Secretarial Determination of No Adverse Material Impact on the Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries To Support Mo-99 Production, 89436-89439 [2023-28501]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
• National Nuclear Security Administration

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 247 (Wednesday, December 27, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 89436-89439]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28501]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration


Secretarial Determination of No Adverse Material Impact on the 
Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries To 
Support Mo-99 Production

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Department of 
Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: On November 22, 2023, the Secretary of Energy issued a 
Secretarial Determination (hereafter ``determination'') covering the 
sale, lease, or transfer of up to 750 kilograms uranium (kgU) of high-
assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) (above 5, but less than 20 weight 
percent (wt.-%) uranium-235) per year during the two-year period 
following signature of the determination to support molybdenum-99 (Mo-
99) production. For the reasons set forth in the Department's 
``Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain Uranium Transactions on the 
Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries,'' which 
is incorporated into the determination, the Secretary determined that 
these transactions will not have an adverse material impact on the 
domestic uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment industries.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional information 
may be sent to Peter Rocco: [email protected] or (202) 
287-1018.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Authority and Background

    The Department of Energy (``the Department'') holds limited 
inventories of uranium in various forms and quantities that have been 
declared as excess and are not dedicated to U.S. national security 
missions. Within DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) manages these inventories to carry out critical missions, 
including minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in 
civilian applications. NNSA down-blends excess HEU from these 
inventories to high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU)--a subset of 
low enriched uranium (LEU) enriched above the commercial level of 5 
wt.-% and below 20 wt.-% of the isotope U-235--to be used as fuel for 
research reactors and target material for the production of critical 
medical isotopes.
    This notice involves the sale, lease, or transfer of HALEU to 
support molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) producers. Leases covered by this 
determination fulfill a directive in the American Medical Isotopes 
Production Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-239, Division C, Title XXXI, 
Subtitle F, 42 U.S.C. 2065) for the Department to establish a program 
to make HALEU available, through lease contracts, for the production of 
Mo-99 for medical uses. The sales, leases, or transfers covered by this 
determination also support U.S. nuclear nonproliferation initiatives by 
down-blending HEU and encouraging the use of HALEU in civilian 
applications in lieu of HEU.
    These sales, leases, or transfers are conducted in accordance with 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., ``AEA''), as 
amended, and other applicable laws. Specifically, title I, chapters 6 
and 14 of the AEA authorize DOE to sell or transfer special nuclear 
material, including HALEU. The USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104-134, 
42 U.S.C. 2297h et seq.), however, places certain limitations on DOE's 
authority to sell or transfer uranium from its excess uranium 
inventory. Specifically, under section 3112(d)(2) of the USEC 
Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10(d)(2)), DOE may make certain 
sales or transfers of natural uranium or LEU if the Secretary 
determines that the sales ``will not have an adverse material impact on 
the domestic uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment industry, taking 
into account the sales of uranium under the Russian HEU Agreement and 
the Suspension Agreement,''
    On November 22, 2023, the Secretary of Energy issued a 
determination covering the sale, lease, or transfer of up to 750 kgU of 
HALEU per year during the two-year period following signing of the 
determination to support Mo-99 production. For the reasons set forth in 
the Department's ``Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain Uranium 
Transactions on the Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment 
Industries,'' which is incorporated into the determination, the 
Secretary determined that these transactions will not have an adverse 
material impact on the domestic uranium mining,

[[Page 89437]]

conversion, or enrichment industries. In accordance with section 306(a) 
of Division D, Title III of the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2015 (Pub. L. 113-235), this determination is valid 
for no more than two calendar years following the date of the 
determination.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Department of Energy was signed on December 
18, 2023, by Corey Hinderstein, Deputy Administrator for Defense 
Nuclear Nonproliferation, pursuant to delegated authority from the 
Secretary of Energy. The document with the original signature and date 
is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in 
compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the 
undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to 
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as 
an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative 
process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon 
publication in the Federal Register.

    Signed in Washington, DC, on December 21, 2023.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.

    Set forth below is the full text of the Secretarial Determination.

Secretarial Determination for the Sale, Lease, or Transfer of Certain 
High-Assay, Low-Enriched Uranium for the Next Two Years

    I determine that the sale, lease, or transfer of up to 750 
kilograms uranium (kgU) of high-assay low-enriched uranium (above 5, 
but less than 20 weight percent uranium-235) per calendar year 
subsequent to signing this determination to support molybdenum-99 
production will not have an adverse material impact on the domestic 
uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment industries. I base my 
conclusions on the Department's Analysis of Potential Impacts of 
Certain Uranium Transactions on the Domestic Uranium Mining, 
Conversion, and Enrichment Industries, which is incorporated herein. I 
have considered, inter alia, the requirements of the USEC Privatization 
Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. 2297h et seq.), the nature of uranium markets, 
and the current status of the domestic uranium industries. I have also 
taken into account the sales of uranium under the Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched 
Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (``Russian HEU Agreement'') and 
the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on Uranium From 
the Russian Federation (``Suspension Agreement'').

Jennifer Granholm
Date: November 22, 2023

    Set forth below is the full text of the Analysis of Potential 
Impacts of Certain Uranium Transactions on the Domestic Uranium Mining, 
Conversion, and Enrichment Industries.

Analysis of Potential Impacts of Certain Uranium Transactions on the 
Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries

I. Introduction

A. Legal Authority

    The Department of Energy (DOE) manages its excess uranium inventory 
in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et 
seq., ``AEA''), as amended, and other applicable laws. Specifically, 
Title I, Chapters 6 and 14 of the AEA authorize DOE to sell or transfer 
special nuclear material. Low-enriched uranium (LEU) is a type of 
special nuclear material.
    The USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104-134, 42 U.S.C. 2297h et 
seq.) places certain limitations on DOE's authority to sell or transfer 
uranium from its excess uranium inventory. Specifically, under section 
3112(d)(2)(B) of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h 
10(d)(2)(B)), DOE may make certain sales or transfers of natural 
uranium or LEU \1\ if:
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    \1\ Section 3102 of the USEC Privatization Act defines ``low-
enriched uranium'' as ``uranium enriched to less than 20 percent of 
the uranium-235 isotope, including that which is derived from highly 
enriched uranium.'' 42 U.S.C. 2297h(5). Section 3112A of the USEC 
Privatization Act also provides a definition of LEU: ``a uranium 
product in any form, including uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and 
uranium oxide (UO2), in which the uranium contains less than 20 
percent uranium-235, including natural uranium, without regard to 
whether the uranium is incorporated into fuel rods or complete fuel 
assemblies.'' 42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a(a)(5). Both definitions encompass 
HALEU, which is U-235 enriched between 5%-20%. Thus, HALEU is a form 
of LEU and falls within the Secretarial Determination requirement.
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    (A) The President determines that the material is not necessary for 
national security needs;
    (B) The Secretary determines that the sale of the material will not 
have an adverse material impact on the domestic uranium mining, 
conversion, or enrichment industry, taking into account the sales of 
uranium under the Russian HEU Agreement and the Suspension Agreement; 
and,
    (C) The price paid to the Secretary will not be less than the fair 
market value of the material.
    Regarding condition (A): for purposes of section 3112(d)(2)(A) of 
the USEC Privatization Act, DOE has historically treated material not 
included in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (a memorandum 
signed by the President that identifies uranium necessary for defense 
needs) as being excess to national security needs. None of the material 
included in the proposed transactions was included in the most recent 
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.
    This analysis focuses on condition B above.
    Regarding condition (C): the price paid to the Secretary will not 
be less than the fair market value of the LEU sold, transferred, or 
leased. Specifically, for HALEU leased under the ULTB Program, the 
lease contracts contain a pricing mechanism to ensure that the 
Department receives the prevailing market value for its material, as 
required by AMIPA. For other HALEU sales or transfers, the contracts 
will require cash payment for the fair market value of the HALEU sold. 
Accordingly, all sale or lease transactions will comply with section 
3112(d)(2)(C), and the fair market value will be determined at the time 
of the transaction.
    The validity of any determination under this section is limited to 
no more than two calendar years subsequent to the determination.\2\ The 
USEC Privatization Act also permits sales or transfers of enriched 
uranium for governmental purposes under section 3112(e), which are not 
subject to the limitations imposed by section 3112(d).
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    \2\ See section 306(a) of Division D, Title III of the 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Pub. 
L. 113-235).
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B. Transactions Considered in This Analysis

    Two types of potential transactions are considered in this 
analysis: (1) the lease of LEU for the production of molybdenum-99 (Mo-
99) pursuant to the American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012 
(AMIPA); \3\ and (2) the sale or transfer of LEU to producers for use 
in medical isotope development and production, which would enable the 
material to be used for Mo-99 production outside of AMIPA requirements. 
The exact uses of LEU under these transactions and designs of 
facilities in which the LEU would be utilized vary by producer, but 
fission-based production usually involves fabrication or preparation of 
uranium

[[Page 89438]]

for irradiation, followed by chemical processing to extract the Mo-99 
for packaging into a generator and delivery to a radiopharmacy.
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    \3\ Public Law 112-239, Division C, Title XXXI, Subtitle F, 42 
U.S.C. 2065.
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    The first type of transaction would be under AMIPA. These transfers 
would support the Uranium Lease and Take Back (ULTB) program, was 
established under AMIPA and enables DOE to lease LEU to produce Mo-99 
in the United States without the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
    The second type of transaction considered in this analysis is a 
sale or transfer of LEU to producers for use in medical isotope 
development and production processes, including Mo-99, that are not 
under the ULTB program and do not meet the criteria of section 
3112(e)(3) of the USEC Privatization Act for governmental purposes.
    Both types of transactions require a Secretarial Determination 
under section 3112(d)(2)(B) of the USEC Privatization Act as well as 
meeting the other criteria of section 3112(d)(2).
    The materials considered in this analysis would be sold, leased, or 
transferred during the two-year period following the signing of the 
Secretarial Determination and would consist of no more than 750 kgU of 
HALEU in any year. Based on semi-annual HALEU demand surveys conducted 
to determine producers' material needs, DOE's National Nuclear Security 
Administration (DOE/NNSA) assessed 750 kgU of HALEU for each year 
covered by this determination.
    Assuming a tails assay of 0.20 wt.-% U-235, this quantity would be 
equivalent to approximately 28,700 kgU of natural uranium hexafluoride 
and approximately 33,850 separative work units (``SWU'') to produce 750 
kgU of HALEU at 19.75 weight-% U-235.\4\
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    \4\ The calculation is based on the Y-12 Standard Specification 
for LEU Metal Supply for Mo-99 Isotope Production, which assumes 
deliveries of quantities of 19.75 wt.-% LEU. If any sale, lease, or 
transfer includes material at an assay other than 19.75 wt.-%, the 
amount will be converted so that the total amount in any year 
covered by this Determination is equivalent to no more than 750 kgU 
at 19.75 wt.-%.
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II. Analytical Approach

    The analytical approach relied on for previous Secretarial 
Determinations covering the sale, transfer, or lease of excess uranium 
for Mo-99 development and production (80 FR 65728, Oct. 27, 2015), the 
ULTB program (81 FR 1409, Jan. 12, 2016), and the Secretarial 
Determinations for the Sale, Lease or Transfer of Uranium (signed and 
dated Nov. 26, 2019 and Nov. 23, 2021, respectively) is repeated here 
and updated to the extent necessary.
    This analysis evaluates the state of the domestic uranium 
industries and the relevant impacts if DOE goes forward with these 
potential transactions. DOE has developed a set of factors that this 
analysis considers in assessing whether DOE's uranium sales and 
transfers will have an ``adverse material impact'' on the domestic 
uranium mining, conversion, or enrichment industry:

1. Prices
2. Production at existing facilities
3. Employment levels in the industry
4. Changes in capital improvement plans and development of future 
facilities
5. Long-term viability and health of the industry
6. Russian HEU Agreement and Russian Suspension Agreement

    While no single factor is dispositive of the issue, DOE believes 
that these factors are representative of the types of impacts that the 
proposed sale, lease, or transfer may have on the domestic uranium 
industries. Not every factor will necessarily be relevant on a given 
occasion or to a particular industry; DOE intends this list of factors 
only as a guide to its analysis.

III. Assessment of Potential Impacts

1. Prices

    There is currently no domestic commercial supplier for HALEU. 
Therefore, there is no established market price for HALEU. DOE sets a 
price for HALEU based on a combination of commercial market price 
components for LEU, plus a charge for the separative work above the 5% 
LEU limit reflecting the historical cost to DOE to produce this 
material. Through the end of 2022, the market value of 4.95% enriched 
LEU rose 200% from its low point in October 2017. The market price rose 
90% from December 2020 through December 2022. Industry analysts 
forecast a continued increase in the market value of LEU.\5\ The 
relatively small quantities of HALEU provided by DOE have not impacted 
the price increases in this market, and DOE does not expect that they 
would impact price in the future.
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    \5\ Energy Resources International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Supply and Price Report, ERI-2006-2202/December 2022.
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    Further, with no domestic commercial provider for HALEU, the DOE 
sales and leases of HALEU would not displace production or affect 
prices among the commercial domestic uranium mining, conversion, or 
enrichment industries. Even if it did, the amount would be so small 
that the effects would be minimal.

2. Production at Existing Facilities

    An analysis of the impact of the proposed sales and leases based on 
an assessment of production at existing facilities is straightforward. 
There is currently no domestic commercial supplier of HALEU in the 
United States. Due to the lack of a sufficient near-term market, owners 
and operators of enrichment facilities have not developed HALEU 
enrichment capability to produce uranium enriched to 19.75 wt.-% U-235. 
With the closing of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 2013, the 
only uranium enrichment facility in the United States operating at 
commercial scale is the URENCO USA facility operated by Louisiana 
Energy Services, LLC (LES), in Eunice, New Mexico, which is currently 
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to possess uranium 
only up to 5.5 wt. % U 235.\6\
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    \6\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Materials License. 
License Number SNM-2010, Amendment 57, Docket Number 70-3103.
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    Further, it is not feasible for commercial Mo-99 producers to use 
commercially available assays of LEU (i.e., LEU enriched to 5.5 wt.-% 
U-235 or less) instead of HALEU. Given the specialized uses, designs, 
and regulatory requirements of these isotope producers, the use of 
commercial-assay LEU would prevent the facility or target from 
achieving the same performance or efficiency and thus from being used 
for their intended purposes.
    Although the DOE sales and leases of HALEU would not displace 
production among the commercial domestic uranium mining, conversion, or 
enrichment industries, even if it did, the amount would be so small 
that the effects would be minimal. With respect to these industries, to 
produce the amount of HALEU in the proposed sales and leases from 
primary production would require approximately 75,000 pounds of uranium 
concentrates (U3O8), 28,700 kgU of conversion services, and 33,800 SWU 
of enrichment services. By comparison, the entire domestic fleet of 
nuclear reactors in 2020 required approximately 43 million pounds of 
U3O8, 16.2 million kgU of conversion services, and about 14.8 million 
SWU.\7\ Therefore, the feed, conversion, and SWU content of the DOE 
material represents 0.17%, 0.17%, and 0.22% of annual domestic 
requirements, respectively.
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    \7\ The global requirements information comes from an analysis 
prepared by Energy Resources International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Supply and Price Report, ERI-2006-2101/June 2021.
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    The domestic conversion industry consists of only one facility that

[[Page 89439]]

historically produced between 10 million kgU and 12 million kgU per 
year and reduced its capability to 7 million kgU in 2017. Honeywell, 
the owner of that facility, suspended operation in 2018, but resumed 
operation in July 2023 at 7 million kgU per year. Thus, although there 
has been no conversion occurring in the United States for several 
years, there are signs of the market improving given Honeywell's recent 
restart. As mentioned above, there is only one currently operating 
commercial enrichment facility, URENCO USA's subsidiary, LES, in the 
United States. The total capacity of that facility is 4.9 million SWU.
    In October 2023, American Centrifuge Operating, LLC (ACO), a 
subsidiary of the U.S. company, Centrus Energy Corp. (Centrus), began 
enrichment operations on a demonstration basis at DOE's facility in 
Piketon, Ohio.\8\ The initial production goal is 20 kgU 19.75% HALEU. 
ACO/Centrus is discussed at length in Section 4 below.
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    \8\ HALEU Demonstration Project Starts Enrichment Operations in 
Ohio [verbar] Department of Energy.
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3. Employment Levels in the Industry

    As stated above, DOE sales and leases of HALEU would not displace 
production among the commercial domestic uranium mining, conversion, or 
enrichment industries, and therefore will not affect employment levels 
in these industries.

4. Changes in Capital Improvement Plans and Development of Future 
Facilities

    Although there is currently no domestic uranium enrichment 
capability to produce HALEU, there have been recent noteworthy 
developments. In 2019, the Department entered into a cost-shared 
contract for a HALEU Demonstration Program with ACO to deploy a 16-
machine cascade of AC-100 M centrifuges in Piketon, Ohio to produce 
19.75 wt.-% U-235 with U.S.-origin enrichment technology that will 
result in a small quantity of HALEU. In June 2021, the NRC approved 
ACO's license amendment request to produce HALEU with an enrichment 
assay of up to 20 wt.-% U-235 at the Piketon facility. In November 
2022, DOE announced another cost-shared award with ACO, equating to 
approximately $150 million and including a $30 million cost share 
during the first year to start up and operate the 16 centrifuges at the 
Piketon facility. In June 2023, ACO received NRC approval to introduce 
uranium hexafluoride into its cascade following completion of an 
operational readiness review.\9\ As part of the 2022 award, ACO must 
produce 20 kilograms of 19.75% enriched HALEU by December 31, 2023. 
Following completion of the demonstration, the contract calls for 
production at an annual rate of 900 kg of HALEU in 2024 with additional 
options to produce more material under the contract in future years, 
all subject to appropriations.\10\
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    \9\ ``Centrus gets NRC's okay to introduce uranium in HALEU 
demonstration cascade.'' https://www.ans.org/news/article-5092/centrus-gets-nrcs-okay-to-introduce-uranium-in-haleu-demonstration-cascade/.
    \10\ American Centrifuge Plant and HALEU, from an analysis 
prepared by Energy Resources International, Inc. (ERI), Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Supply and Price Report, ERI-2006-2202/December 2022.
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    Additionally, URENCO USA provided a notice to the NRC in April 2021 
of its intent to amend the URENCO USA license to increase the 
enrichment level up to 10 wt.-% U-235.\11\ URENCO USA expects to have 
capability to deliver HALEU up to 10 wt.-% U-235 in 2024. URENCO USA 
also has longer term plans to produce up to 19.75 wt.-% U-235.
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    \11\ Louisiana Energy Services, LLC, dba Urenco USA, Submittal 
of License Amendment Request for Revision for MCNP6 Validation 
Report (LAR 21-03) (nrc.gov).
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    However, the relatively small amounts of material covered by this 
Determination have no impact on capital improvement plans and 
development of future facilities including mines, conversion 
facilities, and enrichment plants.

5. Long-Term Viability and Health of the Industry

    There is currently no commercial supplier of HALEU in the United 
States. Therefore, there is no long-term industry impact to assess. 
During the period covered by this Determination, Centrus/ACO may begin 
producing up to 900 kgU annually in both 2024 and 2025. However, DOE 
providing a maximum of 750 kgU annually over the same time period to a 
specific subset of end users--Mo-99 producers--would not displace 
production by Centrus/ACO, given DOE's own estimate of extant HALEU 
demand (up to 40 metric tons by 2029-30).\12\
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    \12\ U.S. Department of Energy to Acquire High-Assay Low-
Enriched Uranium Material [verbar] Department of Energy.
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6. Russian HEU Agreement and Russian Suspension Agreement

    The Russian HEU Agreement ended in December 2013. The Suspension 
Agreement was extended on October 5, 2020 (85 FR 64112) and remains in 
force through 2040 with annual export limits on Russian enriched 
uranium product sold to U.S. utilities at commercially available assays 
(e.g., 5 wt.-% U-235).\13\ The Suspension Agreement allows for the sale 
of up to the following amounts of U-235 per year in 2023, 2024, and 
2025 respectively: 25,471 kg, 20,968 kg, and 20,697 kg. The relatively 
small amount of material covered by this Determination is minimal 
compared to domestic needs for LEU and imports from the Russian 
Federation.
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    \13\ 2020 Amendment to the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping 
Investigation on Uranium From the Russian Federation, Federal 
Register/Vol. 85, No. 197/Friday, October 9, 2020/Notices https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/09/2020-22431/2020-amendment-to-the-agreementsuspending-the-antidumping-investigation-on-uranium-from-the-russian.
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IV. Conclusion

    With respect to the six factors listed above to assess market 
impacts:
    1. The relatively small amounts of material covered by this 
Determination have no impact on the price of HALEU, for which there is 
currently no domestic commercial market price.
    2. There are new developments in the industry, but production 
timelines will not be impacted in the timeframe for this Determination.
    3. The relatively small amounts of material covered by this 
Determination have no impact on employment levels in the mining, 
conversion, or enrichment industries.
    4. New market developments will not mature during this 
Determination period to a point where the market could be impacted by 
DOE sales, leases, or transfers.
    5. The relatively small amounts of material covered by this 
Determination have no impact on the long-term viability and health of 
the mining, conversion, and enrichment industries.
    6. The Russian HEU Agreement and Suspension Agreement are not 
factors because there is no HALEU currently being imported from Russia 
to the United States.
    Thus, DOE concludes that the sale, lease, or transfer of up to 750 
kgU of HALEU per year to support the development and production of Mo-
99 will not have an adverse material impact on the domestic uranium 
mining, conversion, or enrichment industry, taking into account the 
ended Russian HEU Agreement and extended Russian Suspension Agreement.

[FR Doc. 2023-28501 Filed 12-26-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P