Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC and Holtec Palisades, LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption, 418-422 [2023-28909]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 2 (Wednesday, January 3, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 418-422]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28909]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-255; NRC-2023-0193]


Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC and Holtec Palisades, 
LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an 
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning 
International, LLC (HDI), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec 
International, that would allow HDI and Holtec Palisades, LLC, to 
reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property damage insurance 
from $1.06 billion to $50 million for the Palisades Nuclear Plant.

DATES: The exemption was issued on December 21, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0193 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0193. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information 
Contact section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select

[[Page 419]]

``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please 
contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, at 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available 
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this 
document.
     NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an 
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8 
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tanya E. Hood, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1387; email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: December 28, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya E. Hood,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket No. 50-255

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC; 
Palisades Nuclear Plant, Exemption

I. Background

    By letter dated October 19, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System Accession No. ML17292A032), Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC, or Commission) that it planned to permanently cease 
power operations at the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) no later 
than May 31, 2022. On May 20, 2022, ENOI permanently ceased power 
operations at Palisades, and by letter dated June 13, 2022 
(ML22164A067), ENOI certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently 
removed from the Palisades reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel 
pool (SFP) on June 10, 2022. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraphs 
50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 
the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating license for Palisades no 
longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention 
of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is still authorized to 
possess, and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Palisades 
spent fuel is currently stored in the SFP and in dry cask storage at 
the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated October 26, 2022 (ML22299A062), Holtec 
Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), one of the licensees of 
Palisades and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec 
International (Holtec), requested an exemption on behalf of Holtec 
Palisades, LLC, the other Palisades licensee, from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 
concerning onsite liability insurance. HDI and Holtec Palisades, LLC, 
are hereafter collectively referred to as the licensee. The exemption 
from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit the licensee to reduce the 
required level of onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion 
to $50 million for Palisades.
    The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires licensees to have and 
maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and 
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident. 
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever 
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources 
(whichever is less).
    The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently 
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an 
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no 
longer authorized at Palisades, there are no events that would require 
the stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly, 
the risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite 
contamination at Palisades is also much lower than the risk of such an 
event at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an 
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage 
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the 
reduced risk of an incident at the permanently shutdown and defueled 
Palisades site.

III. Discussion

    Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any 
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized 
by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and 
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the 
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were 
established after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 
accident out of concern that licensees may be unable to financially 
cover onsite cleanup costs in the event of a major nuclear accident. 
The specified $1.06 billion coverage amount requirement was developed 
based on an analysis of an accident at a nuclear reactor operating at 
power, resulting in a large fission product release and requiring 
significant resource expenditures to stabilize the reactor and 
ultimately decontaminate and cleanup the site.
    These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of 
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were 
derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive material from 
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor 
is very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In 
an operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor 
coolant system (RCS) and the inventory of relatively short-lived 
radionuclides contribute to both the risk and consequences of an 
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at 
Palisades and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor 
vessel, such accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor 
vessel, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate and have no 
function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, 
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, 
RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are 
associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption 
request dated October 26, 2022, the licensee discussed both design-
basis and beyond design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored 
in the SFP. The licensee determined that there are no possible design-
basis events at Palisades that could result in an offsite radiological 
release exceeding the limits established by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) 
of 1 roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a 
way to demonstrate that any possible radiological releases would be 
minimal and would not require precautionary protective actions (e.g., 
sheltering in place or evacuation).

[[Page 420]]

    The NRC staff evaluated the radiological consequences associated 
with various decommissioning activities and the design-basis accidents 
(DBAs) at Palisades in consideration of a permanently shutdown and 
defueled condition. The possible DBA scenarios at Palisades have 
greatly reduced radiological consequences. Based on its review, the NRC 
staff concluded that no reasonably conceivable DBA exists that could 
cause an offsite release greater than the EPA PAGs.
    The only incident that has the potential to lead to a significant 
radiological release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire. 
The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, 
beyond DBA scenario that involves loss of water inventory from the SFP 
resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel and culminating in 
substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The 
probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat 
of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a 
zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time 
since Palisades has been permanently shutdown.
    The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite 
financial protection based on this analysis of the zirconium fire risk. 
In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements for 
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 
140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ML15062A483), the NRC staff 
recommended changes to the power reactor financial protection 
regulations that would allow licensees to lower onsite insurance levels 
to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel stored in the SFP can 
be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum to SECY-96-256, 
dated January 28, 1997 (ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC 
staff's recommendation that, among other things, would allow 
permanently shutdown power reactor licensees to reduce commercial 
onsite property damage insurance coverage to $50 million when the 
licensee was able to demonstrate the technical criterion that the spent 
fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
    The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar 
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Pilgrim Nuclear 
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 14, 2020 
(85 FR 2153); Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, published in 
the Federal Register on March 26, 2021 (86 FR 16241); and Duane Arnold 
Energy Center, published in the Federal Register on May 18, 2021 (86 FR 
26946)). These prior exemptions were based on these licensees 
demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent with the 
technical criterion discussed above.
    In its October 26, 2022 request, the licensee compared Palisades 
fuel storage parameters with those used in NRC generic evaluations of 
fuel cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory 
Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized-
Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated 
August 1997 (ML082260098). The analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 
determined that natural air circulation would adequately cool fuel that 
has decayed for 17 months after operation in a typical PWR. The 
licensee compared the post-shutdown fuel storage conditions with those 
assumed for the analysis presented in NUREG/CR-6451.
    In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, 
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ML003721626 and 
ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff discussed additional 
information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at decommissioning 
reactors and associated implications for onsite property damage 
insurance. Providing an analysis of when the spent fuel stored in the 
SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure that can be used to 
demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium fire is exceedingly 
low. However, the NRC staff has more recently used an additional 
analysis that bounds an incomplete drain down of the SFP water, or some 
other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of the SFP with 
rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of rubble 
to the SFP). The analysis postulates that decay heat transfer from the 
spent fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation would be impeded. 
This analysis is often referred to as an adiabatic heatup.
    In its exemption dated October 26, 2022, the licensee stated, and 
the NRC staff confirmed, that the bounding analyses for the Palisades 
SFP for beyond design basis events demonstrate that 12 months after 
shutdown of Palisades a minimum of 10 hours is available before the 
fuel cladding temperature of the hottest fuel assembly in the SFP 
reaches 900 [deg]C with a complete loss of SFP water inventory. This 
analysis, ``Holtec Spent Fuel Pool Calculations,'' dated July 8, 2022, 
[non-public] was submitted as Attachment 1 by the licensee in support 
of the letter dated July 11, 2022 (ML22192A134), in which the licensee 
requested exemptions from specific portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 for the Palisades license.
    As stated in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool 
Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 
2001 (ML010430066), 900 [deg]C is an acceptable temperature to use for 
assessing the onset of fission product release, where the SFP is 
drained and air cooling is not possible; at least 10 hours would be 
available from the time spent fuel cooling is lost until the hottest 
fuel assembly reaches a temperature of 900 [deg]C. The 10-hour 
criterion, conservatively, does not consider the time to uncover the 
fuel and assumes instantaneous loss of cooling to the fuel. The 10-hour 
time period is also not intended to represent the time that it would 
take to repair all key safety systems or to repair a large SFP breach. 
The 10-hour criterion is a conservative period of time in which pre-
planned mitigation measures to provide makeup water or spray to the SFP 
can be reliably implemented before the onset of a zirconium cladding 
ignition. In addition, in the unlikely event that a release is 
projected to occur, 10 hours would provide sufficient time for offsite 
agencies, if deemed warranted, to take appropriate action to protect 
the health and safety of the public.
    In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-23-0043, ``Request 
by Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC for Exemptions from 
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for Palisades Nuclear Plant,'' 
dated May 15, 2023 (ML23054A179), the NRC staff assessed the licensee's 
accident analyses associated with the radiological risks from a 
zirconium fire at a permanently shutdown and defueled Palisades after 
12 months of fuel decay. For the highly unlikely beyond design-basis 
accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a 
manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no 
longer available, the NRC staff found that there will be a minimum of 
10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches 
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The NRC 
staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment of 
mitigation equipment, consistent with

[[Page 421]]

plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a 
point of rapid oxidation. As a result, the likelihood that such a 
scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is deemed not credible.
    However, the NRC staff has postulated that there is still a 
potential for other radiological incidents at a decommissioning reactor 
that could result in significant onsite contamination besides a 
zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC staff cited the rupture of a 
large, contaminated liquid storage tank (~450,000 gallons) causing soil 
contamination and potential groundwater contamination as the costliest 
postulated event to decontaminate and remediate (other than an SFP 
zirconium fire). The postulated large liquid radiological waste storage 
tank rupture event was determined to have a bounding onsite cleanup 
cost of approximately $50 million. Therefore, the NRC staff determined 
that the licensee's proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level of 
$50 million would be consistent with the bounding cleanup and 
decontamination cost, as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the 
postulated rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the 
Palisades site, should such an event occur.
    The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction 
in onsite property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million 
is consistent with SECY-96-256 and subsequent insurance considerations 
resulting from additional zirconium fire risks as discussed in SECY-00-
0145 and SECY-01-0100, as well as NUREG/CR-6451 and NUREG-1738. In 
addition, the NRC staff notes that similar exemptions have been granted 
to other permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors, upon 
demonstration that the criterion of the zirconium fire risks from the 
irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow the 
licensee to reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property 
damage insurance. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant 
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when the exemptions 
are authorized by law.
    As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the 
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance 
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256. 
Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 12 months after the permanent 
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time 
will have elapsed at Palisades to decrease the probability of an onsite 
and offsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire 
accident to negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to 
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with 
the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture 
of a large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed 
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, based on 
its review of the licensee's exemption request as discussed above, and 
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption 
is authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety

    The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that 
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be 
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for 
Palisades are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is 
operating. However, Palisades was permanently shut down on May 20, 
2022, and defueled on June 10, 2022. The permanently shutdown and 
defueled status of the facility results in a significant reduction in 
the number and severity of potential accidents and, correspondingly, a 
significant reduction in the potential for and severity of onsite 
property damage. The proposed reduction in the amount of onsite 
insurance coverage does not impact the probability or consequences of 
potential accidents. The proposed level of insurance coverage is 
commensurate with the reduced consequences of potential nuclear 
accidents at Palisades. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that 
granting the requested exemption will not present an undue risk to the 
health and safety of the public.

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements 
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely 
affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect 
special nuclear material. Physical security measures at Palisades are 
not affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed 
exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
regulation. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide 
reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize 
reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site 
decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a 
significant amount of radiological material. Since Palisades 
permanently shut down on May 20, 2022, and defueled on June 10, 2022, 
it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of DBAs or 
other credible events at Palisades to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs 
at the exclusion area boundary.
    The licensee has evaluated the consequences of highly unlikely, 
beyond-design-basis conditions involving a loss of inventory from the 
SFP. The analyses show that 12 months after the permanent cessation of 
power operations on May 20, 2022, the likelihood of such an event 
leading to a large radiological release is negligible. The NRC staff's 
evaluation of the licensee's analyses confirms this conclusion.
    The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million 
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and 
decontamination cost as discussed in SECY-96-256 to account for the 
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the 
Palisades site should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff 
concludes that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is 
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the 
permanently shutdown and defueled Palisades reactor.
    Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present 
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that 
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation 
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by 
others similarly situated.
    The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to 
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of

[[Page 422]]

$1.06 billion, the associated insurance premiums would be in excess of 
those necessary and commensurate with the radiological contamination 
risks posed by the site. In addition, such insurance levels would be 
significantly in excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities 
that have been granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
    The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would 
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in 
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are 
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated. 
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) 
and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity 
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by 
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after 
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. 
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the 
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that: (i) there is no significant hazards 
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is 
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant 
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological 
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought 
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
    As the Director of the Division of Decommissioning, Uranium 
Recovery, and Waste Programs in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material 
Safety and Safeguards, I have determined that approval of the exemption 
request involves no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 
CFR 50.92, because reducing the licensee's onsite property damage 
insurance for Palisades does not: (1) involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; 
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial protection 
regulation is unrelated to the operation of Palisades or site 
activities. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite and no significant increase in individual or 
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted 
regulation is not associated with construction so there is no 
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not 
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an 
accident) nor any activities conducted at the site. Therefore, there is 
no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a 
radiological accident. In addition, there would be no significant 
impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural 
resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region resulting from 
issuance of the requested exemption. The requirement for onsite 
property damage insurance involves surety, insurance, and indemnity 
matters only.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present as set 
forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
    Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Holtec Palisades and HDI an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for Palisades. 
Palisades permanently ceased power operations on May 20, 2022. The 
exemption permits Palisades to lower the minimum required onsite 
insurance to $50 million 12 months after permanent cessation of power 
operations, which was May 20, 2023. Because this period had already 
elapsed, the exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated this 21st day of December, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jane Marshall,

Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium, Recovery, and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 2023-28909 Filed 1-2-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P