Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Energy Center; Exemption, 90208-90212 [2023-28777]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 249 (Friday, December 29, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 90208-90212]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28777]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286; NRC-2023-0175]


Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, 
LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Energy Center; 
Exemption

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an 
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning 
International, LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, 
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, to reduce the minimum coverage limit 
for onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million 
for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, 
collectively referred to as the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC).

DATES: The exemption was issued on November 14, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0175 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0175. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information 
Contact section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, 
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for 
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the 
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
     NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an 
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8 
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-8534, email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: December 26, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, 
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 
Nos. 1, 2, and 3; Exemption

I. Background

    Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased 
generation on October 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1 
reactor vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC, the Commission) issued an order approving the safe-
storage condition of IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued Amendment No. 52 to 
IP1's provisional operating license, which changed the expiration date 
of the provisional license to be consistent with that of the Indian 
Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2) facility license at that 
time. Pursuant to title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 
section 50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer authorizes operation of 
the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor 
vessel. There is no IP1 spent fuel in wet storage at the Indian Point 
Energy Center (IPEC) site; IP1 spent fuel is stored onsite in dry cask 
storage at the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
    By letter dated February 8, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System Accession No. ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Indian 
Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC 
licensees at that time, collectively, Entergy) certified to the NRC 
that they planned to permanently cease power operations at IP2 and 
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 2020, and 
April 30, 2021, respectively. By letters dated May 12, 2020, and May 
11, 2021 (ML20133J902 and ML21131A157), Entergy certified to the NRC 
that power operations permanently ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 
2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the same letters, Entergy 
certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the IP2 
and IP3 reactor vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 spent fuel pools 
(SFPs) as of May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively.
    Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessels, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed 
facility licenses for IP2 and IP3 (Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64, 
respectively) no longer authorize operation of the reactors or 
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessels. The facility 
is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) 
nuclear fuel. At the time of the exemption request described below, 
spent fuel was stored onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the SFPs 
and in a dry cask ISFSI.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated March 18, 2022 (ML22077A132), Holtec 
Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), one of the licensees of IPEC 
and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec International 
(Holtec), requested an exemption on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, 
LLC (a licensee of IP1 and IP2, referred to as Holtec IP2) and Holtec 
Indian Point 3, LLC (a licensee of IP3, and referred to as Holtec IP3), 
from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) concerning onsite liability 
insurance. HDI, Holtec IP2, and Holtec IP3 are hereafter collectively 
referred to as the licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 
would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of onsite

[[Page 90209]]

property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for IPEC.
    The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires licensees to have and 
maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and 
decontaminate the reactor(s) and reactor site in the event of an 
accident. The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or 
whatever amount of insurance is generally available from private 
sources (whichever is less).
    The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently 
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an 
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no 
longer authorized at IPEC, there are no events that would require the 
stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly, the 
risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite 
contamination at IPEC is also much lower than the risk of such an event 
at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption 
from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage insurance 
from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the reduced risk 
of an incident at the permanently shutdown and defueled IPEC site.

III. Discussion

    Under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission may, 
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, 
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the 
exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to 
public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and 
security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2) are present.
    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were 
established after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 
accident out of concern that licensees may be unable to financially 
cover onsite cleanup costs in the event of a major nuclear accident. 
The specified $1.06 billion coverage amount requirement was developed 
based on an analysis of an accident at a nuclear reactor operating at 
power, resulting in a large fission product release and requiring 
significant resource expenditures to stabilize the reactor and 
ultimately decontaminate and cleanup the site.
    These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of 
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were 
derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive material from 
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor 
is very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In 
an operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor 
coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an 
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at IPEC 
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessels, such 
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor vessels, 
RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate and have no function 
related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated 
accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactors, RCS, or 
supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are 
associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption 
request dated March 18, 2022, the licensee discussed both design-basis 
and beyond design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the 
SFPs. The licensee determined that there are no possible design-basis 
events at IPEC that could result in an offsite radiological release 
exceeding the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of 1 
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a way 
to demonstrate that any possible radiological releases would be minimal 
and would not require precautionary protective actions (e.g., 
sheltering in place or evacuation). The NRC staff evaluated the 
radiological consequences associated with various decommissioning 
activities and the design basis accidents at IPEC, in consideration of 
the permanently shutdown and defueled condition. The possible design-
basis accident scenarios at IPEC have greatly reduced radiological 
consequences. Based on its review, the NRC staff concluded that no 
reasonably conceivable design-basis accident exists that could cause an 
offsite release greater than the EPA PAGs.
    The only incident that has the potential to lead to a significant 
radiological release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire 
in the SFP. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly 
unlikely, beyond design-basis accident scenario that involves loss of 
water inventory from the SFP resulting in a significant heat up of the 
spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation 
and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is 
related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. 
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to 
decrease as a function of the time since IPEC has been permanently shut 
down.
    The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite 
financial protection, based on this analysis of the zirconium fire 
risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements 
for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 
CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ML15062A483), the NRC staff 
recommended changes to the power reactor financial protection 
regulations that would allow licensees to lower onsite insurance levels 
to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel stored in the SFP can 
be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum to SECY-96-256, 
dated January 28, 1997 (ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC 
staff's recommendation that, among other things, would allow 
permanently shutdown power reactor licensees to reduce commercial 
onsite property damage insurance coverage to $50 million when the 
licensee was able to demonstrate the technical criterion that the spent 
fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
    The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar 
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic 
Power Station, published in the Federal Register (FR) on January 19, 
1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the FR on 
December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station, published in 
the FR on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638); Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear 
Generation Plant, published in the FR on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); 
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, published in the FR on 
December 28, 2018 (83 FR 67365); Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 
published in the FR on January 14, 2020 (85 FR 2153); Three Mile Island 
Nuclear Station, Unit 1, published in the FR on March 26, 2021 (86 FR 
16241); and the Duane Arnold Energy Center, published in the FR on May 
18, 2021 (86 FR 26946)). These prior exemptions were based on these 
licensees demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent 
with the technical criterion discussed above.
    In its March 18, 2022, request, the licensee compared the IPEC fuel 
storage parameters with those used in NRC generic evaluations of fuel 
cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment 
of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR

[[Page 90210]]

[Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ML082260098). The analysis described in 
NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural air circulation would adequately 
cool fuel in the representative PWR.
    In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, 
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ML003721626 and 
ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff discussed additional 
information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at decommissioning 
reactors and associated implications for onsite property damage 
insurance. Providing an analysis of when the spent fuel stored in the 
SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure that can be used to 
demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium fire is exceedingly 
low.
    In their letter dated March 18, 2022, HDI stated, and the NRC staff 
confirmed, that the bounding analyses for the IP2 and IP3 SFPs for 
beyond design basis events demonstrate that 15 months after shutdown of 
IP3 a minimum of 10 hours is available before the fuel cladding 
temperature of the hottest fuel assembly in either SFP reaches 
900[deg]C with a complete loss of SFP water inventory. This analysis, 
``Holtec Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculation Methodology Topical 
Report, Revision 2,'' dated December 22, 2021 (ML21357A005 [non-
public]), was submitted by HDI in support of a request for exemptions 
from certain emergency planning requirements, dated December 22, 2021 
(ML21356B693). HDI provided further information in Enclosure 1, 
``Indian Point Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up 
Calculations,'' to HDI's supplemental letter dated February 1, 2022 
(ML22032A117).
    As stated in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool 
Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 
2001 (ML010430066), 900[deg]C is an acceptable temperature to use for 
assessing the onset of fission product release, where the SFP is 
drained and air cooling is not possible; at least 10 hours would be 
available from the time spent fuel cooling is lost until the hottest 
fuel assembly reaches a temperature of 900[deg]C. The 10-hour 
criterion, conservatively, does not consider the time to uncover the 
fuel and assumes instantaneous loss of cooling to the fuel. The 10-hour 
time period is also not intended to represent the time that it would 
take to repair all key safety systems or to repair a large SFP breach. 
The 10-hour criterion is a conservative period of time in which pre-
planned mitigation measures to provide makeup water or spray to the SFP 
can be reliably implemented before the onset of a zirconium cladding 
ignition. In addition, in the unlikely event that a release is 
projected to occur, 10 hours would provide sufficient time for offsite 
agencies, if deemed warranted, to take appropriate action to protect 
the health and safety of the public.
    In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-22-0102, the NRC 
staff assessed the HDI accident analyses associated with the 
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shutdown and 
defueled IPEC after 15 months of fuel decay. For the highly unlikely 
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory 
is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the 
spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff found that there will 
be a minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the 
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might 
occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support 
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, 
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid 
oxidation. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would 
progress to a zirconium fire is deemed not credible.
    Based on the evaluation in SECY-96-256, as well as analysis done by 
HDI and verified by the NRC staff, the NRC staff determined $50 million 
to be an adequate level of onsite property damage insurance for a 
decommissioning reactor once the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer 
susceptible to a zirconium fire. However, the NRC staff has postulated 
that there is still a potential for other radiological incidents at a 
decommissioning reactor that could result in significant onsite 
contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC staff 
cited the rupture of a large, contaminated liquid storage tank 
(~450,000 gallons) causing soil contamination and potential groundwater 
contamination as the costliest postulated event to decontaminate and 
remediate (other than an SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large 
liquid radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to 
have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million. 
Therefore, the NRC staff determined that the licensee's proposal to 
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be consistent 
with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in 
SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid 
radiological waste tank at the IPEC site, should such an event occur.
    The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction 
in onsite property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million 
is consistent with SECY-96-256 and subsequent insurance considerations 
resulting from additional zirconium fire risks as discussed in SECY-00-
0145 and SECY-01-0100, as well as NUREG/CR-6451 and NUREG-1738. In 
addition, the NRC staff notes that similar exemptions have been granted 
to other permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors, upon 
demonstration that the criterion of the zirconium fire risks from the 
irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible concern. The NRC 
staff concluded that 15 months after the permanent shutdown date of IP3 
of April 30, 2021, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have 
elapsed at IPEC to decrease the probability of an onsite radiological 
release from a postulated zirconium fire accident to negligible levels. 
In addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a 
level of $50 million is consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup 
costs for the recovery from the rupture of a large liquid radwaste 
storage tank.
    The NRC staff also notes that in accordance with letters submitted 
by HDI on February 15, 2023, and October 16, 2023 (ML23046A102 and 
ML23289A158), all the spent fuel from the IP2 and IP3 SFPs has been 
transferred to dry storage within the ISFSI. As such, an initiating 
event that would threaten SFP integrity is no longer applicable.

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow the 
licensee to reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property 
damage insurance. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant 
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when the exemptions 
are authorized by law.
    As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the 
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance 
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256. 
Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 15 months after the permanent 
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time 
will have

[[Page 90211]]

elapsed at IPEC to decrease the probability of an onsite and offsite 
radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident to 
negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce 
onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with the 
maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture of a 
large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed 
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, based on 
its review of the licensee's exemption request as discussed above, and 
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption 
is authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety

    The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that 
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be 
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for 
IPEC are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating. 
However, IPEC permanently ceased power operations on October 31, 1974, 
April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, 
respectively), and permanently defueled as of January 1976, May 12, 
2020, and May 11, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively). The 
permanent cessation of operations and defueled status of the facility 
results in a significant reduction in the number and severity of 
potential accidents and, correspondingly, a significant reduction in 
the potential for and severity of onsite property damage. The proposed 
reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does not impact 
the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The proposed 
level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the reduced 
consequences of potential nuclear accidents at IPEC. Therefore, the NRC 
staff concludes that granting the requested exemption will not present 
an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements 
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely 
affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect 
special nuclear material. Physical security measures at IPEC are not 
affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption 
is consistent with the common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
regulation.
    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide 
reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize 
reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site 
decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a 
significant amount of radiological material. Since IPEC permanently 
ceased power operations on October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and April 
30, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively), and permanently 
defueled as of January 1976, May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021 (For IP1, 
IP2, and IP3, respectively), it is no longer possible for the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents or other credible 
events at IPEC to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion 
area boundary. The licensee has evaluated the consequences of highly 
unlikely, beyond-design-basis conditions involving a loss of coolant 
from the SFP. The analyses show that 15 months after the permanent 
cessation of power operations, the likelihood of such an event leading 
to a large radiological release is negligible. The NRC staff's 
evaluation of the licensee's analyses confirms this conclusion.
    The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million 
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and 
decontamination cost as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the 
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the 
IPEC site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff 
concludes that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is 
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the 
permanently shutdown and defueled IPEC reactors.
    Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present 
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that 
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation 
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by 
others similarly situated.
    The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to 
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the 
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary and 
commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the 
site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in 
excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been 
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
    The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would 
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in 
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are 
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
    Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity 
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by 
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after 
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. 
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the 
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR, ``Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission,'' is a categorical exclusion provided that: (i) 
there is no significant hazards consideration; (ii) there is no 
significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts 
of any effluents that may be released offsite; (iii) there is no 
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational 
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no significant construction impact; 
(v) there is no significant increase in the potential for or 
consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements 
from which an exemption is sought involve surety, insurance, or 
indemnity requirements.
    As the Director of the Division of Decommissioning, Uranium 
Recovery, and Waste Programs in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material 
Safety and Safeguards, I have determined that approval of the exemption 
request involves no significant hazards

[[Page 90212]]

consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' 
because reducing the licensee's onsite property damage insurance for 
IPEC does not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is 
unrelated to the operation of IPEC or site activities. Accordingly, 
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in 
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no 
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational 
radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with 
construction so there is no significant construction impact. The 
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential 
amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the 
site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for, 
or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would 
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic 
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the 
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The 
requirement for onsite property damage insurance involves surety, 
insurance, and indemnity matters only.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), 
``Criterion for categorical exclusion; identification of licensing and 
regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or otherwise not 
requiring environmental review,'' no environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the 
approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present as set 
forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
    Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an exemption 
from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for IPEC. IPEC permanently 
ceased power operations on October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and April 
30, 2021, for IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively. The exemption from 10 
CFR 50.54(w)(1) permits IPEC to reduce the minimum required onsite 
property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million 15 months 
after permanent cessation of power operations, which was August 1, 
2022. Because this period has already elapsed, the exemption is 
effective upon issuance.

    Dated: November 14, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jane Marshall,

Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 2023-28777 Filed 12-28-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P