Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption, 101-105 [2023-28813]
Download as PDF
101
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 2, 2024 / Notices
Overview of This Information
Collection
1. Type of Information Collection:
Extension of a currently approved
collection.
2. Title of the Form/Collection: SelfCertification, Training, and Logbooks for
Regulated Sellers and Mail-Order
Distributors of Scheduled Listed
Chemical Products.
3. Agency form number, if any, and
the applicable component of the
Department of Justice sponsoring the
collection: DEA From 597. The
applicable component within the
Department of Justice is the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Diversion
Control Division.
4. Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract:
Affected public (Primary): Private
Sector—business or other for-profit.
Affected public (Other): Not-for-profit
institutions; Federal, State, local, and
tribal governments.
Abstract: The Combat
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of
2005 (CMEA), which is Title VII of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Pub. L.
109–177), requires that on and after
September 30, 2006, a regulated seller
must not sell at retail over-the-counter
(non-prescription) products containing
the List I chemicals ephedrine,
pseudoephedrine, or
phenylpropanolamine, unless it has
self-certified to DEA, through DEA’s
website. The Methamphetamine
Production Prevention Act of 2008
(MPPA) (Pub. L. 110–415) was enacted
in 2008 to clarify the information entry
and signature requirements for
electronic logbook systems permitted for
the retail sale of scheduled listed
chemical products.
5. Obligation to Respond: Mandatory
21 CFR 1314.
6. Total Estimated Number of
Respondents: 20,467,641.
7. Estimated Time per Respondent: 3
minutes for Training Record, 15 minutes
for Self-Certification, and 1 minute for
Transaction Record (regulated seller)
and Transaction Record (customer).
8. Frequency: Training Record is
13.200, Transaction Record (regulated
seller) is 395.975, and Transaction
record (customer) and Self-certification
are 1.000.
9. Total Estimated Annual Time
Burden: 727,455 hours.
10. Total Estimated Annual Other
Costs Burden: $157,279.
If additional information is required,
contact: Darwin Arceo, Department
Clearance Officer, Policy and Planning
Staff, Justice Management Division,
United States Department of Justice,
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:38 Dec 29, 2023
Jkt 262001
Two Constitution Square, 145 N Street
NE, 4W–218, Washington, DC 20530.
Dated: December 27, 2023.
Darwin Arceo,
Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2023–28818 Filed 12–29–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–255; NRC–2023–0200]
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC;
Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
AGENCY:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC (HDI), an indirect wholly owned
subsidiary of Holtec International, that
would allow HDI and Holtec Palisades,
LLC, regarding certain emergency
planning (EP) requirements. The
exemption eliminates the requirements
to maintain an offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plan and
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities
at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, based on
the reduced risks of accidents that could
result in an offsite radiological release at
a decommissioning nuclear power
reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on
December 22, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2023–0200 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2023–0200. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301–415–0624; email:
Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00059
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at
301–415–4737, or by email to
PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS
accession number for each document
referenced (if it is available in ADAMS)
is provided the first time that it is
mentioned in this document.
• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you
may examine and order copies of
publicly available documents, is open
by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please
send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov
or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415–
4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern
time (ET), Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
Tanya E. Hood, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–1387; email: Tanya.Hood@
nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The text of
the exemption is attached.
Dated: December 27, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya E. Hood,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning
Branch, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
Attachment—Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Docket No. 50–255
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC;
Palisades Nuclear Plant, Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated October 19, 2017
(Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML17292A032), Entergy
Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI)
certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, or Commission) that
it planned to permanently cease power
operations at the Palisades Nuclear
Plant (Palisades) no later than May 31,
2022. On May 20, 2022, ENOI
permanently ceased power operations at
Palisades, and by letter dated June 13,
2022 (ML22164A067), ENOI certified to
the NRC that the fuel was permanently
removed from the Palisades reactor
vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool
(SFP) on June 10, 2022.
By application dated December 23,
2020 (ML20358A075), as supplemented
E:\FR\FM\02JAN1.SGM
02JAN1
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
102
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 2, 2024 / Notices
by information provided in letters from
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC (HDI, the licensee) dated December
23, 2020, and October 29, 2021
(ML20358A232, ML20358A239, and
ML21302A064), ENOI, Entergy Nuclear
Palisades, LLC, Holtec International,
and HDI submitted an ‘‘Application for
Order Consenting to Transfers of
Control of Licenses and Approving
Conforming License Amendments’’
requesting transfer of the Palisades
license to HDI. By letter dated December
13, 2021 (ML21292A145), the NRC
issued an order consenting to the
license transfer and draft conforming
administrative license amendments. The
license transfer was executed on June
28, 2022 (ML22173A173), coinciding
with the transition of Palisades from an
operational to a decommissioning
status.
Based on the docketing of the
certifications for permanent cessation of
operations and permanent removal of
fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified
in section 50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility
operating license for Palisades no longer
authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel in the
reactor vessel. The facility is still
authorized to possess and store
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel.
Palisades spent fuel is currently stored
in the SFP and in dry cask storage at the
independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
Many of the accident scenarios
postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports (USARs) for operating
nuclear power reactors involve failures
or malfunctions of systems, which could
affect the fuel in the reactor core and, in
the most severe postulated accidents,
would involve the release of some
fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at
Palisades and the permanent removal of
fuel from the reactor vessel, many
accidents are no longer possible. The
reactor, reactor coolant system, and
supporting systems are no longer in
operation and have no function related
to the storage of the spent fuel.
Therefore, the emergency planning (EP)
provisions for postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, reactor coolant system, or
supporting systems are no longer
applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47,
‘‘Emergency plans,’’ and appendix E,
‘‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness
for Production and Utilization
Facilities,’’ to 10 CFR part 50 continue
to apply to nuclear power reactors that
have provided certification that they
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:59 Dec 29, 2023
Jkt 262001
have permanently ceased operations
and have permanently removed all fuel
from the reactor vessel. There are no
explicit regulatory provisions
distinguishing EP requirements for a
power reactor that is permanently shut
down and defueled from those for a
reactor that is authorized to operate. To
reduce or eliminate EP requirements
that are no longer necessary due to the
decommissioning status of the facility,
the licensee must obtain exemptions
from those EP regulations. Only then
can HDI modify the Palisades
emergency plan to reflect the reduced
risk associated with the permanently
shutdown and defueled condition of
Palisades.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 11, 2022
(ML22192A134), HDI requested
exemptions from specific portions of the
EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 for
Palisades. More specifically, HDI
requested exemptions from certain
planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)
regarding onsite and offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans for
nuclear power reactors; from certain
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for
establishment of plume exposure
pathway and ingestion pathway
emergency planning zones (EPZs) for
nuclear power reactors; and from certain
requirements in 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV, ‘‘Content of
Emergency Plans.’’
The exemptions requested by HDI
would eliminate the requirements to
maintain formal offsite radiological
emergency plans, reviewed by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) under the requirements of 44
CFR, ‘‘Emergency Management and
Assistance,’’ Part 350, ‘‘Review and
Approval of State and Local
Radiological Emergency Plans and
Preparedness,’’ and would reduce the
scope of the onsite EP activities at
Palisades. HDI stated that application of
all the standards and requirements in 10
CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10
CFR part 50, appendix E is not needed
for adequate emergency response
capability, based on the substantially
lower onsite and offsite radiological
consequences of accidents still possible
at the permanently shutdown and
defueled facility as compared to an
operating facility.
If offsite protective actions were
needed for a highly unlikely beyond
design-basis accidents (DBAs) that
could challenge the safe storage of spent
fuel at Palisades, provisions exist for
offsite agencies to take protective
actions using a comprehensive
PO 00000
Frm 00060
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
emergency management plan (CEMP)
under the National Preparedness System
to protect the health and safety of the
public. A CEMP in this context, also
referred to as an emergency operations
plan, is addressed in FEMA’s
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide
101, ‘‘Developing and Maintaining
Emergency Operations Plans,’’ which is
publicly available at https://
www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/
npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101 is the
foundation for State, territorial, Tribal,
and local EP in the United States. It
promotes a common understanding of
the fundamentals of risk-informed
planning and decision-making and
helps planners at all levels of
government in their efforts to develop
and maintain viable, all-hazards, allthreats emergency plans. An emergency
operations plan is flexible enough for
use in all emergencies. It describes how
people and property will be protected;
details who is responsible for carrying
out specific actions; identifies the
personnel, equipment, facilities,
supplies and other resources available;
and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to
as a synonym for ‘‘all-hazards
planning.’’
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12,
‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ the Commission
may, upon application by any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 when: (1) the exemptions
are authorized by law, will not present
an undue risk to public health or safety,
and are consistent with the common
defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2) are present. These special
circumstances include, among other
things, that the application of the
regulation in the particular
circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule.
As noted previously, the EP
regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part
50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has
consistently acknowledged that the risk
of an offsite radiological release at a
power reactor that has permanently
ceased operations and permanently
removed fuel from the reactor vessel is
significantly lower, and the types of
possible accidents are significantly
fewer, than at an operating power
reactor. However, current EP regulations
do not recognize that once a power
E:\FR\FM\02JAN1.SGM
02JAN1
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 2, 2024 / Notices
reactor permanently ceases operation,
the risk of a large radiological release
from a credible emergency accident
scenario is reduced. Due to the
permanently defueled status of the
reactor, no new spent fuel will be added
to the Palisades SFP and the
radionuclides in the current spent fuel
will continue to decay as the spent fuel
ages. The spent fuel will produce less
heat due to radioactive decay,
increasing the available time to mitigate
a loss of water inventory from the SFP.
The NRC’s NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety
and Regulatory Assessment of Generic
BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR
[Pressurized Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ dated August 1997
(ML082260098), and the NRC’s
NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study of
Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ dated February 2001
(ML010430066), confirmed that for
permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors that are bounded by the
assumptions and conditions in the
report, the risk of offsite radiological
release is significantly less than for an
operating nuclear power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to
those requested by HDI, have been
granted to licensees of permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors.
However, the exemptions did not
relieve the licensees of all EP
requirements. Rather, the exemptions
allowed the licensees to modify their
emergency plans commensurate with
the credible site-specific risks that were
consistent with a permanently
shutdown and defueled status.
Specifically, the NRC’s approval of
these prior exemptions from certain EP
requirements was based on the
licensee’s demonstration that: (1) the
radiological consequences of DBAs
would not exceed the limits of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) Protective Action Guidelines
(PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary,
and (2) in the highly unlikely event of
a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all
modes of cooling for the spent fuel
stored in the SFP, there is sufficient
time to initiate appropriate mitigating
actions, and if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement offsite
protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and
safety of the public. In prior
exemptions, sufficient time was
demonstrated if the time exceeded 10
hours from the loss of coolant until the
fuel temperature would be expected to
reach 900 degrees Celsius (°C), assuming
no air cooling. In this exemption
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:59 Dec 29, 2023
Jkt 262001
request, the licensee provided an
analysis demonstrating that after the
spent fuel has decayed for 12 months,
for beyond-design-basis events where
the SFP is drained and air cooling is not
possible, at least 10 hours would be
available from the time spent fuel
cooling is lost until the hottest fuel
assembly reaches a temperature of
900 °C. This 10-hour minimum
threshold provides sufficient time for
the licensee to take mitigative actions,
or if government officials deem
warranted, for offsite protective actions
to be initiated using a CEMP or ‘‘allhazards’’ approach.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s
justification for the requested
exemptions against the criteria in 10
CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as
described below, that the criteria in 10
CFR 50.12(a) are met, and that the
exemptions should be granted. An
assessment of the HDI EP exemptions is
described in SECY–23–0043, ‘‘Request
by Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC for Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning
Requirements for Palisades Nuclear
Plant,’’ dated May 30, 2023
(ML23054A179). The Commission
approved the NRC staff’s
recommendation to grant the
exemptions in the staff requirements
memorandum to SECY–23–0043, dated
December 7, 2023 (ML23341A181). The
exemptions are conditioned to make it
clear that the exemptions will terminate
if the status of the Palisades reactor
changes such that the certifications of
permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the
reactor vessel are no longer applicable.
Descriptions of the specific exemptions
requested by HDI and the NRC staff’s
basis for granting each exemption are
provided in SECY–23–0043. The staff’s
detailed review and technical basis for
the approval of the specific EP
exemptions, requested by HDI, are
provided in the NRC staff’s safety
evaluation dated December 22, 2023
(ML23263A977).
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed
exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10
CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV, which would
allow HDI to revise the Palisades
Emergency Plan to reflect the submittal
of the certification of the permanently
shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. As stated above, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission
may, upon application by any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
PO 00000
Frm 00061
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
103
CFR part 50. The NRC staff has
determined that granting of the
licensee’s proposed exemptions will not
result in a violation of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the
NRC’s regulations. Therefore, the
exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents no Undue
Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, HDI provided
analyses that show the radiological
consequences of DBA will not exceed
the limits of the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. Therefore,
formal offsite radiological emergency
plans required under 10 CFR part 50 are
no longer needed for protection of the
public beyond the exclusion area
boundary, based on the radiological
consequences of DBAs still possible at
Palisades.
Although highly unlikely, there is one
postulated beyond DBA that might
result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG–1738
confirms that the risk of beyond DBAs
is greatly reduced at permanently
shutdown and defueled reactors. The
NRC staff’s analyses in NUREG–1738
concludes that the event sequences
important to risk at permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors
are limited to large earthquakes and
cask drop events. For EP assessments,
this is an important difference relative
to the operating power reactors, where
typically a large number of different
sequences make significant
contributions to risk. As described in
NUREG–1738, relaxation of offsite EP
requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few
months after shutdown resulted in only
a small change in risk. The report
further concludes that the change in risk
due to relaxation of offsite EP
requirements is small because the
overall risk is low, and because even
under current EP requirements for
operating power reactors, EP was judged
to have marginal impact on evacuation
effectiveness in the severe earthquake
event that dominates SFP risk. All other
sequences including cask drops (for
which offsite radiological emergency
plans are expected to be more effective)
are too low in likelihood to have a
significant impact on risk. Therefore,
granting exemptions to eliminate the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 to
maintain offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans and to reduce the
scope of onsite EP activities will not
present an undue risk to the public
health and safety.
E:\FR\FM\02JAN1.SGM
02JAN1
104
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 2, 2024 / Notices
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the
Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by HDI
only involve EP requirements under 10
CFR part 50 and will allow HDI to revise
the Palisades Emergency Plan to reflect
the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of the facility.
Physical security measures at Palisades
are not affected by the requested EP
exemptions. The discontinuation of
formal offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans and the reduction in
scope of the onsite EP activities at
Palisades will not adversely affect the
licensee’s ability to physically secure
the site or protect special nuclear
material. Therefore, the proposed
exemptions are consistent with common
defense and security.
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present
whenever application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule. The underlying
purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV, is to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological
emergency, to establish plume exposure
and ingestion pathway emergency
planning zones for nuclear power
plants, and to ensure that licensees
maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency preparedness
plans. The standards and requirements
in these regulations were developed by
considering the risks associated with
operation of a nuclear power reactor at
its licensed full-power level. These risks
include the potential for a reactor
accident with offsite radiological dose
consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III,
because Palisades is permanently shut
down and defueled, there is no longer
a risk of offsite radiological release from
a DBA and the risk of a significant
offsite radiological release from a
beyond DBA is greatly reduced when
compared to the risk at an operating
power reactor. The NRC staff has
confirmed the reduced risks at Palisades
by comparing the generic risk
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG–
1738 to site-specific conditions at
Palisades and determined that the risk
values in NUREG–1738 bound the risks
presented for Palisades. As indicated by
the results of the research conducted for
NUREG–1738, and more recently for
NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a
Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:59 Dec 29, 2023
Jkt 262001
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S.
Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,’’ dated
September 2014 (ML14255A365), while
other consequences can be extensive,
accidents from SFPs with significant
decay time have little potential to cause
offsite early fatalities, even if the formal
offsite radiological EP requirements
were relaxed. HDI’s analysis of a beyond
DBA involving a complete loss of SFP
water inventory, based on an adiabatic
heatup analysis of the limiting fuel
assembly for decay heat, shows that 12
months after permanent cessation of
power operations at Palisades, the time
for the limiting fuel assembly to reach
900 °C is at least 10 hours after the
assemblies have been uncovered
assuming a loss of all cooling means.
The NRC staff has verified the
licensee’s analyses and its calculations.
The analyses provide reasonable
assurance that in granting the requested
exemptions to HDI, there is no DBA that
will result in an offsite radiological
release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In the highly
unlikely event of a beyond DBA
affecting the SFP that results in a
complete loss of heat removal via all
modes of heat transfer, there will be a
minimum of 10 hours available before
an offsite release might occur and,
therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate
appropriate mitigating actions to restore
a means of heat removal to the spent
fuel. If a radiological release were
projected to occur under this highly
unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10
hours is considered sufficient time for
offsite authorities to implement
protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and
safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP
requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC
when the site-specific analyses show
that at least 10 hours is available
following a loss of SFP coolant
inventory with no air cooling (or other
methods of removing decay heat) until
cladding of the hottest fuel assembly
reaches the rapid oxidation temperature.
The NRC staff concluded in its
previously granted exemptions, as it
does with the licensee’s requested EP
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10
hours is available to initiate mitigative
actions consistent with plant conditions
or, if needed, for offsite authorities to
implement protective actions using a
CEMP approach, then formal offsite
radiological emergency preparedness
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50,
are not necessary at permanently
shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, in its letter to the NRC
dated July 11, 2022, HDI described the
PO 00000
Frm 00062
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
SFP makeup strategies that could be
used in the event of a catastrophic loss
of SFP inventory. The multiple
strategies for providing makeup water to
the SFP include: using various existing
plant systems for inventory makeup and
an internal strategy that relies on the
portable FLEX pump manifold, and
having available two installed dieseldriven fire pumps and one motor-driven
fire pump that can provide 1,500 gallons
per minute makeup water from the
facility intake via hard pipe or hose
stations. In addition, HDI states that two
onsite FLEX pumper units with a
capacity of 1,000 gallons per minute
each can provide makeup water from
the facility intake or from Lake
Michigan directly. Further, Palisades
procedures specify that the installation
of the SFP spray monitor nozzles and
direct fill should be given priority over
the hard pipe fill connection due to
expected SFP area high radiation levels
if the SFP water level cannot be
maintained. These strategies will
continue to be required as License
Condition 6.b of Renewed Facility
License No. DPR–20 for Palisades.
Considering the very low probability of
beyond DBAs affecting the SFP, these
diverse strategies provide multiple
methods to obtain additional makeup or
spray to the SFP before the onset of any
postulated offsite radiological release.
For all of the reasons stated above, the
NRC staff finds that the licensee’s
requested exemptions meet the
underlying purpose of all of the
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as
the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2)
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, and
satisfy the special circumstances
provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in
view of the greatly reduced risk of
offsite radiological consequences
associated with the permanently
shutdown and defueled state of the
Palisades facility 12 months after the
facility permanently ceases operation.
The NRC staff further concludes that
the exemptions granted by this action
will maintain an acceptable level of
emergency preparedness at Palisades
and provide reasonable assurance that
adequate offsite protective measures, if
needed, can and will be taken by State
and local government agencies using a
CEMP approach, in the highly unlikely
event of a radiological emergency at
Palisades. Since the underlying
purposes of the rules, as exempted,
would continue to be achieved, even
with the elimination of the requirements
under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal
offsite radiological emergency plans and
the reduction in the scope of the onsite
EP activities at Palisades, the special
E:\FR\FM\02JAN1.SGM
02JAN1
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 2, 2024 / Notices
circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
ACTION:
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a),
the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have
a significant effect on the quality of the
human environment as discussed in the
NRC staff’s Environmental Assessment
and Finding of No Significant Impact
published in the Federal Register (FR)
on December 21, 2023 (88 FR 88664).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the licensee’s request for
exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10
CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV, and as
summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY–
23–0043, are authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to the public
health and safety, and are consistent
with the common defense and security.
Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants HDI exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10
CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E, section IV, as discussed and
evaluated in detail in the NRC staff’s
safety evaluation dated December 22,
2023. The exemptions are effective 12
months after permanent cessation of
power operations, which was May 20,
2023. Because this period had already
elapsed, the exemption is effective upon
issuance. These exemptions will
terminate if the status of the Palisades
reactor changes such that the
certifications of permanent cessation of
operations and permanent removal of
fuel from the reactor vessel are no
longer applicable.
Dated: this 22nd day of December 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jane Marshall,
Director, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023–28813 Filed 12–29–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–285; NRC–2022–0127]
Omaha Public Power District; Fort
Calhoun Station, Unit 1; Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
AGENCY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:59 Dec 29, 2023
Jkt 262001
Notice; issuance.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing a finding
of no significant impact (FONSI) and
accompanying environmental
assessment (EA) regarding the NRC’s
consideration of a license amendment
request by Omaha Public Power District
(OPPD) to approve the License
Termination Plan (LTP) for the Fort
Calhoun Station, Unit 1 (FCS), located
in Washington County, Nebraska. If
approved, the amendment would add a
license condition to the FCS license
reflecting the NRC’s approval of its LTP
and establishing criteria for determining
when changes to the LTP require prior
NRC approval. OPPD would use the LTP
to meet the requirements for terminating
the license and releasing the site for
unrestricted use. Based on the EA, the
NRC staff has concluded that there will
be no significant impacts to
environmental resources from the
requested license amendment, and
therefore, a FONSI is appropriate.
DATES: The EA and FONSI referenced in
this document is available on January 2,
2024.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2022–0127 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2022–0127. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301–415–0624; email:
Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at
301–415–4737, or by email to
PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. For the
convenience of the reader, instructions
about obtaining materials referenced in
this document are provided in the
‘‘Availability of Documents’’ section of
this document.
• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you
may examine and order copies of
publicly available documents, is open
by appointment. To make an
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00063
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
105
appointment to visit the PDR, please
send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov
or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415–
4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern
time (ET), Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Marla Morales, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–0715; email: Marla.Morales@
nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
The NRC is considering issuance of a
license amendment request to approve
the LTP for the FCS, located in
Washington County, Nebraska, as part of
OPPD’s part 50 of title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
‘‘Domestic Licensing of Production and
Utilization Facilities,’’ Facility
Operating License No. DPR–40. If
granted, the license amendment would
add a condition to FCS’s license
reflecting the NRC’s approval of FCS’s
LTP and establishing criteria for
determining when changes to the LTP
require prior NRC approval. As required
by 10 CFR part 51, ‘‘Environmental
Protection Regulations for Domestic
Licensing and Related Regulatory
Functions,’’ the NRC prepared an
environmental assessment (EA). Based
on the results of the EA, the NRC has
determined not to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS)
for the license amendment request and
is issuing a finding of no significant
impact (FONSI).
Construction of FCS began in 1968,
and the NRC issued an operating license
to the OPPD in 1973. The FCS began
commercial operation in September
1973. The OPPD submitted the
Certification of Permanent Cessation of
Power Operations in August 2016 in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.82 (a)(1)(i)
and shutdown on October 24, 2016.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), on
November 13, 2016, the OPPD certified
to the NRC that as of November 2016,
all fuel had been removed from the FCS
reactor vessel and placed into the FCS
spent fuel pool.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(4)(i), the
OPPD submitted its initial PostShutdown Decommissioning Activities
Report (PSDAR) on March 30, 2017, and
supplemented it by letter dated
December 14, 2017. The PSDAR
described OPPD’s selection of the
SAFSTOR method for decommissioning
the FCS. The FCS reactor remained in
SAFSTOR until December 16, 2019.
E:\FR\FM\02JAN1.SGM
02JAN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 2, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 101-105]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28813]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-255; NRC-2023-0200]
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades,
LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC (HDI), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec
International, that would allow HDI and Holtec Palisades, LLC,
regarding certain emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemption
eliminates the requirements to maintain an offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP
activities at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, based on the reduced risks
of accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on December 22, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0200 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0200. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tanya E. Hood, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1387; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: December 27, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya E. Hood,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-255
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC;
Palisades Nuclear Plant, Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated October 19, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17292A032), Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, or Commission) that it planned to permanently cease
power operations at the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) no later
than May 31, 2022. On May 20, 2022, ENOI permanently ceased power
operations at Palisades, and by letter dated June 13, 2022
(ML22164A067), ENOI certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently
removed from the Palisades reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel
pool (SFP) on June 10, 2022.
By application dated December 23, 2020 (ML20358A075), as
supplemented
[[Page 102]]
by information provided in letters from Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC (HDI, the licensee) dated December 23, 2020, and
October 29, 2021 (ML20358A232, ML20358A239, and ML21302A064), ENOI,
Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC, Holtec International, and HDI submitted
an ``Application for Order Consenting to Transfers of Control of
Licenses and Approving Conforming License Amendments'' requesting
transfer of the Palisades license to HDI. By letter dated December 13,
2021 (ML21292A145), the NRC issued an order consenting to the license
transfer and draft conforming administrative license amendments. The
license transfer was executed on June 28, 2022 (ML22173A173),
coinciding with the transition of Palisades from an operational to a
decommissioning status.
Based on the docketing of the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel, as specified in section 50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility
operating license for Palisades no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e.,
spent) nuclear fuel. Palisades spent fuel is currently stored in the
SFP and in dry cask storage at the independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports (USARs) for operating nuclear power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the
reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of some fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at Palisades and the permanent removal of
fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible.
The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems are no
longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the
spent fuel. Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) provisions for
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor,
reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
appendix E, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and
Utilization Facilities,'' to 10 CFR part 50 continue to apply to
nuclear power reactors that have provided certification that they have
permanently ceased operations and have permanently removed all fuel
from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions
distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is permanently
shut down and defueled from those for a reactor that is authorized to
operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements that are no longer
necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility, the
licensee must obtain exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then
can HDI modify the Palisades emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk
associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of
Palisades.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 11, 2022 (ML22192A134), HDI requested
exemptions from specific portions of the EP requirements of 10 CFR
50.47 and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 for Palisades. More
specifically, HDI requested exemptions from certain planning standards
in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for establishment of plume exposure
pathway and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones (EPZs) for
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, ``Content of Emergency Plans.''
The exemptions requested by HDI would eliminate the requirements to
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44
CFR, ``Emergency Management and Assistance,'' Part 350, ``Review and
Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and
Preparedness,'' and would reduce the scope of the onsite EP activities
at Palisades. HDI stated that application of all the standards and
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response capability,
based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological
consequences of accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown
and defueled facility as compared to an operating facility.
If offsite protective actions were needed for a highly unlikely
beyond design-basis accidents (DBAs) that could challenge the safe
storage of spent fuel at Palisades, provisions exist for offsite
agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency
management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to
protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context,
also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is addressed in
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is publicly available
at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State,
territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It promotes a
common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and
decision-making and helps planners at all levels of government in their
efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats
emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is flexible enough for
use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards
planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule.
As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor.
However, current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power
[[Page 103]]
reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological
release from a credible emergency accident scenario is reduced. Due to
the permanently defueled status of the reactor, no new spent fuel will
be added to the Palisades SFP and the radionuclides in the current
spent fuel will continue to decay as the spent fuel ages. The spent
fuel will produce less heat due to radioactive decay, increasing the
available time to mitigate a loss of water inventory from the SFP. The
NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic
BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 1997
(ML082260098), and the NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent
Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated February 2001 (ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors that are bounded by the
assumptions and conditions in the report, the risk of offsite
radiological release is significantly less than for an operating
nuclear power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by HDI, have
been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions from
certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's demonstration that:
(1) the radiological consequences of DBAs would not exceed the limits
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective Action
Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary, and (2) in the highly
unlikely event of a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all modes of
cooling for the spent fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time
to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and safety of the public. In prior
exemptions, sufficient time was demonstrated if the time exceeded 10
hours from the loss of coolant until the fuel temperature would be
expected to reach 900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), assuming no air
cooling. In this exemption request, the licensee provided an analysis
demonstrating that after the spent fuel has decayed for 12 months, for
beyond-design-basis events where the SFP is drained and air cooling is
not possible, at least 10 hours would be available from the time spent
fuel cooling is lost until the hottest fuel assembly reaches a
temperature of 900 [deg]C. This 10-hour minimum threshold provides
sufficient time for the licensee to take mitigative actions, or if
government officials deem warranted, for offsite protective actions to
be initiated using a CEMP or ``all-hazards'' approach.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a)
are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of
the HDI EP exemptions is described in SECY-23-0043, ``Request by Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC for Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements for Palisades Nuclear Plant,'' dated
May 30, 2023 (ML23054A179). The Commission approved the NRC staff's
recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff requirements
memorandum to SECY-23-0043, dated December 7, 2023 (ML23341A181). The
exemptions are conditioned to make it clear that the exemptions will
terminate if the status of the Palisades reactor changes such that the
certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are no longer applicable.
Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by HDI and the NRC
staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-23-0043.
The staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the
specific EP exemptions, requested by HDI, are provided in the NRC
staff's safety evaluation dated December 22, 2023 (ML23263A977).
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV, which would allow HDI to revise the Palisades Emergency
Plan to reflect the submittal of the certification of the permanently
shutdown and defueled condition of the facility. As stated above, in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that
granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will not result in a
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's
regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents no Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, HDI provided analyses that show the
radiological consequences of DBA will not exceed the limits of the EPA
PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, formal offsite
radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 50 are no
longer needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area
boundary, based on the radiological consequences of DBAs still possible
at Palisades.
Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond DBA that
might result in significant offsite radiological releases. However,
NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond DBAs is greatly reduced at
permanently shutdown and defueled reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in
NUREG-1738 concludes that the event sequences important to risk at
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large
earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an
important difference relative to the operating power reactors, where
typically a large number of different sequences make significant
contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738, relaxation of
offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few months after shutdown
resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further concludes
that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is
small because the overall risk is low, and because even under current
EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was judged to have
marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the severe earthquake
event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops
(for which offsite radiological emergency plans are expected to be more
effective) are too low in likelihood to have a significant impact on
risk. Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of
10 CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present
an undue risk to the public health and safety.
[[Page 104]]
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by HDI only involve EP requirements under
10 CFR part 50 and will allow HDI to revise the Palisades Emergency
Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. Physical security measures at Palisades are not affected by
the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in scope of
the onsite EP activities at Palisades will not adversely affect the
licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect special
nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent
with common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the
risks associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its
licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a
reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III, because Palisades is
permanently shut down and defueled, there is no longer a risk of
offsite radiological release from a DBA and the risk of a significant
offsite radiological release from a beyond DBA is greatly reduced when
compared to the risk at an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has
confirmed the reduced risks at Palisades by comparing the generic risk
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions
at Palisades and determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound
the risks presented for Palisades. As indicated by the results of the
research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more recently for NUREG-2161,
``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the
Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated
September 2014 (ML14255A365), while other consequences can be
extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little
potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite
radiological EP requirements were relaxed. HDI's analysis of a beyond
DBA involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an
adiabatic heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat,
shows that 12 months after permanent cessation of power operations at
Palisades, the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C
is at least 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming
a loss of all cooling means.
The NRC staff has verified the licensee's analyses and its
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in
granting the requested exemptions to HDI, there is no DBA that will
result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event of a beyond DBA
affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via
all modes of heat transfer, there will be a minimum of 10 hours
available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at
least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a
means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were
projected to occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10
hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to
implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the
health and safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory with no air cooling (or other methods of removing
decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the
rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously
granted exemptions, as it does with the licensee's requested EP
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently
shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, in its letter to the NRC dated July 11, 2022, HDI
described the SFP makeup strategies that could be used in the event of
a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple strategies for
providing makeup water to the SFP include: using various existing plant
systems for inventory makeup and an internal strategy that relies on
the portable FLEX pump manifold, and having available two installed
diesel-driven fire pumps and one motor-driven fire pump that can
provide 1,500 gallons per minute makeup water from the facility intake
via hard pipe or hose stations. In addition, HDI states that two onsite
FLEX pumper units with a capacity of 1,000 gallons per minute each can
provide makeup water from the facility intake or from Lake Michigan
directly. Further, Palisades procedures specify that the installation
of the SFP spray monitor nozzles and direct fill should be given
priority over the hard pipe fill connection due to expected SFP area
high radiation levels if the SFP water level cannot be maintained.
These strategies will continue to be required as License Condition 6.b
of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-20 for Palisades. Considering the
very low probability of beyond DBAs affecting the SFP, these diverse
strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or
spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite
radiological release.
For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, and satisfy the special
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the Palisades
facility 12 months after the facility permanently ceases operation.
The NRC staff further concludes that the exemptions granted by this
action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at
Palisades and provide reasonable assurance that adequate offsite
protective measures, if needed, can and will be taken by State and
local government agencies using a CEMP approach, in the highly unlikely
event of a radiological emergency at Palisades. Since the underlying
purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction
in the scope of the onsite EP activities at Palisades, the special
[[Page 105]]
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact published
in the Federal Register (FR) on December 21, 2023 (88 FR 88664).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the licensee's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
23-0043, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants HDI exemptions from certain EP requirements in
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's
safety evaluation dated December 22, 2023. The exemptions are effective
12 months after permanent cessation of power operations, which was May
20, 2023. Because this period had already elapsed, the exemption is
effective upon issuance. These exemptions will terminate if the status
of the Palisades reactor changes such that the certifications of
permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from
the reactor vessel are no longer applicable.
Dated: this 22nd day of December 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jane Marshall,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023-28813 Filed 12-29-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P