Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges, 75541-75550 [2023-24310]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices Whereas, the Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZ) Act provides for ‘‘. . . the establishment . . . of foreign-trade zones in ports of entry of the United States, to expedite and encourage foreign commerce, and for other purposes,’’ and authorizes the Board to grant to qualified corporations the privilege of establishing foreign-trade zones in or adjacent to U.S. Customs and Border Protection ports of entry; Whereas, the Board adopted the alternative site framework (ASF) (15 CFR 400.2(c)) as an option for the establishment or reorganization of zones; Whereas, the Lummi Indian Business Council, grantee of Foreign-Trade Zone 128, submitted an application to the Board (FTZ Docket B–32–2023, docketed May 9, 2023) for authority to reorganize under the ASF with a service area that includes all Lummi Nation property which encompasses the Lummi Indian Reservation plus all property owned by the Lummi Nation outside the exterior boundaries of the Lummi Indian Reservation, in and adjacent to the Bellingham Customs and Border Protection port of entry, and FTZ 128’s existing Site 1 would be categorized as a magnet site; Whereas, notice inviting public comment was given in the Federal Register (88 FR 30718, May 9, 2023) and the application has been processed pursuant to the FTZ Act and the Board’s regulations; and, Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the examiners’ report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and the Board’s regulations are satisfied; Now, Therefore, the Board hereby orders: The application to reorganize FTZ 128 under the ASF is approved, subject to the FTZ Act and the Board’s regulations, including section 400.13, to the Board’s standard 2,000-acre activation limit for the zone. lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 Dated: October 30, 2023. Lisa W. Wang, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance, Alternate Chairman, ForeignTrade Zones Board. [FR Doc. 2023–24358 Filed 11–2–23; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Foreign-Trade Zones Board Bureau of Industry and Security [Order No. 2150] Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges Reorganization of Foreign-Trade Zone 281 (Expansion of Service Area) Under Alternative Site Framework; Miami, Florida Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of June 18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a–81u), the Foreign-Trade Zones Board (the Board) adopts the following Order: Whereas, the Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZ) Act provides for ‘‘. . . the establishment . . . of foreign-trade zones in ports of entry of the United States, to expedite and encourage foreign commerce, and for other purposes,’’ and authorizes the Board to grant to qualified corporations the privilege of establishing foreign-trade zones in or adjacent to U.S. Customs and Border Protection ports of entry; Whereas, the Board adopted the alternative site framework (ASF) (15 CFR 400.2(c)) as an option for the establishment or reorganization of zones; Whereas, Miami-Dade County, grantee of Foreign-Trade Zone 281, submitted an application to the Board (FTZ Docket B–22–2023, docketed March 22, 2023) for authority to expand the service area of the zone to include all of Miami-Dade County, Florida, as described in the application, within the Miami Customs and Border Protection port of entry; Whereas, notice inviting public comment was given in the Federal Register (88 FR 18295–18296, March 28, 2023) and the application has been processed pursuant to the FTZ Act and the Board’s regulations; and, Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the examiners’ report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and the Board’s regulations are satisfied; Now, Therefore, the Board hereby orders: The application to reorganize FTZ 281 to expand the service area under the ASF is approved, subject to the FTZ Act and the Board’s regulations, including section 400.13, and to the Board’s standard 2,000-acre activation limit for the zone. Dated: October 30, 2023. Lisa W. Wang, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance, Alternate Chairman, ForeignTrade Zones Board. [FR Doc. 2023–24357 Filed 11–2–23; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 75541 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Mahmoud Amini, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation, 42 Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France; Sirjanco Trading LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Mahan Air General Trading LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates; Mehdi Bahrami, Mahan Airways—Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey; Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a al-Naser Airlines, a/ k/a Al Naser Wings Airline, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and, Air Freight Ltd., Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St. 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St. 3/H.20) Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan; Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay, Home 46, AlKarrada, Babil Region, District 929, St. 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177; Bahar Safwa General Trading, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Aviation, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Ltd., a/k/a Sky Blue Bird FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade Zone, United Arab Emirates; Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam Muhammad, Anwar Nur Shammout, a/k/a Issam Anwar, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17–18 Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey. Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (‘‘EAR’’ or ‘‘the Regulations’’), I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’) to renew the temporary denial order issued in this matter on May 5, 2023. I find that E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 75542 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices renewal of this order, as modified, is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations and that renewal for an extended period is appropriate because Mahan Airways has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.1 I. Procedural History On March 17, 2008, Darryl W. Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement (‘‘Assistant Secretary’’), signed an order denying Mahan Airways’ export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order also named as denied persons Blue Airways, of Yerevan, Armenia (‘‘Blue Airways of Armenia’’), as well as the ‘‘Balli Group Respondents,’’ namely, Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The order was issued ex parte pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations, and went into effect on March 21, 2008, the date it was published in the Federal Register. This temporary denial order (‘‘TDO’’) was renewed in accordance with Section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.2 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 1 The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2023), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601– 4623 (Supp. III 2015)) (‘‘EAA’’), which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)) (‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 2 Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods, if it believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be made in writing no later than 20 days before the scheduled expiration date of a temporary denial order. Renewal requests may include discussion of VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 Subsequent renewals also have issued pursuant to Section 766.24(d), including most recently on May 5, 2023.3 Some of the renewal orders and the modification orders that have issued between renewals have added certain parties as respondents or as related persons, or effected the removal of certain parties.4 The September 11, 2009 renewal order continued the denial order as to Mahan Airways, but not as to the Balli Group Respondents or Blue Airways of Armenia.5 As part of the February 25, 2011 renewal order, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard (a/k/a Kosarian Fard), Mahmoud Amini, and Gatewick LLC (a/k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo Services, a/k/a Gatewick Aviation any additional or changed circumstances, and may seek appropriate modifications to the order, including the addition of parties as respondents or related persons, or the removal of parties previously added as respondents or related persons. BIS is not required to seek renewal as to all parties, and a removal of a party can be effected if, without more, BIS does not seek renewal as to that party. Any party included or added to a temporary denial order as a respondent may oppose a renewal request as set forth in section 766.24(d). Parties included or added as related persons can at any time appeal their inclusion as a related person, but cannot challenge the underlying temporary denial order, either as initially issued or subsequently renewed, and cannot oppose a renewal request. See also note 4, infra. 3 The May 5, 2023 renewal order was effective upon issuance and published in the Federal Register on May 10, 2023 (88 FR 30,078). Prior renewal orders issued on September 17, 2008, March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009, March 9, 2010, September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, February 15, 2012, August 9, 2012, February 4, 2013, July 31, 2013, January 24, 2014, July 22, 2014, January 16, 2015, July 13, 2015, January 7, 2016, July 7, 2016, December 30, 2016, June 27, 2017, December 20, 2017, June 14, 2018, December 11, 2018, June 5, 2019, May 29, 2020, November 24, 2020, May 21, 2021, November 17, 2021, May 13, 2022, November 8, 2022, and May 5, 2023, respectively. The August 24, 2011 renewal followed the issuance of a modification order that issued on July 1, 2011, to add Zarand Aviation as a respondent. The July 13, 2015 renewal followed a modification order that issued May 21, 2015, and added Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as respondents. Each of the renewal orders and each of the modification orders referenced in this footnote or elsewhere in this order has been published in the Federal Register. 4 Pursuant to sections 766.23 and 766.24(c) of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to a denied person by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may be added as a ‘‘related person’’ to a temporary denial order to prevent evasion of the order. 5 Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation settled proposed BIS administrative charges as part of a settlement agreement that was approved by a settlement order issued on February 5, 2010. The sanctions imposed pursuant to that settlement and order included, inter alia, a $15 million civil penalty and a requirement to conduct five external audits and submit related audit reports. The Balli Group Respondents also settled related charges with the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Services) were added as related persons to prevent evasion of the TDO.6 A modification order issued on July 1, 2011, adding Zarand Aviation as a respondent in order to prevent an imminent violation.7 As part of the August 24, 2011 renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, and Ali Eslamian were added as related persons. Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. were added as related persons by a modification order issued on April 9, 2012. Mehdi Bahrami was added as a related person as part of the February 4, 2013 renewal order. On May 21, 2015, a modification order was issued adding Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as respondents. As detailed in that order and discussed further infra, these respondents were added to the TDO based upon evidence that they were acting together to, inter alia, obtain aircraft subject to the Regulations for export or reexport to Mahan in violation of the Regulations and the TDO. Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief executive officer, Issam Shammout, were added as related persons as part of the July 13, 2015 renewal order.8 On November 16, 2017, a modification order issued to remove Ali Eslamian, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. as related persons following a request by OEE for their removal.9 6 See note 4, supra, concerning the addition of related persons to a temporary denial order. Kosarian Fard and Mahmoud Amini remain parties to the TDO. On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick resolved administrative charges against Gatewick, including a charge for acting contrary to the terms of a BIS denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)). In addition to the payment of a civil penalty, the settlement includes a seven-year denial order. The first two years of the denial period were active, with the remaining five years suspended conditioned upon Gatewick’s full and timely payment of the civil penalty and its compliance with the Regulations during the seven-year denial order period. This denial order, in effect, superseded the TDO as to Gatewick, which was not included as part of the January 16, 2015 renewal order. The Gatewick LLC Final Order was published in the Federal Register on August 20, 2014. See 79 FR 49,283 (Aug. 20, 2014). 7 Zarand Aviation’s export privileges remained denied until July 22, 2014, when it was not included as part of the renewal order issued on that date. 8 The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) designated Sky Blue Bird and Issam Shammout as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (‘‘SDGTs’’) on May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for ‘‘providing support to Iran’s Mahan Air.’’ See 80 FR 30,762 (May 29, 2015). 9 The November 16, 2017 modification was published in the Federal Register on December 4, 2017. See 82 FR 57,203 (Dec. 4, 2017). On September 28, 2017, BIS and Ali Eslamian resolved an administrative charge for acting contrary to the terms of the denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)) that was based upon Eslamian’s violation of the TDO after E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices The December 11, 2018 renewal order continued the denial of the export privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, Bahar Safwa General Trading, Sky Blue Bird Group, and Issam Shammout. On April 6, 2023, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for renewal of the TDO that issued on November 8, 2022. The written request was made more than 20 days before the TDO’s scheduled expiration. Notice of the renewal request was provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading in accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received. Furthermore, no appeal of the related person determinations made as part of the September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, April 9, 2012, February 4, 2013, and July 13, 2015 renewal or modification orders has been made by Kosarian Fard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue Bird Group, or Issam Shammout.10 II. Renewal of the TDO lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 A. Legal Standard Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue or renew an order temporarily denying a respondent’s export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ‘‘imminent violation’’ of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be ‘imminent’ either in time or degree of likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ‘‘either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As to the likelihood of future violations, his addition to the TDO on August 24, 2011. Equipco (UK) Ltd. and Skyco (UK) Ltd., two companies owned and operated by Eslamian, also were parties to the settlement agreement and were added to the settlement order as related persons. In addition to other sanctions, the settlement provides that Eslamian, Equipco, and Skyco shall be subject to a conditionally suspended denial order for a period of four years from the date of the settlement order. 10 A party named or added as a related person may not oppose the issuance or renewal of the underlying temporary denial order, but may file an appeal of the related person determination in accordance with section 766.23(c). See also note 2, supra. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge ‘‘is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent [.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.’’ Id. If BIS believes that renewal of a denial order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation, it may file a written request for renewal, with any modifications if appropriate. 15 CFR 766.24(d)(1). The written request, which must be filed no later than 20 days prior to the TDO’s expiration, should set forth the basis for BIS’s belief that renewal is necessary, including any additional or changed circumstances. Id. ‘‘In cases demonstrating a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional period not exceeding one year.’’ 11 Id. B. The TDO and BIS’s Requests for Renewal OEE’s request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the initial TDO, and the renewal and modification orders subsequently issued in this matter, including the May 21, 2015 modification order and the renewal order issued on November 8, 2022, and the evidence developed over the course of this investigation, which indicate a blatant disregard of U.S. export controls and the TDO. The initial TDO was issued as a result of evidence that showed that Mahan Airways and other parties engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by knowingly reexporting to Iran three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically Boeing 747s (‘‘Aircraft 1–3’’), items subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control Classification Number (‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.b, without the required U.S. Government authorization. Further evidence submitted by BIS indicated that Mahan Airways was involved in the attempted re-export of three additional U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (‘‘Aircraft 4–6’’) to Iran. As discussed in the September 17, 2008 renewal order, evidence presented by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1–3 continued to be flown on Mahan Airways’ routes after issuance of the TDO, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself.12 It also showed that 11 88 FR 59791 (Aug. 30, 2023). in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k). 12 Engaging PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 75543 Aircraft 1–3 had been flown in further violation of the Regulations and the TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an Iranian Government airline. Moreover, as discussed in the March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009 and March 9, 2010 renewal orders, Mahan Airways registered Aircraft 1–3 in Iran, obtained Iranian tail numbers for them (EP–MNA, EP–MNB, and EP–MNE, respectively), and continued to operate at least two of them in violation of the Regulations and the TDO,13 while also committing an additional knowing and willful violation when it negotiated for and acquired an additional U.S.-origin aircraft. The additional acquired aircraft was an MD–82 aircraft, which subsequently was painted in Mahan Airways’ livery and flown on multiple Mahan Airways’ routes under tail number TC–TUA. The March 9, 2010 renewal order also noted that a court in the United Kingdom (‘‘U.K.’’) had found Mahan Airways in contempt of court on February 1, 2010, for failing to comply with that court’s December 21, 2009 and January 12, 2010 orders compelling Mahan Airways to remove the Boeing 747s from Iran and ground them in the Netherlands. Mahan Airways and the Balli Group Respondents had been litigating before the U.K. court concerning ownership and control of Aircraft 1–3. In a letter to the U.K. court dated January 12, 2010, Mahan Airways’ Chairman indicated, inter alia, that Mahan Airways opposes U.S. Government actions against Iran, that it continued to operate the aircraft on its routes in and out of Tehran (and had 158,000 ‘‘forward bookings’’ for these aircraft), and that it wished to continue to do so and would pay damages if required by that court, rather than ground the aircraft. The September 3, 2010 renewal order discussed the fact that Mahan Airways’ violations of the TDO extended beyond operating U.S.-origin aircraft and attempting to acquire additional U.S.origin aircraft. In February 2009, while subject to the TDO, Mahan Airways participated in the export of computer motherboards, items subject to the Regulations and designated as EAR99, from the United States to Iran, via the United Arab Emirates (‘‘UAE’’), in violation of both the TDO and the Regulations, by transporting and/or forwarding the computer motherboards from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airways’ violations were facilitated by Gatewick 13 The third Boeing 747 appeared to have undergone significant service maintenance and may not have been operational at the time of the March 9, 2010 renewal order. E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 75544 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 LLC, which not only participated in the transaction, but also has stated to BIS that it acted as Mahan Airways’ sole booking agent for cargo and freight forwarding services in the UAE. Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing in the U.K. court, Mahan Airways asserted that Aircraft 1–3 were not being used, but stated in pertinent part that the aircraft were being maintained in Iran ‘‘in an airworthy condition’’ and that, depending on the outcome of its U.K. court appeal, the aircraft ‘‘could immediately go back into service . . . on international routes into and out of Iran.’’ Mahan Airways’ January 24, 2011 submission to U.K. Court of Appeal, at p. 25, ¶¶ 108, 110. This clearly stated intent, both on its own and in conjunction with Mahan Airways’ prior misconduct and statements, demonstrated the need to renew the TDO in order to prevent imminent future violations. Two of these three 747s subsequently were removed from Iran and are no longer in Mahan Airways’ possession. The third of these 747s remained in Iran under Mahan’s control. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224, this 747 was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (‘‘SDGT’’) by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) on September 19, 2012.14 Furthermore, as discussed in the February 4, 2013 Order, open source information indicated that this 747, painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways, had been flown between Iran and Syria, and was suspected of ferrying weapons and/or other equipment to the Syrian Government from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In addition, as first detailed in the July 1, 2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, and discussed in subsequent renewal orders in this matter, Mahan Airways also continued to evade U.S. export control laws by operating two Airbus A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airways’ livery and logo, on flights into and out of Iran.15 At the time of the July 1, 2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, these Airbus A310s were registered in France, with tail numbers F–OJHH and F–OJHI, 14 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/ 20120919.aspx. 15 The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin engines. The engines are subject to the Regulations and classified under Export Control Classification (‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the Regulations. They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 respectively.16 The August 2012 renewal order also found that Mahan Airways had acquired another Airbus A310 aircraft subject to the Regulations, with MSN 499 and Iranian tail number EP–VIP, in violation of the Regulations.17 On September 19, 2012, all three Airbus A310 aircraft (tail numbers F–OJHH, F–OJHI, and EP–VIP) were designated as SDGTs.18 The February 4, 2013 renewal order laid out further evidence of continued and additional efforts by Mahan Airways and other persons acting in concert with Mahan, including Kral Aviation and another Turkish company, to procure U.S.-origin engines—two GE CF6–50C2 engines, with MSNs 517621 and 517738, respectively—and other aircraft parts in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.19 The February 4, 2013 order also added Mehdi Bahrami as a related person in accordance with Section 766.23 of the Regulations. Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-President and the head of Mahan’s Istanbul Office, also was involved in Mahan’s acquisition of the original three Boeing 747s (Aircraft 1–3) that resulted in the original TDO, and has had a business 16 OEE subsequently presented evidence that after the August 24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways worked along with Kerman Aviation and others to de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France and to register both aircraft in Iran (with, respectively, Iranian tail numbers EP–MHH and EP–MHI). It was determined subsequent to the February 15, 2012 renewal order that the registration switch for these A310s was cancelled, and that Mahan Airways then continued to fly the aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F– OJHH and F–OJHI, respectively). Both aircraft apparently remain in Mahan Airways’ possession. 17 See note 14, supra. 18 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/ 20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18, 2011. 77 FR 64427 (October 18, 2011). 19 Kral Aviation was referenced in the February 4, 2013 renewal order as ‘‘Turkish Company No. 1.’’ Kral Aviation purchased a GE CF6–50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in July 2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able to prevent this engine from reaching Mahan by issuing a redelivery order to the freight forwarder in accordance with Section 758.8 of the Regulations. OEE also issued Kral Aviation a redelivery order for the second CF6–50C2 engine (MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner of the second engine subsequently cancelled the item’s sale to Kral Aviation. In September 2012, OEE was alerted by a U.S. exporter that another Turkish company (‘‘Turkish Company No. 2’’) was attempting to purchase aircraft spare parts intended for re-export by Turkish Company No. 2 to Mahan Airways. See February 4, 2013 renewal order. On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added to BIS’s Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. See 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013). Companies and individuals are added to the Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. See 15 CFR 744.11. PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 relationship with Mahan dating back to 1997. The July 31, 2013 renewal order detailed additional evidence obtained by OEE showing efforts by Mahan Airways to obtain another GE CF6–50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the United States via Turkey. Multiple Mahan employees, including Mehdi Bahrami, were involved in or aware of matters related to the engine’s arrival in Turkey from the United States, plans to visually inspect the engine, and prepare it for shipment from Turkey. Mahan Airways sought to obtain this U.S.-origin engine through Pioneer Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yonetim Danismanlik (‘‘Pioneer Logistics’’), an aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey, and its director/operator, Gulnihal Yegane, a Turkish national who previously had conducted Mahan related business with Mehdi Bahrami and Ali Eslamian. Moreover, as referenced in the July 31, 2013 renewal order, a sworn affidavit by Kosol Surinanda, also known as Kosol Surinandha, Managing Director of Mahan’s General Sales Agent in Thailand, stated that the shares of Pioneer Logistics for which he was the listed owner were ‘‘actually the property of and owned by Mahan.’’ He further stated that he held ‘‘legal title to the shares until otherwise required by Mahan’’ but would ‘‘exercise the rights granted to [him] exactly and only as instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/ or decisions [would] only and exclusively reflect the wills and demands of Mahan[.]’’ 20 The January 24, 2014 renewal order outlined OEE’s continued investigation of Mahan Airways’ activities and detailed an attempt by Mahan, which OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an Indonesian aircraft parts supplier, two U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF–502R–5 aircraft engines (MSNs LF5660 and LF5325), items subject to the Regulations, from a U.S. company located in Texas. An invoice of the Indonesian aircraft parts supplier dated March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways as the purchaser of the engines and included a Mahan ship-to address. OEE also obtained a Mahan air waybill dated March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.origin aircraft parts subject to the Regulations—including, among other items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a transmitter, and a power control unit— being transported by Mahan from Turkey to Iran in violation of the TDO. 20 Pioneer Logistics, Gulnihal Yegane, and Kosol Surinanda also were added to the Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75,458 (Dec. 12, 2013). E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices The July 22, 2014 renewal order discussed open source evidence from the March–June 2014 time period regarding two BAE regional jets, items subject to the Regulations, that were painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP–MOI and EP–MOK, respectively.21 In addition, aviation industry resources indicated that these aircraft were obtained by Mahan Airways in late November 2013 and June 2014, from Ukrainian Mediterranean Airline, a Ukrainian airline that was added to BIS’s Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations) on August 15, 2011, for acting contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.22 Open source information indicated that at least EP– MOI remained active in Mahan’s fleet, and that the aircraft was being operated on multiple flights in July 2014. The January 16, 2015 renewal order detailed evidence of additional attempts by Mahan Airways to acquire items subject to the Regulations in further violation of the TDO. Specifically, in March 2014, OEE became aware of an inertial reference unit bearing serial number 1231 (‘‘the IRU’’) that had been sent to the United States for repair. The IRU is a U.S.-origin item, subject to the Regulations, classified under ECCN 7A103, and controlled for missile technology reasons. Upon closer inspection, it was determined that IRU came from or had been installed on an Airbus A340 aircraft bearing MSN 056. Further investigation revealed that as of approximately February 2014, this aircraft was registered under Iranian tail number EP–MMB and had been painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways. The January 16, 2015 renewal order also described related efforts by the lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 21 The BAE regional jets are powered with U.S.origin engines. The engines are subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. These aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR. They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. 22 See 76 FR 50,407 (Aug. 15, 2011). The July 22, 2014 renewal order also referenced two Airbus A320 aircraft painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP–MMK and EP–MML, respectively. OEE’s investigation also showed that Mahan obtained these aircraft in November 2013, from Khors Air Company, another Ukrainian airline that, like Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines, was added to BIS’s Entity List on August 15, 2011. Open source evidence indicates the two Airbus A320 aircraft may have been transferred by Mahan Airways to another Iranian airline in October 2014, and issued Iranian tail numbers EP–APE and EP– APF, respectively. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 Departments of Justice and Treasury to further thwart Mahan’s illicit procurement efforts. Specifically, on August 14, 2014, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland filed a civil forfeiture complaint for the IRU pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(b) that resulted in the court issuing an Order of Forfeiture on December 2, 2014. EP–MMB remains listed as active in Mahan Airways’ fleet and has been used on flights into and out of Iran as recently as December 19, 2017. Additionally, on August 29, 2014, OFAC blocked the property and interests in property of Asian Aviation Logistics of Thailand, a Mahan Airways affiliate or front company, pursuant to Executive Order 13224. In doing so, OFAC described Mahan Airways’ use of Asian Aviation Logistics to evade sanctions by making payments on behalf of Mahan for the purchase of engines and other equipment.23 The May 21, 2015 modification order detailed the acquisition of two aircraft, specifically an Airbus A340 bearing MSN 164 and an Airbus A321 bearing MSN 550, that were purchased by Al Naser Airlines in late 2014/early 2015 and were under the possession, control, and/or ownership of Mahan Airways.24 The sales agreements for these two aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah Alhay for Al Naser Airlines.25 Payment information reveals that multiple electronic funds transfers (‘‘EFT’’) were made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General Trading in order to acquire MSNs 164 and 550. The May 21, 2015 modification order also laid out evidence showing the respondents’ attempts to obtain other controlled aircraft, including aircraft physically located in the United States in similarlypatterned transactions during the same 23 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/ 20140829.aspx. See 79 FR 55,073 (Sep. 15, 2014). OFAC also blocked the property and property interests of Pioneer Logistics of Turkey on August 29, 2014. Id. Mahan Airways’ use of Pioneer Logistics in an effort to evade the TDO and the Regulations was discussed in a prior renewal order, as summarized, supra, at 14. BIS added both Asian Aviation Logistics and Pioneer Logistics to the Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013). 24 Both of these aircraft are powered by U.S.origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. Both aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. 25 The evidence obtained by OEE showed Ali Abdullah Alhay as a 25% owner of Al Naser Airlines. PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 75545 recent time period. Transactional documents involving two Airbus A320s bearing MSNs 82 and 99, respectively, again showed Ali Abdullah Alhay signing sales agreements for Al Naser Airlines.26 A review of the payment information for these aircraft similarly revealed EFTs from Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General Trading that follow the pattern described for MSNs 164 and 550, supra. MSNs 82 and 99 were detained by OEE Special Agents prior to their planned export from the United States. The July 13, 2015 renewal order outlined evidence showing that Al Naser Airlines’ attempts to acquire aircraft on behalf of Mahan Airways extended beyond MSNs 164 and 550 to include a total of nine aircraft.27 Four of the aircraft, all of which are subject to the Regulations and were obtained by Mahan from Al Naser Airlines, had been issued the following Iranian tail numbers: EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP– MMG (MSN 383), EP–MMH (MSN 391) and EP–MMR (MSN 416), respectively.28 Publicly available flight tracking information provided evidence that at the time of the July 13, 2015 renewal, both EP–MMH and EP–MMR were being actively flown on routes into 26 Both aircraft were physically located in the United States and therefore are subject to the Regulations pursuant to Section 734.3(a)(1). Moreover, these Airbus A320s are powered by U.S.origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under Export Control Classification Number ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A320s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. 27 This evidence included a press release dated May 9, 2015, that appeared on Mahan Airways’ website and stated that Mahan ‘‘added 9 modern aircraft to its air fleet [,]’’ and that the newly acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and one Airbus A321. See https://www.mahan.aero/en/ mahan-air/press-room/44. The press release was subsequently removed from Mahan Airways’ website. Publicly available aviation databases similarly showed that Mahan had obtained nine additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May 2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also discussed in the July 13, 2015 renewal order, Sky Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shammout, was actively involved in Al Naser Airlines’ acquisition of MSNs 164 and 550, and the attempted acquisition of MSNs 82 and 99 (which were detained by OEE). 28 The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 75546 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 and out of Iran in violation of the Regulations.29 The January 7, 2016 renewal order discussed evidence that Mahan Airways had begun actively flying EP–MMD on international routes into and out of Iran. Additionally, the January 7, 2016 order described publicly available aviation database and flight tracking information indicating that Mahan Airways continued efforts to acquire Iranian tail numbers and press into active service under Mahan’s livery and logo at least two more of the Airbus A340 aircraft it had obtained from or through Al Naser Airlines: EP–MME (MSN 371) and EP– MMF (MSN 376), respectively. The July 7, 2016 renewal order described Mahan Airways’ acquisition of a BAE Avro RJ–85 aircraft (MSN 2392) in violation of the Regulations and its subsequent registration under Iranian tail number EP–MOR.30 This information was corroborated by publicly available information on the website of Iran’s civil aviation authority. The July 7, 2016 order also outlined Mahan’s continued operation of EP– MMF in violation of the Regulations on routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and Shanghai, China, respectively. The December 30, 2016 renewal order outlined Mahan’s continued operation of multiple Airbus aircraft, including EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP–MMF (MSN 376), and EP–MMH (MSN 391), which were acquired from or through Al Naser Airlines, as previously detailed in pertinent part in the July 13, 2015 and January 7, 2016 renewal orders. Publicly available flight tracking information showed that the aircraft were operated on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Beijing, China, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Istanbul, Turkey.31 29 There is some publicly available information indicating that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying under Iranian tail number EP–MMR is now MSN 615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Airlines in violation of the Regulations. Moreover, both aircraft were designated as SDGTs by OFAC on May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224. See 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015). 30 The BAE Avro RJ–85 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The BAE Avro RJ– 85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result is subject to the EAR regardless of its location. The aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or re-export to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. 31 Specifically, on December 22, 2016, EP–MMD (MSN 164) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran, Iran. Between December 20 and December 22, 2016, EP– MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and Istanbul, Turkey, respectively. Between December 26 and December 28, 2016, EP– VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 The June 27, 2017 renewal order included similar evidence regarding Mahan Airways’ operation of multiple Airbus aircraft subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to, aircraft procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Moscow, Russia, Shanghai, China and Kabul, Afghanistan. The June 27, 2017 order also detailed evidence concerning a suspected planned or attempted diversion to Mahan of an Airbus A340 subject to the Regulations that had first been mentioned in OEE’s December 13, 2016 renewal request. The December 20, 2017 renewal order presented evidence that a Mahan employee attempted to initiate negotiations with a U.S. company for the purchase of an aircraft subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A610. Moreover, the order highlighted Al Naser Airlines’ acquisition, via lease, of at least possession and/or control of a Boeing 737 (MSN 25361), bearing tail number YR–SEB, and an Airbus A320 (MSN 357), bearing tail number YR– SEA, from a Romanian company in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.32 Open source information indicates that after the December 20, 2017 renewal order publicly exposed Al Naser’s acquisition of these two aircraft (MSNs 25361 and 357), the leases were subsequently cancelled and the aircraft returned to their owner. The December 20, 2017 renewal order also included evidence indicating that Mahan Airways was continuing to operate a number of aircraft subject to the Regulations, including aircraft originally procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Lahore, Pakistan, Shanghai, China, Ankara, Turkey, Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq. The June 14, 2018 renewal order outlined evidence that Mahan began actively operating EP–MMT, an Airbus A340 aircraft (MSN 292) acquired in 2017 and previously registered in Kazakhstan under tail number UP– A4003, on international flights into and out of Iran.33 It also discussed evidence MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 32 The Airbus A320 is powered with U.S.-origin engines, which are subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control Classification (‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.d. The engines are valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft, which consequently is subject to the EAR. The aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or reexport to Iran would require U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. 33 The Airbus A340 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 that Mahan continued to operate a number of aircraft subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to, EP–MME, EP–MMF, and EP–MMH, on international flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Beijing, China. The June 14, 2018 renewal order also noted OFAC’s May 24, 2018 designation of Otik Aviation, a/k/a Otik Havacilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi, of Turkey, as an SDGT pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for providing material support to Mahan, as well as OFAC’s designation as SDGTs of an additional twelve aircraft in which Mahan has an interest.34 The June 14, 2018 order also cited the April 2018 arrest and arraignment of a U.S. citizen on a three-count criminal information filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey involving the unlicensed exports of U.S.-origin aircraft parts valued at over $2 million to Iran, including to Mahan Airways. The December 11, 2018 renewal order detailed publicly available information showing that Mahan Airways had continued operating a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP–MMB, EP–MME, EP– MMF, and EP–MMQ, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, Guangzhou, China, Bangkok, Thailand, and Dubai, UAE.35 It also discussed that OEE’s continued classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result is subject to the Regulations regardless of its location. The aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of this aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. On June 4, 2018, EP–MMT (MSN 292) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran. 34 See 83 FR 27828 (June 14, 2018). OFAC’s related press release stated in part that ‘‘[o]ver the last several years, Otik Aviation has procured and delivered millions of dollars in aviation-related spare and replacement parts for Mahan Air, some of which are procured from the United States and the European Union. As recently as 2017, Otik Aviation continued to provide Mahan Air with replacement parts worth well over $100,000 per shipment, such as aircraft brakes.’’ The twelve additional Mahan-related aircraft that were designated are: EP–MMA (MSN 20), EP–MMB (MSN 56), EP–MMC (MSN 282), EP–MMJ (MSN 526), EP–MMV (MSN 2079), EP–MNF (MSN 547), EP–MOD (MSN 3162), EP–MOM (MSN 3165), EP– MOP (MSN 2257), EP–MOQ (MSN 2261), EP–MOR (MSN 2392), and EP–MOS (MSN 2347). See https:// home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0395. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/ 20180524.aspx. 35 Flight tracking information showed that on December 10, 2018, EP–MMB (MSN 56) flew from Istanbul, Turkey to Tehran, Iran, and EP–MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on December 6, 2018, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran, and on December 9, 2018, EP–MMQ (MSN 449) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran, Iran. E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 investigation of Mahan Airways and its affiliates and agents had resulted in an October 2018 guilty plea by Arzu Sagsoz, a Turkish national, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, stemming from her involvement in a conspiracy to export a U.S.-origin aircraft engine, valued at approximately $810,000, to Mahan. The December 11, 2018 order also noted OFAC’s September 14, 2018 designation of Mahan-related entities as SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order 13224, namely, My Aviation Company Limited, of Thailand, and Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD, a/k/a Mahan Travel a/k/a Mihan Travel & Tourism SDN BHD, of Malaysia.36 As general sales agents for Mahan Airways, these companies sold cargo space aboard Mahan Airways’ flights, including on flights to Iran, and provided other services to or for the benefit of Mahan Airways and its operations.37 The June 5, 2019 renewal order highlighted Mahan’s continued violation of the TDO and the Regulations. An end-use check conducted by BIS in Malaysia in March 2019 uncovered evidence that, on approximately ten occasions, Mahan had caused, aided and/or abetted the unlicensed export of U.S.-origin items subject to the Regulations from the United States to Iran via Malaysia. The items included helicopter shafts, transmitters, and other aircraft parts, some of which are listed on the Commerce Control List and controlled on anti-terrorism grounds. The June 5, 2019 order also detailed publicly available flight tracking information showing that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran, including on routes to and from Damascus, Syria.38 36 See 83 FR 34301 (July 19, 2018) (designation of Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on July 9, 2018), and 83 FR 53359 (Oct. 22, 2018) (designation of My Aviation Company Limited and updating of entry for Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on September 14, 2018). 37 OFAC’s press release concerning its designation of My Aviation Company Limited on September 14, 2018, states in part that ‘‘[t]his Thailand-based company has disregarded numerous U.S. warnings, issued publicly and delivered bilaterally to the Thai government, to sever ties with Mahan Air.’’ My Aviation provides cargo services to Mahan Airways, including freight booking, and works with local freight forwarding entities to ship cargo on regularly scheduled Mahan Airways’ flights to Tehran, Iran. My Aviation has also provided Mahan Airways with passenger booking services. See https://home.treasury.gov/ news/press-releases/sm484. 38 Specifically, on May 26, 2019, EP–MMJ (MSN 526) flew from Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran. In addition, on May 24, 2019, EP–MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, and on May 23, 2019, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 The June 5, 2019 order also described actions taken by both BIS and OFAC to thwart efforts by entities connected to or acting on behalf of Mahan Airways to violate U.S. export controls and sanctions related to Iran. On May 14, 2019, BIS added Manohar Nair, Basha Asmath Shaikh, and two co-located companies that they operate, Emirates Hermes General Trading and Presto Freight International, LLC, to the Entity List pursuant to Section 744.11 of the Regulations, including for engaging in activities to procure U.S.-origin items on Mahan’s behalf.39 On January 24, 2019, OFAC designated as SDGTs Flight Travel LLC, which is Mahan’s general service agent in Yerevan, Armenia, and Qeshm Fars Air, an Iranian airline which operates two U.S.-origin Boeing 747s 40 and is owned or controlled by Mahan, and also linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC–QF).41 The December 2, 2019 renewal order noted that OEE’s on-going investigation revealed that U.S.-origin passenger flight and database management software subject to the Regulations was provided to a company in Turkey and subsequently used to facilitate and service Mahan’s operations into and out of Turkey in further violation of the Regulations. Additionally, open source information, including flight tracking data and news articles published in October 2019, showed that Mahan Airways was now operating a U.S.origin Boeing 747 on routes between Iranian airports in Tehran, Kish Island, and Mashhad. This aircraft, bearing Iranian tail number EP–MNB, appears to be one of the three aircraft that Mahan illegally acquired via Blue Airways of Armenia and U.K.-based Balli Group that resulted in the issuance of the original TDO.42 See supra at 10–12. 39 See 84 FR 21233 (May 14, 2019). 747s are registered in Iran with tail numbers EP–FAA and EP–FAB, respectively. 41 OFAC’s press release concerning these designations states that Qeshm Fars Air was being designated for ‘‘being owned or controlled by Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC–QF,’’ and that Flight Travel LLC was being designated for ‘‘acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air.’’ It further states, inter alia, that ‘‘Mahan Air employees fill Qeshm Fars Air management positions, and Mahan Air provides technical and operational support for Qeshm Fars Air, facilitating the airline’s illicit operations.’’ See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ sm590. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/ 20190124.aspx. 42 The same open sources indicated this aircraft continued to operate on flights within Iran to include a May 11, 2020 flight from Tehran, Iran to Kerman, Iran. 75547 Evidence was also described in the December 2, 2019 renewal order showing that on or about November 11, 2019, Mahan caused, aided and/or abetted the unlicensed export of a U.S.origin atomic absorption spectrometer, an item subject to the Regulations, from the United States to Iran via the UAE. Finally, publicly available flight tracking information showed that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran, including on routes to and from Guangzhou, China, Istanbul, Turkey, and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.43 The May 29, 2020 renewal order cited Mahan’s operation of EP–MMD, EP– MMF, and EP–MMI, aircraft originally acquired from Al Naser Airlines, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to Bangkok, Thailand, Dubai, UAE, and Shanghai, China in violation of the TDO and EAR.44 The May 29, 2020 renewal order also detailed the indictment of Ali Abdullah Alhay and Issam Shammout, parties added to the TDO in May and July 2015, respectively, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Alhay and Shammout were charged with, among other violations, conspiring to export aircraft and parts to Mahan in violation of export control laws and the embargo on Iran beginning around August 2012 through May 2015. In addition to detailing the operation of multiple aircraft in violation of the Regulations,45 the November 24, 2020 renewal order discussed a related TDO issued on August 19, 2020, denying for 180 days the export privileges of Indonesia-based PT MS Aero Support (‘‘PTMS Aero’’), PT Antasena Kreasi (‘‘PTAK’’), PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama (‘‘PTKEU’’), Sunarko Kuntjoro, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, and Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito based on their involvement in the unlicensed export of aircraft parts to Mahan Airways—often in coordination 40 These PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 43 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on November 23, 2019, EP–MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran, and on November 21, 2019, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on November 20, 2019, EP–MMQ (MSN 449) flew from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Tehran, Iran. 44 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on May 8, 2020, EP–MMD (MSN 164) flew on routes between Bangkok, Thailand and Tehran, Iran, and on May 10, 2020, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes between Dubai, UAE and Tehran. In addition, on May 9, 2020, EP–MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Shanghai, China and Tehran. 45 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on November 13, 2020, EP–MMQ (MSN 449) flew on routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran, and on November 15, 2020, EP–MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Shenzhen, China and Tehran. E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 75548 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices with Mustafa Ovieci, a Mahan executive.46 These parties also facilitated the shipment of damaged Mahan parts to the United States for repair and subsequent export back to Iran in further violation of U.S. laws. In both instances, the fact that the items were destined to Iran/Mahan was concealed from U.S. companies, shippers, and freight forwarders.47 The November 24, 2020 renewal order also includes actions taken by other U.S. government agencies such as OFAC’s August 19, 2020 designation of UAEbased Parthia Cargo, its CEO Amin Mahdavi, and Delta Parts Supply FZC as SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order 13224 for providing ‘‘key parts and logistics services for Mahan Air. . . .’’ The OFAC press release further states, in part, that Mahdavi ‘‘has directly coordinated the shipment of parts on behalf of Mahan Air.’’ 48 In addition, Mahdavi and Parthia Cargo were indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for violating sanctions on Iran.49 Moreover, in October 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Joyce Eliasbachus to 18 months of confinement based on her role in a conspiracy to export $2 million dollars’ worth of aircraft parts from the United States to Iran, including to Mahan Airways.50 The May 21, 2021 renewal order outlined Mahan’s continued operation of a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP– MMH, EP–MMI, and EP–MMQ, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to Shanghai, China, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Guangzhou, China, respectively.51 Open source news reporting also indicated that after five years of maintenance, Mahan Air is now operating EP–MNE, a Boeing 747 on 46 See 85 FR 52321 (Aug. 25, 2020). Aero, PTAK, PTKEU, and Sunarko Kuntjoro were each indicted in December 2019 on multiple counts related to this conspiracy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 48 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ sm1098. 49 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iraniannational-and-uae-business-organization-chargedcriminal-conspiracy-violate-iranian. 50 Eliasbachus’ arrest and arraignment were detailed in the June 14, 2018 renewal order, as described supra at 21. 51 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on May 14, 2021, EP–MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes between Shanghai, China and Tehran, Iran, and on May 13, 2021, EP–MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran. In addition, on May 20, 2021, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Guangzhou, China and Tehran. domestic flights within Iran.52 In addition to this aircraft being one of the original three Boeing aircraft Mahan obtained in violation of the Regulations, any service or maintenance involving parts subject to the EAR would further violate the TDO. The November 17, 2021 order details Mahan’s continued operation of a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to EP–MME, EP–MMJ, EP–MMQ, on flights into and out of Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Shenzhen, China, respectively.53 Additionally, publicly available industry sources showed that EP–MMG (MSN 383), an aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Air in violation of both the TDO and Regulations, was in a maintenance, repair, overhaul (‘‘MRO’’) status at Iran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran, Iran. The May 13, 2022 renewal order outlines Mahan’s continuing violation of the TDO and/or Regulations including, but not limited to the operation of EP–MME, EP–MNO, and EP–MMB on flights into and out of Iran from/to Moscow, Russia, Damascus, Syria, and Guangzhou, China, respectively.54 Open source press reports also indicates that as of April 2022, Mahan Air increased its service into Moscow, Russia by adding two weekly flights to Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport (‘‘SVO’’) to its current service into Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport (‘‘VKO’’).55 Mahan flights into Russia after February 24, 2022 violated the stringent export controls imposed on aviation-related (e.g., Commerce Control List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia in response to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. These controls include a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in Export Control lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 47 PTMS VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 52 https://simpleflying.com/mahan-air-747-300flies-again/. 53 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on November 7, 2021, EP–MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran, and on November 9, 2021, EP–MMJ (MSN 526) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran, Iran. In addition, on November 8, 2021, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Shenzhen, China and Tehran, Iran. 54 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on May 2, 2022, EP–MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran, and on May 5, 2022, EP–MNO (MSN 595) flew on routes between Damascus, Syria and Tehran, Iran. In addition, on May 6, 2022, EP–MMB (MSN 56) flew on routes between Guangzhou, China and Tehran, Iran. 55 https://centreforaviation.com/news/mahan-airlaunches-moscow-sheremetyevo-service-1131185. PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 (Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).56 The May 13, 2022 renewal order also cited OFAC’s recent administrative enforcement action with an Australian freight forwarder resulting in a $6,131,855 civil penalty, which resolved, in part, allegations of receiving 327 payments from Mahan that were processed through U.S. financial institutions or foreign branches of U.S. financial institutions in apparent violation of OFAC sanctions.57 The November 8, 2022 order detailed Mahan Air’s continued violation of the TDO and Regulations, including the Russia-related export controls set out in Section 746.8 of the Regulations. On September 19, 2022, BIS publicly identified Mahan’s EP–MEE aircraft for its unlicensed reexport to Russia in apparent violation of Section 746.8 of the Regulations.58 Additionally, open source evidence showed that Mahan continues to operate EP–MME, EP– MMJ, and EP–MMQ on flights into and out of Iran from/to Moscow, Russia, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, respectively, without the requisite authorization.59 Further, on August 2, 2022, BIS took a related enforcement action against Venezuela-based cargo airline Empresa de Transporte Ae´reocargo del Sur, S.A., a/k/a Aerocargo del Sur Transportation Company, a/k/a EMTRASUR (‘‘EMTRASUR’’), for acquiring custody and/or control from Mahan Air of a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 aircraft bearing manufacturer’s serial number 23413 (‘‘MSN 23413’’) in violation of the TDO.60 In or around October 2021, Mahan Air transferred custody and control of MSN 23413 to EMTRASUR’s parent company, CONVIASA,61 through an intermediary. 56 The TDO prohibits Mahan from being eligible to use license exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the EAR). 57 https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ 20220425_toll.pdf. 58 https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/ about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3138-bis-pressrelease-gp10-iranian-craft-additions/file. 59 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on October 9, 2022, EP–MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between Tehran, Iran and Moscow, Russia’s VTO airport, and on October 26, 2022, EP– MMJ (MSN 526) flew on routes between Tehran, Iran and Moscow, Russia’s SVO airport. On October 28, 2022, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran, Iran. 60 BIS issued a separate TDO denying the export privileges of EMTRASUR for a period of 180 days. See 87 FR 47,964 (Aug. 5, 2022). 61 On or about February 7, 2020, U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) added CONVIASA, a Venezuelan stateowned airline, to the list of Specially Designated Nationals (‘‘SDN’’) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13884. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/ press-releases/sm903. E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 The May 5, 2023 renewal order outlined open source evidence showing Mahan continuing to operate EP–MNF, EP–MMQ, and EP–MME on flights into and out of Iran from/to Guangzhou, China, Kabul, Afghanistan, and Moscow, Russia, respectively, without the requisite authorization.62 The renewal order also noted the national security and foreign policy concerns raised by Mahan’s intention to start direct flights from Iran to Minsk, Belarus.63 Lastly, the May 3, 2023 renewal order cited publicly available information showing that Russian airline Aeroflot, which is currently subject to its own TDO,64 has begun sending its aircraft to Mahan for repairs and/or maintenance.65 OEE’s October 11, 2023 renewal request and on-going investigation outlines Mahan’s continued violation of the TDO by operating aircraft including EP–MME, EP–MMQ, and EP–MMB on flights into and out of Iran from/to Erbil, Iraq, Shanghai, China, Lahore, Pakistan, and Moscow, Russia.66 OEE also highlighted its continued investigation into Mahan’s recent acquisition of an Airbus A340 (MSN 75) bearing Iranian tail number EP–MJA, which has flown to/from Tehran, Iran and Moscow, Russia as recently as October 25, 2023. Lastly, public reporting details the ongoing national security and foreign policy threats and concerns raised by Mahan’s destabilizing activities. Specifically, open source reporting details October 12, 2023 airstrikes at Syria’s Damascus and Aleppo airports made in an effort to divert a Mahan A340 (MSN 282 and bearing tail number EP–MMC) 67 which was in route at the time from Tehran, Iran to Syria and suspected of carrying weapons.68 62 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on April 24, 2023, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Guangzhou, China, and Tehran, Iran, and on April 27, 2023, EP–MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes between Kabul, Afghanistan and Tehran, Iran. On April 28, 2023, EP–MME (MSN 371) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran. 63 https://iranpress.com/content/76332/mahanair-launches-direct-flight-from-tehran-minsk. 64 See 88 FR 66807 (Sep. 28, 2023). 65 https://simpleflying.com/aeroflot-airbus-a330maintenance-iran-mahan-air/. 66 Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on October 24, 2023, EP–MME (MSN 371) flew on routes between Erbil, Iraq and Tehran, Iran, and on October 23, 2023, EP–MMB (MSN 56) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran. On October 21–22, 2023, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Lahore, Pakistan and Tehran, Iran. 67 See supra at footnote 34. 68 https://www.jns.org/syria-airport-strikes-saidto-stop-iranian-missile-shipment/; https:// www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-state-tvsays-israeli-attack-targets-aleppo-damascusairports-2023-10-12/; https://www.israelhayom. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 C. Findings Under the applicable standard set forth in Section 766.24 of the Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the denied persons have acted in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that such violations have been significant, deliberate and covert; and that given the foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation, there is a likelihood of imminent violations. Moreover, I find that renewal for an extended period is appropriate given the pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, renewal of the TDO is necessary in the public interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to give notice to companies and individuals in the United States and abroad that they should continue to avoid dealing with Mahan Airways and Al Naser Airlines and the other denied persons, in connection with export and reexport transactions involving items subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity subject to the Regulations. III. Order It is therefore ordered: First, that MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN MAHMOOD KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/ A KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHMOUD AMINI, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; KERMAN AVIATION A/K/A GIE KERMAN AVIATION, 42 Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France; SIRJANCO TRADING LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHAN AIR GENERAL TRADING LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates; MEHDI BAHRAMI, Mahan AirwaysIstanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey; AL NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL–NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL NASER WINGS AIRLINE A/K/A ALNASER AIRLINES AND AIR FREIGHT LTD., Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, com/2023/10/17/revealed-this-could-be-why-israelallegedly-bombed-2-airports-simultaneously/. PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 75549 Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan; ALI ABDULLAH ALHAY A/K/A ALI ALHAY A/K/A ALI ABDULLAH AHMED ALHAY, Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177; BAHAR SAFWA GENERAL TRADING, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; SKY BLUE BIRD GROUP A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD AVIATION A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD LTD A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade Zone, United Arab Emirates; and ISSAM SHAMMOUT A/K/A MUHAMMAD ISAM MUHAMMAD ANWAR NUR SHAMMOUT A/K/A ISSAM ANWAR, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17–18 Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey, and when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’ and collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’) may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to: A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document; B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR; or C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR. Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following: A. Export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item subject to the EAR; E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1 lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1 75550 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 212 / Friday, November 3, 2023 / Notices B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control; C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States; D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing. Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to a Denied Person by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order. Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-origin technology. In accordance with the provisions of sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa General Trading may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–4022. In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue Bird Group, and/or Issam VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:02 Nov 02, 2023 Jkt 262001 Shammout may, at any time, appeal their inclusion as a related person by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– 4022. In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be opposed by Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa General Trading as provided in section 766.24(d), by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date of the Order. A copy of this Order shall be provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading and each related person, and shall be published in the Federal Register. This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for one year. Kevin J. Kurland, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement. [FR Doc. 2023–24310 Filed 11–2–23; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE International Trade Administration [A–552–802] Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Results, Partial Rescission, and Preliminary Determination of No Shipments of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022–2023 Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce. SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) preliminarily determines that no companies under review qualify for a separate rate and that these companies are, therefore, considered part of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam)-wide entity. Additionally, Commerce is partially rescinding this review with respect to companies for which all review requests were timely withdrawn. Further, Commerce preliminary determines that certain companies had no shipments of subject merchandise during the period AGENCY: PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 of review (POR), February 1, 2022, through January 31, 2023. Interested parties are invited to comment on these preliminary results. DATES: Applicable November 3, 2023. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jonathan Schueler, AD/CVD Operations, Office VIII, Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482–9175. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On February 2, 2023, Commerce published a notice of opportunity to request an administrative review of the antidumping duty order on certain frozen warmwater shrimp from the Vietnam.1 Commerce received timely requests for an administrative review from AHSTAC (the petitioner),2 ASPA (domestic processors),3 and numerous Vietnamese companies. On April 11, 2023, Commerce published in the Federal Register a notice of initiation of an administrative review of the Order for the period February 1, 2022, through January 31, 2023, covering 187 companies including multiple companies with name variations/ abbreviations in accordance with section 751(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act) and 19 CFR 351.221(c)(1)(i).4 On May 16 and 17, 2023, the petitioner filed timely withdrawals of its review requests of 41 companies.5 On May 17, 2023, ASPA filed timely withdrawals of its review requests of 35 companies.6 On May 16, 2023, Ngoc Tri Seafood Joint Stock Company, Tai Kim Anh Seafood Joint Stock Corporation, and 49 other Vietnamese producers and/ 1 See Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended Investigation; Opportunity to Request Administrative Review, 88 FR 7071 (February 2, 2023); see also Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 70 FR 5152 (February 1, 2005) (Order). 2 The petitioner, AHSTAC, is the Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee. 3 The domestic processors, ASPA, are the American Shrimp Processors Association. 4 See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 88 FR 21609 (April 11, 2023) (Initiation Notice). 5 See Petitioner’s Letters, ‘‘Domestic Producers’ Partial Withdrawal of Review Requests,’’ dated May 16, 2023; and ‘‘Domestic Producers’ Partial Withdrawal of Review Requests,’’ dated May 17, 2023. 6 See ASPA’s Letters, ‘‘American Shrimp Processors Association’s Partial Withdrawal of Review Requests,’’ dated May 17, 2023; and ‘‘American Shrimp Processors Association’s Partial Withdrawal of Review Requests,’’ dated May 17, 2023. E:\FR\FM\03NON1.SGM 03NON1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 212 (Friday, November 3, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75541-75550]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-24310]

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp.
Way, Tehran, Iran;
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard, P.O. Box 52404,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahmoud Amini, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al
Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation, 42 Avenue Montaigne
75008, Paris, France;
Sirjanco Trading LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahan Air General Trading LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik
Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates;
Mehdi Bahrami, Mahan Airways--Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil
Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey;
Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a al-Naser Airlines, a/k/a Al Naser Wings
Airline, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and, Air Freight Ltd., Home 46, Al-
Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St. 21, Beside Al Jadirya
Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309,
St. 3/H.20) Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan;
Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay,
Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St. 21, Beside Al
Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif,
Saudi Arabia 61177;
Bahar Safwa General Trading, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-
5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O.
Box 8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Aviation, a/k/a Sky Blue
Bird Ltd., a/k/a Sky Blue Bird FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah
Trade Zone, United Arab Emirates;
Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam Muhammad, Anwar Nur Shammout, a/
k/a Issam Anwar, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous Street,
Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17-18
Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and
Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A
Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey.

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2021) (``EAR'' or ``the
Regulations''), I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export
Enforcement (``OEE'') to renew the temporary denial order issued in
this matter on May 5, 2023. I find that

[[Page 75542]]

renewal of this order, as modified, is necessary in the public interest
to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations and that renewal
for an extended period is appropriate because Mahan Airways has engaged
in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations
of the EAR.\1\
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\1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774
(2023), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act
(50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015)) (``EAA''), which lapsed on
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of
August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by
successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While section 1766 of
ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections
which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in
pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms
of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA,
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall
continue in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5)
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
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I. Procedural History

On March 17, 2008, Darryl W. Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Export Enforcement (``Assistant Secretary''), signed an
order denying Mahan Airways' export privileges for a period of 180 days
on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public
interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order
also named as denied persons Blue Airways, of Yerevan, Armenia (``Blue
Airways of Armenia''), as well as the ``Balli Group Respondents,''
namely, Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid
Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue
Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky
Six Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The order was issued ex parte
pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations, and went into effect
on March 21, 2008, the date it was published in the Federal Register.
This temporary denial order (``TDO'') was renewed in accordance
with Section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.\2\ Subsequent renewals also
have issued pursuant to Section 766.24(d), including most recently on
May 5, 2023.\3\ Some of the renewal orders and the modification orders
that have issued between renewals have added certain parties as
respondents or as related persons, or effected the removal of certain
parties.\4\
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\2\ Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a
temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods, if it
believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent
an imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be made in writing no
later than 20 days before the scheduled expiration date of a
temporary denial order. Renewal requests may include discussion of
any additional or changed circumstances, and may seek appropriate
modifications to the order, including the addition of parties as
respondents or related persons, or the removal of parties previously
added as respondents or related persons. BIS is not required to seek
renewal as to all parties, and a removal of a party can be effected
if, without more, BIS does not seek renewal as to that party. Any
party included or added to a temporary denial order as a respondent
may oppose a renewal request as set forth in section 766.24(d).
Parties included or added as related persons can at any time appeal
their inclusion as a related person, but cannot challenge the
underlying temporary denial order, either as initially issued or
subsequently renewed, and cannot oppose a renewal request. See also
note 4, infra.
\3\ The May 5, 2023 renewal order was effective upon issuance
and published in the Federal Register on May 10, 2023 (88 FR
30,078). Prior renewal orders issued on September 17, 2008, March
16, 2009, September 11, 2009, March 9, 2010, September 3, 2010,
February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, February 15, 2012, August 9,
2012, February 4, 2013, July 31, 2013, January 24, 2014, July 22,
2014, January 16, 2015, July 13, 2015, January 7, 2016, July 7,
2016, December 30, 2016, June 27, 2017, December 20, 2017, June 14,
2018, December 11, 2018, June 5, 2019, May 29, 2020, November 24,
2020, May 21, 2021, November 17, 2021, May 13, 2022, November 8,
2022, and May 5, 2023, respectively. The August 24, 2011 renewal
followed the issuance of a modification order that issued on July 1,
2011, to add Zarand Aviation as a respondent. The July 13, 2015
renewal followed a modification order that issued May 21, 2015, and
added Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General
Trading as respondents. Each of the renewal orders and each of the
modification orders referenced in this footnote or elsewhere in this
order has been published in the Federal Register.
\4\ Pursuant to sections 766.23 and 766.24(c) of the
Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization
related to a denied person by affiliation, ownership, control, or
position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related
services may be added as a ``related person'' to a temporary denial
order to prevent evasion of the order.
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The September 11, 2009 renewal order continued the denial order as
to Mahan Airways, but not as to the Balli Group Respondents or Blue
Airways of Armenia.\5\ As part of the February 25, 2011 renewal order,
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard (a/k/a Kosarian Fard), Mahmoud Amini, and
Gatewick LLC (a/k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo Services, a/k/a Gatewick
Aviation Services) were added as related persons to prevent evasion of
the TDO.\6\ A modification order issued on July 1, 2011, adding Zarand
Aviation as a respondent in order to prevent an imminent violation.\7\
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\5\ Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation settled proposed BIS
administrative charges as part of a settlement agreement that was
approved by a settlement order issued on February 5, 2010. The
sanctions imposed pursuant to that settlement and order included,
inter alia, a $15 million civil penalty and a requirement to conduct
five external audits and submit related audit reports. The Balli
Group Respondents also settled related charges with the Department
of Justice and the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control.
\6\ See note 4, supra, concerning the addition of related
persons to a temporary denial order. Kosarian Fard and Mahmoud Amini
remain parties to the TDO. On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick
resolved administrative charges against Gatewick, including a charge
for acting contrary to the terms of a BIS denial order (15 CFR
764.2(k)). In addition to the payment of a civil penalty, the
settlement includes a seven-year denial order. The first two years
of the denial period were active, with the remaining five years
suspended conditioned upon Gatewick's full and timely payment of the
civil penalty and its compliance with the Regulations during the
seven-year denial order period. This denial order, in effect,
superseded the TDO as to Gatewick, which was not included as part of
the January 16, 2015 renewal order. The Gatewick LLC Final Order was
published in the Federal Register on August 20, 2014. See 79 FR
49,283 (Aug. 20, 2014).
\7\ Zarand Aviation's export privileges remained denied until
July 22, 2014, when it was not included as part of the renewal order
issued on that date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As part of the August 24, 2011 renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, and Ali Eslamian were added as related persons. Mahan Air
General Trading LLC, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. were added
as related persons by a modification order issued on April 9, 2012.
Mehdi Bahrami was added as a related person as part of the February 4,
2013 renewal order.
On May 21, 2015, a modification order was issued adding Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as
respondents. As detailed in that order and discussed further infra,
these respondents were added to the TDO based upon evidence that they
were acting together to, inter alia, obtain aircraft subject to the
Regulations for export or reexport to Mahan in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO. Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief executive
officer, Issam Shammout, were added as related persons as part of the
July 13, 2015 renewal order.\8\ On November 16, 2017, a modification
order issued to remove Ali Eslamian, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK)
Ltd. as related persons following a request by OEE for their
removal.\9\
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\8\ The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (``OFAC'') designated Sky Blue Bird and Issam
Shammout as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (``SDGTs'') on
May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for ``providing
support to Iran's Mahan Air.'' See 80 FR 30,762 (May 29, 2015).
\9\ The November 16, 2017 modification was published in the
Federal Register on December 4, 2017. See 82 FR 57,203 (Dec. 4,
2017). On September 28, 2017, BIS and Ali Eslamian resolved an
administrative charge for acting contrary to the terms of the denial
order (15 CFR 764.2(k)) that was based upon Eslamian's violation of
the TDO after his addition to the TDO on August 24, 2011. Equipco
(UK) Ltd. and Skyco (UK) Ltd., two companies owned and operated by
Eslamian, also were parties to the settlement agreement and were
added to the settlement order as related persons. In addition to
other sanctions, the settlement provides that Eslamian, Equipco, and
Skyco shall be subject to a conditionally suspended denial order for
a period of four years from the date of the settlement order.

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[[Page 75543]]

The December 11, 2018 renewal order continued the denial of the
export privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard,
Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General
Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay,
Bahar Safwa General Trading, Sky Blue Bird Group, and Issam Shammout.
On April 6, 2023, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for
renewal of the TDO that issued on November 8, 2022. The written request
was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration.
Notice of the renewal request was provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading in
accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No
opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received. Furthermore, no
appeal of the related person determinations made as part of the
September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, April 9, 2012,
February 4, 2013, and July 13, 2015 renewal or modification orders has
been made by Kosarian Fard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue
Bird Group, or Issam Shammout.\10\
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\10\ A party named or added as a related person may not oppose
the issuance or renewal of the underlying temporary denial order,
but may file an appeal of the related person determination in
accordance with section 766.23(c). See also note 2, supra.
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II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue or renew an order
temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing
that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an
``imminent violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and
766.24(d). ``A violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of
likelihood.'' 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a
violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the
matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative
charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent [.]'' Id. A
``lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.'' Id.
If BIS believes that renewal of a denial order is necessary in the
public interest to prevent an imminent violation, it may file a written
request for renewal, with any modifications if appropriate. 15 CFR
766.24(d)(1). The written request, which must be filed no later than 20
days prior to the TDO's expiration, should set forth the basis for
BIS's belief that renewal is necessary, including any additional or
changed circumstances. Id. ``In cases demonstrating a pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may
request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional
period not exceeding one year.'' \11\ Id.
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\11\ 88 FR 59791 (Aug. 30, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. The TDO and BIS's Requests for Renewal

OEE's request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the
issuance of the initial TDO, and the renewal and modification orders
subsequently issued in this matter, including the May 21, 2015
modification order and the renewal order issued on November 8, 2022,
and the evidence developed over the course of this investigation, which
indicate a blatant disregard of U.S. export controls and the TDO. The
initial TDO was issued as a result of evidence that showed that Mahan
Airways and other parties engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by
knowingly re-exporting to Iran three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically
Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 1-3''), items subject to the EAR and classified
under Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 9A991.b, without
the required U.S. Government authorization. Further evidence submitted
by BIS indicated that Mahan Airways was involved in the attempted re-
export of three additional U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 4-6'')
to Iran.
As discussed in the September 17, 2008 renewal order, evidence
presented by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1-3 continued to be flown on
Mahan Airways' routes after issuance of the TDO, in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO itself.\12\ It also showed that Aircraft 1-3
had been flown in further violation of the Regulations and the TDO on
the routes of Iran Air, an Iranian Government airline. Moreover, as
discussed in the March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009 and March 9, 2010
renewal orders, Mahan Airways registered Aircraft 1-3 in Iran, obtained
Iranian tail numbers for them (EP-MNA, EP-MNB, and EP-MNE,
respectively), and continued to operate at least two of them in
violation of the Regulations and the TDO,\13\ while also committing an
additional knowing and willful violation when it negotiated for and
acquired an additional U.S.-origin aircraft. The additional acquired
aircraft was an MD-82 aircraft, which subsequently was painted in Mahan
Airways' livery and flown on multiple Mahan Airways' routes under tail
number TC-TUA.
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\12\ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates
the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).
\13\ The third Boeing 747 appeared to have undergone significant
service maintenance and may not have been operational at the time of
the March 9, 2010 renewal order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The March 9, 2010 renewal order also noted that a court in the
United Kingdom (``U.K.'') had found Mahan Airways in contempt of court
on February 1, 2010, for failing to comply with that court's December
21, 2009 and January 12, 2010 orders compelling Mahan Airways to remove
the Boeing 747s from Iran and ground them in the Netherlands. Mahan
Airways and the Balli Group Respondents had been litigating before the
U.K. court concerning ownership and control of Aircraft 1-3. In a
letter to the U.K. court dated January 12, 2010, Mahan Airways'
Chairman indicated, inter alia, that Mahan Airways opposes U.S.
Government actions against Iran, that it continued to operate the
aircraft on its routes in and out of Tehran (and had 158,000 ``forward
bookings'' for these aircraft), and that it wished to continue to do so
and would pay damages if required by that court, rather than ground the
aircraft.
The September 3, 2010 renewal order discussed the fact that Mahan
Airways' violations of the TDO extended beyond operating U.S.-origin
aircraft and attempting to acquire additional U.S.-origin aircraft. In
February 2009, while subject to the TDO, Mahan Airways participated in
the export of computer motherboards, items subject to the Regulations
and designated as EAR99, from the United States to Iran, via the United
Arab Emirates (``UAE''), in violation of both the TDO and the
Regulations, by transporting and/or forwarding the computer
motherboards from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airways' violations were
facilitated by Gatewick

[[Page 75544]]

LLC, which not only participated in the transaction, but also has
stated to BIS that it acted as Mahan Airways' sole booking agent for
cargo and freight forwarding services in the UAE.
Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing in the U.K. court, Mahan
Airways asserted that Aircraft 1-3 were not being used, but stated in
pertinent part that the aircraft were being maintained in Iran ``in an
airworthy condition'' and that, depending on the outcome of its U.K.
court appeal, the aircraft ``could immediately go back into service . .
. on international routes into and out of Iran.'' Mahan Airways'
January 24, 2011 submission to U.K. Court of Appeal, at p. 25, ]] 108,
110. This clearly stated intent, both on its own and in conjunction
with Mahan Airways' prior misconduct and statements, demonstrated the
need to renew the TDO in order to prevent imminent future violations.
Two of these three 747s subsequently were removed from Iran and are no
longer in Mahan Airways' possession. The third of these 747s remained
in Iran under Mahan's control. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224, this
747 was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (``SDGT'')
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control (``OFAC'') on September 19, 2012.\14\ Furthermore, as discussed
in the February 4, 2013 Order, open source information indicated that
this 747, painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways, had been
flown between Iran and Syria, and was suspected of ferrying weapons
and/or other equipment to the Syrian Government from Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, as first detailed in the July 1, 2011 and August 24,
2011 orders, and discussed in subsequent renewal orders in this matter,
Mahan Airways also continued to evade U.S. export control laws by
operating two Airbus A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airways' livery and
logo, on flights into and out of Iran.\15\ At the time of the July 1,
2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, these Airbus A310s were registered in
France, with tail numbers F-OJHH and F-OJHI, respectively.\16\ The
August 2012 renewal order also found that Mahan Airways had acquired
another Airbus A310 aircraft subject to the Regulations, with MSN 499
and Iranian tail number EP-VIP, in violation of the Regulations.\17\ On
September 19, 2012, all three Airbus A310 aircraft (tail numbers F-
OJHH, F-OJHI, and EP-VIP) were designated as SDGTs.\18\
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\15\ The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin engines. The
engines are subject to the Regulations and classified under Export
Control Classification (``ECCN'') 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain
controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the
total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the
Regulations. They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or
reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government
authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the
Regulations.
\16\ OEE subsequently presented evidence that after the August
24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways worked along with Kerman Aviation
and others to de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France and
to register both aircraft in Iran (with, respectively, Iranian tail
numbers EP-MHH and EP-MHI). It was determined subsequent to the
February 15, 2012 renewal order that the registration switch for
these A310s was cancelled, and that Mahan Airways then continued to
fly the aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F-OJHH and
F-OJHI, respectively). Both aircraft apparently remain in Mahan
Airways' possession.
\17\ See note 14, supra.
\18\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously
designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18, 2011. 77 FR 64427
(October 18, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The February 4, 2013 renewal order laid out further evidence of
continued and additional efforts by Mahan Airways and other persons
acting in concert with Mahan, including Kral Aviation and another
Turkish company, to procure U.S.-origin engines--two GE CF6-50C2
engines, with MSNs 517621 and 517738, respectively--and other aircraft
parts in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.\19\ The February 4,
2013 order also added Mehdi Bahrami as a related person in accordance
with Section 766.23 of the Regulations. Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-President
and the head of Mahan's Istanbul Office, also was involved in Mahan's
acquisition of the original three Boeing 747s (Aircraft 1-3) that
resulted in the original TDO, and has had a business relationship with
Mahan dating back to 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\19\ Kral Aviation was referenced in the February 4, 2013
renewal order as ``Turkish Company No. 1.'' Kral Aviation purchased
a GE CF6-50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in
July 2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able to prevent this
engine from reaching Mahan by issuing a redelivery order to the
freight forwarder in accordance with Section 758.8 of the
Regulations. OEE also issued Kral Aviation a redelivery order for
the second CF6-50C2 engine (MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner
of the second engine subsequently cancelled the item's sale to Kral
Aviation. In September 2012, OEE was alerted by a U.S. exporter that
another Turkish company (``Turkish Company No. 2'') was attempting
to purchase aircraft spare parts intended for re-export by Turkish
Company No. 2 to Mahan Airways. See February 4, 2013 renewal order.
On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added to BIS's Entity
List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. See 78 FR
75458 (Dec. 12, 2013). Companies and individuals are added to the
Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United States. See 15
CFR 744.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The July 31, 2013 renewal order detailed additional evidence
obtained by OEE showing efforts by Mahan Airways to obtain another GE
CF6-50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the United States via
Turkey. Multiple Mahan employees, including Mehdi Bahrami, were
involved in or aware of matters related to the engine's arrival in
Turkey from the United States, plans to visually inspect the engine,
and prepare it for shipment from Turkey.
Mahan Airways sought to obtain this U.S.-origin engine through
Pioneer Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yonetim Danismanlik (``Pioneer
Logistics''), an aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey, and its
director/operator, Gulnihal Yegane, a Turkish national who previously
had conducted Mahan related business with Mehdi Bahrami and Ali
Eslamian. Moreover, as referenced in the July 31, 2013 renewal order, a
sworn affidavit by Kosol Surinanda, also known as Kosol Surinandha,
Managing Director of Mahan's General Sales Agent in Thailand, stated
that the shares of Pioneer Logistics for which he was the listed owner
were ``actually the property of and owned by Mahan.'' He further stated
that he held ``legal title to the shares until otherwise required by
Mahan'' but would ``exercise the rights granted to [him] exactly and
only as instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/or decisions [would]
only and exclusively reflect the wills and demands of Mahan[.]'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\20\ Pioneer Logistics, Gulnihal Yegane, and Kosol Surinanda
also were added to the Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR
75,458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The January 24, 2014 renewal order outlined OEE's continued
investigation of Mahan Airways' activities and detailed an attempt by
Mahan, which OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an Indonesian aircraft parts
supplier, two U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF-502R-5 aircraft engines (MSNs
LF5660 and LF5325), items subject to the Regulations, from a U.S.
company located in Texas. An invoice of the Indonesian aircraft parts
supplier dated March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways as the purchaser of
the engines and included a Mahan ship-to address. OEE also obtained a
Mahan air waybill dated March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.-origin
aircraft parts subject to the Regulations--including, among other
items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a transmitter, and a power
control unit--being transported by Mahan from Turkey to Iran in
violation of the TDO.

[[Page 75545]]

The July 22, 2014 renewal order discussed open source evidence from
the March-June 2014 time period regarding two BAE regional jets, items
subject to the Regulations, that were painted in the livery and logo of
Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP-MOI and EP-
MOK, respectively.\21\ In addition, aviation industry resources
indicated that these aircraft were obtained by Mahan Airways in late
November 2013 and June 2014, from Ukrainian Mediterranean Airline, a
Ukrainian airline that was added to BIS's Entity List (Supplement No. 4
to Part 744 of the Regulations) on August 15, 2011, for acting contrary
to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States.\22\ Open source information indicated that at least EP-MOI
remained active in Mahan's fleet, and that the aircraft was being
operated on multiple flights in July 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\21\ The BAE regional jets are powered with U.S.-origin engines.
The engines are subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN
9A991.d. These aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued
at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result are subject to the EAR. They are classified under ECCN
9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires
U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7
of the Regulations.
\22\ See 76 FR 50,407 (Aug. 15, 2011). The July 22, 2014 renewal
order also referenced two Airbus A320 aircraft painted in the livery
and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers
EP-MMK and EP-MML, respectively. OEE's investigation also showed
that Mahan obtained these aircraft in November 2013, from Khors Air
Company, another Ukrainian airline that, like Ukrainian
Mediterranean Airlines, was added to BIS's Entity List on August 15,
2011. Open source evidence indicates the two Airbus A320 aircraft
may have been transferred by Mahan Airways to another Iranian
airline in October 2014, and issued Iranian tail numbers EP-APE and
EP-APF, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The January 16, 2015 renewal order detailed evidence of additional
attempts by Mahan Airways to acquire items subject to the Regulations
in further violation of the TDO. Specifically, in March 2014, OEE
became aware of an inertial reference unit bearing serial number 1231
(``the IRU'') that had been sent to the United States for repair. The
IRU is a U.S.-origin item, subject to the Regulations, classified under
ECCN 7A103, and controlled for missile technology reasons. Upon closer
inspection, it was determined that IRU came from or had been installed
on an Airbus A340 aircraft bearing MSN 056. Further investigation
revealed that as of approximately February 2014, this aircraft was
registered under Iranian tail number EP-MMB and had been painted in the
livery and logo of Mahan Airways.
The January 16, 2015 renewal order also described related efforts
by the Departments of Justice and Treasury to further thwart Mahan's
illicit procurement efforts. Specifically, on August 14, 2014, the
United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland filed a
civil forfeiture complaint for the IRU pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(b)
that resulted in the court issuing an Order of Forfeiture on December
2, 2014. EP-MMB remains listed as active in Mahan Airways' fleet and
has been used on flights into and out of Iran as recently as December
19, 2017.
Additionally, on August 29, 2014, OFAC blocked the property and
interests in property of Asian Aviation Logistics of Thailand, a Mahan
Airways affiliate or front company, pursuant to Executive Order 13224.
In doing so, OFAC described Mahan Airways' use of Asian Aviation
Logistics to evade sanctions by making payments on behalf of Mahan for
the purchase of engines and other equipment.\23\
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\23\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140829.aspx. See 79 FR 55,073 (Sep. 15, 2014).
OFAC also blocked the property and property interests of Pioneer
Logistics of Turkey on August 29, 2014. Id. Mahan Airways' use of
Pioneer Logistics in an effort to evade the TDO and the Regulations
was discussed in a prior renewal order, as summarized, supra, at 14.
BIS added both Asian Aviation Logistics and Pioneer Logistics to the
Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The May 21, 2015 modification order detailed the acquisition of two
aircraft, specifically an Airbus A340 bearing MSN 164 and an Airbus
A321 bearing MSN 550, that were purchased by Al Naser Airlines in late
2014/early 2015 and were under the possession, control, and/or
ownership of Mahan Airways.\24\ The sales agreements for these two
aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah Alhay for Al Naser Airlines.\25\
Payment information reveals that multiple electronic funds transfers
(``EFT'') were made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General
Trading in order to acquire MSNs 164 and 550. The May 21, 2015
modification order also laid out evidence showing the respondents'
attempts to obtain other controlled aircraft, including aircraft
physically located in the United States in similarly-patterned
transactions during the same recent time period. Transactional
documents involving two Airbus A320s bearing MSNs 82 and 99,
respectively, again showed Ali Abdullah Alhay signing sales agreements
for Al Naser Airlines.\26\ A review of the payment information for
these aircraft similarly revealed EFTs from Ali Abdullah Alhay and
Bahar Safwa General Trading that follow the pattern described for MSNs
164 and 550, supra. MSNs 82 and 99 were detained by OEE Special Agents
prior to their planned export from the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\24\ Both of these aircraft are powered by U.S.-origin engines
that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN
9A991.d. Both aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued
at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The
aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export
of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
\25\ The evidence obtained by OEE showed Ali Abdullah Alhay as a
25% owner of Al Naser Airlines.
\26\ Both aircraft were physically located in the United States
and therefore are subject to the Regulations pursuant to Section
734.3(a)(1). Moreover, these Airbus A320s are powered by U.S.-origin
engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under
Export Control Classification Number ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A320s
contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent
of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to
the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified
under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to
Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections
742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The July 13, 2015 renewal order outlined evidence showing that Al
Naser Airlines' attempts to acquire aircraft on behalf of Mahan Airways
extended beyond MSNs 164 and 550 to include a total of nine
aircraft.\27\ Four of the aircraft, all of which are subject to the
Regulations and were obtained by Mahan from Al Naser Airlines, had been
issued the following Iranian tail numbers: EP-MMD (MSN 164), EP-MMG
(MSN 383), EP-MMH (MSN 391) and EP-MMR (MSN 416), respectively.\28\
Publicly available flight tracking information provided evidence that
at the time of the July 13, 2015 renewal, both EP-MMH and EP-MMR were
being actively flown on routes into

[[Page 75546]]

and out of Iran in violation of the Regulations.\29\
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\27\ This evidence included a press release dated May 9, 2015,
that appeared on Mahan Airways' website and stated that Mahan
``added 9 modern aircraft to its air fleet [,]'' and that the newly
acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and one Airbus A321.
See https://www.mahan.aero/en/mahan-air/press-room/44. The press
release was subsequently removed from Mahan Airways' website.
Publicly available aviation databases similarly showed that Mahan
had obtained nine additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May
2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also discussed in the July 13,
2015 renewal order, Sky Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shammout, was
actively involved in Al Naser Airlines' acquisition of MSNs 164 and
550, and the attempted acquisition of MSNs 82 and 99 (which were
detained by OEE).
\28\ The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin engines that
are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d.
The Airbus A340s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result
are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft
are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these
aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to
Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
\29\ There is some publicly available information indicating
that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying under Iranian tail number
EP-MMR is now MSN 615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus
A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Airlines in
violation of the Regulations. Moreover, both aircraft were
designated as SDGTs by OFAC on May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive
Order 13224. See 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).
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The January 7, 2016 renewal order discussed evidence that Mahan
Airways had begun actively flying EP-MMD on international routes into
and out of Iran. Additionally, the January 7, 2016 order described
publicly available aviation database and flight tracking information
indicating that Mahan Airways continued efforts to acquire Iranian tail
numbers and press into active service under Mahan's livery and logo at
least two more of the Airbus A340 aircraft it had obtained from or
through Al Naser Airlines: EP-MME (MSN 371) and EP-MMF (MSN 376),
respectively.
The July 7, 2016 renewal order described Mahan Airways' acquisition
of a BAE Avro RJ-85 aircraft (MSN 2392) in violation of the Regulations
and its subsequent registration under Iranian tail number EP-MOR.\30\
This information was corroborated by publicly available information on
the website of Iran's civil aviation authority. The July 7, 2016 order
also outlined Mahan's continued operation of EP-MMF in violation of the
Regulations on routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and Shanghai,
China, respectively.
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\30\ The BAE Avro RJ-85 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that
are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d.
The BAE Avro RJ-85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at
more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result is subject to the EAR regardless of its location. The
aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or re-
export to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to
Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The December 30, 2016 renewal order outlined Mahan's continued
operation of multiple Airbus aircraft, including EP-MMD (MSN 164), EP-
MMF (MSN 376), and EP-MMH (MSN 391), which were acquired from or
through Al Naser Airlines, as previously detailed in pertinent part in
the July 13, 2015 and January 7, 2016 renewal orders. Publicly
available flight tracking information showed that the aircraft were
operated on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Beijing,
China, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Istanbul, Turkey.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\31\ Specifically, on December 22, 2016, EP-MMD (MSN 164) flew
from Dubai, UAE to Tehran, Iran. Between December 20 and December
22, 2016, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran to
Beijing, China and Istanbul, Turkey, respectively. Between December
26 and December 28, 2016, EP-MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes from
Tehran, Iran to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The June 27, 2017 renewal order included similar evidence regarding
Mahan Airways' operation of multiple Airbus aircraft subject to the
Regulations, including, but not limited to, aircraft procured from or
through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of Iran, including
from/to Moscow, Russia, Shanghai, China and Kabul, Afghanistan. The
June 27, 2017 order also detailed evidence concerning a suspected
planned or attempted diversion to Mahan of an Airbus A340 subject to
the Regulations that had first been mentioned in OEE's December 13,
2016 renewal request.
The December 20, 2017 renewal order presented evidence that a Mahan
employee attempted to initiate negotiations with a U.S. company for the
purchase of an aircraft subject to the Regulations and classified under
ECCN 9A610. Moreover, the order highlighted Al Naser Airlines'
acquisition, via lease, of at least possession and/or control of a
Boeing 737 (MSN 25361), bearing tail number YR-SEB, and an Airbus A320
(MSN 357), bearing tail number YR-SEA, from a Romanian company in
violation of the TDO and the Regulations.\32\ Open source information
indicates that after the December 20, 2017 renewal order publicly
exposed Al Naser's acquisition of these two aircraft (MSNs 25361 and
357), the leases were subsequently cancelled and the aircraft returned
to their owner.
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\32\ The Airbus A320 is powered with U.S.-origin engines, which
are subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control
Classification (``ECCN'') 9A991.d. The engines are valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft, which
consequently is subject to the EAR. The aircraft is classified under
ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or reexport to Iran would require U.S.
Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the
Regulations.
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The December 20, 2017 renewal order also included evidence
indicating that Mahan Airways was continuing to operate a number of
aircraft subject to the Regulations, including aircraft originally
procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of
Iran, including from/to Lahore, Pakistan, Shanghai, China, Ankara,
Turkey, Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq.
The June 14, 2018 renewal order outlined evidence that Mahan began
actively operating EP-MMT, an Airbus A340 aircraft (MSN 292) acquired
in 2017 and previously registered in Kazakhstan under tail number UP-
A4003, on international flights into and out of Iran.\33\ It also
discussed evidence that Mahan continued to operate a number of aircraft
subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to, EP-MME, EP-
MMF, and EP-MMH, on international flights into and out of Iran,
including from/to Beijing, China.
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\33\ The Airbus A340 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are
subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The
Airbus A340 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result
is subject to the Regulations regardless of its location. The
aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export
of this aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. On June 4,
2018, EP-MMT (MSN 292) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The June 14, 2018 renewal order also noted OFAC's May 24, 2018
designation of Otik Aviation, a/k/a Otik Havacilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret
Limited Sirketi, of Turkey, as an SDGT pursuant to Executive Order
13224, for providing material support to Mahan, as well as OFAC's
designation as SDGTs of an additional twelve aircraft in which Mahan
has an interest.\34\ The June 14, 2018 order also cited the April 2018
arrest and arraignment of a U.S. citizen on a three-count criminal
information filed in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey involving the unlicensed exports of U.S.-origin aircraft
parts valued at over $2 million to Iran, including to Mahan Airways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\34\ See 83 FR 27828 (June 14, 2018). OFAC's related press
release stated in part that ``[o]ver the last several years, Otik
Aviation has procured and delivered millions of dollars in aviation-
related spare and replacement parts for Mahan Air, some of which are
procured from the United States and the European Union. As recently
as 2017, Otik Aviation continued to provide Mahan Air with
replacement parts worth well over $100,000 per shipment, such as
aircraft brakes.'' The twelve additional Mahan-related aircraft that
were designated are: EP-MMA (MSN 20), EP-MMB (MSN 56), EP-MMC (MSN
282), EP-MMJ (MSN 526), EP-MMV (MSN 2079), EP-MNF (MSN 547), EP-MOD
(MSN 3162), EP-MOM (MSN 3165), EP-MOP (MSN 2257), EP-MOQ (MSN 2261),
EP-MOR (MSN 2392), and EP-MOS (MSN 2347). See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0395. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180524.aspx.
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The December 11, 2018 renewal order detailed publicly available
information showing that Mahan Airways had continued operating a number
of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP-MMB,
EP-MME, EP-MMF, and EP-MMQ, on international flights into and out of
Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, Guangzhou, China, Bangkok, Thailand, and
Dubai, UAE.\35\ It also discussed that OEE's continued

[[Page 75547]]

investigation of Mahan Airways and its affiliates and agents had
resulted in an October 2018 guilty plea by Arzu Sagsoz, a Turkish
national, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
stemming from her involvement in a conspiracy to export a U.S.-origin
aircraft engine, valued at approximately $810,000, to Mahan.
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\35\ Flight tracking information showed that on December 10,
2018, EP-MMB (MSN 56) flew from Istanbul, Turkey to Tehran, Iran,
and EP-MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran.
Additionally, on December 6, 2018, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew from
Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran, and on December 9, 2018, EP-MMQ
(MSN 449) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and
Tehran, Iran.
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The December 11, 2018 order also noted OFAC's September 14, 2018
designation of Mahan-related entities as SDGTs pursuant to Executive
Order 13224, namely, My Aviation Company Limited, of Thailand, and
Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD, a/k/a Mahan Travel a/k/a Mihan Travel
& Tourism SDN BHD, of Malaysia.\36\ As general sales agents for Mahan
Airways, these companies sold cargo space aboard Mahan Airways'
flights, including on flights to Iran, and provided other services to
or for the benefit of Mahan Airways and its operations.\37\
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\36\ See 83 FR 34301 (July 19, 2018) (designation of Mahan
Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on July 9, 2018), and 83 FR 53359 (Oct.
22, 2018) (designation of My Aviation Company Limited and updating
of entry for Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on September 14,
2018).
\37\ OFAC's press release concerning its designation of My
Aviation Company Limited on September 14, 2018, states in part that
``[t]his Thailand-based company has disregarded numerous U.S.
warnings, issued publicly and delivered bilaterally to the Thai
government, to sever ties with Mahan Air.'' My Aviation provides
cargo services to Mahan Airways, including freight booking, and
works with local freight forwarding entities to ship cargo on
regularly scheduled Mahan Airways' flights to Tehran, Iran. My
Aviation has also provided Mahan Airways with passenger booking
services. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm484.
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The June 5, 2019 renewal order highlighted Mahan's continued
violation of the TDO and the Regulations. An end-use check conducted by
BIS in Malaysia in March 2019 uncovered evidence that, on approximately
ten occasions, Mahan had caused, aided and/or abetted the unlicensed
export of U.S.-origin items subject to the Regulations from the United
States to Iran via Malaysia. The items included helicopter shafts,
transmitters, and other aircraft parts, some of which are listed on the
Commerce Control List and controlled on anti-terrorism grounds. The
June 5, 2019 order also detailed publicly available flight tracking
information showing that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number
of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran,
including on routes to and from Damascus, Syria.\38\
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\38\ Specifically, on May 26, 2019, EP-MMJ (MSN 526) flew from
Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran. In addition, on May 24, 2019, EP-
MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, and
on May 23, 2019, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran.
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The June 5, 2019 order also described actions taken by both BIS and
OFAC to thwart efforts by entities connected to or acting on behalf of
Mahan Airways to violate U.S. export controls and sanctions related to
Iran. On May 14, 2019, BIS added Manohar Nair, Basha Asmath Shaikh, and
two co-located companies that they operate, Emirates Hermes General
Trading and Presto Freight International, LLC, to the Entity List
pursuant to Section 744.11 of the Regulations, including for engaging
in activities to procure U.S.-origin items on Mahan's behalf.\39\ On
January 24, 2019, OFAC designated as SDGTs Flight Travel LLC, which is
Mahan's general service agent in Yerevan, Armenia, and Qeshm Fars Air,
an Iranian airline which operates two U.S.-origin Boeing 747s \40\ and
is owned or controlled by Mahan, and also linked to the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).\41\
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\39\ See 84 FR 21233 (May 14, 2019).
\40\ These 747s are registered in Iran with tail numbers EP-FAA
and EP-FAB, respectively.
\41\ OFAC's press release concerning these designations states
that Qeshm Fars Air was being designated for ``being owned or
controlled by Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring, or
providing financial, material or technological support for, or
financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF,'' and
that Flight Travel LLC was being designated for ``acting for or on
behalf of Mahan Air.'' It further states, inter alia, that ``Mahan
Air employees fill Qeshm Fars Air management positions, and Mahan
Air provides technical and operational support for Qeshm Fars Air,
facilitating the airline's illicit operations.'' See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm590. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/
20190124.aspx.
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The December 2, 2019 renewal order noted that OEE's on-going
investigation revealed that U.S.-origin passenger flight and database
management software subject to the Regulations was provided to a
company in Turkey and subsequently used to facilitate and service
Mahan's operations into and out of Turkey in further violation of the
Regulations.
Additionally, open source information, including flight tracking
data and news articles published in October 2019, showed that Mahan
Airways was now operating a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 on routes between
Iranian airports in Tehran, Kish Island, and Mashhad. This aircraft,
bearing Iranian tail number EP-MNB, appears to be one of the three
aircraft that Mahan illegally acquired via Blue Airways of Armenia and
U.K.-based Balli Group that resulted in the issuance of the original
TDO.\42\ See supra at 10-12.
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\42\ The same open sources indicated this aircraft continued to
operate on flights within Iran to include a May 11, 2020 flight from
Tehran, Iran to Kerman, Iran.
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Evidence was also described in the December 2, 2019 renewal order
showing that on or about November 11, 2019, Mahan caused, aided and/or
abetted the unlicensed export of a U.S.-origin atomic absorption
spectrometer, an item subject to the Regulations, from the United
States to Iran via the UAE. Finally, publicly available flight tracking
information showed that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number
of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran,
including on routes to and from Guangzhou, China, Istanbul, Turkey, and
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.\43\
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\43\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on November 23, 2019, EP-MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to
Tehran, Iran, and on November 21, 2019, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew on
routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on
November 20, 2019, EP-MMQ (MSN 449) flew from Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, to Tehran, Iran.
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The May 29, 2020 renewal order cited Mahan's operation of EP-MMD,
EP-MMF, and EP-MMI, aircraft originally acquired from Al Naser
Airlines, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to
Bangkok, Thailand, Dubai, UAE, and Shanghai, China in violation of the
TDO and EAR.\44\ The May 29, 2020 renewal order also detailed the
indictment of Ali Abdullah Alhay and Issam Shammout, parties added to
the TDO in May and July 2015, respectively, in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. Alhay and Shammout were
charged with, among other violations, conspiring to export aircraft and
parts to Mahan in violation of export control laws and the embargo on
Iran beginning around August 2012 through May 2015.
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\44\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on May 8, 2020, EP-MMD (MSN 164) flew on routes between Bangkok,
Thailand and Tehran, Iran, and on May 10, 2020, EP-MMF (MSN 376)
flew on routes between Dubai, UAE and Tehran. In addition, on May 9,
2020, EP-MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Shanghai, China and
Tehran.
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In addition to detailing the operation of multiple aircraft in
violation of the Regulations,\45\ the November 24, 2020 renewal order
discussed a related TDO issued on August 19, 2020, denying for 180 days
the export privileges of Indonesia-based PT MS Aero Support (``PTMS
Aero''), PT Antasena Kreasi (``PTAK''), PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama
(``PTKEU''), Sunarko Kuntjoro, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, and Satrio
Wiharjo Sasmito based on their involvement in the unlicensed export of
aircraft parts to Mahan Airways--often in coordination

[[Page 75548]]

with Mustafa Ovieci, a Mahan executive.\46\ These parties also
facilitated the shipment of damaged Mahan parts to the United States
for repair and subsequent export back to Iran in further violation of
U.S. laws. In both instances, the fact that the items were destined to
Iran/Mahan was concealed from U.S. companies, shippers, and freight
forwarders.\47\
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\45\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on November 13, 2020, EP-MMQ (MSN 449) flew on routes between
Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran, and on November 15, 2020, EP-MMI
(MSN 416) flew on routes between Shenzhen, China and Tehran.
\46\ See 85 FR 52321 (Aug. 25, 2020).
\47\ PTMS Aero, PTAK, PTKEU, and Sunarko Kuntjoro were each
indicted in December 2019 on multiple counts related to this
conspiracy in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
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The November 24, 2020 renewal order also includes actions taken by
other U.S. government agencies such as OFAC's August 19, 2020
designation of UAE-based Parthia Cargo, its CEO Amin Mahdavi, and Delta
Parts Supply FZC as SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order 13224 for
providing ``key parts and logistics services for Mahan Air. . . .'' The
OFAC press release further states, in part, that Mahdavi ``has directly
coordinated the shipment of parts on behalf of Mahan Air.'' \48\ In
addition, Mahdavi and Parthia Cargo were indicted in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for violating sanctions on
Iran.\49\
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\48\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1098.
\49\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-national-and-uae-business-organization-charged-criminal-conspiracy-violate-iranian.
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Moreover, in October 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey sentenced Joyce Eliasbachus to 18 months of confinement
based on her role in a conspiracy to export $2 million dollars' worth
of aircraft parts from the United States to Iran, including to Mahan
Airways.\50\
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\50\ Eliasbachus' arrest and arraignment were detailed in the
June 14, 2018 renewal order, as described supra at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The May 21, 2021 renewal order outlined Mahan's continued operation
of a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited
to, EP-MMH, EP-MMI, and EP-MMQ, on international flights into and out
of Iran from/to Shanghai, China, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and
Guangzhou, China, respectively.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\51\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on May 14, 2021, EP-MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes between Shanghai,
China and Tehran, Iran, and on May 13, 2021, EP-MMI (MSN 416) flew
on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran. In
addition, on May 20, 2021, EP-MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between
Guangzhou, China and Tehran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Open source news reporting also indicated that after five years of
maintenance, Mahan Air is now operating EP-MNE, a Boeing 747 on
domestic flights within Iran.\52\ In addition to this aircraft being
one of the original three Boeing aircraft Mahan obtained in violation
of the Regulations, any service or maintenance involving parts subject
to the EAR would further violate the TDO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\52\ https://simpleflying.com/mahan-air-747-300-flies-again/.
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The November 17, 2021 order details Mahan's continued operation of
a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to
EP-MME, EP-MMJ, EP-MMQ, on flights into and out of Iran from/to
Istanbul, Turkey, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Shenzhen, China,
respectively.\53\ Additionally, publicly available industry sources
showed that EP-MMG (MSN 383), an aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al
Naser Air in violation of both the TDO and Regulations, was in a
maintenance, repair, overhaul (``MRO'') status at Iran's Imam Khomeini
International Airport in Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\53\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on November 7, 2021, EP-MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between
Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran, and on November 9, 2021, EP-MMJ
(MSN 526) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and
Tehran, Iran. In addition, on November 8, 2021, EP-MMQ (MSN 346)
flew on routes between Shenzhen, China and Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The May 13, 2022 renewal order outlines Mahan's continuing
violation of the TDO and/or Regulations including, but not limited to
the operation of EP-MME, EP-MNO, and EP-MMB on flights into and out of
Iran from/to Moscow, Russia, Damascus, Syria, and Guangzhou, China,
respectively.\54\ Open source press reports also indicates that as of
April 2022, Mahan Air increased its service into Moscow, Russia by
adding two weekly flights to Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport (``SVO'') to
its current service into Moscow's Vnukovo Airport (``VKO'').\55\ Mahan
flights into Russia after February 24, 2022 violated the stringent
export controls imposed on aviation-related (e.g., Commerce Control
List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia in response to Russia's
further invasion of Ukraine. These controls include a license
requirement for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia
of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in Export Control
Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 (Section 746.8(a)(1) of the
EAR).\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\54\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on May 2, 2022, EP-MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between Moscow,
Russia and Tehran, Iran, and on May 5, 2022, EP-MNO (MSN 595) flew
on routes between Damascus, Syria and Tehran, Iran. In addition, on
May 6, 2022, EP-MMB (MSN 56) flew on routes between Guangzhou, China
and Tehran, Iran.
\55\ https://centreforaviation.com/news/mahan-air-launches-moscow-sheremetyevo-service-1131185.
\56\ The TDO prohibits Mahan from being eligible to use license
exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of
the EAR).
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The May 13, 2022 renewal order also cited OFAC's recent
administrative enforcement action with an Australian freight forwarder
resulting in a $6,131,855 civil penalty, which resolved, in part,
allegations of receiving 327 payments from Mahan that were processed
through U.S. financial institutions or foreign branches of U.S.
financial institutions in apparent violation of OFAC sanctions.\57\
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\57\ https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20220425_toll.pdf.
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The November 8, 2022 order detailed Mahan Air's continued violation
of the TDO and Regulations, including the Russia-related export
controls set out in Section 746.8 of the Regulations. On September 19,
2022, BIS publicly identified Mahan's EP-MEE aircraft for its
unlicensed reexport to Russia in apparent violation of Section 746.8 of
the Regulations.\58\ Additionally, open source evidence showed that
Mahan continues to operate EP-MME, EP-MMJ, and EP-MMQ on flights into
and out of Iran from/to Moscow, Russia, and Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, respectively, without the requisite authorization.\59\
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\58\ https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3138-bis-press-release-gp10-iranian-craft-additions/file.
\59\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on October 9, 2022, EP-MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between Tehran,
Iran and Moscow, Russia's VTO airport, and on October 26, 2022, EP-
MMJ (MSN 526) flew on routes between Tehran, Iran and Moscow,
Russia's SVO airport. On October 28, 2022, EP-MMQ (MSN 346) flew on
routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further, on August 2, 2022, BIS took a related enforcement action
against Venezuela-based cargo airline Empresa de Transporte
A[eacute]reocargo del Sur, S.A., a/k/a Aerocargo del Sur Transportation
Company, a/k/a EMTRASUR (``EMTRASUR''), for acquiring custody and/or
control from Mahan Air of a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 aircraft bearing
manufacturer's serial number 23413 (``MSN 23413'') in violation of the
TDO.\60\ In or around October 2021, Mahan Air transferred custody and
control of MSN 23413 to EMTRASUR's parent company, CONVIASA,\61\
through an intermediary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\60\ BIS issued a separate TDO denying the export privileges of
EMTRASUR for a period of 180 days. See 87 FR 47,964 (Aug. 5, 2022).
\61\ On or about February 7, 2020, U.S. Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') added
CONVIASA, a Venezuelan state-owned airline, to the list of Specially
Designated Nationals (``SDN'') pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)
13884. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm903.

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[[Page 75549]]

The May 5, 2023 renewal order outlined open source evidence showing
Mahan continuing to operate EP-MNF, EP-MMQ, and EP-MME on flights into
and out of Iran from/to Guangzhou, China, Kabul, Afghanistan, and
Moscow, Russia, respectively, without the requisite authorization.\62\
The renewal order also noted the national security and foreign policy
concerns raised by Mahan's intention to start direct flights from Iran
to Minsk, Belarus.\63\ Lastly, the May 3, 2023 renewal order cited
publicly available information showing that Russian airline Aeroflot,
which is currently subject to its own TDO,\64\ has begun sending its
aircraft to Mahan for repairs and/or maintenance.\65\
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\62\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on April 24, 2023, EP-MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between
Guangzhou, China, and Tehran, Iran, and on April 27, 2023, EP-MNF
(MSN 547) flew on routes between Kabul, Afghanistan and Tehran,
Iran. On April 28, 2023, EP-MME (MSN 371) flew on routes between
Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran.
\63\ https://iranpress.com/content/76332/mahan-air-launches-direct-flight-from-tehran-minsk.
\64\ See 88 FR 66807 (Sep. 28, 2023).
\65\ https://simpleflying.com/aeroflot-airbus-a330-maintenance-iran-mahan-air/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

OEE's October 11, 2023 renewal request and on-going investigation
outlines Mahan's continued violation of the TDO by operating aircraft
including EP-MME, EP-MMQ, and EP-MMB on flights into and out of Iran
from/to Erbil, Iraq, Shanghai, China, Lahore, Pakistan, and Moscow,
Russia.\66\ OEE also highlighted its continued investigation into
Mahan's recent acquisition of an Airbus A340 (MSN 75) bearing Iranian
tail number EP-MJA, which has flown to/from Tehran, Iran and Moscow,
Russia as recently as October 25, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\66\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on October 24, 2023, EP-MME (MSN 371) flew on routes between Erbil,
Iraq and Tehran, Iran, and on October 23, 2023, EP-MMB (MSN 56) flew
on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran. On October 21-22,
2023, EP-MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Lahore, Pakistan and
Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lastly, public reporting details the on-going national security and
foreign policy threats and concerns raised by Mahan's destabilizing
activities. Specifically, open source reporting details October 12,
2023 airstrikes at Syria's Damascus and Aleppo airports made in an
effort to divert a Mahan A340 (MSN 282 and bearing tail number EP-MMC)
\67\ which was in route at the time from Tehran, Iran to Syria and
suspected of carrying weapons.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\67\ See supra at footnote 34.
\68\ https://www.jns.org/syria-airport-strikes-said-to-stop-iranian-missile-shipment/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-state-tv-says-israeli-attack-targets-aleppo-damascus-airports-2023-10-12/; https://www.israelhayom.com/2023/10/17/revealed-this-could-be-why-israel-allegedly-bombed-2-airports-simultaneously/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Findings

Under the applicable standard set forth in Section 766.24 of the
Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the
evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the denied
persons have acted in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that
such violations have been significant, deliberate and covert; and that
given the foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation,
there is a likelihood of imminent violations. Moreover, I find that
renewal for an extended period is appropriate given the pattern of
repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.
Therefore, renewal of the TDO is necessary in the public interest to
prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to give notice to
companies and individuals in the United States and abroad that they
should continue to avoid dealing with Mahan Airways and Al Naser
Airlines and the other denied persons, in connection with export and
reexport transactions involving items subject to the Regulations and in
connection with any other activity subject to the Regulations.

III. Order

It is therefore ordered:
First, that MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A.
Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN MAHMOOD KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/A
KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHMOUD
AMINI, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and
Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates; KERMAN AVIATION A/K/A GIE KERMAN AVIATION, 42
Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France; SIRJANCO TRADING LLC, P.O. Box
8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHAN AIR GENERAL TRADING LLC, 19th
Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab
Emirates; MEHDI BAHRAMI, Mahan Airways- Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad.
Sibil Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey; AL NASER
AIRLINES A/K/A AL-NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL NASER WINGS AIRLINE A/K/A
ALNASER AIRLINES AND AIR FREIGHT LTD., Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil
Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital,
Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St. 3/H.20, Al
Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan; ALI ABDULLAH ALHAY
A/K/A ALI ALHAY A/K/A ALI ABDULLAH AHMED ALHAY, Home 46, Al-Karrada,
Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital,
Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177; BAHAR SAFWA
GENERAL TRADING, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-5, Office #504,
Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 8709, Citadel
Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; SKY BLUE BIRD GROUP
A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD AVIATION A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD LTD A/K/A SKY BLUE
BIRD FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade Zone, United Arab
Emirates; and ISSAM SHAMMOUT A/K/A MUHAMMAD ISAM MUHAMMAD ANWAR NUR
SHAMMOUT A/K/A ISSAM ANWAR, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous
Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17-
18 Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and
Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A Silivri,
Istanbul, Turkey, and when acting for or on their behalf, any
successors or assigns, agents, or employees (each a ``Denied Person''
and collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not, directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any
commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to
as ``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR
including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license
exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR, or engaging in any other
activity subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of a
Denied Person any item subject to the EAR;

[[Page 75550]]

B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing or other support activities
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item,
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to a Denied Person by ownership, control,
position of responsibility, affiliation or other connection in the
conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions
of this Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or
other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that
are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-
origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of sections 766.24(e) of the EAR,
Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar
Safwa General Trading may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a
full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022. In accordance with
the provisions of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR,
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue
Bird Group, and/or Issam Shammout may, at any time, appeal their
inclusion as a related person by filing a full written statement in
support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge,
U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be
opposed by Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or
Bahar Safwa General Trading as provided in section 766.24(d), by filing
a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days
before the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading and each
related person, and shall be published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
one year.

Kevin J. Kurland,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023-24310 Filed 11-2-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P

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