Nikolay Goltsev, a/k/a Nick Stevens, a/k/a Gio Ross, 107 Rue Caron, Ste-Anne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1; Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, 3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11224; Kristina Puzyreva, 107 Rue Caron, Ste-Anne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1; Vladimir Bochkarev, Privolnaya Street 75, Korp.1, Apt. 173, Moscow, Russia; Pavel Chernikov, Zoologicheskiy Pereulok 9/11. Apt. 13, Moscow, Russia 123242; Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Ulitsa Privolnaya 75/1, Apt. 173, Moscow, Russia, 109431; Oleg Zenchenko, Vesenniya Street 16, Taytsy, Petersburg Region, Russia and Kupchinskaya Street 29/1, Apt. 363, St. Petersburg, Russia 192283; SH Brothers Group, Inc., 3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11224; SN Electronics, Inc., 2650 AB Coney Island Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11223; Suntronic F.Z.E., Shiekh Khalifa Bin Zayed, St-Amberjem Tower E1/913, Ajman, United Arab Emirates; Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges, 77955-77959 [2023-25005]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South
Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–
4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
seek renewal of this Order by filing a
written request not later than 20 days
before the expiration date. A renewal
request may be opposed by Rossiya as
provided in section 766.24(d), by filing
a written submission with the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement, which must be received
not later than seven days before the
expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided
to Rossiya and shall be published in the
Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately
and shall remain in effect for one year.
Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023–25091 Filed 11–13–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
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Nikolay Goltsev, a/k/a Nick Stevens, a/
k/a Gio Ross, 107 Rue Caron, SteAnne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada
H9X4A1; Salimdzhon Nasriddinov,
3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11224;
Kristina Puzyreva, 107 Rue Caron, SteAnne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada
H9X4A1; Vladimir Bochkarev,
Privolnaya Street 75, Korp.1, Apt. 173,
Moscow, Russia; Pavel Chernikov,
Zoologicheskiy Pereulok 9/11. Apt. 13,
Moscow, Russia 123242; Yekaterina
Vetoshkina, Ulitsa Privolnaya 75/1, Apt.
173, Moscow, Russia, 109431; Oleg
Zenchenko, Vesenniya Street 16,
Taytsy, Petersburg Region, Russia and
Kupchinskaya Street 29/1, Apt. 363, St.
Petersburg, Russia 192283; SH
Brothers Group, Inc., 3734 Laurel Ave.,
Brooklyn, NY 11224; SN Electronics,
Inc., 2650 AB Coney Island Ave.,
Brooklyn, NY 11223; Suntronic F.Z.E.,
Shiekh Khalifa Bin Zayed, StAmberjem Tower E1/913, Ajman,
United Arab Emirates; Order
Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
Pursuant to section 766.24 of the
Export Administration Regulations (the
‘‘Regulations’’ or ‘‘EAR’’),1 the Bureau of
1 The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR
parts 730 through 774 (2023), originally issued
pursuant to the Export Administration Act (50
U.S.C. 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘EAA’’), which
lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through
Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR,
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by successive
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Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S.
Department of Commerce, through its
Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’),
has requested the issuance of an Order
temporarily denying, for a period of 180
days, the export privileges under the
Regulations of: Nikolay Goltsev,
Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, Kristina
Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel
Chernikov, Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg
Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc.
(‘‘SH Brothers’’), SN Electronics, Inc.
(‘‘SN Electronics’’), and Suntronic FZE
(‘‘Suntronic’’). OEE’s request and related
information indicates that these parties
are located in New York, the Russian
Federation and the United Arab
Emirates (‘‘U.A.E.’’), at the respective
addresses listed on the caption page of
this order and on page 16, infra.
I. Legal Standard
Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may
issue an order temporarily denying a
respondent’s export privileges upon a
showing that the order is necessary in
the public interest to prevent an
‘‘imminent violation’’ of the
Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and
766.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be
‘imminent’ either in time or degree of
likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS
may show ‘‘either that a violation is
about to occur, or that the general
circumstances of the matter under
investigation or case under criminal or
administrative charges demonstrate a
likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As
to the likelihood of future violations,
BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ‘‘is significant,
deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur
again, rather than technical or
negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘[l]ack of information
establishing the precise time a violation
may occur does not preclude a finding
that a violation is imminent, so long as
there is sufficient reason to believe the
likelihood of a violation.’’ Id.
Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in
effect under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012))
(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
which includes the Export Control Reform Act of
2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While section
1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA
(except for three sections which are inapplicable
here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent
part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other
forms of administrative action that were made or
issued under the EAA, including as continued in
effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of
ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall
continue in effect according to their terms until
modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through
action undertaken pursuant to the authority
provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5)
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary
denial orders.
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77955
II. OEE’S Request for a Temporary
Denial Order
The U.S. Commerce Department,
through BIS, responded to the Russian
Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further
invasion of Ukraine by implementing a
sweeping series of stringent export
controls that severely restrict Russia’s
access to technologies and other items
that it needs to sustain its aggressive
military capabilities. These controls
primarily target Russia’s defense,
aerospace, and maritime sectors and are
intended to cut off Russia’s access to
vital technological inputs, atrophy key
sectors of its industrial base, and
undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to
exert influence on the world stage.
As of February 24, 2022, any item
classified under any Export
Classification Control Number
(‘‘ECCN’’) in Categories 3 through 9 of
the Commerce Control List (‘‘CCL’’)
required a license to be exported or
reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226
(Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8, 2022, the
license requirements for Russia were
expanded to cover all items on the CCL.
See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These
rules were codified in 15 CFR 746.8,
which state, ‘‘a license is required,
excluding deemed exports and deemed
reexports, to export, reexport, or transfer
(in-country) to or within Russia or
Belarus any item subject to the EAR and
specified in any Export Control
Classification Number (ECCN) on the
CCL.’’
BIS has imposed additional license
requirements for exports, reexports and
transfers to or within Russia of any
items subject to the EAR that were
identified under certain Schedule B or
Harmonized Tariff Schedule 6 (‘‘HTS’’)
numbers under Supplement No. 4 to
Part 746—Russian and Belarusian
Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to
§ 746.5(a)(1)(ii).2 HTS codes take their
first six digits from the corresponding
Harmonized System (‘‘HS’’) code, a
standardized numerical method of
classifying traded products used by
customs authorities around the world.
On September 14, 2023, working in
conjunction with the United Kingdom
and European Union, BIS published a
‘‘Common High Priority Items List,’’
which identified items by their
corresponding HTS codes listed in
Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 that Russia
sought to procure for its weapons
programs.3
2 See,
e.g., 87 FR 12856 (March 8, 2022).
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/allarticles/13-policyguidance/country-guidance/2172russia-export-controls-list-of-common-high-priorityitems. Note that additional HTS codes were added
3 See
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On or about November 6, 2023,
Goltsev, Nasriddinov, Puzyreva,
Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and
Zenchenko (collectively ‘‘the coconspirators’’) were each indicted on
multiple counts in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
New York. The charges include, but are
not limited to, conspiring to violate U.S.
export control laws in connection with
the unlicensed export of items on the
CCL and Supp. No. 4 to Part 746. The
co-conspirators are also charged with
smuggling, as well as failure to file and
filing false Electronic Export
Information (‘‘EEI’’).4
In its request, OEE has presented
evidence indicating that, between at
least on or about January 2022 and
October 2023, Goltsev, Nasriddinov,
Puzyreva, Bochkarev, Chernikov,
Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko conspired
to violate ECRA and the EAR by
unlawfully sourcing and exporting
millions of dollars in dual-use
electronics from the United States for
export to Russia without the required
licenses. In instances where a particular
item may not have required an export
license, the co-conspirators also made,
and caused to be made, false and
misleading statements with respect to
EEI filings in order to conceal the
ultimate end destination and end user.
As alleged in the indictment, Goltsev
and Nasriddinov sourced and purchased
U.S.-origin electronics at the direction
of Russian procurement agents,
including Bochkarev, Chernikov,
Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko. Goltsev,
Nasriddinov, and Puzyreva utilized
U.S.-registered companies, SH Brothers
Group, Inc. and SN Electronics, Inc.,
both located in Brooklyn, NY, as part of
the procurement scheme. Before
ultimate diversion to Russia, some of
these items were shipped to thirdcountry transshipment companies,
including Suntronic, a front company
located in the United Arab Emirates and
utilized by Bochkarev. Based on the
facts alleged in the indictment, Goltsev,
Nasriddinov, Puzyreva, Bochkarev,
Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko
were aware of U.S. export control laws
and took affirmative action to conceal
their unlawful export-related activities
in order to deceive U.S. manufacturers
and distributors, and to evade detection
by law enforcement.
to Supp. No. 4 to Part 746, including for items
identified on the ‘‘Common High Priority Items
List,’’ pursuant to several Federal Register notices.
See 87 FR 57068 (Sep. 16, 2022); 88 FR 12175 (Feb.
27, 2023); and 88 FR 33922 (May 23, 2023).
4 The co-conspirators are also charged with, inter
alia, conspiracy to defraud the United States, wire
fraud and wire fraud conspiracy, and money
laundering conspiracy.
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A. The Unlawful Procurement Scheme
As further alleged in the indictment,
several of the co-conspirators worked to
procure items on behalf of various
Russian entities. For example, until in
or about August 2022, Vetoshkina, a
Russian national residing in Russia,
served as a procurement manager for
OOO 5 Radioavtomatika
(‘‘Radioavtomatika’’), a Russian defense
procurement firm based in Moscow.
Radioavtomatika was added to the BIS
Entity List on or about March 3, 2022.6
Vetoshkina then began working for OOO
Komtech (‘‘Komtech’’), a Moscow-based
electronics distributor.
Chernikov, a Russian national
residing in Russia, conducted
procurement operations for OOO
Testkomplekt (‘‘Testkomplekt’’), another
Moscow-based electronics distributor
that has held contracts with Russian
military entities. Testkomplekt was
added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (‘‘SDN’’) list on or about May
19, 2023, pursuant to Executive Order
14024.7 Similarly, Zenchenko
conducted procurement operations for
OOO NEVA–EKB (‘‘EKB-Neva’’), a
Moscow-based electronics supplier,
which was added to OFAC’s SDN list on
or about May 19, 2023, pursuant to
Executive Order 14024. Goltsev, a
Russian national residing in Canada,
also had long-standing relationships
with Radioavtomatika, Testkomplekt,
EKB–NEVA and other Russia-based
entities, and had procured electronic
components for them for years.
Based on evidence presented by OEE
and as further stated in the indictment,
Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and
Zenchenko received orders from
Russian end users in the defense and
technology sectors seeking to acquire
U.S.-origin items. They then relayed
these requests to Goltsev, who used
aliases, including ‘‘Nick Stevens’’ and
‘‘Gio Ross,’’ to communicate with U.S.
manufacturers and distributors. In these
communications, Goltsev made material
misrepresentations about the
transactions, including about the
ultimate end use and end users, as well
as the parties involved in the
transactions. Goltsev and Nasriddinov, a
dual-national of Russia and Tajikistan
residing in New York, purchased the
items from U.S. companies. Nasriddinov
received the items at various addresses
in Brooklyn, New York and supervised
5 ‘‘OOO’’ is the abbreviation for the Russian
business entity type ‘‘j,otcndj c juhfybxtyyjq
jndtncndtyyjcnm.,’’ which means limited private
company and is roughly the equivalent of a limited
liability company or LLC in the United States.
6 See 87 FR 13141 (Mar. 9, 2022).
7 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/
jy1494.
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their repackaging. To further the
scheme, Puzyreva, Goltsev’s spouse,
utilized numerous bank accounts,
including one that listed Nasriddinov’s
home address as the address of record.
After repackaging the items,
Nasriddinov and Goltsev then exported
the items from the United States for
transshipment to Russia and Russian
end users, including Radioavtomatika,
Komtech, Testkomplekt, and EKB–
NEVA. Using SH Brothers and SN
Electronics, Nasriddinov and Goltsev
shipped the items through various
intermediaries located in third
countries, including China, India,
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.
One such intermediary was Suntronic,
located in the U.A.E. and used by
Bochkarev to conduct multiple
procurement operations for Russian
entities.
As part of the scheme, Goltsev,
Nasriddinov, Puzyreva, Bochkarev,
Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko
also made, and caused to be made,
material misrepresentations and
omissions, including with respect to EEI
filings, to conceal the unlawful
procurement transactions. As a result of
their actions, the co-conspirators caused
U.S. companies to, among other things,
sell and export electronic components
in violation of ECRA and the EAR.
Some of the items sourced and
exported by Goltsev, Nasriddinov,
Puzyreva, Bochkarev, Chernikov,
Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko included
electronic components and integrated
circuits listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 746
of the EAR and requiring a license to
Russia, which have been designated as
‘‘Tier 1’’ items on the Common High
Priority Items List. These priority items
pose a heightened risk of being diverted
illegally to Russia because of their
importance to Russia’s war efforts.
B. Knowledge of U.S. Export Controls
and Intent To Evade
As further alleged in the indictment,
communications between the coconspirators indicate that they had
knowledge of U.S. export controls and
made efforts to conceal their unlawful
procurement. For example, in or about
October 2021, after Vetoshkina advised
Goltsev that paperwork for an order of
electronics stated that the items were
destined for Russia, Goltsev advised her
to use a Hong Kong-based company as
the ‘‘bill-to’’ and confirmed that he
would nonetheless ship the items to
Radioavtomatika. In another
communication to Goltsev in or about
October 2022, Vetoshkina’s employee
listed several different electronic
components, including coaxial switches
and capacitors, that required a license to
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be shipped to Russia and stated, ‘‘please
tell me do you have these goods,
priceless in Russia.’’ Goltsev responded
with price quotations for the items.
Based on facts alleged in the
indictment, other communications
between Goltsev and Russian
procurement agents, including
Chernikov, demonstrate a knowledge of
export control laws and sanctions, as
well as an intent to conceal. For
example, in a December 2022 text
message exchange with Chernikov
regarding an order placed through SH
Brothers, Goltsev requested ‘‘separate
invoices. . .the ECCN[s] aren’t very
pretty. We’ll ship them piecemeal.’’ In
another communication in or about
February 28, 2023, Goltsev mentions the
sanctioning of Electronic Network, Inc.
(‘‘Electronic Network’’), a company
based in Montreal, Canada, which was
added to the BIS Entity List on or about
February 24, 2023.8 Goltsev said, ‘‘. . .
do me a favor. If anyone ever asks about
me, don’t tell them who I am, where I
am, etc. . . . Elnet’s [Electronic
Network] been in trouble for a long time
because they exported a lot to Russia.’’
Goltsev was an account manager and
purchasing coordinator for Electronic
Network.
Communications between Goltsev and
Zenchenko also reflect knowledge of
and familiarity with U.S. export
controls. Specifically, Goltsev also
received requests from Zenchenko to
obtain items on the CCL that were
controlled for anti-terrorism reasons.
For example, on or about December 16,
2022, in response to a query, Zenchenko
advised Goltsev that ‘‘76 pcs, you can
buy them here with ECCN 3A991.c.3.’’
In a message on or about February 1,
2023, Zenchenko asked Goltsev, ‘‘ECCN:
5A991.b.4 can you get this?’’ and
included a screenshot of a product from
a Texas-based electronics distributor.
Similarly, in a message on or about
February 6, 2023, Zenchenko asked
Goltsev, ‘‘can you get this ECCN?
4A994.’’ In a message on or about
February 22, 2023, Zenchenko requested
‘‘40 pcs ECCN 5A991.b.1 Can you get
this?’’ At the time of these
communications, each of ECCNs listed
in this paragraph required an export
license to Russia and was subject to a
presumption of denial licensing policy.
See Section 746.8. Between November
2022 and February 2023, SH Brothers
made nine shipments to Zenchenko in
Russia through a Turkish intermediary.
8 See
88 FR 12170 (Feb. 27, 2023).
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C. SH Brothers, SN Electronics, and
Suntronic
As alleged in the indictment and
based on evidence presented by OEE,
the co-conspirators used SH Brothers
and SN Electronics to export items from
the United States through
intermediaries located in third
countries. OEE has presented evidence
that Nasriddinov founded SH Brothers
on or about June 11, 2021 and SN
Electronics, which was registered in his
wife’s name, on or about January 30,
2023. Both companies have listed
addresses in Brooklyn, New York. One
of intermediaries used for
transshipment to Russia was Suntronic,
a front company located in the U.A.E.
and used by Bochkarev to conduct
procurement operations for multiple
Russian entities. As alleged in the
indictment, on or about and between
August 2022 and September 2023, SH
Brothers exported more than 250
shipments of electronic components,
valued at more than $7 million, to thirdcountry transshipment companies,
including Suntronic, where they were
then unlawfully diverted to Russia.
The indictment further alleges that,
between in or about November 2022 and
August 2023, SH Brothers exported
approximately 27 shipments, valued at
approximately $1,086,058, to Suntronic.
These shipments were then sent to
Russian end users, including Petersburg
Intelligent Transportation Logistics
(‘‘Petersburg’’), which was added to
OFAC’s SDN list on or about May 19,
2023; Suntronic received approximately
$15 million from Petersburg between in
or about October 2022 and February
2023. As detailed in the indictment, one
of the shipments, occurring in or about
June 23, 2023, was for transceivers
listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 of the
EAR and requiring a license to Russia,
which carried a Tier 1 HTS code listed
on the Common High Priority Items List.
The transceivers, which have been
found in Russian UAVs, required a
license from BIS to be exported to
Russia pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1) of
the Regulations. These types of
transceivers have been found in Russian
unmanned aerial vehicles (‘‘UAVs’’) in
Ukraine.
Based on the facts set forth in the
indictment, Goltsev and Bochkarev
communicated about the shipments,
including ways in which to conceal the
ultimate destination and end users. For
example, in a communication in or
about January 2023, Goltsev informed
Bochkarev that he needed an end user
declaration and Bochkarev responded,
‘‘darn.’’ The two ultimately agreed to
falsely list a U.A.E. company as the end
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77957
user. In a February 2023
communication, Goltsev advised
Bochkarev to ‘‘write something more
substantial [to the U.S. company] so that
there are no more questions.’’ After
Bochkarev asked, ‘‘is it better to provide
them with a Chinese end user,’’ Goltsev
stated ‘‘yes should be ok.’’ In another
message on or about March 3, 2023,
Bochkarev asked Goltsev about the
possibility of making one shipment paid
‘‘via the Chinese company,’’ since ‘‘each
one separately so expensive, or does it
mean extra trouble at customs?’’ Goltsev
responded, ‘‘no sir, more than 50–60
will trigger a lot of interest it’s better to
break it up.’’
The indictment also alleges that
between in or about September 2022
and November 2022, SH Brothers made
approximately 15 shipments of
electronic components, valued at
approximately $352,000, to
Testkomplekt through an intermediary
located in Hong Kong. In or about
November 2022, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (‘‘CBP’’) detained
some shipments from SH Brothers that
were allegedly bound for Hong Kong but
ultimately destined for Testkomplekt in
Russia. As detailed in the indictment,
Chernikov repeatedly questioned
Goltsev about the status of the detained
shipments and provided him with false
information to use in responding to CBP
inquiries.
Based on the facts alleged in the
indictment and evidence presented by
OEE, SH Brothers also made a shipment
of microchips to Vetoshkina’s company,
Komtech, through a Turkish
intermediary. Specifically, in a message
on or about August 31, 2022, Komtech’s
founder and director requested that
Vetoshkina procure 3,000 microchips
made by an Arizona-based
manufacturer. Vetoshkina sourced the
microchips through Goltsev and SH
Brothers, who received several
payments from the Turkish
intermediary, including an October 3,
2022 payment for $5,300. The wire
details for this payment listed the part
number of the microchips and denoted
‘‘QTY 2000.’’
In a message exchange on or about
April 21, 2023, Vetoshkina and Goltsev
discussed shipping the microchips
through China or Turkey, ultimately
deciding to make the shipment through
Turkey to ‘‘avoid problems.’’ Goltsev
provided Vetoshkina with an SH
Brothers invoice for 3,000 pieces of the
requested microchip, which listed the
applicable HTS codes and payment
information for an SH Brothers bank
account in Brooklyn, New York. On or
about April 17, 2023, a U.S. company
shipped a package containing the
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microchips was mailed to SH Brothers
and two days later, on or about April 25,
2023, Nasriddinov sent the same items
to the intermediary in Turkey. OEE’s
evidence includes an invoice for 3,000
ATMEGA8A–MN Microchip
Microcontrollers, and a second line item
of 2,000 ATMEGA8A–MN Microchip
Microcontrollers, bearing Tier 1 HTS
code 8542310001, which is listed in
Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 of the EAR and
requires a license to Russia. The HTS
code is listed on the Common High
Priority Items List and the microchips
would have required a license from BIS
to be exported to Russia. See Section
746.5(a)(1)(ii).
Based on OEE’s investigation, which
remains ongoing, SH Brothers also
furthered the scheme by making false
EEI filings, including by declaring that
items were being shipped to one party
when they were, in fact, being shipped
to another, presumably to further
obfuscate the transactions with respect
to the ultimate destination and to evade
detection by law enforcement. For
example, OEE has presented evidence
that, an EEI filing made by SH Brothers
in or about February 16, 2023 indicated
that shipment was destined for China,
with an intermediary consignee also
located in China. Based on
corresponding DHL records, however,
the items were shipped to a different
location in China not identified on the
EEI. Records also reflect that the
shipment contained items that would
have required a license for export to
Russia, specifically CY7C109D–10VXI
Infineon SRAM Chips, bearing HTS
code 8542320041 and classified under
ECCN 3A991.b.2.b.
In another EEI filing made by SH
Brothers on or about February 9, 2023,
ostensibly to the U.A.E, SH Brothers
identified the intermediary consignee as
Suntronic. Corresponding DHL records,
however, show that SH Brothers
shipped the items to a company located
in Hong Kong. The shipment contained
a ADM3202ARNZ AD Transmitter,
bearing HTS code 8542390001, a Tier 1
HTS code listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part
746 of the EAR, which would have
required an export license for export to
Russia pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1).
OEE’s investigation also indicates
that, in or about January 2023, in a
further effort to evade detection and in
response to law enforcement scrutiny,
including the delay or detention of
several outbound shipments from SH
Brothers, Goltsev and Nasriddinov
began using SN Electronics to order and
export electronic components. As
alleged in the indictment, on or about
and between November 8, 2022 and
November 15, 2022, Goltsev and
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:48 Nov 13, 2023
Jkt 262001
Nasriddinov exchanged a series of
messages discussing a shipment of
electronic components that had been
detained by U.S. officials at John F.
Kennedy International Airport (‘‘JFK’’)
in Queens, New York. Goltsev
commented that shipping to Russia had
become ‘‘dangerous’’ and went on to
say, ‘‘we need to figure out why they
keep holding the package . . . I don’t
really understand how they figured [it]
out.’’ In a subsequent message, on or
about November 9, 2022, Goltsev
commented that, ‘‘in the future we will
need to load from several companies,
not to attract attention . . . for now
large packages will be dangerous until
we understand what they figured out
. . . we will need to think of
diversifying the load . . . so that not
everything is moving from the same
deck.’’
In subsequent communications
between on or about January 31, 2023
and February 10, 2023, Nasriddinov
confirmed to Goltsev that the ‘‘new
company is already functioning . . . Its
called SN Electronics’’ and Goltsev
responded, ‘‘Wonderful sir . . . Eagerly
waiting for Tax ID sir. We had problems
with some large orders from [a Texasbased company] . . . we will reorder
later from SN.’’ Nasriddinov later
provided Goltsev with SN Electronics’
registered address in Brooklyn, New
York, which was also the address of a
restaurant that Nasriddinov owned.
As detailed in the indictment, Goltsev
and Nasriddinov then used SN
Electronics to obtain approximately
$36,871.49 worth of non-reflective
switches, listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part
746 of the EAR and requiring a license
to Russia, from a U.S. company for
Chernikov and Testkomplekt. Although
Nasriddinov had initially placed the
order for these non-reflective switches
from the U.S. company through SH
Brothers, the order was cancelled and
the U.S. company told Goltsev that the
‘‘manufacturer requires that shipments
of this product be direct to an END
CUSTOMER from an AUTHORIZED
DISTRIBUTOR only.’’
Goltsev subsequently placed the same
order through SN Electronics, using the
alias ‘‘Gio Ross’’ in his email
communications with the U.S. company
and falsely claimed in an email on or
about February 15, 2023 that SN
Electronics was a ‘‘prototype and design
manufacturing company.’’ On or about
February 21, 2023, the order was
shipped to an SN Electronics address in
Brooklyn, New York and, on or about
February 27, 2023, Nasriddinov
exported the items to a Hong-Kong
based transshipment company
frequently utilized by Testkomplekt.
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
The switches had Tier 1 HTS codes that
were included on the Common High
Priority Items List and required a
license from BIS to be exported to
Russia pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1).
III. Findings
I find that the evidence presented by
BIS demonstrates that a violation of the
Regulations by the above-captioned
parties is imminent in both time and
degree of likelihood. This includes
evidence demonstrating the breadth of
the conspiracy, that multiple parties and
entities are involved, and that the
conduct occurred over a lengthy period
of time. As such, a TDO is needed to
give notice to persons and companies in
the United States and abroad that they
should cease dealing with Nikolay
Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov,
Kristina Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev,
Pavel Chernikov, Yekaterina
Vetoshkina, Oleg Zenchenko, SH
Brothers Group, Inc. (‘‘SH Brothers’’),
SN Electronics, Inc. (‘‘SN Electronics’’),
and Suntronic FZE (‘‘Suntronic’’) in
export or reexport transactions
involving items subject to the EAR.
Such a TDO is consistent with the
public interest to preclude future
violations of the Regulations given the
deliberate, covert, and determined
nature of the misconduct and clear
disregard for complying with U.S.
export control laws.
This Order is being issued on an ex
parte basis without a hearing based
upon BIS’s showing of an imminent
violation in accordance with section
766.24 of the Regulations.
It is therefore ordered:
First, that NIKOLAY GOLTSEV, a/k/a
NICK STEVENS, a/k/a GIO ROSS, with
an address at 107 Rue Caron, Ste-AnneDe-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1;
SALIMDZHON NASRIDDINOV, with an
address at 3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn,
NY 11224; KRISTINA PUZYREVA, with
an address at 107 Rue Caron, Ste-AnneDe-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1;
VLADIMIR BOCHKAREV, with an
address at Privolnaya Street 75, Korp.1,
Apt. 173, Moscow, Russia; PAVEL
CHERNIKOV, with an address at
Zoologicheskiy Pereulok 9/11. Apt.13,
Moscow, Russia 123242; YEKATERINA
VETOSHKINA, with an address at
Ulitsa Privolnaya 75/1, Apt. 173,
Moscow, Russia, 109431; OLEG
ZENCHENKO, with an address at
Vesenniya Street 16, Taytsy, Petersburg
Region, Russia and an address at
Kupchinskaya Street 29/1, Apt. 363, St.
Petersburg, Russia 192283; SH
BROTHERS GROUP, INC., with an
address at 3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn,
NY 11224; SN ELECTRONICS, INC.,
with an address at 2650 AB Coney
E:\FR\FM\14NON1.SGM
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khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices
Island Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11223; and
SUNTRONIC FZE, with an address at
Shiekh Khalifa Bin Zayed St-Amberjem
Tower E1/913 Ajman, United Arab
Emirates; and when acting for or on
their behalf, any successors or assigns,
agents, or employees (each a ‘‘Denied
Person’’ and collectively the ‘‘Denied
Persons’’) may not, directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any
transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter
collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’)
exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR,
or in any other activity subject to the
EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license, License Exception, or
export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or in any other
activity subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the EAR, or in any
other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly
or indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of a Denied Person any item subject to
the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
a Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States,
including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction
whereby a Denied Person acquires or
attempts to acquire such ownership,
possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from a Denied Person of any
item subject to the EAR that has been
exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the
United States any item subject to the
EAR with knowledge or reason to know
that the item will be, or is intended to
be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by a Denied Person if such
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:48 Nov 13, 2023
Jkt 262001
service involves the use of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States. For
purposes of this paragraph, servicing
means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
person, firm, corporation, or business
organization related to Nikolay Goltsev,
Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, Kristina
Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel
Chernikov, Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg
Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc., SN
Electronics, Inc., and Suntronic FZE by
affiliation, ownership, control, or
position of responsibility in the conduct
of trade or related services may also be
made subject to the provisions of this
Order.
In accordance with the provisions of
section 766.24(e) of the EAR, Nikolay
Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov,
Kristina Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev,
Pavel Chernikov, Yekaterina
Vetoshkina, Oleg Zenchenko, SH
Brothers Group, Inc., SN Electronics,
Inc., and Suntronic FZE may, at any
time, appeal this Order by filing a full
written statement in support of the
appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South
Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–
4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
seek renewal of this Order by filing a
written request not later than 20 days
before the expiration date. Respondents
Nikolay Goltsev, Salimdzhon
Nasriddinov, Kristina Puzyreva,
Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel Chernikov,
Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg
Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc., SN
Electronics, Inc., and Suntronic FZE
may oppose a request to renew this
Order by filing a written submission
with the Assistant Secretary for Export
Enforcement, which must be received
not later than seven days before the
expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be served
on each denied person and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately
and shall remain in effect for 180 days.
Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023–25005 Filed 11–13–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
77959
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A–570–831]
Fresh Garlic From the People’s
Republic of China: Preliminary
Affirmative Determination of
Circumvention
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of
Commerce (Commerce) preliminarily
determines that imports of small and
large garlic chunks from the People’s
Republic of China (China) are
circumventing the antidumping (AD)
order on fresh garlic from China.
DATES: Applicable November 14, 2023.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Charles DeFilippo or Jacob Saude, AD/
CVD Operations, Office VII,
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401
Constitution Avenue NW, Washington,
DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482–3797 or
202–482–0981, respectively.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
AGENCY:
Background
On November 16, 1994, Commerce
published the AD order on imports of
fresh garlic from China.1 On February
16, 2023, the Fresh Garlic Producers
Association and its individual members
(collectively, the petitioners) requested
that Commerce initiate a circumvention
inquiry with regard to small and large
garlic chunks that are exported to the
United States from China.2 In the
Circumvention Request, the petitioners
alleged that small and large garlic
chunks constitute merchandise altered
in form or appearance in such minor
respects that it should be included
within the scope of the Order, pursuant
to section 781(c) of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended (the Act) and 19 CFR
251.226(j).3
On June 8, 2023, Commerce published
in the Federal Register the notice of
initiation of this circumvention
inquiry.4 In the Initiation Notice,
1 See Antidumping Duty Order: Fresh Garlic from
the People’s Republic of China, 59 FR 59209
(November 16, 1994) (Order).
2 See Petitioners Letter, ‘‘Petitioners’ Request for
Circumvention Ruling Pursuant to Section 781(c) of
the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended,’’ dated
February 16, 2023 (Circumvention Request).
3 See Circumvention Request.
4 See Fresh Garlic From the People’s Republic of
China: Initiation of Circumvention Inquiry on the
Antidumping Duty Order, 88 FR 37510 (June 8,
2023) (Initiation Notice), and accompanying
Initiation Checklist.
E:\FR\FM\14NON1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 218 (Tuesday, November 14, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77955-77959]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-25005]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Nikolay Goltsev, a/k/a Nick Stevens, a/k/a Gio Ross, 107 Rue
Caron, Ste-Anne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1; Salimdzhon
Nasriddinov, 3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11224; Kristina Puzyreva,
107 Rue Caron, Ste-Anne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1; Vladimir
Bochkarev, Privolnaya Street 75, Korp.1, Apt. 173, Moscow, Russia;
Pavel Chernikov, Zoologicheskiy Pereulok 9/11. Apt. 13, Moscow, Russia
123242; Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Ulitsa Privolnaya 75/1, Apt. 173,
Moscow, Russia, 109431; Oleg Zenchenko, Vesenniya Street 16, Taytsy,
Petersburg Region, Russia and Kupchinskaya Street 29/1, Apt. 363, St.
Petersburg, Russia 192283; SH Brothers Group, Inc., 3734 Laurel Ave.,
Brooklyn, NY 11224; SN Electronics, Inc., 2650 AB Coney Island Ave.,
Brooklyn, NY 11223; Suntronic F.Z.E., Shiekh Khalifa Bin Zayed, St-
Amberjem Tower E1/913, Ajman, United Arab Emirates; Order Temporarily
Denying Export Privileges
Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations
(the ``Regulations'' or ``EAR''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and
Security (``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of
Export Enforcement (``OEE''), has requested the issuance of an Order
temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges
under the Regulations of: Nikolay Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov,
Kristina Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel Chernikov, Yekaterina
Vetoshkina, Oleg Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc. (``SH Brothers''),
SN Electronics, Inc. (``SN Electronics''), and Suntronic FZE
(``Suntronic''). OEE's request and related information indicates that
these parties are located in New York, the Russian Federation and the
United Arab Emirates (``U.A.E.''), at the respective addresses listed
on the caption page of this order and on page 16, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730
through 774 (2023), originally issued pursuant to the Export
Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''),
which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive
Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as
extended by successive Presidential Notices, continued the
Regulations in effect under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August
13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA'').
While section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except
for three sections which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of
ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules,
regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made
or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant
to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August
13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until
modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action
undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover,
section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary
denial orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Legal Standard
Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.''
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A
``[l]ack of information establishing the precise time a violation may
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.'' Id.
II. OEE'S Request for a Temporary Denial Order
The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian
Federation's (``Russia's'') further invasion of Ukraine by implementing
a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict
Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to
sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily
target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are
intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs,
atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's
strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage.
As of February 24, 2022, any item classified under any Export
Classification Control Number (``ECCN'') in Categories 3 through 9 of
the Commerce Control List (``CCL'') required a license to be exported
or reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8,
2022, the license requirements for Russia were expanded to cover all
items on the CCL. See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These rules were
codified in 15 CFR 746.8, which state, ``a license is required,
excluding deemed exports and deemed reexports, to export, reexport, or
transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or Belarus any item subject
to the EAR and specified in any Export Control Classification Number
(ECCN) on the CCL.''
BIS has imposed additional license requirements for exports,
reexports and transfers to or within Russia of any items subject to the
EAR that were identified under certain Schedule B or Harmonized Tariff
Schedule 6 (``HTS'') numbers under Supplement No. 4 to Part 746--
Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to Sec.
746.5(a)(1)(ii).\2\ HTS codes take their first six digits from the
corresponding Harmonized System (``HS'') code, a standardized numerical
method of classifying traded products used by customs authorities
around the world. On September 14, 2023, working in conjunction with
the United Kingdom and European Union, BIS published a ``Common High
Priority Items List,'' which identified items by their corresponding
HTS codes listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 that Russia sought to
procure for its weapons programs.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, e.g., 87 FR 12856 (March 8, 2022).
\3\ See https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/all-articles/13-policyguidance/country-guidance/2172-russia-export-controls-list-of-common-high-priority-items. Note that additional HTS codes were
added to Supp. No. 4 to Part 746, including for items identified on
the ``Common High Priority Items List,'' pursuant to several Federal
Register notices. See 87 FR 57068 (Sep. 16, 2022); 88 FR 12175 (Feb.
27, 2023); and 88 FR 33922 (May 23, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 77956]]
On or about November 6, 2023, Goltsev, Nasriddinov, Puzyreva,
Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko (collectively ``the co-
conspirators'') were each indicted on multiple counts in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The charges
include, but are not limited to, conspiring to violate U.S. export
control laws in connection with the unlicensed export of items on the
CCL and Supp. No. 4 to Part 746. The co-conspirators are also charged
with smuggling, as well as failure to file and filing false Electronic
Export Information (``EEI'').\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The co-conspirators are also charged with, inter alia,
conspiracy to defraud the United States, wire fraud and wire fraud
conspiracy, and money laundering conspiracy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its request, OEE has presented evidence indicating that, between
at least on or about January 2022 and October 2023, Goltsev,
Nasriddinov, Puzyreva, Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko
conspired to violate ECRA and the EAR by unlawfully sourcing and
exporting millions of dollars in dual-use electronics from the United
States for export to Russia without the required licenses. In instances
where a particular item may not have required an export license, the
co-conspirators also made, and caused to be made, false and misleading
statements with respect to EEI filings in order to conceal the ultimate
end destination and end user.
As alleged in the indictment, Goltsev and Nasriddinov sourced and
purchased U.S.-origin electronics at the direction of Russian
procurement agents, including Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and
Zenchenko. Goltsev, Nasriddinov, and Puzyreva utilized U.S.-registered
companies, SH Brothers Group, Inc. and SN Electronics, Inc., both
located in Brooklyn, NY, as part of the procurement scheme. Before
ultimate diversion to Russia, some of these items were shipped to
third-country transshipment companies, including Suntronic, a front
company located in the United Arab Emirates and utilized by Bochkarev.
Based on the facts alleged in the indictment, Goltsev, Nasriddinov,
Puzyreva, Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko were aware of
U.S. export control laws and took affirmative action to conceal their
unlawful export-related activities in order to deceive U.S.
manufacturers and distributors, and to evade detection by law
enforcement.
A. The Unlawful Procurement Scheme
As further alleged in the indictment, several of the co-
conspirators worked to procure items on behalf of various Russian
entities. For example, until in or about August 2022, Vetoshkina, a
Russian national residing in Russia, served as a procurement manager
for OOO \5\ Radioavtomatika (``Radioavtomatika''), a Russian defense
procurement firm based in Moscow. Radioavtomatika was added to the BIS
Entity List on or about March 3, 2022.\6\ Vetoshkina then began working
for OOO Komtech (``Komtech''), a Moscow-based electronics distributor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``OOO'' is the abbreviation for the Russian business entity
type ``[ocy][bcy][shchcy][iecy][scy][tcy][vcy][ocy] [scy]
[ocy][gcy][rcy][acy][ncy][icy][chcy][iecy][ncy][ncy][ocy][jcy]
[ocy][tcy][vcy][iecy][tcy][scy][tcy][vcy][iecy][ncy][ncy][ocy][scy][t
cy][softcy][yucy],'' which means limited private company and is
roughly the equivalent of a limited liability company or LLC in the
United States.
\6\ See 87 FR 13141 (Mar. 9, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chernikov, a Russian national residing in Russia, conducted
procurement operations for OOO Testkomplekt (``Testkomplekt''), another
Moscow-based electronics distributor that has held contracts with
Russian military entities. Testkomplekt was added to OFAC's Specially
Designated Nationals (``SDN'') list on or about May 19, 2023, pursuant
to Executive Order 14024.\7\ Similarly, Zenchenko conducted procurement
operations for OOO NEVA-EKB (``EKB-Neva''), a Moscow-based electronics
supplier, which was added to OFAC's SDN list on or about May 19, 2023,
pursuant to Executive Order 14024. Goltsev, a Russian national residing
in Canada, also had long-standing relationships with Radioavtomatika,
Testkomplekt, EKB-NEVA and other Russia-based entities, and had
procured electronic components for them for years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1494.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on evidence presented by OEE and as further stated in the
indictment, Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko received
orders from Russian end users in the defense and technology sectors
seeking to acquire U.S.-origin items. They then relayed these requests
to Goltsev, who used aliases, including ``Nick Stevens'' and ``Gio
Ross,'' to communicate with U.S. manufacturers and distributors. In
these communications, Goltsev made material misrepresentations about
the transactions, including about the ultimate end use and end users,
as well as the parties involved in the transactions. Goltsev and
Nasriddinov, a dual-national of Russia and Tajikistan residing in New
York, purchased the items from U.S. companies. Nasriddinov received the
items at various addresses in Brooklyn, New York and supervised their
repackaging. To further the scheme, Puzyreva, Goltsev's spouse,
utilized numerous bank accounts, including one that listed
Nasriddinov's home address as the address of record.
After repackaging the items, Nasriddinov and Goltsev then exported
the items from the United States for transshipment to Russia and
Russian end users, including Radioavtomatika, Komtech, Testkomplekt,
and EKB-NEVA. Using SH Brothers and SN Electronics, Nasriddinov and
Goltsev shipped the items through various intermediaries located in
third countries, including China, India, Turkey, and the United Arab
Emirates. One such intermediary was Suntronic, located in the U.A.E.
and used by Bochkarev to conduct multiple procurement operations for
Russian entities.
As part of the scheme, Goltsev, Nasriddinov, Puzyreva, Bochkarev,
Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko also made, and caused to be made,
material misrepresentations and omissions, including with respect to
EEI filings, to conceal the unlawful procurement transactions. As a
result of their actions, the co-conspirators caused U.S. companies to,
among other things, sell and export electronic components in violation
of ECRA and the EAR.
Some of the items sourced and exported by Goltsev, Nasriddinov,
Puzyreva, Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko included
electronic components and integrated circuits listed in Supp. No. 4 to
Part 746 of the EAR and requiring a license to Russia, which have been
designated as ``Tier 1'' items on the Common High Priority Items List.
These priority items pose a heightened risk of being diverted illegally
to Russia because of their importance to Russia's war efforts.
B. Knowledge of U.S. Export Controls and Intent To Evade
As further alleged in the indictment, communications between the
co-conspirators indicate that they had knowledge of U.S. export
controls and made efforts to conceal their unlawful procurement. For
example, in or about October 2021, after Vetoshkina advised Goltsev
that paperwork for an order of electronics stated that the items were
destined for Russia, Goltsev advised her to use a Hong Kong-based
company as the ``bill-to'' and confirmed that he would nonetheless ship
the items to Radioavtomatika. In another communication to Goltsev in or
about October 2022, Vetoshkina's employee listed several different
electronic components, including coaxial switches and capacitors, that
required a license to
[[Page 77957]]
be shipped to Russia and stated, ``please tell me do you have these
goods, priceless in Russia.'' Goltsev responded with price quotations
for the items.
Based on facts alleged in the indictment, other communications
between Goltsev and Russian procurement agents, including Chernikov,
demonstrate a knowledge of export control laws and sanctions, as well
as an intent to conceal. For example, in a December 2022 text message
exchange with Chernikov regarding an order placed through SH Brothers,
Goltsev requested ``separate invoices. . .the ECCN[s] aren't very
pretty. We'll ship them piecemeal.'' In another communication in or
about February 28, 2023, Goltsev mentions the sanctioning of Electronic
Network, Inc. (``Electronic Network''), a company based in Montreal,
Canada, which was added to the BIS Entity List on or about February 24,
2023.\8\ Goltsev said, ``. . . do me a favor. If anyone ever asks about
me, don't tell them who I am, where I am, etc. . . . Elnet's
[Electronic Network] been in trouble for a long time because they
exported a lot to Russia.'' Goltsev was an account manager and
purchasing coordinator for Electronic Network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See 88 FR 12170 (Feb. 27, 2023).
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Communications between Goltsev and Zenchenko also reflect knowledge
of and familiarity with U.S. export controls. Specifically, Goltsev
also received requests from Zenchenko to obtain items on the CCL that
were controlled for anti-terrorism reasons. For example, on or about
December 16, 2022, in response to a query, Zenchenko advised Goltsev
that ``76 pcs, you can buy them here with ECCN 3A991.c.3.'' In a
message on or about February 1, 2023, Zenchenko asked Goltsev, ``ECCN:
5A991.b.4 can you get this?'' and included a screenshot of a product
from a Texas-based electronics distributor. Similarly, in a message on
or about February 6, 2023, Zenchenko asked Goltsev, ``can you get this
ECCN? 4A994.'' In a message on or about February 22, 2023, Zenchenko
requested ``40 pcs ECCN 5A991.b.1 Can you get this?'' At the time of
these communications, each of ECCNs listed in this paragraph required
an export license to Russia and was subject to a presumption of denial
licensing policy. See Section 746.8. Between November 2022 and February
2023, SH Brothers made nine shipments to Zenchenko in Russia through a
Turkish intermediary.
C. SH Brothers, SN Electronics, and Suntronic
As alleged in the indictment and based on evidence presented by
OEE, the co-conspirators used SH Brothers and SN Electronics to export
items from the United States through intermediaries located in third
countries. OEE has presented evidence that Nasriddinov founded SH
Brothers on or about June 11, 2021 and SN Electronics, which was
registered in his wife's name, on or about January 30, 2023. Both
companies have listed addresses in Brooklyn, New York. One of
intermediaries used for transshipment to Russia was Suntronic, a front
company located in the U.A.E. and used by Bochkarev to conduct
procurement operations for multiple Russian entities. As alleged in the
indictment, on or about and between August 2022 and September 2023, SH
Brothers exported more than 250 shipments of electronic components,
valued at more than $7 million, to third-country transshipment
companies, including Suntronic, where they were then unlawfully
diverted to Russia.
The indictment further alleges that, between in or about November
2022 and August 2023, SH Brothers exported approximately 27 shipments,
valued at approximately $1,086,058, to Suntronic. These shipments were
then sent to Russian end users, including Petersburg Intelligent
Transportation Logistics (``Petersburg''), which was added to OFAC's
SDN list on or about May 19, 2023; Suntronic received approximately $15
million from Petersburg between in or about October 2022 and February
2023. As detailed in the indictment, one of the shipments, occurring in
or about June 23, 2023, was for transceivers listed in Supp. No. 4 to
Part 746 of the EAR and requiring a license to Russia, which carried a
Tier 1 HTS code listed on the Common High Priority Items List. The
transceivers, which have been found in Russian UAVs, required a license
from BIS to be exported to Russia pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1) of
the Regulations. These types of transceivers have been found in Russian
unmanned aerial vehicles (``UAVs'') in Ukraine.
Based on the facts set forth in the indictment, Goltsev and
Bochkarev communicated about the shipments, including ways in which to
conceal the ultimate destination and end users. For example, in a
communication in or about January 2023, Goltsev informed Bochkarev that
he needed an end user declaration and Bochkarev responded, ``darn.''
The two ultimately agreed to falsely list a U.A.E. company as the end
user. In a February 2023 communication, Goltsev advised Bochkarev to
``write something more substantial [to the U.S. company] so that there
are no more questions.'' After Bochkarev asked, ``is it better to
provide them with a Chinese end user,'' Goltsev stated ``yes should be
ok.'' In another message on or about March 3, 2023, Bochkarev asked
Goltsev about the possibility of making one shipment paid ``via the
Chinese company,'' since ``each one separately so expensive, or does it
mean extra trouble at customs?'' Goltsev responded, ``no sir, more than
50-60 will trigger a lot of interest it's better to break it up.''
The indictment also alleges that between in or about September 2022
and November 2022, SH Brothers made approximately 15 shipments of
electronic components, valued at approximately $352,000, to
Testkomplekt through an intermediary located in Hong Kong. In or about
November 2022, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (``CBP'') detained
some shipments from SH Brothers that were allegedly bound for Hong Kong
but ultimately destined for Testkomplekt in Russia. As detailed in the
indictment, Chernikov repeatedly questioned Goltsev about the status of
the detained shipments and provided him with false information to use
in responding to CBP inquiries.
Based on the facts alleged in the indictment and evidence presented
by OEE, SH Brothers also made a shipment of microchips to Vetoshkina's
company, Komtech, through a Turkish intermediary. Specifically, in a
message on or about August 31, 2022, Komtech's founder and director
requested that Vetoshkina procure 3,000 microchips made by an Arizona-
based manufacturer. Vetoshkina sourced the microchips through Goltsev
and SH Brothers, who received several payments from the Turkish
intermediary, including an October 3, 2022 payment for $5,300. The wire
details for this payment listed the part number of the microchips and
denoted ``QTY 2000.''
In a message exchange on or about April 21, 2023, Vetoshkina and
Goltsev discussed shipping the microchips through China or Turkey,
ultimately deciding to make the shipment through Turkey to ``avoid
problems.'' Goltsev provided Vetoshkina with an SH Brothers invoice for
3,000 pieces of the requested microchip, which listed the applicable
HTS codes and payment information for an SH Brothers bank account in
Brooklyn, New York. On or about April 17, 2023, a U.S. company shipped
a package containing the
[[Page 77958]]
microchips was mailed to SH Brothers and two days later, on or about
April 25, 2023, Nasriddinov sent the same items to the intermediary in
Turkey. OEE's evidence includes an invoice for 3,000 ATMEGA8A-MN
Microchip Microcontrollers, and a second line item of 2,000 ATMEGA8A-MN
Microchip Microcontrollers, bearing Tier 1 HTS code 8542310001, which
is listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 of the EAR and requires a license
to Russia. The HTS code is listed on the Common High Priority Items
List and the microchips would have required a license from BIS to be
exported to Russia. See Section 746.5(a)(1)(ii).
Based on OEE's investigation, which remains ongoing, SH Brothers
also furthered the scheme by making false EEI filings, including by
declaring that items were being shipped to one party when they were, in
fact, being shipped to another, presumably to further obfuscate the
transactions with respect to the ultimate destination and to evade
detection by law enforcement. For example, OEE has presented evidence
that, an EEI filing made by SH Brothers in or about February 16, 2023
indicated that shipment was destined for China, with an intermediary
consignee also located in China. Based on corresponding DHL records,
however, the items were shipped to a different location in China not
identified on the EEI. Records also reflect that the shipment contained
items that would have required a license for export to Russia,
specifically CY7C109D-10VXI Infineon SRAM Chips, bearing HTS code
8542320041 and classified under ECCN 3A991.b.2.b.
In another EEI filing made by SH Brothers on or about February 9,
2023, ostensibly to the U.A.E, SH Brothers identified the intermediary
consignee as Suntronic. Corresponding DHL records, however, show that
SH Brothers shipped the items to a company located in Hong Kong. The
shipment contained a ADM3202ARNZ AD Transmitter, bearing HTS code
8542390001, a Tier 1 HTS code listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 of the
EAR, which would have required an export license for export to Russia
pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1).
OEE's investigation also indicates that, in or about January 2023,
in a further effort to evade detection and in response to law
enforcement scrutiny, including the delay or detention of several
outbound shipments from SH Brothers, Goltsev and Nasriddinov began
using SN Electronics to order and export electronic components. As
alleged in the indictment, on or about and between November 8, 2022 and
November 15, 2022, Goltsev and Nasriddinov exchanged a series of
messages discussing a shipment of electronic components that had been
detained by U.S. officials at John F. Kennedy International Airport
(``JFK'') in Queens, New York. Goltsev commented that shipping to
Russia had become ``dangerous'' and went on to say, ``we need to figure
out why they keep holding the package . . . I don't really understand
how they figured [it] out.'' In a subsequent message, on or about
November 9, 2022, Goltsev commented that, ``in the future we will need
to load from several companies, not to attract attention . . . for now
large packages will be dangerous until we understand what they figured
out . . . we will need to think of diversifying the load . . . so that
not everything is moving from the same deck.''
In subsequent communications between on or about January 31, 2023
and February 10, 2023, Nasriddinov confirmed to Goltsev that the ``new
company is already functioning . . . Its called SN Electronics'' and
Goltsev responded, ``Wonderful sir . . . Eagerly waiting for Tax ID
sir. We had problems with some large orders from [a Texas-based
company] . . . we will reorder later from SN.'' Nasriddinov later
provided Goltsev with SN Electronics' registered address in Brooklyn,
New York, which was also the address of a restaurant that Nasriddinov
owned.
As detailed in the indictment, Goltsev and Nasriddinov then used SN
Electronics to obtain approximately $36,871.49 worth of non-reflective
switches, listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 of the EAR and requiring a
license to Russia, from a U.S. company for Chernikov and Testkomplekt.
Although Nasriddinov had initially placed the order for these non-
reflective switches from the U.S. company through SH Brothers, the
order was cancelled and the U.S. company told Goltsev that the
``manufacturer requires that shipments of this product be direct to an
END CUSTOMER from an AUTHORIZED DISTRIBUTOR only.''
Goltsev subsequently placed the same order through SN Electronics,
using the alias ``Gio Ross'' in his email communications with the U.S.
company and falsely claimed in an email on or about February 15, 2023
that SN Electronics was a ``prototype and design manufacturing
company.'' On or about February 21, 2023, the order was shipped to an
SN Electronics address in Brooklyn, New York and, on or about February
27, 2023, Nasriddinov exported the items to a Hong-Kong based
transshipment company frequently utilized by Testkomplekt. The switches
had Tier 1 HTS codes that were included on the Common High Priority
Items List and required a license from BIS to be exported to Russia
pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1).
III. Findings
I find that the evidence presented by BIS demonstrates that a
violation of the Regulations by the above-captioned parties is imminent
in both time and degree of likelihood. This includes evidence
demonstrating the breadth of the conspiracy, that multiple parties and
entities are involved, and that the conduct occurred over a lengthy
period of time. As such, a TDO is needed to give notice to persons and
companies in the United States and abroad that they should cease
dealing with Nikolay Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, Kristina
Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel Chernikov, Yekaterina Vetoshkina,
Oleg Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc. (``SH Brothers''), SN
Electronics, Inc. (``SN Electronics''), and Suntronic FZE
(``Suntronic'') in export or reexport transactions involving items
subject to the EAR. Such a TDO is consistent with the public interest
to preclude future violations of the Regulations given the deliberate,
covert, and determined nature of the misconduct and clear disregard for
complying with U.S. export control laws.
This Order is being issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing
based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation in accordance with
section 766.24 of the Regulations.
It is therefore ordered:
First, that NIKOLAY GOLTSEV, a/k/a NICK STEVENS, a/k/a GIO ROSS,
with an address at 107 Rue Caron, Ste-Anne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada
H9X4A1; SALIMDZHON NASRIDDINOV, with an address at 3734 Laurel Ave.,
Brooklyn, NY 11224; KRISTINA PUZYREVA, with an address at 107 Rue
Caron, Ste-Anne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1; VLADIMIR BOCHKAREV,
with an address at Privolnaya Street 75, Korp.1, Apt. 173, Moscow,
Russia; PAVEL CHERNIKOV, with an address at Zoologicheskiy Pereulok 9/
11. Apt.13, Moscow, Russia 123242; YEKATERINA VETOSHKINA, with an
address at Ulitsa Privolnaya 75/1, Apt. 173, Moscow, Russia, 109431;
OLEG ZENCHENKO, with an address at Vesenniya Street 16, Taytsy,
Petersburg Region, Russia and an address at Kupchinskaya Street 29/1,
Apt. 363, St. Petersburg, Russia 192283; SH BROTHERS GROUP, INC., with
an address at 3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11224; SN ELECTRONICS,
INC., with an address at 2650 AB Coney
[[Page 77959]]
Island Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11223; and SUNTRONIC FZE, with an address at
Shiekh Khalifa Bin Zayed St-Amberjem Tower E1/913 Ajman, United Arab
Emirates; and when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or
assigns, agents, or employees (each a ``Denied Person'' and
collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly,
participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as
``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR
including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License
Exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity
subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item
subject to the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing or other support activities
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item,
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to Nikolay Goltsev, Salimdzhon
Nasriddinov, Kristina Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel Chernikov,
Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc., SN
Electronics, Inc., and Suntronic FZE by affiliation, ownership,
control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or
related services may also be made subject to the provisions of this
Order.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(e) of the EAR,
Nikolay Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, Kristina Puzyreva, Vladimir
Bochkarev, Pavel Chernikov, Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg Zenchenko, SH
Brothers Group, Inc., SN Electronics, Inc., and Suntronic FZE may, at
any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in
support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge,
U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. Respondents Nikolay
Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, Kristina Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev,
Pavel Chernikov, Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg Zenchenko, SH Brothers
Group, Inc., SN Electronics, Inc., and Suntronic FZE may oppose a
request to renew this Order by filing a written submission with the
Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, which must be received not
later than seven days before the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be served on each denied person and
shall be published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
180 days.
Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023-25005 Filed 11-13-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P