Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption, 483-487 [2023-28951]
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 3 / Thursday, January 4, 2024 / Notices
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–255; NRC–2023–0198]
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC;
Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
AGENCY:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC (HDI), an indirect wholly owned
subsidiary of Holtec International, that
would allow HDI and Holtec Palisades,
LLC, to reduce the required level of
primary offsite liability insurance from
$450 million to $100 million and to
eliminate the requirement to carry
secondary financial protection for the
Palisades Nuclear Plant.
DATES: The exemption was issued on
December 22, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2023–0198 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2023–0198. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301–415–0624; email:
Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at
301–415–4737, or by email to
PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS
accession number for each document
referenced (if it is available in ADAMS)
is provided the first time that it is
mentioned in this document.
• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you
may examine and order copies of
publicly available documents, is open
by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please
send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov
or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415–
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SUMMARY:
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4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern
time (ET), Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Tanya E. Hood, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone:
301–415–1387, email: Tanya.Hood@
nrc.gov.
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The text of
the exemption is attached.
Dated: December 28, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya E. Hood,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning
Branch, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
Attachment—Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50–255
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC;
Palisades Nuclear Plant Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated October 19, 2017
(Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System Accession No.
ML17292A032), Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC, or Commission) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at
the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades)
no later than May 31, 2022. On May 20,
2022, ENOI permanently ceased power
operations at Palisades, and by letter
dated June 13, 2022 (ML22164A067),
ENOI certified to the NRC that the fuel
was permanently removed from the
Palisades reactor vessel and placed in
the spent fuel pool (SFP) on June 10,
2022. Accordingly, pursuant to
paragraphs 50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility
operating license for Palisades no longer
authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel in the
reactor vessel. The facility is still
authorized to possess, and store
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel.
Palisades spent fuel is currently stored
in the SFP and in dry cask storage at the
independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated October 26, 2022
(ML22299A059), Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC
(HDI), one of the licensees of Palisades
and an indirect wholly owned
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483
subsidiary of Holtec International
(Holtec), requested an exemption on
behalf of Holtec Palisades, LLC, the
other Palisades licensee, from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) concerning offsite primary
and secondary liability insurance. HDI
and Holtec Palisades, LLC, are hereafter
collectively referred to as the licensee.
The exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee
to reduce the required level of primary
offsite liability insurance from $450
million to $100 million and to eliminate
the requirement to carry secondary
financial protection for Palisades.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
requires licensees to have and maintain
primary financial protection in an
amount of $450 million. In addition,
licensees are required to participate in
an industry retrospective rating plan
(secondary financial protection) that
commits licensees to pay into an
insurance pool to be used for damages
that may exceed primary insurance
coverage. Participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan will subject the
licensee to deferred premium charges
up to a maximum total deferred
premium of $131,056,000 with respect
to any nuclear incident at any operating
nuclear power plant and up to a
maximum annual deferred premium of
$20,496,000 per incident.
Many of the accident scenarios
postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power
reactors involve failures or malfunctions
of systems, which could affect the fuel
in the reactor core and, in the most
severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of large quantities of
fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at
Palisades and the permanent removal of
the fuel from the reactor vessel, many
accidents are no longer possible.
Similarly, the associated risk of offsite
liability damages that would require
insurance or indemnification is
commensurately lower for permanently
shutdown and defueled plants.
Therefore, the licensee requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to
permit a reduction in primary offsite
liability insurance and to withdraw
from participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ‘‘Specific
exemptions,’’ the Commission may,
upon application of any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
such exemptions from the requirements
of the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public
interest. The NRC staff has reviewed the
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licensee’s request for an exemption from
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) and has concluded
that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in
the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957
(PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to
compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident.
Specifically, the PAA requires licensees
of facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of
100,000 electrical kilowatts or more’’ to
maintain the maximum amount of
primary offsite liability insurance
commercially available (currently $450
million) and a specified amount of
secondary insurance coverage (currently
up to $131,056,000 per reactor). In the
event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each
licensee would be assessed a prorated
share of the excess damages, up to
$131,056,000 per reactor, for a total of
approximately $13 billion per nuclear
incident. The NRC’s regulations at 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA
insurance requirements and set forth the
amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee
must have.
As noted above, the PAA
requirements with respect to primary
and secondary insurance and the
implementing regulations at 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of
facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of
100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.’’ In
accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the
license for a power reactor no longer
authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel into
the reactor vessel upon the docketing of
the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel.
Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to
generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is
undergoing decommissioning has no
‘‘rated capacity.’’ Therefore, the NRC
may take the reactor licensee out of the
category of reactor licensees that are
required to maintain the maximum
available insurance and to participate in
the secondary retrospective insurance
pool.
The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) were established to
require licensees to maintain sufficient
insurance, as specified under the PAA,
to satisfy liability claims by members of
the public for personal injury, property
damage, and the legal cost associated
with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear
accident at an operating reactor with a
rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts
electric or greater. Therefore, the
insurance levels established by this
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regulation, as required by the PAA, were
associated with the risks and potential
consequences of an accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity
of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
The legal and associated technical
basis for granting exemptions from 10
CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY–93–
127, ‘‘Financial Protection Required of
Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants
During Decommissioning,’’ dated May
10, 1993 (ML12257A628). The legal
analysis underlying SECY–93–127
concluded that, upon a technical
finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of power
operations (and the reactor having no
‘‘rated capacity’’), the Commission has
the discretion under the PAA to reduce
the amount of insurance required of a
licensee undergoing decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a
reactor has permanently ceased power
operations is not itself determinative as
to whether a licensee may cease
providing the offsite liability coverage
required by the PAA and 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of
freshly discharged irradiated fuel in the
SFP at a recently shutdown reactor, the
potential for an offsite radiological
release from a zirconium fire with
consequences comparable in some
respects to an operating reactor accident
remains. That risk is very low at the
time of reactor shutdown because of
design provisions that prevent a
significant reduction in coolant
inventory in the SFP under normal and
accident conditions and becomes no
longer credible once the continual
reduction in decay heat provides ample
time to restore coolant inventory and
permits air cooling in a drained SFP.
After that time, the probability of a
large offsite radiological release from a
zirconium fire is negligible for
permanently shutdown reactors, but the
SFP is still operational and an inventory
of radioactive materials still exists
onsite. Therefore, an evaluation of the
potential for offsite damage is necessary
to determine the appropriate level of
offsite insurance post shutdown in
accordance with the Commission’s
discretionary authority under the PAA
to establish an appropriate level of
required financial protection for such
permanently shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an
evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and
transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor, no
reasonably conceivable potential
accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During
normal power reactor operations, the
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forced flow of water through the reactor
coolant system (RCS) removes heat
generated by the reactor. The RCS
transfers this heat away from the reactor
core by converting reactor feedwater to
steam which then flows to the main
turbine generator to produce electricity.
Most of the accident scenarios
postulated for operating power reactors
involve failures or malfunctions of
systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe
postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission
products. With the permanent cessation
of reactor operations at Palisades and
the permanent removal of the fuel from
the reactor core, such accidents are no
longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and
supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the
storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore,
postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or
supporting systems are no longer
applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the
principal radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel
onsite. On a case-by-case basis,
licensees undergoing decommissioning
have been granted permission to reduce
the required amount of primary offsite
liability insurance coverage from $450
million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One
of the technical criteria for granting the
exemption is that the possibility of a
design-basis event that could cause
significant offsite damage has been
significantly reduced.
The NRC staff performed an
evaluation of the design-basis accidents
(DBAs) for Palisades being permanently
defueled as part of SECY–23–0043,
‘‘Request by Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC for Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning
Requirements for Palisades Nuclear
Plant,’’ dated May 15, 2023
(ML23054A179). The licensee has
stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that
while spent fuel remains in the SFP, the
only postulated DBAs that would
remain applicable to Palisades in the
permanently defueled condition that
could contribute a significant dose is a
fuel handling accident (FHA) in the
Fuel Handling Building, where the SFP
is located; a liquid waste incident; a
waste gas incident and a postulated cask
drop accident. For completeness, the
NRC staff also evaluated the
applicability of other DBAs documented
in the Palisades Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR)
(ML21125A344) to ensure that these
accidents would not have consequences
that could potentially exceed the 10
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CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory
Guide 1.183, ‘‘Alternative Radiological
Source Terms for Evaluating Design
Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power
Reactors,’’ dose acceptance criteria or
approach the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) early phase
protective action guides (PAGs).
The NRC staff previously approved
the revised DBA radiological
consequence analyses in License
Amendment No. 272, ‘‘Palisades
Nuclear Plant—Issuance of Amendment
No. 272 Re: Permanently Defueled
Technical Specifications (EPID L–2021–
LLA–0099),’’ dated May 13, 2022
(ML22039A198). As documented in the
NRC’s safety evaluation for License
Amendment No. 272, the NRC staff
determined that 17 days is the amount
of time needed for decay to meet the
EPA early phase PAG limit of 1 rem
total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) at
the exclusion area boundary (EAB). In
using the same assumptions, except for
decay time, the licensee’s dose analysis
for an FHA with 60 days of decay in the
SFP results in a dose of 0.014 rem TEDE
at the EAB. This result meets the 6.3
rem acceptance criteria of RG 1.183 at
the EAB and low population zone. In
addition, it also meets the EPA early
phase PAG criterion of 1 rem TEDE and
below 10 percent EPA PAG threshold
for declaration of a site area emergency.
The licensee has determined that after
a decay time of at least 60 days after
shutdown, the FHA doses would
decrease to a level that would not
warrant protective actions under the
EPA early phase PAG framework,
notwithstanding meeting the dose limit
requirements under 10 CFR 50.67 and
dose acceptance criteria under
Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC staff
notes that the doses from an FHA are
dominated by the isotope Iodine-131.
Palisades permanently ceased power
operations on May 20, 2022. After over
a year of decay, the thyroid dose from
an FHA would be negligible. The only
isotope remaining in significant
amounts, among those postulated to be
released in a design-basis FHA, would
be Krypton-85. Since Krypton-85
primarily decays by beta emission, the
calculated skin dose from an FHA
release would make an insignificant
contribution to the total effective dose
equivalent, which is the parameter of
interest in the determination of the EPA
early phase PAGs for sheltering or
evacuation. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the dose consequences
from an FHA for the permanently
shutdown Palisades facility would not
approach the EPA early phase PAG
criterion.
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The NRC staff reviewed the
consequences of an FHA, liquid waste
incident, waste gas incident, and
postulated cask drop accident in detail
during the review of previously
approved license amendment requests
and exemptions from various emergency
planning requirements for Palisades and
found them to be acceptable. Since this
technical information has not changed
in relation to this exemption request,
the NRC staff relied on these previous
conclusions to conduct portions of the
review for this exemption request. The
NRC staff notes that while the licensee
continues to rely on the information
from previously approved licensing
actions, the calculated doses would be
expected to be lower when this
exemption is implemented due to
additional decay time beyond the time
assumed in the previously approved
actions. Therefore, any offsite
consequence from a design-basis
radiological release is highly unlikely
and, therefore, a significant amount of
offsite liability insurance coverage is not
required.
The only beyond design-basis event
that has the potential to lead to a
significant radiological release at a
permanently shutdown and defueled
reactor is a zirconium fire. The
zirconium fire scenario is a postulated,
but highly unlikely, accident scenario
that involves the loss of water inventory
from the SFP resulting in a significant
heatup of the spent fuel and
culminating in substantial zirconium
cladding oxidation and fuel damage.
The probability of a zirconium fire
scenario is related to the decay heat of
the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium
fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time that Palisades has
been permanently shutdown.
The licensee performed an analysis
demonstrating that 12 months after
Palisades permanently shut down, the
spent fuel stored in the SFP will have
decayed to the extent that the requested
exemption may be implemented at
Palisades. Given Palisades’ permanent
shutdown date was May 20, 2022, and
the fuel decay time of 12 months, May
31, 2023, terminates the period during
which the spent fuel could heat-up to
clad ignition temperature within 10
hours under adiabatic conditions. This
analysis, ‘‘Holtec Spent Fuel Pool
Calculation,’’ dated July 8, 2022, [nonpublic], was submitted as Attachment 1
by the licensee in support of the letter
dated July 11, 2022 (ML22192A134), in
which the licensee requested
exemptions from specific portions of 10
CFR 50.47 and appendix E to 10 CFR
part 50 for the Palisades license. The
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485
analysis determined the decay time
necessary to ensure a minimum of 10
hours is available before the fuel
cladding temperature of the hottest fuel
assembly in the SFP reaches 900 °C.
This 10-hour minimum threshold
provides sufficient time for the licensee
to take mitigative actions, and, if
necessary, for offsite agencies to take
appropriate action to protect the health
and safety of the public if fuel and
cladding oxidation occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s
calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were
within acceptable ranges and that the
results were accurate. The NRC staff
determined that the physical properties
of materials were appropriate in the
licensee’s calculations related to SFP
heatup considerations for Palisades.
Therefore, the NRC staff found that 12
months after permanent cessation of
power operations, more than 10 hours
would be available before a significant
offsite release could begin. The NRC
staff concluded that the adiabatic
heatup calculation provided an
acceptable method for determining the
minimum time available for deployment
of mitigation equipment and, if
necessary, implementing measures
under a comprehensive general
emergency plan. In this regard, one
technical criterion for relieving
decommissioning reactor licensees from
the insurance obligations applicable to
an operating reactor is a finding that the
heat generated by the SFP has decayed
to the point where the possibility of a
zirconium fire is highly unlikely.
This was addressed in SECY–93–127,
where the NRC staff concluded that
there was a low likelihood and reduced
short-term public health consequences
of a zirconium fire once a
decommissioning plant’s spent fuel has
sufficiently decayed. In its Staff
Requirements Memorandum, ‘‘Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of
Large Nuclear Power Plants during
Decommissioning,’’ dated July 13, 1993
(ML003760936), the Commission
approved a policy that authorized,
through the exemption process,
withdrawal from participation in the
secondary insurance layer and a
reduction in commercial liability
insurance coverage to $100 million
when a licensee is able to demonstrate
that the spent fuel could be air-cooled
if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical
criterion to grant similar exemptions to
other decommissioning reactors (e.g.,
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on
January 14, 2020 (85 FR 1827); Three
Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1,
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published in the Federal Register on
March 26, 2021 (86 FR 14472); and
Duane Arnold Energy Center, published
in the Federal Register on May 18, 2021
(86 FR 26961)). Additional discussions
of other decommissioning reactor
licensees that have received exemptions
to reduce their primary insurance level
to $100 million are provided in SECY–
96–256, ‘‘Changes to the Financial
Protection Requirements for
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR
140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996
(ML15062A483). These prior
exemptions were based on the licensee
demonstrating that the SFP could be aircooled consistent with the technical
criterion discussed above.
In the exemption request dated
October 26, 2022, the licensee compared
the Palisades fuel storage parameters
with those used in NRC generic
evaluations of fuel cooling included in
NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety and
Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR
[Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR
[Pressurized-Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ dated August 1997
(ML082260098). The analysis described
in NUREG/CR–6451 determined that
natural air circulation would adequately
cool fuel that has decayed for 17 months
after operation in a typical PWR. The
licensee compared the post-shutdown
fuel storage conditions with those
assumed for the analysis presented in
NUREG/CR–6451.
The licensee found that the Palisades
fuel storage configuration is smaller
than the values modeled in NUREG/CR–
6451. However, these differences are
considered to be conservatively offset by
the lower power density of the Palisades
fuel assemblies, substantially larger
downcomer areas for improved
buoyancy driven air flow and natural
circulation, and the fewer number of
fuel assemblies that are stored in the
fuel racks as compared to the NUREG/
CR–6451 PWR model. Therefore, the
cooling air flow should be comparable.
In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated
Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28,
2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy
Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance,
and Emergency Preparedness
Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in
Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June 4, 2001
(ML003721626 and ML011450420,
respectively), the NRC staff discussed
additional information concerning SFP
zirconium fire risks at decommissioning
reactors and associated implications for
offsite insurance. Analyzing when the
spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable
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of adequate air-cooling is one measure
that demonstrates when the probability
of a zirconium fire would be
exceedingly low.
The NRC staff has determined that the
licensee’s proposed reduction in
primary offsite liability coverage to a
level of $100 million and the licensee’s
proposed withdrawal from participation
in the secondary insurance pool for
offsite financial protection are
consistent with the policy established in
SECY–93–127 and subsequent
insurance considerations resulting from
zirconium fire risks, as discussed in
SECY–00–0145 and SECY–01–0100.
The NRC has previously determined in
SECY–00–0145 that the minimum
offsite financial protection requirement
may be reduced to $100 million and that
secondary insurance is not required
once it is determined that the spent fuel
in the SFP is no longer thermalhydraulically capable of sustaining a
zirconium fire based on a plant-specific
analysis. The NRC staff also notes that
similar exemptions from these
insurance requirements have been
granted to other permanently shutdown
and defueled power reactors upon
satisfactory demonstration that
zirconium fire risk from the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible
concern.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing
regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that
have a rated capacity of 100,000
kilowatts electric or more to have and
maintain $450 million in primary
financial protection and to participate in
a secondary retrospective insurance
pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8,
the Commission may grant exemptions
from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are
authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting
exemptions from 10 CFR part 140 are set
forth in SECY–93–127. The legal
analysis underlying SECY–93–127
concluded that, upon a technical
finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of
operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the
amount of insurance required of a
licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption
request, the NRC staff concludes that the
technical criteria for relieving Holtec
Palisades and HDI from their existing
primary and secondary insurance
obligations have been met. As explained
above, the NRC staff has concluded that
no reasonably conceivable DBA exists
that could cause an offsite release
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greater than the EPA PAGs and,
therefore, that any offsite consequence
from a design-basis radiological release
is highly unlikely and the need for a
significant amount of offsite liability
insurance coverage is unwarranted.
Additionally, the NRC staff determined
that, after 12 months decay, the fuel
stored in the Palisades SFP will be
capable of being adequately cooled by
air in the highly unlikely event of pool
drainage. Moreover, in the highly
unlikely beyond DBA scenario where
the SFP water inventory is lost in such
a manner that all methods of heat
removal from the spent fuel are no
longer available, the NRC staff has
determined that at least 10 hours would
be available and is sufficient time to
support deployment of mitigation
equipment, consistent with plant
conditions, to prevent the zirconium
cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the fuel stored in the
Palisades SFP will have decayed
sufficiently by the requested effective
date for the exemption of 12 months
after permanent cessation of power
operations to support a reduction in the
required insurance consistent with
SECY–00–0145.
The NRC staff has determined that
granting the licensee’s proposed
exemption will not result in a violation
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
Section 170, or other laws, as amended,
which require licensees to maintain
adequate financial protection.
Accordingly, consistent with the legal
standard presented in SECY–93–127,
under which decommissioning reactor
licensees may be relieved of the
requirements to carry the maximum
amount of insurance available and to
participate in the secondary
retrospective premium pool where there
is sufficient technical justification, the
NRC staff concludes that the requested
exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the
Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 140.11 were established to require
licensees to maintain sufficient offsite
liability insurance to ensure adequate
funding for offsite liability claims
following an accident at an operating
reactor. However, the regulation does
not consider the reduced potential for
and consequence of nuclear incidents at
permanently shutdown and
decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY–93–127,
SECY–00–0145, and SECY–01–0100
allows licensees of decommissioning
plants to reduce their primary offsite
liability insurance and to withdraw
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 3 / Thursday, January 4, 2024 / Notices
from participation in the retrospective
rating pool for deferred premium
charges. As discussed in these
documents, once the zirconium fire
concern is determined to be negligible,
possible accident scenario risks at
permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors are greatly reduced when
compared to the risks at operating
reactors and the associated potential for
offsite financial liabilities from an
accident are commensurately less. The
licensee analyzed and the NRC staff
confirmed that the risks of accidents
that could result in an offsite
radiological release are minimal, which
justifies the proposed reductions in
offsite primary liability insurance and
withdrawal from participation in the
secondary retrospective rating pool for
deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the
secondary retrospective rating pool
could potentially have adverse
consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a
nuclear incident sufficient to trigger the
secondary insurance layer occurred at
another nuclear power plant, the
licensee could incur financial liability
of up to $131,056,000. However,
because Palisades is permanently
shutdown, it cannot produce revenue
from electricity generation sales to cover
such a liability. Therefore, such liability
if subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the
facility to conduct and complete timely
radiological decontamination and
decommissioning activities. In addition,
as SECY–93–127 concluded, the shared
financial risk exposure to the licensee is
greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by Palisades
when compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public at
decommissioning power plants does not
warrant that the licensee be required to
carry full operating reactor insurance
coverage after the requisite spent fuel
cooling period has elapsed following
final reactor shutdown.
The licensee’s proposed financial
protection limits will maintain a level of
liability insurance coverage
commensurate with the risk to the
public. These changes are consistent
with previous NRC policy as discussed
in SECY–00–0145 and exemptions
approved for other decommissioning
reactors. Therefore, the underlying
purpose of the regulations will not be
adversely affected by the reductions in
insurance coverage. Accordingly, an
exemption from participation in the
secondary insurance pool and a
reduction in the primary insurance to
$100 million, a value more in line with
the potential consequences of accidents,
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:54 Jan 03, 2024
Jkt 262001
would be in the public interest in that
this ensures that there will be adequate
funds to address any of those
consequences and helps to ensure the
safe and timely decommissioning of the
reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has
concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit
Holtec Palisades and HDI to lower the
Palisades primary insurance levels and
to withdraw from the secondary
retrospective premium pool at the
requested effective date of 12 months
after permanent cessation of power
operations, is in the public interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC’s approval of an exemption
from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of
actions that the Commission, by rule or
regulation, has declared to be a
categorical exclusion after first finding
that the category of actions does not
individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded
from the requirement to prepare an
environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting
of an exemption from the requirements
of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR
is a categorical exclusion provided that:
(i) there is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite; (iii) there is
no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no
significant construction impact; (v)
there is no significant increase in the
potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the
requirements from which an exemption
is sought involve surety, insurance, or
indemnity requirements.
As the Director of the Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery,
and Waste Programs in the NRC’s Office
of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, I have determined that
approval of the exemption request
involves no significant hazards
consideration, as defined in 10 CFR
50.92, because reducing the licensee’s
offsite liability requirements at
Palisades does not: (1) involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
487
margin of safety. The exempted
financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of Palisades
or site activities. Accordingly, there is
no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of
any effluents that may be released
offsite and no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The
exempted regulation is not associated
with construction so there is no
significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern
the source term (i.e., potential amount
of radiation in an accident) nor any
activities conducted at the site.
Therefore, there is no significant
increase in the potential for, or
consequences of, a radiological
accident. In addition, there would be no
significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions
in the region resulting from issuance of
the requested exemption. The
requirement for offsite liability
insurance involves surety, insurance, or
indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR
51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by
law and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission
hereby grants Holtec Palisades and HDI
an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for Palisades.
Palisades permanently ceased power
operations on May 20, 2022. The
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
permits Palisades to reduce the required
level of primary financial protection
from $450 million to $100 million and
to withdraw from participation in the
secondary layer of financial protection
12 months after permanent cessation of
power operations, which was May 20,
2023. Because this period had already
elapsed, the exemption is effective upon
issuance.
Dated: this 22nd day of December 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Jane Marshall,
Director, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023–28951 Filed 1–3–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 3 (Thursday, January 4, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 483-487]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28951]
[[Page 483]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-255; NRC-2023-0198]
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades,
LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC (HDI), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec
International, that would allow HDI and Holtec Palisades, LLC, to
reduce the required level of primary offsite liability insurance from
$450 million to $100 million and to eliminate the requirement to carry
secondary financial protection for the Palisades Nuclear Plant.
DATES: The exemption was issued on December 22, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0198 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0198. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information
Contact section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tanya E. Hood, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-1387, email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: December 28, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya E. Hood,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50-255
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC;
Palisades Nuclear Plant Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated October 19, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System Accession No. ML17292A032), Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, or Commission) that it planned to permanently cease
power operations at the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) no later
than May 31, 2022. On May 20, 2022, ENOI permanently ceased power
operations at Palisades, and by letter dated June 13, 2022
(ML22164A067), ENOI certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently
removed from the Palisades reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel
pool (SFP) on June 10, 2022. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraphs
50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating license for Palisades no
longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention
of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is still authorized to
possess, and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Palisades
spent fuel is currently stored in the SFP and in dry cask storage at
the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated October 26, 2022 (ML22299A059), Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), one of the licensees of
Palisades and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec
International (Holtec), requested an exemption on behalf of Holtec
Palisades, LLC, the other Palisades licensee, from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
concerning offsite primary and secondary liability insurance. HDI and
Holtec Palisades, LLC, are hereafter collectively referred to as the
licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) would permit the
licensee to reduce the required level of primary offsite liability
insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to eliminate the
requirement to carry secondary financial protection for Palisades.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires licensees to have
and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450 million.
In addition, licensees are required to participate in an industry
retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection) that commits
licensees to pay into an insurance pool to be used for damages that may
exceed primary insurance coverage. Participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan will subject the licensee to deferred premium
charges up to a maximum total deferred premium of $131,056,000 with
respect to any nuclear incident at any operating nuclear power plant
and up to a maximum annual deferred premium of $20,496,000 per
incident.
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at Palisades and the permanent removal of
the fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer
possible. Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages
that would require insurance or indemnification is commensurately lower
for permanently shutdown and defueled plants. Therefore, the licensee
requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction
in primary offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from
participation in the industry retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations in 10 CFR part 140 when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC staff has
reviewed the
[[Page 484]]
licensee's request for an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) and has
concluded that the requested exemption is authorized by law and is
otherwise in the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite
liability insurance commercially available (currently $450 million) and
a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage (currently up to
$131,056,000 per reactor). In the event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each licensee would be assessed a
prorated share of the excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor,
for a total of approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The
NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and
secondary insurance and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' In accordance with 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the license for a power reactor no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the
reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel. Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no
``rated capacity.'' Therefore, the NRC may take the reactor licensee
out of the category of reactor licensees that are required to maintain
the maximum available insurance and to participate in the secondary
retrospective insurance pool.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require licensees to maintain sufficient insurance, as
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost
associated with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric
or greater. Therefore, the insurance levels established by this
regulation, as required by the PAA, were associated with the risks and
potential consequences of an accident at an operating reactor with a
rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ML12257A628). The legal analysis
underlying SECY-93-127 concluded that, upon a technical finding that
lesser potential hazards exist after permanent cessation of power
operations (and the reactor having no ``rated capacity''), the
Commission has the discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of
insurance required of a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently
ceased power operations is not itself determinative as to whether a
licensee may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by
the PAA and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly
discharged irradiated fuel in the SFP at a recently shutdown reactor,
the potential for an offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire
with consequences comparable in some respects to an operating reactor
accident remains. That risk is very low at the time of reactor shutdown
because of design provisions that prevent a significant reduction in
coolant inventory in the SFP under normal and accident conditions and
becomes no longer credible once the continual reduction in decay heat
provides ample time to restore coolant inventory and permits air
cooling in a drained SFP.
After that time, the probability of a large offsite radiological
release from a zirconium fire is negligible for permanently shutdown
reactors, but the SFP is still operational and an inventory of
radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an evaluation of
the potential for offsite damage is necessary to determine the
appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown in accordance with
the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA to establish an
appropriate level of required financial protection for such permanently
shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor,
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam which then
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at Palisades and the
permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are
no longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer
operate and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated
fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction
of the reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability
insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical criteria for
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event
that could cause significant offsite damage has been significantly
reduced.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
(DBAs) for Palisades being permanently defueled as part of SECY-23-
0043, ``Request by Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for Palisades
Nuclear Plant,'' dated May 15, 2023 (ML23054A179). The licensee has
stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while spent fuel remains in the
SFP, the only postulated DBAs that would remain applicable to Palisades
in the permanently defueled condition that could contribute a
significant dose is a fuel handling accident (FHA) in the Fuel Handling
Building, where the SFP is located; a liquid waste incident; a waste
gas incident and a postulated cask drop accident. For completeness, the
NRC staff also evaluated the applicability of other DBAs documented in
the Palisades Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
(ML21125A344) to ensure that these accidents would not have
consequences that could potentially exceed the 10
[[Page 485]]
CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory Guide 1.183, ``Alternative
Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at
Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dose acceptance criteria or approach the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase protective action
guides (PAGs).
The NRC staff previously approved the revised DBA radiological
consequence analyses in License Amendment No. 272, ``Palisades Nuclear
Plant--Issuance of Amendment No. 272 Re: Permanently Defueled Technical
Specifications (EPID L-2021-LLA-0099),'' dated May 13, 2022
(ML22039A198). As documented in the NRC's safety evaluation for License
Amendment No. 272, the NRC staff determined that 17 days is the amount
of time needed for decay to meet the EPA early phase PAG limit of 1 rem
total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) at the exclusion area boundary
(EAB). In using the same assumptions, except for decay time, the
licensee's dose analysis for an FHA with 60 days of decay in the SFP
results in a dose of 0.014 rem TEDE at the EAB. This result meets the
6.3 rem acceptance criteria of RG 1.183 at the EAB and low population
zone. In addition, it also meets the EPA early phase PAG criterion of 1
rem TEDE and below 10 percent EPA PAG threshold for declaration of a
site area emergency.
The licensee has determined that after a decay time of at least 60
days after shutdown, the FHA doses would decrease to a level that would
not warrant protective actions under the EPA early phase PAG framework,
notwithstanding meeting the dose limit requirements under 10 CFR 50.67
and dose acceptance criteria under Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC
staff notes that the doses from an FHA are dominated by the isotope
Iodine-131. Palisades permanently ceased power operations on May 20,
2022. After over a year of decay, the thyroid dose from an FHA would be
negligible. The only isotope remaining in significant amounts, among
those postulated to be released in a design-basis FHA, would be
Krypton-85. Since Krypton-85 primarily decays by beta emission, the
calculated skin dose from an FHA release would make an insignificant
contribution to the total effective dose equivalent, which is the
parameter of interest in the determination of the EPA early phase PAGs
for sheltering or evacuation. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that
the dose consequences from an FHA for the permanently shutdown
Palisades facility would not approach the EPA early phase PAG
criterion.
The NRC staff reviewed the consequences of an FHA, liquid waste
incident, waste gas incident, and postulated cask drop accident in
detail during the review of previously approved license amendment
requests and exemptions from various emergency planning requirements
for Palisades and found them to be acceptable. Since this technical
information has not changed in relation to this exemption request, the
NRC staff relied on these previous conclusions to conduct portions of
the review for this exemption request. The NRC staff notes that while
the licensee continues to rely on the information from previously
approved licensing actions, the calculated doses would be expected to
be lower when this exemption is implemented due to additional decay
time beyond the time assumed in the previously approved actions.
Therefore, any offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological
release is highly unlikely and, therefore, a significant amount of
offsite liability insurance coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a
postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario that involves the
loss of water inventory from the SFP resulting in a significant heatup
of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding
oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario
is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to
decrease as a function of the time that Palisades has been permanently
shutdown.
The licensee performed an analysis demonstrating that 12 months
after Palisades permanently shut down, the spent fuel stored in the SFP
will have decayed to the extent that the requested exemption may be
implemented at Palisades. Given Palisades' permanent shutdown date was
May 20, 2022, and the fuel decay time of 12 months, May 31, 2023,
terminates the period during which the spent fuel could heat-up to clad
ignition temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic conditions. This
analysis, ``Holtec Spent Fuel Pool Calculation,'' dated July 8, 2022,
[non-public], was submitted as Attachment 1 by the licensee in support
of the letter dated July 11, 2022 (ML22192A134), in which the licensee
requested exemptions from specific portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 for the Palisades license. The analysis
determined the decay time necessary to ensure a minimum of 10 hours is
available before the fuel cladding temperature of the hottest fuel
assembly in the SFP reaches 900 [deg]C. This 10-hour minimum threshold
provides sufficient time for the licensee to take mitigative actions,
and, if necessary, for offsite agencies to take appropriate action to
protect the health and safety of the public if fuel and cladding
oxidation occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's calculation to verify that
important physical properties of materials were within acceptable
ranges and that the results were accurate. The NRC staff determined
that the physical properties of materials were appropriate in the
licensee's calculations related to SFP heatup considerations for
Palisades. Therefore, the NRC staff found that 12 months after
permanent cessation of power operations, more than 10 hours would be
available before a significant offsite release could begin. The NRC
staff concluded that the adiabatic heatup calculation provided an
acceptable method for determining the minimum time available for
deployment of mitigation equipment and, if necessary, implementing
measures under a comprehensive general emergency plan. In this regard,
one technical criterion for relieving decommissioning reactor licensees
from the insurance obligations applicable to an operating reactor is a
finding that the heat generated by the SFP has decayed to the point
where the possibility of a zirconium fire is highly unlikely.
This was addressed in SECY-93-127, where the NRC staff concluded
that there was a low likelihood and reduced short-term public health
consequences of a zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's spent
fuel has sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum,
``Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power
Plants during Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993 (ML003760936), the
Commission approved a policy that authorized, through the exemption
process, withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance layer
and a reduction in commercial liability insurance coverage to $100
million when a licensee is able to demonstrate that the spent fuel
could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 14, 2020
(85 FR 1827); Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1,
[[Page 486]]
published in the Federal Register on March 26, 2021 (86 FR 14472); and
Duane Arnold Energy Center, published in the Federal Register on May
18, 2021 (86 FR 26961)). Additional discussions of other
decommissioning reactor licensees that have received exemptions to
reduce their primary insurance level to $100 million are provided in
SECY-96-256, ``Changes to the Financial Protection Requirements for
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR
140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ML15062A483). These prior exemptions
were based on the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could be air-
cooled consistent with the technical criterion discussed above.
In the exemption request dated October 26, 2022, the licensee
compared the Palisades fuel storage parameters with those used in NRC
generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A
Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor]
and PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ML082260098). The analysis described in
NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural air circulation would adequately
cool fuel that has decayed for 17 months after operation in a typical
PWR. The licensee compared the post-shutdown fuel storage conditions
with those assumed for the analysis presented in NUREG/CR-6451.
The licensee found that the Palisades fuel storage configuration is
smaller than the values modeled in NUREG/CR-6451. However, these
differences are considered to be conservatively offset by the lower
power density of the Palisades fuel assemblies, substantially larger
downcomer areas for improved buoyancy driven air flow and natural
circulation, and the fewer number of fuel assemblies that are stored in
the fuel racks as compared to the NUREG/CR-6451 PWR model. Therefore,
the cooling air flow should be comparable.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ML003721626 and
ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff discussed additional
information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at decommissioning
reactors and associated implications for offsite insurance. Analyzing
when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable of adequate air-
cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the probability of a
zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million and
the licensee's proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary
insurance pool for offsite financial protection are consistent with the
policy established in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance
considerations resulting from zirconium fire risks, as discussed in
SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100. The NRC has previously determined in
SECY-00-0145 that the minimum offsite financial protection requirement
may be reduced to $100 million and that secondary insurance is not
required once it is determined that the spent fuel in the SFP is no
longer thermal-hydraulically capable of sustaining a zirconium fire
based on a plant-specific analysis. The NRC staff also notes that
similar exemptions from these insurance requirements have been granted
to other permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors upon
satisfactory demonstration that zirconium fire risk from the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $450 million in
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of insurance required of
a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving Holtec Palisades
and HDI from their existing primary and secondary insurance obligations
have been met. As explained above, the NRC staff has concluded that no
reasonably conceivable DBA exists that could cause an offsite release
greater than the EPA PAGs and, therefore, that any offsite consequence
from a design-basis radiological release is highly unlikely and the
need for a significant amount of offsite liability insurance coverage
is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff determined that, after 12
months decay, the fuel stored in the Palisades SFP will be capable of
being adequately cooled by air in the highly unlikely event of pool
drainage. Moreover, in the highly unlikely beyond DBA scenario where
the SFP water inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of
heat removal from the spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff
has determined that at least 10 hours would be available and is
sufficient time to support deployment of mitigation equipment,
consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the fuel stored in the Palisades SFP will have decayed
sufficiently by the requested effective date for the exemption of 12
months after permanent cessation of power operations to support a
reduction in the required insurance consistent with SECY-00-0145.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, Section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require licensees
to maintain adequate financial protection. Accordingly, consistent with
the legal standard presented in SECY-93-127, under which
decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved of the requirements
to carry the maximum amount of insurance available and to participate
in the secondary retrospective premium pool where there is sufficient
technical justification, the NRC staff concludes that the requested
exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims following an
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100
allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw
[[Page 487]]
from participation in the retrospective rating pool for deferred
premium charges. As discussed in these documents, once the zirconium
fire concern is determined to be negligible, possible accident scenario
risks at permanently shutdown and defueled reactors are greatly reduced
when compared to the risks at operating reactors and the associated
potential for offsite financial liabilities from an accident are
commensurately less. The licensee analyzed and the NRC staff confirmed
that the risks of accidents that could result in an offsite
radiological release are minimal, which justifies the proposed
reductions in offsite primary liability insurance and withdrawal from
participation in the secondary retrospective rating pool for deferred
premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to
$131,056,000. However, because Palisades is permanently shutdown, it
cannot produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such
a liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial
risk exposure to the licensee is greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by Palisades when compared to operating
reactors. The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning
power plants does not warrant that the licensee be required to carry
full operating reactor insurance coverage after the requisite spent
fuel cooling period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown.
The licensee's proposed financial protection limits will maintain a
level of liability insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the
public. These changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as
discussed in SECY-00-0145 and exemptions approved for other
decommissioning reactors. Therefore, the underlying purpose of the
regulations will not be adversely affected by the reductions in
insurance coverage. Accordingly, an exemption from participation in the
secondary insurance pool and a reduction in the primary insurance to
$100 million, a value more in line with the potential consequences of
accidents, would be in the public interest in that this ensures that
there will be adequate funds to address any of those consequences and
helps to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit Holtec Palisades and HDI to lower
the Palisades primary insurance levels and to withdraw from the
secondary retrospective premium pool at the requested effective date of
12 months after permanent cessation of power operations, is in the
public interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) there is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director of the Division of Decommissioning, Uranium
Recovery, and Waste Programs in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, I have determined that approval of the exemption
request involves no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10
CFR 50.92, because reducing the licensee's offsite liability
requirements at Palisades does not: (1) involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated;
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial protection
regulation is unrelated to the operation of Palisades or site
activities. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite and no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with construction so there is no
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident) nor any activities conducted at the site. Therefore, there is
no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a
radiological accident. In addition, there would be no significant
impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region resulting from
issuance of the requested exemption. The requirement for offsite
liability insurance involves surety, insurance, or indemnity matters
only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Holtec
Palisades and HDI an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) for Palisades. Palisades permanently ceased power
operations on May 20, 2022. The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
permits Palisades to reduce the required level of primary financial
protection from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw from
participation in the secondary layer of financial protection 12 months
after permanent cessation of power operations, which was May 20, 2023.
Because this period had already elapsed, the exemption is effective
upon issuance.
Dated: this 22nd day of December 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Jane Marshall,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023-28951 Filed 1-3-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P