cost for this
provision, it is expected that the benefits to
industry of avoiding duplicative reporting would
exceed the costs to the government.
420 For more information on how CISA
considered rescoping the description of covered
entities, see Section 0 and Section 5 of the
Preliminary RIA, which present alternative
approaches to the description of covered entities.
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government cost, as this is a cost borne
by industry.
For fiscal year 2023, CISA budgeted
$34.5 million for CIRCIA related work.
In 2024, CISA has requested $97.7
million, to perform work necessary to
prepare for CIRCIA implementation.
This includes funding to support several
efforts specifically mandated by CIRCIA
or necessary for the practical
implementation of the CIRCIA
mandates, such as the rulemaking
process; stakeholder outreach; and
efforts to begin creating the technology
infrastructure necessary to receive and
share reports, report on and use the
information collected under CIRCIA,
and other key functions. Because
funding requested for 2023 has already
been allocated, this is considered part of
the pre-regulatory baseline in the
Preliminary RIA. Including the preregulatory baseline, CISA presents an
11-year government cost estimate for
this proposed rule.421
CISA anticipates needing an annual
budget of approximately $115.9 million
to cover all the functions associated
with CIRCIA. CISA anticipates this
budget request to include funding for
additional federal staff, contractor
support, and new technology costs.
Additional staffing would be necessary
to conduct a myriad of mission-critical
activities, such as analyzing the CIRCIA
Reports to conduct trend and threat
analysis, vulnerability and mitigation
assessment, the provision of early
warnings, incident response and
mitigation, supporting Federal efforts to
disrupt threat actors, and advancing
cyber resiliency. Additional full-time
equivalent staffing would be added to
support the ingest of reports;
engagement efforts, including a CIRCIA
help desk; 422 CIRCIA enforcement
actions; and other mission support
roles. Technology costs would account
for developing the infrastructure
necessary to collect, maintain,
automatically analyze, and share
information from CIRCIA Reports as
well as licenses, updates, and
maintenance for CISA systems.423
421 To account for the pre-regulatory baseline,
CISA includes costs incurred in 2023. These costs
are reverse discounted by applying the discount
factor of 1.020 to the undiscounted cost of $34.5
million in year 2023.
422 CISA would need to provide a means for the
regulated public to contact CISA for assistance with
complying with the final regulation when it
becomes effective.
423 Although CISA does not estimate industry
costs for submitting CIRCIA reports until Year 3
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23749
As noted by the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission, the government’s cyber
incident situational awareness, its
ability to detect coordinated cyber
campaigns, and its cyber risk
identification and assessment efforts
rely on comprehensive data and, prior
to the passage of CIRCIA, the Federal
government lacked a mandate to
systematically collect cyber incident
information reliably and at the scale
necessary.424 The government
investment discussed in the Preliminary
RIA will provide CISA with the
resources to meet the stated goals of
CIRCIA. Specifically, the government
cost presented in this NPRM will be
used by CISA to develop and
operationalize the system and
infrastructure necessary to receive and
analyze a sufficient quantity of Covered
Cyber Incident Reports and Ransom
Payment Reports from across critical
infrastructure sectors, share information
with stakeholders, and use that
information and analysis to develop
informational products and other tools
to be shared with and leveraged by
CISA’s Federal and non-Federal
stakeholders.
Because CISA has already begun
making investments to operationalize
the CIRCIA program in anticipation of
the publication of the final rule in 2025,
this analysis accounts for government
costs from 2023 through 2033, or the
full 10-year period of analysis and one
year of pre-regulatory costs, even though
industry would not incur costs until
2025 upon publication of the final rule.
As presented in Table 11, CISA
estimates an undiscounted government
cost for CIRCIA of $1.2 billion over the
period of analysis from 2023 through
2033. Discounted at 2%, the government
cost would be $1.1 billion, with an
annualized cost of $108.1 million.
(2026), CISA anticipates requesting the full CIRCIA
annual budget of $115.9 million starting in Year 2
(2025) to ensure that all personnel and technology
are in place once the Final Rule is published. As
discussed below, there is a level of uncertainty
regarding the government costs.
424 Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report,
supra note 23, at 103; see also Sandra SchmitzBerndt, ‘‘Defining the Reporting Threshold for a
Cybersecurity Incident under the NIS Directive and
the NIS 2 Directive,’’ Journal of Cybersecurity at 2
(Apr. 5, 2023) (‘‘[L]ow reporting levels result in a
flawed picture of the threat landscape, which in
turn may impact cybersecurity preparedness.’’),
available at https://academic.oup.com/
cybersecurity/article/9/1/tyad009/7160387.
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TABLE 11—GOVERNMENT COST
[$ Millions]
Year
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Discounted at
2%
Undiscounted
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................................................................
$34.5
97.7
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
$34.5
95.8
111.4
109.2
107.1
105.0
102.9
100.9
98.9
97.0
95.1
Total ..................................................................................................................................................
Annualized ........................................................................................................................................
1,175.3
................................
1,057.7
108.1
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
iv. Combined Costs
Table 12 presents the combined
industry and government costs over the
period of analysis. Based on the primary
estimates for industry’s costs presented
throughout Section 4 of the Preliminary
RIA and the government costs presented
in Section 5 of the Preliminary RIA,
CISA estimates an undiscounted cost to
industry and government over the
period of analysis of $2.6 billion.
Discounted at 2%, the estimated cost of
this proposed rule over the period of
analysis is $2.4 billion, with an
annualized cost of $244.7 million.
TABLE 12—COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Year
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Industry
Total,
undiscounted
Government
Total,
discounted 2%
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
$0.0
0.0
467.0
506.6
65.6
66.2
66.7
67.3
67.8
68.4
69.0
$34.5
97.7
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
$34.5
97.7
582.9
622.5
181.5
182.1
182.6
183.2
183.7
184.3
184.9
$34.5
95.8
560.3
586.6
167.7
164.9
162.2
159.5
156.8
154.2
151.6
Total ........................................................................................................
Annualized ..............................................................................................
1,444.5
........................
1,175.3
........................
2,619.8
........................
2,394.0
244.6
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Table 13 presents the cost range for
combined industry and government
costs, discounted at 2%. The costs over
the period of analysis range from a low
estimate of $2.2 billion to a high
estimate of $4.1 billion, and an
annualized range of $225.4 million to
$415.4 million, discounted at 2%.425
TABLE 13—COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COST RANGE
[$ Millions]
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
Year
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
Low estimate
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
Primary estimate
$34.5
95.8
560.3
569.1
141.8
139.5
137.3
135.1
$34.5
95.8
560.3
586.6
167.7
164.9
162.2
159.5
425 This analysis uses 2023 as the base year for
costs estimates.
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High estimate
$34.5
95.8
1,237.5
1,281.8
212.9
209.2
205.6
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23751
TABLE 13—COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COST RANGE—Continued
[$ Millions]
Year
Low estimate
Primary estimate
High estimate
2031 ...........................................................................................................................
2032 ...........................................................................................................................
2033 ...........................................................................................................................
132.9
130.7
128.6
156.8
154.2
151.6
198.6
195.2
191.8
Total ....................................................................................................................
Annualized ..........................................................................................................
2,205.6
225.4
2,394.0
244.6
4,065.1
415.4
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
v. Benefits
The primary purpose of CIRCIA is to
help preserve national security,
economic security, and public health
and safety. The provisions included in
this proposed rule would support that
purpose in a number of ways, providing
several benefits. In this analysis, CISA
discusses the qualitative benefits of the
proposed rule.
Over the last decade, the United
States has seen an exponential increase
in cyber incidents, with nation-states,
criminal actors, and other malicious
cyber threat actors targeting entities
across all of the critical infrastructure
sectors with ever-evolving tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Addressing
this growing, dynamic threat requires a
better understanding of the threat and
the vulnerabilities being exploited, and
the timely sharing of that information
with owners and operators of internetconnected information systems so that
they can take steps to better secure
themselves from potential cyber
incidents. As noted by the Cyberspace
Solarium Commission, ‘‘The
government’s cyber incident situational
awareness, its ability to detect
coordinated cyber campaigns, and its
risk identification and assessment
efforts rely on comprehensive data.
However, there are insufficient federal
and state laws and policies requiring
companies to report incidents that
impact or threaten to impact business
operations.’’ 426 As discussed in greater
detail below, CIRCIA would help the
Federal government address this
shortcoming by helping the Federal
government understand the cyber threat
landscape and enabling the timely
sharing of information to enhance cyber
resilience.
Under this proposed rule, covered
entities would be required to report
covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments to CISA within the
timeframes and other requirements
described in the proposed rule.
Collecting this information in a timely
426 Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report,
supra note 23, at 103–04.
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fashion (within 72 hours after the
covered entity reasonably believes that
a covered cyber incident has occurred or
24 hours after a ransom payment has
been disbursed) would provide the
Federal government with enhanced
cross-sector visibility into the cyber
threat landscape and support the
aggregation, analysis, and sharing of
incident data in a way that heretofore
has been unavailable to the
cybersecurity community. This, in turn,
would facilitate a better understanding
by both Federal and non-Federal entities
of who is causing cyber incidents; what
types of entities malicious cyber actors
are targeting; what tactics, techniques,
and procedures malicious cyber actors
are using to compromise entities in
critical infrastructure sectors; what
vulnerabilities are being exploited; what
security defenses are effective at
stopping the incidents; and what
mitigation measures are successful in
reducing the consequences of an
incident.
While not part of the proposed
rule,427 CIRCIA recognizes the value of
these activities and imposes upon CISA
a number of requirements related to the
analysis and sharing of information
received through CIRCIA Reports to
ensure their value is reasonably
maximized. These obligations include:
• Aggregating and analyzing reports
to assess the effectiveness of security
controls; identify tactics, techniques,
and procedures adversaries use to
overcome these controls; assess
potential impact of cyber incidents on
public health and safety; and enhance
situational awareness of cyber threats
across critical infrastructure sectors; 428
• Coordinating and sharing
information with appropriate Federal
departments and agencies to identify
and track ransom payments; 429
• Leveraging information gathered
about cyber incidents to provide
appropriate entities, including Sector
427 As Congress imposed these obligations solely
on Federal departments and agencies, they are not
included in the CIRCIA proposed rule itself.
428 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(1).
429 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(2).
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Coordinating Councils, Information
Sharing and Analysis Organizations,
SLTT governments, technology
providers, cybersecurity and cyber
incident response firms, and security
researchers, with timely, actionable, and
anonymized reports of cyber incident
campaigns and trends, including, to the
maximum extent practicable, related
contextual information, cyber threat
indicators, and defensive measures; 430
• For significant cyber incidents,
reviewing the details surrounding the
incident or group of incidents and
identifying and disseminating ways to
prevent or mitigate similar cyber
incidents in the future; 431
• Publishing quarterly unclassified,
public reports that describe aggregated,
anonymized observations, findings, and
recommendations; 432
• Proactively identifying
opportunities to leverage and utilize
data on cyber incidents in a manner that
enables and strengthens cybersecurity
research carried out by academic
institutions and other private sector
organizations; 433 and
• Making information received in
CIRCIA Reports available to appropriate
Sector Risk Management Agencies and
other appropriate Federal agencies.434
By requiring CISA to perform these
analytical activities and share
information and analytical the findings
with Federal and non-Federal
stakeholders—an obligation CISA
intends to fulfill through a variety of
information sharing mechanisms,
including through the development,
maintenance, and issuance of publicly
available alerts, advisories, a known
exploited vulnerabilities catalog, and
other products that can be leveraged by
both covered entities and non-covered
entities—CIRCIA will indirectly
enhance the nation’s overall level of
cybersecurity and resiliency, resulting
in direct, tangible benefits to the nation.
For example:
430 6
U.S.C. 681a(a)(3)(B).
U.S.C. 681a(a)(6).
432 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(8).
433 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(9).
434 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(10).
431 6
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ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
• By supporting CISA’s ability to
share information that will enable nonFederal and Federal partners to detect
and counter sophisticated cyber
campaigns earlier with the potential for
significant avoided or mitigated
negative impacts to critical
infrastructure or national security,
CIRCIA’s mandatory reporting
requirements reduce the risks associated
with those campaigns.435
• By facilitating the identification and
sharing of information on exploited
vulnerabilities and measures that can be
taken to address those vulnerabilities,
incident reporting enables entities with
unremediated and unmitigated
vulnerabilities on their systems to take
steps to remedy those vulnerabilities
before the entity also falls victim to
cyberattack.436
• By supporting sharing information
about common threat actor tactics,
techniques, and procedures with the IT
community, cyber incident reporting
will enable software developers and
vendors to develop more secure
products or send out updates to add
security to existing products, better
protecting end users.437
435 See, e.g., Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing,
supra note 17, at 17–18 (statement of FireEye
Mandiant Vice President Ronald Bushar) (‘‘Timely
reporting of incidents within and across sectors
allow[s] for earlier detection of large, sophisticated
cyber campaigns that have the potential for
significant impacts to critical infrastructure or
National security implications. Technical
indicators, along with contextual information,
provide a more robust data set to conduct faster and
more accurate attribution in adversary intent. This
type of analysis is critical in formulating the most
impactful response to such attacks and to do so in
a time frame that has a high probability of
successful countermeasures or deterrence.’’). See
also Mandiant, Analysis of Time-to-Exploit Trends:
2021–2022 (Sept. 28, 2023), available at https://
www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/time-to-exploittrends-2021-2022.
436 See, e.g., Cyber Threats in the Pipeline:
Lessons from the Federal Response to the Colonial
Pipeline Ransomware Attack: Hearing Before the
Subcomms. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Innovation & Transportation and
Maritime Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Security, 117th Cong. 21 (June 15, 2021) (testimony
of CISA Cybersecurity Division Executive Assistant
Director Eric Goldstein) (‘‘With increased visibility,
we are able to better identify adversary activity
across sectors, which allows us to produce more
targeted guidance. . . .’’), available at https://
www.congress.gov/event/117th-congress/jointevent/LC69050/text (hereinafter ‘‘CHS June 15, 2021
Hearing’’); Bitsight Security Research, A Mere Five
Percent of Vulnerable Enterprises Fix Their Issues
Every Month: How to Help Them Do Better? (May
3, 2023), available at https://www.bitsight.com/blog/
mere-five-percent-vulnerable-enterprises-fix-theirissues-every-month-how-help-them-do-better
(noting that CISA alerts and advisories can increase
the likelihood of rapid cybersecurity vulnerability
remediation by nearly five times the likelihood of
rapid remediation for cybersecurity vulnerabilities
for which there is no CISA alert or advisory).
437 See, e.g., Open Hearing: Hack of U.S.
Networks by a Foreign Adversary Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 117th Cong. (Feb. 23,
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• By enabling rapid identification of
ongoing incidents and increased
understanding of successful mitigation
measures, incident reporting increases
the ability of impacted entities and the
Federal government to respond to
ongoing campaigns faster and mitigate
the consequences that could result from
them.438
• Law enforcement entities can use
the information submitted in reports to
investigate, identify, capture, and
prosecute perpetrators of cybercrime,
getting malicious cyber actors off the
street and deterring future actors.439
• By contributing to a more accurate
and comprehensive understanding of
the cyber threat environment, incident
reporting allows for CISA’s Federal and
non-Federal stakeholders to more
efficiently and effectively allocate
resources to prevent, deter, defend
against, respond to, and mitigate
significant cyber incidents.440 Please
2021) (written testimony of SolarWinds CEO
Sudhakar Ramakrishna) (‘‘Indicators of compromise
associated with [cybersecurity] events shared with
software vendors in an anonymized way enriches
the understanding of prevailing threat actor
techniques and target sets, enabling software
providers to improve defenses and better protect
users.’’), available at https://www.intelligence.
senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-hearing-hack-usnetworks-foreign-adversary.
438 See, e.g., id. (written testimony of Microsoft
President Brad Smith) (‘‘A private sector disclosure
obligation will foster greater visibility, which can in
turn strengthen a national coordination strategy
with the private sector which can increase
responsiveness and agility.’’); Understanding and
Responding to the SolarWinds Supply Chain
Attack: The Federal Perspective: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 117th Cong. (Mar. 18, 2021) (opening
statement of Sen. Gary Peters, Chairman) (‘‘In order
to adapt to the evolving cybersecurity threat, both
the public and private sector need a centralized,
transparent, and streamlined process for sharing
information. In the event of a future attack[ ], this
will be critical to mitigating the damage.’’),
available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/
understanding-and-responding-to-the-solarwindssupply-chain-attack-the-federal-perspective/
(hereinafter ‘‘HSGAC March 18, 2021 Hearing’’).
439 See, e.g., HSGAC March 18, 2021 Hearing,
supra note 438 (statement of FBI Cyber Division
Acting Assistant Director Tonya Ugoretz) (‘‘[The
SolarWinds attack] highlighted how vital private
sector cooperation is to our broader work protecting
America from cyber threats. The virtuous cycle we
can drive when we work together has been on
display in the SolarWinds response: information
from the private sector fuels our investigations,
allows us to identify evidence and adversary
infrastructure, and enables us to hand off leads to
intelligence and law enforcement partners here and
abroad. Our partners then put that information to
work and hand us back more than we started with,
which we can then use to arm the private sector to
harden itself against the threat. By leaning into our
partnerships, all of us who are combating malicious
cyber activity become stronger while we weaken the
perpetrators together.’’).
440 See, e.g., CHS June 15, 2021 Hearing, supra
note 436, at 15 (statement of TSA Assistant
Administrator for Surface Operations Sonya
Proctor) (‘‘By requiring the reporting of
cybersecurity incidents, the Federal Government is
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also see the discussion of market failure
associated with the current patchwork
system of cyber incident reporting that
exists today and why a centralized
regulatory system to collect incident
reports is needed to correct this failure,
in Section 1.2 of the Preliminary RIA.
Even before CIRCIA, one of the core
mechanisms through which CISA
achieves its cybersecurity mission is
producing and widely sharing timely
and actionable operational alerts and
advisories on known threats, incidents,
and vulnerabilities. The broad sharing
of timely information enables CISA to
make an impact at scale and buy down
broad swaths of risk. CISA leverages
many information sharing mechanisms
and partnership communities to ensure
that relevant information is reaching the
targeted audience.441 There are many
ways in which CISA ensures that alerts,
advisories, analysis, and specific
vulnerability or threat information is
widely shared to the broadest
appropriate audience, including:
• Working to prioritize stakeholder
awareness of actively exploited
vulnerabilities through maintenance of a
known exploited vulnerability (KEV)
catalog which is available on CISA’s
website. Members of the public can also
subscribe to the GovDelivery
notification subscription to receive
email notifications whenever the KEV
catalog is updated.
• Leveraging several communities to
ensure broadest appropriate
dissemination of guidance to specific
communities of interest, such as
through Sector Risk Management
Agencies, Information Sharing &
Analysis Centers (ISACs), and CISA
regional personnel to engage state and
local governments, critical
infrastructure, and other communities
directly.
• Depending on the severity of the
threat, vulnerability, or threat actor
campaign, CISA may reach out directly
to potentially impacted entities to try to
ensure their awareness and
recommended mitigations, if available.
better positioned to understand the changing threat
of cyber events and the current and evolving risks
to pipelines.’’); Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing,
supra note 17, at 20 (statement of FireEye Mandiant
Vice President Ronald Bushar) (‘‘[R]obust and
centralized collection of incident information
provides the Government with a much more
accurate cyber risk picture and enables more
effective and efficient investments and support
before, during, and after major cyber attacks.’’).
441 CISA shares and disseminates information in
myriad ways, including via the CISA.gov website
and/or the StopRansomware.gov website, various
social media platforms, and the GovDelivery email
notification subscription. Information is also shared
with the Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN), U.S. Cyber Centers, and through direct
stakeholder engagement.
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• CISA shares cyber threat indicators,
based on information shared with CISA
by CISA partners or generated through
CISA’s own analysis and engagements,
via the Automated Indicator Sharing
platform.
• Working with other federal and
industry partners, as appropriate, who
will also disseminate alerts/advisories
through their information sharing
mechanisms.
Through CIRCIA reporting, CISA
would be able to gather more timesensitive threat and vulnerability data
regarding covered cyber incidents or
ransomware attacks. This timely
collection of specific data elements, fed
into CISA’s existing robust
communication channels, described
above, would allow for sharing of a
higher volume of actionable information
that is more timely and could be used
to reduce risk and mitigate against
losses associated with covered cyber
incidents and ransom payments. The
reporting of covered cyber incidents by
impacted entities would provide
information that could reduce the
number of incidents with consequences
through increased awareness of attack
vectors and vulnerabilities, leading to
more informed covered entities (and
non-covered entities) taking
preventative or protective measures
based on the shared information. This
would allow entities to either reduce the
losses associated with incidents for
which they have been a victim, or for
entities to take protective measures
prevent an incident altogether. Through
early identification and warning of
threat actor tactics, cyber incidents, or
vulnerabilities, CISA would be able to
help entities recognize potential
weaknesses and implement protective
measures to prevent cyber incidents or
limit the consequences of cyber
incidents.
By creating a centralized regulatory
incident reporting system, CIRCIA can
help the Federal government develop a
comprehensive understanding of known
incidents and ransom payments. Under
the current patchwork reporting system,
many incidents go unreported, other
incidents are reported with limited
technical information that results in
limited ability to use the reports to help
prevent other incidents, and there is no
reliable mechanism to ensure that
reports are being shared broadly enough
across the Federal government or
between the Federal government and
non-Federal partners to make the
reported information actionable to
mitigate against negative impacts. A
robust, rich, and consolidated incident
reporting program, facilitated by the
proposed rule, would make the
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realization of the benefits listed above
far more likely, comprehensive, useful,
and timely.
These benefits, which stem from the
reporting of cyber incidents for
aggregation, analysis, and information
sharing, directly contribute to a
reduction in economic, health, safety,
and security consequences associated
with cyber incidents by reducing the
likelihood of cyber incidents
successfully perpetrated and mitigating
the consequences of those cyber
incidents that are successful by catching
them earlier. For example, incident
reporting to CISA within 72 hours and
CISA’s sharing of that information has a
number of benefits associated with
rapid vulnerability remediation. For
example: (1) vendors that receive earlier
warning of previously undisclosed
vulnerabilities can begin to develop
patches sooner, reducing the likelihood
of an incident resulting from their
exploitation;, (2) entities that remediate
a vulnerability rapidly can reduce the
likelihood of a known vulnerability
being exploited by reducing the period
of time during which their systems are
vulnerable to exploitation of that
vulnerability; (3) entities that remediate
a vulnerability rapidly can reduce the
likelihood of the propagation of a threat
within their systems, which would
reduce the impact of a vulnerability that
has already been exploited (i.e.,
reducing the severity of an incident);
and (4) awareness that a vulnerability is
being actively exploited by threat actors
can help entities effectively prioritize
their remediation and patching efforts
(as entities often have more patches in
the queue than their personnel can
realistically remediate in a timely
fashion). In an analysis of its proprietary
dataset of cyber claims, the Marsh
McLennan Cyber Risk Analytics Center
compared cyber controls in terms of
their effectiveness in reducing the
likelihood of an organization
experiencing a cyber event. Although
patching was identified as one of the
most effective controls, tied for fourth,
it was found to have one of the lowest
implementation rates.442 However, a
recent study suggests that information
put out by CISA is meaningfully
shaping how entities are implementing
this highly effective control. Bitsight
Security Research found that CISA
alerts and advisories can increase the
likelihood of rapid cybersecurity
vulnerability remediation by nearly five
442 Marsh McLennan, Using data to prioritize
cybersecurity investments (2023), available at
https://www.marsh.com/us/services/cyber-risk/
insights/using-cybersecurity-analytics-to-prioritizecybersecurity-investments.html.
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times the likelihood of rapid
remediation for vulnerabilities for
which there is no CISA alert or
advisory, outpacing the impact of even
sustained social media coverage:
Further, strategic coverage of
vulnerabilities in CISA briefings (Alerts and
Current Activity advisories) can accelerate
the pace of their remediation, boosting the
probability of rapid remediation by around
4.7x. Even greater impacts may be possible,
which would be highly desirable. Sustained
coverage of vulnerabilities on social media,
e.g. Twitter, is associated with boosting their
prospects of rapid remediation by roughly
2.7x.443
By identifying a vulnerability through
CIRCIA reporting, and disseminating
that information quickly and broadly,
CISA can provide earlier disclosure to
vendors of zero-day vulnerabilities and
early warning to potentially impacted
entities to take preventative or
protective measures to remediate known
vulnerabilities before they become
exploited.444 CISA requests comment on
the potential impact of reporting
requirements for preventing or
mitigating cybersecurity incidents.
It is worth noting that these benefits
are not limited to covered entities
required to report under CIRCIA, but
also inure to entities not subject to
CIRCIA’s reporting requirements as they
too will receive the downstream benefits
of enhanced information sharing, more
secure technology products, and an
ability to better defend their networks
based on sector-specific and cross-sector
understandings of the threat landscape.
CISA also anticipates qualitative
benefits stemming from the data and
record preservation requirements of this
proposed rule. The preservation of data
and records in the aftermath of a
covered cyber incident serves a number
of critical purposes, such as supporting
the ability of analysts and investigators
to understand how a cyber incident was
perpetrated and by whom. Access to
forensic data, such as records and logs,
can help analysts uncover how
malicious cyber activity was conducted,
what vulnerabilities were exploited,
what tactics were used, and so on. This
information can be essential to
preventing others from falling victim to
similar incidents in the future. How an
incident was perpetrated may not be
immediately identifiable upon
443 Bitsight Security Research, A Mere Five
Percent of Vulnerable Enterprises Fix Their Issues
Every Month: How to Help Them Do Better? (May
3, 2023), available at https://www.bitsight.com/blog/
mere-five-percent-vulnerable-enterprises-fix-theirissues-every-month-how-help-them-do-better.
444 See also Mandiant, Analysis of Time-toExploit Trends: 2021–2022 (Sept. 28, 2023),
available at https://www.mandiant.com/resources/
blog/time-to-exploit-trends-2021-2022.
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discovery of an incident, and the failure
to properly preserve data or records
during the period of initial incident
response can render it difficult to
subsequently perform this analysis. This
can especially be true in incidents
involving zero-day vulnerabilities or
highly complex malicious cyber activity
by nation state threat actors, such as the
‘‘SUNBURST’’ malware that
compromised legitimate updates of
customers using SolarWinds products or
the Hafnium campaign on Exchange
servers, with the full extent, cause, or
attribution of an incident often not
being known until months after the
initial discovery.445
In designing the proposed rule, CISA
sought the approach that would provide
the best balance between qualitative
benefits and the costs associated with
implementation of the rule. For
instance, in determining the proposed
scope of the covered entity population,
CISA attempted to balance the need for
sufficient reporting necessary to achieve
the benefits described in this section
with the recognition that the larger the
covered entity population, the greater
the costs associated with the rule would
be.446 In light of that, as described in
Section IV.B, CISA worked closely with
its Federal partners to carefully target
specific types of entities from each
critical infrastructure sector for
inclusion after consideration of the
three factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) and the entities’ ability to
manage the reporting requirements.
Based on that, CISA is proposing to
cover only a small portion of the
millions of entities ‘‘in a critical
infrastructure sector’’ that could have
been included in the description of
covered entities.
Another example of where CISA
looked to maximize qualitative benefits
relative to costs is in the content that a
covered entity is required to submit
when making a Covered Cyber Incident
Report. CISA generally focused on
requiring content that was either
specifically enumerated as required
content in the CIRCIA legislation or that
CISA believes is necessary for CISA to
accomplish an obligation imposed upon
CISA by the legislation.
Similarly, as described in Section
IV.F, regarding data preservation, CISA
felt that there are significant benefits
from requiring entities to retain data for
an extended period of time. When
determining the data preservation
445 See,
e.g., Evidence Preservation, supra note
timeframe, CISA considered existing
best practices regarding preservation of
information related to cyber incidents,
data retention or preservation
requirements from comparable
regulatory programs, and comments
received on this issue from stakeholders
in response to the CIRCIA RFI and at
CIRCIA listening sessions. Based on the
above, CISA believes that a data
preservation requirement lasting
anywhere between two and three years
would be consistent with existing best
practices, would be implementable by
the regulated community, and would
achieve the purposes for which data
preservation is intended under CIRCIA.
Recognizing that the costs for preserving
data increase the longer the data must
be retained, and wanting to limit costs
of compliance with CIRCIA where
possible without sacrificing the ability
to achieve the intended purposes, CISA
is proposing a length at the lower end
of the spectrum of best practices for data
preservation. While many regulatory
regimes require data to be preserved for
three years or more, CISA has elected to
propose a two-year reporting period.
CISA believes the two-year period
would provide the best balance between
qualitative benefits and costs by
balancing the incremental costs of
continued data retention against the
benefits of having incident data
available for an extended period of time
following an incident.
In addition to identifying the
qualitative benefits discussed above,
CISA considered a break-even analysis.
Break-even analysis is useful when it is
not possible to quantify the benefits of
a regulatory action. OMB Circular A–4
recommends a ‘‘threshold’’ or ‘‘breakeven’’ analysis when non-quantified
benefits are important to evaluating the
benefits of a regulation. Threshold or
break-even analysis answers the
question, ‘‘How small could the value of
the non-quantified benefits be (or how
large would the value of the nonquantified costs need to be) before the
rule would yield zero net benefits?’’ 447
OMB Circular A–4 notes that ‘‘It may be
useful to focus a break even analysis on
whether the action under consideration
will change the probability of events
occurring or the potential magnitude of
those events. For example, there may be
instances when you have estimates of
the expected outcome of a type of
catastrophic event, but assessing the
change in the probability of such an
event may be difficult. Your break-even
analysis could demonstrate how much a
370.
446 See
Section III.C.ii for a discussion of why a
sufficient number of reports is needed to achieve
the purposes of CIRCIA.
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447 OMB,
Circular A–4 (Sept. 17, 2003), available
at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/
circulars_a004_a-4/.
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regulatory alternative would need to
reduce the probability of a catastrophic
event occurring in order to yield
positive net benefits or change which
regulatory alternative is most net
beneficial.’’ 448
In the past, DHS has used a breakeven analysis to compare the costs of a
proposed rule to the expected impacts
of a terrorist attack, or other extremely
rare, high consequence event. This
analysis would differ for CIRCIA, as this
proposed rule would help prevent or
mitigate far more common cybersecurity
incidents that, as discussed in Section
1.1 of the Preliminary RIA, occur more
often, and with an increased frequency
since 2018.
Agencies typically use break-even to
produce a conditional justification for
the proposed rule. While this
conditional justification does not
resolve whether or not a rule would
break-even, or reach net-zero benefits, it
serves to highlight what information is
missing and what kind of assumptions
would be necessary to provide a basis
for the proposed rule to break-even.449
According to Sunstein, break-even
analysis helps agencies ‘‘. . . to specify
the source of uncertainty, and what they
would need to know in order to reduce
it. Conditional justifications have the
advantage of transparency, because they
specify the factual assumptions that
would have to be made for the benefits
to justify the costs. That specification is
exceedingly important, because it can
promote accountability, promote
consideration of the plausibility of the
underlying assumptions, and promote
testing and revisiting over time as new
information becomes available.’’ 450
CISA expects this proposed rule to
reduce the risk of loss of critical services
or financial losses due to a covered
cyber incident in the critical
infrastructure sectors. As described
above, upon receiving a Covered Cyber
Incident Report or Ransom Payment
Report, the statute requires CISA to
undertake a number of analytical and
information-sharing efforts. The
development and sharing of actionable
information about cyber threats, security
vulnerabilities, and defensive measures
can help other entities to avoid the costs
of a cyber incident in two ways.
First, the information would allow
some entities to take actions that
prevent the incident from occurring. For
example, this could lead to discovery of
a zero-day vulnerability earlier in time,
448 Id.
449 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘‘The Limits of
Quantification,’’ 102 California Law Review 102, no.
6 (2014).
450 Id.
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resulting in earlier vendor development
and customer deployment of a patch;
recognition that a previously identified
vulnerability is one being actively
exploited by threat actors, resulting in
its remediation being prioritized; 451 or
identification of a new threat actor
tactic, technique, or procedure, for
which companies can deploy enhanced
network or end-point scanning and
blocking.
Second, even where an incident is not
prevented, the information would allow
other entities to mitigate the impacts of
the incident (e.g., by reducing the
propagation of the incident throughout
the organization). Incidents occur in
different stages (often referred to as the
‘‘lifecycle’’ of a cyber incident); the
earlier in the lifecycle a network
defender can identify an incident, the
more likely network defenders can
negate or impede the adversary from
achieving their goals.452 This means that
earlier detection of incidents minimizes
both the impact to systems and data
(and the associated damage from that
impact) and the cost of containment,
remediation, and recovery.
CISA requests comment on the
potential use of a break-even analysis in
this case, specifically on what the
consequences of a substantial cyber
incident would be, and the number of
substantial cyber incidents expected in
a given year. Additionally, CISA
requests comment on how effective
early notification of cyber incidents
would be in mitigating expected
consequences of an incident.
When thinking about benefits, CISA
considered estimates of the cost of a
covered cyber incident from the
Information Risk Insights Study (IRIS)
2022 by the Cyentia Institute, which
was sponsored by CISA. The Cyentia
Institute analyzed Advisen’s Cyber Loss
23755
Data, which is widely used and presents
the most comprehensive list of
historical cyber incidents. From the July
2022 Advisen dataset, the Cyentia
Institute analyzed the 1,893 cyber
events with reported loss data, from the
10-year period ranging from 2012 to
2021. These predominately U.S. events
impacted firms across all 20 NAICS
sectors at the two-digit level and were
assigned to one of eight patterns: Denial
of Service Attack, Accidental
Disclosure, Scam or Fraud, System
Intrusion, Insider Misuse, Physical
Threats, Ransomware, and System
Failure. Of these eight pattern types,
System Intrusion was found to be both
the most frequent (49.6% of all types)
and to have the highest financial impact
(60.2% of the total impact across all
types). Table 14 presents summary
statistics associated with these 1,893
cyber events.453
TABLE 14—SUMMARY OF CYBER EVENT LOSSES AND COUNTS, IRIS 2022
Measure
Number of events
(2012–2021) a
Loss
Minimum ......................................................................................................................
First Quartile ................................................................................................................
Geometric Mean ..........................................................................................................
Third Quartile ...............................................................................................................
95th Percentile .............................................................................................................
Maximum .....................................................................................................................
$32
29,000
266,000
2,000,000
52,000,000
12,000,000,000
0
474
479
458
386
96
Average annual
number of
events
0
47.4
47.9
45.8
38.6
9.6
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Note. Data is based on data from the Cyentia Institute’s IRIS 2022 study.
a These are the number of events that resulted in losses between the breakpoints of each of the following loss bin: [$0, $32), [$32, $29,000),
[$29,000, $266,000), [$266,000, $ 2 million), [$2 million, $52 million), and [$52 million, $12 billion]. Since the minimum value of $32 is the single
lowest loss that occurred among the 1,893 events, there are no events associated with it in this column. Instead, there are 474 events which had
losses from $32 up to $29,000, 479 events from $29,000 up to $266,000, and so on.
As noted in the Cyentia Institute IRIS
2022 report, the typical cost of a
security incident is close to the
geometric mean of $266,000, and the
average, or arithmetic mean, is over $25
million. Rather than require reporting of
any cyber incident, this rule proposes to
require reporting only of covered cyber
incidents, which means a substantial
cyber incident experienced by a covered
entity. Under the proposed rule, a
substantial cyber incident means a
Cyber Incident that leads to any of the
following:
1. Substantial loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability;
2. Serious impact on safety and
resiliency of operational systems and
processes;
3. Disruption of ability to engage in
business or industrial operations, or
deliver goods or services; or
4. Unauthorized access facilitated
through or caused by a: (1) compromise
of a cloud service provider, managed
service provider, or other third-party
data hosting provider, or (2) supply
chain compromise.454
Although none of these impacts is
defined in terms of event loss, in its
report ‘‘IRIS 20/20 Xtreme,’’ Cyentia
Institute describes losses associated
with business interruptions, which are
included in the third type of impact for
substantial cyber events.455 Cyentia
Institute finds that business
interruptions are the most numerous
event category, with over half of all total
losses attributable to business
interruption, and have high median
losses of $82 million. Because this rule
proposes to require incident reporting
only for covered cyber incidents, which
must by definition be substantial cyber
incidents, CISA considered comparing
the cost of this proposed rule to the 95th
percentile loss value of $52 million,
which is closer to the estimate of $82
million and perhaps more
representative of what a substantial
cyber incident may cost. CISA again
welcomes comment on the potential
application of these and other estimates.
451 CISA, Reducing the Significant Risk of Known
Exploited Vulnerabilities, https://www.cisa.gov/
known-exploited-vulnerabilities (last visited Nov.
28, 2023).
452 See, e.g., MITRE, Overview of How Cyber
Resiliency Affects the Cyber Attack Lifecycle (2015),
available at https://www2.mitre.org/public/industryperspective/documents/lifecycle-ex.pdf.
453 Cyentia Institute, Information Risk Insights
Study 2022, tbl. 3, Loss Summary, available at
https://www.cyentia.com/iris-2022/.
454 See § 226.1 of the proposed rule.
455 Cyentia Institute, Information Risk Insights
Study IRIS 20/20 Xtreme (2020), tbl. 4, Event Top
Level Category, available at https://
www.cyentia.com/wp-content/uploads/IRIS2020Xtreme.pdf.
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vi. Accounting Statement
The OMB A–4 Accounting Statement
(Table 15) presents annualized costs and
qualitative benefits of the proposed rule
in 2022 dollars.
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TABLE 15—OMB A–4 ACCOUNTING STATEMENT
[$ Millions, 2022 dollars]
Estimates
Category
Primary
estimate
Units
Low
estimate
I
High
estimate
I
Year
dollar
Discount
rate
(%)
I
I
Period
covered
(years)
Notes
Cost Savings
Quantitative Annualized Monetized ($ millions/
year).
N/A ......................................
N/A
Qualitative ..........................................................
Qualitative benefits include (a) improved incident reporting and response and
(b) improved cybersecurity posture through improved ability to prevent or mitigate events through information sharing, early warning, threat analysis, and
incident response. The preservation of data and records in the aftermath of a
covered cyber incident serves a number of critical purposes, such as supporting the ability of (a) analysts and investigators to understand how a cyber
incident was perpetrated and by whom and (b) law enforcement to capture
and prosecute perpetrators of cyber incidents and recover ill-gotten proceeds
from the criminal activity
I
N/A
I
N/A .........
I
2
N/A
I
Costs
Annualized Monetized ($ millions/year) .............
$244.6 .................................
$225.4
$415.4
2023 .......
2
10
................
N/A
................
To: N/A ..
N/A .........
To: .........
................
2
N/A
................
N/A
................
NPRM RIA.
Transfers
From/To ..............................................................
Other Annualized Monetized ($ millions/year) ...
From/To ..............................................................
From: N/A ............................
N/A ......................................
From: ...................................
................
N/A
N/A
Effects
State, Local, and/or Tribal Government—
Annualized Monetized ($ millions/year).
Small Business ...................................................
Wages ................................................................
Growth ................................................................
$10.1 ...................................
................
................
................
2
10
Conducted Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA).
None ....................................
Not measured ......................
................
................
................
................
................
................
................
................
................
................
................
................
................
vii. Alternatives
As part of this analysis, CISA
considered alternatives to the proposed
rule. Below, CISA presents the four
alternatives considered for this
rulemaking along with the estimated
costs. When comparing alternatives,
CISA reviewed the cost of each
alternative as well as the objective of the
rulemaking effort and the benefits
associated with each alternative. While
CISA did not estimate quantitative
benefits for each alternative, the
qualitative benefits for each alternative
provide context as to why the NPRM
alternative is the preferred choice for
CISA.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
1. The Preferred Alternative—The
NPRM
The analysis for this alternative was
discussed above, as it is the proposed
alternative. As presented in Section
V.A.iv, CISA estimates a combined
industry and government cost of $2.6
billion over the period of analysis, and
an annualized cost of $244.6 million,
discounted at 2%.
CISA selected this alternative as the
preferred alternative, as it would
provide the best balance between
qualitative benefits and costs while
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................
................
I
I
being responsive to the statutorily
mandated requirements of CIRCIA.
While there are potential lower cost
alternatives, the scoping of the
population of covered entities in the
preferred alternative allows CISA to
capture adequate reporting populations
from not just the sector-based criteria,
but also from entities in multiple critical
infrastructure sectors and subsectors
using a single threshold.
As discussed above in Section
IV.B.iv.1, there are several benefits to
including the size-based criterion in the
population of covered entities. CISA
believes that substantial cyber incidents
at larger entities routinely will have a
higher likelihood of disrupting the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure, making timely
knowledge by CISA of any covered
cyber incidents affecting larger entities
in critical infrastructure sectors
essential for potential mitigation of
negative consequences. Also, larger
entities are more likely to identify early
signs of compromise than smaller
entities because larger entities also are
likely to have more mature
cybersecurity capabilities or be better
situated to bring in outside experts to
PO 00000
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NPRM RIA (Section
11.2.1).
IRFA (Section 9).
assist during an incident.456 By
including large entities in the
description of covered entity, the
likelihood that an incident is noticed
and reported is increased, while the
timeframe between initiation of an
incident and its reporting is likely to be
decreased, making any potential
mitigation efforts more effective. CISA
also believes that large entities would be
better situated to simultaneously report
and respond to or mitigate an incident.
Because large entities represent a
disproportionate percent of the impacts
of covered cyber incidents on critical
infrastructure, are more likely to be able
to identify a cover cyber incident
earlier, and respond more quickly while
mitigating an incident, CISA believes
that the inclusion of the size-based
criterion will materially improve the
content and volume of reports that CISA
receives.
Additionally, the data and record
preservation requirements put forth in
the preferred alternative are consistent
with existing best practices, help ensure
the ability to assess and analyze an
incident as new information comes to
light related to this specific incident or
type of incident, support eventual
456 Verizon
E:\FR\FM\04APP2.SGM
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04APP2
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 66 / Thursday, April 4, 2024 / Proposed Rules
attribution of an incident that may not
be known in the immediate aftermath of
the incident, and increase the likelihood
that necessary data and records are
preserved long enough to support
investigation and prosecution of the
threat actors responsible for carrying out
the incident. Any reduction in these
provisions, while reducing burden,
would not justify the sacrifice in
benefits. In the following sections for
each alternative, CISA more fully
explains why each proposed alternative
was rejected.
2. Alternative 1—Reduce the Data and
Record Preservation Period
For this alternative, CISA reduces the
proposed data and record preservation
period from two years to six months. A
six-month period would align with
existing FBI Letters of Preservation,
which allow for an initial 90-day
duration, with the option to request
preservation for another 90-day period,
if needed. Under this alternative, there
would be no change to the CIRCIA
reporting requirements and therefore, no
changes to the costs estimated for
becoming familiar with the rule,
reporting, help desk, or enforcement of
CIRCIA.
Under this alternative, we estimate
the costs only for six months of storage,
which is the equivalent of multiplying
the number of reports per year by $500,
without accounting for storage costs
after the year the report was submitted.
Table 16 presents the industry cost for
Alternative 1 (based on the primary
estimates presented in Section V.A.ii),
which CISA estimated would be $1.2
billion over the period of analysis and
$129.2 million annualized at a 2%
discount rate.
TABLE 16—ALTERNATIVE 1 INDUSTRY COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Familiarization
costs
Reporting
costs
Data & record
preservation
costs
Help desk
costs
Enforcement
costs
Total
Undiscounted
Discounted 2%
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
$0.0
467.0
475.1
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
16.2
$0.0
0.0
9.7
9.7
9.8
9.9
9.9
10.0
10.0
10.1
$0.0
0.0
12.5
12.7
12.8
13.0
13.2
13.3
13.5
13.6
$0.00
0.00
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.46
0.46
$0.00
0.00
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
$0.0
467.0
497.8
39.1
39.3
39.5
39.7
40.0
40.2
40.4
$0.0
448.9
469.1
36.1
35.6
35.1
34.6
34.1
33.6
33.2
Total ................................
Annualized ......................
1,055.5
........................
79.1
..................
104.6
..........................
3.59
..................
0.24
......................
1,243.0
........................
1,160.2
129.2
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Under this alternative, CISA would
not anticipate a change in Federal
government costs, which would remain
$1.2 billion, discounted at 2%, over the
period of analysis for government costs
(see Table 11). The combined costs for
industry and government under
Alternative 1 are presented in Table 17.
CISA estimates a combined 11-year cost
of $2.2 billion and an annualized cost of
$226.7 million, discounted at 2%.
TABLE 17—ALTERNATIVE 1 COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Industry
cost
Year
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Total cost
Government
cost
Undiscounted
Discounted 2%
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
$0.0
0.0
467.0
497.8
39.1
39.3
39.5
39.7
40.0
40.2
40.4
$34.5
97.7
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
$34.5
97.7
582.9
613.7
155.0
155.2
155.4
155.6
155.9
156.1
156.3
$34.5
95.8
560.3
578.3
143.2
140.6
138.0
135.5
133.0
130.6
128.2
Total ........................................................................................................
Annualized ..............................................................................................
1,243.0
........................
1,175.3
........................
2,418.3
........................
2,218.0
226.6
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Alternative 1 represents a cost savings
compared to the Preferred Alternative of
$176.0 million over the period of
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analysis, all of which is realized due to
the reduction of the data and record
preservation period. While Alternative 1
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would implement CIRCIA at a lower
cost than the Preferred Alternative,
CISA rejects this alternative because it
E:\FR\FM\04APP2.SGM
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would not convey the full benefits
associated with the data and record
preservation requirements. The data and
record preservation requirements can
support the ability of analysts and
investigators to understand how a cyber
incident was perpetrated and by whom
as well as enable data and trend analysis
and the investigation of incidents. This
could lead to a reduction or mitigation
of the risk of future cyber incidents.
The reduction in the data and record
preservation requirements would
weaken the ability for CISA and other
agencies to assess and analyze an
incident as new information that may
come to light related to this specific
incident or type of incident, support
eventual attribution of an incident that
may not be known in the immediate
aftermath of the incident. Reducing the
data and records preservation period
would also decrease the likelihood that
necessary data and records are
preserved long enough to support
investigation and prosecution of the
threat actors responsible for carrying out
the incident. Any reduction in these
provisions, while reducing burden,
would not justify the sacrifice in
benefits.
3. Alternative 2—Remove Size-Based
Criterion
For this alternative, CISA would
decrease the affected population of
covered entities by removing the sizebased criterion for covered entities. This
change would reduce the population of
covered entities by 35,152 (see Section
8.3 of the Preliminary RIA) to 284,607
covered entities, which would be
approximately a 12% reduction from
the Preferred Alternative. Although this
alternative estimates the cost savings for
the removal of all 35,152 covered
entities identified under the size-based
criterion, it is unlikely that the removal
of this criterion would result in the
removal of all covered entities in the
size-based criterion. CISA, however,
does not have an estimate for the
number of covered entities that would
be removed from the affected
population of covered entities based on
the removal of the size-based standard.
As discussed in Section IV.B.iv, CISA
recognizes that additional sector-based
criteria would be developed in lieu of
the size-based standard, however, CISA
has not yet developed the thresholds
that would be necessary to define these
additional criteria. For this alternative,
CISA conducted the analysis using the
same methodology as presented in the
Preferred Alternative.
Table 18 presents the industry cost for
Alternative 2. CISA estimated all costs
using the methodology for obtaining the
primary estimates presented in Section
V.A.ii above and Section 4 of the
Preliminary RIA, but based on the
reduced population of covered entities.
CISA estimated the total cost to industry
would be $1.1 billion over the period of
analysis and $119.7 million annualized
at a 2% discount rate.
TABLE 18—ALTERNATIVE 2 INDUSTRY COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Familiarization
Reporting
costs
Data & record
preservation
costs
Help desk
costs
Enforcement
costs
Total
Discounted 2%
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
...............................................
$0.0
395.3
401.0
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
$0.0
0.0
7.0
7.0
7.1
7.2
7.2
7.3
7.3
7.5
$0.0
0.0
9.2
29.0
29.5
30.0
30.5
31.0
31.5
32.0
$0.0
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
$0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
$0.0
395.3
417.6
47.9
48.4
49.0
49.5
50.1
50.7
51.3
$0.0
380.0
393.5
44.2
43.9
43.5
43.1
42.8
42.4
42.1
Total ........................................
Annualized ..............................
876.6
........................
50.2
..................
190.6
..........................
2.3
..................
0.21
......................
1,159.8
................
1,075.4
119.7
Under this alternative, CISA would
not anticipate a change in Federal
government costs, which would remain
$1.2 billion over the 11-year period of
analysis for government costs. CISA
assumes no change in government cost
due to the relatively small impact
associated with the removal of the sizebased criterion. Additionally, since
government costs are based on expected
budget requests, there is a high degree
of uncertainty regarding how this
change would impact that request. The
combined costs for industry and
government under Alternative 2 are
presented in Table 19. CISA estimates a
combined 11-year cost of $2.1 billion
and an annualized cost of $218.0
million, discounted at 2%.
TABLE 19—ALTERNATIVE 2 COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
[$ Millions]
Industry
cost
Year
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
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Government
cost
0.0
0.0
395.3
417.6
47.9
48.4
49.0
E:\FR\FM\04APP2.SGM
34.5
97.7
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
04APP2
Total cost
Undiscounted
34.5
97.7
511.2
533.5
163.8
164.3
164.9
Discounted 2%
34.5
95.8
491.4
502.7
151.3
148.8
146.4
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TABLE 19—ALTERNATIVE 2 COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE—Continued
[$ Millions]
Industry
cost
Year
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
2030
2031
2032
2033
Total cost
Government
cost
Undiscounted
Discounted 2%
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
49.5
50.1
50.7
51.3
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
165.4
166.0
166.6
167.2
144.0
141.7
139.4
137.2
Total ........................................................................................................
Annualized ..............................................................................................
1,159.8
........................
1,175.3
........................
2,335.1
........................
2,133.1
218.0
While Alternative 2 would present a
lower cost than the Preferred
Alternative, there are several reasons
why it was rejected in favor of the
Preferred Alternative. As discussed in
Section IV.B, there are a wide variety of
types of entities that are active
participants in critical infrastructure
sectors and communities and are
considered ‘‘in a critical infrastructure
sector.’’ Rather than develop sectorbased criteria for each of these potential
categories of covered entities, CISA
relies on the size-based criterion to
capture entities in these sectors and
subsectors that are not otherwise
covered in the sector-based criteria and
for which CISA considered that
requiring reporting only from large
entities was sufficient to meet CIRCIA’s
purposes. Including these entities is
critical for the following reasons, as
described in further detail in section
IV.B.iv.1:
• While size is not alone indicative of
criticality, larger entities’ larger
customer bases, market shares, number
of employees, and other similar sizebased characteristics mean that cyber
incidents affecting them typically have
greater potential to result in
consequences impacting national
security, economic security, or public
health and safety than cyber incidents
affecting smaller companies.
• Large entities disproportionately
experience cyber incidents.
• Non-small entities are likely to own
or operate a disproportionate percentage
of the nation’s critical infrastructure.
• In light of the interconnectedness of
the world today, incidents at entities in
critical infrastructure sectors that are
not themselves owners and operators of
critical infrastructure can have
cascading effects that end up impacting
critical infrastructure. Based on this,
CISA believes that substantial cyber
incidents at larger entities routinely will
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have a high likelihood of disrupting the
reliable operation of critical
infrastructure.
Removing the size-based criterion
would limit CISA’s ability to collect
valuable information from a broader set
of entities than relying on the sectorbased criteria would allow.
Furthermore, removing the size-based
criterion would require CISA to develop
additional sector-based criteria to
capture entities from certain critical
sectors or subsectors, such as Food and
Agriculture Sector entities, Commercial
Facilities, Oil and Natural Gas Subsector
entities, and medical laboratories that
currently are included in the
description of covered entity primarily
or solely based on the size-based
criterion. Covering these additional
entities is much more in line with the
purpose of the regulation for CISA to
learn about new or novel vulnerabilities,
trends, or tactics sooner and be able to
share early warnings before additional
entities within the sector, critical or
non-critical, can fall victim to them.
Contrary to the minimum benefits (in
terms of industry cost savings) likely to
be gained by elimination of the sizebased criterion, CISA believes there are
significant reasons to include the
criterion in the proposal. First, as
described at length in Section IV.B.iv.1,
there are a number of reasons why CISA
believes requiring reporting from large
entities is beneficial. This includes the
belief that substantial cyber incidents at
larger entities routinely will have a high
likelihood of disrupting the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure,
making timely knowledge by CISA of
any covered cyber incidents affecting
larger entities in critical infrastructure
sectors essential for potential mitigation
of negative consequences; larger entities
are more likely to identify early signs of
compromise than smaller entities; large
entities would be better situated to
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simultaneously report and respond to or
mitigate an incident; and the inclusion
of the size-based criterion will
materially improve the content and
volume of reports that CISA receives.
Second, the size-based criterion allows
CISA to capture adequate reporting from
multiple sectors and subsectors using a
single threshold. As noted above,
without the size-based criterion, CISA
likely would need to establish one or
more new sector-based criteria for each
of at least five critical infrastructure
sectors or subsectors, and has included
alternative proposed sector-based
criteria in the proposed rulemaking for
this purpose. In total, while CISA
believes it could achieve the purposes of
the CIRCIA statute without a size-based
criterion, CISA believes that the benefits
of including the size-based criterion far
exceed the almost certainly minimal
cost savings associated with an
alternative where additional sectorbased criteria are used in lieu of the
size-based criterion.
4. Alternative 3—Reduce the Data and
Record Preservation Requirement and
Remove Size-Based Criterion
For this alternative, CISA would
combine the cost reductions presented
in Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 to
present the lowest cost alternative.
Table 20 presents the industry cost for
Alternative 3. CISA estimated all costs,
with the exception of the data and
record preservation costs, using the
methodology for obtaining the primary
estimates presented in Section V.A.ii.
CISA estimated the data and records
preservation costs using the same
methodology used under Alternative 1
as presented in Section V.A.vii.a. CISA
estimated the total cost to industry
would be $950.0 million over the period
of analysis and $105.7 million
annualized at a 2% discount rate.
E:\FR\FM\04APP2.SGM
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TABLE 20—ALTERNATIVE 3 INDUSTRY COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Familiarization
costs
Reporting
costs
Data & record
preservation
costs
Help desk
costs
Enforcement
costs
Total
Undiscounted
Discounted 2%
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
$0.0
395.3
401.0
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
$0.0
0.0
7.0
7.0
7.1
7.2
7.2
7.3
7.3
7.5
$0.0
0.0
9.2
9.4
9.6
9.7
9.9
10.0
10.2
10.4
$0.0
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
$0.00
0.00
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
$0.0
395.3
417.6
28.3
28.5
28.7
28.9
29.2
29.4
29.7
$0.0
380.0
393.5
26.1
25.8
25.5
25.2
24.9
24.6
24.4
Total ................................
Annualized ......................
876.6
........................
57.7
..................
78.4
..........................
2.7
..................
0.24
......................
1,015.5
105.7
949.9
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Under this alternative, CISA would
not anticipate a change in Federal
government costs, which would remain
$1.2 billion over the 11-year period of
analysis for government costs. The
combined costs for industry and
government under Alternative 3 are
presented in Table 21. CISA estimates a
11-year cost of $2.0 billion and an
annualized cost of $205.1 million,
discounted at 2%.
TABLE 21—ALTERNATIVE 3 COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Industry
cost
Year
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Total cost
Government
cost
Undiscounted
Discounted 2%
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
$0.0
0.0
395.3
417.6
28.3
28.5
28.7
28.9
29.2
29.4
29.7
$34.5
97.7
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
115.9
$34.5
97.7
511.2
533.5
144.2
144.4
144.6
144.8
145.1
145.3
145.6
$34.5
95.8
491.4
502.7
133.2
130.8
128.4
126.1
123.8
121.6
119.4
Total ........................................................................................................
Annualized ..............................................................................................
1,015.5
........................
1,175.3
........................
2,190.8
........................
2,007.6
205.1
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Alternative 3 estimates the lowest cost
alternative in this analysis, which
presents a lower burden based on
changes to discretionary elements in
two required provisions—a reduction in
the data and records preservation
requirements and a reduction in the
number of covered entities through the
removal of the size-based criterion. As
discussed in Sections V.A.vii.b and c,
the reduction in the data preservation
period and the removal of the size-based
criterion, while reducing costs, would
sacrifice benefits as compared to
Preferred Alternative.
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5. Alternative 4—Increase the Affected
Population to All Critical Infrastructure
Entities
For this alternative, CISA widened the
description of covered entity to include
all entities operating in the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors.457 Under this
alternative, the affected population
would increase from 316,244 covered
entities to 13,180,483 covered entities.
This population was estimated by using
the manner of determining whether an
entity is in a critical infrastructure
457 The 16 critical infrastructure sectors listed by
Presidential Policy Directive 21. See https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/
12/presidential-policy-directive-criticalinfrastructure-security-and-resil/ (last visited Nov.
28, 2023).
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sector as explained in Section IV.B.ii.
As discussed above, the SSPs for each
critical infrastructure sector include a
sector profile of entities in the sector.458
The number of covered entities within
each sector, was based on information
in the SSPs, as well as populations
based on NAICS codes for the affected
industries, which was estimated using
U.S. Census County Business Patterns
data. Table 22 presents the affected
population for each of the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors. This affected
population would include small and not
458 The list of 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors
can be found at https://www.cisa.gov/topics/
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/
critical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited Nov. 28,
2023).
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small businesses, based on SBA size
standards, within the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors.
standards, within the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors.
TABLE 22—AFFECTED POPULATION BY CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR
Affected
population
Criteria
Percentage of affected population
2%
5%
10%
Chemical Sector ........................................................................................................................
Commercial Facilities Sector .....................................................................................................
Communications Sector .............................................................................................................
Critical Manufacturing Sector ....................................................................................................
Dams Sector ..............................................................................................................................
Defense Industrial Base Sector .................................................................................................
Emergency Services ..................................................................................................................
Energy Sector ............................................................................................................................
Financial Services Sector ..........................................................................................................
Food and Agriculture Sector ......................................................................................................
Government Facilities Sector ....................................................................................................
Healthcare and Public Health Sector ........................................................................................
Information Technology Sector ..................................................................................................
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector .......................................................................
Transportation Systems Sector .................................................................................................
Water and Wastewater Sector ..................................................................................................
31,717
7,980,640
92,861
46,259
107,054
60,000
118,098
36,069
294,794
3,239,083
89,626
142,806
557,000
143
214,833
169,500
634
159,613
1,857
925
2,141
1,200
2,362
721
5,896
64,782
1,793
2,856
11,140
3
4,297
3,390
1,586
399,032
4,643
2,313
5,353
3,000
5,905
1,803
14,740
161,954
4,481
7,140
27,850
7
10,742
8,475
3,172
798,064
9,286
4,626
10,705
6,000
11,810
3,607
29,479
323,908
8,963
14,281
55,700
14
21,483
16,950
Total ....................................................................................................................................
13,180,483
263,610
659,024
1,318,048
Using all of the same assumptions for
the primary estimates presented in
Sections V.A.i and ii, this would
increase the number of expected CIRCIA
Reports from 210,525 to 5,292,818 over
the period of analysis. This would
significantly increase the cost to
industry, which is estimated to be $31.8
billion over the period of analysis, or
$3.5 billion annualized, discounted at
2%, as presented in Table 23.
TABLE 23—ALTERNATIVE 4 INDUSTRY COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Familiarization
costs
Reporting
costs
Data & record
preservation
costs
Help desk
costs
Enforcement
costs
Total cost
Undiscounted
Discounted 2%
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
.......................................
$0.0
10,461.9
10,799.4
675.0
675.0
675.0
675.0
675.0
675.0
675.0
$0.0
0.0
384.3
384.4
384.4
384.5
384.5
384.6
384.7
384.8
$0.0
0.0
235.6
732.8
733.3
733.8
734.3
734.8
735.3
735.8
$0.0
0.0
11.3
11.3
11.3
11.3
11.3
11.3
11.3
11.3
$0.00
0.00
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
$0.0
10,461.9
11,430.6
1,803.5
1,804.0
1,804.6
1,805.1
1,805.7
1,806.3
1,806.9
$0.0
10,055.7
10,771.3
1,666.1
1,634.0
1,602.4
1,571.5
1,541.1
1,511.4
1,482.3
Total ................................
Annualized ......................
25,986.1
........................
3,076.2
..................
5,375.8
..........................
90.3
..................
0.24
......................
34,528.6
........................
31,835.8
3,544.2
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
In addition to increased industry cost,
CISA assumes that the substantial
increase in volume of CIRCIA Reports
submitted would lead to increased
Federal government costs necessary to
manage a much larger CIRCIA program.
For the purposes of this alternatives
analysis, CISA assumes a 10X (900%)
increase in government cost in response
to the 4,967% increase in the affected
population. As presented in Table 24,
CISA estimates a combined 11-year cost
of $42.1 billion, with an annualized cost
of $4.3 billion, discounted at 2%, for
Alternative 4.
TABLE 24—ALTERNATIVE 4 COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COSTS, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
Year
Industry cost
2023 ...............................................................................................................
2024 ...............................................................................................................
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Government
cost
$0.0
0.0
E:\FR\FM\04APP2.SGM
$34.5
977.0
04APP2
Total cost
Undiscounted
$34.5
977.0
Discounted 2%
$34.5
957.8
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TABLE 24—ALTERNATIVE 4 COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COSTS, PRIMARY ESTIMATE—Continued
[$ Millions]
Year
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Total cost
Government
cost
Industry cost
Undiscounted
Discounted 2%
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
...............................................................................................................
10,461.9
11,430.6
1,803.5
1,804.0
1,804.6
1,805.1
1,805.7
1,806.3
1,806.9
1,159.0
1,159.0
1,159.0
1,159.0
1,159.0
1,159.0
1,159.0
1,159.0
1,159.0
11,620.9
12,589.6
2,962.5
2,963.0
2,963.6
2,964.1
2,964.7
2,965.3
2,965.9
11,169.7
11,863.5
2,736.8
2,683.7
2,631.6
2,580.5
2,530.3
2,481.2
2,433.1
Total ........................................................................................................
Annualized ..............................................................................................
34,528.6
........................
11,442.5
........................
45,971.1
........................
42,102.7
4,302.0
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
While Alternative 4 would capture a
significantly larger affected population,
and therefore provide CISA with
additional data to use in its efforts to
prevent, or mitigate the impact of,
covered cyber incidents, this alternative
is rejected due to its high cost. CISA
would not anticipate additional benefits
comparable to the cost increase from
expanding the population, as the
Preferred Alternative focuses the
affected population on the highest-risk
population within the critical
infrastructure sectors and is expected to
provide sufficient reporting for CISA to
identify cyber incident threats and
trends.
6. Alternative Comparison
In this analysis, CISA considered four
regulatory alternatives to the Preferred
Alternative. Table 25 presents the cost
comparison for the Preferred Alternative
and the four additional alternatives
discussed.
TABLE 25—ALTERNATIVES SUMMARY, COMBINED INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COST, PRIMARY ESTIMATE
[$ Millions]
11-Year cost
Alternative
Undiscounted
Preferred ........
1 .....................
2 .....................
3 .....................
4 .....................
Annualized cost
Description
Proposed Rulemaking .................................................................................
Reduces the data and record preservation period .....................................
Remove Size Based Criterion for Covered Entities 459 ...............................
Reduces the data and record preservation period and removes the sizebased criterion.
Increases the affected population to all critical infrastructure entities ........
Discounted 2%
Discounted 2%
$2,619.8
2,418.3
2,335.1
2,190.8
$2,394.0
2,218.0
2,133.1
2,007.6
$244.6
226.6
218.0
205.1
45,971.1
42,102.7
4,302.0
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
459 In this proposed rule, CISA proposes several criteria in § 226.2 to describe entities that would be considered covered entities, and one criterion would include entities that exceed the SBA small business size standard. Alternatives 2 and 3 would remove that as a criterion for determining covered entities.
B. Small Entities
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),
5 U.S.C. 603, requires agencies to
consider the impacts of its rules on
small entities. In accordance with the
RFA, CISA has prepared an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA)
that examines the impacts of the
proposed rule on small entities. The
IRFA is included in the Preliminary RIA
that is available in the docket for this
rulemaking. The term ‘‘small entities’’
comprises small businesses, not-forprofit organizations that are
independently owned and operated and
are not dominant in their fields, and
governmental jurisdictions with
populations of fewer than 50,000.
CISA is publishing the IRFA in the
rulemaking docket to aid the public in
commenting on the potential small
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entity impacts of the requirements in
this proposed rule. CISA invites all
interested parties to submit data and
information regarding the potential
economic impact on small entities that
would result from the adoption of the
proposed requirements in this proposed
rule. Under section 603(b) and (c) of the
RFA, an IRFA must describe the impact
of the proposed rule on small entities
and contain the following:
• A description of the reasons why
action by the agency is being
considered.
• A succinct statement of the
objectives of, and legal basis for, the
proposed rule.
• A description of and, where
feasible, an estimate of the number of
small entities to which the proposed
rule would apply.
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• A description of the projected
reporting, recordkeeping, and other
compliance requirements of the
proposed rule, including an estimate of
the classes of small entities which
would be subject to the requirements
and the type of professional skills
necessary for preparation of the report
or record.
• An identification, to the extent
practicable, of all relevant Federal rules
which may duplicate, overlap, or
conflict with the proposed rule.
• A description of any significant
alternatives to the proposed rule that
accomplish the stated objectives of
applicable statutes and may minimize
any significant economic impact of the
proposed rule on small entities.
CISA has discussed many of these
issues in other sections of the preamble
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ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
to the NPRM and in the Preliminary
RIA, which is published in the
rulemaking docket. CISA welcomes
comment from the public on the
Preliminary RIA.
An estimated 316,244 covered entities
would be subject to requirements
proposed in this NPRM and potentially
incur costs as a result of this proposed
rule. These covered entities include
businesses, government entities, and
organizations—some of which are
considered to be small entities as
defined by the RFA.
CISA does not have a complete list of
the entities that would be subject to the
requirements of this proposed rule.
Therefore, as discussed in Section 9.4 of
the Preliminary RIA, CISA conducted an
analysis to review the NAICS codes that
would most likely have entities affected
by the proposed rule. Using the SBA
size standards, CISA estimated the
number of small entities within each of
the 280 relevant NAICS codes. CISA
then performed an IRFA to assess the
impacts on small entities resulting from
this proposed rule using the estimated
cost per covered entity.
Based on the IRFA, CISA found:
• Of the 316,244 covered entities,
CISA estimates that 310,855 would be
considered small entities.
• Of the 264 NAICS codes with
available revenue data, 99.2% had a
revenue impact of less than or equal to
1%.
• CISA estimated that the average
cost per non-covered entity would be
$33.58 and the average cost per covered
entity experiencing a single covered
cyber incident would be $4,139.60.
CISA has discussed many of these
issues in other sections of the NPRM
and in the Preliminary RIA, which is
published in the rulemaking docket.
CISA welcomes comment from the
public on the Preliminary RIA and the
IRFA.
C. Assistance for Small Entities
Under section 213(a) of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104–121),
CISA wants to assist small entities in
understanding this proposed rule so that
they can better evaluate its effects on
them and participate in the rulemaking.
If this proposed rule would affect your
small business, organization, or
governmental jurisdiction and you have
questions concerning its provisions or
options for compliance, please contact
the person in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
NPRM. CISA will not retaliate against
small entities that question or complain
about this proposed rule or any policy
or action of the CISA.
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D. Collection of Information
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501–3520,
agencies are required to submit to OMB,
for review and approval, any reporting
requirements inherent in a rule. This
proposed rule would call for a new
collection of information under PRA.
CIRCIA also includes a broad exemption
to PRA, which provides that: ‘‘Sections
3506(c), 3507, 3508, and 3509 of title 44
shall not apply to any action to carry out
this section.’’ 6 U.S.C. 681b(f). CISA
interprets the phrase ‘‘this section’’ as
referring to 6 U.S.C. 681b for the
purposes of the PRA exemption.
Therefore, CISA understands the scope
of this PRA exemption as applying to all
information collection related to
CIRCIA’s reporting requirements under
6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)–(3) as wholly
exempt from compliance with the PRA,
regardless of whether that information
must be required under this proposed
rule or is voluntarily provided in
response to an optional question in a
CIRCIA Report.
Covered entities will also have the
opportunity to submit additional data
and information to enhance situational
awareness of cyber threats, as
authorized under 6 U.S.C. 681c(b), via
an open text box and/or the ability to
upload information as part of a covered
entity’s CIRCIA Report. Because CISA
does not plan to require covered entities
to submit this data and information, nor
will it pose identical questions that
must be responded to in any particular
form or time period to covered entities,
this additional information does not
constitute a ‘‘collection of information’’
under the Paperwork Reduction Act.
See 5 CFR 1320.3(c).
Accordingly, information collected
through CIRCIA Reports, including
additional information collected in an
ad hoc manner that is incorporated into
CIRCIA Reports, is exempt from
compliance with PRA requirements.
Information collected by CISA entirely
pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681c is outside of
the scope of this rulemaking and not
exempt from compliance with PRA
requirements.
E. Federalism
Under Executive Order 13132,
Federalism, 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10,
1999), agencies must adhere to
fundamental federalism principles,
policymaking criteria, and in some cases
follow additional requirements when
promulgating federal regulations. While
it is possible that the regulations
proposed through this notice may have
some impact on SLTT governments,
CISA believes that this rule would not
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23763
trigger the additional requirements
contained in Executive Order 13132 for
rules that have federalism impacts.
Depending on the type of rule under
development, Executive Order 13132
may require an agency to: (1) provide
the State and local government with
funds to pay for the direct costs they
incur in complying with the regulation;
(2) consult with State and local officials
early in the process of developing the
proposed regulation; (3) provide a
federalism summary impact statement
in the preamble of the rule; and/or (4)
provide the Director of OMB with
written communications submitted to
the agency by State and local officials.
Under Section 6 of the Executive Order,
agencies must meet these additional
requirements for two categories of rules.
Section 6(b) describes the first category
as rules that have federalism
implications, impose substantial direct
compliance costs on State and local
governments, and that are not required
by statute. Because the regulations
proposed through this notice are
required by statute, this proposed rule is
not the sort of action contemplated by
Section 6(b). The second category,
described in Section 6(c) is a rule that
would have federalism implications and
that would preempt state law. While the
regulations proposed through this notice
may have some impact on SLTT
governments, the rule would not have
federalism implications as defined in
Executive Order 13132, nor would the
majority of this rule preempt state law.
A rule has implications for federalism
under Executive Order 13132 if it has a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. While this
proposed rule describes covered entity
to include State and local government
entities and entities like emergency
service or education providers that may
be considered part of a State, the
requirement to file a CIRCIA Report is
not a substantial direct effect under
Executive Order 13132. Congress
explicitly prohibited CISA from
pursuing enforcement against a State or
local government for failure to report a
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment as otherwise required under
the statute’s implementing regulations.
See 6 U.S.C. 681d(f). Thus, even though
these proposed regulations require some
State and local governments and
government entities to report covered
cyber incidents and ransom payments to
CISA, this requirement is unenforceable.
CISA believes that an unenforceable
requirement to submit an informational
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report to a federal agency is not the type
of government action that results in a
substantial direct effect on States, the
relationship between the States and the
national government, or the distribution
of power or responsibilities among the
various levels of government.
Accordingly, CISA believes that this
proposed rule would not have sufficient
federalism implications that require
under Executive Order 13132
preparation of a federalism summary
impact statement, nor require further
consultation with State and local
government officials.
Similarly, the majority of this rule
would not preempt State and/or local
government law. Congress did not
include any express preemption
provision in the CIRCIA statute, and
CISA does not assert through this
rulemaking that the Federal government
so fully occupies the field of cyber
incident reporting that States or local
governments cannot also regulate in this
space. To CISA’s knowledge, no State or
local laws directly conflict with the
incident reporting requirements set
forth by this regulation, but CISA
welcomes comment from stakeholders
explaining otherwise.
One exception to this general lack of
preemption is the set of statutory
provisions included in CIRCIA,
replicated in the proposed rulemaking
for clarity in § 226.18(a)(5)(A) and (b)(2),
that places limits on a State and/or local
government’s ability to use information
obtained solely through a CIRCIA
Report, and disclose the CIRCIA Reports
themselves. Similar to the restriction
placed on federal regulatory use of
information obtained through reporting
to CISA under CIRCIA, CIRCIA
prohibits SLTT governments from using
information about a covered cyber
incident or ransom payment obtained
solely through reporting directly to
CISA under CIRCIA to regulate the
activities of the covered entity or entity
that made the ransom payment, unless
the SLTT expressly permitted the entity
to submit a CIRCIA Report to comply
with its SLTT reporting obligations. See
6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(5).460 Similarly, in
addition to exemption from disclosure
under the Federal FOIA, CIRCIA also
exempts CIRCIA Reports from
disclosure under SLTT freedom of
information laws or similar laws
requiring disclosure of information or
records. See U.S.C. 681e(b)(3). CISA
believes, however, that incorporation of
460 A CIRCIA Report may, consistent with State
regulatory authority specifically relating to the
prevention and mitigation of cybersecurity threats
to information systems, inform the development or
implementation of regulations relating to such
systems. 6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(5)(B).
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these provisions into the proposed rule
does not result in a rule that implicates
federalism as contemplated under
Executive Order 13132 for several
reasons. First, these two information
protection provisions, are a small,
supportive aspect of the CIRCIA
regulations and will only actually be
implicated if and when SLTT
governments receive CIRCIA Reports, or
information included therein. Unless
the SLTT government is in possession of
a CIRCIA Report or information
obtained solely through a CIRCIA
Report after it has been submitted to
CISA, these restrictions do not apply.
Further, regarding the regulatory use
restrictions, SLTT governments are not
prohibited from taking regulatory
actions based on information they
receive from another source, even if that
very same information was submitted to
CISA as part of a CIRCIA Report.
Congress prohibited from using the
information obtained solely through a
CIRCIA Report for such regulatory
purposes, unless the submission of a
CIRCIA Report is expressly permitted to
meet SLTT reporting requirements. In
other words, the rule would only place
limits on SLTT governments’ use and
disclosure of information that they
would not have otherwise obtained (and
therefore, as a practical matter, would
not have had in their possession to use
or disclose) but for the rule itself.
Second, these provisions are expected to
inure to the benefit of SLTT
governments by making it possible for
CIRCIA Reports and/or information
contained in those reports that is
provided to the Federal government to
be shared with the States, which CISA
would not otherwise be able to do
without risking the important
confidentiality and other stakeholder
protections required by CIRCIA. This
ultimately means that SLTT
governments will have more
information (e.g., to protect their own
information systems) than they would
have had without the rule. Accordingly,
CISA does not believe that this rule
contains federalism implications and
preempts state law in the manner that
would trigger additional steps required
for certain regulatory actions under
Executive Order 13121.
Although CISA believes that
Executive Order 13132 does not require
adherence to the additional steps
otherwise necessary for rules that have
federalism implications and which
preempt state law, CISA notes that
representatives from several State and
local government entities were
consulted early in the development of
this proposed rule. CISA hosted several
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listening sessions between September
and November 2022 to obtain input
from those entities who may be
impacted by the proposed regulations
once they have been finalized.
Representatives from various State and
local government entities were invited
to and attended these listening sessions.
In some cases, representatives from
State and local entities provided input
on the proposed regulations during the
listening session, for example, during
the Emergency Services Sector and
Government Facilities Sector sectorspecific listening sessions. Transcripts
of those listening sessions are available
in the docket for this rulemaking.
CISA welcomes public comments on
Executive Order 13132 federalism
implications.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 or UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531–1538,
directs Federal agencies to assess the
effects of regulatory actions on State,
local, and tribal governments, and the
private sector. UMRA’s requirements
apply when any Federal mandate may
result in the expenditure by a State,
local, or tribal government, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector of
$100,000,000 (which is now
$177,000,000 when adjusted for
inflation) or more in any one year.461
This proposed rule does not impose an
unfunded Federal mandate on State,
local, or tribal governments because the
proposed reporting requirements are
unenforceable against SLTT
Government Entities.462 Although this
proposed rulemaking would not impose
an unfunded mandate on State, local, or
tribal governments, the estimates for
years 2 and 3 show an unfunded
mandate in excess of $177 million on
the private sector primarily due to the
estimated familiarization costs with the
final rule. The regulatory impact
assessment prepared in conjunction
with this proposed rule satisfies
461 $100 million in 1995 dollars adjusted for
inflation to 2022 using the GDP implicit price
deflator for the U.S. economy. Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, ‘‘GDP Implicit Price Deflator in United
States,’’ available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
series/USAGDPDEFAISMEI#0, last accessed on July
21, 2023.
462 See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Guidance for
Implementing Title II of S. 1, from Alice Rivlin,
OMB Director (Mar. 31, 1995) (‘‘As a general matter,
a Federal mandate includes Federal regulations that
impose enforceable duties on State, local, and tribal
governments, or on the private sector . . . .’’),
available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
omb/memoranda_1998 (last accessed Oct. 13,
2023). See also 5 U.S.C. 1555 which defines a
federal mandate as ‘‘. . . any provision in statute
or regulation or any Federal court ruling that
imposes an enforceable duty upon State, local, or
tribal governments . . .’’ (emphasis added).
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UMRA’s requirements under 2 U.S.C.
1532.
G. Taking of Private Property
This proposed rule would not cause a
taking of private property or otherwise
have taking implications under
Executive Order 12630, Governmental
Actions and Interference with
Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights, 53 FR 8863 (Mar. 18, 1988).
H. Civil Justice Reform
This proposed rule meets the
applicable standards set forth in section
3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order
12988, Civil Justice Reform, 61 FR 4729
(Feb. 5, 1996) to minimize litigation,
eliminate ambiguity, and reduce
burden.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
I. Protection of Children
This proposed rule, while
‘‘economically significant’’ under
Executive Order 12866 as amended by
Executive Order 14094, does not
concern an environmental health risk or
safety risk that an agency has reason to
believe may disproportionately affect
children. Accordingly, no further
analysis is needed under Executive
Order 13045, Protection of Children
from Environmental Health Risks and
Safety Risks, 62 FR 19885 (Apr. 21,
1997).
J. Indian Tribal Governments
This rule does not have ‘‘tribal
implications’’ under Executive Order
13175, Consultation and Coordination
With Indian Tribal Governments, 65 FR
67249 (Nov. 6, 2000), because it does
not have substantial direct effects on
one or more Indian tribes, on the
relationship between the Federal
government and Indian tribes, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities between the Federal
government and Indian tribes. As with
State and local governments, this
proposed rule describes ‘‘covered
entity,’’ to include tribal government
entities and entities like emergency
service providers that may be
considered part of a tribal government.
The requirement to file a CIRCIA
Report, however, is not a substantial
direct effect under Executive Order
13175. Further, Congress explicitly
prohibited CISA from pursuing
enforcement against a tribal government
for failure to report a covered cyber
incident or ransom payment as
otherwise required under the statute’s
implementing regulations. See 6 U.S.C.
681d(f). Accordingly, CISA believes that
this rule does not have tribal
implications, and therefore Executive
Order 13175 requires no further agency
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action or analysis. CISA welcomes
public comments on Executive Order
13175 tribal implications.
K. Energy Effects
CISA has analyzed this proposed rule
under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use, 66 FR 28355 (May
18, 2001). CISA has determined that it
is not a ‘‘significant energy action’’
under that order because even though it
is a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’
under Executive Order 12866, it is not
likely to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy, and it has not been designated
by the Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs as a
‘‘significant energy action.’’
Accordingly, the provisions of
Executive Order 13211 to not apply to
this proposed rule.
L. Technical Standards
The National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act, codified as a
note to 15 U.S.C. 272, directs agencies
to use voluntary consensus standards in
their regulatory activities unless the
agency provides Congress, through
OMB, with an explanation of why using
these standards would be inconsistent
with applicable law or otherwise
impractical. Voluntary consensus
standards are technical standards (e.g.,
specifications of materials, performance,
design, or operation; test methods;
sampling procedures; and related
management systems practices) that are
developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies. This
proposed rule does not use technical
standards. Therefore, CISA did not
consider the use of voluntary consensus
standards.
M. National Environmental Policy Act
Section 102 of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., requires
Federal agencies to evaluate the impact
of any proposed major Federal action
significantly affecting the human
environment, consider alternatives to
the proposed action, provide public
notice and opportunity for comment,
and properly document its analysis. See
40 CFR parts 1501, 1502, 1506.6. DHS
and its component agencies analyze
proposed actions to determine whether
NEPA applies and, if so, what level of
analysis and documentation is required.
See 40 CFR 1501.3.
DHS Directive 023–01 Rev. 01
(Directive) and Instruction Manual 023–
01–001–01 Rev. 01 (Instruction Manual)
together establish the policies and
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procedures DHS and its component
agencies use to comply with NEPA and
the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) regulations for implementing the
procedural requirements of NEPA,
codified at 40 CFR parts 1500 through
1508.
The CEQ regulations allow Federal
agencies to establish in their NEPA
implementing procedures, with CEQ
review and concurrence, categories of
actions (‘‘categorical exclusions’’) that
experience has shown do not,
individually or cumulatively, have a
significant effect on the human
environment and, therefore, do not
require preparation of an Environmental
Assessment or Environmental Impact
Statement. 40 CFR 1507.3(e)(2)(ii),
1501.4. Appendix A of the Instruction
Manual lists the DHS categorical
exclusions. Under DHS NEPA
implementing procedures, for a
proposed action to be categorically
excluded it must satisfy each of the
following three conditions: (1) the entire
action clearly fits within one or more of
the categorical exclusions; (2) the action
is not a piece of a larger action; and (3)
no extraordinary circumstances exist
that create the potential for a significant
environmental effect. Instruction
Manual section V.B(2)(a)–(c).
This proposed rule implements the
authority in CIRCIA to develop and
codify requirements for covered entities
to report covered cyber incidents,
ransom payments, and substantial new
or different information from what was
previously reported regarding such
cyber incidents and ransom payments.
The proposed rules will be codified at
6 CFR 226.1 through 226.20.
DHS has determined that this
proposed rule will have no significant
effect on the human environment and
clearly fits within categorical exclusion
A3 in Appendix A of the Instruction
Manual established for promulgation of
rules of a strictly administrative or
procedural nature and that implement
statutory requirements without
substantive change.
This proposed rule is not part of a
larger action and presents no
extraordinary circumstances creating
the potential for significant
environmental effects. Therefore, this
proposed rule is categorically excluded
from further NEPA review.
VI. Proposed Regulation
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 226
Computer technology, Critical
infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Internet,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
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For the reasons stated in the preamble,
and under the authority of 6 U.S.C. 681
through 681e and 6 U.S.C. 681g, the
Department of Homeland Security
proposes to add chapter II, consisting of
part 226 to title 6 of the Code of
Regulations to read as follows:
■
CHAPTER II—DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, CYBERSECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
AGENCY
PART 226—COVERED CYBER
INCIDENT AND RANSOM PAYMENT
REPORTING
Sec.
226.1 Definitions.
226.2 Applicability.
226.3 Required reporting on covered cyber
incidents and ransom payments.
226.4 Exceptions to required reporting on
covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments.
226.5 CIRCIA Report submission deadlines.
226.6 Required manner and form of CIRCIA
Reports.
226.7 Required information for CIRCIA
Reports.
226.8 Required information for Covered
Cyber Incident Reports.
226.9 Required information for Ransom
Payment Reports.
226.10 Required information for Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom
Payment Reports.
226.11 Required information for
Supplemental Reports.
226.12 Third party reporting procedures
and requirements.
226.13 Data and records preservation
requirements.
226.14 Request for information and
subpoena procedures.
226.15 Civil enforcement of subpoenas.
226.16 Referral to the Department of
Homeland Security Suspension and
Debarment Official.
226.17 Referral to Cognizant Contracting
Official or Attorney General.
226.18 Treatment of information and
restrictions on use.
226.19 Procedures for protecting privacy
and civil liberties.
226.20 Other procedural measures.
Authority: 6 U.S.C. 681–681e, 6 U.S.C.
681g; Sections 2240–2244 and 2246 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–
296, 116 Stat. 2135, as amended by Pub. L.
117–103 and Pub. L. 117–263 (Dec. 23, 2022).
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§ 226.1
Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
CIRCIA means the Cyber Incident
Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act
of 2022, as amended, in 6 U.S.C. 681–
681g.
CIRCIA Agreement means an
agreement between CISA and another
Federal agency that meets the
requirements of § 226.4(a)(2), has not
expired or been terminated, and, when
publicly posted by CISA in accordance
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with § 226.4(a)(5), indicates the
availability of a substantially similar
reporting exception for use by a covered
entity.
CIRCIA Report means a Covered
Cyber Incident Report, Ransom Payment
Report, Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Report, or
Supplemental Report, as defined under
this part.
Cloud service provider means an
entity offering products or services
related to cloud computing, as defined
by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology in Nat’l Inst. of
Standards & Tech., NIST Special
Publication 800–145, and any
amendatory or superseding document
relating thereto.
Covered cyber incident means a
substantial cyber incident experienced
by a covered entity.
Covered Cyber Incident Report means
a submission made by a covered entity
or a third party on behalf of a covered
entity to report a covered cyber incident
as required by this part. A Covered
Cyber Incident Report also includes any
responses to optional questions and
additional information voluntarily
submitted as part of a Covered Cyber
Incident Report.
Covered entity means an entity that
meets the criteria set forth in § 226.2 of
this part.
Cyber incident means an occurrence
that actually jeopardizes, without lawful
authority, the integrity, confidentiality,
or availability of information on an
information system; or actually
jeopardizes, without lawful authority,
an information system.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency or CISA means the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency as established under
section 2202 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 652), as amended
by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency Act of 2018 and
subsequent laws, or any successor
organization.
Cybersecurity threat means an action,
not protected by the First Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States,
on or through an information system
that may result in an unauthorized effort
to adversely impact the security,
availability, confidentiality, or integrity
of an information system or information
that is stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system. This
term does not include any action that
solely involves a violation of a
consumer term of service or a consumer
licensing agreement.
Director means the Director of CISA,
any successors to that position within
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the Department of Homeland Security,
or any designee.
Information system means a discrete
set of information resources organized
for the collection, processing,
maintenance, use, sharing,
dissemination, or disposition of
information, including, but not limited
to, operational technology systems such
as industrial control systems,
supervisory control and data acquisition
systems, distributed control systems,
and programmable logic controllers.
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report means a
submission made by a covered entity or
a third party on behalf of a covered
entity to simultaneously report both a
covered cyber incident and ransom
payment related to the covered cyber
incident being reported, as required by
this part. A Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report
also includes any responses to optional
questions and additional information
voluntarily submitted as part of the
report.
Managed service provider means an
entity that delivers services, such as
network, application, infrastructure, or
security services, via ongoing and
regular support and active
administration on the premises of a
customer, in the data center of the
entity, such as hosting, or in a thirdparty data center.
Personal information means
information that identifies a specific
individual or nonpublic information
associated with an identified or
identifiable individual. Examples of
personal information include, but are
not limited to, photographs, names,
home addresses, direct telephone
numbers, social security numbers,
medical information, personal financial
information, contents of personal
communications, and personal web
browsing history.
Ransom payment means the
transmission of any money or other
property or asset, including virtual
currency, or any portion thereof, which
has at any time been delivered as
ransom in connection with a
ransomware attack.
Ransom Payment Report means a
submission made by a covered entity or
a third party on behalf of a covered
entity to report a ransom payment as
required by this part. A Ransom
Payment Report also includes any
responses to optional questions and
additional information voluntarily
submitted as part of a Ransom Payment
Report.
Ransomware attack means an
occurrence that actually or imminently
jeopardizes, without lawful authority,
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the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of information on an
information system, or that actually or
imminently jeopardizes, without lawful
authority, an information system that
involves, but need not be limited to, the
following:
(1) The use or the threat of use of:
(i) Unauthorized or malicious code on
an information system; or
(ii) Another digital mechanism such
as a denial-of-service attack;
(2) To interrupt or disrupt the
operations of an information system or
compromise the confidentiality,
availability, or integrity of electronic
data stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system; and
(3) To extort a ransom payment.
(4) Exclusion. A ransomware attack
does not include any event where the
demand for a ransom payment is:
(i) Not genuine; or
(ii) Made in good faith by an entity in
response to a specific request by the
owner or operator of the information
system.
State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial
Government entity or SLTT Government
entity means an organized domestic
entity which, in addition to having
governmental character, has sufficient
discretion in the management of its own
affairs to distinguish it as separate from
the administrative structure of any other
governmental unit, and which is one of
the following or a subdivision thereof:
(1) A State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa,
the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, and any possession of
the United States;
(2) A county, municipality, city, town,
township, local public authority, school
district, special district, intrastate
district, council of governments,
regardless of whether the council of
governments is incorporated as a
nonprofit corporation under State law,
regional or interstate government entity,
or agency or instrumentality of a Local
government;
(3) An Indian tribe, band, nation, or
other organized group or community, or
other organized group or community,
including any Alaska Native village or
regional or village corporation as
defined in or established pursuant to 43
U.S.C. 1601 et seq., which is recognized
as eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States
to Indians because of their status as
Indians; and
(4) A rural community,
unincorporated town or village, or other
public entity.
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Substantial cyber incident means a
cyber incident that leads to any of the
following:
(1) A substantial loss of
confidentiality, integrity or availability
of a covered entity’s information system
or network;
(2) A serious impact on the safety and
resiliency of a covered entity’s
operational systems and processes;
(3) A disruption of a covered entity’s
ability to engage in business or
industrial operations, or deliver goods
or services;
(4) Unauthorized access to a covered
entity’s information system or network,
or any nonpublic information contained
therein, that is facilitated through or
caused by a:
(i) Compromise of a cloud service
provider, managed service provider, or
other third-party data hosting provider;
or
(ii) Supply chain compromise.
(5) A ‘‘substantial cyber incident’’
resulting in the impacts listed in
paragraphs (1) through (3) in this
definition includes any cyber incident
regardless of cause, including, but not
limited to, any of the above incidents
caused by a compromise of a cloud
service provider, managed service
provider, or other third-party data
hosting provider; a supply chain
compromise; a denial-of-service attack;
a ransomware attack; or exploitation of
a zero-day vulnerability.
(6) The term ‘‘substantial cyber
incident’’ does not include:
(i) Any lawfully authorized activity of
a United States Government entity or
SLTT Government entity, including
activities undertaken pursuant to a
warrant or other judicial process;
(ii) Any event where the cyber
incident is perpetrated in good faith by
an entity in response to a specific
request by the owner or operator of the
information system; or
(iii) The threat of disruption as
extortion, as described in 6 U.S.C.
650(22).
Supplemental report means a
submission made by a covered entity or
a third party on behalf of a covered
entity to update or supplement a
previously submitted Covered Cyber
Incident Report or to report a ransom
payment made by the covered entity
after submitting a Covered Cyber
Incident Report as required by this part.
A supplemental report also includes any
responses to optional questions and
additional information voluntarily
submitted as part of a supplemental
report.
Supply chain compromise means a
cyber incident within the supply chain
of an information system that an
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adversary can leverage, or does leverage,
to jeopardize the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the
information system or the information
the system processes, stores, or
transmits, and can occur at any point
during the life cycle.
Virtual currency means the digital
representation of value that functions as
a medium of exchange, a unit of
account, or a store of value. Virtual
currency includes a form of value that
substitutes for currency or funds.
§ 226.2
Applicability.
This part applies to an entity in a
critical infrastructure sector that either:
(a) Exceeds the small business size
standard. Exceeds the small business
size standard specified by the applicable
North American Industry Classification
System Code in the U.S. Small Business
Administration’s Small Business Size
Regulations as set forth in 13 CFR part
121; or
(b) Meets a sector-based criterion.
Meets one or more of the sector-based
criteria provided below, regardless of
the specific critical infrastructure sector
of which the entity considers itself to be
part:
(1) Owns or operates a covered
chemical facility. The entity owns or
operates a covered chemical facility
subject to the Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards pursuant to 6 CFR
part 27;
(2) Provides wire or radio
communications service. The entity
provides communications services by
wire or radio communications, as
defined in 47 U.S.C. 153(40), 153(59), to
the public, businesses, or government,
as well as one-way services and twoway services, including but not limited
to:
(i) Radio and television broadcasters;
(ii) Cable television operators;
(iii) Satellite operators;
(iv) Telecommunications carriers;
(v) Submarine cable licensees
required to report outages to the Federal
Communications Commission under 47
CFR 4.15;
(vi) Fixed and mobile wireless service
providers;
(vii) Voice over internet Protocol
providers; or
(viii) internet service providers;
(3) Owns or operates critical
manufacturing sector infrastructure.
The entity owns or has business
operations that engage in one or more of
the following categories of
manufacturing:
(i) Primary metal manufacturing;
(ii) Machinery manufacturing;
(iii) Electrical equipment, appliance,
and component manufacturing; or
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(iv) Transportation equipment
manufacturing;
(4) Provides operationally critical
support to the Department of Defense or
processes, stores, or transmits covered
defense information. The entity is a
contractor or subcontractor required to
report cyber incidents to the Department
of Defense pursuant to the definitions
and requirements of the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement 48
CFR 252.204–7012;
(5) Performs an emergency service or
function. The entity provides one or
more of the following emergency
services or functions to a population
equal to or greater than 50,000
individuals:
(i) Law enforcement;
(ii) Fire and rescue services;
(iii) Emergency medical services;
(iv) Emergency management; or
(v) Public works that contribute to
public health and safety;
(6) Bulk electric and distribution
system entities. The entity is required to
report cybersecurity incidents under the
North American Electric Reliability
Corporation Critical Infrastructure
Protection Reliability Standards or
required to file an Electric Emergency
Incident and Disturbance Report OE–
417 form, or any successor form, to the
Department of Energy;
(7) Owns or operates financial
services sector infrastructure. The entity
owns or operates any legal entity that
qualifies as one or more of the following
financial services entities:
(i) A banking or other organization
regulated by:
(A) The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency under 12 CFR parts 30 and
53, which includes all national banks,
Federal savings associations, and
Federal branches and agencies of foreign
banks;
(B) The Federal Reserve Board under:
(1) 12 CFR parts 208, 211, 225, or 234,
which includes all U.S. bank holding
companies, savings and loans holding
companies, state member banks, the
U.S. operations of foreign banking
organizations, Edge and agreement
corporations, and certain designated
financial market utilities; or
(2) 12 U.S.C. 248(j), which includes
the Federal Reserve Banks;
(C) The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation under 12 CFR part 304,
which includes all insured state
nonmember banks, insured statelicensed branches of foreign banks, and
insured State savings associations;
(ii) A Federally insured credit union
regulated by the National Credit Union
Administration under 12 CFR part 748;
(iii) A designated contract market,
swap execution facility, derivatives
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clearing organization, or swap data
repository regulated by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission under 17
CFR parts 37, 38, 39, and 49;
(iv) A futures commission merchant
or swap dealer regulated by the
Commodity Futures Trading
Commission under 17 CFR parts 1 and
23;
(v) A systems compliance and
integrity entity, security-based swap
dealer, or security-based swap data
repository regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission under
Regulation Systems Compliance and
Integrity or Regulation Security-Based
Swap Regulatory Regime, 17 CFR part
242;
(vi) A money services business as
defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(ff); or
(vii) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as
defined in 12 CFR 1201.1;
(8) Qualifies as a State, local, Tribal,
or territorial government entity. The
entity is a State, local, Tribal, or
territorial government entity for a
jurisdiction with a population equal to
or greater than 50,000 individuals;
(9) Qualifies as an education facility.
The entity qualifies as any of the
following types of education facilities:
(i) A local educational agency,
educational service agency, or state
educational agency, as defined under 20
U.S.C. 7801, with a student population
equal to or greater than 1,000 students;
or
(ii) An institute of higher education
that receives funding under Title IV of
the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
1001 et seq., as amended;
(10) Involved with information and
communications technology to support
elections processes. The entity
manufactures, sells, or provides
managed services for information and
communications technology specifically
used to support election processes or
report and display results on behalf of
State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial
governments, including but not limited
to:
(i) Voter registration databases;
(ii) Voting systems; and
(iii) Information and communication
technologies used to report, display,
validate, or finalize election results;
(11) Provides essential public healthrelated services. The entity provides one
or more of the following essential public
health-related services:
(i) Owns or operates a hospital, as
defined by 42 U.S.C. 1395x(e), with 100
or more beds, or a critical access
hospital, as defined by 42 U.S.C.
1395x(mm)(1);
(ii) Manufactures drugs listed in
appendix A of the Essential Medicines
Supply Chain and Manufacturing
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Resilience Assessment developed
pursuant to section 3 of E.O. 14017; or
(iii) Manufactures a Class II or Class
III device as defined by 21 U.S.C. 360c;
(12) Information technology entities.
The entity meets one or more of the
following criteria:
(i) Knowingly provides or supports
information technology hardware,
software, systems, or services to the
Federal government;
(ii) Has developed and continues to
sell, license, or maintain any software
that has, or has direct software
dependencies upon, one or more
components with at least one of these
attributes:
(A) Is designed to run with elevated
privilege or manage privileges;
(B) Has direct or privileged access to
networking or computing resources;
(C) Is designed to control access to
data or operational technology;
(D) Performs a function critical to
trust; or
(E) Operates outside of normal trust
boundaries with privileged access;
(iii) Is an original equipment
manufacturer, vendor, or integrator of
operational technology hardware or
software components;
(iv) Performs functions related to
domain name operations;
(13) Owns or operates a commercial
nuclear power reactor or fuel cycle
Facility. The entity owns or operates a
commercial nuclear power reactor or
fuel cycle facility licensed to operate
under the regulations of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR chapter
I;
(14) Transportation system entities.
The entity is required by the
Transportation Security Administration
to report cyber incidents or otherwise
qualifies as one or more of the following
transportation system entities:
(i) A freight railroad carrier identified
in 49 CFR 1580.1(a)(1), (4), or (5);
(ii) A public transportation agency or
passenger railroad carrier identified in
49 CFR 1582.1(a)(1)–(4);
(iii) An over-the-road bus operator
identified in 49 CFR 1584.1;
(iv) A pipeline facility or system
owner or operator identified in 49 CFR
1586.101;
(v) An aircraft operator regulated
under 49 CFR part 1544;
(vi) An indirect air carrier regulated
under 49 CFR part 1548;
(vii) An airport operator regulated
under 49 CFR part 1542; or
(viii) A Certified Cargo Screening
Facility regulated under 49 CFR part
1549;
(15) Subject to regulation under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act.
The entity owns or operates a vessel,
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facility, or outer continental shelf
facility subject to 33 CFR parts 104, 105,
or 106; or
(16) Owns or operates a qualifying
community water system or publicly
owned treatment works. The entity
owns or operates a community water
system, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 300f(15),
or a publicly owned treatment works, as
defined in 40 CFR 403.3(q), for a
population greater than 3,300 people.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
§ 226.3 Required reporting on covered
cyber incidents and ransom payments.
(a) Covered cyber incident. A covered
entity that experiences a covered cyber
incident must report the covered cyber
incident to CISA in accordance with
this part.
(b) Ransom payment. A covered entity
that makes a ransom payment, or has
another entity make a ransom payment
on the covered entity’s behalf, as the
result of a ransomware attack against the
covered entity must report the ransom
payment to CISA in accordance with
this part. This reporting requirement
applies to a covered entity even if the
ransomware attack that resulted in a
ransom payment is not a covered cyber
incident subject to the reporting
requirements of this part. If a covered
entity makes a ransom payment that
relates to a covered cyber incident that
was previously reported in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section, the
covered entity must instead submit a
supplemental report in accordance with
paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section.
(c) Covered cyber incident and
ransom payment. A covered entity that
experiences a covered cyber incident
and makes a ransom payment, or has
another entity make a ransom payment
on the covered entity’s behalf, that is
related to that covered cyber incident
may report both events to CISA in a
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report in accordance
with this part. If a covered entity, or a
third party acting on the covered
entity’s behalf, submits a Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report in accordance with this part, the
covered entity is not required to also
submit reports pursuant to paragraph (a)
and (b) of this section.
(d) Supplemental Reports—(1)
Required Supplemental Reports. A
covered entity must promptly submit
Supplemental Reports to CISA about a
previously reported covered cyber
incident in accordance with this part
unless and until such date that the
covered entity notifies CISA that the
covered cyber incident at issue has
concluded and has been fully mitigated
and resolved. Supplemental Reports
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must be promptly submitted by the
covered entity if:
(i) Substantial new or different
information becomes available.
Substantial new or different information
includes but is not limited to any
information that the covered entity was
required to provide as part of a Covered
Cyber Incident Report but did not have
at the time of submission; or
(ii) The covered entity makes a
ransom payment, or has another entity
make a ransom payment on the covered
entity’s behalf, that relates to a covered
cyber incident that was previously
reported in accordance with paragraph
(a) of this section.
(2) Optional notification that a
covered cyber incident has concluded.
A covered entity may submit a
Supplemental Report to inform CISA
that a covered cyber incident previously
reported in accordance with paragraph
(a) of this section has concluded and
been fully mitigated and resolved.
§ 226.4 Exceptions to required reporting
on covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments.
(a) Substantially similar reporting
exception—(1) In general. A covered
entity that reports a covered cyber
incident, ransom payment, or
information that must be submitted to
CISA in a supplemental report to
another Federal agency pursuant to the
terms of a CIRCIA Agreement will
satisfy the covered entity’s reporting
obligations under § 226.3. A covered
entity is responsible for confirming that
a CIRCIA Agreement is applicable to the
covered entity and the specific reporting
obligation it seeks to satisfy under this
part, and therefore, qualifies for this
exemption.
(2) CIRCIA Agreement requirements.
A CIRCIA Agreement may be entered
into and maintained by CISA and
another Federal agency in
circumstances where CISA has
determined the following:
(i) A law, regulation, or contract exists
that requires one or more covered
entities to report covered cyber
incidents or ransom payments to the
other Federal agency;
(ii) The required information that a
covered entity must submit to the other
Federal agency pursuant to a legal,
regulatory, or contractual reporting
requirement is substantially similar
information to that which a covered
entity is required to include in a CIRCIA
Report as specified in §§ 226.7 through
226.11, as applicable;
(iii) The applicable law, regulation, or
contract requires covered entities to
report covered cyber incidents or
ransom payments to the other Federal
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agency within a substantially similar
timeframe to those for CIRCIA Reports
specified in § 226.5; and
(iv) CISA and the other Federal
agency have an information sharing
mechanism in place.
(3) Substantially similar information
determination. CISA retains discretion
to determine what constitutes
substantially similar information for the
purposes of this part. In general, in
making this determination, CISA will
consider whether the specific fields of
information reported by the covered
entity to another Federal agency are
functionally equivalent to the fields of
information required to be reported in
CIRCIA Reports under §§ 226.7 through
226.11, as applicable.
(4) Substantially similar timeframe.
Reporting in a substantially similar
timeframe means that a covered entity is
required to report covered cyber
incidents, ransom payments, or
supplemental reports to another Federal
agency in a timeframe that enables the
report to be shared by the Federal
agency with CISA by the applicable
reporting deadline specified for each
type of CIRCIA Report under § 226.5.
(5) Public posting of CIRCIA
Agreements. CISA will maintain an
accurate catalog of all CIRCIA
Agreements on a public-facing website
and will make CIRCIA Agreements
publicly available, to the maximum
extent practicable. An agreement will be
considered a CIRCIA Agreement for the
purposes of this section when CISA
publishes public notice concerning the
agreement on such website and until
notice of termination or expiration has
been posted as required under
§ 226.4(a)(6).
(6) Termination or expiration of a
CIRCIA Agreement. CISA may terminate
a CIRCIA Agreement at any time. CISA
will provide notice of the termination or
expiration of CIRCIA Agreements on the
public-facing website where the catalog
of CIRCIA Agreements is maintained.
(7) Continuing supplemental reporting
requirement. Covered entities remain
subject to the supplemental reporting
requirements specified under § 226.3(d),
unless the covered entity submits the
required information to another Federal
agency pursuant to the terms of a
CIRCIA Agreement.
(8) Communications with CISA.
Nothing in this section prevents or
otherwise restricts CISA from contacting
any entity that submits information to
another Federal agency, nor is any
entity prevented from communicating
with, or submitting a CIRCIA Report to,
CISA.
(b) Domain Name System exception.
The following entities, to the degree that
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they are considered a covered entity
under § 226.2, are exempt from the
reporting requirements in this part:
(1) The Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers;
(2) The American Registry for Internet
Numbers;
(3) Any affiliates controlled by the
covered entities listed in paragraphs
(b)(1) and (2) of this section; and
(4) The root server operator function
of a covered entity that has been
recognized by the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers as
responsible for operating one of the root
identities and has agreed to follow the
service expectations established by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers and its Root Server
System Advisory Committee.
(c) FISMA report exception. Federal
agencies that are required by the Federal
Information Security Modernization
Act, 44 U.S.C. 3551 et seq., to report
incidents to CISA are exempt from
reporting those incidents as covered
cyber incidents under this part.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
§ 226.5 CIRCIA Report submission
deadlines.
Covered entities must submit CIRCIA
Reports in accordance with the
submission deadlines specified in this
section.
(a) Covered Cyber Incident Report
deadline. A covered entity must submit
a Covered Cyber Incident Report to
CISA no later than 72 hours after the
covered entity reasonably believes the
covered cyber incident has occurred.
(b) Ransom Payment Report deadline.
A covered entity must submit a Ransom
Payment Report to CISA no later than 24
hours after the ransom payment has
been disbursed.
(c) Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report deadline. A
covered entity that experiences a
covered cyber incident and makes a
ransom payment within 72 hours after
the covered entity reasonably believes a
covered cyber incident has occurred
may submit a Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report to
CISA no later than 72 hours after the
covered entity reasonably believes the
covered cyber incident has occurred.
(d) Supplemental Report Deadline. A
covered entity must promptly submit
supplemental reports to CISA. If a
covered entity submits a supplemental
report on a ransom payment made after
the covered entity submitted a Covered
Cyber Incident Report, as required by
§ 226.3(d)(1)(ii), the covered entity must
submit the Supplemental Report to
CISA no later than 24 hours after the
ransom payment has been disbursed.
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§ 226.6 Required manner and form of
CIRCIA Reports.
A covered entity must submit CIRCIA
Reports to CISA through the web-based
CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form
available on CISA’s website or in any
other manner and form of reporting
approved by the Director.
§ 226.7 Required information for CIRCIA
Reports.
A covered entity must provide the
following information in all CIRCIA
Reports to the extent such information
is available and applicable to the event
reported:
(a) Identification of the type of
CIRCIA Report submitted by the covered
entity;
(b) Information relevant to
establishing the covered entity’s
identity, including the covered entity’s:
(1) Full legal name;
(2) State of incorporation or
formation;
(3) Affiliated trade names;
(4) Organizational entity type;
(5) Physical address;
(6) website;
(7) Internal incident tracking number
for the reported event;
(8) Applicable business numerical
identifiers;
(9) Name of the parent company or
organization, if applicable; and
(10) The critical infrastructure sector
or sectors in which the covered entity
considers itself to be included;
(c) Contact information, including the
full name, email address, telephone
number, and title for:
(1) The individual submitting the
CIRCIA Report on behalf of the covered
entity;
(2) A point of contact for the covered
entity if the covered entity uses a third
party to submit the CIRCIA Report or
would like to designate a preferred
point of contact that is different from
the individual submitting the report;
and
(3) A registered agent for the covered
entity, if neither the individual
submitting the CIRCIA Report, nor the
designated preferred point of contact are
a registered agent for the covered entity;
and
(d) If a covered entity uses a third
party to submit a CIRCIA Report on the
covered entity’s behalf, an attestation
that the third party is expressly
authorized by the covered entity to
submit the CIRCIA Report on the
covered entity’s behalf.
§ 226.8 Required information for Covered
Cyber Incident Reports.
A covered entity must provide all the
information identified in § 226.7 and the
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following information in a Covered
Cyber Incident Report, to the extent
such information is available and
applicable to the covered cyber
incident:
(a) A description of the covered cyber
incident, including but not limited to:
(1) Identification and description of
the function of the affected networks,
devices, and/or information systems
that were, or are reasonably believed to
have been, affected by the covered cyber
incident, including but not limited to:
(i) Technical details and physical
locations of such networks, devices,
and/or information systems; and
(ii) Whether any such information
system, network, and/or device supports
any elements of the intelligence
community or contains information that
has been determined by the United
States Government pursuant to an
Executive Order or statute to require
protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national
defense or foreign relations, or any
restricted data, as defined in 42 U.S.C.
2014(y);
(2) A description of any unauthorized
access, regardless of whether the
covered cyber incident involved an
attributed or unattributed cyber
intrusion, identification of any
informational impacts or information
compromise, and any network location
where activity was observed;
(3) Dates pertaining to the covered
cyber incident, including but not
limited to:
(i) The date the covered cyber
incident was detected;
(ii) The date the covered cyber
incident began;
(iii) If fully mitigated and resolved at
the time of reporting, the date the
covered cyber incident ended;
(iv) The timeline of compromised
system communications with other
systems; and
(v) For covered cyber incidents
involving unauthorized access, the
suspected duration of the unauthorized
access prior to detection and reporting;
and
(4) The impact of the covered cyber
incident on the covered entity’s
operations, such as information related
to the level of operational impact and
direct economic impacts to operations;
any specific or suspected physical or
informational impacts; and information
to enable CISA’s assessment of any
known impacts to national security or
public health and safety;
(b) The category or categories of any
information that was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, accessed or
acquired by an unauthorized person or
persons;
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(c) A description of any
vulnerabilities exploited, including but
not limited to the specific products or
technologies and versions of the
products or technologies in which the
vulnerabilities were found;
(d) A description of the covered
entity’s security defenses in place,
including but not limited to any
controls or measures that resulted in the
detection or mitigation of the incident;
(e) A description of the type of
incident and the tactics, techniques, and
procedures used to perpetrate the
covered cyber incident, including but
not limited to any tactics, techniques,
and procedures used to gain initial
access to the covered entity’s
information systems, escalate privileges,
or move laterally, if applicable;
(f) Any indicators of compromise,
including but not limited to those listed
in § 226.13(b)(1)(ii), observed in
connection with the covered cyber
incident;
(g) A description and, if possessed by
the covered entity, a copy or samples of
any malicious software the covered
entity believes is connected with the
covered cyber incident;
(h) Any identifying information,
including but not limited to all available
contact information, for each actor
reasonably believed by the covered
entity to be responsible for the covered
cyber incident;
(i) A description of any mitigation and
response activities taken by the covered
entity in response to the covered cyber
incident, including but not limited to:
(1) Identification of the current phase
of the covered entity’s incident response
efforts at the time of reporting;
(2) The covered entity’s assessment of
the effectiveness of response efforts in
mitigating and responding to the
covered cyber incident;
(3) Identification of any law
enforcement agency that is engaged in
responding to the covered cyber
incident, including but not limited to
information about any specific law
enforcement official or point of contact,
notifications received from law
enforcement, and any law enforcement
agency that the covered entity otherwise
believes may be involved in
investigating the covered cyber incident;
and
(4) Whether the covered entity
requested assistance from another entity
in responding to the covered cyber
incident and, if so, the identity of each
entity and a description of the type of
assistance requested or received from
each entity;
(j) Any other data or information as
required by the web-based CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form or any other
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manner and form of reporting
authorized under § 226.6.
§ 226.9 Required information for Ransom
Payment Reports.
A covered entity must provide all the
information identified in § 226.7 and the
following information in a Ransom
Payment Report, to the extent such
information is available and applicable
to the ransom payment:
(a) A description of the ransomware
attack, including but not limited to:
(1) Identification and description of
the function of the affected networks,
devices, and/or information systems
that were, or are reasonably believed to
have been, affected by the ransomware
attack, including but not limited to:
(i) Technical details and physical
locations of such networks, devices,
and/or information systems; and
(ii) Whether any such information
system, network, and/or device supports
any elements of the intelligence
community or contains information that
has been determined by the United
States Government pursuant to an
Executive Order or statute to require
protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national
defense or foreign relations, or any
restricted data, as defined in 42 U.S.C.
2014(y);
(2) A description of any unauthorized
access, regardless of whether the
ransomware attack involved an
attributed or unattributed cyber
intrusion, identification of any
informational impacts or information
compromise, and any network location
where activity was observed;
(3) Dates pertaining to the
ransomware attack, including but not
limited to:
(i) The date the ransomware attack
was detected;
(ii) The date the ransomware attack
began;
(iii) If fully mitigated and resolved at
the time of reporting, the date the
ransomware attack ended;
(iv) The timeline of compromised
system communications with other
systems; and
(v) For ransomware attacks involving
unauthorized access, the suspected
duration of the unauthorized access
prior to detection and reporting; and
(4) The impact of the ransomware
attack on the covered entity’s
operations, such as information related
to the level of operational impact and
direct economic impacts to operations;
any specific or suspected physical or
informational impacts; and any known
or suspected impacts to national
security or public health and safety;
(b) A description of any
vulnerabilities exploited, including but
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not limited to the specific products or
technologies and versions of the
products or technologies in which the
vulnerabilities were found;
(c) A description of the covered
entity’s security defenses in place,
including but not limited to any
controls or measures that resulted in the
detection or mitigation of the
ransomware attack;
(d) A description of the tactics,
techniques, and procedures used to
perpetrate the ransomware attack,
including but not limited to any tactics,
techniques, and procedures used to gain
initial access to the covered entity’s
information systems, escalate privileges,
or move laterally, if applicable;
(e) Any indicators of compromise the
covered entity believes are connected
with the ransomware attack, including,
but not limited to, those listed in section
226.13(b)(1)(ii), observed in connection
with the ransomware attack;
(f) A description and, if possessed by
the covered entity, a copy or sample of
any malicious software the covered
entity believes is connected with the
ransomware attack;
(g) Any identifying information,
including but not limited to all available
contact information, for each actor
reasonably believed by the covered
entity to be responsible for the
ransomware attack;
(h) The date of the ransom payment;
(i) The amount and type of assets used
in the ransom payment;
(j) The ransom payment demand,
including but not limited to the type
and amount of virtual currency,
currency, security, commodity, or other
form of payment requested;
(k) The ransom payment instructions,
including but not limited to information
regarding how to transmit the ransom
payment; the virtual currency or
physical address where the ransom
payment was requested to be sent; any
identifying information about the
ransom payment recipient; and
information related to the completed
payment, including any transaction
identifier or hash;
(l) Outcomes associated with making
the ransom payment, including but not
limited to whether any exfiltrated data
was returned or a decryption capability
was provided to the covered entity, and
if so, whether the decryption capability
was successfully used by the covered
entity;
(m) A description of any mitigation
and response activities taken by the
covered entity in response to the
ransomware attack, including but not
limited to:
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(1) Identification of the current phase
of the covered entity’s incident response
efforts at the time of reporting;
(2) The covered entity’s assessment of
the effectiveness of response efforts in
mitigating and responding to the
ransomware attack;
(3) Identification of any law
enforcement agency that is engaged in
responding to the ransomware attack,
including but not limited to information
about any specific law enforcement
official or point of contact, notifications
received from law enforcement, and any
law enforcement agency that the
covered entity otherwise believes may
be involved in investigating the
ransomware attack; and
(4) Whether the covered entity
requested assistance from another entity
in responding to the ransomware attack
or making the ransom payment and, if
so, the identity of such entity or entities
and a description of the type of
assistance received from each entity;
(n) Any other data or information as
required by the web-based CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form or any other
manner and form of reporting
authorized under § 226.6.
§ 226.10 Required information for Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom
Payment Reports.
A covered entity must provide all the
information identified in §§ 226.7,
226.8, and 226.9 in a Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report to the extent such information is
available and applicable to the reported
covered cyber incident and ransom
payment.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS2
§ 226.11 Required information for
Supplemental Reports.
(a) In general. A covered entity must
include all of the information identified
as required in § 226.7 and the following
information in any Supplemental
Report:
(1) The case identification number
provided by CISA for the associated
Covered Cyber Incident Report or Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom
Payment Report;
(2) The reason for filing the
Supplemental Report;
(3) Any substantial new or different
information available about the covered
cyber incident, including but not
limited to information the covered
entity was required to provide as part of
a Covered Cyber Incident Report but did
not have at the time of submission and
information required under § 226.9 if
the covered entity or another entity on
the covered entity’s behalf has made a
ransom payment after submitting a
Covered Cyber Incident Report; and
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(4) Any other data or information
required by the web-based CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form or any other
manner and form of reporting
authorized under § 226.6.
(b) Required information for a
Supplemental Report providing notice
of a ransom payment made following
submission of a Covered Cyber Incident
Report. When a covered entity submits
a Supplemental Report to notify CISA
that the covered entity has made a
ransom payment after submitting a
related Covered Cyber Incident Report,
the supplemental report must include
the information required in § 226.9.
(c) Optional information to provide
notification that a covered cyber
incident has concluded. Covered
entities that choose to submit a
notification to CISA that a covered cyber
incident has concluded and has been
fully mitigated and resolved may submit
optional information related to the
conclusion of the covered cyber
incident.
§ 226.12 Third party reporting procedures
and requirements.
(a) General. A covered entity may
expressly authorize a third party to
submit a CIRCIA Report on the covered
entity’s behalf to satisfy the covered
entity’s reporting obligations under
§ 226.3. The covered entity remains
responsible for ensuring compliance
with its reporting obligations under this
part even when the covered entity has
authorized a third party to submit a
CIRCIA Report on the covered entity’s
behalf.
(b) Procedures for third party
submission of CIRCIA Reports. CIRCIA
Reports submitted by third parties must
comply with the reporting requirements
and procedures for covered entities set
forth in this part.
(c) Confirmation of express
authorization required. For the purposes
of compliance with the covered entity’s
reporting obligations under this part,
upon submission of a CIRCIA Report, a
third party must confirm that the
covered entity expressly authorized the
third party to file the CIRCIA Report on
the covered entity’s behalf. CIRCIA
Reports submitted by a third party
without an attestation from the third
party that the third party has the express
authorization of a covered entity to
submit a report on the covered entity’s
behalf will not be considered by CISA
for the purposes of compliance of the
covered entity’s reporting obligations
under this part.
(d) Third party ransom payments and
responsibility to advise a covered entity.
A third party that makes a ransom
payment on behalf of a covered entity
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impacted by a ransomware attack is not
required to submit a Ransom Payment
Report on behalf of itself for the ransom
payment. When a third party knowingly
makes a ransom payment on behalf of a
covered entity, the third party must
advise the covered entity of its
obligations to submit a Ransom Payment
Report under this part.
§ 226.13 Data and records preservation
requirements.
(a) Applicability. (1) A covered entity
that is required to submit a CIRCIA
Report under § 226.3 or experiences a
covered cyber incident or makes a
ransom payment but is exempt from
submitting a CIRCIA Report pursuant to
§ 226.4(a) is required to preserve data
and records related to the covered cyber
incident or ransom payment in
accordance with this section.
(2) A covered entity maintains
responsibility for compliance with the
preservation requirements in this
section regardless of whether the
covered entity submitted a CIRCIA
Report or a third party submitted the
CIRCIA Report on the covered entity’s
behalf.
(b) Covered data and records. (1) A
covered entity must preserve the
following data and records:
(i) Communications with any threat
actor, including copies of actual
correspondence, including but not
limited to emails, texts, instant or direct
messages, voice recordings, or letters;
notes taken during any interactions; and
relevant information on the
communication facilities used, such as
email or Tor site;
(ii) Indicators of compromise,
including but not limited to suspicious
network traffic; suspicious files or
registry entries; suspicious emails;
unusual system logins; unauthorized
accounts created, including usernames,
passwords, and date/time stamps and
time zones for activity associated with
such accounts; and copies or samples of
any malicious software;
(iii) Relevant log entries, including
but not limited to, Domain Name
System, firewall, egress, packet capture
file, NetFlow, Security Information and
Event Management/Security
Information Management, database,
Intrusion Prevention System/Intrusion
Detection System, endpoint, Active
Directory, server, web, Virtual Private
Network, Remote Desktop Protocol, and
Window Event;
(iv) Relevant forensic artifacts,
including but not limited to live
memory captures; forensic images; and
preservation of hosts pertinent to the
incident;
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(v) Network data, including but not
limited to NetFlow or packet capture
file, and network information or traffic
related to the incident, including the
internet Protocol addresses associated
with the malicious cyber activity and
any known corresponding dates,
timestamps, and time zones;
(vi) Data and information that may
help identify how a threat actor
compromised or potentially
compromised an information system,
including but not limited to information
indicating or identifying how one or
more threat actors initially obtained
access to a network or information
system and the methods such actors
employed during the incident;
(vii) System information that may
help identify exploited vulnerabilities,
including but not limited to operating
systems, version numbers, patch levels,
and configuration settings;
(viii) Information about exfiltrated
data, including but not limited to file
names and extensions; the amount of
data exfiltration by byte value; category
of data exfiltrated, including but not
limited to, classified, proprietary,
financial, or personal information; and
evidence of exfiltration, including but
not limited to relevant logs and
screenshots of exfiltrated data sent from
the threat actor;
(ix) All data or records related to the
disbursement or payment of any ransom
payment, including but not limited to
pertinent records from financial
accounts associated with the ransom
payment; and
(x) Any forensic or other reports
concerning the incident, whether
internal or prepared for the covered
entity by a cybersecurity company or
other third-party vendor.
(2) A covered entity is not required to
create any data or records it does not
already have in its possession based on
this requirement.
(c) Required preservation period.
Covered entities must preserve all data
and records identified in paragraph (b)
of this section:
(1) Beginning on the earliest of the
following dates:
(i) The date upon which the covered
entity establishes a reasonable belief
that a covered cyber incident occurred;
or
(ii) The date upon which a ransom
payment was disbursed; and
(2) For no less than two years from the
submission of the most recently
required CIRCIA Report submitted
pursuant to § 226.3, or from the date
such submission would have been
required but for the exception pursuant
to § 226.4(a).
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(d) Original data or record format.
Covered entities must preserve data and
records set forth in paragraph (b) of this
section in their original format or form
whether the data or records are
generated automatically or manually,
internally or received from outside
sources by the covered entity, and
regardless of the following:
(1) Form or format, including hard
copy records and electronic records;
(2) Where the information is stored,
located, or maintained without regard to
the physical location of the information,
including stored in databases or cloud
storage, on network servers, computers,
other wireless devices, or by a thirdparty on behalf of the covered entity;
and
(3) Whether the information is in
active use or archived.
(e) Storage, protection, and allowable
use of data and records. (1) A covered
entity may select its own storage
methods, electronic or non-electronic,
and procedures to maintain the data and
records that must be preserved under
this section.
(2) Data and records must be readily
accessible, retrievable, and capable of
being lawfully shared by the covered
entity, including in response to a lawful
government request.
(3) A covered entity must use
reasonable safeguards to protect data
and records against unauthorized access
or disclosure, deterioration, deletion,
destruction, and alteration.
§ 226.14 Request for information and
subpoena procedures.
(a) In general. This section applies to
covered entities, except a covered entity
that qualifies as a State, Local, Tribal, or
Territorial Government entity as defined
in § 226.1.
(b) Use of authorities. When
determining whether to exercise the
authorities in this section, the Director
or designee will take into consideration:
(1) The complexity in determining if
a covered cyber incident has occurred;
and
(2) The covered entity’s prior
interaction with CISA or the covered
entity’s awareness of CISA’s policies
and procedures for reporting covered
cyber incidents and ransom payments.
(c) Request for information—(1)
Issuance of request. The Director may
issue a request for information to a
covered entity if there is reason to
believe that the entity experienced a
covered cyber incident or made a
ransom payment but failed to report the
incident or payment in accordance with
§ 226.3. Reason to believe that a covered
entity failed to submit a CIRCIA Report
in accordance with § 226.3 may be
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based upon public reporting or other
information in possession of the Federal
Government, which includes but is not
limited to analysis performed by CISA.
A request for information will be served
on a covered entity in accordance with
the procedures in paragraph (e) of this
section.
(2) Form and contents of the request.
At a minimum, a request for information
must include:
(i) The name and address of the
covered entity;
(ii) A summary of the facts that have
led CISA to believe that the covered
entity has failed to submit a required
CIRCIA Report in accordance with
§ 226.3. This summary is subject to the
nondisclosure provision in paragraph (f)
of this section;
(iii) A description of the information
requested from the covered entity. The
Director, in his or her discretion, may
decide the scope and nature of
information necessary for CISA to
confirm whether a covered cyber
incident or ransom payment occurred.
Requested information may include
electronically stored information,
documents, reports, verbal or written
responses, records, accounts, images,
data, data compilations, and tangible
items;
(iv) A date by which the covered
entity must reply to the request for
information; and
(v) The manner and format in which
the covered entity must provide all
information requested to CISA.
(3) Response to request for
information. A covered entity must
reply in the manner and format, and by
the deadline, specified by the Director.
If the covered entity does not respond
by the date specified in paragraph
(c)(2)(iv) of this section or the Director
determines that the covered entity’s
response is inadequate, the Director, in
his or her discretion, may request
additional information from the covered
entity to confirm whether a covered
cyber incident or ransom payment
occurred, or the Director may issue a
subpoena to compel information from
the covered entity pursuant to
paragraph (d) of this section.
(4) Treatment of information received.
Information provided to CISA by a
covered entity in a reply to a request for
information under this section will be
treated in accordance with §§ 226.18
and 226.19.
(5) Unavailability of Appeal. A
request for information is not a final
agency action within the meaning of 5
U.S.C. 704 and cannot be appealed.
(d) Subpoena—(1) Issuance of
subpoena. The Director may issue a
subpoena to compel disclosure of
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information from a covered entity if the
entity fails to reply by the date specified
in paragraph (c)(2)(iv) of this section or
provides an inadequate response, to a
request for information. The authority to
issue a subpoena is a nondelegable
authority. A subpoena will be served on
a covered entity in accordance with the
procedures in paragraph (e) of this
section.
(2) Timing of subpoena. A subpoena
to compel disclosure of information
from a covered entity may be issued no
earlier than 72 hours after the date of
service of the request for information.
(3) Form and contents of subpoena.
At a minimum, a subpoena must
include:
(i) The name and address of the
covered entity;
(ii) An explanation of the basis for
issuance of the subpoena and a copy of
the request for information previously
issued to the covered entity, subject to
the nondisclosure provision in
paragraph (f) of this section;
(iii) A description of the information
that the covered entity is required to
produce. The Director, in his or her
discretion, may determine the scope and
nature of information necessary to
determine whether a covered cyber
incident or ransom payment occurred,
obtain the information required to be
reported under § 226.3, and to assess the
potential impacts to national security,
economic security, or public health and
safety. Subpoenaed information may
include electronically stored
information, documents, reports, verbal
or written responses, records, accounts,
images, data, data compilations, and
tangible items;
(iv) A date by which the covered
entity must reply; and
(v) The manner and format in which
the covered entity must provide all
information requested to CISA.
(4) Reply to the Subpoena. A covered
entity must reply in the manner and
format, and by the deadline, specified
by the Director. If the Director
determines that the information
received from the covered entity is
inadequate to determine whether a
covered cyber incident or ransom
payment occurred, does not satisfy the
reporting requirements under § 226.3, or
is inadequate to assess the potential
impacts to national security, economic
security, or public health and safety, the
Director may request or subpoena
additional information from the covered
entity or request civil enforcement of a
subpoena pursuant to § 226.15.
(5) Authentication requirement for
electronic subpoenas. Subpoenas issued
electronically must be authenticated
with a cryptographic digital signature of
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an authorized representative of CISA or
with a comparable successor technology
that demonstrates the subpoena was
issued by CISA and has not been altered
or modified since issuance. Electronic
subpoenas that are not authenticated
pursuant to this subparagraph are
invalid.
(6) Treatment of information received
in response to a subpoena—(i) In
general. Information obtained by
subpoena is not subject to the
information treatment requirements and
restrictions imposed within § 226.18
and privacy and procedures for
protecting privacy and civil liberties in
§ 226.19; and
(ii) Provision of certain information
for criminal prosecution and regulatory
enforcement proceedings. The Director
may provide information submitted in
response to a subpoena to the Attorney
General or the head of a Federal
regulatory agency if the Director
determines that the facts relating to the
cyber incident or ransom payment may
constitute grounds for criminal
prosecution or regulatory enforcement
action. The Director may consult with
the Attorney General or the head of the
appropriate Federal regulatory agency
when making any such determination.
Information provided by CISA under
this paragraph (d)(6)(ii) may be used by
the Attorney General or the head of a
Federal regulatory agency for criminal
prosecution or a regulatory enforcement
action. Any decision by the Director to
exercise this authority does not
constitute final agency action within the
meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704 and cannot be
appealed.
(7) Withdrawal and appeals of
subpoena issuance—(i) In general.
CISA, in its discretion, may withdraw a
subpoena that is issued to a covered
entity. Notice of withdrawal of a
subpoena will be served on a covered
entity in accordance with the
procedures in paragraph (e) of this
section.
(ii) Appeals of subpoena issuance. A
covered entity may appeal the issuance
of a subpoena through a written request
that the Director withdraw it. A covered
entity, or a representative on behalf of
the covered entity, must file a Notice of
Appeal within seven (7) calendar days
after service of the subpoena. All
Notices of Appeal must include:
(A) The name of the covered entity;
(B) The date of subpoena issuance;
(C) A clear request that the Director
withdraw the subpoena;
(D) The covered entity’s rationale for
requesting a withdrawal of the
subpoena; and
(E) Any additional information that
the covered entity would like the
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Director to consider as part of the
covered entity’s appeal.
(iii) Director’s final decision.
Following receipt of a Notice of Appeal,
the Director will issue a final decision
and serve it upon the covered entity. A
final decision made by the Director
constitutes final agency action. If the
Director’s final decision is to withdraw
the subpoena, a notice of withdrawal of
a subpoena will be served on the
covered entity in accordance with the
procedures in § 226.14(e).
(e) Service—(1) covered entity point of
contact. A request for information,
subpoena, or notice of withdrawal of a
subpoena may be served by delivery on
an officer, managing or general agent, or
any other agent authorized by
appointment or law to receive service of
process on behalf of the covered entity.
(2) Method of service. Service of a
request for information, subpoena, or
notice of withdrawal of a subpoena will
be served on a covered entity through a
reasonable electronic or non-electronic
attempt that demonstrates receipt, such
as certified mail with return receipt,
express commercial courier delivery, or
electronically.
(3) Date of service. The date of service
of any request for information,
subpoena, or notice of withdrawal of a
subpoena shall be the date on which the
document is mailed, electronically
transmitted, or delivered in person,
whichever is applicable.
(f) Nondisclosure of certain
information. In connection with the
procedures in this section, CISA will
not disclose classified information as
defined in Section 1.1(d) of E.O. 12968
and reserves the right to not disclose
any other information or material that is
protected from disclosure under law or
policy.
§ 226.15
Civil enforcement of subpoenas.
(a) In general. If a covered entity fails
to comply with a subpoena issued
pursuant to § 226.14(d), the Director
may refer the matter to the Attorney
General to bring a civil action to enforce
the subpoena in any United States
District Court for the judicial district in
which the covered entity resides, is
found, or does business.
(b) Contempt. A United States District
Court may order compliance with the
subpoena and punish failure to obey a
subpoena as a contempt of court.
(c) Classified and protected
information. In any review of an action
taken under § 226.14, if the action was
based on classified or protected
information as described in § 226.14(f),
such information may be submitted to
the reviewing court ex parte and in
camera. This paragraph does not confer
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or imply any right to review in any
tribunal, judicial or otherwise.
§ 226.16 Referral to the Department of
Homeland Security Suspension and
Debarment Official.
The Director must refer all
circumstances concerning a covered
entity’s noncompliance that may
warrant suspension and debarment
action to the Department of Homeland
Security Suspension and Debarment
Official.
§ 226.17 Referral to Cognizant Contracting
Official or Attorney General.
The Director may refer information
concerning a covered entity’s
noncompliance with the reporting
requirements in this part that pertain to
performance under a federal
procurement contract to the cognizant
contracting official or the Attorney
General for civil or criminal
enforcement.
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§ 226.18 Treatment of information and
restrictions on use.
(a) In general. The protections and
restrictions on use enumerated in this
section apply to CIRCIA Reports and
information included in such reports
where specified in this section, as well
as to all responses provided to requests
for information issued under
§ 226.14(c). This section does not apply
to information and reports submitted in
response to a subpoena issued under
§ 226.14(d) or following Federal
government action under §§ 226.15–
226.17.
(b) Treatment of information—(1)
Designation as commercial, financial,
and proprietary information. A covered
entity must clearly designate with
appropriate markings at the time of
submission a CIRCIA Report, a response
provided to a request for information
issued under § 226.14(c), or any portion
of a CIRCIA Report or a response
provided to a request for information
issued under § 226.14(c) that it
considers to be commercial, financial,
and proprietary information. CIRCIA
Reports, responses provided to a request
for information issued under
§ 226.14(c), or designated portions
thereof, will be treated as commercial,
financial, and proprietary information of
the covered entity upon designation as
such by a covered entity.
(2) Exemption from disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act. CIRCIA
Reports submitted pursuant to this part
and responses provided to requests for
information issued under § 226.14(c) are
exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(3), and under any State, Local, or
Tribal government freedom of
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information law, open government law,
open meetings law, open records law,
sunshine law, or similar law requiring
disclosure of information or records. If
CISA receives a request under the
Freedom of Information Act to which a
CIRCIA Report, response to a request for
information under § 226.14(c), or
information contained therein is
responsive, CISA will apply all
applicable exemptions from disclosure,
consistent with 6 CFR part 5.
(3) No Waiver of Privilege. A covered
entity does not waive any applicable
privilege or protection provided by law,
including trade secret protection, as a
consequence of submitting a CIRCIA
Report under this part or a response to
a request for information issued under
§ 226.14(c).
(4) Ex parte communications waiver.
CIRCIA Reports submitted pursuant to
this part and responses provided to
requests for information issued under
§ 226.14(c) are not subject to the rules or
procedures of any Federal agency or
department or any judicial doctrine
regarding ex parte communications with
a decision-making official.
(c) Restrictions on use—(1)
Prohibition on use in regulatory actions.
Federal, State, Local, and Tribal
Government entities are prohibited from
using information obtained solely
through a CIRCIA Report submitted
under this part or a response to a
request for information issued under
§ 226.14(c) to regulate, including
through an enforcement proceeding, the
activities of the covered entity or the
entity that made a ransom payment on
the covered entity’s behalf, except:
(i) If the Federal, State, Local, or
Tribal Government entity expressly
allows the entity to meet its regulatory
reporting obligations through
submission of reports to CISA; or
(ii) Consistent with Federal or State
regulatory authority specifically relating
to the prevention and mitigation of
cybersecurity threats to information
systems, a CIRCIA Report or response to
a request for information issued under
§ 226.14(c) may inform the development
or implementation of regulations
relating to such systems.
(2) Liability protection—(i) No cause
of action. No cause of action shall lie or
be maintained in any court by any
person or entity for the submission of a
CIRCIA Report or a response to a request
for information issued under § 226.14(c)
and must be promptly dismissed by the
court. This liability protection only
applies to or affects litigation that is
solely based on the submission of a
CIRCIA Report or a response provided
to a request for information issued
under § 226.14(c).
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(ii) Evidentiary and discovery bar for
reports. CIRCIA Reports submitted
under this part, responses provided to
requests for information issued under
§ 226.14(c), or any communication,
document, material, or other record,
created for the sole purpose of
preparing, drafting, or submitting
CIRCIA Reports or responses to requests
for information issued under
§ 226.14(c), may not be received in
evidence, subject to discovery, or
otherwise used in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in or before any court,
regulatory body, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision thereof. This bar does not
create a defense to discovery or
otherwise affect the discovery of any
communication, document, material, or
other record not created for the sole
purpose of preparing, drafting, or
submitting a CIRCIA Report under this
part or a response to a request for
information issued under § 226.14(c).
(iii) Exception. The liability
protection provided in paragraph
(c)(2)(i) of this section does not apply to
an action taken by the Federal
government pursuant to § 226.15.
(3) Limitations on authorized uses.
Information provided to CISA in a
CIRCIA Report or in a response to a
request for information issued under
§ 226.14(c) may be disclosed to, retained
by, and used by any Federal agency or
department, component, officer,
employee, or agent of the Federal
Government, consistent with otherwise
applicable provisions of Federal law,
solely for the following purposes:
(i) A cybersecurity purpose;
(ii) The purpose of identifying a
cybersecurity threat, including the
source of the cybersecurity threat, or a
security vulnerability;
(iii) The purpose of responding to, or
otherwise preventing or mitigating, a
specific threat of:
(A) Death;
(B) Serious bodily harm; or
(C) Serious economic harm;
(iv) The purpose of responding to,
investigating, prosecuting, or otherwise
preventing or mitigating a serious threat
to a minor, including sexual
exploitation and threats to physical
safety; or
(v) The purpose of preventing,
investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting
an offense:
(A) Arising out of events required to
be reported in accordance with § 226.3;
(B) Described in 18 U.S.C. 1028
through 1030 relating to fraud and
identity theft;
(C) Described in 18 U.S.C. chapter 37
relating to espionage and censorship; or
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(D) Described in 18 U.S.C. 90 relating
to protection of trade secrets.
§ 226.19 Procedures for protecting privacy
and civil liberties.
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(a) In general. The use of personal
information received in CIRCIA Reports
and in responses provided to requests
for information issued under § 226.14(c)
is subject to the procedures described in
this section for protecting privacy and
civil liberties. CISA will ensure that
privacy controls and safeguards are in
place at the point of receipt, retention,
use, and dissemination of a CIRCIA
Report. The requirements in this section
do not apply to personal information
submitted in response to a subpoena
issued under § 226.14(d) or following
Federal government action under
§§ 226.15 through 226.17.
(b) Instructions for submitting
personal information. A covered entity
should only include the personal
information requested by CISA in the
web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting
Form or in the request for information
and should exclude unnecessary
personal information from CIRCIA
Reports and responses to requests for
information issued under § 226.14(c).
(c) Assessment of personal
information. CISA will review each
CIRCIA Report and response to request
for information issued under § 226.14(c)
to determine if the report contains
personal information other than the
information requested by CISA and
whether the personal information is
directly related to a cybersecurity threat.
Personal information directly related to
a cybersecurity threat includes personal
information that is necessary to detect,
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prevent, or mitigate a cybersecurity
threat.
(1) If CISA determines the personal
information is not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat, nor necessary for
contacting a covered entity or report
submitter, CISA will delete the personal
information from the CIRCIA Report or
response to request for information.
covered entity or report submitter
contact information, including
information of third parties submitting
on behalf of an entity, will be
safeguarded when retained and
anonymized prior to sharing the report
outside of the federal government unless
CISA receives the consent of the
individual for sharing personal
information and the personal
information can be shared without
revealing the identity of the covered
entity.
(2) If the personal information is
determined to be directly related to a
cybersecurity threat, CISA will retain
the personal information and may share
it consistent with § 226.18 of this part
and the guidance described in
paragraph (d) of this section.
(d) Privacy and civil liberties
guidance. CISA will develop and make
publicly available guidance relating to
privacy and civil liberties to address the
retention, use, and dissemination of
personal information contained in
Covered Cyber Incident Reports and
Ransom Payment Reports by CISA. The
guidance shall be consistent with the
need to protect personal information
from unauthorized use or disclosure,
and to mitigate cybersecurity threats.
(1) One year after the publication of
the guidance, CISA will review the
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effectiveness of the guidance to ensure
that it appropriately governs the
retention, use, and dissemination of
personal information pursuant to this
part and will perform subsequent
reviews periodically.
(2) The Chief Privacy Officer of CISA
will complete an initial review of
CISA’s compliance with the privacy and
civil liberties guidance approximately
one year after the effective date of this
part and subsequent periodic reviews
not less frequently than every three
years.
§ 226.20
Other procedural measures.
(a) Penalty for false statements and
representations. Any person that
knowingly and willfully makes a
materially false or fraudulent statement
or representation in connection with, or
within, a CIRCIA Report, response to a
request for information, or response to
an administrative subpoena is subject to
the penalties under 18 U.S.C. 1001.
(b) Severability. CISA intends the
various provisions of this part to be
severable from each other to the extent
practicable, such that if a court of
competent jurisdiction were to vacate or
enjoin any one provision, the other
provisions are intended to remain in
effect unless they are dependent upon
the vacated or enjoined provision.
Jennie M. Easterly,
Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, Department of Homeland
Security.
[FR Doc. 2024–06526 Filed 3–27–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–G1–P
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Agencies
- DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 66 (Thursday, April 4, 2024)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23644-23776]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-06526]
[[Page 23643]]
Vol. 89
Thursday,
No. 66
April 4, 2024
Part II
Department of Homeland Security
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Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
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6 CFR Part 226
Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA)
Reporting Requirements; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 66 / Thursday, April 4, 2024 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 23644]]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
6 CFR Part 226
[Docket No. CISA-2022-0010]
RIN 1670-AA04
Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA)
Reporting Requirements
AGENCY: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, DHS
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act
of 2022 (CIRCIA), as amended, requires the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to promulgate regulations
implementing the statute's covered cyber incident and ransom payment
reporting requirements for covered entities. CISA seeks comment on the
proposed rule to implement CIRCIA's requirements and on several
practical and policy issues related to the implementation of these new
reporting requirements.
DATES: Comments and related material must be submitted on or before
June 3, 2024.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments, identified by docket number CISA-
2022-0010, through the Federal eRulemaking Portal available at https://www.regulations.gov.
Instructions: All comments received must include the docket number
for this rulemaking. All comments received will be posted to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided. If
you cannot submit your comment using https://www.regulations.gov,
contact the person in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this proposed rule for alternate instructions. For detailed
instructions on sending comments and additional information on the
types of comments that are of particular interest to CISA for this
proposed rulemaking, see the ``Public Participation'' heading of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
Docket: For access to the docket and to read background documents
mentioned in this proposed rule and comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Todd Klessman, CIRCIA Rulemaking Team
Lead, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,
[email protected], 202-964-6869.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Public Participation
II. Executive Summary
A. Purpose and Summary of the Regulatory Action
B. Summary of Costs and Benefits
III. Background and Purpose
A. Legal Authority
B. Current Cyber Incident Reporting Landscape
C. Purpose of Regulation
i. Purposes of the CIRCIA Regulation
ii. How the Regulatory Purpose of CIRCIA Influenced the Design
of the Proposed CIRCIA Regulation
D. Harmonization Efforts
E. Information Sharing Required by CIRCIA
F. Summary of Stakeholder Comments
i. General Comments
ii. Comments on the Definition of Covered Entity
iii. Comments on the Definition of Covered Cyber Incident and
Substantial Cyber Incident
iv. Comments on Other Definitions
v. Comments on Criteria for Determining Whether the Domain Name
System Exception Applies
vi. Comments on Manner and Form of Reporting, Content of
Reports, and Reporting Procedures
vii. Comments on the Deadlines for Submission of CIRCIA Reports
viii. Comments on Third-Party Submitters
ix. Comments on Data and Records Preservation Requirements
x. Comments on Other Existing Cyber Incident Reporting
Requirements and the Substantially Similar Reporting Exception
xi. Comments on Noncompliance and Enforcement
xii. Comments on Treatment and Restrictions on Use of CIRCIA
Reports
IV. Discussion of Proposed Rule
A. Definitions
i. Covered Entity
ii. Cyber Incident, Covered Cyber Incident, and Substantial
Cyber Incident
iii. CIRCIA Reports
iv. Other Definitions
v. Request for Comments on Proposed Definitions
B. Applicability
i. Interpreting the CIRCIA Statutory Definition of Covered
Entity
ii. Determining if an Entity Is in a Critical Infrastructure
Sector
iii. Clear Description of the Types of Entities That Constitute
Covered Entities Based on Statutory Factors
iv. Explanation of Specific Proposed Applicability Criteria
v. Other Approaches Considered To Describe Covered Entity
vi. Request for Comments on Applicability Section
C. Required Reporting on Covered Cyber Incidents and Ransom
Payments
i. Overview of Reporting Requirements
ii. Reporting of Single Incidents Impacting Multiple Covered
Entities
D. Exceptions to Required Reporting on Covered Cyber Incidents
and Ransom Payments
i. Substantially Similar Reporting Exception
ii. Domain Name System (DNS) Exception
iii. Exception for Federal Agencies Subject to Federal
Information Security Modernization Act Reporting Requirements
E. Manner, Form, and Content of Reports
i. Manner of Reporting
ii. Form for Reporting
iii. Content of Reports
iv. Timing of Submission of CIRCIA Reports
v. Report Submission Procedures
vi. Request for Comments on Proposed Manner, Form, and Content
of Reports
F. Data and Records Preservation Requirements
i. Types of Data That Must Be Preserved
ii. Required Preservation Period
iii. Data Preservation Procedural Requirements
iv. Request for Comments on Proposed Data Preservation
Requirements
G. Enforcement
i. Overview
ii. Request for Information
iii. Subpoena
iv. Service of an RFI, Subpoena, or Notice of Withdrawal
v. Enforcement of Subpoenas
vi. Acquisition, Suspension, and Debarment Enforcement
Procedures
vii. Penalty for False Statements and Representations
viii. Request for Comments on Proposed Enforcement
H. Protections
i. Treatment of Information and Restrictions on Use
ii. Protection of Privacy and Civil Liberties
iii. Digital Security
iv. Request for Comments on Proposed Protections
I. Severability
V. Statutory and Regulatory Analyses
A. Regulatory Planning and Review
i. Number of Reports
ii. Industry Cost
iii. Government Cost
iv. Combined Costs
v. Benefits
vi. Accounting Statement
vii. Alternatives
B. Small Entities
C. Assistance for Small Entities
D. Collection of Information
E. Federalism
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
G. Taking of Private Property
H. Civil Justice Reform
I. Protection of Children
J. Indian Tribal Governments
K. Energy Effects
L. Technical Standards
M. National Environmental Policy Act
VI. Proposed Regulation
List of Tables
Table 1: Affected Population, by Criteria
Table 2: Number of CIRCIA Reports, Primary Estimate
Table 3: Number of CIRCIA Reports
Table 4: Familiarization Cost by Entity Type, Primary Estimate
Table 5: Total Familiarization Costs ($ Millions, Undiscounted)
[[Page 23645]]
Table 6: Cost of CIRCIA Reporting
Table 7: Data and Record Preservation Costs
Table 8: Industry Cost Range, ($ Millions, Undiscounted)
Table 9: Total Industry Cost, Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 10: Cost by Covered Entity Criteria, ($ Millions,
Undiscounted)
Table 11: Government Cost ($ Millions)
Table 12: Combined Industry and Government Cost, Primary Estimate ($
Millions)
Table 13: Combined Industry and Government Cost Range, ($ Millions)
Table 14: Summary of Cyber Event Losses and Counts, IRIS 2022
Table 15: OMB A-4 Accounting Statement ($ Millions, 2022 Dollars)
Table 16: Alternative 1 Industry Cost, Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 17: Alternative 1 Combined Industry and Government Cost,
Primary Estimate, ($ Millions)
Table 18: Alternative 2 Industry Cost, Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 19: Alternative 2 Combined Industry and Government Cost,
Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 20: Alternative 3 Industry Cost, Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 21: Alternative 3 Combined Industry and Government Cost,
Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 22: Affected Population by Critical Infrastructure Sector
Table 23: Alternative 4 Industry Cost, Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 24: Alternative 4 Combined Industry and Government Costs,
Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Table 25: Alternatives Summary, Combined Industry and Government
Cost, Primary Estimate ($ Millions)
Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
ARIN American Registry for Internet Numbers
ATO Authority to Operate
BES Bulk Electric System
CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission
CHS U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIRC Cyber Incident Reporting Council
CIRCIA Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of
2022, as amended
CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CSP Cloud Service Provider
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DNS Domain Name System
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESA Educational Service Agency
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FHFA Federal Housing Finance Agency
FICU Federally Insured Credit Union
FISMA Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FRB Federal Reserve Board
GAO Government Accountability Office
GCC Government Coordinating Council
GSA General Services Administration
gTLD Generic Top-Level Domain
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
HITECH Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health
HSGAC U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IHE Institute of Higher Education
IP Internet Protocol
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
IT Information Technology
K-12 Kindergarten through 12th Grade
LEA Local Educational Agency
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act
NAICS North American Industry Classification System
NCF National Critical Function
NCUA National Credit Union Administration
NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NORS Network Outage Reporting System
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSA National Security Agency
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OT Operational Technology
OTRB Over-the-Road Bus
POTW Publicly Owned Treatment Works
PPD Presidential Policy Directive
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
PTPR Public Transportation and Passenger Railroads
RFI Request for Information
RIR Regional Internet Registry
RTR Research and Test Reactor
RSO Root Server Operator
SBA Small Business Administration
SCC Sector Coordinating Council
SEA State Educational Agency
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SLTT State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial
SRMA Sector Risk Management Agency
SSP Sector-Specific Plan
TLD Top-Level Domain
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USCG United States Coast Guard
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
I. Public Participation
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) views
public participation as essential to effective rulemaking and invites
interested persons to participate by submitting data, comments, and
other information on the content and assumptions made in this proposed
rule. Your comments can help shape the outcome of this rulemaking. CISA
is particularly interested in comments on the following:
a. Proposed Definitions. The proposed definition of covered cyber
incident and the other definitions CISA is proposing to include in the
regulation (see proposed Sec. 226.1 and Section IV.A in this
document);
b. Applicability. The proposed description of covered entity, the
scope of entities to whom this regulation applies (see proposed Sec.
226.2 and Section IV.B in this document);
c. Examples of Reportable Covered Cyber Incidents. The examples of
substantial cyber incidents included in this Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) (see Section IV.A.ii.3.e in this document);
d. CIRCIA Reporting Requirements and Procedures. The proposed
reporting requirements and procedures for CIRCIA Reports, specifically
the manner, form, and content of CIRCIA Reports (see proposed
Sec. Sec. 226.6 through 226.12 and Section IV.E.i-iii in this
document), including CISA's proposal to use a single, dynamic, web-
based form as the primary means of submission for all CIRCIA Reports
(see Section IV.E.i.2 in this document);
e. Proposed CIRCIA Report Submission Deadlines. The proposed
deadlines for submitting CIRCIA Reports and CISA's proposed
interpretations of these submission deadline requirements (see proposed
Sec. 226.5 and Section IV.E.iv in this document);
f. Data and Records Preservation Requirements. The proposed data
and records preservation requirements and preservation period (see
proposed Sec. 226.13 and Section IV.F in this document);
g. Enforcement Procedures. The proposed enforcement procedures,
including the procedures related to
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issuance of a Request for Information (RFI) or subpoena and the
proposed subpoena withdrawal and appeals process (see proposed
Sec. Sec. 226.14 through 226.17 and Section IV.G in this document);
h. Treatment of Information and Restrictions on Use. The proposed
rules governing the protections and restrictions on the use of CIRCIA
Reports, information included in such reports, and responses to RFIs
(see proposed Sec. 226.18 and Section IV.H.i in this document); and
i. Procedures for Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties. The
proposed procedures governing the protection of personal information
contained in CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs (see proposed Sec.
226.19 and Section IV.H.ii in this document), which are further
described in the draft Privacy and Civil Liberties Guidance for CIRCIA
(this draft document is available in the docket for this proposed
regulatory action (CISA-2022-0010)).
CISA is including in the docket a draft privacy and civil liberties
guidance document that would apply to CISA's retention, use, and
dissemination of personal information contained in a CIRCIA Report and
guide other Federal departments and agencies with which CISA will share
CIRCIA Reports. CISA encourages interested readers to review this draft
guidance and to submit comments on it. Commenters should clearly
identify which specific comment(s) concern the draft guidance document.
CISA will accept comments no later than the date provided in the
DATES section of this document. Interested parties may submit data,
comments, and other information using any of the methods described in
the ADDRESSES section of this document. To ensure appropriate
consideration of your comment, indicate the specific section of this
proposed rule and, if applicable, the specific comment request number
associated with the topic to which each comment applies; explain a
reason for any suggestion or recommendation; and include data,
information, or authority that supports the recommended course of
action. Comments submitted in a manner other than those described
above, including emails or letters sent to Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) or CISA officials, will not be considered comments on
the proposed rule and may not receive a response from CISA.
Instructions to Submit Comments. If you submit a comment, you must
submit it to the docket associated with CISA Docket Number CISA-2022-
0010. All submissions may be posted, without change, to the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at www.regulations.gov and will include any personal
information that you provide. You may choose to submit your comment
anonymously. Additionally, you may upload or include attachments with
your comments. Do not upload any material in your comments that you
consider confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure. Do not
submit comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or
financial information, Protected Critical Infrastructure Information,
Sensitive Security Information, or any other protected information to
the public regulatory docket. Please submit comments containing
protected information separately from other comments by contacting the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document for instructions on how to submit comments that include
protected information. CISA will not place comments containing
protected information in the public docket and will handle them in
accordance with applicable safeguards and restrictions on access. CISA
will hold such comments in a separate file to which the public does not
have access and place a note in the public docket documenting receipt.
If CISA receives a request for a copy of any comments submitted
containing protected information, CISA will process such a request
consistent with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552,
and the Department's FOIA regulation found in part 5 of title 6 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
To submit a comment, go to www.regulations.gov, type CISA-2022-0010
in the search box and click ``Search.'' Next, look for this Federal
Register notice of proposed rulemaking in the Search Results column,
and click on it. Then click on the Comment option. If you cannot submit
your comment by using https://www.regulations.gov, call or email the
point of contact in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document for alternate instructions.
Viewing material in docket. For access to the docket and to view
documents mentioned in this NPRM as being available in the docket, go
to https://www.regulations.gov, search for the docket number provided
in the previous paragraph, and then select ``Supporting & Related
Material'' in the Document Type column. Public comments will also be
placed in the docket and can be viewed by following instructions on the
Frequently Asked Questions web page https://www.regulations.gov/faq.
The Frequently Asked Questions page also explains how to subscribe for
email alerts that will notify you when comments are posted or if
another Federal Register document is published. CISA will review all
comments received. CISA may choose to withhold information provided in
comments from public viewing or to not post comments that CISA
determines are off-topic or inappropriate.
Public meeting. CISA does not plan to hold additional public
meetings at this time, but may consider doing so if CISA determines
from public comments that a meeting would be helpful. If CISA decides
to hold a public meeting, a notice announcing the date, time, and
location for the meeting will be issued in a separate Federal Register
notice.
II. Executive Summary
A. Purpose and Summary of the Regulatory Action
On March 15, 2022, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) was signed into law. See 6 U.S.C.
681-681g; Public Law 117-103, as amended by Public Law 117-263 (Dec.
23, 2022). CIRCIA requires covered entities to report to CISA within
certain prescribed timeframes any covered cyber incidents, ransom
payments made in response to a ransomware attack, and any substantial
new or different information discovered related to a previously
submitted report. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)-(3). CIRCIA further requires the
Director of CISA to implement these new reporting requirements through
rulemaking, by issuing an NPRM no later than March 15, 2024, and a
final rule within 18 months of publication of the NPRM. 6 U.S.C.
681b(b). CISA is issuing this NPRM to solicit public comment on
proposed regulations that would codify these reporting requirements.
This NPRM is divided into six sections. Section I--Public
Participation describes the process for members of the public to submit
comments on the proposed regulations and lists specific topics on which
CISA is particularly interested in receiving public comment. Section
II--Executive Summary contains a summary of the proposed regulatory
action and the anticipated costs and benefits of the proposed
regulations. Section III--Background and Purpose contains a summary of
the legal authority for this proposed regulatory action; an overview of
the current regulatory cyber incident reporting landscape; a
description of the purpose of the proposed regulations; a discussion of
efforts CISA has taken to
[[Page 23647]]
harmonize these proposed regulations with other Federal cyber incident
reporting regulations; a discussion of information sharing activities
related to the proposed regulations; and a summary of the comments CISA
received in response to an RFI issued by CISA on approaches to the
proposed regulations and during listening sessions hosted by CISA on
the same topic. Section IV--Discussion of Proposed Rule includes a
detailed discussion of the proposed rule, the justification for CISA's
specific proposals, and the alternatives considered by CISA. Section
V--Statutory and Regulatory Analyses contains the analyses that CISA is
required by statute or Executive Order to perform as part of the
rulemaking process prior to issuance of the final rule, such as the
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act analysis. Section VI contains the proposed regulatory text.
The proposed rule is comprised of 20 sections, Sec. Sec. 226.1
through 226.20, beginning with a section containing definitions for a
number of key terms used throughout the proposed regulation. Among
other definitions, Sec. 226.1 includes proposed definitions for the
terms used to describe and ultimately scope what types of incidents
must be reported to CISA (i.e., cyber incident, covered cyber incident,
ransom payment, and substantial cyber incident) and the term used to
describe the different types of reports that must be submitted (i.e.,
CIRCIA Reports).
The next section of the proposed rule, Sec. 226.2, describes the
applicability of the proposed rule to certain entities in a critical
infrastructure sector, i.e., those entities that are considered covered
entities and to whom the operative provisions of the rule would apply.
The next section of the proposed rule, Sec. 226.3, describes the
circumstances under which a covered entity must submit a CIRCIA Report
to CISA. This includes when a covered entity experiences a covered
cyber incident, makes a ransom payment, has another entity make a
ransom payment on its behalf, or acquires substantial new or different
information after submitting a previous CIRCIA Report. See Sec. 226.3;
Section IV.C in this document. CISA is proposing three exceptions to
these reporting requirements for covered entities, which are in Sec.
226.4 of the proposed regulation and described in Section IV.D in this
document. These exceptions include when a covered entity reports
substantially similar information in a substantially similar timeframe
to another Federal agency pursuant to an existing law, regulation, or
contract when a CIRCIA Agreement is in place between CISA and the other
Federal agency; when an incident impacts certain covered entities
related to the Domain Name System (DNS); and when Federal agencies are
required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
(FISMA) to report incidents to CISA. See Sec. 226.4 of the proposed
regulation and Section IV.D of this document.
Section 226.5 of the proposed regulation contains the submission
deadlines for the four different types of CIRCIA Reports (i.e., Covered
Cyber Incident Reports; Ransom Payment Reports; Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Reports; Supplemental Reports). These
deadlines, including how to calculate them, are discussed further in
Section IV.E.iv in this document. Section 226.6 of the proposed
regulation sets forth the proposed manner and form of reporting, which
CISA proposes to be through a web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form
available on CISA's website or in any other manner and form of
reporting approved by the Director. Additional details on the proposed
manner and form of reporting and related submission procedures are
contained in Sections IV.E.i, ii and v in this document. The
information CISA proposes that covered entities must include in each of
the four types of CIRCIA Reports is enumerated in Sec. Sec. 226.7
through 226.11 and expanded upon in Section IV.E.iii in this document.
A covered entity may use a third party to submit a CIRCIA Report to
CISA on the covered entity's behalf to satisfy the covered entity's
reporting obligations. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(d). The proposed procedures
and requirements for using a third party to submit a CIRCIA Report on
behalf of the covered entity are contained in Sec. 226.12 of the
proposed regulations and discussed in detail in Section IV.E.v.3 in
this document. The proposed regulation also affirms the statutorily
mandated obligation for a third party to advise the covered entity of
its ransom payment reporting obligations under CIRCIA when the third
party knowingly makes a ransom payment on behalf of a covered entity.
See 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(4), Sec. 226.12(d) of the proposed regulations,
and Section IV.E.v.3.e of the NPRM.
Section 226.13 of the proposed regulation sets forth the proposed
data and records preservation requirements. It includes a recitation of
the types of data and records that a covered entity must preserve; the
required preservation period; the format or form in which the data and
records must be preserved; and the storage, protection, and allowable
uses of the preserved data and records. See Sec. 226.13 and Section
IV.F in this document.
CIRCIA authorizes CISA to use various mechanisms to obtain
information from a covered entity about a covered cyber incident or
ransom payment that was not reported in accordance with CISA's proposed
regulatory reporting requirements. 6 U.S.C. 681d. These mechanisms
include the issuance of an RFI; the issuance of a subpoena; a referral
to the Attorney General to bring a civil action in District Court to
enforce a subpoena; and acquisition, suspension, and debarment
enforcement procedures. The proposed procedures for each of these
enforcement mechanisms are contained in Sec. Sec. 226.14 through
226.17 of the proposed regulation and discussed in Section IV.G.i-vi in
this document.
CIRCIA provides a variety of requirements related to the treatment
and restrictions on the use of CIRCIA Reports, information contained in
such reports, as well as information submitted in response to an RFI.
See 6 U.S.C. 681e(b), 681e(a)(1), (5). CIRCIA also provides liability
protection for the submission of a CIRCIA Report in compliance with the
reporting requirements established in the CIRCIA regulation. 6 U.S.C.
681e(c). To ensure that such requirements related to the treatment and
restrictions on the use of CIRCIA Reports are applied consistently,
CISA proposes to include them in Sec. 226.18, as discussed in Section
IV.H.i in this document. CISA additionally proposes steps to minimize
the collection of unnecessary personal information in CIRCIA Reports
and additional procedures for protecting privacy and civil liberties
related to the submission of CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs.
These proposed procedures for protecting privacy and civil liberties
are contained in Sec. 226.19 of the proposed regulation and discussed
further in Section IV.H.ii in this document as well as in the guidance
document posted to the docket for this proposed rule.
The final section of the proposed regulation, Sec. 226.20,
proposes two distinct procedural provisions. The first proposed
provision provides that any person who knowingly and willfully makes a
materially false or fraudulent statement or representation in
connection with, or within, a CIRCIA Report, RFI response, or reply to
an administrative subpoena is subject to penalties under 18 U.S.C.
1001. Sec. 226.20(a). The second proposed provision is a severability
clause, which
[[Page 23648]]
states CISA intends the various provisions of this part to be severable
from each other to the extent practicable, such that if a court of
competent jurisdiction were to vacate or enjoin any one provision, the
other provisions remain in effect unless they are dependent upon the
vacated or enjoined provision. Sec. 226.20(b). These are discussed in
Sections IV.G.vii and IV.I in this document, respectively.
B. Summary of Costs and Benefits
CISA estimates the cost of this proposed rule would be $2.6 billion
over the period of analysis \1\ (undiscounted). CISA estimates that
there will be 316,244 entities potentially affected by the proposed
rule (i.e., covered entities) who collectively will submit an estimated
total of 210,525 CIRCIA Reports over the period of analysis, resulting
in $1.4 billion (undiscounted) in cost to industry and $1.2 billion
(undiscounted) in cost to the Federal Government. The cost over the
period of analysis discounted at 2% would be $2.4 billion ($1.3 billion
for industry, $1.1 billion for government), with an annualized cost of
$244.6 million, as presented in the Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) included in the docket. The main industry cost drivers
of this proposed rule are the initial costs associated with becoming
familiar with the proposed rule, followed by the recurring data and
records preservation requirements, and then reporting requirements.
Other industry costs include those associated with help desk calls and
enforcement actions. Government costs include costs CISA anticipates
incurring associated with the creation, implementation, and operation
of the government infrastructure needed to run the CIRCIA program. This
includes both personnel and technology costs necessary to support the
receipt, analysis, and sharing of information from CIRCIA Reports
submitted to CISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CISA used an 11-year period of analysis spanning from 2023-
2033 to reflect that CISA began incurring costs related to CIRCIA
implementation in 2023, one year prior to the publication of the
NPRM. See the Executive Summary section of the CIRCIA Regulation
Proposed Rulemaking Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for additional detail on the
period of analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Preliminary RIA also discusses the qualitative benefits of the
proposed rule. From a qualitative benefits perspective, the proposed
reporting requirements, analytical activities, and information sharing
will lead to Federal and non-Federal stakeholders having the ability to
adopt an enhanced overall level of cybersecurity and resiliency,
resulting in direct, tangible benefits to the nation. For example:
By supporting CISA's ability to share information that
will enable non-Federal and Federal partners to detect and counter
sophisticated cyber campaigns earlier with the potential for
significant avoided or minimized negative impacts to critical
infrastructure or national security, CIRCIA's mandatory reporting
requirements reduce the risks associated with those campaigns.
By facilitating the identification and sharing of
information on exploited vulnerabilities and measures that can be taken
to address those vulnerabilities, incident reporting enables entities
with unremediated and unmitigated vulnerabilities on their systems to
take steps to remedy or mitigate those vulnerabilities before they also
fall victim to cyberattack.
By supporting sharing of information about common threat
actor tactics, techniques, and procedures with the IT community, cyber
incident reporting will enable software developers and vendors to
develop more secure products or send out updates to add security to
existing products, better protecting end users.
By enabling rapid identification of ongoing incidents and
increased understanding of successful mitigation measures, incident
reporting increases the ability of impacted entities and the Federal
government to respond to ongoing campaigns faster and mitigate or
minimize the consequences that could result from them.
Law enforcement entities can use the information submitted
in reports to investigate, identify, capture, and prosecute
perpetrators of cybercrime, getting malicious cyber actors off the
street and deterring future actors.
By contributing to a more accurate and comprehensive
understanding of the cyber threat environment, incident reporting
allows for CISA's Federal and non-Federal stakeholders to more
efficiently and effectively allocate resources to prevent, deter,
defend against, respond to, and mitigate significant cyber incidents.
These benefits, which stem from CISA receiving cyber incident and
ransom payment reporting for aggregation, analysis, and information
sharing, directly contribute to a reduction in economic, health,
safety, and security consequences associated with cyber incidents by
reducing the number of cyber incidents successfully perpetrated and
mitigating the consequences of those cyber incidents that are
successful by catching them earlier. It is worth noting that these
benefits are not limited to covered entities required to report under
CIRCIA, but also inure to entities not subject to CIRCIA's reporting
requirements as they too will receive the downstream benefits of
enhanced information sharing, more secure technology products, and an
ability to better defend their networks based on sector-specific and
cross-sector understandings of the threat landscape.
CISA also anticipates qualitative benefits stemming from the data
and record preservation requirements of this proposed rule. The
preservation of data and records in the aftermath of a covered cyber
incident serves a number of critical purposes, such as supporting the
ability of analysts and investigators to understand how a cyber
incident was perpetrated and by whom.
III. Background and Purpose
A. Legal Authority
On March 15, 2022, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) was signed into law. See 6 U.S.C.
681-681g; Public Law 117-103, as amended by Public Law 117-263 (Dec.
23, 2022). CIRCIA requires covered entities to report to CISA covered
cyber incidents within 72 hours after the covered entity reasonably
believes that the covered cyber incident has occurred and ransom
payments made in response to a ransomware attack within 24 hours after
the ransom payment has been made. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a). Among other
benefits, this new authority will enhance CISA's ability to identify
trends and track cyber threat activity across the cyber threat
landscape beyond the Federal agencies that are already required to
report information on certain cyber incidents to CISA pursuant to the
FISMA, 44 U.S.C. 3554(b)(7)(C)(ii) and 6 U.S.C. 652(c)(3). CIRCIA
requires the Director of CISA to implement these new reporting
requirements through rulemaking, by issuing a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking no later than March 15, 2024, and a final rule within 18
months of the NPRM's publication. 6 U.S.C. 681b(b).
CIRCIA also authorizes CISA to request information and engage in
administrative enforcement actions to compel a covered entity to
disclose information if it has failed to comply with its reporting
obligations. 6 U.S.C. 681d. CIRCIA establishes information treatment
requirements and restrictions on use, including certain protections
against liability and exemptions from public disclosure, for required
reports and information submitted to CISA. 6 U.S.C. 681e, 681d(b)(2),
681c(c). CIRCIA also provides for Federal interagency
[[Page 23649]]
coordination and sharing of information on cyber incidents, including
ransomware attacks, reported to Federal departments and agencies, and
covered cyber incidents and ransom payments reported to CISA. 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(10), (b), 681g.
Although CIRCIA requires CISA to implement new reporting
requirements through regulation, CISA's rulemaking authority under
CIRCIA does not supersede, abrogate, modify, or otherwise limit any
authority to regulate or act with respect to the cybersecurity of an
entity vested in any United States Government officer or agency. 6
U.S.C. 681b(h). Therefore, covered entities that are obligated to
report covered cyber incidents or ransom payments pursuant to another
Federal regulatory requirement, directive, or similar mandate will
remain obligated to do so even if the reporting requirements differ
from those established by CIRCIA. Where CIRCIA imposes regulatory
requirements that may overlap or duplicate other Federal regulatory
requirements, CISA is committed to working with other Federal partners
to explore options to minimize unnecessary duplication between CIRCIA's
reporting requirements and other Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements and welcomes public comment regarding options to minimize
unnecessary duplication or identification of specific Federal cyber
incident reporting requirements where such duplication is likely to
occur. Additionally, CIRCIA does not permit or require a provider of a
remote computing service or electronic communication service to the
public to disclose information not otherwise permitted or required to
be disclosed under 18 U.S.C. 2701-2713 (commonly known as the ``Stored
Communications Act''). 6 U.S.C. 681e(e).
CIRCIA also provides that entities may voluntarily report cyber
incidents or ransom payments to CISA that are not required to be
reported under the CIRCIA regulations, and applies the same information
treatment requirements on use (including liability protections) and
restrictions on use to such voluntarily submitted reports. 6 U.S.C.
681c(a), (c); 681e. CISA is not, however, proposing to address entirely
voluntary reporting (e.g., how such reports may be submitted) in this
rulemaking.
B. Current Cyber Incident Reporting Landscape
The cyber incident reporting landscape currently consists of dozens
of Federal and state, local, tribal, or territorial (SLTT) cyber
incident reporting requirements that may apply to entities operating
within the United States, depending on where an entity or its customers
are located and the type of business in which the entity is engaged. At
the Federal level alone, more than three dozen different cyber incident
reporting requirements currently are in effect, with a number of
additional proposed regulatory reporting requirements in various stages
of development. At the SLTT level, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and all 50 states have laws that
require reporting and/or public disclosure of at least some cyber
incidents that result in data breaches.
Despite these myriad Federal and SLTT reporting requirements, prior
to the enactment of CIRCIA, there was no Federal statute or regulation
supporting a comprehensive and coordinated approach to understanding
cyber incidents across critical infrastructure sectors. Nor was there a
Federal department or agency charged with coordinating cross-sector
sharing of information related to cyber incidents with Federal and non-
Federal stakeholders. Indeed, during the lead up to the passage of
CIRCIA, Congress stated ``[t]oday no one U.S. Government agency has
visibility into all cyber-attacks occurring against U.S. critical
infrastructure on a daily basis. This bill would change that--enabling
a coordinated, informed U.S. response to the foreign governments and
criminal organizations conducting these attacks against the U.S.'' \2\
The enactment of CIRCIA authorized CISA to fill these key gaps in the
current cyber incident reporting landscape.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs (HSGAC), Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act at 1 (Dec. 17, 2021), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Overview%20of%20Cyber%20Incident%20Reporting%20Legislation.pdf
(hereinafter, ``HSGAC Fact Sheet'').
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There are a number of different reasons why a government entity may
establish cyber incident reporting requirements. A recent DHS report to
Congress based on the work of the Cyber Incident Reporting Council
(CIRC) \3\ titled Harmonization of Cyber Incident Reporting to the
Federal Government suggests that these reasons generally can be
organized into two primary categories.\4\ The first category consists
of regulations primarily focused on national security, economic
security, public health and safety, and/or the resiliency of National
Critical Functions (NCFs). A majority of Federal reporting regimes
appear to be solely or primarily animated by these concerns. The
remaining Federal cyber incident reporting regimes, as well as
virtually all SLTT cyber incident reporting regimes, are designed
primarily to address privacy, consumer protection, or investor
protection considerations. This second category includes all the
reporting regimes often referred to as data breach notification laws.
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\3\ CIRCIA established an intergovernmental Cyber Incident
Reporting Council. Chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the CIRC is responsible for coordinating, deconflicting, and
harmonizing Federal incident reporting requirements, including those
issued through regulations. 6 U.S.C. 681f.
\4\ Department of Homeland Security, Harmonization of Cyber
Incident Reporting to the Federal Government at 5 (Sept. 19, 2023),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/harmonization-cyber-incident-reporting-federal-government (hereinafter, ``the DHS
Report'').
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Outside of state data breach notification laws, most existing cyber
incident reporting requirements target specific communities with common
characteristics. Some focus on entities within a specific industry or
sector (e.g., commercial nuclear power reactors; financial services
institutions) while others cover entities across sectors that possess
certain shared characteristics (e.g., entities possessing threshold
quantities of certain chemicals of interest that render those entities
high-risk of being targeted by terrorists; entities located upon
navigable bodies of water where they present the risk of a
transportation security incident; entities that maintain personal
health-related records).
Central aspects of cyber incident reporting regimes, such as what
constitutes a reportable incident, the process for reporting an
incident, which entity receives the report, what information must be
reported, and how long an entity has to report the incident, can vary
widely from regime to regime, with the purpose of the regime frequently
impacting these variables. For instance, reporting regimes focused on
national or economic security tend to have shorter deadlines for
reporting than those regimes focused on privacy or consumer
protections. Similarly, reporting regimes focused on national or
economic security almost universally require reporting to a Federal
department or agency, while regimes with a primary purpose of privacy
or consumer protections often require reporting to the impacted
individual and sometimes credit reporting agencies, instead of, or in
addition to, reporting to the governing Federal or SLTT entity.
Given the number and variety of different cyber incident reporting
regimes, and their continued evolution,
[[Page 23650]]
CISA does not intend to describe each one of them as part of this
section. Instead, CISA is providing the following brief summaries of
some of the major regulatory programs that require reporting of cyber
incidents and that are concerned at least in part with national
security, economic security, public safety, and/or the resiliency of
NCFs: \5\
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\5\ Individuals interested in learning more about existing
Federal cyber incident reporting requirements are encouraged to
review the Federal Cyber Incident Reporting Requirements Inventory
contained in Appendix B of the DHS Report, supra note 4.
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Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). CISA's
CFATS program worked for the prior 16 years to identify and regulate
high-risk chemical facilities to ensure security measures are in place
to reduce the risk of certain chemicals of interest from being
weaponized by terrorists. See 6 CFR part 27. Under CFATS Risk-Based
Performance Standard 15, CFATS-covered facilities were expected to
establish protocols governing the identification and reporting of
significant cyber incidents to the appropriate facility personnel,
local law enforcement, and/or CISA. On July 28, 2023, the statutory
authority for the CFATS program expired, but CISA anticipates that
CFATS will be reauthorized prior to the publication of the CIRCIA Final
Rule.
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).
Pursuant to 32 CFR 236.1-236.7 and 48 CFR 252.204-7012, Department of
Defense (DOD) contractors must report to DOD all cyber incidents (1)
involving covered defense information on their covered contractor
information systems or (2) affecting the contractor's ability to
provide operationally critical support. Contractors subject to these
requirements, who are members of the Defense Industrial Base sector,
must report cyber incidents to DOD at https://dibnet.dod.mil.
Department of Energy (DOE) DOE-417 reporting requirements.
DOE's Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response
requires certain Energy Sector entities to report certain cybersecurity
incidents to DOE pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 772(b). Entities subject to the
reporting requirements include Balancing Authorities, Reliability
Coordinators, some Generating Entities, and Electric Utilities,
including those located in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or
other U.S. possessions.
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Network Outage
Reporting System (NORS) Requirements. Under 47 CFR part 4, providers of
telecommunications services and Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP)
providers are required to report to the FCC communications service
outages, including those caused by cyber incidents, that meet certain
minimum requirements for duration and magnitude. The goal of this
regulation, which applies to wireline, wireless, VoIP, cable,
satellite, Signaling System 7, submarine cable, covered 911 service,
and covered 988 service providers, is to provide rapid, complete, and
accurate information on service disruptions that could affect homeland
security, public health or safety, and the economic well-being of the
Nation and help ensure the public's access to emergency services.
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014.
FISMA requires Federal civilian departments and agencies to report
cybersecurity incidents to CISA within one hour of discovery.\6\ CISA
uses information received in FISMA incident reports to, among other
things, provide technical assistance to victims of cyber incidents,
compile and analyze incident information to identify cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, and share guidance with others on how to detect,
handle, and prevent similar incidents.\7\ Federal agencies are also
required to report major incidents under FISMA and pursuant to OMB
Guidance, including those that implicate personal information.\8\
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\6\ 44 U.S.C. 3554(b)(7)(C)(ii).
\7\ 44 U.S.C. 3556(a).
\8\ 44 U.S.C. 3554(b)(7)(C)(iii).
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Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
(FedRAMP). FedRAMP requires any cloud service providers (CSPs) with a
Federal agency-issued Authority to Operate (ATO) or a FedRAMP-issued
provisional ATO to report suspected and confirmed information security
incidents to the FedRAMP Program Management Office within the General
Services Administration (GSA), CISA, and the affected agency.\9\
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\9\ See FedRAMP, GSA, https://www.gsa.gov/technology/government-it-initiatives/fedramp (last visited Nov. 27, 2023).
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Financial Services Sector Regulations. Most of the primary
Financial Services Sector regulators have adopted cyber incident
reporting requirements for their regulated communities. Among other
things, these reporting requirements have been established to help
promote early awareness of emerging threats to banking organizations
and the broader financial system, and to help the regulating entities
react to these threats before they can cause systemic impacts across
the financial system. Included among these are cyber incident reporting
requirements managed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) (12 CFR part 53), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) (12 CFR part
225), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (12 CFR part
304), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (see, e.g., 17
CFR 38.1051 (designated contract markets); 17 CFR 37.1401 (swap
execution facilities); 17 CFR 39.18 (derivatives clearing
organizations); 17 CFR 49.24 (swap data repositories); 17 CFR 23.603
(swap dealers)), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) (12
CFR part 748), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (see, e.g.,
17 CFR parts 229, 232, 239, 240, 242, and 249), and the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) (Advisory Bulletin 2020-05).
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). Under MTSA
(33 CFR parts 104, 105, or 106) entities that own vessels or
facilities, including outer continental shelf facilities, subject to
MTSA must report cyber incidents to the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG)
National Response Center. These cyber incident reporting requirements
are part of a larger suite of security requirements for vessels and
facilities to identify, assess, and prevent transportation security
incidents (TSIs) in the marine transportation system. USCG is also in
the process of updating its maritime security regulations by adding
cybersecurity requirements to existing Maritime Security
regulations.\10\
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\10\ See Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs Unified Agenda, available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202304&RIN=1625-AC77.
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North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard CIP-008-6: Cyber
Security--Incident Reporting and Response Planning. Certain electric
grid entities, designated as ``responsible entities,'' are required to
report cyber incidents to both CISA and the Electricity Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), a component of NERC. See 18 CFR
part 40 and CIP-008-6. The goal of these reporting requirements, which
were developed pursuant to the authority granted NERC in Section 215 of
the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. Ch 12, as amended through Pub. L. 115-
325) to develop mandatory and enforceable reliability standards subject
to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) review and approval, is
to mitigate the risk to the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric
[[Page 23651]]
System (BES) as the result of a cybersecurity incident.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Cyber Security Event
Notification Regulation. Owners and operators of commercial nuclear
power reactors are required to report cyber incidents impacting safety,
security, or emergency preparedness functions to the NRC.\11\
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\11\ 10 CFR 73.77.
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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Medical Device
Regulations. Under section 519 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 U.S.C. 360i), as implemented by the Medical Device Reporting
Regulations (21 CFR part 803) and the Medical Device Reports of
Corrections and Removals Regulations (21 CFR part 806), manufacturers
and importers must report certain device-related adverse events and
product problems, including those caused by cyber incidents, to the
FDA. For example, medical device manufacturers are required to report
to the FDA when they learn that any of their devices may have caused or
contributed to a death or serious injury. Manufacturers must also
report to the FDA when they become aware that their device has
malfunctioned and would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or
serious injury if the malfunction were to recur. Medical device
manufacturers and importers also must report to FDA any correction or
removal of a medical device initiated to reduce a risk to health posed
by the device or to remedy a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, including those caused by cyber incidents, caused by the
device that may present a risk to health. A report must be made even if
the event was caused by user error.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security
Directives and Security Program Amendments. TSA has issued several
Security Directives and Security Program Amendments requiring various
Transportation Systems Sector entities to report cybersecurity
incidents to CISA.\12\ These include, among other provisions, reporting
requirements for certain passenger railroad carrier and rail transit
systems, hazardous and natural gas pipeline owners and operators,
freight railroad carriers, airport operators, aircraft operators,
indirect air carriers, and Certified Cargo Screening Facilities. TSA is
also in the process of codifying the requirements for surface
transportation through a rulemaking (TSA's regulations provide for
changes to aircraft operator security programs through an amendment
process).\13\
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\12\ See, e.g., TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 series,
Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity; TSA Security Directive 1580-21-01
series, Enhancing Rail Cybersecurity, available at https://www.tsa.gov/sd-and-ea.
\13\ See Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs Unified Agenda, available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202304&RIN=1652-AA74.
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C. Purpose of Regulation
While the legislative history and statutory text shed some light on
the goals that Congress hoped to achieve through this regulation,
Congress did not include an explicit statement of purpose in CIRCIA.
CISA believes considering the specific intended purpose behind a cyber
incident reporting regulation during the development of the regulations
is important as the purpose likely impacts key aspects of the
regulation, such as what entities are required to report, what types of
incidents must be reported, how quickly incidents must be reported,
what information must be included in incident reports, and to whom the
reports must be provided.
Many stakeholders echoed this belief in remarks made during CIRCIA
listening sessions or through comments provided in response to the
CIRCIA RFI, which encouraged CISA to articulate the goals of the
regulation to help inform the best regulatory proposal.\14\ This
section of the NPRM is intended to provide insight into what CISA
interprets to be the purposes of the regulation that has informed the
development of CISA's proposed regulation.
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\14\ See 87 FR 55833 (Sept. 12, 2022); comments submitted by
Information Technology Industry Council, CISA-2022-0010-0097 (``[I]t
is vital that CISA articulate its tactical goals and/or plan for
actualizing CIRCIA, as only upon understanding what CISA hopes to
accomplish with these reports can industry stakeholders provide more
specific commentary on key scoping and reporting threshold
questions.''); National Grain and Feed Association, CISA-2022-0010-
0104 (``CISA should also identify the specific purpose of reporting
an incident. For example, if the data will be used by the government
for trend identification.''); G. Rattray, CISA-2022-0010-0159
(``[CISA] will have to decide whether it is reporting that serves
the purpose of characterizing threats or you're trying to understand
risks and vulnerability. Both are probably viable analytically, but
those would lead to different sort of reporting requirements.'').
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i. Purposes of the CIRCIA Regulation
CIRCIA's legislative history indicates that the primary purpose of
CIRCIA is to help preserve national security, economic security, and
public health and safety. For example, in December 2021, HSGAC issued a
fact sheet on the proposed legislation acknowledging the ``serious
national security threat'' posed by cyberattacks and stating that
CIRCIA would help enable a coordinated, informed U.S. response to the
foreign governments and criminal organizations conducting these attacks
against the United States.\15\ Similarly, the U.S. House Committee on
Homeland Security (CHS) issued a fact sheet on the proposed legislation
stating that CIRCIA would provide CISA and its Federal partners the
visibility needed to bolster cybersecurity, identify malicious cyber
campaigns in early stages, identify longer-term threat trends, and
ensure actionable cyber threat intelligence is getting to the first
responders and Federal officials who need it.\16\
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\15\ HSGAC Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1.
\16\ CHS, The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act at 1, 3 (Aug. 2021), available at https://democrats-homeland.house.gov/download/incident-reporting-bill-draft-fact-sheet (hereinafter, ``CHS Fact Sheet'').
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The plain language that Congress used throughout CIRCIA reflects
the purpose discussed in CIRCIA's legislative history. For example,
CIRCIA requires CISA to review covered cyber incidents that are
``likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security
interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United States or to the
public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the
people of the United States'' and to ``identify and disseminate ways to
prevent or mitigate similar incidents in the future.'' 6 U.S.C. 681(9);
6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(6). CIRCIA also requires CISA to ``assess potential
impact of cyber incidents on public health and safety,'' and to
consider, when describing covered entities, both ``the consequences
that disruption to or compromise of [a covered entity] could cause to
national security, economic security, or public health and safety'' and
``the extent to which damage, disruption, or unauthorized access to
such an entity . . . will likely enable the disruption of the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure.'' 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(1); 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1)(A), 681b(c)(1)(C).
Both CIRCIA's legislative history and statutory text highlight a
number of more discrete purposes within the broader goals of enhancing
national and economic security, and public health and safety. Some
examples of these purposes include trend and threat analysis (i.e., the
performance of cybersecurity threat and incident trend analysis and
tracking, to include the analysis and identification of adversary
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)); \17\ vulnerability and
mitigation
[[Page 23652]]
assessment (i.e., the identification of cyber vulnerabilities and the
assessment of countermeasures that might be available to address them);
\18\ the provision of early warnings (i.e., the rapid sharing of
information on cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures
through the issuance of cybersecurity alerts or other means); \19\
incident response and mitigation (i.e., rapid identification of
significant cybersecurity incidents and offering of assistance--e.g.,
personnel, services--in incident response, mitigation, or recovery);
\20\ supporting Federal efforts to disrupt threat actors; \21\ and
advancing cyber resiliency (i.e., developing and sharing strategies for
improving overall cybersecurity resilience; facilitating use of cyber
incident data to further cybersecurity research; engagement with
software/equipment manufacturers on vulnerabilities and how to close
them).\22\
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\17\ See, e.g., id. at 3; Stakeholder Perspectives on the Cyber
Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2021 Before
the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Innovation of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 117th Cong. 64
(2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/event/117th-congress/house-event/114018/text (hereinafter, ``Stakeholder Perspectives
Hearing'') (statement of Rep. Yvette Clarke) (``One of the goals in
drafting this legislation was to provide CISA with enough
information to analyze and understand threats . . . .''); 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(1) (CISA must aggregate and analyze reports to identify TTPs
adversaries use and to enhance situational awareness of cyber
threats across critical infrastructure sectors).
\18\ See, e.g., Responding to and Learning from the Log4Shell
Vulnerability Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 117th Cong. 2 (2022) (statement of Sen. Gary
Peters, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/responding-to-and-learning-from-the-log4shell-vulnerability/
(hereinafter, ``Log4Shell Vulnerability Hearing Peters Statement'')
(``This legislation will help our lead cybersecurity agency better
understand the scope of attacks, including from vulnerabilities like
Log4j. . . .''); 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(1) (CISA must aggregate and
analyze reports to assess the effectiveness of security controls).
\19\ See, e.g., Log4Shell Vulnerability Hearing Peters
Statement, supra note 18, at 2 (``This legislation will help our
lead cybersecurity agency . . . warn others of the threat, prepare
for potential impacts. . . .''); Minority Staff of S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 117th Cong., America's
Data Held Hostage: Case Studies in Ransomware Attacks on American
Companies vi (Comm. Print 2022), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/americas-data-held-hostage-case-studies-in-ransomware-attacks-on-american-companies/ (``This
legislation will enhance the Federal Government's ability to combat
cyberattacks, mount a coordinated defense, hold perpetrators
accountable, and prevent and mitigate future attacks through the
sharing of timely and actionable threat information.''); 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(3)(B) (CISA must provide entities with timely, actionable,
and anonymized reports of cyber incident campaigns and trends,
including, to the maximum extent practicable, cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures); 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(5)-(7) (CISA
must identify and disseminate ways to prevent or mitigate cyber
incidents, and must review reports for cyber threat indicators that
can be anonymized and disseminated, with defensive measures, to
stakeholders).
\20\ See, e.g., HSGAC Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1 (``This
information will allow CISA to provide additional assistance to
avoid cyber-attacks against our critical infrastructure, like the
attacks on Colonial Pipeline and JBS Foods.''); Log4Shell
Vulnerability Hearing Peters Statement, supra note 18 (``This
legislation will help our lead cybersecurity agency . . . help
affected entities respond and recover.'').
\21\ See, e.g., Press Release, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Portman, Peters Introduce Bipartisan
Legislation Requiring Critical Infrastructure Entities to Report
Cyberattacks (Sept. 28, 2021), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/peters-and-portman-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-requiring-critical-infrastructure-entities-to-report-cyber-attacks/ (``As cyber and ransomware attacks continue
to increase, the federal government must be able to quickly
coordinate a response and hold these bad actors accountable.'');
Letter from Sen. Rob Portman, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, to Vanessa Countryman, Secretary,
SEC, Re: RE: SEC Proposed Rule on Cybersecurity Risk Management,
Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, File No. S7-09-22, 3
(May 9, 2022), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-22/s70922-20128391-291294.pdf (``When considering the legislation,
Congress noted if the FBI is `provided information from reports
under the process outlined in the statute, [it] may, as appropriate,
use information contained in the reports and derived from them' for
a range of investigatory activities. This is consistent with the
statute which states incident reports can be used for `the purpose
[of] preventing, investigating, disrupting, or prosecuting an
offense arising out of a cyber incident' reported under the law.
This allows law enforcement agencies to disrupt and deter hostile
cyber actors. . . .'' (footnotes omitted)).
\22\ See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(9) (CISA must proactively
identify opportunities to leverage and utilize data on cyber
incidents to enable and strengthen cybersecurity research carried
out by academia and private sector organizations).
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ii. How the Regulatory Purpose of CIRCIA Influenced the Design of the
Proposed CIRCIA Regulation
Based on CISA's understanding of the purposes of CIRCIA, CISA
identified two fundamental principles that influenced the design of the
proposed CIRCIA regulation in key areas. First, to achieve many of the
desired goals of the proposed regulation--such as conducting analysis
to identify adversary TTPs and providing early warnings to enhance
situational awareness of cyber threats across critical infrastructure
sectors--CISA needs to receive a sufficient quantity of Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and Ransom Payment Reports from across the spectrum of
critical infrastructure. As noted by the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission, the government's cyber incident situational awareness, its
ability to detect coordinated cyber campaigns, and its cyber risk
identification and assessment efforts rely on comprehensive data and,
prior to the passage of CIRCIA, the Federal government lacked a mandate
to systematically collect cyber incident information reliably and at
the scale necessary.\23\ Sufficient data also is central to being able
to differentiate campaigns from isolated incidents and support the
development of more generalizable conclusions.\24\
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\23\ Cyberspace Solarium Commission, Cyberspace Solarium
Commission Report at 103 (Mar. 2020), available at https://cybersolarium.org/march-2020-csc-report/march-2020-csc-report/
(hereinafter ``Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report''); see also
Sandra Schmitz-Berndt, ``Defining the Reporting Threshold for a
Cybersecurity Incident under the NIS Directive and the NIS 2
Directive,'' Journal of Cybersecurity at 2 (Apr. 5, 2023) (``[L]ow
reporting levels result in a flawed picture of the threat landscape,
which in turn may impact cybersecurity preparedness.''), available
at https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/9/1/tyad009/7160387.
\24\ See, e.g., CISA, Cost of a Cyber Incident: Systematic
Review and Cross-Validation at 49 (Oct. 26, 2020) (reliance on
limited data sources such as those based on convenience samples
``means that no statistical representativeness can be claimed
[which] limits the ability to support inference for generalizing
results beyond the studied samples.''), available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/cost-cyber-incident-systematic-review-and-cross-validation.
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If CISA designs the proposed regulations in a way that overly
limits the quantity and variety of reports it receives from across
critical infrastructure sectors, CISA will lack sufficient information
to support reliable trend analysis, vulnerability identification,
provision of early warnings, and other key purposes of the proposed
regulation as indicated by CIRCIA. This fundamental principle was
particularly important for CISA as it considered different options
related to which entities should be required to report, what types of
cyber incidents should be reported, and the scope and amount of
technical detail necessary in CIRCIA Reports to enable CISA to conduct
threat analysis, track campaigns, and provide early warnings as
required by CIRCIA.
Many stakeholders provided comments in response to the RFI issued
in September 2022 cautioning CISA that collecting too many reports
could result in data overload and hinder CISA's ability to identify
important trends and vulnerabilities. While CISA agrees that there
could be some point at which the number of reports submitted begins to
yield diminishing marginal returns, CISA believes that, due to advances
in technology and strategies for managing large data sets, the
potential challenges associated with receiving large volumes of reports
can be mitigated through technological and procedural strategies.
Additionally, as discussed in Section IV.E.ii in this document, CISA
proposes to design the reporting form in a manner that is easy for a
covered entity or third-party submitter to complete, encourages the
submission of useful information,
[[Page 23653]]
and provides information to CISA in a manner that facilitates analysis
and review. As a result, CISA is less concerned about receiving too
many reports and more concerned about not receiving enough reports to
support the intended regulatory purposes of the CIRCIA regulations. As
noted by Microsoft President Brad Smith during his testimony in front
of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during a hearing on
the ``Hack of U.S. Networks by a Foreign Adversary,'' in the wake of
the supply chain compromise of the SolarWinds Orion product, ``one of
the challenges in this space is the nature of all threat intelligence,
whether it's cyber-based or physically based, is that it's always about
connecting dots. So the more dots you have, the more likely you are to
see a pattern and reach a conclusion. . . . And then they're spread out
across different parts of the public sector as well. So this notion of
aggregating them is key.'' \25\
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\25\ Testimony of Brad Smith to the U.S. Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, ``Hearing on Hack of U.S. Networks by a Foreign
Adversary'' (Feb. 23, 2021), available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-hearing-hack-us-networks-foreign-adversary.
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CISA is cognizant of the fact that reporting does not come without
costs, however, so CISA is not seeking simply to capture the maximum
number of reports possible under the statutory language (i.e., by
scoping both the applicability of the rule and covered cyber incidents
as broadly as legally permissible). CISA's goal is to identify and
achieve the proper balance among the number of reports being submitted,
the benefits resulting from their submission, and the costs to both the
reporting entities and the government of the submission, analysis, and
storage of those reports.
The second major principle CISA identified that influenced aspects
of the proposed regulation was the importance of timeliness in both the
receipt of reports and in CISA's ability to analyze and share
information gleaned from those reports. To achieve the very important
early visibility and warning aspects of this regulatory regime and
increase the likelihood that entities across the critical
infrastructure community will be able to address identified
vulnerabilities and secure themselves against the latest adversary TTPs
before falling victim to them, time is of the essence. CISA kept this
second principle in mind as CISA considered options for when a covered
entity's reporting obligations begin under the proposed regulation and
the manner, form, and procedures for reporting.
Similar to the first principle, CISA recognizes that potential
drawbacks to overprioritizing timely reporting exist, such as
potentially impacting a covered entity's ability to conduct preliminary
incident response and mitigation. CISA also recognizes that a covered
entity may not have all the information in the early aftermath of
incident discovery, and that some preliminary determinations made at
the outset of an incident response process may later be determined to
be inaccurate when the entity is afforded time to conduct further
investigation and analysis. Accordingly, CISA has sought to balance the
critical need for timely reporting with the potential challenges
associated with rapid reporting in the aftermath of a covered cyber
incident. For example, CISA recognizes that covered entities may
require some limited time to conduct preliminary analysis before
establishing a reasonable belief that a covered cyber incident has
occurred and thereby triggering the 72-hour timeframe for reporting.
See Section IV.E.iv.1 in this document. Additionally, to the extent
that information that is required to be reported under the regulation
is evolving or unknown within the initial reporting deadline for a
covered cyber incident, CISA is proposing to allow covered entities to
submit new or updated information in a Supplemental Report as
additional information becomes known about the covered cyber incident.
See Section IV.E.iii.4 in this document.
D. Harmonization Efforts
Given the number of existing cyber incident reporting requirements
at the Federal and SLTT levels, CISA recognizes that covered entities
may be subject to multiple, potentially duplicative requirements to
report cyber incidents. In an attempt to minimize the burden on covered
entities potentially subject to both CIRCIA and other Federal cyber
incident reporting requirements, CISA is committed to exploring ways to
harmonize this regulation with other existing Federal reporting
regimes, where practicable and seeks comment from the public on how it
can further achieve this goal. CISA is already engaged in several
efforts in furtherance of harmonization of cyber incident reporting,
including: (1) serving as a member of the CIRC and participating in the
CIRC's efforts to coordinate, deconflict, and harmonize Federal cyber
incident reporting requirements; (2) participating in the Cybersecurity
Forum for Independent and Executive Branch Regulators; (3) performing
extensive outreach with Federal and non-Federal entities to gain a
fulsome understanding of the existing cyber incident reporting
regulatory landscape and gather perspectives on how to harmonize
existing cyber incident reporting requirements; and (4) engaging with
other Federal departments and agencies that implement cyber incident
reporting requirements to determine whether covered entities could
potentially take advantage of the proposed substantially similar
reporting exception to CIRCIA reporting (discussed further in Section
IV.D.i in this document).
CISA actively participated in the CIRC to help identify potential
approaches to harmonizing Federal cyber incident reporting requirements
and to support the identification of recommended practices that could
be considered by CISA and other Federal departments and agencies as
they develop or update their respective cyber incident reporting
regimes. Specifically, CISA participated in various DHS-led working
groups to identify potential recommended practices and areas of
harmonization related to Federal cyber incident reporting requirements,
many of which are reflected in the DHS Report.\26\ CISA considered the
DHS Report and its recommendations as it developed this proposed rule
and attempted to leverage the model definition and reporting form
recommended in the DHS Report to the extent practicable and consistent
with the unique regulatory authority granted to CISA under CIRCIA and
the purpose of the CIRCIA regulation (described in Sections III.A and C
in this document).
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\26\ DHS Report, supra note 4, at 5.
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CISA has also been an active participant in the Cybersecurity Forum
for Independent and Executive Branch Regulators. The goal of this
forum, which was initially launched in 2014, is to increase the overall
effectiveness and consistency of Federal regulatory authorities related
to cybersecurity by enhancing communication among regulatory agencies,
sharing best practices, and exploring ways to align, leverage, and
deconflict approaches to cybersecurity regulation.\27\ Current
participants in the Forum include, among others, FCC, CISA, CFTC,
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), DHS, Department of the Treasury, FERC, FHFA, FRB,
Federal Trade Commission, FDA, NRC, OCC, SEC, TSA, USCG, and the Office
of the National Cyber Director.
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\27\ See Cybersecurity Forum for Independent and Executive
Branch Regulators Charter (2014), available at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1501/ML15014A296.pdf.
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[[Page 23654]]
Additionally, CISA has performed, and as required by CIRCIA, plans
on continuing to perform, outreach to both Federal partners and non-
Federal stakeholders to learn about existing and proposed cyber
incident reporting regulations and ways in which CISA may be able to
design and implement the CIRCIA requirements to harmonize with those
reporting requirements to the extent practicable. In addition to the
RFI and listening sessions described in Section III.F in this document,
CISA held a series of consultations with each Sector Risk Management
Agency (SRMA), all Federal departments and agencies that currently
oversee cyber incident reporting requirements, and various other
Federal departments and agencies with equities in cyber incident and
ransom payment reporting. During these engagements, CISA has sought to
learn about existing and proposed Federal regimes that require the
reporting of cyber incidents or ransom payments and discuss areas where
CISA and its Federal counterparts might want to, and be able to,
harmonize their respective reporting requirements. CISA leveraged the
information gained via the RFI, listening sessions, and Federal
consultations in the development of this NPRM, and intends to continue
to engage Federal partners during the development and implementation of
the final rule in an attempt to harmonize reporting requirements and
reduce the burden on potential covered entities, where practicable.
Finally, CISA intends to work with other Federal departments and
agencies to explore opportunities to reduce duplicative reporting of
covered cyber incidents through a proposed substantially similar
reporting exception to CIRCIA. Under this exception, which is
authorized under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B), a covered entity that is
required by law, regulation, or contract to report information to
another Federal entity that is substantially similar to the information
that must be reported under CIRCIA and is required to submit the report
in a substantially similar timeframe to CIRCIA's reporting deadlines,
may be excepted from reporting it again under CIRCIA. Per the statute,
for covered entities to be able to leverage this specific exception,
CISA and the respective Federal entity must enter into an interagency
agreement, referred to as a CIRCIA Agreement, and establish an
information sharing mechanism to share reports. To the extent
practicable, CISA is committed to working in good faith with its
Federal partners to have CIRCIA Agreements finalized before the
effective date of the final rule. Additional details on the
substantially similar reporting exception to CIRCIA are discussed in
Section IV.D.i in this document.
CISA welcomes all comments on all aspects of harmonizing CIRCIA's
regulatory reporting requirements with other cyber incident and ransom
payment reporting requirements, including:
1. Potential approaches to harmonizing CIRCIA's regulatory
reporting requirements with other existing Federal or SLTT laws,
regulations, directives, or similar policies that require reporting of
cyber incidents or ransom payments.
2. How to reduce actual, likely, or potential duplication or
conflict between other Federal or SLTT laws, regulations, directives,
or policies and CIRCIA's reporting requirements.
E. Information Sharing Required by CIRCIA
Sharing information on cyber incidents, ransomware attacks, and the
broader cyber threat landscape is central to CIRCIA. In fact, CIRCIA
imposes several requirements upon CISA and other Federal departments
and agencies related to the sharing of information received through
cyber incident and ransom payment reporting programs, including the
CIRCIA proposed regulations. As Congress imposed these obligations
solely on Federal departments and agencies, they are not included in
the CIRCIA proposed rule; however, information sharing will be an
integral part of the overall CIRCIA implementation, and CISA is
committed to working with its Federal partners to share cyber threat
information across the Federal government and, as appropriate, with
non-Federal stakeholders.
As required by 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(10) and (b), CISA will make
information received via CIRCIA Reports or in response to an RFI or
subpoena available to appropriate SRMAs and other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, as determined by the President or a designee
of the President, within 24 hours of receipt. CIRCIA also includes a
reciprocal requirement, where any Federal department or agency that
receives a report of a cyber incident shall provide the report to CISA
within 24 hours of receiving the report. See 6 U.S.C. 681g(a)(1). Upon
receipt of a report from another Federal agency pursuant to this
requirement, CISA must share the report with other Federal agencies as
it would any other report submitted to CISA under CIRCIA. 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(10), 681a(b), 681g(a)(1). In addition to any otherwise
generally applicable laws (such as the Privacy Act of 1974 \28\ and the
E-Government Act of 2002 \29\), pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681g(a)(3), CISA
must protect the reports it receives from Federal partners under these
provisions in accordance with any privacy, confidentiality, or
information security requirements imposed upon the originating Federal
department or agency. CIRCIA also requires CISA to ``coordinate and
share information with appropriate Federal departments and agencies to
identify and track ransom payments.'' 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(2).
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\28\ See 5 U.S.C. 552a.
\29\ See 44 U.S.C. 3501 note, Public Law 107-347.
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CIRCIA imposes requirements on CISA related to sharing cyber threat
information with non-Federal stakeholders as well. For example, 6
U.S.C. 681a(a)(7) requires CISA to immediately review Covered Cyber
Incident Reports or voluntary reports submitted to CISA pursuant to 6
U.S.C. 681c to the extent they involve ongoing cyber threats or
security vulnerabilities for cyber threat indicators that can be
anonymized and disseminated, with defensive measures, to appropriate
stakeholders. Similarly, for a covered cyber incident or group of
covered cyber incidents that satisfies the definition of a significant
cyber incident, CISA must conduct a review of the details surrounding
the incident(s) and identify and disseminate ways to prevent or
mitigate similar incidents in the future. 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(6). CISA
must also ``publish quarterly unclassified, public reports that
describe aggregated, anonymized observations, findings, and
recommendations'' based on Covered Cyber Incident Reports. 6 U.S.C.
681a(a)(8). In addition to limiting sharing of information as may
otherwise be required by laws that are generally applicable to
information received by the Federal government, such as the Trade
Secrets Act,\30\ when sharing with critical infrastructure owners and
operators and the general public any information received via CIRCIA
Reports or responses to RFIs, CISA must anonymize information related
to the victim who reported the incident. See 6 U.S.C. 681e(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ 18 U.S.C. 1905.
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F. Summary of Stakeholder Comments
While developing this NPRM, CISA sought feedback from an array of
public and private sector stakeholders in an effort to identify the
most effective potential approach to implementing CIRCIA's reporting
requirements. CISA published an RFI in the Federal
[[Page 23655]]
Register; \31\ held in-person, public listening sessions around the
country; \32\ conducted virtual, sector-specific listening sessions;
\33\ and consulted with SRMAs and other relevant Federal departments
and agencies, all with the goal of receiving meaningful input from
entities that will potentially be impacted by this regulation. CISA has
considered this feedback when developing the proposals set forth in
this NPRM. A summary of the most salient points received in response to
the RFI and during the CIRCIA listening sessions follows. All comments
received in response to the RFI, as well as transcripts from all the
public and sector-specific listening sessions, are available in the
electronic docket for this rulemaking.
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\31\ The RFI, which was published in the Federal Register on
September 12, 2022, solicited inputs on potential aspects of the
proposed regulation prior to the publication of this NPRM. CISA did
not limit the type of feedback commenters could submit in response
to the RFI, but did specifically request comments on definitions for
and interpretations of the terminology to be used in the proposed
regulation; the form, manner, content, and procedures for submission
of reports required under CIRCIA; information regarding other
incident reporting requirements including the requirement to report
a description of the vulnerabilities exploited; and other policies
and procedures, such as enforcement procedures and information
protection policies, that will be required for implementation of the
regulation. The comment period was open through November 14, 2022,
and CISA received 131 individual comments in response to the RFI. 87
FR 55833.
\32\ Between September 21, 2022, and November 16, 2022, CISA
hosted ten listening sessions in Salt Lake City, Utah; Chicago,
Illinois; Fort Worth, Texas; New York, New York; Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Washington, DC; Oakland, California; Boston,
Massachusetts; Seattle, Washington; and Kansas City, Missouri. 87 FR
55830; 87 FR 60409.
\33\ Because CIRCIA defines covered entities with reference to
critical infrastructure sectors, CISA held sector-specific listening
sessions for each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors
identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21, see https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors, as well as a separate session for
the Aviation Subsector. Transcripts from these sessions can be
viewed in the docket for this rulemaking by going to
www.regulations.gov and searching for CISA-2022-0010.
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i. General Comments
In general, several commenters told CISA that the regulations
should be easy to comply with, such that individuals who are not
cybersecurity professionals can complete the required reporting, and
avoid overly burdensome requirements.\34\ Commenters recommended that
compliance with the regulation be incentive-based and supportive,
rather than punitive,\35\ and commenters also expressed concerns about
the confidentiality of reported information.\36\ Commenters also urged
CISA to consider the landscape of existing cyber incident reporting
requirements and expressed general concern about the potential negative
impacts of unharmonized, complex, and duplicative reporting
regimes.\37\
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\34\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Confidentiality
Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0030; Credit Union National Association,
CISA-2022-0010-0050; SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114; Federation of
American Hospitals, CISA-2022-0010-0063; Epic, CISA-2022-0010-0090.
\35\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Arizona Cyber Threat
Response Alliance and Arizona Technical Council, CISA-2022-0010-
0022; SolarWinds, CISA-2022-0010-0027.
\36\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Google Cloud, CISA-2022-
0010-0109; Tenable, CISA-2022-0010-0032; NCTA--The Internet &
Television Association, CISA-2022-0010-0102.
\37\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by CTIA, CISA-2022-0010-0070;
R Street Institute, CISA-2022-0010-0125; IBM, CISA-2022-0010-0069;
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0105.
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ii. Comments on the Definition of Covered Entity
Several commenters provided suggestions on how to define the term
covered entity under this regulation. While some commenters thought the
definition of covered entity was straightforward and already
understood,\38\ others pointed to different criteria or frameworks CISA
could use to scope the definition more effectively. These included,
among others, a size-based threshold,\39\ a risk-based approach,\40\ or
a focus on the degree to which an entity supported a NCF.\41\
Commenters also suggested leveraging existing lists, standards, or
definitions, such as the list of critical infrastructure ``where a
cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional
or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or
national security,'' as determined pursuant to Section 9(a) of
Executive Order 13636; \42\ the NERC CIP standard; \43\ the National
Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST's) definition; \44\ or
definitions used by other countries.\45\ Others suggested considering
the unique qualities of particular industries and sectors and either
creating sector-based definitions or excluding certain sectors and
industries from the definition altogether.\46\
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\38\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Arizona Cyber Threat
Response Alliance and Arizona Technical Council, CISA-2022-0010-
0022.
\39\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Computing Technology
Industry Association, CISA-2022-0010-0122; BlackBerry Corporation,
CISA-2022-0010-0036; Cyber Threat Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0019;
SolarWinds, CISA-2022-0010-0027.
\40\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Information Technology
Industry Council, CISA-2022-0010-0097; U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
CISA-2022-0010-0075; American Property Casualty Insurance
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0064.
\41\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Mitchell Berger, CISA-2022-
0010-0004.
\42\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the UnityPoint Health,
CISA-2022-0010-0107; National Retail Federation, CISA-2022-0010-
0092; National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, CISA-2022-
0010-0025.
\43\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Powder River Energy
Corporation, CISA-2022-0010-0099.
\44\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Credit Union National
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0050.
\45\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114.
\46\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Rural Wireless
Association, Inc., CISA-2022-0010-0093 (recommending excluding small
telecommunications carriers); TechNet, CISA-2022-0010-0072
(discussing the ``innovation economy''); American Property Casualty
Insurance Association, CISA-2022-0010-0064 (recommending exclusion
of insurance agencies); NAFCU, CISA-2022-0010-0076 (recommending
exclusion of the credit union industry).
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iii. Comments on the Definition of Covered Cyber Incident and
Substantial Cyber Incident
Many commenters provided thoughts on how to define covered cyber
incident and substantial cyber incident, including some who offered
their own definitions for CISA to consider.\47\ Multiple commenters
indicated a desire for a high threshold for reporting to minimize
burdens on regulated entities, avoid duplicative reporting, and prevent
CISA from being inundated with reports,\48\ although at least one
commenter noted that a narrow definition could leave CISA with an
incomplete understanding of the threat landscape.\49\ In recommending
high thresholds, commenters suggested that CISA could bound the
definition of covered cyber incident in a variety of ways, such as by
limiting reporting to ``confirmed incidents''; \50\ incidents that
cause ``actual harm''; \51\ only incidents that impact business
operations; \52\ only
[[Page 23656]]
incidents that impact an entity's critical infrastructure functions;
\53\ incidents that directly impact U.S. companies, citizens, economies
or national security; \54\ and/or those resulting only from malicious
intent.\55\ Several commenters also advocated for considering
definitions that already exist, such as the definition created by NIST
that is used in FISMA,\56\ or definitions that are already used among
the 16 critical infrastructure sectors.\57\
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\47\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Cybersecurity
Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0105; Microsoft Corporation, CISA-2022-
0010-0058.
\48\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by The Associations: BPI,
ABA, IIB, SIFMA, CISA-2022-0010-0046; American Council of Life
Insurers, CISA-2022-0010-0095; UnityPoint Health, CISA-2022-0010-
0107; Cloudflare, Inc., CISA-2022-0010-0074; American Property
Casualty Insurance Association, CISA-2022-0010-0064; Jim Wollbrinck,
CISA-2022-0010-0151.
\49\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by NERC, CISA-2022-0010-0049.
\50\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Mandiant, CISA-2022-0010-
0120; Edison Electric Institute, CISA-2022-0010-0079; Connected
Health Initiative, CISA-2022-0010-0130; ACT [bond] The App
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0129.
\51\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the internet
Infrastructure Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0055; Independent Community
Bankers of America, CISA-2022-0010-0080; Institute of International
Finance, CISA-2022-0010-0060.
\52\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by IBM, CISA-2022-0010-0069;
Edison Electric Institute, CISA-2022-0010-0079; Fidelity National
Information Services, CISA-2022-0010-0033; National Technology
Security Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0061.
\53\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by IBM, CISA-2022-0010-0069;
CrowdStrike, CISA-2022-0010-0128; Microsoft Corporation, CISA-2022-
0010-0058; Professional Services Council, CISA-2022-0010-0044;
Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto Innovators), CISA-2022-
0010-0082; Telecommunications Industry Association, CISA-2022-0010-
0132.
\54\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Airlines for America,
CISA-2022-0010-0066; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, CISA-2022-0010-0075;
Express Association of America, CISA-2022-0010-0038; The
Associations: AFPM, AGA, API, APGA, INGAA, LEPA, CISA-2022-0010-
0057.
\55\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Cloudflare, Inc., CISA-
2022-0010-0074; The Associations: BPI, ABA, IIB, SIFMA, CISA-2022-
0010-0046; internet Infrastructure Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0055.
\56\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the National Technology
Security Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0061; The Associations: BPI, ABA,
IIB, SIFMA, CISA-2022-0010-0046; Mandiant, CISA-2022-0010-0120;
Glenn Herdrich, CISA-2022-0010-0158.
\57\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by NCTA--The Internet &
Television Association, CISA-2022-0010-0102 (generally advocating
for a sector-based approach to the definition); Financial Services
Sector Coordinating Council, CISA-2022-0010-0094; The Associations:
BPI, ABA, IIB, SIFMA, CISA-2022-0010-0046; The Clearing House, CISA-
2022-0010-0086 (advocating for alignment with the FDIC's Computer-
Security Incident Notification Rule); HIMSS Electronic Health Record
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0040 (advocating for alignment with the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requirements);
Nuclear Energy Institute, CISA-2022-0010-0029; Rich Mogavero, CISA-
2022-0010-0139 (advocating alignment with the definition used by the
NRC); Electric Power Supply Association, CISA-2022-0010-0045; Edison
Electric Institute, CISA-2022-0010-0079 (advocating for alignment
with the reporting standards used by the NERC); NTCA--The Rural
Broadband Association, CISA-2022-0010-0100 (recommending
consideration of the FCC's reporting requirements in developing the
definition).
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Comments received on the potential definition of substantial cyber
incident echoed those received on the potential definition of covered
cyber incident, though a few commenters noted that the term substantial
cyber incident does not have existing legal definitions as does covered
cyber incident.\58\ One commenter noted that CISA should clarify
whether ``substantial cyber incidents'' are separate from ``covered
cyber incidents,'' \59\ and another commenter recommended covered cyber
incidents and substantial cyber incidents should be synonymous
terms.\60\
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\58\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies, CISA-2022-0010-0088; U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, CISA-2022-0010-0075; Fidelity National Information
Services, CISA-2022-0010-0033.
\59\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Professional Services
Council, CISA-2022-0010-0044.
\60\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Gideon Rasmussen, CISA-
2022-0010-0011.
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iv. Comments on Other Definitions
CISA received a small number of comments on other definitions. A
few commenters provided feedback on the meaning of the terms ransom
payment and ransomware attack, with several noting that the definitions
of ransom payment and ransomware attack were understood as defined in
CIRCIA and recommending no changes to these terms in the
regulation.\61\
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\61\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by (ISC)2, CISA-2022-0010-
0112; Exelon Corp., CISA-2022-0010-0043; SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114.
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A few commenters offered input on the meaning of supply chain
compromise, with those who did often acknowledging the statutory
definition of the term (see 6 U.S.C. 650(28)),\62\ and recommending
that CISA align this term as closely as possible with similar, existing
terms, such as ``supply chain attack'' used by NIST or the definition
of ``supply chain compromise'' used by MITRE.\63\ Several commenters
emphasized a need for clarity regarding when a customer or end user
would be expected to report on an incident caused somewhere above them
in the supply chain, noting that in many cases the impacted covered
entity may have limited visibility into what happened along the supply
chain to cause the incident.\64\
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\62\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Cybersecurity
Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0105.
\63\ See id.; see, e.g., Comment submitted by the Information
Technology Industry Council, CISA-2022-0010-0097.
\64\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the American Water Works
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0127; Edison Electric Institute, CISA-
2022-0010-0079; NCTA--The Internet & Television Association, CISA-
2022-0010-0102; Exelon Corp., CISA-2022-0010-0043.
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v. Comments on Criteria for Determining Whether the Domain Name System
Exception Applies
The few comments received relating to whether an entity is a multi-
stakeholder organization that develops, implements, and enforces
policies concerning the DNS reflected different views. One commenter
recommended that CISA clarify that domain name registries and
registrars are ``governed by a multistakeholder organization.'' \65\
Another commenter opined that it would not be appropriate to exempt
domain name registrars. The same commenter recommended that CISA
identify exempted organizations by name in the final rule, listing
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the
Regional Internet Registries for consideration.\66\
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\65\ Comment submitted by the Internet Infrastructure Coalition,
CISA-2022-0010-0055.
\66\ See Comment submitted by the Energy Transfer LP, CISA-2022-
0010-0037. Regional Internet Registries include ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE
NCC, AFRINIC, and APNIC (see Regional Internet Registries [bond] The
Number Resource Organization (nro.net)).
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vi. Comments on Manner and Form of Reporting, Content of Reports, and
Reporting Procedures
Numerous commenters provided recommendations on the manner and form
of reporting, with many of those concurring with the use of a web-based
form for reporting or other means of electronic reporting.\67\ Some
explicitly recommended that CISA make a mobile application or otherwise
make the form available via a mobile device as well.\68\ Several
commenters recommended alternative or additional methods of reporting
to include phone or email.\69\ Multiple commenters emphasized that
reporting should not require the download or purchase of new
technology.\70\ A number of commenters recommended that the same portal
be used for Supplemental Reports as for the original reports.\71\
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\67\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by American Council of Life
Insurers, CISA-2022-0010-0095; HIMSS Electronic Health Record
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0040; Epic, CISA-2022-0010-0090; Cyber
Threat Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0019; League of Southeastern Credit
Unions, CISA-2022-0010-0121; Marty Reynolds, CISA-2022-0010-0135;
Patrick Thornton, CISA-2022-0010-0144.
\68\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Cyber Threat Alliance,
CISA-2022-0010-0019; Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange,
CISA-2022-0010-0041; OCHIN, CISA-2022-0010-0039; Cybersecurity
Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0105.
\69\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by CHIME, CISA-2022-0010-
0035; Business Roundtable, CISA-2022-0010-0115; CTIA, CISA-2022-
0010-0070; The Clearing House, CISA-2022-0010-0086.
\70\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Operational Technology
Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0108; NTCA--The Rural
Broadband Association, CISA-2022-0010-0100; Tenable, CISA-2022-0010-
0032.
\71\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Cybersecurity
Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0105; Information Technology Industry
Council, CISA-2022-0010-0097; Credit Union National Association,
CISA-2022-0010-0050.
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Overall, commenters emphasized the need for a user-friendly
reporting form. While several commenters recommended that the reporting
form be
[[Page 23657]]
standardized for all covered entities,\72\ at least one commenter noted
that a uniform reporting format could unintentionally limit the type of
information CISA receives.\73\ Many commenters recommended that any
reporting form include drop-down menus, check-boxes, or other fields
that could be pre-populated for ease of submission.\74\ Other
commenters recommended that the incident reporting form generate
questions pertinent to the type of incident being reported, including
an indication of which fields were required for each type of
report.\75\ Several commenters also recommended that CISA assign
reference numbers to each report, which would allow entities to more
easily locate and return to a specific CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form
at a later point.\76\ Commenters also recommended existing reporting or
submission procedures that CISA could emulate. Some commenters
recommended CISA rely on a standardized approach, noting examples such
as the National Information Exchange Model \77\ or Structured Threat
Information eXpression (STIX) and Trusted Automated Exchange of
Intelligence Information (TAXII).\78\ Other commenters recommended CISA
align its reporting approach to that of other Federal departments and
agencies such as USCG,\79\ TSA,\80\ or DOD.\81\
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\72\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation, CISA-2022-0010-0082; Lucid Motors, CISA-2022-
0010-0078; USTelecom--The Broadband Association, CISA-2022-0010-
0067; Palo Alto Networks, CISA-2022-0010-0089.
\73\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Association of American
Railroads, CISA-2022-0010-0117.
\74\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Workgroup for
Electronic Data Interchange, CISA-2022-0010-0041; CTIA, CISA-2022-
0010-0070; Anonymous, CISA-2022-0010-0012; National Grain and Feed
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0104; Mitchell Berger, CISA-2022-0010-
0004; League of Southeastern Credit Unions, CISA-2022-0010-0121;
NERC, CISA-2022-0010-0049.
\75\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Municipal Information
Systems Association of California, CISA-2022-0010-0118; City of
Roseville, CISA-2022-0010-0111; City of Cerritos, CISA-2022-0010-
0084; Cyber Threat Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0019; (ISC)2, CISA-2022-
0010-0112.
\76\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Arizona Cyber Threat
Response Alliance and Arizona Technical Council, CISA-2022-0010-
0022; Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, CISA-2022-0010-
0041.
\77\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Cyber Threat Alliance,
CISA-2022-0010-0019; SolarWinds, CISA-2022-0010-0027; MITRE, CISA-
2022-0010-0073.
\78\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by ACT [bond] The App
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0129; Connected Health Initiative, CISA-
2022-0010-0130; Cyber Threat Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0019; HIMSS,
CISA-2022-0010-0119.
\79\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the American Association of
Port Authorities, CISA-2022-0010-0126.
\80\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Energy Transfer LP, CISA-
2022-0010-0037.
\81\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Trustwave Government
Solutions, CISA-2022-0010-0096.
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When proposing suggestions for the content of CIRCIA reports, many
commenters recommended that CISA require minimal detail at the 72-hour
reporting deadline to not divert resources from response efforts,\82\
emphasizing that covered entities should be required to report only
what is absolutely needed.\83\ Several commenters recommended a core
set of questions be asked for every covered entity,\84\ while others
suggested the question set could be sector-specific.\85\ Many
commenters offered their thoughts on specific pieces of data that CISA
should consider collecting via the CIRCIA reporting form, many, if not
most, of which covered entities are statutorily required to include in
either Covered Cyber Incident Reports or Ransom Payment Reports.\86\
Some non-statutorily required fields that commenters suggested
included: identification of critical infrastructure sector, anyone else
that the entity informed, severity of the event, and victim IP
addresses.\87\
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\82\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by BSA [bond] The Software
Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0106; SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114; Arizona
Cyber Threat Response Alliance and Arizona Technical Council, CISA-
2022-0010-0022; American Chemistry Council, CISA-2022-0010-0098;
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, CISA-2022-0010-0075.
\83\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by CHIME, CISA-2022-0010-
0035; Google Cloud, CISA-2022-0010-0109; The Clearing House, CISA-
2022-0010-0086; Information Technology-ISAC, CISA-2022-0010-0048.
\84\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Institute of
International Finance, CISA-2022-0010-0060; National Association of
Chemical Distributors, CISA-2022-0010-0056; UnityPoint Health, CISA-
2022-0010-0107; Powder River Energy Corporation, CISA-2022-0010-
0099.
\85\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by HIMSS, CISA-2022-0010-
0109; CHIME, CISA-2022-0010-0035; CTIA, CISA-2022-0010-0070.
\86\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, CISA-2022-0010-0075 (recommending that CISA focus on the
ten elements listed in CISA's Sharing Cyber Event Information:
Observe, Act, Report document, namely: incident date and time,
incident location, type of observed activity; detailed narrative of
the event; number of people or systems affected; company/
organization name; point of contact details; severity of event;
critical infrastructure sector; and anyone else the entity
informed.); Cyber Threat Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0019 (recommending
that the form include three ``layers,'' containing fields applicable
to all incidents (victim information, incident type, incident
information, and threat actor information), incident specific fields
(with different fields each for business email compromise,
ransomware or other extortion, data theft, financial theft such as
banking trojans, service theft, denial of service, disruptive or
destructive attack, data manipulation or integrity loss, branding/
reputation attack, or unauthorized access), and an optional layer
for the provision of technical information (such as victim IP
addresses, threat actor groups, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, exploited
vulnerabilities)); Municipal Information Systems Association of
California, CISA-2022-0010-0118 (recommending that the form include
impacted ``[a]gency,'' date of incident, date incident discovered,
indicators of compromise, type of data compromised (if applicable),
other compliance agencies mandated to receive this report, a
description of the incident, steps taken so far, and logs); City of
Roseville, CISA-2022-0010-0111 (same); City of Cerritos, CISA-2022-
0010-0084 (same); Palo Alto Networks, CISA-2022-0010-0089
(recommending that the template reporting form include the attack
vector or vectors that led to the compromise; tactics or techniques
used by threat actor; indicators of compromise; information on the
affected systems, devices, or networks; information relevant to the
identification of the threat actor or actors involved; a point of
contact from the affected entity; and impact, earliest known time,
and duration of compromise); Mitchell Berger, CISA-2022-0010-0004
(suggesting that CISA include a list of the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors, 55 national critical functions, or similar
items with boxes to check).
\87\ See id.
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vii. Comments on the Deadlines for Submission of CIRCIA Reports
Although the 72-hour reporting deadline for the reporting of a
covered cyber incident is codified in the text of CIRCIA itself,
several commenters offered thoughts on how to interpret this
requirement. Many commenters suggested that CISA provide flexibility in
initiating the 72-hour clock due to the challenges entities face in
identifying a ``reasonable belief'' and responding to covered cyber
incidents.\88\ Similarly, commenters urged that CISA adopt certain
flexibilities in considering the deadline to have been met, such as
allowing entities to omit fields on a form when information is not yet
known \89\ or provide extensions to the 72-hour deadline when covered
entities are experiencing an external event, such as a natural disaster
or pandemic.\90\ A few commenters noted that it may not be objective or
clear in the moment when a covered entity has a ``reasonable belief,''
and recommended that CISA consider determining whether a reasonable
belief exists on a case-by-case basis.\91\ Many commenters stated that
``reasonable belief'' should be defined as a confirmed or validated
[[Page 23658]]
cyber incident from the perspective of the covered entity and that the
72-hour clock should therefore begin at that time.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Cybersecurity Coalition,
CISA-2022-0010-0105; TechNet, CISA-2022-0010-0072; Federation of
American Hospitals, CISA-2022-0010-0063; National Association of
Manufacturers, CISA-2022-0010-0087; American Council of Life
Insurers, CISA-2022-0010-0095.
\89\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Google Cloud, CISA-2022-
0010-0109.
\90\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by HIMSS, CISA-2022-0010-0119.
\91\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by NCTA--The Internet &
Television Association, CISA-2022-0010-0102; SAP, CISA-2022-0010-
0114; CTIA, CISA-2022-0010-0070.
\92\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by National Electrical
Manufacturers Association, CISA-2022-0010-0026; League of
Southeastern Credit Unions, CISA-2022-0010-0121; The Associations:
AFPM, AGA, API, APGA, INGAA, LEPA, CISA-2022-0010-0057; Trustwave
Government Solutions, CISA-2022-0010-0096; Microsoft Corporation,
CISA-2022-0010-0058.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, several commenters recommended specific interpretations
for the point at which the 24-hour clock deadline for submission of a
Ransom Payment Report should begin. For instance, commenters
recommended that the 24-hour clock should begin after the ransom
payment is sent,\93\ when ``funds or items of value are transmitted to
the extorting party,'' \94\ or as soon as ``any part'' of the ransom
payment is no longer in possession of the impacted entity or any of its
affiliated third parties.\95\
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\93\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Exelon Corp., CISA-2022-
0010-0043; Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0105; Credit
Union National Association, CISA-2022-0010-0050; National
Association of Chemical Distributors, CISA-2022-0010-0056.
\94\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Cybersecurity
Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0105.
\95\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Sophos, Inc, CISA-2022-
0010-0047.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In regards to Supplemental Reports, while some commenters
recommended flexibility, including no deadline for timing of submission
of Supplemental Reports,\96\ others recommended CISA provide a separate
deadline for the submission of Supplemental Reports.\97\ Recommended
deadlines varied from as short as 12 hours after discovering
substantially new or different information \98\ to as long as one year
after the incident.\99\ On the question of what should constitute
substantially new or different information that would necessitate
filing a Supplemental Report, many commenters recommended that covered
entities be permitted to decide when new findings necessitate a
Supplemental Report.\100\ Other commenters suggested the types of
material changes that could be considered substantial new or different
information, such as changes to the types of data stolen or altered;
changes to the number or type of systems impacted; or updates to
information regarding the TTPs used in the incident.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Airlines for America,
CISA-2022-0010-0066; SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114.
\97\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by SolarWinds, CISA-2022-
0010-0027; Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, CISA-2022-
0010-0041; Telecommunications Industry Association, CISA-2022-0010-
0132.
\98\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Sophos, Inc, CISA-2022-
0010-0047.
\99\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Workgroup for
Electronic Data Interchange, CISA-2022-0010-0041.
\100\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by USTelecom--The Broadband
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0067; Institute of International
Finance, CISA-2022-0010-0060; Exelon Corp., CISA-2022-0010-0043.
\101\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Institute of
International Finance, CISA-2022-0010-0060; League of Southeastern
Credit Unions, CISA-2022-0010-0121; Payments Leadership Council,
CISA-2022-0010-0031.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
viii. Comments on Third-Party Submitters
Of the commenters who offered feedback on the third-party
submissions of CIRCIA Reports, most seemed to support the framework
already contemplated by statute. For instance, one commenter stated
that organizations should be able to identify a third party to submit
on their behalf,\102\ and more than one stated that the reporting
mechanisms, guidelines, and procedures should be the same for the
third-party submitter as for the covered entity.\103\ Many commenters
recommend that CISA clarify that the duty to comply with the regulation
falls on the covered entity,\104\ and that third-party submitters have
no obligation to report on the covered entity's behalf.\105\
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\102\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by American Chemistry
Council, CISA-2022-0010-0098.
\103\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by American Chemistry
Council, CISA-2022-0010-0098; CrowdStrike, CISA-2022-0010-0128.
\104\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by BlackBerry; CISA-2022-
0010-0036; American Property Casualty Insurance Association, CISA-
2022-0010-0064; Computing Technology Industry Association, CISA-
2022-0010-0122.
\105\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Cyber Threat
Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0019; Airlines for America, CISA-2022-0010-
0066; Operational Technology Cybersecurity Coalition, CISA-2022-
0010-0108; Information Technology-ISAC, CISA-2022-0010-0048;
BlackBerry, CISA-2022-0010-0036.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters recommended additional safeguards for covered
entities using third-party reporters. A few commenters recommended that
CISA clarify the types of third parties authorized to submit reports on
behalf of the covered entity.\106\ One commenter recommended that CISA
consider entities like ISACs to be suitable third-party reporters.\107\
Multiple commenters also recommended that CISA allow third-party
submitters to register with CISA as a known third-party submitter.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Exelon Corp., CISA-2022-
0010-0043; The Associations: AFPM, AGA, API, APGA, INGAA, LEPA,
CISA-2022-0010-0057.
\107\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies, CISA-2022-0010-0088.
\108\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by BSA The
Software Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0106; SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114;
Information Technology Industry Council, CISA-2022-0010-0097.
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ix. Comments on Data and Records Preservation Requirements
Very few commenters offered recommendations related to data and
records preservation requirements. Several of those that did
recommended CISA not impose additional data and records preservation
requirements on covered entities via the CIRCIA regulation, and instead
defer to covered entities' existing legal obligations or specific
requests from law enforcement.\109\ Only one commenter offered
suggestions on the type of information that covered entities should
preserve,\110\ while a small number of commenters recommended lengths
of time for how long CISA should require information to be
preserved.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Mandiant, CISA-2022-0010-
0120; Accenture, CISA-2022-0010-0077; USTelecom--The Broadband
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0067.
\110\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by Sophos, Inc, CISA-2022-
0010-0047 (recommending that information preserved should include at
least all logs containing data related to the incident, such as
network logs, system logs, and access logs; all correspondence with
attackers, including any notes taken during any unrecorded
interactions; all identified TTPs and indicators of compromise; all
data related to any ransomware payment; and contact information of
individuals and entities that provided tactical support in the
incident response and investigation process).
\111\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Sophos, Inc., CISA-2022-
0010-0047; SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114; National Association of
Chemical Distributors, CISA-2022-0010-0056.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
x. Comments on Other Existing Cyber Incident Reporting Requirements and
the Substantially Similar Reporting Exception
Many commenters offered feedback on the breadth of existing
Federal, SLTT, and international cyber incident reporting requirements,
and the potential for overlap, conflict, or alignment between CIRCIA
and those requirements. CISA will not summarize the specific reporting
requirements that commenters mentioned, because CISA provides a high-
level summary of these existing reporting requirements in Section III.B
in this document.
To avoid duplicative and burdensome reporting, several commenters
recommended that CISA align its reporting requirements with existing
Federal and SLTT requirements.\112\
[[Page 23659]]
Commenters frequently recommended that CISA consult with other Federal
departments and agencies with pre-existing regulatory authority in the
commenters' particular sectors to avoid duplicative requirements in the
CIRCIA regulation. Numerous commenters recommended that, alongside
harmonization efforts, CISA should establish a single, national point
of contact or process for mandatory cyber incident reporting,\113\
suggesting that DHS or CISA serve as the primary or sole entity for
receiving and disseminating cyber incident report information.\114\
Many commenters, noting the language in CIRCIA to this effect,
encouraged CISA to implement the reporting exemption for covered
entities that submit cyber incident reports with substantially similar
information to other Federal departments and agencies, within a
substantially similar timeframe.\115\ A few commenters offered criteria
for determining whether a report submitted to another Federal entity
constitutes ``substantially similar reported information.'' \116\
Commenters also offered suggestions on which existing reporting
obligations should be considered to include substantially similar
information. These suggestions included the Cyber Incident Notification
Requirements for Federally Insured Credit Unions (FICUs), located at 12
CFR 748.1; \117\ the DFARS incident reporting requirement, located at
48 CFR 252.204-7012; \118\ Cyber Security Event Notifications for
Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors, located at 10 CFR 73.77; TSA
Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 series, Enhancing Pipeline
Cybersecurity; \119\ and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Breach Notification Rule, located at
45 CFR 164.400-414, and corresponding Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act Health Breach Notification
Rule, located at 16 CFR part 318, which applies to entities not subject
to the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule.\120\
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\112\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by National Association of
Secretaries of State, CISA-2022-0010-0054; OCHIN, CISA-2022-0010-
0039; HIMSS Electronic Health Record Association, CISA-2022-0010-
0040; Alliance for Automotive Innovation, CISA-2022-0010-0082; Lucid
Motors, CISA-2022-0010-0078; Center for Democracy & Technology,
CISA-2022-0010-0068.
\113\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Indiana Municipal Power
Agency, CISA-2022-0010-0018; HIMSS, CISA-2022-0010-0119; Exelon
Corp., CISA-2022-0010-0043; MITRE, CISA-2022-0010-0073; Options
Security Corporation, CISA-2022-0010-0160; Airport Council
International North America, CISA-2022-0010-0135; Cameron Braatz,
CISA-2022-0010-0154.
\114\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by The Associations, CISA-
2022-0010-0057: AFPM, AGA, API, APGA, INGAA, LEPA; Google Cloud,
CISA-2022-0010-; Express Association of America, CISA-2022-0010-
0038; Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, CISA-2022-0010-
0041; internet Infrastructure Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0055;
American Council of Life Insurers, CISA-2022-0010-0095; Business
Roundtable, CISA-2022-0010-0115.
\115\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the American Public Power
Association and the Large Public Power Council, CISA-2022-0010-0028;
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, CISA-2022-0010-
0025; California Special Districts Association, CISA-2022-0010-0042;
Professional Services Council, CISA-2022-0010-0044; American
Association of Port Authorities, CISA-2022-0010-0126; Virginia Port
Authority, CISA-2022-0010-0052; CHIME, CISA-2022-0010-0035; AHIP,
CISA-2022-0010-0091.
\116\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Payments Leadership
Council, CISA-2022-0010-0031 (recommending CISA consider a report to
include substantially similar information if ``the material essence
of the incident is reflected in the information contained within the
report to the other federal entity''); BSA [bond] The Software
Alliance, CISA-2022-0010-0106 (recommending that there be a
``rebuttable presumption that a report provided by a covered entity
to another federal entity is substantially similar'').
\117\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by NAFCU, CISA-2022-0010-
0076.
\118\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
CISA-2022-0010-0075; National Defense ISAC, CISA-2022-0010-0144.
\119\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Energy Transfer LP, CISA-
2022-0010-0037
\120\ See Comment submitted by Nuclear Energy Institute, CISA-
2022-0010-0029; see also comment submitted by Blue Cross Blue Shield
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0103.
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xi. Comments on Noncompliance and Enforcement
A small number of commenters offered recommendations related to
noncompliance and enforcement of the CIRCIA regulations. These
commenters encouraged CISA to keep in mind that covered entities are
victims of an incident \121\ and recommended that CISA focus on
collaboration, not enforcement.\122\ Similarly, a number of commenters
recommended that CISA not penalize entities for reporting in good faith
under the rule.\123\ Such possible penalties that commenters
recommended CISA avoid included pursuing enforcement under CIRCIA or
allowing CIRCIA Reports to be the basis for enforcement actions by
other Federal departments and agencies under separate regulations.\124\
One commenter suggested that non-profit, self-incorporated fire and
Emergency Management Service departments be excluded from enforcement
in the same manner as SLTT Government Entities.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the National Technology
Security Coalition, CISA-2022-0010-0061; The Associations: BPI, ABA,
IIB, SIFMA, CISA-2022-0010-0046.
\122\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Airlines for America,
CISA-2022-0010-0066; Connected Health Initiative, CISA-2022-0010-
0130; ACT--The App Association CISA-2022-0010-0129.
\123\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Association of
American Railroads, CISA-2022-0010-0117; SolarWinds, CISA-2022-0010-
0027; NTCA--The Rural Broadband Association, CISA-2022-0010-0100.
\124\ Id.
\125\ See, e.g., Comment submitted by the International
Association of Fire Chiefs, CISA-2022-0010-0081.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
xii. Comments on Treatment and Restrictions on Use of CIRCIA Reports
Numerous commenters provided recommendations on the treatment and
restrictions on use of CIRCIA Reports and information therein. One
consistent theme throughout the comments on this topic was the notion
that CISA should take steps to ensure the confidentiality of the
information, including the identity of the victims of reported cyber
incidents, included in CIRCIA Reports.\126\ Some of the procedural
strategies recommended by commenters to achieve this include having
CISA anonymize and aggregate cyber incident report information prior to
sharing it with others,\127\ exempting CIRCIA Reports and/or the
information contained therein from release under FOIA and similar state
laws,\128\ and considering treating CIRCIA Reports as Protected
Critical Infrastructure Information, ``confidential,'' or ``secret.''
\129\ Numerous commenters also stressed the need for CISA to protect
information submitted in CIRCIA Reports through strong data protection
standards, data security practices, and data privacy safeguards.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by IBM, CISA-2022-0010-0069;
Gideon Rasmussen, CISA-2022-0010-0011; Institute of International
Finance, CISA-2022-0010-0060; Powder River Energy Corporation, CISA-
2022-0010-0099.
\127\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Fidelity National
Information Services, CISA-2022-0010-0033; UnityPoint Health, CISA-
2022-0010-0107; Institute of International Finance, CISA-2022-0010-
0060.
\128\ See,e.g., Comments submitted by Edison Electric Institute,
CISA-2022-0010-0079; HIMSS, CISA-2022-0010-0119; National Grain and
Feed Association, CISA-2022-0010-0104; NAFCU, CISA-2022-0010-0076.
\129\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by NCTA, CISA-2022-0010-
0102; SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114.
\130\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Financial Services
Sector Coordinating Council, CISA-2022-0010-0094; The Clearing
House, CISA-2022-0010-0086; Payments Leadership Council, CISA-2022-
0010-0031.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters also suggested several different limitations on the use
of the information contained in CIRCIA Reports. A number of commenters
recommended CISA include adequate liability protections in the proposed
regulation.\131\ Other commenters recommended CISA clarify that
reporting does not result in the waiver
[[Page 23660]]
of attorney-client privilege, trade secret protections, or other
privileges or protections.\132\ A few commenters recommended that
information contained in CIRCIA Reports be protected from discovery in
civil or criminal actions.\133\ One commenter recommended that the
various protections afforded to CIRCIA Reports still apply even in the
event that a CIRCIA Report is compromised (i.e., accessed by an
unauthorized individual or made public in an unauthorized manner).\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by American Chemistry
Council, CISA-2022-0010-0098; SolarWinds, CISA-2022-0010-0027; The
Associations: BPI, ABA, IIB, SIFMA, CISA-2022-0010-0046.
\132\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by CrowdStrike, CISA-2022-
0010-0128; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, CISA-2022-0010-0075; Connected
Health Initiative, CISA-2022-0010-0130.
\133\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by Connected Health
Initiative, CISA-2022-0010-0130; ACT [bond] The App Association,
CISA-2022-0010-0129.
\134\ See Comment submitted by submitted by Health-ISAC and the
Healthcare and Public Health Sector Coordinating Council
Cybersecurity Working Group, CISA-2022-0010-0123.
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IV. Discussion of Proposed Rule
A. Definitions
Section 226.1 of the proposed rule contains proposed definitions
for certain terms used within the rule. These proposed definitions are
intended to help clarify the meaning of various terms used throughout
the proposed rule and promote consistency in application of the
regulatory requirements.
For a number of the terms, CISA proposes using, either verbatim or
with minor adjustments, definitions provided in the Definitions
sections of CIRCIA, as amended (6 U.S.C. 681). For several other terms
where CIRCIA does not include a CIRCIA-specific definition, CISA
proposes using, either verbatim or with minor adjustments, definitions
provided in the Definitions sections at Section 2 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) or at the beginning of Title XXII
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650), each as amended,
since definitions in those sections also apply to CIRCIA. Proposed
definitions that are derived from these legal authorities include:
cloud service provider; cyber incident; Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency or CISA; cybersecurity threat; Director;
information system; managed service provider; ransom payment;
ransomware attack; supply chain compromise; and virtual currency.
Additionally, CISA is proposing definitions for a variety of terms
that will have a specific meaning within the proposed regulation. These
include CIRCIA; CIRCIA Agreement; CIRCIA Report; covered cyber
incident; Covered Cyber Incident Report; covered entity; Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report; personal information; Ransom
Payment Report; State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial Government entity
or SLTT Government entity; substantial cyber incident; and Supplemental
Report. The basis for each of these proposed definitions is discussed
in their respective subsection below.
i. Covered Entity
Covered entity is a key term in the proposed regulation as, among
other things, it is the operative term used to describe the regulated
parties responsible for complying with the covered cyber incident and
ransom payment reporting and data and records preservation requirements
in the proposed CIRCIA regulation. While the statute includes a
definition for the term covered entity, the statute explicitly requires
CISA to further clarify the meaning of that term through description in
the CIRCIA rulemaking. Specifically, the statute defines covered entity
to mean ``an entity in a critical infrastructure sector, as defined in
Presidential Policy Directive 21, that satisfies the definition
established by the Director in the final rule issued pursuant to
section 681b(b) of this title.'' 6 U.S.C. 681(4). CIRCIA also requires
CISA to include a ``clear description of the types of entities that
constitute covered entities'' in the final rule based on various
specified factors. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1).
CISA proposes to provide the criteria for covered entities in an
Applicability section at Sec. 226.2 of the regulation with a cross-
reference to the Applicability section in the Definitions section under
the term covered entity. See Section IV.B below and Sec. 226.2 for a
detailed discussion of the proposed covered entity criteria and the
``clear description of the types of entities that constitute covered
entities,'' required by 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1).
ii. Cyber Incident, Covered Cyber Incident, and Substantial Cyber
Incident
1. Cyber Incident
CISA is proposing to include in the regulation a definition of the
term cyber incident. The definition of cyber incident is important as
it will help bound the types of incidents that trigger reporting
requirements for covered entities under the proposed regulation.
CIRCIA states that the term cyber incident ``(A) has the meaning
given the term `incident' in section 2209; and (B) does not include an
occurrence that imminently, but not actually, jeopardizes--(i)
information on information systems; or (ii) information systems.'' See
6 U.S.C. 681(5). Section 2209's definition of ``incident'' has since
been moved to Section 2200 and defines the term ``incident'' as ``an
occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful
authority, the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of
information on an information system, or actually or imminently
jeopardizes, without lawful authority, an information system.'' See 6
U.S.C. 650(12).\135\
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\135\ The definition of ``incident'' was moved from Section 2209
of the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. 659) to Section 2200 of the
Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. 650(12)) as part of the
consolidation of definitions in Section 7143 (CISA Technical
Corrections and Improvements) of the James M. Inhofe National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (hereinafter, ``CISA
Technical Corrections''). Public Law 117-263, Div. G, Title LXXI,
Sec. 7143, Dec. 23, 2022. Section (f)(2) of the CISA Technical
Corrections includes a rule of construction that provides that
``[a]ny reference to a term defined in the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) on the day before the date of enactment
of this Act that is defined in section 2200 of that Act pursuant to
the amendments made under this Act shall be deemed to be a reference
to that term as defined in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, as added by this Act.'' Pursuant to this rule of
construction, the cross-reference in CIRCIA's definition of ``cyber
incident'' to the definition of ``incident'' in Section 2209 of the
Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. 659) is deemed a reference to the
definition of ``incident'' in Section 2200 of the Homeland Security
Act (6 U.S.C. 650).
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CISA is proposing to define cyber incident to mean an occurrence
that actually jeopardizes, without lawful authority, the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of information on an information
system, or actually jeopardizes, without lawful authority, an
information system. The definition would use the 6 U.S.C. 650
definition verbatim other than striking the ``imminently jeopardizes''
clause in that definition, as required by 6 U.S.C. 681(5)(B).
2. Covered Cyber Incident
CIRCIA requires CISA to include within the proposed rule a
definition for the term covered cyber incident. See 6 U.S.C. 681(3).
Because CIRCIA requires covered entities to report only those cyber
incidents that qualify as covered cyber incidents to CISA, this
definition is essential for triggering the reporting requirement. CISA
is proposing to define the term covered cyber incident to mean a
substantial cyber incident experienced by a covered entity. CISA also
proposes definitions for both substantial cyber incident and covered
entity within this NPRM.
Within CIRCIA, Congress defined a covered cyber incident as ``a
substantial cyber incident experienced by a covered entity that
satisfies the definition and
[[Page 23661]]
criteria established by the Director in the final rule issued pursuant
to section 681b(b) of this title.'' See 6 U.S.C. 681(3). CISA believes
that defining a covered cyber incident to include all substantial cyber
incidents experienced by a covered entity rather than some subset
thereof is both consistent with the statutory definition of covered
cyber incident and is the least complicated approach to defining
covered cyber incidents.
Under this approach, a covered entity simply needs to determine if
a cyber incident is a substantial cyber incident for it to be reported,
rather than having to perform an additional analysis to determine if a
substantial cyber incident meets some narrower criteria for a covered
cyber incident. As the term substantial cyber incident is not used in
CIRCIA other than to help define a covered cyber incident, CISA does
not see any benefit to having one set of requirements for what
constitutes a substantial cyber incident and a separate set of
requirements for which substantial cyber incidents experienced by a
covered entity qualify as covered cyber incidents.
3. Substantial Cyber Incident
CISA is proposing to include within the rule a definition for the
term substantial cyber incident. Given CISA's proposal to define a
covered cyber incident as a substantial cyber incident experienced by a
covered entity, the term substantial cyber incident is essential to the
CIRCIA regulation as it identifies the types of incidents that, when
experienced by a covered entity, must be reported to CISA.
While CIRCIA does not define the term substantial cyber incident,
it provides minimum requirements for the types of substantial cyber
incidents that qualify as covered cyber incidents. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A). Consistent with these minimum requirements, CISA
proposes the term substantial cyber incident to mean a cyber incident
that leads to any of the following: (a) a substantial loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a covered entity's
information system or network; (b) a serious impact on the safety and
resiliency of a covered entity's operational systems and processes; (c)
a disruption of a covered entity's ability to engage in business or
industrial operations, or deliver goods or services; or (d)
unauthorized access to a covered entity's information system or
network, or any nonpublic information contained therein, that is
facilitated through or caused by either a compromise of a cloud service
provider, managed service provider, other third-party data hosting
provider, or a supply chain compromise. CISA is further proposing that
a substantial cyber incident resulting in one of the listed impacts
include any cyber incident regardless of cause, including, but not
limited to, a compromise of a cloud service provider, managed service
provider, or other third-party data hosting provider; a supply chain
compromise; a denial-of-service attack; a ransomware attack; or
exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability. Finally, CISA is proposing
the term substantial cyber incident does not include (a) any lawfully
authorized activity of a United States Government entity or SLTT
Government entity, including activities undertaken pursuant to a
warrant or other judicial process; (b) any event where the cyber
incident is perpetrated in good faith by an entity in response to a
specific request by the owner or operator of the information system; or
(c) the threat of disruption as extortion, as described in 6 U.S.C.
650(22).\136\
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\136\ The definition of ransomware attack contained in Section
2240(14)(A) was originally codified in 6 U.S.C. 681(14) but was
moved from 6 U.S.C. 681(14) to 6 U.S.C. 650(22) as part of the
consolidation of definitions in the CISA Technical Corrections,
supra note 135. The CISA Technical Corrections, however, did not
update this cross-reference in CIRCIA. Nevertheless, pursuant to the
rule of construction in Section (f)(2) of the CISA Technical
Corrections, the cross reference in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(C)(ii) to
part of the definition of ransomware attack in 6 U.S.C. 681(14) is
deemed a reference to the definition of ransomware attack now in 6
U.S.C. 650 (Section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act).
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In developing this proposed definition, CISA examined how other
Federal departments and agencies that regulate cyber incident reporting
define similar terminology for their reporting regimes, reviewed the
Model Definition for a Reportable Cyber Incident proposed by the
Secretary of Homeland Security in the CIRC-informed DHS Report to
Congress (the ``CIRC Model Definition''), and considered the many
comments received on this topic from stakeholders both at CIRCIA
listening sessions and in written comments submitted in response to the
CIRCIA RFI. CISA considered those various perspectives and approaches
both within the constraints explicitly imposed by CIRCIA and in light
of the purposes for which CISA believes CIRCIA was created as described
in Section III.C in this document.
The proposed definition contains the following elements: (1) a set
of four threshold impacts which, if one or more occur as the result of
a cyber incident, would qualify that cyber incident as a substantial
cyber incident; (2) an explicit acknowledgment that substantial cyber
incidents can be caused through compromises of third-party service
providers or supply chains, as well as various techniques and methods;
and (3) three separate types of incidents that, even if they were to
meet the other criteria contained within the substantial cyber incident
definition, would be excluded from treatment as a substantial cyber
incident. Each of these elements is addressed in turn below.
a. Minimum Requirements for a Cyber Incident To Be a Substantial Cyber
Incident
While Congress did not define the term substantial cyber incident
in CIRCIA, Congress did include minimum requirements for the types of
substantial cyber incidents that constitute covered cyber incidents.
See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A).\137\ Because CISA is proposing that a
covered cyber incident mean any substantial cyber incident experienced
by a covered entity (see Section IV.A.ii.2 in this document), CISA
interprets the minimum requirements enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A) as the minimum requirements an incident must meet to be
considered a substantial cyber incident (as opposed to a subset of
substantial cyber incidents that constitute covered cyber incidents).
Thus, while CISA has discretion to raise the threshold required for
something to be a substantial cyber incident, resulting in a reduction
of the number of incidents that would qualify as substantial, CISA may
not lower the threshold below the requirements enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A).
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\137\ 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A) states that the types of
substantial cyber incidents that constitute covered cyber incidents
must, ``at a minimum, require the occurrence of (i) a cyber incident
that leads to substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of such information system or network, or a serious
impact on the safety and resiliency of operational systems and
processes; (ii) a disruption of business or industrial operations,
including due to a denial-of-service attack, ransomware attack, or
exploitation of a zero day vulnerability, against (I) an information
system or network; or (II) an operational technology system or
process; or (iii) unauthorized access or disruption of business or
industrial operations due to loss of service facilitated through, or
caused by, a compromise of a cloud service provider, managed service
provider, or other third-party data hosting provider or by a supply
chain compromise.''
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CISA believes that the minimum requirements enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A) create a sufficiently high threshold to prevent
overreporting by making it clear that routine or minor cyber incidents
do not need to be reported. Accordingly, CISA is proposing to use those
requirements as the basis for the first part of the definition of
substantial cyber incident,
[[Page 23662]]
with minor modifications for clarity and for greater consistency with
the CIRC Model Definition of a reportable cyber incident. Ultimately,
CISA is proposing four types of impacts that, if experienced by a
covered entity as a result of a cyber incident, would result in the
incident being classified as a substantial cyber incident and therefore
reportable under the CIRCIA regulation. Each of these impact types is
described in its own prong of the substantial cyber incident
definition.
i. Impact 1: Substantial Loss of Confidentiality, Integrity, or
Availability
Under the first proposed threshold impact, a cyber incident would
be considered a substantial cyber incident if it resulted in a
substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a
covered entity's information system or network. See Sec. 226.1 of the
proposed regulation. This impact reflects the substantive criteria
contained in the first part of 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(i), which states
``a cyber incident that leads to substantial loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of such information system or network.''
Although this prong does not explicitly mention operational technology
(OT)), CISA is using the term ``information system,'' (which, per the
proposed definition, as described in Section IV.A.iv.7 in this
document, includes OT) in this threshold and proposes to interpret this
aspect of the regulation to also specifically cover cyber incidents
that lead to substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of a covered entity's OT.
The concepts of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA),
often referred to as the ``CIA triad,'' represent the three pillars of
information security.\138\ ``Confidentiality'' refers to ``preserving
authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.''
\139\ ``Integrity'' refers to ``guarding against improper information
modification or destruction and ensuring information non-repudiation
and authenticity.'' \140\ ``Availability'' refers to ``ensuring timely
and reliable access to and use of information.'' \141\
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\138\ See, e.g., NIST, Data Integrity: Identifying and
Protecting Assets Against Ransomware and Other Destructive Events,
NIST Special Publication 1800-25 Vol. A at 1 (Dec. 2020), available
at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/1800/25/final.
\139\ Id.
\140\ Id.
\141\ Id.
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The loss of CIA of an information system, including OT, or network
can occur in many ways. For example, if an unauthorized individual
steals credentials or uses a brute force attack to gain access to a
system, they have caused a loss of the confidentiality of a system. If
that unauthorized individual uses that access to modify or destroy any
information on the system, they have caused a loss of the integrity of
the system and potentially a loss of the availability of the
information contained therein. A denial-of-service attack that renders
a system or network inaccessible is another example of an incident that
leads to a loss of the availability of the system or network. These are
just some of the many types of incidents that can lead to a loss of CIA
and would be reportable if the impacts are ``substantial.''
Whether a loss of CIA constitutes a ``substantial'' loss will
likely depend on a variety of factors, such as the type, volume,
impact, and duration of the loss. One example of a cyber incident that
typically would meet the ``substantial'' threshold for this impact type
is a distributed denial-of-service attack that renders a covered
entity's service unavailable to customers for an extended period of
time. Similarly, a ransomware attack or other attack that encrypts one
of a covered entity's core business or information systems
substantially impacting the confidentiality, availability, or integrity
of the entity's data or services likely also would meet the threshold
of a substantial cyber incident under this first impact type and would
need to be reported under the CIRCIA regulation. Persistent access to
information systems by an unauthorized third party would typically be
considered a substantial loss of confidentiality. By contrast, even
time-limited access to certain high-value information systems, such as
access to privileged credentials or to a domain controller, could also
be considered a substantial loss of confidentiality. A large-scale data
breach or otherwise meaningful exfiltration of data typically would
also be considered a substantial cyber incident as it would reflect a
substantial loss of the confidentiality of an information system. A
theft of data that may or may not itself meet the ``substantial''
impact threshold by nature of the data theft alone (based on the type
or volume of data stolen) could become a substantial cyber incident if
the theft is followed by a data leak or a credible threat to leak data.
Conversely, CISA would not expect a denial-of-service attack or other
incident that results in a covered entity's public-facing website being
unavailable for a few minutes to typically rise to the level of a
substantial cyber incident under this impact.\142\
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\142\ The examples provided in this paragraph and elsewhere in
this section of what typically might or might not be considered a
substantial cyber incident are simply a few sample scenarios meant
to provide context around this discussion. The examples are not
meant as an exhaustive or definitive list of what is and is not a
substantial cyber incident. Whether something is or is not a
substantial cyber incident is fact-dependent and must be assessed on
a case-by-case basis. For example, while, as noted, an incident
resulting in a brief unavailability of a public-facing website would
typically not qualify as a substantial loss of availability, such an
incident may be significant for a covered entity whose public-facing
website is a core part of its service offering (such as a webmail
provider).
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ii. Impact 2: Serious Impact on Safety and Resiliency of Operational
Systems and Processes
The second impact type of the proposed substantial cyber incident
definition would require a covered entity to report a cyber incident
that results in a serious impact on the safety and resiliency of a
covered entity's operational systems and processes. This impact
reflects the threshold enumerated in the second part of 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(i), which states ``a cyber incident that leads to . . . a
serious impact on the safety and resiliency of operational systems and
processes.'' Safety is a commonly understood term, which NIST defines
as ``[f]reedom from conditions that can cause death, injury,
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or
damage to the environment.'' \143\ NIST defines resilience as ``[t]he
ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand
and recover rapidly from disruption,'' and operational resilience as
``[t]he ability of systems to resist, absorb, and recover from, or
adapt to an adverse occurrence during operation that may cause harm,
destruction, or loss of the ability to perform mission-related
functions.'' \144\
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\143\ NIST, Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems, NIST Special
Publication 800-160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1, at 67 (Dec. 2021), available at
https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/160/v2/r1/final.
\144\ Id. at 65-66.
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Similar to the interpretation of the word ``substantial'' in the
first impact type, whether an impact on the safety and resiliency of an
operational system or process is ``serious'' will likely depend on a
variety of factors, such as the safety or security hazards associated
with the system or process, and the scale and duration of the impact.
For example, a cyber incident that noticeably increases the potential
for a release of a hazardous material used in chemical manufacturing or
water purification likely would meet this
[[Page 23663]]
definition. Similarly, a cyber incident that compromised or disrupted a
BES cyber system that performs one or more reliability tasks would also
likely meet this prong of the substantial cyber incident definition.
Further, a cyber incident that disrupts the ability of a communications
service provider to transmit or deliver emergency alerts or 911 calls,
or results in the transmission of false emergency alerts or 911 calls,
would meet this definition. While CISA anticipates that the types of
incidents that will actually lead to a serious impact to the safety and
resilience of operational systems and processes may frequently involve
OT, CISA does not interpret ``operational systems and processes'' to be
a reference to OT. Congress used the specific phrase ``operational
technology'' elsewhere in CIRCIA--including in the immediate next
provision--and therefore certainly could have used it in this provision
if that was the intent. Compare 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(i) with 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(ii)(II)). Accordingly, CISA interprets this prong broadly
as not being limited to only incidents impacting OT, and covered
entities should report incidents that are covered cyber incidents under
this prong of the definition even if the impacts that meet the
threshold are not to OT.
iii. Impact 3: Disruption of Ability To Engage in Business or
Industrial Operations
The third impact of the proposed substantial cyber incident
definition would require a covered entity to report an incident that
results in a disruption of a covered entity's ability to engage in
business or industrial operations, or deliver goods or services. This
prong reflects criteria enumerated by Congress in both 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), which provides that one type of incident
that could qualify as a substantial cyber incident that constitutes a
covered cyber incident is a cyber incident that causes a disruption of
business or industrial operations, including due to a denial-of-service
attack, ransomware attack, or exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability,
against (I) an information system or network; or (II) an operational
technology system or process; or unauthorized access or disruption of
business or industrial operations due to loss of service facilitated
through, or caused by, a compromise of a CSP, managed service provider,
or other third-party data hosting provider or by a supply chain
compromise.
In drafting this prong, CISA has added two clauses to the statutory
criteria relating to an entity's ability to engage in business
operations or deliver goods or services. CISA proposes adding these
clauses to this prong of the substantial cyber incident definition to
clarify CISA's understanding of the statutory language. CISA
understands that a disruption of business operations includes a
disruption to an entity's ability to engage in business operations and
the ability to deliver goods or services. CISA considers this language
to be a clarification of the statutory language, and not an expansion.
NIST defines a disruption as ``[a]n unplanned event that causes a .
. . system to be inoperable for a length of time (e.g., minor or
extended power outage, extended unavailable network, or equipment or
facility damage or destruction).'' \145\ As opposed to the statutory
source for the first two prongs of this definition, the portion of
CIRCIA from which this prong is drawn does not contain a qualifier such
as ``substantial'' or ``serious.'' Nevertheless, because this prong is
part of the threshold for a ``substantial'' cyber incident, CISA
believes it is appropriate to read into the prong some level of
significance. Like the previous prongs, whether a disruption rises to
the level of reportability may depend on a variety of factors and
circumstances, such as the scope of the disruption and what was
disrupted. A relatively minor disruption to a critical system or
network could rise to a high level of substantiality, while a
significant disruption to a non-critical system or network might not.
Generally speaking, incidents that result in minimal or insignificant
disruptions are unlikely to rise to the level of a substantial cyber
incident reportable under this prong; however, the specific
circumstances of the disruption should be taken into consideration.
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\145\ NIST, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information
Systems, NIST Special Publication 800-34 Rev. 1, Appendix G, (May
2010), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/34/r1/upd1/final.
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While 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(ii) provides that this category
includes disruptions of business or industrial operations ``due to a
denial of service attack, ransomware attack, or exploitation of a zero
day vulnerability,'' CISA is not proposing to include this language in
this third prong, as CISA reads this language as being illustrative of
the types of incidents that might lead to a disruption of business or
industrial operations, rather than a limitation on the types of
incidents that can be reportable under this prong. To that end,
examples of cyber incidents that would meet this prong include the
exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability resulting in the extended
downtime of a covered entity's information system or network, a
ransomware attack that locks a covered entity out of its industrial
control system, or a distributed denial-of-service attack that prevents
customers from accessing their accounts with a covered entity for an
extended period of time. Another example would be where a critical
access hospital is unable to operate due to a ransomware attack on a
third-party medical records software company on whom the critical
access hospital relies; the critical access hospital, and perhaps the
medical records software company as well if it also is a covered
entity, would need to report the incident. Cyber incidents that result
in minor disruptions, such as short-term unavailability of a business
system or a temporary need to reroute network traffic, typically would
not be considered substantial under this prong.
iv. Impact 4: Unauthorized Access Facilitated Through or Caused by a:
(1) Compromise of a CSP, Managed Service Provider, or Other Third-Party
Data Hosting Provider, or (2) Supply Chain Compromise
The fourth prong of the proposed substantial cyber incident
definition would require a covered entity to report an incident that
results in unauthorized access to a covered entity's information system
or network, or any nonpublic information contained therein, that is
facilitated through or caused by a compromise of a CSP, managed service
provider, other third-party data hosting provider, or by a supply chain
compromise. This prong reflects criteria enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(iii).
NIST defines unauthorized access as occurring when an individual
``gains logical or physical access without permission to a network,
system, application, data, or other resource.'' \146\ Unauthorized
access causes actual jeopardy to information systems and the
information therein by compromising the first pillar of the CIA triad--
confidentiality--and by providing an adversary with a launching off
point for additional penetration of a system or network. Much like the
third prong, the source language in CIRCIA does not contain any
qualifier such as ``substantial'' or ``serious.'' However, unlike that
prong, CISA understands the absence of a qualifier here to be a
reflection of the seriousness of
[[Page 23664]]
unauthorized access through a third party (such as a managed service
provider or CSP) or a supply chain compromise. Such cyber incidents
uniquely have the ability to cause significant or substantial nation-
level impacts, even if the impacts at many of the individual covered
entities are relatively minor. The legislative intent makes clear that
supply chain compromises such as the ``SUNBURST'' malware that
compromised legitimate updates of customers using the SolarWinds Orion
product, and third-party incidents like the compromise of the managed
service provider Kaseya, were major drivers of the passage of
CIRCIA.\147\ CISA therefore understands that this prong reflects a
recognition that CISA needs visibility into the breadth of a third-
party incident or supply chain compromise to adequately meet its
obligations under CIRCIA.
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\146\ NIST, Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security, NIST
Special Publication 800-82 Rev. 3, at 168 (Sept. 2023), available at
https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final.
\147\ See, e.g., CHS Fact Sheet, supra note 16, (referencing the
SolarWinds supply chain compromise); Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Staff Report: America's Data Held Hostage:
Case Studies in Ransomware Attacks on American Companies, 25-27
(Mar. 2022) (discussing the Kaseya ransomware attacks), available at
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/americas-data-held-hostage-case-studies-in-ransomware-attacks-on-american-companies/;
Business Meeting, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee, Opening Remarks by Ranking Member Rob Portman (Oct. 6,
2021), (citing SolarWinds as an example of an event that shows why
greater transparency of these types of events through cyber incident
reporting to CISA is needed), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/10-06-2021-business-meeting/;
Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing, supra note 17, at 55 (Statement of
Rep. James Langevin) (``The SolarWinds breach has brought new
attention to the issue of incident reporting, and for good
reason.''); 168 Cong. Rec. S1149 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2022)
(statement of Sen. Mark Warner) (``The SolarWinds breach
demonstrated how broad the ripple effects of these attacks can be,
affecting hundreds or even thousands of entities connected to the
initial target.'').
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Examples of cyber incidents that CISA typically would consider
meeting this prong include a detected, unauthorized intrusion into an
information system or the exfiltration of information as a result of a
supply chain compromise (see Section IV.A.iv.13 for further discussion
on the meaning of supply chain compromise). Similarly, unauthorized
access that was achieved through exploitation of a vulnerability in the
cloud services provided to a covered entity by a CSP or by leveraging
access to a covered entity's system through a managed service provider
would meet this prong. Conversely, because the statute requires the
unauthorized access to have been facilitated through or caused by a
compromise of a third-party service provider or supply chain
compromise, unauthorized access that results from a vulnerability
within proprietary code developed by the covered entity or a gap in the
covered entity's access control procedures that allows an unauthorized
employee administrative access to the system would not constitute a
substantial cyber incident under this prong (though could still qualify
as a substantial cyber incident under one of the first three prongs if
it resulted in the requisite impact levels).
b. Guidance for Assessing Whether an Impact Threshold Is Met
When evaluating whether a cyber incident meets one of the four
proposed impact thresholds that would qualify it as a substantial cyber
incident, a covered entity should keep in mind several principles.
First, an incident needs to meet only one of the four prongs, not all
four of the prongs, for it to be a substantial cyber incident. CISA
believes Congress's use of the word ``or'' in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)
was intentional and was meant to confer the fact that for an incident
to be a substantial cyber incident that meets the threshold of a
covered cyber incident it only had to meet one of the enumerated
criteria, not all the enumerated criteria. CISA's proposed definition
for substantial cyber incident follows this example, using ``or''
intentionally to indicate that if an incident meets any of the
enumerated criteria within the definition it is a substantial cyber
incident. This approach is also consistent with the CIRC Model
Definition, with which, for the reasons discussed below, CISA attempted
to align to the extent practicable.
Second, for an incident to qualify as a substantial cyber incident,
CISA interprets CIRCIA to require the incident to actually result in
one or more of the impacts described above. A number of other cyber
incident reporting regulations do not require actual impacts for an
incident to have to be reported; rather, some require reporting if an
incident results in imminent or potential harm, or identification of a
vulnerability. While good policy rationales exist for both approaches
in various contexts, CISA believes the phrase ``require the occurrence
of'' in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A) limits reportable incidents under CIRCIA
to those that have actually resulted in at least one of the impacts
described in that section of CIRCIA. Likewise, CIRCIA's definition of
cyber incident (of which substantial cyber incidents are a subset)
specifically omits occurrences imminently, but not actually,
jeopardizing information systems or information on information systems.
6 U.S.C. 681(5). Consequently, if a cyber incident jeopardizes an
entity or puts the entity at imminent risk of threshold impacts but
does not actually result in any of the impacts included in the proposed
definition, the cyber incident does not meet the definition of a
substantial cyber incident. Similarly, if malicious cyber activity is
thwarted by a firewall or other defensive or mitigative measure before
causing the requisite level of impact, it would not meet the proposed
definition of a substantial cyber incident and would not have to be
reported. Consequently, blocked phishing attempts, failed attempts to
gain access to systems, credentials reported missing but that have not
been used to access the system and have since been rendered inactive,
and routine scanning that presents no evidence of penetration are
examples of events or incidents that typically would not be considered
substantial cyber incidents. To both convey this intention and to more
closely align with the language used in the CIRC Model Definition, CISA
is proposing ``a cyber incident that leads to'' as the introductory
language before the enumerated threshold prongs. CISA believes the
phrase ``leads to'' satisfactorily conveys that a covered entity must
have experienced one of the enumerated impacts for an incident to be
considered a substantial cyber incident.
Third, the type of TTP used by an adversary to perpetrate the cyber
incident and cause the requisite level of impact is typically
irrelevant to the determination of whether an incident is a substantial
cyber incident.\148\ CISA believes that the specific attack vector or
TTP used to perpetrate the incident (e.g., malware, denial-of-service,
spoofing, phishing) should not be relevant to determining if an
incident is a substantial cyber incident if one of the impact threshold
prongs are met. One of the primary purposes of the CIRCIA regulation is
to allow CISA the ability to identify TTPs being used by adversaries to
cause cyber incidents. Limiting reporting to a specific list of TTPs
that CISA currently is aware of would inhibit CISA's ability to fully
understand the dynamic cyberthreat landscape as it evolves over time or
be able to warn infrastructure owners and
[[Page 23665]]
operators of novel or reemerging TTPs. (See further discussion in
Section IV.A.ii.3.f of this document describing why CISA is proposing
not to use the sophistication or novelty of the tactics used to narrow
the definition of substantial cyber incidents.) This is also consistent
with CIRCIA's statutory language, which references certain types of
TTPs, such as denial-of-service attacks or exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability, as only examples, rather than a limitation on reportable
covered cyber incidents. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ The primary exception is the fourth prong, which is
limited to instances where unauthorized access was facilitated
through or caused by a compromise of a CSP, managed service
provider, or another third-party data hosting provider, or by a
supply chain compromise. However, even within this vector-specific
prong, the specific TTPs used by the threat actor to compromise a
third-party provider or the supply chain is not relevant to whether
the incident is reportable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, for similar reasons, CISA has elected not to limit the
definition of substantial cyber incident to impacts to specific types
of systems, networks, or technologies. A number of commenters suggested
that CISA should only require reporting of incidents that impact
critical systems. CISA is proposing that under CIRCIA, if a cyber
incident impacting a system, network, or technology that an entity may
not believe is critical nonetheless results in actual impacts that meet
the level of one or more of the threshold impact prongs, then the
incident should be reported to CISA. In addition to helping ensure CISA
receives reports on substantial cyber incidents even if they were
perpetrated against a system, network, or technology deemed non-
critical by the impacted covered entity, this approach also has the
benefit of alleviating the need for a covered entity to proactively
determine which systems, networks, or technologies it believes are
``critical'' and instead focus solely on the actual impacts of an
incident as the primary determining factor as to whether a cyber
incident is a reportable substantial cyber incident. For similar
reasons, CISA is proposing to include, but not specifically
distinguish, cyber incidents with impacts to OT. While it may be the
case that cyber incidents affecting OT are more likely to meet the
impact thresholds in the definition of substantial cyber incident, CISA
did not want to artificially scope out cyber incidents that primarily
impact business systems but nevertheless result in many of the same
type of impacts that could result from a cyber incident affecting OT.
Fifth, CISA is aware that in some cases, a covered entity will not
know for certain the cause of the incident within the first few days
following the occurrence of the incident. As is discussed in greater
detail in Section IV.E.iv on the timing of submission of CIRCIA
Reports, a covered entity does not need to know the cause of the
incident with certainty for it to be a reportable substantial cyber
incident. For incidents where the covered entity has not yet been able
to confirm the cause of the incident, the covered entity must report
the incident if it has a ``reasonable belief'' that a covered cyber
incident occurred. If an incident meets any of the impact-based
criteria, it would be reportable if the covered entity has a
``reasonable belief'' that the threshold impacts occurred as a result
of activity without lawful authority, even if the specific cause is not
confirmed. For the fourth prong, a reasonable belief that unauthorized
access was caused by a third-party provider or a supply chain
compromise would be sufficient to trigger a reporting obligation, even
if the cause of the cyber incident was not yet confirmed. As discussed
in Section III.C.ii on the purposes of the regulation, timely reporting
is of the essence for CISA to be able to quickly analyze incident
reports, identify trends, and provide early warnings to other entities
before they can become victims. Accordingly, CISA believes its ability
to achieve the regulatory purposes of CIRCIA would be greatly
undermined if covered entities were allowed to delay reporting until an
incident has been confirmed to have been perpetrated without lawful
authority. Therefore, an incident whose cause is undetermined, but for
which the covered entity has a reasonable belief that the incident may
have been perpetrated without lawful authority, must be reported if the
incident otherwise meets the reporting criteria. If, however, the
covered entity knows with certainty the cause of the incident, then the
covered entity only needs to report the incident if the incident was
perpetrated without lawful authority.
Finally, CISA expects a covered entity to exercise reasonable
judgment in determining whether it has experienced a cyber incident
that meets one of the substantiality thresholds. If a covered entity is
unsure as to whether a cyber incident meets a particular threshold,
CISA encourages the entity to either proactively report the incident or
reach out to CISA to discuss whether the incident needs to be reported.
c. Reportability of Cyber Incidents Regardless of Cause
As noted in Section IV.A.ii.3.a.iv of this document, the CIRCIA
statute limits which cyber incidents only involving unauthorized access
can be considered a substantial cyber incident. Specifically, the
statute states that to be considered a substantial cyber incident based
on unauthorized access alone (without any of the impacts listed in the
first three prongs, such as where the unauthorized access does not
result in a ``substantial'' loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability under the first prong), a cyber incident must be
facilitated through or caused by a compromise of a CSP, managed service
provider, another third-party data hosting provider, or by a supply
chain compromise. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(iii). Cyber incidents
resulting in impacts other than unauthorized access and described in
the first three impact prongs are not limited by the source or cause in
the same manner. Similarly, as noted in Section IV.A.ii.3.a.iii of this
document, CISA does not view the language in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(ii)
regarding denial-of-service attacks, ransomware attacks, or
exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability as suggesting a limitation on
the vector or type of incidents in the third prong, or to suggest that
denial-of-service attacks, ransomware attacks, or exploitation of a
zero-day vulnerability that leads to the impacts described in the first
two prongs would not be reportable if the impact thresholds are
otherwise met. To ensure it is clear that cyber incidents resulting in
threshold impacts other than unauthorized access should be reported
regardless of cause or vector, including whether they were or were not
facilitated through or caused by a compromise of a third-party service
provider or supply chain compromise, denial-of-service attack,
ransomware attack, or exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability, CISA is
proposing to include in the definition of substantial cyber incident
explicit language to that effect. Specifically, CISA is proposing to
include in the definition of substantial cyber incident the statement
that a substantial cyber incident resulting in any of the threshold
impacts identified in the first three prongs includes any cyber
incident regardless of cause. See proposed Sec. 226.1. As indicated in
the proposed regulatory text, CISA interprets the phrase ``regardless
of cause'' to include, but not be limited to, incidents caused by a
compromise of a CSP, managed service provider, or other third-party
data hosting provider; a supply chain compromise; a denial-of-service
attack; a ransomware attack; or exploitation of a zero-day
vulnerability.
In today's complex cyber environment, entities frequently rely on
third parties for various IT-related services, such as hosting,
administering, managing, or securing networks, systems, applications,
infrastructure, and digital information. Depending on what services are
being provided, these third-party service providers--be they CSPs,
managed service providers, or other third-party data hosting
[[Page 23666]]
providers--via the systems and networks they manage, may provide an
additional avenue through which nefarious individuals can seek to
impact a service provider's customer's information systems or the
information contained therein, which may also impact a covered entity.
Similarly, adversaries may seek to impact covered entities by
exploiting elements of the supply chain that a covered entity may rely
upon.
This part of the substantial cyber incident definition is intended,
in part, to ensure that a covered entity reports cyber incidents
experienced by the covered entity that rise to the level of
substantiality that warrants reporting even if the cyber incident in
question was caused by a compromise of a product or service managed by
someone other than the covered entity. This clause is important to
prevent the creation of a ``blind spot'' where the covered entity
experiences a substantial cyber incident but escapes required reporting
based on the manner in which the incident was initiated or perpetrated.
Congress recognized the importance of this approach, and explicitly
authorized it in CIRCIA for incidents that resulted in ``unauthorized
access or disruption of business or industrial operations due to loss
of service facilitated through, or caused by, a compromise of a cloud
service provider, managed service provider, or other third-party data
hosting provider or by a supply chain compromise.'' 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(iii).
CISA believes the policy rationale for applying this provision to
incidents resulting in unauthorized access or disruption of business or
industrial operations (the third and fourth threshold prongs) applies
equally to incidents resulting in a substantial loss of CIA, or a
serious impact on the safety and resiliency of operational systems and
processes (the first and second prongs). Accordingly, CISA proposes
including this clause as a full part of the substantial cyber incident
definition, so that it applies to cyber incidents that result in
impacts meeting any of the four impact threshold prongs.
While a covered entity must report qualifying incidents that are
the result of a compromise of a CSP, managed service provider, or other
third-party data hosting provider, or by a supply chain compromise, it
is important to note that this imposes reporting requirements solely on
the covered entity that the incident impacts at a threshold level.
Accordingly, a CSP, managed service provider, or other third-party
service provider is not obligated, by virtue of this provision, to
report an incident that causes threshold level impacts to one of its
customers even if the impacts are the result of a compromise of the
third-party's services, network, software, etc. A third-party service
provider only needs to report a cyber incident if (a) the third-party
service provider independently meets the definition of covered entity,
and (b) the third-party service provider itself experiences impacts
that rise to the level of a substantial cyber incident. Note, however,
a covered entity third-party provider could experience a reportable
substantial cyber incident without the third-party service provider
experiencing direct impacts from a cyber incident that exploits or
compromises their information networks or systems. This would be the
case where a cyber incident facilitated through or caused by a
compromise of the third-party service provider meeting the definition
of a covered entity caused enough impacts to one or more of the
provider's customers that the cumulative effect of the incident
resulted in a substantial disruption of the third-party service
provider's business operations.
This part of the proposed substantial cyber incident definition is
also intended to emphasize that the first three prongs of the
definition of substantial cyber incident are also TTP, incident type,
and vector agnostic. While denial-of-service attack, ransomware attack,
and exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability are specifically listed in
this part of the definition in light of their inclusion in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(A)(ii), their inclusion in the statute and this part of the
definition are as examples only. Any cyber incident experienced by a
covered entity, regardless of cause, that meets the impact thresholds
in the first three prongs of the definition of substantial cyber
incident would be considered a substantial cyber incident. This
includes, for example, exploitation of a previously known
vulnerability, and not just exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability.
For further examples of incidents that typically would and would not be
considered a substantial cyber incident, see Section IV.A.ii.3.e of
this document.
d. Exclusions
In 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(C), Congress identified two types of events
that CISA must exclude from the types of incidents that constitute
covered cyber incidents. Specifically, Congress stated that CISA was to
``exclude (i) any event where the cyber incident is perpetrated in good
faith by an entity in response to a specific request by the owner or
operator of the information system; and (ii) the threat of disruption
as extortion, as described in section 2240(14)(A).'' 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(C). In addition, CISA is proposing excluding any lawfully
authorized U.S. Government or SLTT Government entity activity including
activities undertaken pursuant to a warrant or other judicial process.
CISA is proposing to incorporate these exclusions into the
definition of substantial cyber incident by proposing a statement
reiterating these exclusions at the end of the definition itself. The
statement added to the proposed definition of substantial cyber
incident is taken almost verbatim from the CIRC Model Definition which
itself includes both of the exclusions contained in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(C). Additional information on each of the prongs of this
exclusory statement are contained in the following three subsections.
i. Lawfully Authorized Activities of a United States Government Entity
or SLTT Government Entity
CISA proposes excluding from the definition of substantial cyber
incident any lawfully authorized United States Government entity or
SLTT Government entity activity, including activities undertaken
pursuant to a warrant or other judicial process. This exception, which
is similar to an exception contained in the CIRC Model Definition, is
intended to except from reporting any incident that occurs as the
result of a lawful activity of a Federal or SLTT law enforcement
agency, Federal intelligence agency, or other Federal or SLTT
Government entity. This exception does not, however, allow a covered
entity to delay or forgo reporting a covered cyber incident to CISA
because it has reported a covered cyber incident to, or is otherwise
working with, law enforcement. It simply says that a lawful activity
conducted by a Federal or SLTT governmental entity, such as a search or
seizure conducted pursuant to a warrant, is not itself a substantial
cyber incident.
CISA believes this exception is warranted as reports on lawful
Federal or SLTT government activity would in no meaningful way further
the articulated purposes of the regulation, such as analyzing adversary
TTPs and enabling a better understanding of the current cyber threat
environment. This exception provides further clarity on the scope of
cyber incident, which is defined as an occurrence ``without lawful
authority.'' Moreover, failure to exclude such incidents from required
reporting could negatively impact a covered entity's willingness to
work
[[Page 23667]]
with Federal or SLTT law enforcement, intelligence, or other government
agencies if such cooperation could result in new regulatory reporting
obligations.
ii. Incidents Perpetrated in Good Faith by an Entity in Response to a
Specific Request by the Owner or Operator of the Information System
Section 681b(c)(2)(C)(i) of title 6, United States Code, states
that the description of the types of substantial cyber incidents that
constitute covered cyber incidents shall exclude ``any event where the
cyber incident is perpetrated in good faith by an entity in response to
a specific request by the owner or operator of the information
system.'' CISA is proposing incorporating this exclusion verbatim into
the proposed definition of substantial cyber incident.
There are a variety of situations in which a cyber incident could
occur at a covered entity as the result of an entity acting in good
faith to a request of the owner or operator of the information system
through which the cyber incident was perpetrated. One example of this
would be if a third-party service provider acting within the parameters
of a contract with the covered entity unintentionally misconfigures one
of the covered entity's devices leading to a service outage. Another
example would be a properly authorized penetration test that
inadvertently results in a cyber incident with actual impacts. Congress
intended that such incidents, when the result of good faith actions
conducted pursuant to a specific request by the owner or operator of
the information system at issue, be excluded from the CIRCIA reporting
requirements.
In addition to the examples provided above, CISA interprets this
exclusion to also exclude from reporting cyber incidents that result
from security research testing conducted by security researchers who
have been authorized by the covered entity or the owner or operator of
the impacted information system to attempt to compromise the system,
such as in accordance with a vulnerability disclosure policy or bug
bounty programs published by the owner or operator. However, because
the exception only applies to ``cyber incident[s] perpetrated in good
faith . . . in response to a specific request by'' the information
system owner or operator, this exception would only apply to this type
of research where the bug bounty program, vulnerability disclosure
policy, or other form of authorization preceded the discovery of the
incident. That said, CISA anticipates that this example would occur
rarely, as good faith security research should generally stop at the
point the vulnerability can be demonstrated and should not typically
engage in activity that would result in a covered cyber incident.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ See, e.g., CISA, Vulnerability Disclosure Policy Template
(``Only use exploits to the extent necessary to confirm a
vulnerability's presence. Do not use an exploit to compromise or
exfiltrate data, establish persistent command line access, or use
the exploit to pivot to other systems.''), available at https://www.cisa.gov/vulnerability-disclosure-policy-template-0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding this exclusion, the request that causes the incident need
not necessarily come from the impacted covered entity itself, but
rather from the owner or operator of the information system at issue.
While the owner or operator of the information system through which the
incident was caused will often be the covered entity, that may not
always be the case. For example, in some situations involving a CSP or
managed service provider, the service provider may duly authorize a
penetration test on its own systems or software. If such testing
inadvertently resulted in a cyber incident at the service provider, it
could have downstream effects on one or more of the service provider's
customers (such as by taking out of operation a key cloud-based
software that the customers rely upon for core operations). Such
downstream effects could themselves constitute substantial cyber
incidents, and, absent this exclusion, could be considered a covered
cyber incident, subject to reporting under the proposed CIRCIA
regulation if an impacted customer was a covered entity. However,
because such a substantial cyber incident would have been perpetrated
in good faith pursuant to a penetration test duly authorized by the
information system's owner or operator (even if the owner or operator
is not the sole impacted entity), neither the covered entity nor the
service provider would be required to report the incident.
Conversely, circumstances could occur where a covered entity or the
information system's owner or operator authorizes an action that
results in a reportable impact despite the immediately precipitating
action being approved by the covered entity or information system's
owner or operator. For instance, if a covered entity, in response to a
ransomware attack or other malicious incident, decides to take an
action itself resulting in reportable level impacts, such as shutting
down a portion of its system or operations, to prevent possibly more
significant impacts, this would still be considered a reportable
substantial cyber incident. In such a case, because the cyber incident
itself was not perpetrated in good faith, and the threshold level
impacts would not have occurred but for the initial cyber incident,
CISA would not consider the covered entity's actions to meet the ``good
faith'' exception even though the covered entity directed the
immediately precipitating action in a good faith attempt to minimize
the potential impacts of a cyber incident.
iii. The Threat of Disruption as Extortion, as Described in 6 U.S.C.
650(22)
Section 681b(c)(2)(C)(ii) of title 6, United States Code, provides
that the description of the types of substantial cyber incidents that
constitute covered cyber events shall exclude ``the threat of
disruption as extortion, as described in section 2240(14)(A).'' CISA is
proposing incorporating this exclusion verbatim into the proposed
definition of substantial cyber incident with a minor technical
correction to include the updated citation to the definition for
ransomware attack in CIRCIA.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ The definition of ransomware attack contained in Section
2240(14)(A) moved locations within the U.S. Code as part of the
consolidation of definitions in the CISA Technical Corrections,
supra note 135. While the CISA Technical Corrections did not update
this cross-reference in CIRCIA, pursuant to the rule of construction
in Section (f)(2) of the CISA Technical Corrections, CISA considers
6 U.S.C. 650 as the proper citation for the definition of
``ransomware attack'' for purposes of the proposed regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 650(22) of title 6, United States Code, defines
``ransomware attack'' as ``an incident that includes the use or threat
of use of unauthorized or malicious code on an information system, or
the use or threat of use of another digital mechanism such as a denial
of service attack, to interrupt or disrupt the operations of an
information system or compromise the confidentiality, availability, or
integrity of electronic data stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system to extort a demand for a ransom payment.'' While, as
noted above, the definition of cyber incident excludes incidents where
jeopardy is ``imminent'' but not ``actual,'' the definition of
ransomware attack includes threatened disruptions as a means of
extortion. This exclusion clarifies that the threat of disruption of a
system to extort a ransom payment that does not result in the actual
disruption of a system is an ``imminent,'' but not ``actual,'' event,
and is therefore not required to be reported as a covered cyber
incident.
However, if a covered entity makes a ransom payment in response to
such a
[[Page 23668]]
threat, even if the disruption never materializes into a substantial
cyber incident subject to covered cyber incident reporting required by
this Part, the payment itself would still be subject to ransom payment
reporting required by this Part. Only such a threat where no ransom
payment is made and the disruption never materializes into a
substantial cyber incident would remain excluded from mandatory
reporting. Additionally, as noted in Section IV.A.ii.3.a.i above, this
exclusion would not prevent a cyber incident involving a threat to
disclose information obtained from an information system without
authorization from being a reportable substantial cyber incident if the
cyber incident otherwise meets the threshold for being a substantial
cyber incident, e.g., under prong (a)(1) of the substantial cyber
incident definition due to the initial loss of confidentiality of the
information system.
e. Examples of Cyber Incidents That Meet the Definition of Substantial
Cyber Incident
To help covered entities determine what might and might not be
considered a substantial cyber incident under the proposed definition,
CISA is providing the following examples of (a) cyber incidents that
are likely to be considered substantial cyber incidents, and (b) cyber
incidents that are unlikely to be considered substantial cyber
incidents. Both of these lists are for exemplary purposes only and are
not intended to be exhaustive. Moreover, inclusion on either list is
not a formal declaration that a similar incident would or would not be
a substantial cyber incident if the agency were to finalize the
definition as proposed. Inclusion here simply indicates the relative
likelihood that such an incident would or would not rise to the level
of a reportable substantial cyber incident. Determinations as to
whether a cyber incident qualifies as a substantial cyber incident
would need to be made on a case-by-case basis considering the specific
factual circumstances surrounding the incident. Note, CISA continues to
encourage reporting or sharing of information about all cyber
incidents, even if it would not be required under the proposed
regulations.
Examples of Incidents That Likely Would Qualify as Substantial Cyber
Incidents
(1) A distributed denial-of-service attack that renders a covered
entity's service unavailable to customers for an extended period of
time.
(2) Any cyber incident that encrypts one of a covered entity's core
business systems or information systems.
(3) A cyber incident that significantly increases the potential for
a release of a hazardous material used in chemical manufacturing or
water purification.
(4) A cyber incident that compromises or disrupts a BES cyber
system that performs one or more reliability tasks.
(5) A cyber incident that disrupts the ability of a communications
service provider to transmit or deliver emergency alerts or 911 calls,
or results in the transmission of false emergency alerts or 911 calls.
(6) The exploitation of a vulnerability resulting in the extended
downtime of a covered entity's information system or network.
(7) A ransomware attack that locks a covered entity out of its
industrial control system.
(8) Unauthorized access to a covered entity's business systems
caused by the automated download of a tampered software update, even if
no known data exfiltration has been identified.
(9) Unauthorized access to a covered entity's business systems
using compromised credentials from a managed service provider.
(10) The intentional exfiltration of sensitive data in an
unauthorized manner for an unauthorized purpose, such as through
compromise of identity infrastructure or unauthorized downloading to a
flash drive or online storage account.
Examples of Incidents That Likely Would Not Qualify as Substantial
Cyber Incidents
(1) A denial-of-service attack or other incident that only results
in a brief period of unavailability of a covered entity's public-facing
website that does not provide critical functions or services to
customers or the public.
(2) Cyber incidents that result in minor disruptions, such as
short-term unavailability of a business system or a temporary need to
reroute network traffic.
(3) The compromise of a single user's credential, such as through a
phishing attempt, where compensating controls (such as enforced
multifactor authentication) are in place to preclude use of those
credentials to gain unauthorized access to a covered entity's systems.
(4) Malicious software is downloaded to a covered entity's system,
but anti-virus software successfully quarantines the software and
precludes it from executing.
(5) A malicious actor exploits a known vulnerability, which a
covered entity has not been able to patch but has instead deployed
increased monitoring for TTPs associated with its exploitation,
resulting in the activity being quickly detected and remediated before
significant additional activity is undertaken.
f. Considerations
In 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(B), Congress identified three considerations
for CISA in deciding what types of substantial cyber incidents
constitute covered cyber incidents. Specifically, Congress instructed
CISA to consider ``(i) the sophistication or novelty of the tactics
used to perpetrate such a cyber incident, as well as the type, volume,
and sensitivity of the data at issue; (ii) the number of individuals
directly or indirectly affected or potentially affected by such a cyber
incident; and (iii) potential impacts on industrial control systems,
such as supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed
control systems, and programmable logic controllers.'' 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(2)(B).
Throughout the process of analyzing what types of cyber incidents
should constitute a substantial cyber incident, CISA kept in mind the
considerations enumerated by Congress in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(B). Some
of the considerations are directly reflected in what CISA believes will
be a substantial cyber incident under the proposed definition. For
instance, as discussed above, factors such as the type, volume, and
sensitivity of the data at issue, or the number of individuals directly
or indirectly affected by an incident, will impact whether an incident
should be considered a substantial cyber incident. Incidents where less
data is impacted, the impacted data is not particularly sensitive, and/
or the number of individuals directly or indirectly affected, are less
likely to be considered substantial cyber incidents. Conversely,
incidents involving large volumes of impacted data, sensitive data, or
large numbers of impacted individuals are more likely to be considered
substantial cyber incidents. Similarly, incidents that impact
industrial control systems are much more likely to result in the second
prong of the substantial cyber incident definition being met than
incidents that solely impact business systems.
There is one consideration listed in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(B),
however, that CISA considered, but ultimately determined should not
affect whether a cyber incident rises to the level of a substantial
cyber incident in this proposed rule. That is the consideration listed
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(B)(i), ``the
[[Page 23669]]
sophistication or novelty of the tactics used to perpetrate such a
cyber incident.'' CISA believes there is value in receiving reports on
all types of substantial cyber incidents, whether the tactics used are
sophisticated or not, novel or not. If an unsophisticated TTP is being
used to cause substantial impacts to covered entities, CISA believes
there is value in knowing that so CISA and its Federal partners can
warn other potential victims that this tactic is being used and can
identify and share new or previously identified methods to mitigate
vulnerabilities that allow this tactic to be effective.
Similarly, if there is a resurgence in adversary use of a TTP that
has previously been reported upon, there is value in CISA knowing that
so it can alert entities to make sure they are maintaining effective
defensive measures to counter that tactic. In fact, CISA routinely adds
older vulnerabilities to the Known Exploited Vulnerability database
that CISA publishes based on the fact that the previously identified
vulnerabilities are actively being exploited. This allows CISA and
others to emphasize with the public the importance of addressing those
vulnerabilities.
Finally, it is possible that neither CISA nor the reporting entity
might know the sophistication or novelty of the TTP at the time or
reporting. CISA and/or the reporting entity may need time to assess the
incident before being able to determine its sophistication and novelty,
and CISA does not believe reporting should be delayed simply to
evaluate the tactics used to perpetrate a cyber incident. For the
aforementioned reasons, CISA is proposing that the relative
sophistication or novelty of a TTP used in perpetrating a cyber
incident should not influence whether that incident meets the
definition of a substantial cyber incident.
g. Harmonization of Definition With the CIRC Model Definition and Other
Regulatory Definitions
As discussed in Section III.B of this document, a number of
different Federal departments and agencies oversee regulations,
directives, or other programs that require certain entities to report
cyber incidents. CISA has received many comments from stakeholders
encouraging CISA to harmonize the CIRCIA reporting requirements with
the requirements in other regulations, to include the definition of
what is a reportable incident. See Section III.F.x of this document.
CISA fully supports the harmonization of regulatory requirements where
practicable and has been an active participant in the CIRC's efforts to
identify potential approaches to harmonizing Federal regulatory cyber
incident reporting requirements. One of the specific recommendations
made by the Department in its CIRC-informed Report to Congress is for
departments and agencies to consider adopting a model definition for a
reportable cyber incident where practicable.\151\
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\151\ DHS Report, supra note 4, at 25 (``Recommendation 1: The
Federal Government should adopt a model definition of a reportable
cyber incident wherever practicable. Federal agencies should
evaluate the feasibility of adapting current and future cyber
incident reporting requirements to align to a model definition of a
reportable cyber incident.'').
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Cognizant of that recommendation and the value in seeking
harmonization where practical, CISA considered the CIRC Model
Definition for a reportable cyber incident during the development of
the proposed CIRCIA definition for a substantial cyber incident.
Ultimately, CISA did elect to incorporate many aspects of the CIRC
Model Definition into the proposed CIRCIA definition for a substantial
cyber incident, some verbatim. CISA did not propose using the CIRC
Model Definition in its entirety, however, due in part to specific
statutory requirements imposed within CIRCIA and the specific purposes
CIRCIA is designed to achieve.
One example of where CISA's proposed definition differs from the
CIRC Model Definition due to specific language contained in CIRCIA is
in the sentence used to introduce the threshold criteria that elevate
an incident to the level of a reportable or substantial cyber incident.
Specifically, the first sentence of the CIRC Model Definition states
``[a] reportable cyber incident is an incident that leads to, or, if
still under the covered entity's investigation, could reasonably lead
to any of the following [impacts].'' \152\ The section of CIRCIA
related to substantial cyber incidents states that for a cyber incident
to be a substantial cyber incident, it ``requires the occurrence of''
one of the enumerated impacts. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A). Because CIRCIA
requires actual occurrence of the impacts, CISA does not propose
including the phrase ``or, if still under the covered entity's
investigation, could reasonably lead to any of the following'' in the
initial sentence of the CIRCIA definition for substantial cyber
incident. For similar reasons, CISA did not propose inclusion of the
CIRC Model Definition's fourth threshold prong ``potential operational
disruption'' (emphasis added), as CISA interprets CIRCIA to require
actual impact, not potential impact, for an incident to be a
substantial cyber incident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ Id. at 26.
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Another substantive difference between the CIRC Model Definition
and the CIRCIA proposed definition for substantial cyber incident is
the inclusion in the CIRCIA proposed definition of a separate threshold
prong based on a serious impact to safety and resiliency of a covered
entity's operational systems and processes. While the CIRC Model
Definition does not include a similar threshold prong, this threshold
is specifically listed in CIRCIA as one of the minimum types of impacts
that would qualify a cyber incident for inclusion as a covered cyber
incident. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(i). Accordingly, CISA determined it
was important to include that impact as a basis for coverage in its
definition of substantial cyber incident despite its absence in the
CIRC Model Definition.
CISA also occasionally modified the language used in the CIRC Model
Definition to terminology that is consistent with CIRCIA and other
portions of the proposed CIRCIA regulation. For example, CISA proposes
using the term ``covered entity's information system'' instead of the
CIRC Model Definition's construction ``a covered information system''
in the first threshold prong of the definition. Because CIRCIA does not
distinguish between covered and not covered information systems,
networks, or technologies, the use of the word ``covered'' in this
manner would be inconsistent.
In addition to the CIRC Model Definition, CISA also considered how
other Federal regulations defined reportable cyber incidents. While
many of the regulations CISA reviewed have some similarities in how
they define and interpret what is a reportable cyber incident, the
specific language, structure, examples, and actual requirements varied
greatly based on the specific agency mission and purpose of the
regulation. As the CIRC was established to make recommendations on how
to harmonize these disparate regulations, and the DHS Report
specifically recommends that agencies evaluate the feasibility of
adapting current and future cyber incident reporting requirements to
align with a model definition of a reportable cyber incident,\153\ CISA
ultimately felt that the path that would most effectively support
harmonization across the various Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements was to align the definition of covered cyber incident, to
the extent
[[Page 23670]]
practicable, with the CIRC Model Definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ Id. at 25-27.
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iii. CIRCIA Reports
1. CIRCIA Report
CISA is proposing to include in the regulation a definition of the
term CIRCIA Report. CIRCIA requires a covered entity to submit (either
directly or through a third party) a report to CISA when it reasonably
believes a covered cyber incident occurred, makes a ransom payment, or
experiences one of a number of circumstances that requires the covered
entity to update or supplement a previously submitted Covered Cyber
Incident Report. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)-(3). These reports are called
Covered Cyber Incident Reports, Ransom Payment Reports, and
Supplemental Reports, respectively. CIRCIA additionally allows covered
entities that make a ransom payment associated with a covered cyber
incident to submit a single report to satisfy both the covered cyber
incident and ransom payment reporting requirements. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(5)(A). CISA is proposing to call this joint submission a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report.
CISA is proposing a term CIRCIA Report to be an umbrella term that
encompasses all four types of covered entity reports collectively.
Accordingly, CISA is proposing to define CIRCIA Report to mean a
Covered Cyber Incident Report, Ransom Payment Report, Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report, or Supplemental Report.
In some instances, CIRCIA refers to ``reports,'' and at other times
refers to ``information'' (either information contained in a CIRCIA
Report or information about cyber incidents, covered cyber incidents,
or ransom payments). CISA understands Congress' use of these different
terms in different contexts within CIRCIA to be intentional, and
therefore replicates these distinctions in the proposed rule.
Specifically, references to a CIRCIA Report or any individual report
(i.e., a Covered Cyber Incident Report, Ransom Payment Report, Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report, or Supplemental
Report) throughout this NPRM are intended to refer to the submission as
a whole. By contrast, references to information (either in a CIRCIA
Report or about cyber incidents, covered cyber incidents, or ransom
payments) are intended to refer to discrete pieces of facts and ideas
(which sometimes may be contained within a CIRCIA Report, perhaps along
with other pieces of information), rather than the submission as a
whole.
2. Covered Cyber Incident Report
CISA is proposing to include in the regulation a definition of the
term Covered Cyber Incident Report. CIRCIA requires a covered entity
that experiences a covered cyber incident to report that incident to
CISA. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1). CISA is proposing to refer to this type of
report as a Covered Cyber Incident Report and to define that term to
mean a submission made by a covered entity or a third party on behalf
of a covered entity to report a covered cyber incident as required by
this Part. CISA is further proposing that a Covered Cyber Incident
Report also includes any additional, optional information submitted as
part of a Covered Cyber Incident Report.
As noted in the definition, a Covered Cyber Incident Report may be
submitted by a covered entity or by a third party on behalf of a
covered entity. Additionally, a covered entity may voluntarily include
within a Covered Cyber Incident Report additional information pursuant
to 6 U.S.C. 681c(b). Voluntarily provided information will be
considered part of the Covered Cyber Incident Report. Additional
requirements related to the manner, form, content, and other aspects of
a Covered Cyber Incident Report are described in Sections IV.E.i-iii of
this document and Sec. Sec. 226.6, 226.7, and 226.8 of the proposed
regulation.
3. Ransom Payment Report
CISA is proposing to include in the regulation a definition of the
term Ransom Payment Report. CIRCIA requires a covered entity that makes
a ransom payment, or has another entity make a ransom payment on the
covered entity's behalf, to report that payment to CISA. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(2)(A). CISA is proposing to refer to this type of report as a
Ransom Payment Report and to define that term to mean a submission made
by a covered entity or a third party on behalf of a covered entity to
report a ransom payment as required by this Part. CISA is further
proposing for a Ransom Payment Report to also include any additional,
optional information submitted as part of a Ransom Payment Report.
As noted in the definition, a Ransom Payment Report may be
submitted by a covered entity or by a third party on behalf of a
covered entity. Additionally, a covered entity may voluntarily include
within a Ransom Payment Report additional information submitted
pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681c(b). Voluntarily provided information will be
considered part of the Ransom Payment Report. Additional requirements
related to the manner, form, content, and other aspects of a Ransom
Payment Report are described in Sections IV.E.i-iii of this document
and Sec. Sec. 226.6, 226.7, and 226.9 of the proposed regulation. If
the ransom payment being reported is the result of a covered cyber
incident that the covered entity or a third party acting on its behalf
has already reported to CISA, then the Ransom Payment Report also would
be considered a Supplemental Report and must meet any requirements
associated with Supplemental Reports as well.
4. Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report
CISA is proposing to include in the regulation a definition of the
term Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report. Pursuant
to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A), covered entities that make a ransom payment
associated with a covered cyber incident prior to the expiration of the
72-hour reporting timeframe for reporting the covered cyber incident
may submit a single report to satisfy both the covered cyber incident
and ransom payment reporting requirements. CISA is proposing to call
this joint submission a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report and to define that term to mean a submission made by a covered
entity or a third party on behalf of a covered entity to simultaneously
report both a covered cyber incident and ransom payment related to the
covered cyber incident being reported. CISA is proposing that a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report also include any
additional, optional information submitted as part of the report.
As noted in the definition, a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report may be submitted by a covered entity or by a
third party on behalf of a covered entity. Additionally, a covered
entity may voluntarily include within a Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Report additional information pursuant to 6 U.S.C.
681c(b). Voluntarily provided information will be considered part of
the Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report. Additional
requirements related to the manner, form, and content of a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report are described in
Sections IV.E.i-iii of this document and Sec. Sec. 226.6, 226.7, and
226.10 of the proposed regulation.
[[Page 23671]]
5. Supplemental Report
CISA is proposing to include in the regulation a definition of the
term Supplemental Report. CIRCIA requires a covered entity to promptly
submit an update or supplement to a previously submitted Covered Cyber
Incident Report under certain circumstances. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). CISA
is proposing to refer to this type of report as a Supplemental Report.
CISA is proposing that the term Supplemental Report be used to describe
a submission made by a covered entity or a third party on behalf of a
covered entity to update or supplement a previously submitted Covered
Cyber Incident Report or to report a ransom payment made by the covered
entity after submitting a Covered Cyber Incident Report as required by
this Part. CISA is further proposing that a Supplemental Report also
include any additional, optional information submitted as part of a
Supplemental Report.
As noted in the definition, a Supplemental Report may be submitted
by a covered entity or by a third party on behalf of a covered entity.
Additionally, a covered entity may voluntarily include within a
Supplemental Report additional information pursuant to 6 U.S.C.
681c(b). Voluntarily provided information is considered part of the
Supplemental Report. Additional requirements related to the manner,
form, content, and other aspects of a Supplemental Report are described
in Sections IV.E.i-iii of this document and Sec. Sec. 226.6, 226.7,
and 226.11 of the proposed regulation.
iv. Other Definitions
1. CIRCIA
CISA is proposing to define the term CIRCIA to mean the Cyber
Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, as amended.
This will simplify the regulatory text by allowing CISA to refer to
CIRCIA without having to use the full title of the statute or full
legal citation throughout the regulation.
2. CIRCIA Agreement
CISA is proposing to create the term CIRCIA Agreement and define it
as an agreement between CISA and another Federal agency that meets the
requirements of Sec. 226.4(a)(2), that has not expired or been
terminated, and which, when publicly posted in accordance with Sec.
226.4(a)(5), indicates the availability of a substantially similar
reporting exception. CISA believes the establishment and defining of
this term will allow covered entities to better identify circumstances
where they can leverage the substantially similar reporting exception
and avoid potentially duplicative reporting to another Federal
department or agency and CISA. Additional details on both the CIRCIA
Agreement and the substantially similar reporting exception can be
found in Section IV.D.i of this document.
3. Cloud Service Provider
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term cloud
service provider. CISA believes defining this term is important to
ensure that covered entities understand the meaning of an unauthorized
access or disruption of business or industrial operations due to a loss
of service facilitated through, or caused by, a compromise of a CSP, as
that is one example of a substantial cyber incident provided in CIRCIA.
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(iii). Section 650 of title 6, United States
Code, defines the term CSP as ``an entity offering products or services
related to cloud computing, as defined by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology in NIST Special Publication 800-145 and any
amendatory or superseding document relating thereto.'' 6 U.S.C. 650(3).
Because this definition applies to all of Title XXII of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended, including CIRCIA, CISA is proposing
to use this definition in the regulation.
4. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency or CISA. This term is
used repeatedly throughout the proposed regulation to describe the
Federal entity responsible for the oversight of the proposed CIRCIA
regulation and with whom covered entities and other stakeholders will
engage on various activities required under the regulation. CISA is
proposing to define Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency or
CISA as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency as
established under section 2202 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 652), as amended by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency Act of 2018 and subsequent laws, or any successor
organization.
5. Cybersecurity Threat
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term
cybersecurity threat. Defining the term cybersecurity threat is a
streamlined approach that provides needed context for the requirement
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(D) that CISA include in the final rule
procedures for, among other things, protecting privacy and civil
liberties, for certain personal information received in CIRCIA Reports
that is not directly related to a cyber threat. For the reasons
explained below, CISA is proposing to use and define the term
cybersecurity threat instead of ``cyber threat.''
CIRCIA defines the term ``cyber threat'' as ``ha[ving] the meaning
given the term `cybersecurity threat' in section 2200 [6 U.S.C. 650]''
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. Section 650 of title
6, United States Code, defines ``cybersecurity threat'' as ``an action,
not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, on or through an information system that may result in an
unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security, availability,
confidentiality, or integrity of an information system or information
that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system,''
other than ``any action that solely involves a violation of a consumer
term of service or a consumer licensing agreement.'' 6 U.S.C. 650(8).
Rather than using the term ``cyber threat,'' CISA is proposing to use
the term ``cybersecurity threat,'' with this definition effectively
verbatim, because CISA believes it is most consistent with CIRCIA.
6. Director
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term Director and
to define it as the Director of CISA, any successors to that position,
or any designee. CISA is proposing to include this definition as CIRCIA
assigns the Director specific responsibilities related to
implementation of the CIRCIA regulation.
7. Information System
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term information
system. This term is a key term for the proposed regulation as, among
other things, it is used within the definition of ransomware attack and
substantial cyber incident as well as to help identify the types of
information that a covered entity must provide in reports required
under the regulation.
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3502, defines
information system as ``a discrete set of information resources
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing,
dissemination, or disposition of information.'' \154\ Section 650 of
title 6, United States Code, defines information system as having the
meaning given the term in the PRA,
[[Page 23672]]
44 U.S.C. 3502, specifically including ``industrial control systems,
such as supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed
control systems, and programmable logic controllers.'' 6 U.S.C.
650(14).
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\154\ 44 U.S.C. 3502(8).
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Because the 6 U.S.C. 650 definition applies to all of Title XXII of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, including CIRCIA, CISA
is proposing defining Information using the language contained in the
definition in 6 U.S.C. 650(14) with the addition of an explicit
acknowledgment that OT is included within the definition of information
system. CISA believes OT is encompassed in the definition of
information system contained within 6 U.S.C. 650(14) by reference to
industrial control systems, such as supervisory control and data
acquisition systems, distributed control systems, and programmable
logic controllers; however, CISA is proposing to explicitly include the
words ``operational technology systems'' within the definition in light
of the common industry use of this term to avoid any potential
misinterpretations about whether OT is encompassed by the proposed
CIRCIA definition of information systems.
8. Managed Service Provider
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term managed
service provider. CISA believes it is important to define this term to
ensure that covered entities understand the meaning of an unauthorized
access or disruption of business or industrial operations due to a loss
of service facilitated through, or caused by, a compromise of a managed
service provider, as that is one example of a substantial cyber
incident provided in CIRCIA. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(iii). The term
managed service provider is defined in 6 U.S.C. 650(18) and sets out
three criteria that must be met to qualify as a managed service
provider. The definition reads, ``an entity that delivers services,
such as network, application, infrastructure, or security services, via
ongoing and regular support and active administration on the premises
of a customer, in the data center of the entity (such as hosting), or
in a third party data center.'' 6 U.S.C. 650(18). Because this
definition applies to all of Title XXII of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as amended, including CIRCIA, CISA is proposing to use this same
definition of managed service provider in the regulation.
9. Personal Information
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term personal
information. Personal information is a key term in the proposed
regulation as CIRCIA requires CISA to undertake certain steps to
protect personal information. See e.g., 6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(3). CISA is
proposing to define the term personal information to mean information
that identifies a specific individual or information associated with an
identified or identifiable individual. Under this definition, personal
information would include, but are not limited to, both identifying
information such as photographs, names, home addresses, direct
telephone numbers, and Social Security numbers as well as information
that does not directly identify an individual but is nonetheless
personal, nonpublic, and specific to an identified or identifiable
individual. Examples would include medical information, personal
financial information (e.g., an individual's wage or earnings
information; income tax withholding records; credit score; banking
information), contents of personal communications, and personal web
browsing history. This proposed definition would include ``personally
identifiable information,'' as defined in OMB Memorandum M-17-12 as
referring to information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other
information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual, but
also proposes to include information that might not be clearly linkable
to an individual but would nonetheless relate to a specific individual
and be considered personal and nonpublic, such as an individual's web
browsing history or the content of an email. CISA is proposing this
definition to encompass the broad range of personally sensitive
information that a cybersecurity incident might implicate, including
the content of personal communications, which might not be able to be
used on its own to identify an individual, to ensure that all
personally sensitive information is handled appropriately.
CISA is not proposing to include in this definition information
that does not relate to a specific individual. Therefore, information
such as general business telephone numbers or business financial
information would generally not be considered personal information
under this definition.
This proposed definition of ``personal information'' would be
different and broader than the approach taken by the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015, (6 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.). 6 U.S.C.
1503(d)(2) more narrowly requires removal of information that is
``known at the time of sharing'' to be ``personal information'' that
identifies a specific person or belongs to a specific person rather
than information that is linked or linkable to a specific person. CISA
welcomes public comment on this proposed definition of ``personal
information'' and whether CISA should instead adopt the approach taken
by the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 to defining
personal information.
10. Ransom Payment
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term ransom
payment. Ransom payment is a key term in the proposed regulation as
CIRCIA requires that covered entities report ransom payments to CISA
within 24 hours of the payment being made. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2). CISA is
proposing to use the definition of the term ransom payment from CIRCIA
in the regulation verbatim.
11. Ransomware Attack
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term ransomware
attack. CIRCIA requires a covered entity that makes a ransom payment as
the result of a ransomware attack to report the ransom payment to CISA
within 24 hours of making the payment. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2). CISA
believes including a definition for the term ransomware attack will
help covered entities determine whether they are required to submit a
Ransom Payment Report to CISA.
Section 650(22) of title 6, United States Code, defines the term
ransomware attack as ``(A) [ ] an incident that includes the use or
threat of use of unauthorized or malicious code on an information
system, or the use or threat of use of another digital mechanism such
as a denial of service attack, to interrupt or disrupt the operations
of an information system or compromise the confidentiality,
availability, or integrity of electronic data stored on, processed by,
or transiting an information system to extort a demand for a ransom
payment; and (B) does not include any such event where the demand for
payment is (i) not genuine; or (ii) made in good faith by an entity in
response to a specific request by the owner or operator of the
information system.'' 6 U.S.C. 650(22). Because this definition applies
to all of Title XXII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended,
including CIRCIA, CISA is proposing to use this definition with a few
minor modifications described below.
First, in defining the term ransomware attack, CISA is proposing to
replace the term ``incident'' (which is
[[Page 23673]]
used in the statutory definition of ransomware attack) with the full
definition of ``incident'' as found in section 2200(12) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended (6 U.S.C. 650(12)) (i.e., ``an
occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful
authority, the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of
information on an information system, or actually or imminently
jeopardizes, without lawful authority, an information system''). The
definition of ``incident'' in 6 U.S.C. 650(12) applies to the term
``incident'' throughout Title XXII of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as amended, including to the term ``incident'' within the
statutory definition of ransomware attack at 6 U.S.C. 650(22).\155\
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\155\ As originally enacted, CIRCIA explicitly included a
definition of both ``cyber incident'' and ``incident.'' See Public
Law 117-103. However, when the definition of ``incident'' was moved
as part of the consolidation of definitions in the CISA Technical
Corrections to the beginning of Title XXII of the Homeland Security
Act (6 U.S.C. 650(12)), the definition of ``incident'' in CIRCIA was
struck as a conforming edit to remove the redundancy. See CISA
Technical Corrections, supra note 135, Section (b)(2)(N)(v).
Further, in the original as-enacted version of CIRCIA, both uses of
the term ``incident'' (as opposed to the CIRCIA term ``cyber
incident'') were in definitions that were moved to 6 U.S.C. 650 as
part of the CISA Technical Corrections, namely the definitions of
ransomware attack and supply chain compromise. See 6 U.S.C. 650(22)
and (28).
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Using this definition of ``incident'' is not only consistent with
the statute, but it also avoids CISA specifically defining the term
``incident'' in the regulation, which CISA believes could create
confusion in light of the inclusion in the proposed regulation of a
definition for the term cyber incident.
CISA considered, but ultimately decided against, proposing the use
of the term ``cyber incident'' in place of ``incident'' in the
definition of ransomware attack. As noted earlier in the discussion of
the proposed definition for cyber incident, CIRCIA removed the
``imminently jeopardizes'' clause found in the Homeland Security Act's
definition of ``incident'' from CIRCIA's definition of cyber incident,
instead opting to require ``actual jeopardy'' for an event to qualify
as a cyber incident under CIRCIA. Consequently, using the term ``cyber
incident'' in lieu of ``incident'' in the definition of ransomware
attack would have a substantive impact on the definition. CISA believes
that Congress intentionally used the term ``incident'' (in lieu of the
term ``cyber incident'') in the definition of ransomware attack to
account for the fact that a ransomware attack may involve a threat of
disruption (i.e., imminent jeopardy) and that such a threat--without
the disruption ever occurring--may be sufficient to extort a ransom
payment. Moreover, Congress specifically included incidents where
jeopardy is ``imminent'' but not ``actual'' in its definition of
ransomware attack, including both threatened and realized interruptions
as means of extortion. Therefore, to avoid a substantive change to the
meaning of the term ransomware attack (which would also narrow the
scope of reportable ransom payments), while also avoiding the confusion
that could be caused by similarly defining both ``cyber incident'' and
``incident'' in the proposed rule, the proposed rule relies on 6 U.S.C.
650(12)'s definition of the word ``incident'' in lieu of the word
``incident'' within the definition of the term ransomware attack.
Second, the NPRM replaces the word ``includes'' with ``involves,
but need not be limited to, the following.'' This change was made to
avoid the implication that the term ransomware attack includes some
other category of incidents not otherwise described here (i.e., that
``includes'' means ``includes, but is not limited to''). At the same
time, the definition is not intended to suggest that any occurrence
that includes more than the three listed elements is no longer
considered a ransomware attack. The ``need not be limited to'' clause
is intended to convey that, as long as the three listed elements are
involved in the occurrence in question, any additional facts about the
occurrence would not cause it to be outside of the definition of a
ransomware attack.
Third, CISA is proposing to delete the phrase ``a demand'' from the
third prong of the statutory definition, thus modifying it from ``to
extort a demand for a ransom payment'' to ``to extort a ransom
payment.'' This is intended to clarify that this prong requires that
the threat actor extort the ransom payment itself from the victim
(consistent with the common understanding of a typical ransomware
attack), and not a process where the extortion is a demand for the
victim entity to demand a ransom payment from a third entity. This
interpretation is supported by the legislative history of CIRCIA
showing that Congress understood this term to encompass the traditional
ransomware attacks that the country was experiencing at a significantly
increasing frequency in the months and years prior to CIRCIA's passage
\156\ and not a novel two-step extortion of a demand that, to CISA's
knowledge, has never occurred. Numerous canons of statutory
interpretation, to include the Absurdity Doctrine, the Harmonious-
Reading Canon, and the canon of Purposive Construction, further support
this interpretation.
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\156\ See, e.g., Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing, supra note
17, at 12-13 (statement of Rep. Andrew Garbino, Ranking Member,
Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and innovation
of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security) (``Everyone here remembers the
ransomware attacks on Colonial Pipeline and JBS Meats . . . We must
ensure that CISA has the visibility it needs to help defend our
Federal networks and to help our critical infrastructure owners and
operators protect themselves.''), (statement of Rep. John Katko,
Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Homeland Security) (``Every single day,
entities, large and small, are affected by the scourge of
ransomware. . . .''); 168 Cong. Rec. S1149-50 (daily ed. Mar. 14,
2022) (statement of Sen. Mark Warner) (``[R]ansomware attacks are a
serious national security threat that have affected everything from
our energy sector to the Federal Government and Americans' own
sensitive information . . . As . . . ransomware attacks continue to
increase, the Federal Government must be able to quickly coordinate
a response and hold bad actors accountable.''); HSGAC Minority Staff
Report, America's Data Held Hostage: Case Studies in Ransomware
Attacks on American Companies at iii (``Ransomware is a type of
malware that encrypts victims' computer systems and data, rendering
the systems unusable and the data unreadable. Perpetrators then
issue a ransom demand . . . If the victim pays, hackers may provide
the victim with a key to decrypt their systems and data. . . .''
(italics in original)), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library/files/americas-data-held-hostage-case-studies-in-ransomware-attacks-on-american-companies/.
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CISA's proposed definition also includes two minor, non-substantive
changes to improve the readability of the definition. First, CISA is
proposing to separate the statutory description of the type of incident
that constitutes a ransomware attack into three subparts, one for each
of the three prongs of the definition. Second, in the portion of the
statutory definition contained in the newly delineated paragraph (1),
CISA is proposing to eliminate the second instance of the phrase ``use
or threat of use'' and instead insert roman numerals and the
conjunction ``or'' to make clear that the ``use or threat of use''
phrase applies to both (i) unauthorized or malicious code on an
information system or (ii) another digital mechanism such as a denial-
of-service attack.
The proposed definition of ransomware attack contains language
mirroring language in the CIRCIA authorizing legislation that excludes
from the definition any event where the demand for a ransom payment is
``not genuine'' or is ``made in good faith by an entity in response to
a specific request by the owner or operator of the information
system.'' Circumstances in which an entity may determine a ransom
demand is ``not genuine'' include if the demand is a known hoax or the
demand lacks necessary information for the receiving entity to comply,
such as an amount demanded or payment instructions. Ransom
[[Page 23674]]
demands ``made in good faith by an entity in response to a specific
request by the owner or operator of the information system'' typically
would include those that are part of red teaming, penetration testing,
vulnerability analysis, training exercises, or other authorized
activities designed to test prevention, detection, response, or other
capabilities of the requesting entity. In both exclusions, while there
may facially be a demand that would otherwise meet the definition of
ransomware attack, the demand is made without expectation or desire to
actually receive a ransom payment from the covered entity. Similar to
the parallel ``good faith'' exclusion in the definition of substantial
cyber incident (as discussed in Section IV.A.ii.3.d.ii of this
document), because the exception only applies to instances where the
demand for ransom payment was made ``in response to a specific request
by'' the information system owner or operator, this exception would
only apply to situations where the request or authorization preceded
the demand for ransom payment.
It is noteworthy that, though the definition of a ransomware attack
specifically addresses cyber incidents involving interruption or
disruption of operations and threats to do the same, it does not
include other forms of extortionate cyber incidents that are similar to
ransomware attacks; specifically, extortionate demands for payment
based on threats to leak sensitive information obtained without
authorization from an information system. While such incidents (without
more) do not fall within the definition of a ransomware attack, they
would still be reportable under CIRCIA, if the incident otherwise
qualifies as a covered cyber incident, as proposed to be defined in
Sec. 226.1, e.g., if the underlying incident (including any actual
disclosure in line with those threats) leads to the substantial loss of
confidentiality of an information system or network.
12. State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial Government Entity
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term State,
Local, Tribal, or Territorial Government entity. This term has
significance in the regulation for two primary reasons. First, the term
is used within the proposed definition of covered entity to describe
certain entities that would be subject to CIRCIA's reporting
requirements. Second, pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681d(f), the section of
CIRCIA on noncompliance with required reporting does not apply to a
SLTT Government entity.
The U.S. Census Bureau defines a government entity as ``an
organized entity which, in addition to having governmental character,
has sufficient discretion in the management of its own affairs to
distinguish it as separate from the administrative structure of any
other governmental unit.'' \157\ The Homeland Security Act definition
for the term ``State'' includes both States and territories, defining
the term ``State'' to mean ``any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, and any possession of the United States.'' 6 U.S.C. 101(17).
The Homeland Security Act definition for the term ``Local Government''
includes both local and tribal government entities, defining the term
``Local Government'' to mean ``(a) A county, municipality, city, town,
township, local public authority, school district, special district,
intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the
council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under
State law), regional or interstate government entity, or agency or
instrumentality of a Local government; (b) An Indian tribe or
authorized tribal organization, or in Alaska, a Native village or
Alaska Regional Native Corporation; and (c) A rural community,
unincorporated town or village, or other public entity.'' 6 U.S.C.
101(13).
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\157\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, Classification Manual (Oct.
2006), available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/technical-documentation/classification-manuals.html.
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To create its proposed definition for the term SLTT Government
entity, CISA is proposing to create an umbrella term that merges the
three definitions referenced in the previous paragraph, and include the
definition of Indian tribe that is referenced in the Homeland Security
Act. This approach will allow CISA to leverage existing, accepted
definitions for each element that composes the term SLTT Government
entity--i.e., State, local, territorial, tribal, and government
entity--within a single, consolidated definition. CISA believes this is
also appropriate because SLTT Government Entities are treated the same
throughout the proposed regulation, and this umbrella term simplifies
this task.
13. Supply Chain Compromise
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term supply chain
compromise. This term has significance in the regulation as CIRCIA
explicitly states that unauthorized access facilitated through or
caused by a supply chain compromise can be a substantial cyber
incident. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)(iii).
Section 650 of title 6, United States Code defines ``supply chain
compromise'' as ``an incident within the supply chain of an information
system that an adversary can leverage, or does leverage, to jeopardize
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information
system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits,
and can occur at any point during the life cycle.'' 6 U.S.C. 650(28).
NIST defines a ``supply chain'' as the ``linked set of resources and
processes between and among multiple levels of organizations, each of
which is an acquirer, that begins with the sourcing of products and
services and extends through their life cycle.'' \158\ The supply chain
for an information system is typically considered to be the multiple
layers of software and hardware that are integrated to perform the
various functions of the information system. Examples of items in the
supply chain of an information system, which are acquired often from
multiple vendors, include hardware items like microchips (and the
components that comprise the microchips), operating systems (and the
code libraries that comprise the operating systems), and other types of
software (and the code libraries that compromise the software).
Information systems--including both ICT and OT--``rely on a complex,
globally distributed, extensive, and interconnected supply chain
ecosystem that . . . consists of multiple levels of outsourcing. This
ecosystem is comprised of public and private sector entities (e.g.,
acquirers, suppliers, developers, system integrators, external service
providers, and other ICT/OT-related service providers) that interact to
research, develop, design, manufacture, acquire, deliver, integrate,
operate, maintain, dispose of, and otherwise utilize or manage ICT/OT
products and services.'' \159\
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\158\ NIST, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices
for Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publication 800-161
Rev.1, at 1 (May 2022), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/161/r1/final.
\159\ See id.
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CISA is proposing to use the definition of the term supply chain
compromise contained in 6 U.S.C. 650 verbatim for the definition of the
term in the regulation with one exception: the definition in the
proposed regulation replaces the term ``incident''
[[Page 23675]]
with the term ``cyber incident.'' As noted in the earlier discussion on
the term cyber incident, Congress narrowed the types of incidents CISA
could require reporting on under CIRCIA by explicitly stating the term
cyber incident did not include an incident that imminently jeopardizes,
but does not actually jeopardize, an information system or the
information contained therein. As the use of the term supply chain
compromise in the regulation is limited to the definition of certain
substantial cyber incidents, the actual (versus imminent) jeopardy
requirement is built into the broader requirements already, thus making
the end result the same regardless of whether the definition of supply
chain compromise uses the term incident or cyber incident. Rather than
introducing potential confusion into the regulation by defining
incident and cyber incident, CISA is proposing to use the term cyber
incident in the definition of supply chain compromise.
As noted in the definition, a supply chain compromise can occur
anywhere in the lifecycle of an information system. This can include
design, development and production, distribution, acquisition and
deployment, maintenance, or disposal.\160\ For example, a supply chain
compromise can occur when a cyber threat actor infiltrates a software
vendor's network and deploys malicious code to compromise the software
before the vendor sends it to their customers, which then compromises
the customer's data or systems.\161\ Newly acquired software or
hardware may be compromised from the outset, or a compromise may occur
through other means like a patch or a hotfix.\162\ Common techniques
for software supply chain compromises include hijacking updates,
undermining code signing, and compromising open source code.\163\
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\160\ CISA, Defending Against Software Supply Chain Attacks at
3, available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/defending-against-software-supply-chain-attacks-0 (Apr. 2021).
\161\ Id. at 2.
\162\ See id.
\163\ Id. at 4.
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14. Virtual Currency
CISA is proposing to include a definition for the term virtual
currency. CISA is proposing to define this term because CIRCIA requires
covered entities to include in any Ransom Payment Report ``the type of
virtual currency or other commodity requested'' as part of the ransom
demand. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(G). CISA wants to ensure that covered
entities understand this requirement.
CIRCIA defines virtual currency as ``the digital representation of
value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a
store of value.'' 6 U.S.C. 681(10). CISA understands this definition as
equivalent to a ``value that substitutes for currency or funds'' in 31
U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(J), and ``virtual currency'' as defined in guidance
from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).\164\ Therefore,
CISA is proposing to clarify the relationship between these terms by
adding a sentence to the definition in CIRCIA noting that virtual
currency includes any form of value that substitutes for currency or
funds.
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\164\ FinCEN Guidance, FIN-2019-G001, Application of FinCEN's
Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual
Currencies at 7 (May 9, 2019), available at https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/application-fincens-regulations-certain-business-models.
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v. Request for Comments on Proposed Definitions
CISA seeks comments on all the proposed definitions. In addition,
CISA seeks specific comments on the following questions:
3. The proposed definitions of cyber incident, covered cyber
incident, and substantial cyber incident, to include the
appropriateness and clarity of the thresholds contained in the proposed
definition of substantial cyber incident, the three exclusions to the
proposed definition of substantial cyber incident, and the guiding
principles described in Section IV.A.ii.b of this document regarding
how to determine if an incident was a substantial cyber incident.
4. Whether CISA should specifically add the term ``significant,''
``substantial,'' or any other appropriate word at the beginning of
subparagraph 3 of the definition of substantial cyber incident to
clarify the impact level required.
5. The proposed examples of incidents that likely would or would
not qualify as a substantial cyber incident, to include whether the
examples provided by CISA are accurate and whether there are other
types of incidents that it would be useful to include in the list of
examples to incidents that likely would or would not qualify as a
substantial cyber incident.
6. Anticipated challenges for covered entities related to
understanding or reporting a covered cyber incident if such incident
stemmed from a disruption of a third-party vendor or service provider
that is itself not a covered entity.
7. As noted in the preamble, CISA believes there is value in CISA
receiving reports on all types of cyber incidents that meet the
substantial cyber incident impact thresholds, regardless of whether the
TTPs used are sophisticated or not, or novel or not. Therefore, CISA
proposes that the ``sophistication or novelty of the tactics'' should
not influence whether an individual incident or category of incidents
qualifies as a substantial cyber incident. Do you agree with this
proposal, or should the sophistication or novelty of a tactic influence
whether an individual incident or category of incidents meets one of
the substantial cyber incident thresholds? Similarly, should CISA use
sophistication or novelty of a tactic as a justification for including
or excluding any specific categories of incidents from the population
of cyber incidents required to be reported? How does this intersect
with the minimum requirements enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(2)(A)?
8. Should exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability as a general
matter be considered to meet one of the threshold impacts in the
definition of substantial cyber incident? Please provide data or
information specifically regarding (1) whether exploitation of a zero-
day vulnerability provides an indication of a malicious actor's
sophistication, (2) whether exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability
results in a different level of risk to a victim entity than
exploitation of a known vulnerability, and (3) benefits that reporting
on the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities might provide to CISA's
understanding of the cyber threat landscape, CISA's ability to warn
entities about emerging threats, and the federal government's awareness
of victim entities targeted in cyber incidents utilizing zero-day
vulnerabilities.
9. Whether there are any terms for which CISA did not propose a
definition but should consider including to improve the clarity of the
regulation.
B. Applicability
As noted in Section IV.A.i. above, due to the operative
significance and impact of the term, CISA proposes to define covered
entity to mean any entity that meets the criteria established in the
Applicability Section, Sec. 226.2. CISA believes that Sec. 226.2 also
satisfies the statutory requirement that CISA include in the final rule
a ``clear description of the types of entities that constitute covered
entities.'' See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1).
[[Page 23676]]
The proposed Applicability section includes two primary means by
which an entity in a critical infrastructure sector qualifies as a
covered entity, the first based on the size of the entity and the
second based on whether the entity meets any of the enumerated sector-
based criteria. An entity in a critical infrastructure sector only
needs to meet one of the criteria to be considered a covered entity.
For example, an entity in a critical infrastructure sector that exceeds
the size standard and meets none of the Sec. 226.2(b) sector-based
criteria will be considered a covered entity. Conversely, an entity
that meets one or more of the sector-based criteria will be a covered
entity regardless of whether it exceeds the Sec. 226.2(a) size
standard. An entity in a critical infrastructure sector does not have
to meet both the size-based criterion and one of the sector-based
criteria to be considered a covered entity.
i. Interpreting the CIRCIA Statutory Definition of Covered Entity
In developing this proposed Applicability section, CISA first
looked at the parameters imposed by CIRCIA. See 6 U.S.C. 681(4).
Specifically, in the definition of covered entity provided by CIRCIA,
Congress limits what may be a covered entity to ``an entity in a
critical infrastructure sector, as defined in Presidential Policy
Directive 21.'' See 6 U.S.C. 681(4).
PPD-21 does not define the word ``entity'' but instead adopts a
systems and assets approach when referring to critical infrastructure.
However, this does not fit within the regulatory scheme required by
CIRCIA. Therefore, CISA interprets the word ``entity'' to be a broad
term, generally including any person, partnership, business,
association, corporation, or other organization (whether for-profit,
not-for-profit, nonprofit, or government) regardless of governance
model that has legal standing and is uniquely identifiable from other
entities.\165\ The organizational structure or nomenclature chosen by
the entity does not matter as long as it is a structure that imports
legal presence or standing in the United States. CISA does not,
therefore, interpret or understand the word ``entity'' to mean a system
or asset, and some of the things that would not be considered entities
include software, hardware, and other equipment; buildings and
facilities; and systems. CISA believes this interpretation is both
consistent with the plain language meaning of the term ``entity'' and
appropriate given the purposes of CIRCIA, which require CISA to collect
sufficient reports to develop analysis and understand cyber threat
trends across the entire critical infrastructure landscape.
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\165\ Black's Law Dictionary defines ``entity'' as ``[a] generic
term inclusive of person, partnership, organization, or business
[that] can be legally bound [and] is uniquely identifiable from any
other entity.'' See Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed., as found on
www.thelawdictionary.org. Black's also contains a separate
definition for ``legal entity,'' defining it as ``[a] lawful or
legally standing association, corporation, partnership,
proprietorship, trust, or individual [that h]as legal capacity to
(1) enter into agreements or contracts, (2) assume obligations, (3)
incur and pay debts, (4) sue and be sued in its own right, and (5)
to be accountable for illegal activities.'' Id.
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The second limitation contained in the statutory definition is that
the entity must be ``in a critical infrastructure sector, as defined in
Presidential Policy Directive 21.'' Presidential Policy Directive 21
(PPD-21) does not actually contain a definition for ``critical
infrastructure sector,'' but it does specifically enumerate 16 critical
infrastructure sectors.\166\ PPD-21 also does not specifically define
the composition of the individual critical infrastructure sectors;
however, PPD-21 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to update
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which is intended
to guide the national effort to manage risks to the Nation's critical
infrastructure. The NIPP included a ``Call to Action'' which required
each critical infrastructure sector to update its Sector-Specific Plan
(SSP) as part of an overall joint planning effort and to update the SSP
every four years thereafter.\167\ The SSPs are developed jointly by
representatives of the private sector, referred to as Sector
Coordinating Councils (SCCs),\168\ and representatives of the
government, referred to as Government Coordinating Councils
(GCCs).\169\ Each SSP \170\ includes a ``sector profile,'' which
describes entities that are in the respective critical infrastructure
sector. These profiles do not limit the descriptions of the entities
that comprise each critical infrastructure sector identified in PPD-21
to entities that own systems and assets that meet the statutory
definition of ``critical infrastructure'' set forth by 42 U.S.C.
5195c(e).\171\ Rather, in implementing PPD-21, the SSPs make clear that
a wide variety of entities, including at least some entities that do
not own or operate systems or assets that meet the definition of
critical infrastructure in PPD-21 but are active participants in
critical infrastructure sectors and communities, are considered ``in a
critical infrastructure sector.''
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\166\ The 16 critical infrastructure sectors enumerated in PPD-
21 are Chemical; Commercial Facilities; Communications; Critical
Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency Services;
Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government
Facilities; Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology;
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; Transportation Systems; and
Water and Wastewater Systems.
\167\ The NIPP states that SSPs are supposed to be updated every
four years, but to date, none of these plans have been updated. See
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2013), available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/2013-national-infrastructure-protection-plan.
\168\ The SCCs are self-organized and self-governed councils
that enable critical infrastructure owners and operators, their
trade associations, and other industry representatives to interact
on a wide range of sector-specific strategies, policies, and
activities. The SCCs coordinate and collaborate with SRMAs and
related Government Coordinating Councils to address the entire range
of critical infrastructure security and resilience policies and
efforts for that sector. See https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/sector-coordinating-councils (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\169\ GCCs are formed as the government counterpart for each SCC
to enable interagency and cross-jurisdictional coordination. The
GCCs are comprised of representatives from across various levels of
government (federal, state, local, or tribal), as appropriate to the
operating landscape of each individual sector. See https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/government-coordinating-councils
(last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\170\ CISA's website has a web page for each critical
infrastructure sector, each of which includes a link to the sector's
respective SSP. These web pages are available at https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last visited Nov. 28, 2023). The
current versions of the SSPs are also collectively located at
https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans (last visited Nov.
28, 2023).
\171\ PPD-21 defines ``critical infrastructure'' as ``having the
meaning provided in section 1016(e) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001
(42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)), namely systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination of those matters.''
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For example, according to the 2015 Food and Agriculture SSP, among
the variety of entities that composed the Food and Agriculture Sector
in 2014 were more than 935,000 restaurants and institutional food
service establishments; an estimated 114,000 supermarkets, grocery
stores, and other food outlets; over 81,000 domestic food facilities
(e.g., warehouses; manufacturers; processors); and roughly 2.1 million
farms.\172\ Similarly, according to the 2015 Healthcare and Public
Health SSP, the array of entities that composed the Healthcare and
Public Health Sector included entities that provide direct patient care
(e.g., hospitals, urgent care clinics, doctor and dentist offices);
medical research institutions; medical record system vendors; health
insurance companies; local and State health departments;
[[Page 23677]]
cemeteries, crematoriums, morgues, and funeral homes; pharmaceutical
and other medical supply manufacturers and distributors; medical
laboratories; drug store chains; and blood banks.\173\ As a third
example, the 2015 Commercial Facilities SSP defines the Commercial
Facilities Sector to include a mix of entities, such as the nation's
1.1 million malls, shopping centers, and other retail establishments;
over 52,000 hotel-based properties; nearly 1,400 casinos and associated
resorts; 1 million office buildings; 5.6 million multi-family rental
buildings, and nearly 125,000 establishments designed for public
assembly, such as stadiums, arenas, movie theaters, museums, zoos,
libraries, and other performance venues.\174\ CISA considered the
variety of entities described in the sector profiles in the SSPs when
determining the scope of the Applicability section.
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\172\ DHS, Food and Agriculture SSP at 3 (2015), available at
https://www.cisa.gov/publication/nipp-ssp-food-ag-2015.
\173\ DHS, Healthcare and Public Health SSP at 5 (May 2016),
available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/healthcare-and-public-health-sector-specific-plan-2015 (hereinafter
``Healthcare and Public Health SSP'').
\174\ DHS, Commercial Facilities SSP: An Annex to the NIPP 2013,
at 3 (2015), available at https://www.cisa.gov/publication/nipp-ssp-commercial-facilities-2015.
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CISA has determined it is appropriate to define entities within a
critical infrastructure sector consistently with SSP sector profiles
that were developed through a collaborative public-private partnership,
as these sector profiles reflect a mutual understanding of what types
of entities are in a critical infrastructure sector. This
interpretation was supported by many commenters whose comments
reflected the breadth of entities that are within a critical
infrastructure sector.\175\ Accordingly, CISA proposes to include an
equivalently wide variety of types of entities within the scope of the
CIRCIA regulatory description of ``covered entity'' to reflect the same
diversity of entities that are in a critical infrastructure sector
within the context of PPD-21, the NIPP, and each sector's SSP. This is
also why CISA is not proposing to limit the scope of the Applicability
section to owners and operators of critical infrastructure.
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\175\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the National Retail
Federation, CISA-2022-0010-0092-0001 (stating that food and beverage
retailers and restaurants fall within the definitions of the
Commercial Facilities Sector and/or the Food and Agriculture
Sector); National Electrical Manufacturers Association, CISA-2022-
0010-0026-0001 (noting in an example that shopping malls are part of
the Commercial Facilities Sector); Rural Wireless Association, CISA-
2022-0010-0093-0001 (acknowledging the entire communications sector
may be included in the covered entity definition''); Center for
Democracy and Technology, CISA-2022-0010-0068-0001 (citing the NIPP
and Education Facilities SSP to show that all K-12 schools could be
included as covered entities).
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A number of commenters have recommended that CISA limit the
definition of covered entity to critical infrastructure or a subset
thereof. CISA believes that interpretation is neither consistent with
the authorization granted to CISA by Congress in CIRCIA, nor would it
enable CISA to achieve the intended purposes of the regulation. To the
first point, a plain language reading of CIRCIA's statutory definition
of covered entity indicates that CISA has the authority to include
within the scope of the regulation more than just entities that own or
operate critical infrastructure. As demonstrated by the broad sector
profiles in SSPs described above, CISA views the language used by
Congress in CIRCIA bounding the scope of who could be a covered entity
as simply ``an entity in a critical infrastructure sector, as defined
in Presidential Policy Directive 21'' as representative of a much
broader set of entities than just owners and operators of critical
infrastructure. Had Congress wanted to limit CISA's regulatory
authority to critical infrastructure owners and operators, it could
have easily done so, as PPD-21 includes a definition for the term
``critical infrastructure'' itself that could have been used for this
purpose.\176\
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\176\ See PPD-21, ``Definitions'' at 12, available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/presidential-policy-directive-ppd-21-critical-infrastructure-security-and.
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More importantly, such a narrowing scope of the term covered entity
would severely hinder CISA's ability to achieve CIRCIA's regulatory
purposes. As discussed earlier, CISA identified a number of purposes
that the regulation is designed to facilitate. See Section III.C.i.
Many of these purposes require a sufficient amount of data to achieve.
These purposes include the identification of commonly exploited
vulnerabilities and effective countermeasures; trend analysis and
threat tracking, both generally and in relation to specific sectors,
industries, or geographic regions; and the issuance of cybersecurity
alerts and early warnings. See Section III.C.ii. Reporting from a broad
range of entities is necessary to provide adequate visibility of the
cyber landscape across critical infrastructure sectors, which CIRCIA is
meant to facilitate. 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(1). Furthermore, the products and
analysis CISA is able to produce in support of these goals are likely
to significantly improve in quality in proportion with increases in the
amount of data available to CISA to support its analytical activities.
To receive a sufficient number of reports to achieve these
regulatory goals, CISA believes a broad interpretation of the term
covered entity is essential. See Section III.C.ii. This is particularly
necessary in light of the limitations Congress imposed on the term
covered cyber incident which defines the types of incidents that must
be reported under the proposed rule. As discussed later in this
document, CISA interprets the Congressional language related to
substantial cyber incident and, by proxy, the definition of covered
cyber incident, to limit the types of incidents for which CISA can
mandate reporting. As the number of CIRCIA Reports CISA will receive is
a function of both whether an entity meets the description of a covered
entity and whether the incident experienced meets the definition of
covered cyber incident, narrowly interpreting both would severely
restrict the number of incidents about which CISA receives information.
Because CISA's discretion to define a covered cyber incident is more
limited by CIRCIA itself, CISA believes it is important to scope
covered entity, where it has greater discretion under CIRCIA, more
broadly.
CISA is not, however, proposing to scope the term covered entity so
broadly as to include virtually every entity within one of the critical
infrastructure sectors within the description of covered entity. CISA
believes that this is just the starting threshold at which Congress
intended that CISA consider describing the contours of entities that
should be included as covered entities. Rather, CISA's proposed
Applicability section is designed to focus the reporting requirements
primarily on entities that own or operate systems or assets considered
critical infrastructure under the PPD-21 definition, while still
requiring reporting from a small subset of entities that might not own
or operate critical infrastructure but that could impact critical
infrastructure to help ensure CISA receives an adequate number of
reports overall, including reports of substantial cyber incidents from
entities that are most likely to own or operate critical
infrastructure. To achieve this, CISA is proposing a description for
covered entity that would capture both entities of a sufficient size
(based on number of employees or annual revenue) as well as smaller
entities that meet specific sector-based criteria.
[[Page 23678]]
ii. Determining if an Entity Is in a Critical Infrastructure Sector
As a threshold matter, to be a covered entity, an entity must be
``an entity in a critical infrastructure sector, as defined in
Presidential Policy Directive 21.'' 6 U.S.C. 681. As noted above, PPD-
21 does not actually include a definition for ``critical infrastructure
sector,'' but rather provides a list of the sixteen critical
infrastructure sectors and directed updates to the NIPP and the public-
private partnership model (i.e., SSPs).\177\
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\177\ Id. at 10-11.
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CISA anticipates that the process for an entity to determine if it
is within a critical infrastructure sector will usually be a relatively
straightforward exercise. CISA has strong public-private partnerships
with the critical infrastructure community, and will be leveraging
these relationships as part of the outreach and education campaign that
is required by CIRCIA to inform entities that are likely covered
entities of the regulatory reporting requirements associated with this
proposed rule.\178\ CISA expects that entities will be able to obtain
informational materials as part of this outreach and education campaign
that will simplify the process of determining whether an entity is a
covered entity. However, CISA has attempted to propose a population of
entities in a critical infrastructure sector that would typically
expect themselves to be included in a critical infrastructure sector,
which will enable an entity to easily self-identify whether or not it
is a covered entity. For example, entities engaged in or facilitating
transportation, such as airplane or car manufacturers, airport and
train station operators, and trucking companies, can readily self-
identify as in the Transportation Services Sector. Similarly, entities
engaged in the production, storage, and distribution of food, such as
farms, food packagers and distributers, and grocery stores can readily
self-identify as in the Food and Agriculture Sector. Banks, credit
unions, credit card companies, registered broker-dealers, and other
entities providing financial services can similarly self-identify as in
the Financial Services Sector, while drinking water and wastewater
treatment facilities can also readily identify as in the Water and
Wastewater Systems Sector. Moreover, many of these same entities are
members of the SCC for their respective critical infrastructure sectors
and on this basis would be able to accurately self-identify which
critical infrastructure sector(s) they would fall within.\179\
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\178\ See 6 U.S.C. 681b(e)(1); see also CISA's Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) website
describing CISA's partnership and forum with the critical
infrastructure community at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/critical-infrastructure-partnership-advisory-council-cipac
(last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\179\ See CISA's Sector Coordinating Councils website for
information on SCCs and membership for each sector's SCC at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/sector-coordinating-councils
(last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
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In some cases, however, it may be less obvious to an entity whether
it falls into one or more of the critical infrastructure sectors.
Examples include mine tailings and navigation locks (Dams Sector);
nursing homes and cemeteries (Healthcare and Public Health Sector); and
schools and elections infrastructure (Government Facilities Sector).
The scope of types of entities that are considered part of a sector are
described in the sector profiles in each sector's SSP. As noted above
in Section IV.B.i, SSPs are documents developed jointly by each
sector's SCC and GCC to help implement PPD-21 and the NIPP. The current
versions of SSPs for all 16 sectors can be found on the CISA website at
https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans. The overwhelming
majority of entities, though not all, are considered part of one or
more critical infrastructure sectors. Illustrative examples of entities
that generally are not considered part of one or more critical
infrastructure sector include advertising firms, law firms, political
parties, graphic design firms, think tanks, and public interest groups.
If an entity is unsure as to whether or not it is part of a
critical infrastructure sector, CISA recommends the entity review the
SSP for the sector or sectors that most closely align with the line of
activities in which the entity is engaged. Once the final rule has
issued, entities will also be able to reference informational materials
that will be published as part of CISA's outreach and education
campaign. If after taking these steps, an entity still is unsure as to
whether it is in a critical infrastructure sector, CISA recommends the
entity contact CISA so that CISA can assist the entity in determining
if it is in a critical infrastructure sector.
iii. Clear Description of the Types of Entities That Constitute Covered
Entities Based on Statutory Factors
Section 681b(c)(1) of title 6, United States Code, requires CISA to
include in the final rule ``A clear description of the types of
entities that constitute covered entities, based on--(A) the
consequences that disruption to or compromise of such an entity could
cause to national security, economic security, or public health and
safety; (B) the likelihood that such an entity may be targeted by a
malicious cyber actor, including a foreign country; and (C) the extent
to which damage, disruption, or unauthorized access to such an entity,
including the accessing of sensitive cybersecurity vulnerability
information or penetration testing tools or techniques, will likely
enable the disruption of the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure.''
The first part of this requirement is that CISA must provide ``[a]
clear description of the types of entities that constitute covered
entities . . .'' For the reasons described in this section, CISA
believes that the criteria contained within the proposed Applicability
section are easily understandable and clearly explain the types of
entities that constitute covered entities. Accordingly, CISA believes
that the Applicability section satisfies CIRCIA's ``clear description''
requirement.
In developing this clear description of what is a covered entity, 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) requires CISA to base this clear description on the
three factors enumerated within that section. CISA understands 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) not as imposing minimum requirements on what may be a
covered entity, but rather simply as providing lenses through which
CISA is to consider what entities it should seek to include in the
description of covered entity. For example, CISA is to consider ``the
likelihood'' an entity will be targeted, but 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) does
not require that entities be included in the description of covered
entity only if they have a ``high likelihood'' or ``very high
likelihood'' of being targeted.
Further, while 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) uses the word ``and,'' CISA does
not interpret 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) as requiring that all three factors
be relevant to each entity or category of entities included in the
description of covered entity; rather, CISA reads the ``and'' as
indicating that CISA must consider, as part of its process of
determining the description of covered entity, all three factors. For
example, an entity could be considered a covered entity if it maintains
sensitive intellectual property, the compromise of which could cause
significant national security or economic security consequences (factor
A), even if unauthorized access to that information would not likely
enable the disruption of reliable operation of critical infrastructure
(factor C).
This interpretation is also consistent with the specifics of the 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) factors themselves, which, collectively, address
different aspects of risk. ``Risk'' is generally understood to be a
measure of the extent to which an
[[Page 23679]]
entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, determined
based on a function of (1) the consequences, or adverse impacts, that
could arise if the circumstances or event occurs, and (2) the threat or
vulnerabilities, or the likelihood of occurrence.\180\ In the
cybersecurity context specifically, risk is often understood to refer
to those consequences and threats or vulnerabilities caused by or
resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information or information systems. See
6 U.S.C. 650(7). This risk ``equation'' is often summarized as Risk =
Consequence x Threat x Vulnerability. Viewed through this framing, CISA
interprets the three factors listed in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) to each
represent a different aspect of the risk equation: factor A (the
consequence of disruption or compromise) addresses the ``consequence''
prong of the equation; factor B (the likelihood that such an entity may
be targeted) addresses the ``threat'' prong; and factor C (the extent
to which compromise of an entity could enable the disruption of
reliable operation of critical infrastructure) speaks, albeit
indirectly, to vulnerability, i.e., the extent to which compromise of
this entity could increase the vulnerability of critical
infrastructure. Read through this lens, CISA understands the 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) factors to be direction to CISA to consider specific aspects
of the three prongs of cybersecurity risk--consequence, threat, and
vulnerability--in assessing who should be deemed a covered entity.
While the risk equation recognizes that an extremely low consequence
can balance out a moderate threat to result in a generally low overall
risk, a very high threat combined with even a moderate consequence, or
a very high consequence combined with a moderately low threat can still
lead to a moderate to high cybersecurity risk. With this understanding
in mind, CISA interprets these factors not to limit the possible scope
of covered entities to those entities that achieve high scores on each
prong of the risk equation, but rather to use these factors to consider
the various identified aspects of cybersecurity risk in determining
which entities in a critical infrastructure sector should be covered
entities. Moreover, if CISA were to interpret these three factors as
requiring CISA only to deem entities that meet all three as covered
entities, this could result in CISA not receiving sufficient reporting
across any given critical infrastructure sector to competently fulfill
its statutory responsibilities under CIRCIA to aggregate and analyze
information. As reflected in the discussion throughout this section,
CISA considered all three factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) as
it analyzed how to describe covered entity.
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\180\ See, e.g., NIST, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal
Information and Information Systems, Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication 200 (March 2006) at 48, https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.200 (last visited Mar. 12, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All three factors--i.e., (A) the consequences that disruption to or
compromise of such an entity could cause to national security, economic
security, or public health and safety; (B) the likelihood that such an
entity may be targeted by a malicious cyber actor, including a foreign
country; and (C) the extent to which damage, disruption, or
unauthorized access to such an entity, including the accessing of
sensitive cybersecurity vulnerability information or penetration
testing tools or techniques, will likely enable the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical infrastructure--were particularly
central to the determination of the sector-based criteria being
proposed by CISA to augment the group of entities that would be
considered covered entities under the first prong of the criteria
contained in the Applicability section based on their size. These
factors also drove CISA's proposal to exclude entities in a critical
infrastructure sector that fall below the size standards (unless they
meet a sector-based criteria) while including entities in a critical
infrastructure sector that are larger (even if not otherwise a covered
entity based on the sector-based criteria).
While the discussion below is focused largely on the reasons why
CISA is proposing to include entities in the description of covered
entity based on the extent to which these factors apply in the context
of covered cyber incident reporting requirements, the rationale
generally holds true for ransom payment reporting requirements as well.
CIRCIA provides one term--``covered entity''--to describe the scope of
entities subject to both reporting requirements, and, consistent with
this framing, CISA is proposing to apply the covered cyber incident
reporting requirements and the ransom payment reporting requirements to
the same universe of covered entities. This is also consistent with the
three statutory factors described above, the current threat landscape
related to ransomware attacks, and CISA's responsibilities under
CIRCIA. If a covered entity pays a ransom payment, it is likely that it
has experienced a ransomware attack from which it has not been able to
recover quickly (e.g., through the use of backup systems and data). To
the extent a covered cyber incident against a particular entity would
justify its inclusion in the description of covered entity due to the
factors above (e.g., the consequences that disruption to or compromise
of such an entity could cause), so too would a ransomware attack from
which an entity cannot quickly recover, as this would likely involve
the very disruption or compromise envisioned by these factors. Further,
in light of the rise of ransomware attacks as a proportion of cyber
incidents,\181\ the rise of ransomware attacks targeting entities in
critical infrastructure sectors specifically,\182\ and CISA's statutory
charge under CIRCIA to ``coordinate and share information with
appropriate Federal departments and agencies to identify and track
ransom payments,'' 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(2), it is critical that CISA
receive a sufficient number of Ransom Payment Reports from a breadth of
entities in critical infrastructure sectors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ See, e.g., Verizon, Data Breach Investigations Report at 7
(2022) (hereinafter, ``Verizon 2022 DBIR''), available at https://www.verizon.com/about/news/ransomware-threat-rises-verizon-2022-data-breach-investigations-report.
\182\ See, e.g., CISA, FBI, NSA, Australian Cyber Security
Centre, and United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre, Joint
Cybersecurity Advisory: 2021 Trends Show Increased Globalized Threat
of Ransomware, AA22-040A (Feb. 9, 2022), available at https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-040a (``The
[FBI], [CISA], and [NSA] observed incidents involving ransomware
against 14 of the 16 U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including
the Defense Industrial Base, Emergency Services, Food and
Agriculture, Government Facilities, and Information Technology
Sectors. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) observed
continued ransomware targeting of Australian critical infrastructure
entities, including in the Healthcare and Medical, Financial
Services and Markets, Higher Education and Research, and Energy
Sectors. The United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-
UK) recognizes ransomware as the biggest cyber threat facing the
United Kingdom. Education is one of the top UK sectors targeted by
ransomware actors, but the NCSC-UK has also seen attacks targeting
businesses, charities, the legal profession, and public services in
the Local Government and Health Sectors.''); FBI internet Crime
Complaint Center, internet Crime Report at 14 (2022), available at
https://www.ic3.gov/Home/AnnualReports (noting that the internet
Crime Complaint Center received 870 voluntary complaints that
indicated organizations belonging to a critical infrastructure
sector were victims of a ransomware attack, including at least 1
member of every critical infrastructure sector except Dams and
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sectors).
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iv. Explanation of Specific Proposed Applicability Criteria
1. Size-Based Criterion
a. Overview
The first group of entities that CISA is proposing to include as
covered entities are entities within a critical
[[Page 23680]]
infrastructure sector that exceed the U.S. Small Business
Administration's (SBA) small business size standard based on either
number of employees or annual revenue, depending on the industry. For a
number of reasons CISA believes a sensible approach is to require
larger entities within a critical infrastructure sector to report cyber
incidents while generally excluding smaller entities from those same
reporting requirements.
In assessing whether to propose a size-based criterion as a basis
for scoping which entities in a critical infrastructure sector should
be considered covered entities, CISA took into consideration the three
factors described in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1). CISA believes that each of
these factors support the inclusion of the very small percentage of
businesses in the United States that exceed the small business size
standards in the description of ``covered entity.''
The first factor Congress identified in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) is the
consequences that disruption to or compromise of an entity could cause
to national security, economic security, or public health and safety.
While size is not alone indicative of criticality, larger entities'
larger customer bases, market shares, number of employees, and other
similar size-based characteristics mean that cyber incidents affecting
them typically have greater potential to result in consequences
impacting national security, economic security, or public health and
safety than cyber incidents affecting smaller companies. For example, a
successful cyber incident affecting a national drug store chain is much
likelier to have significant national security, economic security, or
public health and safety impacts than a similar incident affecting a
``mom-and-pop'' drug store. Similarly, there is a substantially higher
likelihood of significant impacts resulting from a successful cyber
incident affecting a large industrial food conglomerate, a
multinational hotel chain, or a large hospital system than one
affecting a small independent farm, a single-location bed and
breakfast, or a small doctor's office, respectively. Countless other
similar examples exist.
At least one other regulator has used the likelihood of greater
consequences at larger facilities to justify imposing regulatory
requirements based on company size. Specifically, the Food and Drug
Administration's Mitigation Strategies to Protect Food Against
Intentional Adulteration regulations at 21 CFR part 121 imposes less
stringent regulatory requirements on small and very small businesses,
stating that larger, more well-known businesses ``are likely to have
larger batch sizes, [with attacks on them] potentially resulting in
greater human morbidity and mortality. Further, an attack on a well-
recognized, trusted brand is likely to result in greater loss of
consumer confidence in the food supply and in the government's ability
to ensure its safety and, consequently, cause greater economic
disruption than a relatively unknown brand that is distributed
regionally.'' \183\ By requiring reporting from large entities, CISA is
more likely to rapidly be informed about incidents impacting the
largest number of people and creating the most significant national
security, economic security, or public health and safety impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ 78 FR 78033 (Dec. 24, 2013).
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The second factor Congress identified in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) for
CISA to consider as part of scoping the description of covered entity
is the likelihood that an entity may be targeted by a malicious cyber
actor. Recent studies show that large entities disproportionately
experience cyber incidents. Per the 2022 Verizon DBIR, from November
2021 through October 2022, entities with more than 1,000 employees
experienced 23.5%, of the cyber security incidents analyzed by Verizon
for which the size of the organization was known,\184\ despite entities
with more than 1,000 employees accounting for less than 1% of U.S.
businesses.\185\ That percentage actually increased the following year,
with the 2023 Verizon DBIR stating that entities with more than 1,000
employees experienced 41% of the cybersecurity incidents analyzed by
Verizon for which the size of the organization was known during the
relevant timeframe.\186\ This is consistent with the belief that
terrorist organizations and other bad actors frequently target larger,
more well-known entities.\187\ The desire to target large entities has
been noted specifically in regards to cyber incidents as well. For
instance, per the 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, based on
trends from the first half of the year, the year 2023 was expected to
be the second most profitable year ever for ransomware attackers due in
part to ``big game hunting,'' i.e., the targeting of large
organizations.\188\
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\184\ Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50 (for the 2,701
incidents analyzed by Verizon that occurred between November 1, 2021
and October 31, 2022 and for which Verizon knew the impacted
organization's size, 636 had more than 1,000 employees).
\185\ According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2021, only 8,365
out of 8,148,606 (or .1%) of companies with one or more employees
had 1,000 or more employees. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2021 County
Business Patterns, available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/data.html.
\186\ Verizon, Data Breach Investigations Report at 50 (2023)
(for the 1,183 incidents analyzed by Verizon that occurred between
November 1, 2021 and October 31, 2022 and for which Verizon knew the
impacted organization's size, 489 had more than 1,000 employees)
(hereinafter, ``Verizon 2023 DBIR''), available at https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/2023/master- guide/.
\187\ See, e.g., Focused Mitigation Strategies To Protect Food
Against Intentional Adulteration, 78 FR 78014, 78033 (Dec. 24, 2013)
(``It is our assessment that [a desire to maximize public health
harm and, to a lesser extent, economic disruption] are likely to
drive terrorist organizations to target the product of relatively
large facilities, especially those for which the brand is nationally
or internationally recognizable. An attack on such a target would
potentially provide the widescale consequences desired by a
terrorist organization and the significant public attention that
would accompany an attack on a recognizable brand.'').
\188\ Department of Homeland Security, 2024 Homeland Security
Threat Assessment at 26 (``Ransomware attackers extorted at least
$449.1 million globally during the first half of 2023 and are
expected to have their second most profitable year. This is due to
the return of `big game hunting'--the targeting of large
organizations--as well as cyber criminals' continued attacks against
smaller organizations.''), available at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/homeland-threat-assessment (hereinafter, ``2024 Homeland
Security Threat Assessment''); see also Dimitry Dontov, What
Businesses are the Most Vulnerable to Cyberattacks, Forbes.com (Jan.
19, 2021) (``[M]ature hacking groups like Evil Corp are going after
large businesses, including Fortune 500 companies. Cybercriminals
have their sights set on `big fish' in various industries, as seen
with attacks on Garmin, Blackbaud, Magellan Health and others.''),
available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2021/01/19/what-businesses-are-the-most-vulnerable-to-cyberattacks/?sh=331f38bf3534.
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The third and final factor Congress identified in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) for CISA to consider as part of scoping the description of
covered entity is the extent to which damage, disruption, or
unauthorized access to such an entity will likely enable the disruption
of the reliable operation of critical infrastructure. The majority of
critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private
sector.\189\ Although the percentage of critical infrastructure owned
and operated by larger entities versus small businesses is unknown,
given that the less than 1% of businesses in America that are not
considered small businesses account for 56% of the United States' gross
domestic product and employ nearly 54% of all private sector
employees,\190\ these entities are likely to own or
[[Page 23681]]
operate a disproportionate percentage of the nation's critical
infrastructure. Moreover, in light of the interconnectedness of the
world today, incidents at entities in critical infrastructure sectors
that are not themselves owners and operators of critical infrastructure
can have cascading effects that end up impacting critical
infrastructure. Based on this, CISA believes that substantial cyber
incidents (which, as described below, are the types of incidents that
covered entities are required to report) at larger entities routinely
will have a high likelihood of disrupting the reliable operation of
critical infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ See, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),
GAO-22-104279: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: CISA Should
Improve Priority Setting, Stakeholder Involvement, and threat
Information Sharing at 1 (Mar. 2022) (``The majority of critical
infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector.''),
available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104279.
\190\ U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy,
Frequently Asked Questions (Mar. 2023), available at https://advocacy.sba.gov/2023/03/07/frequently-asked-questions-about-small-business-2023/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the rationales provided based on CISA's
consideration of the 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) factors, CISA believes there
are additional reasons justifying the proposed sized-based criteria to
scope covered entity. For instance, larger entities also are likely to
have more mature cybersecurity capabilities or be better situated to
bring in outside experts to assist during an incident.\191\ These
capabilities make larger entities more likely to identify early signs
of compromise than smaller entities. By including large entities in the
description of covered entity, the likelihood that an incident is
noticed and reported is increased, while the timeframe between
initiation of an incident and its reporting is likely to be decreased.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ Verizon 2023 DBIR, supra note 186, at 65 (``In certain
prior reports, we have compared and contrasted small and medium
businesses (SMBs) against large organizations to determine whether
the attack surface differed significantly between them.
Increasingly, both SMBs and large companies are using similar
services and infrastructure, and that means that their attack
surfaces share more in common than ever before. This has led to a
convergence of attack profiles regardless of the size of the
organization. However, what is very different is the ability of
organizations to respond to threats due to the number of resources
they can deploy in the event that they are attacked.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For similar reasons, CISA believes larger entities also frequently
will be better situated to simultaneously report and respond to or
mitigate an incident, which is a situation many, if not most, reporting
entities will be faced with given the statutorily mandated 72-hour
reporting requirement for Covered Cyber Incident Reports and 24-hour
reporting requirement for Ransom Payment Reports. Finally, larger
entities generally will be better situated to absorb costs associated
with reporting, even if per-report costs are relatively minimal, which
CISA believes they will be. Given this, to the extent that CISA is
offering regulatory relief to a portion of the community that Congress
included in the statutory definition of covered entity (the regulatory
relief being not including certain entities as covered entities in the
proposed Applicability section in Sec. 226.2), CISA believes that
relief should be provided to smaller businesses that may be less
capable of absorbing costs associated with incident reporting to the
extent they do not fit within the sector-based criteria described
below. Such an approach is also consistent with the goals of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, which Congress enacted in
large part to ensure departments and agencies explore options for
reducing any significant economic impact on small businesses that,
based on their more limited resources, may have greater difficulty
understanding and complying with regulations.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ See 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA believes that this proposed approach has ancillary benefits as
well. First, employee- and revenue-based criteria have a long history
of use for other purposes, including regulatory purposes.\193\ CISA
additionally believes that most entities should be able to relatively
easily determine if they meet the size-based requirements for inclusion
as a covered entity. The desire for definitional clarity was a common
refrain raised by stakeholders during CIRCIA listening sessions and in
comments submitted in response to the RFI. CISA believes this aspect of
the Applicability Section (as well as the Applicability section as a
whole) achieves that clarity. Second, while CISA believes the costs
incurred by an individual entity associated with reporting an incident
under the proposed regulation are relatively low, by removing small
businesses from the description of covered entity unless they meet a
specific sector-based reason for inclusion, CISA will significantly
lower the aggregated costs associated with this regulatory program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ See, e.g., 7 CFR 205.236(d)(1) (provides certain
exceptions to small businesses as determined by 13 CFR part 121 for
requirements applicable to foods labeled as organic); 40 CFR
86.1801-12(j) (exempts small businesses meeting the SBA size
standards from certain vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards);
40 CFR part 1033 (provides different locomotive emissions standards
for ``small railroads'' which, among other things, must meet the SBA
size standards to qualify).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the CIRCIA RFI, several commenters advocated for
CISA to use a size-based threshold that would allow CISA to broadly
capture entities above a certain size. Multiple commenters recommended
the definition of covered entity include all entities with 50 or more
employees,\194\ with some also recommending it include entities with
more than 1,000 customers or $5 million in revenue.\195\ One commenter
suggested exempting from coverage entities that meet the SBA definition
of a small business for certain North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) codes.\196\
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\194\ See e.g., Comments submitted by the Computing Technology
Industry Association, CISA-2022-0010-0122, Cyber Threat Alliance,
CISA-2022-0010-0019, and SolarWinds, CISA-2022-0010-0027.
\195\ See Comments submitted by the Cyber Threat Alliance, CISA-
2022-0010-0019; SolarWinds, CISA-2022-0010-0027.
\196\ See Comment submitted by the National Grain and Feed
Association, CISA-2022-0010-0104.
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Contrarily, a number of stakeholders recommended against using a
size threshold for identifying covered entities because the size of an
entity does not necessarily equate to criticality.\197\ These
stakeholders argued that using a size threshold would: (a) cause CISA
to miss reports from entities that own, or provide products or services
to, critical infrastructure that fell below the chosen threshold; and
(b) require reporting of incidents from entities that do not own or
operate systems or assets that are critical infrastructure, which a
number of the commenters asserted is not in line with the purposes of
the regulation. While CISA agrees with commenters that the size of an
entity does not necessarily equate to that entity's criticality, it
does not believe the two outcomes the commenters suggest will occur or
have the negative impact suggested based on how CISA has proposed to
scope the description of covered entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by the Information
Technology-ISAC, CISA-2022-0010-0048 (``Focusing on the incident's
impact on critical infrastructure might also provide a path to
defining the term `covered entity.' For example, if the goal of the
program is to manage risks and disruptions to critical
infrastructure, CISA could define ``covered entities'' based on the
products or services companies provide to critical infrastructure.
In this way, a covered entity is not determined by its size, but by
the criticality of the products or services it provides to other
critical infrastructure.''); (ISC)2, CISA-2022-0010-0112 (``Each of
the 16 critical infrastructure sectors has varying risk profiles
which should be considered when considering this definition. We
suggest basing the definition on the nature of those services and
the effect it could have on customers instead of employees and
revenue.''); NCTA--The Internet & Television Association, CISA-2022-
0010-0102 (``Covered entity eligibility criteria that are size- and
sector-neutral are critical because the online ecosystem consists of
a broad range of interdependent entities, including communications
networks, cloud services, CDN providers, software and security
vendors, and e-commerce platforms and applications.'').
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Regarding the first concern, that using a size-based standard would
cause CISA to miss reports from critical infrastructure entities that
fall below the size standard, CISA would agree with this if a size-
based standard was the only way in which an entity could become a
covered entity. To address this
[[Page 23682]]
concern and ensure that most entities that own or operate critical
infrastructure are included within the covered entity description
regardless of size, CISA has included additional sector-based criteria
in the Applicability section which, if met by an entity in a critical
infrastructure sector, would make that entity a covered entity, even if
the entity's size is below the applicable size standard. Many of the
sector-based criteria are specifically designed to target entities that
own or operate critical infrastructure, and these criteria are
independent of the size standard for determining applicability of the
proposed regulations. In other words, an entity in a critical
infrastructure sector is a covered entity if it meets any of the
criteria included in the Applicability section, be it the size-based
standard or one of the sector-based criteria. As noted earlier, an
entity in a critical infrastructure sector does not have to meet both
the size-based standard and one of the sector-based criteria for
inclusion as a covered entity.
As to the second concern, that size-based thresholds will result in
reporting of incidents from entities that do not own or operate systems
or assets that constitute critical infrastructure and that those
reports would not advance the purposes of the regulation, CISA agrees
with the first part of the comment, but not the latter. CISA agrees
that size is not always indicative of criticality, and thus, including
all entities of a certain size that are within a critical
infrastructure sector as covered entities will result in CISA receiving
some reporting from entities that are in critical infrastructure
sectors, but do not own or operate systems or assets that constitute
critical infrastructure. CISA, however, disagrees that CISA requiring
reporting from those entities that do not own or operate critical
infrastructure would not support the purposes of this regulation.
Incidents that occur at entities in critical infrastructure sectors
reveal valuable information on TTPs and trends that can be used to help
better protect other entities in those specific sectors and others,
regardless of whether the reporting entities own or operate systems or
assets that constitute critical infrastructure. If CISA were to require
reporting on only significant incidents from entities that own or
operate critical infrastructure, CISA's ability to identify adversary
trends and campaigns, identify vulnerabilities that are being
exploited, and issue early warnings would be significantly more
limited. It is much more in line with the purpose of the regulation for
CISA to learn about new or novel vulnerabilities, trends, or tactics
sooner and be able to share early warnings before additional entities
within a critical infrastructure sector, whether or not they own or
operate critical infrastructure, can fall victim to them.
Additionally, in light of the interconnectedness of the world
today, incidents at entities in a critical infrastructure sector, even
if that the entity does not own or operate critical infrastructure, can
have unexpected, cascading effects that end up impacting critical
infrastructure.\198\ Requiring reporting from entities in critical
infrastructure sectors, whether or not they own or operate systems or
assets that are critical infrastructure, can enable response and
mitigation activities that may help prevent incidents from causing
cascading impacts to critical infrastructure or hamper the delivery of
NCFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ See, e.g., CISA, A Guide to Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience at 6 (Nov. 2019) (``Connections and
interdependencies between infrastructure elements and sectors means
that damage, disruption, or destruction to one infrastructure
element can cause cascading effects, impacting continued operation
of another.''), available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/guide-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience
(hereinafter ``Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience'').
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b. Proposed Size-Based Criterion
CISA is proposing that the description of covered entity include
any entity in a critical infrastructure sector that exceeds the small
business size standard specified by the applicable North American
Industry Classification System Code in the SBA Size Standards, which
are codified in 13 CFR part 121. These standards ``define whether a
business is small and, thus, eligible for Government programs and
preferences reserved for `small business' concerns.'' \199\ While
designed in large part for determining eligibility to participate in
certain Federal government contracts, procurements, grants, and other
similar purposes, the Small Business Size Regulations indicate that the
SBA Size Standards are for general use by Federal departments and
agencies promulgating regulations that include size criteria.\200\ If a
Federal department or agency wants to use different size criteria, it
is required to consult with the SBA in writing during the rulemaking
process and explain why the SBA's existing size standards would not
satisfy program requirements.\201\
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\199\ See 13 CFR 121.101(a).
\200\ See 13 CFR 121.903(a).
\201\ Id.
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SBA Size Standards vary by industry (as designated by NAICS \202\
code) and are generally based on the number of employees or the amount
of annual receipts (i.e., annual revenue) the business has. SBA reviews
and updates the Size Standards every five years via rulemaking. The
current SBA Size Standards are contained in the SBA's Table of Small
Business Size Standards, effective January 1, 2022, which can be found
at both 13 CFR 121.201 and https://www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards. Currently, the threshold for those industries where
small business status is determined by number of employees is between
100 and 1,500 employees depending on the industry. The threshold for
those industries where small business status is determined by annual
revenue is between $2.25 million and $47 million depending on the
industry. It is estimated that, as of 2022, there are more than 32
million small businesses in the United States, and that small
businesses comprise 99.9% of all American businesses.\203\
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\202\ NAICS is the standard used by Federal statistical
departments and agencies in classifying business establishments for
the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical
data related to the U.S. business economy. Additional information on
NAICS, to include a listing of current NAICS codes, can be found at
https://www.census.gov/naics/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\203\ See, e.g., Kelly Main, Small Business Statistics of 2023,
Forbes (Dec. 7, 2022), available at https://www.forbes.com/advisor/business/small-business-statistics/); U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Small Business Statistics, https://www.chamberofcommerce.org/small-business-statistics/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
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In establishing its Size Standards, the SBA considers economic
characteristics comprising the structure of an industry, such as degree
of competition, average firm size, and distribution of firms by size,
as well as competition from other industries, growth trends, historical
activity within an industry, and unique factors occurring in the
industry which may distinguish small firms from other firms.\204\ As
the establishment of the SBA Size Standards is done via regulation, the
public is afforded the opportunity to review and provide comments on
any proposed modifications to existing SBA Size Standards before they
go into effect. In light of the comprehensive and transparent process
through which the SBA establishes its Size Standards, and the
successful use of these standards as size-based thresholds for various
Federal programs, CISA believes the SBA Size Standards are well-suited
for use as the size-based threshold aspect of the CIRCIA Applicability
section.
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\204\ 13 CFR 121.102(a).
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In determining the approach to propose for the covered entity
description's size threshold, CISA also considered working with the SBA
to
[[Page 23683]]
establish a size standard for entities in critical infrastructure
sectors tailored to the CIRCIA program. In exploring this option, CISA
assessed whether a clear justification existed for using higher or
lower thresholds than those established by the SBA Size Standards. CISA
also considered whether a single threshold for all entities, rather
than industry-specific thresholds, might be warranted. Ultimately,
CISA, based in part on conversations with SBA, did not believe
sufficient justification existed to deviate from the existing SBA Size
Standards in any of these manners.
The first alternative CISA considered was the use of higher
thresholds than those established in the SBA Size Standards. By raising
the threshold--i.e., increasing the minimum number of employees or
amount of annual receipts an entity has to have before qualifying as a
covered entity--CISA would be further reducing the number of entities
that would qualify as covered entities. Considering the significant
number of entities for whom using the SBA Size Standards as the
threshold would provide regulatory relief, CISA believes that there is
no need to generally exclude additional entities. Conversely, for the
reasons discussed earlier supporting the need for broad collection of
reports, CISA is concerned that any further reduction in the number of
covered entities could make it difficult for CISA to achieve the goals
of the regulation. See Section III.C.ii.
The second alternative CISA considered was the use of lower
thresholds than those established in the SBA Size Standards. By
lowering the threshold--i.e., decreasing the minimum number of
employees or amount of annual receipts an entity has to have before
qualifying as a covered entity--CISA would be expanding the number of
entities that would qualify as covered entities under this threshold.
For the reasons discussed above, CISA believes it does not need to
collect reports from the entire possible universe of covered entities
allowed under the statutory language and that it is prudent to provide
regulatory relief to smaller entities where possible. To the extent
that some categories of entities from whom CISA believes reporting is
important fall below the size threshold, CISA will be able to include
those entities in the description of covered entity using the proposed
sector-based criteria.
Finally, CISA explored whether there might be some benefit to using
a single size-based threshold (or two--i.e., one each for number of
employees and annual receipts), as opposed to the SBA Size Standards
approach that establishes bespoke thresholds for more than 1,000
individual industries based on their NAICS codes. CISA does believe
that using a single size-based threshold (or two) that would be
consistent across all industries would be a simpler, clearer approach;
however, the SBA has consistently determined that using size thresholds
tailored by industry is important to respecting relevant and
significant distinctions across different industries. Not only does the
SBA use that approach in its own Size Standards, the Small Business
Size Regulations require the SBA Administrator to ensure that any size
standard approved by the SBA for use by other Federal regulators under
the 13 CFR 121.903 process ``varies from industry to industry to the
extent necessary to reflect the differing characteristics of the
various industries, and consider other relevant factors.'' \205\ In
light of this, CISA believes the best approach would be to use the SBA
Size Standards as the basis for the CIRCIA size threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ 13 CFR 121.903(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. How To Determine Whether an Entity Meets the Size Threshold
To determine if an entity in a critical infrastructure sector meets
the proposed size threshold, an entity will need to determine which
NAICS code should be applied to the entity and whether the entity meets
the applicable employee-based or annual receipts-based threshold. The
SBA's Small Business Size Regulations provide requirements for how to
determine if an entity qualifies as a small business under SBA
regulations.\206\ This includes, among other things, requirements for
determining which NAICS code applies to a given entity (13 CFR
121.101), how to calculate number of employees (13 CFR 121.106), and
how to calculate annual receipts (i.e., annual revenue) (13 CFR
121.104). CISA does not see any reason to deviate from this well-
established approach to determining an entity's size and thus is
proposing to use the instructions found in the SBA's Small Business
Size Regulations as the methodology to be used to determine if an
entity meets the CIRCIA covered entity size threshold. Accordingly,
CISA is proposing that when an entity is determining whether it meets
the size threshold provided in the Applicability section, the entity
should follow the instructions contained in the Small Business Size
Regulations, 13 CFR part 121, or any successor thereto.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ See 13 CFR 121.103-121.107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA recognizes that entity size and other characteristics can be
dynamic, and whether an entity meets the size-based threshold or other
criteria for being a covered entity may vary depending on when the
entity assesses if they meet the criteria set forth in Sec. 226.2. See
discussion on reporting requirements in Section IV.C.i in this document
for more information.
2. Sector-Based Criteria
CISA is also proposing to include as part of the description of
covered entity in the Applicability section a series of criteria that
are based on characteristics typically associated with entities in one
or more specific critical infrastructure sectors or subsectors.
Specifically, CISA is proposing to include in the scope of covered
entity any entity that meets one or more of a set of specified sector-
based criteria, each of which is described below. These criteria apply
regardless of the specific critical infrastructure sector of which the
entity considers itself to be part.
CISA is proposing these additional, sector-based criteria for a
variety of reasons. First, as noted in the discussion regarding the
size-based criterion, an entity's size does not necessarily reflect its
criticality. Some entities in a critical infrastructure sector that
fall below the proposed size-based thresholds own or operate systems or
assets that would be likely to meet the definition of critical
infrastructure set forth by 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e). One of the main
purposes of this regulatory program authorized by CIRCIA is to enhance
the security and resiliency of critical infrastructure, and therefore
receiving Covered Cyber Incident Reports and Ransom Payment Reports
from as many entities that own or operate critical infrastructure as
possible is imperative to meet this directive.
Another designated purpose of the CIRCIA regulation is for CISA to
develop and share information on cybersecurity trends and threats. CISA
believes that in addition to cross-sector cybersecurity threat and
trend analysis, there is great value to being able to produce sector-
specific threat and trend analysis. To achieve the latter, it is
essential for the Federal government to have sufficient reporting from
each critical infrastructure sector. For some sectors or subsectors,
such as the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector, there currently is
little or no required reporting of cyber incidents to the Federal
government, making it very difficult for CISA or other Federal partners
to provide reliable, incident-based, sector-specific trend and threat
analysis. CISA believes the proposed sector-based criteria will help
ensure the Federal government has sufficient
[[Page 23684]]
reporting within each sector to support this type of analysis.
Third, consistent with the factors in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1), CISA
believes that broader coverage may be warranted for those sectors,
subsectors, or industries that have historically been inordinately
targeted by malicious cyber actors, including by foreign countries, or
for which there is a greater likelihood of significant national
security, economic security, or public health and safety consequences
or disruption to the reliable operation of critical infrastructure. By
ensuring CISA receives CIRCIA Reports from entities, regardless of
size, in these more frequently or likely targeted sectors, subsectors,
or industries, and entities against whom a covered cyber incident is
more likely to result in significant consequences or disruptions to
critical infrastructure, CISA and its partners will be better situated
to identify new TTPs, campaigns, and vulnerabilities and share early
warnings and prevention measures to help entities in those communities
address the potential heightened threat for them of cyber incidents.
Based on the above rationales, CISA is proposing sector-based
criteria for entities operating in each of the critical infrastructure
sectors listed below. During the development of these proposed
criteria, CISA engaged each of the SRMAs to consult on potential
criteria for their respective sector, as well as other Federal agencies
with cybersecurity-related regulatory authorities focused on specific
sectors. CISA also considered the inputs received from the public
through both the CIRCIA listening sessions and in response to the
CIRCIA RFI.
For the proposed sector-based criteria, CISA proposes to cover
entities that own or operate certain types of facilities or entities
that perform certain functions as covered entities. For example, the
Chemical Sector sector-based criteria proposes capturing within the
description of covered entity any entity that owns or operates a CFATS-
covered chemical facility, and the Healthcare and Public Health sector-
based criteria would include, among others, entities that manufacture
any Class II or III medical device. See Section IV.B.iv.2.a and i in
this document. While these criteria are focused on certain facility
types or functions as the basis of determining whether an entity is a
covered entity, CISA is proposing that the entire entity (e.g.,
corporation, organization), and not the individual facility or
function, is the covered entity. Thus, for example, if an entity owns
20 chemical distribution facilities, only five of which are CFATS-
regulated facilities, the entire entity is the covered entity, and not
simply the five CFATS-regulated facilities. Accordingly, if that entity
experiences a substantial cyber incident or makes a ransom payment, the
entity would need to report that incident or payment to CISA regardless
of whether the underlying incident impacted any of the five CFATS-
regulated facilities. Similarly, if an entity manufactures Class II or
III medical devices, in addition to other functions that do not meet
one of the sector-based criteria, the entire entity is the covered
entity, and any substantial cyber incident experienced by any part of
the entity would need to be reported, regardless of whether the
underlying incident impacted the manufacturing of Class II or III
medical devices. CISA believes this is consistent with CIRCIA's entity-
based approach, and will ensure that adequate reporting is provided to
CISA to perform sector-specific cybersecurity threat and trend
analysis, which might not be possible if reporting was limited only to
incidents that actually impact the specific facilities or functions
identified in the sector-based criteria. Considering the entire entity
(e.g., corporation, organization), and not an individual facility or
function, as the covered entity will also avoid delays in reporting
that could be caused if entities had to wait to specifically determine
whether particular facilities or functions were impacted by a
substantial cyber incident.
a. Chemical Sector
CISA is proposing to include in the description of covered entity
any entity in a critical infrastructure sector that owns or operates a
covered chemical facility subject to the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards.\207\ CISA proposes including this criterion to
ensure that entities that own or operate a covered chemical facility
that presents a high risk of significant adverse consequences for human
life or health, national security, and/or critical economic assets if
subjected to terrorist attack, compromise, infiltration, or
exploitation are required to report substantial cyber incidents to
CISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ See 6 CFR part 27. CISA is aware that, at the time of
publication of this NPRM, Congress has allowed statutory authority
for the CFATS program to expire. CISA believes that by the time the
CIRCIA final rule is issued, CFATS will be reauthorized by Congress.
Should CFATS not be reauthorized by the time the CIRCIA final rule
is ready for publication, CISA proposes to replace the proposed
CFATS-based Chemical Sector criterion in this NPRM with an alternate
Chemical Sector criterion focused on owners and operators of
facilities regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
under its Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations. That
alternative is discussed at the end of this subsection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under CFATS, any facility that possesses a threshold quantity of
one of more than 300 chemicals of interest must provide information to
CISA to enable CISA to conduct a risk assessment of the facility. See 6
CFR 27.200. If CISA determines that the facility is high-risk based on
this assessment, the facility is required to develop and implement a
site security plan, which must include appropriate cybersecurity
measures. See 6 CFR 27.210(a)(3). These facilities are referred to
under the CFATS regulations as covered chemical facilities.
Consideration of the three factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) also supports the inclusion of entities that own or operate
CFATS covered chemical facilities within the description of covered
entity. To determine if a chemical facility is high-risk and thus
subject to CFATS, CISA conducts a risk assessment on the facility that
considers the potential consequences of a successful attack on the
facility, the level of threat facing the facility, and the
vulnerability of the facility to an attack.\208\ Only chemical
facilities that have the potential to cause significant consequences to
public health and safety if compromised by terrorism (i.e., the first
factor identified in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1), which relates to consequence)
and face a high potential threat (i.e., the second factor identified in
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1), which relates to likelihood of threat) will meet
the criteria to be designated a CFATS covered chemical facility. As
such, CISA believes that the first two factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) support the inclusion of entities that own or operate CFATS
covered chemical facilities within the description of covered entity.
The third factor enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1), which refers to the
extent to which damage, disruption, or unauthorized access to such an
entity will likely enable the disruption of the reliable operation of
critical infrastructure, similarly supports inclusion of these
entities, as most, if not all, CFATS covered chemical facilities would
meet the definition of critical infrastructure based on the potential
national security or public health and safety consequences associated
with a successful attack on the facility.
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\208\ See CISA, CFATS Tiering Methodology Fact Sheet, available
at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/programs/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards-cfats/cfats-tiering-methodology) (last
visited Oct. 15, 2023).
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[[Page 23685]]
As noted in the previous section of this document, while CFATS
security requirements apply only to the covered chemical facilities
themselves, CISA is proposing in this NPRM that the CIRCIA cyber
incident reporting requirements apply to the entire corporate entity
that owns or operates the CFATS-covered chemical facility and are not
limited to substantial cyber incidents that impact a CFATS-covered
chemical facility. CISA believes this is consistent with CIRCIA's
entity-based approach and will ensure that adequate reporting is
provided to CISA to perform chemical sector cyber threat and trend
analysis, which might not be possible if reporting were limited only to
incidents that actually impact CFATS-covered chemical facilities.
Because CFATS currently requires covered chemical facilities to
report certain incidents, including potential cyber incidents, to CISA,
CISA recognizes that this proposed criteria likely will result in two
different legal obligations for certain entities to report cyber
incidents to CISA under certain circumstances, depending on whether it
is reporting a covered cyber incident or not. To avoid the same entity
having to report the same incident to CISA twice, CISA is proposing
that submission of a cyber incident report to CISA under either one of
these authorities will satisfy the incident reporting obligations for
both regulations for the incident, assuming the single submission
includes all the information required to comply with both CFATS and
CIRCIA, independently. However, if a covered entity reports an incident
to CISA per CFATS requirements and intends for this report to also meet
its reporting obligations under CIRCIA, it would need to indicate that
intent in the submission. Otherwise, a separate CIRCIA Report would
need to be filed to meet the entity's reporting obligations.
Finally, CISA also is aware that a number of high-risk chemical
facilities may not be subject to CFATS under one of the statutory
exemptions in the legislation authorizing CFATS. Specifically, CFATS
does not apply to facilities regulated under MTSA; public water
systems, as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. 300f; Treatment Works, as
that term is defined in 33 U.S.C. 1292; or facilities subject to
regulation by the NRC. 6 CFR 27.110(b). As a result, many entities that
own high-risk chemical facilities would not be required to report cyber
incidents to CISA either under CFATS or under this proposed sector-
based criteria. CISA is proposing to require each of these categories
of entities to file a CIRCIA Report under various other sector-based
criteria, however, so CISA ultimately is proposing that all entities
that own or operate a high-risk chemical facility must report covered
cyber incidents and ransom payments under one of the sector-based
criteria.
As noted in an earlier footnote, CISA is aware that, at the time of
publication of this NPRM, Congress allowed the statutory authority for
CFATS to expire. CISA believes that by the time the CIRCIA final rule
is issued, CFATS will be reauthorized, but also recognizes that it is
prudent to include for public consideration a proposed alternative
Chemical Sector sector-based criterion should CFATS not be
reauthorized. Accordingly, CISA proposes that if CFATS is not
reauthorized by the time the CIRCIA final rule is ready for
publication, CISA instead would replace the CFATS-based Chemical Sector
criterion with a Chemical Sector sector-based criterion that
description identifies owners and operators of facilities subject to
the EPA RMP rule as covered entities.
The EPA RMP rule, which is authorized by Section 112(r) of the
Clean Air Act,\209\ requires facilities that use certain extremely
hazardous substances to develop a risk management plan for chemical
accident prevention purposes.\210\ For similar reasons as those
provided above in relation to the proposed CFATS-focused Chemical
Sector sector-based criterion, a consideration of the 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) factors would also support the inclusion of entities that
own or operate facilities that are required to comply with EPA RMP
requirements in the description of covered entity. According to the
EPA, such chemical accidents that occur at such facilities can pose
significant consequence and potential threat to national security and
public health and safety because ``[f]acilities subject to the RMP
regulation pose significant risks to the public and the environment.
These risks stem from potential accidental chemical releases that can
cause fires, explosions, and harmful vapor clouds.'' \211\ Furthermore,
according to the U.S. GAO, ``[t]housands of high-risk chemical
facilities may be subject to the risk posed by cyber threat
adversaries--terrorists, criminals, or nations. These adversaries could
potentially manipulate facilities' information and control systems to
release or steal hazardous chemicals and inflict mass causalities to
surrounding populations.'' \212\ Moreover, as part of the development
of the CFATS program's regulations, DHS drew from information and
sources available through EPA RMP, including the list of substances
used by EPA RMP to regulate facilities, due to the overlapping safety
and security concerns associated with many chemicals.\213\
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\209\ See 40 CFR part 68.
\210\ See EPA, Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule Overview,
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/risk-management-program-rmp-rule-overview
(last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\211\ Reconsideration of the 2017 Amendments to the Accidental
Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the
Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7), Regulatory Impact Analysis at 76
(Nov. 18, 2019), available at https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-2089.
\212\ U.S. GAO, GAO-20-453: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:
Actions Needed to Enhance DHS Oversight of Cybersecurity at High-
Risk Chemical Facilities (May 2020), available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-453.
\213\ See 72 FR 17688 (Apr. 9, 2007).
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For the reasons described above, CISA believes entities owning
facilities subject to EPA RMP would be a satisfactory alternate
criterion for ensuring CISA receives reporting under CIRCIA from
entities within the Chemical Sector, and is supported by the three
factors in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1); however, CISA believes the CFATS-
targeted criterion would be a better criterion for the Chemical Sector,
if permissible, for a few reasons. First, regulation under the EPA RMP
rule is limited to facilities that only present toxic or flammable
release concerns because they impact public health and safety, whereas
CFATS regulates facilities that are high risk due to other chemical
security related concerns. Additional security concerns posed by CFATS
includes coverage of chemicals that pose risks related to theft or
diversion of explosives or weapons of mass effect, in addition to toxic
and flammable release hazards. Second, whereas EPA RMP determines
coverage primarily based on the potential consequences of a chemical
release, CFATS additionally is required to take into account threat
when determining if a facility is a CFATS covered chemical facility.
Finally, because CFATS imposes cyber incident reporting requirements,
using CFATS as a basis for the CIRCIA cyber incident reporting
requirements coverage promotes harmonization of Federal cyber incident
reporting regulations by aligning reporting requirements for the same
population of entities. For these reasons, CISA is proposing to include
a criterion capturing entities that own or operate facilities regulated
under EPA RMP within the description of covered entity only if CFATS is
not authorized at the time of the issuance of the CIRCIA final rule.
[[Page 23686]]
CISA is interested in receiving comments on these two alternatives,
to include:
10. The decision to solely use the CFATS-based criterion if CFATS
is in effect at the time of the issuance of the CIRCIA final rule.
11. Other possible alternatives that CISA should consider as a
sector-based criterion for the Chemical Sector if CFATS is not
reauthorized by Congress.
b. Communications Sector
CISA is proposing to include in the description of covered entity
any entity that provides communications services by wire or radio
communications, as defined in 47 U.S.C. 153(40), 153(59), to the
public, business, or government. This criterion would also require
reporting from both one-way communications service providers (e.g.,
radio and television broadcasters, cable television and satellite
operators) and two-way communications service providers (e.g.,
telecommunications carriers; submarine cable licensees; fixed and
mobile wireless service providers; VoIP providers; internet service
providers), irrespective of whether they are subject to FCC regulatory
reporting or other FCC requirements.
Consideration of the factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of both one-way and two-way communications
service providers within the description of covered entity. First, the
disruption or compromise of either one-way or two-way communications
systems could significantly impact national security, economic
security, and public health and safety. As noted in the 2015
Communications SSP, ``[v]irtually every element of modern life is now
dependent on cyber infrastructure. As a result, our Nation's economic
and national security relies on the security of the assets and
operations of critical communications infrastructure.'' \214\ Executive
Order 13618--Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness
Communications Functions reinforces the importance of these entities to
national security, stating that ``[t]he Federal Government must have
the ability to communicate at all times and under all circumstances to
carry out its most critical and time sensitive missions. . . . Such
communications must be possible under all circumstances to ensure
national security, effectively manage emergencies, and improve national
resilience.'' \215\
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\214\ See Communications SSP: An Annex to the NIPP 2013 at 3
(2015), available at https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans
(hereinafter ``Communications SSP'').
\215\ E.O. 13618--Assignment of National Security and Emergency
Preparedness Communications Functions, 77 FR 40779 (July 6, 2012).
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One-way communications services providers are the primary providers
of information, including emergency alerts, to the public. Therefore, a
covered cyber incident affecting one-way communications service
providers has the potential to significantly jeopardize public health
and national security by crippling the government's ability to
distribute important information quickly. Two-way communications
services are essential to the operation of the nation's public safety
answering points and 911 emergency call system for transmission of both
voice and data.\216\ These risks exist regardless of a provider's size,
as small service providers may serve critical infrastructure operators,
and wireless service providers, broadcasters, and cable providers of
all sizes are responsible for providing emergency alerts.
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\216\ Public safety answering points are required to report
outages to the FCC pursuant to 47 CFR part 4, which the FCC then
shares with CISA.
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Second, Communications Sector assets historically have been
targeted by malicious cyber actors. Per the 2023 IBM Security X Force
Threat Intelligence Index, ``Media and Telecom'' entities have
consistently experienced cyber incidents over the years, with the
industry peaking as the industry experiencing the fourth most incidents
in 2019.\217\ Additionally, per the 2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment, the telecommunications industry is likely to remain a
target of foreign government-affiliated cyber actors from foreign
countries such as Russia and China.\218\
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\217\ IBM, 2023 IBM Security X-Force Threat Intelligence Index
at 42, available at https://www.ibm.com/reports/threat-intelligence
(hereinafter, ``IBM 2023 Threat Index'').
\218\ 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment at 20, supra note
188, at 20 (``Russian government-affiliated cyber espionage likely
will remain a persistent threat to federal, state, and local
governments, as well as entities in the defense, energy, nuclear,
aviation, transportation, healthcare, education, media, and
telecommunications industries. Chinese government cyber actors
likely will continue to target key critical infrastructure sectors
in the United States, including healthcare and public health,
financial services, the defense industrial base, government
facilities, and communications.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, communications services also are essential to the
operations of every other critical infrastructure sector. As noted in
the Communications SSP, ``the Communications Sector is one of the few
sectors that can affect all other sectors. At a minimum, each sector
depends on services from the Communications Sector to support its
operations. . . .'' \219\ Damage, disruption, or unauthorized access to
these communications providers has a high likelihood of disrupting the
reliable operation of other critical infrastructure assets, which can
cause potentially cascading impacts to NCFs. This criticality to other
sectors is reinforced by the fact that communications is one of four
designated lifeline functions, indicating that the reliable operations
of this sector is so critical that a disruption or loss of this
function will directly affect the security and resilience of critical
infrastructure within and across numerous sectors.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\ Communications SSP, supra note 214, at 9.
\220\ See Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience, supra note 198, at 4 (``There are four designated
lifeline functions--transportation, water, energy, and
communications, which means that their reliable operations are so
critical that a disruption or loss of one of these functions will
directly affect the security and resilience of critical
infrastructure within and across numerous sectors.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Critical Manufacturing Sector
CISA is proposing to include in the description of a covered entity
any entity that owns or has business operations that engage in one or
more of the listed categories of manufacturing, which are the four
manufacturing industries that together currently constitute the
Critical Manufacturing Sector. The Critical Manufacturing Sector
subsectors, which were identified by DHS after a study of the
manufacturing sector, are Primary Metal Manufacturing (NAICS Subsector
331); Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS Subsector 333); Electrical
Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing (NAICS Subsector
335); and Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (NAICS Subsector
336).\221\ In 2008, DHS combined these four subsectors into a new
Critical Manufacturing Sector based largely on the fact that the
failure or disruption of any of these industries could cause, among
other things, a large number of fatalities, significant national
economic impact, or an inability of the government to provide necessary
services to the public.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ See 73 FR 23476 (Apr. 30, 2008).
\222\ Id.
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Consideration of the factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of the entities comprising the Critical
Manufacturing Sector within the description of covered entity. First,
as noted in the previous paragraph, the President designated entities
within these NAICS codes as the Critical Manufacturing Sector due in
[[Page 23687]]
large part to the potential that disruption or compromise of such
entities could impact national security, economic security, or public
health and safety.\223\ Moreover, the entities within this sector often
focus on efficiency, not redundancy, with lean inventories and just-in-
time practices that can increase vulnerability to cascading disruptions
and decrease agility in response with potentially damaging financial
implications,\224\ increasing the likelihood that a cyber incident
could negatively impact economic security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ Id.
\224\ See Critical Manufacturing SSP: An Annex to the NIPP 2013
at 4 (2015), available at https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans (hereinafter ``Critical Manufacturing SSP'').
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Second, the manufacturing industry historically have been targeted
by malicious cyber actors, and the expectation is for that targeting to
continue. According to the IBM Security X-Force Threat Intelligence
Index for 2023 (IBM 2023 Threat Index), the manufacturing industry
experienced the most cyber incidents in both 2021 and 2022.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\ See IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42; see also
Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50 (listing Manufacturing as
experiencing the fifth most cyber incidents of any industry in
2022).
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Third, damage or disruption to a Critical Manufacturing Sector
entity has the potential to disrupt the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure. As noted in the Designation of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan Critical Manufacturing Sector,
``[b]ecause of the importance of the manufacturing industry in
sustaining cross-sector interdependencies, the Critical Manufacturing
Sector also includes systems and operations that, if attacked or
disrupted, would cause major interruptions to the essential functions
of one or more other [critical infrastructure] sectors and result in
national-level impacts.'' \226\ Moreover, local or regional disruptions
to entities within the Critical Manufacturing Sector can have cascading
impacts across wide geographic regions and industries.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ 73 FR 23476, 23477 (Apr. 30, 2008).
\227\ See Critical Manufacturing SSP, supra note 224, at v.
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Given the overall criticality of the entities within this sector,
the reliance of NCFs on the items manufactured by entities within this
sector, the relative lack of substitutability of many of the products
produced by the sector, and the history of cyber incidents impacting
manufacturing entities, CISA believes it is appropriate for all
entities operating in any of the four Critical Manufacturing Sector
subsectors to be required to report covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments to CISA.
d. Defense Industrial Base Sector
CISA proposes including within the description of covered entity
any entity that is a contractor or subcontractor required to report
cyber incidents to DOD pursuant to the definitions and requirements of
the DFARS Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident
Reporting clause located at 48 CFR 252.204-7012. This proposed sector-
based criteria would require reporting from DOD contractors and
subcontractors that provide operationally critical support to DOD, as
well as DOD contractors and subcontractors that utilize unclassified
information systems that are owned, or operated by or for, the
contractor to process, store, or transmit covered defense
information.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ See 48 CFR 252.204-7012.
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DOD's contractor cyber incident reporting requirements apply to the
subset of contractors that process, store, or transmit ``covered
defense information'' or that DOD has determined provide
``operationally critical support.'' ``Covered defense information''
includes things such as controlled technical information, critical
information related to operations security, and information concerning
certain items, commodities, technology, or software whose export could
reasonably be expected to adversely affect the United States national
security and nonproliferation objectives.\229\ Contractors that provide
``operationally critical support'' include those that provide
``supplies or services designated by the Government as critical for
airlift, sealift, intermodal transportation services, or logistical
support that is essential to the mobilization, deployment, or
sustainment of the Armed Forces in a contingency operation.'' \230\
CISA acknowledges that contractors that provide operationally critical
support also includes entities in one or more critical infrastructure
sectors, and are not generally considered as part of the Defense
Industrial Base, as described in the Defense Industrial Base SSP.\231\
For the purposes of the CIRCIA rule, CISA proposes grouping these
entities under the Defense Industrial Base Sector sector-based criteria
to provide these entities an easier means of identifying whether they
are a covered entity. CISA also recognizes that certain contractors
that provide operationally critical support may fall under other
proposed Applicability criteria, including other sector-based criteria
(e.g. for the Transportation Sector).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ 48 CFR 204.7301.
\230\ 48 CFR 252.204-7012(a).
\231\ The Defense Industrial Base Sector ``consists of
government and private sector organizations that can support
military operations directly; perform R&D; design, manufacture, and
integrate systems; and maintain depots and service military weapons
systems, subsystems, components, subcomponents, or parts--all of
which are intended to satisfy U.S. military national defense
requirements.'' Defense Industrial Base Sector-Specific Plan: An
Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan at 15 (2015),
available https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/defense-industrial-base-sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As both DOD and their prime contractors frequently contract with
small businesses to meet small business contracting and subcontracting
goals and requirements, many of the entities covered under these
criteria would not be captured by the size threshold contained in the
proposed Applicability section. In developing the final rule requiring
these contractors to report cyber incidents to DOD, DOD specifically
addressed the need to include small businesses in the regulated
population, stating in part that the costs to the nation in lost
intellectual property and lost technological advantage over potential
adversaries is much greater than the costs of implementation of the
regulation and that ``[t]he value of the information (and impact of its
loss) does not diminish when it moves to contractors (prime or sub,
large or small).'' \232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\ 81 FR 72986, 72987 (Oct. 21, 2016).
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Consideration of the factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of these entities within the description of
covered entity. First, cyber incidents perpetrated against contractors
covered under the DFARS regulation ``may cause harm to the Government
through the compromise of covered defense information or other
Government data, or the loss of operationally critical support
capabilities, which could directly impact national security.'' \233\
Second, members of the U.S. intelligence community have concluded that
malicious cyber actors, to include foreign countries, are likely to
continue to target members of the Defense Industrial Base Sector.\234\
Finally, damage, disruption, or unauthorized access to these entities,
including the accessing of sensitive cybersecurity
[[Page 23688]]
vulnerability information, may enable the disruption of the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure because of its interdependency
with critical defense infrastructure. As noted earlier, the entities
proposed for inclusion under this sector-based criterion are regulated
under the DFARS because they provide ``operationally critical support''
or process, store, or transmit ``covered defense information.''
Disruption of operationally critical support definitionally disrupts
the reliable operation of critical defense infrastructure, and the
compromise of covered defense information could be used to enable the
disruption of the reliable operation of critical infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\ See 80 FR 51739 (Aug. 26, 2015).
\234\ See 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment at 20, supra
note 188, at 20 (``Russian government-affiliated cyber espionage
likely will remain a persistent threat to . . . entities in the
defense . . . industr[y]. Chinese government cyber actors likely
will continue to target key critical infrastructure sectors in the
United States, including . . . the defense industrial base. . .
.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA recognizes that entities required to report under these
criteria are, by definition, already required to report certain cyber
incidents to DOD. Given their criticality to national security,
however, CISA nevertheless is proposing to include them within the
CIRCIA Applicability section. This will ensure that the Federal
government receives information necessary to identify cyber threats,
exploited vulnerabilities, and TTPs that affect entities in this
community and in other interdependent critical infrastructure sectors,
even if changes are made to what must be reported pursuant to the DFARS
regulation, over which CISA has no authority. CISA acknowledges the
potential this creates for duplicative reporting and is committed to
working with DOD to explore the applicability of the substantially
similar reporting exception to enable entities subject to both CIRCIA
and DFARS cyber incident reporting requirements to be able to comply
with both regulatory reporting regimes through the submission of a
single report to the Federal government to the extent practicable.
Additional information on the substantially similar reporting exception
can be found in Section IV.D.i in this document.
e. Emergency Services Sector
CISA proposes including within the description of covered entity
any entity that provides one or more of five listed emergency services
or functions to a population equal to or greater than 50,000
individuals. These five disciplines--law enforcement, fire and rescue
services, emergency medical services, emergency management, and public
works that contribute to public health and safety--and the types of
entities that provide these services are described in the 2015
Emergency Services SSP.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\ DHS, Emergency Services SSP: An Annex to the NIPP 2013
(2015), available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/emergency-services-sector-specific-plan-2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consideration of the factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of these entities within the description of
covered entity. Regarding the first and third enumerated factors
(consequence and disruption of reliable operation of critical
infrastructure), as noted in the Emergency Services SSP, this sector's
operations provide the first line of support for nearly all critical
infrastructure, and a failure or disruption in these services could
result in significant harm or loss of life, major public health
impacts, long term economic loss, and cascading disruptions to other
critical infrastructure.\236\ Similarly, members of the broader public
rely on these entities to provide assistance in the times of greatest
need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ See id. at 3-7.
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Regarding the second factor enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1),
which relates to threat, Emergency Services Sector entities routinely
are targeted by malicious cyber actors. As noted in the 2012 Emergency
Services Sector Cyber Risk Assessment Fact Sheet, Emergency Services
Sector entities ``face[ ] threats from criminals, hackers, terrorists,
and nation-states, all of whom have demonstrated varying degrees of
capability and intention to attack [Emergency Services Sector] cyber
infrastructure.'' \237\ Malicious cyber activity targeting law
enforcement and other Emergency Services Sector entities has continued
to be a problem in more recent years.\238\ Given Emergency Services
Sector entities' critical role in the nation's public health and
security and their continued targeting by malicious cyber actors, it is
essential that CISA, as the SRMA for this sector, have an adequate
understanding of emerging cyber threats and trends impacting this
sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\ DHS, 2012 Emergency Services Sector Cyber Risk Assessment
Fact Sheet, available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/emergency-services-sector-cyber-risk-assessment.
\238\ See, e.g., Resecurity, Cybercriminals Are Targeting Law
Enforcement Agencies Worldwide (Aug. 19, 2022) (``Resecurity
registered an increase in malicious activity targeting law
enforcement agencies at the beginning of Q2 2022.''), available at
https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/cybercriminals-are-targeting-law-enforcement-agencies-worldwide; J.J. Green,
Cyberterrorists Targeting First Responders (Sept. 6, 2017) (``A U.S.
intelligence community collaborative warned first responders in late
July about escalating efforts to target them and their missions by
cyberterrorists.''), available at https://wtop.com/national-security/2017/09/cyber-terrorists-targeting-first-responders/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally speaking, entities within the Emergency Services Sector
are not subject to any Federal cyber incident reporting requirements.
While most of the entities within this sector are SLTT entities likely
to be captured by the SLTT Government Facilities Sector sector-based
criterion (see Section IV.B.iv.2.h in this document), without this
sector-based criterion, CISA would not receive reports from those
Emergency Services Sector entities within the private sector that fall
under the SBA Size Standards referenced in the sized-based standard in
the Applicability section. Accordingly, to ensure CISA has both
visibility into cyber incidents impacting privately owned Emergency
Services Sector entities as well sufficient reporting from this sector
overall, CISA is proposing this sector-based criteria.
Much like any other sector, entities within the Emergency Services
Sector can vary greatly in size and resources. For the same reasons
provided above as support for the proposal to use a size-based
threshold, CISA believes that it makes sense to focus CIRCIA covered
cyber incident and ransom payment reporting requirements on the larger,
better-resourced entities within the Emergency Services Sector. To
achieve that, CISA is proposing that the reporting requirements only
apply to those entities that support populations equal to or greater
than 50,000 individuals. CISA based its decision to propose 50,000
individuals as the threshold as that is consistent with the definition
of a ``small government jurisdiction'' under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, which is the primary law requiring Federal departments and
agencies to consider the effects of their regulations on small
businesses and other small entities. 5 U.S.C. 601(5). CISA believes
this is an appropriate basis for reporting under CIRCIA for the same
reasons described in Section IV.B.iv.1.a as support for the size-based
criterion.
f. Energy Sector
CISA proposes including within the description of covered entity
any entity that is required to report cybersecurity incidents under
NERC's CIP Reliability Standards or required to file an Electric
Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report OE-417 form, or any successor
form, to DOE. This criterion proposes to require reporting from
entities registered with NERC who are part of the BES and identified as
``Responsible Entities'' under CIP-003-8 (Cyber Security--Security
Management Controls) or CIP-
[[Page 23689]]
008-6 (Cyber Security--Incident Reporting and Response Planning) and
any successor standards. The goal of the CIP Cyber Security Standards
is to mitigate the risk to the reliable operation of the BES as the
result of a cybersecurity incident. This criterion would also require
reporting from Electric Utilities, Balancing Authorities, Reliability
Coordinators, and Generating Entities that are subject to electric
emergency incident and disturbance reporting requirements via Form OE-
417. DOE uses Form OE-417 to collect information from the electric
power industry relevant to DOE's overall national security and National
Response Framework responsibilities. CISA is proposing to include this
specific criterion in light of the importance of these Energy Sector
assets and the frequency with which the energy industry is impacted by
cyber incidents.
Consideration of the factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of these entities within the description of
covered entity. Regarding the first and third enumerated factors
(consequence and disruption of reliable operation of critical
infrastructure), the reliable operation of the U.S. electric energy
supply systems and BES is essential, as infrastructure within all 16
critical infrastructure sectors relies on electricity to function. As
noted in the 2015 Energy SSP, ``[t]he energy infrastructure provides
essential fuel to all critical infrastructure sectors, and without
energy, none of them can operate properly. Thus the Energy Sector
serves one of the four lifeline functions, which means that its
reliable operation is so critical that a disruption or loss of energy
function will directly affect the security and resilience of other
critical infrastructure sectors.'' \239\ Cyber incidents affecting
entities that own or operate the Energy Sector assets identified in the
proposed criterion could result in cascading impacts affecting the
nation's ability to carry out a multitude of NCFs, with significant
consequences to economic security and public health and safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\239\ Energy SSP at 19 (2015), available at https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the second factor enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
relating to threat, Energy Sector entities routinely are targeted by
malicious cyber actors, including foreign actors. According to the IBM
2023 Threat Index, the energy industry experienced the fourth most
cyber incidents between 2018 and 2022.\240\ The energy industry also is
one of the industries noted in the 2024 Homeland Security Threat
Assessment as likely to remain a target of Russian government-
affiliated cyber espionage.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\ IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42.
\241\ 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, supra note 188,
at 20.
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The criterion proposed captures a wide variety of Energy Sector
entities, to include both energy generators and distributors across the
spectrum of coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, wind, and solar. Many
additional Energy Sector entities would be required to report under the
proposed size-based threshold or other proposed sector-based criteria,
such as the criteria requiring reporting from owners and operators of
commercial nuclear power reactors and certain pipelines (see Sections
IV.B.iv.2.k and l in this document).
CISA acknowledges the potential for the inclusion of this criterion
to create an additional reporting obligation on entities already
required to report cyber incidents to the Federal government. CISA is
committed to working with DOE, FERC, and NERC to explore the
applicability of the substantially similar reporting exception to
enable, to the extent practicable, entities subject to both CIRCIA and
CIP Reliability Standards or Form OE-417 reporting requirements to be
able to comply with both regulatory reporting regimes through the
submission of a single report to the Federal government. Additional
information on the substantially similar reporting exception can be
found in Section IV.D.i in this document.
When developing the sector-based criteria for the Energy Sector,
CISA also considered developing a criterion focused on entities within
the Energy Sector's Oil and Natural Gas Subsector. The Oil and Natural
Gas Subsector includes entities engaged in the production, gathering,
processing, transmission, distribution, and storage of oil and gas,
such as wells, processing plants and refineries, gathering and boosting
stations, and natural or manmade storage facilities.\242\ CISA
anticipates that many Oil and Natural Gas Subsector entities will be
considered covered entities through the size-based threshold, and that
many others will be captured under any of a number of other proposed
sector-based criteria, such as the Chemical Sector sector-based
criterion covering entities that own or operate CFATS facilities, the
Transportation Systems Sector sector-based criterion covering entities
that own or operate MTSA facilities, and the Transportation Systems
Sector sector-based criterion covering entities that own or operate
certain designated pipelines (see Sections IV.B.iv.2.a and l in this
document). In light of the number of Oil and Natural Gas Subsector
entities that CISA anticipates will be covered through these other
criteria, CISA is not proposing a specific sector-based criterion for
this subsector. However, if as a result of public comment, CISA
determines that it must modify or eliminate any aspect of the
description of covered entity through which Oil and Natural Gas
Subsector entities currently would be included as part of this proposed
rule, including the size-based criterion, CISA may incorporate a sector
specific criterion or multiple criteria focused on Oil and Natural Gas
Subsector entities in the final rule to ensure these entities remain
covered entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\ See EPA, Overview of the Oil and Natural Gas Industry,
https://www.epa.gov/natural-gas-star-program/overview-oil-and-natural-gas-industry (last visited on Nov. 28, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If CISA were to include a specific Oil and Natural Gas Subsector
sector-based criterion, it would likely set a threshold for Oil and
Natural Gas Subsector entities and only those entities that exceed a
specific size threshold would be considered a covered entity. Such a
threshold would be set by CISA to ensure that the largest Subsector
entities would be required to report, similar to the scope of entities
that would be required to report under the proposed SBA size-based
criterion, and could likely leverage the SBA Table of Size Standards
employee or annual revenue thresholds using NAICS codes applicable to
the Subsector to create an average that would become the threshold.
CISA may also consider creating a threshold based on metrics specific
to entities that are part of the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector, such as
those entities exceeding specified refinery production capacity or
liquefied natural gas terminal storage capacity.
CISA is interested in receiving comments from the public on the
following topics:
12. CISA's proposal to incorporate Oil and Natural Gas Subsector
entities primarily through the size-based threshold instead of
developing one or more criteria specifically targeting Oil and Natural
Gas Subsector entities--and whether this size threshold will capture
the correct population of entities in this subsector.
13. The potential alternative criteria that could be included if
any of the current proposed criteria that would otherwise capture Oil
and Natural Gas Subsector entities were modified or not included in the
final rule.
[[Page 23690]]
g. Financial Services Sector
CISA proposes to include in the description of covered entity
various Financial Services Sector entities that, if victimized in a
covered cyber incident, have the potential to impact the economic
security of the nation. Specifically, CISA is proposing to include in
the description of covered entity (1) all of the Financial Services
Sector entities that are required to report cybersecurity incidents to
their respective primary Federal regulator (e.g., national banks;
savings and loans holding companies; FICUs), (2) Financial Services
Sector entities for whom the primary Federal regulator has indicated an
intention to require cybersecurity incident reporting (e.g., futures
commission merchants; \243\ security-based swap data repositories), and
(3) Financial Services Sector entities encouraged or expected to report
cybersecurity incidents to their primary Federal regulator pursuant to
an Advisory Bulletin (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; \244\ money
services businesses).\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\ See Testimony of CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam on the
``State of the CFTC,'' U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Agriculture (Mar. 31, 2022), available at https://agriculture.house.gov/uploadedfiles/behnam_testimony_house_ag_3-31-2022.pdf.
\244\ Pursuant to Advisory Bulletin 2020-05, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are expected to report certain cybersecurity incidents
to the FHFA. See AB 2020-05: Enterprise Cybersecurity Incident
Reporting (Aug. 21, 2020), available at https://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/AdvisoryBulletins/Pages/Enterprise-Cybersecurity-Incident-Reporting.aspx.
\245\ Pursuant to Advisory Bulletin FIN-2016-A005, money
services businesses are expected to report certain cybersecurity
incidents to the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network. See FIN-2016-A005, Advisory to Financial
Institutions on Cyber-Events and Cyber-Enabled Crime (Oct. 25,
2016), available at https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincen-advisory-fin-2016-a005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA believes the inclusion of these entities in the description of
covered entity is supported by consideration of the factors enumerated
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1). As noted by many of the regulatory agencies
currently requiring cyber incident reporting from Financial Services
Sector entities, requiring the proposed entities to report helps
promote early awareness of emerging threats to the financial system,
and allows entities and their primary regulators to react to any such
threats before they become systemic and threaten the nation's economic
security.\246\ This is especially important given the continued
targeting of Financial Services Sector entities by malicious cyber
actors, as relevant to the second factor enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) related to threat. According to the IBM 2023 Threat Index,
Financial Services Sector entities have experienced either the most or
second most cyber incidents for each of the past five years,\247\ while
the 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment highlights financial
services as one of the sectors Chinese government cyber actors are
likely to continue targeting.\248\ As to the third factor, i.e., the
extent to which damage, disruption, or unauthorized access will likely
enable the disruption of the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure, systemic impacts to the Financial Services Sector has
the potential to disrupt the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure in light of virtually every critical infrastructure
sectors' reliance on financial services entities for the conduct of
day-to-day business operations.
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\246\ See, e.g., 86 FR 66424, 66424 (Nov. 23, 2021) (``This
requirement will help promote early awareness of emerging threats to
banking organizations and the broader financial system. This early
awareness will help the agencies react to these threats before they
become systemic.''); 88 FR 12811, 12811 (Mar. 1, 2023) (``[G]iven
the growing frequency and severity of cyber incidents within the
financial services industry, it is important that the NCUA receive
timely notice of cyber incidents that disrupt a FICU's operations,
lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, or disrupt members'
access to accounts or services.''); 88 FR 23146, 23147 (Apr. 14,
2023) (``[T]he regulation requires that SCI entities have policies
and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that their systems have
levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and
security, adequate to maintain their operational capability and
promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets. . . .'').
\247\ IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42; see also
Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50 (noting the Finance
industry had the third highest number of incidents in 2022).
\248\ 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, supra note 188,
at 20.
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As with several other proposed sector-based criteria, CISA
recognizes that entities that would be required to report under these
criteria are, for the most part, already required to report to another
Federal regulatory agency. Given their importance to the nation's
economy and the frequency with which they are targeted, CISA
nevertheless is proposing to include them within the CIRCIA
Applicability section ensure that the Federal government is able to
receive information necessary to identify cyber threats against,
exploited vulnerabilities of, and TTPs used to effect entities in this
community without reliance on other authorities whose primary focus may
not be security, and who might not currently or in the future require
the submission of information necessary for CISA to achieve the
purposes for which CIRCIA was enacted. CISA acknowledges the potential
this creates for duplicative reporting and is committed to working with
the respective Financial Services Sector Federal regulatory agencies to
explore the applicability of the substantially similar reporting
exception to enable, to the extent practicable, entities subject to
both CIRCIA and another reporting requirement to be able to comply with
both regulatory reporting regimes through the submission of a single
report to the Federal government. Additional information on the
substantially similar reporting exception can be found in Section
IV.D.i in this document.
h. Government Facilities Sector
CISA proposes to include three different sector-based criteria for
entities in the Government Facilities Sector, one focused on SLTT
Government Entities, one focused on Education Subsector entities, and
one focused on Elections Infrastructure Subsector entities. First, CISA
proposes to include in the description of covered entity any SLTT
Government entity for a jurisdiction with a population equal to or
greater than 50,000 individuals. Second, CISA proposes to include in
the description of covered entity any entity that qualifies as either
(A) a local educational agency (LEA), educational service agency (ESA),
or state educational agency (SEA), as defined under 20 U.S.C. 7801,
with a student population of 1,000 or more students; or (B) an
institute of higher education (IHE) that receives funding under Title
IV of the Higher Education Act. Third, CISA is proposing to include in
the description of covered entity any entity that manufactures, sells,
or provides managed service for information and communications
technology specifically used to support election processes or report
and display results on behalf of SLTT governments, including but not
limited to voter registration databases; voting systems; and
information and communication technologies (ICT) used to report,
display, validate, or finalize election results. As discussed in
greater detail in Section IV.D.iii in this document, CISA is proposing
to except from required reporting Federal agencies already required to
report incidents to CISA under FISMA, such that these sector-based
criteria are focused on SLTT and private sector members of the
Government Facilities sector.
With the first of these three criteria, CISA is seeking reporting
from SLTT Government Entities from jurisdictions over a certain size.
Consideration of the factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) supports
the inclusion of larger SLTT Government Entities in the description of
covered entity. Regarding
[[Page 23691]]
the first factor, it is likely that the disruption or compromise of
only some of the largest SLTT Government Entities have the potential to
cause significant consequences on a large enough scale to impact
national security, economic security, and, especially, public health
and safety. SLTT Government Entities are responsible for numerous NCFs
within their jurisdictions, overseeing functions such as developing and
maintaining public works and services, preparing for and managing
emergencies, and preserving constitutional rights. Similarly, along
with their Federal counterparts, SLTT Government Entities like State
Departments of Health provide a wide variety of services that are
critical to the public health and well-being of their citizenry.
As to the second factor CISA is to consider, i.e., the likelihood
that such an entity will be targeted by a malicious cyber actor, SLTT
Government Entities are frequently impacted by cyber incidents.\249\
Furthermore, the 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment indicates
that SLTT Government Entities are likely to remain the targets of
foreign governments, such as Russia and China.\250\
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\249\ See, e.g., Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50
(public administration entities experienced the second largest
number of reported incidents); IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note
217, at 42 (listing Government as the eighth most impacted
industry).
\250\ See 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, supra note
188, at 20 (``Russian government-affiliated cyber espionage likely
will remain a persistent threat to federal, state, and local
governments [and] Chinese government cyber actors likely will
continue to target key critical infrastructure sectors in the United
States, including . . . government facilities.'').
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Third, damage or disruption to various SLTT Government Entities
have the potential to disrupt the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure. SLTT Government Entities own or operate critical
infrastructure across various sectors, to include energy, water,
transportation, and emergency services among others. Damage or
disruption of these entities has potential to directly impact the
reliable operation of critical infrastructure and to create the
potential for cascading impacts affecting the reliable operations of
other critical infrastructure as well.
For the same reasons that CISA is proposing to limit the Emergency
Services Sector sector-based criteria to entities that serve
populations equal to or greater than 50,000 individuals (see Section
IV.B.iv.2.e), CISA is proposing to use the same small government
jurisdiction threshold to demark which SLTT jurisdictions' government
entities will be required to report. CISA believes that this line of
demarcation, which would provide regulatory relief to more than two-
thirds of counties and over 95% of cities from which CISA could require
reporting under the statutory definition of covered entity, should
cover enough entities to provide sufficient data for CISA to perform
cyber incident trend and threat analysis for this vital community.
With the second of these criteria--covering LEAs, ESAs, and SEAs
with student populations of 1,000 or more students, as well as IHE that
receive funding under Title IV of the Higher Education Act--CISA seeks
to ensure reporting from a sufficient cross-sector of entities to
understand and be able to share information on threats to our nation's
education facilities. Consideration of the factors enumerated in 6
U.S.C 681b(c)(1) supports the inclusion of these entities within the
description of covered entity, especially the second factor related to
threat.
As noted in the 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment,
``[Kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12)] school districts have been a
near constant ransomware target due to school systems' IT budget
constraints and lack of dedicated resources, as well as ransomware
actors' success at extracting payment from some schools that are
required to function within certain dates and hours.'' \251\ The
Verizon 2022 DBIR and the IBM 2023 Threat Index both identified
education facilities as the sixth most frequently impacted industry in
2022.\252\ A recent U.S. GAO report on cybersecurity at K-12 schools
echoed this conclusion, stating that ``research from several federal
and private sector sources indicate that cyber threats [against K-12
schools] have escalated over time, and are becoming more sophisticated
and pervasive.'' \253\ Many Education Subsector entities, primarily
IHE, also own infrastructure or perform activities that support
national security, public health and safety, and the reliable
operations of critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, first
responder organizations, water and wastewater treatment facilities,
energy facilities, and research facilities.
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\251\ See 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, supra note
188, at 18.
\252\ Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50; IBM 2023 Threat
Index, supra note 217, at 42.
\253\ U.S. GAO, GAO-23-105480, Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Additional Federal Coordination is Needed to Enhance K-
12 Cybersecurity at 12 (2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105480.
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To obtain reporting from a representative cross-section of
Education Subsector entities, CISA proposes two prongs to the criterion
for this subsector, one focused on the K-12 community and one focused
on IHE. For the K-12 community, CISA proposes to require reporting from
LEAs, ESAs, and SEAs, as defined in 20 U.S.C. 7801 (part of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as amended (20 U.S.C. 6301 et
seq.)), with a student population of 1,000 or more students. LEAs, more
commonly referred to as school districts, are the public authorities
legally constituted within a State for administrative control or
direction of public schools in a city, county, township, school
district, or other political subdivision of a State.\254\ SEAs are the
Statewide board of education or other agency or officer primarily
responsible for the supervision of schools within a state.\255\ ESAs
are state-authorized regional service centers that often provide direct
education service delivery to schools and districts in their respective
regions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\ 34 CFR 303.23.
\255\ 34 CFR 300.41.
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CISA proposes to require reporting from LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs with
student populations of 1,000 or more students. This threshold would
capture in the description of covered entities all SEAs, approximately
half of all LEAs, and some percentage of ESAs, with smaller LEAs and
ESAs excluded from the reporting population.\256\
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\256\ All SEAs (56 of 56) and approximately 52% of LEAs (6,911
of 13,318) have student populations of 1,000 or more students. See
National Center for Education Statistics, 2022 Digest of Education
Statistics, Table 214.20, available at https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d22/tables/dt22_214.20.asp. As the student population covered
by each ESA is not readily available, to be conservative, for
purposes of the CIRCIA RIA, CISA is assuming all 553 ESAs serve
student populations of 1,000 or more students.
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CISA is proposing this threshold, which is limited to LEAs, SEAs,
and ESAs, with larger student populations, for three primary reasons.
First, studies show that ``larger school districts (as defined by
student enrollment) appear to be at a significantly greater risk for
experiencing a cyber incident than small school districts.'' \257\
Second, covered cyber incidents impacting education agencies with
larger student populations will, on average, have a greater likelihood
of impacting more individuals, thus potentially causing more
substantial impacts than incidents perpetrated against education
agencies with smaller student populations. Finally, similar to the use
of the small government jurisdiction definition as a
[[Page 23692]]
threshold line of demarcation for other SLTT Government Entities, CISA
believes this approach will afford regulatory relief to smaller
entities that are likely to have fewer resources with which to comply
with CIRCIA's incident reporting requirements, while still requiring
reporting from a broad enough population to provide sufficient data for
CISA to perform cyber incident trend and threat analysis for this
community.
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\257\ Douglas Levin, The State of K-12 Cybersecurity: Year in
Review--2022 Annual Report at 15, available at https://www.k12six.org/the-report.
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In developing this criterion and threshold, CISA considered various
alternatives, including (1) covering LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs with student
populations of 2,500 students or more; (2) using the same small
government jurisdiction threshold CISA is proposing to use for other
SLTT Government Entities and entities required to report under the
Emergency Services Sector sector-based criteria (i.e., entities serving
jurisdictions with a population of 50,000 or more individuals); and (3)
requiring reporting from all LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs.
The first alternative CISA considered was establishing a higher
threshold based on student population, specifically one that would
require reporting from LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs with 2,500 or more
students. Setting the threshold at 2,500 students would result in
approximately 30% of all LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs collectively qualifying
as covered entities.\258\ The primary benefit of this threshold, in
comparison to the proposed 1,000 student threshold, would be the lower
costs to the K-12 community resulting from having fewer entities
qualify as covered entities. However, an analysis conducted by the
Department of Education based on cyber incidents impacting the K-12
community that were voluntarily reported to CISA in 2023 showed that
the greatest percentage of incidents impacting the K-12 community
impacted school districts with between 1,000 and 2,500 students (around
approximately 30% of all incidents). This represents the largest
percentage of incidents experienced by any of the size-based segments
of the K-12 community analyzed by the Department of Education.\259\
Given the large percentage of cyber incidents impacting school
districts with between 1,000 and 2,500 students, CISA believes the
small additional burden imposed on the sector by requiring reporting
from education agencies with between 1,000 and 2,500 students that
experience a substantial cyber incident or make a ransom payment is
outweighed by the benefit of the additional insight into cybersecurity
threats targeting the K-12 community that this additional coverage
would provide. Thus, CISA has elected to propose setting the student
population threshold at 1,000 students, and not 2,500 students. CISA
acknowledges that it may be possible to set this threshold at 2,500
students and get some reporting that would be informative to the
overall subsector; however, CISA does not believe this will result in
representative or adequate reporting for the subsector because it would
not include the population that is most likely to be targeted by
malicious actors based on the Department of Education's analysis.
Nonetheless, CISA is interested in receiving comments on the proposal
to set the threshold at 1,000 students versus 2,500 students for this
subsector, and what benefits or disadvantages may exist for selecting
one threshold over another.
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\258\ All SEAs (56 of 56) and approximately 28% of LEAs (3,726
of 13,318) have student populations of 2,500 or more students. See
National Center for Education Statistics, 2022 Digest of Education
Statistics, Table 214.20, available at https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d22/tables/dt22_214.20.asp. As the student population covered
by each ESA is not readily available, to be conservative, for
purposes of the CIRCIA RIA, CISA is assuming all 553 ESAs serve
student populations of 2,500 or more students.
\259\ Department of Education analyzed the incidents experienced
by K-12 school districts with the following size-based segments:
25,000 or more students; 10,000-24,999 students; 5,000-9,999
students; 2,500-4,999 students; 1,000-2,499 students; 600-999
students; 300-599 students; 1-299 students; and no size reported.
Even combining some of the other segments, the 1,000-2,499 students
segment still experienced a greater percentage of the analyzed
incidents than other segments (e.g., more than all of the smaller
segments combined, more than the 2,500-4,999 and 5,000-9,999
students segments combined, and more than the 10,000-24,999 and
25,000 or more students segments combined).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the second alternative considered--i.e., using the same
jurisdiction-based threshold that CISA is proposing for other SLTT
Government Entities--CISA sees value in using the same threshold across
all SLTT Government Entities, which includes LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs.
Doing so would avoid potential confusion resulting from having
different thresholds for different types of SLTT Government Entities.
However, based on consultations with the Department of Education, CISA
understands that school districts frequently do not follow typical
county, city, or other jurisdictional lines, with many LEAs and ESAs
covering schools that are located in multiple jurisdictions. As a
result, the number of individuals within a given LEA's or ESA's
``jurisdiction'' may not be readily available or discernable, causing
many LEAs and ESAs to have difficulties in determining if they meet a
criterion based on the number of individuals located within their
``jurisdiction.'' Conversely, student population is a standard metric
used within the K-12 community for various purposes and is a metric
with which every LEA, SEA, and ESA should be very familiar. As an
entity's ability to determine whether it is a covered entity is crucial
to implementation of the proposed regulation, CISA believes it is
preferable to use a student population-based metric for the K-12
community rather than the jurisdictional population-based metric CISA
is proposing for the sector-based criteria for other SLTT Government
Entities.
Regarding the final alternative considered--i.e., covering all
LEAs, SEAs, and ESAs--there are some arguments in favor of broader
reporting requirements, such as the frequency with which educational
entities are subjected to cyber incidents and the absence of any other
nationwide cyber incident reporting requirements for this community.
Ultimately, however, CISA decided that, for the same reasons CISA is
proposing a size threshold for the sector-based criteria for other SLTT
Government Entities and several other sectors and subsectors, proposing
a size threshold for the sector-based criteria for the K-12 community
is the most well-supported approach. Doing so not only supports general
consistency in approach across the SLTT Government Entities' community,
but also promotes the correct balance between burden and ensuring
sufficient reporting from this community.
CISA is interested in receiving comments on this prong of the
proposed sector-based criteria, to include:
14. Whether CISA should include a size threshold for education
agencies that would be required to report and, if so, what metric
(e.g., student population; number of individuals within the
jurisdiction) should be used as the unit or measurement for the
threshold.
15. If CISA were to include a criterion for education agencies
using a size threshold based on student population, whether 1,000
students, 2,500 students, or another number of students would be the
optimal threshold for this subsector criterion and why.
16. Whether CISA should include a criterion to require reporting
from some or all private schools operating in the K-12 space, as cyber
incidents impacting K-12 private schools would not be subject to
reporting under the current proposal (unless they qualify as a covered
entity under the general size-based threshold) since LEAs, SEAs, and
[[Page 23693]]
ESAs do not have authority over private schools.
The Government Facilities Education Subsector sector-based criteria
would also include in the description of covered entity those IHE that
receive funding under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (Title IV).
In addition to being part of a routinely targeted subsector, given the
diverse roles IHE can play in various NCFs, the consequences of a
covered cyber incident impacting an IHE could be significant. For
example, some IHE provide research or other support to national
security entities such as DOD and DHS, others are high-risk chemical
facilities regulated under CFATS. While some IHE might be covered by
the Applicability section based on other sector-based criteria, CISA
believes it is important to require reporting from IHE more broadly.
IHE that receive funding under Title IV include any IHE--be it a
college or university that offers a 2-year or 4-year degree, a trade
school, or other type of IHE--that offers Federal financial aid to its
students. This includes the majority of IHE, ensuring that CISA will
receive adequate reporting to identify cybersecurity trends for the
entire IHE community. Title IV-funded IHE also already are subject to
cybersecurity incident reporting requirements under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, but that is limited to reporting to the Department of
Education cybersecurity incidents resulting in unauthorized access to
student information. This proposal will expand the scope of reporting
required of these IHE to reporting on a broader range of cybersecurity
incidents and any ransom payments made by these entities.
With the third proposed Government Facilities Sector sector-based
criteria--entities that manufacture, sell, or provide managed service
for information and communications technology specifically used to
support election processes or report and display results on behalf of
SLTT governments, including but not limited to voter registration
databases; voting systems; and ICT used to report, display, validate,
or finalize election results--CISA is seeking to ensure sufficient
reporting to understand cyberthreats to our nation's elections
infrastructure and assist SLTT election officials and their private
sector partners to prevent, respond to, and mitigate impacts of cyber
incidents impacting elections infrastructure. In January 2017, DHS
officially designated election infrastructure as a critical
infrastructure subsector of the Government Facilities Sector.\260\ In
this designation, the Department stated that the United States'
election infrastructure is vital to our national interest and must be a
priority for cybersecurity assistance and protections provided by the
Department.\261\
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\260\ See Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation
of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector
(Jan. 6, 2017), available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical (hereinafter ``Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson'').
\261\ Id.
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Election infrastructure refers to storage facilities, polling
places, and centralized vote tabulation locations used to support the
election process, and ICT systems used to manage the election process
and report and display results on behalf of SLTT governments. Such ICT
systems include, but are not limited to, voter registration databases
and other systems used to manage the voter registration process and
maintain voter registration data; electronic poll books; voting
systems, election management systems, and other systems used to create,
print, facilitate the voting of, and tabulate ballots, including
electronic ballot delivery, marking, and return systems, as well as
systems used to validate, audit, certify, or otherwise finalize
election results; and public information systems used to display
election information and results to the public, including SLTT election
websites and election night reporting systems. These and other types of
technologies used to manage the election process are described in
greater detail in the Election Infrastructure SSP.\262\
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\262\ Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific Plan: An Annex
to the NIPP 2013 (2020), available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_infrastructure_subsector_specific_plan.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, entities that manufacture, sell, or provide managed
services for ICT specifically used to support election processes are
not subject to any Federal cyber incident reporting requirements.
Consequently, in conjunction with the first Government Facilities
Sector sector-based criterion, which would require reporting from SLTT
election entities for jurisdictions with populations greater than
50,000 individuals, CISA believes this third Government Facilities
Sector sector-based criterion focused on private sector members of the
Election Infrastructure Subsector is necessary to ensure CISA and its
Federal partners receive sufficient reporting from both public and
private sector entities within the Elections Infrastructure Subsector
to understand the cyber threats to elections infrastructure.
CISA believes that including these entities in the description of
covered entity is supported by a consideration of the three factors
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) (i.e., consequence, threat, and
disruption of reliable operation of critical infrastructure). While
damage or disruption of election infrastructure may not directly
produce national security, economic security, or public health and
safety consequences, the impact of eroded public confidence in our
election system may indirectly lead to such consequences.\263\ Damage,
destruction, or unauthorized access to elections infrastructure would
impact the reliable operation of critical infrastructure as certain
systems and assets of election infrastructure themselves are critical
infrastructure.\264\ Finally, malicious cyber actors have targeted and
are expected to continue to target elections infrastructure.\265\
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\263\ See Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Dec. 22, 2022),
available at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-J6-REPORT/.
\264\ Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson, supra note 260
(``Given the vital role elections play in this country, it is clear
that certain systems and assets of election infrastructure meet the
definition of critical infrastructure, in fact and in law.'').
\265\ See 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, supra note
188, at 19 (``Our electoral processes remain an attractive target
for many adversaries, and we expect many of them will seek to
influence or interfere with the 2024 election . . . Cyber actors
likely will seek to exploit election-related networks and data,
including state, local, and political parties' networks and election
officials' personal devices and email accounts. . . . Though we
continue to strengthen the integrity of our elections
infrastructure, cyber actors, both government-affiliated and cyber
criminals, likely will remain opportunistic in their targeting of
election-related networks and data, routinely attempting to exploit
misconfigured or vulnerable public-facing websites, webservers, and
election-related information technology systems.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA recognizes that many standard ICT, such as laptops, cell
phones, email, staff management and payroll software, and business and
data management software may be used by entities responsible for the
conduct and management of elections. CISA does not intend for this
sector-based criterion to capture entities that manufacture, sell, or
provide managed services related to those types of ICT, except to the
extent that they are specifically used for election processes. Thus,
for example, while an entity that develops, sells, or provides managed
services related to software specifically designed to facilitate the
management of temporary election workers would be considered a covered
entity under this proposed criterion, a standard staff management and
payroll software provider would not be considered a covered entity
simply
[[Page 23694]]
because an SLTT election office uses the software to conduct routine
business.
i. Healthcare and Public Health Sector
CISA proposes to include in the description of covered entity \266\
multiple sector-based criteria related to the Healthcare and Public
Health Sector. As its name implies, entities within the Healthcare and
Public Health Sector, along with Federal and SLTT Departments of Health
and similar government entities that are part of the Government
Facilities Sector, are essential to the maintenance of the public
health of the nation, providing goods and services that are integral to
maintaining local, national, and global health security. Entities
within the sector provide various services, to include direct patient
care, medical equipment and materials, laboratory support, health IT,
health plans, and mass fatality management services.\267\
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\266\ CISA is aware that covered entity also is a defined term
in the HIPAA regulations. As noted in the proposed Sec. 226.1, the
definitions included in this proposed rule are ``[f]or the purposes
of this Part.'' Whenever the term covered entity is used in this
document, it is referring to the statutory term in CIRCIA and/or the
proposed definition of covered entity in the CIRCIA proposed rule,
and not to entities that meet the existing HIPAA regulatory
definition of covered entity or any other existing definition of the
term covered entity.
\267\ See Healthcare and Public Health SSP, supra note 173.
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Unfortunately, entities within this sector routinely experience
cyber incidents, with U.S. healthcare entities experiencing the seventh
most cyber incidents of any industry in 2022.\268\ Many entities within
the sector currently are required to report certain cyber incidents to
HHS under the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule (45 CFR 164.400-414) and
to the Federal Trade Commission under the HITECH Act Health Breach
Notification Rule (16 CFR 318); however, those requirements are
generally focused solely on data breaches and do not require reporting
of other types of cyber incidents that do not involve unauthorized
acquisition of or access to personal health information. Device
manufacturers, importers, distributors, and user facilities must
establish and maintain records, make such reports, and provide such
information, as the Secretary of Health and Human Services may by
regulation reasonably require to assure that such device is not
adulterated or misbranded and to otherwise assure its safety and
effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. 360i(a). FDA's regulations at 21 CFR part 803
require device manufacturers and importers, to report certain device-
related adverse events and product problems, including those caused by
cyber incidents, to the FDA, but that reporting requirement is limited
to situations where a device is likely to or has caused or contributed
to a death or serious injury or for medical device manufacturers and
importers when they initiate a correction or removal of a medical
device to reduce a risk to health posed by the device. In light of the
sector's broad importance to public health, the diverse nature of the
entities that compose the sector, the historical targeting of the
sector, and the current lack of required reporting unrelated to data
breaches or medical devices, CISA proposes requiring reporting from
multiple parts of this sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ See IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42; Verizon
2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50.
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The first criterion CISA proposes related to this sector will mean
that certain entities providing direct patient care will be considered
covered entities. Specifically, CISA proposes including in the
description of covered entity any entity that owns or operates (1) a
hospital, as defined by 42 U.S.C. 1395x(e), with 100 or more beds, or
(2) a critical access hospital, as defined by 42 U.S.C. 1395x(mm)(1).
Many different types of entities provide direct care to patients, such
as hospitals, clinics, urgent care facilities, medical offices,
surgical centers, rehabilitation centers, nursing homes, and hospices.
The size of the facilities, the number of patients cared for daily, and
the types of services provided can vary dramatically across these
entities. While all of these various types of entities contribute to
the nation's public health and well-being, CISA does not believe it is
prudent or cost-effective to require covered cyber incident and ransom
payment reporting from every individual provider of patient care.
Rather, CISA is proposing to focus on hospitals, as they routinely
provide the most critical care of these various types of entities, and
patients and communities rely on them to remain operational, including
in the face of cyber incidents affecting their devices, systems, and
networks to keep them functioning.
Currently, there are approximately 6,000 hospitals in the United
States.\269\ CISA is proposing requiring reporting from larger
hospitals (i.e., those with more than 100 beds) and critical access
hospitals. CISA believes it is worthwhile to focus on larger hospitals
for required reporting, as they are more likely than smaller hospitals
to experience substantial impacts if they fall victim to a covered
cyber incident given their size and the correspondingly greater number
of patients they are caring for on any given day. Additionally,
focusing on larger hospitals is supported by much of the same rationale
behind CISA's decision to propose an overall size-based criterion based
on the SBA small business size standards in the Applicability section
(e.g., larger hospitals are more likely to have in-house or access to
cyber expertise; larger hospitals are likely to be better equipped to
simultaneously respond to and report a cyber incident).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\ See American Hospital Association, Fast Facts on U.S.
Hospitals, https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us-hospitals
(last visited July 31, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While CISA is not generally proposing to require reporting from
smaller hospitals, CISA is proposing to require reporting from critical
access hospitals. Critical access hospitals are facilities that have
been certified by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services as
meeting certain criteria, including that they are located in a state
that has established a Medicare rural hospital flexibility program, and
that they are designated as a critical access hospital by the State in
which they are located, among other requirements.\270\ CISA is
proposing to include these in the reporting requirements as they
typically are the only source of emergency medical care for individuals
living within certain rural areas. As a result, a substantial cyber
incident at a critical access hospital may have disproportionate
impacts to its size given the limited alternative emergency health care
options for individuals within its service area.
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\270\ See section 1820(e) of the Social Security Act and 42 CFR
485.601 et seq.
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The second public health and healthcare sector sector-based
criterion CISA is proposing would require reporting from manufacturers
of drugs listed in Appendix A of the report Essential Medicines Supply
Chain and Manufacturing Resilience Assessment, sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Administration for
Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR).\271\ In this report, ASPR,
in collaboration with governmental and non-governmental entities,
prioritized 86 essential medicines identified as either critical for
minimum patient care in acute settings or important for acute care or
important for acute care of respiratory illnesses/conditions, with no
[[Page 23695]]
comparable alternative available. The report was published in response
to a commitment by the Biden Administration, in its June 2021 100-day
review of the pharmaceutical supply chain as tasked in Executive Order
14017, to ``assemble a consortium of public health experts (including
emergency medicine and critical care) in the government, non-profit,
and private sector to review [a previous list of Essential Medicines,
Medical Countermeasures, Critical Inputs developed by FDA in response
to Executive Order 13944], and recommend 50-100 drugs that are most
critical to have available at all times for U.S. patients because of
their clinical need and lack of therapeutic redundancy.'' \272\ Given
the importance of these products, CISA believes it is appropriate to
include manufacturers of these products among the CIRCIA covered entity
population in order to enable the Federal government to more quickly
identify any emerging cyberthreats against them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\ ARMI, Essential Medicines Supply Chain and Manufacturing
Resilience Assessment (May 2022), available at https://www.armiusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ARMI_Essential-Medicines_Supply-Chain-Report_508.pdf; see also ASPR, Essential
Medicines Report Now Available (May 23, 2022), available at https://aspr.hhs.gov/newsroom/Pages/Essential-Medicines-May22.aspx.
\272\ Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Review of Pharmaceuticals
and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients at 243 (June 2021), available
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf.
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Third, CISA is proposing to require reporting from manufacturers of
Class II (moderate risk) and Class III (high risk) devices, as defined
in 21 U.S.C. 360c. FDA has established classifications for
approximately 1,700 different generic types of devices, each of which
is assigned to one of three regulatory classes based on the level of
control necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of the device.\273\ These classifications are risk-based,
with Class I devices presenting the lowest risk and Class III devices
presenting the greatest risk.\274\ Based on discussions with FDA, CISA
believes that requiring reporting from manufacturers of Class II and
III devices provides a risk-based means balancing reporting from
medical device manufacturers while supporting the collection of an
adequate amount of reporting to understand cyber threats,
vulnerabilities, and TTPs for this industry segment.
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\273\ See FDA, Classify Your Medical Device, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overview-device-regulation/classify-your-medical-device (last visited July 24, 2023).
\274\ See id.
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CISA believes that the inclusion of all three Healthcare and Public
Health Sector sector-based criteria is supported by a consideration of
the three factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) (i.e., consequence,
threat, and disruption of the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure). Regarding the first factor, consequence, disruption or
compromise at any of these key sector assets has the potential for
significant impacts to public health and safety. All hospitals play an
important role in public health, but disruption or compromise impacting
any of the hospitals CISA proposes to cover could have especially
significant impacts on public health given the number of patients and
types of services provided at large hospitals, and the fact that
critical access hospitals may be the only source of emergency care in
their immediate vicinity, sometimes for hundreds of miles. Similarly, a
compromise or disruption resulting in unavailability, supply shortages,
or compromise of essential medicines, medical countermeasures, or Class
II and III medical devices has a significant potential for creating
public health consequences on a scale that could impact all Americans.
Regarding the second factor, threat, entities within the Healthcare and
Public Health sector routinely experience cyber incidents.\275\ The DHS
2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment indicates that threats against
this sector include Russian and Chinese government-affiliated actors,
who are likely to continue to target the healthcare and public health
sector.\276\ Finally, regarding the third factor, the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical infrastructure, the entities that would
be covered under the criteria--large hospitals; critical access
hospitals; manufacturers of essential medicines; and manufacturers of
Class II and III medical devices--typically themselves are considered
critical infrastructure. Moreover, as the COVID-19 pandemic
demonstrated, significant events impacting the public health can have
cascading affects that threaten the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure across multiple sectors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\ See IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42; Verizon
2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50.
\276\ 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, supra note 188,
at 20.
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In establishing these proposed criteria, CISA also considered
including criteria related to health insurance companies, health IT
providers, and entities operating laboratories or other medical
diagnostics facilities. Ultimately, CISA determined it was not
necessary to include specific sector-based criteria for any of those
three industry segments. In the case of health insurance companies and
entities operating laboratories or other medical diagnostics
facilities, CISA believes a sufficient number of entities already will
be captured under the size-based criterion that applies across all
critical infrastructure sectors. However, if as a result of public
comment, CISA determines that it must modify or eliminate any aspect of
the description of covered entity through which health insurance
companies and entities operating laboratories or other medical
diagnostics facilities are currently captured as part of this proposed
rule, including the size-based criterion, CISA may incorporate a
sector-based criterion or multiple criteria focused on criteria
capturing these entities as part of the final rule to ensure that they
remain covered entities. If CISA were to include one or more sector-
based criteria that would cover health insurance companies and
laboratories and other medical diagnostics facilities, it would likely
set a threshold based on annual revenue, number of employees, or some
other metric and only entities that exceed the threshold would be
considered covered entities. Such a threshold would be set by CISA to
ensure that the largest of these types of entities would be considered
covered entities and CISA likely would look at the SBA Size Standards
for context and to develop relevant averages using NAICS codes
applicable to such entities and may consult with the Healthcare and
Public Health SRMA to develop the final criterion or criteria.
Regarding the health IT community, CISA believes that the most common
type of cyber incident such entities will face are data breaches. As
data breaches are not the primary focus of CIRCIA, and those entities
already are required to report data breaches of unsecured protected
health information under the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule and
personal health records under the HITECH Act Health Breach Notification
Rule, CISA does not believe it is necessary to include a specific
criterion focused on entities in the health IT industry.
CISA would be interested in receiving comments on:
17. The scope of entities that would and would not be considered
covered entities based on the three criteria proposed by CISA, whether
the scoping is appropriate, and what, if any, specific refinements
should CISA consider related to any of the criteria.
18. The proposal to forgo including specific criteria focused on
health insurance companies, health IT providers, and entities operating
laboratories or other medical diagnostics facilities.
j. Information Technology Sector
CISA proposes including within the description of covered entity
any entity that meets one or more of four proposed
[[Page 23696]]
Information Technology (IT) Sector sector-based criteria. First, CISA
proposes including within the description of covered entity any entity
that knowingly provides IT hardware, software, systems, or services to
the Federal government. Second, CISA proposes including within the
description of covered entity any entity that has developed and
continues to sell, license, or maintain any software that meets the
definition of ``critical software'' as that term was defined by NIST
pursuant to Executive Order 14028--Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity
(May 12, 2021). Third, CISA proposes to include within the description
of covered entity, any entity that is an original equipment
manufacturer (OEM), vendor, or integrator of OT hardware or software
components. Fourth, CISA proposes to include within the description of
covered entity any entity that performs functions related to domain
name operations.
To conduct a cyber incident, malicious cyber actors seek to exploit
some aspect of the IT Sector, through IT hardware, software, systems,
or services. Moreover, given many IT providers' positions in the
critical infrastructure supply chain, their roles as cyber service
providers (e.g., CSPs, managed service providers) to other entities,
and their important role in the functioning of the internet, a covered
cyber incident impacting a member of the IT Sector has the potential to
cause significant cascading impacts to tens, hundreds, or even
thousands of other entities. As a result, requiring incident reporting
from a broad range of IT Sector entities is essential to developing a
complete picture of the cyber threat landscape, identifying
vulnerabilities that adversaries are exploiting, and sharing early
warnings to better protect entities from across all critical
infrastructure sectors.
The IT Sector is comprised of hundreds of thousands of companies,
ranging from small businesses to large, multinational enterprises.
While some of these companies are likely to be captured by the proposed
CIRCIA size-based threshold, many will not be. Additionally, as opposed
to many other critical infrastructure sectors with a primary regulatory
agency providing oversight or a small number of clearly identifiable
subsectors, industry segments, or entity types, the IT sector to a
large extent lacks any of these easy means of categorization or
segmentation. Given these characteristics, CISA believes it is
necessary to take a multi-criteria approach including a general
criterion focused on entities that knowingly provide IT hardware,
software, systems, or services to the Federal government, as well as
criteria designed to capture critical software, OT, and DNS services
that are not used by the Federal government.
For the first IT Sector sector-based criterion, CISA is proposing
to include any entity that knowingly provides or supports IT hardware,
software, systems, or services to the Federal government either
directly or through a reseller. CISA believes this proposed approach
will be beneficial in several ways. First, in light of both the
essential services provided to the nation by various Federal entities,
as well as the symbolic value of the Federal government, Federal
entities often are desired targets for attack, and a covered cyber
incident impacting a Federal entity can result in significant
consequences. Second, because an entity selling a good or service to
the Federal government typically will know if it has provided a product
or service to the Federal government, the proposed criterion is
intended to create a clear and easy manner for an entity within the IT
sector to determine if it is a covered entity. This criterion also
would include, for example, some entities that provide IT hardware,
software, systems, or services to the Federal government through a
reseller or by providing software development services, such as a code
repository service. It is for this reason CISA proposes capturing in
this criterion IT hardware, software, system, or service providers that
provide their products to the Federal government only if they knowingly
do so, e.g., if they provide goods to the Federal government through a
procurement contract or another agreement or transaction. Third, given
the breadth of the Federal government and the large number of different
IT products and services it employs, CISA expects this criterion to
cover a broad spectrum of entities from the IT sector, which will help
ensure CISA receives adequate reporting to achieve its responsibilities
under CIRCIA as they relate to the IT sector and beyond.
Note, however, while CISA is proposing to use the provision of
software, hardware, systems, or services to the Federal government as a
criterion for determining who must report, reporting for those entities
that meet this sector-based covered entity criteria is not limited to
incidents impacting the products or services they provide to the U.S.
Government. Rather, an entity that meets this sector-based criteria
must report any covered cyber incident it experiences regardless of
whether it impacts any of their Federal customers or the specific
products or services used by their Federal customers.
CISA acknowledges that entities routinely change their offerings
and customers over time, and that there will be entities who have
provided software, hardware, systems, or services to the Federal
government at one point but no longer do so (either because they no
longer offer or support that software, hardware, system, or service at
all, or because their arrangement with their Federal customer(s) has
ended). In recognition of this, CISA is proposing that an entity would
be captured under this criterion only for as long as the entity
continues to sell, provide, or provide support for the product or
service they have sold to the government, or any updated versions
thereof. If a software, hardware, or system manufacturer or supplier no
longer sells or supports the software, hardware, or system that it
previously sold to the government, or any updated versions thereof,
then it would no longer be considered a covered entity based on this
criterion in relation to that particular software, hardware, or system.
Similarly, if an IT service provider no longer provides any services to
the Federal government, it would not remain a covered entity simply on
the basis of having previously provided IT services to the Federal
government.
In the second IT sector-based criterion, CISA proposes covering any
entity that has developed and continues to sell, license, or maintain
any software that meets the definition of ``critical software''
established by NIST pursuant to Executive Order 14028. On May 12, 2021,
President Biden issued Executive Order 14028, with the goal of
improving government efforts to identify, deter, protect against,
detect, and respond to the persistent and increasingly sophisticated
malicious cyber campaigns that threaten the public sector, private
sector, and the American people's security and privacy. Section 4 of
Executive Order 14028 is focused on software supply chain security,
with Section 4(g) instructing NIST, in consultation with designated
Federal partners, to develop a definition of the term ``critical
software.'' The Federal government would then use the definition of
critical software to support the development of a list of software
categories and products that would be subject to the additional
security activities set forth in the Executive Order, including how the
Federal government purchases and manages deployed critical software. In
particular,
[[Page 23697]]
the Executive Order seeks to limit Federal acquisition to software that
has met security measures such as use of a secure development process
and integrity checks defined in Section 4(e) of the Executive Order.
To develop the definition of critical software, NIST solicited
position papers from the IT community, hosted a virtual workshop to
gather input, and consulted with CISA, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and
the National Security Agency (NSA). Ultimately, NIST defined critical
software to be ``any software that has, or has direct software
dependencies upon, one or more components with at least one of these
attributes: (1) is designed to run with elevated privilege or manage
privileges; (2) has direct or privileged access to networking or
computing resources; (3) is designed to control access to data or
operational technology; (4) performs a function critical to trust;
\277\ or, (5) operates outside of normal trust boundaries with
privileged access.'' \278\ The definition applies to software of all
forms (e.g., standalone software; software integral to specific devices
or hardware components; cloud-based software) purchased for, or
deployed in, production systems and used for operational purposes.\279\
Other use cases, such as software solely used for research or testing
that is not deployed in production systems, are outside of the scope of
this definition.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\ According to NIST, the term ``critical to trust'' covers
``categories of software used for security functions such as network
control, endpoint security, and network protection.'' NIST, Critical
Software Definition--FAQs, FAQ 3, https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-faqs#Ref_FAQ3 (last visited Jan. 26, 2024).
\278\ See NIST, Critical Software--Definition & Explanatory
Material, https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory (last
visited July 24, 2023).
\279\ Id.
\280\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the purposes for which this definition of critical software
was developed (i.e., to support the enhancement of software supply
chain security), the informed process that led to its development, and
its familiarity to the IT community, CISA believes it to be an
appropriate basis for narrowing down the scope of entities engaged in
software development for non-Federal government customers included
within the description of covered entity. However, because the
``critical software'' definition has not been formally codified into
law or regulation, CISA is proposing to incorporate the definition of
``critical software'' developed by NIST directly into the regulatory
text rather than by reference, to provide potential covered entities
with certainty on the scope of this prong of the IT Sector sector-based
criteria.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\ Additional information on the software categories
considered to be critical software, the types of products typically
included, and the rationale for their inclusion, can be found at
https://www.nist.gov/itl/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity/critical-software-definition-explanatory (last visited
Nov. 28, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA is also proposing to limit this criterion to entities that
continue to sell, license, or maintain critical software. While CISA
intends to capture under this criterion entities that continue to be in
the business of providing critical software, CISA does not intend to
capture former critical software developers in perpetuity if they no
longer produce the software. However, to the extent that a critical
software developer continues to sell (directly or indirectly), license,
or otherwise maintain previously developed critical software, it would
continue to be a covered entity under this prong.
For the third IT Sector sector-based criterion, CISA is proposing
to include in the description of covered entity any entity that is an
OEM, vendor, or integrator of OT hardware or software components.
According to NIST,\282\ OT is defined as ``Programmable systems or
devices that interact with the physical environment (or manage devices
that interact with the physical environment). These systems or devices
detect or cause a direct change through the monitoring or control of
devices, processes, and events. Examples include industrial control
systems, building management systems, Fire control systems, and
physical access control mechanisms.'' \283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\282\ In various places throughout this document, CISA
references definitions and guidance found in materials published by
NIST. CISA believes it is appropriate to use NIST publications as
source references given NIST's status as a widely recognized and
accepted source of cybersecurity information and best practices by
and for both industry and government.
\283\ NIST, Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems
Security Engineering Approach, NIST Special Publication 800-160 Vol.
2 Rev. 1, at 65 (Dec. 2021), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/160/v2/r1/final.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OT components are considered vital to the operation of U.S.
critical infrastructure, and the security of OT is essential for the
achievement of a secure and resilient infrastructure for the American
people.\284\ The increasing convergence of IT and OT creates
opportunities for exploitation that could result in catastrophic
consequences, including loss of life, economic damage, and disruption
of the NCFs upon which society relies.\285\ In light of this, CISA
believes it is important to understand the cyberthreat environment
related to OT and to receive reports on cyber incidents involving
manufacturers or developers of OT products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\ See id. at 1; see also CISA, Securing Industrial Control
Systems: A Unified Initiative--FY 2019-2023, at 2 (July 2020)
(hereinafter, ``Securing Industrial Control Systems''), available at
https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/securing-industrial-control-systems.
\285\ Securing Industrial Control Systems, supra note 284, at
ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OT is typically used in manufacturing and distribution industries,
such as electric, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical,
and pharmaceutical manufacturing and distribution. Consequently, the
first IT sector-based criterion--focusing on entities that provide
hardware, software, systems, or services to the Federal government--may
not capture many OT OEMs, vendors, or integrators, resulting in the
need for this third criterion.
For the fourth IT Sector sector-based criteria, CISA proposes to
include in the description of covered entity certain entities that
perform functions related to domain name operations. These are entities
whose activities are key to the fabric of the internet, enabling users
to access resources on the internet and organizations to provide
services online. The criterion is intended to capture entities that
perform these functions for the benefit of their customers, business
partners, or internet users generally. A successful covered cyber
incident perpetuated against such entities could have significant
potential consequences not just to the entity itself but also entities
across all critical infrastructure sectors that rely upon domain name
resolution for their business operations and for the provision of their
resources online. In addition, the significance of these entities to
enabling navigation of the internet and the potential for compromising
one entity in order to impact multiple internet users makes these
entities a target for malicious cyber activity. Given their importance
to the use of the internet and therefore the potential impacts--to
national security, economic security, and public health and safety, as
well as to disruption of the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure--of a cyber incident perpetrated against such entities,
and the attractiveness of such entities to malicious cyber actors, CISA
is proposing to include these entities within the definition of covered
entities.
CISA believes the inclusion of these four IT sector-based criteria
is supported by an analysis of the three factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1) (i.e., consequence, threat, and likelihood of
[[Page 23698]]
disruption of the reliable operation of critical infrastructure).
First, the disruption to or compromise of any of the entities covered
by the proposed criteria for the IT sector has the potential to cause
national security, economic security, or public health and safety. This
is particularly true for entities that provide or support hardware,
software, or services to the Federal government, given the essential
role the Federal government has in national security, economic
security, and public health and safety. This same rationale is also
applicable to entities that develop, license, or sell ``critical
software''; entities that serve as OEMs, vendors, or integrators of OT;
and entities that perform functions related to domain name operations.
Critical software and OT frequently are used by entities and systems in
a wide variety of critical infrastructure, such as water systems,
commercial nuclear power reactors, telecommunications facilities, power
grids, airports, and hospitals, that, if disrupted or compromised
through the supply chain for these software and technologies, could
directly impact national security, economic security, and public health
and safety. By definition, critical software operates in a position
that provides the software extensive privileges, access, or trust, the
compromise of which could be significantly consequential to the systems
and networks where they are used, including critical infrastructure
systems and networks. OT is used to directly perform a multitude of
critical infrastructure functions, such as generating electricity,
monitoring and controlling water, and distributing natural gas. As
described above, entities that perform functions related to domain name
operations play a key role in ensuring the accessibility and security
of online services used by entities in a critical infrastructure
sector, which may include critical services that depend on those
services. For these same reasons, consideration of the third statutory
factor--the extent to which damage, disruption, or unauthorized access
to such an entity will likely enable the disruption of the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure--strongly supports the inclusion
of these entities within the description of covered entity. Finally, in
terms of the threats targeting the IT sector, these entities have been
frequently targeted by malicious cyber actors, which is the second
factor identified in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1). The three primary NAICS
segments where IT sector entities are found (i.e., the Manufacturing
Sector (for hardware); the Information Sector (for software); and the
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services Sector (for IT
services)) routinely rank near the top of the list when it comes to
sectors or industries experiencing the most cyber incidents.\286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ See Verizon 2023 DBIR, supra note 186, at 50; Verizon 2022
DBIR, supra note 181, at 50; IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217,
at 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the four criteria described previously in this
section, CISA considered a variety of other potential criteria for
inclusion, to include different criteria that would address some of the
risks associated with open source code and open source software. Open
source software is defined by NIST as ``[s]oftware that can be
accessed, used, modified, and shared by anyone.'' \287\ Open source
code and open source software are, by their very nature, accessible and
modifiable by everyone. This means that anyone can identify
vulnerabilities, including both good-faith security researchers who
report and help fix the vulnerability as well as bad actors who take
advantage of their findings to manipulate the software instead of
reporting the vulnerability. And while many open source projects are
well maintained, resource constraints or limited developer knowledge in
some cases lead to vulnerabilities in open source projects. As the
practice of integrating open source code with proprietary code and
using open source code in downstream software/services has expanded, so
has the potential for the incorporation of vulnerabilities into
information systems with limited tracking of where the open source
software is integrated, making vulnerability management increasingly
challenging. With the potential for widespread use or integration of a
vulnerable code, and the lack of insight into the full distribution of
the code or software in which the code has been integrated, such an
inherited vulnerability may be present in millions of instances and
difficult to identify potential victims. The potential compromise of a
code repository that houses and shares open source code could also lead
to largescale downstream effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\ See NIST Suborder 6106.01 Ver. 1, Open Source Code at 1
(Dec. 6, 2018), available at https://www.nist.gov/open/policies-directives-and-nists-public-access-plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To better understand these threats associated with open source code
and open source software, CISA considered including in the description
of covered entity any managed service provider or CSP that utilizes
open source software within its proprietary software library. CISA also
considered including in the description of covered entity specific
criteria to cover any code repository platform that hosts open source
code or open source software for public use. At this time, CISA has
elected not to include specific criteria in the proposed rule, but, as
explained earlier, CISA interprets the first proposed IT Sector sector-
based criterion to capture software development services, such as a
code repositories hosting open source code, that know their services
are being used by the Federal government.
CISA is interested in receiving comments on:
19. The scope of entities that would and would not be considered
covered entities based on the four unique criteria proposed by CISA,
whether the scoping is appropriate, and what, if any, specific
refinements should CISA consider related to any of the four criteria.
20. The types of entities that are ``related to domain name
operations'' and what type of relationship such entities may have with
relevant multi-stakeholder organizations, such as the internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Please also see Section
IV.D.ii in this document for additional requests for comment on the
proposed DNS Exception.
21. Whether CISA should include in the final rule specific criteria
to cover managed service providers or CSPs utilizing open source
software or additional, specific criteria that would require reporting
related to open source code, open source software, or code
repositories.
22. How the proposed IT Sector sector-based criteria might apply to
members of the open-source ecosystem, including whether entities that
may provide IT hardware, software, systems, or services to the Federal
government know or could determine whether they are providing such
goods or services to the Federal government, and, if so, the level of
effort in making such a determination.
k. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector
The Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector is composed of
nearly 100 commercial nuclear power reactors; over 30 Research and Test
Reactors (RTRs); approximately ten fuel cycle facilities; thousands of
licensees of radioactive materials for medical, research, and
industrial purposes; and the millions of radioactive packages
transported yearly.\288\ Of these entities,
[[Page 23699]]
CISA proposes to include in the description of covered entity any
entity that owns or operates a commercial nuclear power reactor or fuel
cycle facility. Commercial nuclear power reactors are subject to
regulations that require them to report cyber incidents impacting
safety, security, or emergency preparedness functions to the NRC;
however, other Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector
infrastructure typically are not subject to similar cyber incident
reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\ See DHS, Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste SSP: An
Annex to the NIPP 2013 (2015), available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-nuclear-2015-508.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consideration of the factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)
supports the inclusion of commercial nuclear power reactors and fuel
cycle facilities within the description of covered entity. The first
factor, which relates to consequence, the disruption or compromise of a
commercial nuclear power reactor may present a significant risk to
public health, economic security, and national security, as validated
by the extensive security regulations imposed by the NRC on these
facilities.\289\ Similarly, in the latest Update to the U.S. NRC Cyber
Security Roadmap, the NRC staff stated that the nuclear material and
hazardous chemicals at fuel cycle facilities ``present safety and
security concerns that could lead to potential consequences of concern
. . . as a result of a cyber attack.'' \290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\ See, e.g., 10 CFR part 73.
\290\ U.S. NRC, Update to the U.S. NRC Cyber Security Roadmap,
SECY-17-0034, at 5 (Feb. 28, 2017), available at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1635/ML16354A282.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second factor enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) is the
likelihood that an entity may be targeted by a malicious cyber actor,
including a foreign country. According to the NRC, ``[c]yber threats to
NRC licensees are dynamic due to emerging technologies and the
continuing evolving capabilities of potential adversaries.'' \291\
Foreign countries remain interested in perpetrating cyber incidents at
U.S. nuclear entities, with DHS recently stating that ``Russian
government-affiliated cyber espionage likely will remain a persistent
threat to . . . entities in the . . . nuclear industry[y].'' \292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\ Id. at 2.
\292\ 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, supra note 188,
at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third factor enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) is the extent to
which damage, disruption, or unauthorized access to such an entity is
likely to enable the disruption of the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure. As commercial nuclear power reactors themselves are
critical infrastructure, damage, disruption, or unauthorized access at
a plant likely would result in the disruption of critical
infrastructure. Additional infrastructure beyond the commercial nuclear
power reactor or fuel cycle facility could also be impacted by a
successful cyber incident at one of these entities either through the
loss of power provided by the commercial nuclear power reactor or the
emission of radiation rendering nearby critical infrastructure
generally not safely accessible for some period of time.
In developing this sector-based criteria, CISA also explored
including RTRs in the description of a covered entity. However, the
security risks associated with RTRs are significantly lower than the
risks associated with commercial nuclear power reactors.\293\ Based on
this lower risk assessment, CISA is not proposing to include a specific
Nuclear Sector sector-based criteria capturing RTRs within the
description of covered entity. An owner or operator of an RTR
nevertheless may be a covered entity based on the size-based threshold
or other sector-based criteria, such as the Government Facilities
Sector sector-based criteria for the education subsector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\ See id.; U.S. NRC, Backgrounder on RTRs (2020), available
at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/research-reactors-bg.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
l. Transportation Systems Sector
CISA proposes to include a number of different sector-based
criteria for entities in the Transportation Systems Sector. First, CISA
is proposing to include criteria related to owners and operators of
various non-maritime transportation system infrastructure, such as
freight railroad, public transportation and passenger railroads (PTPR),
pipeline facilities and systems, over-the-road bus (OTRB) operations,
passenger and all-cargo aircraft, indirect air carriers, airports, and
Certified Cargo Screening Facilities. Additionally, CISA is proposing
to include in the description of covered entity any entity that owns or
operates a vessel, facility, or outer continental shelf facility
subject to 33 CFR parts 104, 105, or 106.
Transportation is one of four designated lifeline functions,
meaning the reliable operation of this function is so critical that a
disruption or loss of this function will directly affect the security
and resilience of critical infrastructure within and across numerous
sectors.\294\ Transportation entities have long been targeted by
terrorists and other malicious actors, so it is no surprise that as the
cyberthreat has evolved, transportation entities are routinely
experiencing cyber incidents.\295\ In light of this evolving and
pervasive threat, TSA has identified and imposed heightened
cybersecurity requirements on critical entities across the various
transportation modes. CISA is proposing to include within the
description of covered entity those entities identified by TSA as
requiring cyber incident reporting and (in some cases) enhanced
cybersecurity measures for primarily the same reasons TSA relied upon
in determining that these entities warranted such requirements. Those
specific rationales for the proposed inclusion of each of the different
Transportation Systems Sector criteria are provided in the following
paragraphs. CISA believes that aligning CIRCIA's Applicability section
with the population of entities that TSA requires cyber incident
reporting from or the implementation of enhanced cybersecurity measures
at is appropriate for CIRCIA and consistent with the factors contained
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) (i.e., (1) the consequences that a disruption or
compromise of one of those entities could cause to national security,
economic security, or public health and safety; (2) the likelihood that
one of those entities may be targeted by a malicious cyber actor; and
(3) the extent to which damage, disruption, or unauthorized access to
such an entity will likely enable the disruption of the reliable
operation of critical infrastructure). CISA recognizes that some of the
criteria proposed below is based on TSA's Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk
Management NPRM, and CISA will continue to coordinate with TSA
throughout the rulemaking process to harmonize CIRCIA's Applicability
section with TSA, to the maximum extent practicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\ See Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience, supra note 198, at 4.
\295\ See, e.g., IBM 2023 Threat Index, supra note 217, at 42;
Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 50.
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In the rail subsector, CISA is proposing to require reporting from
owners and operators of freight railroad carriers identified under 49
CFR 1580.1(a)(1), (4), and (5) and PTPR identified in 49 CFR 1582.1.
This is consistent with the factors contained in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1),),
as TSA determined these entities should be required to report cyber
incidents, with the higher-risk PTPR also warranting enhanced
cybersecurity requirements, ``due to the ongoing cybersecurity threat
to surface transportation systems and associated infrastructure to
prevent against the
[[Page 23700]]
significant harm to the national and economic security of the United
States that could result from the `degradation, destruction, or
malfunction of systems that control this infrastructure.' '' \296\ The
scope of applicability for surface transportation is broader than in
TSA's Security Directives, but aligns with TSA's ongoing rulemaking to
codify these requirements that is based on a more long-term and
strategic view of risk as applied to these modes as well as the
applicability for requirements to report physical security incidents in
current 49 CFR 1570.203. This scope includes PTPR and OTRB owner/
operators upon whom TSA does not impose enhanced cybersecurity
requirements but is seeking to impose cyber incident reporting
requirements in their ongoing rulemaking efforts. While TSA has
determined it is not necessary at this time to impose requirements to
implement more robust cybersecurity measures on certain PTPR and OTRBs,
TSA and CISA believe it is important that these entities be required to
report cyber incidents when they occur. While the costs of the
imposition of robust cybersecurity measures upon these PTPRs and OTRBs
may not be justified at this time based on known risks, TSA and CISA
believe that the improved understanding of the threat environment to
the broader transportation sector that would result from the reporting
of substantial cyber incidents experienced by any of these entities
outweighs the minimal costs of such reporting requirements. In the case
of PTPRs, the additional costs of this requirement would be
particularly minimal as all PTPRs already are required to report
security incidents to TSA pursuant to 49 CFR 1570.203.
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\296\ See, e.g., TSA Security Directive 1580-21-01 series,
Enhancing Rail Cybersecurity; TSA Security Directive 1582-21-01
series, Enhancing Public Transportation and Passenger Railroad
Cybersecurity; TSA Security Directive 1580/82-2021-01 series, Rail
Cybersecurity Mitigation Actions and Testing. TSA's Security
Directives imposing cybersecurity requirements on surface
transportation modes are available at https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation-cybersecurity-toolkit.
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CISA is also proposing to require reporting from owners and
operators of the critical pipeline facilities and systems, as
identified in in 49 CFR part 1586 in TSA's rulemaking, Surface
Cybersecurity Risk Management. The scope of applicability includes gas,
hazardous liquid, carbon monoxide, and liquefied natural gas pipelines,
pipeline systems, and facilities that TSA has determined warrant
additional cybersecurity measures to ``reduce the risk of operational
disruption should the Information and/or Operational Technology system
of a gas or liquid pipeline be affected by a cybersecurity incident.''
\297\ Following a determination that a pipeline is critical, TSA
informs the owners and operators of the pipeline of that determination
and the additional cybersecurity requirements that thus apply to
it.\298\ This is similarly consistent with the factors contained in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) as, to determine which pipelines were critical, TSA
considered factors such as the volume of product transported and
whether the pipeline serves other critical sectors. Additionally,
malicious cyber actors continue to target this industry, with the 2023
Verizon DBIR noting nearly 150 cyber incidents for the mining,
quarrying, and oil and gas extraction and utilities segment during the
year covered by the report.\299\
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\297\ See, e.g., TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 series,
Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity and TSA Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-02 series, Pipeline Cybersecurity Mitigation Actions,
Contingency Planning, and Testing, available at https://www.tsa.gov/sd-and-ea.
\298\ Of note, this means that, for at least this prong of the
Transportation Systems Sector sector-based criteria, entities will
clearly know that they are covered entities.
\299\ Verizon 2023 DBIR, supra note 186, at 59.
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Additionally, CISA is proposing to include in the description of
covered entity any entity that is required to implement a TSA-approved
security program under 49 CFR parts 1542, 1544, 1548, and 1549. This
requirement applies to airports, passenger and all-cargo aircraft
operators, indirect air carriers, and Certified Cargo Screening
Facilities, respectively. In November 2021, TSA issued security program
changes requiring these entities to report cybersecurity incidents to
CISA. A subset of these entities were subsequently required to
implement additional cybersecurity measures in what TSA described as
``the latest in TSA's efforts to require that critical transportation
sector operators continue to enhance their ability to defend against
cybersecurity threats.'' \300\ As specifically applied to all-cargo
aircraft operators, the air cargo system faces emerging risks,
including a proliferation of cyber threats.\301\ Adversaries continue
to threaten the air cargo system and seek to use the aviation domain to
carry out terrorist plots, including through the use of the air cargo
supply chain to ship dangerous and potentially deadly items for pre-
operational planning.\302\ The focus on these ``critical transportation
sector operators'' in light of the ``persistent cybersecurity threats
against U.S. critical infrastructure, including the aviation sector''
\303\ is consistent with the three factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(1).
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\300\ TSA Press Release, TSA Issues New Cybersecurity
Requirements for Airport and Aircraft Operators (Mar. 7, 2023),
available at https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2023/03/07/tsa-issues-new-cybersecurity-requirements-airport-and-aircraft
(hereinafter ``TSA Press Release'').
\301\ TSA, Air Cargo Security Roadmap (Dec. 2021), available at
https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2021/12/09/tsa-publishes-new-roadmap-address-vision-improving-air-cargo.
\302\ See id.
\303\ TSA Press Release, supra note 300.
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Most, if not all, of the entities that would be captured under
these criteria already are required to report cybersecurity incidents
to CISA pursuant to these requirements. Including these entities within
the description of covered entity would further align the CIRCIA
requirements with TSA's requirements to support reducing duplication
and avoid unintended gaps in reporting. For example, while this
approach technically creates two legal requirements for these entities
to report cyber incidents, CISA does not believe that this is likely to
result in any actual duplicative reporting because TSA's existing
requirement requires these entities to report to CISA. CISA is
committed to working with TSA to ensure that Transportation Services
Sector entities that are required to report to CISA under both CIRCIA
and a separate TSA authority can do so in a single report where legally
possible. If necessary to do so, CISA and TSA will explore leveraging
the substantially similar reporting exception to formalize the ability
to comply with CIRCIA and TSA cyber incident reporting requirements
through the submission of a single cyber incident report. Additional
information on the substantially similar reporting exception can be
found in Section IV.D.i in this document.
With the final Transportation Systems Sector sector-based
criterion, CISA is proposing to cover those entities that own or
operate assets subject to MTSA. MTSA, which is designed to protect the
nation's ports and waterways from a terrorist attack, requires certain
vessels, facilities, and outer continental shelf facilities to perform
various security-related activities. The goal of MTSA is to prevent a
transportation security incident, which is defined as an incident that
results in significant loss of life, environmental damage,
transportation system disruption, or economic disruption to a
particular area.\304\ This goal is consistent with the first and third
factors enumerated in 6
[[Page 23701]]
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)--i.e., the consequences that disruption to or
compromise of an entity could cause to national security, economic
security, or public health and safety, and the extent damage or
disruption to an entity will likely enable the disruption of the
reliable operation of critical infrastructure. Including MTSA-regulated
facilities is also consistent with the second factor enumerated in 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(1)--the likelihood that an entity may be targeted by a
malicious cyber actor, including a foreign country--given the recent
assessment in the 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment identifying
an increased risk from Chinese government cyber actors to target ports
for disruption.\305\ The MTSA-regulated population is generally
considered to include all critical maritime assets. Considering that,
CISA, after consultation with the USCG, the SRMA for the Transportation
Systems Sector Maritime Subsector and regulatory agency responsible for
MTSA, believes that entities that own or operate vessels, facilities,
or outer continental shelf facilities subject to MTSA should be
required to report cyber incidents under CIRCIA. To achieve that, CISA
proposes that the description of covered entity include any entity that
owns or operates a vessel, facility, or outer continental shelf
facility subject to 33 CFR parts 104, 105, or 106.
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\304\ See U.S. Coast Guard, Operations Home--ISPS/MTSA, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/ISPS-MTSA/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2023); 33 CFR
101.100.
\305\ 2024 Homeland Security Threat Assessment, supra note 188,
at 20.
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CISA and USCG recognize that this proposed approach will result in
two separate cyber incident reporting requirements for entities that
are subject to both MTSA and CIRCIA. CISA and USCG are committed to
exploring the substantially similar reporting exception or other
mechanisms to allow entities that are subject to both MTSA and CIRCIA
cyber incident reporting requirements to comply with both requirements
through the submission of a single cyber incident report. Additional
information on the substantially similar reporting exception can be
found in Section IV.D.i in this document.
m. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector
CISA proposes including within the description of covered entity
any entity that owns or operates a Community Water System, as defined
in 42 U.S.C. 300f(15), or a Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs), as
defined in 40 CFR 403.3(q), that serve more than 3,300 people.
Inclusion of water and wastewater systems in the description of covered
entity is supported by a review of how the three factors enumerated in
6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) apply to these entities. First, as noted in the
2015 Water and Wastewater Systems SSP, safe drinking water is essential
to public health and all human activity, and properly treated
wastewater is vital for preventing disease and protecting the
environment.\306\ According to the EPA, ``[t]he collection and
treatment of . . . wastewater is vital to public health and clean
water.'' \307\ The 2015 Water and Wastewater Systems SSP further notes
that drinking water and wastewater treatment are essential to modern
life and the Nation's economy.\308\ Second, as noted in a March 3, 2023
memorandum issued by the EPA related to public water system
cybersecurity, water systems are increasingly facing cyberattacks.\309\
This assessment is supported by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission,
which stated in its March 2020 report that the ``water supply is known
to be a target for malign actors.'' \310\ Third, other critical
services, such as fire protection, healthcare, and heating and cooling,
are dependent on, and would be disrupted by, the interruption or
cessation of drinking water services.\311\ This criticality to other
sectors is reinforced by water having been designated one of four
designated lifeline functions, indicating that the sector's reliable
operation is so critical that a disruption or loss of this function
will directly affect the security and resilience of critical
infrastructure within and across numerous sectors.\312\
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\306\ See DHS, Water and Wastewater Systems SSP at 1 (2015),
available at https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans
(hereinafter ``Water and Wastewater Systems SSP'').
\307\ See EPA, Municipal Wastewater, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/municipal-wastewater (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\308\ Water and Wastewater Systems SSP, supra note 306, at i.
\309\ Assistant Administrator Fox, Addressing PWS Cybersecurity
in Sanitary Surveys or an Alternate Process (Mar. 3, 2023),
available at https://www.epa.gov/waterresilience/cybersecurity-sanitary-surveys.
\310\ Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report, supra note 23, at
62.
\311\ See Water and Wastewater Systems SSP, supra note 306, at
2.
\312\ See Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience, supra note 198, at 4.
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No cyber incident reporting requirements currently exist for water
and wastewater infrastructure, creating a significant gap in
understanding of the cyber threats to and visibility into emerging TTPs
used against water and wastewater infrastructure. This proposed sector-
based criterion is intended to close this gap and provide the Federal
government with sufficient reporting to better understand the Water and
Wastewater Systems Sector's cyber threat environment.
In developing this sector-based criterion, CISA considered whether
a minimum size threshold, such as population served, should be included
in the criterion. Following consultations with the EPA, the SRMA for
this sector, CISA has determined that the proposed criterion should
only include Community Water Systems and POTWs that serve populations
of more than 3,300 people. In regards to Community Water Systems, this
threshold, which has been used as the line of demarcation to
distinguish small and very small water systems from medium, large, and
very large water systems,\313\ is the threshold for the risk and
resilience assessment requirements established by Congress in 42 U.S.C.
300i-2(a)(1).\314\ Section 300i-2(a)(1) and (b) of title 42 of the
United States Code requires Community Water Systems serving a
population of more than 3,300 people to conduct risk and resilience
assessments and to prepare an emergency response plans that incorporate
the findings of the assessments performed.\315\ CISA interprets
Congress's decision to limit the 42 U.S.C. 300i-2(a)(1) risk and
resilience assessment requirements to facilities serving more than
3,300 individuals as an indication of Congress's assessment of the
relative risk associated with these facilities, and CISA agrees with
this assessment for the reasons stated above. This interpretation is
consistent with the fact that, generally speaking, Community Water
Systems that serve larger populations will de facto present greater
potential risks to public health and safety, if compromised, in light
of the significantly larger populations that rely on their water
service. Similar logic supports the application of the 3,300-
population-served threshold for POTWs, as does the rationale discussed
in Section IV.B.iv.1.a for the proposed inclusion of larger entities in
the covered entity population. By setting the threshold for coverage of
water and wastewater treatment systems at a population served of more
than 3,300 individuals, this criterion would be limiting required
reporting to approximately the largest 20% of water
[[Page 23702]]
and wastewater treatment systems by population served.\316\
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\313\ See, e.g., Water and Wastewater Systems SSP, supra note
306, at 3.
\314\ 42 U.S.C. 300i-2(a)(1).
\315\ See id.; see also EPA, America's Water Infrastructure Act
Section 2013: Risk and Resilience Assessments and Emergency Response
Plans, https://www.epa.gov/waterresilience/awia-section-2013 (last
visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\316\ See Water and Wastewater Systems SSP, supra note 306, at
3, 6.
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In establishing this proposed criterion, CISA, in consultation with
EPA, did consider not including a size threshold and instead requiring
reporting from all water systems and POTWs. CISA believes that
including all water systems and POTWs as a criteria is a reasonable
alternative. A cyber incident that results in a compromise of water
treatment even for smaller communities arguably is a significant enough
potential public health concern that it should warrant reporting to the
Federal government. Moreover, because this sector is predominantly
composed of smaller entities, reporting of incidents from smaller
entities in this sector could be essential to CISA receiving a
sufficient volume of reports to identify trends, TTPs, and
vulnerabilities that can be used to provide early warnings to water and
wastewater facilities of all sizes. Cutting against the argument to
include all water and wastewater systems in the covered entity
definition is the fact that many of the smallest water systems and
POTWs, such as hand pump operated wells at a campground or other small
facility, do not currently utilize information systems, and thus, could
not be the target of malicious cyber activity or experience a covered
cyber incident. Additionally, given that there are more than 150,000
combined Public Water Systems (which includes both Community Water
Systems and non-community water systems) and POTWs, were CISA to
include all of those entities in the description of covered entity, it
would dramatically increase the scope and burden of the proposed
regulations, with water and wastewater facilities accounting for nearly
40% of all covered entities.
After weighing these considerations, CISA ultimately concluded that
proposing limiting reporting required by CIRCIA to medium, large, and
very large Community Water Systems and POTWs entities is the optimal
approach. CISA would be interested in comments on:
23. The proposed Water and Wastewater Systems Sector sector-based
criterion.
24. The alternative criterion for the Water and Wastewater Systems
Sector that was considered.
n. Sectors for Which CISA Is Not Proposing Any Sector-Based Criteria
CISA is not proposing any sector-based criteria for three sectors:
the Commercial Facilities Sector, the Dams Sector, and the Food and
Agriculture Sector. CISA's rationale for proposing to not include
sector-based criteria for each of these sectors is described below.
Instead, CISA proposes to rely on the Applicability section's size-
based criterion or other sector-based criteria to capture the largest
entities in these critical infrastructure sectors for the reasons
described below.
The Commercial Facilities Sector is made up of an extremely diverse
range of physical and virtual sites where large numbers of people
congregate to conduct business, purchase retail products, and enjoy
recreational events and accommodations. It is divided into eight
subsectors--Entertainment and Media, Gaming, Lodging, Outdoor Events,
Public Assembly, Real Estate, Retail, and Sports Leagues. While members
of certain subsectors are at higher risk of cyber incidents, such as
the Entertainment and Media, Gaming, and Lodging subsectors, the
results of a cyber incident impacting an individual small entity in
those industries are unlikely to affect national security, economic
security, or public health and safety. To the extent that a Commercial
Facilities entity is large enough where there is the potential that a
cyber incident affecting it could result in impacts to national
security, economic security, or public health and safety, CISA believes
it likely the entity would be captured by the Applicability section's
size-based criterion. As a result, CISA is not proposing a sector-based
criteria for the Commercial Facilities Sector.
The Dams Sector consists of, among other things, over 100,000 dams,
an estimated 100,000 miles of levees, nearly 250 locks, and 150,000
mine tailings. The majority of these do not have integrated information
systems and thus do not warrant coverage under the CIRCIA regulations
at this time. Those assets that do have significant integrated
information systems, such as large dams, hydroelectric power dams, and
locks, frequently are owned by Federal entities or, in the case of
certain hydroelectric or other dams, are likely to be covered entities
under the proposed Energy Sector or Water and Wastewater Systems Sector
sector-based criteria. CISA, therefore, is not proposing a sector-based
criteria for the Dams Sector.
The Food and Agriculture Sector covers a broad landscape of
entities, including more than 2 million farms; nearly 1 million
restaurants; over 100,000 supermarkets, grocery stores, and other food
outlets; and thousands of meat, poultry, egg, and imported food
processors, warehousers, and distributors. Based on consultations with
the FDA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), who serve as co-
SRMAs for this sector, CISA believes that given the scale of this
sector and the general substitutability of the products that entities
within the sector produce, the Food and Agriculture Sector entities
with the greatest potential to experience a cyber incident resulting in
significant consequences are the largest entities in this sector. For
this reason, FDA regulations focused on food defense incorporate a
size-based threshold, applying more stringent regulatory requirements
to the largest entities.\317\ Based on this, and after consultation
with the FDA and USDA, CISA believes that the size standard proposed by
CIRCIA will capture a sufficient number of Food and Agriculture Sector
entities, including the most critical Food and Agriculture Sector
entities, within the description of covered entity, and that additional
Food and Agriculture Sector sector-based criteria are unnecessary for
the purposes of CIRCIA.
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\317\ See Mitigation Strategies To Protect Food Against
Intentional Adulteration, 21 CFR part 121. As FDA explained in the
NPRM for those regulations, ``[The FDA assesses] that the goal of
terrorist organizations is to maximize public health harm and, to a
lesser extent, economic disruption. It is our assessment that such
goals are likely to drive terrorist organizations to target the
product of relatively large facilities, especially those for which
the brand is nationally or internationally recognizable. An attack
on such a target would potentially provide the wide-scale
consequences desired by a terrorist organization and the significant
public attention that would accompany an attack on a recognizable
brand. Such facilities are likely to have larger batch sizes,
potentially resulting in greater human morbidity and mortality.
Further, an attack on a well-recognized, trusted brand is likely to
result in greater loss of consumer confidence in the food supply and
in the government's ability to ensure its safety and, consequently,
cause greater economic disruption than a relatively unknown brand
that is distributed regionally.'' 78 FR 78033.
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CISA believes that it can rely on other criteria for adequate
reporting from these three sectors. However, if as a result of public
comment CISA determines that it must modify or eliminate any aspect of
the Applicability section's description of a covered entity such that
coverage of these three sectors is no longer deemed adequate, CISA may
incorporate sector-based criteria for these three sectors in the final
rule.
For the Commercial Facilities sector, CISA is relying on the
proposed size-based threshold criterion for reporting. Were that
criterion to be modified or eliminated prior to the issuance of the
final rule, one alternative sector-based criterion CISA likely would
consider would be to capture certain sector
[[Page 23703]]
entities that exceed one or more designated annual revenue or number of
employees thresholds. This could be structured as a single threshold
for all Commercial Facilities Sector entities, or it could vary based
on subsectors or industry segments. If a single threshold were to be
used for all entities in the sector, CISA likely would use the SBA Size
Standards to inform that decision and develop a possible average
threshold, but would not use the SBA Size Standards alone since the
applicable size thresholds in the SBA Size Standards for Commercial
Facilities Sector entities vary depending on the type of entity and
associated NAICS code. An alternative approach to developing a single
size threshold for the sector-based criterion for this sector would be
to simply use the SBA Size Standards themselves (i.e., an entity in the
Commercial Facilities sector that exceeds the applicable SBA Size
Standard), which is how entities in this sector would be considered
covered entities under the current proposal. In either case, CISA would
attempt to set any threshold to cover the same larger entities in the
sector which would be required to report under the proposed size-based
criterion.
Coverage of entities in the Food and Agriculture Sector in the
current proposed approach similarly is reliant on the size-based
threshold criterion. If as a result of public comment CISA determines
that it must eliminate or modify the size-based criterion, CISA likely
would propose multiple different Food and Agriculture Sector sector-
based criteria to ensure that these entities remain covered entities.
This is likely to include one criterion targeting larger food
manufacturers, processors, warehouses, and similar entities; one
criterion targeting larger food producers (e.g., farms, orchards,
groves, ranches, hatcheries, fisheries); and one criterion larger
targeting groceries, supermarkets, and other food outlets. For food
manufacturers, processors, warehouses, and similar entities, a
potential approach to developing this criterion would be to mirror the
approach used in the Food Safety Modernization Act's International
Adulteration rule (21 CFR part 121), which regulates food
manufacturers, processors, warehouses, and similar entities that have
more than 500 employees. For food producers, CISA could leverage the
SBA size standards table to set a size threshold for this criterion
based on annual revenue. As the SBA Size Standards use slightly
different revenue thresholds for different types of food producers,
CISA could elect to use the mean, median, or mode of the different
revenue amounts used in this industry segment or simply have entities
refer to the applicable size standard for their industry in the SBA
Size Standards table. For the final group, i.e., supermarkets,
groceries, and other food outlets, CISA could use a similar approach to
set a size threshold for this criterion, except for these types of
entities, the SBA Size Standards tend to use number of employees as
opposed to annual revenue to distinguish between small and large
entities. Thus, this criterion is likely to be a size threshold based
on the mean, median, or mode of number of employees across such
entities.
As noted above, the only Dams Sector assets that are likely to have
integrated information systems warranting coverage under CIRCIA are
large dams, hydroelectric power dams, and locks. With the Federal
government responsible for 80% of the largest dams and all navigation
locks,\318\ the only segment of this sector where CISA might not have
insight into incidents without CIRCIA reporting would be the 2,600 non-
Federal hydroelectric dams. Unlike the Commercial Facilities and Food
and Agriculture Sector entities, CISA is currently not proposing a
separate standard for this sector because CISA believes these entities
are sufficiently covered in the proposed covered entity description not
by the size-based criterion, but by other sector-based criteria, namely
the Energy Sector sector-based criterion and, to a lesser extent, the
Water and Wastewater Systems Sector sector-based criterion.
Accordingly, if as a result of public comment CISA determines that it
must modify or eliminate the proposed size-based criterion from the
final rule, but the proposed Energy Sector sector-based criterion
remained, CISA does not believe it would need to propose a separate
Dams Sector sector-based criterion. If, however, either the Energy
Sector or Water and Wastewater Systems Sector sector-based criterion
were modified or eliminated as a result of public comment, CISA may
need to add a Dams Sector sector-based criterion to the final rule to
ensure reporting from appropriate non-Federal hydroelectric dams. In
such a case, CISA would consult with FERC and the Dams SRMA to identify
an appropriate criterion for this industry segment. A possible
alternative criterion could be based on energy generating capacity.
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\318\ See Dams SSP: An Annex to the NIPP 2013 at v (2015),
available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-dams-2015-508.pdf.
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CISA is interested in receiving comments on:
25. The proposed approach to the Commercial Facilities Sector, Dams
Sector, and Food and Agriculture Sector.
26. Potential alternative sector-based criteria for each of those
three sectors if CISA modifies or removes the general size-based
threshold criterion, the Energy Sector sector-based criterion, or the
Water and Wastewater Systems Sector sector-based criterion in the final
rule.
o. Interpretation of Sector-Based Criteria Coverage
When an entity is assessing whether it is a covered entity based on
any of the sector-based criteria, the entity should not factor into its
assessment the critical infrastructure sector of which the entity
considers itself to be a part. By definition, each of the sector-based
criterion include entities that are in a critical infrastructure
sector, and entities should therefore assume they meet this threshold
requirement of being ``in a critical infrastructure sector'' if they
meet one or more sector-based criteria, without needing to undertake
any determination described in Section IV.B.ii, above. CISA will
determine whether an entity is a covered entity based on whether the
entity meets any of the specified criteria in Sec. 226.2 of the
proposed rule. Whether or not the entity considers itself part of the
specific critical infrastructure sector that the sector-based criteria
targets or is based upon on is irrelevant for the purposes of
determining whether the entity is a covered entity. For example, if a
pharmaceutical manufacturer owns a covered chemical facility subject to
CFATS (or, if CFATS is not reauthorized by the publication of the final
rule, the EPA RMP), it would qualify as a covered entity regardless of
whether or not the pharmaceutical manufacturer considers itself part of
the Chemical Sector. Similarly, if an SLTT Government entity owns or
operates a Community Water System as defined in 42 U.S.C. 300f(15), it
would qualify as a covered entity regardless of its Title IV status
even if it considers itself a member of the Government Facilities
Sector, and not the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector. Thus, an
entity may qualify as a covered entity under a sector-based criterion
for a sector with which it does not typically identify, and an entity
may qualify as a covered entity under two different sector-based
criteria. However, an entity only needs to meet one of the sector-based
criteria proposed in the Applicability section to qualify as a covered
entity.
[[Page 23704]]
As noted throughout this section, CISA recognizes that a number of
the entities that are captured under the Applicability section already
are, or in the future will be, required to report cyber incidents to a
different Federal department or agency pursuant to another existing or
proposed regulation. CISA could have attempted to design the sector-
based criteria in a manner to avoid designating entities that may be
subject to other Federal cyber incident reporting requirements as
covered entities. With one exception, however, CISA has no authority
over those other regulations.\319\ If CISA were to carve those entities
out of CIRCIA's Applicability section, CISA would have no control over
what incidents the entities must report or what information must be
included in those reports.\320\ CISA also would be unable to guarantee
it would receive such reports in a timely manner. To ensure that CISA
continues to receive reports from entities containing the information
needed to support the CIRCIA mission in a manner and timeframe that
support CIRCIA implementation, CISA proposes not to use other existing
regulatory coverage as a disqualifying factor for inclusion within the
description of covered entity. As noted earlier, CISA is committed to
working with its Federal partners to explore the implementation of the
substantially similar reporting exception where practicable to minimize
duplicative reporting. Moreover, this approach is consistent with
Congressional intent behind the CIRCIA legislation, which included
providing CISA, as the newly minted central repository for cyber
incident reporting, visibility into significant cyber incidents being
conducted across U.S. critical infrastructure sectors and enabling
coordinated, informed Federal government action against perpetrators of
cyberattacks.\321\
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\319\ CISA is responsible for implementation of the CFATS, 6 CFR
part 27, which requires CFATS-covered chemical facilities to report
certain cyber incidents to CISA, although CISA acknowledges that at
the time of publication of this NPRM, Congress has allowed the
statutory authority for CFATS to lapse.
\320\ CISA recognizes that CISA proposes to use regulations that
CISA does not administer to help scope what entities meet the CIRCIA
Applicability. If following the publication of a final rule
implementing CIRCIA the population covered by those other
regulations changes, CISA will review the change and may seek to
update the CIRCIA regulations if the existing regulatory citation no
longer reflects the population from which CISA seeks to receive
reporting under CIRCIA.
\321\ See, e.g., HSGAC Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1 (``Today
no one U.S. Government agency has visibility into all cyber-attacks
occurring against U.S. critical infrastructure on a daily basis.
This bill would change that--enabling a coordinated, informed U.S.
response to the foreign governments and criminal organizations
conducting these attacks against the U.S.'').
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v. Other Approaches Considered To Describe Covered Entity
In addition to the proposed approach, CISA considered various other
options for how to describe covered entity. Among other approaches,
CISA considered simply using the statutory definition contained in
CIRCIA (i.e., any entity in a critical infrastructure sector); aligning
the Applicability section to an existing definition of ``critical
infrastructure;'' and describing covered entity as the entities
identified pursuant to Section 9 of Executive Order 13636--Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (78 FR 11737). CISA opted against
using any of these approaches either as a standalone approach or, where
it would not make the other prongs redundant, as a third prong to the
proposed approach for the reasons described below.
1. Alternative A: Any Entity in a Critical Infrastructure Sector
One alternative approach CISA considered for describing covered
entity was to scope the term as broadly as permissible under the
statute--i.e., to include ``any entity in a critical infrastructure
sector, as defined in PPD-21.'' As discussed earlier, while the term
``critical infrastructure sector'' is not defined in PPD-21, public and
private sector partners for each of the critical infrastructure sectors
identified in PPD-21 jointly developed SSPs for their respective
sectors that set out goals and priorities for the sector to address its
current risk environment.\322\ Each of those SSPs includes a
description of the entities that compose the sector in Sector Profiles.
As the examples provided earlier demonstrate, most of these sectors are
quite expansive, and entities ``in a critical infrastructure sector''
are not limited to--and are often broader than--entities that own or
operate systems or assets that meet the statutory definition of
``critical infrastructure.'' See Section IV.B.ii in this document.
Based on a consolidated reading of these sector-developed descriptions
in the various SSP Sector Profiles, CISA believes that the overwhelming
majority of entities in the United States--though not all--fit within
one or more of the critical infrastructure sectors and thus would meet
the definition of ``an entity in a critical infrastructure sector.''
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\322\ See CISA, 2015 Sector Specific Plans, available https://www.cisa.gov/2015-sector-specific-plans (last visited Nov. 28,
2023).
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According to Census Bureau records, there are more than 8 million
employers in the United States and another approximately 27 million
legal establishments that do not have any employees.\323\ Combined,
that would indicate the existence of approximately 35 million entities
with legal standing within the United States. Given that very few types
of entities are not part of one of the 16 critical infrastructure
sectors, CISA believes that the vast majority of these 35 million
entities would qualify as an ``entity in a critical infrastructure
sector.''
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\323\ See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns
First Look Report for 2021, available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2021/econ/cbp/2021-first-look.html; U.S. Census Bureau,
Nonemployer Statistics Tables for 2019, available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/nonemployer-statistics/data/tables.html.
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Although CISA anticipates the per-report cost of this regulation to
be relatively low, the aggregate cost of reportable incidents across
tens of millions of entities has the potential to be extremely large
and burdensome. Additionally, while CISA believes receiving a large
number of reports is necessary to achieve the goals of the CIRCIA
regulation, CISA acknowledges that there likely is some point at which
the marginal returns provided by each additional report will be
outweighed by the cost of its submission. Although it is difficult to
pinpoint with precision that point of diminishing marginal returns,
CISA is confident that it would be surpassed were CISA to require
reporting from tens of millions of entities.
2. Alternative B: Removal of Size-Based Threshold
A second alternative CISA considered was to use the same general
framework as in the current proposed approach, but without the size-
based criterion. Under this approach, CISA would only rely upon sector-
based criteria to cover the desired population of entities in each
critical infrastructure sector. As the existing sector-based criteria
do not cover all of the sectors and subsectors from which CISA believes
reporting is necessary, were CISA to eliminate the size-based
criterion, CISA would have to propose adding new sector-based criteria
to ensure appropriate coverage of covered entities. Sectors or
subsectors for which CISA would need to add new sector-based criteria
include the Commercial Facilities Sector, the Dams Sector, the Food and
Agriculture Sector, certain parts of the Healthcare and Public Health
Sector (e.g., medical insurers; laboratories and other diagnostic
facilities), and the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector.
[[Page 23705]]
Removing the size-based criterion and replacing it with some number
of new sector-based criteria would have two primary effects. First, the
total number of covered entities likely would be slightly reduced as
there are some entities currently captured by the size-based criterion
that would not meet any of the current proposed or potential additional
sector-based criteria. CISA believes that such entities would be
relatively few, however, as CISA estimates that the majority of
entities that currently meet the size-based criterion either also meet
one of the current sector-based criteria or would be brought into the
covered entity definition by a new sector-based criterion.
Second, CISA believes that this alternative could slightly reduce
familiarization costs associated with the regulation, as entities that
would have had to expend resources to determine if they exceeded the
SBA Size Standard for their respective industry no longer would have to
do so. CISA believes that this impact would also be fairly limited as:
(a) only a portion of potentially covered entities would need to expend
resources to make such a determination since many already know if they
exceed the small business size standard for their respective industry,
(b) the amount of resources necessary to do so typically are relatively
minimal, and (c) a portion of the resources certain entities would save
by the elimination of the size-based criterion would instead be
expended by those or other entities to determine if they meet one of
the new sector-based criteria.
Contrary to the minimum benefits likely to be gained by elimination
of the size-based criterion, CISA believes there are significant
reasons to include the criterion in the proposal. First, as described
at length in Section IV.B.iv.1 above, there are a number of reasons why
CISA believes requiring reporting from large entities is beneficial.
Second, the size-based criterion allows CISA to capture adequate
reporting populations from multiple sectors and subsectors using a
single threshold. As noted above, without the size-based criterion,
CISA would need to establish one or more new sector-based criteria for
each of at least five critical infrastructure sectors or subsectors. In
total, while CISA believes it could achieve the purposes of the CIRCIA
statute without a size-based criterion, CISA believes that the benefits
of including the size-based criterion far exceed the almost certainly
minimal cost savings associated with an alternative where additional
sector-based criteria are used in lieu of the size-based criterion.
3. Alternative C: Definition of Critical Infrastructure
CISA also explored potentially limiting the scope of the covered
entity description to critical infrastructure only and using an
existing definition of critical infrastructure, such as the one at 42
U.S.C. 5195c(e).\324\ As discussed earlier, however, CISA believes that
such a narrow scope of applicability would severely limit, and perhaps
prevent, CISA's ability to achieve CIRCIA's regulatory purposes. See
Section III.C.ii. Additionally, the 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e) definition of
``critical infrastructure'' includes some ambiguity that can make it
difficult for certain entities to know definitively whether they meet
the definition. For example, it is not readily apparent what level of
impact would constitute a ``debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination
of those matters.'' \325\ Moreover, even if a clear definition of that
level of impact existed, it would be unreasonable to expect most
private sector entities to be able determine if an incident impacting
one of their systems would have a debilitating impact on national
security, national economic security, national public health or safety,
or any combination thereof. Because the description of covered entity
will impose regulatory requirements on entities, it is important that
the description be easily understandable and allow different
individuals interpreting the description to routinely come to the same
conclusion.
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\324\ 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e) defines ``critical infrastructure'' as
``systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.''
\325\ Id.
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4. Alternative D: Section 9 List
In comments submitted in response to the RFI, a number of
commenters recommended that CISA use the list of entities developed
pursuant to Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13636 (hereinafter referred
to as the Section 9 List) as either a starting point for identifying,
or the complete list of, covered entities.\326\ The Section 9 List
contains ``critical infrastructure where a cybersecurity incident could
reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national effects on
public health or safety, economic security, or national security.''
\327\ Pursuant to Executive Order 13636, DHS is to review and update
this list annually.
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\326\ See, e.g., Comments submitted by UnityPoint Health, CISA-
2022-0010-0107; National Retail Federation, CISA-2022-0010-0092;
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, CISA-2022-0010-
0025.
\327\ E.O. 13636 Section 9(a), available at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/executive-order-eo-13636-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity.
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Given that the Section 9 List consists of entities against which a
cybersecurity incident could result in catastrophic effects on national
security, economic security, or public health, CISA agrees that the
entities on the Section 9 List are entities that CISA would want to
report covered cyber incidents and ransom payments under CIRCIA. CISA
anticipates, however, that all of the entities on the Section 9 List
would be covered entities under either the proposed size-based
criterion or sector-based criteria in the proposed Applicability
section, rendering any benefits of using the Section 9 List as a basis
for coverage under CIRCIA extremely limited. CISA further believes that
the limited benefits of potentially requiring reporting from a few
Section 9 List entities who would not already be required to report
under other proposed criteria are outweighed by the significant
potential downsides associated with using the Section 9 List in this
manner.
First, CISA is concerned that using the Section 9 List, which
relies in part on nominations to identify entities for inclusion, as
the basis for imposing regulatory requirements would chill nominations
to the list and reduce voluntary participation in cybersecurity efforts
targeted at Section 9 List entities. Depending on how much the use of
the Section 9 List for regulatory purposes disincentivizes cooperation
in the development of the list and participation in voluntary
cybersecurity activities targeted at Section 9 List entities, using the
list for CIRCIA could result in a net overall negative impact to
national cybersecurity efforts.
Second, because of the requirement that CISA update the list
annually, entities would lack certainty regarding their future
regulatory status under CIRCIA. This would not only be frustrating to
entities, but it could also result in some entities wasting resources
to establish regulatory reporting processes and procedures that they
end up not needing or, conversely, result in some entities foregoing
establishing reporting processes and procedures with the thought that
they might not be subject to regulatory requirements the following
year. The annual updates to the list would also present logistical
challenges for CISA, which would need to inform entities whenever they
are
[[Page 23706]]
added to, or removed from, the list for the entities to be aware of
their regulatory status.
vi. Request for Comments on Applicability Section
CISA seeks comments on all aspects of the Applicability Section, to
include comments on the following specific topics:
27. CISA's interpretation of the terms ``entity'' and ``in a
critical infrastructure sector.''
28. Potential challenges for an entity determining whether it is
``in a critical infrastructure sector'' and any specific changes that
can be made to the proposed Sec. 226.2 (Applicability) that would
provide additional clarity for an entity to make this determination.
29. The scope of entities that would only be considered covered
entities because of the size-based criterion and would not meet any of
the sector-based criteria.
30. The use of both a size-based criterion and sector-based
criteria as criteria in the description of covered entity.
31. The proposed decision to include a size-based criterion.
32. The proposal to use the SBA Size Standards as the basis for the
size-based criterion and the Small Business Size Regulations
instructions for determining if an entity exceeds the size threshold
for purposes of determining applicability of these regulations to
certain entities.
33. The proposed sector-based criteria used in the Applicability
Section to identify certain entities as covered entities.
34. Any additional sector-based criteria that would be necessary to
capture entities who are only considered covered entities because of
the size-based criterion if the size-based criterion was removed the
Final Rule.
35. The use of the EPA RMP rule as an alternative Chemical Sector
sector-based criteria should CFATS not be reauthorized at the time of
the issuance of the CIRCIA final rule.
36. The proposed decision to forgo inclusion of sector-based
criteria for certain critical infrastructure sectors, subsectors,
industries, or entity types, and the alternative proposed criteria for
those sectors, subsectors, industries, and entity types.
37. Whether there are other lists of entities in a critical
infrastructure sector that should be included as covered entities
(either instead of the applicability criteria for covered entity
proposed in this NPRM or in addition to the proposed applicability
criteria), to the extent that those listed entities fall within a
critical infrastructure sector.
C. Required Reporting on Covered Cyber Incidents and Ransom Payments
i. Overview of Reporting Requirements
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)-(3), four proposed circumstances
exist that require covered entities (or third parties on their behalf)
to submit a report to CISA, subject to certain proposed exceptions or
limitations discussed in Sections IV.D and IV.E.ii of this document.
First, CIRCIA requires a covered entity that experiences a covered
cyber incident to report that incident to CISA. 6 U.S.C. 681(a)(1)(A).
Second, CIRCIA requires a covered entity that makes a ransom payment as
the result of a ransomware attack against the covered entity to report
that payment to CISA. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2)(A). Third, CIRCIA requires
that, until a covered entity notifies CISA that the covered cyber
incident in question has concluded and been fully mitigated and
resolved, a covered entity must submit an update or supplement to a
previously submitted report on a covered cyber incident if substantial
new or different information becomes available. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3).
Finally, CIRCIA requires that a covered entity submit an update or
supplement to a previously submitted report on a covered cyber incident
if the covered entity makes a ransom payment after submitting a Covered
Cyber Incident Report. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). CISA is proposing to
incorporate these requirements in Sec. 226.3 of the proposed
regulation. Other parts of the proposed regulation discuss the report
submission deadlines (Sec. 226.5; IV.D.iv), manner and form (Sec.
226.6; IV.D.i and ii), and information required (Sec. Sec. 226.7
through 226.11; IV.D.iii) for all of these types of reports.
CISA is proposing to include the first reporting requirement, the
requirement for a covered entity to report a covered cyber incident, in
Sec. 226.3(a). A covered entity would comply with this requirement by
submitting, or having a third-party submit on the covered entity's
behalf, a Covered Cyber Incident Report or a Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report pursuant to Sec. 226.3(c). Cyber
incidents do not occur in a single moment in time, but span from the
initial moment of compromise until the cyber incident is fully
mitigated and resolved. Because of this, CISA interprets the word
``experiences'' (in the statutory phrase ``a covered entity that
experiences a covered cyber incident'') to include the full lifecycle
of a cyber incident, such that this reporting requirement applies to
any entity that qualifies as a covered entity at any point during the
occurrence of the covered cyber incident. For example, this means that
if an entity discovers that it experienced a covered cyber incident two
years ago that has continued to the present, and that entity is a
covered entity at the time of discovery, the entity would be required
to submit a Covered Cyber Incident Report under the proposed rule
because the incident has not concluded and been fully mitigated and
resolved. Conversely, if that same entity was not a covered entity at
the time of discovery, but was one year ago (i.e., during the period
when the covered cyber incident was ongoing but not yet discovered),
the entity would be required to submit a Covered Cyber Incident Report
under the proposed rule because the entity experienced at least part of
the covered cyber incident while it was a covered entity.
CISA is proposing to include the second reporting requirement, the
requirement for a covered entity to report a ransom payment it has
made, in Sec. 226.3(b).\328\ CISA understands CIRCIA as requiring a
covered entity to report a ransom payment regardless of whether the
ransomware attack that led to the ransom payment is a covered cyber
incident. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2)(B). Additionally, CISA interprets 6
U.S.C. 681b(d)(3) to require a covered entity to report a ransom
payment regardless of whether the covered entity itself makes the
ransom payment or has a third-party make the ransom payment on the
covered entity's behalf. Because this reporting requirement is tied to
a single action that occurs at a specific moment in time--the making of
a ransom payment--CISA interprets the word ``makes'' (in the statutory
language ``a covered entity that makes a ransom payment'') to apply
this reporting requirement to any entity that qualifies as a covered
entity at the moment in time that it makes a ransom payment as the
result of a ransomware attack.
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\328\ While the proposed rule includes reporting of ransom
payments to CISA, as CIRCIA requires, CISA notes that ``[t]he U.S.
government strongly discourages all private companies and citizens
from paying ransom or extortion demands and recommends focusing on
strengthening defensive and resilience measures to prevent and
protect against ransomware attacks.'' Department of the Treasury,
Office of Foreign Asset Control, Updated Advisory on Potential
Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments (Sept. 21,
2021).
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Depending on the circumstances surrounding and timing of the ransom
payment, including whether the ransomware attack is a covered cyber
incident, the type of CIRCIA Report a covered entity (or third party on
behalf
[[Page 23707]]
of a covered entity) might use to comply with proposed Sec. 226.3(b)
may vary. For example, if the ransom payment was made as the result of
an incident that did not qualify as a covered cyber incident, the
covered entity would submit a Ransom Payment Report under Sec.
226.3(b). If the ransom payment was made as the result of a covered
cyber incident that has not yet been reported, the covered entity may
opt to submit a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report
under Sec. 226.3(c) instead of a Covered Cyber Incident Report under
Sec. 226.3(a) and a separate Ransom Payment Report under Sec.
226.3(b). Alternatively, if the ransom payment was made as the result
of a covered cyber incident that the covered entity has previously
reported to CISA, then the covered entity would use a Supplemental
Report under Sec. 226.3(d) to report the ransom payment to CISA.
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A), a covered entity that makes a
ransom payment associated with a covered cyber incident prior to the
expiration of the 72-hour reporting timeframe for reporting the covered
cyber incident may submit a single report to satisfy both the covered
cyber incident and ransom payment reporting requirements. CISA is
proposing to include this option in Sec. 226.3(c). Additional details
on this type of joint report, which CISA is proposing to call a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report, can be found in
Section IV.A.iii.4 and IV.E.ii.1 of this document.
Lastly, CISA is proposing to include in Sec. 226.3(d) the
statutory reporting requirements that mandate a covered entity provide
CISA with updates or supplements in certain circumstances. As discussed
in Section IV.A.iii.5 of this document, CIRCIA refers to these types of
reports as Supplemental Reports, which a covered entity is obligated to
provide unless and until it has notified CISA that the underlying
covered cyber incident has concluded and been fully mitigated and
resolved. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). CISA's proposed interpretation for
``concluded'' and ``fully mitigated and resolved'' and the process for
informing CISA of the belief that the covered cyber incident at issue
has concluded and been fully mitigated and resolved are discussed in
further detail in Sections IV.E.iv.3.c and IV.E.v.2 of this document,
respectively. Notifying CISA that the covered entity believes the
underlying covered cyber incident has concluded and been fully
mitigated and resolved is optional.
The first scenario resulting in the requirement to submit a
Supplemental Report is when substantial new or different information
becomes available to a covered entity. As with the covered cyber
incident reporting requirement described above, CISA interprets this
requirement as applying to an entity that is a covered entity during
any point in the incident lifecycle, such that any entity that
qualifies as a covered entity for the purposes of the covered cyber
incident reporting requirement is also subject to the supplemental
reporting requirement to the extent new or different information
becomes available.
The second scenario resulting in the requirement to submit a
Supplemental Report is when a covered entity makes a ransom payment
related to a covered cyber incident for which the covered entity has
already submitted a Covered Cyber Incident Report. As with the ransom
payment reporting requirement described above, CISA interprets this
requirement as applying to an entity that is a covered entity at the
time a ransom payment is made, assuming they also were subject to the
covered cyber incident reporting requirement described above.
These two scenarios that require the submission of a Supplemental
Report are enumerated in Sec. Sec. 226.3(d)(1)(i) and (ii),
respectively.
ii. Reporting of Single Incidents Impacting Multiple Covered Entities
CISA anticipates that occasions will occur where a single cyber
incident causes substantial cyber incident-level impacts to multiple
covered entities. Who must report and the number of reports that must
be submitted in those situations may vary depending on the relationship
between the impacted entities.
In cases where a single cyber incident impacts multiple
unaffiliated covered entities, each covered entity that experiences
substantial cyber incident-level impacts must submit a Covered Cyber
Incident Report to CISA. For example, if a compromise of a CSP causes
substantial cyber incident level-impacts at multiple unaffiliated
customers of the CSP, more than one of whom is a covered entity, then
each of the impacted customers that are covered entities are
responsible for submitting (or having a third party submit on their
behalf) a Covered Cyber Incident Report. The covered entity customers
could, however, authorize the CSP to submit Covered Cyber Incident
Reports on their behalf under Sec. 226.12(a) if the CSP has or is
provided with sufficient information to complete the Covered Cyber
Incident Reports. The CSP may also have to separately submit a Covered
Cyber Incident Report if it is itself a covered entity and it
experiences threshold impacts that meet the definition of a substantial
cyber incident.
Conversely, in cases where a single cyber incident causes
substantial cyber incident-level impacts at multiple affiliated covered
entities, the covered entities can meet their reporting obligations
through either (a) the submission of a single Covered Cyber Incident
Report that provides the required information on all of the impacted
entities, or (b) multiple Covered Cyber Incident Reports, with one or
more covered entities submitting their own reports. Examples of
scenarios where multiple affiliated covered entities may experience
impacts from a single substantial cyber incident include a substantial
cyber incident that impacts a parent corporation and one or more of its
subsidiaries; a cyber incident that impacts a number of SLTT Government
Entities within the same jurisdiction (e.g., an incident that impacts a
single county's general government network, the county's 911 system,
and the county's school district network); or a cyber incident
affecting a jointly operated venture that impacts downstream systems
that are individually owned by members of the joint venture. In these
and similar cases, the impacted covered entities may satisfy their
reporting requirements under CIRCIA through the submission of a single
Covered Cyber Incident Report so long as that report details the
impacts experienced by each of the affected covered entities, any other
required covered entity-specific details, and point(s) of contact who
individually or collectively represent all of the covered entities on
whose behalf the Covered Cyber Incident Report is being submitted.
Similarly, in cases where a cyber incident impacts a facility that
has separate owners and operators, both of whom qualify as a covered
entity, only a single Covered Cyber Incident Report is required. Thus,
for example, if a cyber incident impacts a critical access hospital or
a Community Water System that is owned by one entity and operated by
another, the reporting obligations of both the owner and operator can
be met by a single Covered Cyber Incident Report submitted by (or on
behalf of) either the owner or the operator. However, both are
separately obligated to ensure that at least one Covered Cyber Incident
Report is submitted.
While the examples provided above focus on Covered Cyber Incident
Reports, the principles being described apply equally to all types of
CIRCIA Reports. Accordingly, if a ransom
[[Page 23708]]
payment is made on behalf of multiple affiliated entities, a single
Ransom Payment Report can be submitted on their collective behalf.
Similarly, affiliated entities may opt to submit a single Supplemental
Report detailing substantial new or different information that impacts
multiple affiliated covered entities. By contrast, if a supply chain
compromise results in multiple covered entity customers of a single
service provider experiencing a ransomware attack and each paying a
ransom payment, each covered entity that makes a ransom payment is
responsible for submitting a Ransom Payment Report.
D. Exceptions to Required Reporting on Covered Cyber Incidents and
Ransom Payments
Section 681b(a)(5) of title 6, United States Code, contains three
scenarios in which a covered entity is excepted from having to report a
separate covered cyber incident or ransom payment. The first of these
exceptions authorizes a covered entity to submit a single CIRCIA Report
containing information on both a covered cyber incident and ransom
payment when the covered entity makes a ransom payment related to a
covered cyber incident within the 72-hour window for reporting the
covered cyber incident. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A). The second exception
allows a covered entity to forgo providing an otherwise required CIRCIA
Report to CISA if it is legally required to report substantially
similar information within a substantially similar timeframe to another
Federal agency with whom CISA has an information sharing agreement and
mechanism. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B). The third exception states that
CIRCIA reporting requirements shall not apply to certain covered
entities, or specific functions of those entities, that are owned,
operated, or governed by multi-stakeholder organizations that develop,
implement, and enforce policies concerning the DNS. 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(5)(C). CISA additionally is proposing a fourth exception that
would except Federal agencies from having to submit a CIRCIA Report to
CISA if the Federal agency is required to report the incident in
question to CISA pursuant to FISMA, 44 U.S.C. 3551 et seq.
The first exception, which requires the submission of a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report, is discussed in
Section IV.E.ii of this document. The following subsections discuss the
remaining three exceptions.
i. Substantially Similar Reporting Exception
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B), a covered entity that is
required by law, regulation, or contract to report substantially
similar information on a covered cyber incident or ransom payment to
another Federal agency in a substantially similar timeframe as that
required under CIRCIA does not have to submit a covered cyber incident
Report or Ransom Payment Report to CISA on that covered cyber incident
or ransom payment if CISA has an information sharing agreement and
mechanism in place with that Federal agency. Under that same provision
of CIRCIA, a covered entity is excepted from having to submit a
Supplemental Report to CISA if the entity is required to provide to
another Federal agency substantially similar information to that which
the entity would otherwise be obligated to provide to CISA in a
Supplemental Report, must do so in a substantially similar timeframe as
that required under CIRCIA, and CISA has both an information sharing
agreement and mechanism in place with the other Federal agency. This
reporting exception (hereinafter the substantially similar reporting
exception) will allow covered entities subject to more than one Federal
cyber incident reporting requirement to avoid having to report
duplicative information to both CISA and another Federal agency when
certain conditions are met.
CISA interprets the statutory language to require five criteria for
the application of the substantially similar reporting exception to
apply: (1) the report must be required to contain substantially similar
information to that required to be included in the applicable CIRCIA
report; (2) the report must be required to be provided to the other
Federal agency in a timeframe that allows CISA to receive the report in
a substantially similar timeframe to that which the covered entity
would otherwise have been obligated to provide the report to CISA
pursuant to CIRCIA; (3) CISA and the Federal agency to which the
covered entity submits the report must have an information sharing
agreement in place that satisfies the requirements of 6 U.S.C. 681g(a)
(hereinafter a CIRCIA Agreement); (4) CISA and the Federal agency to
which the covered entity submits the report must have a mechanism in
place by which the Federal agency can share the report with CISA within
the required timeframe; and (5) the covered entity must have submitted
the report to the other Federal agency pursuant to a legal, regulatory,
or contractual obligation.
CISA is proposing to only enter into a CIRCIA Agreement when CISA
has determined that the Federal agency with whom CISA is entering into
the agreement receives cyber incident reports from one or more CIRCIA
covered entities pursuant to a legal, regulatory, or contractual
obligation, and the reporting obligation requires the submission of
substantially similar information in a substantially similar
timeframe.\329\ When assessing whether another reporting obligation
requires reporting of substantially similar information in a
substantially similar timeframe to CIRCIA, CISA intends to coordinate
with the Federal department or agency responsible for the non-CIRCIA
reporting obligation which will inform CISA's decision making process.
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\329\ CISA may enter into other information sharing agreements
with Federal agencies that do not meet the substantially similar
reporting exception criteria; however, such agreements would not be
considered CIRCIA Agreements and would not indicate the
applicability of the substantially similar reporting exception to
entities submitting reports to the Federal entity with which CISA
entered into the agreement.
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If and when CISA has entered into a CIRCIA Agreement, CISA will
announce and catalogue the existence of the CIRCIA Agreement on a
public-facing website. In accordance with 6 U.S.C. 681g(a)(5)(B), to
the extent practicable, CISA will publish the full CIRCIA Agreement.
The listing of a CIRCIA Agreement by CISA demonstrates that CISA has
determined that the applicable law, regulation, or contractual
obligation requires a covered entity to report substantially similar
information related to a covered cyber incident or ransom payment
within a substantially similar timeframe and that the Federal agency
has committed to providing the covered entity's report to CISA within
the relevant deadlines under this Part. If a covered entity submits a
report related to a covered cyber incident or ransom payment to another
Federal agency with which CISA has an active and published CIRCIA
Agreement, the covered entity's report qualifies for the exception
under this section. If no CIRCIA Agreement is listed for a Federal
agency, this exception does not apply, and reporting to that Federal
agency will not exempt a covered entity from having to report directly
to CISA in accordance with this part. A covered entity is responsible
for confirming that a CIRCIA Agreement is applicable to both it and the
specific CIRCIA reporting obligation that it is seeking to satisfy.
CISA generally anticipates that each CIRCIA Agreement will describe or
otherwise identify the
[[Page 23709]]
scope of entities and/or reporting obligations that are the subject of
the CIRCIA Agreement.
If a law, regulation, or contract that serves as the basis for a
CIRCIA Agreement is modified in any way, CISA may reassess if the
respective law, regulation, or contract continues to meet the
requirements necessary for that law, regulation, or contract to serve
as the basis for application of the substantially similar reporting
exception. CISA may terminate a CIRCIA Agreement at any time as long as
doing so would not violate any aspect of the agreement itself. If CISA
terminates a CIRCIA Agreement for any reason, CISA will provide notice
of the termination on the public-facing website where the catalog of
active CIRCIA Agreements is maintained.
1. Substantially Similar Information
To qualify for the substantially similar reporting exception, the
information reported by a covered entity on a covered cyber incident or
ransom payment to another Federal agency must be substantially similar
to the information that the covered entity would be required (but for
the exception) to report to CISA under this Part. CISA does not intend
to define what constitutes substantially similar information in the
final rule. Rather, CISA proposes to retain discretion in making this
determination. In determining whether information is substantially
similar, CISA will consider whether the information required by the
fields in CISA's CIRCIA Report forms is functionally equivalent to the
information required to be reported by the covered entity to another
Federal agency. CISA views functionally equivalent as meaning that the
information or data serves the same function or use, provides the same
insights or conclusions, and enables the same analysis as the
information or data requested in the relevant CIRCIA Report form
fields.
CISA does not believe that the substantially similar information
qualifier requires information to be reported in the same format to the
other Federal agency. Other Federal agency reporting forms are unlikely
to precisely mirror the CIRCIA Report. A covered entity could submit
information in another Federal agency's reporting form that, while not
directly aligning with a specify query in a CIRCIA Report form,
nonetheless provides functionally equivalent data. CISA's determination
that information is substantially similar will hinge on whether the
data and information required to be submitted in a CIRCIA Report form
are substantively included in the report to the other Federal agency.
2. Substantially Similar Timeframe
To qualify for this exception, the covered entity must also be
required to report this information to another Federal agency under
law, regulation, or contractual provision in a substantially similar
timeframe. In interpreting this requirement, CISA has to keep in mind
the limitations related to sharing of reports pursuant to a CIRCIA
Agreement, as set forth in 6 U.S.C. 681g(a)(5)(C). Specifically, that
section requires that Federal agencies who share reports with CISA
pursuant to a CIRCIA Agreement must do so ``in such time as to meet the
overall timeline for covered entity reporting of covered cyber
incidents and ransom payments.'' 6 U.S.C. 681g(a)(5)(C).
When read together, CISA interprets these statutory requirements to
render the substantially similar reporting exception available only if
CISA receives the report on a covered cyber incident or ransom payment
from the other Federal agency within the same timeframe in which the
covered entity would have been required to submit the report to CISA
under CIRCIA had the covered entity reported directly to CISA. Thus,
for a law, regulation, or contractual provision to require reporting
within a ``substantially similar timeframe'' of CIRCIA, it must require
a covered entity to report a covered cyber incident within 72 hours
from when the covered entity reasonably believes that the covered cyber
incident has occurred and a ransom payment within 24 hours after the
ransom payment has been disbursed, leaving the Federal agency time to
share the report with CISA, unless a mechanism is in place that allows
CISA to receive the report at the same time as the other Federal
agency. For example, a law, regulation, or contractual provision that
requires a covered entity to report a covered cyber incident to a
Federal agency within 36 hours after discovery would have a
substantially similar timeframe for the purpose of this exception. The
Federal agency would have an additional 36 hours in which to share the
report with CISA to meet the CIRCIA deadline for Covered Cyber Incident
Reports.\330\ If a law, regulation, or contractual provision required a
covered entity to report a covered cyber incident to a Federal agency
within 72 hours of the covered entity reasonably believing a qualifying
cyber incident occurred, the Federal agency would need to have a
mechanism in place to share the report with CISA instantaneously upon
receipt for it to be received by CISA in a substantially similar
timeframe in compliance with the deadline for a Covered Cyber Incident
Report under this part.
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\330\ Of note, CIRCIA separately provides that any Federal
agency, including any independent establishment, that receives a
report from an entity of a cyber incident, including a ransomware
attack, shall provide the report to CISA as soon as possible, but
not later than 24 hours after receiving the report, unless a shorter
period is required by a CIRCIA Agreement between CISA and the
recipient Federal agency. 6 U.S.C. 681g. This requirement would
apply to reports that are subject to the substantially similar
reporting exception as well, and would therefore be relevant in
determining whether a reporting timeframe is substantially similar
while allowing for sufficient time for CISA to receive the report
from the recipient Federal agency.
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As discussed in Section IV.E.iv.1 of this document, a covered
entity must report a covered cyber incident within 72 hours after it
``reasonably believes'' a covered cyber incident occurred. CISA
recognizes that not all incident reporting requirements in law,
contract, or regulation have the same trigger for ``starting the
clock'' on when an incident becomes reportable, and that different
triggers could result in dramatically different reporting timeframes
even if the numerical timeframes were substantially similar. For
instance, a regulation that requires reporting within 24 hours of
confirmation of a reportable incident could in fact have a reportable
timeframe that effectively is substantially longer than CIRCIA's 72-
hour reporting timeframe as ``confirmation'' of a reportable incident
could occur days or weeks after a ``reasonable belief'' that a
reportable incident occurred is established. In determining whether to
enter into a CIRCIA Agreement with another Federal agency, CISA will
take into account when the reporting timeframe is triggered under the
governing law, regulation, or contract.
3. Supplemental Reporting
Supplemental Reports may also qualify for the substantially similar
reporting exception, provided that the supplemental report provided to
the other Federal agency meets the relevant requirements. As with a
Covered Cyber Incident Report or Ransom Payment Report, the exception
is only available if the covered entity is required to submit
substantially similar information in a substantially similar timeframe
to another Federal agency under law, regulation, or contract and CISA
and the other agency have a CIRCIA Agreement and information sharing
mechanism in place to meet the CIRCIA Report deadlines. CIRCIA requires
[[Page 23710]]
Supplemental Reports be submitted ``promptly,'' which CISA interprets
as within 24 hours of the triggering event. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3) and
Section IV.E.iv.3.a of this document. A covered entity remains
responsible for submitting Supplemental Reports to CISA as required
under this Part unless the covered entity submits any substantial new
or different information to another Federal agency and CISA has
published a CIRCIA Agreement with that Federal agency that specifically
covers Supplemental Reports.
4. Communications With CISA
The exception under this section does not prevent CISA from
contacting the covered entity about the information it provided to the
other Federal agency. 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B)(iii). Moreover, nothing in
this section prohibits a covered entity from also submitting a CIRCIA
Report to CISA even if the CIRCIA Report is qualified for an exception.
6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B)(iii)).
5. Request for Comments
CISA seeks comments on its proposed approach to implementing the
substantially similar reporting exception, to include:
38. CISA's proposed interpretations of what constitutes
substantially similar information and a substantially similar
timeframe.
39. The application of the substantially similar reporting
exception to Supplemental Reports.
40. The manner in which CISA proposes informing the public of the
availability of this exception.
41. Any other aspects of the substantially similar reporting
exception.
ii. Domain Name System (DNS) Exception
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(C), the CIRCIA reporting
requirements ``shall not apply to a covered entity or the functions of
a covered entity that the Director determines constitute critical
infrastructure owned, operated, or governed by multi-stakeholder
organizations that develop, implement, and enforce policies concerning
the Domain Name System, such as the internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers or the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.'' Based
on this language, CISA is proposing to create an exception from CIRCIA
reporting requirements for ICANN, the American Registry for Internet
Numbers (ARIN), and affiliates of those entities. CISA additionally
proposes to create a limited exception from CIRCIA reporting
requirements for the DNS Root Server Operator (RSO) function of a
covered entity.
To qualify for the reporting exception provided in 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(5)(C), a covered entity must have been determined by the
Director to meet two criteria. First, the Director must have determined
that the covered entity constitutes critical infrastructure. Second,
the Director must have determined that the covered entity, or a
specific function of that entity, is owned, operated, or governed by a
multi-stakeholder organization that develops, implements, and enforces
policies concerning the DNS. As very few entities meet the second
criterion, it is more efficient to begin CISA's analysis on this topic
by considering the second criterion first.
To determine what covered entities might meet the second criterion,
CISA assessed the DNS ecosystem to identify multi-stakeholder
organizations that develop, implement, and enforce policies concerning
the DNS and to identify entities that are wholly owned, operated, or
governed by such multi-stakeholder organizations. Based on this
assessment, CISA believes that two specific entities meet this
criterion, and a third category of entities meet the criterion as well.
The first entity that CISA has assessed is a multi-stakeholder
organization that develops, implements, and enforces DNS policies is
ICANN. ICANN is a not-for-profit, multi-stakeholder organization that
leads the development of bottom-up, consensus policies and guidelines
that help advance the stable and secure operation of the internet's
unique identifier systems and help define how the DNS functions.\331\
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\331\ See ICANN, Policy Mission, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mission-2012-08-27-en (last visited July 24, 2023);
see also ICANN, ICANN For Beginners, https://www.icann.org/get-started (last visited July 24, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second entity that CISA has assessed as meeting this criterion
is Public Technical Identifiers (PTI). PTI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit
whose specific purpose is to operate exclusively to carry out the
purposes of ICANN, which is a multi-stakeholder organization.\332\ PTI
is an affiliate of ICANN that is wholly controlled by ICANN, akin to
complete ownership, thus meeting the ``owned, operated, or governed
by'' a multi-stakeholder organization clause contained within CIRCIA's
statutory reporting exception.
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\332\ See PTI Articles of Incorporation Sections II and III. The
PTI Articles of Incorporation are available at https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation (last visited Nov. 13,
2023). See also later discussion of the IANA functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third group of covered entities that are multi-stakeholder
organizations with responsibilities related to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of DNS policies are Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs). RIRs are multi-stakeholder organizations responsible
for managing, distributing, and registering internet number resources
(IPv4 and IPv6 address space and Autonomous System (AS) Numbers) within
their respective regions.\333\ Currently, there are five RIRs in the
world: (1) the African Network Information Centre (AFRINIC), which
services Africa and the Indian Ocean; (2) the Asia-Pacific Network
Information Centre (APNIC), which services Asia and the Pacific; (3)
ARIN, which services the United States, Canada, and many Caribbean and
North Atlantic Islands; (4) the Latin American and Caribbean Internet
Addresses Registry (LACNIC), which services Latin America and the
Caribbean; and (5) the R[eacute]seaux IP Europ[eacute]ens Network
Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), which services Europe, the Middle East,
and parts of Central Asia.\334\ Since ARIN is the only RIR with a legal
presence in the United States, CISA has assessed that ARIN is the only
relevant RIR for purposes of CIRCIA.
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\333\ See NRO, Regional Internet Registries, https://www.nro.net/about/rirs/ (last visited July 24, 2023).
\334\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, CISA assessed whether the CIRCIA reporting exception
should apply to any specific function of a covered entity that is
owned, operated, or governed by a multi-stakeholder organization that
develops, implements, and enforces policies concerning the DNS. Given
the RSO's role in operationalizing a specific, critical IANA function
of overseeing operation of the internet root server system, CISA has
assessed that the DNS RSO function also meets this criterion.
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority functions (IANA functions)
are administered by PTI, which is owned by ICANN, a multi-stakeholder
organization responsible for development, implementation, and
enforcement of policies concerning the DNS.\335\ One of the key IANA
functions is the management of the DNS root zone.\336\ The ``root
zone'' is the upper-most part of the DNS hierarchy.\337\ The root zone
management function uses the Root Server System (RSS) for publication
of the root zone. The RSS is
[[Page 23711]]
administered collectively by the RSOs, which serve as the authorities
for each of the A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M root servers.
The root servers operated by the RSOs act exclusively as a mechanism by
which the content of the root zone database is made publicly available.
This activity is largely viewed by the DNS ecosystem as an
operationalization of the historic IANA root zone management function
on behalf of ICANN.\338\ ICANN manages matters related to the
operation, administration, security, and integrity of the internet root
server system through the Root Server System Advisory Committee
(RSSAC), which is an advisory committee created by ICANN to advise the
ICANN community and board.\339\ As part of RSSAC's advice, it has also
defined a set of service expectations that RSOs have agreed to
satisfy.\340\
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\335\ See U.S.C./ICANN Transition Agreement, ICANN, available at
https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/usc-icann-transition-2012-02-25-en.
\336\ See IANA, Root Zone Management, https://www.iana.org/domains/root (last visited Nov. 14, 2023).
\337\ See IANA, Domain Name Services, https://www.iana.org/domains (last visited Nov. 15, 2023).
\338\ See IANA, Root Zone Management, https://www.iana.org/domains/root (last visited Nov. 14, 2023); see also ICANN, Brief
Overview of the Root Server System, at 4 (May 6, 2020), available at
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/octo-010-06may20-en.pdf
(``The 13 root services respond to the queries they receive either
with information found in the root zone as it is managed by the IANA
Functions operated by ICANN. . .'').
\339\ You can find more information about the RSSAC at https://
www.icann.org/groups/
rssac#:~:text=Root%20Server%20System%20Advisory%20Committee%20%20%20,
31%20December%202024%20%208%20more%20rows%20 (last visited Nov. 28,
2023).
\340\ RSSAC001, Service Expectations of Root Servers, Version 1
(Dec. 4, 2015) available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/rssac-001-root-service-expectations-04dec15-en.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA has assessed that the RSO function is an operationalization of
ICANN's responsibility to operate the internet root server system and
thus qualifies as a ``function[ ] of a covered entity . . . owned,
operated, or governed by multi-stakeholder organizations that develop,
implement, and enforce policies concerning the Domain Name System, such
as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers or the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.'' Accordingly, CISA has assessed
that the RSO function of a covered entity that has been recognized by
ICANN as responsible for operating one of the 13 root identities and
agrees to follow the service expectations established by the RSSAC and
ICANN may qualify for the DNS Exception, if the second criterion for
the DNS Exception is met, (i.e., whether the function also constitutes
critical infrastructure).\341\
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\341\ There currently are 12 RSOs that perform the IANA root
zone management function: Verisign, Inc.; the University of Southern
California, Information Sciences Institute; Cogent Communications;
the University of Maryland; NASA; Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.;
the U.S. Department of Defense (NIC); the U.S. Army Research Lab;
Netnod; RIPE NCC; ICANN; and WIDE Project. Verisign, Inc. manages
two of the root identities. See IANA, Root Servers, https://www.iana.org/domains/root/servers (last visited Nov. 14, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note, to the extent the proposed DNS Exception may apply to a
covered entity that is an RSO, it would only apply to the RSO function
of the entity. Other functions performed by an RSO that are not the RSO
function would not qualify for the proposed DNS Exception under CIRCIA.
Accordingly, should an RSO that is also a covered entity experience a
covered cyber incident or make a ransom payment as the result of a
ransomware attack that impacts the entity's activities or business
streams that are separate from, or in addition to, its RSO function,
the covered entity would be required to report that covered cyber
incident or ransom payment under this proposed regulation.
For a covered entity to be eligible for an exception from CIRCIA
reporting requirements under the proposed DNS Exception, it must also
meet the first criterion included in the statutory language--i.e., be
determined by the Director to constitute critical infrastructure. The
USA Patriot Act (Pub. L. 107-56) and, by reference, both the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, as amended, and PPD-21 define ``critical
infrastructure'' as ``systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.'' \342\ Given their roles in ensuring the
functioning of the DNS around the world, and the debilitating impacts a
significant failure of the DNS would have on national security,
economic security, or public health, and safety, the Director has
determined that ICANN, ARIN, and their affiliates \343\ (such as PTI)
meet the definition of critical infrastructure for purposes of applying
this statutory exception. The Director also has determined that, given
the criticality of the DNS root zone to the operation of the internet,
the RSO function performed by a covered entity qualifies as critical
infrastructure as well.
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\342\ 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e).
\343\ ``Affiliates'' in this context is meant to reflect
entities that have been recognized by ICANN or IANAARIN as an
affiliate and are so significantly controlled by ICANN or ARIN that
the average non-technical individual might actually consider them to
be part of ICANN or ARIN.
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Based on the aforementioned analysis, ICANN, ARIN, any affiliates
of ICANN or ARIN (such as PTI), and the RSO function of covered
entities meet both criteria contained in the statute for the DNS
Exception. Accordingly, CISA proposes in Sec. 226.4(b) that ICANN,
ARIN, and their affiliates do not need to report to CISA covered cyber
incidents that they experience or ransom payments they make as the
result of a ransomware attack. CISA further proposes to exempt a
covered entity from CIRCIA reporting requirements for covered cyber
incidents and ransom payments made as a result of a ransomware attack
that solely relate to the entity's RSO function.
Given the complexities of the DNS, as well as the long-standing
U.S. Government policy goal of support of the multi-stakeholder
approach to internet governance that may impact other entities in this
space, CISA recognizes the importance of public feedback on the scoping
of this reporting exception consistent with the legal requirements in 6
U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(C) and the purposes for which CIRCIA has been
established. In particular, CISA welcomes comments on all aspects of
this topic. Among other things, CISA welcomes comments on the possible
application of the DNS exception to domain name registries and
registrars, and of all associated questions of law and policy. CISA
will give extreme careful consideration to alternative views, including
the possible application of the DNS exception to domain name registries
and registrars. Consistent with Executive Order 13563, CISA is strongly
committed to public participation, to maintaining openness, and to
serious assessment of alternative approaches that might better balance
the relevant interests. CISA invites submission of views, information,
data, and comments on the following policy and legal questions that are
unique to the DNS community:
[[Page 23712]]
42. The covered entities which CISA proposes this exception apply
to, including whether any additional covered entities involved in DNS
operations, such as domain name registries and registrars, should be
considered by CISA for this reporting exception. If so, how do those
covered entities, or specific functions thereof, meet the statutory
requirements, including specifically how the entity or its functions
may ``constitute critical infrastructure owned, operated, or governed
by multi-stakeholder organizations that develop, implement, and enforce
policies concerning the Domain Name System, such as the internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers or the internet Assigned
Numbers Authority''?
43. Information, facts, or other views that describe or explain the
relationship between ICANN and domain name registries and registrars,
as well as specific cyber incident and ransom payment information that
must be reported to ICANN by entities accredited by ICANN.
44. What types of covered cyber incidents could be unique to, or
have a unique impact on, the covered entities that would be exempt from
reporting under CIRCIA based on the scoping of the proposed DNS
Exception?
45. What are the potential consequences of covered cyber incidents
that would not be reported to CISA based on the proposed DNS Exception
(e.g., impacts to the functionality of the internet or to services
offered to critical infrastructure)?
46. What are the specific technical functions that DNS entities
perform or provide in order to support the DNS versus related, but
separate commercial offerings? How would this apply to different DNS
entities such as root server operators, domain name registries, and
domain name registrars?
47. What cyber incident reporting requirements, either in the
United States or internationally, are DNS entities currently subject
to? To what government agency or other entity must those entities
report cyber incidents? Please describe the specific cyber incident
reporting requirement (e.g., timing and trigger requirements; details
that must be reported; mechanism for reporting; supplemental reporting
requirements).
48. How should the U.S. government's support for the multi-
stakeholder system of internet governance inform the DNS Exception?
49. Any other aspects of CISA's proposed approach to the DNS
Exception.
iii. Exception for Federal Agencies Subject to Federal Information
Security Modernization Act Reporting Requirements
CISA also is proposing to exempt Federal agencies required by FISMA
(44 U.S.C. 3551 et seq.) to report incidents to CISA from reporting
those incidents as covered cyber incidents under CIRCIA. FISMA requires
Federal agencies (as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502), except for systems
identified in 44 U.S.C. 3553(d) and (e), to notify CISA regarding
information security incidents involving their information and
information systems, whether managed by a Federal agency, contractor,
or other source.
While the definition for substantial cyber incident under the
CIRCIA regulation will not be finalized until CISA completes the
rulemaking process, CISA anticipates that all incidents that ultimately
will constitute substantial cyber incidents would also be considered
reportable incidents under FISMA if experienced by a Federal agency.
Similarly, CISA anticipates that the content that Federal agencies must
submit in reports required under FISMA will be substantially similar to
the information required in CIRCIA Covered Cyber Incident Reports.
Finally, FISMA requires reporting by Federal agencies to CISA in a
shorter timeframe--one hour from the time of identification of the
incident--than is required under CIRCIA. In light of this, CISA expects
to already be receiving substantially similar information from FISMA-
covered Federal agencies on all substantial cyber incidents within a
shorter timeframe than required by CIRCIA. For these reasons, CISA is
proposing to exempt FISMA-covered Federal agencies that are required by
FISMA to report incidents to CISA from having to submit a CIRCIA Report
for those incidents that constitute covered cyber incidents. Per the
terms of this exception, as proposed in Sec. 226.4(c), this exception
only applies to Federal agencies, and does not exempt government
contractors or subcontractors from any otherwise-required CIRCIA
reporting.
Other cyber incident reporting regulations may exist for which
entities may be required to provide other Federal departments or
agencies with similar information about substantial cyber incidents in
a similar or shorter timeframe than that which is required under
CIRCIA. CISA is not offering a similar exclusion to entities based on
those reporting requirements. CISA is proposing to exclude Federal
agencies subject to cyber incident reporting under FISMA, but not
entities subject to other Federal cyber incident reporting
requirements, because CISA believes FISMA differs from those other
regulations in two important ways. First, because CISA is the Federal
entity responsible for implementing FISMA, CISA has control (within the
boundaries of any limitations established by Congress in the FISMA
authorizing legislation) over the types of incidents that must be
reported, the content that must be included in those reports, and the
timeframe for submission of those reports. CISA does not have similar
control over those aspects of reporting required by other regulatory
programs. As a result, CISA has no ability to ensure that those
regulatory programs continue to require incident reports with
substantially similar information for substantial cyber incidents in a
substantially similar timeframe. Second, because the statutory
requirements for using the substantially similar reporting exception--
e.g., the information is required to be reported ``to another Federal
agency''--explicitly address situations involving CISA and a different
Federal regulator, CISA is unable to leverage the substantially similar
reporting exception to avoid duplicative reporting for requirements
such as FISMA where CISA is the entity responsible for overseeing the
reporting requirement. To avoid duplicative reporting requirements in
situations where CISA is the entity receiving reports under two
requirements, CISA needs to specifically exempt entities subject to
those requirements from CIRCIA reporting requirements or otherwise make
it clear in either the CIRCIA regulations or the other reporting
requirements that submission of a CIRCIA Report satisfies both
reporting requirements. For reporting requirements that require
reporting to a different Federal agency, the substantially similar
reporting exception is the proper approach for seeking to avoid
duplicative reporting requirements.
To the extent other regulations exist that require a covered entity
to submit cyber incident reports containing substantially similar
information to that required in CIRCIA Reports to another Federal
entity in a substantially similar timeframe to that required under
CIRCIA, CISA intends to work with that Federal entity to explore the
possibility of enabling the covered entity's submission to the other
Federal entity to satisfy the covered entity's CIRCIA incident
reporting requirements. This would be done consistent with the
substantially similar reporting exception
[[Page 23713]]
authorized in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(B) of CIRCIA. Additional information
on the substantially similar reporting exception, and the process CISA
will undertake to implement it, can be found in Section IV.D.i of this
document.
CISA seeks comments on its proposed exception for Federal agencies
subject to FISMA reporting requirements, to include:
50. The establishment of the FISMA reporting exception.
51. Any aspects of CISA's proposed approach to implementing the
FISMA reporting exception.
E. Manner, Form, and Content of Reports
i. Manner of Reporting
1. Overview
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(6) of CIRCIA, covered entities must
make CIRCIA Reports in the manner and form prescribed in the final
rule. CIRCIA requires CISA to include procedures for submitting these
reports in the final rule, including the manner and form thereof. 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(A). CIRCIA gives CISA broad discretion in determining
the manner and form for submission of CIRCIA Reports, although 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(8)(A) requires CISA to ``include, at a minimum, a concise,
user-friendly web-based form'' as one manner for submission of required
reports.
CISA has direct experience using a web-based form to receive cyber
incident reports, as that is the primary manner in which CISA has been
receiving cyber incident reports from external stakeholders for a
number of years. CISA also has experience receiving voluntarily
submitted cyber incident reports from stakeholders telephonically and
via email.
A variety of means for submitting cyber incident reports are
currently in effect across the numerous Federal departments and
agencies that require entities to report cyber incidents to them. A
number of Federal departments and agencies use a web-based form or
similar online submission system as the sole mechanism or one option
for submitting required cyber incident reports. These include, among
others, DOD,\344\ DOE,\345\ TSA,\346\ SEC,\347\ and the NRC.\348\ Other
commonly allowed methods for the submission of cyber incident reports
include telephone, email, and automated (i.e., machine-to-machine)
reporting.\349\ At least one regulator does not articulate specific
manners in which regulated entities must submit reports to it, leaving
the manner up to the discretion of the reporting party.\350\
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\344\ See DOD--Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security
Activities, 32 CFR 236.4(b)(2) (reports must be made electronically
through https://dibnet.dod.mil). DOD does offer reporting
telephonically if the dibnet is unavailable. See Defense Industrial
Base Cybersecurity Portal Frequently Asked Questions, available at
https://dibnet.dod.mil/portal/intranet/#faq-4.
\345\ DOE has established mandatory reporting requirements for
electric emergency incidents and disturbances, to include those
caused by cyber incidents. Entities within the electric power
industry that have reportable incidents must use Form DOE-417 to
report those incidents. DOE prefers that the form be submitted
online through the DOE-417 Online System at https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417/, although DOE will also accept
submissions via fax, telephone, or email. See DOE-417 Electric
Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report (OMB No.: 1901-0288) at 1,
available at https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/oe417.aspx.
\346\ See, e.g., Security Directive 1580-21-01--Enhancing Rail
Cybersecurity, Section B.3 (``Reports required by this section must
be made to CISA Central using CISA's Reporting System form at:
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/report or by calling (888) 282-
0870.''); Security Directive 1582-21-01--Enhancing Public
Transportation and Passenger Railroad Cybersecurity, Section B.3
(``Reports required by this section must be made to CISA Central
using CISA's Reporting System form at: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/report or by calling (888) 282-0870.''); Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-01--Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity, Section C
(``Reports must be made to CISA Central using CISA's Reporting
System form at: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/report or by calling
(888) 282-0870.''). Copies of these security directives are
available at https://www.tsa.gov/sd-and-ea.
\347\ Regulation SCI Entities are required to use the Form SCI
to notify the SEC of reportable incidents. A pdf version of Form SCI
can be found at https://www.sec.gov/files/form-sci.pdf (last visited
Nov. 28, 2023). Form SCI can be filed in an electronic format
through the Electronic Form Filing System, a secure website operated
by the SEC that can be accessed at https://tts.sec.gov/effs/do/Index.
\348\ The NRC's Cyber Security Event Notifications regulations
require covered licensees to provide the NRC with initial
notifications of cybersecurity events telephonically to the NRC
Headquarters Operations Center via the Emergency Notification
System. 10 CFR 73.77(c). For certain types of cyber security events,
licensees must provide the NRC with written security follow-up
reports using NRC Form 366. 10 CFR 73.77(d)(3). A copy of the web-
based version of NRC Form 366 can be found at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1308/ML13083A106.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\349\ See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, Computer-Security
Incident Notification Requirements, 12 CFR 225.302 (``A banking
organization must notify the appropriate Board-designated point of
contact about a notification incident through email, telephone, or
other similar methods that the Board may prescribe.''); Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, Computer-Security Incident
Notification Requirements, 12 CFR 53.3 (``A banking organization
must notify the appropriate OCC supervisory office, or OCC-
designated point of contact, about a notification incident through
email, telephone, or other similar methods that the OCC may
prescribe.''); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Computer-
Security Incident Notification Requirements, 12 CFR 304.23 (``A
banking organization must notify the appropriate FDIC supervisory
office, or an FDIC-designated point of contact, about a notification
incident through email, telephone, or other similar methods that the
FDIC may prescribe.''); NCUA, Cyber Incident Notification
Requirements for Federally Insured Credit Unions Proposed Rule, 87
FR 45029 (proposed rule would require ``[e]ach federally insured
credit union must notify the appropriate NCUA-designated point of
contact of the occurrence of a reportable cyber incident via email,
telephone, or other similar methods that the NCUA may prescribe.'');
see also FCC-NORS, 47 CFR part 4 (regulated entities can submit
reports automatically through an approved NORS Application
Programming Interface).
\350\ See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commission Designated
Contract Markets System Safeguards regulations, 17 CFR 38.1051(e)(2)
(requires designated contract markets to promptly notify CFTC staff
of certain cybersecurity incidents, but does specify how
notifications must be provided), 39.18(g) (requires derivatives
clearing organizations to promptly notify CFTC staff of certain
security incidents). While the CFTC's regulations do not specify how
notifications must be provided, the CFTC has a portal for such
notifications that is available to registrants.
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A majority of comments on this topic provided by stakeholders in
response to the CIRCIA RFI and at CIRCIA listening sessions indicated
support for the use of a web-based portal as a means for submission of
reports to CISA. Some commenters recommended offering a web-based
portal as either the only means or the preferred means of submission,
while others suggested offering the web-based portal as simply one
means of submission. One reason often provided by commenters advocating
for the web-based portal to be one of multiple mechanisms for reporting
was to ensure the existence of an alternative method of reporting
should a covered cyber incident have rendered it difficult for the
covered entity to submit a report via a web-based portal. Commenters
expressing this rationale often suggested telephonic reporting as the
recommended alternative option. A small number of commenters
recommended that CISA offer the ability for covered entities to use
automated (i.e., machine-to-machine) reporting, email, or submit
through other Federal departments or agencies' field office locations.
See Section III.F.vi in this document for a summary of stakeholder
comments on the manner and form of submission of CIRCIA Reports.
2. Proposed Approach
Section 226.6 of the proposed rule contains CISA's proposal for the
manner of submission of CIRCIA Reports. CISA is proposing that a
covered entity must
[[Page 23714]]
submit CIRCIA Reports through the web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting
Form available on CISA's website or in any other manner approved by the
Director.
As noted earlier, CIRCIA requires CISA to offer a web-based form as
one manner of submission of CIRCIA Reports. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(A).
Not only does CISA intend to offer a web-based form as a manner of
submission of CIRCIA Reports, for several reasons CISA agrees with
those commenters who suggested that an electronic, web-based form is
the preferred manner for submission of CIRCIA Reports. First, a web-
based form is a cost-effective way to gather information from large
numbers of submitters both simultaneously and over time. If designed
properly, it allows for significant standardization of data (in both
form and content) and tailoring of circumstance-specific questions
using dynamic prompts and responses incorporating conditional logic
filters and conditional or branching questions. A web-based form can
also reduce the likelihood of human error during the data submission
process in various ways. For example, submission methods such as via
telephone call require at least two individuals to facilitate the
submission (i.e., one person from the covered entity to provide CISA
with information on the incident and another person from CISA to
transcribe the information into CISA's information management system)
and create the possibility of human error if one individual mishears,
misspeaks, erroneously transcribes, or otherwise unintentionally enters
incorrect data into the system. This is especially problematic for some
of the data that CISA expects covered entities may often need to
report, such as malware hashes or IP addresses, which typically are
long strings of numbers and/or letters. A web-based form only requires
the involvement of a single individual (i.e., the person entering the
information into the form on behalf of the covered entity) and allows
for that individual to review information after entry but prior to
submission, greatly reducing the potential for such errors.
Similarly, by using drop-down menus, radio buttons, or other
limited response options where feasible and appropriate, a web-based
form reduces the likelihood of human error resulting from the submitter
not understanding the types of responses a question is seeking or CISA
not understanding a narrative answer provided by a submitter. Third, a
web-based form both allows for greater standardization of responses and
does so in a machine-readable format, and, in doing so, it facilitates
a number of activities that are much more challenging when data is
submitted in other manners. These activities include automated triage
of reports; rapid, large-scale trend analysis; timely information
sharing; and long-term storage, many of which CISA is required by
CIRCIA to perform. Finally, a web-based form enables the submission of
digital artifacts (e.g., malware samples), which cannot be transmitted
verbally.
Conversely, web-based forms present only a small number of
potential drawbacks, each of which CISA believes are easily addressed.
First, the government will incur costs to develop, maintain, and
implement a web-based form. Depending on the options selected, existing
resources, and other factors, the governmental costs associated with
developing, maintaining, and implementing a web-based form may be
greater or less than other potential methods of submission. In this
case, however, the issue is effectively moot because, as noted earlier,
CIRCIA requires that CISA offer a web-based form as a manner of
submission. Consequently, CISA will have to incur the costs associated
with a web-based form regardless of whether it is the sole, primary, or
one of many options.
Second, a cyber incident at a covered entity could make it
impossible or insecure for a covered entity to use its own information
system(s) to report via a web-based form. CISA believes that this is a
relatively minor concern, however, as organizations and individuals
today typically have a variety of ways to access the internet.
Additionally, CISA intends to make the web-based form available via a
web browser so that incident reports can be submitted from any
internet-connected device. This should allow covered entities various
ways to access the form even if the entity's IT system is rendered
inoperable by a cyber incident. Furthermore, CIRCIA permits a third
party to submit CIRCIA Reports on a covered entity's behalf, such that
even if the covered entity itself cannot report via a web-based form
using its own information system(s) or any other internet connected
device, any number of third parties should be able to submit the CIRCIA
Report on the covered entity's behalf.
Third, there is the potential that an incident at CISA could render
the web-form unavailable for use by covered entities for a period of
time. CISA has extensive experience building systems that operate with
high availability and intends to build in redundancy to ensure the 24/7
availability of the reporting system. CISA also intends to maintain a
capability to support reporting via telephone as a back-up option so
that, in the unlikely event of an extended interruption of the
availability of the web-based form, any impacted covered entities will
have an alternative mechanism available to submit CIRCIA Reports in a
timely manner. This or any other approved alternative mechanism also
may be used in lieu of the web-based reporting system should a covered
entity wish to submit a CIRCIA Report during any short-term
unavailability of the system, such as if CISA must temporarily restrict
access to the web-based form for routine maintenance.
On balance, CISA believes that the web-based form is the most
useful and cost-effective manner for the submission and receipt of
CIRCIA Reports and is proposing that as the sole explicitly identified
option for submission of CIRCIA Reports.\351\ CISA is also proposing to
include in the rule the statement that covered entities may also submit
CIRCIA Reports in any other manner and form of reporting approved by
the Director. This provision would allow CISA to operate a telephonic
reporting capability as a backup system and maintain flexibility to
offer alternative manners of submission in the future on a short- or
long-term basis. CISA believes that this flexibility is important for
several reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\ For similar reasons, CISA is considering encouraging
entities that submit voluntary reports to CISA to do so through the
CIRCIA web-based form; however, as noted in Section III.A, CISA is
not proposing to address entirely voluntary reporting, including how
such reports may be submitted, in this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, in the unlikely
event of an extended interruption of the availability of the web-based
form or other situation that renders it impossible for an entity to
submit via the web-based form, this phrase would allow CISA the
flexibility to establish other means to accept CIRCIA Reports in a
rapid fashion. Second, as discussed further below, CISA believes that
automated (i.e., machine-to-machine) reporting has the potential to be
a cost-effective method for some covered entities to submit CIRCIA
Reports in the future. The ``any other manner and form of reporting
approved by the Director'' clause will allow CISA the agility to more
rapidly authorize entities to submit CIRCIA Reports via machine-to-
machine reporting should CISA determine that is a viable, cost-
effective approach in the future without having to undertake additional
rulemaking. Similarly, this
[[Page 23715]]
provision will allow CISA the flexibility to consider and adopt new
submission mechanisms that may become feasible as technology advances.
CISA will publicize any additional manners of submission on its website
and through notifications to stakeholders should the CISA Director
approve any.
3. Additional Reporting Methods Options Considered
In deciding upon this proposed approach, CISA considered numerous
options in addition to a web-based form. The additional options CISA
considered are detailed in the following subsections. Each option has
drawbacks that led CISA to determine not to offer them as a manner of
submission at this time with the potential exception of a backup
capability should the web-based form become unavailable for a period of
time.
a. Telephone
One alternative manner CISA considered was telephonic submission of
reports. Under this approach, a covered entity would be able to call
CISA and verbally report the incident to CISA via telephone. To ensure
that all of the necessary information is submitted and that the
information is stored and made available to CISA in a manner consistent
with the web-based form manner of submission, a CISA representative
would ask the caller all of the pertinent questions in the web-based
form and simultaneously fill out the web-based form on the caller's
behalf.
The primary benefits of this approach include the ubiquity of and
familiarity individuals have with telephones, their ease of use, the
ability for a covered entity and a CISA representative to directly
engage during the reporting process, the ability for CISA to ensure all
necessary information is being submitted (including by asking real-time
follow up questions), and the ability for CISA to ultimately capture
information in a manner compatible with the statutorily required web-
based form submissions. A few significant downsides with this approach
exist, however. The first is the potentially significant additional
cost to the government of manning a 24/7 telephone operation at a scale
large enough to handle the receipt of all CIRCIA Reports. The second
drawback is the added layer of potential transcription error introduced
by requiring an individual other than the covered entity representative
to physically enter the information into the web-based form. Beyond the
potential for transcription error, it would likely take more time for a
CISA telephone operator to solicit, transcribe, and validate the
information with the covered entity than to have a covered entity enter
the same information directly into a web-based form.
In light of these drawbacks, CISA is not proposing to include
telephonic reporting as a primary option. CISA does, however, intend to
maintain telephonic reporting capabilities as a back-up option in case
a covered entity is unable to submit a CIRCIA Report using the web-
based form for some legitimate reason, such as an outage affecting the
availability of the web-based form.
b. Email
CISA also considered the submission of CIRCIA Reports via email.
Email could be used in two primary ways for the submission of reports.
First, CISA could allow covered entities to use email to submit a
standardized form (e.g., a fillable PDF form or a paper form that an
entity could scan and attach to an email). Second, CISA could allow
covered entities to submit required information via text contained in
the body of the email itself without requiring any specific format or
template be used.
Offering either manner of email submissions would provide a number
of benefits. For instance, given the ubiquity of email in today's
society and its availability on mobile devices, employees of covered
entities are likely to have both familiarity with and access to email
even if a cyber incident has rendered a covered entity's information
systems inoperable. Similarly, email is a standard part of CISA
operations, so CISA would be able to easily establish a mechanism to
receive email submissions without having to expend significant upfront
costs. Email generally also comes with automated tracking (via sent
email folders), which can help the covered entity provide proof that a
report has been submitted and the time and date of the submission.
There are, however, several major drawbacks associated with email
submissions. First, as opposed to a web-based form where CISA could
require certain questions be answered for the form to be submitted, or
a telephone submission where a CISA employee could directly interact
with the submitter to ensure all necessary information is provided,
email does not provide a means for CISA to ensure that all required
information is submitted before the report is made. Consequently, CISA
envisions email submissions would result in a potentially significant
number of cases in which CISA would need to follow up with the covered
entity to obtain required information. Limiting the use of email as a
mechanism for the submission only of a fillable reporting form might
somewhat reduce the need for follow-up when compared to allowing
unbound email submissions; however, CISA believes this likely still
would occur frequently.
Second, regardless of which email submission approach is used, CISA
would be required to establish and implement processes to transfer data
from the email submissions into an online case management system so
that CIRCIA Reports submitted via email could be consolidated,
analyzed, stored, etc., in a similar way as CIRCIA Reports submitted
via the web-form or other subsequently approved mechanisms. These
additional activities are likely to result in significant additional
implementation costs for CISA, increase the amount of time it takes for
CISA to receive necessary details about cyber incidents and ransom
payments, and introduce an additional vector for error during the
transcription or conversion of the data.
Third, email generally is not a secure form of transmission. Using
unsecured email would increase the likelihood that an individual
outside of the covered entity and CISA could gain access to potentially
sensitive information on the covered cyber incident or ransom payment
being reported, especially if the threat actor has compromised the
covered entity's email system. CISA also would not be able to ensure
that email submissions are protected at the level required by 6 U.S.C.
681e. Another challenge is the potential security concerns associated
with receiving an email attachment from an entity that is compromised
at the time of sending the email. CISA would be unable to guarantee the
safety of the attachment and could be opening itself up to a security
risk by accepting the email. Security measures CISA may implement to
protect itself from such risks, as well as cybersecurity measures CISA
has in place as a matter of routine, have the potential to block an
email or attachment from making it to CISA, creating the possibility
that a covered entity could take all steps intended to comply with
their reporting obligation with CISA not receiving the CIRCIA Report.
Given these significant operational challenges, potentially
substantial additional costs, and limited benefit associated with email
submission above other options, CISA is not proposing email as a
submission option at this time.
[[Page 23716]]
c. Fax
A fourth potential mechanism for covered entities to submit CIRCIA
Reports would be via fax, which could be done by completing a report on
paper and submitting it to CISA via fax machine or by submitting a fax
electronically via an online faxing service or application. The primary
benefit of offering faxing as a means of submission is that for many
organizations, fax machines are separate from an organization's IT
systems and thus may be available even when a cyber incident renders
reporting via a web-based form or company email system unavailable.
This benefit is somewhat limited these days, however, as fewer entities
maintain actual fax machines as a means of communications, and online
faxing services or applications are presumably no more likely to be an
available and secure mechanism for an entity experiencing a cyber
incident than reporting via a web-based form or company email
system.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\ See, e.g., Ashifa Kassam, The Outdated Machine Hampering
the Fight Against Covid-19, BBC Future (Sept. 5, 2021) (``By 2000,
fax's role in business was declining as companies switched to email
and the internet to share information. But in other sectors, such as
healthcare and real estate, the fax machine has stubbornly clung
on.''), available at https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20210903-how-covid-19-could-finally-be-the-end-of-the-fax-machine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, much like with email submissions, CIRCIA Reports
submitted via fax would not provide a means for CISA to ensure that all
required information is provided at the time of the submission.
Consequently, CISA expects this could result in a large number of cases
where CISA would need to follow up with the covered entity to obtain
required information or validate the information received (e.g., in the
event that handwriting is illegible). CISA also would have to manually
review and upload all submissions into an online case management system
so that CIRCIA Reports submitted via fax could be consolidated,
analyzed, stored, etc. in a similar way as CIRCIA Reports submitted via
the web-form or other approved submission mechanisms. These additional
activities are likely to result in additional implementation costs for
CISA, increase the amount of time it takes for CISA to receive
necessary details about the cyber incident or ransom payment, and
introduce an additional vector for human error during the transcription
or conversion of the data. Finally, faxing is generally considered
insecure, with outdated protocols, and data that is typically
transmitted without encryption.\353\ For these reasons, CISA is not
proposing faxes as a means for submitting CIRCIA Reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\ See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Fax Machines Are Still
Everywhere, and Wildly Insecure, Wired (Aug. 12, 2018), available at
https://www.wired.com/story/fax-machine-vulnerabilities/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. U.S. Mail or Other Physical Delivery Service
Another potential means for covered entities to submit CIRCIA
Reports could be the delivery of physical, written reports using the
U.S. Mail or other physical delivery service (e.g., United Parcel
Service, Federal Express, or a local courier). While this approach has
the potential benefit of remaining available when a covered entity's
information systems have been rendered unavailable or insecure due to
the reportable incident, there are significant drawbacks associated
with this mechanism of submission that likely would outweigh any
associated benefits. Chief among these is the significant increase in
the amount of time it likely would take for CISA to physically receive
the submission from the covered entity. Depending on the service and
postage used, it can take days for something sent via U.S. Mail or
other delivery services to arrive at its destination. Even if overnight
delivery service or local courier services were used, items delivered
to a Federal agency such as CISA typically have to undergo security
screening that frequently delays delivery to the intended office. These
resulting delays could significantly impact the ability of CISA to
achieve some of its statutory requirements, such as providing
appropriate entities with timely, actionable, and anonymized reports of
cyber incident campaigns and trends and immediately reviewing certain
reports for cyber threat indicators that can be anonymized and
disseminated, with defensive measures, to appropriate stakeholders. See
6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(3)(B), 681a(a)(7).
Much like with email and fax submissions, mail submission also does
not provide a means for CISA to ensure that all required information is
provided at the time of the submission. Consequently, CISA expects this
would result in a number of cases where CISA would need to follow up
with the covered entity to obtain required information. CISA also would
have to manually review and upload all submissions into an online case
management system so that CIRCIA Reports received by mail could be
consolidated, analyzed, stored, etc. in similar way as all other CIRCIA
Reports. These additional activities are likely to result in
significant additional implementation costs for CISA, increase the
amount of time it takes for CISA analysts to receive necessary details
about the cyber incident or ransom payment, and introduce an additional
vector for human error during the transcription or conversion of the
data. For these reasons, CISA is not proposing U.S. Mail or similar
delivery services as an acceptable mechanism for submitting CIRCIA
Reports.
e. Automated/Machine-to-Machine Reporting
Automated (i.e., machine-to-machine or application programming
interface (API)-based) reporting presents many potential benefits. If
designed properly, automated reporting could provide nearly real-time,
secure reporting of high volumes of incidents, in a manner and format
tailored for analysis and incorporation into CISA's online case
management system. Automated reporting could assure the use of
consistent terminology and reduce the potential introduction of human
error by eliminating the need for humans to enter or transcribe the
data.
Automated cyber incident and ransom payment reporting does,
however, potentially present some significant challenges. These
challenges include potentially significant upfront costs to design a
system and develop the associated standard; the costs for users to
implement the standard, including any costs necessary to integrate it
with their existing systems to feed the data exchange; and potentially
significant amounts of overreporting if the automated reporting
thresholds are not set properly by the covered entity.
Given the potentially significant benefits that could result from
automated reporting, and the success that some other Federal regulators
have had with automated reporting, this is an approach that CISA would
be interested in exploring further once the CIRCIA final rule is issued
and all necessary systems to support CIRCIA Reports are developed and
deployed. CISA can envision this becoming an additional manner of
submission approved by the Director in the future. At this time,
however, CISA is not proposing automated reporting as a means for
submission of CIRCIA Reports for a few reasons. First, CISA believes it
is prudent to focus the finite technical and financial resources CISA
has available for CIRCIA implementation on the development of the user-
friendly, web-based form which CISA is required to offer as a means for
submission of
[[Page 23717]]
CIRCIA Reports. Second, until the rule is finalized and reporting
begins, CISA will not know definitively the volume of reports CISA will
be receiving or the number of covered entities that might be interested
in using machine-to-machine reporting to comply with CIRCIA. Prior to
expending potentially significant resources on the development of
machine-to-machine reporting capabilities, CISA would want to better
understand the utility and demand for such a reporting mechanism and
the potential return on investment of offering it as a means of
reporting.
f. In-Person Reporting
One other method CISA considered is in-person reporting, either
verbally or through provision of a written report, to a CISA staff
member, such as a CISA Cybersecurity Advisor, Protective Security
Advisor, Chemical Security Inspector, or a member of CISA's
Cybersecurity Threat Hunting team. All of these individuals are trained
security professionals who work daily with owners and operators of
entities within the critical infrastructure sectors.
In-person reporting would have the benefit of facilitating direct
engagement between an entity experiencing a cyber incident and CISA
staff who might not only be able to receive a report, but also provide
or direct the covered entity to assistance in responding to or
mitigating the impacts of the incident. Direct engagement between CISA
and the entity experiencing the incident may also help ensure that the
most pertinent information is provided to CISA, and CISA may be able to
get clarifications or answers to follow-up questions in real time,
particularly for verbal reporting. In-person provision of a written
report would also revert some of the downsides of mail-in reporting,
such as by ensuring timeliness and real-time confirmation of receipt by
CISA.
The downsides of in-person reporting include the increased burden
required to broadly train CISA staff on the protocols for receiving in-
person reports, the need for the individual receiving the report to
subsequently input the information received into CISA's online case
management system, and the additional likelihood of human error that
these engagements would add into the process (though perhaps moderately
less so than with telephone reporting as the parties could review the
transcribed report with the reporting individual in real time). There
also are logistical challenges that likely would limit the utility of
this option as it would require the reporting individual and the CISA
representative to be in the same physical location. This approach would
almost certainly require either a representative of a covered entity to
travel to meet the CISA representative or vice versa, both delaying the
time before reporting could be completed and increasing the cost of
reporting (due to both the direct costs of travel and the indirect
wage-related costs of the individual required to travel). Additionally,
at least for verbal reporting, the CISA staff most likely to receive
in-person reports are highly trained security professionals whose jobs
are to engage with owners and operators of critical infrastructure. As
these individuals already have significant, important day-to-day
responsibilities, receiving and uploading CIRCIA Reports may not be the
most cost-efficient use of their taxpayer-funded time in support of
CISA's mission. In light of these drawbacks, CISA is not proposing to
use direct, in-person reporting as a mechanism for receiving CIRCIA
Reports.
ii. Form for Reporting
Section 681b(a)(6) of title 6, United States Code, states that
Covered Cyber Incident Reports, Ransom Payment Reports, and
Supplemental Reports ``shall be made in the manner and form . . .
prescribed in the final rule.'' As discussed in the previous section,
CISA is proposing to use the ``concise, user-friendly web-based form''
CISA is required by 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8) to offer as a means for
submission as the primary authorized means for submitting CIRCIA
Reports. CISA proposes naming this web-based form the ``CIRCIA Incident
Reporting Form.''
For the reasons discussed below, CISA is proposing to use the same
user interface for the CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form regardless of
which of the four types of discrete mandatory reports identified in
CIRCIA (i.e., Covered Cyber Incident Report; Ransom Payment Report;
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report; and
Supplemental Report) that must be submitted by a covered entity.
Additionally, CISA is proposing to use the same user interface
regardless of whether a covered entity itself is submitting a CIRCIA
Report or if a third party is submitting a report on behalf of a
covered entity. To facilitate this approach, CISA is proposing to use a
dynamic, user-friendly, web-based form with conditional logic filters,
with questions that adjust based on the answers to gateway or filtering
questions used throughout the form. For instance, an early question
might ask the submitter to indicate what type of report is being
submitted--e.g., a Covered Cyber Incident Report, a Ransom Payment
Report, a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report, a
Supplemental Report--and the questions that follow will be tailored
based on the response provided by the submitter.
CISA believes that numerous benefits exist in using the same user
interface for all CIRCIA Reports (and potentially for voluntarily
provided reports as well). First, this approach would allow all
entities to go to a single location to comply with their CIRCIA
reporting obligations regardless of what type of CIRCIA Report they
need to submit. Second, it would prevent the covered entity from having
to choose from multiple different forms to determine which is the
correct set of questions for their particular reporting situation.
There are a variety of circumstances under which a covered entity may
be submitting a CIRCIA Report, such as a covered cyber incident that
does not involve a ransom payment, a covered cyber incident for which a
ransom payment has been made, a ransom payment being reported via a
Supplemental Report after a covered cyber incident has been submitted,
or a ransom payment made in response to a cyber incident that does not
meet the criteria of a covered cyber incident. Instead of creating
unique forms for each possible reporting scenario and requiring the
covered entity to correctly identify which one applies, having a single
user interface that can be used to address any potential reporting
circumstance eliminates both the need for the covered entity to expend
resources identifying the correct form and the possibility of the
covered entity selecting the incorrect form.
Finally, a single user interface also reduces the burden in
situations where the covered entity's reporting requirements change
during the preparation of the report. For instance, a covered entity
may begin to report a covered cyber incident and, before submitting it
to CISA, the entity makes a ransom payment as part of its response to
the incident. Having a dynamic user interface may make it possible to
allow the covered entity to modify its responses to certain questions
and/or add the additional information related to the ransom payment
rather than recreate all of its previous work in a separate form
designed specifically for submitting a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report.
The dynamic nature of the concise, user-friendly, web-based form
being proposed by CISA has additional benefits beyond the facilitation
of a single form model. A dynamic user
[[Page 23718]]
interface supports the tailoring of questions even within a single type
of report (e.g., a Covered Cyber Incident Report), allowing CISA to
present only those secondary or tertiary questions applicable to the
covered entity's unique circumstances, thus minimizing the overall
number of questions asked of each submitter.\354\ Similarly, in
addition to appropriately modifying whether a question is asked at all,
a dynamic approach also allows CISA to vary whether responding to
specific questions is required or optional based on the report type and
other answers provided by the submitter.
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\354\ For instance, for a hypothetical first-level question on
what type of entity a covered entity is (e.g., individual,
corporation, State or local government), a covered entity that
indicates it is a State or local government might receive a
secondary question asking it to identify what State it represents
and a tertiary question asking it to identify the State department
or agency. If the covered entity instead indicated it was a
corporation, it would not be asked those specific secondary or
tertiary questions, but rather might be asked different questions
that would not be visible to an entity that indicated it was a State
or local government, such as the State in which the corporation was
incorporated and the corporation's Data Universal Numbering System
(DUNS) number.
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In the user interface, CISA intends to use a mixture of input
options, such as radio buttons, drop-down menus, and text boxes.
Tailoring the response format and options for individual questions will
allow CISA to advance various goals simultaneously, to include reducing
the burden of completing the report, supporting consistency in
terminology to facilitate analysis of data, facilitating the logic-flow
based tailoring of questions, and offering opportunities for covered
entities to provide additional pertinent details via narratives where
useful.
As discussed in the previous section, CISA intends to maintain the
ability to receive telephonic reports as a back-up option and, in the
future, may offer alternative mechanisms for a covered entity to submit
a report beyond the web-based user interface, such as automated (i.e.,
machine-to-machine) reporting. If CISA offers, and a covered entity
elects to use, a mechanism other than the web-based user interface to
submit a report, CISA will establish procedures to ensure all mandatory
questions are answered and the benefits of a single, dynamic form are
preserved to the maximum extent practicable. For example, if CISA were
to allow telephonic reporting in the future, CISA could have an
operator complete the web-based form for the caller by verbally talking
the caller through the form, asking them every pertinent question,
typing the responses into the form, and then transmitting the covered
entity a copy of the completed report for its records. Similarly, if a
fillable PDF or paper-based format is offered, CISA could design that
paper-based form in a manner similar to forms used by the Internal
Revenue Service for filing of taxes, where the provision of specific
answers to questions on the universal section of the form direct the
preparer of the form to annexes or addendums that they should complete
and include with their submission given their case-specific
circumstances.\355\
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\355\ For example, an individual only needs to complete Schedule
B to Form 1040 if they received certain interest or ordinary
dividends during a given tax year (see https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-schedule-b-form-1040 (last visited Nov. 28, 2023)) or
Schedule C if they need to report income or loss from a business
operated or profession practiced as a sole proprietor (see https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-schedule-c-form-1040 (last visited Nov.
28, 2023)).
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Consistent with what has been discussed above, 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(5)(A) requires that CISA offer a means to comply with reporting
requirements for both a covered cyber incident and a ransom payment
using a single report if a covered entity makes a ransom payment prior
to the 72-hour requirement for submitting a Covered Cyber Incident
Report.\356\ CISA's proposed approach of using a dynamic reporting user
interface for all CIRCIA Reports would enable a covered entity to
submit information on both a covered cyber incident and ransom payment
at the same time using the same form, thus satisfying this statutory
requirement. As discussed in Section IV.A.iii.4 in this document, CISA
is proposing to call this report a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report. To complete this type of report, a covered
entity should follow the processes described herein that apply to all
CIRCIA Reports and include all content required in both a Covered Cyber
Incident Report and Ransom Payment Report, as set out in the following
section and Sec. Sec. 226.7 through 226.10 of the proposed regulation.
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\356\ Specifically, 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(5)(A) states ``If a covered
entity is the victim of a covered cyber incident and makes a ransom
payment prior to the 72 hour requirement under paragraph (1), such
that the reporting requirements under paragraphs (1) and (2) both
apply, the covered entity may submit a single report to satisfy the
requirements of both paragraphs in accordance with procedures
established in the final rule issued pursuant to subsection (b).''
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iii. Content of Reports
Sections 681b(c)(4) and (5) of title 6, United States Code, require
CISA to include in the final rule a ``clear description of the specific
required contents'' of a Covered Cyber Incident Report and Ransom
Payment Report, respectively. Sections 226.7 through 226.11 of the
proposed regulation contain a description of the content required in
those reports, as well as the other two types of CIRCIA Reports.
In determining what content covered entities should be required to
include in either a Covered Cyber Incident Report or Ransom Payment
Report, CISA considered a variety of sources. First and foremost, CISA
considered 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4) and (5), as those sections contain
extensive lists of the specific types and categories of information
that submitters must include in Covered Cyber Incident Reports and
Ransom Payment Reports, respectively.
Second, CISA examined what data is required for CISA to perform the
activities Congress assigned to CISA within CIRCIA and evaluated
whether that data is captured within the content categories enumerated
in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4) and (5). Based on that evaluation, CISA
determined that certain data CISA will need to perform its statutory
mandates will not necessarily be captured by any of the categories of
content specified by Congress in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4) and (5).
Accordingly, CISA is proposing to make that content required in one or
more types of CIRCIA Report. For example, 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(3)(B) of
CIRCIA requires CISA to ``provide appropriate entities . . . with
timely, actionable, and anonymized reports of cyber incident campaigns
and trends, including . . . related contextual information, cyber
threat indicators, and defensive measures.'' To comply with this
requirement, CISA needs to collect information on cyber threat
indicators from victims of cyber incidents. Accordingly, while some of
the categories enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4) and (5) would likely
elicit the submission of some information that would qualify as cyber
threat indicators (as defined in 6 U.S.C. 650(5)), CISA is proposing
including additional mandatory content for CIRCIA Reports for CISA to
collect a broader range of cyber threat indicators.
Third, CISA engaged with stakeholders from across the Federal
government to determine what data related to cyber incidents might be
useful to them to accomplish their respective missions or, for those
with their own cyber incident reporting programs, what data they have
found to be the most useful and other information that might be helpful
to have in the future. Among the groups CISA consulted were:
the SRMAs responsible for coordinating critical
infrastructure security efforts across the 16 critical infrastructure
sectors;
[[Page 23719]]
members of the law enforcement and intelligence
communities, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
U.S. Secret Service, the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, and the NSA; and
Federal departments and agencies that oversee cyber
incident reporting regulations or directives, such as DOE, NRC, SEC,
FCC, TSA, and the Department of the Treasury's OCC.
In this vein, CISA also considered what incident-related
information CISA has found to be the most useful in executing non-
CIRCIA responsibilities, including CISA's asset response authorities
under 6 U.S.C. 652(c)(1) and 659(f)(1) and as further described in
Presidential Policy Directive--41, United States Cyber Incident
Coordination.
CISA also solicited the perspective of the public and members of
the private sector on this topic through the issuance of an RFI and the
hosting of more than two dozen listening sessions. CISA received
numerous comments on contents of reports, which have been considered by
CISA in developing the proposed content of reports. More information on
the comments received by CISA in response to the RFI and during the
CIRCIA listening sessions can be found in Section III.F in this
document.
Finally, CISA reviewed the Model Reporting Form developed by DHS
through the CIRC effort. As part of the CIRC's mandate to promote
harmonization of Federal cyber incident reporting regulations and
minimize the burden on entities that may need to comply with more than
one cyber incident reporting requirement, DHS, informed by close
collaboration with the CIRC, developed a Model Reporting Form. CISA
fully supports harmonizing cyber incident reporting requirements where
practicable and has sought to align the CIRCIA reporting form required
content with the content recommendations in the Model Reporting Form
where practical and consistent with the CIRCIA statutory requirements
related to both the content of CIRCIA Reports and CISA's obligations
with respect to information received through CIRCIA Reports.
Based on the above, CISA is proposing certain content be submitted
by a covered entity regardless of the type of CIRCIA Report being
submitted, while other content will be required only in certain types
of CIRCIA Reports. The following subsections discuss the categories of
content that CISA is proposing be required for inclusion in (a) all
CIRCIA Reports, (b) Covered Cyber Incident Reports (and subsequent
Supplemental Reports as necessary) only, (c) Ransom Payment Reports
only, and (d) Supplemental Reports only.
1. Proposed Content To Be Included in All CIRCIA Reports
This subsection describes the content, such as contact information
for the covered entity, that CISA is proposing must be included
regardless of the type of CIRCIA Report a covered entity is submitting.
Other categories of content that CISA is proposing for inclusion in a
specific type of report, such as the date and amount of the ransom
payment, follow, organized by report type.
The majority of the content proposed for inclusion is explicitly
required by CIRCIA. Where this is the case, the discussion below will
include a reference to the specific statutory provision in CIRCIA
requiring the inclusion of the proposed content. Where CISA is
proposing to seek content beyond what is explicitly set out in 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4) and (5), the rationale supporting that proposal is included.
a. Report Type
At or near the beginning of the reporting user interface will be
questions related to what type of report an entity wants to submit.
This will help identify if a report is a Covered Cyber Incident Report,
a Ransom Payment Report, a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom
Payment Report, or a Supplemental Report. The answer submitted in
response to these questions will help determine the spectrum of
additional content the reporting entity will be asked to provide and
may be used to streamline reporting in other ways, such as by
supporting the pre-population of previously submitted data when
submitting a Supplemental Report, to the extent pre-population is
available for the covered entity's chosen manner of submission. This
section of the form also may include some optional questions such as
whether this information is being additionally submitted to meet any
other reporting requirements. If a covered entity is reporting an
incident to CISA per another regulatory requirement and intends for
this report to also meet its reporting obligations under CIRCIA, the
covered entity would need to indicate both requirements on the form.
Otherwise, a separate CIRCIA Report would need to be filed.
b. Identity of the Covered Entity
All CIRCIA Reports are statutorily required to include information
sufficient to clearly identify the c making the report or on whose
behalf the report is being made. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(E) and (5)(D).
This must include, as applicable, the State of incorporation or
formation of the covered entity, trade names, legal names, or other
identifiers. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(E) and (5)(D). Other types of
information that CISA intends on requesting in this section of the form
include the entity type (e.g., Federal, State, local, Territorial,
Tribal, ISAC, private sector); physical address; organization's
website; any internal incident tracking number used by the entity for
the reported event (if one exists); any applicable business numerical
identifiers, such as a NAICS code, General Services Administration-
Issued Unique Entity Identifier (GSA-UEI), Dun & Bradstreet Data
Universal Numbering System (D-U-N-S) Number, Tax ID Number, EPA
Facility ID number; Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) ID Number,
or MTSA Facility ID Number; the name of the covered entity's parent
corporation or organization, if applicable; and the critical
infrastructure sector or sectors of which the covered entity considers
itself a part. This additional information will help ensure that CISA
has the correct identity of the covered entity (including understanding
the corporate familial relationship between the covered entity or
covered entities that experienced the substantial cyber incident and
any subsidiary, parent, or sister corporation or organization that may
be reporting on behalf of affected subsidiaries, parents, or sisters),
facilitate information sharing with appropriate partners, and support
trend and threat analysis by specific geographic regions, entity types,
critical infrastructure sectors, and other characteristics.
c. Contact Information
All CIRCIA Reports are statutorily required to include contact
information, such as telephone number or email address, that CISA may
use to contact the covered entity, an authorized agent thereof, or,
where applicable, an authorized third party acting with the express
permission and at the direction of the covered entity to assist with
compliance with CIRCIA reporting requirements. 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(F)
and (5)(E). To satisfy this statutory requirement, CISA is proposing
requiring a covered entity to provide the name, phone number, email,
and title of the reporting party and, if different, the point of
contact for the covered entity. CISA is also proposing requiring a
covered entity to provide the name, phone number, email address, and
title
[[Page 23720]]
of the covered entity's registered agent, if that individual is
different than the identified point of contact. CISA also is proposing
that in cases where a third party is submitting a report on behalf of a
covered entity, the aforementioned contact information must be provided
for both the third-party submitter and the covered entity point of
contact.
CISA additionally is proposing to include an optional field through
which contact information for a 24/7 point of contact could be provided
to better enable incident response support and emergency follow-up
engagement. CISA may also include optional fields for additional
contact information elements such as a classified phone number or
classified email account where the 24/7 point of contact or another
identified individual(s) can be reached, if applicable.
d. Third Party Authorization To Submit
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(1), a covered entity may use a third
party to submit a CIRCIA Report on behalf of the covered entity. As
discussed in greater detail in Section IV.E.v.3.a in this document,
CISA is proposing requiring a third party that submits a report on
behalf of a covered entity to include in the submission an attestation
that it has been expressly authorized by the covered entity to submit
the report. CISA is proposing to require this indication of
authorization in any CIRCIA Report submitted by a third party on behalf
of a covered entity, regardless of the type of report. This requirement
is set forth in Sec. 226.7(d) of the proposed regulation. Additional
details on third-party submissions and the proposed requirement for
third-party submitters to confirm their authority to submit a CIRCIA
Report on a covered entity's behalf can be found in Section IV.E.v.3 in
this document.
2. Covered Cyber Incident Report Specific Content
CISA is proposing requiring submission of information in the
following categories of content in a Covered Cyber Incident Report. As
noted in the individual content categories, CISA is proposing that some
of the proposed data elements within the individual content categories
are required while other proposed data elements are optional. CISA
intends to ask for all the required information in an initial Covered
Cyber Incident Report; however, CISA understands that a covered entity
may not know all of the required information within the initial 72-hour
reporting timeframe. Accordingly, answers of ``unknown at this time''
or something similar will be considered acceptable for certain
questions in initial reporting. A covered entity must, however, comply
with its Supplemental Reporting requirements and provide previously
unknown information promptly to CISA once discovered if the information
meets the ``substantial new or different information'' threshold. That
includes any information required to be submitted in an initial Covered
Cyber Incident or Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report that a covered entity subsequently learns after initially
responding that the information was unknown at the time of reporting.
See Section IV.E.iv.3.b in this document for a more fulsome discussion
on what CISA is proposing constitutes ``substantial new or different
information.'' CISA is proposing that a covered entity ultimately must
provide all applicable required content in either the initial Covered
Cyber Incident Report or a Supplemental Report to be considered fully
compliant with its reporting obligations under CIRCIA.
a. Description of the Covered Incident
The first category of content required by CIRCIA is focused on
ensuring CISA receives information on the systems affected by the
incident and the impacts of the incident. Specifically, 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4)(A) requires covered entities to include in a Covered Cyber
Incident Report a ``description of the covered cyber incident''
containing, among other things, an identification and description of
the affected information systems, networks, or devices; a description
of the unauthorized access with substantial loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the affected information system or
network or disruption of business or industrial operations; the
estimated date range of the incident; and the impact to the operations
of the covered entity. To collect this information, CISA is proposing
including a combination of one or more text boxes where entities can
provide a narrative description of the incident or specific aspects of
the incident along with a series of questions containing radio buttons,
drop-down menus, or limited data fields (e.g., dates) to ensure the
provision of certain information.
For the first statutorily enumerated element under this category--
identification and a description of the function of the affected
information systems, networks, or devices--CISA is interested in the
name and a description of the impacted systems, networks, and/or
devices, to include technical details and physical locations of the
impacted systems, networks, and/or devices. CISA also would like to
know if any of the impacted systems, networks, and/or devices contain
or process information created by or for any element of the
Intelligence Community or contain information that has been determined
by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive Order or
statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted
data, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 2014(y).
For the second statutorily enumerated element under this category--
description of the unauthorized access with substantial loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the affected information
system or network or disruption of business or industrial operations--
CISA is interested in whether the incident involved any unauthorized
access (whether or not the access involves an attributed or
unattributed cyber intrusion), whether there were any informational
impacts, or whether any information was compromised. If the answer to
any of those questions is ``yes,'' CISA proposes requiring the covered
entity to answer a small number of follow-up questions to elicit
additional details. CISA also intends to request information regarding
what network location(s) the activity was observed in. While the
statutorily enumerated element incorporates the ``substantial loss''
standard from the first prong of the definition of substantial cyber
incident, CISA is proposing to require covered entities to describe any
unauthorized access once an incident meets the reportable threshold so
that CISA and other Federal agencies can have a broader understanding
of potential impacts to the CIA of information systems, networks, or
the information therein. CISA believes the ``disruption of business or
industrial operations'' portion of this statutorily enumerated element
is sufficiently addressed by the fourth statutorily enumerated element,
discussed below.
For the third statutorily enumerated element under this category--
incident date range--CISA is proposing to seek information on the date
the covered cyber incident was detected, the date the covered cyber
incident began (if known), the date the covered cyber incident was
fully mitigated and resolved (if it has been), and the timeline of
compromised system communications with other systems. For incidents
involving unauthorized access, CISA also proposes asking about the
suspected duration of the unauthorized access prior to detection and
reporting. While CISA is proposing
[[Page 23721]]
to ask for more details than just the incident date range (i.e., the
beginning and end of the incident), understanding the key timeline of
events that comprised the incident is key to enhancing the Federal
government's understanding of the incident as a whole.
In describing this category of information, the proposed regulatory
text refers to the incident as the ``covered cyber incident'' to refer
to the incident that is subject to the CIRCIA reporting requirement.
CISA does not interpret the use of that term to import any threshold
definitional triggers. For example, in requiring that the Covered Cyber
Incident Report include the date that the covered cyber incident began,
CISA is not asking for the date on which the covered entity began
experiencing impact levels that met the definition of a substantial
cyber incident, and therefore a covered cyber incident. Rather, once a
covered entity has determined it has experienced a covered cyber
incident, it should report all relevant dates related to the underlying
cyber incident. As such, the date that the covered cyber incident began
would be the earliest date of identified unauthorized activity
associated with the cyber incident that would ultimately become the
covered cyber incident.
For the final statutorily enumerated element under this category--
impacts to the operations of the covered entity--CISA proposes asking
various questions to understand both the level of impact and specific
impacts, such as whether any known or suspected physical or
informational impacts occurred. CISA is also proposing to include
questions related to the nature of the impact, i.e., was the system,
network, device, or data accessed, manipulated, exfiltrated, destroyed,
or rendered unavailable. To satisfy some of the requirements imposed
upon CISA by CIRCIA, CISA also needs information on impacts of the
incident beyond simply the operations of the covered entity. For
instance, among other things, 6 U.S.C. 681a(a) requires CISA to analyze
Covered Cyber Incident Reports to assess potential impacts of cyber
incidents on public health and safety. Similarly, 6 U.S.C. 681a(c)
requires CISA to periodically brief certain members of Congress on the
national cyber threat landscape. Likewise, 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(6) requires
CISA to review any covered cyber incidents or group of incidents that
are likely to result in demonstrable harm to the economy of the United
States and identify and disseminate ways to prevent similar incidents
in the future. In support of these and other requirements, CISA also
envisions asking questions that will help CISA assess the economic
impacts of the incident and the potential impacts of the incident on
public health and safety, national security, economic security, and any
of the NCFs.
CIRCIA also requires a covered entity to include in its Covered
Cyber Incident Report the ``category or categories of information that
were, or are reasonably believed to have been, accessed or acquired by
an unauthorized person.'' 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(D). CISA proposes
including questions related to this topic in the Covered Cyber Incident
Report form.
b. Vulnerabilities, Security Defenses, and TTPs
The second statutorily required block of content is focused on how
the incident was carried out. Specifically, 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(B)
requires covered entities to include in a Covered Cyber Incident Report
``[w]here applicable, a description of the vulnerabilities exploited
and security defenses in place, as well as the tactics, techniques, and
procedures used to perpetrate the covered cyber incident.'' This
information will enable CISA to carry out its core statutory
responsibilities related to identifying and sharing information on
cyber incident trends, TTPs, vulnerability exploitations, campaigns,
and countermeasures that may be useful in preventing others from
falling victim to similar incidents and preventing similar
vulnerability classes in the future.
CISA is proposing to codify the need to submit information to
address this statutory requirement in five consecutive regulatory
subsections. First, proposed Sec. 226.8(c) would require the
submission of information on the vulnerabilities exploited, including
but not limited to the specific products or technologies and versions
in which the vulnerabilities were found. Next, proposed Sec. 226.8(d)
would require the submission of information on the covered entity's
security defenses, including but not limited to any controls or
measures that resulted in detection or mitigation of the incident. As
part of this, CISA is likely to ask what, if any, security controls or
control families (e.g., NIST Special Pub 800-171 controls \357\; NIST
Cybersecurity Framework measures \358\; CISA Cybersecurity Performance
Goal activities \359\) the covered entity had in place on the
compromised system, and, to the extent known, which controls or control
families failed, were insufficient, or not implemented that may have
been a factor in this incident. CISA also is likely to include
questions aimed at helping CISA understand how the covered entity
identified the incident; what, if any, detection methods were used to
discover the incident; and if the covered entity has identified the
initially affected device(s).
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\357\ See NIST, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information
in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations, NIST Special Publication
800-171 Rev. 2, (Feb. 2020), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/171/r2/upd1/final.
\358\ See NIST, Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, available at
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework.
\359\ See CISA, Cross-Sector Performance Goals, available at
https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-performance-goals.
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Finally, proposed Sec. 226.8(e), (f) and (g) would require
information on the type of incident (e.g., denial-of-service;
ransomware attack; multi-factor authentication interception); the TTPs
used to cause the incident, to include any TTPs that were used to gain
initial access to the covered entity's system; indicators of compromise
observed in connection with the covered cyber incident; and a
description and copy or sample of any malicious software the covered
entity believes is connected with the covered cyber incident. Questions
CISA may ask to obtain this information potentially include what, if
any, attack vectors did the covered entity identify; to the covered
entity's knowledge, were any advanced persistent threat actors
involved; were any malicious software, malicious scripts, or other
indicators of compromise found, and, if so, what specific variants or
strains were used. In addition to a description of any malware samples
or indicators of compromise observed or captured by the covered entity,
CISA is proposing to require covered entities provide indicators of
compromise identified as well as copies of any malware samples related
to the covered cyber incident that the covered entity has in its
possession. While 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4)(B) uses the term ``description,''
obtaining actual indicators of compromise and copies of malware
samples, rather than a mere description, is important to enable CISA to
perform the activities assigned to CISA under CIRCIA (including
identifying, developing, and disseminating actionable cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures), and is also consistent with key
requests in other incident reporting programs.\360\
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\360\ See, e.g., 48 CFR 252.204-7012(d) (requirement in DFARS
incident reporting requirement for contractors to submit copies of
malicious software to DOD when they have discovered and isolated
malicious software in connection with a reported cyber incident).
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[[Page 23722]]
In cases where the covered cyber incident involves a ransomware
attack but the covered entity did not make a ransom payment and is thus
not obligated to submit a Ransom Payment Report, pursuant to proposed
Sec. 226.8(e), CISA intends to ask specific questions related to
ransomware attack-specific TTPs, such as information on the ransom
payment demand and instructions, that a covered entity would otherwise
have been required to provide in a Ransom Payment Report were one
required. This information will help CISA and its partners on the Joint
Ransomware Task Force established pursuant to CIRCIA more fully
understand and combat existing threats related to ransomware attacks.
To assist in the development of responses to these questions and
the use of common terminology, CISA anticipates providing drop-down
menus or other selection options tied to the MITRE ATT&CK[supreg]
framework \361\ or another broadly recognized cyber incident reporting
framework. CISA may also ask whether the entity has any applicable logs
(e.g., network logs; system logs; memory captures) available.
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\361\ MITRE ATT&CK[supreg] is a globally accessible knowledge
base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world
observations, available at https://attack.mitre.org/.
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CISA recognizes that some of the information requested in this
section of the form may be unavailable at the time a covered entity is
submitting the initial Covered Cyber Incident Report. Nevertheless, to
assist CISA in conducting analysis and providing early warnings in as
timely a manner as possible, CISA does intend to ask for this
information in Covered Cyber Incident Reports and expects covered
entities to provide that information when they possess it with some
degree of confidence; however, good faith answers of ``unknown at this
time'' or something similar generally will be acceptable responses to
these questions in an initial Covered Cyber Incident Report. If this
information is not submitted in the initial report, to the extent the
information is applicable to the incident and knowable, a covered
entity will be required to include that information in a Supplemental
Report before its reporting obligations are considered met under the
regulation. A covered entity should keep in mind its obligation to
report ``substantial new and different information'' to CISA
``promptly'' upon discovery and should not be waiting until all unknown
information is gathered before submitting a Supplemental Report to
CISA.
c. Information Related to the Identity of the Perpetrator of the
Incident
Section 681b(c)(4)(C) of title 6, United States Code, requires
covered entities to include in a Covered Cyber Incident Report
``[w]here applicable, any identifying or contact information related to
each actor reasonably believed to be responsible for such cyber
incident.'' CISA is proposing to include in this section questions
seeking any attribution-related information the covered entity may
possess. Additionally, CISA is proposing to include in this section
questions regarding whether the covered entity believes they can
attribute the cyber incident, what evidence supports their attribution
assessment, and how confident they are in their attribution assessment.
d. Mitigation/Response
Although not included among the specifically required contents
enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(4), CISA is proposing a small number of
questions regarding the mitigation and response activities a covered
entity is taking or has taken in response to a covered cyber incident.
Under 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(3)(B) and (7), CISA is required to, among other
things, leverage information gathered about cyber incidents to provide
appropriate entities with defensive measures, and, with respect to
Covered Cyber Incident Reports involving an ongoing cybersecurity
threat or security vulnerability, immediately review those reports and
disseminate defensive measures. Further, under 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(6),
CISA is required to conduct a review of details surrounding each
covered cyber incident or group of such incidents that satisfy the
definition of a significant cyber incident to identify and disseminate
ways to prevent or mitigate similar incidents in the future.
Understanding the mitigation and response activities taken by a covered
entity will be key to CISA's ability to identify or develop defensive
measures that can be leveraged by other entities, as well as to
evaluate and identify ways to mitigate similar incidents in the future.
The questions CISA is proposing to ask to support this analysis
include what mitigation measures the covered entity had in place, what
responsive actions the covered entity has taken, what phase of incident
response (e.g., detection, analysis, containment, eradication,
recovery, and post-incident activity) the covered entity is currently
in, and what is the covered entity's assessment of the efficacy of
those mitigation and response activities.\362\ As part of this, CISA is
also proposing to ask about engagement with law enforcement agencies,
if the covered entity reached out to another entity for mitigation or
response assistance, and, if so, to whom.\363\ CISA will also provide
an opportunity for the covered entity to indicate that it would like to
request assistance from CISA related to the incident. This information
will facilitate CISA's coordination with its Federal partners,
including law enforcement, and non-Federal partners who may already be
engaged in responding to the incident.
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\362\ See NIST, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, NIST
Special Publication 800-61 Rev. 2, at 21-45 (Aug. 2012), available
at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r2/final (hereinafter ``NIST
SP 800-61r2'').
\363\ In response to this topic and the related topic in the
required content for Ransom Payment Reports, covered entities do not
need to include every vendor from whom they have sought a quote but
did not ultimately use. However, covered entities should not
necessarily limit their response to entities from whom they have
actually received assistance, particularly as some requests for
assistance may remain outstanding at the time the report is
submitted.
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e. Additional Data or Information
CISA is proposing to require a covered entity to include in a
Covered Cyber Incident Report any other data or information required by
the web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form or other authorized manner
and form of reporting. CISA recognizes that cyber incidents are dynamic
in nature and that, over time, CISA may identify additional data or
information that would be useful or necessary to meet the purposes of
the CIRCIA regulations. CISA may also identify ways to streamline
reporting in response to particular circumstances, such as by allowing
covered entities to check a box to indicate if their Covered Cyber
Incident Report is related to a specific known campaign, supply chain
compromise, or compromise of a third-party service provider. CISA is
proposing to include Sec. 226.8(j) to ensure that covered entities
would be required to include any additional required data or
information that CISA subsequently determines is necessary and
consistent with CISA's authorities under CIRCIA. Additionally, CISA may
include optional requests for data and information that apply to the
type of covered cyber incident reported and that may help clarify the
covered entity's responses to information required by Sec. 226.8. CISA
is proposing to include similar language in Sec. 226.9(n) for Ransom
Payment Reports and
[[Page 23723]]
Sec. 226.11(a)(4) for Supplemental Reports. CIRCIA exempts any action
required to carry out 6 U.S.C. 681b, including the reporting
requirements in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)-(3), from compliance with the PRA
requirements codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(c), 3507, 3508, and 3509. 6
U.S.C. 681b(f). This exemption includes actions taken by CISA to make
changes to the questions included in the CIRCIA web-based Incident
Reporting Form as described above and to solicit for optional
information and data as part of CIRCIA Reports.
3. Ransom Payment Report Specific Content
Section 681b(c)(5) of title 6, United States Code, enumerates
specific content that is to be included in a Ransom Payment Report. Two
of the enumerated items, information identifying the covered entity
that made the ransom payment (or on whose behalf the ransom payment was
made) and contact information for the covered entity or an authorized
agent thereof, were discussed previously and are part of the categories
of information that must be included regardless of report type. The
remaining items enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5) are specific to
Ransom Payment Reports and are discussed in the following subsections.
a. Description of the Ransomware Attack
Section 681b(c)(5)(A) of title 6, United States Code, requires a
covered entity to include in its Ransom Payment Report a ``description
of the ransomware attack, including the estimated date range of the
attack.'' For those ransom payments that are the result of a covered
cyber incident and for which a Covered Cyber Incident Report has been
submitted, the information necessary to address this category will have
been contained in the Covered Cyber Incident Report. For those ransom
payments that are not the result of a covered cyber incident, or for
which a Ransom Payment Report is being submitted prior to the
submission of a Covered Cyber Incident Report, CISA is proposing
requiring the covered entity to include in its Ransom Payment Report
questions similar to those asked in Sec. 226.8(a) of the regulation
and described in Section IV.E.iii.2.a in this document. While 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4)(A) includes much more specific detailed requirements as to
what must be included in a description of a covered cyber incident than
the parallel 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(A) includes for the required
description of ransomware attacks, CISA is proposing to ask similar
questions for this topic because, for the reasons described in Section
IV.E.iii.2.a in this document, these questions would provide CISA with
relevant information to understand the incident and its impact.
b. Vulnerabilities, Security Defenses, and TTPs
Section 681b(c)(5)(B) of title 6, United States Code, requires a
covered entity to include in its Ransom Payment Report, ``where
applicable, a description of the vulnerabilities, tactics, techniques,
and procedures used to perpetrate the ransomware attack.'' For those
ransom payments that are the result of a covered cyber incident and for
which a Covered Cyber Incident Report has been submitted, the
information necessary to address this category will have been contained
in the Covered Cyber Incident Report or a previously submitted
Supplemental Report. For those ransom payments that are not the result
of a covered cyber incident, or for which a Ransom Payment Report is
being submitted prior to the submission of a Covered Cyber Incident
Report, CISA is proposing requiring the covered entity to include in
its Ransom Payment Report questions similar to those asked in Sec.
226.8(c)-(f) of the regulation and described in Section IV.E.iii.2.b in
this document. While 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(B) does not include reference
to the security defenses, as is included in the parallel 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(4)(B), CISA is proposing to ask similar questions about
security defenses in Ransom Payment Reports. This information will
enable CISA to carry out its core statutory responsibilities related to
identifying and sharing information on cyber incident trends, TTPs,
vulnerability exploitations, campaigns, and countermeasures that may be
useful in preventing others from falling victim to similar incidents,
and preventing similar vulnerability classes in the future, regardless
of whether the ransomware attack that precipitated the ransom payment
was a covered cyber incident or not. This information would be
particularly useful to CISA in preventing others from falling victim to
similar ransomware attacks that could rise to the level of being a
covered cyber incident in the event those security defenses were the
reason why a particular ransomware attack did not rise to the level of
a substantial cyber incident.
c. Information Related to the Identification of the Perpetrator of the
Attack
Section 681b(c)(5)(C) of title 6, United States Code, requires a
covered entity to include in its Ransom Payment Report, ``where
applicable, any identifying or contact information related to the actor
or actors reasonably believed to be responsible for the ransomware
attack.'' For those ransom payments that are the result of a covered
cyber incident and for which a Covered Cyber Incident Report has been
submitted, the information necessary to address this category will have
been contained in the Covered Cyber Incident Report. For those ransom
payments that are not the result of a covered cyber incident, or for
which a Ransom Payment Report is being submitted prior to the
submission of a Covered Cyber Incident Report, CISA is proposing
requiring the covered entity to include in its Ransom Payment Report
questions similar to those asked in Sec. 226.8(h) of the regulation
and described in Section IV.E.iii.2.c in this document.
d. Information on the Ransom Payment
Sections 681b(c)(5)(F)-(I) of title 6, United States Code, require
a covered entity to submit a variety of information related to any
ransom payment it makes or that gets made on its behalf. This
information includes the date of the ransom payment (6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(5)(F)); the ransom payment demand, including the type of
virtual currency or other commodity requested (6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(G));
the ransom payment instructions, including information regarding where
to send the payment (6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(H)); and the amount of the
ransom payment (6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(5)(I)). CISA is proposing including
questions in the Ransom Payment Report sufficient to elicit submission
of these statutorily required data elements, including details to help
contextualize these elements (such as the type of assets used in the
ransom payment, which is necessary to understand the value of the
amount of the ransom payment), as well as information useful to
identify the completed transaction, such as any transaction identifier
or hash.
To ensure completeness in the response and a full understanding of
the ransom demand, CISA is proposing to require the covered entity to
provide either the verbatim text of the demand or, where available, a
screenshot or copy of the actual ransom demand. Additionally, if
multiple demands were made during a single incident, CISA expects the
covered entity to provide the required information on each such demand.
Similarly, if multiple ransom payments were made in response to a
single incident, a covered entity is required to report each such
ransom payment.
[[Page 23724]]
e. Results of Ransom Payment
CISA is proposing to require a covered entity to include in a
Ransom Payment Report information regarding what occurred as the result
of the covered entity making the ransom payment. Examples of
information that CISA would expect a covered entity to provide under
this heading would be whether any data that had been exfiltrated was
returned or, in cases where the perpetrator encrypted any of the
covered entity's systems or information, whether a decryption
capability was provided. If a decryption capability was provided, CISA
would seek specific information on that capability, to include whether
or not it was effective.
f. Additional Data or Information
CISA is proposing to require a covered entity to include in a
Ransom Payment Report three additional items, all of which CISA is
proposing to require in a Covered Cyber Incident Report as well. First,
CISA is proposing to ask whether the covered entity requested
assistance from another entity in responding to the ransomware attack
or making the ransom payment and, if so, the identity of such entity or
entities. This information will help CISA understand the capabilities
covered entities typically do and do not possess to respond to a
ransomware attack, where assistance may be beneficial, and the broader
ecosystem of activities related to ransomware attacks. This will also
help CISA have a better understanding of the universe of entities who
may be subject to the responsibilities to advise a covered entity
pursuant to Sec. 226.12(d) (discussed further in Section IV.E.v.3.e in
this document).
Second, CISA is proposing to require a covered entity to provide
information on any engagement the covered entity has had with any law
enforcement agency related to the ransom payment or underlying
ransomware attack. Such information would be extremely beneficial to
effective operations of the Joint Ransomware Task Force established by
CIRCIA and help the Federal government minimize the potential for
uncoordinated law enforcement activities.
Finally, CISA is proposing to require a covered entity to include
in a Ransom Payment Report any other data or information required by
the web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form or any other authorized
manner and form of reporting. Cyber incidents involving ransom payments
are dynamic in nature and, over time, CISA may identify additional data
or information that would be useful or necessary to meet the purposes
of CIRCIA. CISA is proposing to include Sec. 226.9(n) to ensure that
covered entities would be required to include any additional required
data or information that CISA subsequently determines is necessary and
consistent with CISA's authorities under CIRCIA. Additionally, CISA may
include optional requests for data and information that may help
clarify the covered entity's responses to information required by Sec.
226.9. CISA is proposing to include similar language in Sec. 226.8(j)
for Covered Cyber Incident Reports and Sec. 226.11(a)(4) for
Supplemental Reports.
CIRCIA exempts any action required to carry out the reporting
requirements in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)-(3) from compliance with PRA
requirements codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(c), 3507, 3508, and 3509. 6
U.S.C. 681b(f). This exemption includes actions taken by CISA to make
changes to the questions included in the CIRCIA web-based Incident
Reporting Form as described above and to solicit for optional
information and data as part of CIRCIA reports.
4. Supplemental Report Specific Content
While CIRCIA includes some specific categories of content that a
covered entity must include in a Covered Cyber Incident Report or
Ransom Payment Report, CIRCIA does not contain any similar requirements
regarding what content must be included in a Supplemental Report. Given
that the purpose of a Supplemental Report is to provide CISA with
additional or updated information regarding a previously reported
covered cyber incident, the content required in a Supplemental Report
generally will be a subset of the content required to be reported and
optional content in a Covered Cyber Incident Report and/or Ransom
Payment Report, tailored to the reason for the submission of the
Supplemental Report and the information previously provided by the
covered entity in the previously submitted CIRCIA Report.
A unique content request proposed to be contained in a Supplemental
Report is information on the purpose for filing the Supplemental
Report. CISA envisions providing a list of possible answers for this
question, which may include (a) providing CISA with newly discovered
information that makes a previously submitted Covered Cyber Incident
Report or Supplemental Report more complete, (b) providing CISA with
information that corrects or amends a previously submitted Covered
Cyber Incident Report or Supplemental Report, (c) informing CISA that
the covered entity has made a Ransom Payment related to a previously
reported covered cyber incident, or (d) informing CISA that the covered
entity considers a previously reported covered cyber incident concluded
and fully mitigated and resolved. CISA is also proposing to require
that a Supplemental Report include the case identification number
provided by CISA for the covered cyber incident with which the
Supplemental Report is associated. This will facilitate pre-population
of the Supplemental Report form and help CISA ensure that the
Supplemental Report is properly assigned and maintained.
For Supplemental Reports being submitted by a covered entity for
the purposes of informing CISA that the covered entity considers a
previously reported covered cyber incident concluded and fully
mitigated and resolved, CISA proposes including optional questions in
the form that would allow a covered entity to provide information on
the actual recovery date and time, and an estimate of the costs
incurred to fully mitigate the incident, as well as any other financial
losses (e.g., losses in productivity; losses in revenue) incurred due
to the incident. This data would help inform assessments of the risks
associated with and impacts of cyber incidents and will assist CISA in
meeting some of the briefing and reporting requirements assigned to
CISA under CIRCIA.
A small number of commenters requested a mechanism for a covered
entity to ``de-escalate'' an incident (i.e., inform CISA when the
covered entity discovers additional information that causes the entity
to believe an incident for which it had previously submitted a Covered
Cyber Incident Report does not actually meet the criteria for a covered
cyber incident). CISA believes this scenario is simply one variation
that a Supplemental Report may take and proposes to include questions
tailored to this within the Supplemental Report portion of the user
interface for occasions where a covered entity is using a Supplemental
Report for this purpose. CIRCIA exempts any action required to carry
out the reporting requirements in 6 U.S.C. 681b, including 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(1)-(3), from compliance with PRA requirements codified in 44
U.S.C. 3506(c), 3507, 3508, and 3509. 6 U.S.C. 681b(f). This exemption
includes actions taken by CISA to make changes to the questions
included in the CIRCIA web-based Incident Reporting Form as described
[[Page 23725]]
above and to solicit for optional information and data as part of
CIRCIA Reports.
5. Content in the DHS-Developed Model Reporting Form Not Included in
Proposed CIRCIA Reporting Forms
As noted earlier, as part of its efforts to promote harmonization
of Federal cyber incident reporting regulations and minimize the burden
on entities that may need to comply with more than one cyber incident
reporting requirement, DHS, informed by conversations with the CIRC,
developed a Model Reporting Form. In support of harmonization of
Federal cyber incident reporting requirements, CISA carefully
considered the Model Reporting Form during the development of the
proposed CIRCIA reporting form and strove to align the content required
by the two forms where possible while still meeting the requirements,
needs, and limitations imposed by CIRCIA. Consequently, the majority of
the content that CISA is proposing be submitted via its reporting form
is also requested in the Model Reporting Form and vice versa (i.e., the
majority of the content requested by the Model Reporting Form is
proposed for inclusion in the CIRCIA reporting forms).
CISA ultimately determined that a small number of items contained
in the Model Reporting Form were not appropriate for inclusion in the
CIRCIA reporting forms or were only appropriate for inclusion on an
optional basis. First, the Model Reporting Form includes a section
where a reporting entity is afforded the opportunity to indicate if it
believes one or more FOIA exemptions should apply to the information
being submitted. CIRCIA Reports are statutorily exempt from disclosure
under FOIA and any similar State, Local, and Tribal freedom of
information laws, open government laws, sunshine laws, or similar laws
requiring disclosure of information or records. 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(2).
Accordingly, the CIRCIA reporting form does not contain a similar
section on FOIA exemptions that may apply under other authorities;
however, it will contain a statement acknowledging this protection from
disclosure under FOIA or similar laws pursuant to CIRCIA.
Second, the Model Reporting Form includes a number of questions
related to whom the reporting entity has notified about the incident.
This includes questions regarding whether the reporting entity has
notified any governmental entities (e.g., regulators or other
departments or agencies, law enforcement, Congress) and, in the case of
consumer data breaches or privacy breaches, if the reporting entity has
notified impacted individuals and provided them with guidance on how to
take steps to protect themselves during an ongoing incident. CISA is
proposing to include as required content in CIRCIA Reports information
on a covered entity's notification or other form of engagement with law
enforcement agencies. CISA, however, is not proposing to require that
covered entities report whether they have notified other stakeholders,
such as non-law enforcement government entities, Congress, or
individuals potentially impacted by the incident. While some of these
additional notifications may be of general interest to CISA and support
more effective or efficient information sharing among partners, none
are required for CISA to meet its obligations under CIRCIA.
Accordingly, CISA is not proposing requiring that covered entities
report any of this information in a CIRCIA Report. CISA may include
optional questions on some of these topics so that covered entities who
are interested in voluntarily providing this information to CISA may do
so.
iv. Timing of Submission of CIRCIA Reports
1. Timing for Submission of Covered Cyber Incident Reports
Under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)(A), a covered entity that experiences a
covered cyber incident must submit a Covered Cyber Incident Report to
CISA ``not later than 72 hours after the covered entity reasonably
believes that the covered cyber incident has occurred.'' CISA has
included proposed language in the regulation establishing this
timeframe in Sec. 226.5(a).
CISA acknowledges that the point at which a covered entity should
have ``reasonably believed'' a covered cyber incident occurred is
subjective and will depend on the specific factual circumstances
related to the particular incident. Accordingly, CISA is not proposing
a specific definition for the term ``reasonably believes,'' nor is CISA
attempting to prescribe a specific point in the incident life cycle at
which a ``reasonable belief'' will always be realized. Rather, CISA is
providing the following guidance to help covered entities understand
when a ``reasonable belief'' generally is expected to have occurred.
CISA does not expect a covered entity to have reached a
``reasonable belief'' that a covered cyber incident occurred
immediately upon occurrence of the incident, although this certainly
may be true in some cases (e.g., an entity receives a ransom demand
simultaneously with discovery that it has been locked out of its
system). Oftentimes, an entity may need to perform some preliminary
analysis before coming to a ``reasonable belief'' that a covered cyber
incident occurred. This preliminary analysis may be necessary, for
instance, to quickly rule out certain potential benign causes of the
incident or determine the extent of the incident's impact. CISA
believes that in most cases, this preliminary analysis should be
relatively short in duration (i.e., hours, not days) before a
``reasonable belief'' can be obtained, and generally would occur at the
subject matter expert level and not the executive officer level. As
time is of the essence, CISA expects a covered entity to engage in any
such preliminary analysis as soon as reasonably practicable after
becoming aware of an incident and is proposing including such a
requirement in the regulatory text.
A number of stakeholders submitted comments in response to the RFI
suggesting that a ``reasonable belief'' occurs when an entity has
confirmed, determined, or otherwise definitively established that an
incident was a covered cyber incident. CISA does not agree with those
commenters, and instead interprets ``reasonable belief'' to be a much
lower threshold than ``confirmation.'' CISA additionally believes that
if Congress had intended the timeframe for reporting to begin at
confirmation of an incident, it would have used specific language
making that clear. CISA believes few, if any, circumstances will occur
where an extended investigation must be undertaken and concluded before
an entity can form a ``reasonable belief'' that a covered cyber
incident occurred.
2. Timing for Submission of Ransom Payment Reports
Under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2)(A), a covered entity that makes a ransom
payment must submit a Ransom Payment Report to CISA ``not later than 24
hours after the ransom payment has been made.'' CISA has included
proposed language in the regulation reflecting this timeframe in Sec.
226.5(b).
Different regulations have taken different approaches to when a
payment is considered to have been ``made'' by a party. Some
regulations interpret a payment to have been made on the date the
payment is disbursed (e.g., sent, transmitted, submitted).\364\ Others
[[Page 23726]]
interpret a payment to have been made on the date the payment is
received by the payee or otherwise becomes available to the payee.\365\
For some regulations, when the payment is made varies based on the
method of payment.\366\
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\364\ Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 CFR 52.232-25 (``The
Government considers payment as being made on the day a check is
dated or the date of an electronic funds transfer.''); IRS Tax
Regulations, 26 CFR 301.7502-1 (``[I]f the requirements of that
section are met, a document or payment is deemed to be filed or paid
on the date of the postmark stamped on the envelope or other
appropriate wrapper (envelope) in which the document or payment was
mailed.'').
\365\ IRS Employment Tax Regulations, 26 CFR 31.3406(a)-4
(``Amounts are considered paid when they are credited to the account
of, or made available to, the payee. Amounts are not considered paid
solely because they are posted (e.g., an informational notation on
the payee's passbook) if they are not actually credited to the
payee's account or made available to the payee.'').
\366\ Prompt Payment Act Regulations, 5 CFR 1315.4(h) (``Payment
will be considered to be made on the settlement date for an
electronic funds transfer payment or the date of the check for a
check payment.'').
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For purposes of this provision of the regulation, CISA proposes
interpreting payment to have been made upon disbursement of the payment
by the covered entity or a third party directly authorized to make a
payment on the covered entity's behalf. CISA is proposing this approach
for two main reasons. First, when disbursement of a payment was made is
easier for a covered entity to determine than when a payment has
cleared, settled, posted, or otherwise been made available to the
payee. Selecting payment disbursement instead of payment settlement or
clearance as the trigger for when the reporting timeline begins
provides greater clarity and prevents a covered entity from having to
try to determine when a payment has actually been received by or
otherwise made available to the payee. Second, as discussed earlier in
Section III.C.ii in this document, it is imperative that CISA receive
reports of covered cyber incidents and ransom payments in a timely
manner so CISA can more quickly identify adversary trends, TTPs, and
vulnerabilities being exploited to be able to provide other entities
early warnings and mitigation strategies to help them avoid becoming
victims to similar attacks. By interpreting when a payment is made to
be at the earlier point of payment disbursement, rather than the later
point of payment receipt, posting, or settlement, CISA will be able to
receive reports of ransom payments earlier and be better situated to
achieve some of the ultimate goals that Congress authorized the
regulation to achieve.
CISA recognizes that in certain situations, more than one third
party may be involved in the disbursement of a ransom payment. For
instance, a covered entity might send funds to an intermediate third
party, who might then transmit the funds to a financial institution,
who then transfers the payment to the account specified by the party
demanding the ransom payment. In interpreting this regulatory
provision, the reporting timeline shall be deemed to be initiated at
the earliest instance of disbursement. Thus, in the example provided,
disbursement has occurred and the timeline for reporting would be
triggered when the covered entity sent funds to the intermediate third
party. In a case where a covered entity authorizes an intermediate
third party to transmit funds on its behalf to make a ransom payment
but does not actually disburse funds itself at that time, the reporting
timeline shall be deemed to be initiated when the intermediate third
party disburses funds.
3. Timing for Submission of Supplemental Reports
Under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3), a covered entity that has previously
submitted a Covered Cyber Incident Report must ``promptly'' submit to
CISA an update or supplement to that report if either: (a)
``substantial new or different information becomes available''; or (b)
``the covered entity makes a ransom payment after submitting a covered
cyber incident report.'' A covered entity is subject to these
supplemental reporting obligations unless and until the covered entity
notifies CISA that the incident that is the subject of the original
Covered Cyber Incident Report ``has concluded and has been fully
mitigated and resolved.'' Section 226.5(d) of the proposed regulation
contains these Supplemental Reporting requirements.
a. Meaning of ``Promptly''
CISA is proposing to use the statutory language contained in 6
U.S.C. 681b(a)(3) verbatim in the regulation to identify the timeframe
and associated trigger for providing Supplemental Reports to CISA. As
opposed to the statutory language for Covered Cyber Incident Reports
and Ransom Payment Reports that contain specific numerical timeframes,
CIRCIA requires Supplemental Reports to be submitted ``promptly'' upon
the occurrence of either of the two identified triggering events. CISA
interprets ``promptly'' to generally mean what it means colloquially,
i.e., without delay or as soon as possible.
CISA notes that one of the two potential triggering events for a
Supplemental Report has a separate timeframe for reporting mandated in
CIRCIA. Specifically, making a ransom payment following the submission
of a Covered Cyber Incident Report triggers a requirement for the
covered entity to submit a Supplemental Report. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(3). Given that CIRCIA requires covered entities to submit
Ransom Payment Reports within 24 hours of making the ransom payment,
CISA believes it is appropriate to interpret ``promptly'' to mean no
longer than 24 hours after disbursement of the payment. Any other
interpretation would result in a logical inconsistency where a covered
entity would be able to extend the timeframe for reporting a ransom
payment by filing a separate Covered Cyber Incident Report prior to
making the ransom payment.
b. Meaning of ``Substantial New or Different Information''
CISA proposes interpreting ``substantial new or different
information'' as meaning information that (1) is responsive to a
required data field in a Covered Cyber Incident Report that the covered
entity was unable to substantively answer at the time of submission of
that report or any Supplemental Report related to that incident, or (2)
shows that a previously submitted Covered Cyber Incident Report or
Supplemental Report is materially incorrect or incomplete in some
manner. Together, these two provisions will help ensure that a covered
entity has provided to CISA all required information related to a
covered cyber incident in a timely fashion and that any material
inaccuracies in a previously submitted Covered Cyber Incident Report or
Supplemental Report are promptly corrected.
The first prong of the interpretation--information that is
responsive to a required data field in a Covered Cyber Incident Report
that the covered entity was unable to substantively answer at the time
of submission of that report or any Supplemental Report related to that
incident--is focused on filling informational gaps from prior
reporting. For instance, if an entity stated in its Covered Cyber
Incident Report that the vulnerability exploited in perpetrating the
incident was ``unknown at this time,'' discovery of the exploited
vulnerability would be information that meets this prong and would need
to be reported promptly in a Supplemental Report. This prong is focused
solely on completion of required data fields for which a covered entity
previously did not have responsive or complete information at the time
of filing a Covered Cyber Incident Report. CISA considers newly
discovered information
[[Page 23727]]
for any previously unaddressed required data field to be substantial
and to meet the meaning of ``substantial new or different
information.'' If a covered entity discovers new information related to
a question it has previously responded to, that information should be
evaluated under the second prong, and would only be considered
``substantial new or different information'' that must be reported if
it meets a materiality threshold.
The second prong of the interpretation--information that shows that
a previously submitted Covered Cyber Incident Report or Supplemental
Report is materially incorrect or incomplete in some manner--is focused
on amendments or additions to content previously provided by a covered
entity about a covered cyber incident. To reduce the burden of
supplemental reporting on covered entities, CISA is proposing to limit
supplemental reporting requirements under this prong to times when the
amendment or addition would result in a material change in CISA's
understanding of the covered cyber incident. Limiting this prong to
material changes will help ensure that CISA gets material updates in a
timely manner while avoiding making a covered entity submit a
Supplemental Report every time it learns anything new about the
incident.
Examples of the types of information that CISA believes typically
should be considered material include updated or corrected information
on the TTPs used to perpetrate the incident; the discovery or
identification of additional indicators of compromise; additional or
corrected information related to the identity of the individual or
individuals who perpetrated the incident; or identification of
significant new consequences. Changes to the covered entity's point of
contact information should also be considered material and reported
promptly. Additionally, while newly discovered information that is
responsive to an ``optional'' question need not be reported, material
corrections to previously submitted information must be reported even
if the originally submitted information was submitted in response to an
``optional'' question.
Examples that generally would not be considered material include
minor technical corrections or changes to the extent, but not the type,
of the impact (unless the changes to the extent of the impact were
orders of magnitude higher than what was previously reported). CISA
encourages covered entities to provide that information to CISA, but
covered entities are not required to do so. Similarly, CISA encourages
covered entities to voluntarily provide additional information that is
not required by CIRCIA Reports but ``enhances the situational awareness
of cyber threats'' consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681c(b).
While covered entities are not expected to submit Supplemental
Reports for Ransom Payment Reports (unless the Ransom Payment Report is
associated with a Covered Cyber Incident Report), CISA expects a
covered entity to correct material inaccuracies. For example, if a
covered entity submitted the incorrect phone number for its point of
contact, the covered entity should correct its Ransom Payment report
submission.
c. Meaning of ``Concluded'' and ``Fully Mitigated and Resolved''
A covered entity's supplemental reporting requirements remain in
effect until the covered entity notifies CISA ``that the covered cyber
incident at issue has concluded and has been fully mitigated and
resolved.'' 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). Although the point at which an
incident is concluded and fully mitigated and resolved may vary based
on the specific facts of the incident, reaching the following
milestones is a good indication that an incident has been concluded and
fully mitigated and resolved: (1) the entity has completed an
investigation of the incident, gathered all necessary information, and
documented all relevant aspects of the incident; and (2) the entity has
completed steps required to address the root cause of the incident
(e.g., completed any necessary containment and eradication actions;
identified and mitigated all exploited vulnerabilities; removed any
unauthorized access). The completion of a lessons learned analysis
(i.e., after action report) is a valuable part of incident response,
but CISA does not believe that such analysis needs to be completed for
an incident to be considered concluded and fully mitigated and
resolved. Similarly, CISA does not believe that all damage caused by
the incident must have been fully addressed and remediated for an
incident to be considered concluded and fully mitigated and resolved.
For an incident to be concluded and fully mitigated and resolved, a
covered entity should have a good-faith belief that further
investigation would not uncover any substantial new or different
information about the covered cyber incident. If, following the
provision of a notification to CISA that the covered entity believes
the covered cyber incident to be concluded and fully mitigated and
resolved, the covered entity becomes aware of any substantial new or
different information, the covered entity is responsible for submitting
a Supplemental Report. In such a situation, CISA will consider the
prior notification that the incident is concluded and fully mitigated
and resolved to be rendered void and the covered cyber incident ongoing
and active. The covered entity remains responsible for submitting
Supplemental Information until such time as the covered cyber incident
is concluded and fully mitigated and resolved and no new or different
information indicates that the covered cyber incident is ongoing.
v. Report Submission Procedures
1. Submission of CIRCIA Reports to CISA
As discussed above, CISA is proposing that covered entities or
third parties submitting CIRCIA Reports on behalf of a covered entity
are required to do so using the web-based user interface or other
mechanism subsequently approved by the Director. To submit a report
using the web-based user interface, the submitter will need to have
completed all required fields, to include, in the case of a third-party
submitter, an attestation that the third party has been expressly
authorized by the covered entity to submit the report on the covered
entity's behalf. In recognition that a covered entity may not have all
the required information within the 72-hour time limit for submission
of a Covered Cyber Incident Report, CISA may accept submission of a
report where the response to some required answers is ``unknown at this
time,'' ``pending the results of additional investigation,'' or some
other similar option to submit the initial report.
CISA is proposing that, upon receipt of a report, CISA issue the
covered entity (and, in the cases of a third-party submitter, the third
party) a confirmation of receipt along with a unique case management
number. The confirmation of receipt is simply meant to inform the
covered entity that the report has been properly submitted to and
received by CISA; the confirmation is not, however, an indication that
a covered entity has necessarily met all of its reporting requirements.
The case identification number is meant to facilitate tracking and
performance of future actions related to the specific incident or
ransom payment, to include supporting pre-population of data fields
during the preparation of Supplemental Reports.
CISA intends to provide covered entities the opportunity to
register with
[[Page 23728]]
CISA under this proposed rule. Registration would allow a covered
entity to pre-populate a number of the required data fields, such as
entity identifying information, on the proposed web-based CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form. Registering with CISA would allow a covered
entity to submit certain information to CISA for use in future CIRCIA
reporting. Any covered entity that had previously submitted a CIRCIA
Report would also have the information they submitted stored for future
use. CISA believes that allowing this optional registration, which is
completely voluntary, would reduce the time burden associated with
submitting a CIRCIA Report when required due to the advanced submission
and pre-population of certain information that is required in a CIRCIA
Report.
2. Process for Notifying CISA That an Incident Has Concluded and Been
Fully Mitigated and Resolved
Covered entities have the option of notifying CISA that a
previously reported covered cyber incident has concluded and has been
fully mitigated and resolved. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(3). Although
notifying CISA that a previously reported covered cyber incident has
concluded and been fully mitigated and resolved is not required, doing
so terminates the covered entity's responsibility to provide
Supplemental Reports.\367\
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\367\ As noted in Section IV.D.iv.3.c, CISA interprets
notification to terminate the requirement to submit Supplemental
Reports only if no substantial new or different information is
subsequently discovered by the covered entity. CISA believes the
discovery of such information would indicate that the covered
entity's belief that the incident was concluded, fully mitigated,
and resolved, was inaccurate, rendering the declaration of closure
void.
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CISA is proposing that the process for notifying CISA that a
previously reported covered cyber incident has concluded and been fully
mitigated and resolved is through the submission of a Supplemental
Report. A covered entity or a third party submitting a notification on
a covered entity's behalf simply would indicate in the Supplemental
Report that the purpose (or one of the purposes) of the Supplemental
Report is to notify CISA that the covered entity believes the incident
has concluded and been fully mitigated and resolved. The process for
doing so would be the same as for the submission of any other
Supplemental Report, which is described in Sec. 226.6 of the
regulation, although the submitter may be asked certain questions
related to how the incident was concluded, mitigated, and resolved.
3. Third-Party Submission of CIRCIA Reports
CIRCIA authorizes covered entities to use third parties to submit
Covered Cyber Incident Reports or Ransom Payment Reports on behalf of
the covered entity. Specifically, 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(1) states ``[a]
covered entity that is required to submit a covered cyber incident
report or a ransom payment report may use a third party, such as an
incident response company, insurance provider, service provider,
Information Sharing and Analysis Organization, or law firm, to submit
the required report under subsection (a).'' The following subsections
address various aspects of third-party submission of CIRCIA Reports.
a. Who May Serve as a Third-Party Submitter
In response to the RFI, a number of commenters requested that CISA
clarify the types of third parties authorized to submit CIRCIA Reports
on behalf of a covered entity. A few commenters encouraged CISA to
allow anyone approved by a covered entity to be able to submit a report
on their behalf, while others encouraged CISA take the opposite
approach and limit the types of entities that could serve as a third-
party submitter. Some commenters provided specific types of entities
that they believe CISA should authorize to serve as third-party
submitters, including, but not limited to, ISACs, incident management
firms, external legal representatives, state water associations, and
SLTT jurisdictions to whom an entity is also obligated to report.
In 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(1), Congress provides a list of entities that
covered entities might use to report Covered Cyber Incident Reports or
Ransom Payment Reports on the covered entity's behalf. Specifically, 6
U.S.C. 681b(d)(1) states a covered entity that is required to submit a
Covered Cyber Incident Report or a Ransom Payment Report ``may use a
third party, such as an incident response company, insurance provider,
service provider, Information Sharing and Analysis Organization, or law
firm,'' to submit the required report. As Congress preceded this list
with the phrase ``such as,'' CISA interprets the list to be
illustrative examples and not a closed list of which categories of
third parties a covered entity may use to submit CIRCIA Reports on its
behalf.
The few comments CISA received on this topic demonstrate that there
may be a wide variety of types of organizations or individuals that a
covered entity may wish to have submit a report on the covered entity's
behalf. CISA does not at this time see any policy rationales for
limiting the types of organizations or individuals that a covered
entity can choose to submit a report on the covered entity's behalf,
especially considering that the responsibility for complying with the
regulation remains with the covered entity even if it uses a third
party to submit a report on its behalf. 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(3). On the
contrary, CISA sees value in allowing the covered entity the
flexibility to determine which party is best situated to submit CIRCIA
Reports on its behalf. Accordingly, CISA is proposing that a covered
entity may use any organization or individual it chooses to submit a
CIRCIA Report on its behalf.
While CISA is proposing that a covered entity may select any
organization or individual it chooses to submit a report on its behalf,
the third party must be expressly authorized by the covered entity to
submit a report on the covered entity's behalf for the report to be
accepted by CISA for purposes of compliance with the regulation. As the
requirement to submit a timely and accurate report under CIRCIA remains
in all cases with the covered entity itself, it is imperative that the
covered entity have expressly authorized a third party to submit a
report on its behalf. Express authorization can be granted in any
number of ways, including verbally or in writing. Any report submitted
by a third party that has not been expressly authorized by the covered
entity to submit the report will not be imputed to the covered entity
or considered by CISA for purposes of CIRCIA compliance.\368\
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\368\ Historically, CISA has on occasion received reports from
individuals or organizations not directly affiliated with the entity
experiencing the impact or otherwise not authorized to report the
incident on behalf of the affected entity. This may occur, for
instance, where an individual or organization is directly
experiencing an incident that is causing cascading effects on
another entity's information systems, where an individual or
organization has become aware of what it believes to be an incident
on another entity's cyber system, or where an employee of an
organization that is experiencing a cyber incident elects to report
an incident despite not having authority from the entity to report
on its behalf. In these and other situations where an individual
wants to submit a report about an incident without the consent of
the covered entity experiencing the incident, it may do so through
CISA's voluntary reporting portal; however, the information
contained in that report will not be imputed to the entity
experiencing the incident, nor will it be considered a report
submitted for the purposes of CIRCIA compliance.
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To better ensure that a report being submitted by a third party is
being submitted subject to the express authorization of the covered
entity, CISA is proposing requiring the third party to include in the
submission an attestation that it has been expressly
[[Page 23729]]
authorized by the covered entity to submit the report. This likely
would be accomplished by requiring a third party to check a box in the
online form attesting to this, or some other similar electronic
mechanism. As a general legal prohibition against knowingly providing
false information to the Federal government exists (see 18 U.S.C.
1001), CISA believes that requiring this attestation from the third
party is a sufficient deterrent to prevent individuals or organizations
from seeking to submit a CIRCIA Report on behalf of a covered entity
without express authorization.
CISA considered requiring a third party to provide some sort of
evidence verifying its claim of authorization, such as a contract or
email clearly conferring the authority. CISA believes, however, that
the deterrent value of requiring the third party to attest in the
reporting form that they have the express authority to submit on behalf
of the covered entity is sufficient to prevent most cases of
unauthorized submissions, and that the marginal benefit provided by
requiring evidence of such express authorization is exceeded by the
burden of providing specific evidence. Additionally, CISA believes
requiring evidence beyond an attestation has the potential to
disincentivize the use of third-party submitters, which CISA believes
may be detrimental to organizations seeking to leverage third parties
to assist with incident response and recovery.
Some commenters suggested that a third party must be in a formal,
contractual relationship with the covered entity to submit on the
entity's behalf. CISA believes this level of formality is not necessary
and may not be practical in certain arrangements, such as where an
entity is using an ISAC or an SLTT Government entity to submit on the
entity's behalf. Accordingly, CISA is not proposing that a covered
entity and third party must have entered into a formal, contractual
agreement for the third party to be authorized to submit on the covered
entity's behalf.
b. Types of CIRCIA Reports a Third Party May Submit
Section 681b(d)(1) of title 6, United States Code, states ``[a]
covered entity that is required to submit a covered cyber incident
report or a ransom payment report may use a third party, such as an
incident response company, insurance provider, service provider,
Information Sharing and Analysis Organization, or law firm, to submit
the required report under subsection (a).'' The subsection that clause
refers to is 6 U.S.C. 681b(a) which, among other things, sets forth the
general requirements related to Covered Cyber Incident Reports, Ransom
Payment Reports, and Supplemental Reports. Although the first part of 6
U.S.C. 681b(d)(1) only mentions Covered Cyber Incident Reports and
Ransom Payment Reports, CISA interprets the phrase ``submit the
required report under subsection (a)'' to cover not only Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and Ransom Payment Reports, but Supplemental Reports
as well.
CISA is not aware of any persuasive policy reasons for allowing a
covered entity to use a third party to submit a Covered Cyber Incident
Report or Ransom Payment Report on the entity's behalf, but not allow a
third party to submit a Supplemental Report to CISA on the covered
entity's behalf; nor does CISA believe that was Congress's intent.
Conversely, CISA believes that there would be benefits to allowing a
covered entity to use a third party to submit a Supplemental Report on
the covered entity's behalf, especially in cases where a covered entity
used the same third party to submit a previous report on the covered
entity's behalf. Accordingly, CISA is proposing that covered entities
be allowed to use a third party to submit and update any type of CIRCIA
Report--i.e., a Covered Cyber Incident Report, Ransom Payment Report,
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report, or Supplemental
Report--on behalf of the covered entity, so long as any other
regulatory requirements related to using a third party to submit a
CIRCIA Report on a covered entity's behalf are met. CISA further
proposes that a covered entity need not have used a third party to
submit its initial report (be it a Covered Cyber Incident Report or a
Ransom Payment Report) to use a third party to submit a Supplemental
Report or vice versa. Similarly, a covered entity can use different
third-party submitters for subsequent CIRCIA Reports. Whether a covered
entity submits a report itself or uses a third party, and who the
third-party submitter is if one is used, is something the covered
entity may decide each time it submits a CIRCIA Report.
CISA also is proposing to allow third parties to submit a single
report on behalf of multiple covered entities if the circumstances
leading to the reporting requirement for the various covered entities
is similar enough to be reported collectively. For example, if a single
cyber incident perpetrated against a CSP, managed service provider, or
other third-party service provider impacts a number of the service
provider's customers in a similar fashion, and those impacted customers
are covered entities, the service provider may be well situated to
submit a single report on behalf of itself and some or all of its
affected customers. In such a situation, the rules regarding third
party submissions still would apply, with the third-party service
provider needing to have the authorization to report on behalf of any
customer on whose behalf it is reporting, as well as the ability to
provide all of the information that the covered entity customer would
have has to submit on its own, were it submitting its own CIRCIA
Report. CISA believes this proposed approach will help reduce reporting
burden while still providing a complete picture of the covered cyber
incident.
c. Process for Submission of CIRCIA Reports by Third Parties
CISA is proposing that the process for the submission of a report
by a third party on behalf of the covered entity be the same process as
that which exists for the submission of a report by the covered entity
itself, with two minor modifications. First, as noted in Section
IV.E.iii.1.d in this document, CISA is proposing that a third-party
submitter must attest in the reporting form to the fact that it has
been authorized by the covered entity to submit the report on behalf of
the covered entity. Second, as noted in Section IV.E.iii.4 in this
document, CISA is proposing that any CIRCIA Report submitted by a third
party include a small number of additional questions to ensure that
CISA has a name and point of contact information for both the third-
party submitter and the covered entity on whose behalf the report is
being submitted. CISA's rationale for these two minor modifications are
discussed in the respective sections of this document cited earlier in
this paragraph.
d. Burden of Compliance When a Covered Entity Uses a Third Party To
Submit a Report
A number of comments received by CISA in response to the RFI
encourage CISA to confirm that the responsibilities for complying with
the CIRCIA regulatory requirements do not shift from the covered entity
to a third party when the covered entity uses a third party to submit a
CIRCIA Report on the covered entity's behalf. CISA interprets the
statutory language to affirm that use of a third party does not shift
compliance responsibilities from the covered entity to the third party.
While the statute authorizes a covered entity to use a third party to
submit a report on the covered entity's behalf, it does not
[[Page 23730]]
at any point authorize CISA to hold a third-party submitter accountable
for a covered entity's reporting responsibilities, nor does it at any
point absolve the covered entity of its reporting obligations. In fact,
6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(3) indicates the contrary, stating third-party
reporting ``does not relieve a covered entity from the duty to comply
with the requirements for covered cyber incident report or ransom
payment report submission.'' While 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(3) does not mention
Supplemental Reports, there similarly is nothing in the statute
absolving a covered entity of the responsibility for submitting
Supplemental Reports as required or shifting that responsibility to a
third party, and CISA is unaware of any policy rationales for treating
Supplemental Reports differently in this circumstance from Covered
Cyber Incident Reports or Ransom Payment Reports.
Additional support for the interpretation that the burden does not
shift to the third party when a covered entity uses a third party to
submit on its behalf is found in 6 U.S.C. 681d(a), which explicitly
refers to covered entities as the entity to which CISA is authorized to
issue an RFI or a subpoena when it believes a covered entity has failed
to submit a required CIRCIA Report. Likewise, the venue provision
contained in 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)(B) focuses on where the covered entity
resides, is found, or does business for purposes of determining where a
civil action may be brought. These sections make clear that any
enforcement action for noncompliance is to be brought against the
covered entity, not a third party that submitted (or failed to submit)
a report on the covered entity's behalf. Consistent with this
understanding, CISA interprets it to be the covered entity's
responsibility to ensure that any CIRCIA Report submitted by a third-
party on the covered entity's behalf is accurate and to correct any
inaccurate or update incomplete information through the submission of a
Supplemental Report.
e. Third Party Ransom Payments and Duty To Advise
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(2), a third party that makes a ransom
payment on behalf of a covered entity impacted by a ransomware attack
is not required to submit a Ransom Payment Report on behalf of itself
for such ransom payment. The obligation to report that ransom payment
remains with the covered entity, although the covered entity may
authorize the third party who made the ransom payment, or a different
third party, to submit a Ransom Payment Report to CISA on the covered
entity's behalf. Accordingly, CISA proposes reflecting this in the
proposed regulation by stating in Sec. 226.12(d) that a third party
that makes a ransom payment on behalf of a covered entity impacted by a
ransomware attack is not required to submit a Ransom Payment Report on
behalf of itself for the ransom payment.
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681b(d)(4), however, a third party that
knowingly makes a ransom payment on behalf of a covered entity impacted
by a ransomware attack does have a duty to advise that covered entity
of its obligation to report the ransom payment to CISA. CISA proposes
codifying this in the regulation in Sec. 226.12(d). CISA recognizes
that there may be situations where a chain of third parties is involved
in making a ransom payment on behalf of a covered entity. CISA intends
the duty to advise the covered entity of its reporting obligations to
apply only to a third party who is directly engaging with the covered
entity knowingly for the purposes of making the ransom payment. Third
parties involved in the payment of the ransom who do not have a direct
relationship with the covered entity or who are not aware that the
funds being transmitted are for the purpose of paying a ransom payment
are not obliged to inform the covered entity of CIRCIA reporting
requirements.
vi. Request for Comments on Proposed Manner, Form, and Content of
Reports
CISA seeks comments on all aspects of the proposed manner, form,
and content of CIRCIA Reports, and the proposed procedures for
submitting CIRCIA Reports, to include the following:
52. The proposed use of a web-based form as the primary means of
submission of CIRCIA Reports, the proposed maintenance of telephonic
reporting as a back-up reporting option, assumptions used in evaluating
different possible manners of submission, and the possibility of
allowing automated (i.e., machine-to-machine) reporting or other
manners of submission in the future at the discretion of the Director.
53. The proposal to use a single, dynamic, web-based form for the
submission of all types of CIRCIA Reports, regardless of whether the
report is submitted by a covered entity or a third party on the covered
entity's behalf.
54. The content CISA is proposing be included in all CIRCIA Reports
and the specific proposed content for Covered Cyber Incident Reports,
Ransom Payment Reports, Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Reports, and Supplemental Reports, respectively, as well as additional
content CISA is proposing to require when a third-party submitter is
used to submit a CIRCIA Report on behalf of a covered entity.
55. The proposals CISA is making related to the timing of reports,
including the proposed interpretation of ``reasonable belief,'' the
proposed interpretation for when a ransom payment ``has been made,''
the proposed meaning of ``promptly,'' the proposed meaning of
``substantial new or different information,'' and the proposed meaning
of ``concluded'' and ``fully mitigated and resolved.''
56. The proposed CIRCIA Report submission procedures, to include
the process for notifying CISA that an incident has concluded and been
fully mitigated and resolved.
57. The proposed rules regarding the submission of a report by a
third party on behalf of a covered entity, to include who may serve as
a third-party submitter, the types of CIRCIA Reports a third party may
submit on behalf of a covered entity, the burden of compliance when a
covered entity uses a third party to submit a report, and a third
party's duty to advise a covered entity of the covered entity's CIRCIA
reporting requirements when the third party makes a ransom payment on
behalf of a covered entity.
F. Data and Records Preservation Requirements
Under CIRCIA, any covered entity that submits a CIRCIA Report must
preserve data relevant to the reported covered cyber incident or ransom
payment in accordance with procedures established in the final rule. 6
U.S.C. 681b(a)(4). To implement this requirement, CISA is to include in
the final rule, a clear description of the types of data that covered
entities must preserve, the period of time for which the data must be
preserved, and allowable uses, processes, and procedures. See 6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(6).
As noted earlier, a covered entity's use of a third party to submit
a CIRCIA Report on behalf of the covered entity does not shift
compliance responsibilities from the covered entity to the third party.
See IV.D.v.3.d. That principle holds true for data preservation
requirements as well. A covered entity will retain responsibility for
complying with the data preservation requirements established in the
final rule even when the covered entity has a third party submit a
required CIRCIA Report to CISA on behalf of the covered entity.
[[Page 23731]]
i. Types of Data That Must Be Preserved
The preservation of data and records \369\ in the aftermath of a
covered cyber incident serves a number of critical purposes, such as
supporting the ability of analysts and investigators to understand how
a cyber incident was perpetrated and by whom. Access to forensic data,
such as records and logs, can help analysts uncover how malicious cyber
activity was conducted, what vulnerabilities were exploited, what
tactics were used, and so on, which can be essential to preventing
others from falling victim to similar incidents in the future. How an
incident was perpetrated may not be immediately identifiable upon
discovery, and the failure to properly preserve data or records during
the period of initial incident response can render it difficult to
subsequently perform this analysis. This can especially be true in
incidents involving zero-day vulnerabilities or highly complex
malicious cyber activity by nation state threat actors, such as the
``SUNBURST'' malware that compromised legitimate updates of customers
using the SolarWinds Orion product or the Hafnium campaign on Exchange
servers, with the full extent, cause, or attribution of an incident
often not being known until months after the initial discovery.\370\
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\369\ The section in CIRCIA addressing this topic, 6 U.S.C.
681b(a)(4), uses the terms ``data'' and ``information'' at different
times to characterize what a covered entity must preserve. CIRCIA
does not, however, define either term. Rather than add to, or
attempt to select from, the numerous definitions that have been
proffered for both terms in a wide variety of cyber-related
resources, CISA is proposing instead to include in the regulation a
list of items that a covered entity will be required to preserve.
See proposed Sec. 226.13(b). The proposed list includes data and
information in various forms, such as logs, images, registry
entries, and reports. To better reflect the spectrum of information
CISA is proposing to require entities to preserve, and in
recognition of the fact that the term ``records'' is commonly used
in the area of data or records retention, CISA is proposing to use
the term ``data and records'' instead of simply ``data'' or
``information.''
\370\ See, e.g., Adam J. Hart, Evidence Preservation: The Key to
Limiting the Scope of a Breach, American Bar Association
Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Committee Newsletter (Spring 2021),
available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insurance_practice/committees/cyber-data-privacy/evidence-preservation/ (hereinafter ``Evidence Preservation'').
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Preservation of data is also central to law enforcement's ability
to investigate and prosecute the crime. As stated by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in their guidance for Federal prosecutors entitled
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in
Criminal Investigations, ``Electronic records such as computer network
logs, email, word processing files, and image files increasingly
provide the government with important (and sometimes essential)
evidence in criminal cases.'' \371\ Failure to properly preserve
relevant data and other forensic evidence can make identification and
prosecution of the perpetrators of a cyber incident significantly
harder, if not impossible.
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\371\ Department of Justice Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining
Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations at ix (2009),
available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-ccips/ccips-documents-and-reports.
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In order to support these activities, and consistent with the
authorities provided to CISA in 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(4) and 681(c)(6), CISA
is proposing requiring covered entities to preserve a variety of data
and records related to any covered cyber incidents or ransom payments
reported to CISA in a CIRCIA Report. Specifically, CISA is proposing to
require covered entities preserve data and records relating to
communications between the covered entity and the threat actor;
indicators of compromise; relevant log entries, memory captures, and
forensic images; network information or traffic related to the cyber
incident; the attack vector; system information that may help identify
vulnerabilities that were exploited to perpetrate the incident;
information on any exfiltrated data; \372\ data and records related to
any ransom payment made; and any forensic or other reports about the
cyber incident produced or procured by the covered entity. See Sec.
226.13(b).
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\372\ CISA is not proposing that a covered entity be required to
preserve copies of all of the exfiltrated data; rather, CISA is
proposing that a covered entity preserve information related to the
data, such as the type and amount of data exfiltrated.
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CISA developed the proposed list of data and records to be
preserved based upon its own experience with conducting incident
detection, response, prevention, and analysis; by reviewing both best
practices related to incident management, data preservation, and post-
incident forensic analysis and stakeholder recommendations provided in
response to the CIRCIA RFI and at the CIRCIA listening sessions; and
following consultations with various Federal partners, to include the
FBI and DOJ. Each of the proposed categories of data and records
contains information directly relevant to questions and reporting
elements of incident reports, as well as potentially helps CISA or
other investigators identify and understand the TTPs used to perpetrate
the incident, the vulnerabilities exploited in doing so, and
potentially the identity of the perpetrator of the incident. The data
and records proposed for preservation additionally may be useful in
subsequent law enforcement investigations and prosecution of the
individual or individuals who perpetrated the incident.
A covered entity that has any of the data or records listed above
must preserve those data or records regardless of what format they are
in, whether they are electronic or not, located onsite or offsite,
found in the network or in the cloud, etc. A covered entity is not,
however, required to create any data or records it does not already
have in its possession based on this regulatory requirement. The
requirement for a covered entity to preserve data or records applies
only to the extent the entity already has created, or would be creating
them, irrespective of CIRCIA.
CISA is aware that retaining data and records is not without cost.
In recognition of this, CISA attempted to reduce or focus the list of
items to be retained to those that CISA believes would most likely be
of value in support of future analysis or investigation. For instance,
rather than require covered entities retain all log entries or memory
captures from the time of the incident in case any of them may have
contained pertinent data, CISA is proposing to limit this to log
entries, memory captures, or forensic images that the covered entity
believes in good faith are relevant to the incident. Similarly, CISA is
not proposing that a covered entity be required to preserve copies of
all data that was exfiltrated during an incident, but rather simply
proposes that a covered entity preserve information sufficient to
understand what type of and how much data was exfiltrated.
ii. Required Preservation Period
CISA is proposing that covered entities that submit CIRCIA Reports
must begin preserving the required data at the earlier of either (a)
the date upon which the entity establishes a reasonable belief that a
covered cyber incident has occurred, or (b) the date upon which a
ransom payment was disbursed, and must preserve the data for a period
of no less than two years from the submission of the latest required
CIRCIA Report submitted pursuant to Sec. 226.3, to include any
Supplemental Reports. Accordingly, if a covered entity only submits a
single CIRCIA Report to CISA on a covered cyber incident or ransom
payment, then the data preservation obligation is two years from the
submission of the Covered Cyber Incident Report, Ransom Payment Report,
or Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report. If, however,
a covered entity submits one or more Supplemental Reports on a
[[Page 23732]]
single covered cyber incident or ransom payment, the two-year retention
period restarts at the time of submission of each Supplemental Report.
In establishing this proposed two-year timeframe, CISA considered
existing best practices regarding preservation of information related
to cyber incidents, data retention or preservation requirements from
comparable regulatory programs, and comments received on this issue
from stakeholders in response to the CIRCIA RFI and at CIRCIA listening
sessions. In Section 3.4.3 of its Computer Security Incident Handling
Guide,\373\ NIST discusses best practices for retaining evidence in the
aftermath of a cybersecurity incident. Specifically, NIST Special
Publication 800-61 Revision 2 (NIST SP 800-61r2) encourages
organizations to establish policies regarding retention of evidence
from an incident and states that ``[m]ost organizations choose to
retain all evidence for months or years after the incident ends.'' In
determining how long an entity should choose to preserve evidence, NIST
recommends entities consider three factors. First, NIST notes that
evidence may be needed in order to prosecute the threat actor which, in
some cases, may take several years. On this point, NIST also notes that
sometimes evidence that seems insignificant at the time of the incident
will become more important in the future. The second factor NIST
suggests entities consider is any existing internal data retention
policies. As a point of reference, NIST notes that the General Records
Schedule for Information Systems Security Records requires Federal
departments and agencies to maintain computer security incident
handling, reporting, and follow-up records for three years after all
necessary follow-up actions have been completed.\374\ The final factor
NIST mentions as something that should be considered is cost. NIST
notes that certain items preserved as evidence generally may be
inexpensive individually, but costs can be substantial if an
organization stores such items for years. Outside of noting the three-
year retention period included in the General Records Schedule, NIST SP
800-61r2 does not recommend a specific timeframe as a best practice for
data preservation.
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\373\ NIST SP 800-61r2, supra note 362, at 41.
\374\ National Archives, General Records Schedule 3.2:
Information Systems Security Records, Item 020 (Jan. 2023),
available at https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/grs.html.
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While most existing cyber incident reporting requirements do not
include timeframes specifically targeted at preservation of records
related to a cyber incident, many do have broader recordkeeping
requirements that frequently apply to cyber incident reports and/or
other data or records related to a reportable cyber incident. For
instance, facilities subject to CFATS are required to maintain records
on incidents and breaches of security for three years.\375\ The NRC
similarly requires regulated entities to maintain a copy of any written
report submitted to the NRC on a cyber incident for three years.\376\
MTSA requires covered facilities to retain all records related to MTSA,
including those related to cybersecurity incidents, for at least two
years.\377\ And while not a regulation, M-21-31, ``Improving the
Federal Government's Investigative and Remediation Capabilities Related
to Cybersecurity Incidents,'' requires Federal government entities
subject to Executive Order 14028, ``Improving the Nation's
Cybersecurity,'' to retain most logs and certain other items related to
cybersecurity incidents for a period of 30 months.\378\
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\375\ 6 CFR 27.255(a).
\376\ 10 CFR 73.77(d)(12).
\377\ 33 CFR 105.225(a).
\378\ See Office of Management and Budget, M-21-31, Improving
the Federal Government's Investigative and Remediation Capabilities
Related to Cybersecurity Incidents (Aug. 27, 2021), available at
https://www.fedramp.gov/2023-07-14-fedramp-guidance-for-m-21-31-and-m-22-09/.
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CISA did not receive many comments from stakeholders on the topic
of data preservation in response to the RFI or at CIRCIA listening
sessions, but those stakeholders who did comment on the length of
preservation generally recommended timeframes consistent with those
identified above. Specifically, one commenter recommended requiring
data be preserved for no longer than two years,\379\ one commenter
recommended requiring data be preserved for no longer than three
years,\380\ one commenter recommended being consistent with M-21-
31,\381\ and one commenter stated that data should be preserved for as
long as needed, but not in perpetuity.\382\ While not providing
specific recommendations on the duration of preservation requirements,
at least two commenters did note that data preservation can be costly,
and encouraged CISA to develop preservation requirements that are not
overly burdensome and limited in scope and duration.\383\
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\379\ Comments submitted by SAP, CISA-2022-0010-0114.
\380\ Comments submitted by the National Association of Chemical
Distributors, CISA-2022-0010-0056.
\381\ Comments submitted by Sophos, Inc., CISA-2022-0010-0047.
\382\ Comments submitted by the American Chemistry Council,
CISA-2022-0010-0098.
\383\ See, e.g., Comments Submitted by CTIA, CISA-2022-0010-
0070, and the Information Technology Industry Council, CISA-2022-
0010-0097.
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Based on the above, CISA believes that a data preservation
requirement typically lasting anywhere between two and three years
would be consistent with existing best practices across industry and
the Federal government, would be implementable by the regulated
community, and would achieve the purposes for which data preservation
is intended under CIRCIA. Recognizing that the costs for preserving
data increase the longer the data must be retained, and wanting to
limit costs of compliance with CIRCIA where possible without
sacrificing the ability to achieve the purposes of the regulation, CISA
thus is proposing that covered entities must preserve the required data
and records for the lower end of the spectrum of best practice for data
preservation, i.e., a period of two years, unless substantial new or
different information is discovered or additional actions occur that
require the submission of a Supplemental Report and a commensurate
extension of the data preservation timeframe.
iii. Data Preservation Procedural Requirements
Section 681b(c)(6) of title 6, United States Code, requires CISA to
include in the final rule a clear description of the processes and
procedures a covered entity must follow when preserving data. In light
of the different manners in which the various required data and records
can be stored, CISA is proposing to give covered entities significant
flexibility in determining how to preserve the data and records, so
long as the preservation method retains all salient details. This may
include electronic or non-electronic (i.e., hard copy) storage, onsite
or offsite storage, network or cloud storage, and active or cold (i.e.,
archived) storage. CISA believes that this flexibility will allow a
covered entity to determine the most cost-effective way to preserve the
data and records given the entity's specific circumstances and the
nature and format of the data and records being preserved.
CISA is proposing to impose two limitations on this flexibility,
however. First, CISA is proposing that the covered entity must store
the data and records in a manner that allows the data and records to be
readily accessible and retrievable by the covered entity in
[[Page 23733]]
response to a lawful government request. CISA does not intend for this
provision to require entities to maintain the data onsite and have it
immediately available upon request. Rather, CISA expects a covered
entity to be able to retrieve and provide the data and records in
response to a lawful government request within a reasonable amount of
time.
Second, CISA is proposing to require covered entities to employ
reasonable safeguards to protect the data and records against
unauthorized access or disclosure, deterioration, deletion,
destruction, and alteration. These safeguards must include protections
against both natural and man-made, intentional and unintentional
events, including cyber incidents. NIST Special Publication 1800-25,
``Data Integrity: Identifying and Protecting Assets Against Ransomware
and Other Destructive Events,'' provides examples of the types of best
practices that a covered entity might employ to meet this proposed
requirement.
iv. Request for Comments on Proposed Data Preservation Requirements
CISA seeks comments on the proposed data preservation requirements,
to include:
58. The types of data CISA is proposing covered entities preserve.
59. The proposed length of time covered entities must preserve data
for.
60. The proposed procedural requirements governing the preservation
of data.
61. Any other aspect of the proposed data preservation
requirements.
G. Enforcement
i. Overview
CIRCIA provides a variety of mechanisms for CISA to use if CISA
believes that a covered entity has failed to submit a CIRCIA Report in
accordance with CIRCIA regulatory requirements. See 6 U.S.C. 681d. The
potential approaches CISA has to address noncompliance include issuance
of an RFI (6 U.S.C. 681d(b)), issuance of a subpoena (6 U.S.C.
681d(c)(1)), referral to the Attorney General to bring a civil action
to enforce the subpoena and/or pursue a potential contempt of court (6
U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)), and other enforcement mechanisms to include
potential acquisition penalties, suspension, and debarment (6 U.S.C.
681b(c)(8)(B)(ii)). Section 681b(c)(8)(B) of title 6, United States
Code, requires CISA to include in the final rule procedures to carry
out these enforcement provisions. Sections 226.14 through 226.17 of the
proposed rule contain CISA's proposed procedures for each of these
enforcement mechanisms, each of which is described in greater detail
below.
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681d(e), CISA must consider certain factors
when determining whether to exercise any of these enforcement
authorities. Specifically, CIRCIA mandates the Director take into
consideration the complexity of determining whether a covered cyber
incident occurred, and the covered entity's prior interaction with CISA
or its understanding of the policies and procedures for reporting for
covered cyber incidents and ransom payments, as part of the process for
evaluating whether to exercise an enforcement mechanism. CISA is
proposing to include this statutory requirement essentially verbatim in
Sec. 226.14(b) of the proposed regulation. CISA will develop policies
and procedures to ensure that the factors stated above are applied
similarly to covered entities in similar circumstances.
CIRCIA additionally states that its enforcement provisions do not
apply to SLTT Government Entities. 6 U.S.C. 681d(f). CISA proposes
including this SLTT exclusion in Sec. 226.14(a). What qualifies as a
SLTT Government entity is defined in proposed Sec. 226.1 and discussed
in Section IV.A.iv.12 in this document.
ii. Request for Information
CIRCIA authorizes the Director to request information from a
covered entity if the Director has reason to believe that the covered
entity has experienced a covered cyber incident or made a ransom
payment but failed to report the covered cyber incident or ransom
payment in accordance with CIRCIA regulation. 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(1).
Through an RFI, the Director may request additional information from
the covered entity to confirm whether or not a covered cyber incident
or ransom payment occurred. 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(1). Proposed Sec.
226.14(c) contains the language CISA is proposing regarding CISA's
authority to issue an RFI, the form and content of an RFI, requirements
a covered entity must follow to adequately respond to the RFI, the
treatment of information included in a response to an RFI, and the
inability for the issuance of an RFI to be appealed.
1. Issuance of Request
Proposed Sec. 226.14(c) begins with a description of CISA's
authority to issue an RFI. The proposed language starts first with the
acknowledgement that the Director has the authority to delegate the
issuance of an RFI, and then identifies the two different scenarios
that may be the basis of the issuance of an RFI.
Although CIRCIA prohibits the delegation of the Director's subpoena
authority to another individual, CIRCIA does not similarly restrict who
may issue an RFI. To provide CISA with additional flexibility regarding
who may be able to issue an RFI, CISA is proposing to allow an RFI to
be issued by either the Director or a designee of the Director. This
would allow the Director to formally designate another individual (or
more than one individual) as having the authority to issue an RFI. CISA
believes this flexibility will help ensure CISA's ability to issue RFIs
in a timely manner, which may be essential in a rapidly unfolding,
potentially substantial cyber incident. Accordingly, CISA proposes
defining the Director in Sec. 226.1 to include the Director of CISA or
any designee.
Section 681d(b)(1) of title 6, United States Code, authorizes CISA
to issue an RFI when CISA has reason to believe that a covered entity
has experienced a covered cyber incident or made a ransom payment, but
failed to report it ``in accordance'' with 6 U.S.C. 681b(a). CISA
proposes including this authority in Sec. 226.14(c)(1), which would
authorize the issuance of an RFI to a covered entity when CISA has
reason to believe that the entity experienced a covered cyber incident
or made a ransom payment but failed to report the incident or payment
in accordance with section 226.3. CISA interprets this language to
allow CISA to issue an RFI in two distinct circumstances. First, CISA
interprets this to allow CISA to issue an RFI when it believes a
covered entity failed to report a covered cyber incident it experienced
or a ransom payment it made. Second, CISA interprets this to allow
issuance of an RFI to receive additional information following a
covered entity's submission of a report that CISA believes is deficient
or otherwise noncompliant. This second scenario includes when CISA
believes a covered entity failed to submit a Supplemental Report as
required.
A plain reading of 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(1) makes it clear that CISA is
authorized to issue an RFI when CISA believes a covered entity
experienced a covered cyber incident or ransom payment but failed to
report it. That section of CIRCIA also provides additional context for
what the Director, or Director's designee, may use to determine that a
covered entity failed to submit a required CIRCIA Report. Specifically,
[[Page 23734]]
CIRCIA states that CISA may base its decision to issue an RFI (or
subpoena, if necessary) on public reporting or information in the
possession of the Federal government. CISA proposes including this in
Sec. 226.14(c)(1) of the proposed regulation. CISA construes
``information in the possession of the Federal government'' broadly, to
include, among other categories, information derived by CISA analysis,
information reported by the covered entity, information from other
sources typically used or shared by the government, or any combination
of such information.
CISA interprets the language of 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(1) to also
authorize CISA to issue an RFI in cases where a covered entity
submitted a report, but the report was deficient or otherwise
noncompliant. For a number of reasons, CISA believes this to be the
correct interpretation. First, CISA interprets the phrase ``in
accordance'' to not only require that a covered entity submitted a
report, but that it did so in a manner that complies with all the
CIRCIA regulatory requirements for a report of the type in question.
CISA believes that the use of the phrase ``to confirm whether or not a
covered cyber incident or ransom payment has occurred'' in 6 U.S.C.
681d(b)(1) also supports this interpretation. CISA interprets
``confirm'' to include verification, thus allowing CISA to request
information from a covered entity necessary for CISA to confirm (i.e.,
verify) that an incident or payment discussed in an incomplete report
submitted by the covered entity was in fact a covered cyber incident or
reportable ransom payment. Finally, CISA believes this interpretation
also is supported by the fact that CIRCIA authorizes CISA to issue a
subpoena to ``obtain the information required to be reported pursuant
to section 681b of this title.'' 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(1). As the
enforcement process requires the issuance of an RFI prior to the
issuance of a subpoena, it is only logical that CISA would be able to
issue an RFI for information it has the authority to request through a
subsequent enforcement mechanism. For the same reason, CISA interprets
the language to allow for the issuance of an RFI when CISA believes an
entity has failed to submit a Supplemental Report as required.
2. Form and Contents of the RFI
Proposed Sec. 226.14(c)(2) contains CISA's proposal regarding the
content CISA will include in an RFI. While not required to do so by the
statute, CISA believes that enumerating the minimum content that CISA
must include in an RFI will help ensure that a covered entity receives
information explaining why the RFI is being issued and the necessary
elements for the covered entity's response to be adequate. CISA
proposes that an RFI must include the covered entity's contact
information; a summary of the facts describing CISA's reason to believe
that the covered entity failed to report a covered event in compliance
with the regulation; a description of other requested information to
allow CISA to confirm whether a reportable event occurred; the form in
which information must be provided; and the date the information is
due. As set forth in proposed Sec. 226.14(c)(2), CISA interprets
``information'' broadly, including, among other things, tangible items,
electronically stored information, and verbal or written responses.
In certain cases, CISA may want to issue an RFI based on facts that
are derived from nonpublic, confidential, or classified information,
sources, or processes. CISA is proposing in Sec. 226.14(c)(2)(ii) and
(f) that, in such a case, CISA will not reveal the nonpublic,
confidential, or classified information, sources, or processes, and may
limit the summary of the facts to a statement that CISA is aware of
facts indicating that the covered entity has failed to report a covered
cyber incident or ransom payment as required.
3. RFI Response
Proposed Sec. 226.14(c)(3) states that a covered entity must reply
in the manner and format, and within the deadline, set forth in the
RFI. If the covered entity's response to the RFI is inadequate, the
Director, or Director's designee, may request additional information
from the covered entity to determine whether a covered cyber incident
or ransom payment occurred, or the Director may issue a subpoena to
compel the provision of information. Examples of an inadequate response
to an RFI include, but are not limited to, failing to respond to the
RFI, providing a response with insufficient information for CISA to
confirm that a covered cyber incident or ransom payment occurred, or a
covered entity's continued failure to comply with the mandatory covered
cyber incident, ransom payment, and/or Supplemental Report reporting
obligations set forth in Sec. 226.3.
4. Treatment of Information Received
Under 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(2), information provided to CISA in response
to an RFI is to be treated as if it was submitted through the standard
reporting procedures established for submission of a CIRCIA Report. As
a result, information submitted by a covered entity in response to an
RFI receives the protections afforded by Sec. 226.18 as well as the
privacy and civil liberties procedures of Sec. 226.19, to information
submitted in a CIRCIA Report. This includes information provided to
CISA in response to a request for additional information following a
covered entity's inadequate response to an RFI. CISA has included
language in Sec. 226.14(c)(4) of the proposed regulation confirming
that the information protections that apply to information contained in
CIRCIA Reports applies to information submitted in response to an RFI.
As discussed below, however, these protections do not apply to
information provided by the covered entity in response to a subpoena.
5. Unavailability of Appeal
CISA does not consider an RFI to constitute a final agency action.
RFIs have no immediate regulatory implications for the entity, but
rather are an interim step in CISA's compliance communications with an
entity and are not final agency action that has legal consequences for
a party.\384\
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\384\ See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (agency
action may not be interlocutory in nature, but must represent the
``consummation of the agency's decision making process'' and be an
action ``by which rights or obligations have been determined or from
which legal consequences will flow'' (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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In other words, the substance of any enforceable requirements
triggering legal liability are not established by the RFI--any such
requirements, if they are imposed, will not be established until CISA
issues a subpoena for information. Consequently, the RFI is not final
agency action. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 704, only final agency actions are
subject to judicial review. Accordingly, as an RFI is not a final
agency action, the issuance of an RFI cannot be appealed. CISA proposes
including Sec. 226.14(c)(5) to provide notice that the issuance of an
RFI is not appealable.
iii. Subpoena
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(1), if the Director has not received
an adequate response to an RFI within 72 hours of issuance of the RFI,
the Director may issue to the covered entity a subpoena to compel
disclosure of information deemed necessary to determine whether a
covered cyber incident or ransom payment has occurred and obtain the
information required within the applicable CIRCIA Report, as well as
information necessary to assess potential impacts of the incident to
[[Page 23735]]
national security, economic security, or public health and safety. CISA
views the use of the word ``may'' in 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(1) as providing
the Director discretion in determining whether or not to issue a
subpoena, and there could be times that the Director issues a second
RFI if the covered entity's reply was incomplete or unclear such that
CISA cannot confirm whether or not a covered cyber incident or ransom
payment has occurred. Proposed Sec. 226.14(d)(1) codifies this in the
regulation, articulating that the Director may issue a subpoena to
compel disclosure of information from a covered entity if the entity
fails to reply to an RFI or provides an inadequate response. CISA
interprets ``inadequate response'' to mean the submission of a response
to the RFI with omitted, incomplete, unclear, or otherwise insufficient
answers to the Director's, or Director's designee's, RFI. CISA also
interprets ``inadequate response'' as including the covered entity's
continued failure to comply with the mandatory Covered Cyber Incident,
Ransom Payment, and/or Supplemental Report reporting obligations set
forth in 226.3.
1. Timing of Subpoena
Section 681d(c)(1) of title 6, United States Code, provides that
the Director may issue a subpoena if a covered entity fails to respond
to an RFI within 72 hours. CISA interprets this timeframe as the
minimum period after which the Director may issue a subpoena. Thus,
CISA is proposing to state in Sec. 226.14(d)(2) that the Director may
not issue a subpoena earlier than 72 hours after the date of service of
an RFI. There is no deadline by which the Director must issue a
subpoena; the Director may issue a subpoena any time after 72 hours
from the date on which the Director issues an RFI.
2. Form and Contents of Subpoena
Proposed Sec. 226.14(d)(3) contains CISA's proposal regarding the
content CISA will include in a subpoena. Similar to the form and
content of an RFI, CISA believes that enumerating the minimum required
content that must be included in a subpoena will help ensure that a
covered entity receives information explaining why the subpoena is
being issued and the requirements for an adequate response. CISA
proposes a subpoena must include the name and address of the covered
entity, an explanation of the basis for issuing the subpoena and a copy
of the relevant RFI, a description of the information requested, the
date by which the covered entity must reply, and the manner and form in
which the covered entity must provide the information to CISA. As in
regard to the information that may be required in response to an RFI,
CISA interprets ``information'' broadly here, including, among other
things, tangible items, electronically stored information, and verbal
or written responses.
In certain cases, CISA may want to issue a subpoena based on facts
that are derived from nonpublic, confidential, or classified
information, sources, or processes. CISA is proposing in Sec.
226.14(d)(3)(ii) and (f) that, in such a case, CISA will not reveal the
nonpublic, confidential, or classified information, sources, or
processes, and may limit the summary of the facts to a statement that
CISA is aware of facts indicating that the covered entity has failed to
report a covered cyber incident, ransom payment, or substantial new or
different information as required.
3. Reply to the Subpoena
Proposed Sec. 226.14(d)(4) sets forth the subpoena response
requirements for a covered entity. It states that the subpoenaed
covered entity must respond by the deadline identified in the subpoena,
and in the manner and format specified in the subpoena by the Director.
If the covered entity's response to the subpoena is inadequate, the
Director may request or subpoena additional information from the
covered entity or request civil enforcement of the subpoena. Examples
of inadequate response include, but are not limited to, a complete
failure to respond, providing a response that does not allow CISA to
determine whether a covered cyber incident or ransom payment occurred,
providing a response that does not fully comply with the regulatory
reporting requirements, or providing a response that is otherwise
insufficient to assess the potential impacts to national security,
economic security, or public health and safety. As further discussed
below, information provided in response to a subpoena may be referred
to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution or the head of a
regulatory enforcement agency for enforcement if the Director believes
that there is a basis for such action based on the information
received.
CISA considers any responses to CISA's subsequent engagement with a
subpoenaed entity related to the covered cyber incident or ransom
payment as subpoenaed information for the purpose of referral to the
Attorney General or head of a regulatory agency and application of
information protections. Thus, this information may be provided to the
Attorney General or head of a regulatory enforcement agency as
discussed in Sec. 226.14(d)(6)(ii) and is not entitled to the
protections set forth in Sec. 226.18. The Director will take into
account the covered entity's engagement and cooperation with CISA when
determining whether to provide information to the Attorney General or
head of a regulatory agency for criminal prosecution or regulatory
enforcement, respectively, or to pursue civil enforcement.
4. Authentication Requirement for Electronic Subpoenas
Section 681d(c)(4)(A) of title 6, United States Code, states that
any electronically issued subpoena must be authenticated with a
cryptographic digital signature of an authorized representative of
CISA, or other comparable technology, that allows CISA to demonstrate
that CISA issued the subpoena and that the subpoena has not been
altered or modified since its issuance. CISA will make available, for
example on its website, information by which subpoena recipients can
verify that the signature was provided by an authorized representative
of CISA. A recipient of any electronically issued subpoena without the
required authentication does not need to consider the subpoena to be
valid. See 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(4)(A). Proposed Sec. 226.14(d)(5) reflects
this requirement essentially verbatim. This authentication requirement
applies solely to electronically issued subpoenas.
5. Treatment of Information Received in Response to a Subpoena
CIRCIA provides a number of protections to information submitted to
CISA voluntarily, as part of a compliant CIRCIA Report, or in response
to an RFI. These protections, all of which are mandated by CIRCIA, are
set forth in Sec. 226.18 of the proposed regulation and described in
Section IV.H.i in this document. CIRCIA does not explicitly require
similar protections be afforded to information provided in response to
a subpoena issued under CIRCIA. CISA is proposing to explicitly note in
Sec. 226.14(d)(6) of the regulation that these protections do not
apply to information submitted in response to a subpoena. Similarly,
CIRCIA does not require that the privacy and civil liberties procedures
apply to information provided in response to a subpoena issued under
CIRCIA, and thus CISA proposes to note explicitly in the regulatory
text that these procedures do not apply to information submitted in
response to a subpoena. The reason CISA is proposing that the CIRCIA-
[[Page 23736]]
specific privacy and civil liberties procedures would not apply to
responses to subpoenas is that such information is subject to different
handling limitations and authorized uses than information received in a
CIRCIA Report or in response to an RFI. Of note, subpoenaed information
may be shared with certain law enforcement and regulatory officials.
Although the CIRCIA-specific privacy and civil liberties procedures
that CISA is proposing would not apply, CISA notes that any personal
information contained in responses to subpoenas would still be handled
in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 \385\ and the E-Government
Act of 2002.\386\
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\385\ See 5 U.S.C. 552a.
\386\ See 44 U.S.C. 3501 note, Public Law 107-347.
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CISA is proposing this approach in the hopes that the
unavailability of these protections for information submitted in
response to a subpoena will serve as an incentive for covered entities
to comply with the applicable regulation or an RFI, thus preventing the
need for issuance of a subpoena. The RFI provides a window for covered
entities that have failed to submit a CIRCIA Report, as required, to
comply with their legal obligations. If the covered entity remedies
their noncompliance at that time, the covered entity is entitled to
protections under Sec. 226.18 and procedures under Sec. 226.19. If
the entity remains noncompliant and CISA elects to issue a subpoena,
any subsequent information provided by the covered entity in response
to the subpoena will not benefit from those protections.
This section of the proposed regulation also includes language
related to the Director's authority under 6 U.S.C. 681d(d)(1) to
provide information submitted by a covered entity in response to a
subpoena to the Attorney General or head of a Federal regulatory agency
if the Director determines that the facts relating to the covered cyber
incident or ransom payment may constitute grounds for criminal
prosecution or regulatory enforcement action. As part of the decision-
making process related to the exercise of this authority, the Director
is allowed to consult with the Attorney General or the head of the
appropriate Federal regulatory agency. See 6 U.S.C. 681d(d)(2). For
reasons similar to those discussed in Section IV.G.ii.5 in this
document above regarding the appealability of the issuance of an RFI,
CISA proposes including in Sec. 226.14(d)(6)(ii) a statement that any
decision by the Director to execute this authority is not a final
agency action and cannot be appealed.
6. Withdrawal and Appeals of Subpoena Issuance
Section 226.14(d)(7)(i) provides that CISA, in its discretion, may
withdraw a subpoena. If CISA withdraws a subpoena, CISA will serve the
notice of withdrawal as set forth in Sec. 226.14(e). Section
226.14(d)(7)(ii) addresses appeals of a subpoena issuance. CISA is
proposing to allow covered entities to appeal the issuance of a
subpoena within seven calendar days after the date of service by
providing a written request to the Director to withdraw the subpoena.
CISA is proposing requiring a Notice of Appeal to contain, at a
minimum, the name of the covered entity appealing the subpoena
issuance, the request that the Director withdraw the subpoena, the
rationale for the request (e.g., why the entity believes it is not a
covered entity; why the entity believes that the incident is not a
covered cyber incident), and any additional information the covered
entity would like the Director to consider.
iv. Service of an RFI, Subpoena, or Notice of Withdrawal
Proposed Sec. 226.14(e) sets forth the service process for an RFI,
subpoena, or notice of withdrawal of a subpoena. CISA is proposing that
these documents may be served on an officer, managing or general agent,
or any other agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service
or process, and that they may be served through a reasonable electronic
or non-electronic means that demonstrates receipt, such as certified
mail with return receipt, express commercial courier delivery, or
electronic delivery. CISA further is proposing that the date of service
of any RFI, subpoena, or notice of withdrawal of a subpoena shall be
the date on which the document is mailed, electronically transmitted,
or delivered in person, whichever is applicable. These proposed
processes are consistent with standard processes used for service of
legal documents.
v. Enforcement of Subpoenas
Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)(A), if a covered entity fails to
comply with a subpoena, the Director may refer the matter to the
Attorney General to bring a civil action in a district court of the
United States to enforce the subpoena. A civil action to enforce a
subpoena under CIRCIA may be brought in any judicial district in which
the covered entity against whom the action is brought resides, is
found, or does business. 6 U.S.C. 681d(c)(2)(B). A court may punish a
failure to comply with a CIRCIA subpoena as contempt of court. 6 U.S.C.
681d(c)(2)(C). CISA has proposed language reflecting these statutory
authorities in Sec. 226.15 of the proposed regulation.
The Director's referral of a subpoena to the Attorney General is
discretionary. As discussed above, prior to making such a referral, the
Director must consider, among other things, the covered entity's prior
engagement with CISA.
vi. Acquisition, Suspension, and Debarment Enforcement Procedures
Section 681b(c)(8)(B)(ii) of title 6, United States Code, requires
CISA to include in the final rule procedures related to ``other
available enforcement mechanisms including acquisition, suspension and
debarment procedures.'' CISA is proposing procedures to effectuate this
clause in Sec. Sec. 226.16 and 226.17 of the proposed regulation.
Proposed Sec. 226.16 would require the Director to refer all
circumstances concerning a covered entity's noncompliance that may
warrant suspension and debarment action to the DHS Suspension and
Debarment Official. Suspension and debarment are meant to help protect
the Federal government from fraud, waste and abuse by supporting the
Federal government's ability to avoid doing business with non-
responsible contractors.\387\ By including this requirement in CIRCIA,
Congress has provided CISA with an enforcement mechanism to both
discourage and, when necessary, punish noncompliance by making it more
difficult for entities who meet the standard for suspension and
debarment to do business with the Federal government.
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\387\ See GSA, Frequently Asked Questions: Suspension &
Debarment, https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/acquisition-policy/office-of-acquisition-policy/gsa-acq-policy-integrity-workforce/suspension-debarment-and-agency-protests/frequently-asked-questions-suspension-debarment (last visited Nov.
28, 2023).
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Proposed Sec. 226.17 address the ``acquisition'' portion of 6
U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(B)(ii), by authorizing the Director to provide
information regarding a noncompliant entity who has a procurement
contract with the Federal government to the contracting official
responsible for oversight of the contract in question and to the
Attorney General. Whether or not any action can or should be taken
against the entity who is the subject of the referred information is up
to the contracting official's Department or Agency or the Attorney
General, not CISA.
[[Page 23737]]
vii. Penalty for False Statements and Representations
Any person that knowingly and willfully makes a materially false or
fraudulent statement or representation in connection with, or within, a
CIRCIA Report, RFI Response, or reply to an administrative subpoena is
subject to penalties under 18 U.S.C. 1001. CISA interprets materially
false or fraudulent statements or representations relating to CIRCIA to
potentially include, but not be limited to, knowingly and willfully
doing any of the following: submitting a CIRCIA Report for an incident
that did not occur, claiming to be a representative of a covered entity
whom you do not in fact represent, certifying you are a third party
authorized to submit on behalf of a covered entity when you do not have
authorization, and including false information within a CIRCIA Report,
RFI Response, or response to an administrative subpoena. CISA would not
consider scenarios where a covered entity reports information that it
reasonably believes to be true at the time of submission, but later
learns through investigation that it was not correct and submits a
Supplemental Report reflecting this new information, to constitute a
false statement or representation. Penalties for making false
statements and representations under 18 U.S.C. 1001 include a fine or
imprisonment for not more than five years. The maximum penalty for
making false statements and penalties increases to eight years
imprisonment if the false statement is related to international or
domestic terrorism or certain sexual offenses. As part of implementing
this proposed provision, CISA would refer potential violations of this
proposed provision to DOJ, and DOJ would determine whether to prosecute
violators of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Further, the inclusion of materially false
or fraudulent statements or representations in submissions to CISA
would not receive the protections and restrictions on use enumerated in
Sec. 226.18 because they would be inaccurate, incomplete, or invalid
submissions that do not satisfy the regulatory reporting obligations
and requirements proposed by this Part.
viii. Request for Comments on Proposed Enforcement
CISA seeks comments on its proposed approach to enforcement and
noncompliance, including the following:
62. The proposed approach for RFIs, to include the delegation of
authority to issue an RFI; the circumstances in which an RFI should be
issued; the form and content of an RFI; the manner, form, and timeline
for responding to an RFI; the treatment of information received in
response to an RFI; and the lack of availability of an appeal for an
RFI;
63. The proposed approach for subpoenas, to include the
circumstances in which a subpoena should be issued; the timing of
issuance of a subpoena; the form and content of a subpoena; the manner,
form, and timeline for responding to a subpoena; the treatment of
information received in response to a subpoena; and the withdrawal and
appeal of a subpoena;
64. The proposed service process for an RFI, Subpoena, or Notice of
Withdrawal;
65. The proposed process for enforcement of subpoenas, to include
the referral of the matter to the Attorney General to bring a civil
action; and
66. The proposed acquisition, suspension, and debarment enforcement
procedures.
H. Protections
i. Treatment of Information and Restrictions on Use
1. Overview
CIRCIA applies a variety of information protections and
restrictions on the use of CIRCIA Reports, as well as information
submitted in response to an RFI. See 6 U.S.C. 681d(b)(2), 681e(b),
681e(a)(1) and (5). CIRCIA also provides liability protection for any
person or entity that submits a CIRCIA Report in compliance with the
reporting requirements established in the CIRCIA regulation or in a
response to an RFI, as described in greater detail below. See 6 U.S.C.
681e(c). To ensure that the full suite of information protections and
restrictions on use of CIRCIA Reports authorized by CIRCIA applies
consistently to CIRCIA Reports or information in CIRCIA reports (as
applicable), as well as responses to RFIs, CISA proposes to include
them in Sec. 226.18 of the proposed rule. However, as discussed in the
section on Treatment of Information Received in Response to a Subpoena
(Section IV.G.iii.5 in this document), CIRCIA does not require similar
protections to be afforded to information provided in response to a
subpoena issued under CIRCIA. Therefore, CISA proposes to specifically
exclude all information and reports submitted in response to a subpoena
from receiving any of the protections provided under Sec. 226.18 of
the proposed rule.
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e, Sec. 226.18 generally includes
protections governing how CIRCIA Reports or the information submitted
therein and responses to RFIs must be treated within the U.S.
Government and restricts how CIRCIA Reports or the information
submitted therein and responses to RFIs may be used. The proposed rule
separates these protections into two broad categories with the specific
protections afforded to (1) CIRCIA Reports or information submitted in
CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs and (2) reporting entities and
persons detailed under each. Specifically, CISA proposes under the
first category, Treatment of Information, the following protections
which are consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e: (a) Designation as Commercial,
Financial, and Proprietary Information, (b) Exemption from Disclosure
under FOIA, (c) No Waiver of Privilege or Protection Provided by Law,
and (d) an Ex Parte Communications Waiver. Under Restrictions on Use,
CISA proposes the following restrictions consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e:
(a) Prohibition on Use in Regulatory Actions, (b) Liability Protection
and Evidentiary and Discovery Bar for CIRCIA Reports, and (c)
Authorized Uses. CISA's understanding and interpretation of each of
these protections and restrictions is provided in more detail below.
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e, Sec. 226.18(a) notes that each
provision of Sec. 226.18 applies to CIRCIA Reports or the information
in CIRCIA Reports, as stated in the respective subsection.
2. Treatment of Information
a. Designation as Commercial, Financial, and Proprietary Information
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(1), Sec. 226.18(b)(1) provides
that a covered entity may designate a CIRCIA Report, a response to an
RFI, or any portion thereof, as commercial, financial, and proprietary
information by clearly designating the report or a portion thereof as
such with appropriate markings at the time of submission. CISA intends
to enable covered entities or third parties to easily perform this
designation when submitting a CIRCIA Report by including in the web-
based form for all CIRCIA Reports a mechanism such as a check box
through which such a designation can be made. Upon a covered entity or
third-party submitter making the designation, CISA will treat the
CIRCIA Report, or the designated portions thereof, as commercial,
financial, and proprietary information belonging to the covered entity.
[[Page 23738]]
b. Exemption From Disclosure Under FOIA
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(2), Sec. 226.18(b)(2) provides
that CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs submitted in compliance with
the CIRCIA regulation are exempt from disclosure under section
552(b)(3) of the FOIA and any State, Local, or Tribal government
freedom of information law, open government law, open meetings law,
open records law, sunshine law, or similar law requiring disclosure of
information or records. CISA proposes that, in the event CISA receives
a FOIA request for which a CIRCIA Report or response to RFI would be
responsive, CISA would assert that this exemption from disclosure under
FOIA applies to such CIRCIA Report or response to RFI if submitted by a
covered entity or third-party submitter in conformance with the manner,
form, and content requirements described in Sec. Sec. 226.6 through
226.11. CISA does not see any compelling policy reason or legal
rationale to interpret this CIRCIA statutory exemption from disclosure
under the FOIA any differently than as the plain language states and
interprets the CIRCIA FOIA exemption to protect against disclosure of
CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs. Further, if CISA receives a FOIA
request for a CIRCIA Report, response to RFI, or information contained
therein, CISA will apply any other applicable exemptions, consistent
with DHS FOIA regulations.
c. No Waiver of Privilege
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(3), Sec. 226.18(b)(3) provides
that a covered entity does not waive any applicable privilege or
protection provided by law, including trade secret protection, as a
consequence of submitting a CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI in
conformance with the CIRCIA regulations. Accordingly, to the extent
that any claim of a waiver is based on disclosure of the information to
the Federal government, CISA proposes to interpret the CIRCIA
provisions to cover all circumstances where state or Federal privileges
and protections may attach, including privileges or protections such as
the attorney-client and work-product privileges, as well as others
recognized under common law.
d. Ex Parte Communications Waiver
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(b)(4), Sec. 226.18(b)(4) provides
that CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs submitted in conformance with
the CIRCIA regulation are not subject to the rules or procedures of any
Federal agency or department or any judicial doctrine regarding ex
parte communications with a decision-making official, including any
concerns about ex parte communications related to rulemaking or other
processes under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553 et seq.
Consistent with this understanding, CISA proposes that the ex parte
communications waiver offered by CIRCIA also extends to the procedures
of any Federal agency or department regarding ex parte communications
as CISA notes that not all Federal departments and agencies have rules
that govern this issue.
3. Restrictions on Use
a. Prohibition on Use in Regulatory Actions
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(5), proposed Sec. 226.18(c)(1)
provides that Federal and SLTT governments are prohibited from using
information obtained solely through a CIRCIA Report submitted pursuant
to the CIRCIA regulation or in a response to an RFI to regulate,
including through an enforcement proceeding, the activities of a
covered entity or any entity that made a ransom payment on behalf of a
covered entity.\388\ CISA also proposes two exceptions to this
prohibition that track 6 U.S.C. 681(a)(5)(A) and 681(a)(5)(B),
respectively. First, CISA is proposing that information in CIRCIA
Reports and responses to RFIs may be used to regulate if a Federal or
SLTT Government entity expressly allows the covered entity to meet any
separate regulatory reporting requirement that Federal or SLTT
Government entity has in place through submission of CIRCIA Reports to
CISA. Second, CISA is proposing that CIRCIA Reports and responses to
RFIs may be used consistent with Federal or State authority
specifically relating to the prevention and mitigation of cybersecurity
threats to information systems to inform the development or
implementation of regulation relating to such systems.
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\388\ CISA notes that cyber incident reporting that another
agency separately obtains pursuant to reporting requirements issued
under its own authorities, even if subsequently shared with CISA
under an approved information sharing agreement (such as a CIRCIA
Agreement), is not a ``CIRCIA Report'' as proposed to be defined in
Sec. 226.1. Therefore, such information is not obtained ``solely''
through a CIRCIA Report (even if separately obtained through a
CIRCIA Report), and therefore is not subject to this bar.
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CISA views the first exception described above as applying to
situations where a Federal or SLTT Government entity has independent
regulatory authority to mandate reporting of covered cyber incidents or
ransom payments but has elected to streamline its own independent
regulatory reporting requirements by allowing covered entities to
submit such reports to CISA to satisfy both regulatory reporting
requirements. Both currently and prior to the passage of CIRCIA, a
small number of Federal regulators either direct or permit regulated
entities to meet the respective regulator's cyber incident reporting
requirements via reporting to CISA. For example, entities subject to
TSA's cyber incident reporting requirements must report cybersecurity
incidents to CISA via the internet reporting form or by telephone, and
certain entities within the BES are required to provide cyber incident
reports to both CISA and the Electricity ISAC. Pursuant to this
exception, reports such as these, which are submitted to CISA by a
covered entity in part to satisfy another independent regulatory
reporting requirement, are permitted to be used by Federal and SLTT
regulators for regulatory purposes, notwithstanding the otherwise
generally applicable bar on regulatory use in Sec. 226.18(c).
CISA notes that the second exception to the general prohibition on
regulatory use of CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs is that they can
provide Federal and SLTT government regulators with information to
better understand the cyber threat landscape and the threats and trends
that may be impacting the particular community that they are
responsible for regulating.
b. Liability Protection
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(c)(1), proposed Sec. 226.18(c)(2)(i)
provides that no cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any
court by any person for the submission of a CIRCIA Report submitted in
conformance with the requirements of the CIRCIA regulation or response
to an RFI and must be promptly dismissed by the court. Section
226.18(c)(2)(i) also clarifies the extent of this liability protection,
which only applies to or affects civil litigation that is solely based
on the submission of a CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI. This
liability protection does not serve to shield covered entities from
liability for the underlying covered cyber incident, ransomware attack,
or ransom payment, should there be a separate basis for liability
(e.g., a violation of state consumer protection laws that was exploited
by the cyber incident). Nor does the provision shield covered entities
from liability for associated criminal acts. Additionally, Sec.
226.18(c)(2)(iii) creates an exception that is consistent with 6 U.S.C.
681e(c)(3), which exempts actions taken
[[Page 23739]]
by the Federal government to enforce CIRCIA's reporting requirements as
described in the enforcement Section IV.G in this document. Therefore,
civil actions brought by the Federal government to enforce a subpoena
are exempt from liability protection afforded under CIRCIA and may
proceed in court.
Finally, Sec. 226.18(c)(2)(ii) creates an evidentiary and
discovery bar that prohibits CIRCIA Reports, responses to RFIs, and any
communication, document, material, or other record, created for the
sole purpose of preparing, drafting, or submitting CIRCIA Reports or
responses to RFIs from being received in evidence, subject to
discovery, or otherwise used in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding
in or before any court, regulatory body, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. Consistent
with 6 U.S.C. 681e(c)(3), Sec. 226.18(c)(2)(ii) clarifies that the
evidentiary and discovery bar created by CIRCIA does not create a
defense to discovery or otherwise affect the discovery of any
communication, document, material, or other record not created for the
sole purpose of preparing, drafting, or submitting a CIRCIA Report or
response to an RFI.
While the scope of the liability protection offered by CIRCIA is
limited to litigation solely based on the submission of a CIRCIA
Report, the submitted CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI itself is
subject to a broad evidentiary and discovery bar. The scope of settings
and venues for which this bar applies is broad--evidence, discovery, or
other uses in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a
State, or any political subdivision. However, CISA notes that the scope
of materials subject to this bar is narrow. Legislative history also
makes clear that the intent was for this evidentiary and discovery bar
to be limited to CIRCIA Reports, responses to RFIs, and the underlying
materials created solely for the purpose of preparing, drafting, or
submitting a CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI, but does not apply to
the underlying information contained in the report or response. Based
on this understanding of legislative intent and a plain reading of
CIRCIA, CISA understands this to mean that while a CIRCIA Report or
response to an RFI could not, for example, be attached to a warrant
application, the underlying information contained in the CIRCIA Report
or response to an RFI could be used to support the warrant application.
Further, CISA cannot provide a CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI
in response to a third-party discovery request. Similarly, the
protection for other records is limited only to those created solely to
facilitate preparing, drafting, or submitting a report; this would
include, for example, a draft submission, or an email seeking to verify
information for the express purpose of populating a CIRCIA Report or
response to an RFI. However, a forensic incident report that was
developed for the purpose of investigating the underlying incident,
which happened to have been used in populating a CIRCIA Report or
response to an RFI, would not be ``created for the sole purpose of
preparing, drafting, or submitting'' a CIRCIA Report or response to an
RFI. Therefore, CISA's view is that this bar would not create a defense
to discovery for a record, such as the forensic record example above,
that was not created for the sole purpose of preparing, drafting, or
submitting a CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI.
c. Limitations on Authorized Uses
Consistent with 6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(1), CISA proposes including a
section in the regulations identifying the statutory limitations on the
uses of information provided to CISA in a CIRCIA Report or response to
an RFI. Specifically, proposed Sec. 226.18(c)(3) generally states that
information provided to CISA in a CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI
may be disclosed to, retained by, and used by, consistent with
otherwise applicable provisions of Federal law, any Federal agency or
department, component, officer, employee, or agent of the Federal
government solely for the delineated purposes. These purposes are
generally consistent with the authorized use limitations for cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures shared with the Federal
government under the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501-1533),
with the additional authorized purpose of preventing, investigating,
disrupting, or prosecuting an offense arising out of events required to
be reported in accordance with Sec. 226.3.\389\ This additional
authorized purpose would allow, for example, information provided to
CISA in a CIRCIA Report or response to an RFI to be used by Federal law
enforcement agencies to investigate, identify, capture, and prosecute
perpetrators of cybercrime. In light of the often interconnected nature
of cyber incidents and cyber campaigns, and the resulting holistic
response actions that the Federal government may take to respond to
such cyber incidents and campaigns, CISA views the proposed term
``events'' in proposed Sec. 226.18(c)(3)(v)(A) to broadly to include
events such as campaigns, individual cyber incidents, or otherwise
related cyber incidents. CISA therefore interprets the statutory
provision as authorizing the Federal government to use all of the
information about cyber incidents provided to CISA in accordance with
proposed Sec. 226.3 or voluntarily for this additional authorized
purpose. While not separately defined in the regulation, CISA
understands ``cybersecurity purpose'' and ``security vulnerability'' to
have the meaning given those terms in the Homeland Security Act of
2002, as amended, specifically at 6 U.S.C. 650.\390\
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\389\ This includes, for example, the purpose of responding to,
or otherwise preventing or mitigating, a specific threat of death,
serious bodily harm, or serious economic harm, which CISA interprets
to include a terrorist act or use of a weapon of mass destruction.
\390\ 6 U.S.C. 650(6) defines ``cybersecurity purpose'' as ``the
purpose of protecting an information system or information that is
stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system from a
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.'' 6 U.S.C. 650(25)
defines ``security vulnerability'' as ``any attribute of hardware,
software, process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the
defeat of a security control.'' In turn, 6 U.S.C. 650(24) defines
``security control'' as ``the management, operational, and technical
controls used to protect against an unauthorized effort to adversely
affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an
information system or its information.''
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ii. Protection of Privacy and Civil Liberties
CIRCIA requires that the rule include procedures for protecting
privacy and civil liberties consistent with processes adopted pursuant
to 6 U.S.C. 1504(b) and for anonymizing and safeguarding, or no longer
retaining information received through CIRICA Reports that is known to
be personal information that is not directly related to a cybersecurity
threat. See 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(8)(D). CISA is proposing to include these
procedures in Sec. 226.19, and they would apply to personal
information in CIRCIA Reports, as well as in information submitted in
response to an RFI. CISA is proposing to place privacy controls and
safeguards at the point of receipt of a CIRCIA Report as well as for
the retention, use, and dissemination of a CIRCIA Report. CISA proposes
that the procedures proposed in this section will not apply, however,
to information and reports submitted in response to a subpoena.
Although the CIRCIA-specific privacy and civil liberties procedures
that CISA is proposing would not apply to subpoenaed information, CISA
notes that information contained in responses
[[Page 23740]]
to subpoenas would still be handled in accordance with the Privacy Act
of 1974 \391\ and the E-Government Act of 2002.\392\
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\391\ See 5 U.S.C. 552a.
\392\ See 44 U.S.C. 3501 note, Public Law 107-347.
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1. Instructions for Personal Information
CISA is proposing steps to minimize the collection of unnecessary
personal information in CIRCIA Reports and in responses to RFIs. First,
CISA is proposing that covered entities should only include personal
information that is requested in the reporting form or in the RFI and
should exclude any unnecessary personal information. CISA would include
on the CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form instructions and guidance on when
personal information should and should not be included in a CIRCIA
Report. While some personal information, such as the contact
information for the covered entity and information about the identity
of the actor perpetrating the incident (if known), will be required for
the CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form, CISA will endeavor to provide clear
guidance to help covered entities avoid submitting extraneous personal
information. For example, while the CIRCIA Report would require
categories of information that were believed to have been accessed or
acquired by an unauthorized person, CISA would provide guidance that
CIRCIA Reports should not include any specific personal information
that was accessed. Thus, while a covered entity might indicate whether,
for example, medical or driver's license information was accessed in
the incident, the covered entity should not provide the medical
information itself nor a list of the compromised driver's license
numbers or images.
CISA would also include privacy-preserving measures in the CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form tool itself to help prevent covered entities
from including unnecessary personal information. Such measures could
include limiting the number of fields requiring open-ended responses,
as well as mechanisms to scan for indicators that unnecessary personal
information might be included (e.g., information in standard social
security number format) and prompts for the covered entity to verify
whether the information is necessary to submit before proceeding with
the report submission.
CISA considered, but is not proposing, prohibiting submission of
unnecessary personal information in CIRCIA Reports. The Cybersecurity
Act of 2015 includes a provision that requires non-Federal entities to
review cyber threat indicators before submission to CISA to assess
whether those indicators contain any information not directly related
to a cybersecurity threat that the entity knows at the time of sharing
to be personal information of a specific individual or information that
identifies a specific individual and remove such information. See 6
U.S.C. 1502(b). Although a requirement to remove irrelevant personal
information would likely reduce the amount of personal information
collected through CIRCIA Reports, CISA is not proposing this option due
to the increased burden such a requirement would likely place on
compliance with CIRCIA reporting requirements. Because such a
prohibition would likely have required that CISA reject reports that
include such information or otherwise determine that the report was not
correctly submitted, such a prohibition would place a greater burden on
covered entities to comply with CIRCIA reporting requirements and would
likely make meeting the required report submission timelines more
difficult. CISA welcomes comment on these and any other steps that
could reduce the collection of unnecessary personal information.
2. Assessment of Personal Information
CISA is proposing to review each CIRCIA Report to determine if the
report contains personal information other than the personal
information specifically requested. Because some fields in the CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form specifically ask for personal information, such
as covered entity contact information and certain information about the
threat actor (if known), CISA would assume that those fields in a
submitted CIRCIA Report contain personal information, and would not
necessarily review those fields, though CISA may do so to determine if
extraneous personal information might have been included. CISA would
then assess the personal information to determine if it is directly
related to a cybersecurity threat, as that term is proposed to be
defined in proposed Sec. 226.1. personal information that is necessary
to detect, prevent, or mitigate a cybersecurity threat would be
considered directly related to a cybersecurity threat. Examples of
personal information directly related to a cybersecurity threat would
include malicious IP addresses, spoofed email addresses, domains that
contain names from which malicious emails were sent, compromised
usernames, and spoofed identities in malicious emails. Examples of
personal information that would typically not be directly related to a
cybersecurity threat would include contact information of the victim or
entity reporting on behalf of the victim, and the name of a recipient
of a malicious email.
CISA would automate its reviews for personal information be
automated to the extent practicable taking into consideration costs,
technical complexities, and any other challenges associated with
automation, and to use human review when necessary. Privacy controls
and safeguards include the internal administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards that CISA employs to ensure compliance with privacy
requirements and manage privacy risks. Examples of the controls CISA
would employ include ensuring only those who have a need to know can
access, retain, or disseminate covered reports; ensuring those with a
need to know are trained on proper handling procedures; and that
activities using CIRCIA Reports are solely used for purposes in which
the CIRCIA Report was first collected.
When CISA determines that personal information submitted in a
CIRCIA Report is not directly related to a cybersecurity threat, CISA
proposes to delete the information, unless it is necessary contact
information. For personal information necessary for contacting the
covered entity or the report submitter, CISA proposes to safeguard and
anonymize the information prior to sharing the report outside of the
Federal government, unless CISA receives the consent of the individual
to share their personal information and the personal information can be
shared without revealing the identity of the covered entity. CISA
proposes to retain personal information that is directly related to a
cybersecurity threat and may share such personal information consistent
with the provisions of section 226.18 and the privacy and civil
liberties guidance, which is described below.
Consistent with the approach to privacy and civil liberties
protections in 6 U.S.C. 1504(b), CISA is proposing to develop and
publish privacy and civil liberties guidance that would apply to CISA's
retention, use, and dissemination of personal information contained in
a CIRCIA Report, and which would also provide guidance to other Federal
departments and agencies with which CISA shares CIRCIA Reports. The
guidance is not intended to place any requirements on regulated
entities. CISA would draft the guidance to be consistent with the need
to protect personal information from unauthorized use or disclosure and
mitigate
[[Page 23741]]
cybersecurity threats; thus, in the guidance, CISA would endeavor to
balance the privacy and civil liberties concerns relating to the
handling of personal information with the need, where applicable, for
personal information to address cybersecurity threats.
In the guidance, CISA would describe how CISA would review reports
to identify personal information and to determine whether the
information is or is not related to a cybersecurity threat. CISA would
also plan to describe in the guidance the use of technical capabilities
to remove or anonymize personal information not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat. CISA would also describe a process for the timely
destruction of personal information that is not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat and that is not contact information needed to
contact the submitter or covered entity.
CISA would make the guidance publicly available, likely by
publishing the guidance on its website at the same time as the
publication of the final rule for this rulemaking. CISA proposes to
review the effectiveness of the guidance one year after publication to
ensure it is appropriate to the needs for retention, use, and
dissemination of personal information for mitigation and protection
against cybersecurity threats and appropriately protect privacy and
civil liberties of individuals. CISA proposes to conduct periodic
subsequent reviews after the initial review. The CISA Chief Privacy
Officer will also conduct an initial review of CISA's compliance with
the guidance after one year and subsequent periodic reviews not less
than every three (3) years. Where reviews result in a change needed to
the guidance, CISA would publish updated guidance on its website.
CISA has included draft guidance in the docket for this proposed
rule and is accepting public comment on any aspect of the draft
guidance.
iii. Digital Security
CISA recognizes that reports submitted under CIRCIA and responses
to RFIs often will include sensitive security, business, or other
confidential information. In addition to the legal protections
described above that exist in part to ensure that sensitive information
submitted in CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs is only shared with
appropriate individuals or entities, CISA is committed to maintaining
physical and cybersecurity measures in place to prevent illicit
unauthorized access to the information CISA receives in CIRCIA Reports
and responses to RFIs. At a minimum, and consistent with 6 U.S.C.
681e(a)(4), CISA will ensure that CIRCIA Reports, responses to RFIs,
and any information contained therein are collected, stored, and
protected in accordance with the requirements for moderate impact
Federal information systems, as described in Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 199, or any successor document.
iv. Request for Comments on Proposed Protections
CISA seeks comments on its proposed approach to the treatment of
information, restrictions of use, and applicable protections, including
the following:
67. The proposed approach to designating CIRCIA Reports, responses
to RFIs, or the information contained therein as commercial, financial,
and proprietary information;
68. The proposed application of the exemption from disclosure under
FOIA and similar freedom of information laws;
69. The proposed implementation of the statement that submission of
a CIRCIA Report or response to RFI does not waive any applicable
privilege or protection;
70. The proposal that CIRCIA Reports and responses to RFIs are not
subject to the rules governing ex parte communications;
71. The proposed restrictions on the use of information obtained
solely through CIRCIA Reports or response to RFIs in regulatory actions
or as independent causes of liability;
72. The proposed restrictions on the receipt of CIRCIA Reports or
responses to RFIs in evidence, their discoverability, or their other
use in any trial, hearing, or similar proceeding; and
73. The proposed privacy and civil liberties protections, to
include the steps proposed by CISA to minimize the collection of
unnecessary personal information in CIRCIA Reports, the assessment of
personal information contained therein, and the draft guidance CISA is
proposing to create.
I. Severability
To the extent that any portion of this proposed rule becomes final
and is declared unenforceable by a court, CISA has structured the
proposed rule so that all remaining provisions are severable from each
other to the extent practicable and remain in effect unless they are
dependent on the vacated or enjoined provision. Thus, even if a court
decision invalidating or vacating a portion of the CIRCIA final rule
results in a partial amendment to the regulation or a reversion to the
statutory language itself, CISA intends that the rest of the rule
continue to operate.
V. Statutory and Regulatory Analyses
A. Regulatory Planning and Review
Executive Orders 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review,\393\ as
amended by Executive Order 14094, Modernizing Regulatory Review,\394\
and 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,\395\ direct
agencies to assess the costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety effects, distributive impacts,
and equity). Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of
quantifying both costs and benefits, reducing costs, harmonizing rules,
and promoting flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\ See E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR 190
(Oct. 4, 1993), available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf.
\394\ See E.O. 14094, Modernizing Regulatory Review, 88 FR 21879
(Apr. 11, 2023), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-04-11/pdf/2023-07760.pdf.
\395\ See E.O. 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
(Jan. 18, 2011), available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_13563.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has designated this rule
a ``significant regulatory action'' as defined under section 3(f)(1) of
E.O. 12866, as amended by Executive Order 14094, because its annual
effects on the economy would exceed $200 million in at least one year
of the analysis. Accordingly, OMB has reviewed this proposed rule.
CISA has prepared a Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)
which can be found in the docket for this proposed rule. CISA welcomes
comment on the Preliminary RIA, and includes a summary of findings
below.
Through this NPRM, CISA proposes the following reporting
requirements, collectively known as CIRCIA Reports:
A covered entity that experiences a covered cyber incident
must report that incident to CISA no later than 72 hours after the
covered entity reasonably believes that the covered cyber incident has
occurred.
A covered entity that makes a ransom payment, or has
another entity make a ransom payment on its behalf, as the result of a
ransomware attack against the covered entity must report that payment
to CISA no later than 24 hours after the ransom payment has been
disbursed.
A covered entity that experiences a covered cyber incident
and makes a
[[Page 23742]]
ransom payment, or has another entity make a ransom payment on its
behalf, that is related to the covered cyber incident may report both
events to CISA in a joint report no later than 72 hours after the
covered entity reasonably believes that the covered cyber incident has
occurred.
A covered entity must promptly submit a Supplemental
Report about a previously reported covered cyber incident if
substantial new or different information becomes available.
A covered entity must submit a Supplemental Report if the
covered entity makes a ransom payment, or has another entity make a
ransom payment on its behalf, that relates to a covered cyber incident
that was previously reported. The covered entity must submit the
Supplemental Report to CISA no later than 24 hours after the ransom
payment has been disbursed.
In addition to reporting, CISA proposes data and records
preservation requirements, which would require that certain data and
records related to reported covered cyber incidents and ransom payments
be maintained beginning on the date upon which the covered entity
establishes reasonable belief that a covered cyber incident occurred or
the date upon which a ransom payment was disbursed and until two years
following the last report submitted to CISA. This data and records
preservation is essential to enabling investigation of cyber incidents.
CISA estimates that the total affected population of this proposed
rule would be 351,383 covered entities based on the above criteria.
However, due to overlap across the sector criteria as well as overlap
between the entities covered under both the sector-based criteria and
the size-based criterion (i.e., all large entities that are also
captured under the sector-based criteria), CISA believes that this
affected population represents an overestimate of the number of covered
entities. As such, CISA assumes that there would be a 10% overlap,
which has been removed from the total number of the affected
population. Table 1 below presents the total affected population by
covered entity \396\ criteria and the 10% reduction for the affected
population.\397\ For the rest of this analysis, CISA based its
estimates on 316,244 covered entities, accounting for the 10% overlap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\ This table identifies the covered entities that would be
required to comply with the rule. In addition to these entities,
CISA estimates that an additional approximately 13 million entities
would not actually be covered entities but would still incur some
burden to determine they are not covered entities. This is detailed
in Section 2 of the Preliminary RIA.
\397\ CISA does not expect there to be a 10% overlap uniformly
across all sectors, but the overlap is applied uniformly for
presentational purposes. Since the costs do not differ across
criteria or covered entities, there is no difference in applying the
overlap to each sector as opposed to applying it to the total number
of affected covered entities.
Table 1--Affected Population, by Criteria
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected population
-------------------------------
Criteria Excluding the
Total 10% overlap
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Small Entities...................... 35,152 31,637
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sector-Based Criteria
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Owns or Operates a Covered Chemical 3,249 2,924
Facility...............................
Provides Wire or Radio Communications 71,250 64,125
Service................................
Owns or Operates Critical Manufacturing 42,728 38,455
Sector Infrastructure..................
Provides Operationally Critical Support 80,000 72,000
to the DoD or Processes, Stores, or
Transmits Covered Defense Information..
Performs an Emergency Service or 9,257 8,331
Function...............................
Bulk Electric and Distribution System 4,214 3,793
Entities...............................
Owns or Operates Financial Services 42,965 38,669
Sector Infrastructure..................
Qualifies as an SLTT Government Entity.. 3,231 2,908
Qualifies as an Education Facility...... 13,421 12,079
Involved with Information and 106 95
Communications Technology to Support
Election Processes.....................
Provides Essential Public Health-Related 14,418 12,976
Services...............................
IT Entities............................. 6,708 6,037
Owns or Operates a Commercial Nuclear 107 95
Power Reactor or Fuel Cycle Facility...
Transportation System Entities.......... 5,752 5,177
Subject to Regulation Under the Maritime 4,530 4,077
Transportation Security Act............
Owns or Operates a Qualifying Community 14,295 12,866
Water System or Publicly Owned
Treatment Works........................
-------------------------------
Total \398\......................... 351,383 316,244
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Preliminary RIA estimates the costs of complying with the
proposed requirements for an affected population of 316,244 covered
entities over the period of analysis.\399\ The main industry cost
drivers of this proposed rule are the costs associated with becoming
familiar with the rule, data and records preservation, and reporting
requirements. Other costs include those associated with help desk calls
and enforcement actions. Although this analysis uses a base year of
2024, CISA estimates industry costs beginning in 2025 upon the expected
publication of the Final Rule. The combined cost of the NPRM is based
on an 11-year period of analysis, as CISA estimates government costs
starting in 2023 to account for costs incurred before the expected
publication of the final rule, which is covered under the pre-
regulatory
[[Page 23743]]
baseline costs, as discussed in the preliminary RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\ As discussed in Section 2.3 of the Preliminary RIA, CISA
anticipates the total number of covered entities is an overestimate
as some of the not-small entities would also be captured by the
sector-based criteria. In addition, CISA anticipates there to be
overlap across the sector-based criteria. For example, the 80,000
DoD contractors likely include entities also captured under the
critical manufacturing, transportation, and IT sectors. Other
examples include likely overlap between the communications service
providers and IT entities, and between CFATS and Maritime
Transportation Security Act populations.
\399\ For the purposes of this analysis, CISA presents a static
affected population over the period of analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under this proposed rule, familiarization costs include the time
spent by an entity in a critical infrastructure sector to review the
rule and/or other materials to help the entity determine if it is a
covered entity subject to the rule, as well as time spent by a covered
entity reading the rule to understand the requirements imposed by the
rule. Familiarization costs also include an annual burden for covered
entities to review any necessary CIRCIA documents to ensure proper
compliance. For the reporting requirements, covered entities would have
to submit a CIRCIA Report if they experience a covered cyber incident
or make a ransom payment as the result of a ransomware attack. The
costs associated with these reporting requirements are the opportunity
cost of time spent completing the forms, including preparation time to
gather the necessary information to complete the forms. Data and
records preservation costs include the time burden for data and
information to be collected and placed into appropriate storage, either
physical or digital, and storage costs the entity incurs that they
would not have incurred but for the proposed CIRCIA data and records
preservation requirements.
i. Number of Reports
CISA expects the Final Rule to publish in late 2025. In order to
comply with Administrative Procedure Act and Congressional Review Act
requirements, CISA would be required to delay the effective date of the
rule for a total of 60 days, which would likely push the effective date
to 2026. Due to this required delay and uncertainty surrounding the
publication date, covered entities will likely not begin submitting
CIRCIA reports until 2026. As such, reporting costs, and other
associated costs, other than familiarization costs, will be estimated
starting in 2026.\400\ Because there is a great deal of uncertainty
regarding the number of CIRCIA Reports that would be required to be
submitted upon implementation of this proposed rule, CISA presents a
range for industry costs. As presented in the Preliminary RIA, CISA
developed a sensitivity analysis for the range of expected number of
CIRCIA Reports based on several sources, including current CISA
voluntary reporting through CISA's web-based Incident Reporting Form,
reporting under DOD and DOE mandatory reporting programs, and cyber
loss data from the Information Risk Insights Study (IRIS) 2022 by the
Cyentia Institute,\401\ which was sponsored by CISA. Using these
sources to inform the percentage of covered entities expected to submit
CIRCIA Covered Cyber Incident Reports, CISA applies percentages of 2%,
5%, and 10% to the total affected population to conduct our low,
primary, and high estimates for the number of cyber incidents that
would need to be reported. These percentages were determined using the
reporting rates from CISA, DoD, DOE, and the Cyentia Institute ranges
as reference points. As none of the reporting populations discussed
above are fully representative of the CIRCIA population of covered
entities, CISA developed reporting percentages that present a
reasonable range of possible outcomes. This takes into account the low
reporting estimate of 0.725% for DoD DFARS reporting as well as the
higher reporting ranges presented by Cyentia. Recognizing that the
majority of entities that are proposed to be subject to the CIRCIA
reporting requirements are small businesses through the sector-based
criteria,\402\ CISA determined that it was appropriate to present
reporting percentages in line with the lowest revenue categories
presented by Cyentia and not the high end of their range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\ For this analysis, CISA uses 2024 as Year 1 to account for
initial government costs to implement the CIRCIA regulatory program,
making 2026 year 3 of the analysis. CISA also includes government
costs from 2023 as part of the pre-regulatory baseline.
\401\ Cyentia Institute, Information Risk Insights Study 2022,
tbl. 3, Loss Summary, available at https://www.cyentia.com/iris-2022/.
\402\ According to the SBA, over 99% of all businesses are small
businesses (see Section 2.1 of the Preliminary RIA). Additionally,
the size standard criteria for covered entities represent
approximately 6% of the regulated population, further supporting the
assumption that the vast majority of covered entities would be
considered small businesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The number of Ransom Payment Reports is based on data from Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) annual internet crime reports regarding
the number of ransomware attacks for which complaints are received
annually. In the 2021 and 2022 reports, the FBI reports the number of
voluntary complaints that indicated organizations in one of the 16
critical infrastructure sectors had been victims of a ransomware
attack. The internet Crime Complaint Center received 649 such
complaints in 2021,\403\ and 870 in 2022.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\ FBI, Internet Crime Complaint Center, Internet Crime
Report 2021, available at https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2021_IC3Report.pdf.
\404\ FBI, Internet Crime Complaint Center. Internet Crime
Report 2022, available at https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2022_IC3Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on this limited data, CISA forecast the number of ransomware
attacks in critical infrastructure sectors by estimating the linear
trend in the data based on available data from 2021 and 2022.\405\ This
results in an estimated 1,312 ransomware attacks that would be reported
in 2024, which is Year 1 for this analysis, and an estimated 1,754
ransomware attacks in 2026, which is likely the first year in which
covered entities would begin incurring reporting costs. CISA recognizes
that not all ransomware attacks will result in a ransom payment being
made; however, given the lack of a consensus regarding what percentage
of ransomware attacks do result in a ransom payment, CISA has elected
to provide a very conservative estimate and assume that all ransomware
attacks result in ransom payments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\ CISA conducted the forecast using Microsoft Excel's TREND
function, which forecasts a linear trend based on the available
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA bases the estimated number of Ransom Payment Reports on these
values on the FBI internet Crime Complaint Center data.\406\ For the
purposes of this analysis, CISA anticipates receiving Ransom Payment
Reports from 2026 to 2033, which would be a total of 20,220 Ransom
Payment Reports. CISA also makes assumptions regarding the number of
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Reports. For the
purposes of this analysis, CISA assumes a low estimate of 1%, a primary
estimate of 2%, and a high estimate of 3% of covered entities
submitting a Ransom Payment Report would submit a Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\ As reporting to the FBI internet Crime Complaint Center is
voluntary, this may be an underestimate to the extent that it does
not capture any non-reported ransomware attacks in critical
infrastructure sectors; however, it may be an overestimate to the
extent that it is capturing ransomware attacks that did not result
in ransom payments.
\407\ The percentage of ransomware attacks that would be part of
or would themselves be a covered cyber incident are based on CISA
subject matter expertise. CISA requests comment on the number of
Joint covered cyber incident and Ransom Payment Reports that would
be filed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the ranges presented for Covered Cyber Incident
Reports, CISA also developed a range of estimates for Supplemental
Reports. CISA assumes the number of Supplemental Reports would be based
on a percentage of entities submitting Covered Cyber Incident Reports
and Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Reports. Due to the
lack of available data on how many Supplemental
[[Page 23744]]
Reports would need to be filed, CISA assumes 25% of entities submitting
Covered Cyber Incident Reports and Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Reports for the low estimate, 50% for the primary
estimate, and 75% for the high estimate.\408\ These percentages for
Supplemental Reports are applied to the range of covered entities
submitting Covered Cyber Incident Reports. For example, for each
estimate in the range of covered cyber incidents (2%, 5%, and 10%),
CISA applies the range of percentages of Supplemental Reports. Table 2
presents the range of Supplemental Reports for the primary estimate for
this analysis, which applies the 50% of Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Reports resulting in a Supplemental Report across the
range of estimates.\409\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\ CISA requests comments on the number of Supplemental
Reports that would be filed.
\409\ Section 3.1 of the Preliminary RIA presents the number of
Supplemental Reports in greater detail, breaking down the ranges for
the low, primary, and high estimates for the number of reports
submitted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Table 2, CISA presents the estimated number of CIRCIA Reports,
by report type for the primary estimate, which is 210,525.
Table 2--Number of CIRCIA Reports, Primary Estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint covered
Covered cyber Ransom cyber incident Supplemental
Year incident payment and ransom reports Total
reports reports payment reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024............................... 0 0 0 0 0
2025............................... 0 0 0 0 0
2026............................... 15,812 1,754 35 7,906 25,507
2027............................... 15,812 1,975 40 7,921 25,748
2028............................... 15,812 2,196 44 7,924 25,976
2029............................... 15,812 2,417 48 7,926 26,203
2030............................... 15,812 2,638 53 7,928 26,431
2031............................... 15,812 2,859 57 7,930 26,659
2032............................... 15,812 3,080 62 7,932 26,886
2033............................... 15,812 3,301 66 7,935 27,114
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................... 126,498 20,220 404 63,403 210,525
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Table 3, CISA presents the estimated range for the number of
CIRCIA Reports that would be submitted over the period of analysis,
with a low estimate of 83,760, a primary estimate of 210,525, and a
high estimate of 463,850 over the period of analysis.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\ Due to the high degree of uncertainty, CISA requests
comment on the number of reports submitted, as well as the ranges
used in this sensitivity analysis.
Table 3--Number of CIRCIA Reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Low estimate Primary estimate High estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024................................................... 0 0 0
2025................................................... 0 0 0
2026................................................... 9,681 25,507 57,149
2027................................................... 9,905 25,748 57,377
2028................................................... 10,129 25,976 57,639
2029................................................... 10,353 26,203 57,872
2030................................................... 10,577 26,431 58,104
2031................................................... 10,800 26,659 58,337
2032................................................... 11,024 26,886 58,570
2033................................................... 11,291 27,114 58,802
--------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................................. 83,760 210,525 463,850
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
ii. Industry Cost
The main costs to industry associated with this proposed rule are
those associated with covered entities and entities that fall within a
critical infrastructure sector that are not covered entities
(hereinafter, ``non-covered entities'') becoming sufficiently familiar
with the rule to determine whether they are covered, and if it is
determined that they meet one or more of the criteria for a covered
entity, becoming familiar with how to comply with the requirements. The
second largest cost associated with this rule would be data and records
preservation costs, followed by the cost for covered entities to
complete the forms for the CIRCIA Reports (including preparation time).
Covered Entitles would also potentially incur costs associated with
help desk calls and enforcement actions. For this analysis, all cost
estimates are based on 2022 dollars.
Familiarization costs are estimated based on the opportunity cost
of reading some or all of the rule or related materials to determine
whether or not an entity is a covered entity, and if so, how to comply
with the proposed rule. CISA estimates that covered entities would
begin to incur familiarization costs upon publication of the Final
Rule, with familiarization costs divided equally across years 2 and 3
of the
[[Page 23745]]
period of analysis.\411\ The Preliminary RIA presents a primary
estimate of $33.58 for a non-covered entity to determine that they are
not a covered entity, and a primary estimate of $1,587.49 for a covered
entity to familiarize themselves with the proposed rule. This cost per
entity is based on personnel in either the lawyer or general manager
labor category (or some combination thereof) spending 0.275 hours per
non-covered entity and 13 hours per covered entity to review the rule
or related materials. This per entity cost and the total cost is
presented in Table 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\ Some covered entities could begin reviewing and
familiarizing themselves with the Final Rule upon publication in
late 2025, before the effective date, which would likely not be
until 2026 due to required delays for major rules associated with
the Administrative Procedure Act and Congressional Review Act. Other
covered entities could wait until the effective date.
Table 4--Familiarization Cost by Entity Type, Primary Estimate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-covered entities Covered entities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hourly Time Burden............. 0.275 13
Weighted Average Cost per $33.58 $1,587.49
Entity........................
Number of Entities............. 12,864,239 316,244
----------------------------------------
Total Cost................. $432,000,574 $502,034,650
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
In addition to initial familiarization costs for the affected
population to read the rulemaking documents, CISA estimates an annual
familiarization cost for covered entities to review CIRCIA program
information. CISA bases this cost on each covered entity having a staff
member equivalent to a General and Operations Manager spending 30
minutes (0.5 hours) reviewing the CIRCIA reporting forms, CIRCIA
definitions, or any other information to ensure they are prepared to
comply with the requirements if necessary. At an hourly compensation
rate of $102.42, the per-entity cost is estimated to be $51.21.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\ $51.21 per entity = 0.5 hours x $102.42 per hour.
Information on the hourly compensation rates used is contained in
Section 3.2 of the Preliminary RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combining the primary cost estimate for initial familiarization
with the annual familiarization costs results in a total cost of $1.1
billion over the period of analysis, as presented in Table 5.
Table 5--Total Familiarization Costs
[$ Millions, undiscounted]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial familiarization
-------------------------------- Annual
Year Non-covered Covered familiarization Total
entities entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024......................................... $0 $0 $0 $0
2025......................................... 251.0 216.0 0.0 467.0
2026......................................... 251.0 216.0 8.1 475.1
2027......................................... 0.0 0.0 16.2 16.2
2028......................................... 0.0 0.0 16.2 16.2
2029......................................... 0.0 0.0 16.2 16.2
2030......................................... 0.0 0.0 16.2 16.2
2031......................................... 0.0 0.0 16.2 16.2
2032......................................... 0.0 0.0 16.2 16.2
2033......................................... 0.0 0.0 16.2 16.2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................... 502.0 432.0 121.5 1,055.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
The reporting cost is estimated based on the time spent completing
the CIRCIA Reports. CISA estimates that both Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Reports would take three hours to complete, a Joint
Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report would take 4.25 hours
to complete, and a Supplemental Report would take 7.5 hours to
complete. As described in the Preliminary RIA, CISA assumes a weighted
average compensation rate of $86.29 for the personnel responsible for
completing the report. Multiplying this compensation rate by the time
burden and number of reports from the primary estimate results in an
estimated cost of $79.1 million for CIRCIA Reports, as presented in
Table 6.
[[Page 23746]]
Table 6--Cost of CIRCIA Reporting
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental cost
Covered cyber of joint covered
Year incident Supplemental Ransom payment cyber incident Total
reports reports reports and ransom
payment reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024........................ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
2025........................ 0 0 0 0 0
2026........................ 4,093,099 5,116,373 454,035 3,784 9,667,290
2027........................ 4,093,099 5,126,294 511,242 4,260 9,734,895
2028........................ 4,093,099 5,127,724 568,449 4,737 9,794,009
2029........................ 4,093,099 5,129,154 625,657 5,214 9,853,123
2030........................ 4,093,099 5,130,584 682,864 5,691 9,912,237
2031........................ 4,093,099 5,132,015 740,071 6,167 9,971,352
2032........................ 4,093,099 5,133,445 797,279 6,644 10,030,466
2033........................ 4,093,099 5,134,875 854,486 7,121 10,089,580
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 32,744,788 41,030,464 5,234,082 43,617 79,052,951
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA also estimates costs associated with Data and Records
Preservation. CISA estimates that a covered entity would spend six
hours per submission to collect, store, and maintain records in the
first year of the preservation period.\413\ The cost of this provision
is based on an hourly compensation rate of $35.19, which is the rate
for Office and Administrative Support.\414\ Based on six hours per
year, at $35.19 per hour, the annual labor cost of data and record
preservation would be $211.12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\ ICR 1670-0007 includes a burden of six hours per month to
conduct electronic recordkeeping for CSAT. CISA applied the same six
hours per month for CIRCIA, but only applies the burden to one
month, as the covered entity is expected to undergo the
recordkeeping burden only once, not on a recurring basis as with
CSAT.
\414\ Information on the hourly compensation rates used is
contained in Section 3.2 of the Preliminary RIA. CISA requests
comment on this cost, specifically on the level of burden required
to compile the data and the appropriate personnel to complete the
task.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA also estimates costs associated with acquiring additional
storage to save records related to CIRCIA Reports. According to CISA
Cybersecurity Division, a cyber incident generates four terabytes of
data, on average.\415\ To estimate the cost of storage for this amount
of data, CISA conducted market research to determine the cost of
sufficient cloud storage to store and access the data. Based on this
research, the price of cloud storage for four terabytes of data would
have an annual cost ranging from under $700 to almost $1,300.\416\
Based on this range, CISA assumes that all covered entities that submit
a CIRCIA Report would spend $1,000 per year on cloud storage for two
years.\417\ Applying the $1,000 cost for data and record preservation
for the number of reports for two years results in a storage cost range
of $132.4 million to $512.6 million, with a primary estimate of $275.1
million over the period of analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ The estimate of four terabytes is based on the average of
all incident response activities that CISA Threat Hunting engaged in
in FY 2022 and FY 2023, and includes incidents across Federal, SLTT,
critical infrastructure and non-critical infrastructure private
entities.
\416\ Enterprise Storage Forum, Cloud Storage Pricing in 2023:
Everything You Need to Know, available at https://www.enterprisestorageforum.com/cloud/cloud-storage-pricing/.
\417\ CISA recognizes that the data retention period may be
longer than two years, particularly for the estimated 50% of covered
entities that submit one or more Supplemental Reports for a covered
cyber incident. CISA assumes that covered entities currently retain
data under normal business practices, and as such, only estimates
the marginal cost of an additional two years over the current
retention practices. CISA requests comment on this assumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combining the labor and storage costs results in a total data and
record preservation cost range from $147.4 million to $570.4 million,
with a primary estimate of $306.1 million, as presented in Table 7.
Table 7--Data and Record Preservation Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Low estimate Primary estimate High estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024................................................... $0 $0 $0
2025................................................... 0 0 0
2026................................................... 9,805,715 21,317,218 40,488,895
2027................................................... 18,172,475 39,191,526 74,195,639
2028................................................... 18,666,018 39,689,956 74,698,955
2029................................................... 19,159,562 40,188,386 75,202,271
2030................................................... 19,653,105 40,686,816 75,705,588
2031................................................... 20,146,648 41,185,246 76,208,904
2032................................................... 20,640,191 41,683,675 76,712,220
2033................................................... 21,133,735 42,182,105 77,215,537
--------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................................. 147,377,449 306,124,929 570,428,009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cost associated with the help desk is the opportunity cost for
personnel in the General and Operations Manager occupation at covered
entities to call the help desk. CISA assumes that, on average, each
covered entity that submits a report would call the help desk one time
for each report submitted. The number of help desk calls is based on
the number of reports, although a help desk call could be for any
aspect of CIRCIA compliance such as
[[Page 23747]]
registration, reporting, or data and record preservation. Based on
similar costs for CSAT, CISA estimates an average time of ten minutes
for a help desk call.\418\ CISA estimates the cost per call by
multiplying the time burden by the hourly compensation rate for the
General and Operations Manager occupation of $102.42. Multiplying this
hourly compensation rate by ten minutes (0.17 hours) results in an
average cost of a help desk call of $17.07 for covered entities.
Applying this cost to the number of calls, CISA estimates the cost for
help desk calls ranging from $1.4 million to $7.9 million, with a
primary estimate of $3.6 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\ CISA, ICR 1670-0007 Supporting Statement A, uploaded May
23, 2019, available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=201905-1670-001. See Table 2, Estimated
Annual Burden Hours and Costs by Reporting by Instrument. CISA uses
the previous ICR estimate of ten minutes for the help desk burden
rather than the most recent estimate of seven minutes, since CFATS
is a more mature program and has been able to reduce help desk call
times over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Preliminary RIA also details potential enforcement costs based
on the opportunity cost for a covered entity to respond to a Request
for Information or a subpoena issued by CISA, including costs
associated with a potential appeal of a subpoena. CISA estimates a
total 10-year enforcement cost of $237,573, undiscounted. This is based
on the issuance of 100 RFIs, five subpoenas, and one appeal per year.
CISA estimates the undiscounted cost to industry could range from
$1.2 billion to $3.2 billion, with a primary estimate of $1.4 billion.
Discounted at 2%, the primary cost would be $1.3 billion, with an
annualized cost of $148.8 million. Table 8 presents the industry cost
range for this analysis for the period from 2024 through 2033.
Table 8--Industry Cost Range
[$ Millions, undiscounted]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Low estimate Primary estimate High estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024................................................... $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
2025................................................... 467.0 467.0 1,171.6
2026................................................... 488.1 506.6 1,244.3
2027................................................... 37.6 65.6 114.5
2028................................................... 38.1 66.2 115.1
2029................................................... 38.7 66.7 115.7
2030................................................... 39.2 67.3 116.2
2031................................................... 39.8 67.8 116.8
2032................................................... 40.3 68.4 117.4
2033................................................... 40.9 69.0 117.9
--------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................................. 1,229.8 1,444.5 3,229.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Table 9 presents the primary industry cost estimate for the period
of analysis.
Table 9--Total Industry Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data
Year Familiarization Reporting preservation Help desk Enforcement Total Discounted
costs costs costs costs costs 2%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024............................................... $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.00 $0.00 $0.0 $0.0
2025............................................... 467.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 467.0 448.9
2026............................................... 475.1 9.7 21.3 0.44 0.03 506.6 477.3
2027............................................... 16.2 9.7 39.2 0.44 0.03 65.6 60.6
2028............................................... 16.2 9.8 39.7 0.44 0.03 66.2 59.9
2029............................................... 16.2 9.9 40.2 0.45 0.03 66.7 59.2
2030............................................... 16.2 9.9 40.7 0.45 0.03 67.3 58.6
2031............................................... 16.2 10.0 41.2 0.46 0.03 67.8 57.9
2032............................................... 16.2 10.0 41.7 0.46 0.03 68.4 57.2
2033............................................... 16.2 10.1 42.2 0.46 0.03 69.0 56.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................... 1,055.5 79.1 306.1 3.59 0.24 1,444.5 1,336.2
Annualized..................................... ............... ........... .............. ........... .............. ........... 148.8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Table 10 presents the total undiscounted industry cost by affected
population.
[[Page 23748]]
Table 10--Cost by Covered Entity Criteria
[$ Millions, undiscounted]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 10-year
Affected population cost,
undiscounted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not Covered Entities................................... $432.0
Non-Small Entities..................................... 101.3
Owns or Operates a Covered Chemical Facility........... 9.4
Provides Wire or Radio Communications Service.......... 205.3
Owns or Operates Critical Manufacturing Sector 123.1
Infrastructure........................................
Provides Operationally Critical Support to the 230.5
Department of Defense or Processes, Stores, or
Transmits Covered Defense Information.................
Performs an Emergency Service or Function.............. 26.7
Bulk Electric and Distribution System Entities......... 12.1
Owns or Operates Financial Services Sector 123.8
Infrastructure........................................
Qualifies as a State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial 9.3
Government Entity.....................................
Qualifies as an Education Facility..................... 38.7
Entities Involved with Information and Communication 0.3
Technologies Used to Support Core Election Processes..
Provides Essential Public Health-Related Services...... 41.5
Information Technology Entities........................ 19.3
Owns or Operators a Commercial Nuclear Power Reactor or 0.3
Fuel Cycle Facility...................................
Transportation System Entities......................... 16.6
Subject to Regulation Under the Maritime Transportation 13.1
Security Act..........................................
Owns or Operates a Qualifying Community Water System or 41.2
Publicly Owned Treatment Works........................
----------------
Total.............................................. 1,444.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed throughout Section 4 of the Preliminary RIA, there is
a great deal of uncertainty in the cost estimates presented in this
analysis. Because this would be a completely new regulatory program, it
is difficult to predict precisely how the regulated population would
respond. A number of assumptions used to estimate the costs have
significant uncertainty around them, which has led CISA to develop a
sensitivity analysis in the Preliminary RIA to account for this
uncertainty. The main areas of uncertainty are:
Number of CIRCIA Report Submissions--The number of reports
is difficult to predict, as a mandatory reporting program with this
scope does not currently exist, nor does a truly comparable program
that CISA could use as a proxy. As such, CISA presents a range of
possible outcomes for the number of reports submitted with percentages
of entities reporting based on several data sources.
Time Burden for Familiarization--Particularly as it
relates to non-covered entities, CISA has no way to predict what level
of effort such entities would invest in reading the rulemaking
documents, nor can CISA predict the number of entities that would read
all or some of the rulemaking documents, yet ultimately not be a
covered entity. CISA also recognizes that there is a significant
uncertainty regarding the time burden associated with a covered entity
familiarizing themselves with the requirements. In this analysis, CISA
estimates the cost based on the time necessary to read the NPRM, which
is expected to be similar to that of reading the Final Rule. There is
additional uncertainty regarding the number of non-covered entities
that would incur costs associated with familiarization. The current
analysis estimates that approximately 12.9 million entities in critical
infrastructure sectors would incur some costs associated with
familiarization. However, it is unclear how many such entities would
familiarize themselves with the rule, and whether or not entities
outside critical infrastructure would potentially incur some
familiarization costs to confirm that they are not covered entities
(e.g., by reading the Applicability section and assessing whether they
are or not in a critical infrastructure sector).
Means for Data and Records Preservation--The analysis
currently assumes that all covered entities that submit a report will
comply with the Data and Records Preservation requirements by storing
and maintaining digital records. CISA acknowledges that there may be
some instances where hard copy records or data are maintained either in
lieu of or in addition to at least some digital records, but does not
estimate the potential cost of physical records. CISA expects that the
cost of preserving physical records would replace, and be comparable
to, the costs for digital records, rather be an additional cost of this
provision.
Number of Enforcement Actions--While CIRCIA empowers CISA
to take enforcement action against covered entities that have not
submitted required CIRCIA Reports, it is unclear how many of these
actions CISA would take and which mechanisms would be leveraged. There
is a great deal of uncertainty regarding how CISA would identify
potentially non-compliant entities, as that would require CISA to be
aware of an event that was not reported, or for CISA to be aware that
an entity that reported has subsequently uncovered substantial new or
different information than that which was previously reported. Until
CISA operationalizes this program, it is unable to accurately predict
the number or nature of enforcement actions that would be needed.
There may also be implementation costs to the government and cost
savings to the affected population associated with CIRCIA's
substantially similar reporting exception, as discussed earlier in this
NPRM. This reporting exception will allow covered entities subject to
more than one Federal cyber incident reporting requirement to avoid
having to report duplicative information to both CISA and another
Federal agency when certain conditions are met. CISA believes that this
exception would provide an overall cost savings, with the potential
cost savings to the affected population through the avoidance of
duplicative reporting requirements outweighing the implementation costs
the government would incur (e.g., the
[[Page 23749]]
costs associated with drafting, negotiating, and entering into CIRCIA
Agreements, as defined in Sec. 226.1 of the proposed rule). Because
CIRCIA Agreements cannot be fully developed, and this exception cannot
be fully implemented, until the final rule stage or after
implementation of the regulatory program, at this time, CISA is unable
to estimate what the impact of this exception would be on either
government costs or industry savings.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\419\ While CISA does not estimate the cost for this provision,
it is expected that the benefits to industry of avoiding duplicative
reporting would exceed the costs to the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Government Cost
CISA anticipates incurring significant costs associated with the
creation, implementation, and operation of the government
infrastructure to run the CIRCIA program. Implementing and
operationalizing CIRCIA as statutorily mandated would require
significant new government investment. This investment is necessary to
develop and maintain the infrastructure, in both technology and
personnel, necessary to receive, analyze, and share information from
CIRCIA Reports submitted to CISA. While CISA exercised some discretion
in the description of covered entities, this description was scoped in
such a way that reducing the number of the entities subject to the rule
in a manner that would materially impact the government cost (i.e., by
materially reducing the number of CIRCIA Reports received) would also
sacrifice the extent to which the proposed rule would achieve the
purpose of CIRCIA and the proposed rule, as described in section
III.C.\420\ This is particularly true for the government costs, where
much of the costs would be incurred regardless of the scope of covered
entities (e.g., the different aspects of the technology
infrastructure). Further, as noted in section III.C, CISA believes
that, due to advances in technology and strategies for managing large
data sets, the potential challenges associated with receiving large
volumes of reports can be mitigated through technological and
procedural strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\ For more information on how CISA considered rescoping the
description of covered entities, see Section 0 and Section 5 of the
Preliminary RIA, which present alternative approaches to the
description of covered entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA also has discretion in the period for Data and Records
Preservation. However, this would not impact the government cost, as
this is a cost borne by industry.
For fiscal year 2023, CISA budgeted $34.5 million for CIRCIA
related work. In 2024, CISA has requested $97.7 million, to perform
work necessary to prepare for CIRCIA implementation. This includes
funding to support several efforts specifically mandated by CIRCIA or
necessary for the practical implementation of the CIRCIA mandates, such
as the rulemaking process; stakeholder outreach; and efforts to begin
creating the technology infrastructure necessary to receive and share
reports, report on and use the information collected under CIRCIA, and
other key functions. Because funding requested for 2023 has already
been allocated, this is considered part of the pre-regulatory baseline
in the Preliminary RIA. Including the pre-regulatory baseline, CISA
presents an 11-year government cost estimate for this proposed
rule.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\ To account for the pre-regulatory baseline, CISA includes
costs incurred in 2023. These costs are reverse discounted by
applying the discount factor of 1.020 to the undiscounted cost of
$34.5 million in year 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA anticipates needing an annual budget of approximately $115.9
million to cover all the functions associated with CIRCIA. CISA
anticipates this budget request to include funding for additional
federal staff, contractor support, and new technology costs. Additional
staffing would be necessary to conduct a myriad of mission-critical
activities, such as analyzing the CIRCIA Reports to conduct trend and
threat analysis, vulnerability and mitigation assessment, the provision
of early warnings, incident response and mitigation, supporting Federal
efforts to disrupt threat actors, and advancing cyber resiliency.
Additional full-time equivalent staffing would be added to support the
ingest of reports; engagement efforts, including a CIRCIA help desk;
\422\ CIRCIA enforcement actions; and other mission support roles.
Technology costs would account for developing the infrastructure
necessary to collect, maintain, automatically analyze, and share
information from CIRCIA Reports as well as licenses, updates, and
maintenance for CISA systems.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\ CISA would need to provide a means for the regulated
public to contact CISA for assistance with complying with the final
regulation when it becomes effective.
\423\ Although CISA does not estimate industry costs for
submitting CIRCIA reports until Year 3 (2026), CISA anticipates
requesting the full CIRCIA annual budget of $115.9 million starting
in Year 2 (2025) to ensure that all personnel and technology are in
place once the Final Rule is published. As discussed below, there is
a level of uncertainty regarding the government costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, the government's
cyber incident situational awareness, its ability to detect coordinated
cyber campaigns, and its cyber risk identification and assessment
efforts rely on comprehensive data and, prior to the passage of CIRCIA,
the Federal government lacked a mandate to systematically collect cyber
incident information reliably and at the scale necessary.\424\ The
government investment discussed in the Preliminary RIA will provide
CISA with the resources to meet the stated goals of CIRCIA.
Specifically, the government cost presented in this NPRM will be used
by CISA to develop and operationalize the system and infrastructure
necessary to receive and analyze a sufficient quantity of Covered Cyber
Incident Reports and Ransom Payment Reports from across critical
infrastructure sectors, share information with stakeholders, and use
that information and analysis to develop informational products and
other tools to be shared with and leveraged by CISA's Federal and non-
Federal stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\ Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report, supra note 23, at
103; see also Sandra Schmitz-Berndt, ``Defining the Reporting
Threshold for a Cybersecurity Incident under the NIS Directive and
the NIS 2 Directive,'' Journal of Cybersecurity at 2 (Apr. 5, 2023)
(``[L]ow reporting levels result in a flawed picture of the threat
landscape, which in turn may impact cybersecurity preparedness.''),
available at https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/9/1/tyad009/7160387.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because CISA has already begun making investments to operationalize
the CIRCIA program in anticipation of the publication of the final rule
in 2025, this analysis accounts for government costs from 2023 through
2033, or the full 10-year period of analysis and one year of pre-
regulatory costs, even though industry would not incur costs until 2025
upon publication of the final rule. As presented in Table 11, CISA
estimates an undiscounted government cost for CIRCIA of $1.2 billion
over the period of analysis from 2023 through 2033. Discounted at 2%,
the government cost would be $1.1 billion, with an annualized cost of
$108.1 million.
[[Page 23750]]
Table 11--Government Cost
[$ Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Undiscounted Discounted at 2%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023.................................................................... $34.5 $34.5
2024.................................................................... 97.7 95.8
2025.................................................................... 115.9 111.4
2026.................................................................... 115.9 109.2
2027.................................................................... 115.9 107.1
2028.................................................................... 115.9 105.0
2029.................................................................... 115.9 102.9
2030.................................................................... 115.9 100.9
2031.................................................................... 115.9 98.9
2032.................................................................... 115.9 97.0
2033.................................................................... 115.9 95.1
---------------------------------------
Total............................................................... 1,175.3 1,057.7
Annualized.......................................................... .................. 108.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
iv. Combined Costs
Table 12 presents the combined industry and government costs over
the period of analysis. Based on the primary estimates for industry's
costs presented throughout Section 4 of the Preliminary RIA and the
government costs presented in Section 5 of the Preliminary RIA, CISA
estimates an undiscounted cost to industry and government over the
period of analysis of $2.6 billion. Discounted at 2%, the estimated
cost of this proposed rule over the period of analysis is $2.4 billion,
with an annualized cost of $244.7 million.
Table 12--Combined Industry and Government Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Total,
Year Industry Government undiscounted discounted 2%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023........................................... $0.0 $34.5 $34.5 $34.5
2024........................................... 0.0 97.7 97.7 95.8
2025........................................... 467.0 115.9 582.9 560.3
2026........................................... 506.6 115.9 622.5 586.6
2027........................................... 65.6 115.9 181.5 167.7
2028........................................... 66.2 115.9 182.1 164.9
2029........................................... 66.7 115.9 182.6 162.2
2030........................................... 67.3 115.9 183.2 159.5
2031........................................... 67.8 115.9 183.7 156.8
2032........................................... 68.4 115.9 184.3 154.2
2033........................................... 69.0 115.9 184.9 151.6
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 1,444.5 1,175.3 2,619.8 2,394.0
Annualized................................. .............. .............. .............. 244.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Table 13 presents the cost range for combined industry and
government costs, discounted at 2%. The costs over the period of
analysis range from a low estimate of $2.2 billion to a high estimate
of $4.1 billion, and an annualized range of $225.4 million to $415.4
million, discounted at 2%.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\ This analysis uses 2023 as the base year for costs
estimates.
Table 13--Combined Industry and Government Cost Range
[$ Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Low estimate Primary estimate High estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023................................................... $34.5 $34.5 $34.5
2024................................................... 95.8 95.8 95.8
2025................................................... 560.3 560.3 1,237.5
2026................................................... 569.1 586.6 1,281.8
2027................................................... 141.8 167.7 212.9
2028................................................... 139.5 164.9 209.2
2029................................................... 137.3 162.2 205.6
2030................................................... 135.1 159.5 202.1
[[Page 23751]]
2031................................................... 132.9 156.8 198.6
2032................................................... 130.7 154.2 195.2
2033................................................... 128.6 151.6 191.8
--------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................................. 2,205.6 2,394.0 4,065.1
Annualized......................................... 225.4 244.6 415.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
v. Benefits
The primary purpose of CIRCIA is to help preserve national
security, economic security, and public health and safety. The
provisions included in this proposed rule would support that purpose in
a number of ways, providing several benefits. In this analysis, CISA
discusses the qualitative benefits of the proposed rule.
Over the last decade, the United States has seen an exponential
increase in cyber incidents, with nation-states, criminal actors, and
other malicious cyber threat actors targeting entities across all of
the critical infrastructure sectors with ever-evolving tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Addressing this growing, dynamic threat
requires a better understanding of the threat and the vulnerabilities
being exploited, and the timely sharing of that information with owners
and operators of internet-connected information systems so that they
can take steps to better secure themselves from potential cyber
incidents. As noted by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, ``The
government's cyber incident situational awareness, its ability to
detect coordinated cyber campaigns, and its risk identification and
assessment efforts rely on comprehensive data. However, there are
insufficient federal and state laws and policies requiring companies to
report incidents that impact or threaten to impact business
operations.'' \426\ As discussed in greater detail below, CIRCIA would
help the Federal government address this shortcoming by helping the
Federal government understand the cyber threat landscape and enabling
the timely sharing of information to enhance cyber resilience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report, supra note 23, at
103-04.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under this proposed rule, covered entities would be required to
report covered cyber incidents and ransom payments to CISA within the
timeframes and other requirements described in the proposed rule.
Collecting this information in a timely fashion (within 72 hours after
the covered entity reasonably believes that a covered cyber incident
has occurred or 24 hours after a ransom payment has been disbursed)
would provide the Federal government with enhanced cross-sector
visibility into the cyber threat landscape and support the aggregation,
analysis, and sharing of incident data in a way that heretofore has
been unavailable to the cybersecurity community. This, in turn, would
facilitate a better understanding by both Federal and non-Federal
entities of who is causing cyber incidents; what types of entities
malicious cyber actors are targeting; what tactics, techniques, and
procedures malicious cyber actors are using to compromise entities in
critical infrastructure sectors; what vulnerabilities are being
exploited; what security defenses are effective at stopping the
incidents; and what mitigation measures are successful in reducing the
consequences of an incident.
While not part of the proposed rule,\427\ CIRCIA recognizes the
value of these activities and imposes upon CISA a number of
requirements related to the analysis and sharing of information
received through CIRCIA Reports to ensure their value is reasonably
maximized. These obligations include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\ As Congress imposed these obligations solely on Federal
departments and agencies, they are not included in the CIRCIA
proposed rule itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aggregating and analyzing reports to assess the
effectiveness of security controls; identify tactics, techniques, and
procedures adversaries use to overcome these controls; assess potential
impact of cyber incidents on public health and safety; and enhance
situational awareness of cyber threats across critical infrastructure
sectors; \428\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\ 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coordinating and sharing information with appropriate
Federal departments and agencies to identify and track ransom payments;
\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\ 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leveraging information gathered about cyber incidents to
provide appropriate entities, including Sector Coordinating Councils,
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, SLTT governments,
technology providers, cybersecurity and cyber incident response firms,
and security researchers, with timely, actionable, and anonymized
reports of cyber incident campaigns and trends, including, to the
maximum extent practicable, related contextual information, cyber
threat indicators, and defensive measures; \430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For significant cyber incidents, reviewing the details
surrounding the incident or group of incidents and identifying and
disseminating ways to prevent or mitigate similar cyber incidents in
the future; \431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\431\ 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Publishing quarterly unclassified, public reports that
describe aggregated, anonymized observations, findings, and
recommendations; \432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proactively identifying opportunities to leverage and
utilize data on cyber incidents in a manner that enables and
strengthens cybersecurity research carried out by academic institutions
and other private sector organizations; \433\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\ 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Making information received in CIRCIA Reports available to
appropriate Sector Risk Management Agencies and other appropriate
Federal agencies.\434\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ 6 U.S.C. 681a(a)(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By requiring CISA to perform these analytical activities and share
information and analytical the findings with Federal and non-Federal
stakeholders--an obligation CISA intends to fulfill through a variety
of information sharing mechanisms, including through the development,
maintenance, and issuance of publicly available alerts, advisories, a
known exploited vulnerabilities catalog, and other products that can be
leveraged by both covered entities and non-covered entities--CIRCIA
will indirectly enhance the nation's overall level of cybersecurity and
resiliency, resulting in direct, tangible benefits to the nation. For
example:
[[Page 23752]]
By supporting CISA's ability to share information that
will enable non-Federal and Federal partners to detect and counter
sophisticated cyber campaigns earlier with the potential for
significant avoided or mitigated negative impacts to critical
infrastructure or national security, CIRCIA's mandatory reporting
requirements reduce the risks associated with those campaigns.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\ See, e.g., Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing, supra note
17, at 17-18 (statement of FireEye Mandiant Vice President Ronald
Bushar) (``Timely reporting of incidents within and across sectors
allow[s] for earlier detection of large, sophisticated cyber
campaigns that have the potential for significant impacts to
critical infrastructure or National security implications. Technical
indicators, along with contextual information, provide a more robust
data set to conduct faster and more accurate attribution in
adversary intent. This type of analysis is critical in formulating
the most impactful response to such attacks and to do so in a time
frame that has a high probability of successful countermeasures or
deterrence.''). See also Mandiant, Analysis of Time-to-Exploit
Trends: 2021-2022 (Sept. 28, 2023), available at https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/time-to-exploit-trends-2021-2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By facilitating the identification and sharing of
information on exploited vulnerabilities and measures that can be taken
to address those vulnerabilities, incident reporting enables entities
with unremediated and unmitigated vulnerabilities on their systems to
take steps to remedy those vulnerabilities before the entity also falls
victim to cyberattack.\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ See, e.g., Cyber Threats in the Pipeline: Lessons from the
Federal Response to the Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack: Hearing
Before the Subcomms. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Innovation & Transportation and Maritime Security of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Security, 117th Cong. 21 (June 15, 2021)
(testimony of CISA Cybersecurity Division Executive Assistant
Director Eric Goldstein) (``With increased visibility, we are able
to better identify adversary activity across sectors, which allows
us to produce more targeted guidance. . . .''), available at https://www.congress.gov/event/117th-congress/joint-event/LC69050/text
(hereinafter ``CHS June 15, 2021 Hearing''); Bitsight Security
Research, A Mere Five Percent of Vulnerable Enterprises Fix Their
Issues Every Month: How to Help Them Do Better? (May 3, 2023),
available at https://www.bitsight.com/blog/mere-five-percent-vulnerable-enterprises-fix-their-issues-every-month-how-help-them-do-better (noting that CISA alerts and advisories can increase the
likelihood of rapid cybersecurity vulnerability remediation by
nearly five times the likelihood of rapid remediation for
cybersecurity vulnerabilities for which there is no CISA alert or
advisory).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By supporting sharing information about common threat
actor tactics, techniques, and procedures with the IT community, cyber
incident reporting will enable software developers and vendors to
develop more secure products or send out updates to add security to
existing products, better protecting end users.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\ See, e.g., Open Hearing: Hack of U.S. Networks by a
Foreign Adversary Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 117th
Cong. (Feb. 23, 2021) (written testimony of SolarWinds CEO Sudhakar
Ramakrishna) (``Indicators of compromise associated with
[cybersecurity] events shared with software vendors in an anonymized
way enriches the understanding of prevailing threat actor techniques
and target sets, enabling software providers to improve defenses and
better protect users.''), available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-hearing-hack-us-networks-foreign-adversary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By enabling rapid identification of ongoing incidents and
increased understanding of successful mitigation measures, incident
reporting increases the ability of impacted entities and the Federal
government to respond to ongoing campaigns faster and mitigate the
consequences that could result from them.\438\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\ See, e.g., id. (written testimony of Microsoft President
Brad Smith) (``A private sector disclosure obligation will foster
greater visibility, which can in turn strengthen a national
coordination strategy with the private sector which can increase
responsiveness and agility.''); Understanding and Responding to the
SolarWinds Supply Chain Attack: The Federal Perspective: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
117th Cong. (Mar. 18, 2021) (opening statement of Sen. Gary Peters,
Chairman) (``In order to adapt to the evolving cybersecurity threat,
both the public and private sector need a centralized, transparent,
and streamlined process for sharing information. In the event of a
future attack[ ], this will be critical to mitigating the
damage.''), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/understanding-and-responding-to-the-solarwinds-supply-chain-attack-the-federal-perspective/ (hereinafter ``HSGAC March 18, 2021
Hearing'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law enforcement entities can use the information submitted
in reports to investigate, identify, capture, and prosecute
perpetrators of cybercrime, getting malicious cyber actors off the
street and deterring future actors.\439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\ See, e.g., HSGAC March 18, 2021 Hearing, supra note 438
(statement of FBI Cyber Division Acting Assistant Director Tonya
Ugoretz) (``[The SolarWinds attack] highlighted how vital private
sector cooperation is to our broader work protecting America from
cyber threats. The virtuous cycle we can drive when we work together
has been on display in the SolarWinds response: information from the
private sector fuels our investigations, allows us to identify
evidence and adversary infrastructure, and enables us to hand off
leads to intelligence and law enforcement partners here and abroad.
Our partners then put that information to work and hand us back more
than we started with, which we can then use to arm the private
sector to harden itself against the threat. By leaning into our
partnerships, all of us who are combating malicious cyber activity
become stronger while we weaken the perpetrators together.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By contributing to a more accurate and comprehensive
understanding of the cyber threat environment, incident reporting
allows for CISA's Federal and non-Federal stakeholders to more
efficiently and effectively allocate resources to prevent, deter,
defend against, respond to, and mitigate significant cyber
incidents.\440\ Please also see the discussion of market failure
associated with the current patchwork system of cyber incident
reporting that exists today and why a centralized regulatory system to
collect incident reports is needed to correct this failure, in Section
1.2 of the Preliminary RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\ See, e.g., CHS June 15, 2021 Hearing, supra note 436, at
15 (statement of TSA Assistant Administrator for Surface Operations
Sonya Proctor) (``By requiring the reporting of cybersecurity
incidents, the Federal Government is better positioned to understand
the changing threat of cyber events and the current and evolving
risks to pipelines.''); Stakeholder Perspectives Hearing, supra note
17, at 20 (statement of FireEye Mandiant Vice President Ronald
Bushar) (``[R]obust and centralized collection of incident
information provides the Government with a much more accurate cyber
risk picture and enables more effective and efficient investments
and support before, during, and after major cyber attacks.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even before CIRCIA, one of the core mechanisms through which CISA
achieves its cybersecurity mission is producing and widely sharing
timely and actionable operational alerts and advisories on known
threats, incidents, and vulnerabilities. The broad sharing of timely
information enables CISA to make an impact at scale and buy down broad
swaths of risk. CISA leverages many information sharing mechanisms and
partnership communities to ensure that relevant information is reaching
the targeted audience.\441\ There are many ways in which CISA ensures
that alerts, advisories, analysis, and specific vulnerability or threat
information is widely shared to the broadest appropriate audience,
including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\441\ CISA shares and disseminates information in myriad ways,
including via the CISA.gov website and/or the StopRansomware.gov
website, various social media platforms, and the GovDelivery email
notification subscription. Information is also shared with the
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), U.S. Cyber Centers,
and through direct stakeholder engagement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Working to prioritize stakeholder awareness of actively
exploited vulnerabilities through maintenance of a known exploited
vulnerability (KEV) catalog which is available on CISA's website.
Members of the public can also subscribe to the GovDelivery
notification subscription to receive email notifications whenever the
KEV catalog is updated.
Leveraging several communities to ensure broadest
appropriate dissemination of guidance to specific communities of
interest, such as through Sector Risk Management Agencies, Information
Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISACs), and CISA regional personnel to
engage state and local governments, critical infrastructure, and other
communities directly.
Depending on the severity of the threat, vulnerability, or
threat actor campaign, CISA may reach out directly to potentially
impacted entities to try to ensure their awareness and recommended
mitigations, if available.
[[Page 23753]]
CISA shares cyber threat indicators, based on information
shared with CISA by CISA partners or generated through CISA's own
analysis and engagements, via the Automated Indicator Sharing platform.
Working with other federal and industry partners, as
appropriate, who will also disseminate alerts/advisories through their
information sharing mechanisms.
Through CIRCIA reporting, CISA would be able to gather more time-
sensitive threat and vulnerability data regarding covered cyber
incidents or ransomware attacks. This timely collection of specific
data elements, fed into CISA's existing robust communication channels,
described above, would allow for sharing of a higher volume of
actionable information that is more timely and could be used to reduce
risk and mitigate against losses associated with covered cyber
incidents and ransom payments. The reporting of covered cyber incidents
by impacted entities would provide information that could reduce the
number of incidents with consequences through increased awareness of
attack vectors and vulnerabilities, leading to more informed covered
entities (and non-covered entities) taking preventative or protective
measures based on the shared information. This would allow entities to
either reduce the losses associated with incidents for which they have
been a victim, or for entities to take protective measures prevent an
incident altogether. Through early identification and warning of threat
actor tactics, cyber incidents, or vulnerabilities, CISA would be able
to help entities recognize potential weaknesses and implement
protective measures to prevent cyber incidents or limit the
consequences of cyber incidents.
By creating a centralized regulatory incident reporting system,
CIRCIA can help the Federal government develop a comprehensive
understanding of known incidents and ransom payments. Under the current
patchwork reporting system, many incidents go unreported, other
incidents are reported with limited technical information that results
in limited ability to use the reports to help prevent other incidents,
and there is no reliable mechanism to ensure that reports are being
shared broadly enough across the Federal government or between the
Federal government and non-Federal partners to make the reported
information actionable to mitigate against negative impacts. A robust,
rich, and consolidated incident reporting program, facilitated by the
proposed rule, would make the realization of the benefits listed above
far more likely, comprehensive, useful, and timely.
These benefits, which stem from the reporting of cyber incidents
for aggregation, analysis, and information sharing, directly contribute
to a reduction in economic, health, safety, and security consequences
associated with cyber incidents by reducing the likelihood of cyber
incidents successfully perpetrated and mitigating the consequences of
those cyber incidents that are successful by catching them earlier. For
example, incident reporting to CISA within 72 hours and CISA's sharing
of that information has a number of benefits associated with rapid
vulnerability remediation. For example: (1) vendors that receive
earlier warning of previously undisclosed vulnerabilities can begin to
develop patches sooner, reducing the likelihood of an incident
resulting from their exploitation;, (2) entities that remediate a
vulnerability rapidly can reduce the likelihood of a known
vulnerability being exploited by reducing the period of time during
which their systems are vulnerable to exploitation of that
vulnerability; (3) entities that remediate a vulnerability rapidly can
reduce the likelihood of the propagation of a threat within their
systems, which would reduce the impact of a vulnerability that has
already been exploited (i.e., reducing the severity of an incident);
and (4) awareness that a vulnerability is being actively exploited by
threat actors can help entities effectively prioritize their
remediation and patching efforts (as entities often have more patches
in the queue than their personnel can realistically remediate in a
timely fashion). In an analysis of its proprietary dataset of cyber
claims, the Marsh McLennan Cyber Risk Analytics Center compared cyber
controls in terms of their effectiveness in reducing the likelihood of
an organization experiencing a cyber event. Although patching was
identified as one of the most effective controls, tied for fourth, it
was found to have one of the lowest implementation rates.\442\ However,
a recent study suggests that information put out by CISA is
meaningfully shaping how entities are implementing this highly
effective control. Bitsight Security Research found that CISA alerts
and advisories can increase the likelihood of rapid cybersecurity
vulnerability remediation by nearly five times the likelihood of rapid
remediation for vulnerabilities for which there is no CISA alert or
advisory, outpacing the impact of even sustained social media coverage:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\ Marsh McLennan, Using data to prioritize cybersecurity
investments (2023), available at https://www.marsh.com/us/services/cyber-risk/insights/using-cybersecurity-analytics-to-prioritize-cybersecurity-investments.html.
Further, strategic coverage of vulnerabilities in CISA briefings
(Alerts and Current Activity advisories) can accelerate the pace of
their remediation, boosting the probability of rapid remediation by
around 4.7x. Even greater impacts may be possible, which would be
highly desirable. Sustained coverage of vulnerabilities on social
media, e.g. Twitter, is associated with boosting their prospects of
rapid remediation by roughly 2.7x.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\443\ Bitsight Security Research, A Mere Five Percent of
Vulnerable Enterprises Fix Their Issues Every Month: How to Help
Them Do Better? (May 3, 2023), available at https://www.bitsight.com/blog/mere-five-percent-vulnerable-enterprises-fix-their-issues-every-month-how-help-them-do-better.
By identifying a vulnerability through CIRCIA reporting, and
disseminating that information quickly and broadly, CISA can provide
earlier disclosure to vendors of zero-day vulnerabilities and early
warning to potentially impacted entities to take preventative or
protective measures to remediate known vulnerabilities before they
become exploited.\444\ CISA requests comment on the potential impact of
reporting requirements for preventing or mitigating cybersecurity
incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\ See also Mandiant, Analysis of Time-to-Exploit Trends:
2021-2022 (Sept. 28, 2023), available at https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/time-to-exploit-trends-2021-2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is worth noting that these benefits are not limited to covered
entities required to report under CIRCIA, but also inure to entities
not subject to CIRCIA's reporting requirements as they too will receive
the downstream benefits of enhanced information sharing, more secure
technology products, and an ability to better defend their networks
based on sector-specific and cross-sector understandings of the threat
landscape.
CISA also anticipates qualitative benefits stemming from the data
and record preservation requirements of this proposed rule. The
preservation of data and records in the aftermath of a covered cyber
incident serves a number of critical purposes, such as supporting the
ability of analysts and investigators to understand how a cyber
incident was perpetrated and by whom. Access to forensic data, such as
records and logs, can help analysts uncover how malicious cyber
activity was conducted, what vulnerabilities were exploited, what
tactics were used, and so on. This information can be essential to
preventing others from falling victim to similar incidents in the
future. How an incident was perpetrated may not be immediately
identifiable upon
[[Page 23754]]
discovery of an incident, and the failure to properly preserve data or
records during the period of initial incident response can render it
difficult to subsequently perform this analysis. This can especially be
true in incidents involving zero-day vulnerabilities or highly complex
malicious cyber activity by nation state threat actors, such as the
``SUNBURST'' malware that compromised legitimate updates of customers
using SolarWinds products or the Hafnium campaign on Exchange servers,
with the full extent, cause, or attribution of an incident often not
being known until months after the initial discovery.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\445\ See, e.g., Evidence Preservation, supra note 370.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In designing the proposed rule, CISA sought the approach that would
provide the best balance between qualitative benefits and the costs
associated with implementation of the rule. For instance, in
determining the proposed scope of the covered entity population, CISA
attempted to balance the need for sufficient reporting necessary to
achieve the benefits described in this section with the recognition
that the larger the covered entity population, the greater the costs
associated with the rule would be.\446\ In light of that, as described
in Section IV.B, CISA worked closely with its Federal partners to
carefully target specific types of entities from each critical
infrastructure sector for inclusion after consideration of the three
factors enumerated in 6 U.S.C. 681b(c)(1) and the entities' ability to
manage the reporting requirements. Based on that, CISA is proposing to
cover only a small portion of the millions of entities ``in a critical
infrastructure sector'' that could have been included in the
description of covered entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\ See Section III.C.ii for a discussion of why a sufficient
number of reports is needed to achieve the purposes of CIRCIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another example of where CISA looked to maximize qualitative
benefits relative to costs is in the content that a covered entity is
required to submit when making a Covered Cyber Incident Report. CISA
generally focused on requiring content that was either specifically
enumerated as required content in the CIRCIA legislation or that CISA
believes is necessary for CISA to accomplish an obligation imposed upon
CISA by the legislation.
Similarly, as described in Section IV.F, regarding data
preservation, CISA felt that there are significant benefits from
requiring entities to retain data for an extended period of time. When
determining the data preservation timeframe, CISA considered existing
best practices regarding preservation of information related to cyber
incidents, data retention or preservation requirements from comparable
regulatory programs, and comments received on this issue from
stakeholders in response to the CIRCIA RFI and at CIRCIA listening
sessions. Based on the above, CISA believes that a data preservation
requirement lasting anywhere between two and three years would be
consistent with existing best practices, would be implementable by the
regulated community, and would achieve the purposes for which data
preservation is intended under CIRCIA. Recognizing that the costs for
preserving data increase the longer the data must be retained, and
wanting to limit costs of compliance with CIRCIA where possible without
sacrificing the ability to achieve the intended purposes, CISA is
proposing a length at the lower end of the spectrum of best practices
for data preservation. While many regulatory regimes require data to be
preserved for three years or more, CISA has elected to propose a two-
year reporting period. CISA believes the two-year period would provide
the best balance between qualitative benefits and costs by balancing
the incremental costs of continued data retention against the benefits
of having incident data available for an extended period of time
following an incident.
In addition to identifying the qualitative benefits discussed
above, CISA considered a break-even analysis. Break-even analysis is
useful when it is not possible to quantify the benefits of a regulatory
action. OMB Circular A-4 recommends a ``threshold'' or ``break-even''
analysis when non-quantified benefits are important to evaluating the
benefits of a regulation. Threshold or break-even analysis answers the
question, ``How small could the value of the non-quantified benefits be
(or how large would the value of the non-quantified costs need to be)
before the rule would yield zero net benefits?'' \447\ OMB Circular A-4
notes that ``It may be useful to focus a break even analysis on whether
the action under consideration will change the probability of events
occurring or the potential magnitude of those events. For example,
there may be instances when you have estimates of the expected outcome
of a type of catastrophic event, but assessing the change in the
probability of such an event may be difficult. Your break-even analysis
could demonstrate how much a regulatory alternative would need to
reduce the probability of a catastrophic event occurring in order to
yield positive net benefits or change which regulatory alternative is
most net beneficial.'' \448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ OMB, Circular A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/.
\448\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the past, DHS has used a break-even analysis to compare the
costs of a proposed rule to the expected impacts of a terrorist attack,
or other extremely rare, high consequence event. This analysis would
differ for CIRCIA, as this proposed rule would help prevent or mitigate
far more common cybersecurity incidents that, as discussed in Section
1.1 of the Preliminary RIA, occur more often, and with an increased
frequency since 2018.
Agencies typically use break-even to produce a conditional
justification for the proposed rule. While this conditional
justification does not resolve whether or not a rule would break-even,
or reach net-zero benefits, it serves to highlight what information is
missing and what kind of assumptions would be necessary to provide a
basis for the proposed rule to break-even.\449\ According to Sunstein,
break-even analysis helps agencies ``. . . to specify the source of
uncertainty, and what they would need to know in order to reduce it.
Conditional justifications have the advantage of transparency, because
they specify the factual assumptions that would have to be made for the
benefits to justify the costs. That specification is exceedingly
important, because it can promote accountability, promote consideration
of the plausibility of the underlying assumptions, and promote testing
and revisiting over time as new information becomes available.'' \450\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\ Cass R. Sunstein, ``The Limits of Quantification,'' 102
California Law Review 102, no. 6 (2014).
\450\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA expects this proposed rule to reduce the risk of loss of
critical services or financial losses due to a covered cyber incident
in the critical infrastructure sectors. As described above, upon
receiving a Covered Cyber Incident Report or Ransom Payment Report, the
statute requires CISA to undertake a number of analytical and
information-sharing efforts. The development and sharing of actionable
information about cyber threats, security vulnerabilities, and
defensive measures can help other entities to avoid the costs of a
cyber incident in two ways.
First, the information would allow some entities to take actions
that prevent the incident from occurring. For example, this could lead
to discovery of a zero-day vulnerability earlier in time,
[[Page 23755]]
resulting in earlier vendor development and customer deployment of a
patch; recognition that a previously identified vulnerability is one
being actively exploited by threat actors, resulting in its remediation
being prioritized; \451\ or identification of a new threat actor
tactic, technique, or procedure, for which companies can deploy
enhanced network or end-point scanning and blocking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\ CISA, Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited
Vulnerabilities, https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, even where an incident is not prevented, the information
would allow other entities to mitigate the impacts of the incident
(e.g., by reducing the propagation of the incident throughout the
organization). Incidents occur in different stages (often referred to
as the ``lifecycle'' of a cyber incident); the earlier in the lifecycle
a network defender can identify an incident, the more likely network
defenders can negate or impede the adversary from achieving their
goals.\452\ This means that earlier detection of incidents minimizes
both the impact to systems and data (and the associated damage from
that impact) and the cost of containment, remediation, and recovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\ See, e.g., MITRE, Overview of How Cyber Resiliency Affects
the Cyber Attack Lifecycle (2015), available at https://www2.mitre.org/public/industry-perspective/documents/lifecycle-ex.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA requests comment on the potential use of a break-even analysis
in this case, specifically on what the consequences of a substantial
cyber incident would be, and the number of substantial cyber incidents
expected in a given year. Additionally, CISA requests comment on how
effective early notification of cyber incidents would be in mitigating
expected consequences of an incident.
When thinking about benefits, CISA considered estimates of the cost
of a covered cyber incident from the Information Risk Insights Study
(IRIS) 2022 by the Cyentia Institute, which was sponsored by CISA. The
Cyentia Institute analyzed Advisen's Cyber Loss Data, which is widely
used and presents the most comprehensive list of historical cyber
incidents. From the July 2022 Advisen dataset, the Cyentia Institute
analyzed the 1,893 cyber events with reported loss data, from the 10-
year period ranging from 2012 to 2021. These predominately U.S. events
impacted firms across all 20 NAICS sectors at the two-digit level and
were assigned to one of eight patterns: Denial of Service Attack,
Accidental Disclosure, Scam or Fraud, System Intrusion, Insider Misuse,
Physical Threats, Ransomware, and System Failure. Of these eight
pattern types, System Intrusion was found to be both the most frequent
(49.6% of all types) and to have the highest financial impact (60.2% of
the total impact across all types). Table 14 presents summary
statistics associated with these 1,893 cyber events.\453\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\ Cyentia Institute, Information Risk Insights Study 2022,
tbl. 3, Loss Summary, available at https://www.cyentia.com/iris-2022/.
Table 14--Summary of Cyber Event Losses and Counts, IRIS 2022
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of events Average annual
Measure Loss (2012-2021) \a\ number of events
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum................................................. $32 0 0
First Quartile.......................................... 29,000 474 47.4
Geometric Mean.......................................... 266,000 479 47.9
Third Quartile.......................................... 2,000,000 458 45.8
95th Percentile......................................... 52,000,000 386 38.6
Maximum................................................. 12,000,000,000 96 9.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note. Data is based on data from the Cyentia Institute's IRIS 2022 study.
\a\ These are the number of events that resulted in losses between the breakpoints of each of the following loss
bin: [$0, $32), [$32, $29,000), [$29,000, $266,000), [$266,000, $ 2 million), [$2 million, $52 million), and
[$52 million, $12 billion]. Since the minimum value of $32 is the single lowest loss that occurred among the
1,893 events, there are no events associated with it in this column. Instead, there are 474 events which had
losses from $32 up to $29,000, 479 events from $29,000 up to $266,000, and so on.
As noted in the Cyentia Institute IRIS 2022 report, the typical
cost of a security incident is close to the geometric mean of $266,000,
and the average, or arithmetic mean, is over $25 million. Rather than
require reporting of any cyber incident, this rule proposes to require
reporting only of covered cyber incidents, which means a substantial
cyber incident experienced by a covered entity. Under the proposed
rule, a substantial cyber incident means a Cyber Incident that leads to
any of the following:
1. Substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability;
2. Serious impact on safety and resiliency of operational systems
and processes;
3. Disruption of ability to engage in business or industrial
operations, or deliver goods or services; or
4. Unauthorized access facilitated through or caused by a: (1)
compromise of a cloud service provider, managed service provider, or
other third-party data hosting provider, or (2) supply chain
compromise.\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\454\ See Sec. 226.1 of the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although none of these impacts is defined in terms of event loss,
in its report ``IRIS 20/20 Xtreme,'' Cyentia Institute describes losses
associated with business interruptions, which are included in the third
type of impact for substantial cyber events.\455\ Cyentia Institute
finds that business interruptions are the most numerous event category,
with over half of all total losses attributable to business
interruption, and have high median losses of $82 million. Because this
rule proposes to require incident reporting only for covered cyber
incidents, which must by definition be substantial cyber incidents,
CISA considered comparing the cost of this proposed rule to the 95th
percentile loss value of $52 million, which is closer to the estimate
of $82 million and perhaps more representative of what a substantial
cyber incident may cost. CISA again welcomes comment on the potential
application of these and other estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\ Cyentia Institute, Information Risk Insights Study IRIS
20/20 Xtreme (2020), tbl. 4, Event Top Level Category, available at
https://www.cyentia.com/wp-content/uploads/IRIS2020-Xtreme.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
vi. Accounting Statement
The OMB A-4 Accounting Statement (Table 15) presents annualized
costs and qualitative benefits of the proposed rule in 2022 dollars.
[[Page 23756]]
Table 15--OMB A-4 Accounting Statement
[$ Millions, 2022 dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimates Units
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Period Notes
Primary estimate Low High Year Discount covered
estimate estimate dollar rate (%) (years)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Savings
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantitative Annualized Monetized ($ N/A.................... N/A N/A N/A 2 N/A
millions/year).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative.......................... Qualitative benefits include (a) improved incident reporting and
response and (b) improved cybersecurity posture through improved
ability to prevent or mitigate events through information sharing,
early warning, threat analysis, and incident response. The
preservation of data and records in the aftermath of a covered
cyber incident serves a number of critical purposes, such as
supporting the ability of (a) analysts and investigators to
understand how a cyber incident was perpetrated and by whom and (b)
law enforcement to capture and prosecute perpetrators of cyber
incidents and recover ill-gotten proceeds from the criminal
activity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annualized Monetized ($ millions/ $244.6................. $225.4 $415.4 2023 2 10 NPRM RIA.
year).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transfers
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From/To.............................. From: N/A.............. ......... ......... To: N/A ......... ......... ................................
Other Annualized Monetized ($ N/A.................... N/A N/A N/A 2 N/A ................................
millions/year).
From/To.............................. From:.................. N/A ......... To: N/A ......... ................................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effects
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
State, Local, and/or Tribal $10.1.................. ......... ......... .......... 2 10 NPRM RIA (Section 11.2.1).
Government--Annualized Monetized ($
millions/year).
Small Business....................... Conducted Initial ......... ......... .......... ......... ......... IRFA (Section 9).
Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA).
Wages................................ None................... ......... ......... .......... ......... ......... ................................
Growth............................... Not measured........... ......... ......... .......... ......... ......... ................................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
vii. Alternatives
As part of this analysis, CISA considered alternatives to the
proposed rule. Below, CISA presents the four alternatives considered
for this rulemaking along with the estimated costs. When comparing
alternatives, CISA reviewed the cost of each alternative as well as the
objective of the rulemaking effort and the benefits associated with
each alternative. While CISA did not estimate quantitative benefits for
each alternative, the qualitative benefits for each alternative provide
context as to why the NPRM alternative is the preferred choice for
CISA.
1. The Preferred Alternative--The NPRM
The analysis for this alternative was discussed above, as it is the
proposed alternative. As presented in Section V.A.iv, CISA estimates a
combined industry and government cost of $2.6 billion over the period
of analysis, and an annualized cost of $244.6 million, discounted at
2%.
CISA selected this alternative as the preferred alternative, as it
would provide the best balance between qualitative benefits and costs
while being responsive to the statutorily mandated requirements of
CIRCIA. While there are potential lower cost alternatives, the scoping
of the population of covered entities in the preferred alternative
allows CISA to capture adequate reporting populations from not just the
sector-based criteria, but also from entities in multiple critical
infrastructure sectors and subsectors using a single threshold.
As discussed above in Section IV.B.iv.1, there are several benefits
to including the size-based criterion in the population of covered
entities. CISA believes that substantial cyber incidents at larger
entities routinely will have a higher likelihood of disrupting the
reliable operation of critical infrastructure, making timely knowledge
by CISA of any covered cyber incidents affecting larger entities in
critical infrastructure sectors essential for potential mitigation of
negative consequences. Also, larger entities are more likely to
identify early signs of compromise than smaller entities because larger
entities also are likely to have more mature cybersecurity capabilities
or be better situated to bring in outside experts to assist during an
incident.\456\ By including large entities in the description of
covered entity, the likelihood that an incident is noticed and reported
is increased, while the timeframe between initiation of an incident and
its reporting is likely to be decreased, making any potential
mitigation efforts more effective. CISA also believes that large
entities would be better situated to simultaneously report and respond
to or mitigate an incident. Because large entities represent a
disproportionate percent of the impacts of covered cyber incidents on
critical infrastructure, are more likely to be able to identify a cover
cyber incident earlier, and respond more quickly while mitigating an
incident, CISA believes that the inclusion of the size-based criterion
will materially improve the content and volume of reports that CISA
receives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\ Verizon 2022 DBIR, supra note 181, at 65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the data and record preservation requirements put
forth in the preferred alternative are consistent with existing best
practices, help ensure the ability to assess and analyze an incident as
new information comes to light related to this specific incident or
type of incident, support eventual
[[Page 23757]]
attribution of an incident that may not be known in the immediate
aftermath of the incident, and increase the likelihood that necessary
data and records are preserved long enough to support investigation and
prosecution of the threat actors responsible for carrying out the
incident. Any reduction in these provisions, while reducing burden,
would not justify the sacrifice in benefits. In the following sections
for each alternative, CISA more fully explains why each proposed
alternative was rejected.
2. Alternative 1--Reduce the Data and Record Preservation Period
For this alternative, CISA reduces the proposed data and record
preservation period from two years to six months. A six-month period
would align with existing FBI Letters of Preservation, which allow for
an initial 90-day duration, with the option to request preservation for
another 90-day period, if needed. Under this alternative, there would
be no change to the CIRCIA reporting requirements and therefore, no
changes to the costs estimated for becoming familiar with the rule,
reporting, help desk, or enforcement of CIRCIA.
Under this alternative, we estimate the costs only for six months
of storage, which is the equivalent of multiplying the number of
reports per year by $500, without accounting for storage costs after
the year the report was submitted.
Table 16 presents the industry cost for Alternative 1 (based on the
primary estimates presented in Section V.A.ii), which CISA estimated
would be $1.2 billion over the period of analysis and $129.2 million
annualized at a 2% discount rate.
Table 16--Alternative 1 Industry Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data & record Total
Year Familiarization Reporting preservation Help desk Enforcement --------------------------------
costs costs costs costs costs Undiscounted Discounted 2%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024........................................... $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.00 $0.00 $0.0 $0.0
2025........................................... 467.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 467.0 448.9
2026........................................... 475.1 9.7 12.5 0.44 0.03 497.8 469.1
2027........................................... 16.2 9.7 12.7 0.44 0.03 39.1 36.1
2028........................................... 16.2 9.8 12.8 0.44 0.03 39.3 35.6
2029........................................... 16.2 9.9 13.0 0.45 0.03 39.5 35.1
2030........................................... 16.2 9.9 13.2 0.45 0.03 39.7 34.6
2031........................................... 16.2 10.0 13.3 0.46 0.03 40.0 34.1
2032........................................... 16.2 10.0 13.5 0.46 0.03 40.2 33.6
2033........................................... 16.2 10.1 13.6 0.46 0.03 40.4 33.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 1,055.5 79.1 104.6 3.59 0.24 1,243.0 1,160.2
Annualized................................. ............... .......... ............... .......... ............ .............. 129.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Under this alternative, CISA would not anticipate a change in
Federal government costs, which would remain $1.2 billion, discounted
at 2%, over the period of analysis for government costs (see Table 11).
The combined costs for industry and government under Alternative 1 are
presented in Table 17. CISA estimates a combined 11-year cost of $2.2
billion and an annualized cost of $226.7 million, discounted at 2%.
Table 17--Alternative 1 Combined Industry and Government Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total cost
Year Industry cost Government --------------------------------
cost Undiscounted Discounted 2%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023........................................... $0.0 $34.5 $34.5 $34.5
2024........................................... 0.0 97.7 97.7 95.8
2025........................................... 467.0 115.9 582.9 560.3
2026........................................... 497.8 115.9 613.7 578.3
2027........................................... 39.1 115.9 155.0 143.2
2028........................................... 39.3 115.9 155.2 140.6
2029........................................... 39.5 115.9 155.4 138.0
2030........................................... 39.7 115.9 155.6 135.5
2031........................................... 40.0 115.9 155.9 133.0
2032........................................... 40.2 115.9 156.1 130.6
2033........................................... 40.4 115.9 156.3 128.2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 1,243.0 1,175.3 2,418.3 2,218.0
Annualized................................. .............. .............. .............. 226.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Alternative 1 represents a cost savings compared to the Preferred
Alternative of $176.0 million over the period of analysis, all of which
is realized due to the reduction of the data and record preservation
period. While Alternative 1 would implement CIRCIA at a lower cost than
the Preferred Alternative, CISA rejects this alternative because it
[[Page 23758]]
would not convey the full benefits associated with the data and record
preservation requirements. The data and record preservation
requirements can support the ability of analysts and investigators to
understand how a cyber incident was perpetrated and by whom as well as
enable data and trend analysis and the investigation of incidents. This
could lead to a reduction or mitigation of the risk of future cyber
incidents.
The reduction in the data and record preservation requirements
would weaken the ability for CISA and other agencies to assess and
analyze an incident as new information that may come to light related
to this specific incident or type of incident, support eventual
attribution of an incident that may not be known in the immediate
aftermath of the incident. Reducing the data and records preservation
period would also decrease the likelihood that necessary data and
records are preserved long enough to support investigation and
prosecution of the threat actors responsible for carrying out the
incident. Any reduction in these provisions, while reducing burden,
would not justify the sacrifice in benefits.
3. Alternative 2--Remove Size-Based Criterion
For this alternative, CISA would decrease the affected population
of covered entities by removing the size-based criterion for covered
entities. This change would reduce the population of covered entities
by 35,152 (see Section 8.3 of the Preliminary RIA) to 284,607 covered
entities, which would be approximately a 12% reduction from the
Preferred Alternative. Although this alternative estimates the cost
savings for the removal of all 35,152 covered entities identified under
the size-based criterion, it is unlikely that the removal of this
criterion would result in the removal of all covered entities in the
size-based criterion. CISA, however, does not have an estimate for the
number of covered entities that would be removed from the affected
population of covered entities based on the removal of the size-based
standard. As discussed in Section IV.B.iv, CISA recognizes that
additional sector-based criteria would be developed in lieu of the
size-based standard, however, CISA has not yet developed the thresholds
that would be necessary to define these additional criteria. For this
alternative, CISA conducted the analysis using the same methodology as
presented in the Preferred Alternative.
Table 18 presents the industry cost for Alternative 2. CISA
estimated all costs using the methodology for obtaining the primary
estimates presented in Section V.A.ii above and Section 4 of the
Preliminary RIA, but based on the reduced population of covered
entities. CISA estimated the total cost to industry would be $1.1
billion over the period of analysis and $119.7 million annualized at a
2% discount rate.
Table 18--Alternative 2 Industry Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data & record
Year Familiarization Reporting preservation Help desk Enforcement Total Discounted 2%
costs costs costs costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024................................................ $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
2025................................................ 395.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 395.3 380.0
2026................................................ 401.0 7.0 9.2 0.3 0.0 417.6 393.5
2027................................................ 11.5 7.0 29.0 0.3 0.0 47.9 44.2
2028................................................ 11.5 7.1 29.5 0.3 0.0 48.4 43.9
2029................................................ 11.5 7.2 30.0 0.3 0.0 49.0 43.5
2030................................................ 11.5 7.2 30.5 0.3 0.0 49.5 43.1
2031................................................ 11.5 7.3 31.0 0.3 0.0 50.1 42.8
2032................................................ 11.5 7.3 31.5 0.3 0.0 50.7 42.4
2033................................................ 11.5 7.5 32.0 0.3 0.0 51.3 42.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................... 876.6 50.2 190.6 2.3 0.21 1,159.8 1,075.4
Annualized...................................... ............... .......... ............... .......... ............ ......... 119.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under this alternative, CISA would not anticipate a change in
Federal government costs, which would remain $1.2 billion over the 11-
year period of analysis for government costs. CISA assumes no change in
government cost due to the relatively small impact associated with the
removal of the size-based criterion. Additionally, since government
costs are based on expected budget requests, there is a high degree of
uncertainty regarding how this change would impact that request. The
combined costs for industry and government under Alternative 2 are
presented in Table 19. CISA estimates a combined 11-year cost of $2.1
billion and an annualized cost of $218.0 million, discounted at 2%.
Table 19--Alternative 2 Combined Industry and Government Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total cost
Year Industry cost Government --------------------------------
cost Undiscounted Discounted 2%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023........................................... 0.0 34.5 34.5 34.5
2024........................................... 0.0 97.7 97.7 95.8
2025........................................... 395.3 115.9 511.2 491.4
2026........................................... 417.6 115.9 533.5 502.7
2027........................................... 47.9 115.9 163.8 151.3
2028........................................... 48.4 115.9 164.3 148.8
2029........................................... 49.0 115.9 164.9 146.4
[[Page 23759]]
2030........................................... 49.5 115.9 165.4 144.0
2031........................................... 50.1 115.9 166.0 141.7
2032........................................... 50.7 115.9 166.6 139.4
2033........................................... 51.3 115.9 167.2 137.2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 1,159.8 1,175.3 2,335.1 2,133.1
Annualized................................. .............. .............. .............. 218.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Alternative 2 would present a lower cost than the Preferred
Alternative, there are several reasons why it was rejected in favor of
the Preferred Alternative. As discussed in Section IV.B, there are a
wide variety of types of entities that are active participants in
critical infrastructure sectors and communities and are considered ``in
a critical infrastructure sector.'' Rather than develop sector-based
criteria for each of these potential categories of covered entities,
CISA relies on the size-based criterion to capture entities in these
sectors and subsectors that are not otherwise covered in the sector-
based criteria and for which CISA considered that requiring reporting
only from large entities was sufficient to meet CIRCIA's purposes.
Including these entities is critical for the following reasons, as
described in further detail in section IV.B.iv.1:
While size is not alone indicative of criticality, larger
entities' larger customer bases, market shares, number of employees,
and other similar size-based characteristics mean that cyber incidents
affecting them typically have greater potential to result in
consequences impacting national security, economic security, or public
health and safety than cyber incidents affecting smaller companies.
Large entities disproportionately experience cyber
incidents.
Non-small entities are likely to own or operate a
disproportionate percentage of the nation's critical infrastructure.
In light of the interconnectedness of the world today,
incidents at entities in critical infrastructure sectors that are not
themselves owners and operators of critical infrastructure can have
cascading effects that end up impacting critical infrastructure. Based
on this, CISA believes that substantial cyber incidents at larger
entities routinely will have a high likelihood of disrupting the
reliable operation of critical infrastructure.
Removing the size-based criterion would limit CISA's ability to
collect valuable information from a broader set of entities than
relying on the sector-based criteria would allow. Furthermore, removing
the size-based criterion would require CISA to develop additional
sector-based criteria to capture entities from certain critical sectors
or subsectors, such as Food and Agriculture Sector entities, Commercial
Facilities, Oil and Natural Gas Subsector entities, and medical
laboratories that currently are included in the description of covered
entity primarily or solely based on the size-based criterion. Covering
these additional entities is much more in line with the purpose of the
regulation for CISA to learn about new or novel vulnerabilities,
trends, or tactics sooner and be able to share early warnings before
additional entities within the sector, critical or non-critical, can
fall victim to them.
Contrary to the minimum benefits (in terms of industry cost
savings) likely to be gained by elimination of the size-based
criterion, CISA believes there are significant reasons to include the
criterion in the proposal. First, as described at length in Section
IV.B.iv.1, there are a number of reasons why CISA believes requiring
reporting from large entities is beneficial. This includes the belief
that substantial cyber incidents at larger entities routinely will have
a high likelihood of disrupting the reliable operation of critical
infrastructure, making timely knowledge by CISA of any covered cyber
incidents affecting larger entities in critical infrastructure sectors
essential for potential mitigation of negative consequences; larger
entities are more likely to identify early signs of compromise than
smaller entities; large entities would be better situated to
simultaneously report and respond to or mitigate an incident; and the
inclusion of the size-based criterion will materially improve the
content and volume of reports that CISA receives. Second, the size-
based criterion allows CISA to capture adequate reporting from multiple
sectors and subsectors using a single threshold. As noted above,
without the size-based criterion, CISA likely would need to establish
one or more new sector-based criteria for each of at least five
critical infrastructure sectors or subsectors, and has included
alternative proposed sector-based criteria in the proposed rulemaking
for this purpose. In total, while CISA believes it could achieve the
purposes of the CIRCIA statute without a size-based criterion, CISA
believes that the benefits of including the size-based criterion far
exceed the almost certainly minimal cost savings associated with an
alternative where additional sector-based criteria are used in lieu of
the size-based criterion.
4. Alternative 3--Reduce the Data and Record Preservation Requirement
and Remove Size-Based Criterion
For this alternative, CISA would combine the cost reductions
presented in Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 to present the lowest cost
alternative.
Table 20 presents the industry cost for Alternative 3. CISA
estimated all costs, with the exception of the data and record
preservation costs, using the methodology for obtaining the primary
estimates presented in Section V.A.ii. CISA estimated the data and
records preservation costs using the same methodology used under
Alternative 1 as presented in Section V.A.vii.a. CISA estimated the
total cost to industry would be $950.0 million over the period of
analysis and $105.7 million annualized at a 2% discount rate.
[[Page 23760]]
Table 20--Alternative 3 Industry Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data & record Total
Year Familiarization Reporting preservation Help desk Enforcement --------------------------------
costs costs costs costs costs Undiscounted Discounted 2%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024........................................... $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.00 $0.0 $0.0
2025........................................... 395.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 395.3 380.0
2026........................................... 401.0 7.0 9.2 0.3 0.03 417.6 393.5
2027........................................... 11.5 7.0 9.4 0.3 0.03 28.3 26.1
2028........................................... 11.5 7.1 9.6 0.3 0.03 28.5 25.8
2029........................................... 11.5 7.2 9.7 0.3 0.03 28.7 25.5
2030........................................... 11.5 7.2 9.9 0.3 0.03 28.9 25.2
2031........................................... 11.5 7.3 10.0 0.3 0.03 29.2 24.9
2032........................................... 11.5 7.3 10.2 0.3 0.03 29.4 24.6
2033........................................... 11.5 7.5 10.4 0.3 0.03 29.7 24.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 876.6 57.7 78.4 2.7 0.24 1,015.5 949.9
Annualized................................. ............... .......... ............... .......... ............ 105.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Under this alternative, CISA would not anticipate a change in
Federal government costs, which would remain $1.2 billion over the 11-
year period of analysis for government costs. The combined costs for
industry and government under Alternative 3 are presented in Table 21.
CISA estimates a 11-year cost of $2.0 billion and an annualized cost of
$205.1 million, discounted at 2%.
Table 21--Alternative 3 Combined Industry and Government Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total cost
Year Industry cost Government --------------------------------
cost Undiscounted Discounted 2%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023........................................... $0.0 $34.5 $34.5 $34.5
2024........................................... 0.0 97.7 97.7 95.8
2025........................................... 395.3 115.9 511.2 491.4
2026........................................... 417.6 115.9 533.5 502.7
2027........................................... 28.3 115.9 144.2 133.2
2028........................................... 28.5 115.9 144.4 130.8
2029........................................... 28.7 115.9 144.6 128.4
2030........................................... 28.9 115.9 144.8 126.1
2031........................................... 29.2 115.9 145.1 123.8
2032........................................... 29.4 115.9 145.3 121.6
2033........................................... 29.7 115.9 145.6 119.4
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 1,015.5 1,175.3 2,190.8 2,007.6
Annualized................................. .............. .............. .............. 205.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Alternative 3 estimates the lowest cost alternative in this
analysis, which presents a lower burden based on changes to
discretionary elements in two required provisions--a reduction in the
data and records preservation requirements and a reduction in the
number of covered entities through the removal of the size-based
criterion. As discussed in Sections V.A.vii.b and c, the reduction in
the data preservation period and the removal of the size-based
criterion, while reducing costs, would sacrifice benefits as compared
to Preferred Alternative.
5. Alternative 4--Increase the Affected Population to All Critical
Infrastructure Entities
For this alternative, CISA widened the description of covered
entity to include all entities operating in the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors.\457\ Under this alternative, the affected
population would increase from 316,244 covered entities to 13,180,483
covered entities. This population was estimated by using the manner of
determining whether an entity is in a critical infrastructure sector as
explained in Section IV.B.ii. As discussed above, the SSPs for each
critical infrastructure sector include a sector profile of entities in
the sector.\458\ The number of covered entities within each sector, was
based on information in the SSPs, as well as populations based on NAICS
codes for the affected industries, which was estimated using U.S.
Census County Business Patterns data. Table 22 presents the affected
population for each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors. This
affected population would include small and not
[[Page 23761]]
small businesses, based on SBA size standards, within the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\457\ The 16 critical infrastructure sectors listed by
Presidential Policy Directive 21. See https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2023).
\458\ The list of 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors can be
found at https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last
visited Nov. 28, 2023).
Table 22--Affected Population by Critical Infrastructure Sector
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of affected
Affected population
Criteria population ---------------------------------
2% 5% 10%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemical Sector.................................................. 31,717 634 1,586 3,172
Commercial Facilities Sector..................................... 7,980,640 159,613 399,032 798,064
Communications Sector............................................ 92,861 1,857 4,643 9,286
Critical Manufacturing Sector.................................... 46,259 925 2,313 4,626
Dams Sector...................................................... 107,054 2,141 5,353 10,705
Defense Industrial Base Sector................................... 60,000 1,200 3,000 6,000
Emergency Services............................................... 118,098 2,362 5,905 11,810
Energy Sector.................................................... 36,069 721 1,803 3,607
Financial Services Sector........................................ 294,794 5,896 14,740 29,479
Food and Agriculture Sector...................................... 3,239,083 64,782 161,954 323,908
Government Facilities Sector..................................... 89,626 1,793 4,481 8,963
Healthcare and Public Health Sector.............................. 142,806 2,856 7,140 14,281
Information Technology Sector.................................... 557,000 11,140 27,850 55,700
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector.................... 143 3 7 14
Transportation Systems Sector.................................... 214,833 4,297 10,742 21,483
Water and Wastewater Sector...................................... 169,500 3,390 8,475 16,950
----------------------------------------------
Total........................................................ 13,180,483 263,610 659,024 1,318,048
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using all of the same assumptions for the primary estimates
presented in Sections V.A.i and ii, this would increase the number of
expected CIRCIA Reports from 210,525 to 5,292,818 over the period of
analysis. This would significantly increase the cost to industry, which
is estimated to be $31.8 billion over the period of analysis, or $3.5
billion annualized, discounted at 2%, as presented in Table 23.
Table 23--Alternative 4 Industry Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data & record Total cost
Year Familiarization Reporting preservation Help desk Enforcement --------------------------------
costs costs costs costs costs Undiscounted Discounted 2%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2024........................................... $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.00 $0.0 $0.0
2025........................................... 10,461.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 10,461.9 10,055.7
2026........................................... 10,799.4 384.3 235.6 11.3 0.03 11,430.6 10,771.3
2027........................................... 675.0 384.4 732.8 11.3 0.03 1,803.5 1,666.1
2028........................................... 675.0 384.4 733.3 11.3 0.03 1,804.0 1,634.0
2029........................................... 675.0 384.5 733.8 11.3 0.03 1,804.6 1,602.4
2030........................................... 675.0 384.5 734.3 11.3 0.03 1,805.1 1,571.5
2031........................................... 675.0 384.6 734.8 11.3 0.03 1,805.7 1,541.1
2032........................................... 675.0 384.7 735.3 11.3 0.03 1,806.3 1,511.4
2033........................................... 675.0 384.8 735.8 11.3 0.03 1,806.9 1,482.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 25,986.1 3,076.2 5,375.8 90.3 0.24 34,528.6 31,835.8
Annualized................................. ............... .......... ............... .......... ............ .............. 3,544.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
In addition to increased industry cost, CISA assumes that the
substantial increase in volume of CIRCIA Reports submitted would lead
to increased Federal government costs necessary to manage a much larger
CIRCIA program. For the purposes of this alternatives analysis, CISA
assumes a 10X (900%) increase in government cost in response to the
4,967% increase in the affected population. As presented in Table 24,
CISA estimates a combined 11-year cost of $42.1 billion, with an
annualized cost of $4.3 billion, discounted at 2%, for Alternative 4.
Table 24--Alternative 4 Combined Industry and Government Costs, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total cost
Year Industry cost Government --------------------------------
cost Undiscounted Discounted 2%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023........................................... $0.0 $34.5 $34.5 $34.5
2024........................................... 0.0 977.0 977.0 957.8
[[Page 23762]]
2025........................................... 10,461.9 1,159.0 11,620.9 11,169.7
2026........................................... 11,430.6 1,159.0 12,589.6 11,863.5
2027........................................... 1,803.5 1,159.0 2,962.5 2,736.8
2028........................................... 1,804.0 1,159.0 2,963.0 2,683.7
2029........................................... 1,804.6 1,159.0 2,963.6 2,631.6
2030........................................... 1,805.1 1,159.0 2,964.1 2,580.5
2031........................................... 1,805.7 1,159.0 2,964.7 2,530.3
2032........................................... 1,806.3 1,159.0 2,965.3 2,481.2
2033........................................... 1,806.9 1,159.0 2,965.9 2,433.1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total...................................... 34,528.6 11,442.5 45,971.1 42,102.7
Annualized................................. .............. .............. .............. 4,302.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.
While Alternative 4 would capture a significantly larger affected
population, and therefore provide CISA with additional data to use in
its efforts to prevent, or mitigate the impact of, covered cyber
incidents, this alternative is rejected due to its high cost. CISA
would not anticipate additional benefits comparable to the cost
increase from expanding the population, as the Preferred Alternative
focuses the affected population on the highest-risk population within
the critical infrastructure sectors and is expected to provide
sufficient reporting for CISA to identify cyber incident threats and
trends.
6. Alternative Comparison
In this analysis, CISA considered four regulatory alternatives to
the Preferred Alternative. Table 25 presents the cost comparison for
the Preferred Alternative and the four additional alternatives
discussed.
Table 25--Alternatives Summary, Combined Industry and Government Cost, Primary Estimate
[$ Millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11-Year cost Annualized cost
Alternative Description -------------------------------------------------
Undiscounted Discounted 2% Discounted 2%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred....................... Proposed Rulemaking......... $2,619.8 $2,394.0 $244.6
1............................... Reduces the data and record 2,418.3 2,218.0 226.6
preservation period.
2............................... Remove Size Based Criterion 2,335.1 2,133.1 218.0
for Covered Entities \459\.
3............................... Reduces the data and record 2,190.8 2,007.6 205.1
preservation period and
removes the size-based
criterion.
4............................... Increases the affected 45,971.1 42,102.7 4,302.0
population to all critical
infrastructure entities.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\459\ In this proposed rule, CISA proposes several criteria in Sec. 226.2 to describe entities that would be
considered covered entities, and one criterion would include entities that exceed the SBA small business size
standard. Alternatives 2 and 3 would remove that as a criterion for determining covered entities.
B. Small Entities
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 603, requires
agencies to consider the impacts of its rules on small entities. In
accordance with the RFA, CISA has prepared an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis (IRFA) that examines the impacts of the proposed
rule on small entities. The IRFA is included in the Preliminary RIA
that is available in the docket for this rulemaking. The term ``small
entities'' comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations
that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their
fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of fewer than
50,000.
CISA is publishing the IRFA in the rulemaking docket to aid the
public in commenting on the potential small entity impacts of the
requirements in this proposed rule. CISA invites all interested parties
to submit data and information regarding the potential economic impact
on small entities that would result from the adoption of the proposed
requirements in this proposed rule. Under section 603(b) and (c) of the
RFA, an IRFA must describe the impact of the proposed rule on small
entities and contain the following:
A description of the reasons why action by the agency is
being considered.
A succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis
for, the proposed rule.
A description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the
number of small entities to which the proposed rule would apply.
A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping,
and other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, including an
estimate of the classes of small entities which would be subject to the
requirements and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record.
An identification, to the extent practicable, of all
relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with
the proposed rule.
A description of any significant alternatives to the
proposed rule that accomplish the stated objectives of applicable
statutes and may minimize any significant economic impact of the
proposed rule on small entities.
CISA has discussed many of these issues in other sections of the
preamble
[[Page 23763]]
to the NPRM and in the Preliminary RIA, which is published in the
rulemaking docket. CISA welcomes comment from the public on the
Preliminary RIA.
An estimated 316,244 covered entities would be subject to
requirements proposed in this NPRM and potentially incur costs as a
result of this proposed rule. These covered entities include
businesses, government entities, and organizations--some of which are
considered to be small entities as defined by the RFA.
CISA does not have a complete list of the entities that would be
subject to the requirements of this proposed rule. Therefore, as
discussed in Section 9.4 of the Preliminary RIA, CISA conducted an
analysis to review the NAICS codes that would most likely have entities
affected by the proposed rule. Using the SBA size standards, CISA
estimated the number of small entities within each of the 280 relevant
NAICS codes. CISA then performed an IRFA to assess the impacts on small
entities resulting from this proposed rule using the estimated cost per
covered entity.
Based on the IRFA, CISA found:
Of the 316,244 covered entities, CISA estimates that
310,855 would be considered small entities.
Of the 264 NAICS codes with available revenue data, 99.2%
had a revenue impact of less than or equal to 1%.
CISA estimated that the average cost per non-covered
entity would be $33.58 and the average cost per covered entity
experiencing a single covered cyber incident would be $4,139.60.
CISA has discussed many of these issues in other sections of the
NPRM and in the Preliminary RIA, which is published in the rulemaking
docket. CISA welcomes comment from the public on the Preliminary RIA
and the IRFA.
C. Assistance for Small Entities
Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), CISA wants to assist small
entities in understanding this proposed rule so that they can better
evaluate its effects on them and participate in the rulemaking. If this
proposed rule would affect your small business, organization, or
governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its
provisions or options for compliance, please contact the person in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this NPRM. CISA will not
retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this
proposed rule or any policy or action of the CISA.
D. Collection of Information
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501-
3520, agencies are required to submit to OMB, for review and approval,
any reporting requirements inherent in a rule. This proposed rule would
call for a new collection of information under PRA. CIRCIA also
includes a broad exemption to PRA, which provides that: ``Sections
3506(c), 3507, 3508, and 3509 of title 44 shall not apply to any action
to carry out this section.'' 6 U.S.C. 681b(f). CISA interprets the
phrase ``this section'' as referring to 6 U.S.C. 681b for the purposes
of the PRA exemption. Therefore, CISA understands the scope of this PRA
exemption as applying to all information collection related to CIRCIA's
reporting requirements under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(1)-(3) as wholly exempt
from compliance with the PRA, regardless of whether that information
must be required under this proposed rule or is voluntarily provided in
response to an optional question in a CIRCIA Report.
Covered entities will also have the opportunity to submit
additional data and information to enhance situational awareness of
cyber threats, as authorized under 6 U.S.C. 681c(b), via an open text
box and/or the ability to upload information as part of a covered
entity's CIRCIA Report. Because CISA does not plan to require covered
entities to submit this data and information, nor will it pose
identical questions that must be responded to in any particular form or
time period to covered entities, this additional information does not
constitute a ``collection of information'' under the Paperwork
Reduction Act. See 5 CFR 1320.3(c).
Accordingly, information collected through CIRCIA Reports,
including additional information collected in an ad hoc manner that is
incorporated into CIRCIA Reports, is exempt from compliance with PRA
requirements. Information collected by CISA entirely pursuant to 6
U.S.C. 681c is outside of the scope of this rulemaking and not exempt
from compliance with PRA requirements.
E. Federalism
Under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10,
1999), agencies must adhere to fundamental federalism principles,
policymaking criteria, and in some cases follow additional requirements
when promulgating federal regulations. While it is possible that the
regulations proposed through this notice may have some impact on SLTT
governments, CISA believes that this rule would not trigger the
additional requirements contained in Executive Order 13132 for rules
that have federalism impacts.
Depending on the type of rule under development, Executive Order
13132 may require an agency to: (1) provide the State and local
government with funds to pay for the direct costs they incur in
complying with the regulation; (2) consult with State and local
officials early in the process of developing the proposed regulation;
(3) provide a federalism summary impact statement in the preamble of
the rule; and/or (4) provide the Director of OMB with written
communications submitted to the agency by State and local officials.
Under Section 6 of the Executive Order, agencies must meet these
additional requirements for two categories of rules. Section 6(b)
describes the first category as rules that have federalism
implications, impose substantial direct compliance costs on State and
local governments, and that are not required by statute. Because the
regulations proposed through this notice are required by statute, this
proposed rule is not the sort of action contemplated by Section 6(b).
The second category, described in Section 6(c) is a rule that would
have federalism implications and that would preempt state law. While
the regulations proposed through this notice may have some impact on
SLTT governments, the rule would not have federalism implications as
defined in Executive Order 13132, nor would the majority of this rule
preempt state law.
A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132
if it has a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. While this proposed rule describes covered entity to
include State and local government entities and entities like emergency
service or education providers that may be considered part of a State,
the requirement to file a CIRCIA Report is not a substantial direct
effect under Executive Order 13132. Congress explicitly prohibited CISA
from pursuing enforcement against a State or local government for
failure to report a covered cyber incident or ransom payment as
otherwise required under the statute's implementing regulations. See 6
U.S.C. 681d(f). Thus, even though these proposed regulations require
some State and local governments and government entities to report
covered cyber incidents and ransom payments to CISA, this requirement
is unenforceable. CISA believes that an unenforceable requirement to
submit an informational
[[Page 23764]]
report to a federal agency is not the type of government action that
results in a substantial direct effect on States, the relationship
between the States and the national government, or the distribution of
power or responsibilities among the various levels of government.
Accordingly, CISA believes that this proposed rule would not have
sufficient federalism implications that require under Executive Order
13132 preparation of a federalism summary impact statement, nor require
further consultation with State and local government officials.
Similarly, the majority of this rule would not preempt State and/or
local government law. Congress did not include any express preemption
provision in the CIRCIA statute, and CISA does not assert through this
rulemaking that the Federal government so fully occupies the field of
cyber incident reporting that States or local governments cannot also
regulate in this space. To CISA's knowledge, no State or local laws
directly conflict with the incident reporting requirements set forth by
this regulation, but CISA welcomes comment from stakeholders explaining
otherwise.
One exception to this general lack of preemption is the set of
statutory provisions included in CIRCIA, replicated in the proposed
rulemaking for clarity in Sec. 226.18(a)(5)(A) and (b)(2), that places
limits on a State and/or local government's ability to use information
obtained solely through a CIRCIA Report, and disclose the CIRCIA
Reports themselves. Similar to the restriction placed on federal
regulatory use of information obtained through reporting to CISA under
CIRCIA, CIRCIA prohibits SLTT governments from using information about
a covered cyber incident or ransom payment obtained solely through
reporting directly to CISA under CIRCIA to regulate the activities of
the covered entity or entity that made the ransom payment, unless the
SLTT expressly permitted the entity to submit a CIRCIA Report to comply
with its SLTT reporting obligations. See 6 U.S.C. 681e(a)(5).\460\
Similarly, in addition to exemption from disclosure under the Federal
FOIA, CIRCIA also exempts CIRCIA Reports from disclosure under SLTT
freedom of information laws or similar laws requiring disclosure of
information or records. See U.S.C. 681e(b)(3). CISA believes, however,
that incorporation of these provisions into the proposed rule does not
result in a rule that implicates federalism as contemplated under
Executive Order 13132 for several reasons. First, these two information
protection provisions, are a small, supportive aspect of the CIRCIA
regulations and will only actually be implicated if and when SLTT
governments receive CIRCIA Reports, or information included therein.
Unless the SLTT government is in possession of a CIRCIA Report or
information obtained solely through a CIRCIA Report after it has been
submitted to CISA, these restrictions do not apply. Further, regarding
the regulatory use restrictions, SLTT governments are not prohibited
from taking regulatory actions based on information they receive from
another source, even if that very same information was submitted to
CISA as part of a CIRCIA Report. Congress prohibited from using the
information obtained solely through a CIRCIA Report for such regulatory
purposes, unless the submission of a CIRCIA Report is expressly
permitted to meet SLTT reporting requirements. In other words, the rule
would only place limits on SLTT governments' use and disclosure of
information that they would not have otherwise obtained (and therefore,
as a practical matter, would not have had in their possession to use or
disclose) but for the rule itself. Second, these provisions are
expected to inure to the benefit of SLTT governments by making it
possible for CIRCIA Reports and/or information contained in those
reports that is provided to the Federal government to be shared with
the States, which CISA would not otherwise be able to do without
risking the important confidentiality and other stakeholder protections
required by CIRCIA. This ultimately means that SLTT governments will
have more information (e.g., to protect their own information systems)
than they would have had without the rule. Accordingly, CISA does not
believe that this rule contains federalism implications and preempts
state law in the manner that would trigger additional steps required
for certain regulatory actions under Executive Order 13121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\ A CIRCIA Report may, consistent with State regulatory
authority specifically relating to the prevention and mitigation of
cybersecurity threats to information systems, inform the development
or implementation of regulations relating to such systems. 6 U.S.C.
681e(a)(5)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although CISA believes that Executive Order 13132 does not require
adherence to the additional steps otherwise necessary for rules that
have federalism implications and which preempt state law, CISA notes
that representatives from several State and local government entities
were consulted early in the development of this proposed rule. CISA
hosted several listening sessions between September and November 2022
to obtain input from those entities who may be impacted by the proposed
regulations once they have been finalized. Representatives from various
State and local government entities were invited to and attended these
listening sessions. In some cases, representatives from State and local
entities provided input on the proposed regulations during the
listening session, for example, during the Emergency Services Sector
and Government Facilities Sector sector-specific listening sessions.
Transcripts of those listening sessions are available in the docket for
this rulemaking.
CISA welcomes public comments on Executive Order 13132 federalism
implications.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 or UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531-
1538, directs Federal agencies to assess the effects of regulatory
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private
sector. UMRA's requirements apply when any Federal mandate may result
in the expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 (which is now
$177,000,000 when adjusted for inflation) or more in any one year.\461\
This proposed rule does not impose an unfunded Federal mandate on
State, local, or tribal governments because the proposed reporting
requirements are unenforceable against SLTT Government Entities.\462\
Although this proposed rulemaking would not impose an unfunded mandate
on State, local, or tribal governments, the estimates for years 2 and 3
show an unfunded mandate in excess of $177 million on the private
sector primarily due to the estimated familiarization costs with the
final rule. The regulatory impact assessment prepared in conjunction
with this proposed rule satisfies
[[Page 23765]]
UMRA's requirements under 2 U.S.C. 1532.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\461\ $100 million in 1995 dollars adjusted for inflation to
2022 using the GDP implicit price deflator for the U.S. economy.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ``GDP Implicit Price Deflator in
United States,'' available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USAGDPDEFAISMEI#0, last accessed on July 21, 2023.
\462\ See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, Guidance for Implementing Title II of S. 1, from Alice
Rivlin, OMB Director (Mar. 31, 1995) (``As a general matter, a
Federal mandate includes Federal regulations that impose enforceable
duties on State, local, and tribal governments, or on the private
sector . . . .''), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda_1998 (last accessed Oct.
13, 2023). See also 5 U.S.C. 1555 which defines a federal mandate as
``. . . any provision in statute or regulation or any Federal court
ruling that imposes an enforceable duty upon State, local, or tribal
governments . . .'' (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Taking of Private Property
This proposed rule would not cause a taking of private property or
otherwise have taking implications under Executive Order 12630,
Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected
Property Rights, 53 FR 8863 (Mar. 18, 1988).
H. Civil Justice Reform
This proposed rule meets the applicable standards set forth in
section 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice
Reform, 61 FR 4729 (Feb. 5, 1996) to minimize litigation, eliminate
ambiguity, and reduce burden.
I. Protection of Children
This proposed rule, while ``economically significant'' under
Executive Order 12866 as amended by Executive Order 14094, does not
concern an environmental health risk or safety risk that an agency has
reason to believe may disproportionately affect children. Accordingly,
no further analysis is needed under Executive Order 13045, Protection
of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks, 62 FR
19885 (Apr. 21, 1997).
J. Indian Tribal Governments
This rule does not have ``tribal implications'' under Executive
Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal
Governments, 65 FR 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000), because it does not have
substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the
relationship between the Federal government and Indian tribes, or on
the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal
government and Indian tribes. As with State and local governments, this
proposed rule describes ``covered entity,'' to include tribal
government entities and entities like emergency service providers that
may be considered part of a tribal government. The requirement to file
a CIRCIA Report, however, is not a substantial direct effect under
Executive Order 13175. Further, Congress explicitly prohibited CISA
from pursuing enforcement against a tribal government for failure to
report a covered cyber incident or ransom payment as otherwise required
under the statute's implementing regulations. See 6 U.S.C. 681d(f).
Accordingly, CISA believes that this rule does not have tribal
implications, and therefore Executive Order 13175 requires no further
agency action or analysis. CISA welcomes public comments on Executive
Order 13175 tribal implications.
K. Energy Effects
CISA has analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use, 66 FR 28355 (May 18, 2001). CISA has determined
that it is not a ``significant energy action'' under that order because
even though it is a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866, it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on
the supply, distribution, or use of energy, and it has not been
designated by the Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs as a ``significant energy action.'' Accordingly, the
provisions of Executive Order 13211 to not apply to this proposed rule.
L. Technical Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, codified as a
note to 15 U.S.C. 272, directs agencies to use voluntary consensus
standards in their regulatory activities unless the agency provides
Congress, through OMB, with an explanation of why using these standards
would be inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical.
Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards (e.g.,
specifications of materials, performance, design, or operation; test
methods; sampling procedures; and related management systems practices)
that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies.
This proposed rule does not use technical standards. Therefore, CISA
did not consider the use of voluntary consensus standards.
M. National Environmental Policy Act
Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., requires Federal agencies to evaluate
the impact of any proposed major Federal action significantly affecting
the human environment, consider alternatives to the proposed action,
provide public notice and opportunity for comment, and properly
document its analysis. See 40 CFR parts 1501, 1502, 1506.6. DHS and its
component agencies analyze proposed actions to determine whether NEPA
applies and, if so, what level of analysis and documentation is
required. See 40 CFR 1501.3.
DHS Directive 023-01 Rev. 01 (Directive) and Instruction Manual
023-01-001-01 Rev. 01 (Instruction Manual) together establish the
policies and procedures DHS and its component agencies use to comply
with NEPA and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations
for implementing the procedural requirements of NEPA, codified at 40
CFR parts 1500 through 1508.
The CEQ regulations allow Federal agencies to establish in their
NEPA implementing procedures, with CEQ review and concurrence,
categories of actions (``categorical exclusions'') that experience has
shown do not, individually or cumulatively, have a significant effect
on the human environment and, therefore, do not require preparation of
an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement. 40 CFR
1507.3(e)(2)(ii), 1501.4. Appendix A of the Instruction Manual lists
the DHS categorical exclusions. Under DHS NEPA implementing procedures,
for a proposed action to be categorically excluded it must satisfy each
of the following three conditions: (1) the entire action clearly fits
within one or more of the categorical exclusions; (2) the action is not
a piece of a larger action; and (3) no extraordinary circumstances
exist that create the potential for a significant environmental effect.
Instruction Manual section V.B(2)(a)-(c).
This proposed rule implements the authority in CIRCIA to develop
and codify requirements for covered entities to report covered cyber
incidents, ransom payments, and substantial new or different
information from what was previously reported regarding such cyber
incidents and ransom payments. The proposed rules will be codified at 6
CFR 226.1 through 226.20.
DHS has determined that this proposed rule will have no significant
effect on the human environment and clearly fits within categorical
exclusion A3 in Appendix A of the Instruction Manual established for
promulgation of rules of a strictly administrative or procedural nature
and that implement statutory requirements without substantive change.
This proposed rule is not part of a larger action and presents no
extraordinary circumstances creating the potential for significant
environmental effects. Therefore, this proposed rule is categorically
excluded from further NEPA review.
VI. Proposed Regulation
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 226
Computer technology, Critical infrastructure, Cybersecurity,
Internet, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
[[Page 23766]]
0
For the reasons stated in the preamble, and under the authority of 6
U.S.C. 681 through 681e and 6 U.S.C. 681g, the Department of Homeland
Security proposes to add chapter II, consisting of part 226 to title 6
of the Code of Regulations to read as follows:
CHAPTER II--DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CYBERSECURITY AND
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY
PART 226--COVERED CYBER INCIDENT AND RANSOM PAYMENT REPORTING
Sec.
226.1 Definitions.
226.2 Applicability.
226.3 Required reporting on covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments.
226.4 Exceptions to required reporting on covered cyber incidents
and ransom payments.
226.5 CIRCIA Report submission deadlines.
226.6 Required manner and form of CIRCIA Reports.
226.7 Required information for CIRCIA Reports.
226.8 Required information for Covered Cyber Incident Reports.
226.9 Required information for Ransom Payment Reports.
226.10 Required information for Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Reports.
226.11 Required information for Supplemental Reports.
226.12 Third party reporting procedures and requirements.
226.13 Data and records preservation requirements.
226.14 Request for information and subpoena procedures.
226.15 Civil enforcement of subpoenas.
226.16 Referral to the Department of Homeland Security Suspension
and Debarment Official.
226.17 Referral to Cognizant Contracting Official or Attorney
General.
226.18 Treatment of information and restrictions on use.
226.19 Procedures for protecting privacy and civil liberties.
226.20 Other procedural measures.
Authority: 6 U.S.C. 681-681e, 6 U.S.C. 681g; Sections 2240-2244
and 2246 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135, as amended by Pub. L. 117-103 and Pub. L. 117-263 (Dec.
23, 2022).
Sec. 226.1 Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
CIRCIA means the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
Infrastructure Act of 2022, as amended, in 6 U.S.C. 681-681g.
CIRCIA Agreement means an agreement between CISA and another
Federal agency that meets the requirements of Sec. 226.4(a)(2), has
not expired or been terminated, and, when publicly posted by CISA in
accordance with Sec. 226.4(a)(5), indicates the availability of a
substantially similar reporting exception for use by a covered entity.
CIRCIA Report means a Covered Cyber Incident Report, Ransom Payment
Report, Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report, or
Supplemental Report, as defined under this part.
Cloud service provider means an entity offering products or
services related to cloud computing, as defined by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology in Nat'l Inst. of Standards &
Tech., NIST Special Publication 800-145, and any amendatory or
superseding document relating thereto.
Covered cyber incident means a substantial cyber incident
experienced by a covered entity.
Covered Cyber Incident Report means a submission made by a covered
entity or a third party on behalf of a covered entity to report a
covered cyber incident as required by this part. A Covered Cyber
Incident Report also includes any responses to optional questions and
additional information voluntarily submitted as part of a Covered Cyber
Incident Report.
Covered entity means an entity that meets the criteria set forth in
Sec. 226.2 of this part.
Cyber incident means an occurrence that actually jeopardizes,
without lawful authority, the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of information on an information system; or actually
jeopardizes, without lawful authority, an information system.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency or CISA means the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency as established under
section 2202 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 652), as
amended by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of
2018 and subsequent laws, or any successor organization.
Cybersecurity threat means an action, not protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, on or through an
information system that may result in an unauthorized effort to
adversely impact the security, availability, confidentiality, or
integrity of an information system or information that is stored on,
processed by, or transiting an information system. This term does not
include any action that solely involves a violation of a consumer term
of service or a consumer licensing agreement.
Director means the Director of CISA, any successors to that
position within the Department of Homeland Security, or any designee.
Information system means a discrete set of information resources
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing,
dissemination, or disposition of information, including, but not
limited to, operational technology systems such as industrial control
systems, supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed
control systems, and programmable logic controllers.
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report means a
submission made by a covered entity or a third party on behalf of a
covered entity to simultaneously report both a covered cyber incident
and ransom payment related to the covered cyber incident being
reported, as required by this part. A Joint Covered Cyber Incident and
Ransom Payment Report also includes any responses to optional questions
and additional information voluntarily submitted as part of the report.
Managed service provider means an entity that delivers services,
such as network, application, infrastructure, or security services, via
ongoing and regular support and active administration on the premises
of a customer, in the data center of the entity, such as hosting, or in
a third-party data center.
Personal information means information that identifies a specific
individual or nonpublic information associated with an identified or
identifiable individual. Examples of personal information include, but
are not limited to, photographs, names, home addresses, direct
telephone numbers, social security numbers, medical information,
personal financial information, contents of personal communications,
and personal web browsing history.
Ransom payment means the transmission of any money or other
property or asset, including virtual currency, or any portion thereof,
which has at any time been delivered as ransom in connection with a
ransomware attack.
Ransom Payment Report means a submission made by a covered entity
or a third party on behalf of a covered entity to report a ransom
payment as required by this part. A Ransom Payment Report also includes
any responses to optional questions and additional information
voluntarily submitted as part of a Ransom Payment Report.
Ransomware attack means an occurrence that actually or imminently
jeopardizes, without lawful authority,
[[Page 23767]]
the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information on an
information system, or that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without
lawful authority, an information system that involves, but need not be
limited to, the following:
(1) The use or the threat of use of:
(i) Unauthorized or malicious code on an information system; or
(ii) Another digital mechanism such as a denial-of-service attack;
(2) To interrupt or disrupt the operations of an information system
or compromise the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of
electronic data stored on, processed by, or transiting an information
system; and
(3) To extort a ransom payment.
(4) Exclusion. A ransomware attack does not include any event where
the demand for a ransom payment is:
(i) Not genuine; or
(ii) Made in good faith by an entity in response to a specific
request by the owner or operator of the information system.
State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial Government entity or SLTT
Government entity means an organized domestic entity which, in addition
to having governmental character, has sufficient discretion in the
management of its own affairs to distinguish it as separate from the
administrative structure of any other governmental unit, and which is
one of the following or a subdivision thereof:
(1) A State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of
the United States;
(2) A county, municipality, city, town, township, local public
authority, school district, special district, intrastate district,
council of governments, regardless of whether the council of
governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under State law,
regional or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality
of a Local government;
(3) An Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or
community, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska
Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or
established pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., which is recognized as
eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United
States to Indians because of their status as Indians; and
(4) A rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other
public entity.
Substantial cyber incident means a cyber incident that leads to any
of the following:
(1) A substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity or
availability of a covered entity's information system or network;
(2) A serious impact on the safety and resiliency of a covered
entity's operational systems and processes;
(3) A disruption of a covered entity's ability to engage in
business or industrial operations, or deliver goods or services;
(4) Unauthorized access to a covered entity's information system or
network, or any nonpublic information contained therein, that is
facilitated through or caused by a:
(i) Compromise of a cloud service provider, managed service
provider, or other third-party data hosting provider; or
(ii) Supply chain compromise.
(5) A ``substantial cyber incident'' resulting in the impacts
listed in paragraphs (1) through (3) in this definition includes any
cyber incident regardless of cause, including, but not limited to, any
of the above incidents caused by a compromise of a cloud service
provider, managed service provider, or other third-party data hosting
provider; a supply chain compromise; a denial-of-service attack; a
ransomware attack; or exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability.
(6) The term ``substantial cyber incident'' does not include:
(i) Any lawfully authorized activity of a United States Government
entity or SLTT Government entity, including activities undertaken
pursuant to a warrant or other judicial process;
(ii) Any event where the cyber incident is perpetrated in good
faith by an entity in response to a specific request by the owner or
operator of the information system; or
(iii) The threat of disruption as extortion, as described in 6
U.S.C. 650(22).
Supplemental report means a submission made by a covered entity or
a third party on behalf of a covered entity to update or supplement a
previously submitted Covered Cyber Incident Report or to report a
ransom payment made by the covered entity after submitting a Covered
Cyber Incident Report as required by this part. A supplemental report
also includes any responses to optional questions and additional
information voluntarily submitted as part of a supplemental report.
Supply chain compromise means a cyber incident within the supply
chain of an information system that an adversary can leverage, or does
leverage, to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of the information system or the information the system processes,
stores, or transmits, and can occur at any point during the life cycle.
Virtual currency means the digital representation of value that
functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a store of
value. Virtual currency includes a form of value that substitutes for
currency or funds.
Sec. 226.2 Applicability.
This part applies to an entity in a critical infrastructure sector
that either:
(a) Exceeds the small business size standard. Exceeds the small
business size standard specified by the applicable North American
Industry Classification System Code in the U.S. Small Business
Administration's Small Business Size Regulations as set forth in 13 CFR
part 121; or
(b) Meets a sector-based criterion. Meets one or more of the
sector-based criteria provided below, regardless of the specific
critical infrastructure sector of which the entity considers itself to
be part:
(1) Owns or operates a covered chemical facility. The entity owns
or operates a covered chemical facility subject to the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards pursuant to 6 CFR part 27;
(2) Provides wire or radio communications service. The entity
provides communications services by wire or radio communications, as
defined in 47 U.S.C. 153(40), 153(59), to the public, businesses, or
government, as well as one-way services and two-way services, including
but not limited to:
(i) Radio and television broadcasters;
(ii) Cable television operators;
(iii) Satellite operators;
(iv) Telecommunications carriers;
(v) Submarine cable licensees required to report outages to the
Federal Communications Commission under 47 CFR 4.15;
(vi) Fixed and mobile wireless service providers;
(vii) Voice over internet Protocol providers; or
(viii) internet service providers;
(3) Owns or operates critical manufacturing sector infrastructure.
The entity owns or has business operations that engage in one or more
of the following categories of manufacturing:
(i) Primary metal manufacturing;
(ii) Machinery manufacturing;
(iii) Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing;
or
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(iv) Transportation equipment manufacturing;
(4) Provides operationally critical support to the Department of
Defense or processes, stores, or transmits covered defense information.
The entity is a contractor or subcontractor required to report cyber
incidents to the Department of Defense pursuant to the definitions and
requirements of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
48 CFR 252.204-7012;
(5) Performs an emergency service or function. The entity provides
one or more of the following emergency services or functions to a
population equal to or greater than 50,000 individuals:
(i) Law enforcement;
(ii) Fire and rescue services;
(iii) Emergency medical services;
(iv) Emergency management; or
(v) Public works that contribute to public health and safety;
(6) Bulk electric and distribution system entities. The entity is
required to report cybersecurity incidents under the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection
Reliability Standards or required to file an Electric Emergency
Incident and Disturbance Report OE-417 form, or any successor form, to
the Department of Energy;
(7) Owns or operates financial services sector infrastructure. The
entity owns or operates any legal entity that qualifies as one or more
of the following financial services entities:
(i) A banking or other organization regulated by:
(A) The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency under 12 CFR
parts 30 and 53, which includes all national banks, Federal savings
associations, and Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks;
(B) The Federal Reserve Board under:
(1) 12 CFR parts 208, 211, 225, or 234, which includes all U.S.
bank holding companies, savings and loans holding companies, state
member banks, the U.S. operations of foreign banking organizations,
Edge and agreement corporations, and certain designated financial
market utilities; or
(2) 12 U.S.C. 248(j), which includes the Federal Reserve Banks;
(C) The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation under 12 CFR part
304, which includes all insured state nonmember banks, insured state-
licensed branches of foreign banks, and insured State savings
associations;
(ii) A Federally insured credit union regulated by the National
Credit Union Administration under 12 CFR part 748;
(iii) A designated contract market, swap execution facility,
derivatives clearing organization, or swap data repository regulated by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under 17 CFR parts 37, 38, 39,
and 49;
(iv) A futures commission merchant or swap dealer regulated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission under 17 CFR parts 1 and 23;
(v) A systems compliance and integrity entity, security-based swap
dealer, or security-based swap data repository regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission under Regulation Systems Compliance
and Integrity or Regulation Security-Based Swap Regulatory Regime, 17
CFR part 242;
(vi) A money services business as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(ff);
or
(vii) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as defined in 12 CFR 1201.1;
(8) Qualifies as a State, local, Tribal, or territorial government
entity. The entity is a State, local, Tribal, or territorial government
entity for a jurisdiction with a population equal to or greater than
50,000 individuals;
(9) Qualifies as an education facility. The entity qualifies as any
of the following types of education facilities:
(i) A local educational agency, educational service agency, or
state educational agency, as defined under 20 U.S.C. 7801, with a
student population equal to or greater than 1,000 students; or
(ii) An institute of higher education that receives funding under
Title IV of the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., as
amended;
(10) Involved with information and communications technology to
support elections processes. The entity manufactures, sells, or
provides managed services for information and communications technology
specifically used to support election processes or report and display
results on behalf of State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial governments,
including but not limited to:
(i) Voter registration databases;
(ii) Voting systems; and
(iii) Information and communication technologies used to report,
display, validate, or finalize election results;
(11) Provides essential public health-related services. The entity
provides one or more of the following essential public health-related
services:
(i) Owns or operates a hospital, as defined by 42 U.S.C. 1395x(e),
with 100 or more beds, or a critical access hospital, as defined by 42
U.S.C. 1395x(mm)(1);
(ii) Manufactures drugs listed in appendix A of the Essential
Medicines Supply Chain and Manufacturing Resilience Assessment
developed pursuant to section 3 of E.O. 14017; or
(iii) Manufactures a Class II or Class III device as defined by 21
U.S.C. 360c;
(12) Information technology entities. The entity meets one or more
of the following criteria:
(i) Knowingly provides or supports information technology hardware,
software, systems, or services to the Federal government;
(ii) Has developed and continues to sell, license, or maintain any
software that has, or has direct software dependencies upon, one or
more components with at least one of these attributes:
(A) Is designed to run with elevated privilege or manage
privileges;
(B) Has direct or privileged access to networking or computing
resources;
(C) Is designed to control access to data or operational
technology;
(D) Performs a function critical to trust; or
(E) Operates outside of normal trust boundaries with privileged
access;
(iii) Is an original equipment manufacturer, vendor, or integrator
of operational technology hardware or software components;
(iv) Performs functions related to domain name operations;
(13) Owns or operates a commercial nuclear power reactor or fuel
cycle Facility. The entity owns or operates a commercial nuclear power
reactor or fuel cycle facility licensed to operate under the
regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR chapter I;
(14) Transportation system entities. The entity is required by the
Transportation Security Administration to report cyber incidents or
otherwise qualifies as one or more of the following transportation
system entities:
(i) A freight railroad carrier identified in 49 CFR 1580.1(a)(1),
(4), or (5);
(ii) A public transportation agency or passenger railroad carrier
identified in 49 CFR 1582.1(a)(1)-(4);
(iii) An over-the-road bus operator identified in 49 CFR 1584.1;
(iv) A pipeline facility or system owner or operator identified in
49 CFR 1586.101;
(v) An aircraft operator regulated under 49 CFR part 1544;
(vi) An indirect air carrier regulated under 49 CFR part 1548;
(vii) An airport operator regulated under 49 CFR part 1542; or
(viii) A Certified Cargo Screening Facility regulated under 49 CFR
part 1549;
(15) Subject to regulation under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act. The entity owns or operates a vessel,
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facility, or outer continental shelf facility subject to 33 CFR parts
104, 105, or 106; or
(16) Owns or operates a qualifying community water system or
publicly owned treatment works. The entity owns or operates a community
water system, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 300f(15), or a publicly owned
treatment works, as defined in 40 CFR 403.3(q), for a population
greater than 3,300 people.
Sec. 226.3 Required reporting on covered cyber incidents and ransom
payments.
(a) Covered cyber incident. A covered entity that experiences a
covered cyber incident must report the covered cyber incident to CISA
in accordance with this part.
(b) Ransom payment. A covered entity that makes a ransom payment,
or has another entity make a ransom payment on the covered entity's
behalf, as the result of a ransomware attack against the covered entity
must report the ransom payment to CISA in accordance with this part.
This reporting requirement applies to a covered entity even if the
ransomware attack that resulted in a ransom payment is not a covered
cyber incident subject to the reporting requirements of this part. If a
covered entity makes a ransom payment that relates to a covered cyber
incident that was previously reported in accordance with paragraph (a)
of this section, the covered entity must instead submit a supplemental
report in accordance with paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section.
(c) Covered cyber incident and ransom payment. A covered entity
that experiences a covered cyber incident and makes a ransom payment,
or has another entity make a ransom payment on the covered entity's
behalf, that is related to that covered cyber incident may report both
events to CISA in a Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment
Report in accordance with this part. If a covered entity, or a third
party acting on the covered entity's behalf, submits a Joint Covered
Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report in accordance with this part,
the covered entity is not required to also submit reports pursuant to
paragraph (a) and (b) of this section.
(d) Supplemental Reports--(1) Required Supplemental Reports. A
covered entity must promptly submit Supplemental Reports to CISA about
a previously reported covered cyber incident in accordance with this
part unless and until such date that the covered entity notifies CISA
that the covered cyber incident at issue has concluded and has been
fully mitigated and resolved. Supplemental Reports must be promptly
submitted by the covered entity if:
(i) Substantial new or different information becomes available.
Substantial new or different information includes but is not limited to
any information that the covered entity was required to provide as part
of a Covered Cyber Incident Report but did not have at the time of
submission; or
(ii) The covered entity makes a ransom payment, or has another
entity make a ransom payment on the covered entity's behalf, that
relates to a covered cyber incident that was previously reported in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(2) Optional notification that a covered cyber incident has
concluded. A covered entity may submit a Supplemental Report to inform
CISA that a covered cyber incident previously reported in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section has concluded and been fully
mitigated and resolved.
Sec. 226.4 Exceptions to required reporting on covered cyber
incidents and ransom payments.
(a) Substantially similar reporting exception--(1) In general. A
covered entity that reports a covered cyber incident, ransom payment,
or information that must be submitted to CISA in a supplemental report
to another Federal agency pursuant to the terms of a CIRCIA Agreement
will satisfy the covered entity's reporting obligations under Sec.
226.3. A covered entity is responsible for confirming that a CIRCIA
Agreement is applicable to the covered entity and the specific
reporting obligation it seeks to satisfy under this part, and
therefore, qualifies for this exemption.
(2) CIRCIA Agreement requirements. A CIRCIA Agreement may be
entered into and maintained by CISA and another Federal agency in
circumstances where CISA has determined the following:
(i) A law, regulation, or contract exists that requires one or more
covered entities to report covered cyber incidents or ransom payments
to the other Federal agency;
(ii) The required information that a covered entity must submit to
the other Federal agency pursuant to a legal, regulatory, or
contractual reporting requirement is substantially similar information
to that which a covered entity is required to include in a CIRCIA
Report as specified in Sec. Sec. 226.7 through 226.11, as applicable;
(iii) The applicable law, regulation, or contract requires covered
entities to report covered cyber incidents or ransom payments to the
other Federal agency within a substantially similar timeframe to those
for CIRCIA Reports specified in Sec. 226.5; and
(iv) CISA and the other Federal agency have an information sharing
mechanism in place.
(3) Substantially similar information determination. CISA retains
discretion to determine what constitutes substantially similar
information for the purposes of this part. In general, in making this
determination, CISA will consider whether the specific fields of
information reported by the covered entity to another Federal agency
are functionally equivalent to the fields of information required to be
reported in CIRCIA Reports under Sec. Sec. 226.7 through 226.11, as
applicable.
(4) Substantially similar timeframe. Reporting in a substantially
similar timeframe means that a covered entity is required to report
covered cyber incidents, ransom payments, or supplemental reports to
another Federal agency in a timeframe that enables the report to be
shared by the Federal agency with CISA by the applicable reporting
deadline specified for each type of CIRCIA Report under Sec. 226.5.
(5) Public posting of CIRCIA Agreements. CISA will maintain an
accurate catalog of all CIRCIA Agreements on a public-facing website
and will make CIRCIA Agreements publicly available, to the maximum
extent practicable. An agreement will be considered a CIRCIA Agreement
for the purposes of this section when CISA publishes public notice
concerning the agreement on such website and until notice of
termination or expiration has been posted as required under Sec.
226.4(a)(6).
(6) Termination or expiration of a CIRCIA Agreement. CISA may
terminate a CIRCIA Agreement at any time. CISA will provide notice of
the termination or expiration of CIRCIA Agreements on the public-facing
website where the catalog of CIRCIA Agreements is maintained.
(7) Continuing supplemental reporting requirement. Covered entities
remain subject to the supplemental reporting requirements specified
under Sec. 226.3(d), unless the covered entity submits the required
information to another Federal agency pursuant to the terms of a CIRCIA
Agreement.
(8) Communications with CISA. Nothing in this section prevents or
otherwise restricts CISA from contacting any entity that submits
information to another Federal agency, nor is any entity prevented from
communicating with, or submitting a CIRCIA Report to, CISA.
(b) Domain Name System exception. The following entities, to the
degree that
[[Page 23770]]
they are considered a covered entity under Sec. 226.2, are exempt from
the reporting requirements in this part:
(1) The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers;
(2) The American Registry for Internet Numbers;
(3) Any affiliates controlled by the covered entities listed in
paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section; and
(4) The root server operator function of a covered entity that has
been recognized by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers as responsible for operating one of the root identities and has
agreed to follow the service expectations established by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and its Root Server System
Advisory Committee.
(c) FISMA report exception. Federal agencies that are required by
the Federal Information Security Modernization Act, 44 U.S.C. 3551 et
seq., to report incidents to CISA are exempt from reporting those
incidents as covered cyber incidents under this part.
Sec. 226.5 CIRCIA Report submission deadlines.
Covered entities must submit CIRCIA Reports in accordance with the
submission deadlines specified in this section.
(a) Covered Cyber Incident Report deadline. A covered entity must
submit a Covered Cyber Incident Report to CISA no later than 72 hours
after the covered entity reasonably believes the covered cyber incident
has occurred.
(b) Ransom Payment Report deadline. A covered entity must submit a
Ransom Payment Report to CISA no later than 24 hours after the ransom
payment has been disbursed.
(c) Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report
deadline. A covered entity that experiences a covered cyber incident
and makes a ransom payment within 72 hours after the covered entity
reasonably believes a covered cyber incident has occurred may submit a
Joint Covered Cyber Incident and Ransom Payment Report to CISA no later
than 72 hours after the covered entity reasonably believes the covered
cyber incident has occurred.
(d) Supplemental Report Deadline. A covered entity must promptly
submit supplemental reports to CISA. If a covered entity submits a
supplemental report on a ransom payment made after the covered entity
submitted a Covered Cyber Incident Report, as required by Sec.
226.3(d)(1)(ii), the covered entity must submit the Supplemental Report
to CISA no later than 24 hours after the ransom payment has been
disbursed.
Sec. 226.6 Required manner and form of CIRCIA Reports.
A covered entity must submit CIRCIA Reports to CISA through the
web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form available on CISA's website or
in any other manner and form of reporting approved by the Director.
Sec. 226.7 Required information for CIRCIA Reports.
A covered entity must provide the following information in all
CIRCIA Reports to the extent such information is available and
applicable to the event reported:
(a) Identification of the type of CIRCIA Report submitted by the
covered entity;
(b) Information relevant to establishing the covered entity's
identity, including the covered entity's:
(1) Full legal name;
(2) State of incorporation or formation;
(3) Affiliated trade names;
(4) Organizational entity type;
(5) Physical address;
(6) website;
(7) Internal incident tracking number for the reported event;
(8) Applicable business numerical identifiers;
(9) Name of the parent company or organization, if applicable; and
(10) The critical infrastructure sector or sectors in which the
covered entity considers itself to be included;
(c) Contact information, including the full name, email address,
telephone number, and title for:
(1) The individual submitting the CIRCIA Report on behalf of the
covered entity;
(2) A point of contact for the covered entity if the covered entity
uses a third party to submit the CIRCIA Report or would like to
designate a preferred point of contact that is different from the
individual submitting the report; and
(3) A registered agent for the covered entity, if neither the
individual submitting the CIRCIA Report, nor the designated preferred
point of contact are a registered agent for the covered entity; and
(d) If a covered entity uses a third party to submit a CIRCIA
Report on the covered entity's behalf, an attestation that the third
party is expressly authorized by the covered entity to submit the
CIRCIA Report on the covered entity's behalf.
Sec. 226.8 Required information for Covered Cyber Incident Reports.
A covered entity must provide all the information identified in
Sec. 226.7 and the following information in a Covered Cyber Incident
Report, to the extent such information is available and applicable to
the covered cyber incident:
(a) A description of the covered cyber incident, including but not
limited to:
(1) Identification and description of the function of the affected
networks, devices, and/or information systems that were, or are
reasonably believed to have been, affected by the covered cyber
incident, including but not limited to:
(i) Technical details and physical locations of such networks,
devices, and/or information systems; and
(ii) Whether any such information system, network, and/or device
supports any elements of the intelligence community or contains
information that has been determined by the United States Government
pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign
relations, or any restricted data, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 2014(y);
(2) A description of any unauthorized access, regardless of whether
the covered cyber incident involved an attributed or unattributed cyber
intrusion, identification of any informational impacts or information
compromise, and any network location where activity was observed;
(3) Dates pertaining to the covered cyber incident, including but
not limited to:
(i) The date the covered cyber incident was detected;
(ii) The date the covered cyber incident began;
(iii) If fully mitigated and resolved at the time of reporting, the
date the covered cyber incident ended;
(iv) The timeline of compromised system communications with other
systems; and
(v) For covered cyber incidents involving unauthorized access, the
suspected duration of the unauthorized access prior to detection and
reporting; and
(4) The impact of the covered cyber incident on the covered
entity's operations, such as information related to the level of
operational impact and direct economic impacts to operations; any
specific or suspected physical or informational impacts; and
information to enable CISA's assessment of any known impacts to
national security or public health and safety;
(b) The category or categories of any information that was, or is
reasonably believed to have been, accessed or acquired by an
unauthorized person or persons;
[[Page 23771]]
(c) A description of any vulnerabilities exploited, including but
not limited to the specific products or technologies and versions of
the products or technologies in which the vulnerabilities were found;
(d) A description of the covered entity's security defenses in
place, including but not limited to any controls or measures that
resulted in the detection or mitigation of the incident;
(e) A description of the type of incident and the tactics,
techniques, and procedures used to perpetrate the covered cyber
incident, including but not limited to any tactics, techniques, and
procedures used to gain initial access to the covered entity's
information systems, escalate privileges, or move laterally, if
applicable;
(f) Any indicators of compromise, including but not limited to
those listed in Sec. 226.13(b)(1)(ii), observed in connection with the
covered cyber incident;
(g) A description and, if possessed by the covered entity, a copy
or samples of any malicious software the covered entity believes is
connected with the covered cyber incident;
(h) Any identifying information, including but not limited to all
available contact information, for each actor reasonably believed by
the covered entity to be responsible for the covered cyber incident;
(i) A description of any mitigation and response activities taken
by the covered entity in response to the covered cyber incident,
including but not limited to:
(1) Identification of the current phase of the covered entity's
incident response efforts at the time of reporting;
(2) The covered entity's assessment of the effectiveness of
response efforts in mitigating and responding to the covered cyber
incident;
(3) Identification of any law enforcement agency that is engaged in
responding to the covered cyber incident, including but not limited to
information about any specific law enforcement official or point of
contact, notifications received from law enforcement, and any law
enforcement agency that the covered entity otherwise believes may be
involved in investigating the covered cyber incident; and
(4) Whether the covered entity requested assistance from another
entity in responding to the covered cyber incident and, if so, the
identity of each entity and a description of the type of assistance
requested or received from each entity;
(j) Any other data or information as required by the web-based
CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form or any other manner and form of
reporting authorized under Sec. 226.6.
Sec. 226.9 Required information for Ransom Payment Reports.
A covered entity must provide all the information identified in
Sec. 226.7 and the following information in a Ransom Payment Report,
to the extent such information is available and applicable to the
ransom payment:
(a) A description of the ransomware attack, including but not
limited to:
(1) Identification and description of the function of the affected
networks, devices, and/or information systems that were, or are
reasonably believed to have been, affected by the ransomware attack,
including but not limited to:
(i) Technical details and physical locations of such networks,
devices, and/or information systems; and
(ii) Whether any such information system, network, and/or device
supports any elements of the intelligence community or contains
information that has been determined by the United States Government
pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign
relations, or any restricted data, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 2014(y);
(2) A description of any unauthorized access, regardless of whether
the ransomware attack involved an attributed or unattributed cyber
intrusion, identification of any informational impacts or information
compromise, and any network location where activity was observed;
(3) Dates pertaining to the ransomware attack, including but not
limited to:
(i) The date the ransomware attack was detected;
(ii) The date the ransomware attack began;
(iii) If fully mitigated and resolved at the time of reporting, the
date the ransomware attack ended;
(iv) The timeline of compromised system communications with other
systems; and
(v) For ransomware attacks involving unauthorized access, the
suspected duration of the unauthorized access prior to detection and
reporting; and
(4) The impact of the ransomware attack on the covered entity's
operations, such as information related to the level of operational
impact and direct economic impacts to operations; any specific or
suspected physical or informational impacts; and any known or suspected
impacts to national security or public health and safety;
(b) A description of any vulnerabilities exploited, including but
not limited to the specific products or technologies and versions of
the products or technologies in which the vulnerabilities were found;
(c) A description of the covered entity's security defenses in
place, including but not limited to any controls or measures that
resulted in the detection or mitigation of the ransomware attack;
(d) A description of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used
to perpetrate the ransomware attack, including but not limited to any
tactics, techniques, and procedures used to gain initial access to the
covered entity's information systems, escalate privileges, or move
laterally, if applicable;
(e) Any indicators of compromise the covered entity believes are
connected with the ransomware attack, including, but not limited to,
those listed in section 226.13(b)(1)(ii), observed in connection with
the ransomware attack;
(f) A description and, if possessed by the covered entity, a copy
or sample of any malicious software the covered entity believes is
connected with the ransomware attack;
(g) Any identifying information, including but not limited to all
available contact information, for each actor reasonably believed by
the covered entity to be responsible for the ransomware attack;
(h) The date of the ransom payment;
(i) The amount and type of assets used in the ransom payment;
(j) The ransom payment demand, including but not limited to the
type and amount of virtual currency, currency, security, commodity, or
other form of payment requested;
(k) The ransom payment instructions, including but not limited to
information regarding how to transmit the ransom payment; the virtual
currency or physical address where the ransom payment was requested to
be sent; any identifying information about the ransom payment
recipient; and information related to the completed payment, including
any transaction identifier or hash;
(l) Outcomes associated with making the ransom payment, including
but not limited to whether any exfiltrated data was returned or a
decryption capability was provided to the covered entity, and if so,
whether the decryption capability was successfully used by the covered
entity;
(m) A description of any mitigation and response activities taken
by the covered entity in response to the ransomware attack, including
but not limited to:
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(1) Identification of the current phase of the covered entity's
incident response efforts at the time of reporting;
(2) The covered entity's assessment of the effectiveness of
response efforts in mitigating and responding to the ransomware attack;
(3) Identification of any law enforcement agency that is engaged in
responding to the ransomware attack, including but not limited to
information about any specific law enforcement official or point of
contact, notifications received from law enforcement, and any law
enforcement agency that the covered entity otherwise believes may be
involved in investigating the ransomware attack; and
(4) Whether the covered entity requested assistance from another
entity in responding to the ransomware attack or making the ransom
payment and, if so, the identity of such entity or entities and a
description of the type of assistance received from each entity;
(n) Any other data or information as required by the web-based
CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form or any other manner and form of
reporting authorized under Sec. 226.6.
Sec. 226.10 Required information for Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Reports.
A covered entity must provide all the information identified in
Sec. Sec. 226.7, 226.8, and 226.9 in a Joint Covered Cyber Incident
and Ransom Payment Report to the extent such information is available
and applicable to the reported covered cyber incident and ransom
payment.
Sec. 226.11 Required information for Supplemental Reports.
(a) In general. A covered entity must include all of the
information identified as required in Sec. 226.7 and the following
information in any Supplemental Report:
(1) The case identification number provided by CISA for the
associated Covered Cyber Incident Report or Joint Covered Cyber
Incident and Ransom Payment Report;
(2) The reason for filing the Supplemental Report;
(3) Any substantial new or different information available about
the covered cyber incident, including but not limited to information
the covered entity was required to provide as part of a Covered Cyber
Incident Report but did not have at the time of submission and
information required under Sec. 226.9 if the covered entity or another
entity on the covered entity's behalf has made a ransom payment after
submitting a Covered Cyber Incident Report; and
(4) Any other data or information required by the web-based CIRCIA
Incident Reporting Form or any other manner and form of reporting
authorized under Sec. 226.6.
(b) Required information for a Supplemental Report providing notice
of a ransom payment made following submission of a Covered Cyber
Incident Report. When a covered entity submits a Supplemental Report to
notify CISA that the covered entity has made a ransom payment after
submitting a related Covered Cyber Incident Report, the supplemental
report must include the information required in Sec. 226.9.
(c) Optional information to provide notification that a covered
cyber incident has concluded. Covered entities that choose to submit a
notification to CISA that a covered cyber incident has concluded and
has been fully mitigated and resolved may submit optional information
related to the conclusion of the covered cyber incident.
Sec. 226.12 Third party reporting procedures and requirements.
(a) General. A covered entity may expressly authorize a third party
to submit a CIRCIA Report on the covered entity's behalf to satisfy the
covered entity's reporting obligations under Sec. 226.3. The covered
entity remains responsible for ensuring compliance with its reporting
obligations under this part even when the covered entity has authorized
a third party to submit a CIRCIA Report on the covered entity's behalf.
(b) Procedures for third party submission of CIRCIA Reports. CIRCIA
Reports submitted by third parties must comply with the reporting
requirements and procedures for covered entities set forth in this
part.
(c) Confirmation of express authorization required. For the
purposes of compliance with the covered entity's reporting obligations
under this part, upon submission of a CIRCIA Report, a third party must
confirm that the covered entity expressly authorized the third party to
file the CIRCIA Report on the covered entity's behalf. CIRCIA Reports
submitted by a third party without an attestation from the third party
that the third party has the express authorization of a covered entity
to submit a report on the covered entity's behalf will not be
considered by CISA for the purposes of compliance of the covered
entity's reporting obligations under this part.
(d) Third party ransom payments and responsibility to advise a
covered entity. A third party that makes a ransom payment on behalf of
a covered entity impacted by a ransomware attack is not required to
submit a Ransom Payment Report on behalf of itself for the ransom
payment. When a third party knowingly makes a ransom payment on behalf
of a covered entity, the third party must advise the covered entity of
its obligations to submit a Ransom Payment Report under this part.
Sec. 226.13 Data and records preservation requirements.
(a) Applicability. (1) A covered entity that is required to submit
a CIRCIA Report under Sec. 226.3 or experiences a covered cyber
incident or makes a ransom payment but is exempt from submitting a
CIRCIA Report pursuant to Sec. 226.4(a) is required to preserve data
and records related to the covered cyber incident or ransom payment in
accordance with this section.
(2) A covered entity maintains responsibility for compliance with
the preservation requirements in this section regardless of whether the
covered entity submitted a CIRCIA Report or a third party submitted the
CIRCIA Report on the covered entity's behalf.
(b) Covered data and records. (1) A covered entity must preserve
the following data and records:
(i) Communications with any threat actor, including copies of
actual correspondence, including but not limited to emails, texts,
instant or direct messages, voice recordings, or letters; notes taken
during any interactions; and relevant information on the communication
facilities used, such as email or Tor site;
(ii) Indicators of compromise, including but not limited to
suspicious network traffic; suspicious files or registry entries;
suspicious emails; unusual system logins; unauthorized accounts
created, including usernames, passwords, and date/time stamps and time
zones for activity associated with such accounts; and copies or samples
of any malicious software;
(iii) Relevant log entries, including but not limited to, Domain
Name System, firewall, egress, packet capture file, NetFlow, Security
Information and Event Management/Security Information Management,
database, Intrusion Prevention System/Intrusion Detection System,
endpoint, Active Directory, server, web, Virtual Private Network,
Remote Desktop Protocol, and Window Event;
(iv) Relevant forensic artifacts, including but not limited to live
memory captures; forensic images; and preservation of hosts pertinent
to the incident;
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(v) Network data, including but not limited to NetFlow or packet
capture file, and network information or traffic related to the
incident, including the internet Protocol addresses associated with the
malicious cyber activity and any known corresponding dates, timestamps,
and time zones;
(vi) Data and information that may help identify how a threat actor
compromised or potentially compromised an information system, including
but not limited to information indicating or identifying how one or
more threat actors initially obtained access to a network or
information system and the methods such actors employed during the
incident;
(vii) System information that may help identify exploited
vulnerabilities, including but not limited to operating systems,
version numbers, patch levels, and configuration settings;
(viii) Information about exfiltrated data, including but not
limited to file names and extensions; the amount of data exfiltration
by byte value; category of data exfiltrated, including but not limited
to, classified, proprietary, financial, or personal information; and
evidence of exfiltration, including but not limited to relevant logs
and screenshots of exfiltrated data sent from the threat actor;
(ix) All data or records related to the disbursement or payment of
any ransom payment, including but not limited to pertinent records from
financial accounts associated with the ransom payment; and
(x) Any forensic or other reports concerning the incident, whether
internal or prepared for the covered entity by a cybersecurity company
or other third-party vendor.
(2) A covered entity is not required to create any data or records
it does not already have in its possession based on this requirement.
(c) Required preservation period. Covered entities must preserve
all data and records identified in paragraph (b) of this section:
(1) Beginning on the earliest of the following dates:
(i) The date upon which the covered entity establishes a reasonable
belief that a covered cyber incident occurred; or
(ii) The date upon which a ransom payment was disbursed; and
(2) For no less than two years from the submission of the most
recently required CIRCIA Report submitted pursuant to Sec. 226.3, or
from the date such submission would have been required but for the
exception pursuant to Sec. 226.4(a).
(d) Original data or record format. Covered entities must preserve
data and records set forth in paragraph (b) of this section in their
original format or form whether the data or records are generated
automatically or manually, internally or received from outside sources
by the covered entity, and regardless of the following:
(1) Form or format, including hard copy records and electronic
records;
(2) Where the information is stored, located, or maintained without
regard to the physical location of the information, including stored in
databases or cloud storage, on network servers, computers, other
wireless devices, or by a third-party on behalf of the covered entity;
and
(3) Whether the information is in active use or archived.
(e) Storage, protection, and allowable use of data and records. (1)
A covered entity may select its own storage methods, electronic or non-
electronic, and procedures to maintain the data and records that must
be preserved under this section.
(2) Data and records must be readily accessible, retrievable, and
capable of being lawfully shared by the covered entity, including in
response to a lawful government request.
(3) A covered entity must use reasonable safeguards to protect data
and records against unauthorized access or disclosure, deterioration,
deletion, destruction, and alteration.
Sec. 226.14 Request for information and subpoena procedures.
(a) In general. This section applies to covered entities, except a
covered entity that qualifies as a State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial
Government entity as defined in Sec. 226.1.
(b) Use of authorities. When determining whether to exercise the
authorities in this section, the Director or designee will take into
consideration:
(1) The complexity in determining if a covered cyber incident has
occurred; and
(2) The covered entity's prior interaction with CISA or the covered
entity's awareness of CISA's policies and procedures for reporting
covered cyber incidents and ransom payments.
(c) Request for information--(1) Issuance of request. The Director
may issue a request for information to a covered entity if there is
reason to believe that the entity experienced a covered cyber incident
or made a ransom payment but failed to report the incident or payment
in accordance with Sec. 226.3. Reason to believe that a covered entity
failed to submit a CIRCIA Report in accordance with Sec. 226.3 may be
based upon public reporting or other information in possession of the
Federal Government, which includes but is not limited to analysis
performed by CISA. A request for information will be served on a
covered entity in accordance with the procedures in paragraph (e) of
this section.
(2) Form and contents of the request. At a minimum, a request for
information must include:
(i) The name and address of the covered entity;
(ii) A summary of the facts that have led CISA to believe that the
covered entity has failed to submit a required CIRCIA Report in
accordance with Sec. 226.3. This summary is subject to the
nondisclosure provision in paragraph (f) of this section;
(iii) A description of the information requested from the covered
entity. The Director, in his or her discretion, may decide the scope
and nature of information necessary for CISA to confirm whether a
covered cyber incident or ransom payment occurred. Requested
information may include electronically stored information, documents,
reports, verbal or written responses, records, accounts, images, data,
data compilations, and tangible items;
(iv) A date by which the covered entity must reply to the request
for information; and
(v) The manner and format in which the covered entity must provide
all information requested to CISA.
(3) Response to request for information. A covered entity must
reply in the manner and format, and by the deadline, specified by the
Director. If the covered entity does not respond by the date specified
in paragraph (c)(2)(iv) of this section or the Director determines that
the covered entity's response is inadequate, the Director, in his or
her discretion, may request additional information from the covered
entity to confirm whether a covered cyber incident or ransom payment
occurred, or the Director may issue a subpoena to compel information
from the covered entity pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.
(4) Treatment of information received. Information provided to CISA
by a covered entity in a reply to a request for information under this
section will be treated in accordance with Sec. Sec. 226.18 and
226.19.
(5) Unavailability of Appeal. A request for information is not a
final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704 and cannot be
appealed.
(d) Subpoena--(1) Issuance of subpoena. The Director may issue a
subpoena to compel disclosure of
[[Page 23774]]
information from a covered entity if the entity fails to reply by the
date specified in paragraph (c)(2)(iv) of this section or provides an
inadequate response, to a request for information. The authority to
issue a subpoena is a nondelegable authority. A subpoena will be served
on a covered entity in accordance with the procedures in paragraph (e)
of this section.
(2) Timing of subpoena. A subpoena to compel disclosure of
information from a covered entity may be issued no earlier than 72
hours after the date of service of the request for information.
(3) Form and contents of subpoena. At a minimum, a subpoena must
include:
(i) The name and address of the covered entity;
(ii) An explanation of the basis for issuance of the subpoena and a
copy of the request for information previously issued to the covered
entity, subject to the nondisclosure provision in paragraph (f) of this
section;
(iii) A description of the information that the covered entity is
required to produce. The Director, in his or her discretion, may
determine the scope and nature of information necessary to determine
whether a covered cyber incident or ransom payment occurred, obtain the
information required to be reported under Sec. 226.3, and to assess
the potential impacts to national security, economic security, or
public health and safety. Subpoenaed information may include
electronically stored information, documents, reports, verbal or
written responses, records, accounts, images, data, data compilations,
and tangible items;
(iv) A date by which the covered entity must reply; and
(v) The manner and format in which the covered entity must provide
all information requested to CISA.
(4) Reply to the Subpoena. A covered entity must reply in the
manner and format, and by the deadline, specified by the Director. If
the Director determines that the information received from the covered
entity is inadequate to determine whether a covered cyber incident or
ransom payment occurred, does not satisfy the reporting requirements
under Sec. 226.3, or is inadequate to assess the potential impacts to
national security, economic security, or public health and safety, the
Director may request or subpoena additional information from the
covered entity or request civil enforcement of a subpoena pursuant to
Sec. 226.15.
(5) Authentication requirement for electronic subpoenas. Subpoenas
issued electronically must be authenticated with a cryptographic
digital signature of an authorized representative of CISA or with a
comparable successor technology that demonstrates the subpoena was
issued by CISA and has not been altered or modified since issuance.
Electronic subpoenas that are not authenticated pursuant to this
subparagraph are invalid.
(6) Treatment of information received in response to a subpoena--
(i) In general. Information obtained by subpoena is not subject to the
information treatment requirements and restrictions imposed within
Sec. 226.18 and privacy and procedures for protecting privacy and
civil liberties in Sec. 226.19; and
(ii) Provision of certain information for criminal prosecution and
regulatory enforcement proceedings. The Director may provide
information submitted in response to a subpoena to the Attorney General
or the head of a Federal regulatory agency if the Director determines
that the facts relating to the cyber incident or ransom payment may
constitute grounds for criminal prosecution or regulatory enforcement
action. The Director may consult with the Attorney General or the head
of the appropriate Federal regulatory agency when making any such
determination. Information provided by CISA under this paragraph
(d)(6)(ii) may be used by the Attorney General or the head of a Federal
regulatory agency for criminal prosecution or a regulatory enforcement
action. Any decision by the Director to exercise this authority does
not constitute final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704
and cannot be appealed.
(7) Withdrawal and appeals of subpoena issuance--(i) In general.
CISA, in its discretion, may withdraw a subpoena that is issued to a
covered entity. Notice of withdrawal of a subpoena will be served on a
covered entity in accordance with the procedures in paragraph (e) of
this section.
(ii) Appeals of subpoena issuance. A covered entity may appeal the
issuance of a subpoena through a written request that the Director
withdraw it. A covered entity, or a representative on behalf of the
covered entity, must file a Notice of Appeal within seven (7) calendar
days after service of the subpoena. All Notices of Appeal must include:
(A) The name of the covered entity;
(B) The date of subpoena issuance;
(C) A clear request that the Director withdraw the subpoena;
(D) The covered entity's rationale for requesting a withdrawal of
the subpoena; and
(E) Any additional information that the covered entity would like
the Director to consider as part of the covered entity's appeal.
(iii) Director's final decision. Following receipt of a Notice of
Appeal, the Director will issue a final decision and serve it upon the
covered entity. A final decision made by the Director constitutes final
agency action. If the Director's final decision is to withdraw the
subpoena, a notice of withdrawal of a subpoena will be served on the
covered entity in accordance with the procedures in Sec. 226.14(e).
(e) Service--(1) covered entity point of contact. A request for
information, subpoena, or notice of withdrawal of a subpoena may be
served by delivery on an officer, managing or general agent, or any
other agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service of
process on behalf of the covered entity.
(2) Method of service. Service of a request for information,
subpoena, or notice of withdrawal of a subpoena will be served on a
covered entity through a reasonable electronic or non-electronic
attempt that demonstrates receipt, such as certified mail with return
receipt, express commercial courier delivery, or electronically.
(3) Date of service. The date of service of any request for
information, subpoena, or notice of withdrawal of a subpoena shall be
the date on which the document is mailed, electronically transmitted,
or delivered in person, whichever is applicable.
(f) Nondisclosure of certain information. In connection with the
procedures in this section, CISA will not disclose classified
information as defined in Section 1.1(d) of E.O. 12968 and reserves the
right to not disclose any other information or material that is
protected from disclosure under law or policy.
Sec. 226.15 Civil enforcement of subpoenas.
(a) In general. If a covered entity fails to comply with a subpoena
issued pursuant to Sec. 226.14(d), the Director may refer the matter
to the Attorney General to bring a civil action to enforce the subpoena
in any United States District Court for the judicial district in which
the covered entity resides, is found, or does business.
(b) Contempt. A United States District Court may order compliance
with the subpoena and punish failure to obey a subpoena as a contempt
of court.
(c) Classified and protected information. In any review of an
action taken under Sec. 226.14, if the action was based on classified
or protected information as described in Sec. 226.14(f), such
information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in
camera. This paragraph does not confer
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or imply any right to review in any tribunal, judicial or otherwise.
Sec. 226.16 Referral to the Department of Homeland Security
Suspension and Debarment Official.
The Director must refer all circumstances concerning a covered
entity's noncompliance that may warrant suspension and debarment action
to the Department of Homeland Security Suspension and Debarment
Official.
Sec. 226.17 Referral to Cognizant Contracting Official or Attorney
General.
The Director may refer information concerning a covered entity's
noncompliance with the reporting requirements in this part that pertain
to performance under a federal procurement contract to the cognizant
contracting official or the Attorney General for civil or criminal
enforcement.
Sec. 226.18 Treatment of information and restrictions on use.
(a) In general. The protections and restrictions on use enumerated
in this section apply to CIRCIA Reports and information included in
such reports where specified in this section, as well as to all
responses provided to requests for information issued under Sec.
226.14(c). This section does not apply to information and reports
submitted in response to a subpoena issued under Sec. 226.14(d) or
following Federal government action under Sec. Sec. 226.15-226.17.
(b) Treatment of information--(1) Designation as commercial,
financial, and proprietary information. A covered entity must clearly
designate with appropriate markings at the time of submission a CIRCIA
Report, a response provided to a request for information issued under
Sec. 226.14(c), or any portion of a CIRCIA Report or a response
provided to a request for information issued under Sec. 226.14(c) that
it considers to be commercial, financial, and proprietary information.
CIRCIA Reports, responses provided to a request for information issued
under Sec. 226.14(c), or designated portions thereof, will be treated
as commercial, financial, and proprietary information of the covered
entity upon designation as such by a covered entity.
(2) Exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
CIRCIA Reports submitted pursuant to this part and responses provided
to requests for information issued under Sec. 226.14(c) are exempt
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(3), and under any State, Local, or Tribal government freedom of
information law, open government law, open meetings law, open records
law, sunshine law, or similar law requiring disclosure of information
or records. If CISA receives a request under the Freedom of Information
Act to which a CIRCIA Report, response to a request for information
under Sec. 226.14(c), or information contained therein is responsive,
CISA will apply all applicable exemptions from disclosure, consistent
with 6 CFR part 5.
(3) No Waiver of Privilege. A covered entity does not waive any
applicable privilege or protection provided by law, including trade
secret protection, as a consequence of submitting a CIRCIA Report under
this part or a response to a request for information issued under Sec.
226.14(c).
(4) Ex parte communications waiver. CIRCIA Reports submitted
pursuant to this part and responses provided to requests for
information issued under Sec. 226.14(c) are not subject to the rules
or procedures of any Federal agency or department or any judicial
doctrine regarding ex parte communications with a decision-making
official.
(c) Restrictions on use--(1) Prohibition on use in regulatory
actions. Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Government entities are
prohibited from using information obtained solely through a CIRCIA
Report submitted under this part or a response to a request for
information issued under Sec. 226.14(c) to regulate, including through
an enforcement proceeding, the activities of the covered entity or the
entity that made a ransom payment on the covered entity's behalf,
except:
(i) If the Federal, State, Local, or Tribal Government entity
expressly allows the entity to meet its regulatory reporting
obligations through submission of reports to CISA; or
(ii) Consistent with Federal or State regulatory authority
specifically relating to the prevention and mitigation of cybersecurity
threats to information systems, a CIRCIA Report or response to a
request for information issued under Sec. 226.14(c) may inform the
development or implementation of regulations relating to such systems.
(2) Liability protection--(i) No cause of action. No cause of
action shall lie or be maintained in any court by any person or entity
for the submission of a CIRCIA Report or a response to a request for
information issued under Sec. 226.14(c) and must be promptly dismissed
by the court. This liability protection only applies to or affects
litigation that is solely based on the submission of a CIRCIA Report or
a response provided to a request for information issued under Sec.
226.14(c).
(ii) Evidentiary and discovery bar for reports. CIRCIA Reports
submitted under this part, responses provided to requests for
information issued under Sec. 226.14(c), or any communication,
document, material, or other record, created for the sole purpose of
preparing, drafting, or submitting CIRCIA Reports or responses to
requests for information issued under Sec. 226.14(c), may not be
received in evidence, subject to discovery, or otherwise used in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, regulatory
body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision thereof. This bar does not create a defense to discovery or
otherwise affect the discovery of any communication, document,
material, or other record not created for the sole purpose of
preparing, drafting, or submitting a CIRCIA Report under this part or a
response to a request for information issued under Sec. 226.14(c).
(iii) Exception. The liability protection provided in paragraph
(c)(2)(i) of this section does not apply to an action taken by the
Federal government pursuant to Sec. 226.15.
(3) Limitations on authorized uses. Information provided to CISA in
a CIRCIA Report or in a response to a request for information issued
under Sec. 226.14(c) may be disclosed to, retained by, and used by any
Federal agency or department, component, officer, employee, or agent of
the Federal Government, consistent with otherwise applicable provisions
of Federal law, solely for the following purposes:
(i) A cybersecurity purpose;
(ii) The purpose of identifying a cybersecurity threat, including
the source of the cybersecurity threat, or a security vulnerability;
(iii) The purpose of responding to, or otherwise preventing or
mitigating, a specific threat of:
(A) Death;
(B) Serious bodily harm; or
(C) Serious economic harm;
(iv) The purpose of responding to, investigating, prosecuting, or
otherwise preventing or mitigating a serious threat to a minor,
including sexual exploitation and threats to physical safety; or
(v) The purpose of preventing, investigating, disrupting, or
prosecuting an offense:
(A) Arising out of events required to be reported in accordance
with Sec. 226.3;
(B) Described in 18 U.S.C. 1028 through 1030 relating to fraud and
identity theft;
(C) Described in 18 U.S.C. chapter 37 relating to espionage and
censorship; or
[[Page 23776]]
(D) Described in 18 U.S.C. 90 relating to protection of trade
secrets.
Sec. 226.19 Procedures for protecting privacy and civil liberties.
(a) In general. The use of personal information received in CIRCIA
Reports and in responses provided to requests for information issued
under Sec. 226.14(c) is subject to the procedures described in this
section for protecting privacy and civil liberties. CISA will ensure
that privacy controls and safeguards are in place at the point of
receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of a CIRCIA Report. The
requirements in this section do not apply to personal information
submitted in response to a subpoena issued under Sec. 226.14(d) or
following Federal government action under Sec. Sec. 226.15 through
226.17.
(b) Instructions for submitting personal information. A covered
entity should only include the personal information requested by CISA
in the web-based CIRCIA Incident Reporting Form or in the request for
information and should exclude unnecessary personal information from
CIRCIA Reports and responses to requests for information issued under
Sec. 226.14(c).
(c) Assessment of personal information. CISA will review each
CIRCIA Report and response to request for information issued under
Sec. 226.14(c) to determine if the report contains personal
information other than the information requested by CISA and whether
the personal information is directly related to a cybersecurity threat.
Personal information directly related to a cybersecurity threat
includes personal information that is necessary to detect, prevent, or
mitigate a cybersecurity threat.
(1) If CISA determines the personal information is not directly
related to a cybersecurity threat, nor necessary for contacting a
covered entity or report submitter, CISA will delete the personal
information from the CIRCIA Report or response to request for
information. covered entity or report submitter contact information,
including information of third parties submitting on behalf of an
entity, will be safeguarded when retained and anonymized prior to
sharing the report outside of the federal government unless CISA
receives the consent of the individual for sharing personal information
and the personal information can be shared without revealing the
identity of the covered entity.
(2) If the personal information is determined to be directly
related to a cybersecurity threat, CISA will retain the personal
information and may share it consistent with Sec. 226.18 of this part
and the guidance described in paragraph (d) of this section.
(d) Privacy and civil liberties guidance. CISA will develop and
make publicly available guidance relating to privacy and civil
liberties to address the retention, use, and dissemination of personal
information contained in Covered Cyber Incident Reports and Ransom
Payment Reports by CISA. The guidance shall be consistent with the need
to protect personal information from unauthorized use or disclosure,
and to mitigate cybersecurity threats.
(1) One year after the publication of the guidance, CISA will
review the effectiveness of the guidance to ensure that it
appropriately governs the retention, use, and dissemination of personal
information pursuant to this part and will perform subsequent reviews
periodically.
(2) The Chief Privacy Officer of CISA will complete an initial
review of CISA's compliance with the privacy and civil liberties
guidance approximately one year after the effective date of this part
and subsequent periodic reviews not less frequently than every three
years.
Sec. 226.20 Other procedural measures.
(a) Penalty for false statements and representations. Any person
that knowingly and willfully makes a materially false or fraudulent
statement or representation in connection with, or within, a CIRCIA
Report, response to a request for information, or response to an
administrative subpoena is subject to the penalties under 18 U.S.C.
1001.
(b) Severability. CISA intends the various provisions of this part
to be severable from each other to the extent practicable, such that if
a court of competent jurisdiction were to vacate or enjoin any one
provision, the other provisions are intended to remain in effect unless
they are dependent upon the vacated or enjoined provision.
Jennie M. Easterly,
Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Department
of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2024-06526 Filed 3-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-G1-P