APEXX Pharmacy, LLC; Decision and Order, 86941-86944 [2023-27524]
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Suzanne Morris,
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Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 2023–27558 Filed 12–14–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 22–48]
APEXX Pharmacy, LLC; Decision and
Order
I. Introduction
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On August 2, 2022, the Administrator
of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA or Government) issued an Order to
Show Cause and Immediate Suspension
of Registration (collectively, OSC) to
APEXX Pharmacy, LLC (Respondent), of
Hudson, Florida. OSC, at 1, 9. The OSC
immediately suspended, and proposes
the revocation of, Respondent’s DEA
registration No. FA5493363, pursuant to
21 U.S.C. 824(d) and (a)(4), and 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1).1 Id. at 1. The OSC more
1 Effective December 2, 2022, the Medical
Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research Expansion
Act, Public Law 117–215, 136 Stat. 2257 (2022)
(Marijuana Research Amendments or MRA),
amended the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and
other statutes. Relevant to this matter, the MRA
redesignated 21 U.S.C. 823(f), cited in the OSC, as
21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Accordingly, this Decision cites
to the current designation, 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), and
to the MRA-amended CSA throughout.
The Federal and state substantive violations
alleged in the OSC include 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(2) and
842(a)(1); 21 CFR 1306.04(a) and 1306.06; Fla. Stat.
893.055(3)(a)(3); and Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B16–
27.810(1) and (2), Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B16–
27.831(1)(b) and (c), (2)(c), and (4), and Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B16–27.1001(4).
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specifically alleges that Respondent’s
‘‘continued registration is inconsistent
with the public interest.’’ Id. It also
alleges violations of Florida law. Supra
n.1.
The hearing Respondent requested
was held on December 13 and 14, 2022.
Hearing Transcript. The Recommended
Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (RD)
concludes that Respondent’s registration
should be revoked. RD, at 27. This
Decision and Order, based solely on
OSC allegations that Respondent filled
controlled substances under the names
of three individuals who, at the time,
were deceased, agrees.2 Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B16–27.1001(4). Accordingly,
the Agency will revoke Respondent’s
registration. Infra Order.
II. Findings of Fact
The Allegation That Respondent Filled
Controlled Substance Prescriptions
Issued to Deceased Individuals
The OSC alleges, among other things,
that Respondent filled controlled
substance prescriptions issued to
individuals who, at the time, were
deceased. OSC, at 9. According to the
Government’s evidence, Respondent
filled at least forty-seven such
controlled substance prescriptions. See,
e.g., GX 6–GX 8 and GX 12–GX 14.
Respondent does not dispute that it
filled the forty-seven Schedule II
controlled substance prescriptions. See,
e.g., Tr. 366. It does not, however, take
responsibility for doing so. Instead, it
maintains that it acted properly and
suggests, without any documentary or
evidentiary support, a complex and
layered theory of misconduct by others.
According to the testimony of
Respondent’s owner/Pharmacist-inCharge (PIC), whom the Agency finds to
be not credible, infra, the ‘‘only way’’ he
can determine the validity of a
prescription is to call the issuing doctor
and ask whether the doctor wrote the
specific elements of the order for the
2 The OSC’s substantive headings describe the
allegations as ‘‘Improper Filling of Prescriptions to
Undercover Officers,’’ specifically referencing July
7, 2022, July 14, 2022, and July 15, 2022, ‘‘Issuing
Prescriptions to Dead Patients,’’ and ‘‘Imminent
Danger.’’ The OSC cites federal and state authorities
as the bases of its allegations. Supra n.1.
This Decision is adjudicating only OSC
allegations that Respondent filled controlled
substance prescriptions issued to individuals who
were deceased. Because these allegations alone are
sufficient to revoke Respondent’s registration, the
Agency does not reach the other OSC allegations.
The other OSC allegations include various
references to conduct observed by and involving
undercover officers; the record evidence related to
those observations and interactions is periodically
referenced herein as relevant to the analysis of
Respondent’s credibility and trustworthiness.
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individual to whom the prescription is
issued. Id. at 368–69. He testified that
he does this for all of the prescriptions
presented to his pharmacy. Id. at 369.
He also testified that, for the forty-seven
controlled substance prescriptions, each
issuing doctor provided the verification.
Id.
Further, Respondent’s owner/PIC
testified, for the forty-seven
prescriptions, as with all other
prescriptions, that ‘‘every patient that
comes into the pharmacy ha[s] to have
an ID,’’ that he ‘‘get[s] their ID,’’ and that
he has ‘‘to have an ID that matches the
person in front of . . . [him].’’ Tr. 367.
He specifically testified that he
‘‘always’’ makes a copy of the IDs to put
in the pharmacy’s files, and that those
prescriptions were not an exception.3
Id.
While he acknowledged the
Government-sponsored testimony that
no copies of IDs presented for the fortyseven prescriptions were found in
Respondent’s files, the owner/PIC
testified that ‘‘that is impossible’’
because ‘‘[f]or every patient there ha[s]
to be an ID to match the—the patient.
They have to fill the information sheet
and they have to give me an ID to match
them and the prescription that they are
filling.’’ Id. at 368. He further testified
that he was provided IDs for the three
deceased individuals’ prescriptions, that
he made copies of them, and that ‘‘those
IDs seem to match the prescriptions that
were presented to’’ him. Id. The owner/
PIC could not recall whether, for each
of the forty-seven prescriptions, the
individual presenting the Schedule II
controlled substance prescription
provided an ID in hard copy or
electronically. Id. at 367; see also RD, at
23 (owner/PIC’s ‘‘testimony is
undermined by his statement that he
could not remember whether the
customer presented a physical
identification or emailed him one from
a phone application’’). Regardless, as
already noted, Respondent’s owner/PIC
testified that he has ‘‘to have an ID that
matches the person in front of . . .
[him].’’ Tr. 367.
When asked for his explanation as to
how Respondent filled any of the fortyseven Schedule II controlled substance
prescriptions issued to deceased
3 The admitted exhibits do not support the
owner/PIC’s testimony that he always makes a copy
of the IDs. GX 4; GX 5. They indicate that the
owner/PIC made copies of controlled substance
prescriptions and patient history forms. E.g., GX 5,
at 1, 5. They do not indicate, however, that the
owner/PIC made a copy of any of the IDs that the
undercover officers handed him. See, e.g., GX 5, at
2, 10. Accordingly, the Agency finds that the
testimony of Respondent’s owner/PIC lacks
credibility. See also infra section V (credibility
discussion).
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persons, Respondent’s owner/PIC
testified that the ‘‘only thing’’ he ‘‘can
think of is identity theft.’’ Tr. 366. In
other words, instead of acknowledging
the possibility that his actions led, in
any way, to the diversion of Schedule II
controlled substances ordered on any of
the forty-seven prescriptions,
Respondent’s owner/PIC engaged in
speculation and misdirection.
Respondent offered no documentary
evidence to support the identity theft
theory. Indeed, it should have had
evidence to prove or disprove the
identity theft theory had Respondent’s
owner/PIC, as he testified (though not
credibly), required the production of an
ID that matched the individual
presenting any of the forty-seven
Schedule II controlled substance
prescriptions, copied the ID, and put the
copy in the pharmacy’s files. See supra
n.3. The Diversion Investigator (DI),
though, credibly testified that he did not
see any such IDs in Respondent’s files
for any of the forty-seven controlled
substance prescriptions. Tr. 276–77;
infra.
Again, though, instead of
acknowledging the possibility that its
actions or inactions led, in any way, to
there being no copies of IDs in the
pharmacy’s files for any of the fortyseven prescriptions, Respondent
suggested that the Government’s seizure
of its files was the cause. See, e.g.,
Respondent Prehearing Statement, at 8
(‘‘Proposed Documents—None because
the Government seized all APEXX
Pharmacy documents without a valid
search warrant, as required pursuant to
F.S. 465’’).
Respondent did not, however,
successfully develop its suggestions of
Government responsibility for
Respondent’s allegedly missing
pharmacy records. Instead, the Special
Agent (S/A) testified about the seizure
of Respondent’s files, the DI testified
about the content of those seized files,
and the ALJ explicitly invited
Respondent to develop its position
through the cross-examination of both
Government witnesses. See, e.g., Tr.
123–31, 132–34, 136–37 (S/A
testimony); id. at 126–27, 130, 134–36,
139, 277 (Administrative Law JudgeRespondent colloquy); see also id. at
206–09, (Respondent’s cross
examination of S/A); id. at 272–73, 275–
77 (Respondent’s cross examination of
DI). However, Respondent did not
successfully develop, on crossexamination of those two witnesses, its
suggestion that Government error is the
reason that there are no IDs in
Respondent’s seized files for any of the
forty-seven controlled substance
prescriptions. Supra. Instead,
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Respondent’s owner/PIC testified that
the Government’s exhibits, offered as
including Respondent’s records
regarding the forty-seven controlled
substance prescriptions, ‘‘match what is
on PDMP.’’ 4 Tr. 366; see also id. at 134.
As it is Respondent that submitted these
data to E–FORCSE, Florida’s PDMP, the
fact that Respondent’s owner/PIC
admits that the data in the
Government’s exhibits match the data in
the PDMP is further evidence of the
soundness and legal sufficiency of the
Government’s seizure of Respondent’s
files and the lack of credibility of
Respondent’s claims.
In sum, Respondent is asking the
Agency to credit its post hoc, concocted
sequential claims that: (1) it always
copies and files an ID that matches each
person presenting a prescription, (2) on
forty-seven occasions it was presented
with IDs that matched the physical
characteristics of the persons presenting
the forty-seven prescriptions for
Schedule II controlled substances, but
those IDs were fake and part of the
perpetration of forty-seven incidents of
identity theft, (3) Respondent cannot
document the forty-seven fake IDs
because of unspecified Government
errors during the Government’s search
and seizure of Respondent’s files, (4)
and Respondent cannot develop the
parameters of the unspecified
Government errors even though it was
given ample opportunity to do so during
the hearing. The Agency declines.
After thoroughly reviewing the
transmitted record, the Agency
concludes that it will afford the
testimony of both Government
witnesses full credibility, and find that
the testimony of Respondent’s owner/
PIC that conflicts with the Government
witnesses’ testimonies is not credible or
creditable.5 Accord RD, at 4, 5
(Government witnesses); id. at 14
(Respondent’s witness). Further, when
testimony of Respondent’s owner/PIC
conflicts with the testimony of a
Government witness, the Agency will
credit the testimony of the Government
witness. Accord RD, at 14.
4 PDMP stands for Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program.
5 The credibility of Respondent’s owner/PIC is
further eroded by his relentless pursuit of
controlled substances sales and his willingness to
violate legal requirements. See, e.g., GX 5, at 7
(Respondent’s owner/PIC telling the undercover
sponsor which days during the following week to
bring in ‘‘some more people’’ whom the sponsor
will be ‘‘taking to the doc’’), GX 5, at 3, 4 (showing
how Respondent’s owner/PIC coached undercover
sponsors and undercover officers on what to do to
get the controlled substances from him that they
want), and infra section V (addressing Respondent’s
owner/PIC’s decision to close, permanently, the
pharmacy’s back door).
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Based on the record before it, the
Agency finds uncontroverted evidence
that Respondent, through Respondent’s
owner/PIC, filled forty-seven controlled
substance prescriptions issued to
individuals who, at the time, were
deceased.6 See, e.g., GX 6–GX 8 and GX
12–GX 14; infra section III. The Agency
further finds uncontroverted record
evidence that, due to these fillings,
Respondent diverted 1,040
hydromorphone 8 mg tablets and 966
oxycodone HCL 30 mg tablets, or a total
of 2006 Schedule II controlled substance
tablets.7 Id. The Agency concludes,
based on substantial record evidence,
that, since the individuals to whom
these controlled substance prescriptions
were issued were deceased, Respondent
could not have ‘‘dispensed’’ the
prescribed controlled substances to the
individuals to whom the prescriptions
were issued, and necessarily
‘‘dispensed’’ each of these forty-seven
controlled substance prescriptions to a
‘‘third party’’ instead. GX 12–14; accord
RD, at 24.
The Agency also finds substantial
record evidence that Respondent’s
owner/PIC did not explain credibly why
Respondent’s seized files do not contain
any of the alleged copies of the deceased
customers’ identifications that its
owner/PIC testified he made when
filling the forty-seven Schedule II
controlled substance prescriptions.
Supra.
III. Florida Legal Prohibition on
‘‘Dispensing’’ Prescriptions to ‘‘Third
Parties’’
Among its other statutes and
regulatory provisions concerning
pharmacy standards of practice, Florida
prohibits the ‘‘dispensing’’ of controlled
6 Based on all of the above, the Agency does not
credit Respondent’s submissions to E–FORCSE that
the individuals who dropped off the forty-seven
prescriptions and picked up the filled controlled
substances were the individuals to whom the
controlled substance prescriptions were issued. GX
6, at 4, GX 7, at 4, and GX 8, at 4.
Further, a violation of the Florida regulation that
this Decision is applying, according to the
regulation’s text, simply occurs when a pharmacy
physically ‘‘dispenses’’ a controlled substance to a
‘‘third party,’’ not to the individual in whose name
the prescription is written. Cf., e.g., United States
v. Green Drugs, 905 F.2d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 1990)
(‘‘The defendants further argue that the result we
enunciate here would allow the government to hold
virtually any pharmacy liable for the most minor
infraction even where the greatest care has been
exercised and good faith demonstrated. This is a
consequence that Congress likely accepted in
enacting the [Controlled Substances] Act, and
perhaps should be considered together with the
broad discretion the district court has in assessing
fines.’’).
7 Some prescriptions were written for Dilaudid 8
mg and were filled with hydromorphone HCL 8 mg.
See, e.g., GX 10, at 9–10, 13–18, and 25–28; GX 11,
at 3–4, 19–20, 23–26, and 31–32.
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substances to a ‘‘third party.’’ Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B16–27.1001(4)
(2010) (‘‘The pharmacist, as an integral
aspect of dispensing, shall be directly
and immediately available to the patient
or the patient’s agent for consultation
and shall not dispense to a third party.
No prescription shall be deemed to be
properly dispensed unless the
pharmacist is personally available.’’).
According to the clear text of the
regulation, nothing beyond the physical
‘‘dispensing’’ to a ‘‘third party’’
constitutes a violation. This regulation
was in effect for the entire time covered
by the OSC’s allegations and, therefore,
applies to Respondent’s actions during
that period.
Having thoroughly analyzed all of the
record evidence, the Agency finds
substantial and undisputed record
evidence that Respondent ‘‘dispensed’’
controlled substances, pursuant to
prescriptions issued to deceased
individuals, to ‘‘third parties’’ at least
forty-seven times. See, e.g., GX 6–GX 8
and GX 12–GX 14.
IV. Discussion
Under Section 304 of the CSA, ‘‘[a]
registration . . . to . . . distribute[ ] or
dispense a controlled substance . . .
may be suspended or revoked by the
Attorney General upon a finding that
the registrant . . . has committed such
acts as would render his registration
under section 823 of this title
inconsistent with the public interest as
determined by such section.’’ 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4). In the case of a ‘‘practitioner,’’
which is defined in 21 U.S.C. 802(21) to
include a ‘‘pharmacy,’’ Congress
directed the Attorney General to
consider five factors in making the
public interest determination. 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(1)(A–E). The five factors are
considered in the disjunctive. Robert A.
Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003).
According to Agency decisions, the
Agency ‘‘may rely on any one or a
combination of factors and may give
each factor the weight [it] deems
appropriate in determining whether’’ to
revoke a registration. Id.; see also Jones
Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v.
Drug Enf’t Admin., 881 F.3d 823, 830
(11th Cir. 2018) (citing Akhtar-Zaidi v.
Drug Enf’t Admin., 841 F.3d 707, 711
(6th Cir. 2016)); MacKay v. Drug Enf’t
Admin., 664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir.
2011); Volkman v. U. S. Drug Enf’t
Admin., 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir.
2009); Hoxie v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 419
F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover,
while the Agency is required to consider
each of the factors, it ‘‘need not make
explicit findings as to each one.’’
MacKay, 664 F.3d at 816 (quoting
Volkman, 567 F.3d at 222); see also
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Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 482. ‘‘In short, . . .
the Agency is not required to
mechanically count up the factors and
determine how many favor the
Government and how many favor the
registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry which
focuses on protecting the public
interest; what matters is the seriousness
of the registrant’s misconduct.’’ Jayam
Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 FR 459, 462
(2009). Accordingly, as the Tenth
Circuit has recognized, findings under a
single factor can support the revocation
of a registration. MacKay, 664 F.3d at
821.
According to DEA regulations, ‘‘[a]t
any hearing for the revocation . . . of a
registration, the . . . [Government] shall
have the burden of proving that the
requirements for such revocation . . .
pursuant to . . . 21 U.S.C. 824(a) . . .
are satisfied.’’ 21 CFR 1301.44(e).
In this matter, while all of the 21
U.S.C. 823(g)(1) factors have been
considered, the Government’s evidence
in support of its prima facie case
regarding the forty-seven prescriptions
is confined to Factors B and D.8
Government’s Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, at 19; see also
RD, at 16.
Factors B and/or D—Respondent’s
Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Compliance With
Applicable Laws Related to Controlled
Substances
Florida regulations explicitly prohibit
pharmacies from ‘‘dispensing’’ to ‘‘third
parties.’’ Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B16–
27.1001(4) (2010); supra sections II and
III. The record evidence is
uncontroverted that, at least forty-seven
times, Respondent filled Schedule II
controlled substance prescriptions when
the persons to whom the prescriptions
were issued were deceased. Due to these
fillings, Respondent diverted 1,040
hydromorphone 8 mg tablets and 966
oxycodone HCL 30 mg tablets, or a total
of 2006 Schedule II controlled substance
tablets to ‘‘third parties.’’ Supra sections
II and III. The Agency finds that, as a
result of this ‘‘dispensing’’ to ‘‘third
parties,’’ Respondent repeatedly
violated applicable law, supporting the
revocation of its registration. 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4) and Fla. Admin. Code r.
64B16–27.1001(4) (2010).
Accordingly, the Agency finds that
Respondent’s continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest. 21
U.S.C. 824(a)(4) and 823(g)(1)(B) and
(D).
8 Neither Respondent nor the Government argues
that it offered evidence relevant to Factors A, C, or
E. Although the Agency considered Factors A, C,
and E, it finds that they are not relevant to this
adjudication. Accord RD, at 16.
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V. Sanction
Where, as here, the Government has
met its prima facie burden of showing
that Respondent’s continued registration
is inconsistent with the public interest
due to its numerous violations
pertaining to controlled substances, the
burden shifts to the Respondent to show
why it can be entrusted with a
registration. Garrett Howard Smith,
M.D., 83 FR 18882 (2018). The issue of
trust is necessarily a fact-dependent
determination based on the
circumstances presented by the
individual respondent. Jeffrey Stein,
M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019).
Moreover, as past performance is the
best predictor of future performance,
DEA Administrators have required that
a registrant who has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest
must accept responsibility for those acts
and demonstrate that it will not engage
in future misconduct. Id. A registrant’s
acceptance of responsibility must be
unequivocal. Id. In addition, a
registrant’s candor during the
investigation and hearing has been an
important factor in determining
acceptance of responsibility and the
appropriate sanction. Id. Furthermore,
DEA Administrators have found that the
egregiousness and extent of the
misconduct are significant factors in
determining the appropriate sanction.
Id. DEA Administrators have also
considered the need to deter similar acts
by the respondent and by the
community of registrants. Id.
Regarding these matters, there is no
record evidence that Respondent, or its
owner/PIC, takes responsibility, let
alone unequivocal responsibility, for the
founded, egregious violations involving
the diversion of 2006 Schedule II
controlled substance tablets. Supra
sections II and IV. Instead, Respondent’s
case consists of one debunked and
failed attempt after another to shift the
blame for the unlawful filling of at least
forty-seven controlled substance
prescriptions away from itself.9
The interests of specific and general
deterrence weigh in favor of revocation.
Respondent has not convinced the
Agency that it understands that its
controlled substance prescription filling
fell short of the applicable legal
standards and that this substandard
filling has serious negative ramifications
for the health, safety, and medical care
of individuals who come to it for
medicine. See, e.g., Garrett Howard
Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18910 (collecting
cases). As such, it is not reasonable to
9 The testimony offering these serial attempts
reflects poorly on the candor of Respondent’s
owner/PIC. Supra section II.
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believe that Respondent’s future
controlled substance prescription filling
will comply with legal requirements.10
Indeed, Respondent’s owner/PIC’s own
testimony suggests that he has no
intention of complying with the CSA in
the future because he believes
compliance is unduly burdensome.11
Further, given the foundational nature
and vast number of Respondent’s
violations, a sanction less than
revocation would send a message to the
existing and prospective registrant
community that compliance with the
law is not a condition precedent to
maintaining a registration.
The Agency finds that it cannot
entrust Respondent with a
registration.12 It finds that Respondent’s
actions were motivated by profiting
while avoiding DEA’s detection and
lacked any genuine care for the health
and welfare of its customers. For
example, the record evidence shows
that Respondent coached customers
regarding what to write on their forms
in order to get the desired controlled
substances, see, e.g., GX 5, at 3, 4, and
shows the complete willingness of
Respondent’s owner/PIC to continue to
fill the controlled substance
prescriptions that S/A and undercover
officer ‘‘sponsors’’ were bringing him.
GX 5, at 1, 7.13
Respondent’s owner/PIC’s testimony
regarding those matters further erodes
the Agency’s trust in the truthfulness of
Respondent’s owner/PIC and in the
10 The Agency notes the record evidence, in GX
5, of two incidents when Respondent’s owner/PIC
declined to provide the undercover officers with
additional controlled substances without a
prescription. GX 5, at 6, 8–9. These incidents do not
excuse Respondent’s owner/PIC’s otherwise laserfocused pursuit of controlled substances sales
regardless of legal requirements. Supra section II.
11 Respondent’s owner/PIC testified that ‘‘filling
controls is a lot of headache. You have to record
it down, you have to go through a lot of process,
and nobody wants to deal with that.’’ Tr. 297.
Respondent’s owner/PIC further testified that when
he worked for larger pharmacies in the past, he
would tell customers that controlled substances
were not in stock because he got paid the same
amount whether he filled controlled or noncontrolled substances. Id. He testified, ‘‘why would
pharmacies . . . want to fill a control medication
for somebody when it can come back to haunt him
when he can say I don’t have it, I will fill just the
non-controls.’’ Id.
12 While only the evidence relating to the found
violation, supra, was used to determine that the
Government made a prima facie case, the entire
record supports the Agency’s determination that
Respondent’s owner/PIC is not credible and that,
therefore, the Agency cannot entrust Respondent
with a registration.
13 GX 5, at 1 (‘‘S/A: ‘Can I drop you some more
scripts?’ . . . . Respondent’s owner/PIC: ‘How
many is there?’ ’’); GX 5, at 7 (‘‘Undercover Officer:
‘I got some more people I’m taking to the doc. you
good with me bringing them here again? Um next
week.’ . . . . Respondent’s owner/PIC: ‘Next week,
yeah, next week that’s fine.’ ’’).
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ability of Respondent to maintain a
registration in compliance with the law.
In sum, the record supports the
imposition of a sanction because
Respondent did not unequivocally
accept responsibility for its egregious
and extensive violations, and has not
convinced the Agency that it can be
entrusted with a registration.
Accordingly, the Agency shall order
the sanction the Government requested,
as contained in the Order below.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4), I hereby revoke DEA
registration No. FA5493363 issued to
APEXX Pharmacy, LLC. Further,
pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending
application of APEXX Pharmacy, LLC,
for a DEA Registration in Florida. This
Order is effective January 16, 2024.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug
Enforcement Administration was signed
on December 7, 2023, by Administrator
Anne Milgram. That document with the
original signature and date is
maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
DEA. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug
Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2023–27524 Filed 12–14–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Gary R. Wisner, M.D.; Decision and
Order
On March 1, 2023, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show
Cause (OSC) to Gary R. Wisner, M.D.
(Registrant). Request for Final Agency
Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1,
3. The OSC proposed the revocation of
Registrant’s Certificates of Registration
(COR) Nos. FW8432471 and
AW2971073 at the registered addresses
of 621 S. Ham Ln., Ste. A, Lodi,
PO 00000
Frm 00072
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
California 95242, and 16246 N. Locust
Tree Road, Lodi, California 95240,
respectively. Id. at 1. The OSC alleged
that Registrant’s registrations should be
revoked because Registrant was
‘‘without authority to prescribe,
administer, dispense, or otherwise
handle controlled substances in the
State of California, the state in which
[he is] registered with DEA.’’ Id. at 2
(citing, inter alia, 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3); 21
CFR 1301.37(b)).
The OSC notified Registrant of his
right to file with DEA a written request
for hearing, and that if he failed to file
such a request, he would be deemed to
be in default. Id. at 2 (citing 21 CFR
1301.43(c)(1)). Here, Registrant did not
request a hearing. RFAA, at 1.1 ‘‘A
default, unless excused, shall be
deemed to constitute a waiver of the
[registrant’s] right to a hearing and an
admission of the factual allegations of
the [OSC].’’ 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
Further, ‘‘[i]n the event that a
registrant . . . is deemed to be in
default . . . DEA may then file a request
for final agency action with the
Administrator, along with a record to
support its request. In such
circumstances, the Administrator may
enter a default final order pursuant to
[21 CFR] 1316.67.’’ Id. 1301.43(f)(1).
Here, the Government has requested
final agency action based on Registrant’s
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c),
(f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 1.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of
Registrant’s default, the factual
allegations in the OSC are admitted.
According to the OSC, ‘‘[e]ffective
January 30, 2023, as part of an
agreement with the [Medical Board of
California] . . . [Registrant] surrendered
[his] license to practice medicine in the
State of California.’’ RFAAX 1, at 1–2.
According to California’s online
records, of which the Agency takes
official notice, the status of Registrant’s
physician and surgeon license (type A)
is listed as surrendered, and he is not
permitted to practice.2 California
1 Based on the Government’s submissions in its
RFAA dated August 3, 2023, the Agency finds that
service of the OSC on Registrant was adequate.
Specifically, the included declaration by a DEA
Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on March
13, 2023, the DI personally ‘‘served [Respondent] a
copy of the [OSC] by hand delivery.’’ RFAAX 2, at
1.
2 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an
agency ‘‘may take official notice of facts at any stage
in a proceeding—even in the final decision.’’
United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint
1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ‘‘[w]hen an
agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a
E:\FR\FM\15DEN1.SGM
15DEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 240 (Friday, December 15, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 86941-86944]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-27524]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 22-48]
APEXX Pharmacy, LLC; Decision and Order
I. Introduction
On August 2, 2022, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause and
Immediate Suspension of Registration (collectively, OSC) to APEXX
Pharmacy, LLC (Respondent), of Hudson, Florida. OSC, at 1, 9. The OSC
immediately suspended, and proposes the revocation of, Respondent's DEA
registration No. FA5493363, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(d) and (a)(4),
and 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1).\1\ Id. at 1. The OSC more specifically alleges
that Respondent's ``continued registration is inconsistent with the
public interest.'' Id. It also alleges violations of Florida law. Supra
n.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Effective December 2, 2022, the Medical Marijuana and
Cannabidiol Research Expansion Act, Public Law 117-215, 136 Stat.
2257 (2022) (Marijuana Research Amendments or MRA), amended the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and other statutes. Relevant to this
matter, the MRA redesignated 21 U.S.C. 823(f), cited in the OSC, as
21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Accordingly, this Decision cites to the current
designation, 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), and to the MRA-amended CSA
throughout.
The Federal and state substantive violations alleged in the OSC
include 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(2) and 842(a)(1); 21 CFR 1306.04(a) and
1306.06; Fla. Stat. 893.055(3)(a)(3); and Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B16-
27.810(1) and (2), Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B16-27.831(1)(b) and (c),
(2)(c), and (4), and Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B16-27.1001(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The hearing Respondent requested was held on December 13 and 14,
2022. Hearing Transcript. The Recommended Rulings, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decision of the Administrative Law Judge (RD)
concludes that Respondent's registration should be revoked. RD, at 27.
This Decision and Order, based solely on OSC allegations that
Respondent filled controlled substances under the names of three
individuals who, at the time, were deceased, agrees.\2\ Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B16-27.1001(4). Accordingly, the Agency will revoke
Respondent's registration. Infra Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The OSC's substantive headings describe the allegations as
``Improper Filling of Prescriptions to Undercover Officers,''
specifically referencing July 7, 2022, July 14, 2022, and July 15,
2022, ``Issuing Prescriptions to Dead Patients,'' and ``Imminent
Danger.'' The OSC cites federal and state authorities as the bases
of its allegations. Supra n.1.
This Decision is adjudicating only OSC allegations that
Respondent filled controlled substance prescriptions issued to
individuals who were deceased. Because these allegations alone are
sufficient to revoke Respondent's registration, the Agency does not
reach the other OSC allegations. The other OSC allegations include
various references to conduct observed by and involving undercover
officers; the record evidence related to those observations and
interactions is periodically referenced herein as relevant to the
analysis of Respondent's credibility and trustworthiness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Findings of Fact
The Allegation That Respondent Filled Controlled Substance
Prescriptions Issued to Deceased Individuals
The OSC alleges, among other things, that Respondent filled
controlled substance prescriptions issued to individuals who, at the
time, were deceased. OSC, at 9. According to the Government's evidence,
Respondent filled at least forty-seven such controlled substance
prescriptions. See, e.g., GX 6-GX 8 and GX 12-GX 14.
Respondent does not dispute that it filled the forty-seven Schedule
II controlled substance prescriptions. See, e.g., Tr. 366. It does not,
however, take responsibility for doing so. Instead, it maintains that
it acted properly and suggests, without any documentary or evidentiary
support, a complex and layered theory of misconduct by others.
According to the testimony of Respondent's owner/Pharmacist-in-
Charge (PIC), whom the Agency finds to be not credible, infra, the
``only way'' he can determine the validity of a prescription is to call
the issuing doctor and ask whether the doctor wrote the specific
elements of the order for the individual to whom the prescription is
issued. Id. at 368-69. He testified that he does this for all of the
prescriptions presented to his pharmacy. Id. at 369. He also testified
that, for the forty-seven controlled substance prescriptions, each
issuing doctor provided the verification. Id.
Further, Respondent's owner/PIC testified, for the forty-seven
prescriptions, as with all other prescriptions, that ``every patient
that comes into the pharmacy ha[s] to have an ID,'' that he ``get[s]
their ID,'' and that he has ``to have an ID that matches the person in
front of . . . [him].'' Tr. 367. He specifically testified that he
``always'' makes a copy of the IDs to put in the pharmacy's files, and
that those prescriptions were not an exception.\3\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The admitted exhibits do not support the owner/PIC's
testimony that he always makes a copy of the IDs. GX 4; GX 5. They
indicate that the owner/PIC made copies of controlled substance
prescriptions and patient history forms. E.g., GX 5, at 1, 5. They
do not indicate, however, that the owner/PIC made a copy of any of
the IDs that the undercover officers handed him. See, e.g., GX 5, at
2, 10. Accordingly, the Agency finds that the testimony of
Respondent's owner/PIC lacks credibility. See also infra section V
(credibility discussion).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While he acknowledged the Government-sponsored testimony that no
copies of IDs presented for the forty-seven prescriptions were found in
Respondent's files, the owner/PIC testified that ``that is impossible''
because ``[f]or every patient there ha[s] to be an ID to match the--the
patient. They have to fill the information sheet and they have to give
me an ID to match them and the prescription that they are filling.''
Id. at 368. He further testified that he was provided IDs for the three
deceased individuals' prescriptions, that he made copies of them, and
that ``those IDs seem to match the prescriptions that were presented
to'' him. Id. The owner/PIC could not recall whether, for each of the
forty-seven prescriptions, the individual presenting the Schedule II
controlled substance prescription provided an ID in hard copy or
electronically. Id. at 367; see also RD, at 23 (owner/PIC's ``testimony
is undermined by his statement that he could not remember whether the
customer presented a physical identification or emailed him one from a
phone application''). Regardless, as already noted, Respondent's owner/
PIC testified that he has ``to have an ID that matches the person in
front of . . . [him].'' Tr. 367.
When asked for his explanation as to how Respondent filled any of
the forty-seven Schedule II controlled substance prescriptions issued
to deceased
[[Page 86942]]
persons, Respondent's owner/PIC testified that the ``only thing'' he
``can think of is identity theft.'' Tr. 366. In other words, instead of
acknowledging the possibility that his actions led, in any way, to the
diversion of Schedule II controlled substances ordered on any of the
forty-seven prescriptions, Respondent's owner/PIC engaged in
speculation and misdirection.
Respondent offered no documentary evidence to support the identity
theft theory. Indeed, it should have had evidence to prove or disprove
the identity theft theory had Respondent's owner/PIC, as he testified
(though not credibly), required the production of an ID that matched
the individual presenting any of the forty-seven Schedule II controlled
substance prescriptions, copied the ID, and put the copy in the
pharmacy's files. See supra n.3. The Diversion Investigator (DI),
though, credibly testified that he did not see any such IDs in
Respondent's files for any of the forty-seven controlled substance
prescriptions. Tr. 276-77; infra.
Again, though, instead of acknowledging the possibility that its
actions or inactions led, in any way, to there being no copies of IDs
in the pharmacy's files for any of the forty-seven prescriptions,
Respondent suggested that the Government's seizure of its files was the
cause. See, e.g., Respondent Prehearing Statement, at 8 (``Proposed
Documents--None because the Government seized all APEXX Pharmacy
documents without a valid search warrant, as required pursuant to F.S.
465'').
Respondent did not, however, successfully develop its suggestions
of Government responsibility for Respondent's allegedly missing
pharmacy records. Instead, the Special Agent (S/A) testified about the
seizure of Respondent's files, the DI testified about the content of
those seized files, and the ALJ explicitly invited Respondent to
develop its position through the cross-examination of both Government
witnesses. See, e.g., Tr. 123-31, 132-34, 136-37 (S/A testimony); id.
at 126-27, 130, 134-36, 139, 277 (Administrative Law Judge-Respondent
colloquy); see also id. at 206-09, (Respondent's cross examination of
S/A); id. at 272-73, 275-77 (Respondent's cross examination of DI).
However, Respondent did not successfully develop, on cross-examination
of those two witnesses, its suggestion that Government error is the
reason that there are no IDs in Respondent's seized files for any of
the forty-seven controlled substance prescriptions. Supra. Instead,
Respondent's owner/PIC testified that the Government's exhibits,
offered as including Respondent's records regarding the forty-seven
controlled substance prescriptions, ``match what is on PDMP.'' \4\ Tr.
366; see also id. at 134. As it is Respondent that submitted these data
to E-FORCSE, Florida's PDMP, the fact that Respondent's owner/PIC
admits that the data in the Government's exhibits match the data in the
PDMP is further evidence of the soundness and legal sufficiency of the
Government's seizure of Respondent's files and the lack of credibility
of Respondent's claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ PDMP stands for Prescription Drug Monitoring Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, Respondent is asking the Agency to credit its post hoc,
concocted sequential claims that: (1) it always copies and files an ID
that matches each person presenting a prescription, (2) on forty-seven
occasions it was presented with IDs that matched the physical
characteristics of the persons presenting the forty-seven prescriptions
for Schedule II controlled substances, but those IDs were fake and part
of the perpetration of forty-seven incidents of identity theft, (3)
Respondent cannot document the forty-seven fake IDs because of
unspecified Government errors during the Government's search and
seizure of Respondent's files, (4) and Respondent cannot develop the
parameters of the unspecified Government errors even though it was
given ample opportunity to do so during the hearing. The Agency
declines.
After thoroughly reviewing the transmitted record, the Agency
concludes that it will afford the testimony of both Government
witnesses full credibility, and find that the testimony of Respondent's
owner/PIC that conflicts with the Government witnesses' testimonies is
not credible or creditable.\5\ Accord RD, at 4, 5 (Government
witnesses); id. at 14 (Respondent's witness). Further, when testimony
of Respondent's owner/PIC conflicts with the testimony of a Government
witness, the Agency will credit the testimony of the Government
witness. Accord RD, at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The credibility of Respondent's owner/PIC is further eroded
by his relentless pursuit of controlled substances sales and his
willingness to violate legal requirements. See, e.g., GX 5, at 7
(Respondent's owner/PIC telling the undercover sponsor which days
during the following week to bring in ``some more people'' whom the
sponsor will be ``taking to the doc''), GX 5, at 3, 4 (showing how
Respondent's owner/PIC coached undercover sponsors and undercover
officers on what to do to get the controlled substances from him
that they want), and infra section V (addressing Respondent's owner/
PIC's decision to close, permanently, the pharmacy's back door).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the record before it, the Agency finds uncontroverted
evidence that Respondent, through Respondent's owner/PIC, filled forty-
seven controlled substance prescriptions issued to individuals who, at
the time, were deceased.\6\ See, e.g., GX 6-GX 8 and GX 12-GX 14; infra
section III. The Agency further finds uncontroverted record evidence
that, due to these fillings, Respondent diverted 1,040 hydromorphone 8
mg tablets and 966 oxycodone HCL 30 mg tablets, or a total of 2006
Schedule II controlled substance tablets.\7\ Id. The Agency concludes,
based on substantial record evidence, that, since the individuals to
whom these controlled substance prescriptions were issued were
deceased, Respondent could not have ``dispensed'' the prescribed
controlled substances to the individuals to whom the prescriptions were
issued, and necessarily ``dispensed'' each of these forty-seven
controlled substance prescriptions to a ``third party'' instead. GX 12-
14; accord RD, at 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Based on all of the above, the Agency does not credit
Respondent's submissions to E-FORCSE that the individuals who
dropped off the forty-seven prescriptions and picked up the filled
controlled substances were the individuals to whom the controlled
substance prescriptions were issued. GX 6, at 4, GX 7, at 4, and GX
8, at 4.
Further, a violation of the Florida regulation that this
Decision is applying, according to the regulation's text, simply
occurs when a pharmacy physically ``dispenses'' a controlled
substance to a ``third party,'' not to the individual in whose name
the prescription is written. Cf., e.g., United States v. Green
Drugs, 905 F.2d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 1990) (``The defendants further
argue that the result we enunciate here would allow the government
to hold virtually any pharmacy liable for the most minor infraction
even where the greatest care has been exercised and good faith
demonstrated. This is a consequence that Congress likely accepted in
enacting the [Controlled Substances] Act, and perhaps should be
considered together with the broad discretion the district court has
in assessing fines.'').
\7\ Some prescriptions were written for Dilaudid 8 mg and were
filled with hydromorphone HCL 8 mg. See, e.g., GX 10, at 9-10, 13-
18, and 25-28; GX 11, at 3-4, 19-20, 23-26, and 31-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Agency also finds substantial record evidence that Respondent's
owner/PIC did not explain credibly why Respondent's seized files do not
contain any of the alleged copies of the deceased customers'
identifications that its owner/PIC testified he made when filling the
forty-seven Schedule II controlled substance prescriptions. Supra.
III. Florida Legal Prohibition on ``Dispensing'' Prescriptions to
``Third Parties''
Among its other statutes and regulatory provisions concerning
pharmacy standards of practice, Florida prohibits the ``dispensing'' of
controlled
[[Page 86943]]
substances to a ``third party.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B16-27.1001(4)
(2010) (``The pharmacist, as an integral aspect of dispensing, shall be
directly and immediately available to the patient or the patient's
agent for consultation and shall not dispense to a third party. No
prescription shall be deemed to be properly dispensed unless the
pharmacist is personally available.''). According to the clear text of
the regulation, nothing beyond the physical ``dispensing'' to a ``third
party'' constitutes a violation. This regulation was in effect for the
entire time covered by the OSC's allegations and, therefore, applies to
Respondent's actions during that period.
Having thoroughly analyzed all of the record evidence, the Agency
finds substantial and undisputed record evidence that Respondent
``dispensed'' controlled substances, pursuant to prescriptions issued
to deceased individuals, to ``third parties'' at least forty-seven
times. See, e.g., GX 6-GX 8 and GX 12-GX 14.
IV. Discussion
Under Section 304 of the CSA, ``[a] registration . . . to . . .
distribute[ ] or dispense a controlled substance . . . may be suspended
or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant .
. . has committed such acts as would render his registration under
section 823 of this title inconsistent with the public interest as
determined by such section.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In the case of a
``practitioner,'' which is defined in 21 U.S.C. 802(21) to include a
``pharmacy,'' Congress directed the Attorney General to consider five
factors in making the public interest determination. 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(1)(A-E). The five factors are considered in the disjunctive.
Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003).
According to Agency decisions, the Agency ``may rely on any one or
a combination of factors and may give each factor the weight [it] deems
appropriate in determining whether'' to revoke a registration. Id.; see
also Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881
F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Akhtar-Zaidi v. Drug Enf't
Admin., 841 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 2016)); MacKay v. Drug Enf't
Admin., 664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011); Volkman v. U. S. Drug Enf't
Admin., 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009); Hoxie v. Drug Enf't Admin.,
419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, while the Agency is
required to consider each of the factors, it ``need not make explicit
findings as to each one.'' MacKay, 664 F.3d at 816 (quoting Volkman,
567 F.3d at 222); see also Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 482. ``In short, . . .
the Agency is not required to mechanically count up the factors and
determine how many favor the Government and how many favor the
registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry which focuses on protecting the
public interest; what matters is the seriousness of the registrant's
misconduct.'' Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 FR 459, 462 (2009).
Accordingly, as the Tenth Circuit has recognized, findings under a
single factor can support the revocation of a registration. MacKay, 664
F.3d at 821.
According to DEA regulations, ``[a]t any hearing for the revocation
. . . of a registration, the . . . [Government] shall have the burden
of proving that the requirements for such revocation . . . pursuant to
. . . 21 U.S.C. 824(a) . . . are satisfied.'' 21 CFR 1301.44(e).
In this matter, while all of the 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) factors have
been considered, the Government's evidence in support of its prima
facie case regarding the forty-seven prescriptions is confined to
Factors B and D.\8\ Government's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, at 19; see also RD, at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Neither Respondent nor the Government argues that it offered
evidence relevant to Factors A, C, or E. Although the Agency
considered Factors A, C, and E, it finds that they are not relevant
to this adjudication. Accord RD, at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Factors B and/or D--Respondent's Experience in Dispensing Controlled
Substances and Compliance With Applicable Laws Related to Controlled
Substances
Florida regulations explicitly prohibit pharmacies from
``dispensing'' to ``third parties.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B16-
27.1001(4) (2010); supra sections II and III. The record evidence is
uncontroverted that, at least forty-seven times, Respondent filled
Schedule II controlled substance prescriptions when the persons to whom
the prescriptions were issued were deceased. Due to these fillings,
Respondent diverted 1,040 hydromorphone 8 mg tablets and 966 oxycodone
HCL 30 mg tablets, or a total of 2006 Schedule II controlled substance
tablets to ``third parties.'' Supra sections II and III. The Agency
finds that, as a result of this ``dispensing'' to ``third parties,''
Respondent repeatedly violated applicable law, supporting the
revocation of its registration. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4) and Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B16-27.1001(4) (2010).
Accordingly, the Agency finds that Respondent's continued
registration is inconsistent with the public interest. 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4) and 823(g)(1)(B) and (D).
V. Sanction
Where, as here, the Government has met its prima facie burden of
showing that Respondent's continued registration is inconsistent with
the public interest due to its numerous violations pertaining to
controlled substances, the burden shifts to the Respondent to show why
it can be entrusted with a registration. Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83
FR 18882 (2018). The issue of trust is necessarily a fact-dependent
determination based on the circumstances presented by the individual
respondent. Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019). Moreover,
as past performance is the best predictor of future performance, DEA
Administrators have required that a registrant who has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest must accept responsibility for
those acts and demonstrate that it will not engage in future
misconduct. Id. A registrant's acceptance of responsibility must be
unequivocal. Id. In addition, a registrant's candor during the
investigation and hearing has been an important factor in determining
acceptance of responsibility and the appropriate sanction. Id.
Furthermore, DEA Administrators have found that the egregiousness and
extent of the misconduct are significant factors in determining the
appropriate sanction. Id. DEA Administrators have also considered the
need to deter similar acts by the respondent and by the community of
registrants. Id.
Regarding these matters, there is no record evidence that
Respondent, or its owner/PIC, takes responsibility, let alone
unequivocal responsibility, for the founded, egregious violations
involving the diversion of 2006 Schedule II controlled substance
tablets. Supra sections II and IV. Instead, Respondent's case consists
of one debunked and failed attempt after another to shift the blame for
the unlawful filling of at least forty-seven controlled substance
prescriptions away from itself.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The testimony offering these serial attempts reflects poorly
on the candor of Respondent's owner/PIC. Supra section II.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The interests of specific and general deterrence weigh in favor of
revocation. Respondent has not convinced the Agency that it understands
that its controlled substance prescription filling fell short of the
applicable legal standards and that this substandard filling has
serious negative ramifications for the health, safety, and medical care
of individuals who come to it for medicine. See, e.g., Garrett Howard
Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18910 (collecting cases). As such, it is not
reasonable to
[[Page 86944]]
believe that Respondent's future controlled substance prescription
filling will comply with legal requirements.\10\ Indeed, Respondent's
owner/PIC's own testimony suggests that he has no intention of
complying with the CSA in the future because he believes compliance is
unduly burdensome.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The Agency notes the record evidence, in GX 5, of two
incidents when Respondent's owner/PIC declined to provide the
undercover officers with additional controlled substances without a
prescription. GX 5, at 6, 8-9. These incidents do not excuse
Respondent's owner/PIC's otherwise laser-focused pursuit of
controlled substances sales regardless of legal requirements. Supra
section II.
\11\ Respondent's owner/PIC testified that ``filling controls is
a lot of headache. You have to record it down, you have to go
through a lot of process, and nobody wants to deal with that.'' Tr.
297. Respondent's owner/PIC further testified that when he worked
for larger pharmacies in the past, he would tell customers that
controlled substances were not in stock because he got paid the same
amount whether he filled controlled or non-controlled substances.
Id. He testified, ``why would pharmacies . . . want to fill a
control medication for somebody when it can come back to haunt him
when he can say I don't have it, I will fill just the non-
controls.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, given the foundational nature and vast number of
Respondent's violations, a sanction less than revocation would send a
message to the existing and prospective registrant community that
compliance with the law is not a condition precedent to maintaining a
registration.
The Agency finds that it cannot entrust Respondent with a
registration.\12\ It finds that Respondent's actions were motivated by
profiting while avoiding DEA's detection and lacked any genuine care
for the health and welfare of its customers. For example, the record
evidence shows that Respondent coached customers regarding what to
write on their forms in order to get the desired controlled substances,
see, e.g., GX 5, at 3, 4, and shows the complete willingness of
Respondent's owner/PIC to continue to fill the controlled substance
prescriptions that S/A and undercover officer ``sponsors'' were
bringing him. GX 5, at 1, 7.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ While only the evidence relating to the found violation,
supra, was used to determine that the Government made a prima facie
case, the entire record supports the Agency's determination that
Respondent's owner/PIC is not credible and that, therefore, the
Agency cannot entrust Respondent with a registration.
\13\ GX 5, at 1 (``S/A: `Can I drop you some more scripts?' . .
. . Respondent's owner/PIC: `How many is there?' ''); GX 5, at 7
(``Undercover Officer: `I got some more people I'm taking to the
doc. you good with me bringing them here again? Um next week.' . . .
. Respondent's owner/PIC: `Next week, yeah, next week that's fine.'
'').
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Respondent's owner/PIC's testimony regarding those matters further
erodes the Agency's trust in the truthfulness of Respondent's owner/PIC
and in the ability of Respondent to maintain a registration in
compliance with the law.
In sum, the record supports the imposition of a sanction because
Respondent did not unequivocally accept responsibility for its
egregious and extensive violations, and has not convinced the Agency
that it can be entrusted with a registration.
Accordingly, the Agency shall order the sanction the Government
requested, as contained in the Order below.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a)(4), I hereby revoke DEA registration No. FA5493363 issued
to APEXX Pharmacy, LLC. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any
pending application of APEXX Pharmacy, LLC, for a DEA Registration in
Florida. This Order is effective January 16, 2024.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
December 7, 2023, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with the
original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the
Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer
has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic
format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This
administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2023-27524 Filed 12-14-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P