Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 62242-62283 [2023-18199]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Executive Office for Immigration
Review
8 CFR Parts 1001, 1003, 1239, and 1240
[Docket No. EOIR 021–0410; AG Order No.
5738–2023]
RIN 1125–AB18
Appellate Procedures and Decisional
Finality in Immigration Proceedings;
Administrative Closure
Executive Office for
Immigration Review, Department of
Justice.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
In December 2020, the
Department of Justice issued a final rule
(the ‘‘AA96 Final Rule’’) establishing
novel limits on the authority of
immigration judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (‘‘BIA’’ or
‘‘Board’’) to manage their dockets and
efficiently dispose of cases. Among
other changes, the AA96 Final Rule
would have required the BIA to set
simultaneous briefing schedules for
every appeal, limited the authority of
immigration judges and the BIA to
temporarily pause cases while the
United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (‘‘USCIS’’)
adjudicates a noncitizen’s pending visa
application, and restricted the BIA’s
discretion to remand matters to
immigration judges in light of legal and
factual errors. The AA96 Final Rule was
enjoined shortly after its issuance in
March 2021, and it has not been in
effect since that date. After careful
reconsideration, the Department
proposes to restore longstanding
procedures in place prior to the AA96
Final Rule, including administrative
closure, and to clarify and codify other
established practices. Given the
aforementioned injunction, the
proposed regulatory language largely
reflects the currently operative status
quo. The Department believes that this
rule will promote the efficient and
expeditious adjudication of cases, afford
immigration judges and the BIA
flexibility to efficiently allocate their
limited resources, and protect due
process for parties before immigration
judges and the BIA.
DATES: Electronic comments must be
submitted, and written comments must
be postmarked or otherwise indicate a
shipping date on or before November 7,
2023. The electronic Federal Docket
Management System at
www.regulations.gov will accept
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electronic comments until 11:59 p.m.
Eastern Time on that date.
ADDRESSES: If you wish to provide
comments regarding this rulemaking,
you must submit comments, identified
by the agency name and reference RIN
1125–AB18 or EOIR Docket No. 021–
0410, by one of the two methods below.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal:
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
website instructions for submitting
comments.
• Mail: Paper comments that
duplicate an electronic submission are
unnecessary. If you wish to submit a
paper comment in lieu of electronic
submission, please direct the mail/
shipment to: Raechel Horowitz, Chief,
Immigration Law Division, Office of
Policy, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1800,
Falls Church, VA 22041. To ensure
proper handling, please reference the
agency name and RIN 1125–AB18 or
EOIR Docket No. 021–0410 on your
correspondence. Mailed items must be
postmarked or otherwise indicate a
shipping date on or before the
submission deadline.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Raechel Horowitz, Chief, Immigration
Law Division, Office of Policy,
Executive Office for Immigration
Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1800,
Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone
(703) 305–0289.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Public Participation
Interested persons are invited to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written data, views, or
arguments on all aspects of this
proposed rule via one of the methods
and by the deadline stated above. The
Department of Justice (‘‘Department’’)
also invites comments that relate to the
economic, environmental, or federalism
effects that might result from this
proposed rule. Comments that will
provide the most assistance to the
Department in developing these
procedures will reference a specific
portion of the proposed rule; explain the
reason for any recommended change;
and include data, information, or
authority that support such
recommended change.
Please note that all comments
received are considered part of the
public record and made available for
public inspection at
www.regulations.gov. Such information
includes personally identifying
information (such as your name,
address, etc.) voluntarily submitted by
the commenter.
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If you want to submit personally
identifying information (such as your
name, address, etc.) as part of your
comment, but do not want it to be
posted online, you must include the
phrase ‘‘PERSONALLY IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION’’ in the first paragraph
of your comment and identify what
information you want redacted.
If you want to submit confidential
business information as part of your
comment, but do not want it to be
posted online, you must include the
phrase ‘‘CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS
INFORMATION’’ in the first paragraph
of your comment. You also must
prominently identify the confidential
business information to be redacted
within the comment. If a comment has
so much confidential business
information that it cannot be effectively
redacted, all or part of that comment
may not be posted on
www.regulations.gov.
Personally identifying information
located as set forth above will be placed
in the agency’s public docket file, but
not posted online. Confidential business
information identified and located as set
forth above will not be placed in the
public docket file. The Department may
withhold from public viewing
information provided in comments that
it determines may impact the privacy of
an individual or is offensive. For
additional information, please read the
Privacy Act notice that is available via
the link in the footer of
www.regulations.gov. To inspect the
agency’s public docket file in person,
you must make an appointment with the
agency. Please see the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT paragraph above
for agency contact information.
II. Legal Authority
The Department issues this proposed
rule pursuant to section 103(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act
(‘‘INA’’), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g), as amended
by the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(‘‘HSA’’), Public Law 107–296, 116 Stat.
2135 (as amended). Under the HSA, the
Attorney General retains authority to
‘‘establish such regulations, . . . issue
such instructions, review such
administrative determinations in
immigration proceedings, delegate such
authority, and perform such other acts
as the Attorney General determines to
be necessary for carrying out’’ the
Attorney General’s authorities under the
INA. HSA 1102, 116 Stat. at 2273–74;
INA 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(2).
III. History and Background
On August 26, 2020, the Department
published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (‘‘NPRM’’ or ‘‘proposed
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rule’’) that proposed to amend the
Executive Office for Immigration
Review (‘‘EOIR’’) regulations regarding
the handling of appeals to the Board.
Appellate Procedures and Decisional
Finality in Immigration Proceedings;
Administrative Closure, 85 FR 52491
(Aug. 26, 2020) (‘‘AA96 NPRM’’). The
Department proposed multiple changes
to the processing of appeals to ‘‘ensure
the consistency, efficiency, and quality
of its adjudications.’’ Id. at 52491. In
addition, the Department proposed to
amend the regulations to expressly state
that immigration judges and Appellate
Immigration Judges 1 have no
‘‘freestanding’’ authority to
administratively close cases. Id. Finally,
the Department proposed to delete
inapplicable or unnecessary provisions
regarding the forwarding of the record of
proceeding on appeal. Id.2 The AA96
NPRM set forth a 30-day comment
period, stating that any public
comments must be submitted by
September 25, 2020. Id. The Department
received 1,287 comments during the
comment period.3
On December 16, 2020, the
Department published a final rule,
wherein it responded to comments
received during the notice-andcomment period and adopted the
regulatory language proposed in the
AA96 NPRM with minor changes.
Appellate Procedures and Decisional
Finality in Immigration Proceedings;
Administrative Closure, 85 FR 81588
(Dec. 16, 2020) (‘‘AA96 Final Rule’’).
The AA96 Final Rule’s effective date
was January 15, 2021, id. at 81588, but
the rule was enjoined on March 10,
2021, in litigation described in further
detail below. See Centro Legal de la
Raza v. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., 524
F. Supp. 3d 919 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
1 Historically, Department rules, including the
AA96 Final Rule, used the term ‘‘Board member’’
to refer to members of the Board. See Appellate
Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration
Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 85 FR 81588,
81590 (Dec. 16, 2020). The Department has begun
using the term ‘‘Appellate Immigration Judge’’ to
refer to members of the Board, and that is the term
used in this NPRM. Although ‘‘Board member’’ and
‘‘Appellate Immigration Judge’’ are synonymous,
see 8 CFR 1003.1(a)(1)–(2), the Department believes
that ‘‘Appellate Immigration Judge’’ is a more
accurate description of the role of members of the
Board. See Organization of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, 84 FR 44537, 44539 (issued as
interim final rule) (Aug. 26, 2019).
2 In addition, the Department proposed to update
outdated references to the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (‘‘INS’’). 85 FR at 52507 n.36.
3 The Department posted 1,284 of the comments
received for public review. The Department did not
post three of the comments received because they
were either non-substantive or duplicates of other
comments that were posted.
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A. Briefing Schedule Changes at the
Board of Immigration Appeals
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the
regulations specified that appeals
involving detained noncitizens 4 were
subject to a simultaneous briefing
schedule, wherein both parties had 21
days to file simultaneous briefs, unless
the Board specified a shorter period. 8
CFR 1003.3(c)(1) (2019). The regulations
permitted parties subject to a
simultaneous briefing schedule to
submit reply briefs within 21 days of the
deadline for the initial brief, when
permitted by the Board. Id. For cases
involving non-detained noncitizens, the
regulations provided for a consecutive
briefing schedule. The appellant had 21
days to file an initial brief, unless the
Board specified a shorter period, and
the appellee then had an equivalent
amount of time, including any
extensions granted to the appellant, to
file a reply brief. Id.
Appellate Immigration Judges were
authorized, upon written motion, to
extend the filing deadline of an initial
brief or a reply brief for up to 90 days
for good cause shown. Id. Appellate
Immigration Judges generally granted
briefing extensions in 21-day
increments but would also grant longer
extensions for good cause shown. The
regulations also authorized Appellate
Immigration Judges to request
supplemental briefing from parties after
the briefing deadline expired. Id.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule amended 8 CFR
1003.3(c)(1) to require a simultaneous
briefing schedule for all cases before the
Board, regardless of the noncitizen’s
detention status. 85 FR at 81588. The
AA96 Final Rule also reduced the
allowable time to extend a briefing
schedule from a maximum of 90 days to
a maximum of 14 days and limited all
parties to one briefing extension. Id. at
81654 (‘‘If an extension is granted, it is
granted to both parties, and neither
party may request a further extension.’’).
The AA96 Final Rule specified that no
party was entitled to a briefing
extension as a matter of right and that
briefing extensions should only be
granted upon an ‘‘individualized
consideration of good cause.’’ Id. The
4 For purposes of the discussion in this preamble,
the Department uses the term ‘‘noncitizen’’
colloquially and synonymous with the term ‘‘alien’’
as it is used in the INA. See INA 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(3). This NPRM is also proposing to define
the term ‘‘noncitizen’’ to be synonymous with the
term ‘‘alien,’’ as explained later in this preamble.
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AA96 Final Rule also shortened the
maximum amount of time for
submitting reply briefs from 21 days to
14 days, and only when the Board
permitted filing of a reply brief. Id.
B. Administrative Closure Authority
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2019) and 1003.10(b)
(2019) stated that EOIR adjudicators
‘‘may take any action consistent with
their authorities under the [INA] and the
regulations as is appropriate and
necessary for the disposition’’ of the
case. Although the regulations have
never explicitly stated that EOIR
adjudicators have general administrative
closure authority, numerous courts of
appeals and the Board have interpreted
‘‘any action’’ to include using docket
management tools such as
administrative closure. See Romero v.
Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir. 2019)
(explaining that ‘‘[8 CFR] 1003.10(b) and
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously confer[ ]
upon [immigration judges] and the BIA
the general authority to administratively
close cases’’); Meza Morales v. Barr, 973
F.3d 656, 667 n.6 (7th Cir. 2020)
(Barrett, J.) (concluding that ‘‘[8 CFR]
1003.10(b) grants immigration judges
the power to administratively close
cases’’); Arcos Sanchez v. Att’y Gen.,
997 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2021)
(explaining ‘‘that the plain language
establishes that general administrative
closure authority is unambiguously
authorized by these regulations’’);
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688,
692 (BIA 2012) (stating that EOIR
adjudicators may utilize continuances
or administrative closure ‘‘to
temporarily remove a case from an
Immigration Judge’s active calendar or
from the Board’s docket’’). But see
Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d
459, 466 (6th Cir. 2020) (concluding that
‘‘[8 CFR] 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d) do
not delegate to [immigration judges] or
the Board the general authority to
suspend indefinitely immigration
proceedings by administrative closure’’
(internal quotation marks omitted));
Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland, 999 F.3d
986, 991–93 (6th Cir. 2021)
(subsequently ruling that immigration
judges and the Board do have authority
to grant administrative closure to permit
a noncitizen to apply for a provisional
unlawful presence waiver).
Since 1958, regulations have
authorized EOIR adjudicators to
exercise their discretion as may be
‘‘appropriate and necessary’’ for the
disposition of a case. Miscellaneous
Amendments to Chapter, 23 FR 2670,
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2671 (Apr. 23, 1958) (‘‘Subject to any
specific limitation prescribed by the act
and this chapter, special inquiry officers
shall also exercise the discretion and
authority conferred upon the Attorney
General by the act as is appropriate and
necessary for the disposition of such
cases.’’); 5 see also Hernandez-Serrano,
981 F.3d at 464 (‘‘As early as 1958,
regulations granted the predecessors to
[immigration judges] (called ‘special
inquiry officers’) and the Board
authority to take actions ‘appropriate
and necessary for the disposition of’
their cases.’’). In 2000, the Department
published an NPRM that proposed more
expansive authority: that EOIR
adjudicators could take ‘‘any action’’
appropriate and necessary for the
disposition of a case. See Authorities
Delegated to the Director of the
Executive Office for Immigration
Review, the Chairman of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and the Chief
Immigration Judge, 65 FR 81434, 81436–
37 (Dec. 26, 2000). The Department
adopted this regulatory language for
Board members in 2002, and for
immigration judges in 2007.6
Since at least the 1980s,7 immigration
judges and the Board have exercised
their authority to use administrative
closure as a docketing tool, where
appropriate, to remove cases from their
active dockets and to regulate the course
of proceedings. See Arcos Sanchez, 997
F.3d at 116–17 (recognizing that
adjudicators have used administrative
closure dating back to the 1980s).
In 1984, the EOIR Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge issued an Operating
Policies and Procedures Memorandum
(‘‘OPPM’’) setting forth options available
to immigration judges in cases where
noncitizens failed to appear for their
hearings, including the option to
administratively close cases. EOIR,
OPPM 84–2: Cases in Which
Respondents/Applicants Fail to Appear
for Hearing, 1984 WL 582760 (Mar. 7,
5 Initially, the adjudicators who reviewed and
decided deportation cases were known as special
inquiry officers. INA 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(4)
(1952). These adjudicators later became known as
immigration judges. See INA 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C.
1101(b)(4) (defining ‘‘immigration judge’’);
Immigration Judge, 38 FR 8590 (Apr. 4, 1973) (‘‘The
term ‘immigration judge’ means special inquiry
officer.’’).
6 Although the same NPRM proposed this
regulatory authority for both the Board and
immigration judges, the regulatory language was
codified for the Board and immigration judges in
separate final rules. See Board of Immigration
Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 FR 54877, 54902–904 (Aug. 26,
2002); Authorities Delegated to the Director of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the
Chief Immigration Judge, 72 FR 53673, 53677–78
(Sept. 20, 2007).
7 Indeed, EOIR records indicate that
administrative closure was used as early as 1974.
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1984). The OPPM included language
specifying that administratively closed
cases were to be considered ‘‘no longer
pending before the Immigration Judge,’’
and that no further action would be
taken until ‘‘the case is presented for recalendaring and further proceedings.’’
Id. at *2. The OPPM provided a nonexhaustive list of factors for immigration
judges to consider such as adequacy of
notice; likelihood that a deportation
order, if entered in absentia, would be
enforced; the nature of charges; and the
need for parties to be present. Id. at *1.
The next significant development in
the exercise of administrative closure
came in 1986, shortly after President
Reagan signed into law the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Public
Law 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359. The
Immigration Reform and Control Act
created a pathway to lawful status for
certain undocumented noncitizens who
had entered the United States prior to
January 1, 1982. Immigration judges
used administrative closure to pause
removal proceedings while noncitizens
pursued this newly available pathway to
lawful status. See, e.g., Veliz v.
Caplinger, No. 96–1508, 1997 WL
61456, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 1997)
(noting that the removal proceedings
before the agency were administratively
closed to allow noncitizens to apply for
legalization under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act).
As administrative closure became
more common, the Board began to
address questions related to its use. For
example, in 1988, the Board published
a decision in which it determined that
an immigration judge improperly
exercised administrative closure
authority. Matter of Amico, 19 I&N Dec.
652, 654 (BIA 1988) (determining that
the immigration judge’s decision to
administratively close a case rather than
hold proceedings in absentia was
‘‘inappropriate’’ because administrative
closure would have permitted the
noncitizen to avoid an order of
deportation by failing to appear). In its
decision, the Board clarified that
administratively closing a case ‘‘does
not result in a final order’’ and ‘‘is
merely an administrative convenience
which allows the removal of cases from
the calendar in appropriate situations.’’
Id. at 654 n.1. In 1990, the Board
published Matter of Lopez-Barrios and
Matter of Munoz-Santos, both of which
held that an immigration judge could
not administratively close a case if
either party to the proceedings opposed
closure. Matter of Lopez-Barrios, 20 I&N
Dec. 203 (BIA 1990), overruled by
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 697;
Matter of Munoz-Santos, 20 I&N Dec.
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205 (BIA 1990), overruled by Matter of
Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 697.8
Over the next decade, the Department
entered into binding settlement
agreements and issued numerous
regulations that required immigration
judges and the Board to administratively
close cases or provided that parties
could request administrative closure in
a variety of specified situations. See,
e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 243
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(‘‘[I]f the [Respondent] fails to appear for
the scheduled hearing . . . the case
shall be administratively closed,
following which, should the
Respondent come forward, the hearing
shall be recalendared[.]’’); American
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F.
Supp. 796, 805 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (‘‘ABC’’)
(ordering that proceedings before EOIR
be administratively closed, generally,
for class members); Adjustment of
Status for Certain Nationals of
Nicaragua and Cuba, 63 FR 27823,
27830 (May 21, 1998) (implementing
administrative closure procedures for
noncitizens who appeared eligible to
adjust status under the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act of 1997 (‘‘NACARA’’)) (8 CFR
245.13(d)(3) (1999)); Adjustment of
Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 64
FR 25756, 25769 (May 12, 1999)
(requiring EOIR adjudicators to exercise
administrative closure in cases where
noncitizens appeared to be eligible to
file an application for adjustment of
status under the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998
(‘‘HRIFA’’) and met various other
requirements) (8 CFR 245.15(p)(4)
(2000)); Executive Office for
Immigration Review; Adjustment of
Status for Certain Nationals of
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti, 66 FR
29449, 29452 (May 31, 2001) (providing
that a noncitizen for whose case an
immigration judge or the Board has
granted a motion to reopen under
particular statutes may move to have
proceedings administratively closed to
seek adjustment of status) (8 CFR
245.13(m)(1)(ii) (2002)); V
Nonimmigrant Classification; Spouses
and Children of Lawful Permanent
Residents, 66 FR 46697, 46700 (Sept. 7,
2001) (‘‘If the [noncitizen] appears
eligible for V nonimmigrant status, the
8 These decisions did not suggest that
adjudicators did not have the authority to
administratively close cases. Rather, they, as well
as numerous subsequent administrative decisions,
addressed when using administrative closure might
be ‘‘appropriate’’ under the regulations. See 8 CFR
236.1 (1958) (permitting adjudicators to exercise
authorities only as ‘‘appropriate and necessary’’);
see also 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2019); 8 CFR
1003.10(b) (2019).
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immigration judge or the Board,
whichever has jurisdiction, shall
administratively close the proceeding or
continue the motion indefinitely.’’) (8
CFR 214.15(l) (2002)); New
Classification for Victims of Severe
Forms of Trafficking in Persons;
Eligibility for ‘‘T’’ Nonimmigrant Status,
67 FR 4783, 4797 (Jan. 31, 2002) (stating
that T-visa applicants may request
administrative closure) (codifying
language later moved to 8 CFR
1214.2(a)); Adjustment of Status for
Certain Aliens from Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos in the United States, 67 FR
78667, 78673 (Dec. 26, 2002)
(authorizing certain nationals of
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to move
for administrative closure pending their
applications for adjustment of status,
but preventing the immigration judge or
the Board from ‘‘defer[ring] or
dismiss[ing] the proceeding’’ without
the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s consent)
(codifying language later moved to 8
CFR 1245.21(c)).
Since 2011, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (‘‘DHS’’) has issued
a number of enforcement priority
memoranda, some of which have
subsequently been rescinded, that
included discussions of when U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(‘‘ICE’’) attorneys should exercise
prosecutorial discretion in pursuing
removal, which noncitizens were
considered priorities for removal, and
methods for implementing those
priorities as to noncitizens who were
already in removal proceedings,
including by filing joint motions to
administratively close proceedings. See,
e.g., Memorandum for All Field Office
Directors et al., from John Morton,
Director, ICE, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of
the Agency for the Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Aliens at 2
(Jun. 17, 2011) (describing prosecutorial
discretion as a decision ‘‘not to assert
the full scope of the enforcement
authority available to the agency’’),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum for
Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, ICE,
from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary,
DHS, Guidelines for the Enforcement of
Civil Immigration Law (Sept. 30, 2021),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/
guidelines-civilimmigrationlaw.pdf.
Many pending removal-related cases
before EOIR and the federal courts at the
time potentially fell under the
memoranda’s criteria for low priorities
for removal. Cf. In re Immigr. Petitions
for Rev. Pending in U.S. Ct. of Appeals
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for Second Cir., 702 F.3d 160, 160 (2d
Cir. 2012) (‘‘[The petitioner] is one of
more than a thousand cases in our Court
that are actually or potentially subject to
a future decision by the Government as
to whether it will or can remove
petitioners if their petitions are
denied.’’). The use of administrative
closure served to facilitate the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion by allowing
DHS counsel to request that certain lowpriority cases be removed from
immigration judges’ active calendars
and the Board’s docket, thereby
allowing adjudicators to focus on higher
priority cases.
In 2012, the Board published Matter
of Avetisyan, which overruled the
Board’s prior precedent in Matter of
Lopez-Barrios and Matter of MunozSantos. In Matter of Avetisyan, the
Board established that EOIR
adjudicators could administratively
close proceedings over a party’s
objection and set forth a list of factors
that adjudicators should consider when
determining whether administrative
closure was appropriate.9 25 I&N Dec. at
688. In so holding, the Board stated that
EOIR adjudicators’ authority to
administratively close proceedings
stemmed from their general regulatory
authority, under 8 CFR 1003.10(b) and
1003.1(d)(1)(ii), to take any appropriate
and necessary action. Id. at 691. The
Board found that an EOIR adjudicator’s
determination to administratively close
a case over DHS’s objection would not
undermine DHS’s prosecutorial
discretion, as prosecutorial discretion
related to DHS’s decision to commence
removal proceedings. Id. at 694. In
contrast, the Board determined that
once jurisdiction over removal
proceedings vests with EOIR, the EOIR
adjudicator has the authority to regulate
the course of proceedings, including to
administratively close cases where
appropriate. Id.
The Board also explained that EOIR
adjudicators should independently
weigh all relevant factors in determining
whether to administratively close a case,
including but not limited to:
9 Notably, before Matter of Avetisyan overruled
the Board’s prior precedent on this issue, the Board
had encouraged DHS to consider moving for
administrative closure rather than multiple
continuances in ‘‘appropriate circumstances, such
as where there is a pending prima facie approvable
visa petition.’’ Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785,
791 n.4 (BIA 2009); see also Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N
Dec. 127, 135 n.10 (BIA 2009). The Board described
administrative closure as ‘‘an attractive option in
these situations, as it will assist in ensuring that
only those cases that are likely to be resolved are
before the Immigration Judge.’’ Matter of Hashmi,
24 I&N Dec. at 791 n.4. The Board also noted that
administrative closure could ‘‘avoid the repeated
rescheduling of a case that is clearly not ready to
be concluded.’’ Id.
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(1) the reason administrative closure is
sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to
administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the
respondent will succeed on any petition,
application, or other action [the respondent]
is pursuing outside of removal proceedings;
(4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5)
the responsibility of either party, if any, in
contributing to any current or anticipated
delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of
removal proceedings (for example,
termination of the proceedings or entry of a
removal order) when the case is recalendared
before the Immigration Judge or the appeal is
reinstated before the Board.
Id. at 696. The Board later held that
‘‘the primary consideration for an
Immigration Judge in determining
whether to administratively close or
recalendar proceedings is whether the
party opposing administrative closure
has provided a persuasive reason for the
case to proceed and be resolved on the
merits.’’ Matter of W–Y–U–, 27 I&N Dec.
17, 20 (BIA 2017).
In 2013, DHS published a final rule
that allowed certain noncitizens in
removal proceedings to apply for
provisional unlawful presence waivers
of inadmissibility while still in the
United States, but only if their removal
proceedings had been administratively
closed and not recalendared at the time
they filed for the waiver. Provisional
Unlawful Presence Waivers of
Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate
Relatives, 78 FR 535, 577 (Jan. 3, 2013)
(codifying language that was later
moved to 8 CFR 212.7(e)(4)(iii)).10 DHS
further articulated that administrative
closure is an appropriate and common
procedural tool for dispensing with nonpriority cases. Id. at 544 (‘‘Under its
prosecutorial discretion (PD) policies,
ICE has been reviewing cases pending
10 Pursuant to INA 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(9)(B), noncitizens who are inadmissible
because they accrued more than 180 days of
unlawful presence while in the United States and
subsequently depart the United States may seek
waiver of this ground of inadmissibility. Prior to the
DHS rulemaking, such noncitizens, if not eligible to
adjust status within the United States, had to
request a waiver at their consular interview after
leaving the United States and triggering the ground
of inadmissibility. 78 FR at 536. In 2013, DHS
established the provisional unlawful presence
waiver process. Id. It began allowing noncitizens
who are immediate relatives (spouses, children, and
parents) of U.S. citizens to apply for a waiver while
remaining in the United States, and, upon
provisional approval, travel abroad to attend their
consular interview for an immigrant visa, thus
mitigating the likelihood that such individuals
would be required to wait outside of the United
States, apart from their immediate relatives, while
the waiver was adjudicated. Id. In 2016, to further
improve administrative efficiency, DHS expanded
the provisional unlawful presence waiver process to
all noncitizens statutorily eligible for an immigrant
visa and a waiver of inadmissibility based on
unlawful presence in the United States. Expansion
of Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of
Inadmissibility, 81 FR 50244 (July 29, 2016).
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before EOIR and all incoming cases to
ensure that they are aligned with the
agency’s civil enforcement priorities
and that ICE is effectively using its finite
resources. For cases that ICE determines
are not enforcement priorities, it
exercises its discretion where
appropriate, typically by moving for
administrative closure.’’). That same
year, the Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge encouraged immigration judges to
use administrative closure where the
parties reached an ‘‘alternate case
resolution’’ through prosecutorial
discretion. See EOIR, OPPM 13–01:
Continuances and Administrative
Closure at 4 (Mar. 7, 2013) (rescinded),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/08/13-01.pdf.
In 2017, the effectiveness of
administrative closure for streamlining
EOIR’s cases was briefly referenced in a
study conducted by an outside
consultant. See EOIR, Booz Allen
Hamilton, Legal Case Study: Summary
Report at 26 (Apr. 6, 2017)
(recommending that the Department
engage in discussions with DHS to
explore the development of policies
regarding administrative closure as one
way to improve processing efficiency).11
In 2018, the longstanding practice of
administrative closure stopped when
the Attorney General issued Matter of
Castro-Tum, overruling Matter of
Avetisyan and all Board precedents
inconsistent with the Attorney General’s
decision. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N
Dec. 271, 271 (A.G. 2018), overruled by
Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326
(A.G. 2021). In Castro-Tum, the
Attorney General held that EOIR
adjudicators lack the general authority
under the regulations to
administratively close cases and, as a
result, lack the authority to
administratively close cases unless a
regulation or a settlement agreement
expressly provided such authority. Id. at
272.
Matter of Castro-Tum has been
rejected by the majority of those courts
of appeals that have considered it. The
Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits
rejected Matter of Castro-Tum, holding
that the pre-AA96 regulations
unambiguously provide EOIR
adjudicators with general authority to
administratively close cases. See
Romero, 937 F.3d at 297 (concluding
that 8 CFR 1003.10(b) and
11 The Department has considered the various
proposals made in the report. For example, in 2021,
EOIR finalized a rule implementing electronic filing
at all immigration courts and the BIA. See Booz
Allen Hamilton, Legal Case Study: Summary Report
at 23; Executive Office for Immigration Review
Electronic Case Access and Filing, 86 FR 70708
(Dec. 13, 2021) (‘‘ECAS Rule’’).
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1003.1(d)(1)(ii) ‘‘unambiguously confer
upon [immigration judges] and the BIA
the general authority to administratively
close cases’’); Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d
at 122 (‘‘[W]e hold that the plain
language establishes that general
administrative closure authority is
unambiguously authorized by these
regulations.’’); Meza Morales, 973 F.3d
at 667 n.6 (concluding that 8 CFR
1003.10(b) ‘‘grants immigration judges
the power to administratively close
cases’’). The Sixth Circuit reached a
different conclusion, finding that the
pre-AA96 regulations do not confer
such general authority. HernandezSerrano, 981 F.3d at 466 (citing Matter
of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. at 272).
However, the Sixth Circuit subsequently
clarified that ‘‘administrative closure for
the limited purpose of permitting
noncitizens to apply for provisional
unlawful presence waivers’’ was an
‘‘appropriate and necessary’’ act under 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b), as
codified prior to the AA96 Final Rule.
Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d 986 at 992–93.
Recently, the Second Circuit held that
neither the immigration judge nor the
BIA abused its discretion in relying on
Matter of Castro-Tum—which was in
effect at the time of the agency’s
adjudications—to deny a noncitizen’s
motion for administrative closure.
Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62, 76 (2d
Cir. 2023). The Second Circuit
concluded that the pre-AA96
regulations were ambiguous as to
whether they authorized general
administrative closure and deferred to
the Attorney General’s interpretation in
Matter of Castro-Tum. See id. at 72–75.
However, the Second Circuit noted
that—after the BIA issued its decision in
the case—the Attorney General issued
Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at
326, which overruled Matter of CastroTum. Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th at 69.
In Cruz-Valdez, the Attorney General
explained that ‘‘three courts of appeals
have rejected Castro-Tum,’’ that CastroTum ‘‘departed from long-standing
practice,’’ and that the matter was the
subject of an ongoing rulemaking. See
Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at
328–29 (directing EOIR adjudicators to
continue applying the standard for
administrative closure set forth in
Matter of Avetisyan and Matter of W–Y–
U-, except in jurisdictions where a court
of appeals has held otherwise, while the
Department reconsiders the AA96 Final
Rule). Against this backdrop, the
Second Circuit left open the possibility
that other interpretations of the
regulations could also be permissible.
See Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th at 69
(noting that ‘‘the Attorney General has
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supplanted Matter of Castro-Tum with a
new interpretation of the applicable
regulations’’).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule amended 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) and
related provisions to expressly state that
EOIR adjudicators do not have
‘‘freestanding authority’’ to
administratively close cases before
EOIR. 85 FR at 81651, 81655. Rather, the
AA96 Final Rule expressly limited
administrative closure authority to
express grants of such authority by
regulation or judicially approved
settlement. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1214.2(a),
1214.3, 1240.62(b), 1240.70(f)–(h),
1245.13(d)(3)(i), 1245.15(p)(4)(i),
1245.21(c); Barahona-Gomez, 243 F.
Supp. 2d at 1035–36 (discussing
settlement agreement requiring
immigration judges and the Board to
administratively close class members’
cases).
The AA96 Final Rule was consistent
with the Attorney General’s holding in
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. at
284, that 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and
1003.10(b) do not provide for general
administrative closure authority.12 The
AA96 Final Rule asserted that general
administrative closure authority
improperly allows immigration judges
to determine which immigration cases
should be adjudicated and which ones
should not. 85 FR at 81599. The AA96
Final Rule stated that general authority
to administratively close cases was
improper because ‘‘in practice, unlike
continuances, administrative closure
has at times been used to effectively
terminate cases through indefinite
delay.’’ Id.
C. Termination and Dismissal
As discussed above, the regulations in
place prior to the AA96 Final Rule
conferred on EOIR adjudicators the
general authority to ‘‘take any action
consistent with their authorities under
the Act and regulations’’ as ‘‘appropriate
and necessary for the disposition’’ of
such cases. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii),
1003.10(b). The regulations further state
that immigration judge orders ‘‘shall
direct the respondent’s removal from
the United States, or the termination of
the proceedings, or other such
disposition of the case as may be
appropriate.’’ 8 CFR 1240.12(c). Further,
immigration judges are ‘‘authorized to
12 Moreover, the AA96 Final Rule cited the
Attorney General’s explanation that general
administrative closure authority conflicts with
regulatory requirements to resolve matters in a
‘‘timely’’ fashion. 85 FR 81588 (Dec. 16, 2020) at
81599.
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issue orders in the alternative or in
combination as [they] may deem
necessary.’’ Id.
The regulations, as published prior to
and unchanged by the AA96 Final Rule,
provide immigration judges with
explicit authority to terminate or
dismiss removal proceedings after the
commencement of proceedings in
certain circumstances. With respect to
dismissal, 8 CFR 1239.2(c) provides that
after commencement of proceedings,
government counsel or certain
enumerated officers under 8 CFR
239.1(a) may move to dismiss
proceedings on grounds set forth in 8
CFR 239.2(a), which include where: (1)
the respondent is a national of the
United States; (2) the respondent is not
deportable or inadmissible under
immigration laws; (3) the respondent is
deceased; (4) the respondent is not in
the United States; (5) the Notice to
Appear was issued for the respondent’s
failure to file a timely petition as
required by section 216(c) of the Act,
but the respondent’s failure to file a
timely petition was excused in
accordance with section 216(d)(2)(B) of
the Act; (6) the Notice to Appear was
improvidently issued; or (7)
circumstances of the case have changed
after the Notice to Appear was issued to
such an extent that continuation is no
longer in the best interest of the
government. 8 CFR 1239.2(c). Dismissal
of proceedings is without prejudice to
DHS or the noncitizen. Id.
With respect to termination, 8 CFR
1239.2(f) provides that ‘‘[a]n
immigration judge may terminate
removal proceedings to permit the
[noncitizen] to proceed to a final
hearing on a pending application or
petition for naturalization when the
[noncitizen] has established prima facie
eligibility for naturalization and the
matter involves exceptionally appealing
or humanitarian factors[.]’’ 8 CFR
1239.2(f). The regulation also provides
that ‘‘in every other case, the removal
hearing shall be completed as promptly
as possible notwithstanding the
pendency of an application for
naturalization during any state of the
proceedings.’’ Id.
The regulations also confer authority
on immigration judges to dismiss or
terminate proceedings in other discrete
circumstances. See, e.g., 8 CFR
1216.4(a)(6) (authorizing termination
upon joint motion of the parties for
failure to properly file a Petition to
Remove the Conditions on Residence,
Form I–751); 8 CFR 1235.3(b)(5)(iv)
(authorizing termination where U.S.
citizenship, permanent residence, or
asylee or refugee status is found in
claimed status review proceedings); id.
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at 1235.3(b)(5)(iv) (authorizing
termination where U.S. citizenship,
permanent residence, or asylee or
refugee status is found in claimed status
review proceedings); id. at 1238.1(e)
(authorizing termination upon DHS
motion in order for DHS to commence
administrative removal under section
238 of the Act); see also id. at 1245.13(l)
(deeming proceedings terminated upon
the granting of adjustment of status for
certain Nicaraguan and Cuban
nationals).13
Additionally, the Board has held that
the immigration judge may terminate
proceedings when there is a proper
reason to do so, such as where DHS
cannot meet its burden to sustain
charges of removability ‘‘or in other
specific circumstances consistent with
the law and applicable regulations.’’
Matter of Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I&N Dec.
43, 45 (BIA 2012); see also Matter of
Lopez-Barrios, 20 I&N Dec. at 204.
In 2018, the Attorney General held
that, under the regulations, EOIR
adjudicators lacked the ‘‘inherent
authority’’ to terminate proceedings
except as expressly authorized. Matter
of S–O–G– & F–D–B–, 27 I&N Dec. 462,
463 (A.G. 2018). In reaching that
conclusion, the Attorney General relied
13 Although codified separately in the regulations,
termination and dismissal authority have been
referenced interchangeably by EOIR. See, e.g.,
Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. 648, 648
n.1 (A.G. 2022) (‘‘This labeling distinction is not
material when a movant asks an immigration judge
or the Board to end a case pursuant to a provision
that does not use one of those labels. Except where
a distinction between the two terms exists in
regulations, this opinion refers to ‘termination’ and
‘dismissal’ interchangeably.’’); Matter of VizcarraDelgadillo, 13 I&N Dec. 51, 55 (BIA 1968) (holding
that the immigration judge had authority to
terminate proceedings as ‘‘improvidently begun’’ in
a case where INS moved for dismissal and both
parties agreed to the motion to dismiss); Matter of
G–N–C, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 284 (BIA 1998) (using the
term ‘‘dismissal’’ and ‘‘termination’’
interchangeably in a case involving an INS motion
for dismissal of proceedings under former 8 CFR
239.2(c)); Matter of W–C–B-, 24 I& N Dec. 118, 122
(BIA 2007) (stating that once jurisdiction vests with
an immigration judge, a Notice to Appear cannot be
cancelled but instead DHS must ‘‘move for
dismissal of the matter, i.e., request termination of
the removal proceeding’’ under 8 CFR 239.2(c));
Matter of Andrade Jaso & Carbajal Ayala, 27 I&N
Dec. 557, 559 (BIA 2019) (holding that the
‘‘immigration judge properly granted the DHS’s
motion to dismiss the proceedings without
prejudice’’ under 8 CFR 1239.2(c)); see also 78 FR
535 (Jan. 3, 2013) at 544 (preamble to a DHS final
rule stating that ‘‘[i]f the Form I–601A is approved
for [a noncitizen] whose proceedings have been
administratively closed, the [noncitizen] should
seek termination or dismissal of the proceedings,
without prejudice, by EOIR . . . or risk becoming
ineligible for the immigrant visa based on another
ground of inadmissibility’’). While used
interchangeably, the regulations limit dismissal to
only those cases where DHS has moved for
dismissal. Nevertheless, both termination and
dismissal result in concluding removal proceedings
without entering an order of removal.
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heavily on the decision in Matter of
Castro-Tum. See id. at 463, 466.
However, the Attorney General
subsequently overruled Matter of S–O–
G– & F–D–B–, explaining that ‘‘[t]he
precedential basis for that opinion ha[d]
been significantly eroded by the
overruling of Castro-Tum,’’ 14 and that it
‘‘imposed ‘rigid procedural
requirements that would undermine
. . . fair and efficient adjudication’ in
certain immigration cases.’’ Matter of
Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. 648,
651 (A.G. 2022) (quoting Matter of A–C–
A–A–, 28 I&N Dec. 351, 351 (A.G.
2021)). Accordingly, Matter of Coronado
Acevedo held that ‘‘immigration judges
and the Board should be permitted to
consider and, where appropriate, grant
termination’’ in certain limited
circumstances pending the outcome of a
rulemaking to reconsider the regulations
at issue in both Matter of Castro-Tum
and Matter of S–O–G– & F–D–B–. Id. at
652.
D. Sua Sponte Reopening or
Reconsideration and Self-Certification
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
EOIR adjudicators have long had the
authority to sua sponte reopen or
reconsider cases, under rules
promulgated in 1958 that remained in
effect until the issuance of the AA96
Final Rule. See Miscellaneous
Amendments to Chapter, 23 FR 9115,
9117 (Nov. 26, 1958); 8 CFR 1003.2(a)(1)
and 1003.23(b)(1) (2019).15 However,
even prior to 1958, courts recognized
such authority. See Dada v. Mukasey,
554 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2008) (discussing
14 In particular, the Fourth Circuit has indicated
that it ‘‘fail[ed] to see how the general power to
terminate proceedings’’ would be inconsistent with
the ‘‘authorities bestowed by the INA.’’ Gonzalez v.
Garland, 16 F.4th 131, 141–42 (4th Cir. 2021) (‘‘We
have found no provisions stating that the
[immigration judge] or BIA cannot terminate
removal proceedings, and the Government does not
cite to any.’’). Further, in that case, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the Government’s position that
section 240(c)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1229a(c)(1)(A), which states that ‘‘[a]t the
conclusion of the proceeding, the immigration
judge shall decide whether [a noncitizen] is
removable from the United States,’’ precludes
termination. Gonzalez, 16 F.4th at 141. Specifically,
the court concluded that a statutory requirement
that an immigration judge decide whether a
noncitizen is removable does not limit the
immigration judge’s actions after making that
determination, and that there are circumstances
where delay or termination after such
determination may be appropriate. Id.
15 The 1958 rule amended, inter alia, part 3.2 of
Title 8 of the CFR. Following the creation of DHS
in 2003 after the passage of the HSA, EOIR’s
regulations were moved from Chapter I of Title 8
to Chapter V. Aliens and Nationality; Homeland
Security; Reorganization of Regulations, 68 FR 9824
(Feb. 28, 2003). Part 3.2 was subsequently
duplicated for EOIR at part 1003.2. Id. at 9830.
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reopening as ‘‘a judicial creation later
codified by federal statute’’ and citing
decisions using reopening as early as
1916).
As originally implemented by the
Department, the sua sponte authority of
immigration judges and Appellate
Immigration Judges was not limited by
time or number requirements. In 1996,
however, the Department issued a rule
establishing time and number
limitations on motions to reopen to
implement statutory changes made by
the Immigration Act of 1990, Public Law
101–649, 104 Stat. 4978. Immigration
Act of 1990, sec. 545(d), 104 Stat. at
5066 (‘‘[T]he Attorney General shall
issue regulations with respect to . . .
the period of time in which motions to
reopen and to reconsider may be offered
in deportation proceedings, which
regulations include a limitation on the
number of such motions that may be
filed and a maximum time period for
the filing of such motions[.]’’); Executive
Office for Immigration Review; Motions
and Appeals in Immigration
Proceedings, 61 FR 18900 (Apr. 29,
1996). At the time, the Department
declined to include a ‘‘good cause’’
exception to the time and number
limitations for motions to reopen filed
by a party in proceedings because the
same goal was accomplished by sua
sponte authority. 61 FR at 18902; see
also Avila-Santoyo v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
713 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir. 2013)
(same).
Additionally, prior to the AA96 Final
Rule, the Board had the authority to
self-certify cases. 8 CFR 1003.1(c)
(2019). Under this authority, the Board
could, in its discretion, review decisions
of an immigration judge and DHS by its
own certification. 8 CFR 1003.1(b)–(c)
(2019). The Board could exercise this
authority even in cases where a party’s
appeal was untimely or defective, after
determining that the parties were given
a fair opportunity to make
representations before the Board. Id.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule revised the
regulations to limit the longstanding
general sua sponte authority to reopen
or reconsider cases and established that
sua sponte reopening or reconsideration
could only be used to correct
typographical errors or defects in
service. 85 FR at 81654–55 (8 CFR
1003.23(b)(1)). The AA96 Final Rule
also limited exceptions to the time and
numerical limits on filing a motion to
reopen to cases where a change in fact
or law post-dating the entry of a final
order vitiated the grounds for removal
and the movant demonstrated diligence
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in pursuing the motion. Id. (8 CFR
1003.23(b)(4)(v)). The Department chose
to apply these restrictions on
immigration judges’ and the Board’s sua
sponte reopening authority to all
pending cases. Id. at 81646–47. The
Department explained that this
rescission was needed because sua
sponte authority had been used
improperly. Id. at 81628. Additionally,
the Department explained that the
Attorney General rescinded his
delegation of sua sponte authority to
reopen or reconsider given the lack of a
meaningful standard to guide a decision
whether to order reopening or
reconsideration of cases through the use
of sua sponte authority. Id.
The AA96 Final Rule also amended 8
CFR 1003.1(c) to remove the Board’s
authority to self-certify cases in order to
accept untimely or defective appeals in
exceptional circumstances. The
Department explained that the change
was necessary due to similar concerns
such as the lack of standards for the use
of the self-certification authority,
inconsistent applications resulting from
the lack of a defined standard for
determining when ‘‘exceptional’’
circumstances exist, the potential for
lack of notice to the parties when the
Board elected to use its self-certification
authority, the potential for inconsistent
application and abuse of selfcertification authority, and the strong
interest in finality of EOIR’s
adjudications. Id. at 81591.
E. Board Findings of Fact—
Administrative Notice
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the
regulations generally precluded the
Board from engaging in fact-finding in
the course of deciding appeals. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2019). However, the
regulations authorized the Board to take
‘‘administrative notice of commonly
known facts such as current events or
the contents of official documents.’’ Id.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule expanded the
regulations regarding administrative
notice in several ways. First, in addition
to permitting the Board to take
administrative notice of the content of
official documents and current events,
the rule further permitted the Board to
take administrative notice of ‘‘[f]acts
that can be accurately and readily
determined from official government
sources and whose accuracy is not
disputed’’ and ‘‘[u]ndisputed facts
contained in the record.’’ 85 FR at 81651
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(8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A)(3), (4)). The
AA96 Final Rule went on to state that
where the Board intends to rely on
administratively noticed facts to reverse
an immigration judge’s grant of relief or
protection from removal, the Board is
required to notify the parties of its
intent and provide them at least 14 days
within which to respond to the notice.
Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(B)). However,
the AA96 Final Rule did not require the
Board to notify the parties if it relied on
an administratively noticed fact to
uphold an immigration judge’s denial.
See id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(v)).
F. Board Findings of Fact—Voluntary
Departure
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
Voluntary departure is a discretionary
form of relief that ‘‘allows certain
favored [noncitizens] . . . to leave the
country willingly’’ either before the
conclusion of removal proceedings or
after being found deportable. Dada, 554
U.S. at 8. A noncitizen must apply for
voluntary departure in the first instance
before an immigration judge; otherwise,
the opportunity to seek such relief will
be deemed waived. See, e.g., Matter of
J–Y–C–, 24 I&N Dec. 260, 261 n.1 (BIA
2007) (declining to consider claim
raised for the first time on appeal).
Likewise, the noncitizen must raise the
issue of voluntary departure in any
appeal to the Board; otherwise, it will be
deemed waived. See Matter of
Cervantes, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 561 n.1
(BIA 1999) (refusing to address an issue
not raised on appeal).
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the
regulations described an immigration
judge’s authority to grant voluntary
departure but did not articulate the
Board’s authority to do so. See generally
8 CFR 1240.26 (2019). The regulations
stated that in limited circumstances, the
Board could reinstate an order of
voluntary departure when removal
proceedings had been reopened for a
purpose other than solely requesting
voluntary departure. 8 CFR 1240.26(h)
(2019).16 The Board could remand cases
to the immigration court to consider
whether a noncitizen was eligible for
voluntary departure or for the
16 Although the regulations have never explicitly
stated that the Board has the authority to grant
voluntary departure, the Eleventh Circuit has stated
that the Board has the authority to grant or deny
voluntary departure in the first instance pursuant
to its general (pre-AA96) regulatory authority under
8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) to ‘‘review questions of law,
discretion, and judgment and all other issues in
appeals from decisions of immigration judges de
novo.’’ Blanc v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 996 F.3d 1274,
1278 (11th Cir. 2021) (‘‘At the agency level, the
Board of Immigration Appeals itself can grant—or
deny—voluntary departure.’’).
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immigration judge to review whether a
noncitizen had received proper
voluntary departure advisals. See Matter
of Gamero, 25 I&N Dec. 164, 168 (BIA
2010) (concluding that ‘‘a remand is the
appropriate remedy when the
mandatory advisals have not been
provided by the Immigration Judge’’).
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2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule delegated
explicit authority to the Board to
consider issues relating to the
immigration judge’s decision on
voluntary departure de novo and to
issue final decisions on requests for
voluntary departure based on the record
evidence. 85 FR at 81652, 81655 (8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(E); 1240.26(k)). The
AA96 Final Rule barred the Board from
remanding a case to the immigration
court solely to consider a request for
voluntary departure or for the
immigration judge’s failure to provide
advisals following a grant of voluntary
departure. Id. at 81652.
Specifically, the AA96 Final Rule
provided that the Board could issue an
order of voluntary departure, with an
alternate order of removal, where: (1)
the noncitizen requested voluntary
departure before the immigration judge;
(2) the notice of appeal specified that
the noncitizen was appealing an
immigration judge’s denial of voluntary
departure and raised specific factual
and legal challenges on this issue; and
(3) the Board determined that the
noncitizen was otherwise eligible for
voluntary departure. Id. The AA96 Final
Rule mandated that if the Board did not
grant the request for voluntary
departure, it would be required to deny
the request. Id.
The AA96 Final Rule further provided
that in instances where the Board
determined that the immigration judge
incorrectly denied a noncitizen’s
request for voluntary departure or failed
to provide appropriate advisals, it
would be required to consider the
request for voluntary departure de novo
and, if warranted, it must enter an order
granting voluntary departure with an
alternate order of removal. Id. at 81655.
Furthermore, the AA96 Final Rule
specified that in cases where DHS
appealed an immigration judge’s
decision, the Board could not grant
voluntary departure unless: (1) the
noncitizen requested voluntary
departure before the immigration judge
and provided or proffered evidence to
support the request; (2) the immigration
judge either granted voluntary departure
or did not rule on the request; and (3)
the noncitizen otherwise met the
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statutory and regulatory criteria for
voluntary departure. Id.
Lastly, the AA96 Final Rule specified
that the Board could impose conditions
that it deemed necessary to ensure the
noncitizen’s timely departure from the
United States and required the Board to
provide written advisals of such
conditions and other duties associated
with voluntary departure. Id. at 81655–
56. The noncitizen could accept the
grant of voluntary departure or could
decline by providing written notice
within five days of receipt of the Board’s
decision, failing to timely post any
required bond, or otherwise failing to
comply with the Board’s order. Id. at
81656.
G. Board Remand Authority—
Additional Findings of Fact
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
The Board does not engage in factfinding when adjudicating appeals of
immigration judges’ decisions. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(i). Accordingly, under the
pre-AA96 regulations, a party asserting
that the Board could not properly
resolve an appeal without further factfinding would file a motion to remand.
8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2019).
Generally, motions to remand are
subject to the same substantive
requirements as motions to reopen,
particularly where a party seeks remand
during the pendency of a direct appeal
to present new evidence or to apply for
a newly available form of relief not
considered by the immigration judge.
See Rodriguez v. INS, 841 F.2d 865, 867
(9th Cir. 1987) (substantive
requirements of a motion to remand are
the same as a motion to reopen); Matter
of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464, 471 (BIA
1992) (explaining ‘‘where a motion to
remand is really in the nature of a
motion to reopen or a motion to
reconsider, it must comply with the
substantive requirements for such
motions’’). Additionally, prior to the
AA96 Final Rule, the Board had
regulatory authority to sua sponte
remand a case for further fact-finding
where necessary. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)
(2019); see also Matter of S–H–, 23 I&N
Dec. 462, 466 (BIA 2002) (exercising sua
sponte remand authority).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule restricted the
Board’s authority to remand for further
fact-finding or consideration of new
evidence. 85 FR at 81651 (8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(C)–(D)). First, the AA96
Final Rule provided that the Board may
only grant motions to remand for further
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fact-finding when: (1) the party seeking
remand preserved the issue before the
immigration judge; (2) the party seeking
remand attempted to adduce the
additional facts before the immigration
judge, if it bore the burden of proof; (3)
additional fact-finding would alter the
outcome of the case; (4) additional factfinding would not be cumulative of the
evidence already presented or contained
in the record; and (5) either the
immigration judge’s factual findings
were clearly erroneous, the immigration
judge committed an error of law that
required additional fact-finding on
remand, or remand to DHS was
warranted following a de novo review.
Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(D)). Second,
the AA96 Final Rule prohibited the
Board from sua sponte remanding a case
for further fact-finding except when
necessary to determine whether the
immigration judge had jurisdiction over
the case. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(C)).
The AA96 Final Rule provided
exceptions to these general restrictions
on remand authority under 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(6)(iii) and (d)(7)(v)(B). 85 FR
at 81651–52. Under paragraph (d)(6)(iii),
DHS could move the Board to remand
the record to the immigration judge to
consider whether, in light of new
information gained by identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations
or examinations, any pending
applications for relief or protection
should be denied. Id. If DHS failed to
report the results of such investigations
or examinations, the regulations
directed the Board to remand the case
to the immigration judge for further
proceedings under 8 CFR 1003.47(h). Id.
Paragraph (d)(7)(v)(B) reiterated that the
Board was not limited in remanding a
case based on new evidence or
information gained from identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations
or examinations; to address a question
of jurisdiction over an application or
proceedings; or to address a question
regarding grounds of removability in
sections 212 or 237 of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1182, 1227. 85 FR at 81652.
H. Board Remand Authority—Errors in
Fact or Law
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the
regulations broadly authorized the
Board to remand cases ‘‘as . . .
appropriate, without entering a final
decision on the merits of the case.’’ 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(7) (2019). However, as
the AA96 Final Rule explained, the
regulation granted this authority
without any further guidance or
instructions regarding when the Board
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could order a remand instead of issuing
a final order. 85 FR at 81589.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule restricted the
Board’s authority to remand for errors in
fact or law or consideration of material
changes in fact or law. Id. at 81652 (8
CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)). Specifically, the
AA96 Final Rule provided that the
Board could not remand a case without
first identifying the standard of review
that it had applied, as well as the
specific error or errors made by the
immigration judge. Id. The Board also
could not remand a case based on a
‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ standard
of review or based on a legal argument
that was not presented in 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(D) through (E), with
certain exceptions. Id.
Additionally, the AA96 Final Rule
barred the Board from remanding a case
sua sponte, unless the remand solely
involved a question of jurisdiction. Id.
As discussed above, the Board also
could not remand a case solely for
consideration of voluntary departure or
as the result of the failure to give
required advisals for a grant of
voluntary departure. Id. Moreover, the
AA96 Final Rule generally barred
remanding based on any legal
arguments that did not pertain to an
‘‘issue of jurisdiction over an
application or the proceedings,’’ or to
‘‘material change[s] in fact or law’’
underlying a removability ground or
grounds that occurred after the date of
the immigration judge’s decision and
substantial evidence indicated that the
material change would vitiate all
grounds of removability. Id.
I. Background Check
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1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
In 2005, the Department implemented
regulations covering background and
security investigations in proceedings
before immigration judges and the
Board. See Background and Security
Investigations in Proceedings Before
Immigration Judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals, 70 FR 4743 (Jan.
31, 2005) (‘‘Background Check Rule’’)
(issued as interim final rule). The
Background Check Rule amended
Department regulations to ensure that
the necessary identity, law enforcement,
and security investigations (hereinafter
‘‘background checks’’) are promptly
initiated and have been completed by
DHS prior to the granting of certain
forms of relief or protection from
removal. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6) (2019).
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Under the framework implemented by
the Background Check Rule, applicants
for relief or protection from removal in
proceedings before EOIR have an
obligation to comply with applicable
requirements to provide biometrics and
other biographical information, and
failure to comply with such
requirements within the time allowed
constitutes abandonment of the
application, with certain exceptions. Id.;
8 CFR 1003.47(c), (d).
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the
Board could address incomplete or
outdated background checks by either
remanding the case to the immigration
judge or placing adjudication of the case
on hold until background checks were
completed or updated. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(6)(ii)(A), (B) (2019). However,
the Board was not required to remand
or hold a case if dismissing the appeal
or when denying the relief sought. 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iv) (2019).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule limited the
Board’s authority to remand a decision
with incomplete or outdated
background checks. 85 FR at 81651 (8
CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(ii)–(iii)). Under the
new framework, the Board was only
permitted to place such cases on hold
and to notify the parties about the hold,
including certain advisals about the
consequences for failure to comply with
background check requirements. Id.
Further, the AA96 Final Rule required
the Board to deem an application for
relief from removal abandoned if a
noncitizen failed to comply with
background check procedures within 90
days of DHS’s instruction notice under
8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(ii), unless the
noncitizen demonstrated good cause
prior to the end of the 90-day period, or
if the noncitizen was detained. Id. at
81651–52 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iii)). If the
noncitizen demonstrated good cause
within the 90-day period, the Board
could give the noncitizen one extension
of up to 30 additional days to comply.
Id. at 81652. The AA96 Final Rule
further required that the Board
adjudicate the remainder of the appeal
within 30 days after an application was
deemed abandoned and enter an order
of removal or a grant of voluntary
departure, as appropriate. Id.
Regarding motions to remand, the
AA96 Final Rule permitted DHS to file
a motion to remand if it obtained
relevant information when completing
or updating background checks so that
the immigration judge could consider
whether, in light of the new
information, any pending applications
for relief or protection should be denied.
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Id. Additionally, the AA96 Final Rule
instructed the Board to remand the case
to the immigration judge if DHS failed
to report the results of background
checks within 180 days of the Board’s
notice. Id.
J. Adjudication Timelines
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the
regulations provided for a case
management system that set forth, in
relevant part, procedures for initial
screening for cases appealed to the
Board and general guidance regarding a
decision’s timeliness. 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(1), (8) (2019). Regarding initial
screening, the regulations established
that cases would be referred to a
screening panel for review and that
appeals subject to summary dismissal
must be ‘‘promptly dismissed.’’ 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(1) (2019). However, the Board
did not have a concrete timeline for
such review or dismissal. Id. As for
timeliness, the regulations provided that
in all cases, other than those subject to
summary dismissal, the Appellate
Immigration Judge or panel should issue
a decision on the merits ‘‘as soon as
practicable,’’ prioritizing cases
involving detained noncitizens. 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8) (2019). The regulations
further set forth a 90-day decision
deadline for cases adjudicated by a
single Appellate Immigration Judge,
beginning upon completion of the
record on appeal, and a 180-day
deadline for cases adjudicated by a
three-member panel, beginning once an
appeal was assigned to the threemember panel. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i)
(2019). However, the Board Chairman 17
could extend those deadlines in exigent
circumstances. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii)
(2019). The Chairman could also
suspend the regulatory deadlines and
indefinitely hold a case or group of
cases in anticipation of an impending
decision by the United States Supreme
Court, a United States Court of Appeals,
the Board sitting en banc, or impending
Department regulations. 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(iii) (2019). Moreover, the
Chairman was required to notify the
EOIR Director and the Attorney General
if an Appellate Immigration Judge
consistently failed to meet the assigned
deadlines or adhere to the case
management system, as well as to
prepare an annual report assessing the
timeliness of the disposition of cases by
17 The Board Chairman, or the Chairman, is also
known as the ‘‘Chief Appellate Immigration Judge.’’
See Organization of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, 85 FR 69465, 69466 (Nov. 3,
2020) (final rule).
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each Appellate Immigration Judge. 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v) (2019).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule imposed
numerous internal deadlines for
adjudicating Board appeals. 85 FR at
81652–53 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)). For
example, the rule required the Board
screening panel to review cases within
14 days of the filing of a Notice of
Appeal, the filing of a motion, or the
receipt of a remand from a federal court.
Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(1)). Following an
initial review, the Board had to
adjudicate requests for summary
dismissal no later than 30 days after the
filing of the Notice of Appeal, subject to
limited exceptions, and interlocutory
appeals within 30 days of the filing of
the appeal, unless referred to a threemember panel. Id. After the screening
panel completed its review, the Board
would then have seven days to order a
transcript and would be required to set
a briefing schedule within seven days
after the transcript was provided,
subject to limited exceptions. Id. at
81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)).
The AA96 Final Rule also required
that the Board assign each case to a
single Appellate Immigration Judge
within seven days of the completion of
the record on appeal. Id. The single
Appellate Immigration Judge would
then determine whether to adjudicate
the appeal independently or to
designate the case for decision by a
three-member panel. Id.
The AA96 Final Rule did not alter the
completion deadlines of 90 days for a
single-member decision and 180 days
for a three-member decision. 85 FR at
81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i)). However,
the AA96 Final Rule changed the 180day time period for completion of a
three-member decision to begin earlier,
upon completion of the record, rather
than beginning the clock after the case
was assigned to a three-member panel,
and added that the Chairman’s
determination as to whether exigent
circumstances warranted extension of
those deadlines would be subject to
concurrence by the EOIR Director. Id.
The AA96 Final Rule also limited the
‘‘rare circumstances’’ under which the
Chairman could place cases on hold to
only those groups of cases that would be
substantially impacted by an impending
decision by the United States Supreme
Court or the Board sitting en banc and
removed the ability to hold cases to
await an impending decision by a
United States Court of Appeals or
impending Department regulations. 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(iii). The AA96 Final
Rule also required the concurrence of
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the EOIR Director to hold cases under
this provision. Id. at 81653 (8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(iii)). The AA96 Final Rule
limited such holds to a maximum of 120
days. Id. The AA96 Final Rule also
imposed additional reporting
requirements on the Chairman for
transcription processes and cases
involving extensions, holds, or other
delays. Id. at 81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8),
(8)(v)).
Furthermore, the AA96 Final Rule
required that all cases that remained
pending for more than 335 days after
receipt of a filed appeal or motion, or
remand from a federal court, would be
referred to the EOIR Director for a
decision unless subject to an extension,
hold, deferral, or remand. Id. at 81653
(8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v)). The Director
would then exercise delegated authority
from the Attorney General identical to
that of the Board, including the
authority to issue precedential decisions
or refer cases to the Attorney General.
Id. However, the AA96 Final Rule
limited further delegation of such
authority from the EOIR Director to
other individuals. Id.
K. Director’s Authority To Issue
Decisions
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
Until 2019, the EOIR Director had no
authority to adjudicate cases arising
under the Act, including appeals before
the Board. See 8 CFR 1003.0(c) (2018).
Instead, the regulations simply provided
that for cases not completed within the
relevant time limits and not subject to
any exceptions, the Chairman should
self-refer them or refer them to the Vice
Chairman for completion within 14
days. Alternatively, the Chairman could
refer them to the Attorney General. 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii) (2018).
In 2019, the Department established a
narrow discretionary authority for the
EOIR Director to decide appeals in
certain circumstances. See Organization
of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, 84 FR 44537, 44539–40 (Aug.
26, 2019) (issued as an interim final
rule), 85 FR 69465, 69466 (Nov. 3, 2020)
(final rule); see also 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(ii) (authorizing the EOIR
Director to decide an appeal that
exceeded the 90- and 180-day regulatory
time limits unless the Chairman selfreferred the case or referred the case to
the Vice Chairman); 8 CFR 1003.0(c)
(providing that the EOIR Director may
not adjudicate cases arising under the
Act ‘‘[e]xcept as provided by statute,
regulation, or delegation of authority
from the Attorney General, or when
acting as a designee of the Attorney
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62251
General’’). The Department
subsequently codified, at the final rule
stage, language stating that the EOIR
Director’s authority to decide appeals in
certain circumstances under 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(ii) could not be further
delegated. 85 FR at 69480–81; 8 CFR
1003.0(b)(2)(ii) (‘‘The Director may not
delegate the authority assigned to the
Director in [8 CFR] 1003.1(e)(8)(ii)
. . .’’).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule authorized the
EOIR Director to decide cases in two
distinct circumstances. First, the rule
directed the Chairman to refer any case
still pending 335 days after an appeal or
motion was filed or a remand was
received to the EOIR Director for
adjudication. 85 FR at 81653 (8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(v)). Under the AA96 Final
Rule, the following categories of cases
were not subject to the EOIR Director’s
adjudication authority: (1) cases subject
to a hold under 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(ii);
(2) cases subject to an extension under
8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii); (3) cases subject
to a hold under 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(iii);
(4) cases whose adjudication had been
deferred by the EOIR Director pursuant
to 8 CFR 1003.0(b)(1)(ii); (5) cases that
were remanded by the EOIR Director
under 8 CFR 1003.1(k) in which 335
days had elapsed following remand; and
(6) cases that were administratively
closed prior to 335 days after the appeal
was filed pursuant to a regulation
promulgated by the Department or a
previous judicially approved settlement
that authorized such an action but for
which the administrative closure caused
the pendency of the appeal to exceed
335 days. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v)(A)–
(F)).
Second, the rule established a
procedure for an immigration judge to
certify a Board decision to the EOIR
Director when the immigration judge
believed the Board made one or more
enumerated errors. Id. (8 CFR
1003.1(k)). This authority is discussed
in further detail in the section on the
‘‘Quality Assurance Certification’’
provision.
For cases referred to the EOIR
Director, the EOIR Director would
exercise delegated authority from the
Attorney General identical to that of the
Board, including the authority to issue
precedential decisions and the authority
to refer cases to the Attorney General for
review. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v)). The
AA96 Final Rule prohibited the EOIR
Director from further delegating this
authority. Id. Of note, the AA96 Final
Rule did not amend the existing
regulatory provision reiterating that 8
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CFR 1003.1(e)(8) did not confer
substantive or procedural rights
enforceable before any immigration
judge, the Board, or any court of law or
equity, 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(vi), which,
under the AA96 Final Rule, included
case referrals to the EOIR Director.
L. Quality Assurance Certification
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1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, various
options were available to ensure quality
case adjudications. If a party were
dissatisfied with a Board decision, the
party could file a motion to reconsider.
8 CFR 1003.2(a). Alternatively, the
noncitizen could file a petition for
review of a final order of removal with
a federal court of appeals. INA 242(a)(1),
8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(1). In addition, DHS
could seek to certify a Board decision to
the Attorney General for review, 8 CFR
1003.1(h)(1)(iii), or the Attorney General
could self-certify a Board decision for
review, 8 CFR 1003.1(h)(1)(i). The Board
could also reconsider or reopen a
decision by exercising its sua sponte
authority. 8 CFR 1003.2(a) (2019)
(providing that ‘‘[t]he Board may at any
time reopen or reconsider on its own
motion’’ any Board decision). The
process by which an immigration judge
could certify a decision to the EOIR
Director did not exist prior to the AA96
Final Rule. See generally 8 CFR
1003.23(b) (2019).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule did not change
some of the existing options to ensure
quality case adjudications discussed
above, including a party’s ability to file
a motion to reconsider with the Board,
the ability to file a petition for review
of a final order of removal with a federal
court of appeals, and the case referral
options outlined in 8 CFR 1003.1(h).18
In addition to these options, the AA96
Final Rule implemented a quality
assurance certification, wherein the
immigration judge could forward a case
by certification to the EOIR Director for
further review if the Board decision: (1)
contained a typographical or clerical
error that affected the outcome of the
case; (2) was clearly contrary to an
immigration law or statute, applicable
regulation, or published binding
precedent; (3) was ‘‘vague, ambiguous,
internally inconsistent, or otherwise did
not resolve the basis for the appeal’’; or
(4) did not consider a material factor
pertinent to the issues before the
18 The AA96 Final Rule limited the Board’s sua
sponte authority to reopen or reconsider a decision
as discussed in Section III.D of this preamble.
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immigration judge. 85 FR at 81653–54 (8
CFR 1003.1(k)(1)). To certify a decision,
the immigration judge was required to
issue an order of certification within 30
days of the Board decision, or within 15
days if the noncitizen was detained,
specifying the regulatory basis for the
certification, summarizing the
underlying factual basis, and providing
notice of the certification to both
parties. Id. at 81653 (8 CFR
1003.1(k)(2)).
For such cases, the EOIR Director
would exercise delegated authority from
the Attorney General identical to that of
the Board. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(k)(3)). The
Director could dismiss the certification
and return the case to the immigration
judge or remand the case back to the
Board. Id. The Director could not,
however, issue an order of removal,
grant a request for voluntary departure,
or grant or deny an application for relief
or protection from removal. Id. The
AA96 Final Rule further barred the
quality assurance certification process
from being used solely to express
general disapproval or disagreement
with the outcome of a Board decision.
Id. at 81654 (8 CFR 1003.1(k)(4)).
M. Forwarding of Record on Appeal
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule
The pre-AA96 regulation provided
that, when a transcript of an oral
decision was required, an immigration
judge would review the transcript and
approve the decision within 14 days of
receipt (or within seven days following
an immigration judge’s return from
leave or a detail). 8 CFR 1003.5(a)
(2019). Further, the regulation required
the transcript to be forwarded to the
Board upon its request or order. Id. The
regulation instructed the Chairman and
Chief Immigration Judge to determine
the most effective and expeditious way
to transcribe proceedings before
immigration judges, including reducing
the time necessary to produce
transcripts and improving the quality of
such transcripts. Id.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final
Rule
The AA96 Final Rule amended 8 CFR
1003.5(a) so that immigration judges
would not need to forward the record to
the Board if the Board already had
electronic access to the record. 85 FR at
81654 (8 CFR 1003.5(a)). The AA96
Final Rule also removed the
requirement that immigration judges
review transcripts of oral decisions,
which included review of, potential
revisions to, and approval of the
transcript. Compare 8 CFR 1003.5(a)
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(2019) (‘‘Where transcription of an oral
decision is required, the immigration
judge shall review the transcript and
approve the decision . . .’’), with 85 FR
at 81654 (8 CFR 1003.5(a)) (omitting that
requirement).
The AA96 Final Rule did not alter the
requirement that the EOIR Director, in
consultation with the Chairman and
Chief Immigration Judge, determine the
most effective and expeditious way to
transcribe proceedings. 85 FR at 81654
(8 CFR 1003.5(a)). However, it directed
the Chairman and Chief Immigration
Judge to ‘‘ensure,’’ id. (8 CFR 1003.5(a)),
rather than simply ‘‘improve,’’ 8 CFR
1003.5(a) (2019), the quality of such
transcripts.
The AA96 Final Rule also amended 8
CFR 1003.5(b) by removing language
describing procedures regarding appeals
from DHS decisions that are within the
BIA’s appellate jurisdiction and stated
that those procedures were not
applicable to EOIR adjudicators. 85 FR
at 81654 (8 CFR 1003.5(b)).
N. Centro Legal de la Raza Litigation
On March 10, 2021, the United States
District Court for the Northern District
of California granted a nationwide
preliminary injunction barring the
Department from implementing or
enforcing the AA96 Final Rule or any
portion thereof and staying the
effectiveness of the rule under 5 U.S.C.
705. Centro Legal de la Raza v. Exec.
Off. for Immigr. Rev., 524 F. Supp. 3d
919 (N.D. Cal. 2021). The preliminary
injunction and stay of the rule’s
effectiveness remain in effect.19 In
granting the preliminary injunction and
stay under 5 U.S.C. 705, the court
determined that plaintiffs were likely to
ultimately succeed on several
substantive and procedural challenges
raised with respect to the AA96 Final
Rule. Id. at 954–76.20
19 In addition to this preliminary injunction, the
United States District Court of the District of
Columbia granted a stay of the implementation of
the AA96 Final Rule on April 3, 2021, determining
that the 30-day comment period associated with the
rulemaking was procedurally insufficient. See
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. v. Exec.
Off. for Immigr. Rev., No. 21–00094, 2021 WL
3609986 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2021).
20 Procedurally, the court stated that plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on their claim that the
Department’s 30-day notice-and-comment period
was insufficient under the Administrative
Procedure Act (‘‘APA’’) due to the rule’s
complexity, the COVID–19 pandemic, and other
concerns. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d
at 954–58. The court also raised ‘‘serious concerns’’
with the Department’s ‘‘staggered rulemaking’’
approach, explaining that because ‘‘numerous
intertwined proposed rules were promulgated at
different times, including after the close of the
comment period in this case, the true impact of the
[AA96 Final Rule] was obscured and the public was
deprived of a meaningful opportunity to comment.’’
Id. at 958, 962.
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1. ‘‘Arbitrary and Capricious’’
Challenges
Substantively, the court determined
that the plaintiffs demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits of
their arguments that the AA96 Final
Rule’s changes to the briefing schedule
for BIA appeals, administrative closure,
and sua sponte reopening and
reconsideration authority were arbitrary
and capricious. Id. at 963–71. The court
also made a generally applicable finding
that EOIR’s failure to adequately
consider the Booz Allen Hamilton
report that EOIR ‘‘specifically
commissioned to analyze the very
concerns that purportedly animate’’ the
AA96 Final Rule raised significant APA
concerns. Id. at 963.
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i. Changes to BIA Briefing Schedule
The court found that there was a
substantial likelihood that the AA96
Final Rule’s changes to the briefing
schedule for BIA appeals are arbitrary
and capricious because the Department
failed to adequately consider the impact
on pro se individuals and how the
changes would operate, in conjunction
with existing BIA practices and
procedures, to create difficulties for
noncitizens and their attorneys in
meeting briefing deadlines. Id. at 964–
66. The court was not persuaded by the
Department’s position that noncitizens
need not wait until the BIA briefing
schedule had been issued to seek
representation for an appeal because,
the court stated, ‘‘the vast majority of
individuals appearing before
immigration courts are pro se,’’ 21 and
many face language barriers. Id. at 965.
Additionally, the court noted that, ‘‘of
critical importance[,]’’ immigration
judges often issue oral decisions;
accordingly, noncitizens may not have
the documents necessary to seek
representation until after the Board
issues and mails the briefing schedule,
transcript, and a copy of the
immigration judge’s order. Id. The court
stated that the Department failed to
address how challenges to the
compressed briefing schedule might be
exacerbated by the Board’s mail-based
system, failure to follow the ‘‘mailbox
rule,’’ and unpredictable briefing
schedules.22 Id. The court also found
21 EOIR data reports an 86% representation rate
for ‘‘all completed appeals,’’ a 90% representation
rate for ‘‘all pending appeals,’’ and a 45%
representation rate for ‘‘overall pending’’
adjudications. See EOIR, Adjudication Statistics:
Current Representation Rates, https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1062991/download
(data generated Apr. 21, 2023).
22 The court noted that the ‘‘U.S. Postal service is
experiencing historic backlogs’’ due to the COVID–
19 pandemic. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp.
3d at 966.
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the Department’s reliance on future
implementation of an electronic filing
system unpersuasive. Id. The court
further stated that the Department failed
to consider the challenges that the
COVID–19 pandemic may present to
compliance with the compressed
briefing schedule. Id. at 966.
ii. Administrative Closure
The court also determined that
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their
argument that the AA96 Final Rule’s
restrictions on administrative closure
are arbitrary and capricious. First, the
court found that, although the
Department cited efficiency reasons for
promulgating the rule, it failed to
meaningfully address the existence of
‘‘extensive contrary evidence showing
that administrative closure enhances
efficiency.’’ Id. at 967. The court also
noted that EOIR’s consultants had
previously recommended that EOIR
work with DHS to explore developing
policies regarding administrative
closure, and yet EOIR did not discuss or
consider that recommendation in its
rulemaking. Id. The court further stated
that the Department improperly
dismissed and minimized commenter
concerns that eliminating administrative
closure could lead to the removal of
noncitizens with meritorious claims for
relief or protection, including removal
in violation of the United States’ nonrefoulement obligations under
international law. Id. at 968. The court
explained that, although the Department
cited the availability of administrative
closure in some circumstances, it did
not adequately address the issue that
administrative closure would no longer
be available for ‘‘the vast majority of
noncitizens in removal proceedings,
including people for whom Congress
has specifically crafted humanitarian
relief.’’ Id.
Additionally, the court determined
that the Department did not adequately
engage with commenter concerns that
the AA96 Final Rule conflicted with
section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), as DHS has
interpreted it. Id.; see also 8 CFR
212.7(e)(4)(iii) (rendering an individual
in removal proceedings ineligible for an
unlawful presence hardship waiver
unless the proceedings are
administratively closed); see also
Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d at 993 (‘‘We
conclude that immigration judges and
the BIA retain the authority to grant
administrative closure so that
noncitizens may apply for a provisional
unlawful presence waiver.’’).
The court noted that, although DHS
had previously determined that
individuals who have been granted
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voluntary departure would not be
eligible for such provisional waivers,
see Expansion of Provisional Unlawful
Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility, 81
FR 50244, 50256 (July 29, 2016), EOIR
nevertheless asserted in the AA96 Final
Rule that eliminating general authority
to administratively close cases would
have no bearing on a noncitizen’s
‘‘ability to obtain an order of voluntary
departure and then a provisional waiver
before departing to receive the final
waiver abroad.’’ 85 FR at 81601. The
court determined that the Department
did not provide a ‘‘reasoned basis’’ for
this position. Centro Legal de la Raza,
524 F. Supp. 3d at 969.
iii. Sua Sponte Reopening and
Reconsideration Authority
The court also determined that the
Department’s decision to eliminate
adjudicators’ sua sponte reopening and
reconsideration authority was likely
arbitrary and capricious. The court
expressed that it was ‘‘extremely
troubled’’ by the Department’s
contention that, because there is no
right to sua sponte reopening, the
Department was not required to assess
commenter concerns about any reliance
interests or weigh such interests against
competing policy concerns. Id. at 970;
see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct.
1891, 1913 (2020) (‘‘When an agency
changes course . . . it must be
cognizant that longstanding policies
may have engendered serious reliance
interests that must be taken into
account.’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The court similarly expressed
concerns with the Department’s
justifications for eliminating sua sponte
reopening and reconsideration in light
of ‘‘the reality that its elimination will
foreclose the only avenue of relief for
some noncitizens who would otherwise
be eligible for relief from removal.’’
Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp.
3d at 971. For example, the Department
asserted that the rule would promote
fairness by withdrawing an authority
that may be subject to inconsistent and
potentially abusive usage and could
undermine finality in proceedings. Id.
However, the court found that the
Department failed to provide examples
of inconsistent application or abuse and
did not adequately explain why ‘‘it
could not articulate or clarify a
meaningful standard to govern’’ when
‘‘ ‘exceptional situations’ would permit
sua sponte reopening or
reconsideration.’’ Id.; see also Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–49
(1983) (‘‘[A]n agency must cogently
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explain why it has exercised its
discretion in a given manner.’’).
2. Regulatory Flexibility Act Challenge
The court determined that the
plaintiffs raised serious questions that
the AA96 Final Rule violated the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (‘‘RFA’’),
which requires federal agencies to
analyze the impact of proposed rules on
small entities. Centro Legal de la Raza,
524 F. Supp. 3d at 971–74; see also 5
U.S.C. 601–12. Specifically, the court
determined that the plaintiff, Centro
Legal de la Raza, was likely a small
entity under the RFA and that the AA96
Final Rule would apply to it because it
would be required to comply with the
changes implemented by the rule.
Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp.
3d at 973. Further, the court expressed
doubt that the AA96 Final Rule’s
‘‘cursory’’ statement that the rule would
not have a substantial impact on small
entities was a sufficient factual basis to
avoid engaging in an RFA analysis,
particularly in light of the scope of the
AA96 Final Rule and the numerous
comments from organizations claiming
that the AA96 Final Rule would
economically impact them. Id. at 974.
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3. Delegation of Rulemaking Authority
to the EOIR Director
Lastly, the court determined that the
plaintiffs had raised serious questions
regarding whether the AA96 Final
Rule’s delegation of rulemaking
authority to the EOIR Director, based on
the specific facts of that case, violated
the APA. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524
F. Supp. 3d at 976. The court was
troubled by the manner by which the
delegation occurred. Id. Specifically, the
court stated that while the Attorney
General signed the AA96 NPRM, the
Attorney General did not delegate
rulemaking authority until after the
close of the NPRM’s comment period
and did so through a non-public order.
Id. The court also expressed particular
concern that the AA96 Final Rule,
signed by the EOIR Director pursuant to
the delegated rulemaking authority,
significantly expanded the EOIR
Director’s authority to adjudicate Board
appeals. Id. The court stated that
although the AA96 NPRM—as signed by
the Attorney General—proposed
expanding the EOIR Director’s authority
in this manner, the NPRM did not
disclose that the EOIR Director would
issue the final rule and, thus, would
ultimately be in charge of considering
the public’s comments about expanding
the EOIR Director’s own authority. Id.
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IV. Description of Proposed Regulatory
Changes
The Department has carefully
reconsidered the AA96 Final Rule, the
comments received on the AA96
Proposed Rule, the issues identified in
the Centro Legal de la Raza decision,
and other experience gained since that
decision. The Department now proposes
to restore the longstanding procedures
in place prior to the AA96 Final Rule,
subject to several changes. For the
reasons described below, the
Department believes that these
amendments will promote the efficient
and expeditious adjudication of cases,
afford immigration judges and the BIA
flexibility to efficiently allocate their
limited resources, and protect due
process for parties before immigration
judges and the Board.
A. Briefing Schedule Changes
The Department proposes to rescind
changes that the AA96 Final Rule made
to briefing schedules before the Board.
Specifically, the Department proposes
to restore regulatory language, in effect
before the promulgation of the AA96
Final Rule, that would re-establish
longstanding consecutive briefing
schedules for non-detained noncitizens
and simultaneous briefing schedules for
detained noncitizens. 8 CFR 1003.3(c)(1)
(proposed). The proposed language
states that those subject to a
simultaneous briefing schedule would
have 21 days to submit simultaneous
briefs unless the Board specifies a
shorter period. Id. The proposed
language also states that in appeals
involving simultaneous briefing, the
Board may permit parties to file reply
briefs within 21 days of the deadline for
the initial briefs. Id.
Those subject to a consecutive
briefing schedule would again have 21
days to file initial briefs, unless the
Board specifies a shorter period. Id.
Parties would have the same amount of
time to file reply briefs as was provided
for filing the initial brief, including any
extensions.23 Id. The Board would also
again be authorized to grant one or more
extensions for filing briefs or reply
briefs for up to 90 days for good cause
23 In the ECAS Rule, the finalized regulatory
language reverted 8 CFR 1003.3(c)(2) (Appeal from
decision of a DHS officer) to pre-AA96 standards.
See ECAS Rule, 86 FR at 70721. Specifically, the
ECAS Rule removed the maximum 14-day period
for the filing of a single permitted reply brief, the
14-day limitation on extensions, and procedures for
filing supplemental briefs implemented by the
AA96 Final Rule. Id. The ECAS Rule retained the
AA96 Final Rule’s technical edits to replace
‘‘Service’’ with ‘‘DHS’’ where appropriate, id., and
this NPRM proposes additional minor, technical
changes, as discussed at Section IV.O of this
preamble.
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shown. Id. The Board could also, in its
discretion, request supplemental
briefings from parties after the briefing
deadline has expired. Id. The Board
would remain authorized to consider
untimely filed briefs. Id.
As stated in the AA96 Final Rule,
there is ‘‘no entitlement’’ to a briefing
schedule under the Act. See 85 FR at
81636. Indeed, the Act does not
enumerate the procedures that apply to
the Board’s adjudication of appeals.
Nevertheless, a noncitizen, with certain
limited exceptions, is entitled to seek
appellate review before the Board of an
immigration judge’s decision and, in
some cases, a decision of a DHS
officer.24 8 CFR 1003.3(a)(1)–(2). As part
of that review, the noncitizen is entitled
to certain rights under the Act,
including the right to have legal
representation before the Board (at no
expense to the government). INA 292, 8
U.S.C. 1362. The Department believes
that truncating the briefing schedule
that had been in place for over 20 years,
see Board of Immigration Appeals:
Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 FR 54878, 54895 (Aug.
26, 2002) (discussing changes to 8 CFR
3.3(c)), could impact a noncitizen’s
ability to adequately prepare their case
for appeal or secure legal representation
to do so, and create undue confusion for
pro se noncitizens and practitioners
appearing before EOIR. Concerns about
adequate preparation time are
particularly relevant given the
possibility of unique and unaccountedfor future issues, similar to the COVID–
19 pandemic, which may present new
obstacles to seeking and securing
representation, as well as preparing and
submitting briefs. See Centro Legal de la
Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 965–66 (‘‘[T]he
agency completely disregarded the fact
that the challenges of briefing on a
compressed timetable are compounded
by the BIA’s mail-based system, failure
to follow the ‘mailbox rule,’ and
unpredictable briefing schedules. . .
Moreover, the agency entirely dismissed
the impact of imposing the briefing
schedule changes during the COVID–19
pandemic, a concern raised by
numerous commenters.’’).
The Department notes that it has now
implemented electronic filing
procedures for registered attorneys
through the EOIR Courts & Appeals
System, see ECAS Rule, 86 FR 70708,
which may mitigate some concerns
about mail service and its potential
effect on briefing schedule timing
24 Examples of DHS officer decisions subject to
appellate review before the Board include denials
of waivers under INA 212(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3),
and denials of visa petitions made on a Form I–130.
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because parties will be able to view and
download documents for cases with
electronic records of proceeding.
However, the Department has not yet
fully implemented electronic filing and
case access for pro se noncitizens, see
86 FR at 70709–10, and therefore
believes that the current availability of
electronic filing in most, but not all,
circumstances is insufficient to address
concerns about the AA96 Final Rule’s
truncated briefing schedules. Indeed,
briefing schedules that allow
adjudicators the flexibility to establish
deadlines as appropriate for a particular
case, within given parameters, are a
fixture of legal practice. For example, in
the federal courts, Rule 31 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure
establishes a ‘‘good cause’’ exception to
its specified time frame. Fed. R. App. P.
31(a)(1) (explaining that ‘‘a reply brief
must be filed at least 7 days before
argument, unless the court, for good
cause, allows a later filing’’). Similarly,
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure also builds flexibility into its
established timeframes. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(C) (‘‘A party must serve a reply
to an answer within 21 days after being
served with an order to reply, unless the
order specifies a different time.’’).
Upon reconsideration, the Department
believes that the Board should have the
discretion to manage briefing schedules
and extensions. An inflexible rule that
requires all briefs to be filed within 35
days would be unable to accommodate
the continually changing landscape that
may affect parties’ ability to seek and
retain counsel, as well as to prepare and
submit briefs within a specified period
of time. To the extent that shorter
briefing schedules or, conversely,
extensions for both initial and reply
briefs, might be appropriate given the
particular facts and circumstances of an
individual case, the Board is optimally
situated to make such determinations on
a case-by-case basis to ensure that
briefing schedules do not impede access
to the appellate process and the right to
counsel. Cf. Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at
665 (‘‘‘[T]imeliness’ is not a hard and
fast deadline; some cases are more
complex and simply take longer to
resolve. Thus, not all mechanisms that
lengthen the proceedings of a case
prevent ‘timely’ resolution.’’). Under the
proposed rule, the Board would again
have the discretion to specify shorter
briefing schedules as it deems
appropriate.
Numerous organizations and
commenters on the AA96 Final Rule,
including those who administer the
Board Pro Bono Program, claimed that
the policies set forth in the AA96 Final
Rule would have (and in some cases
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already have had) an impact on their
ability to provide appellate
representation. See Complaint, CLINIC
v. EOIR, No. 21–CV–094 (D.D.C. Jan. 11,
2021); Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, Centro Legal de
la Raza v. EOIR, No. 21–CV–00463
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2021). This proposed
rule is intended to remove the
possibility that reducing the total
amount of time that a noncitizen has to
file an appeal brief would impede
access to the appellate process and the
fair and efficient adjudication of appeals
for at least some pro se individuals and
those seeking representation.
The Department also proposes to
amend the briefing schedule, with
respect to motions to reopen or
reconsider before the BIA, to extend the
deadline to submit a reply brief from 13
days to 21 days. 8 CFR 1003.2(g)(3)
(proposed). The Department currently
sees no reason to distinguish between
applicable deadlines for reply briefs for
appeals and for motions to reopen or
reconsider.
B. Administrative Closure Authority—
Immigration Judges and the Board
The Department proposes to remove
the AA96 Final Rule’s language that
would, if effectuated, limit an EOIR
adjudicator’s authority to
administratively close cases. Instead,
this NPRM proposes to explicitly state
that EOIR adjudicators have the general
authority to administratively close, and
to recalendar,25 individual cases
pursuant to a party’s motion. The
proposed rule would also set forth
factors that adjudicators should
consider, as the circumstances of the
case warrant, in adjudicating such
motions. The Department believes that
the proposed changes will improve the
efficiency and fairness of EOIR
proceedings.
As described above, there is a long
history of EOIR adjudicators utilizing
administrative closure as a helpful tool
for managing dockets at both the
immigration courts and the Board. See
Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d at 989 (‘‘For at
least three decades, immigration judges
and the BIA regularly administratively
closed cases.’’); Matter of Avetisyan, 25
I&N Dec. at 690 (‘‘Administrative
closure is a procedural tool created for
the convenience of the Immigration
Courts and the Board.’’). Indeed, the
Attorney General acknowledged this
25 The Department notes that the term ‘‘reinstate’’
has been used interchangeably with ‘‘recalendar’’
before the Board. See, e.g., Matter of Avetisyan, 25
I&N Dec. at 692. However, consistent with
longstanding practice and to avoid confusion, the
Department is using ‘‘recalendar’’ for both the
immigration courts and the Board in this regulation.
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longstanding practice in overruling
Matter of Castro-Tum. See Matter of
Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at 329
(‘‘Because Castro-Tum departed from
long-standing practice, it is appropriate
to overrule that opinion in its entirety
. . .’’). In Matter of Cruz-Valdez, the
Attorney General restored
administrative closure authority,
specifically directing immigration
judges and the Board to apply the
standard for administrative closure set
forth in Matter of Avetisyan and Matter
of W–Y–U– while the Department
reconsiders the AA96 Final Rule. Id.
Additionally, circuit court case law
undercuts the AA96 Final Rule’s
assertion that administrative closure is
unsupported by the law and that Matter
of Avetisyan was wrongly decided. See
Romero, 937 F.3d at 294–95 (holding
that the regulations ‘‘unambiguously
confer upon [immigration judges] and
the [Board] the general authority to
administratively close cases’’); Meza
Morales, 973 F.3d at 667 (concluding
that Matter of Castro-Tum was contrary
to the unambiguous meaning of the
regulations and that immigration judges
and the Board are ‘‘not precluded from
administratively closing cases when
appropriate’’); Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d
at 122 (holding that ‘‘the plain language
establishes that general administrative
closure authority is unambiguously
authorized by these regulations’’); see
also Zelaya Diaz v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 687,
691–92 (7th Cir. 2021) (applying Meza
Morales).
Although two circuit courts have
rejected challenges to Matter of CastroTum, both left open the possibility that
the regulations could permissibly be
interpreted to permit administrative
closure in at least some circumstances.
In Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62 (2d
Cir. 2023), the Second Circuit held that
the pre-AA96 regulations were
ambiguous as to whether they
authorized general administrative
closure and deferred to the Attorney
General’s interpretation in Matter of
Castro-Tum. In reaching that
conclusion, the Second Circuit did not
interpret 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and
1003.10(b) (2018) to foreclose general
administrative closure authority. Rather,
the Second Circuit focused narrowly on
the text of those regulations and held
that it was not unreasonable for the
Attorney General in Matter of CastroTum to interpret them as not explicitly
authorizing general administrative
closure. See id. at 73–74. The Second
Circuit acknowledged EOIR
adjudicators’ use of administrative
closure since at least 1990, however, id.
at 66, and recognized that before CastroTum, whether to allow administrative
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closure was ‘‘a matter reserved to the
discretion of the Immigration Judge or
the Board.’’ Id. at 76 n.13.
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Matter
of Castro-Tum that the regulatory
language prior to the AA96 Final Rule
does not provide EOIR adjudicators a
free-standing authority to
administratively close cases. See
Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 466.
However, it later clarified that
immigration judges and the Board have
the authority to grant administrative
closure to permit a noncitizen to apply
for a provisional unlawful presence
waiver, even though this authority was
not explicitly stated in the regulations.
See Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d at 992–93.
As such, the AA96 Final Rule
introduced novel restrictions on EOIR
adjudicators’ long-standing authority to
manage the cases before them, including
through the use of administrative
closure when appropriate. See Matter of
Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at 328–29
(stating that the AA96 Final Rule
‘‘effectively codified Castro-Tum[,]’’
which ‘‘departed from long-standing
practice . . .’’).
Although several courts of appeals
have determined that the authority to
administratively close cases was clearly
encompassed in the regulations prior to
the AA96 Final Rule, that authority was
not explicitly stated. As the decisions
from the Second and Sixth Circuits
make clear, this lack of explicit language
has led to debate and confusion over the
full scope of EOIR adjudicators’
authority to manage cases before them.
See, e.g., Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62
at 74 (concluding the pre-AA96
regulations ‘‘do not unambiguously
permit [general] administrative
closure.’’); Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d
at 466 (holding that the regulations prior
to the AA96 Final Rule did not give
adjudicators the general authority to
administratively close cases); see also
Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d at 992–93
(concluding that an application for a
provisional unlawful presence waiver
‘‘is a limited circumstance where
administrative closure is ‘appropriate
and necessary’ under [8 CFR] 1003.10(b)
and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)’’). It is in the
interests of the Department and the
public to have a clear understanding of
the scope of an adjudicator’s authority.
Accordingly, the Department proposes
to amend the regulations to make an
EOIR adjudicator’s long-standing
authority to administratively close cases
explicit in the regulations.
Additionally, the court in Centro
Legal de la Raza identified a number of
issues with the AA96 Final Rule’s
changes made with respect to
administrative closure. 524 F. Supp. 3d
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at 966–69. Specifically, the court noted
that the Department failed to adequately
consider or meaningfully address: (1)
the impact that the AA96 Final Rule
would have on the vast majority of
applicants for administrative closure or
how it would affect noncitizens with
meritorious claims for relief; (2)
commenter concerns that the AA96
Final Rule’s restriction on
administrative closure conflicted with
the inadmissibility waiver provision at
section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), as it has been
interpreted by DHS; and (3) the
existence of ‘‘extensive contrary
evidence showing that administrative
closure enhances efficiency.’’ Id. In this
NPRM, the Department proposes further
rulemaking on this topic to address
these concerns.
The Department believes that
codifying general administrative closure
authority will serve the interests of the
Department and the public in fairness
and administrative efficiency.
Immigration judges and the Board have
used administrative closure as a
safeguard to ensure fairness and to
postpone cases in appropriate
circumstances, such as cases involving
certain juvenile noncitizens or those
with mental competency issues. See
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 691
(stating that EOIR adjudicators may
determine that it is ‘‘necessary or, in the
interests of justice and fairness to the
parties, prudent to defer further action
for some period of time’’). Retaining the
AA96 Final Rule’s restrictions on
administrative closure could limit the
ability of noncitizens to pursue certain
statutory immigration benefits and
forms of discretionary relief, including:
(1) Special Immigrant Juvenile status,
INA 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(27)(J); (2) visas for victims of
certain crimes who are cooperating with
law enforcement (U visas), INA
101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U);
(3) visas for certain family-sponsored
immigrants (e.g., ‘‘Petition for Alien
Relative’’ (Form I–130)), INA 203(a), 8
U.S.C. 1153(a); (4) adjustment of status
as a VAWA self-petitioner, INA 204, 8
U.S.C. 1154; (5) Temporary Protected
Status (‘‘TPS’’), INA 244, 8 U.S.C.
1254a; and (6) provisional unlawful
presence waivers, 8 CFR 212.7(e)(4)(iii).
USCIS approval of any of these benefits
would generally eliminate the need for
continued removal proceedings.
Moreover, a removal order entered by an
immigration judge and affirmed by the
Board could cut off the noncitizen’s
ability to obtain such benefit or relief.
Additionally, if EOIR moves forward
with removal proceedings while a prima
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facie eligible application for relief is
pending before DHS, the outcome of the
case may ultimately depend upon
which agency is the first to issue a final
administrative decision. Administrative
closure, therefore, allows for the full
consideration of a noncitizen’s
application for relief without exposing
the noncitizen to the risk of removal.
See Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 665
(acknowledging the Attorney General’s
efficiency justification in Matter of
Castro-Tum but stating that cases must
also be ‘‘disposed of fairly, and granting
a noncitizen the opportunity to pursue
relief to which she is entitled may be
appropriate and necessary for a fair
disposition’’).
Without administrative closure, by
contrast, individuals are often unable to
sufficiently postpone their proceedings
before EOIR and, as a result, often are
issued a removal order from EOIR that
impedes the ability of USCIS to grant
relief unless the individual files a
motion to reopen with EOIR to have that
order lifted. Requiring individuals to
file motions to reopen and
accompanying stay of removal requests,
if necessary, creates additional
procedural hurdles that increase the risk
of removal while a potentially valid
request for relief is pending with USCIS.
Moreover, such procedural hurdles are
significantly more challenging to
overcome if the individual is physically
removed from the United States and
must pursue a motion to reopen from
abroad.
In addition, upon reconsideration, the
Department is now of the belief that the
procedures set forth in the AA96 Final
Rule would not improve efficient
adjudication and may, in some cases,
undermine the efficiency of certain
adjudications. See Centro Legal de la
Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 968 (‘‘Indeed,
the Fourth Circuit found that the
Attorney General’s efficiency
justification in Matter of Castro Tum—
the same efficiency rationale cited in the
NPRM and Final Rule—was ‘internally
inconsistent.’ ’’).
In particular, speed in adjudicating an
individual case is not the only factor
that bears on administrative efficiency.
But see AA96 Final Rule at 81598
(characterizing administrative closure as
creating delays that conflict with EOIR’s
mission to expeditiously adjudicate
cases before it). Efficiency also
encompasses consideration of
prioritization and allocation of
resources among different cases. Cf.
Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 665 (‘‘[T]he
. . . requirement that cases be resolved
in ‘timely’ fashion does not foreclose
administrative closure. For one thing,
‘timeliness’ is not a hard and fast
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deadline; some cases are more complex
and simply take longer to resolve. Thus,
not all mechanisms that lengthen the
proceedings of a case prevent ‘timely’
resolution.’’); Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d
at 123 (‘‘The authority to
administratively close cases, within the
appropriate and necessary context of
each case, can and does permit
[immigration judges] and the Board to
answer the questions before them in a
timely and impartial manner consistent
with the Act and the regulations. Or in
other words, delay in the case through
administrative closure does not, by
definition, prevent the timely
disposition of the case and resolution of
questions.’’). Moreover, as pointed out
in Meza Morales, the Department is
tasked with the dual imperatives to
adjudicate cases with both speed and
fairness—the combination of which
offers a better measure of administrative
efficiency than speed alone. 973 F.3d at
665.
In addition, as observed by the
Second Circuit, ‘‘it is wasteful to
commit judicial resources to
immigration cases when circumstances
suggest that, if the Government prevails,
it is unlikely to promptly effect the
petitioner’s removal.’’ In re Immigr.
Petitions, 702 F.3d at 160. Relatedly, it
would be wasteful to commit judicial
resources to cases where there are
pending alternative resolutions to the
case that would obviate the need for, or
significantly narrow the issues in,
removal proceedings. See Meza Morales,
973 F.3d at 665 (‘‘Unsurprisingly . . .
an immigration judge might sometimes
conclude, in exercising the discretion
granted by [8 CFR 1003.10], that it is
appropriate and necessary to dispose of
a case through administrative closure.’’);
Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 791
n.4 (BIA 2009) (noting that
administrative closure could ‘‘avoid the
repeated rescheduling of a case that is
clearly not ready to be concluded’’).
Given EOIR’s overburdened dockets, as
well as the growing backlog of pending
cases, it is imperative that EOIR
effectively allocate its limited
resources—including docket time—to
first adjudicate those cases where there
are no pending alternative resolutions to
removal. To do otherwise would expend
precious judicial resources on a
practically ‘‘empty exercise tantamount
to issuing an advisory opinion’’ where
such resources could instead be used to
adjudicate those cases where no
alternative resolutions may be possible.
See In re Immigr. Petitions, 702 F.3d at
161 (internal quotations omitted).
Procedurally, administrative closure
is often more efficient than repeatedly
postponing proceedings through
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multiple continuances, which requires
repeatedly reserving hearing time on the
immigration court’s docket. Notably,
before Matter of Avetisyan, the Board
had encouraged DHS to consider
moving for administrative closure rather
than multiple continuances in
‘‘appropriate circumstances, such as
where there is a pending prima facie
approvable visa petition.’’ Matter of
Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791 n.4; see also
Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 135
n.10 (BIA 2009). The Board described
administrative closure as ‘‘an attractive
option in these situations, as it will
assist in ensuring that only those cases
that are likely to be resolved are before
the Immigration Judge.’’ Matter of
Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791 n.4. The
Board also noted that administrative
closure could ‘‘avoid the repeated
rescheduling of a case that is clearly not
ready to be concluded.’’ Id.
With respect to those cases that could
result in motions to reopen being filed
with EOIR because of insufficient time
to postpone the conclusion of
proceedings for noncitizens to pursue
pending relief outside of EOIR, the
AA96 Final Rule framework would also
create significant inefficiencies, as the
immigration courts and the Board must
adjudicate both the initial removal
proceedings and the subsequent motion
to reopen, as well as any stay of removal
requests. Administrative closure could
put such cases on hold until any related
matters pending outside of EOIR are
adjudicated, which, in turn, would
allow the immigration judge or the
Board to put that adjudication time
towards another case before EOIR.
Similarly, some statutes necessarily
delay EOIR proceedings while
noncitizens pursue collateral
applications before USCIS. For example,
the William Wilberforce Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2008 (‘‘TVPRA’’), Public Law 110–
457, 122 Stat. 5044, mandates that
USCIS has initial jurisdiction over any
asylum applications filed by
unaccompanied children in removal
proceedings before EOIR. See INA
208(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(C)
(codifying the TVPRA’s requirement).
Under such circumstances,
administrative closure of proceedings
while USCIS considers any applications
for asylum would likely be more
efficient than repeatedly setting aside
docket time for future hearings that are
then continued. Matter of Hashmi, 24
I&N Dec. at 791 n.4 (noting that
administrative closure could ‘‘assist in
ensuring that only those cases that are
likely to be resolved are before the
[i]mmigration [j]udge’’ and prevent ‘‘the
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62257
repeated rescheduling of a case’’ that is
unready to be concluded).
The AA96 Final Rule asserted that
administrative closure, and in particular
administrative closure over a party’s
objection, ‘‘failed as a policy’’ because
of an increased backlog of immigration
cases after Matter of Avetisyan was
decided. 85 FR at 81599 (quoting AA96
NPRM, 85 FR at 52504). However, to the
extent that eliminating administrative
closure was designed to control the
backlog of cases, EOIR’s pending case
data does not support a conclusion that
eliminating administrative closure led
to such a result. Between May 17, 2018,
when Matter of Castro-Tum was issued,
and July 15, 2021, when Matter of CruzValdez was issued, the backlog of
pending cases at EOIR increased from
796,791 on September 30, 2018, to
1,408,669 on September 30, 2021.26
Even accounting for the pandemic and
looking only to the end of FY 2019, the
number of pending cases at EOIR
increased from 796,791 to 1,088,499.27
While no single factor alone was
responsible for the increase in the
backlog, numerous factors may have
contributed, including: a general
increase in the number of proceedings
initiated by DHS; increasing complexity
in immigration cases; fluctuating
numbers of defensive asylum
applications filed in and adjudicated by
EOIR; external factors requiring court
closures that generally result in
cancellation of non-detained hearings,
such as the COVID–19 pandemic-related
closures and an appropriations lapse
between December 2018 and January
2019; and the limited number of
appropriated immigration judge
positions. See Congressional Research
Service, R47077, U.S. Immigration
Courts and the Pending Cases Backlog,
at 19–30 (Apr. 25, 2022); EOIR,
Congressional Budget Submission for
FY 2023 (Mar. 2022) (‘‘Over the years,
several factors have contributed to
record growth in both the number of
pending immigration cases and the time
required to adjudicate them. . .
Recently, this caseload increase has
been exacerbated by the closures and
reductions in service associated with
the COVID–19 pandemic, as well as the
consistent rise in the number of new
NTAs that DHS has filed before the
immigration court over the last five
years, even with the reduction in filings
over FY 2020 and FY 2021 (from a high
of almost 550,000 in FY 2019).’’).
26 See EOIR, Adjudication Statistics, Pending
Cases, New Cases, and Total Completions, https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download
(data generated Apr. 21, 2023).
27 Id.
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Additionally, as discussed above, the
growing backlog of cases is one
significant reason it is important for
EOIR adjudicators to be able to
efficiently manage their dockets to first
adjudicate those cases that are ripe for
review, where removal is a priority, or
where there are no pending alternative
resolutions to removal. Administrative
closure is a critical tool that helps EOIR
adjudicators manage their dockets. See
Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at 326 (noting
that administrative closure has become
‘‘a routine ‘tool used to regulate
proceedings’ and ‘manage an
Immigration Judge’s calendar (or the
Board’s docket)’ ’’ (quoting Avetisyan,
25 I&N Dec. at 694)); Arcos Sanchez,
997 F.3d at 123 (‘‘[D]elay in the case
through administrative closure does not,
by definition, prevent the timely
disposition of the case and resolution of
questions . . . Without the general
authority to administratively close
appropriate cases when necessary, the
[immigration judges] and the Board . . .
may be less effective in managing
cases.’’); Romero, 937 F.3d at 292–93
(‘‘[D]ocket management actions such as
administrative closure [ ] often facilitate
. . . case resolution . . . As illustrated
by Matter of Avetisyan and other BIA
cases, administrative closure is
‘appropriate and necessary’ in a variety
of circumstances.’’).
Indeed, an outside consultant
previously recommended that EOIR
explore administrative closure as a
potential tool that could enhance the
efficiency for EOIR proceedings without
compromising fairness. EOIR, Booz
Allen Hamilton, Legal Case Study:
Summary Report at 26 (Apr. 6, 2017).
Specifically, the consultant, after
engaging in a year-long study of EOIR
operations, identified numerous
external factors that contribute to delays
in adjudications. See generally id.
Among other things, the consultant
recommended that the Department
engage in discussions with DHS to
explore the development of policies
regarding administrative closure as one
way to improve processing efficiency.
Id. at 26.
Separately, while the AA96 Final
Rule asserted that administrative
closure would place the EOIR
adjudicator in the position of the
prosecutor, 85 FR at 81599, upon
reconsideration, the Department now
concurs with the reasoning in Matter of
Avetisyan, which ‘‘considered the
respective roles and responsibilities of
the DHS, the Immigration Judges, and
the Board in removal proceedings’’ and
concluded that ‘‘[a]lthough
administrative closure impacts the
course removal proceedings may take, it
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does not preclude the DHS from
instituting or pursuing those
proceedings and so does not infringe on
the DHS’s prosecutorial discretion.’’ 25
I&N Dec. at 694.28 Indeed,
administrative closure is similar to the
widespread practice of stays of
proceedings in federal court, which are
often utilized to avoid unnecessary
litigation. See, e.g., Ayanian v. Garland,
64 F.4th 1074, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2023)
(explaining that the court previously
granted a motion to stay appellate
proceedings ‘‘to allow time to examine
grounds for a possible alternative to
litigation’’).
The AA96 NPRM stated that
administrative closure precludes DHS
from pursuing removal proceedings
while the administrative closure order is
in effect. 85 FR at 52503. However,
either party can file a motion to
recalendar a case at any time. Thus, if,
for example, an individual’s case has
been administratively closed while the
individual’s prima facie eligible
application for adjustment of status is
pending before DHS and DHS has a
strong interest in concluding
proceedings, DHS need only complete
adjudication of the application before it
and file a motion to recalendar the case,
actions well within its control. If the
EOIR adjudicator grants the motion to
recalendar, the case will proceed.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed
above, the Department proposes
regulatory language explicitly providing
that immigration judges’ and the Board’s
authority to take ‘‘any action’’ includes
administratively closing cases. See 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (proposed),
28 The AA96 NPRM asserted that the Board, in
Matter of Avetisyan departed, without explanation,
from its prior precedent in Matter of Chamizo, 13
I&N Dec. 435 (BIA 1969), Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N
Dec. 348 (BIA 1982), and Matter of Roussis, 18 I&N
Dec. 256 (BIA 1982). 85 FR at 52503. However,
upon further examination, the Department is now
of the opinion that the AA96 NPRM’s reliance on
those cases for the proposition that administrative
closure infringes upon DHS’s prosecutorial
discretion was inapposite. Notably, none of those
cases involved administrative closure. Further,
Matter of Chamizo cannot reasonably be read to
implicate DHS’s prosecutorial discretion authority,
as that case was about the impropriety of an
immigration judge granting voluntary departure
without entering an alternative order of removal, as
was required by the Act and pertinent regulations
at the time. 13 I&N Dec. at 437. As to Matter of
Quintero and Matter of Roussis, those cases are
most logically read to stand for the proposition that
an immigration judge is not permitted to take an
action that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of or
otherwise committed to the discretion of the former
INS District Director. Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N
Dec. at 350; Matter of Roussis, 18 I&N Dec. at 258.
Accordingly, Matter of Avetisyan is not inconsistent
with those cases because the administrative closure
of a case does not usurp authority from DHS or
require that DHS take or refrain from taking any
specific action otherwise committed to its
discretion.
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1003.10(b) (proposed).29 The
Department’s proposed language
emphasizes that the phrase ‘‘any action’’
is intended to be interpreted broadly to
include the general authority to take
actions regardless of whether they are
explicitly described by regulation by
stating that ‘‘[s]uch actions include,’’
but are not limited to, administrative
closure, so long as such actions, are
‘‘necessary or appropriate’’ and are
otherwise consistent with governing
statutes and regulations. Id.
The Department does not believe that
existing regulations that expressly
authorize administrative closure in
certain circumstances are sufficient to
capture the numerous scenarios where it
may be necessary or appropriate for
EOIR adjudicators to administratively
close proceedings based upon the
particular facts of any given case. See,
e.g., 8 CFR 1214.2(a) (referencing
administrative closure for T visa
applicants); 1214.3 (referencing
administrative closure for V visa
applicants); 1240.62(b) (referencing
administrative closure for certain
American Baptist Church (ABC) class
members); 1240.70(f)–(h) (referencing
administrative closure for ABC class
members, among others);
1245.13(d)(3)(i) (referencing
administrative closure for certain
nationals of Nicaragua and Cuba);
1245.15(p)(4)(i) (referencing
administrative closure for Haitian
Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of
1998 (‘‘HRIFA’’) applicants); 1245.21(c)
(referencing administrative closure for
certain nationals of Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos). Limiting administrative
closure to these discrete scenarios
would not permit EOIR adjudicators to
consider other important factors that
may render a case ripe for
administrative closure. Thus, using
administrative closure only in these
enumerated circumstances would limit
29 As discussed above, the Department finds
persuasive the reasoning of several circuit courts
that have determined that this authority was
previously inherent but not explicitly stated in the
regulations as they existed prior to the AA96 Final
Rule. See Romero, 937 F.3d at 294–95 (holding that
the regulations ‘‘unambiguously confer upon
[immigration judges] and the BIA the general
authority to administratively close cases’’ but
stating that even if ambiguous, ‘‘the Attorney
General’s reading of the regulations does not
warrant deference because it amounts to an ‘unfair
surprise’ ’’); Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 667
(concluding that Matter of Castro-Tum was contrary
to the unambiguous meaning of the regulations and
that immigration judges and the Board are ‘‘not
precluded from administratively closing cases when
appropriate’’); Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 122
(holding that ‘‘the plain language establishes that
general administrative closure authority is
unambiguously authorized by these regulations’’);
see also Zelaya Diaz v. Rosen, 986 F.3d at 691–92
(applying Meza Morales).
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administrative closure’s efficacy as a
docket-management tool. Nor do the
regulations explicitly authorize
administrative closure in common
scenarios where administrative closure
may be necessary or appropriate, such
as where noncitizens may have pending
applications for relief before DHS.
The Department proposes revising the
phrase ‘‘appropriate and necessary’’ to
read ‘‘necessary or appropriate’’ to
emphasize that adjudicators may choose
to administratively close cases, or take
other actions, even if such action is not
required.30 For example, administrative
closure may be appropriate even where
other docket management tools, such as
continuances, may be available. See
Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 665
(‘‘Administrative closure is plainly an
‘action.’ . . . in cases in which two
coordinate offices in the executive
branch are simultaneously adjudicating
collateral applications, closing one
proceeding might help advance a case
toward resolution.’’); Matter of
Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 691 (stating
that adjudicators may determine that it
is ‘‘necessary or, in the interests of
justice and fairness to the parties,
prudent to defer further action for some
period of time’’); Matter of Hashmi, 24
I&N Dec. at 791 n.4 (noting that
administrative closure could ‘‘avoid the
repeated rescheduling of a case that is
clearly not ready to be concluded’’). As
another example, the Sixth Circuit
recently determined that, although a
noncitizen could theoretically apply for
an unlawful presence waiver from
outside of the United States if EOIR did
not administratively close their case (a
prerequisite for applying for a
provisional unlawful presence waiver in
the United States pursuant to 8 CFR
212.7(e)(4)(iii)), administrative closure
was still appropriate because it
‘‘increases the likelihood that
noncitizens will obtain legal status and
resolve their immigration proceedings.’’
Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d at 992; see id.
(‘‘True, a noncitizen in removal
proceedings whose case[ ] is not
administratively closed may still submit
an I–601 Waiver of Inadmissibility after
they complete their consular interview
and are determined inadmissible. This
old path, however, deterred noncitizens
in removal proceedings from obtaining
legal status as permanent residents.’’).
30 The Department would like to make this
distinction clear in light of Hernandez-Serrano,
which stated that the Romero ‘‘court’s conclusion—
that any action for the disposition of the case is read
most naturally to encompass actions of whatever
kind appropriate for the resolution of a case—reads
out of the regulations the requirement of necessity.’’
981 F.3d at 464 (cleaned up).
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The Department also proposes to
amend the term ‘‘disposition’’ to read
‘‘disposition or alternative resolution’’
of a case. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)
(proposed), 1003.10(b) (proposed). The
Department proposes this amendment to
establish that actions other than those
that lead to a final disposition in a case
may still be necessary or appropriate for
resolution of the case.31 See Arcos
Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 117
(‘‘Administrative closure allows an
[immigration judge] or the Board to
‘temporarily pause removal
proceedings’ and place the case on hold
because of a pending alternative
resolution or because events outside the
control of either party may affect the
case.’’).
Moreover, the Department proposes to
amend 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (proposed)
and 1003.10(b) (proposed) to explain
that the adjudicator should determine
whether the use of administrative
closure meets the relevant standard in
accordance with 8 CFR 1003.1(l)
(proposed) or 1003.18(c) (proposed), as
applicable. The Department notes that
some of the factors proposed for
administrative closure may be similar to
factors proposed for other authorities
such as termination. Compare 8 CFR
1003.1(l) (proposed Board
administrative closure provision), and
1003.18(c) (proposed immigration judge
administrative closure provision), with 8
CFR 1003.1(m) (proposed Board
termination provision), and 1003.18(d)
(proposed immigration judge
termination provision). Thus, an
adjudicator should decide which of
these tools, if any, to use based upon the
specific facts of each particular case in
an exercise of the adjudicator’s
independent judgment and discretion. 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), 1003.10(b).
Furthermore, the Department also
proposes to clarify that the
administrative closure authority would
not be limited by the existence of any
other regulations authorizing or
requiring administrative closure. See,
e.g., 8 CFR 1214.2(a), 1214.3, 1240.62(b),
1240.70(f)–(h), 1245.13, 1245.15(p)(4)(i),
and 1245.21(c).
31 The Department would like to make this
distinction clear in light of Hernandez-Serrano,
which stated that ‘‘the regulations expressly limit
their delegation to actions ‘necessary for the
disposition’ of the case . . . [a]nd that more
restricted delegation cannot support a decision not
to decide the case for reasons of administrative
‘convenience’ or the ‘efficient management of the
resources of the immigration courts and the BIA.’ ’’
981 F.3d at 464. But see Meza Morales, 973 F.3d
at 665 (‘‘Unsurprisingly, then, an immigration judge
might sometimes conclude, in exercising the
discretion granted by 8 CFR 1003.10, that it is
appropriate and necessary to dispose of a case
through administrative closure.’’).
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As discussed above, the Department
proposes to add regulatory language that
would define administrative closure and
set forth guidance to assist adjudicators
with determining whether
administrative closure is necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or
alternative resolution of a case. 8 CFR
1003.1(l)(1), (3) (proposed),
1003.18(c)(1), (3) (proposed). Such
guidance is consistent with established
precedent prior to Matter of CastroTum. See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N
Dec. at 688. Additionally, the proposed
language would also define
recalendaring and set forth guidance for
adjudicators to consider when
determining whether it is appropriate to
recalendar a case. 8 CFR 1003.1(l), (l)(2)
(proposed), 1003.18(c), (c)(2)
(proposed).
Specifically, the proposed rule would
define administrative closure as ‘‘the
temporary suspension of a case.’’ 8 CFR
1003.1(l) (proposed), 1003.18(c)
(proposed); see Matter of Avetisyan, 25
I&N Dec. at 695 (stating that it is an
‘‘undisputed fact that administrative
closure does not result in a final order’’).
Accordingly, the regulations would
describe administrative closure as an act
that would remove a case from the
Board’s or immigration court’s active
docket or calendar until the case is
recalendared. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)
(proposed), 1003.18(c) (proposed).32
The proposed rule would specify that an
EOIR adjudicator ‘‘shall grant a motion
to administratively close or recalendar
filed jointly by both parties, or filed by
one party where the other party has
affirmatively indicated its nonopposition, unless [the adjudicator]
articulates unusual, clearly identified,
and supported reasons for denying the
motion.’’ 33 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3)
32 The regulations also specify that immigration
judges may manage their dockets through the use
of continuances. 8 CFR 1003.29. Continuances keep
the case on the immigration judge’s active docket
and are used ‘‘to await additional action required
of the parties’’ to ready the case for final
adjudication ‘‘that will be, or is expected to be,
completed within a reasonably certain and brief
amount of time.’’ Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec.
at 691. By comparison, administrative closure is a
tool that removes a case from an immigration
judge’s active docket, normally to await some
collateral event whose outcome is not yet known
and may not be known within a definitive time
period, that may impact the course of removal
proceedings, and requires a party to move to
recalendar in order to re-initiate adjudication. Id. at
692.
33 In practice, immigration judges are encouraged
to resolve administrative closure issues as early as
possible in a case by affirmatively asking parties
whether they wish for cases to be administratively
closed. See EOIR, Director’s Memorandum 22–03,
Administrative Closure (Nov. 22, 2021) at 3–4. The
Department notes that a motion to administratively
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(proposed), 1003.18(c)(3) (proposed).
This language adopts the standard
articulated in BIA precedent in the
context of joint and affirmatively
unopposed motions to continue. See
Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791
(‘‘The [motion to continue should be
granted] by the Immigration Judge in the
absence of unusual, clearly identified,
and supported reasons for not doing
so.’’). The Department believes that it is
appropriate to extend this standard to
motions for administrative closure or
recalendaring, as well as motions to
terminate, as discussed in Section IV.C
of this preamble, to help promote
greater administrative efficiency and
eliminate needless confusion for
adjudicators and parties.
Moreover, the Department believes
that where a motion to administratively
close or recalendar a case either is filed
jointly or is affirmatively unopposed, a
denial of such a motion serves no
adversarial interest and that, absent
other very compelling reasons, the
interests in administrative efficiency
dictate granting the motion. See Matter
of Yewondwosen, 21 I&N Dec. 1025,
1026 (BIA 1997) (stating that the parties’
‘‘agreement on an issue or proper course
of action should, in most instances, be
determinative’’); see alsoBadwan v.
Gonzales, 494 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir.
2007) (noting that when the government
expressed ‘‘‘no objection to opposing
counsel’s request’ . . . the government’s
position demonstrate[d] at a minimum
that, as between the parties to the case,
no adversarial interest was served by the
denial’’ of the noncitizen’s motion);
Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 665
(discussing the interests served by the
administrative closure of cases). By
requiring the adjudicator to articulate on
the record unusual, clearly identified,
and supported reasons for denying a
joint or affirmatively unopposed
motion, the Department acknowledges
that rare circumstances might arise
when, in the adjudicator’s judgment,
administrative closure or recalendaring
might be inappropriate. Thus, the
standard provides adjudicators the
flexibility to address the complexities of
an individual case, while requiring the
adjudicator to issue a reasoned
explanation that provides the parties
with due notice of the basis for a denial.
8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3) (proposed),
1003.18(c)(3) (proposed).
In the case of motions to
administratively close or recalendar
proceedings that are neither presented
jointly nor affirmatively unopposed, the
proposed rule would permit EOIR
close a case before the immigration court may be
made in writing or, alternatively, orally in court.
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adjudicators, having considered the
totality of the circumstances, to grant
such a motion over any party’s
objection. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3) (proposed),
1003.18(c)(3) (proposed); see Matter of
Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 694 (holding
that EOIR adjudicators may
administratively close proceedings over
a party’s objection). The proposed rule
would specify that, though
administrative closure may be
appropriate where a petition,
application, or other action is pending
outside of EOIR proceedings, there is no
requirement of a pending petition,
application, or other action for a case to
be administratively closed. 8 CFR
1003.1(l)(3) (proposed), 1003.18(c)(3)
(proposed). The proposed rule would
specify that any other regulations that
separately authorize or require
adjudicators to administratively close
cases in specific circumstances do not
impact the adjudicator’s general
authority to administratively close
cases. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(1) (proposed),
1003.18(c)(1) (proposed); see Meza
Morales, 973 F.3d at 667 (construing the
term ‘‘any action’’ broadly).
In all cases where only one party
moves for administrative closure or
recalendaring, and the motion is not
affirmatively unopposed, the proposed
rule would require adjudicators to
weigh the totality of the circumstances,
taking into consideration all relevant
factors, including any relevant factors
from a nonexhaustive list, before
determining whether, in their
discretion, administrative closure or
recalendaring 34 is appropriate. The
nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to
administrative closure includes: (1) the
reason administrative closure is sought;
(2) the basis for any opposition to
administrative closure; (3) any
requirement that a case be
administratively closed for a petition,
application, or other action to be filed
with, or granted by, DHS; (4) the
likelihood the noncitizen will succeed
on any petition, application, or other
action that the noncitizen is pursuing,
or that the noncitizen states in writing
or on the record at a hearing that they
plan to pursue, outside of proceedings
before the adjudicator; (5) the
anticipated duration of the
administrative closure; (6) the
responsibility of either party, if any, in
contributing to any current or
anticipated delay; and (7) the ultimate
anticipated outcome of the case. 8 CFR
1003.1(l)(3)(i) (proposed),
34 See Matter of W–Y–U–, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 18 n.4
(BIA 2017) (stating that the same factors should be
considered for recalendaring as for administrative
closure).
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1003.18(c)(3)(i) (proposed); see Matter of
Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 696 (listing
factors for consideration relevant to
administrative closure).
When considering whether it would
be appropriate to administratively close
a case, the EOIR adjudicator must weigh
the totality of the listed factors to the
extent they are applicable. See Matter of
Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 696 (‘‘[I]t is
appropriate for an Immigration Judge or
the Board to weigh all relevant factors
presented . . .’’) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the existence or absence of
any one factor is not dispositive of the
immigration judge’s determination. Cf.
Hernandez-Castillo v. Sessions, 875
F.3d 199, 209 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining
that Matter of Avetisyan only required
the BIA to evaluate the ‘‘relevant factors
presented in the case’’ and did not
require the BIA to ‘‘evaluate every factor
in detail’’). For example, there is no
requirement that the noncitizen must be
pursuing, or must plan to pursue, a
petition, application, or other action
outside of proceedings as a prerequisite
for an immigration judge to
administratively close a case. Instead,
the immigration judge in such a case
would consider the other factors that are
applicable to the particular facts and
circumstances of the case in order to
determine whether to grant or deny
administrative closure. Ultimately, the
immigration judge’s or the Board’s
determination whether to grant
administrative closure is a discretionary
decision. The Department notes that the
proposed administrative closure factors
differ from those set forth in Matter of
Avetisyan by adding a factor for
consideration: whether the need for
administrative closure is a prerequisite
to a petition, application, or other action
being filed with, or granted by, DHS.
The Department is proposing this factor
in light of the fairness and efficiency
interests that would be served by
allowing a noncitizen to pursue relief
that may be available, and that may
resolve a case, without expending
unnecessary EOIR and party resources
on litigation.
With respect to the second factor for
consideration, the Department proposes
to make it clear that adjudicators should
consider whether there is any
opposition to administrative closure, in
addition to the basis for any such
opposition. An EOIR adjudicator may
administratively close a case based on a
joint motion, a motion that is
unopposed, or over any party’s
opposition. The principle that an
adjudicator, having considered the
totality of the circumstances, may
administratively close a case over a
party’s objection is consistent with
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Matter of Avetisyan. See 25 I&N Dec. at
694 (stating that ‘‘neither an
Immigration Judge nor the Board may
abdicate the responsibility to exercise
independent judgment and discretion in
a case by permitting a party’s opposition
to act as an absolute bar to
administrative closure of that case when
circumstances otherwise warrant such
action’’).
The Department notes that one reason
administrative closure is sought could
be a representation by DHS that it
wishes for a particular case to be
administratively closed based on an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. As
described above, administrative closure
has long been used to facilitate DHS’s
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see
Section III.B.1 of this preamble, and it
generally would be inefficient for EOIR
to otherwise press forward with
proceedings in such cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Texas, 143 S. Ct. 1964,
1972 (2023) (‘‘In light of inevitable
resource constraints and regularly
changing public-safety and publicwelfare needs, the Executive Branch
must balance many factors when
devising arrest and prosecution
strategies.’’). The Department believes
that an EOIR adjudicator’s role as a
neutral arbiter is better served by
devoting resources to those cases where
DHS has expressed a continued interest
in effectuating an order of removal. In
other words, an EOIR adjudicator may
grant administrative closure solely for
equitable considerations in order to
suspend the proceedings before EOIR,
such as DHS’s determination that it will
not use its limited resources to proceed
with removal proceedings against a
particular noncitizen at that time.
On the other hand, the Department
notes that a noncitizen may, at times,
oppose a motion for administrative
closure due to the noncitizen’s desire to
seek immigration relief available in
proceedings before EOIR. See Matter of
W–Y–U–, 27 I&N Dec. at 20 (‘‘The
respondent is opposed to the
continuation of administrative closure
and has requested recalendaring of the
proceedings. He has explained that he
wants to pursue his application for
asylum to its resolution.’’). As set out in
the proposed rule, the noncitizen’s
objection to administrative closure in
such a situation would be considered as
a factor in the analysis but would not by
itself be dispositive. The Department
notes that DHS may also have valid
reasons for objecting to administrative
closure where, for example, it is clearly
unlikely that an individual will obtain
relief in other proceedings. See, e.g.,
Jesus Garcia-Garcia, A092–286–960 (BIA
May 28, 2009) (non-precedential) (‘‘DHS
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has continued to oppose administrative
closure by reason of the respondent’s
failure to meet the eligibility
requirements [for a 212(c) waiver].’’).
The Department seeks comments
regarding whether the proposed rule
should include any further protections
for noncitizens who wish to have their
cases adjudicated despite DHS’s desire
to seek administrative closure,
including whether the rule, if finalized,
should provide that, where one party
opposes administrative closure, the
primary consideration for the
adjudicator is whether the party
opposing closure has provided a
persuasive reason for the case to
proceed. See Matter of W–Y–U–, 27 I&N
Dec. at 20, n.5 (holding that ‘‘the
primary consideration for an
Immigration Judge in determining
whether to administratively close . . .
proceedings is whether the party
opposing administrative closure has
provided a persuasive reason for the
case to proceed and be resolved on the
merits,’’ but ‘‘continu[ing] to hold that
neither party has absolute veto power
over administrative closure requests’’
(quotation omitted)). As noted above,
there may be situations where DHS
opposes administrative closure.
With respect to the fifth and sixth
factors for consideration—the
anticipated duration of the closure and
the responsibility of either party, if any,
in contributing to any current,
anticipated, or continuing need for
delay—the Department notes that
adjudicators should consider both the
noncitizen’s and DHS’s responsibility
for any delay. DHS’s responsibility for
any delay may include DHS’s failure to
resolve the noncitizen’s pending
applications or requests for relief that, if
granted, may obviate the need for
removal proceedings or significantly
narrow the issues before EOIR.
Moreover, the potential duration of the
administrative closure while awaiting
DHS adjudication, for example, of a
pending application before USCIS,
should not weigh against the decision to
administratively close proceedings.
Although the Department generally
agrees with Matter of W–Y–U–’s
determination that the factors for
administrative closure and
recalendaring should be similar,
recalendaring requires slightly different
considerations than the initial decision
to administratively close a case because,
at the time an EOIR adjudicator may be
considering recalendaring, there may be
more available information regarding
developments in the case that have
happened during the administrative
closure. Such information could aid
adjudicators in their decisions. For
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example, while considering
administrative closure, EOIR
adjudicators can only anticipate the
duration of the requested administrative
closure; however, for recalendaring,
adjudicators will have more definitive
knowledge about the length of time that
the case has actually been
administratively closed. As another
example, when considering
recalendaring, EOIR adjudicators would
have the benefit of knowing whether
parties have taken important steps
towards achieving the purpose of the
administrative closure—such as filing
for relief with another agency—or
knowing whether another agency has
completed adjudication of alternative
forms of relief. In addition, EOIR
adjudicators would have additional
information about any new positive or
negative factors, such as subsequent
criminal history, that would weigh for
or against recalendaring a case.
Therefore, the proposed rule sets out a
separate list of relevant factors that
adjudicators should consider, as the
circumstances of the case warrant, when
evaluating a motion to recalendar.
The nonexhaustive list of factors for
recalendaring includes: (1) the reason
recalendaring is sought; (2) the basis for
any opposition to recalendaring; (3) the
length of time elapsed since the case
was administratively closed; (4) if the
case was administratively closed to
allow the noncitizen to file a petition,
application, or other action outside of
proceedings before the adjudicator,
whether the noncitizen filed the
petition, application, or other action
and, if so, the length of time that
elapsed between when the case was
administratively closed and when the
noncitizen filed the petition,
application, or other action; (5) if a
petition, application, or other action
that was pending outside of proceedings
has been adjudicated, the result of that
adjudication; (6) if a petition,
application, or other action remains
pending outside of proceedings, the
likelihood the noncitizen will succeed
on that petition, application, or other
action; and (7) the ultimate anticipated
outcome if the case is recalendared. 8
CFR 1003.1(l)(3)(ii) (proposed),
1003.18(c)(3)(ii) (proposed).
Additionally, the proposed rule would
permit EOIR adjudicators, having
considered the totality of the
circumstances, to recalendar a case over
any party’s objection. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3)
(proposed), 1003.18(c)(3) (proposed).
The Department emphasizes that the
proposed list of factors for recalendaring
is non-exhaustive, with no single factor
necessarily dispositive. For example,
with respect to the fourth factor—
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measuring the duration between the
administrative closure of the case and
the time when the noncitizen filed a
petition, application, or other action
with DHS—the Department notes that
the length of time is not, on its face,
determinative. The Department is aware
that some petitions, applications, or
other actions are more complex or
require more time, and that the passage
of time is not necessarily a reflection of
a lack of diligence or an intent to
unnecessarily delay proceedings.
Rather, the adjudicator may consider
this as one of many factors, including
whether the noncitizen has not
exercised diligence in applying for
collateral relief with DHS or is seeking
to unnecessarily delay proceedings.
Given the complexity of these issues,
the Department specifically requests
public comment on whether the
specified factors for adjudicators to
consider in adjudicating motions to
administratively close and motions to
recalendar cases are appropriate and
whether the proposed factors should be
revised in any way. Specifically, the
Department seeks public input on
whether the proposed rule should
specify that a request for administrative
closure to allow for the adjudication of
a petition, application, or other action
should generally be granted as long as
the noncitizen demonstrates a
reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits, and that the noncitizen has been
reasonably diligent in pursuing such
relief. The Department also seeks
comment on whether the proposed rule
should set out specific scenarios in
which administrative closure may be
appropriate where there is no petition,
application, or other action pending
outside EOIR proceedings. Moreover,
the Department seeks comment on
whether administrative closure should
be upon the motion of a party or
whether it might be necessary or
appropriate in certain situations for an
immigration judge or a Board member to
administratively close a case without
having received a written motion and, if
on appeal, in situations in which parties
do not generally have the opportunity to
make an oral motion before the Board.
C. Termination and Dismissal
The Department proposes to amend
its regulations at 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)
(pertaining to Appellate Immigration
Judges) and 8 CFR 1003.10(b)
(pertaining to immigration judges) to
make clear that EOIR adjudicators’
authority to ‘‘take any action consistent
with their authorities under the Act and
the regulations that is necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or
alternative resolution of such cases’’
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includes the authority to terminate or
dismiss proceedings.35 The Department
believes that the termination or
dismissal of proceedings in appropriate
situations is consistent with
immigration judges’ and Appellate
Immigration Judges’ statutory authority
and duties. See Matter of Coronado
Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec at 651–52;
Gonzalez, 16 F.4th at 141 (‘‘[W]e fail to
see how the general power to terminate
proceedings is inconsistent with the
authorities bestowed by the INA.’’)
(cleaned up); see also 8 CFR 1240.12(c)
(indicating that an immigration judge’s
order ‘‘shall direct the respondent’s
removal from the United States, or the
termination of proceedings, or other
such disposition of the case as may be
appropriate’’).
As an initial matter, while the terms
‘‘dismissal’’ and ‘‘termination’’ have
been used interchangeably in case law
in some instances, see, e.g., Matter of
Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. at 648
n.1; Matter of G–N–C–, 22 I&N Dec. 281,
284 (BIA 1998), the Department
proposes to more clearly delineate the
circumstances in which the immigration
judge’s order disposing of a case should
be an order of dismissal as compared
with circumstances in which the
immigration judge’s order disposing of a
case should be an order of termination.
See 8 CFR 1239.2(b) (proposed).
The proposed rule would specify that
EOIR adjudicators may only enter an
order to dismiss proceedings upon a
motion by DHS seeking dismissal
pursuant to 8 CFR 1239.2(c) for the
reasons specified in 8 CFR 239.2(a). See
8 CFR 1239.2(b) (proposed). The
Department proposes that a motion to
dismiss proceedings for a reason other
than those authorized by paragraph (c)
should be deemed a motion to terminate
and adjudicated pursuant to 8 CFR
1003.1(m) (proposed) or 1003.18(d)
(proposed). Id.
The Department further proposes to
amend 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and
1003.10(b) to explain that an adjudicator
should determine whether the use of
termination or dismissal meets the
appropriate standard in accordance with
the provisions in 8 CFR 1003.1(m)
(proposed), 1003.18(d) (proposed), or
1239.2(c) (dismissal provision). The
Department reiterates that some of the
factors proposed for termination may be
35 The Department notes that termination is a case
‘‘disposition’’ under 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and
1003.10(b), not an ‘‘alternative resolution,’’ and is
only referred to as such throughout this NPRM.
Gonzalez, 16 F.4th at 141 (‘‘Termination of
proceedings certainly falls within this court’s
reading of ‘any action’; indeed, termination actually
ends a proceeding rather than merely facilitating its
end.’’) (cleaned up).
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similar to factors proposed for
administrative closure; however, as
previously stated, the adjudicator will
exercise their independent judgment
and discretion to decide which of these
tools to use, if any, based upon the
specific facts of each particular case. 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(ii), 1003.10(b).
Substantively, the Department does
not propose to modify the dismissal
grounds referenced by 8 CFR 1239.2(c).
However, the Department believes that
it is important for immigration judges
and Appellate Immigration Judges to
have the authority to terminate
proceedings in circumstances outside of
those explicitly identified in existing
regulations, which do not expressly
capture all situations where EOIR
adjudicators’ exercise of that authority
may be necessary or appropriate for the
disposition of a case. See Matter of
Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. at 651–
52 (noting situations not explicitly
enumerated in the regulations in which
EOIR adjudicators have commonly
deemed termination of proceedings to
be an appropriate disposition of the
case). In such circumstances, these
proposed termination grounds can
promote efficiency and fairness and
help immigration judges and Appellate
Immigration Judges better manage their
calendars and dockets. See id. at 651
(indicating that precluding termination
of proceedings in certain common
situations not accounted for in the
regulations ‘‘would undermine the fair
and efficient adjudication’’ of cases in
some instances) (citing Matter of A–C–
A–A–, 28 I&N Dec. 351, 351 (A.G.
2021)).
Accordingly, the Department
proposes to codify EOIR adjudicators’
termination authority as detailed below.
The proposed rule distinguishes
between EOIR adjudicators’ authority to
terminate removal, deportation, and
exclusion proceedings and their
authority to terminate all other types of
proceedings. See 8 CFR 1003.1(m)
(proposed), 1003.18(d) (proposed).
Although the issue of termination is
likely to occur most frequently in the
context of removal, deportation, and
exclusion proceedings, the Department
is cognizant that issues related to
termination may also arise in other
types of proceedings, including asylumonly proceedings (8 CFR 1208.2(c)(1))
and withholding-only proceedings (8
CFR 1241.8(e)).36 However, because the
36 The Department identifies these types of
proceedings as examples only. The proposed rule’s
framework for termination of other proceedings in
8 CFR 1003.1(m)(2) (proposed) and 8 CFR
1003.18(d)(2) (proposed) applies to all proceedings
other than removal, deportation, and exclusion
proceedings, though the Department anticipates
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scope of these proceedings is more
limited than the scope of removal,
deportation, and exclusion proceedings,
many of the grounds for termination of
removal, deportation, and exclusion
proceedings will be inapplicable to or
inappropriate for other types of
proceedings.37 The Department thus
believes it is appropriate to provide
separate and distinct termination
authority for other types of proceedings.
The proposed rule categorizes EOIR
adjudicators’ termination authority as
follows: (1) mandatory termination in
removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(i) (proposed);
(2) discretionary termination in
removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(ii) (proposed);
and (3) mandatory and discretionary
termination in other proceedings, 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(2) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(2)
(proposed).
The proposed rule identifies specific
circumstances where termination would
be required, and others where
termination would be discretionary. The
proposed rule would require
termination in removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings where: (1) no
charge of deportability, inadmissibility,
or excludability can be sustained; (2)
fundamentally fair proceedings are not
possible because the noncitizen is not
mentally competent and adequate
safeguards are unavailable; (3) the
noncitizen has, since the initiation of
proceedings, obtained United States
citizenship; (4) the noncitizen has, since
the initiation of proceedings, obtained
lawful permanent resident status,
that grounds for termination in other types of
proceedings will be less common.
37 As an illustrative example, withholding-only
proceedings involve noncitizens subject to
reinstatement of prior removal orders under
INA241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), and noncitizens
subject to expedited removal under INA238(b), 8
U.S.C. 1228(b). See 8 CFR1208.2(c)(2). The scope of
review in withholding-only proceedings is limited
to adjudication of whether the noncitizen is eligible
for withholding of removal or protection under the
Convention Against Torture pursuant to INA
241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). See 8 CFR
1208.2(c)(3)(i). Indeed, during withholding-only
proceedings, ‘‘all parties are prohibited from raising
or considering any other issues, including but not
limited to issues of admissibility, deportability,
eligibility for waivers, and eligibility for any other
form of relief.’’ Id. Because of this explicit
limitation in the scope of the proceedings, many of
the grounds for termination of removal, deportation,
and exclusion proceedings do not apply to
withholding-only proceedings. See also id.
(discussing limited scope of review in asylum-only
proceedings); cf. Matter of D–M–C–P–, 26 I&N Dec.
644, 647 (BIA 2015) (stating that EOIR adjudicators
lack the ‘‘jurisdiction to consider whether [asylumonly] proceedings were improvidently instituted
pursuant to a referral under the [Visa Waiver
Program]’’).
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refugee status, asylee status, or
nonimmigrant status under INA
101(a)(15)(S), (T), or (U), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(15)(S), (T), or (U), that has not
been revoked or terminated, and the
noncitizen would not have been
deportable, inadmissible, or excludable
as charged if the noncitizen had
obtained such status before the
initiation of proceedings; 38 (5)
termination is required as provided in 8
CFR 1245.13(l); (6) termination is
otherwise required by law; or (7) the
parties jointly filed a motion to
terminate, or one party filed a motion to
terminate and the other party
affirmatively indicated its nonopposition, unless the adjudicator
articulates unusual, clearly identified,
and supported reasons for denying the
motion. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(i) (proposed).
Regarding the mandatory grounds for
termination of removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings, the Board has
held that termination of removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings is
appropriate where DHS cannot sustain
the charges of removability. Matter of
Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I&N Dec. at 44; see
Matter of Ortega-Quezada, 28 I&N Dec.
598, 604 (BIA 2022) (‘‘Because the
respondent is not removable as charged,
we will sustain the appeal and
terminate the proceedings.’’).
Furthermore, if the noncitizen has
obtained one of the statuses enumerated
above, and the noncitizen would not
have been deportable, inadmissible, or
excludable as charged if the status had
been obtained prior to the initiation of
proceedings, there would be no need to
continue with the proceedings based
upon charges that would not have been
sustainable. Moreover, the Department
proposes to make clear that termination
is required where fundamentally fair
removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings are not possible because the
noncitizen lacks mental competency
and adequate safeguards are
unavailable. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)(B)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(i)(B)
(proposed); cf. Matter of M–A–M–, 25
I&N Dec. 474, 483 (BIA 2011) (‘‘In some
cases, even where the court and the
parties undertake their best efforts to
ensure appropriate safeguards, concerns
may remain. In these cases, the
Immigration Judge may pursue
alternatives with the parties.’’). In
38 This proposed provision is not intended to
amend an EOIR adjudicator’s discretion to reopen
cases. Where such lawful immigration status is
obtained after the conclusion of removal
proceedings, reopening and termination may well
be appropriate; however, this proposed authority
relates solely to termination, and the Department is
not suggesting that reopening would be required.
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addition, the Department further
proposes to make clear that it is not
limiting termination authority, as
specified in the existing regulations or
as otherwise required by constitutional,
statutory, or binding case law. 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(1)(i)(E)–(F) (proposed),
1003.18(d)(1)(i)(E)–(F) (proposed).
Finally, the proposed rule would
mandate that EOIR adjudicators grant
joint motions to terminate removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings,
or motions to terminate such
proceedings by one party to which the
other party has affirmatively indicated
its non-opposition, unless the
adjudicator articulates unusual, clearly
identified, and supported reasons for
denying the motion. 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(1)(i)(G) (proposed),
1003.18(d)(1)(i)(G) (proposed); cf. Matter
of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791 (stating
that in considering a noncitizen’s
motion to continue, ‘‘[i]f the DHS
affirmatively expresses a lack of
opposition, the [motion should be
granted] by the Immigration Judge in the
absence of unusual, clearly identified,
and supported reasons for not doing
so’’); see also Matter of Yewondwosen,
21 I&N Dec. at 1026 (stating that the
parties’ ‘‘agreement on an issue or
proper course of action should, in most
instances, be determinative’’); Badwan,
494 F.3d at 568 (noting that when the
government expressed ‘‘ ‘no objection to
opposing counsel’s request’ . . . the
government’s position demonstrate[d] at
a minimum that, as between the parties
to the case, no adversarial interest was
served by the denial’’ of the noncitizen’s
motion). However, the Department notes
that either party retains the ability to
timely rescind its participation in a joint
termination motion or its affirmative
non-opposition to termination should
circumstances change, such as the
discovery of new relevant evidence.
The proposed ‘‘unusual, clearly
identified, and supported’’ language is
based on the Hashmi standard for joint
and affirmatively unopposed motions to
continue, and also matches the
proposed language in this rule for joint
or affirmatively unopposed motions for
administrative closure. See Section IV.B
of this preamble. The Department
believes that it is appropriate to extend
this standard to motions for termination,
which will help promote greater
administrative efficiency and eliminate
needless confusion for adjudicators and
parties.
In requiring that the adjudicator
articulate on the record unusual, clearly
identified, and supported reasons for
denying a joint or affirmatively
unopposed motion to terminate, the
Department acknowledges that rare
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circumstances might arise where, in the
adjudicator’s judgment, termination
might be inappropriate, even when the
motion is presented jointly or is
affirmatively unopposed. Thus, the
standard provides adjudicators needed
flexibility to address the complexities of
an individual case, while also requiring
due notice to the parties of the reasons
for the denial. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)(G)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(i)(G)
(proposed).
Additionally, the proposed rule
would allow for discretionary
termination of removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings in the following
specific circumstances: (1) where an
unaccompanied child, as defined in
proposed 8 CFR 1001.1(hh), states an
intent, either in writing or on the record
at a hearing, to seek asylum with USCIS,
and USCIS has initial jurisdiction over
the application pursuant to section
208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1158(b)(3)(C); (2) where the noncitizen
demonstrates prima facie eligibility for
relief from removal or lawful status
based on a petition, application, or other
action that USCIS has jurisdiction to
adjudicate, including naturalization or
adjustment of status; (3) where the
noncitizen is a beneficiary of Temporary
Protected Status, deferred action, or
Deferred Enforced Departure; 39 (4)
where USCIS has granted a provisional
unlawful presence waiver pursuant to 8
CFR 212.7(e); (5) where termination is
otherwise authorized by 8 CFR
1216.4(a)(6) or 1238.1(e); (6) where the
parties have filed a motion to terminate
as described in 8 CFR 214.14(c)(1)(i) or
214.11(d)(1)(i); or (7) under other
comparable circumstances, as discussed
in further detail below. Termination is
up to the adjudicator’s discretion in
these circumstances, and the
adjudicator may consider any basis for
opposition to termination in making
their determination.
The Department proposes these
discretionary grounds for termination of
removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings for the following reasons. A
number of these grounds focus on
circumstances where alternative relief
may be available to the noncitizen that
would end the need for continued
proceedings, thereby saving EOIR
adjudicatory resources for other cases.
39 The President may authorize Deferred Enforced
Departure pursuant to the President’s constitutional
authority to conduct the foreign relations of the
United States. See Deferred Enforced Departure,
USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/
deferred-enforced-departure. The Department notes
that Deferred Enforced Departure ‘‘is not a specific
immigration status,’’ but noncitizens who are
covered by Deferred Enforced Departure ‘‘are not
subject to removal from the United States for a
designated period of time.’’ See id.
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These include: (1) a noncitizen
demonstrating prima facie eligibility for
relief from removal or for a lawful status
based on a petition, application, or other
action that USCIS has jurisdiction to
adjudicate; (2) an unaccompanied child,
as defined in proposed 8 CFR
1001.1(hh), intending to apply for
asylum with USCIS; and (3) a
beneficiary of Temporary Protected
Status, deferred action, or Deferred
Enforced Departure. See Matter of
Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. at 651–
52 (explaining that EOIR adjudicators
commonly exercised termination
authority when termination was
necessary for noncitizens ‘‘to be eligible
to seek immigration relief before
USCIS’’). With respect to termination
where a noncitizen has demonstrated
prima facie eligibility for relief from
removal or for a lawful status based on
a petition, application, or other action
that USCIS has jurisdiction to
adjudicate, the Department notes that
EOIR adjudicators must make such
determinations based on the particular
facts of a given case and the Department
does not intend this proposed ground
for discretionary termination to
authorize a general practice of
terminating proceedings involving
prima facie eligibility for asylum.
Rather, consistent with 8 CFR 1208.2(b),
the default rule that EOIR adjudicators
continue to exercise authority over
asylum applications filed by noncitizens
in removal proceedings would continue
to apply.
In addition, where an immigrant visa
is immediately available to a noncitizen
and USCIS has granted a provisional
unlawful presence waiver after the
noncitizen filed a Form I–601A,
Application for Provisional Unlawful
Presence Waiver, it may be appropriate
to terminate proceedings so the
noncitizen can depart the United States
to obtain a visa through consular
processing without becoming
inadmissible on another basis. See 78
FR at 544 (stating that ‘‘[i]f the Form I–
601A is approved for [a noncitizen]
whose proceedings have been
administratively closed, the [noncitizen]
should seek termination or dismissal of
the proceedings, without prejudice, by
EOIR . . . or risk becoming ineligible
for the immigrant visa based on another
ground of inadmissibility’’); see also
Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N
Dec. at 651 (suggesting that termination
of proceedings may be appropriate
where ‘‘the pendency of removal
proceedings [could] cause[ ] adverse
immigration consequences for a
respondent who must travel abroad to
obtain a visa’’).
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The proposed rule would also
authorize immigration judges and
Appellate Immigration Judges to
terminate removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings in the exercise of
discretion in other comparable
circumstances when similarly necessary
or appropriate for the disposition or
alternative resolution of the case. 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(G) (proposed),
1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(G) (proposed). The
Department recognizes that there may
be other circumstances not explicitly
stated in the proposed rule in which
termination may also be appropriate
that are similar in nature to the explicit
grounds in the proposed rule
authorizing termination. Moreover,
similar to the mandatory grounds for
termination of removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings, the Department
proposes to clarify that this proposed
rule is not intended to limit any preexisting regulations authorizing
termination under certain
circumstances. See 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(E)–(F) (proposed),
1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(E)–(F) (proposed). This
proposed standard would provide
sufficient flexibility such that EOIR
adjudicators may terminate a case if it
presents similar circumstances to the
enumerated grounds for termination and
is otherwise necessary or appropriate.
At the same time, this provision
would implement important guardrails
to limit adjudicators’ termination
authority. See 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(G)
(proposed) (precluding termination by
the Board for purely humanitarian
reasons unless DHS expressly consents
to termination, joins in a motion to
terminate, or affirmatively indicates its
non-opposition to a noncitizen’s
motion), 1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(G) (proposed)
(same for immigration judges); see also
8 CFR 1003.1(m)(2)(iii) (proposed)
(providing that in proceedings other
than removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, nothing in the proposed
regulatory provisions authorizes the
Board to terminate proceedings where
prohibited by another regulatory
provision), 1003.18(d)(2)(iii) (proposed)
(same for immigration judges). The
Department acknowledges that
termination of removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings is inappropriate
in certain circumstances. The proposed
rule would not change the longstanding
principle that immigration judges and
Appellate Immigration Judges have no
authority to review or second-guess
DHS’s exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, including its decision
whether to commence removal
proceedings. See, e.g., Matter of E–R–M–
& L–R–M–, 25 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011)
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(holding that an immigration judge
could not second-guess DHS exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to place an
arriving noncitizen directly in removal
proceedings rather than the expedited
removal process); Matter of J–A–B– & I–
J–V–A–, 27 I&N Dec. 168, 170 (BIA 2017)
(explaining that immigration judges and
the Board do not have the authority to
review a DHS decision to initiate
removal proceedings in a particular
case); Matter of G–N–C–, 22 I&N Dec. at
284 (stating that the decision to institute
deportation proceedings is not a
decision that the immigration judge or
Board may review because it is an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion); see
also Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d
1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing
that neither immigration judges nor the
Board possess the authority to review
DHS’s ‘‘discretion regarding when and
whether to initiate [removal]
proceedings’’ (citing authorities)).
Similarly, an adjudicator may not
terminate removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings for purely
humanitarian reasons unless DHS
expressly consents to such termination,
joins in a motion for termination, or
affirmatively states its non-opposition to
a motion for termination on such a
basis. See Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d
1302, 1303 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that
immigration judges have no statutory or
inherent power to terminate deportation
proceedings over the objection of INS to
provide humanitarian relief not
authorized by the statute to a deportable
noncitizen).
Moreover, in light of these proposed
standards governing termination of
proceedings, the Department proposes
to remove and reserve 8 CFR 1239.2(f)
as newly proposed language would
cover the circumstances currently
addressed in that subsection. Compare 8
CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(B) (proposed)
(authorizing termination by the Board
where a noncitizen demonstrates prima
facie eligibility for relief from removal
or for a lawful status based on a
petition, application, or other action
that USCIS has jurisdiction to
adjudicate, including naturalization or
adjustment of status), and
1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(B) (proposed) (same
authorization for immigration judges),
with 8 CFR 1239.2(f) (authorizing an
immigration judge to terminate a
noncitizen’s removal proceedings in
order to pursue a pending application or
petition for naturalization).
Finally, although such scenarios may
be rare, the proposed rule also explicitly
provides for termination in proceedings
other than removal, deportation, or
exclusion. See 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(2)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(2) (proposed).
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Such proceeding types include, among
others, withholding-only, asylum-only,
credible fear, reasonable fear, rescission,
and claimed status. The Department
believes that providing immigration
judges and the Board with termination
authority in these limited proceedings
will ensure that adjudicators are not
limited from reaching a proper
resolution, as determined by the specific
facts of each case.
Substantively, as with removal,
deportation, and exclusion proceedings,
the proposed rule requires immigration
judges and the Board to terminate these
other proceedings where the parties
have jointly filed a motion to terminate,
or one party has filed a motion to
terminate and the other party has
affirmatively indicated its nonopposition, unless the adjudicator
articulates unusual, clearly identified,
and supported reasons for denying the
motion. See 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(2)(i)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(2)(i) (proposed).
The proposed rule further requires
immigration judges and the Board to
terminate these other proceedings when
required by law, including by statute,
regulation, or binding Board or court
decision. Id. In all other circumstances,
the proposed rule provides adjudicators
with the general discretionary authority
to terminate these proceedings where
necessary or appropriate for the
disposition or alternate resolution of the
case, subject to the same limitations as
in removal proceedings. 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(2)(ii) (proposed),
1003.18(d)(2)(ii) (proposed). Finally, the
proposed rule specifies that nothing in
the new provision allows adjudicators
to terminate proceedings where
prohibited by another regulatory
provision; in other words, this new
provision is not intended to trump other
regulatory provisions governing these
proceedings. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(2)(iii)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(2)(iii)
(proposed).
The Department notes that, in some
scenarios in these other proceedings,
alternative options to termination are
available. For example, it may be that an
applicant in withholding-only
proceedings is mentally incompetent
and adequate safeguards are
unavailable, but the adjudicator believes
it would be inappropriate to terminate
the proceedings because doing so would
leave the applicant without any
protection from removal, such as when,
for example, a noncitizen is subject to
reinstatement of a prior removal order
under section 241(a)(5) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), and eligible only for
withholding of removal. In such a
situation, administrative closure would
be available and would allow for the
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62265
case to be recalendared in the future if
appropriate.
The Department seeks public
comment on whether the proposed
termination standards are warranted
and whether these standards should be
broadened, narrowed, or altered.
Additionally, the Department seeks
comment on the evidence that would
best support certain proposed grounds
for termination, for example, whether
evidence of filings with USCIS should
be required in some cases. The
Department also seeks comment on the
proposed framework in 8 CFR 1239.2(b)
that would distinguish between the
exercise of dismissal authority, which
applies to a decision on a DHS motion
to dismiss for the reasons specified in 8
CFR 239.2(a), and termination authority,
which applies when an EOIR
adjudicator terminates proceedings for
the reasons specified in proposed 8 CFR
1003.1(m) and 1003.18(d).
Further, the Department seeks public
comment on whether the regulations
should impose additional constraints on
the termination authority. Finally, the
Department seeks comment on whether
the regulations should specify that
termination should generally be without
prejudice to DHS’s ability to
recommence removal proceedings if
circumstances change except where the
termination was based on DHS’s failure
to sustain the removal charges.
Similarly, the Department seeks
comment on whether immigration
judges or Appellate Immigration Judges
may terminate a case only on a party’s
motion or whether there are situations
where EOIR adjudicators may exercise
termination authority sua sponte.
D. Sua Sponte Reopening or
Reconsideration and Self-Certification
The Department proposes to amend
its regulations at 8 CFR 1003.2(a) and
1003.23(b), respectively, governing the
ability of immigration judges and the
Board to sua sponte reopen or
reconsider a case by restoring the
regulatory standard in effect before the
promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule.40
The restored standard provides that an
immigration judge and the Board may
40 The Department recognizes that an action is
not, by its literal definition, ‘‘sua sponte’’ when the
action is undertaken pursuant to a request made by
a party to the proceedings. See Sua sponte, Black’s
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (‘‘Without
prompting or suggestion; on its own motion.’’).
Nonetheless, immigration judges and the Board
have long entertained motions for sua sponte
reopening, Djie v. Garland, 39 F.4th 280, 282 n.1
(5th Cir. 2022), and the Department will continue
to use this term for motions that may be granted in
‘‘exceptional situations,’’ Matter of G–D–, 22 I&N
Dec. 1132, 1133 (BIA 1999); Matter of J–J–, 21 I&N
Dec. 976, 985 (BIA 1997).
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reopen or reconsider a case upon their
own motion at any time after they have
rendered a decision if they have
jurisdiction.
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the
original regulation conferring authority
to sua sponte reopen or reconsider cases
had been in effect since 1958, see Dada,
554 U.S. at 12–13, and had served as a
vital tool to prevent injustices in the
immigration system. See, e.g., Matter of
X–G–W–, 22 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 1998)
(holding that, in a specific
circumstance, a fundamental change in
asylum law that made the noncitizen
eligible for relief warranted sua sponte
reopening); see also P–O–J–, No.:
AXXX–XXI–700, 2016 WL 1084517, at
*1 (BIA Feb. 24, 2016) (nonprecedential) (sua sponte reopening and
terminating because noncitizen obtained
asylee status). For example, without the
availability of such a tool, noncitizens
who would otherwise be eligible for an
initial grant of, or return to, lawful
status may be removed from the United
States. See Centro Legal de la Raza, 524
F. Supp. 3d at 971 (stating that
‘‘elimination [of sua sponte authority]
will foreclose the only avenue of relief
for some noncitizens who would
otherwise be eligible for relief from
removal’’).
The strong need for sua sponte
authority in certain limited
circumstances is underscored by the fact
that, in promulgating prior regulations
implementing statutory motions to
reopen and reconsider, the Department
specifically declined to add a good
cause exception to the statutory time
and number limits on such motions due
to the availability of sua sponte
reopening and reconsideration. See 61
FR at 18902. Removing sua sponte
authority without creating a similar
safety valve would prevent EOIR
adjudicators from remedying the types
of exceptional circumstances described
above.
Moreover, the longstanding
availability of sua sponte reopening and
reconsideration operated under a
workable scheme. For example, the
Board has published decisions applying
the ‘‘exceptional circumstances’’
standard in specific situations and has
the ability to publish further decisions
clarifying the standard as necessary.
See, e.g., Matter of Yauri, 25 I&N Dec.
103, 110–11 (BIA 2009) (applying
standard to case involving a pending
application before DHS); Matter of
G–D–, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999)
(applying standard to request based on
a change in law). Maintaining the
exceptional circumstances standard
allows adjudicators sufficient discretion
to reopen in meritorious circumstances.
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Similarly, the Department is aware of
no evidence that immigration judges or
the Board routinely used sua sponte
authority to reopen cases in which a
motion to reopen would have been timeor number-barred without considering
whether the ‘‘exceptional
circumstances’’ standard was met. See,
e.g., AA96 Final Rule, 85 FR at 81631
(raising concerns that sua sponte
reopening could be used to cure filing
defects or circumvent regulations).
Additionally, at the immigration court
level, an immigration judge’s exercise of
sua sponte authority is subject to
appellate review by the Board, and the
Board can remand where such authority
has been used improperly. See 8 CFR
1003.2(a); see also Matter of G–D–, 22
I&N Dec. at 1132.
The Department finds that the need
for sua sponte authority in certain cases
outweighs any finality concerns in this
context. See, e.g., AA96 Final Rule, 85
FR at 81632 (raising finality concerns
regarding sua sponte motions). Sua
sponte reopening and reconsideration
are reserved for truly exceptional cases
and, with limited exceptions, are fully
committed to agency discretion. See
Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr, 929 F.3d
1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining
that sua sponte reopening authority is
committed to agency discretion and that
the court may only review for legal or
constitutional error). As noncitizens are
not entitled to sua sponte reopening or
reconsideration, immigration judges and
the Board can ensure that such authority
only disturbs the finality of proceedings
in the limited number of meritorious
cases involving exceptional
circumstances.
For similar reasons as those described
above, the Department proposes to
reinstate the authority of the Board to
accept untimely or defective appeals
through self-certification. 8 CFR
1003.1(c) (proposed).
E. Board Findings of Fact—
Administrative Notice
The Department proposes to rescind
all of the changes that the AA96 Final
Rule made to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)
regarding administrative notice at the
Board. The Board, like federal courts,
has long had the power to take
administrative notice of facts not
reasonably subject to dispute. See Board
of Immigration Appeals: Procedural
Reforms to Improve Case Management,
67 FR 54877 (Aug. 26, 2002)
(implementing regulations that codified
administrative notice authority). The
AA96 Final Rule expanded the Board’s
administrative notice authority to allow
it to resolve certain factual disputes in
the first instance and to rely on those
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determinations to overturn a grant of
relief or protection. See 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(i) (‘‘The Board will not
engage in de novo review of findings of
fact determined by an immigration
judge.’’). The Department recognizes
that it would be unnecessary and
inefficient for the Board to remand a
case to the immigration judge for facts
that are not truly in dispute and would
not be disputed once they are called to
the parties’ attention. However, upon
review, the Department believes that the
AA96 Final Rule’s provisions could
invite impermissible factfinding in
practice, in contravention of the
Department’s longstanding regulatory
approach. Accordingly, the Department
proposes changes regarding
administrative notice procedures. See 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (proposed).
In addition, the Department proposes
to rescind the AA96 Final Rule’s
restrictions on the Board’s authority to
remand to the immigration court for
further findings of fact, as discussed in
further detail below. Accordingly, the
Department finds it unnecessary to
retain broad and possibly confusing
standards for administrative notice that
may prejudice noncitizens, particularly
pro se noncitizens, as the Board will
have the discretion to either take
administrative notice or remand for
further fact-finding, as appropriate. See
8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (proposed) (‘‘If
further factfinding is needed in a
particular case, the Board may remand
the proceeding to the immigration judge
or, as appropriate, to DHS.’’).
Additionally, the AA96 Final Rule, if
made operative, would permit the Board
to rely on any ‘‘undisputed fact[ ] in the
record’’ to overturn a grant of relief even
if the parties did not have a meaningful
opportunity to address that fact in the
proceedings at the immigration-judge
level because, for example, neither the
parties nor the immigration judge found
it necessary to dispute or probe further
about the fact because it appeared
irrelevant or tangential. See 85 FR at
81651 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A)(4)).
Relatedly, the AA96 Final Rule added a
new provision that would allow the
Board to affirm the underlying decision
‘‘on any basis supported by the record’’
including by relying on ‘‘facts that are
not reasonably subject to dispute.’’ See
id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(v)).
Although the AA96 Final Rule, if
enforced, would afford the parties an
opportunity to respond to
administratively noticed facts if those
facts were used to overturn a grant of
relief or protection, 85 FR at 81603 (8
CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(B)), in practice this
could be confusing to noncitizens,
particularly those who are pro se.
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Accordingly, the Department does not
believe the AA96 Final Rule’s
opportunity-to-respond provision
provides adequate procedural
protections to noncitizens, such as
allowing sufficient opportunity to be
heard, to present testimony, and to
develop the record on disputed facts. Cf.
Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 626
(4th Cir. 2021) (‘‘Today, we join the
broad consensus among our sister
circuits by holding that immigration
judges have a legal duty to fully develop
the record in the cases that come before
them. Like the [Board] and the other
circuits to have considered this issue,
we are persuaded that such a duty
necessarily arises from the dictates of
[INA 240(b)(1),] 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(1)
. . .’’).
The Department is also concerned
that the AA96 Final Rule, if effectuated,
would permit the Board to affirm a
denial of relief or protection on the basis
of facts that may not have been
developed by the parties or even
considered by the immigration judge
during removal proceedings, and which
did not factor into the immigration
judge’s denial. Indeed, the AA96 Final
Rule does not provide any requirement
of notice or opportunity to respond if
the Board relies on administratively
noticed facts to affirm an immigration
judge’s decision to deny relief, even if
those facts were not relied on by the
immigration judge or developed at the
hearing.
F. Board Findings of Fact—Voluntary
Departure
Generally, the proposed rule would
retain the voluntary departure-related
changes adopted by the AA96 Final
Rule, which prohibited the Board from
remanding to the immigration judge for
consideration of voluntary departure, as
described at Section III.F.2 of this
preamble. The Department believes that
the changes adopted by the AA96 Final
Rule with respect to voluntary departure
created a workable framework that
improved adjudicatory efficiency. See
Section III.F.2 of this preamble (‘‘Prior
to the AA96 Final Rule, the regulations
described an immigration judge’s
authority to grant voluntary departure
but did not articulate the Board’s
authority to do so.’’ (citation omitted)).
However, the Department proposes to
amend 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7) and
1240.26(k)(1) to allow the Board to
remand cases to the immigration court
for the consideration of voluntary
departure in the limited circumstances
where further fact-finding is needed.
Specifically, the Department proposes
to remove the AA96 Final Rule’s
mandate that ‘‘[i]f the Board does not
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grant the request for voluntary
departure, it must deny the request.’’ 85
FR at 81652 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(iv)). In
cases where the Board has a complete
record and the immigration judge has
made sufficient findings of fact, it is
generally inefficient and unnecessary
for the Board to remand to the
immigration judge solely for
consideration of the issue of voluntary
departure. However, where the
voluntary departure record is
incomplete or otherwise requires further
fact-finding to adjudicate the request,
the Board should be permitted to
remand the case to the immigration
judge to consider the voluntary
departure request.
One such example is when a
noncitizen makes multiple applications
for relief or protection, including
voluntary departure. In that case, the
immigration judge may choose to grant
at least one application but not address
other applications, including voluntary
departure. If DHS appeals the
immigration judge’s decision and the
Board determines that the noncitizen is
not eligible for the relief granted, the
voluntary departure record is likely to
be incomplete or additional fact-finding
may be required to adjudicate the
voluntary departure request. See 85 FR
at 81639–40 (describing commenter
concerns with respect to this example).
The AA96 Final Rule, if effectuated,
would not allow the Board the option to
remand. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(iv) (‘‘If the
Board [did] not grant the request for
voluntary departure, it must deny the
request.’’). However, under the
circumstances described above, the
Board should be permitted to remand
the case to the immigration court to
consider the voluntary departure
request rather than mandate denial of a
potentially eligible request or invite the
possibility of improper fact-finding, in
violation of 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)
(proposed). Accordingly, to make this
remand authority clear, the Department
also proposes to add a sentence to the
end of 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii) (proposed),
stating that ‘‘[if] the record does not
contain sufficient factual findings
regarding eligibility for voluntary
departure, the Board may remand the
decision to the immigration judge for
further factfinding.’’
Additionally, the Department
proposes to remove the AA96 Final
Rule’s prohibition on remands to the
immigration judge to consider voluntary
departure and to amend the regulations
to state that the Board ‘‘may,’’ rather
than ‘‘shall,’’ consider a request for
voluntary departure de novo. 8 CFR
1240.26(k)(1) (proposed). As described
above, in cases where the Board has a
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complete record and the immigration
judge has made sufficient findings of
fact, it is generally inefficient and
unnecessary for the Board to remand to
the immigration judge solely to consider
the issue of eligibility for voluntary
departure. However, where the
voluntary departure record is
incomplete or otherwise requires further
fact-finding to adjudicate the request,
the Board should be permitted to
remand the case to the immigration
judge to consider the voluntary
departure request.
Except as described above, this
proposed rule would not make further
amendments to the voluntary departure
provisions enacted by the AA96 Final
Rule.
When the Board grants voluntary
departure in the first instance, written
voluntary departure advisals served
electronically or by mail in conjunction
with the Board’s order will provide
adequate notice to noncitizens for
purposes of voluntary departure. See 8
CFR 1003.3(g)(6)(i)–(ii) (providing for
electronic service in eligible cases). In
making this decision, the Department
considered that the Act authorizes
service of the Notice to Appear by mail,
including advisals of the consequences
for failure to comply with certain
requirements described in the Notice to
Appear and the consequences for failure
to appear. See INA 239(a)(1)(F)(iii), 8
U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(F)(iii) (consequences
for failure to provide updated address
and telephone information), INA
239(a)(1)(G)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(G)(ii)
(consequences for failure to appear).
The Department believes that given
Congress’s authorization of service by
mail of such advisals, notwithstanding
the significant consequences associated
with failure to comply with such
requirements, electronic or mail service
is also sufficient for voluntary departure
advisals.
G. Board Remand Authority—
Additional Findings of Fact
The Department proposes to rescind
all changes that the AA96 Final Rule
made to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) and
proposes to remove the AA96 Final
Rule’s addition of 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(v) 41—the provisions of the
AA96 Final Rule that eliminated the
Board’s authority to grant a motion to
remand based on new evidence that
arises while a noncitizen’s case is on
appeal before the Board. Rescinding
these changes would reinstate the
41 As discussed above in Section IV.E of this
preamble, the proposed rule would retain some of
the administrative notice language at 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A) but would move it to 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv) and remove paragraph (A).
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Board’s previous authority to remand
based on new evidence (in addition to
intervening changes in law) that could
impact the basis for the immigration
judge’s removability determination or
that could provide the noncitizen with
a form of relief or protection, or other
immigration benefit, that would obviate
the need for continued removal
proceedings or the Board’s adjudication
of the appeal. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)
(proposed). Similar to the provisions of
the AA96 Final Rule that eliminated the
authority of immigration judges and the
Board to grant sua sponte reopening or
administrative closure, the AA96 Final
Rule’s provisions that eliminated the
Board’s authority to remand sua sponte
based on new evidence could impede
certain noncitizens from obtaining an
immigration benefit or relief from
removal for which they have become
prima facie eligible.
Upon review, the Department believes
that the AA96 Final Rule’s limitations
on the Board’s remand authority raise
fairness concerns and would create
inefficiencies that contravene the rule’s
stated justification. For example,
although the AA96 Final Rule would
permit remands based on new evidence
pertaining to grounds of removability,
such as to allow DHS to present new
facts regarding a noncitizen’s
removability, see 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(D) (barring remands
except as provided in 8 CFR(d)(7)(v)(B)),
1003.1(d)(7)(v)(B) (not precluding
remands for further fact-finding related
to ‘‘a question regarding a ground or
grounds of removability specified in
section 212 or 237 of the Act’’), it would
preclude the Board from remanding a
case at the noncitizen’s request for
further fact-finding where the
noncitizen became prima facie eligible
for relief or protection, or other
immigration benefit.
This limitation is overly restrictive
and raises fairness concerns due to the
imbalance between the parties. First, it
would not be fair to permit DHS to seek
remand based on new evidence
discovered during background or
security checks that could render an
individual ineligible for relief, 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(v)(B), but not on the basis
of new evidence that could render an
individual eligible for relief. Second, the
AA96 Final Rule ignored that new
evidence can relate not just to a ground
of removability, but also to grounds for
relief. If new evidence indicates that
noncitizens have become eligible for
new forms of relief from removal,
protection, or other immigration benefit,
the Board should be able to remand for
consideration of that evidence. Such
forms of relief from removal, protection,
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or other immigration benefit may
include: special immigrant juvenile
status, adjustment of status, cancellation
of removal for certain lawful permanent
residents (for example if the noncitizen
is successful in obtaining vacatur of a
criminal conviction that otherwise
precluded applying for that relief before
the immigration judge), or asylum or
similar protection based on new
evidence that only came to light during
the appeal process.
Additionally, the AA96 Final Rule
suggested that an individual who
wishes to obtain relief based on new
evidence must file a motion to reopen
in accordance with the standard
procedures for such motions. See 85 FR
at 81589. While this is technically an
available option, substantive and
procedural limitations on motions to
reopen might make this option more
difficult or unavailable for many
noncitizens, which raises fairness
concerns for noncitizens in proceedings,
as well as questions of efficiency, given
that additional motions practice invites
further litigation that could draw out the
resolution of a proceeding. See, e.g., 8
CFR 1003.2(c)(2) (time and number bar
on motions to reopen), 1103.7(b)(2)
(filing fee for motions to reopen, but not
motions to remand); cf. Garcia-DeLeon,
999 F.3d at 992 (‘‘True, a noncitizen in
removal proceedings whose case is not
administratively closed may still submit
an I–601 Waiver of Inadmissibility after
they complete their consular interview
and are determined inadmissible. This
old path, however, deterred noncitizens
in removal proceedings from obtaining
legal status as permanent residents . . .
Thus, administrative closure for the
limited purpose of permitting
noncitizens to apply for provisional
unlawful presence waivers increases the
likelihood that noncitizens will obtain
legal status and resolve their
immigration proceedings.’’).
In addition to fairness and efficiency
concerns, the AA96 Final Rule’s
limitations on remands for new
evidence also conflict with a permanent
injunction to which the agency is
subject in some circumstances. The
permanent injunction requires the
Board to accept new evidence related to
mental health and to order a limited
remand to assess an unrepresented,
detained noncitizen’s competency to
represent themselves in proceedings
before EOIR. See Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder, No. 10–02211, 2013 WL
8115423 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013);
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10–
02211, 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
29, 2014). In addition, since the
issuance of that injunction, EOIR has
adopted similar procedures pursuant to
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its nationwide policy to provide
enhanced procedural protections to
unrepresented immigration detainees
with serious mental disorders or
conditions 42 (‘‘Nationwide Policy’’) for
similarly situated individuals detained
outside of the three states covered by
the Franco-Gonzalez injunction. Thus,
adherence to the AA96 Final Rule
would be irreconcilable with adherence
to court-ordered permanent injunctions
in effect in three States and
irreconcilable with EOIR’s Nationwide
Policy. The Department notes that the
AA96 Final Rule would still preclude
the Board from remanding proceedings
to the immigration judge for the
requisite factual findings required by
the Nationwide Policy and permanent
injunction even if the Board would have
been permitted to accept new evidence
related to mental competency.
The Department believes that
Appellate Immigration Judges have the
expertise, knowledge, and training to
determine when further fact-finding
might be needed given the variables to
consider on a case-by-case basis when
adjudicating an appeal and that it is in
the interest of justice to charge
Appellate Immigration Judges with
doing so, rather than burdening
litigants, many of whom are pro se, with
strictly complying with the numerous,
inflexible requirements that the AA96
Final Rule set forth at 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(D)(1)–(5).43 As
discussed below, the Department also
proposes to reinstate the Board’s
authority to remand cases based upon a
‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ analysis.
Accordingly, given the fairness and
efficiency concerns implicated in the
AA96 Final Rule’s limitation on the
Board’s ability to remand cases, the
Department proposes to rescind the
AA96 Final Rule’s changes to section
1003.1(d)(3)(iv). Rescinding these
42 See Press Release, EOIR, Department of Justice
and the Department of Homeland Security
Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented
Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental
Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/department-justice-anddepartment-homeland-security-announcesafeguards-unrepresented.
43 For example, if enforced, the Board would only
be permitted to remand a case based on a change
in the law if the change were to render the initial
decision legally erroneous or where the
immigration judge’s factual findings were ‘‘clearly
erroneous.’’ Thus, the AA96 Final Rule would not
have permitted remands for a change in
circumstances, or in a case where the immigration
judge failed to make any finding of fact that the
Board might consider important to the case. There
are undoubtedly other examples of scenarios where
it might be appropriate to remand for further factfinding but that would not have been captured by
the AA96 Final Rule. That concern supports leaving
the Board the flexibility to make case-by-case
determinations.
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provisions would allow the Board to
retain its prior authority to remand in
cases involving new evidence that could
impact a noncitizen’s removability or
render the individual prima facie
eligible for relief.
The AA96 Final Rule also precluded
immigration judges from considering,
on remand, any issues outside of the
scope of the Board’s remand order,
unless pertaining to a question of the
immigration judge’s continuing
jurisdiction over the case. But
developments related to a noncitizen’s
removability or eligibility for protection
or relief from removal could arise after
a remand. In the Department’s view, the
better policy is to avoid inefficiencies
that result from limiting the scope of a
remand, which can lengthen
proceedings by precluding immigration
judges from addressing all relevant
issues in the remanded proceedings.
While the Department is cognizant that
‘‘[b]oth the public and the Board have
significant . . . interests in the finality
of immigration proceedings,’’
Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 118
F.3d 1034, 1042 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
Abudu v. INS, 485 U.S. 94, 106–08
(1988)), the Department does not believe
that finality interests outweigh the
fairness and efficiency concerns that the
AA96 Final Rule’s inflexible approach
creates. Hence, for similar reasons to
those described above, the Department
proposes to remove this restriction on
the immigration judge’s authority when
considering a case on remand.
The proposed rule would also add to
8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) a statement that
‘‘[i]f new evidence is submitted on
appeal, that submission may be deemed
a motion to remand and considered
accordingly.’’ This addition would make
clear that new evidence submitted on
appeal need not be dismissed solely
because the party did not file a pleading
entitled a ‘‘motion to remand.’’ This is
in keeping with pre-AA96 Final Rule
guidance pertaining to motions to
reopen, which the Department also
proposes to republish as part of this
rulemaking. See 8 CFR 1003.2(c)(4)
(2019); 8 CFR 1003.2(c)(4) (proposed).
These amendments would clarify that
the Board has discretion to consider
new facts presented on appeal as a
motion to remand. This parallels the
pre-AA96 Final Rule treatment of new
facts presented as part of a motion to
reopen prior to the conclusion of
proceedings.
H. Board Remand Authority—Errors in
Fact or Law
The Department proposes to rescind
all of the AA96 Final Rule’s restrictions
on the Board’s authority to remand
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decisions based upon errors of fact or
law, specifically, all changes made to 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(i), and proposes to
remove 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii), (iii), and
(v). As discussed above in Section IV.F
of this preamble, the Department
proposes to retain, with modifications, 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(iv) (addressing
voluntary departure), and to renumber
that paragraph as 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii).
These proposed changes would restore
the Board’s broad authority to remand
decisions to the immigration judge or
DHS for ‘‘further action as may be
appropriate.’’ 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(i)
(proposed).
As previously noted in Section III.H.2
of this preamble, the AA96 Final Rule
restricted the Board from remanding a
decision due to an error of law or fact
in the immigration judge’s decision if it
did not identify the standard of review
it applied and the specific error or errors
made by the adjudicator. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(A). The Department
believes that, because the Board’s
standards of review are expressly
delineated by regulation, it is
unnecessary to require the Board to
explicitly include them in every remand
order. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3) (requiring
factual findings to be reviewed for clear
error and legal determinations to be
reviewed de novo).
Additionally, as explained in Section
III.H.2 of this preamble, the AA96 Final
Rule prohibited the Board from
remanding a case: (1) based upon a
‘‘totality of the circumstances,’’ 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(B); (2) based on new
arguments or evidence, except where
the new argument or evidence pertained
to a material change in fact or law and
substantial evidence supported the
change vitiated all grounds of removal,
8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(C); or (3) sua
sponte, subject to limited exceptions, 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(D).
The Department is now proposing to
rescind these provisions, thus
recodifying the longstanding, more
flexible standard that allows the Board
to return the case ‘‘to DHS or an
immigration judge for such further
action as may be appropriate.’’ 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(i) (proposed). The
Department now believes that this
longstanding standard is workable and
sufficiently flexible to allow for
remands in situations where an error of
fact or law warrants remand, or where
fairness or efficiency concerns may
otherwise be implicated. Given the
numerous variables that each case may
present, the Department believes the
Board requires the flexibility to conduct
appellate review, including remanding
proceedings when necessary, rather
than being limited by the rigid
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restrictions that the AA96 Final Rule set
forth at 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii).
Specifically, the Department believes
that Appellate Immigration Judges have
the expertise, knowledge, and training
to determine when an error of fact or
law warrants remand to the immigration
judge without the need for significant
restrictions on such determinations. In
addition, providing the Board with
maximum flexibility to remand due to
errors of fact or law ensures that the
immigration court, which is most
familiar with the record as the court
tasked with receiving evidence, is able
to correct any errors and issue revised
orders based on those corrections in the
first instance.
Moreover, the Board may determine,
under the totality of the circumstances,
that remand is warranted in other
situations, including based on fairness
or efficiency concerns. For example,
under the AA96 Final Rule, the Board
would arguably be unable to remand—
as it has, for example, pursuant to
Matter of S–H–, 23 I&N Dec. at 462–63—
in situations where an immigration
judge decision contains only a brief
summary of the testimony and an
ultimate pronouncement on the merits,
without thorough discussion of each of
the elements of the application for relief
or protection. See Matter of RodriguezCarillo, 22 I&N Dec. 1031, 1033 (BIA
1999) (discussing fairness concerns
implicated by cursory decisions).44 The
Department thus believes that
rescinding the AA96 Final Rule’s
provision prohibiting a remand based
upon a totality of the circumstances will
return the longstanding flexibility to the
Board to remand cases for further action
as appropriate based on the
circumstances presented in each case.
Similarly, under the AA96 Final Rule,
the Board would be prohibited from
44 The Department also acknowledges that
commenters previously raised concerns, in
conjunction with the AA96 rulemaking, that the
AA96 Final Rule does not provide an independent
ground to remand based on superseding or
intervening case law—including litigation
surrounding regulations or precedential decisions
that were the basis for denying relief—to the extent
that such changes do not raise a question of
jurisdiction, vitiate all grounds of removability, or
relate to an error of law. See 85 FR at 81611 (listing
commenter concerns); see also (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)
(discussing remand authority). The Department also
now believes that this omission unduly restricts
appellate review, particularly in light of the
increasing number of significant litigation
developments pertaining to immigration law in
recent years. In some circumstances, for example,
Appellate Immigration Judges may deem it
appropriate to remand for immigration judges to
consider in the first instance the effect of
intervening case law, without determining whether
the decision under review contains an error of law
under this intervening case law. The Department’s
proposal to restore the Board’s broad authority to
remand decisions would correct such limitations.
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remanding based upon the availability
of new evidence where the new
evidence did not vitiate all grounds of
removability applicable to the
noncitizen, even where it might impact
the noncitizen’s eligibility for relief
from removal. Accordingly, as discussed
in Section IV.G of this preamble, this
prohibition on remands would result in
inefficiencies given that such a
prohibition would invite additional
motions practice and further litigation
that could unnecessarily prolong the
ultimate resolution of a proceeding.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the
Department proposes to largely rescind
these restrictions that the AA96 Final
Rule placed on the Board’s remand
authority so as to restore the Board’s
flexibility to remand decisions to the
immigration judge or DHS for ‘‘further
action as may be appropriate.’’ 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(i) (proposed).
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I. Background Check
The Department proposes to amend 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(6) regarding the
completion or updating of background
checks when a case is pending before
the Board. Generally, the proposed rule
would retain the background checkrelated changes from the AA96 Final
Rule, which were intended to reduce
the availability of Board remands to the
immigration court due to background
check concerns. The Department
believes that the pre-AA96 Final Rule
practice of remanding to the
immigration court solely for a
background check to be completed is an
unnecessary procedural action that
creates inefficiencies in case
processing.45
Similar to the AA96 Final Rule, this
NPRM proposes that, when completing
or updating a background check is
necessary to adjudicate an appeal or
motion at the Board, the Board will
issue a notice to the parties holding the
case until such a check is completed
and the results are reported to the
Board. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(ii)
(proposed). The Board’s notice to the
parties will explain that DHS will
contact the noncitizen with instructions
for completing or updating any
necessary checks if DHS is otherwise
unable to independently update them.
Id. The Board’s notice will also advise
the noncitizen of the consequences of
45 The
Department recognizes that such
procedures necessitate service of notices and
advisals electronically or by mail, as opposed to inperson service, and the Department believes that
such service is sufficient for the same reasons as
those described above with respect to advisals
related to voluntary departure. See Section IV.F of
this preamble.
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failing to comply with these
requirements. Id.
However, this proposed rule includes
a number of changes from the AA96
Final Rule’s background check
language. First, the Department is
removing language that the AA96 Final
Rule added to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iii)
that would deem a noncitizen’s failure
to comply with these background check
requirements at the Board as an
automatic abandonment of their
underlying relief application absent a
showing of good cause. Instead, the
Department proposes to revert to the
pre-AA96 Final Rule language, which
provides that the Board retains the
discretion to, on DHS’s motion, remand
to the immigration judge to consider
such noncompliance in determining
whether the underlying relief should be
denied. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iii)
(2019).
Second, the Department proposes to
allow the Board the option of further
holding a case where DHS has failed to
report the results of background checks
within 180 days from the date of the
Board’s notice, rather than requiring the
Board to remand to the immigration
judge. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iii)
(proposed). This would account for
cases where 180 days may not be a
sufficient reporting period or where the
case was placed on hold for other
reasons. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(iii)
(proposed) (specifying when cases may
be placed on hold). This change will
help ensure that cases are not
unnecessarily remanded to an
immigration judge when the Board
determines that further holding the case
would more efficiently contribute to the
completion of the case.
Lastly, the Department proposes to
add a minor clarification to 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(6)(v) that this background
check section applies to applications for
withholding of removal under the Act
and applications for protection under
the Convention Against Torture, by
referencing ‘‘immigration relief or
protection.’’ See Matter of M–D–, 24 I&N
Dec. 138, 140 n.1 (BIA 2007) (‘‘When
referenced in connection with the
background check regulations, the term
‘relief’ includes any form of relief that
permits [a noncitizen] to reside in the
United States, including withholding of
removal and protection under the
Convention Against Torture . . .’’).
J. Adjudication Timelines
The Department proposes to retain the
90- and 180-day processing timelines for
single-member and three-member Board
decisions but amend 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(1)
and (e)(8), regarding internal processing
timelines at the Board. The AA96 Final
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Rule added or modified a number of
Board internal processing timelines,
requiring: (1) screening panel review
within 14 days of filing or receipt; (2)
transcript ordering within seven days
after the screening panel completes its
review; (3) issuance of briefing
schedules within seven days after
receiving the transcript or, if no
transcript is required, within seven days
after the screening panel completes its
review; (4) review by a single Appellate
Immigration Judge within 14 days of
assignment to determine whether a
single- or a three-member panel should
adjudicate the appeal; (5) summary
dismissal of qualifying cases within 30
days of the appeal’s filing date; (6)
adjudication of interlocutory appeals
within 30 days of the appeal’s filing
date; and (7) completion of threemember decisions within 180 days of
the record being complete, rather than
180 days from assignment to the threemember panel. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(1),
(8). The AA96 Final Rule also added
tracking and accountability
requirements for the Chairman at 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(v).
After further review, the Department
has determined that these internal
timelines are overly rigid and concern
internal Board operations and processes
that are not suitable for regulatory
action. Given the wide variety of cases
before the Board, the varying
circumstances of different parties, and
possible changes to EOIR’s dockets,
codifying strict internal timelines in
regulatory text does not afford the Board
adequate flexibility to process cases
efficiently and fairly. Furthermore,
processing timelines may be
accomplished through internal guidance
as necessary. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A)
(exempting ‘‘rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice’’
from the APA’s notice and comment
requirements); see also 8 CFR
1003.1(a)(2)(i)(C) (providing the
Chairman with the authority to ‘‘set
priorities or time frames for the
resolution of cases’’). As a result, the
proposed rule would remove the
specific processing timelines from
EOIR’s regulations, retaining only the
more general 90- and 180-day
processing timelines for single-member
and three-member Board decisions. This
will ensure that the Board continues to
resolve cases expeditiously, while
giving the Board appropriate flexibility
to set internal case management
deadlines based on the particular
circumstances of the cases at issue and
possible changes to EOIR’s dockets.
To calculate the 180-day adjudication
deadline for three-member panels, the
Department believes that starting the
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adjudication period at the time of panel
assignment is most appropriate. See 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i) (proposed). Threemember decisions require robust
discussion among members of the panel,
as well as detailed, thorough decisions,
given that three-member decisions are
intended to address significant legal
issues. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(6)
(explaining that three-member panel
decisions are intended to address,
among other issues, the need to
establish precedent construing the
meaning of laws, regulations, or
procedures, or cases or controversies of
national import). Thus, upon
reconsideration, the Department is now
of the belief that providing less time for
the Board to consider and issue threemember panel decisions would be
inefficient, as this truncated timeline
could negatively affect the Board’s
ability to: (1) settle inconsistencies at
the immigration court; (2) establish
precedent that would clarify significant
legal issues; (3) review decisions that
may not be in conformity with the law
or applicable precedent; (4) resolve
cases or controversies of major national
import; (5) review clearly erroneous
factual determinations; (6) reverse
decisions if appropriate to do so; or (7)
resolve complex, novel, unusual, or
recurring issues of law or fact. See 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(6) (2018). This, in turn,
could have a cascading negative impact
on all EOIR adjudications due to a
resultant lack of clarity, consistency, or
meaningful review and resolution of
important issues that come before EOIR.
Conversely, given that single-member
Board decisions, historically, have been
appropriate for the disposition of
unopposed motions, 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(2),
affirmances without opinion, 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(4), or ‘‘brief orders,’’ 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(5), the Department continues
to believe that calculating the 90-day
adjudication period from the time of
completion of the record on appeal is
appropriate. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i)
(proposed). Returning the adjudicatory
processing timelines to the pre-AA96
Final Rule standards would ensure that
there is sufficient time for the Board to
fully consider and address important
issues requiring three-member panel
decisions, while still allowing for
flexibility and expediency in issuing
single-member decisions.
Additionally, the Department
proposes to include all ‘‘rare
circumstances’’ listed in the regulatory
text prior to the AA96 Final Rule under
which the Chairman was permitted to
hold adjudication of a case or cases.
Specifically, the Department proposes
that the Board may hold a case or group
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of cases where an impending decision
by the United States Supreme Court or
the relevant United States Court of
Appeals, impending Department
regulatory amendments, or an
impending en banc Board decision
might substantially determine the
outcome of the case or group of cases.
8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(iii) (proposed). The
Department also proposes to amend the
pre-AA96 Final Rule language to
account for the potential of ‘‘rare
circumstances’’ other than those
explicitly described by the regulation in
which a hold may be appropriate. Id.
Accordingly, the Department proposes
to add the term ‘‘such as’’ before
describing the rare circumstances to
make clear that these circumstances are
non-exhaustive. Id.
K. Director’s Authority To Issue
Decisions
The Department proposes to amend 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(8) to remove the EOIR
Director’s authority to adjudicate cases
that are pending beyond the Board’s
regulatory adjudication timelines. As a
result, the Department also proposes to
remove the cross-reference prohibiting
delegation of the Director’s authority—
as was set forth in 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)—
from the regulations at 8 CFR
1003.0(b)(2)(ii). The Department is
proposing this change for clarity, as that
cross-reference to the Director’s
authority in 8 CFR 1003.0(b)(2)(ii)
would be rendered nonsensical if the
changes to proposed 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)
are finalized.
As a general rule, the EOIR Director
does not have the authority to
adjudicate, or direct the adjudication of,
cases before EOIR. See 8 CFR 1003.0(c)
(‘‘Except as provided by statute,
regulation, or delegation of authority
from the Attorney General, or when
acting as a designee of the Attorney
General, the Director shall have no
authority to adjudicate cases arising
under the Act or regulations or to direct
the result of an adjudication assigned to
the Board, an immigration judge, the
Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, or
an Administrative Law Judge.’’). Two
recent Department rulemakings,
however, provided exceptions by
allowing the EOIR Director to adjudicate
Board cases that are not completed
within their regulatory adjudication
timelines.
In general, the regulations require
single-member appeals to be completed
within 90 days of completion of the
record, and three-member appeals to be
completed within 180 days. See 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(i). An August 26, 2019,
interim final rule amended this section
to require that if a case is not completed
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within the time limit and any extension,
the Chairman must either assign the
case to themselves or a Board Vice
Chairman or refer the case to EOIR’s
Director for adjudication. See 84 FR at
44539–40; 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii);
Organization of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, 85 FR 69465,
69481 (Nov. 3, 2020) (adopting as final).
Subsequently, the separate AA96 Final
Rule further amended this section to
require the Chairman to refer any case
to the EOIR Director that is pending
adjudication for more than 335 days
after the appeal, motion, or remand was
filed or received by the Board, subject
to certain exceptions. See 85 FR at
81591. Taken together, these
rulemakings significantly expanded the
EOIR Director’s authority to adjudicate
cases before EOIR.
After further review, the Department
has determined that providing the EOIR
Director with such expansive
adjudicatory authority is unnecessary.
The Department proposes to remove the
amendments made to 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)
by both the August 2019 interim final
rule and the related final rule, as well
as the AA96 Final Rule, and revert the
language back to instructing the Board
to refer cases that are not adjudicated in
the time required to the Attorney
General for decision. 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(ii) (proposed). Further,
consistent with the Department’s
longstanding understanding of the EOIR
Director’s authorities and limitations,
this proposed rule ‘‘highlight[s] the
Director’s role as EOIR’s manager,’’ as
opposed to an adjudicator, which is
more properly the function of the
immigration courts and the Board. See
65 FR at 81434 (detailing the EOIR
Director’s broad authority to direct and
supervise EOIR’s components).
In the event that a Board case passes
its regulatory deadline without
adjudication, the Department believes
that such cases are better addressed
internally at the Board, including
through the Chairman and Vice
Chairman referrals included in this
proposed rule, as well as any modified
internal procedures, training, and
hiring, as necessary. Therefore, the
Department proposes to amend 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8) to remove the EOIR
Director’s authority to adjudicate Board
cases that remain pending past
regulatory deadlines.
L. Quality Assurance Certification
The Department proposes to remove
and reserve 8 CFR 1003.1(k), which was
added by the AA96 Final Rule to create
a procedure for immigration judges to
certify cases remanded to them by the
Board and allegedly involving Board
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error to the EOIR Director. In addition,
the Department proposes to remove
language added by the AA96 Final Rule
that references the EOIR Director’s
authority to remand cases as part of the
quality assurance certification process.
See 8 CFR 1003.1(e) (proposed).
After further review, the Department
believes that the pre-AA96 Final Rule
procedures are sufficient to address
potential Board errors. As explained
above, a party dissatisfied with a Board
decision may file a motion to
reconsider, 8 CFR 1003.2(a), the
noncitizen may pursue a petition for
review of a final order of removal in the
federal courts of appeals, INA 242(a)(1),
8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(1), and DHS may also
seek to refer a Board decision to the
Attorney General for further review, 8
CFR 1003.1(h). Within the Department,
the Attorney General may certify a
decision on the Attorney General’s own
initiative; an immigration judge may
certify to the Board any case that is
appealable to the Board; and the Board
may reconsider a decision involving an
error using the Board’s sua sponte
authority as described elsewhere in this
proposed rule. See 8 CFR 1003.1(c), (h),
1003.2(a). All of these options that are
already available to immigration judges,
the Board, the Attorney General, and the
parties to the case permit addressing
alleged Board errors without the need
for a lengthy ancillary process outside of
the normal adjudicatory case flow.
The AA96 Final Rule unnecessarily
inserted the EOIR Director into the
adjudication process. As previously
explained, the EOIR Director has
historically not possessed the authority
to adjudicate, or direct the adjudication
of, cases before EOIR, with limited
exceptions. See 8 CFR 1003.0(c). The
AA96 Final Rule created a substantial
exception to that general limitation on
the Director’s authority by allowing the
EOIR Director to ‘‘exercise delegated
authority from the Attorney General
identical to that of the Board . . .
[including] the authority to issue a
precedent decision, and the authority to
refer the case to the Attorney General for
review’’ after certification from an
immigration judge. 85 FR at 81653; 8
CFR 1003.1(k)(3). In effect, the AA96
Final Rule granted the EOIR Director
broad authority to issue precedential
decisions if an immigration judge
certified a case to the EOIR Director
alleging, for example, that the Board
decision on remand was contrary to law
or was vague, ambiguous, or internally
inconsistent, among other reasons. 8
CFR 1003.1(k)(1)(iii). However, given
the myriad other responsibilities of the
EOIR Director, see 8 CFR 1003.0(b)(1),
and because other existing agency
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procedures are sufficient to address
potential errors, the Department
believes this broadening of the EOIR
Director’s adjudicative authority is
unnecessary and unwarranted at this
time.
M. Forwarding of Record on Appeal
The Department proposes to amend
the regulations at 8 CFR 1003.5
regarding the forwarding of the record
on appeal by largely returning to the
regulatory text in effect prior to the
AA96 Final Rule. First, the proposed
rule would reinstate the requirements
for immigration judges to review their
oral decision transcripts and approve
them within specified timeframes. 8
CFR 1003.5(a) (proposed). Second, the
proposed rule would remove a reference
to the EOIR Director when discussing
the authority to manage the
transcription process. Id.46
The Department originally instituted
timelines for immigration judges to
review oral decision transcripts in order
to ‘‘expedite the handling of cases by
the Board.’’ Board of Immigration
Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve
Case Management, 67 FR 7309, 7311
(Feb. 19, 2002) (proposed rule); 67 FR
54878, 54895 (Aug. 26, 2002) (final
rule). Subsequently, the AA96 Final
Rule completely removed the
immigration judge transcript review
process to further expedite the appeal
process, stating that such review was no
longer needed. 85 FR at 81639.
However, after further consideration,
the Department proposes to reinstate the
prior review procedures as necessary to
ensure that accurate transcripts are
produced. As the source of the oral
decision, the immigration judge is in the
best position to review the transcript to
ensure it is an accurate written version
of their oral decision. Moreover, the
Department believes that the 14-day
review period does not lengthen the
appeal process sufficiently to justify
completely removing the immigration
judge review process. In retaining the
immigration judge transcript review
process, the Department notes that the
process is not intended to allow
immigration judges to change their
decision after the fact but rather to
ensure that the written transcript
accurately captures the immigration
46 The proposed rule retains, however, changes
made by the AA96 Final Rule to delete references
to DHS procedures in paragraph (b) that are not
relevant to EOIR and to change the phrase ‘‘improve
[transcript] quality’’ to ‘‘ensure [transcript] quality.’’
8 CFR 1003.5(a), (b) (proposed). Due to the high
quality of EOIR’s digital audio recording system, the
role of the Chairman and Chief Immigration Judge
in the transcription process is more accurately
defined as ensuring the continued quality of
transcription, rather than improving it.
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judge’s oral decision, particularly
because minor transcription errors have
the potential to cause outsized issues.
The AA96 Final Rule also inserted a
reference to the EOIR Director into 8
CFR 1003.5(a), regarding the
management of the transcription
process, but did not provide an
explanation for the addition. On further
review, the Department proposes to
remove the reference to the EOIR
Director in the management of the
transcription process as unnecessary.
The Chairman and the Chief
Immigration Judge will continue to
manage the transcription process.
The Department also proposes to
retain pre-AA96 Final Rule language at
8 CFR 1003.5(b) regarding procedures
for appeals from DHS officer decisions
to provide clarity to parties about how
to manage the record of proceeding in
cases where DHS, upon reconsideration,
decides to grant a benefit that has been
requested in the appeal to the Board.
N. Definitional Changes
The Department proposes adding two
definitions to 8 CFR 1001.1.
Specifically, the Department proposes to
define the terms ‘‘noncitizen’’ and
‘‘unaccompanied child.’’ See 8 CFR
1001.1(gg)–(hh) (proposed).
First, the proposed rule would define
‘‘noncitizen’’ to be synonymous with
the term ‘‘alien,’’ which is defined by
statute to mean ‘‘any person not a
citizen or national of the United States.’’
INA 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(3). This
change would be consistent with recent
terminology usage changes at EOIR. See
EOIR PM 21–27, Terminology (July 26,
2021), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/
book/file/1415216/download; see also
Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1446 n.2
(2020) (noting that the opinion ‘‘uses the
term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent to the
statutory term ‘alien’ ’’). The Department
notes that a person may claim United
States citizenship or nationality during
immigration court proceedings or may
obtain United States citizenship or
nationality after immigration court
proceedings have commenced. The
Department proposes to use the term
‘‘noncitizen’’ as equivalent to the term
‘‘alien’’ as used in the regulations to
denote a person who is in immigration
proceedings before EOIR, including
those that claim or later obtain United
States citizenship or nationality. The
Department requests comments on
whether there is an alternative term or
terms that would better capture this
concept.47
47 The term ‘‘respondent’’ as defined in 8 CFR
1001.1(r) does not cover all persons appearing for
proceedings before EOIR but instead describes
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Second, the proposed rule would
define ‘‘unaccompanied child’’ to be
synonymous with ‘‘unaccompanied
alien child’’ and its statutory definition
at 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2). Similar to the
proposed ‘‘noncitizen’’ definitional
change, this change is more consistent
with current terminology usage.
O. Technical Changes
The Department proposes technical
changes in paragraphs amended as
noted in this section. Specifically, the
Department proposes to replace
gendered language with gender-neutral
language at 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii),
1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(1),
1003.23(b)(1)(iii), and 1240.26. The
Department also proposes to
decapitalize the term ‘‘Immigration
Judge’’ where appropriate. Lastly, the
Department proposes to replace
references to ‘‘the Service’’ with ‘‘DHS’’
and references to ‘‘alien’’ with
‘‘noncitizen’’ where appropriate.
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P. Request for Comment
In Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec.
621 (BIA 2003), the Board of
Immigration Appeals held that court
orders that vacate a noncitizen’s
conviction will be given effect for
immigration purposes only when they
are based on a substantive or procedural
defect in the underlying criminal
proceeding. In Matter of Thomas &
Thompson, 27 I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019),
Attorney General Barr overruled three
prior Board decisions—Matter of CotaVargas, 37 I&N Dec. 849 (BIA 2005),
Matter of Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA
2001), and Matter of Estrada, 26 I&N
Dec. 749 (BIA 2016)—and held that
state-court orders that modify, clarify, or
otherwise alter a noncitizen’s criminal
sentence will similarly be given effect
for immigration purposes only when
they are based on a substantive or
procedural defect in the underlying
criminal proceeding, and not when
based on reasons unrelated to the
merits, such as rehabilitation or
avoiding immigration consequences.
Recently, a circuit split has emerged
on whether Matter of Thomas &
Thompson may be applied retroactively
in immigration proceedings to orders or
criminal proceedings that predated the
Attorney General’s decision. Compare
noncitizens in removal or deportation proceedings.
See 8 CFR 1001.1(r) (defining respondent ‘‘as a
person named in a notice to appear or an order to
show cause’’); INA 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)
(defining a notice to appear as the charging
document that initiates removal proceedings). EOIR
conducts other proceedings including
‘‘withholding-only’’ proceedings and ‘‘asylumonly’’ proceedings. See, e.g., 8 CFR
1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(C) (asylum-only proceedings),
1208.2(c)(2) (withholding-only proceedings).
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Zaragoza v. Garland, 52 F.4th 1006,
1010 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding that
applying Matter of Thomas &
Thompson to a preexisting sentencemodification order ‘‘is an impermissibly
retroactive application of a new rule’’),
with Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General,
56 F.4th 951, 962 (11th Cir. 2022)
(finding ‘‘no retroactivity problem’’ in
similar circumstances). Questions have
also arisen over how Matter of Thomas
& Thompson and Pickering apply to
particular types of orders. See, e.g.,
Matter of Sotelo, 2019 WL 8197756, at
*2 (BIA Dec. 23, 2019) (giving effect to
a vacatur order issued under Cal. Penal
Code § 1473.7); Khatkarh v. Becerra, 442
F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1285–86 (E.D. Cal.
2020) (discussing Board decision
denying effect to a vacatur order issued
under Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7);
Talamantes-Enriquez v. U.S. Attorney
General, 12 F.4th 1340, 1354–55 (11th
Cir. 2021) (denying effect to a
clarification order where the original
sentence was not ambiguous, but
distinguishing a ‘‘sentence order [that]
was ambiguous and needed
clarification’’).
The Department invites comment on
whether—and if so, to what extent—
Matter of Thomas & Thompson should
be given retroactive effect. In particular,
the Department seeks comment and
information on the appropriate
reference point for the retroactivity
inquiry; the extent to which individuals
reasonably relied on the Board decisions
overturned by Matter of Thomas &
Thompson (e.g., in entering guilty pleas,
in going to trial, in pursuing state-court
modifications, clarifications, or
alterations, or otherwise); the burden
that retroactive application would
impose (e.g., the consequence of
removal and obstacles individuals may
now face to obtaining relief that would
satisfy Thomas & Thompson or in
demonstrating case-specific reliance);
and the interests, if any, in applying
Matter of Thomas & Thompson
retroactively. See, e.g., Zaragoza, 52
F.4th at 1023; Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t
Store Union, AFL–CIO v. NLRB, 466
F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314–21
(2001). The Department also seeks
comment on how Matter of Thomas &
Thompson and Pickering apply to
particular types of orders, such as those
referenced in Matter of Sotelo, Katkarh,
and Talamantes-Enriquez.
Reconsideration of the approach of
Matter of Thomas & Thompson or
Pickering is beyond the scope of this
rulemaking, which focuses on the
application of those decisions without
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reaffirming or reconsidering their
approach.
Q. Reliance Interests
The Department perceives no reliance
interest on the part of any party or entity
in any existing policies implicated or
effected by the proposed rule, apart
from those discussed in the request for
comment in Section IV.P of this
preamble. Nonetheless, the Department
invites commenters to identify any
serious reliance interests that may be
implicated by the provisions of this
proposed rule. See FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
515 (2009) (requiring agencies to
consider cognizable ‘‘serious reliance
interests’’ when changing policies).
V. Regulatory Requirements
A. Administrative Procedure Act
The Department is providing a 60-day
comment period for this proposed rule
to provide the public with ‘‘an
opportunity to participate in the rule
making’’ as required by the
Administrative Procedure Act and in
accordance with the guidance provided
by Executive Order 12866 and Executive
Order 13563. See APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(c);
E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and
Review, 58 FR 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(stating that rulemakings ‘‘in most cases
should include a comment period of not
less than 60 days’’); E.O. 13563,
Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review, 76 FR 3821, 3821–22 (Jan. 18,
2011) (‘‘To the extent feasible and
permitted by law, each agency shall
afford the public . . . a comment period
that should generally be at least 60
days.’’).
The Department reiterates that it
proposes discrete changes to the
appellate process, decisional finality,
and administrative closure. Should
rulemakings arise prior to finalization of
this proposed rule that impact the
changes proposed herein, the
Department intends to identify and
explain the projected impact that this
proposed rule, if finalized, would have
on EOIR’s operations in conjunction
with those future rules in order to give
the public notice of the projected
intersection between related rulemaking
efforts and the opportunity to comment,
where appropriate.
The Department does not anticipate
that the comment period for this
proposed rule will overlap or coincide
with other rules, Attorney General
decisions, or Board decisions that
would affect the effect of the regulatory
changes proposed by this NPRM. The
Department invites the public to submit
comments during the 60-day comment
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period regarding anticipated interaction
with related rules.48 For further
information, the Department notes the
most recent publication of the Unified
Agenda outlining the Department’s
anticipated rulemaking activity through
spring 2024. See Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Spring 2023
Unified Agenda of Regulatory and
Deregulatory Actions, https://
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaMain.
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B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Department has reviewed this
NPRM in accordance with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
605(b)) and certifies that this NPRM will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. The proposed rule will not
regulate ‘‘small entities,’’ as that term is
defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(6). In the main,
this proposed rule reverses the
amendments made by the AA96 Final
Rule and restores and expands on
previously existing authorities exercised
by EOIR adjudicators and processes
governing appeals filed with the Board.
Accordingly, this proposed rule
regulates the conduct of immigration
proceedings before EOIR and therefore
may have a direct impact on noncitizens
in such proceedings. The proposed rule
may indirectly affect resources or
business operations for legal providers
representing noncitizens in proceedings
before EOIR, but the proposed rule
imposes no mandates or requirements
on such entities and, therefore, the
Department believes that the proposed
rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Moreover, the
Department believes it is unlikely that
48 The Department recognizes that litigation is
pending for many of the rules noted by the court
in Centro Legal de la Raza. 524 F. Supp. 3d at 959–
62. As provided in the Department’s Unified
Agenda submission, the Department anticipates
modifying or rescinding the following rules
identified by the court: Executive Office for
Immigration Review; Fee Review, 85 FR 82750
(Dec. 18, 2020); Procedures for Asylum and
Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and
Reasonable Fear Review, 85 FR 80274 (Dec. 11,
2020); and Procedures for Asylum and Withholding
of Removal, 85 FR 81698 (Dec. 16, 2020). Further,
rescission of the AA96 Final Rule addresses the
court’s concerns with the interactions of two other
proposed rules—Motions to Reopen and
Reconsider; Effect of Departure; Stay of Removal, 85
FR 75942 (Nov. 27, 2020), and Good Cause for a
Continuance in Immigration Proceedings, 85 FR
75925 (Nov. 27, 2020). Specifically, the court was
concerned that the Department’s responses in the
AA96 Final Rule to various comments relied on
regulatory provisions that it later proposed to
amend. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d
at 959–62. Publishing this new NPRM, which
proposes to rescind the AA96 Final Rule,
containing the responses causing concern, thereby
eliminates such concerns.
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small entities, including legal service
providers, have changed their practices
since the AA96 Final Rule was
enjoined, thus further minimizing the
proposed rule’s impact on small
entities. The AA96 Final Rule was
enjoined soon after becoming effective.
Thus, the pre-AA96 Final Rule status
quo has been in effect since the
injunction. Given that the proposed rule
generally adopts the pre-AA96 Final
Rule status quo—the framework that is
currently in place—with only a few
alterations, the Department does not
expect the changes proposed by this
NPRM to have a significant impact on
any small entities, as it is unlikely to
require any significant change in
operations to accommodate the changes
proposed herein.
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
This proposed rule would not result
in the expenditure by State, local, and
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or
by the private sector, of $100 million or
more in any one year (adjusted annually
for inflation), and it will not
significantly or uniquely affect small
governments. Therefore, no actions were
deemed necessary under the provisions
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995. See 2 U.S.C. 1532(a).
D. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review), Executive Order
13563 (Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review), and Executive
Order 14094 (Modernizing Regulatory
Review)
The Department has determined that
this proposed rule is a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ under section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866, as amended.
Accordingly, this proposed rule has
been submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget for review.
The Department certifies that this
proposed rule has been drafted in
accordance with the principles of
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order
13563, and Executive Order 14094,
Modernizing Regulatory Review, 88 FR
21879 (Apr. 6, 2023). Executive Orders
12866, 13563, and 14094 direct agencies
to assess the costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select
regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health,
and safety effects, distributive impacts,
and equity). Executive Order 13563
emphasizes the importance of
quantifying both costs and benefits,
reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and
promoting flexibility.
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Overall, the Department believes that
the changes proposed in this NPRM will
provide significant benefits to
adjudicators, the parties, and the
broader public, which outweigh the
potential costs.
For example, the proposed rule’s
provisions for the exercise of
administrative closure, termination, and
dismissal authority strike a balance
between providing sufficient guidance
for adjudicators and regulated parties
while, at the same time, preserving
flexibility that will promote fairer, more
efficient, and more uniform case
processing and adjudication. Likewise,
eliminating projected inefficiencies that
could have resulted from
implementation of the AA96 standards,
including rescinding restrictions on sua
sponte authority for adjudicators to
reopen or reconsider cases, would
codify additional flexibility for
adjudicators, which could provide
significant benefits to noncitizens in
certain cases with exceptional
circumstances, as discussed above.
Further, reinstating Board remand
authority will also codify similar
flexibility for adjudicators, and is
expected to have efficiency benefits as
noted in the preamble above. The
Department believes that the costs of
these provisions mainly relate to any
necessary familiarization with the rule,
but such costs should be de minimis,
given that the AA96 Final Rule has
never been implemented and this NPRM
is proposing to codify the operative
status quo. Further, the NPRM is largely
either proposing to codify prior
longstanding regulatory provisions (sua
sponte authority, Board remand
authority) or longstanding case law
(administrative closure). On balance,
overall, the Department believes that the
fairness and efficiency benefits gained
by the aforementioned proposed
changes outweigh the potential de
minimis costs.
Similarly, many of the other proposed
changes, including to briefing
schedules, background check
procedures, Board adjudication
timelines, quality assurance
certification, forwarding of the record
on appeal, and the EOIR Director’s case
adjudication authority are largely
internal case-processing measures with
no measurable costs to the public.
Moreover, many of these provisions will
revert in large part to longstanding preAA96 Final Rule regulatory language,
with which adjudicators and the parties
should already be familiar.
Additionally, to the extent that any
provisions of the AA96 Final Rule are
retained, such as the background check
procedures allowing a case to be held at
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the Board pending a background check,
rather than remanded to the
immigration court, the Department
believes that such provisions will
provide efficiencies to the immigration
system, which will in turn benefit
adjudicators and the parties.
In sum, any changes contemplated by
the NPRM would not impact on the
public in a way that would render the
proposed rule in conflict with the
principles of Executive Orders 12866,
13563, and 14094.
The additions and revisions read as
follows:
PART 1001—DEFINITIONS
§ 1003.1 Organization, jurisdiction, and
powers of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
1. The authority citation for part 1001
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 8 U.S.C. 1101,
1103; Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135; Title
VII of Pub. L. 110–229.
2. Amend § 1001.1 by adding
paragraphs (gg) and (hh) to read as
follows:
■
§ 1001.1
F. Executive Order 12988—Civil Justice
Reform
This proposed rule meets the
applicable standards set forth in
sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive
Order 12988.
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 6 U.S.C. 521; 8
U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1154, 1155, 1158, 1182,
1226, 1229, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c, 1231,
1254a, 1255, 1324d, 1330, 1361, 1362; 28
U.S.C. 509, 510, 1746; sec. 2 Reorg. Plan No.
2 of 1950; 3 CFR, 1949–1953 Comp., p. 1002;
section 203 of Pub. L. 105–100, 111 Stat.
2196–200; sections 1506 and 1510 of Pub. L.
106–386, 114 Stat. 1527–29, 1531–32; section
1505 of Pub. L. 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763A–
326 to –328.
H. Congressional Review Act
This proposed rule is not a major rule
as defined by section 804 of the
Congressional Review Act. 5 U.S.C. 804.
List of Subjects
8 CFR Part 1001
Administrative practice and
procedure, Immigration.
8 CFR Part 1003
Administrative practice and
procedure, Immigration.
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proposes to amend 8 CFR parts 1001,
1003, 1239, and 1240 as follows:
E. Executive Order 13132—Federalism
This proposed rule would not have
substantial direct effects on the States,
on the relationship between the
National Government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with section 6 of Executive
Order 13132, it is determined that this
proposed rule does not have sufficient
federalism implications to warrant the
preparation of a federalism summary
impact statement.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
This NPRM does not propose new or
revisions to existing ‘‘collection[s] of
information’’ as that term is defined
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, Public Law 104–13, 109 Stat. 163,
44 U.S.C. chapter 35), and its
implementing regulations, 5 CFR part
1320.
8 CFR Part 1239
Administrative practice and
procedure, Aliens, Immigration.
8 CFR Part 1240
Administrative practice and
procedure, Aliens.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth
in the preamble, the Department
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Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(gg) The term noncitizen means any
person not a citizen or national of the
United States.
(hh) The term unaccompanied child
means, and is synonymous with, the
term ‘‘unaccompanied alien child,’’ as
defined in 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2).
PART 1003—EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW
3. The authority citation for part 1003
continues to read as follows:
■
4. Amend § 1003.0 by revising
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read as follows:
■
§ 1003.0
Review.
Executive Office for Immigration
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) The Director may not delegate the
authority assigned to the Director in
§ 1292.18 of this chapter and may not
delegate any other authority to
adjudicate cases arising under the Act or
regulations of this chapter unless
expressly authorized to do so.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 5. Amend § 1003.1 by:
■ a. Revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i)(E), (c),
(d)(1) introductory text, (d)(1)(ii),
(d)(3)(iii) and (iv);
■ b. Removing paragraph (d)(3)(v);
■ c. Revising paragraphs (d)(6)(ii) and
(iii), (d)(6)(v), (d)(7), (e) introductory
text, (e)(1) through (3), (e)(4)(i)
introductory text, (e)(4)(ii), (e)(7), (e)(8)
introductory text, (e)(8)(i) through (iii),
and (v), and (f);
■ d. Removing and reserving paragraph
(k); and
■ e. Adding paragraphs (l) and (m).
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(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) * * *
(E) Adjudicate cases as a Board
member, including the authority to
administratively close and recalendar
cases in accordance with paragraph (l)
of this section; and
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Jurisdiction by certification. The
Secretary, or any other duly authorized
officer of DHS, an immigration judge, or
the Board may in any case arising under
paragraph (b) of this section certify such
case to the Board for adjudication. The
Board, in its discretion, may review any
such case by certification without regard
to the provisions of § 1003.7 if it
determines that the parties have already
been given a fair opportunity to make
representations before the Board
regarding the case, including the
opportunity to request oral argument
and to submit a brief.
(d) * * *
(1) Generally. The Board shall
function as an appellate body charged
with the review of those administrative
adjudications under the Act that the
Attorney General may by regulation
assign to it. The Board shall resolve the
questions before it in a manner that is
timely, impartial, and consistent with
the Act and regulations. In addition, the
Board, through precedent decisions,
shall provide clear and uniform
guidance to DHS, the immigration
judges, and the general public on the
proper interpretation and
administration of the Act and its
implementing regulations.
*
*
*
*
*
(ii) Subject to the governing standards
set forth in paragraph (d)(1)(i) of this
section, Board members shall exercise
their independent judgment and
discretion in considering and
determining the cases coming before the
Board, and a panel or Board member to
whom a case is assigned may take any
action consistent with their authorities
under the Act and the regulations as
necessary or appropriate for the
disposition or alternative resolution of
the case. Such actions include
administrative closure, termination of
proceedings, and dismissal of
proceedings. The standards for the
administrative closure, dismissal, and
termination of cases are set forth in
paragraph (l) of this section, 8 CFR
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1239.2(c), and paragraph (m) of this
section, respectively.
*
*
*
*
*
(3) * * *
(iii) The Board may review de novo
all questions arising in appeals from
decisions issued by DHS officers.
(iv) Except for taking administrative
notice of commonly known facts such as
current events or the contents of official
documents, the Board will not engage in
factfinding in the course of deciding
cases. A party asserting that the Board
cannot properly resolve an appeal
without further factfinding must file a
motion for remand. If new evidence is
submitted on appeal, that submission
may be deemed a motion to remand and
considered accordingly. If further
factfinding is needed in a particular
case, the Board may remand the
proceeding to the immigration judge or,
as appropriate, to DHS.
*
*
*
*
*
(6) * * *
(ii) Except as provided in paragraph
(d)(6)(iv) of this section, if identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations
or examinations are necessary in order
to adjudicate the appeal or motion, the
Board will provide notice to both parties
that the case is being placed on hold
until such time as all identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations
or examinations are completed or
updated and the results have been
reported to the Board. The Board’s
notice will notify the noncitizen that
DHS will contact the noncitizen with
instructions, consistent with
§ 1003.47(d), to take any additional
steps necessary to complete or update
the identity, law enforcement, or
security investigations or examinations
only if DHS is unable to independently
update the necessary identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations
or examinations. The Board’s notice will
also advise the noncitizen of the
consequences for failing to comply with
the requirements of this section. DHS is
responsible for obtaining biometrics and
other biographical information to
complete or update the identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations
or examinations with respect to any
noncitizen in detention.
(iii) In any case placed on hold under
paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this section, DHS
shall report to the Board promptly when
the identity, law enforcement, or
security investigations or examinations
have been completed or updated. If DHS
obtains relevant information as a result
of the identity, law enforcement, or
security investigations or examinations,
or if the noncitizen fails to comply with
the necessary procedures for collecting
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biometrics or other biographical
information after receiving instructions
from DHS under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of
this section, DHS may move the Board
to remand the record to the immigration
judge for consideration of whether, in
view of the new information, or the
noncitizen’s failure to comply with the
necessary procedures for collecting
biometrics or other biographical
information after receiving instructions
from DHS under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of
this section, immigration relief or
protection should be denied, either on
grounds of ineligibility as a matter of
law or as a matter of discretion. If DHS
fails to report the results of timely
completed or updated identity, law
enforcement or security investigations
or examinations within 180 days from
the date of the Board’s notice under
paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this section, the
Board may continue to hold the case
under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this
section, as needed, or remand the case
to the immigration judge for further
proceedings under § 1003.47(h).
*
*
*
*
*
(v) The immigration relief or
protection described in § 1003.47(b) and
granted by the Board shall take effect as
provided in § 1003.47(i).
(7) * * *
(i) The decision of the Board shall be
final except in those cases reviewed by
the Attorney General in accordance with
paragraph (h) of this section. The Board
may return a case to DHS or an
immigration judge for such further
action as may be appropriate without
entering a final decision on the merits
of the case.
(ii) In cases involving voluntary
departure, the Board may issue an order
of voluntary departure under section
240B of the Act, with an alternate order
of removal, if the noncitizen requested
voluntary departure before an
immigration judge, the noncitizen’s
notice of appeal specified that the
noncitizen is appealing the immigration
judge’s denial of voluntary departure
and identified the specific factual and
legal findings that the noncitizen is
challenging, and the Board finds that
the noncitizen is otherwise eligible for
voluntary departure, as provided in 8
CFR 1240.26(k). In order to grant
voluntary departure, the Board must
find that all applicable statutory and
regulatory criteria have been met, based
on the record and within the scope of
its review authority on appeal, and that
the noncitizen merits voluntary
departure as a matter of discretion. If the
record does not contain sufficient
factual findings regarding eligibility for
voluntary departure, the Board may
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remand the decision to the immigration
judge for further factfinding.
(e) Case management system. The
Chairman shall establish a case
management system to screen all cases
and to manage the Board’s caseload.
Unless a case meets the standards for
assignment to a three-member panel
under paragraph (e)(6) of this section,
all cases shall be assigned to a single
Board member for disposition. The
Chairman, under the supervision of the
Director, shall be responsible for the
success of the case management system.
The Chairman shall designate, from
time to time, a screening panel
comprising a sufficient number of Board
members who are authorized, acting
alone, to adjudicate appeals as provided
in this paragraph (e). The provisions of
this paragraph (e) shall apply to all
cases before the Board, regardless of
whether they were initiated by filing a
Notice of Appeal, filing a motion, or
receipt of a remand from Federal court
or the Attorney General.
(1) Initial screening. All cases shall be
referred to the screening panel for
review. Appeals subject to summary
dismissal as provided in paragraph
(d)(2) of this section should be promptly
dismissed.
(2) Miscellaneous dispositions. A
single Board member may grant an
unopposed motion or a motion to
withdraw an appeal pending before the
Board. In addition, a single Board
member may adjudicate a DHS motion
to remand any appeal from the decision
of a DHS officer where DHS requests
that the matter be remanded to DHS for
further consideration of the appellant’s
arguments or evidence raised on appeal;
a case where remand is required
because of a defective or missing
transcript; and other procedural or
ministerial issues as provided by the
case management plan.
(3) Merits review. In any case that has
not been summarily dismissed, the case
management system shall arrange for
the prompt completion of the record of
proceeding and transcript, and the
issuance of a briefing schedule, as
appropriate. A single Board member
assigned under the case management
system shall determine the appeal on
the merits as provided in paragraph
(e)(4) or (5) of this section, unless the
Board member determines that the case
is appropriate for review and decision
by a three-member panel under the
standards of paragraph (e)(6) of this
section. The Board member may
summarily dismiss an appeal after
completion of the record of proceeding.
(4) * * *
(i) The Board member to whom a case
is assigned shall affirm the decision of
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the DHS officer or the immigration
judge without opinion if the Board
member determines that the result
reached in the decision under review
was correct; that any errors in the
decision under review were harmless or
nonmaterial; and that
*
*
*
*
*
(ii) If the Board member determines
that the decision should be affirmed
without opinion, the Board shall issue
an order that reads as follows: ‘‘The
Board affirms, without opinion, the
result of the decision below. The
decision below is, therefore, the final
agency determination. See 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(4).’’ An order affirming
without opinion issued under authority
of this provision shall not include
further explanation or reasoning. Such
an order approves the result reached in
the decision below; it does not
necessarily imply approval of all of the
reasoning of that decision but does
signify the Board’s conclusion that any
errors in the decision of the immigration
judge or DHS were harmless or
nonmaterial.
*
*
*
*
*
(7) Oral argument. When an appeal
has been taken, a request for oral
argument if desired shall be included in
the Notice of Appeal. A three-member
panel or the Board en banc may hear
oral argument, as a matter of discretion,
at such date and time as is established
under the Board’s case management
plan. Oral argument shall be held at the
offices of the Board unless the Deputy
Attorney General or the Attorney
General’s designee authorizes oral
argument to be held elsewhere. DHS
may be represented before the Board by
an officer or counsel of DHS designated
by DHS. No oral argument will be
allowed in a case that is assigned for
disposition by a single Board member.
(8) Timeliness. As provided under the
case management system, the Board
shall promptly enter orders of summary
dismissal, or other miscellaneous
dispositions, in appropriate cases
consistent with paragraph (e)(1) of this
section. In all other cases, after
completion of the record on appeal,
including any briefs, motions, or other
submissions on appeal, the Board
member or panel to which the case is
assigned shall issue a decision on the
merits as soon as practicable, with a
priority for cases or custody appeals
involving detained noncitizens.
(i) Except in exigent circumstances as
determined by the Chairman, or as
provided in paragraph (d)(6) of this
section, the Board shall dispose of all
cases assigned to a single Board member
within 90 days of completion of the
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record, or within 180 days after a case
is assigned to a three-member panel
(including any additional opinion by a
member of the panel).
(ii) In exigent circumstances, the
Chairman may grant an extension in
particular cases of up to 60 days as a
matter of discretion. Except as provided
in paragraph (e)(8)(iii) or (iv) of this
section, in those cases where the panel
is unable to issue a decision within the
established time limits, as extended, the
Chairman shall either self-assign the
case or assign the case to a Vice
Chairman for final decision within 14
days or shall refer the case to the
Attorney General for decision. If a
dissenting or concurring panel member
fails to complete the member’s opinion
by the end of the extension period, the
decision of the majority will be issued
without the separate opinion.
(iii) In rare circumstances, such as
when an impending decision by the
United States Supreme Court or a
United States Court of Appeals, or
impending Department regulatory
amendments, or an impending en banc
Board decision may substantially
determine the outcome of a case or
group of cases pending before the Board,
the Chairman may hold the case or cases
until such decision is rendered,
temporarily suspending the time limits
described in this paragraph (e)(8).
*
*
*
*
*
(v) The Chairman shall notify the
Director of EOIR and the Attorney
General if a Board member consistently
fails to meet the assigned deadlines for
the disposition of appeals, or otherwise
fails to adhere to the standards of the
case management system. The Chairman
shall also prepare a report assessing the
timeliness of the disposition of cases by
each Board member on an annual basis.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) Service of Board decisions. The
decision of the Board shall be in
writing. The Board shall transmit a copy
to DHS and serve a copy upon the
noncitizen or the noncitizen’s
representative, as provided in 8 CFR
part 1292.
*
*
*
*
*
(l) Administrative closure and
recalendaring. Administrative closure is
the temporary suspension of a case.
Administrative closure removes a case
from the Board’s docket until the case
is recalendared. Recalendaring places a
case back on the Board’s docket.
(1) Administrative closure before the
Board. Board members may, in the
exercise of discretion, administratively
close a case upon the motion of a party,
after applying the standard set forth at
paragraph (l)(3) of this section. The
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62277
administrative closure authority
described in this section is not limited
by the authority provided in any other
provisions in this chapter V that
separately authorize or require
administrative closure in certain
circumstances, including 8 CFR
214.15(l) and (p)(4), 1214.2(a), 1214.3,
1240.62(b), 1240.70(f) through(h),
1245.13, 1245.15(p)(4)(i), and
1245.21(c).
(2) Recalendaring before the Board. At
any time after a case has been
administratively closed under paragraph
(l)(1) of this section, the Board may, in
the exercise of discretion, recalendar the
case pursuant to a party’s motion to
recalendar. In deciding whether to grant
such a motion, the Board shall apply the
standard set forth at paragraph (l)(3) of
this section.
(3) Standard for administrative
closure and recalendaring. The Board
shall grant a motion to administratively
close or recalendar filed jointly by both
parties, or filed by one party where the
other party has affirmatively indicated
its non-opposition, unless the Board
articulates unusual, clearly identified,
and supported reasons for denying the
motion. In all other cases, in deciding
whether to administratively close or to
recalendar a case, the Board shall
consider the totality of the
circumstances, including as many of the
factors listed under paragraphs (l)(3)(i)
and (ii) of this section as are relevant to
the particular case. The Board may also
consider other factors where
appropriate. No single factor is
dispositive. Accordingly, the Board,
having considered the totality of the
circumstances, may grant a motion to
administratively close or to recalendar a
particular case over the objection of a
party. Although administrative closure
may be appropriate where a petition,
application, or other action is pending
outside of proceedings before the Board,
such a pending petition, application, or
other action is not required for a case to
be administratively closed.
(i) As the circumstances of the case
warrant, the factors relevant to a
decision to administratively close a case
include:
(A) The reason administrative closure
is sought;
(B) The basis for any opposition to
administrative closure;
(C) Any requirement that a case be
administratively closed in order for a
petition, application, or other action to
be filed with, or granted by, DHS;
(D) The likelihood the noncitizen will
succeed on any petition, application, or
other action that the noncitizen is
pursuing, or that the noncitizen states in
writing or on the record at a hearing that
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they plan to pursue, outside of
proceedings before the Board;
(E) The anticipated duration of the
administrative closure;
(F) The responsibility of either party,
if any, in contributing to any current or
anticipated delay; and
(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome
of the case.
(ii) As the circumstances of the case
warrant, the factors relevant to a
decision to recalendar a case include:
(A) The reason recalendaring is
sought;
(B) The basis for any opposition to
recalendaring;
(C) The length of time elapsed since
the case was administratively closed;
(D) If the case was administratively
closed to allow the noncitizen to file a
petition, application, or other action
outside of proceedings before the Board,
whether the noncitizen filed the
petition, application, or other action
and, if so, the length of time that
elapsed between when the case was
administratively closed and when the
noncitizen filed the petition,
application, or other action;
(E) If a petition, application, or other
action that was pending outside of
proceedings before the Board has been
adjudicated, the result of that
adjudication;
(F) If a petition, application, or other
action remains pending outside of
proceedings before the Board, the
likelihood the noncitizen will succeed
on that petition, application, or other
action; and
(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome
if the case is recalendared.
(m) Termination. The Board shall
have the authority to terminate cases
before it as set forth in paragraphs (m)(1)
and (2) of this section. A motion to
dismiss a case in removal proceedings
before the Board for a reason other than
authorized by 8 CFR 1239.2(c) shall be
deemed a motion to terminate under
paragraph (m)(1) of this section.
(1) Removal, deportation, and
exclusion proceedings—(i) Mandatory
termination. In removal, deportation,
and exclusion proceedings, the Board
shall terminate the case where at least
one of the requirements in paragraphs
(m)(1)(i)(A) through (G) of this section is
met.
(A) No charge of deportability,
inadmissibility, or excludability can be
sustained.
(B) Fundamentally fair proceedings
are not possible because the noncitizen
is mentally incompetent and adequate
safeguards are unavailable.
(C) The noncitizen has, since the
initiation of proceedings, obtained
United States citizenship.
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(D) The noncitizen has, since the
initiation of proceedings, obtained at
least one status listed in paragraphs
(m)(1)(i)(D)(1) through (4) of this
section, provided that the status has not
been revoked or terminated, and the
noncitizen would not have been
deportable, inadmissible, or excludable
as charged if the noncitizen had
obtained such status before the
initiation of proceedings.
(1) Lawful permanent resident status.
(2) Refugee status.
(3) Asylee status.
(4) Nonimmigrant status as defined in
section 101(a)(15)(S), (T), or (U) of the
Act.
(E) Termination is required under 8
CFR 1245.13(l).
(F) Termination is otherwise required
by law.
(G) The parties jointly filed a motion
to terminate, or one party filed a motion
to terminate and the other party
affirmatively indicated its nonopposition, unless the Board articulates
unusual, clearly identified, and
supported reasons for denying the
motion.
(ii) Discretionary termination. In
removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, the Board may, in the
exercise of discretion, terminate the case
where at least one of the requirements
listed in paragraphs (m)(1)(ii) (A)
through (G) of this section is met.
(A) An unaccompanied child, as
defined in 8 CFR 1001.1(hh), states an
intent in writing or on the record at a
hearing to seek asylum with USCIS, and
USCIS has initial jurisdiction over the
application pursuant to section
208(b)(3)(C) of the Act.
(B) The noncitizen demonstrates
prima facie eligibility for relief from
removal or for a lawful status based on
a petition, application, or other action
that USCIS has jurisdiction to
adjudicate, including naturalization or
adjustment of status.
(C) The noncitizen is a beneficiary of
Temporary Protected Status, deferred
action, or Deferred Enforced Departure.
(D) USCIS has granted the
noncitizen’s application for a
provisional unlawful presence waiver
pursuant to 8 CFR 212.7(e).
(E) Termination is authorized by 8
CFR 1216.4(a)(6) or 1238.1(e).
(F) The parties have filed a motion to
terminate under 8 CFR 214.11(d)(1)(i) or
214.14(c)(1)(i).
(G) Due to circumstances comparable
to those described in paragraphs
(m)(1)(ii)(A) through (F) of this section,
termination is similarly necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or
alternative resolution of the case.
However, the Board may not terminate
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a case for purely humanitarian reasons,
unless DHS expressly consents to such
termination, joins in a motion to
terminate, or affirmatively indicates its
non-opposition to a noncitizen’s
motion.
(2) Other proceedings—(i) Mandatory
termination. In proceedings other than
removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, the Board shall terminate
the case where the parties have jointly
filed a motion to terminate, or one party
has filed a motion to terminate and the
other party has affirmatively indicated
its non-opposition, unless the Board
articulates unusual, clearly identified,
and supported reasons for denying the
motion. In addition, the Board shall
terminate such a case where required by
law.
(ii) Discretionary termination. In
proceedings other than removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings,
the Board may, in the exercise of
discretion, terminate the case where one
party has requested termination, and
terminating the case is necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or
alternative resolution of the case.
However, the Board may not terminate
the case for purely humanitarian
reasons, unless DHS expressly consents
to such termination, joins in a motion to
terminate, or affirmatively indicates its
non-opposition to a noncitizen’s
motion.
(iii) Limitation on Termination.
Nothing in paragraphs (m)(2)(i) and (ii)
of this section authorizes the Board to
terminate a case where prohibited by
another regulatory provision.
■ 6. Amend § 1003.2 by:
■ a. Revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(1);
■ b. Removing the words ‘‘Immigration
Judge’’ and adding in their place
‘‘immigration judge’’ in paragraph (c)(2);
■ c. Revising paragraphs (c)(3)(iii) and
(iv);
■ d. Removing paragraphs (c)(3)(v)
through (vii);
■ e. Adding paragraph (c)(4); and
■ f. Revising paragraphs (f), (g)(3), and
(i).
The revisions and addition read as
follows:
§ 1003.2 Reopening or reconsideration
before the Board of Immigration Appeals.
(a) General. The Board may at any
time reopen or reconsider on its own
motion any case in which it has
rendered a decision. A request by DHS
or by the party affected by the decision
to reopen or reconsider a case the Board
has decided must be in the form of a
written motion to the Board. The
decision to grant or deny a motion to
reopen or reconsider is within the
discretion of the Board, subject to the
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restrictions of this section. The Board
has discretion to deny a motion to
reopen even if the moving party has
made out a prima facie case for relief.
(b) * * *
(1) A motion to reconsider shall state
the reasons for the motion by specifying
the errors of fact or law in the prior
Board decision and shall be supported
by pertinent authority. When a motion
to reconsider the decision of an
immigration judge or of a DHS officer is
pending at the time an appeal is filed
with the Board, or when such motion is
filed subsequent to the filing with the
Board of an appeal from the decision
sought to be reconsidered, the motion
may be deemed a motion to remand the
decision for further proceedings before
the immigration judge or the DHS
officer from whose decision the appeal
was taken. Such motion may be
consolidated with and considered by
the Board in connection with the appeal
to the Board.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(iii) Agreed upon by all parties and
jointly filed. Notwithstanding such
agreement, the parties may contest the
issues in a reopened proceeding; or
(iv) Filed by DHS in exclusion or
deportation proceedings when the basis
of the motion is fraud in the original
proceeding or a crime that would
support termination of asylum in
accordance with 8 CFR 1208.24.
(4) A motion to reopen a decision
rendered by an immigration judge or
DHS officer that is pending when an
appeal is filed, or that is filed while an
appeal is pending before the Board, may
be deemed a motion to remand for
further proceedings before the
immigration judge or the DHS officer
from whose decision the appeal was
taken. Such motion may be consolidated
with, and considered by the Board in
connection with, the appeal to the
Board.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) Stay of deportation. Except where
a motion is filed pursuant to the
provisions of § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) and
(b)(4)(iii)(A), the filing of a motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall
not stay the execution of any decision
made in the case. Execution of such
decision shall proceed unless a stay of
execution is specifically granted by the
Board, the immigration judge, or an
authorized DHS officer.
(g) * * *
(3) Briefs and response. The moving
party may file a brief if it is included
with the motion. If the motion is filed
directly with the Board pursuant to
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paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this section, the
opposing party shall have 21 days from
the date of service of the motion to file
a brief in opposition to the motion
directly with the Board. If the motion is
filed with a DHS office pursuant to
paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this section, the
opposing party shall have 21 days from
the date of filing of the motion to file a
brief in opposition to the motion
directly with DHS. In all cases, briefs
and any other filings made in
conjunction with a motion shall include
proof of service on the opposing party.
The Board, in its discretion, may extend
the time within which such brief is to
be submitted and may authorize the
filing of a brief directly with the Board.
A motion shall be deemed unopposed
unless a timely response is made. The
Board may, in its discretion, consider a
brief filed out of time.
*
*
*
*
*
(i) Ruling on motion. Rulings upon
motions to reopen or motions to
reconsider shall be by written order.
Any motion for reconsideration or
reopening of a decision issued by a
single Board member will be referred to
the screening panel for disposition by a
single Board member, unless the
screening panel member determines, in
the exercise of judgment, that the
motion for reconsideration or reopening
should be assigned to a three-member
panel under the standards of
§ 1003.1(e)(6). If the order directs a
reopening and further proceedings are
necessary, the record shall be returned
to the Immigration Court or the DHS
officer having administrative control
over the place where the reopened
proceedings are to be conducted. If the
motion to reconsider is granted, the
decision upon such reconsideration
shall affirm, modify, or reverse the
original decision made in the case.
■ 7. Amend § 1003.3 by revising
paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) to read as
follows:
§ 1003.3
Notice of appeal.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) Appeal from decision of an
immigration judge. Briefs in support of
or in opposition to an appeal from a
decision of an immigration judge shall
be filed directly with the Board. In those
cases that are transcribed, the briefing
schedule shall be set by the Board after
the transcript is available. In cases
involving noncitizens in custody, the
parties shall be provided 21 days in
which to file simultaneous briefs unless
a shorter period is specified by the
Board. Reply briefs shall be permitted
only by leave of the Board and only if
filed within 21 days of the deadline for
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the initial briefs. In cases involving
noncitizens who are not in custody, the
appellant shall be provided 21 days in
which to file a brief, unless a shorter
period is specified by the Board. The
appellee shall have the same period of
time in which to file a reply brief that
was initially granted to the appellant to
file their brief. The time to file a reply
brief commences from the date upon
which the appellant’s brief was due, as
originally set or extended by the Board.
The Board, upon written motion, may
extend the period for filing a brief or a
reply brief for up to 90 days for good
cause shown. In its discretion, the Board
may consider a brief that has been filed
out of time. In its discretion, the Board
may request supplemental briefing from
the parties after the expiration of the
briefing deadline. All briefs, filings, and
motions filed in conjunction with an
appeal shall include proof of service on
the opposing party.
(2) Appeal from decision of a DHS
officer. Briefs in support of or in
opposition to an appeal from a decision
of a DHS officer shall be filed directly
with DHS in accordance with the
instructions in the decision of the DHS
officer. The applicant or petitioner and
DHS shall be provided 21 days in which
to file a brief, unless a shorter period is
specified by the DHS officer from whose
decision the appeal is taken, and reply
briefs shall be permitted only by leave
of the Board. Upon written request of
the noncitizen, the DHS officer from
whose decision the appeal is taken or
the Board may extend the period for
filing a brief for good cause shown. The
Board may authorize the filing of briefs
directly with the Board. In its
discretion, the Board may consider a
brief that has been filed out of time. All
briefs and other documents filed in
conjunction with an appeal, unless filed
by a noncitizen directly with a DHS
office, shall include proof of service on
the opposing party.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 8. Revise § 1003.5 to read as follows:
§ 1003.5
Forwarding of record on appeal.
(a) Appeal from decision of an
immigration judge. If an appeal is taken
from a decision of an immigration judge,
the record of proceeding shall be
promptly forwarded to the Board upon
the request or the order of the Board.
Where transcription of an oral decision
is required, the immigration judge shall
review the transcript and approve the
decision within 14 days of receipt, or
within 7 days after the immigration
judge returns to their duty station if the
immigration judge was on leave or
detailed to another location. The
Chairman and the Chief Immigration
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Judge shall determine the most effective
and expeditious way to transcribe
proceedings before the immigration
judges, and shall take such steps as
necessary to reduce the time required to
produce transcripts of those proceedings
and to ensure their quality.
(b) Appeal from decision of a DHS
officer. If an appeal is taken from a
decision of a DHS officer, the record of
proceeding shall be forwarded to the
Board by the DHS officer promptly upon
receipt of the briefs of the parties, or
upon expiration of the time allowed for
the submission of such briefs. A DHS
officer need not forward such an appeal
to the Board, but may reopen and
reconsider any decision made by the
officer if the new decision will grant the
benefit that has been requested in the
appeal. The new decision must be
served on the appealing party within 45
days of receipt of any briefs or upon
expiration of the time allowed for the
submission of any briefs. If the new
decision is not served within these time
limits or the appealing party does not
agree that the new decision disposes of
the matter, the record of proceeding
shall be immediately forwarded to the
Board.
§ 1003.7
[Amended].
9. Amend § 1003.7 by:
a. Removing the words ‘‘Immigration
Judge’’ and adding in their place the
words ‘‘immigration judge’’ wherever
they appear; and
■ b. Removing the word ‘‘Service’’ and
the words ‘‘the Service’’ and adding in
their place the word ‘‘DHS’’ wherever
they appear.
■ 10. Amend § 1003.9 by revising
paragraph (b)(5) to read as follows:
■
■
§ 1003.9
Judge.
Office of the Chief Immigration
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*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(5) Adjudicate cases as an
immigration judge, including the
authority to administratively close and
recalendar cases in accordance with
§ 1003.18(c); and
*
*
*
*
*
■ 11. Amend § 1003.10 in paragraph (b)
by:
■ a. Revising the second sentence;
■ b. Adding two sentences following the
second sentence;
■ c. Revising the newly redesignated
fifth sentence; and
■ d. Removing the newly redesignated
eight and ninth sentences.
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
§ 1003.10
*
*
Immigration judges.
*
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*
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(b) * * * In deciding the individual
cases before them, and subject to the
applicable governing standards set forth
in paragraph (d) of this section,
immigration judges shall exercise their
independent judgment and discretion
and may take any action consistent with
their authorities under the Act and
regulations that is necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or
alternative resolution of such cases.
Such actions include administrative
closure, termination of proceedings, and
dismissal of proceedings. The standards
for the administrative closure,
dismissal, and termination of cases are
set forth in § 1003.18(c), 8 CFR
1239.2(c), and § 1003.18(d),
respectively. Immigration judges shall
administer oaths, receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine
noncitizens and any witnesses. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
■ 12. Amend § 1003.18 by revising the
section heading, adding paragraph
headings to paragraphs (a) and (b), and
adding paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as
follows:
§ 1003.18
Docket management.
(a) Scheduling. * * *
(b) Notice. * * *
(c) Administrative closure and
recalendaring. Administrative closure is
the temporary suspension of a case.
Administrative closure removes a case
from the immigration court’s active
calendar until the case is recalendared.
Recalendaring places a case back on the
immigration court’s active calendar.
(1) Administrative closure before
immigration judges. An immigration
judge may, in the exercise of discretion,
administratively close a case upon the
motion of a party, after applying the
standard set forth at paragraph (c)(3) of
this section. The administrative closure
authority described in this section is not
limited by the authority provided in any
other provisions in this chapter that
separately authorize or require
administrative closure in certain
circumstances, including 8 CFR
214.15(l), and (p)(4), 1214.2(a), 1214.3,
1240.62(b), 1240.70(f) through (h),
1245.13, 1245.15(p)(4)(i), and
1245.21(c).
(2) Recalendaring before immigration
judges. At any time after a case has been
administratively closed under paragraph
(c)(1) of this section, an immigration
judge may, in the exercise of discretion,
recalendar the case pursuant to a party’s
motion to recalendar. In deciding
whether to grant such a motion, the
immigration judge shall apply the
standard set forth at paragraph (c)(3) of
this section.
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(3) Standard for administrative
closure and recalendaring. An
immigration judge shall grant a motion
to administratively close or recalendar
filed jointly by both parties, or filed by
one party where the other party has
affirmatively indicated its nonopposition, unless the immigration
judge articulates unusual, clearly
identified, and supported reasons for
denying the motion. In all other cases,
in deciding whether to administratively
close or to recalendar a case, an
immigration judge shall consider the
totality of the circumstances, including
as many of the factors listed under
paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (ii) of this
section as are relevant to the particular
case. The immigration judge may also
consider other factors where
appropriate. No single factor is
dispositive. Accordingly, the
immigration judge, having considered
the totality of the circumstances, may
grant a motion to administratively close
or to recalendar a particular case over
the objection of a party. Although
administrative closure may be
appropriate where a petition,
application, or other action is pending
outside of proceedings before the
immigration judge, such a pending
petition, application, or other action is
not required for a case to be
administratively closed.
(i) As the circumstances of the case
warrant, the factors relevant to a
decision to administratively close a case
include:
(A) The reason administrative closure
is sought;
(B) The basis for any opposition to
administrative closure;
(C) Any requirement that a case be
administratively closed in order for a
petition, application, or other action to
be filed with, or granted by, DHS;
(D) The likelihood the noncitizen will
succeed on any petition, application, or
other action that the noncitizen is
pursuing, or that the noncitizen states in
writing or on the record at a hearing that
they plan to pursue, outside of
proceedings before the immigration
judge;
(E) The anticipated duration of the
administrative closure;
(F) The responsibility of either party,
if any, in contributing to any current or
anticipated delay; and
(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome
of the case.
(ii) As the circumstances of the case
warrant, the factors relevant to a
decision to recalendar a case include:
(A) The reason recalendaring is
sought;
(B) The basis for any opposition to
recalendaring;
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(C) The length of time elapsed since
the case was administratively closed;
(D) If the case was administratively
closed to allow the noncitizen to file a
petition, application, or other action
outside of proceedings before the
immigration judge, whether the
noncitizen filed the petition,
application, or other action and, if so,
the length of time that elapsed between
when the case was administratively
closed and when the noncitizen filed
the petition, application, or other action;
(E) If a petition, application, or other
action that was pending outside of
proceedings before the immigration
judge has been adjudicated, the result of
that adjudication;
(F) If a petition, application, or other
action remains pending outside of
proceedings before the immigration
judge, the likelihood the noncitizen will
succeed on that petition, application, or
other action; and
(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome
if the case is recalendared.
(d) Termination. Immigration judges
shall have the authority to terminate
cases before them as set forth in
paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of this section.
A motion to dismiss a case in removal
proceedings before an immigration
judge for a reason other than authorized
by 8 CFR 1239.2(c) shall be deemed a
motion to terminate under paragraph
(d)(1) of this section.
(1) Removal, deportation, and
exclusion proceedings—(i) Mandatory
termination. In removal, deportation,
and exclusion proceedings, immigration
judges shall terminate the case where at
least one of the requirements in
paragraphs (d)(1)(i)(A) through (G) of
this section is met.
(A) No charge of deportability,
inadmissibility, or excludability can be
sustained.
(B) Fundamentally fair proceedings
are not possible because the noncitizen
is mentally incompetent and adequate
safeguards are unavailable.
(C) The noncitizen has, since the
initiation of proceedings, obtained
United States citizenship.
(D) The noncitizen has, since the
initiation of proceedings, obtained at
least one status listed in paragraphs
(d)(1)(i)(D)(1) through (4) of this section,
provided that the status has not been
revoked or terminated, and the
noncitizen would not have been
deportable, inadmissible, or excludable
as charged if the noncitizen had
obtained such status before the
initiation of proceedings.
(1) Lawful permanent resident status.
(2) Refugee status.
(3) Asylee status.
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(4) Nonimmigrant status as defined in
section 101(a)(15)(S), (T), or (U) of the
Act.
(E) Termination is required under 8
CFR 1245.13(l).
(F) Termination is otherwise required
by law.
(G) The parties jointly filed a motion
to terminate, or one party filed a motion
to terminate and the other party
affirmatively indicated its nonopposition, unless the immigration
judge articulates unusual, clearly
identified, and supported reasons for
denying the motion.
(ii) Discretionary termination. In
removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, immigration judges may,
in the exercise of discretion, terminate
the case where at least one of the
requirements listed in paragraphs
(d)(1)(ii)(A) through (G) of this section is
met.
(A) An unaccompanied child, as
defined in 8 CFR 1001.1(hh), states an
intent in writing or on the record at a
hearing to seek asylum with USCIS, and
USCIS has initial jurisdiction over the
application pursuant to section
208(b)(3)(C) of the Act.
(B) The noncitizen demonstrates
prima facie eligibility for relief from
removal or for a lawful status based on
a petition, application, or other action
that USCIS has jurisdiction to
adjudicate, including naturalization or
adjustment of status.
(C) The noncitizen is a beneficiary of
Temporary Protected Status, deferred
action, or Deferred Enforced Departure.
(D) USCIS has granted the
noncitizen’s application for a
provisional unlawful presence waiver
pursuant to 8 CFR 212.7(e).
(E) Termination is authorized by 8
CFR 1216.4(a)(6) or 1238.1(e).
(F) The parties have filed a motion to
terminate under 8 CFR 214.11(d)(1)(i) or
214.14(c)(1)(i).
(G) Due to circumstances comparable
to those described in paragraphs
(d)(1)(ii)(A) through (F) of this section,
termination is similarly necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or
alternative resolution of the case.
However, immigration judges may not
terminate a case for purely
humanitarian reasons, unless DHS
expressly consents to such termination,
joins in a motion to terminate, or
affirmatively indicates its nonopposition to a noncitizen’s motion.
(2) Other proceedings—(i) Mandatory
termination. In proceedings other than
removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, immigration judges shall
terminate the case where the parties
have jointly filed a motion to terminate,
or one party has filed a motion to
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terminate and the other party has
affirmatively indicated its nonopposition, unless the immigration
judge articulates unusual, clearly
identified, and supported reasons for
denying the motion. In addition,
immigration judges shall terminate such
a case where required by law.
(ii) Discretionary termination. In
proceedings other than removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings,
immigration judges may, in the exercise
of discretion, terminate the case where
one party has requested termination,
and terminating the case is necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or
alternative resolution of the case.
However, immigration judges may not
terminate a case for purely
humanitarian reasons, unless DHS
expressly consents to such termination,
joins in a motion to terminate, or
affirmatively indicates its nonopposition to a noncitizen’s motion.
(iii) Limitation on termination.
Nothing in paragraphs (d)(2)(i) and (ii)
of this section authorizes immigration
judges to terminate a case where
prohibited by another regulatory
provision.
■ 13. Amend § 1003.23 by:
■ a. Revising paragraph (a);
■ b. Revising the first sentence and
removing the second sentence of
paragraph (b)(1) introductory text;
■ c. In paragraph (b)(1), removing the
words ‘‘the Service’’ and adding in their
place the word ‘‘DHS’’, wherever they
appear;
■ d. Revising paragraphs (b)(1)(iii)
through (v), (b)(2) and (3), and (b)(4)(i)
and (ii);
■ e. In paragraph (b)(4)(iii)(B), removing
the words ‘‘Immigration Judge’’ and
adding in their place the words
‘‘immigration judge’’; and
■ f. Removing paragraphs (b)(4)(v) and
(vi).
The revisions read as follows:
§ 1003.23 Reopening or reconsideration
before the Immigration Court.
(a) Pre-decision motions. Unless
otherwise permitted by the immigration
judge, motions submitted prior to the
final order of an immigration judge shall
be in writing and shall state, with
particularity the grounds therefor, the
relief sought, and the jurisdiction. The
immigration judge may set and extend
time limits for the making of motions
and replies thereto. A motion shall be
deemed unopposed unless timely
response is made.
(b) * * *
(1) In general. An immigration judge
may upon the immigration judge’s own
motion at any time, or upon motion of
DHS or the noncitizen, reopen or
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reconsider any case in which the judge
has rendered a decision, unless
jurisdiction is vested with the Board of
Immigration Appeals. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
(iii) Assignment to an immigration
judge. If the immigration judge is
unavailable or unable to adjudicate the
motion to reopen or reconsider, the
Chief Immigration Judge or a delegate of
the Chief Immigration Judge shall
reassign such motion to another
immigration judge.
(iv) Replies to motions; decision. The
immigration judge may set and extend
time limits for replies to motions to
reopen or reconsider. A motion shall be
deemed unopposed unless timely
response is made. The decision to grant
or deny a motion to reopen or a motion
to reconsider is within the discretion of
the immigration judge.
(v) Stays. Except in cases involving in
absentia orders, the filing of a motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall
not stay the execution of any decision
made in the case. Execution of such
decision shall proceed unless a stay of
execution is specifically granted by the
immigration judge, the Board, or an
authorized DHS officer.
(2) Motion to reconsider. A motion to
reconsider shall state the reasons for the
motion by specifying the errors of fact
or law in the immigration judge’s prior
decision and shall be supported by
pertinent authority. Such motion may
not seek reconsideration of a decision
denying a previous motion to
reconsider.
(3) Motion to reopen. A motion to
reopen proceedings shall state the new
facts that will be proven at a hearing to
be held if the motion is granted and
shall be supported by affidavits and
other evidentiary material. Any motion
to reopen for the purpose of acting on
an application for relief must be
accompanied by the appropriate
application for relief and all supporting
documents. A motion to reopen will not
be granted unless the immigration judge
is satisfied that evidence sought to be
offered is material and was not available
and could not have been discovered or
presented at the former hearing. A
motion to reopen for the purpose of
providing the noncitizen an opportunity
to apply for any form of discretionary
relief will not be granted if it appears
that the noncitizen’s right to apply for
such relief was fully explained to them
by the immigration judge and an
opportunity to apply therefor was
afforded at the hearing, unless the relief
is sought on the basis of circumstances
that have arisen subsequent to the
hearing. Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1)
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of the Act, a motion to reopen
proceedings for consideration or further
consideration of an application for relief
under section 240A(a) of the Act
(cancellation of removal for certain
permanent residents) or 240A(b) of the
Act (cancellation of removal and
adjustment of status for certain
nonpermanent residents) may be
granted only upon demonstration that
the noncitizen was statutorily eligible
for such relief prior to the service of a
Notice to Appear, or prior to the
commission of an offense referred to in
section 212(a)(2) of the Act that renders
the noncitizen inadmissible or
removable under sections 237(a)(2) or
(a)(4) of the Act, whichever is earliest.
The immigration judge has discretion to
deny a motion to reopen even if the
moving party has established a prima
facie case for relief.
(4) * * *
(i) Asylum and withholding of
removal. The time and numerical
limitations set forth in paragraph (b)(1)
of this section shall not apply if the
basis of the motion is to apply for
asylum under section 208 of the Act or
withholding of removal under section
241(b)(3) of the Act or withholding of
removal under the Convention Against
Torture, and is based on changed
country conditions arising in the
country of nationality or the country to
which removal has been ordered, if such
evidence is material and was not
available and could not have been
discovered or presented at the previous
proceeding. The filing of a motion to
reopen under this section shall not
automatically stay the removal of the
noncitizen. However, the noncitizen
may request a stay and, if granted by the
immigration judge, the noncitizen shall
not be removed pending disposition of
the motion by the immigration judge. If
the original asylum application was
denied based upon a finding that it was
frivolous, then the noncitizen is
ineligible to file either a motion to
reopen or reconsider, or for a stay of
removal.
(ii) Order entered in absentia or in
removal proceedings. An order of
removal entered in absentia or in
removal proceedings pursuant to section
240(b)(5) of the Act may be rescinded
only upon a motion to reopen filed
within 180 days after the date of the
order of removal, if the noncitizen
demonstrates that the failure to appear
was because of exceptional
circumstances as defined in section
240(e)(1) of the Act. An order entered in
absentia pursuant to section 240(b)(5)
may be rescinded upon a motion to
reopen filed at any time upon the
noncitizen’s demonstration of lack of
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
notice in accordance with section
239(a)(1) or (2) of the Act, or upon the
noncitizen’s demonstration of the
noncitizen’s Federal or State custody
and the failure to appear was through no
fault of the noncitizen. However, in
accordance with section 240(b)(5)(B) of
the Act, no written notice of a change
in time or place of proceeding shall be
required if the noncitizen has failed to
provide the address required under
section 239(a)(1)(F) of the Act. The
filing of a motion under this paragraph
shall stay the removal of the noncitizen
pending disposition of the motion by
the immigration judge. A noncitizen
may file only one motion pursuant to
this paragraph (b)(4)(ii).
*
*
*
*
*
PART 1239—INITIATION OF REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
14. The authority citation for part
1239 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1221, 1229.
15. Amend § 1239.2 by:
a. Revising paragraph (b); and
b. Removing and reserving paragraph
(f).
The revisions read as follows:
■
■
■
§ 1239.2
Cancellation of notice to appear.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Ordering termination or dismissal.
After commencement of proceedings, an
immigration judge or Board member
shall have authority to resolve or
dispose of a case through an order of
dismissal or an order of termination. An
immigration judge or Board member
may enter an order of dismissal in cases
where DHS moves for dismissal
pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.
A motion to dismiss removal
proceedings for a reason other than
those authorized by paragraph (c) of this
section shall be deemed a motion to
terminate and adjudicated pursuant to 8
CFR 1003.1(m), pertaining to cases
before the Board, or 8 CFR 1003.18(d),
pertaining to cases before the
immigration court, as applicable.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 1240—PROCEEDINGS TO
DETERMINE REMOVABILITY OF
NONCITIZENS IN THE UNITED STATES
16. The authority citation for part
1240 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, 1182,
1186a, 1186b, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229a,
1229b, 1229c, 1252 note, 1361, 1362; secs.
202 and 203, Pub. L. 105–100 (111 Stat. 2160,
2193); sec. 902, Pub. L. 105–277 (112 Stat.
2681).
17. The heading for part 1240 is
revised to read as set forth above.
■
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18. Amend § 1240.26 by:
a. As shown in the following table,
removing the words in the left column
and adding in their place the words in
the right column wherever they appear:
■
■
An alien .....................
an alien .....................
the alien ....................
alien’s ........................
A noncitizen.
a noncitizen.
the noncitizen.
noncitizen’s.
b. By removing the words ‘‘his or her’’
and adding in their place the words ‘‘the
noncitizen’s’’ in paragraphs (b)(3)(i)
introductory text, (b)(3)(i)(A), (b)(4)(ii),
and (i);
■ c. By removing the words ‘‘his or her’’
and adding in their place the words ‘‘the
ICE Field Office Director’s’’ in
paragraph (c)(4); and
■ d. revising paragraphs (k)(1), (k)(2)
introductory text, (k)(3) introductory
text, (k)(4), and (l).
The revisions read as follows:
■
§ 1240.26 Voluntary departure—authority
of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review.
*
*
*
*
(k) * * *
(1) If the Board finds that an
immigration judge incorrectly denied a
noncitizen’s request for voluntary
departure or failed to provide
appropriate advisals, the Board may
consider the noncitizen’s request for
voluntary departure de novo and, if
warranted, may enter its own order of
voluntary departure with an alternate
order of removal.
(2) In cases in which a noncitizen has
appealed an immigration judge’s
decision or in which DHS and the
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noncitizen have both appealed an
immigration judge’s decision, the Board
shall not grant voluntary departure
under section 240B(a) of the Act unless:
*
*
*
*
*
(3) In cases in which DHS has
appealed an immigration judge’s
decision, the Board shall not grant
voluntary departure under section
240B(b) of the Act unless:
*
*
*
*
*
(4) The Board may impose such
conditions as it deems necessary to
ensure the noncitizen’s timely departure
from the United States, if supported by
the record on appeal and within the
scope of the Board’s authority on
appeal. Unless otherwise indicated in
this section, the Board shall advise the
noncitizen in writing of the conditions
set by the Board, consistent with the
conditions set forth in paragraphs (b),
(c), (d), (e), (h), and (i) of this section
(other than paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this
section), except that the Board shall
advise the noncitizen of the duty to post
the bond with the ICE Field Office
Director within 10 business days of the
Board’s order granting voluntary
departure. If documentation sufficient to
assure lawful entry into the country to
which the noncitizen is departing is not
contained in the record, but the
noncitizen continues to assert a request
for voluntary departure under section
240B of the Act and the Board finds that
the noncitizen is otherwise eligible for
voluntary departure under the Act, the
Board may grant voluntary departure for
a period not to exceed 120 days, subject
to the condition that the noncitizen
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62283
within 60 days must secure such
documentation and present it to DHS
and the Board. If the Board imposes
conditions beyond those specifically
enumerated, the Board shall advise the
noncitizen in writing of such
conditions. The noncitizen may accept
or decline the grant of voluntary
departure and may manifest a
declination either by written notice to
the Board, by failing to timely post any
required bond, or by otherwise failing to
comply with the Board’s order. The
grant of voluntary departure shall
automatically terminate upon a filing by
the noncitizen of a motion to reopen or
reconsider the Board’s decision, or by
filing a timely petition for review of the
Board’s decision. The noncitizen may
decline voluntary departure when
unwilling to accept the amount of the
bond or other conditions.
(l) Penalty for failure to depart. There
shall be a rebuttable presumption that
the civil penalty for failure to depart,
pursuant to section 240B(d)(1)(A) of the
Act, shall be set at $3,000 unless the
immigration judge or the Board
specifically orders a higher or lower
amount at the time of granting voluntary
departure within the permissible range
allowed by law. The immigration judge
or the Board shall advise the noncitizen
of the amount of this civil penalty at the
time of granting voluntary departure.
Dated: August 18, 2023.
Merrick B. Garland,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 2023–18199 Filed 9–7–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–30–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 173 (Friday, September 8, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 62242-62283]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-18199]
[[Page 62241]]
Vol. 88
Friday,
No. 173
September 8, 2023
Part III
Department of Justice
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Executive Office for Immigration Review
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8 CFR Parts 1001, 1003, 1239, et al.
Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration
Proceedings; Administrative Closure; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 173 / Friday, September 8, 2023 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 62242]]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Executive Office for Immigration Review
8 CFR Parts 1001, 1003, 1239, and 1240
[Docket No. EOIR 021-0410; AG Order No. 5738-2023]
RIN 1125-AB18
Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration
Proceedings; Administrative Closure
AGENCY: Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: In December 2020, the Department of Justice issued a final
rule (the ``AA96 Final Rule'') establishing novel limits on the
authority of immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals
(``BIA'' or ``Board'') to manage their dockets and efficiently dispose
of cases. Among other changes, the AA96 Final Rule would have required
the BIA to set simultaneous briefing schedules for every appeal,
limited the authority of immigration judges and the BIA to temporarily
pause cases while the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (``USCIS'') adjudicates a noncitizen's pending visa
application, and restricted the BIA's discretion to remand matters to
immigration judges in light of legal and factual errors. The AA96 Final
Rule was enjoined shortly after its issuance in March 2021, and it has
not been in effect since that date. After careful reconsideration, the
Department proposes to restore longstanding procedures in place prior
to the AA96 Final Rule, including administrative closure, and to
clarify and codify other established practices. Given the
aforementioned injunction, the proposed regulatory language largely
reflects the currently operative status quo. The Department believes
that this rule will promote the efficient and expeditious adjudication
of cases, afford immigration judges and the BIA flexibility to
efficiently allocate their limited resources, and protect due process
for parties before immigration judges and the BIA.
DATES: Electronic comments must be submitted, and written comments must
be postmarked or otherwise indicate a shipping date on or before
November 7, 2023. The electronic Federal Docket Management System at
www.regulations.gov will accept electronic comments until 11:59 p.m.
Eastern Time on that date.
ADDRESSES: If you wish to provide comments regarding this rulemaking,
you must submit comments, identified by the agency name and reference
RIN 1125-AB18 or EOIR Docket No. 021-0410, by one of the two methods
below.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: www.regulations.gov. Follow
the website instructions for submitting comments.
Mail: Paper comments that duplicate an electronic
submission are unnecessary. If you wish to submit a paper comment in
lieu of electronic submission, please direct the mail/shipment to:
Raechel Horowitz, Chief, Immigration Law Division, Office of Policy,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite
1800, Falls Church, VA 22041. To ensure proper handling, please
reference the agency name and RIN 1125-AB18 or EOIR Docket No. 021-0410
on your correspondence. Mailed items must be postmarked or otherwise
indicate a shipping date on or before the submission deadline.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Raechel Horowitz, Chief, Immigration
Law Division, Office of Policy, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1800, Falls Church, VA 22041,
telephone (703) 305-0289.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Public Participation
Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written data, views, or arguments on all aspects of this
proposed rule via one of the methods and by the deadline stated above.
The Department of Justice (``Department'') also invites comments that
relate to the economic, environmental, or federalism effects that might
result from this proposed rule. Comments that will provide the most
assistance to the Department in developing these procedures will
reference a specific portion of the proposed rule; explain the reason
for any recommended change; and include data, information, or authority
that support such recommended change.
Please note that all comments received are considered part of the
public record and made available for public inspection at
www.regulations.gov. Such information includes personally identifying
information (such as your name, address, etc.) voluntarily submitted by
the commenter.
If you want to submit personally identifying information (such as
your name, address, etc.) as part of your comment, but do not want it
to be posted online, you must include the phrase ``PERSONALLY
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph of your comment and
identify what information you want redacted.
If you want to submit confidential business information as part of
your comment, but do not want it to be posted online, you must include
the phrase ``CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph
of your comment. You also must prominently identify the confidential
business information to be redacted within the comment. If a comment
has so much confidential business information that it cannot be
effectively redacted, all or part of that comment may not be posted on
www.regulations.gov.
Personally identifying information located as set forth above will
be placed in the agency's public docket file, but not posted online.
Confidential business information identified and located as set forth
above will not be placed in the public docket file. The Department may
withhold from public viewing information provided in comments that it
determines may impact the privacy of an individual or is offensive. For
additional information, please read the Privacy Act notice that is
available via the link in the footer of www.regulations.gov. To inspect
the agency's public docket file in person, you must make an appointment
with the agency. Please see the For Further Information Contact
paragraph above for agency contact information.
II. Legal Authority
The Department issues this proposed rule pursuant to section 103(g)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (``INA''), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g), as
amended by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (``HSA''), Public Law 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135 (as amended). Under the HSA, the Attorney General
retains authority to ``establish such regulations, . . . issue such
instructions, review such administrative determinations in immigration
proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as
the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out'' the
Attorney General's authorities under the INA. HSA 1102, 116 Stat. at
2273-74; INA 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(2).
III. History and Background
On August 26, 2020, the Department published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (``NPRM'' or ``proposed
[[Page 62243]]
rule'') that proposed to amend the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (``EOIR'') regulations regarding the handling of appeals to the
Board. Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration
Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 85 FR 52491 (Aug. 26, 2020)
(``AA96 NPRM''). The Department proposed multiple changes to the
processing of appeals to ``ensure the consistency, efficiency, and
quality of its adjudications.'' Id. at 52491. In addition, the
Department proposed to amend the regulations to expressly state that
immigration judges and Appellate Immigration Judges \1\ have no
``freestanding'' authority to administratively close cases. Id.
Finally, the Department proposed to delete inapplicable or unnecessary
provisions regarding the forwarding of the record of proceeding on
appeal. Id.\2\ The AA96 NPRM set forth a 30-day comment period, stating
that any public comments must be submitted by September 25, 2020. Id.
The Department received 1,287 comments during the comment period.\3\
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\1\ Historically, Department rules, including the AA96 Final
Rule, used the term ``Board member'' to refer to members of the
Board. See Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in
Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 85 FR 81588, 81590
(Dec. 16, 2020). The Department has begun using the term ``Appellate
Immigration Judge'' to refer to members of the Board, and that is
the term used in this NPRM. Although ``Board member'' and
``Appellate Immigration Judge'' are synonymous, see 8 CFR
1003.1(a)(1)-(2), the Department believes that ``Appellate
Immigration Judge'' is a more accurate description of the role of
members of the Board. See Organization of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, 84 FR 44537, 44539 (issued as interim final
rule) (Aug. 26, 2019).
\2\ In addition, the Department proposed to update outdated
references to the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
(``INS''). 85 FR at 52507 n.36.
\3\ The Department posted 1,284 of the comments received for
public review. The Department did not post three of the comments
received because they were either non-substantive or duplicates of
other comments that were posted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 16, 2020, the Department published a final rule,
wherein it responded to comments received during the notice-and-comment
period and adopted the regulatory language proposed in the AA96 NPRM
with minor changes. Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in
Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 85 FR 81588 (Dec. 16,
2020) (``AA96 Final Rule''). The AA96 Final Rule's effective date was
January 15, 2021, id. at 81588, but the rule was enjoined on March 10,
2021, in litigation described in further detail below. See Centro Legal
de la Raza v. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., 524 F. Supp. 3d 919 (N.D.
Cal. 2021).
A. Briefing Schedule Changes at the Board of Immigration Appeals
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the regulations specified that
appeals involving detained noncitizens \4\ were subject to a
simultaneous briefing schedule, wherein both parties had 21 days to
file simultaneous briefs, unless the Board specified a shorter period.
8 CFR 1003.3(c)(1) (2019). The regulations permitted parties subject to
a simultaneous briefing schedule to submit reply briefs within 21 days
of the deadline for the initial brief, when permitted by the Board. Id.
For cases involving non-detained noncitizens, the regulations provided
for a consecutive briefing schedule. The appellant had 21 days to file
an initial brief, unless the Board specified a shorter period, and the
appellee then had an equivalent amount of time, including any
extensions granted to the appellant, to file a reply brief. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For purposes of the discussion in this preamble, the
Department uses the term ``noncitizen'' colloquially and synonymous
with the term ``alien'' as it is used in the INA. See INA 101(a)(3),
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(3). This NPRM is also proposing to define the term
``noncitizen'' to be synonymous with the term ``alien,'' as
explained later in this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appellate Immigration Judges were authorized, upon written motion,
to extend the filing deadline of an initial brief or a reply brief for
up to 90 days for good cause shown. Id. Appellate Immigration Judges
generally granted briefing extensions in 21-day increments but would
also grant longer extensions for good cause shown. The regulations also
authorized Appellate Immigration Judges to request supplemental
briefing from parties after the briefing deadline expired. Id.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule amended 8 CFR 1003.3(c)(1) to require a
simultaneous briefing schedule for all cases before the Board,
regardless of the noncitizen's detention status. 85 FR at 81588. The
AA96 Final Rule also reduced the allowable time to extend a briefing
schedule from a maximum of 90 days to a maximum of 14 days and limited
all parties to one briefing extension. Id. at 81654 (``If an extension
is granted, it is granted to both parties, and neither party may
request a further extension.''). The AA96 Final Rule specified that no
party was entitled to a briefing extension as a matter of right and
that briefing extensions should only be granted upon an
``individualized consideration of good cause.'' Id. The AA96 Final Rule
also shortened the maximum amount of time for submitting reply briefs
from 21 days to 14 days, and only when the Board permitted filing of a
reply brief. Id.
B. Administrative Closure Authority
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2019) and
1003.10(b) (2019) stated that EOIR adjudicators ``may take any action
consistent with their authorities under the [INA] and the regulations
as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition'' of the case.
Although the regulations have never explicitly stated that EOIR
adjudicators have general administrative closure authority, numerous
courts of appeals and the Board have interpreted ``any action'' to
include using docket management tools such as administrative closure.
See Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that
``[8 CFR] 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously confer[ ] upon
[immigration judges] and the BIA the general authority to
administratively close cases''); Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656,
667 n.6 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.) (concluding that ``[8 CFR]
1003.10(b) grants immigration judges the power to administratively
close cases''); Arcos Sanchez v. Att'y Gen., 997 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir.
2021) (explaining ``that the plain language establishes that general
administrative closure authority is unambiguously authorized by these
regulations''); Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 692 (BIA 2012)
(stating that EOIR adjudicators may utilize continuances or
administrative closure ``to temporarily remove a case from an
Immigration Judge's active calendar or from the Board's docket''). But
see Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2020)
(concluding that ``[8 CFR] 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d) do not delegate to
[immigration judges] or the Board the general authority to suspend
indefinitely immigration proceedings by administrative closure''
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland, 999 F.3d
986, 991-93 (6th Cir. 2021) (subsequently ruling that immigration
judges and the Board do have authority to grant administrative closure
to permit a noncitizen to apply for a provisional unlawful presence
waiver).
Since 1958, regulations have authorized EOIR adjudicators to
exercise their discretion as may be ``appropriate and necessary'' for
the disposition of a case. Miscellaneous Amendments to Chapter, 23 FR
2670,
[[Page 62244]]
2671 (Apr. 23, 1958) (``Subject to any specific limitation prescribed
by the act and this chapter, special inquiry officers shall also
exercise the discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney
General by the act as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition
of such cases.''); \5\ see also Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 464
(``As early as 1958, regulations granted the predecessors to
[immigration judges] (called `special inquiry officers') and the Board
authority to take actions `appropriate and necessary for the
disposition of' their cases.''). In 2000, the Department published an
NPRM that proposed more expansive authority: that EOIR adjudicators
could take ``any action'' appropriate and necessary for the disposition
of a case. See Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review, the Chairman of the Board of Immigration
Appeals, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 65 FR 81434, 81436-37 (Dec.
26, 2000). The Department adopted this regulatory language for Board
members in 2002, and for immigration judges in 2007.\6\
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\5\ Initially, the adjudicators who reviewed and decided
deportation cases were known as special inquiry officers. INA
101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(4) (1952). These adjudicators later
became known as immigration judges. See INA 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C.
1101(b)(4) (defining ``immigration judge''); Immigration Judge, 38
FR 8590 (Apr. 4, 1973) (``The term `immigration judge' means special
inquiry officer.'').
\6\ Although the same NPRM proposed this regulatory authority
for both the Board and immigration judges, the regulatory language
was codified for the Board and immigration judges in separate final
rules. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to
Improve Case Management, 67 FR 54877, 54902-904 (Aug. 26, 2002);
Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 FR 53673,
53677-78 (Sept. 20, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since at least the 1980s,\7\ immigration judges and the Board have
exercised their authority to use administrative closure as a docketing
tool, where appropriate, to remove cases from their active dockets and
to regulate the course of proceedings. See Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at
116-17 (recognizing that adjudicators have used administrative closure
dating back to the 1980s).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Indeed, EOIR records indicate that administrative closure
was used as early as 1974.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1984, the EOIR Office of the Chief Immigration Judge issued an
Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum (``OPPM'') setting forth
options available to immigration judges in cases where noncitizens
failed to appear for their hearings, including the option to
administratively close cases. EOIR, OPPM 84-2: Cases in Which
Respondents/Applicants Fail to Appear for Hearing, 1984 WL 582760 (Mar.
7, 1984). The OPPM included language specifying that administratively
closed cases were to be considered ``no longer pending before the
Immigration Judge,'' and that no further action would be taken until
``the case is presented for re-calendaring and further proceedings.''
Id. at *2. The OPPM provided a non-exhaustive list of factors for
immigration judges to consider such as adequacy of notice; likelihood
that a deportation order, if entered in absentia, would be enforced;
the nature of charges; and the need for parties to be present. Id. at
*1.
The next significant development in the exercise of administrative
closure came in 1986, shortly after President Reagan signed into law
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Public Law 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359. The Immigration Reform and Control Act created a pathway to
lawful status for certain undocumented noncitizens who had entered the
United States prior to January 1, 1982. Immigration judges used
administrative closure to pause removal proceedings while noncitizens
pursued this newly available pathway to lawful status. See, e.g., Veliz
v. Caplinger, No. 96-1508, 1997 WL 61456, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 12,
1997) (noting that the removal proceedings before the agency were
administratively closed to allow noncitizens to apply for legalization
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act).
As administrative closure became more common, the Board began to
address questions related to its use. For example, in 1988, the Board
published a decision in which it determined that an immigration judge
improperly exercised administrative closure authority. Matter of Amico,
19 I&N Dec. 652, 654 (BIA 1988) (determining that the immigration
judge's decision to administratively close a case rather than hold
proceedings in absentia was ``inappropriate'' because administrative
closure would have permitted the noncitizen to avoid an order of
deportation by failing to appear). In its decision, the Board clarified
that administratively closing a case ``does not result in a final
order'' and ``is merely an administrative convenience which allows the
removal of cases from the calendar in appropriate situations.'' Id. at
654 n.1. In 1990, the Board published Matter of Lopez-Barrios and
Matter of Munoz-Santos, both of which held that an immigration judge
could not administratively close a case if either party to the
proceedings opposed closure. Matter of Lopez-Barrios, 20 I&N Dec. 203
(BIA 1990), overruled by Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 697;
Matter of Munoz-Santos, 20 I&N Dec. 205 (BIA 1990), overruled by Matter
of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 697.\8\
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\8\ These decisions did not suggest that adjudicators did not
have the authority to administratively close cases. Rather, they, as
well as numerous subsequent administrative decisions, addressed when
using administrative closure might be ``appropriate'' under the
regulations. See 8 CFR 236.1 (1958) (permitting adjudicators to
exercise authorities only as ``appropriate and necessary''); see
also 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2019); 8 CFR 1003.10(b) (2019).
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Over the next decade, the Department entered into binding
settlement agreements and issued numerous regulations that required
immigration judges and the Board to administratively close cases or
provided that parties could request administrative closure in a variety
of specified situations. See, e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 243 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (``[I]f the [Respondent] fails to
appear for the scheduled hearing . . . the case shall be
administratively closed, following which, should the Respondent come
forward, the hearing shall be recalendared[.]''); American Baptist
Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 805 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(``ABC'') (ordering that proceedings before EOIR be administratively
closed, generally, for class members); Adjustment of Status for Certain
Nationals of Nicaragua and Cuba, 63 FR 27823, 27830 (May 21, 1998)
(implementing administrative closure procedures for noncitizens who
appeared eligible to adjust status under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act of 1997 (``NACARA'')) (8 CFR 245.13(d)(3)
(1999)); Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 64 FR
25756, 25769 (May 12, 1999) (requiring EOIR adjudicators to exercise
administrative closure in cases where noncitizens appeared to be
eligible to file an application for adjustment of status under the
Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 (``HRIFA'') and met
various other requirements) (8 CFR 245.15(p)(4) (2000)); Executive
Office for Immigration Review; Adjustment of Status for Certain
Nationals of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti, 66 FR 29449, 29452 (May 31,
2001) (providing that a noncitizen for whose case an immigration judge
or the Board has granted a motion to reopen under particular statutes
may move to have proceedings administratively closed to seek adjustment
of status) (8 CFR 245.13(m)(1)(ii) (2002)); V Nonimmigrant
Classification; Spouses and Children of Lawful Permanent Residents, 66
FR 46697, 46700 (Sept. 7, 2001) (``If the [noncitizen] appears eligible
for V nonimmigrant status, the
[[Page 62245]]
immigration judge or the Board, whichever has jurisdiction, shall
administratively close the proceeding or continue the motion
indefinitely.'') (8 CFR 214.15(l) (2002)); New Classification for
Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for
``T'' Nonimmigrant Status, 67 FR 4783, 4797 (Jan. 31, 2002) (stating
that T-visa applicants may request administrative closure) (codifying
language later moved to 8 CFR 1214.2(a)); Adjustment of Status for
Certain Aliens from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the United States,
67 FR 78667, 78673 (Dec. 26, 2002) (authorizing certain nationals of
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to move for administrative closure pending
their applications for adjustment of status, but preventing the
immigration judge or the Board from ``defer[ring] or dismiss[ing] the
proceeding'' without the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service's consent) (codifying language later moved to 8 CFR
1245.21(c)).
Since 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'') has
issued a number of enforcement priority memoranda, some of which have
subsequently been rescinded, that included discussions of when U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (``ICE'') attorneys should exercise
prosecutorial discretion in pursuing removal, which noncitizens were
considered priorities for removal, and methods for implementing those
priorities as to noncitizens who were already in removal proceedings,
including by filing joint motions to administratively close
proceedings. See, e.g., Memorandum for All Field Office Directors et
al., from John Morton, Director, ICE, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities
of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens at
2 (Jun. 17, 2011) (describing prosecutorial discretion as a decision
``not to assert the full scope of the enforcement authority available
to the agency''), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum for Tae D. Johnson,
Acting Director, ICE, from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary, DHS,
Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (Sept. 30,
2021), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/guidelines-civilimmigrationlaw.pdf.
Many pending removal-related cases before EOIR and the federal
courts at the time potentially fell under the memoranda's criteria for
low priorities for removal. Cf. In re Immigr. Petitions for Rev.
Pending in U.S. Ct. of Appeals for Second Cir., 702 F.3d 160, 160 (2d
Cir. 2012) (``[The petitioner] is one of more than a thousand cases in
our Court that are actually or potentially subject to a future decision
by the Government as to whether it will or can remove petitioners if
their petitions are denied.''). The use of administrative closure
served to facilitate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by
allowing DHS counsel to request that certain low-priority cases be
removed from immigration judges' active calendars and the Board's
docket, thereby allowing adjudicators to focus on higher priority
cases.
In 2012, the Board published Matter of Avetisyan, which overruled
the Board's prior precedent in Matter of Lopez-Barrios and Matter of
Munoz-Santos. In Matter of Avetisyan, the Board established that EOIR
adjudicators could administratively close proceedings over a party's
objection and set forth a list of factors that adjudicators should
consider when determining whether administrative closure was
appropriate.\9\ 25 I&N Dec. at 688. In so holding, the Board stated
that EOIR adjudicators' authority to administratively close proceedings
stemmed from their general regulatory authority, under 8 CFR 1003.10(b)
and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), to take any appropriate and necessary action. Id.
at 691. The Board found that an EOIR adjudicator's determination to
administratively close a case over DHS's objection would not undermine
DHS's prosecutorial discretion, as prosecutorial discretion related to
DHS's decision to commence removal proceedings. Id. at 694. In
contrast, the Board determined that once jurisdiction over removal
proceedings vests with EOIR, the EOIR adjudicator has the authority to
regulate the course of proceedings, including to administratively close
cases where appropriate. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Notably, before Matter of Avetisyan overruled the Board's
prior precedent on this issue, the Board had encouraged DHS to
consider moving for administrative closure rather than multiple
continuances in ``appropriate circumstances, such as where there is
a pending prima facie approvable visa petition.'' Matter of Hashmi,
24 I&N Dec. 785, 791 n.4 (BIA 2009); see also Matter of Rajah, 25
I&N Dec. 127, 135 n.10 (BIA 2009). The Board described
administrative closure as ``an attractive option in these
situations, as it will assist in ensuring that only those cases that
are likely to be resolved are before the Immigration Judge.'' Matter
of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791 n.4. The Board also noted that
administrative closure could ``avoid the repeated rescheduling of a
case that is clearly not ready to be concluded.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Board also explained that EOIR adjudicators should
independently weigh all relevant factors in determining whether to
administratively close a case, including but not limited to:
(1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis
for any opposition to administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the
respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other
action [the respondent] is pursuing outside of removal proceedings;
(4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5) the responsibility
of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or
anticipated delay; and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal
proceedings (for example, termination of the proceedings or entry of
a removal order) when the case is recalendared before the
Immigration Judge or the appeal is reinstated before the Board.
Id. at 696. The Board later held that ``the primary consideration
for an Immigration Judge in determining whether to administratively
close or recalendar proceedings is whether the party opposing
administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the case to
proceed and be resolved on the merits.'' Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec.
17, 20 (BIA 2017).
In 2013, DHS published a final rule that allowed certain
noncitizens in removal proceedings to apply for provisional unlawful
presence waivers of inadmissibility while still in the United States,
but only if their removal proceedings had been administratively closed
and not recalendared at the time they filed for the waiver. Provisional
Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate
Relatives, 78 FR 535, 577 (Jan. 3, 2013) (codifying language that was
later moved to 8 CFR 212.7(e)(4)(iii)).\10\ DHS further articulated
that administrative closure is an appropriate and common procedural
tool for dispensing with non-priority cases. Id. at 544 (``Under its
prosecutorial discretion (PD) policies, ICE has been reviewing cases
pending
[[Page 62246]]
before EOIR and all incoming cases to ensure that they are aligned with
the agency's civil enforcement priorities and that ICE is effectively
using its finite resources. For cases that ICE determines are not
enforcement priorities, it exercises its discretion where appropriate,
typically by moving for administrative closure.''). That same year, the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge encouraged immigration judges to
use administrative closure where the parties reached an ``alternate
case resolution'' through prosecutorial discretion. See EOIR, OPPM 13-
01: Continuances and Administrative Closure at 4 (Mar. 7, 2013)
(rescinded), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/08/13-01.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Pursuant to INA 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B),
noncitizens who are inadmissible because they accrued more than 180
days of unlawful presence while in the United States and
subsequently depart the United States may seek waiver of this ground
of inadmissibility. Prior to the DHS rulemaking, such noncitizens,
if not eligible to adjust status within the United States, had to
request a waiver at their consular interview after leaving the
United States and triggering the ground of inadmissibility. 78 FR at
536. In 2013, DHS established the provisional unlawful presence
waiver process. Id. It began allowing noncitizens who are immediate
relatives (spouses, children, and parents) of U.S. citizens to apply
for a waiver while remaining in the United States, and, upon
provisional approval, travel abroad to attend their consular
interview for an immigrant visa, thus mitigating the likelihood that
such individuals would be required to wait outside of the United
States, apart from their immediate relatives, while the waiver was
adjudicated. Id. In 2016, to further improve administrative
efficiency, DHS expanded the provisional unlawful presence waiver
process to all noncitizens statutorily eligible for an immigrant
visa and a waiver of inadmissibility based on unlawful presence in
the United States. Expansion of Provisional Unlawful Presence
Waivers of Inadmissibility, 81 FR 50244 (July 29, 2016).
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In 2017, the effectiveness of administrative closure for
streamlining EOIR's cases was briefly referenced in a study conducted
by an outside consultant. See EOIR, Booz Allen Hamilton, Legal Case
Study: Summary Report at 26 (Apr. 6, 2017) (recommending that the
Department engage in discussions with DHS to explore the development of
policies regarding administrative closure as one way to improve
processing efficiency).\11\
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\11\ The Department has considered the various proposals made in
the report. For example, in 2021, EOIR finalized a rule implementing
electronic filing at all immigration courts and the BIA. See Booz
Allen Hamilton, Legal Case Study: Summary Report at 23; Executive
Office for Immigration Review Electronic Case Access and Filing, 86
FR 70708 (Dec. 13, 2021) (``ECAS Rule'').
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In 2018, the longstanding practice of administrative closure
stopped when the Attorney General issued Matter of Castro-Tum,
overruling Matter of Avetisyan and all Board precedents inconsistent
with the Attorney General's decision. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec.
271, 271 (A.G. 2018), overruled by Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec.
326 (A.G. 2021). In Castro-Tum, the Attorney General held that EOIR
adjudicators lack the general authority under the regulations to
administratively close cases and, as a result, lack the authority to
administratively close cases unless a regulation or a settlement
agreement expressly provided such authority. Id. at 272.
Matter of Castro-Tum has been rejected by the majority of those
courts of appeals that have considered it. The Third, Fourth, and
Seventh Circuits rejected Matter of Castro-Tum, holding that the pre-
AA96 regulations unambiguously provide EOIR adjudicators with general
authority to administratively close cases. See Romero, 937 F.3d at 297
(concluding that 8 CFR 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) ``unambiguously
confer upon [immigration judges] and the BIA the general authority to
administratively close cases''); Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 122 (``[W]e
hold that the plain language establishes that general administrative
closure authority is unambiguously authorized by these regulations.'');
Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 667 n.6 (concluding that 8 CFR 1003.10(b)
``grants immigration judges the power to administratively close
cases''). The Sixth Circuit reached a different conclusion, finding
that the pre-AA96 regulations do not confer such general authority.
Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 466 (citing Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N
Dec. at 272). However, the Sixth Circuit subsequently clarified that
``administrative closure for the limited purpose of permitting
noncitizens to apply for provisional unlawful presence waivers'' was an
``appropriate and necessary'' act under 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and
1003.10(b), as codified prior to the AA96 Final Rule. Garcia-DeLeon,
999 F.3d 986 at 992-93.
Recently, the Second Circuit held that neither the immigration
judge nor the BIA abused its discretion in relying on Matter of Castro-
Tum--which was in effect at the time of the agency's adjudications--to
deny a noncitizen's motion for administrative closure. Garcia v.
Garland, 64 F.4th 62, 76 (2d Cir. 2023). The Second Circuit concluded
that the pre-AA96 regulations were ambiguous as to whether they
authorized general administrative closure and deferred to the Attorney
General's interpretation in Matter of Castro-Tum. See id. at 72-75.
However, the Second Circuit noted that--after the BIA issued its
decision in the case--the Attorney General issued Matter of Cruz-
Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at 326, which overruled Matter of Castro-Tum.
Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th at 69. In Cruz-Valdez, the Attorney General
explained that ``three courts of appeals have rejected Castro-Tum,''
that Castro-Tum ``departed from long-standing practice,'' and that the
matter was the subject of an ongoing rulemaking. See Matter of Cruz-
Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at 328-29 (directing EOIR adjudicators to continue
applying the standard for administrative closure set forth in Matter of
Avetisyan and Matter of W-Y-U-, except in jurisdictions where a court
of appeals has held otherwise, while the Department reconsiders the
AA96 Final Rule). Against this backdrop, the Second Circuit left open
the possibility that other interpretations of the regulations could
also be permissible. See Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th at 69 (noting that
``the Attorney General has supplanted Matter of Castro-Tum with a new
interpretation of the applicable regulations'').
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule amended 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b)
and related provisions to expressly state that EOIR adjudicators do not
have ``freestanding authority'' to administratively close cases before
EOIR. 85 FR at 81651, 81655. Rather, the AA96 Final Rule expressly
limited administrative closure authority to express grants of such
authority by regulation or judicially approved settlement. See, e.g., 8
CFR 1214.2(a), 1214.3, 1240.62(b), 1240.70(f)-(h), 1245.13(d)(3)(i),
1245.15(p)(4)(i), 1245.21(c); Barahona-Gomez, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-
36 (discussing settlement agreement requiring immigration judges and
the Board to administratively close class members' cases).
The AA96 Final Rule was consistent with the Attorney General's
holding in Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. at 284, that 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) do not provide for general
administrative closure authority.\12\ The AA96 Final Rule asserted that
general administrative closure authority improperly allows immigration
judges to determine which immigration cases should be adjudicated and
which ones should not. 85 FR at 81599. The AA96 Final Rule stated that
general authority to administratively close cases was improper because
``in practice, unlike continuances, administrative closure has at times
been used to effectively terminate cases through indefinite delay.''
Id.
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\12\ Moreover, the AA96 Final Rule cited the Attorney General's
explanation that general administrative closure authority conflicts
with regulatory requirements to resolve matters in a ``timely''
fashion. 85 FR 81588 (Dec. 16, 2020) at 81599.
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C. Termination and Dismissal
As discussed above, the regulations in place prior to the AA96
Final Rule conferred on EOIR adjudicators the general authority to
``take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and
regulations'' as ``appropriate and necessary for the disposition'' of
such cases. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), 1003.10(b). The regulations further
state that immigration judge orders ``shall direct the respondent's
removal from the United States, or the termination of the proceedings,
or other such disposition of the case as may be appropriate.'' 8 CFR
1240.12(c). Further, immigration judges are ``authorized to
[[Page 62247]]
issue orders in the alternative or in combination as [they] may deem
necessary.'' Id.
The regulations, as published prior to and unchanged by the AA96
Final Rule, provide immigration judges with explicit authority to
terminate or dismiss removal proceedings after the commencement of
proceedings in certain circumstances. With respect to dismissal, 8 CFR
1239.2(c) provides that after commencement of proceedings, government
counsel or certain enumerated officers under 8 CFR 239.1(a) may move to
dismiss proceedings on grounds set forth in 8 CFR 239.2(a), which
include where: (1) the respondent is a national of the United States;
(2) the respondent is not deportable or inadmissible under immigration
laws; (3) the respondent is deceased; (4) the respondent is not in the
United States; (5) the Notice to Appear was issued for the respondent's
failure to file a timely petition as required by section 216(c) of the
Act, but the respondent's failure to file a timely petition was excused
in accordance with section 216(d)(2)(B) of the Act; (6) the Notice to
Appear was improvidently issued; or (7) circumstances of the case have
changed after the Notice to Appear was issued to such an extent that
continuation is no longer in the best interest of the government. 8 CFR
1239.2(c). Dismissal of proceedings is without prejudice to DHS or the
noncitizen. Id.
With respect to termination, 8 CFR 1239.2(f) provides that ``[a]n
immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to permit the
[noncitizen] to proceed to a final hearing on a pending application or
petition for naturalization when the [noncitizen] has established prima
facie eligibility for naturalization and the matter involves
exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors[.]'' 8 CFR 1239.2(f).
The regulation also provides that ``in every other case, the removal
hearing shall be completed as promptly as possible notwithstanding the
pendency of an application for naturalization during any state of the
proceedings.'' Id.
The regulations also confer authority on immigration judges to
dismiss or terminate proceedings in other discrete circumstances. See,
e.g., 8 CFR 1216.4(a)(6) (authorizing termination upon joint motion of
the parties for failure to properly file a Petition to Remove the
Conditions on Residence, Form I-751); 8 CFR 1235.3(b)(5)(iv)
(authorizing termination where U.S. citizenship, permanent residence,
or asylee or refugee status is found in claimed status review
proceedings); id. at 1235.3(b)(5)(iv) (authorizing termination where
U.S. citizenship, permanent residence, or asylee or refugee status is
found in claimed status review proceedings); id. at 1238.1(e)
(authorizing termination upon DHS motion in order for DHS to commence
administrative removal under section 238 of the Act); see also id. at
1245.13(l) (deeming proceedings terminated upon the granting of
adjustment of status for certain Nicaraguan and Cuban nationals).\13\
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\13\ Although codified separately in the regulations,
termination and dismissal authority have been referenced
interchangeably by EOIR. See, e.g., Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28
I&N Dec. 648, 648 n.1 (A.G. 2022) (``This labeling distinction is
not material when a movant asks an immigration judge or the Board to
end a case pursuant to a provision that does not use one of those
labels. Except where a distinction between the two terms exists in
regulations, this opinion refers to `termination' and `dismissal'
interchangeably.''); Matter of Vizcarra-Delgadillo, 13 I&N Dec. 51,
55 (BIA 1968) (holding that the immigration judge had authority to
terminate proceedings as ``improvidently begun'' in a case where INS
moved for dismissal and both parties agreed to the motion to
dismiss); Matter of G-N-C, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 284 (BIA 1998) (using
the term ``dismissal'' and ``termination'' interchangeably in a case
involving an INS motion for dismissal of proceedings under former 8
CFR 239.2(c)); Matter of W-C-B-, 24 I& N Dec. 118, 122 (BIA 2007)
(stating that once jurisdiction vests with an immigration judge, a
Notice to Appear cannot be cancelled but instead DHS must ``move for
dismissal of the matter, i.e., request termination of the removal
proceeding'' under 8 CFR 239.2(c)); Matter of Andrade Jaso &
Carbajal Ayala, 27 I&N Dec. 557, 559 (BIA 2019) (holding that the
``immigration judge properly granted the DHS's motion to dismiss the
proceedings without prejudice'' under 8 CFR 1239.2(c)); see also 78
FR 535 (Jan. 3, 2013) at 544 (preamble to a DHS final rule stating
that ``[i]f the Form I-601A is approved for [a noncitizen] whose
proceedings have been administratively closed, the [noncitizen]
should seek termination or dismissal of the proceedings, without
prejudice, by EOIR . . . or risk becoming ineligible for the
immigrant visa based on another ground of inadmissibility''). While
used interchangeably, the regulations limit dismissal to only those
cases where DHS has moved for dismissal. Nevertheless, both
termination and dismissal result in concluding removal proceedings
without entering an order of removal.
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Additionally, the Board has held that the immigration judge may
terminate proceedings when there is a proper reason to do so, such as
where DHS cannot meet its burden to sustain charges of removability
``or in other specific circumstances consistent with the law and
applicable regulations.'' Matter of Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I&N Dec. 43, 45
(BIA 2012); see also Matter of Lopez-Barrios, 20 I&N Dec. at 204.
In 2018, the Attorney General held that, under the regulations,
EOIR adjudicators lacked the ``inherent authority'' to terminate
proceedings except as expressly authorized. Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-,
27 I&N Dec. 462, 463 (A.G. 2018). In reaching that conclusion, the
Attorney General relied heavily on the decision in Matter of Castro-
Tum. See id. at 463, 466. However, the Attorney General subsequently
overruled Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, explaining that ``[t]he
precedential basis for that opinion ha[d] been significantly eroded by
the overruling of Castro-Tum,'' \14\ and that it ``imposed `rigid
procedural requirements that would undermine . . . fair and efficient
adjudication' in certain immigration cases.'' Matter of Coronado
Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. 648, 651 (A.G. 2022) (quoting Matter of A-C-A-A-,
28 I&N Dec. 351, 351 (A.G. 2021)). Accordingly, Matter of Coronado
Acevedo held that ``immigration judges and the Board should be
permitted to consider and, where appropriate, grant termination'' in
certain limited circumstances pending the outcome of a rulemaking to
reconsider the regulations at issue in both Matter of Castro-Tum and
Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-. Id. at 652.
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\14\ In particular, the Fourth Circuit has indicated that it
``fail[ed] to see how the general power to terminate proceedings''
would be inconsistent with the ``authorities bestowed by the INA.''
Gonzalez v. Garland, 16 F.4th 131, 141-42 (4th Cir. 2021) (``We have
found no provisions stating that the [immigration judge] or BIA
cannot terminate removal proceedings, and the Government does not
cite to any.''). Further, in that case, the Fourth Circuit rejected
the Government's position that section 240(c)(1)(A) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. 1229a(c)(1)(A), which states that ``[a]t the conclusion of
the proceeding, the immigration judge shall decide whether [a
noncitizen] is removable from the United States,'' precludes
termination. Gonzalez, 16 F.4th at 141. Specifically, the court
concluded that a statutory requirement that an immigration judge
decide whether a noncitizen is removable does not limit the
immigration judge's actions after making that determination, and
that there are circumstances where delay or termination after such
determination may be appropriate. Id.
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D. Sua Sponte Reopening or Reconsideration and Self-Certification
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
EOIR adjudicators have long had the authority to sua sponte reopen
or reconsider cases, under rules promulgated in 1958 that remained in
effect until the issuance of the AA96 Final Rule. See Miscellaneous
Amendments to Chapter, 23 FR 9115, 9117 (Nov. 26, 1958); 8 CFR
1003.2(a)(1) and 1003.23(b)(1) (2019).\15\ However, even prior to 1958,
courts recognized such authority. See Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 12-
13 (2008) (discussing
[[Page 62248]]
reopening as ``a judicial creation later codified by federal statute''
and citing decisions using reopening as early as 1916).
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\15\ The 1958 rule amended, inter alia, part 3.2 of Title 8 of
the CFR. Following the creation of DHS in 2003 after the passage of
the HSA, EOIR's regulations were moved from Chapter I of Title 8 to
Chapter V. Aliens and Nationality; Homeland Security; Reorganization
of Regulations, 68 FR 9824 (Feb. 28, 2003). Part 3.2 was
subsequently duplicated for EOIR at part 1003.2. Id. at 9830.
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As originally implemented by the Department, the sua sponte
authority of immigration judges and Appellate Immigration Judges was
not limited by time or number requirements. In 1996, however, the
Department issued a rule establishing time and number limitations on
motions to reopen to implement statutory changes made by the
Immigration Act of 1990, Public Law 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
Immigration Act of 1990, sec. 545(d), 104 Stat. at 5066 (``[T]he
Attorney General shall issue regulations with respect to . . . the
period of time in which motions to reopen and to reconsider may be
offered in deportation proceedings, which regulations include a
limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a
maximum time period for the filing of such motions[.]''); Executive
Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration
Proceedings, 61 FR 18900 (Apr. 29, 1996). At the time, the Department
declined to include a ``good cause'' exception to the time and number
limitations for motions to reopen filed by a party in proceedings
because the same goal was accomplished by sua sponte authority. 61 FR
at 18902; see also Avila-Santoyo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 713 F.3d 1357,
1363 (11th Cir. 2013) (same).
Additionally, prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the Board had the
authority to self-certify cases. 8 CFR 1003.1(c) (2019). Under this
authority, the Board could, in its discretion, review decisions of an
immigration judge and DHS by its own certification. 8 CFR 1003.1(b)-(c)
(2019). The Board could exercise this authority even in cases where a
party's appeal was untimely or defective, after determining that the
parties were given a fair opportunity to make representations before
the Board. Id.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule revised the regulations to limit the
longstanding general sua sponte authority to reopen or reconsider cases
and established that sua sponte reopening or reconsideration could only
be used to correct typographical errors or defects in service. 85 FR at
81654-55 (8 CFR 1003.23(b)(1)). The AA96 Final Rule also limited
exceptions to the time and numerical limits on filing a motion to
reopen to cases where a change in fact or law post-dating the entry of
a final order vitiated the grounds for removal and the movant
demonstrated diligence in pursuing the motion. Id. (8 CFR
1003.23(b)(4)(v)). The Department chose to apply these restrictions on
immigration judges' and the Board's sua sponte reopening authority to
all pending cases. Id. at 81646-47. The Department explained that this
rescission was needed because sua sponte authority had been used
improperly. Id. at 81628. Additionally, the Department explained that
the Attorney General rescinded his delegation of sua sponte authority
to reopen or reconsider given the lack of a meaningful standard to
guide a decision whether to order reopening or reconsideration of cases
through the use of sua sponte authority. Id.
The AA96 Final Rule also amended 8 CFR 1003.1(c) to remove the
Board's authority to self-certify cases in order to accept untimely or
defective appeals in exceptional circumstances. The Department
explained that the change was necessary due to similar concerns such as
the lack of standards for the use of the self-certification authority,
inconsistent applications resulting from the lack of a defined standard
for determining when ``exceptional'' circumstances exist, the potential
for lack of notice to the parties when the Board elected to use its
self-certification authority, the potential for inconsistent
application and abuse of self-certification authority, and the strong
interest in finality of EOIR's adjudications. Id. at 81591.
E. Board Findings of Fact--Administrative Notice
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the regulations generally precluded
the Board from engaging in fact-finding in the course of deciding
appeals. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2019). However, the regulations
authorized the Board to take ``administrative notice of commonly known
facts such as current events or the contents of official documents.''
Id.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule expanded the regulations regarding
administrative notice in several ways. First, in addition to permitting
the Board to take administrative notice of the content of official
documents and current events, the rule further permitted the Board to
take administrative notice of ``[f]acts that can be accurately and
readily determined from official government sources and whose accuracy
is not disputed'' and ``[u]ndisputed facts contained in the record.''
85 FR at 81651 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A)(3), (4)). The AA96 Final Rule
went on to state that where the Board intends to rely on
administratively noticed facts to reverse an immigration judge's grant
of relief or protection from removal, the Board is required to notify
the parties of its intent and provide them at least 14 days within
which to respond to the notice. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(B)).
However, the AA96 Final Rule did not require the Board to notify the
parties if it relied on an administratively noticed fact to uphold an
immigration judge's denial. See id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(v)).
F. Board Findings of Fact--Voluntary Departure
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of relief that ``allows
certain favored [noncitizens] . . . to leave the country willingly''
either before the conclusion of removal proceedings or after being
found deportable. Dada, 554 U.S. at 8. A noncitizen must apply for
voluntary departure in the first instance before an immigration judge;
otherwise, the opportunity to seek such relief will be deemed waived.
See, e.g., Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260, 261 n.1 (BIA 2007)
(declining to consider claim raised for the first time on appeal).
Likewise, the noncitizen must raise the issue of voluntary departure in
any appeal to the Board; otherwise, it will be deemed waived. See
Matter of Cervantes, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 561 n.1 (BIA 1999) (refusing to
address an issue not raised on appeal).
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the regulations described an
immigration judge's authority to grant voluntary departure but did not
articulate the Board's authority to do so. See generally 8 CFR 1240.26
(2019). The regulations stated that in limited circumstances, the Board
could reinstate an order of voluntary departure when removal
proceedings had been reopened for a purpose other than solely
requesting voluntary departure. 8 CFR 1240.26(h) (2019).\16\ The Board
could remand cases to the immigration court to consider whether a
noncitizen was eligible for voluntary departure or for the
[[Page 62249]]
immigration judge to review whether a noncitizen had received proper
voluntary departure advisals. See Matter of Gamero, 25 I&N Dec. 164,
168 (BIA 2010) (concluding that ``a remand is the appropriate remedy
when the mandatory advisals have not been provided by the Immigration
Judge'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Although the regulations have never explicitly stated that
the Board has the authority to grant voluntary departure, the
Eleventh Circuit has stated that the Board has the authority to
grant or deny voluntary departure in the first instance pursuant to
its general (pre-AA96) regulatory authority under 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(ii) to ``review questions of law, discretion, and
judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of
immigration judges de novo.'' Blanc v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 996 F.3d
1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021) (``At the agency level, the Board of
Immigration Appeals itself can grant--or deny--voluntary
departure.'').
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2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule delegated explicit authority to the Board to
consider issues relating to the immigration judge's decision on
voluntary departure de novo and to issue final decisions on requests
for voluntary departure based on the record evidence. 85 FR at 81652,
81655 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(E); 1240.26(k)). The AA96 Final Rule
barred the Board from remanding a case to the immigration court solely
to consider a request for voluntary departure or for the immigration
judge's failure to provide advisals following a grant of voluntary
departure. Id. at 81652.
Specifically, the AA96 Final Rule provided that the Board could
issue an order of voluntary departure, with an alternate order of
removal, where: (1) the noncitizen requested voluntary departure before
the immigration judge; (2) the notice of appeal specified that the
noncitizen was appealing an immigration judge's denial of voluntary
departure and raised specific factual and legal challenges on this
issue; and (3) the Board determined that the noncitizen was otherwise
eligible for voluntary departure. Id. The AA96 Final Rule mandated that
if the Board did not grant the request for voluntary departure, it
would be required to deny the request. Id.
The AA96 Final Rule further provided that in instances where the
Board determined that the immigration judge incorrectly denied a
noncitizen's request for voluntary departure or failed to provide
appropriate advisals, it would be required to consider the request for
voluntary departure de novo and, if warranted, it must enter an order
granting voluntary departure with an alternate order of removal. Id. at
81655.
Furthermore, the AA96 Final Rule specified that in cases where DHS
appealed an immigration judge's decision, the Board could not grant
voluntary departure unless: (1) the noncitizen requested voluntary
departure before the immigration judge and provided or proffered
evidence to support the request; (2) the immigration judge either
granted voluntary departure or did not rule on the request; and (3) the
noncitizen otherwise met the statutory and regulatory criteria for
voluntary departure. Id.
Lastly, the AA96 Final Rule specified that the Board could impose
conditions that it deemed necessary to ensure the noncitizen's timely
departure from the United States and required the Board to provide
written advisals of such conditions and other duties associated with
voluntary departure. Id. at 81655-56. The noncitizen could accept the
grant of voluntary departure or could decline by providing written
notice within five days of receipt of the Board's decision, failing to
timely post any required bond, or otherwise failing to comply with the
Board's order. Id. at 81656.
G. Board Remand Authority--Additional Findings of Fact
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
The Board does not engage in fact-finding when adjudicating appeals
of immigration judges' decisions. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Accordingly,
under the pre-AA96 regulations, a party asserting that the Board could
not properly resolve an appeal without further fact-finding would file
a motion to remand. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2019).
Generally, motions to remand are subject to the same substantive
requirements as motions to reopen, particularly where a party seeks
remand during the pendency of a direct appeal to present new evidence
or to apply for a newly available form of relief not considered by the
immigration judge. See Rodriguez v. INS, 841 F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir.
1987) (substantive requirements of a motion to remand are the same as a
motion to reopen); Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992)
(explaining ``where a motion to remand is really in the nature of a
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, it must comply with the
substantive requirements for such motions''). Additionally, prior to
the AA96 Final Rule, the Board had regulatory authority to sua sponte
remand a case for further fact-finding where necessary. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2019); see also Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462, 466
(BIA 2002) (exercising sua sponte remand authority).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule restricted the Board's authority to remand for
further fact-finding or consideration of new evidence. 85 FR at 81651
(8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(C)-(D)). First, the AA96 Final Rule provided
that the Board may only grant motions to remand for further fact-
finding when: (1) the party seeking remand preserved the issue before
the immigration judge; (2) the party seeking remand attempted to adduce
the additional facts before the immigration judge, if it bore the
burden of proof; (3) additional fact-finding would alter the outcome of
the case; (4) additional fact-finding would not be cumulative of the
evidence already presented or contained in the record; and (5) either
the immigration judge's factual findings were clearly erroneous, the
immigration judge committed an error of law that required additional
fact-finding on remand, or remand to DHS was warranted following a de
novo review. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(D)). Second, the AA96 Final
Rule prohibited the Board from sua sponte remanding a case for further
fact-finding except when necessary to determine whether the immigration
judge had jurisdiction over the case. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(C)).
The AA96 Final Rule provided exceptions to these general
restrictions on remand authority under 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iii) and
(d)(7)(v)(B). 85 FR at 81651-52. Under paragraph (d)(6)(iii), DHS could
move the Board to remand the record to the immigration judge to
consider whether, in light of new information gained by identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations or examinations, any pending
applications for relief or protection should be denied. Id. If DHS
failed to report the results of such investigations or examinations,
the regulations directed the Board to remand the case to the
immigration judge for further proceedings under 8 CFR 1003.47(h). Id.
Paragraph (d)(7)(v)(B) reiterated that the Board was not limited in
remanding a case based on new evidence or information gained from
identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations;
to address a question of jurisdiction over an application or
proceedings; or to address a question regarding grounds of removability
in sections 212 or 237 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182, 1227. 85 FR at 81652.
H. Board Remand Authority--Errors in Fact or Law
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the regulations broadly authorized
the Board to remand cases ``as . . . appropriate, without entering a
final decision on the merits of the case.'' 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7) (2019).
However, as the AA96 Final Rule explained, the regulation granted this
authority without any further guidance or instructions regarding when
the Board
[[Page 62250]]
could order a remand instead of issuing a final order. 85 FR at 81589.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule restricted the Board's authority to remand for
errors in fact or law or consideration of material changes in fact or
law. Id. at 81652 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)). Specifically, the AA96
Final Rule provided that the Board could not remand a case without
first identifying the standard of review that it had applied, as well
as the specific error or errors made by the immigration judge. Id. The
Board also could not remand a case based on a ``totality of the
circumstances'' standard of review or based on a legal argument that
was not presented in 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(D) through (E), with
certain exceptions. Id.
Additionally, the AA96 Final Rule barred the Board from remanding a
case sua sponte, unless the remand solely involved a question of
jurisdiction. Id. As discussed above, the Board also could not remand a
case solely for consideration of voluntary departure or as the result
of the failure to give required advisals for a grant of voluntary
departure. Id. Moreover, the AA96 Final Rule generally barred remanding
based on any legal arguments that did not pertain to an ``issue of
jurisdiction over an application or the proceedings,'' or to ``material
change[s] in fact or law'' underlying a removability ground or grounds
that occurred after the date of the immigration judge's decision and
substantial evidence indicated that the material change would vitiate
all grounds of removability. Id.
I. Background Check
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
In 2005, the Department implemented regulations covering background
and security investigations in proceedings before immigration judges
and the Board. See Background and Security Investigations in
Proceedings Before Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration
Appeals, 70 FR 4743 (Jan. 31, 2005) (``Background Check Rule'') (issued
as interim final rule). The Background Check Rule amended Department
regulations to ensure that the necessary identity, law enforcement, and
security investigations (hereinafter ``background checks'') are
promptly initiated and have been completed by DHS prior to the granting
of certain forms of relief or protection from removal. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(6) (2019).
Under the framework implemented by the Background Check Rule,
applicants for relief or protection from removal in proceedings before
EOIR have an obligation to comply with applicable requirements to
provide biometrics and other biographical information, and failure to
comply with such requirements within the time allowed constitutes
abandonment of the application, with certain exceptions. Id.; 8 CFR
1003.47(c), (d).
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the Board could address incomplete or
outdated background checks by either remanding the case to the
immigration judge or placing adjudication of the case on hold until
background checks were completed or updated. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(ii)(A),
(B) (2019). However, the Board was not required to remand or hold a
case if dismissing the appeal or when denying the relief sought. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(6)(iv) (2019).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule limited the Board's authority to remand a
decision with incomplete or outdated background checks. 85 FR at 81651
(8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(ii)-(iii)). Under the new framework, the Board was
only permitted to place such cases on hold and to notify the parties
about the hold, including certain advisals about the consequences for
failure to comply with background check requirements. Id.
Further, the AA96 Final Rule required the Board to deem an
application for relief from removal abandoned if a noncitizen failed to
comply with background check procedures within 90 days of DHS's
instruction notice under 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(ii), unless the noncitizen
demonstrated good cause prior to the end of the 90-day period, or if
the noncitizen was detained. Id. at 81651-52 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iii)).
If the noncitizen demonstrated good cause within the 90-day period, the
Board could give the noncitizen one extension of up to 30 additional
days to comply. Id. at 81652. The AA96 Final Rule further required that
the Board adjudicate the remainder of the appeal within 30 days after
an application was deemed abandoned and enter an order of removal or a
grant of voluntary departure, as appropriate. Id.
Regarding motions to remand, the AA96 Final Rule permitted DHS to
file a motion to remand if it obtained relevant information when
completing or updating background checks so that the immigration judge
could consider whether, in light of the new information, any pending
applications for relief or protection should be denied. Id.
Additionally, the AA96 Final Rule instructed the Board to remand the
case to the immigration judge if DHS failed to report the results of
background checks within 180 days of the Board's notice. Id.
J. Adjudication Timelines
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the regulations provided for a case
management system that set forth, in relevant part, procedures for
initial screening for cases appealed to the Board and general guidance
regarding a decision's timeliness. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(1), (8) (2019).
Regarding initial screening, the regulations established that cases
would be referred to a screening panel for review and that appeals
subject to summary dismissal must be ``promptly dismissed.'' 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(1) (2019). However, the Board did not have a concrete
timeline for such review or dismissal. Id. As for timeliness, the
regulations provided that in all cases, other than those subject to
summary dismissal, the Appellate Immigration Judge or panel should
issue a decision on the merits ``as soon as practicable,'' prioritizing
cases involving detained noncitizens. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8) (2019). The
regulations further set forth a 90-day decision deadline for cases
adjudicated by a single Appellate Immigration Judge, beginning upon
completion of the record on appeal, and a 180-day deadline for cases
adjudicated by a three-member panel, beginning once an appeal was
assigned to the three-member panel. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i) (2019).
However, the Board Chairman \17\ could extend those deadlines in
exigent circumstances. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii) (2019). The Chairman
could also suspend the regulatory deadlines and indefinitely hold a
case or group of cases in anticipation of an impending decision by the
United States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Appeals, the
Board sitting en banc, or impending Department regulations. 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(iii) (2019). Moreover, the Chairman was required to notify
the EOIR Director and the Attorney General if an Appellate Immigration
Judge consistently failed to meet the assigned deadlines or adhere to
the case management system, as well as to prepare an annual report
assessing the timeliness of the disposition of cases by
[[Page 62251]]
each Appellate Immigration Judge. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v) (2019).
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\17\ The Board Chairman, or the Chairman, is also known as the
``Chief Appellate Immigration Judge.'' See Organization of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, 85 FR 69465, 69466 (Nov. 3,
2020) (final rule).
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2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule imposed numerous internal deadlines for
adjudicating Board appeals. 85 FR at 81652-53 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)). For
example, the rule required the Board screening panel to review cases
within 14 days of the filing of a Notice of Appeal, the filing of a
motion, or the receipt of a remand from a federal court. Id. (8 CFR
1003.1(e)(1)). Following an initial review, the Board had to adjudicate
requests for summary dismissal no later than 30 days after the filing
of the Notice of Appeal, subject to limited exceptions, and
interlocutory appeals within 30 days of the filing of the appeal,
unless referred to a three-member panel. Id. After the screening panel
completed its review, the Board would then have seven days to order a
transcript and would be required to set a briefing schedule within
seven days after the transcript was provided, subject to limited
exceptions. Id. at 81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)).
The AA96 Final Rule also required that the Board assign each case
to a single Appellate Immigration Judge within seven days of the
completion of the record on appeal. Id. The single Appellate
Immigration Judge would then determine whether to adjudicate the appeal
independently or to designate the case for decision by a three-member
panel. Id.
The AA96 Final Rule did not alter the completion deadlines of 90
days for a single-member decision and 180 days for a three-member
decision. 85 FR at 81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i)). However, the AA96
Final Rule changed the 180-day time period for completion of a three-
member decision to begin earlier, upon completion of the record, rather
than beginning the clock after the case was assigned to a three-member
panel, and added that the Chairman's determination as to whether
exigent circumstances warranted extension of those deadlines would be
subject to concurrence by the EOIR Director. Id.
The AA96 Final Rule also limited the ``rare circumstances'' under
which the Chairman could place cases on hold to only those groups of
cases that would be substantially impacted by an impending decision by
the United States Supreme Court or the Board sitting en banc and
removed the ability to hold cases to await an impending decision by a
United States Court of Appeals or impending Department regulations. 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(iii). The AA96 Final Rule also required the
concurrence of the EOIR Director to hold cases under this provision.
Id. at 81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(iii)). The AA96 Final Rule limited
such holds to a maximum of 120 days. Id. The AA96 Final Rule also
imposed additional reporting requirements on the Chairman for
transcription processes and cases involving extensions, holds, or other
delays. Id. at 81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8), (8)(v)).
Furthermore, the AA96 Final Rule required that all cases that
remained pending for more than 335 days after receipt of a filed appeal
or motion, or remand from a federal court, would be referred to the
EOIR Director for a decision unless subject to an extension, hold,
deferral, or remand. Id. at 81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v)). The Director
would then exercise delegated authority from the Attorney General
identical to that of the Board, including the authority to issue
precedential decisions or refer cases to the Attorney General. Id.
However, the AA96 Final Rule limited further delegation of such
authority from the EOIR Director to other individuals. Id.
K. Director's Authority To Issue Decisions
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
Until 2019, the EOIR Director had no authority to adjudicate cases
arising under the Act, including appeals before the Board. See 8 CFR
1003.0(c) (2018). Instead, the regulations simply provided that for
cases not completed within the relevant time limits and not subject to
any exceptions, the Chairman should self-refer them or refer them to
the Vice Chairman for completion within 14 days. Alternatively, the
Chairman could refer them to the Attorney General. 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(ii) (2018).
In 2019, the Department established a narrow discretionary
authority for the EOIR Director to decide appeals in certain
circumstances. See Organization of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, 84 FR 44537, 44539-40 (Aug. 26, 2019) (issued as an interim
final rule), 85 FR 69465, 69466 (Nov. 3, 2020) (final rule); see also 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii) (authorizing the EOIR Director to decide an appeal
that exceeded the 90- and 180-day regulatory time limits unless the
Chairman self-referred the case or referred the case to the Vice
Chairman); 8 CFR 1003.0(c) (providing that the EOIR Director may not
adjudicate cases arising under the Act ``[e]xcept as provided by
statute, regulation, or delegation of authority from the Attorney
General, or when acting as a designee of the Attorney General''). The
Department subsequently codified, at the final rule stage, language
stating that the EOIR Director's authority to decide appeals in certain
circumstances under 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii) could not be further
delegated. 85 FR at 69480-81; 8 CFR 1003.0(b)(2)(ii) (``The Director
may not delegate the authority assigned to the Director in [8 CFR]
1003.1(e)(8)(ii) . . .'').
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule authorized the EOIR Director to decide cases in
two distinct circumstances. First, the rule directed the Chairman to
refer any case still pending 335 days after an appeal or motion was
filed or a remand was received to the EOIR Director for adjudication.
85 FR at 81653 (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v)). Under the AA96 Final Rule, the
following categories of cases were not subject to the EOIR Director's
adjudication authority: (1) cases subject to a hold under 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(6)(ii); (2) cases subject to an extension under 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(ii); (3) cases subject to a hold under 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(iii); (4) cases whose adjudication had been deferred by
the EOIR Director pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.0(b)(1)(ii); (5) cases that
were remanded by the EOIR Director under 8 CFR 1003.1(k) in which 335
days had elapsed following remand; and (6) cases that were
administratively closed prior to 335 days after the appeal was filed
pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the Department or a previous
judicially approved settlement that authorized such an action but for
which the administrative closure caused the pendency of the appeal to
exceed 335 days. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v)(A)-(F)).
Second, the rule established a procedure for an immigration judge
to certify a Board decision to the EOIR Director when the immigration
judge believed the Board made one or more enumerated errors. Id. (8 CFR
1003.1(k)). This authority is discussed in further detail in the
section on the ``Quality Assurance Certification'' provision.
For cases referred to the EOIR Director, the EOIR Director would
exercise delegated authority from the Attorney General identical to
that of the Board, including the authority to issue precedential
decisions and the authority to refer cases to the Attorney General for
review. Id. (8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v)). The AA96 Final Rule prohibited the
EOIR Director from further delegating this authority. Id. Of note, the
AA96 Final Rule did not amend the existing regulatory provision
reiterating that 8
[[Page 62252]]
CFR 1003.1(e)(8) did not confer substantive or procedural rights
enforceable before any immigration judge, the Board, or any court of
law or equity, 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(vi), which, under the AA96 Final
Rule, included case referrals to the EOIR Director.
L. Quality Assurance Certification
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, various options were available to
ensure quality case adjudications. If a party were dissatisfied with a
Board decision, the party could file a motion to reconsider. 8 CFR
1003.2(a). Alternatively, the noncitizen could file a petition for
review of a final order of removal with a federal court of appeals. INA
242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(1). In addition, DHS could seek to certify
a Board decision to the Attorney General for review, 8 CFR
1003.1(h)(1)(iii), or the Attorney General could self-certify a Board
decision for review, 8 CFR 1003.1(h)(1)(i). The Board could also
reconsider or reopen a decision by exercising its sua sponte authority.
8 CFR 1003.2(a) (2019) (providing that ``[t]he Board may at any time
reopen or reconsider on its own motion'' any Board decision). The
process by which an immigration judge could certify a decision to the
EOIR Director did not exist prior to the AA96 Final Rule. See generally
8 CFR 1003.23(b) (2019).
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule did not change some of the existing options to
ensure quality case adjudications discussed above, including a party's
ability to file a motion to reconsider with the Board, the ability to
file a petition for review of a final order of removal with a federal
court of appeals, and the case referral options outlined in 8 CFR
1003.1(h).\18\ In addition to these options, the AA96 Final Rule
implemented a quality assurance certification, wherein the immigration
judge could forward a case by certification to the EOIR Director for
further review if the Board decision: (1) contained a typographical or
clerical error that affected the outcome of the case; (2) was clearly
contrary to an immigration law or statute, applicable regulation, or
published binding precedent; (3) was ``vague, ambiguous, internally
inconsistent, or otherwise did not resolve the basis for the appeal'';
or (4) did not consider a material factor pertinent to the issues
before the immigration judge. 85 FR at 81653-54 (8 CFR 1003.1(k)(1)).
To certify a decision, the immigration judge was required to issue an
order of certification within 30 days of the Board decision, or within
15 days if the noncitizen was detained, specifying the regulatory basis
for the certification, summarizing the underlying factual basis, and
providing notice of the certification to both parties. Id. at 81653 (8
CFR 1003.1(k)(2)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The AA96 Final Rule limited the Board's sua sponte
authority to reopen or reconsider a decision as discussed in Section
III.D of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For such cases, the EOIR Director would exercise delegated
authority from the Attorney General identical to that of the Board. Id.
(8 CFR 1003.1(k)(3)). The Director could dismiss the certification and
return the case to the immigration judge or remand the case back to the
Board. Id. The Director could not, however, issue an order of removal,
grant a request for voluntary departure, or grant or deny an
application for relief or protection from removal. Id. The AA96 Final
Rule further barred the quality assurance certification process from
being used solely to express general disapproval or disagreement with
the outcome of a Board decision. Id. at 81654 (8 CFR 1003.1(k)(4)).
M. Forwarding of Record on Appeal
1. Before Promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule
The pre-AA96 regulation provided that, when a transcript of an oral
decision was required, an immigration judge would review the transcript
and approve the decision within 14 days of receipt (or within seven
days following an immigration judge's return from leave or a detail). 8
CFR 1003.5(a) (2019). Further, the regulation required the transcript
to be forwarded to the Board upon its request or order. Id. The
regulation instructed the Chairman and Chief Immigration Judge to
determine the most effective and expeditious way to transcribe
proceedings before immigration judges, including reducing the time
necessary to produce transcripts and improving the quality of such
transcripts. Id.
2. Changes Made by the AA96 Final Rule
The AA96 Final Rule amended 8 CFR 1003.5(a) so that immigration
judges would not need to forward the record to the Board if the Board
already had electronic access to the record. 85 FR at 81654 (8 CFR
1003.5(a)). The AA96 Final Rule also removed the requirement that
immigration judges review transcripts of oral decisions, which included
review of, potential revisions to, and approval of the transcript.
Compare 8 CFR 1003.5(a) (2019) (``Where transcription of an oral
decision is required, the immigration judge shall review the transcript
and approve the decision . . .''), with 85 FR at 81654 (8 CFR
1003.5(a)) (omitting that requirement).
The AA96 Final Rule did not alter the requirement that the EOIR
Director, in consultation with the Chairman and Chief Immigration
Judge, determine the most effective and expeditious way to transcribe
proceedings. 85 FR at 81654 (8 CFR 1003.5(a)). However, it directed the
Chairman and Chief Immigration Judge to ``ensure,'' id. (8 CFR
1003.5(a)), rather than simply ``improve,'' 8 CFR 1003.5(a) (2019), the
quality of such transcripts.
The AA96 Final Rule also amended 8 CFR 1003.5(b) by removing
language describing procedures regarding appeals from DHS decisions
that are within the BIA's appellate jurisdiction and stated that those
procedures were not applicable to EOIR adjudicators. 85 FR at 81654 (8
CFR 1003.5(b)).
N. Centro Legal de la Raza Litigation
On March 10, 2021, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted a nationwide preliminary
injunction barring the Department from implementing or enforcing the
AA96 Final Rule or any portion thereof and staying the effectiveness of
the rule under 5 U.S.C. 705. Centro Legal de la Raza v. Exec. Off. for
Immigr. Rev., 524 F. Supp. 3d 919 (N.D. Cal. 2021). The preliminary
injunction and stay of the rule's effectiveness remain in effect.\19\
In granting the preliminary injunction and stay under 5 U.S.C. 705, the
court determined that plaintiffs were likely to ultimately succeed on
several substantive and procedural challenges raised with respect to
the AA96 Final Rule. Id. at 954-76.\20\
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\19\ In addition to this preliminary injunction, the United
States District Court of the District of Columbia granted a stay of
the implementation of the AA96 Final Rule on April 3, 2021,
determining that the 30-day comment period associated with the
rulemaking was procedurally insufficient. See Catholic Legal
Immigration Network, Inc. v. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., No. 21-
00094, 2021 WL 3609986 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2021).
\20\ Procedurally, the court stated that plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on their claim that the Department's 30-day notice-and-
comment period was insufficient under the Administrative Procedure
Act (``APA'') due to the rule's complexity, the COVID-19 pandemic,
and other concerns. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 954-
58. The court also raised ``serious concerns'' with the Department's
``staggered rulemaking'' approach, explaining that because
``numerous intertwined proposed rules were promulgated at different
times, including after the close of the comment period in this case,
the true impact of the [AA96 Final Rule] was obscured and the public
was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to comment.'' Id. at 958,
962.
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[[Page 62253]]
1. ``Arbitrary and Capricious'' Challenges
Substantively, the court determined that the plaintiffs
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their arguments
that the AA96 Final Rule's changes to the briefing schedule for BIA
appeals, administrative closure, and sua sponte reopening and
reconsideration authority were arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 963-71.
The court also made a generally applicable finding that EOIR's failure
to adequately consider the Booz Allen Hamilton report that EOIR
``specifically commissioned to analyze the very concerns that
purportedly animate'' the AA96 Final Rule raised significant APA
concerns. Id. at 963.
i. Changes to BIA Briefing Schedule
The court found that there was a substantial likelihood that the
AA96 Final Rule's changes to the briefing schedule for BIA appeals are
arbitrary and capricious because the Department failed to adequately
consider the impact on pro se individuals and how the changes would
operate, in conjunction with existing BIA practices and procedures, to
create difficulties for noncitizens and their attorneys in meeting
briefing deadlines. Id. at 964-66. The court was not persuaded by the
Department's position that noncitizens need not wait until the BIA
briefing schedule had been issued to seek representation for an appeal
because, the court stated, ``the vast majority of individuals appearing
before immigration courts are pro se,'' \21\ and many face language
barriers. Id. at 965. Additionally, the court noted that, ``of critical
importance[,]'' immigration judges often issue oral decisions;
accordingly, noncitizens may not have the documents necessary to seek
representation until after the Board issues and mails the briefing
schedule, transcript, and a copy of the immigration judge's order. Id.
The court stated that the Department failed to address how challenges
to the compressed briefing schedule might be exacerbated by the Board's
mail-based system, failure to follow the ``mailbox rule,'' and
unpredictable briefing schedules.\22\ Id. The court also found the
Department's reliance on future implementation of an electronic filing
system unpersuasive. Id. The court further stated that the Department
failed to consider the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic may
present to compliance with the compressed briefing schedule. Id. at
966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ EOIR data reports an 86% representation rate for ``all
completed appeals,'' a 90% representation rate for ``all pending
appeals,'' and a 45% representation rate for ``overall pending''
adjudications. See EOIR, Adjudication Statistics: Current
Representation Rates, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1062991/download (data generated Apr. 21, 2023).
\22\ The court noted that the ``U.S. Postal service is
experiencing historic backlogs'' due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Administrative Closure
The court also determined that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on
their argument that the AA96 Final Rule's restrictions on
administrative closure are arbitrary and capricious. First, the court
found that, although the Department cited efficiency reasons for
promulgating the rule, it failed to meaningfully address the existence
of ``extensive contrary evidence showing that administrative closure
enhances efficiency.'' Id. at 967. The court also noted that EOIR's
consultants had previously recommended that EOIR work with DHS to
explore developing policies regarding administrative closure, and yet
EOIR did not discuss or consider that recommendation in its rulemaking.
Id. The court further stated that the Department improperly dismissed
and minimized commenter concerns that eliminating administrative
closure could lead to the removal of noncitizens with meritorious
claims for relief or protection, including removal in violation of the
United States' non-refoulement obligations under international law. Id.
at 968. The court explained that, although the Department cited the
availability of administrative closure in some circumstances, it did
not adequately address the issue that administrative closure would no
longer be available for ``the vast majority of noncitizens in removal
proceedings, including people for whom Congress has specifically
crafted humanitarian relief.'' Id.
Additionally, the court determined that the Department did not
adequately engage with commenter concerns that the AA96 Final Rule
conflicted with section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(9)(B)(v), as DHS has interpreted it. Id.; see also 8 CFR
212.7(e)(4)(iii) (rendering an individual in removal proceedings
ineligible for an unlawful presence hardship waiver unless the
proceedings are administratively closed); see also Garcia-DeLeon, 999
F.3d at 993 (``We conclude that immigration judges and the BIA retain
the authority to grant administrative closure so that noncitizens may
apply for a provisional unlawful presence waiver.'').
The court noted that, although DHS had previously determined that
individuals who have been granted voluntary departure would not be
eligible for such provisional waivers, see Expansion of Provisional
Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility, 81 FR 50244, 50256 (July
29, 2016), EOIR nevertheless asserted in the AA96 Final Rule that
eliminating general authority to administratively close cases would
have no bearing on a noncitizen's ``ability to obtain an order of
voluntary departure and then a provisional waiver before departing to
receive the final waiver abroad.'' 85 FR at 81601. The court determined
that the Department did not provide a ``reasoned basis'' for this
position. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 969.
iii. Sua Sponte Reopening and Reconsideration Authority
The court also determined that the Department's decision to
eliminate adjudicators' sua sponte reopening and reconsideration
authority was likely arbitrary and capricious. The court expressed that
it was ``extremely troubled'' by the Department's contention that,
because there is no right to sua sponte reopening, the Department was
not required to assess commenter concerns about any reliance interests
or weigh such interests against competing policy concerns. Id. at 970;
see also Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.
Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (``When an agency changes course . . . it must be
cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered serious
reliance interests that must be taken into account.'' (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The court similarly expressed concerns with the Department's
justifications for eliminating sua sponte reopening and reconsideration
in light of ``the reality that its elimination will foreclose the only
avenue of relief for some noncitizens who would otherwise be eligible
for relief from removal.'' Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at
971. For example, the Department asserted that the rule would promote
fairness by withdrawing an authority that may be subject to
inconsistent and potentially abusive usage and could undermine finality
in proceedings. Id. However, the court found that the Department failed
to provide examples of inconsistent application or abuse and did not
adequately explain why ``it could not articulate or clarify a
meaningful standard to govern'' when `` `exceptional situations' would
permit sua sponte reopening or reconsideration.'' Id.; see also Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 48-49 (1983) (``[A]n agency must cogently
[[Page 62254]]
explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.'').
2. Regulatory Flexibility Act Challenge
The court determined that the plaintiffs raised serious questions
that the AA96 Final Rule violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(``RFA''), which requires federal agencies to analyze the impact of
proposed rules on small entities. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp.
3d at 971-74; see also 5 U.S.C. 601-12. Specifically, the court
determined that the plaintiff, Centro Legal de la Raza, was likely a
small entity under the RFA and that the AA96 Final Rule would apply to
it because it would be required to comply with the changes implemented
by the rule. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 973. Further,
the court expressed doubt that the AA96 Final Rule's ``cursory''
statement that the rule would not have a substantial impact on small
entities was a sufficient factual basis to avoid engaging in an RFA
analysis, particularly in light of the scope of the AA96 Final Rule and
the numerous comments from organizations claiming that the AA96 Final
Rule would economically impact them. Id. at 974.
3. Delegation of Rulemaking Authority to the EOIR Director
Lastly, the court determined that the plaintiffs had raised serious
questions regarding whether the AA96 Final Rule's delegation of
rulemaking authority to the EOIR Director, based on the specific facts
of that case, violated the APA. Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp.
3d at 976. The court was troubled by the manner by which the delegation
occurred. Id. Specifically, the court stated that while the Attorney
General signed the AA96 NPRM, the Attorney General did not delegate
rulemaking authority until after the close of the NPRM's comment period
and did so through a non-public order. Id. The court also expressed
particular concern that the AA96 Final Rule, signed by the EOIR
Director pursuant to the delegated rulemaking authority, significantly
expanded the EOIR Director's authority to adjudicate Board appeals. Id.
The court stated that although the AA96 NPRM--as signed by the Attorney
General--proposed expanding the EOIR Director's authority in this
manner, the NPRM did not disclose that the EOIR Director would issue
the final rule and, thus, would ultimately be in charge of considering
the public's comments about expanding the EOIR Director's own
authority. Id.
IV. Description of Proposed Regulatory Changes
The Department has carefully reconsidered the AA96 Final Rule, the
comments received on the AA96 Proposed Rule, the issues identified in
the Centro Legal de la Raza decision, and other experience gained since
that decision. The Department now proposes to restore the longstanding
procedures in place prior to the AA96 Final Rule, subject to several
changes. For the reasons described below, the Department believes that
these amendments will promote the efficient and expeditious
adjudication of cases, afford immigration judges and the BIA
flexibility to efficiently allocate their limited resources, and
protect due process for parties before immigration judges and the
Board.
A. Briefing Schedule Changes
The Department proposes to rescind changes that the AA96 Final Rule
made to briefing schedules before the Board.
Specifically, the Department proposes to restore regulatory
language, in effect before the promulgation of the AA96 Final Rule,
that would re-establish longstanding consecutive briefing schedules for
non-detained noncitizens and simultaneous briefing schedules for
detained noncitizens. 8 CFR 1003.3(c)(1) (proposed). The proposed
language states that those subject to a simultaneous briefing schedule
would have 21 days to submit simultaneous briefs unless the Board
specifies a shorter period. Id. The proposed language also states that
in appeals involving simultaneous briefing, the Board may permit
parties to file reply briefs within 21 days of the deadline for the
initial briefs. Id.
Those subject to a consecutive briefing schedule would again have
21 days to file initial briefs, unless the Board specifies a shorter
period. Id. Parties would have the same amount of time to file reply
briefs as was provided for filing the initial brief, including any
extensions.\23\ Id. The Board would also again be authorized to grant
one or more extensions for filing briefs or reply briefs for up to 90
days for good cause shown. Id. The Board could also, in its discretion,
request supplemental briefings from parties after the briefing deadline
has expired. Id. The Board would remain authorized to consider untimely
filed briefs. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ In the ECAS Rule, the finalized regulatory language
reverted 8 CFR 1003.3(c)(2) (Appeal from decision of a DHS officer)
to pre-AA96 standards. See ECAS Rule, 86 FR at 70721. Specifically,
the ECAS Rule removed the maximum 14-day period for the filing of a
single permitted reply brief, the 14-day limitation on extensions,
and procedures for filing supplemental briefs implemented by the
AA96 Final Rule. Id. The ECAS Rule retained the AA96 Final Rule's
technical edits to replace ``Service'' with ``DHS'' where
appropriate, id., and this NPRM proposes additional minor, technical
changes, as discussed at Section IV.O of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As stated in the AA96 Final Rule, there is ``no entitlement'' to a
briefing schedule under the Act. See 85 FR at 81636. Indeed, the Act
does not enumerate the procedures that apply to the Board's
adjudication of appeals. Nevertheless, a noncitizen, with certain
limited exceptions, is entitled to seek appellate review before the
Board of an immigration judge's decision and, in some cases, a decision
of a DHS officer.\24\ 8 CFR 1003.3(a)(1)-(2). As part of that review,
the noncitizen is entitled to certain rights under the Act, including
the right to have legal representation before the Board (at no expense
to the government). INA 292, 8 U.S.C. 1362. The Department believes
that truncating the briefing schedule that had been in place for over
20 years, see Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to
Improve Case Management, 67 FR 54878, 54895 (Aug. 26, 2002) (discussing
changes to 8 CFR 3.3(c)), could impact a noncitizen's ability to
adequately prepare their case for appeal or secure legal representation
to do so, and create undue confusion for pro se noncitizens and
practitioners appearing before EOIR. Concerns about adequate
preparation time are particularly relevant given the possibility of
unique and unaccounted-for future issues, similar to the COVID-19
pandemic, which may present new obstacles to seeking and securing
representation, as well as preparing and submitting briefs. See Centro
Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 965-66 (``[T]he agency completely
disregarded the fact that the challenges of briefing on a compressed
timetable are compounded by the BIA's mail-based system, failure to
follow the `mailbox rule,' and unpredictable briefing schedules. . .
Moreover, the agency entirely dismissed the impact of imposing the
briefing schedule changes during the COVID-19 pandemic, a concern
raised by numerous commenters.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Examples of DHS officer decisions subject to appellate
review before the Board include denials of waivers under INA
212(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3), and denials of visa petitions made
on a Form I-130.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department notes that it has now implemented electronic filing
procedures for registered attorneys through the EOIR Courts & Appeals
System, see ECAS Rule, 86 FR 70708, which may mitigate some concerns
about mail service and its potential effect on briefing schedule timing
[[Page 62255]]
because parties will be able to view and download documents for cases
with electronic records of proceeding. However, the Department has not
yet fully implemented electronic filing and case access for pro se
noncitizens, see 86 FR at 70709-10, and therefore believes that the
current availability of electronic filing in most, but not all,
circumstances is insufficient to address concerns about the AA96 Final
Rule's truncated briefing schedules. Indeed, briefing schedules that
allow adjudicators the flexibility to establish deadlines as
appropriate for a particular case, within given parameters, are a
fixture of legal practice. For example, in the federal courts, Rule 31
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes a ``good
cause'' exception to its specified time frame. Fed. R. App. P. 31(a)(1)
(explaining that ``a reply brief must be filed at least 7 days before
argument, unless the court, for good cause, allows a later filing'').
Similarly, Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also builds
flexibility into its established timeframes. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(C) (``A party must serve a reply to an answer within 21 days
after being served with an order to reply, unless the order specifies a
different time.'').
Upon reconsideration, the Department believes that the Board should
have the discretion to manage briefing schedules and extensions. An
inflexible rule that requires all briefs to be filed within 35 days
would be unable to accommodate the continually changing landscape that
may affect parties' ability to seek and retain counsel, as well as to
prepare and submit briefs within a specified period of time. To the
extent that shorter briefing schedules or, conversely, extensions for
both initial and reply briefs, might be appropriate given the
particular facts and circumstances of an individual case, the Board is
optimally situated to make such determinations on a case-by-case basis
to ensure that briefing schedules do not impede access to the appellate
process and the right to counsel. Cf. Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 665
(```[T]imeliness' is not a hard and fast deadline; some cases are more
complex and simply take longer to resolve. Thus, not all mechanisms
that lengthen the proceedings of a case prevent `timely'
resolution.''). Under the proposed rule, the Board would again have the
discretion to specify shorter briefing schedules as it deems
appropriate.
Numerous organizations and commenters on the AA96 Final Rule,
including those who administer the Board Pro Bono Program, claimed that
the policies set forth in the AA96 Final Rule would have (and in some
cases already have had) an impact on their ability to provide appellate
representation. See Complaint, CLINIC v. EOIR, No. 21-CV-094 (D.D.C.
Jan. 11, 2021); Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Centro
Legal de la Raza v. EOIR, No. 21-CV-00463 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2021).
This proposed rule is intended to remove the possibility that reducing
the total amount of time that a noncitizen has to file an appeal brief
would impede access to the appellate process and the fair and efficient
adjudication of appeals for at least some pro se individuals and those
seeking representation.
The Department also proposes to amend the briefing schedule, with
respect to motions to reopen or reconsider before the BIA, to extend
the deadline to submit a reply brief from 13 days to 21 days. 8 CFR
1003.2(g)(3) (proposed). The Department currently sees no reason to
distinguish between applicable deadlines for reply briefs for appeals
and for motions to reopen or reconsider.
B. Administrative Closure Authority--Immigration Judges and the Board
The Department proposes to remove the AA96 Final Rule's language
that would, if effectuated, limit an EOIR adjudicator's authority to
administratively close cases. Instead, this NPRM proposes to explicitly
state that EOIR adjudicators have the general authority to
administratively close, and to recalendar,\25\ individual cases
pursuant to a party's motion. The proposed rule would also set forth
factors that adjudicators should consider, as the circumstances of the
case warrant, in adjudicating such motions. The Department believes
that the proposed changes will improve the efficiency and fairness of
EOIR proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The Department notes that the term ``reinstate'' has been
used interchangeably with ``recalendar'' before the Board. See,
e.g., Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 692. However, consistent
with longstanding practice and to avoid confusion, the Department is
using ``recalendar'' for both the immigration courts and the Board
in this regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described above, there is a long history of EOIR adjudicators
utilizing administrative closure as a helpful tool for managing dockets
at both the immigration courts and the Board. See Garcia-DeLeon, 999
F.3d at 989 (``For at least three decades, immigration judges and the
BIA regularly administratively closed cases.''); Matter of Avetisyan,
25 I&N Dec. at 690 (``Administrative closure is a procedural tool
created for the convenience of the Immigration Courts and the
Board.''). Indeed, the Attorney General acknowledged this longstanding
practice in overruling Matter of Castro-Tum. See Matter of Cruz-Valdez,
28 I&N Dec. at 329 (``Because Castro-Tum departed from long-standing
practice, it is appropriate to overrule that opinion in its entirety .
. .''). In Matter of Cruz-Valdez, the Attorney General restored
administrative closure authority, specifically directing immigration
judges and the Board to apply the standard for administrative closure
set forth in Matter of Avetisyan and Matter of W-Y-U- while the
Department reconsiders the AA96 Final Rule. Id.
Additionally, circuit court case law undercuts the AA96 Final
Rule's assertion that administrative closure is unsupported by the law
and that Matter of Avetisyan was wrongly decided. See Romero, 937 F.3d
at 294-95 (holding that the regulations ``unambiguously confer upon
[immigration judges] and the [Board] the general authority to
administratively close cases''); Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 667
(concluding that Matter of Castro-Tum was contrary to the unambiguous
meaning of the regulations and that immigration judges and the Board
are ``not precluded from administratively closing cases when
appropriate''); Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 122 (holding that ``the
plain language establishes that general administrative closure
authority is unambiguously authorized by these regulations''); see also
Zelaya Diaz v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 687, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2021) (applying
Meza Morales).
Although two circuit courts have rejected challenges to Matter of
Castro-Tum, both left open the possibility that the regulations could
permissibly be interpreted to permit administrative closure in at least
some circumstances. In Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62 (2d Cir. 2023),
the Second Circuit held that the pre-AA96 regulations were ambiguous as
to whether they authorized general administrative closure and deferred
to the Attorney General's interpretation in Matter of Castro-Tum. In
reaching that conclusion, the Second Circuit did not interpret 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) (2018) to foreclose general
administrative closure authority. Rather, the Second Circuit focused
narrowly on the text of those regulations and held that it was not
unreasonable for the Attorney General in Matter of Castro-Tum to
interpret them as not explicitly authorizing general administrative
closure. See id. at 73-74. The Second Circuit acknowledged EOIR
adjudicators' use of administrative closure since at least 1990,
however, id. at 66, and recognized that before Castro-Tum, whether to
allow administrative
[[Page 62256]]
closure was ``a matter reserved to the discretion of the Immigration
Judge or the Board.'' Id. at 76 n.13.
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Matter of Castro-Tum that the
regulatory language prior to the AA96 Final Rule does not provide EOIR
adjudicators a free-standing authority to administratively close cases.
See Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 466. However, it later clarified
that immigration judges and the Board have the authority to grant
administrative closure to permit a noncitizen to apply for a
provisional unlawful presence waiver, even though this authority was
not explicitly stated in the regulations. See Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d
at 992-93. As such, the AA96 Final Rule introduced novel restrictions
on EOIR adjudicators' long-standing authority to manage the cases
before them, including through the use of administrative closure when
appropriate. See Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at 328-29 (stating
that the AA96 Final Rule ``effectively codified Castro-Tum[,]'' which
``departed from long-standing practice . . .'').
Although several courts of appeals have determined that the
authority to administratively close cases was clearly encompassed in
the regulations prior to the AA96 Final Rule, that authority was not
explicitly stated. As the decisions from the Second and Sixth Circuits
make clear, this lack of explicit language has led to debate and
confusion over the full scope of EOIR adjudicators' authority to manage
cases before them. See, e.g., Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62 at 74
(concluding the pre-AA96 regulations ``do not unambiguously permit
[general] administrative closure.''); Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at
466 (holding that the regulations prior to the AA96 Final Rule did not
give adjudicators the general authority to administratively close
cases); see also Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d at 992-93 (concluding that an
application for a provisional unlawful presence waiver ``is a limited
circumstance where administrative closure is `appropriate and
necessary' under [8 CFR] 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)''). It is in
the interests of the Department and the public to have a clear
understanding of the scope of an adjudicator's authority. Accordingly,
the Department proposes to amend the regulations to make an EOIR
adjudicator's long-standing authority to administratively close cases
explicit in the regulations.
Additionally, the court in Centro Legal de la Raza identified a
number of issues with the AA96 Final Rule's changes made with respect
to administrative closure. 524 F. Supp. 3d at 966-69. Specifically, the
court noted that the Department failed to adequately consider or
meaningfully address: (1) the impact that the AA96 Final Rule would
have on the vast majority of applicants for administrative closure or
how it would affect noncitizens with meritorious claims for relief; (2)
commenter concerns that the AA96 Final Rule's restriction on
administrative closure conflicted with the inadmissibility waiver
provision at section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(9)(B)(v), as it has been interpreted by DHS; and (3) the
existence of ``extensive contrary evidence showing that administrative
closure enhances efficiency.'' Id. In this NPRM, the Department
proposes further rulemaking on this topic to address these concerns.
The Department believes that codifying general administrative
closure authority will serve the interests of the Department and the
public in fairness and administrative efficiency. Immigration judges
and the Board have used administrative closure as a safeguard to ensure
fairness and to postpone cases in appropriate circumstances, such as
cases involving certain juvenile noncitizens or those with mental
competency issues. See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 691 (stating
that EOIR adjudicators may determine that it is ``necessary or, in the
interests of justice and fairness to the parties, prudent to defer
further action for some period of time''). Retaining the AA96 Final
Rule's restrictions on administrative closure could limit the ability
of noncitizens to pursue certain statutory immigration benefits and
forms of discretionary relief, including: (1) Special Immigrant
Juvenile status, INA 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J); (2) visas
for victims of certain crimes who are cooperating with law enforcement
(U visas), INA 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U); (3) visas for
certain family-sponsored immigrants (e.g., ``Petition for Alien
Relative'' (Form I-130)), INA 203(a), 8 U.S.C. 1153(a); (4) adjustment
of status as a VAWA self-petitioner, INA 204, 8 U.S.C. 1154; (5)
Temporary Protected Status (``TPS''), INA 244, 8 U.S.C. 1254a; and (6)
provisional unlawful presence waivers, 8 CFR 212.7(e)(4)(iii). USCIS
approval of any of these benefits would generally eliminate the need
for continued removal proceedings. Moreover, a removal order entered by
an immigration judge and affirmed by the Board could cut off the
noncitizen's ability to obtain such benefit or relief. Additionally, if
EOIR moves forward with removal proceedings while a prima facie
eligible application for relief is pending before DHS, the outcome of
the case may ultimately depend upon which agency is the first to issue
a final administrative decision. Administrative closure, therefore,
allows for the full consideration of a noncitizen's application for
relief without exposing the noncitizen to the risk of removal. See Meza
Morales, 973 F.3d at 665 (acknowledging the Attorney General's
efficiency justification in Matter of Castro-Tum but stating that cases
must also be ``disposed of fairly, and granting a noncitizen the
opportunity to pursue relief to which she is entitled may be
appropriate and necessary for a fair disposition'').
Without administrative closure, by contrast, individuals are often
unable to sufficiently postpone their proceedings before EOIR and, as a
result, often are issued a removal order from EOIR that impedes the
ability of USCIS to grant relief unless the individual files a motion
to reopen with EOIR to have that order lifted. Requiring individuals to
file motions to reopen and accompanying stay of removal requests, if
necessary, creates additional procedural hurdles that increase the risk
of removal while a potentially valid request for relief is pending with
USCIS. Moreover, such procedural hurdles are significantly more
challenging to overcome if the individual is physically removed from
the United States and must pursue a motion to reopen from abroad.
In addition, upon reconsideration, the Department is now of the
belief that the procedures set forth in the AA96 Final Rule would not
improve efficient adjudication and may, in some cases, undermine the
efficiency of certain adjudications. See Centro Legal de la Raza, 524
F. Supp. 3d at 968 (``Indeed, the Fourth Circuit found that the
Attorney General's efficiency justification in Matter of Castro Tum--
the same efficiency rationale cited in the NPRM and Final Rule--was
`internally inconsistent.' '').
In particular, speed in adjudicating an individual case is not the
only factor that bears on administrative efficiency. But see AA96 Final
Rule at 81598 (characterizing administrative closure as creating delays
that conflict with EOIR's mission to expeditiously adjudicate cases
before it). Efficiency also encompasses consideration of prioritization
and allocation of resources among different cases. Cf. Meza Morales,
973 F.3d at 665 (``[T]he . . . requirement that cases be resolved in
`timely' fashion does not foreclose administrative closure. For one
thing, `timeliness' is not a hard and fast
[[Page 62257]]
deadline; some cases are more complex and simply take longer to
resolve. Thus, not all mechanisms that lengthen the proceedings of a
case prevent `timely' resolution.''); Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 123
(``The authority to administratively close cases, within the
appropriate and necessary context of each case, can and does permit
[immigration judges] and the Board to answer the questions before them
in a timely and impartial manner consistent with the Act and the
regulations. Or in other words, delay in the case through
administrative closure does not, by definition, prevent the timely
disposition of the case and resolution of questions.''). Moreover, as
pointed out in Meza Morales, the Department is tasked with the dual
imperatives to adjudicate cases with both speed and fairness--the
combination of which offers a better measure of administrative
efficiency than speed alone. 973 F.3d at 665.
In addition, as observed by the Second Circuit, ``it is wasteful to
commit judicial resources to immigration cases when circumstances
suggest that, if the Government prevails, it is unlikely to promptly
effect the petitioner's removal.'' In re Immigr. Petitions, 702 F.3d at
160. Relatedly, it would be wasteful to commit judicial resources to
cases where there are pending alternative resolutions to the case that
would obviate the need for, or significantly narrow the issues in,
removal proceedings. See Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 665
(``Unsurprisingly . . . an immigration judge might sometimes conclude,
in exercising the discretion granted by [8 CFR 1003.10], that it is
appropriate and necessary to dispose of a case through administrative
closure.''); Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 791 n.4 (BIA 2009)
(noting that administrative closure could ``avoid the repeated
rescheduling of a case that is clearly not ready to be concluded'').
Given EOIR's overburdened dockets, as well as the growing backlog of
pending cases, it is imperative that EOIR effectively allocate its
limited resources--including docket time--to first adjudicate those
cases where there are no pending alternative resolutions to removal. To
do otherwise would expend precious judicial resources on a practically
``empty exercise tantamount to issuing an advisory opinion'' where such
resources could instead be used to adjudicate those cases where no
alternative resolutions may be possible. See In re Immigr. Petitions,
702 F.3d at 161 (internal quotations omitted).
Procedurally, administrative closure is often more efficient than
repeatedly postponing proceedings through multiple continuances, which
requires repeatedly reserving hearing time on the immigration court's
docket. Notably, before Matter of Avetisyan, the Board had encouraged
DHS to consider moving for administrative closure rather than multiple
continuances in ``appropriate circumstances, such as where there is a
pending prima facie approvable visa petition.'' Matter of Hashmi, 24
I&N Dec. at 791 n.4; see also Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 135
n.10 (BIA 2009). The Board described administrative closure as ``an
attractive option in these situations, as it will assist in ensuring
that only those cases that are likely to be resolved are before the
Immigration Judge.'' Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791 n.4. The
Board also noted that administrative closure could ``avoid the repeated
rescheduling of a case that is clearly not ready to be concluded.'' Id.
With respect to those cases that could result in motions to reopen
being filed with EOIR because of insufficient time to postpone the
conclusion of proceedings for noncitizens to pursue pending relief
outside of EOIR, the AA96 Final Rule framework would also create
significant inefficiencies, as the immigration courts and the Board
must adjudicate both the initial removal proceedings and the subsequent
motion to reopen, as well as any stay of removal requests.
Administrative closure could put such cases on hold until any related
matters pending outside of EOIR are adjudicated, which, in turn, would
allow the immigration judge or the Board to put that adjudication time
towards another case before EOIR.
Similarly, some statutes necessarily delay EOIR proceedings while
noncitizens pursue collateral applications before USCIS. For example,
the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008 (``TVPRA''), Public Law 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, mandates
that USCIS has initial jurisdiction over any asylum applications filed
by unaccompanied children in removal proceedings before EOIR. See INA
208(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(C) (codifying the TVPRA's
requirement). Under such circumstances, administrative closure of
proceedings while USCIS considers any applications for asylum would
likely be more efficient than repeatedly setting aside docket time for
future hearings that are then continued. Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec.
at 791 n.4 (noting that administrative closure could ``assist in
ensuring that only those cases that are likely to be resolved are
before the [i]mmigration [j]udge'' and prevent ``the repeated
rescheduling of a case'' that is unready to be concluded).
The AA96 Final Rule asserted that administrative closure, and in
particular administrative closure over a party's objection, ``failed as
a policy'' because of an increased backlog of immigration cases after
Matter of Avetisyan was decided. 85 FR at 81599 (quoting AA96 NPRM, 85
FR at 52504). However, to the extent that eliminating administrative
closure was designed to control the backlog of cases, EOIR's pending
case data does not support a conclusion that eliminating administrative
closure led to such a result. Between May 17, 2018, when Matter of
Castro-Tum was issued, and July 15, 2021, when Matter of Cruz-Valdez
was issued, the backlog of pending cases at EOIR increased from 796,791
on September 30, 2018, to 1,408,669 on September 30, 2021.\26\ Even
accounting for the pandemic and looking only to the end of FY 2019, the
number of pending cases at EOIR increased from 796,791 to
1,088,499.\27\
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\26\ See EOIR, Adjudication Statistics, Pending Cases, New
Cases, and Total Completions, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download (data generated Apr. 21, 2023).
\27\ Id.
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While no single factor alone was responsible for the increase in
the backlog, numerous factors may have contributed, including: a
general increase in the number of proceedings initiated by DHS;
increasing complexity in immigration cases; fluctuating numbers of
defensive asylum applications filed in and adjudicated by EOIR;
external factors requiring court closures that generally result in
cancellation of non-detained hearings, such as the COVID-19 pandemic-
related closures and an appropriations lapse between December 2018 and
January 2019; and the limited number of appropriated immigration judge
positions. See Congressional Research Service, R47077, U.S. Immigration
Courts and the Pending Cases Backlog, at 19-30 (Apr. 25, 2022); EOIR,
Congressional Budget Submission for FY 2023 (Mar. 2022) (``Over the
years, several factors have contributed to record growth in both the
number of pending immigration cases and the time required to adjudicate
them. . . Recently, this caseload increase has been exacerbated by the
closures and reductions in service associated with the COVID-19
pandemic, as well as the consistent rise in the number of new NTAs that
DHS has filed before the immigration court over the last five years,
even with the reduction in filings over FY 2020 and FY 2021 (from a
high of almost 550,000 in FY 2019).'').
[[Page 62258]]
Additionally, as discussed above, the growing backlog of cases is
one significant reason it is important for EOIR adjudicators to be able
to efficiently manage their dockets to first adjudicate those cases
that are ripe for review, where removal is a priority, or where there
are no pending alternative resolutions to removal. Administrative
closure is a critical tool that helps EOIR adjudicators manage their
dockets. See Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. at 326 (noting that
administrative closure has become ``a routine `tool used to regulate
proceedings' and `manage an Immigration Judge's calendar (or the
Board's docket)' '' (quoting Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 694)); Arcos
Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 123 (``[D]elay in the case through administrative
closure does not, by definition, prevent the timely disposition of the
case and resolution of questions . . . Without the general authority to
administratively close appropriate cases when necessary, the
[immigration judges] and the Board . . . may be less effective in
managing cases.''); Romero, 937 F.3d at 292-93 (``[D]ocket management
actions such as administrative closure [ ] often facilitate . . . case
resolution . . . As illustrated by Matter of Avetisyan and other BIA
cases, administrative closure is `appropriate and necessary' in a
variety of circumstances.'').
Indeed, an outside consultant previously recommended that EOIR
explore administrative closure as a potential tool that could enhance
the efficiency for EOIR proceedings without compromising fairness.
EOIR, Booz Allen Hamilton, Legal Case Study: Summary Report at 26 (Apr.
6, 2017). Specifically, the consultant, after engaging in a year-long
study of EOIR operations, identified numerous external factors that
contribute to delays in adjudications. See generally id. Among other
things, the consultant recommended that the Department engage in
discussions with DHS to explore the development of policies regarding
administrative closure as one way to improve processing efficiency. Id.
at 26.
Separately, while the AA96 Final Rule asserted that administrative
closure would place the EOIR adjudicator in the position of the
prosecutor, 85 FR at 81599, upon reconsideration, the Department now
concurs with the reasoning in Matter of Avetisyan, which ``considered
the respective roles and responsibilities of the DHS, the Immigration
Judges, and the Board in removal proceedings'' and concluded that
``[a]lthough administrative closure impacts the course removal
proceedings may take, it does not preclude the DHS from instituting or
pursuing those proceedings and so does not infringe on the DHS's
prosecutorial discretion.'' 25 I&N Dec. at 694.\28\ Indeed,
administrative closure is similar to the widespread practice of stays
of proceedings in federal court, which are often utilized to avoid
unnecessary litigation. See, e.g., Ayanian v. Garland, 64 F.4th 1074,
1078-79 (9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that the court previously granted a
motion to stay appellate proceedings ``to allow time to examine grounds
for a possible alternative to litigation'').
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\28\ The AA96 NPRM asserted that the Board, in Matter of
Avetisyan departed, without explanation, from its prior precedent in
Matter of Chamizo, 13 I&N Dec. 435 (BIA 1969), Matter of Quintero,
18 I&N Dec. 348 (BIA 1982), and Matter of Roussis, 18 I&N Dec. 256
(BIA 1982). 85 FR at 52503. However, upon further examination, the
Department is now of the opinion that the AA96 NPRM's reliance on
those cases for the proposition that administrative closure
infringes upon DHS's prosecutorial discretion was inapposite.
Notably, none of those cases involved administrative closure.
Further, Matter of Chamizo cannot reasonably be read to implicate
DHS's prosecutorial discretion authority, as that case was about the
impropriety of an immigration judge granting voluntary departure
without entering an alternative order of removal, as was required by
the Act and pertinent regulations at the time. 13 I&N Dec. at 437.
As to Matter of Quintero and Matter of Roussis, those cases are most
logically read to stand for the proposition that an immigration
judge is not permitted to take an action that is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of or otherwise committed to the discretion
of the former INS District Director. Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec.
at 350; Matter of Roussis, 18 I&N Dec. at 258. Accordingly, Matter
of Avetisyan is not inconsistent with those cases because the
administrative closure of a case does not usurp authority from DHS
or require that DHS take or refrain from taking any specific action
otherwise committed to its discretion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The AA96 NPRM stated that administrative closure precludes DHS from
pursuing removal proceedings while the administrative closure order is
in effect. 85 FR at 52503. However, either party can file a motion to
recalendar a case at any time. Thus, if, for example, an individual's
case has been administratively closed while the individual's prima
facie eligible application for adjustment of status is pending before
DHS and DHS has a strong interest in concluding proceedings, DHS need
only complete adjudication of the application before it and file a
motion to recalendar the case, actions well within its control. If the
EOIR adjudicator grants the motion to recalendar, the case will
proceed.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Department proposes
regulatory language explicitly providing that immigration judges' and
the Board's authority to take ``any action'' includes administratively
closing cases. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (proposed), 1003.10(b)
(proposed).\29\ The Department's proposed language emphasizes that the
phrase ``any action'' is intended to be interpreted broadly to include
the general authority to take actions regardless of whether they are
explicitly described by regulation by stating that ``[s]uch actions
include,'' but are not limited to, administrative closure, so long as
such actions, are ``necessary or appropriate'' and are otherwise
consistent with governing statutes and regulations. Id.
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\29\ As discussed above, the Department finds persuasive the
reasoning of several circuit courts that have determined that this
authority was previously inherent but not explicitly stated in the
regulations as they existed prior to the AA96 Final Rule. See
Romero, 937 F.3d at 294-95 (holding that the regulations
``unambiguously confer upon [immigration judges] and the BIA the
general authority to administratively close cases'' but stating that
even if ambiguous, ``the Attorney General's reading of the
regulations does not warrant deference because it amounts to an
`unfair surprise' ''); Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 667 (concluding
that Matter of Castro-Tum was contrary to the unambiguous meaning of
the regulations and that immigration judges and the Board are ``not
precluded from administratively closing cases when appropriate'');
Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 122 (holding that ``the plain language
establishes that general administrative closure authority is
unambiguously authorized by these regulations''); see also Zelaya
Diaz v. Rosen, 986 F.3d at 691-92 (applying Meza Morales).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department does not believe that existing regulations that
expressly authorize administrative closure in certain circumstances are
sufficient to capture the numerous scenarios where it may be necessary
or appropriate for EOIR adjudicators to administratively close
proceedings based upon the particular facts of any given case. See,
e.g., 8 CFR 1214.2(a) (referencing administrative closure for T visa
applicants); 1214.3 (referencing administrative closure for V visa
applicants); 1240.62(b) (referencing administrative closure for certain
American Baptist Church (ABC) class members); 1240.70(f)-(h)
(referencing administrative closure for ABC class members, among
others); 1245.13(d)(3)(i) (referencing administrative closure for
certain nationals of Nicaragua and Cuba); 1245.15(p)(4)(i) (referencing
administrative closure for Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of
1998 (``HRIFA'') applicants); 1245.21(c) (referencing administrative
closure for certain nationals of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). Limiting
administrative closure to these discrete scenarios would not permit
EOIR adjudicators to consider other important factors that may render a
case ripe for administrative closure. Thus, using administrative
closure only in these enumerated circumstances would limit
[[Page 62259]]
administrative closure's efficacy as a docket-management tool. Nor do
the regulations explicitly authorize administrative closure in common
scenarios where administrative closure may be necessary or appropriate,
such as where noncitizens may have pending applications for relief
before DHS.
The Department proposes revising the phrase ``appropriate and
necessary'' to read ``necessary or appropriate'' to emphasize that
adjudicators may choose to administratively close cases, or take other
actions, even if such action is not required.\30\ For example,
administrative closure may be appropriate even where other docket
management tools, such as continuances, may be available. See Meza
Morales, 973 F.3d at 665 (``Administrative closure is plainly an
`action.' . . . in cases in which two coordinate offices in the
executive branch are simultaneously adjudicating collateral
applications, closing one proceeding might help advance a case toward
resolution.''); Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 691 (stating that
adjudicators may determine that it is ``necessary or, in the interests
of justice and fairness to the parties, prudent to defer further action
for some period of time''); Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791 n.4
(noting that administrative closure could ``avoid the repeated
rescheduling of a case that is clearly not ready to be concluded''). As
another example, the Sixth Circuit recently determined that, although a
noncitizen could theoretically apply for an unlawful presence waiver
from outside of the United States if EOIR did not administratively
close their case (a prerequisite for applying for a provisional
unlawful presence waiver in the United States pursuant to 8 CFR
212.7(e)(4)(iii)), administrative closure was still appropriate because
it ``increases the likelihood that noncitizens will obtain legal status
and resolve their immigration proceedings.'' Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d at
992; see id. (``True, a noncitizen in removal proceedings whose case[ ]
is not administratively closed may still submit an I-601 Waiver of
Inadmissibility after they complete their consular interview and are
determined inadmissible. This old path, however, deterred noncitizens
in removal proceedings from obtaining legal status as permanent
residents.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ The Department would like to make this distinction clear in
light of Hernandez-Serrano, which stated that the Romero ``court's
conclusion--that any action for the disposition of the case is read
most naturally to encompass actions of whatever kind appropriate for
the resolution of a case--reads out of the regulations the
requirement of necessity.'' 981 F.3d at 464 (cleaned up).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department also proposes to amend the term ``disposition'' to
read ``disposition or alternative resolution'' of a case. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (proposed), 1003.10(b) (proposed). The Department
proposes this amendment to establish that actions other than those that
lead to a final disposition in a case may still be necessary or
appropriate for resolution of the case.\31\ See Arcos Sanchez, 997 F.3d
at 117 (``Administrative closure allows an [immigration judge] or the
Board to `temporarily pause removal proceedings' and place the case on
hold because of a pending alternative resolution or because events
outside the control of either party may affect the case.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ The Department would like to make this distinction clear in
light of Hernandez-Serrano, which stated that ``the regulations
expressly limit their delegation to actions `necessary for the
disposition' of the case . . . [a]nd that more restricted delegation
cannot support a decision not to decide the case for reasons of
administrative `convenience' or the `efficient management of the
resources of the immigration courts and the BIA.' '' 981 F.3d at
464. But see Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 665 (``Unsurprisingly, then,
an immigration judge might sometimes conclude, in exercising the
discretion granted by 8 CFR 1003.10, that it is appropriate and
necessary to dispose of a case through administrative closure.'').
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Moreover, the Department proposes to amend 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)
(proposed) and 1003.10(b) (proposed) to explain that the adjudicator
should determine whether the use of administrative closure meets the
relevant standard in accordance with 8 CFR 1003.1(l) (proposed) or
1003.18(c) (proposed), as applicable. The Department notes that some of
the factors proposed for administrative closure may be similar to
factors proposed for other authorities such as termination. Compare 8
CFR 1003.1(l) (proposed Board administrative closure provision), and
1003.18(c) (proposed immigration judge administrative closure
provision), with 8 CFR 1003.1(m) (proposed Board termination
provision), and 1003.18(d) (proposed immigration judge termination
provision). Thus, an adjudicator should decide which of these tools, if
any, to use based upon the specific facts of each particular case in an
exercise of the adjudicator's independent judgment and discretion. 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), 1003.10(b). Furthermore, the Department also
proposes to clarify that the administrative closure authority would not
be limited by the existence of any other regulations authorizing or
requiring administrative closure. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1214.2(a), 1214.3,
1240.62(b), 1240.70(f)-(h), 1245.13, 1245.15(p)(4)(i), and 1245.21(c).
As discussed above, the Department proposes to add regulatory
language that would define administrative closure and set forth
guidance to assist adjudicators with determining whether administrative
closure is necessary or appropriate for the disposition or alternative
resolution of a case. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(1), (3) (proposed),
1003.18(c)(1), (3) (proposed). Such guidance is consistent with
established precedent prior to Matter of Castro-Tum. See Matter of
Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 688. Additionally, the proposed language
would also define recalendaring and set forth guidance for adjudicators
to consider when determining whether it is appropriate to recalendar a
case. 8 CFR 1003.1(l), (l)(2) (proposed), 1003.18(c), (c)(2)
(proposed).
Specifically, the proposed rule would define administrative closure
as ``the temporary suspension of a case.'' 8 CFR 1003.1(l) (proposed),
1003.18(c) (proposed); see Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 695
(stating that it is an ``undisputed fact that administrative closure
does not result in a final order''). Accordingly, the regulations would
describe administrative closure as an act that would remove a case from
the Board's or immigration court's active docket or calendar until the
case is recalendared. 8 CFR 1003.1(l) (proposed), 1003.18(c)
(proposed).\32\ The proposed rule would specify that an EOIR
adjudicator ``shall grant a motion to administratively close or
recalendar filed jointly by both parties, or filed by one party where
the other party has affirmatively indicated its non-opposition, unless
[the adjudicator] articulates unusual, clearly identified, and
supported reasons for denying the motion.'' \33\ 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3)
[[Page 62260]]
(proposed), 1003.18(c)(3) (proposed). This language adopts the standard
articulated in BIA precedent in the context of joint and affirmatively
unopposed motions to continue. See Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 791
(``The [motion to continue should be granted] by the Immigration Judge
in the absence of unusual, clearly identified, and supported reasons
for not doing so.''). The Department believes that it is appropriate to
extend this standard to motions for administrative closure or
recalendaring, as well as motions to terminate, as discussed in Section
IV.C of this preamble, to help promote greater administrative
efficiency and eliminate needless confusion for adjudicators and
parties.
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\32\ The regulations also specify that immigration judges may
manage their dockets through the use of continuances. 8 CFR 1003.29.
Continuances keep the case on the immigration judge's active docket
and are used ``to await additional action required of the parties''
to ready the case for final adjudication ``that will be, or is
expected to be, completed within a reasonably certain and brief
amount of time.'' Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 691. By
comparison, administrative closure is a tool that removes a case
from an immigration judge's active docket, normally to await some
collateral event whose outcome is not yet known and may not be known
within a definitive time period, that may impact the course of
removal proceedings, and requires a party to move to recalendar in
order to re-initiate adjudication. Id. at 692.
\33\ In practice, immigration judges are encouraged to resolve
administrative closure issues as early as possible in a case by
affirmatively asking parties whether they wish for cases to be
administratively closed. See EOIR, Director's Memorandum 22-03,
Administrative Closure (Nov. 22, 2021) at 3-4. The Department notes
that a motion to administratively close a case before the
immigration court may be made in writing or, alternatively, orally
in court.
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Moreover, the Department believes that where a motion to
administratively close or recalendar a case either is filed jointly or
is affirmatively unopposed, a denial of such a motion serves no
adversarial interest and that, absent other very compelling reasons,
the interests in administrative efficiency dictate granting the motion.
See Matter of Yewondwosen, 21 I&N Dec. 1025, 1026 (BIA 1997) (stating
that the parties' ``agreement on an issue or proper course of action
should, in most instances, be determinative''); see alsoBadwan v.
Gonzales, 494 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that when the
government expressed ```no objection to opposing counsel's request' . .
. the government's position demonstrate[d] at a minimum that, as
between the parties to the case, no adversarial interest was served by
the denial'' of the noncitizen's motion); Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 665
(discussing the interests served by the administrative closure of
cases). By requiring the adjudicator to articulate on the record
unusual, clearly identified, and supported reasons for denying a joint
or affirmatively unopposed motion, the Department acknowledges that
rare circumstances might arise when, in the adjudicator's judgment,
administrative closure or recalendaring might be inappropriate. Thus,
the standard provides adjudicators the flexibility to address the
complexities of an individual case, while requiring the adjudicator to
issue a reasoned explanation that provides the parties with due notice
of the basis for a denial. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3) (proposed), 1003.18(c)(3)
(proposed).
In the case of motions to administratively close or recalendar
proceedings that are neither presented jointly nor affirmatively
unopposed, the proposed rule would permit EOIR adjudicators, having
considered the totality of the circumstances, to grant such a motion
over any party's objection. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3) (proposed),
1003.18(c)(3) (proposed); see Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 694
(holding that EOIR adjudicators may administratively close proceedings
over a party's objection). The proposed rule would specify that, though
administrative closure may be appropriate where a petition,
application, or other action is pending outside of EOIR proceedings,
there is no requirement of a pending petition, application, or other
action for a case to be administratively closed. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3)
(proposed), 1003.18(c)(3) (proposed). The proposed rule would specify
that any other regulations that separately authorize or require
adjudicators to administratively close cases in specific circumstances
do not impact the adjudicator's general authority to administratively
close cases. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(1) (proposed), 1003.18(c)(1) (proposed);
see Meza Morales, 973 F.3d at 667 (construing the term ``any action''
broadly).
In all cases where only one party moves for administrative closure
or recalendaring, and the motion is not affirmatively unopposed, the
proposed rule would require adjudicators to weigh the totality of the
circumstances, taking into consideration all relevant factors,
including any relevant factors from a nonexhaustive list, before
determining whether, in their discretion, administrative closure or
recalendaring \34\ is appropriate. The nonexhaustive list of factors
relevant to administrative closure includes: (1) the reason
administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to
administrative closure; (3) any requirement that a case be
administratively closed for a petition, application, or other action to
be filed with, or granted by, DHS; (4) the likelihood the noncitizen
will succeed on any petition, application, or other action that the
noncitizen is pursuing, or that the noncitizen states in writing or on
the record at a hearing that they plan to pursue, outside of
proceedings before the adjudicator; (5) the anticipated duration of the
administrative closure; (6) the responsibility of either party, if any,
in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (7) the
ultimate anticipated outcome of the case. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3)(i)
(proposed), 1003.18(c)(3)(i) (proposed); see Matter of Avetisyan, 25
I&N Dec. at 696 (listing factors for consideration relevant to
administrative closure).
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\34\ See Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 18 n.4 (BIA 2017)
(stating that the same factors should be considered for
recalendaring as for administrative closure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When considering whether it would be appropriate to
administratively close a case, the EOIR adjudicator must weigh the
totality of the listed factors to the extent they are applicable. See
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 696 (``[I]t is appropriate for an
Immigration Judge or the Board to weigh all relevant factors presented
. . .'') (emphasis added). Accordingly, the existence or absence of any
one factor is not dispositive of the immigration judge's determination.
Cf. Hernandez-Castillo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 199, 209 (5th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that Matter of Avetisyan only required the BIA to evaluate
the ``relevant factors presented in the case'' and did not require the
BIA to ``evaluate every factor in detail''). For example, there is no
requirement that the noncitizen must be pursuing, or must plan to
pursue, a petition, application, or other action outside of proceedings
as a prerequisite for an immigration judge to administratively close a
case. Instead, the immigration judge in such a case would consider the
other factors that are applicable to the particular facts and
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether to grant or
deny administrative closure. Ultimately, the immigration judge's or the
Board's determination whether to grant administrative closure is a
discretionary decision. The Department notes that the proposed
administrative closure factors differ from those set forth in Matter of
Avetisyan by adding a factor for consideration: whether the need for
administrative closure is a prerequisite to a petition, application, or
other action being filed with, or granted by, DHS. The Department is
proposing this factor in light of the fairness and efficiency interests
that would be served by allowing a noncitizen to pursue relief that may
be available, and that may resolve a case, without expending
unnecessary EOIR and party resources on litigation.
With respect to the second factor for consideration, the Department
proposes to make it clear that adjudicators should consider whether
there is any opposition to administrative closure, in addition to the
basis for any such opposition. An EOIR adjudicator may administratively
close a case based on a joint motion, a motion that is unopposed, or
over any party's opposition. The principle that an adjudicator, having
considered the totality of the circumstances, may administratively
close a case over a party's objection is consistent with
[[Page 62261]]
Matter of Avetisyan. See 25 I&N Dec. at 694 (stating that ``neither an
Immigration Judge nor the Board may abdicate the responsibility to
exercise independent judgment and discretion in a case by permitting a
party's opposition to act as an absolute bar to administrative closure
of that case when circumstances otherwise warrant such action'').
The Department notes that one reason administrative closure is
sought could be a representation by DHS that it wishes for a particular
case to be administratively closed based on an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. As described above, administrative closure
has long been used to facilitate DHS's exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, see Section III.B.1 of this preamble, and it generally
would be inefficient for EOIR to otherwise press forward with
proceedings in such cases. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 S.
Ct. 1964, 1972 (2023) (``In light of inevitable resource constraints
and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs, the
Executive Branch must balance many factors when devising arrest and
prosecution strategies.''). The Department believes that an EOIR
adjudicator's role as a neutral arbiter is better served by devoting
resources to those cases where DHS has expressed a continued interest
in effectuating an order of removal. In other words, an EOIR
adjudicator may grant administrative closure solely for equitable
considerations in order to suspend the proceedings before EOIR, such as
DHS's determination that it will not use its limited resources to
proceed with removal proceedings against a particular noncitizen at
that time.
On the other hand, the Department notes that a noncitizen may, at
times, oppose a motion for administrative closure due to the
noncitizen's desire to seek immigration relief available in proceedings
before EOIR. See Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 20 (``The respondent
is opposed to the continuation of administrative closure and has
requested recalendaring of the proceedings. He has explained that he
wants to pursue his application for asylum to its resolution.''). As
set out in the proposed rule, the noncitizen's objection to
administrative closure in such a situation would be considered as a
factor in the analysis but would not by itself be dispositive. The
Department notes that DHS may also have valid reasons for objecting to
administrative closure where, for example, it is clearly unlikely that
an individual will obtain relief in other proceedings. See, e.g., Jesus
Garcia-Garcia, A092-286-960 (BIA May 28, 2009) (non-precedential)
(``DHS has continued to oppose administrative closure by reason of the
respondent's failure to meet the eligibility requirements [for a 212(c)
waiver].'').
The Department seeks comments regarding whether the proposed rule
should include any further protections for noncitizens who wish to have
their cases adjudicated despite DHS's desire to seek administrative
closure, including whether the rule, if finalized, should provide that,
where one party opposes administrative closure, the primary
consideration for the adjudicator is whether the party opposing closure
has provided a persuasive reason for the case to proceed. See Matter of
W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 20, n.5 (holding that ``the primary
consideration for an Immigration Judge in determining whether to
administratively close . . . proceedings is whether the party opposing
administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the case to
proceed and be resolved on the merits,'' but ``continu[ing] to hold
that neither party has absolute veto power over administrative closure
requests'' (quotation omitted)). As noted above, there may be
situations where DHS opposes administrative closure.
With respect to the fifth and sixth factors for consideration--the
anticipated duration of the closure and the responsibility of either
party, if any, in contributing to any current, anticipated, or
continuing need for delay--the Department notes that adjudicators
should consider both the noncitizen's and DHS's responsibility for any
delay. DHS's responsibility for any delay may include DHS's failure to
resolve the noncitizen's pending applications or requests for relief
that, if granted, may obviate the need for removal proceedings or
significantly narrow the issues before EOIR. Moreover, the potential
duration of the administrative closure while awaiting DHS adjudication,
for example, of a pending application before USCIS, should not weigh
against the decision to administratively close proceedings.
Although the Department generally agrees with Matter of W-Y-U-'s
determination that the factors for administrative closure and
recalendaring should be similar, recalendaring requires slightly
different considerations than the initial decision to administratively
close a case because, at the time an EOIR adjudicator may be
considering recalendaring, there may be more available information
regarding developments in the case that have happened during the
administrative closure. Such information could aid adjudicators in
their decisions. For example, while considering administrative closure,
EOIR adjudicators can only anticipate the duration of the requested
administrative closure; however, for recalendaring, adjudicators will
have more definitive knowledge about the length of time that the case
has actually been administratively closed. As another example, when
considering recalendaring, EOIR adjudicators would have the benefit of
knowing whether parties have taken important steps towards achieving
the purpose of the administrative closure--such as filing for relief
with another agency--or knowing whether another agency has completed
adjudication of alternative forms of relief. In addition, EOIR
adjudicators would have additional information about any new positive
or negative factors, such as subsequent criminal history, that would
weigh for or against recalendaring a case. Therefore, the proposed rule
sets out a separate list of relevant factors that adjudicators should
consider, as the circumstances of the case warrant, when evaluating a
motion to recalendar.
The nonexhaustive list of factors for recalendaring includes: (1)
the reason recalendaring is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to
recalendaring; (3) the length of time elapsed since the case was
administratively closed; (4) if the case was administratively closed to
allow the noncitizen to file a petition, application, or other action
outside of proceedings before the adjudicator, whether the noncitizen
filed the petition, application, or other action and, if so, the length
of time that elapsed between when the case was administratively closed
and when the noncitizen filed the petition, application, or other
action; (5) if a petition, application, or other action that was
pending outside of proceedings has been adjudicated, the result of that
adjudication; (6) if a petition, application, or other action remains
pending outside of proceedings, the likelihood the noncitizen will
succeed on that petition, application, or other action; and (7) the
ultimate anticipated outcome if the case is recalendared. 8 CFR
1003.1(l)(3)(ii) (proposed), 1003.18(c)(3)(ii) (proposed).
Additionally, the proposed rule would permit EOIR adjudicators, having
considered the totality of the circumstances, to recalendar a case over
any party's objection. 8 CFR 1003.1(l)(3) (proposed), 1003.18(c)(3)
(proposed).
The Department emphasizes that the proposed list of factors for
recalendaring is non-exhaustive, with no single factor necessarily
dispositive. For example, with respect to the fourth factor--
[[Page 62262]]
measuring the duration between the administrative closure of the case
and the time when the noncitizen filed a petition, application, or
other action with DHS--the Department notes that the length of time is
not, on its face, determinative. The Department is aware that some
petitions, applications, or other actions are more complex or require
more time, and that the passage of time is not necessarily a reflection
of a lack of diligence or an intent to unnecessarily delay proceedings.
Rather, the adjudicator may consider this as one of many factors,
including whether the noncitizen has not exercised diligence in
applying for collateral relief with DHS or is seeking to unnecessarily
delay proceedings.
Given the complexity of these issues, the Department specifically
requests public comment on whether the specified factors for
adjudicators to consider in adjudicating motions to administratively
close and motions to recalendar cases are appropriate and whether the
proposed factors should be revised in any way. Specifically, the
Department seeks public input on whether the proposed rule should
specify that a request for administrative closure to allow for the
adjudication of a petition, application, or other action should
generally be granted as long as the noncitizen demonstrates a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and that the noncitizen
has been reasonably diligent in pursuing such relief. The Department
also seeks comment on whether the proposed rule should set out specific
scenarios in which administrative closure may be appropriate where
there is no petition, application, or other action pending outside EOIR
proceedings. Moreover, the Department seeks comment on whether
administrative closure should be upon the motion of a party or whether
it might be necessary or appropriate in certain situations for an
immigration judge or a Board member to administratively close a case
without having received a written motion and, if on appeal, in
situations in which parties do not generally have the opportunity to
make an oral motion before the Board.
C. Termination and Dismissal
The Department proposes to amend its regulations at 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (pertaining to Appellate Immigration Judges) and 8 CFR
1003.10(b) (pertaining to immigration judges) to make clear that EOIR
adjudicators' authority to ``take any action consistent with their
authorities under the Act and the regulations that is necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or alternative resolution of such
cases'' includes the authority to terminate or dismiss proceedings.\35\
The Department believes that the termination or dismissal of
proceedings in appropriate situations is consistent with immigration
judges' and Appellate Immigration Judges' statutory authority and
duties. See Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec at 651-52; Gonzalez,
16 F.4th at 141 (``[W]e fail to see how the general power to terminate
proceedings is inconsistent with the authorities bestowed by the
INA.'') (cleaned up); see also 8 CFR 1240.12(c) (indicating that an
immigration judge's order ``shall direct the respondent's removal from
the United States, or the termination of proceedings, or other such
disposition of the case as may be appropriate'').
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\35\ The Department notes that termination is a case
``disposition'' under 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b), not an
``alternative resolution,'' and is only referred to as such
throughout this NPRM. Gonzalez, 16 F.4th at 141 (``Termination of
proceedings certainly falls within this court's reading of `any
action'; indeed, termination actually ends a proceeding rather than
merely facilitating its end.'') (cleaned up).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an initial matter, while the terms ``dismissal'' and
``termination'' have been used interchangeably in case law in some
instances, see, e.g., Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. at 648
n.1; Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 284 (BIA 1998), the Department
proposes to more clearly delineate the circumstances in which the
immigration judge's order disposing of a case should be an order of
dismissal as compared with circumstances in which the immigration
judge's order disposing of a case should be an order of termination.
See 8 CFR 1239.2(b) (proposed).
The proposed rule would specify that EOIR adjudicators may only
enter an order to dismiss proceedings upon a motion by DHS seeking
dismissal pursuant to 8 CFR 1239.2(c) for the reasons specified in 8
CFR 239.2(a). See 8 CFR 1239.2(b) (proposed). The Department proposes
that a motion to dismiss proceedings for a reason other than those
authorized by paragraph (c) should be deemed a motion to terminate and
adjudicated pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.1(m) (proposed) or 1003.18(d)
(proposed). Id.
The Department further proposes to amend 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and
1003.10(b) to explain that an adjudicator should determine whether the
use of termination or dismissal meets the appropriate standard in
accordance with the provisions in 8 CFR 1003.1(m) (proposed),
1003.18(d) (proposed), or 1239.2(c) (dismissal provision). The
Department reiterates that some of the factors proposed for termination
may be similar to factors proposed for administrative closure; however,
as previously stated, the adjudicator will exercise their independent
judgment and discretion to decide which of these tools to use, if any,
based upon the specific facts of each particular case. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(ii), 1003.10(b).
Substantively, the Department does not propose to modify the
dismissal grounds referenced by 8 CFR 1239.2(c). However, the
Department believes that it is important for immigration judges and
Appellate Immigration Judges to have the authority to terminate
proceedings in circumstances outside of those explicitly identified in
existing regulations, which do not expressly capture all situations
where EOIR adjudicators' exercise of that authority may be necessary or
appropriate for the disposition of a case. See Matter of Coronado
Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. at 651-52 (noting situations not explicitly
enumerated in the regulations in which EOIR adjudicators have commonly
deemed termination of proceedings to be an appropriate disposition of
the case). In such circumstances, these proposed termination grounds
can promote efficiency and fairness and help immigration judges and
Appellate Immigration Judges better manage their calendars and dockets.
See id. at 651 (indicating that precluding termination of proceedings
in certain common situations not accounted for in the regulations
``would undermine the fair and efficient adjudication'' of cases in
some instances) (citing Matter of A-C-A-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 351, 351 (A.G.
2021)).
Accordingly, the Department proposes to codify EOIR adjudicators'
termination authority as detailed below. The proposed rule
distinguishes between EOIR adjudicators' authority to terminate
removal, deportation, and exclusion proceedings and their authority to
terminate all other types of proceedings. See 8 CFR 1003.1(m)
(proposed), 1003.18(d) (proposed). Although the issue of termination is
likely to occur most frequently in the context of removal, deportation,
and exclusion proceedings, the Department is cognizant that issues
related to termination may also arise in other types of proceedings,
including asylum-only proceedings (8 CFR 1208.2(c)(1)) and withholding-
only proceedings (8 CFR 1241.8(e)).\36\ However, because the
[[Page 62263]]
scope of these proceedings is more limited than the scope of removal,
deportation, and exclusion proceedings, many of the grounds for
termination of removal, deportation, and exclusion proceedings will be
inapplicable to or inappropriate for other types of proceedings.\37\
The Department thus believes it is appropriate to provide separate and
distinct termination authority for other types of proceedings.
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\36\ The Department identifies these types of proceedings as
examples only. The proposed rule's framework for termination of
other proceedings in 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(2) (proposed) and 8 CFR
1003.18(d)(2) (proposed) applies to all proceedings other than
removal, deportation, and exclusion proceedings, though the
Department anticipates that grounds for termination in other types
of proceedings will be less common.
\37\ As an illustrative example, withholding-only proceedings
involve noncitizens subject to reinstatement of prior removal orders
under INA241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), and noncitizens subject to
expedited removal under INA238(b), 8 U.S.C. 1228(b). See 8
CFR1208.2(c)(2). The scope of review in withholding-only proceedings
is limited to adjudication of whether the noncitizen is eligible for
withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against
Torture pursuant to INA 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). See 8 CFR
1208.2(c)(3)(i). Indeed, during withholding-only proceedings, ``all
parties are prohibited from raising or considering any other issues,
including but not limited to issues of admissibility, deportability,
eligibility for waivers, and eligibility for any other form of
relief.'' Id. Because of this explicit limitation in the scope of
the proceedings, many of the grounds for termination of removal,
deportation, and exclusion proceedings do not apply to withholding-
only proceedings. See also id. (discussing limited scope of review
in asylum-only proceedings); cf. Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I&N Dec.
644, 647 (BIA 2015) (stating that EOIR adjudicators lack the
``jurisdiction to consider whether [asylum-only] proceedings were
improvidently instituted pursuant to a referral under the [Visa
Waiver Program]'').
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The proposed rule categorizes EOIR adjudicators' termination
authority as follows: (1) mandatory termination in removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings, 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(i) (proposed); (2) discretionary termination
in removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings, 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(1)(ii) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(ii) (proposed); and (3)
mandatory and discretionary termination in other proceedings, 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(2) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(2) (proposed).
The proposed rule identifies specific circumstances where
termination would be required, and others where termination would be
discretionary. The proposed rule would require termination in removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings where: (1) no charge of
deportability, inadmissibility, or excludability can be sustained; (2)
fundamentally fair proceedings are not possible because the noncitizen
is not mentally competent and adequate safeguards are unavailable; (3)
the noncitizen has, since the initiation of proceedings, obtained
United States citizenship; (4) the noncitizen has, since the initiation
of proceedings, obtained lawful permanent resident status, refugee
status, asylee status, or nonimmigrant status under INA 101(a)(15)(S),
(T), or (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(S), (T), or (U), that has not been
revoked or terminated, and the noncitizen would not have been
deportable, inadmissible, or excludable as charged if the noncitizen
had obtained such status before the initiation of proceedings; \38\ (5)
termination is required as provided in 8 CFR 1245.13(l); (6)
termination is otherwise required by law; or (7) the parties jointly
filed a motion to terminate, or one party filed a motion to terminate
and the other party affirmatively indicated its non-opposition, unless
the adjudicator articulates unusual, clearly identified, and supported
reasons for denying the motion. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i) (proposed),
1003.18(d)(1)(i) (proposed).
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\38\ This proposed provision is not intended to amend an EOIR
adjudicator's discretion to reopen cases. Where such lawful
immigration status is obtained after the conclusion of removal
proceedings, reopening and termination may well be appropriate;
however, this proposed authority relates solely to termination, and
the Department is not suggesting that reopening would be required.
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Regarding the mandatory grounds for termination of removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings, the Board has held that
termination of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings is
appropriate where DHS cannot sustain the charges of removability.
Matter of Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I&N Dec. at 44; see Matter of Ortega-
Quezada, 28 I&N Dec. 598, 604 (BIA 2022) (``Because the respondent is
not removable as charged, we will sustain the appeal and terminate the
proceedings.''). Furthermore, if the noncitizen has obtained one of the
statuses enumerated above, and the noncitizen would not have been
deportable, inadmissible, or excludable as charged if the status had
been obtained prior to the initiation of proceedings, there would be no
need to continue with the proceedings based upon charges that would not
have been sustainable. Moreover, the Department proposes to make clear
that termination is required where fundamentally fair removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings are not possible because the
noncitizen lacks mental competency and adequate safeguards are
unavailable. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)(B) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(i)(B)
(proposed); cf. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 483 (BIA 2011) (``In
some cases, even where the court and the parties undertake their best
efforts to ensure appropriate safeguards, concerns may remain. In these
cases, the Immigration Judge may pursue alternatives with the
parties.''). In addition, the Department further proposes to make clear
that it is not limiting termination authority, as specified in the
existing regulations or as otherwise required by constitutional,
statutory, or binding case law. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)(E)-(F)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(i)(E)-(F) (proposed).
Finally, the proposed rule would mandate that EOIR adjudicators
grant joint motions to terminate removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, or motions to terminate such proceedings by one party to
which the other party has affirmatively indicated its non-opposition,
unless the adjudicator articulates unusual, clearly identified, and
supported reasons for denying the motion. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)(G)
(proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(i)(G) (proposed); cf. Matter of Hashmi, 24
I&N Dec. at 791 (stating that in considering a noncitizen's motion to
continue, ``[i]f the DHS affirmatively expresses a lack of opposition,
the [motion should be granted] by the Immigration Judge in the absence
of unusual, clearly identified, and supported reasons for not doing
so''); see also Matter of Yewondwosen, 21 I&N Dec. at 1026 (stating
that the parties' ``agreement on an issue or proper course of action
should, in most instances, be determinative''); Badwan, 494 F.3d at 568
(noting that when the government expressed `` `no objection to opposing
counsel's request' . . . the government's position demonstrate[d] at a
minimum that, as between the parties to the case, no adversarial
interest was served by the denial'' of the noncitizen's motion).
However, the Department notes that either party retains the ability to
timely rescind its participation in a joint termination motion or its
affirmative non-opposition to termination should circumstances change,
such as the discovery of new relevant evidence.
The proposed ``unusual, clearly identified, and supported''
language is based on the Hashmi standard for joint and affirmatively
unopposed motions to continue, and also matches the proposed language
in this rule for joint or affirmatively unopposed motions for
administrative closure. See Section IV.B of this preamble. The
Department believes that it is appropriate to extend this standard to
motions for termination, which will help promote greater administrative
efficiency and eliminate needless confusion for adjudicators and
parties.
In requiring that the adjudicator articulate on the record unusual,
clearly identified, and supported reasons for denying a joint or
affirmatively unopposed motion to terminate, the Department
acknowledges that rare
[[Page 62264]]
circumstances might arise where, in the adjudicator's judgment,
termination might be inappropriate, even when the motion is presented
jointly or is affirmatively unopposed. Thus, the standard provides
adjudicators needed flexibility to address the complexities of an
individual case, while also requiring due notice to the parties of the
reasons for the denial. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(i)(G) (proposed),
1003.18(d)(1)(i)(G) (proposed).
Additionally, the proposed rule would allow for discretionary
termination of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings in the
following specific circumstances: (1) where an unaccompanied child, as
defined in proposed 8 CFR 1001.1(hh), states an intent, either in
writing or on the record at a hearing, to seek asylum with USCIS, and
USCIS has initial jurisdiction over the application pursuant to section
208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(C); (2) where the
noncitizen demonstrates prima facie eligibility for relief from removal
or lawful status based on a petition, application, or other action that
USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate, including naturalization or
adjustment of status; (3) where the noncitizen is a beneficiary of
Temporary Protected Status, deferred action, or Deferred Enforced
Departure; \39\ (4) where USCIS has granted a provisional unlawful
presence waiver pursuant to 8 CFR 212.7(e); (5) where termination is
otherwise authorized by 8 CFR 1216.4(a)(6) or 1238.1(e); (6) where the
parties have filed a motion to terminate as described in 8 CFR
214.14(c)(1)(i) or 214.11(d)(1)(i); or (7) under other comparable
circumstances, as discussed in further detail below. Termination is up
to the adjudicator's discretion in these circumstances, and the
adjudicator may consider any basis for opposition to termination in
making their determination.
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\39\ The President may authorize Deferred Enforced Departure
pursuant to the President's constitutional authority to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States. See Deferred Enforced
Departure, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/deferred-enforced-departure. The Department notes that Deferred Enforced
Departure ``is not a specific immigration status,'' but noncitizens
who are covered by Deferred Enforced Departure ``are not subject to
removal from the United States for a designated period of time.''
See id.
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The Department proposes these discretionary grounds for termination
of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings for the following
reasons. A number of these grounds focus on circumstances where
alternative relief may be available to the noncitizen that would end
the need for continued proceedings, thereby saving EOIR adjudicatory
resources for other cases. These include: (1) a noncitizen
demonstrating prima facie eligibility for relief from removal or for a
lawful status based on a petition, application, or other action that
USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate; (2) an unaccompanied child, as
defined in proposed 8 CFR 1001.1(hh), intending to apply for asylum
with USCIS; and (3) a beneficiary of Temporary Protected Status,
deferred action, or Deferred Enforced Departure. See Matter of Coronado
Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. at 651-52 (explaining that EOIR adjudicators
commonly exercised termination authority when termination was necessary
for noncitizens ``to be eligible to seek immigration relief before
USCIS''). With respect to termination where a noncitizen has
demonstrated prima facie eligibility for relief from removal or for a
lawful status based on a petition, application, or other action that
USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate, the Department notes that EOIR
adjudicators must make such determinations based on the particular
facts of a given case and the Department does not intend this proposed
ground for discretionary termination to authorize a general practice of
terminating proceedings involving prima facie eligibility for asylum.
Rather, consistent with 8 CFR 1208.2(b), the default rule that EOIR
adjudicators continue to exercise authority over asylum applications
filed by noncitizens in removal proceedings would continue to apply.
In addition, where an immigrant visa is immediately available to a
noncitizen and USCIS has granted a provisional unlawful presence waiver
after the noncitizen filed a Form I-601A, Application for Provisional
Unlawful Presence Waiver, it may be appropriate to terminate
proceedings so the noncitizen can depart the United States to obtain a
visa through consular processing without becoming inadmissible on
another basis. See 78 FR at 544 (stating that ``[i]f the Form I-601A is
approved for [a noncitizen] whose proceedings have been
administratively closed, the [noncitizen] should seek termination or
dismissal of the proceedings, without prejudice, by EOIR . . . or risk
becoming ineligible for the immigrant visa based on another ground of
inadmissibility''); see also Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 28 I&N Dec. at
651 (suggesting that termination of proceedings may be appropriate
where ``the pendency of removal proceedings [could] cause[ ] adverse
immigration consequences for a respondent who must travel abroad to
obtain a visa'').
The proposed rule would also authorize immigration judges and
Appellate Immigration Judges to terminate removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings in the exercise of discretion in other comparable
circumstances when similarly necessary or appropriate for the
disposition or alternative resolution of the case. 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(G) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(G) (proposed). The
Department recognizes that there may be other circumstances not
explicitly stated in the proposed rule in which termination may also be
appropriate that are similar in nature to the explicit grounds in the
proposed rule authorizing termination. Moreover, similar to the
mandatory grounds for termination of removal, deportation, or exclusion
proceedings, the Department proposes to clarify that this proposed rule
is not intended to limit any pre-existing regulations authorizing
termination under certain circumstances. See 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(E)-
(F) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(E)-(F) (proposed). This proposed
standard would provide sufficient flexibility such that EOIR
adjudicators may terminate a case if it presents similar circumstances
to the enumerated grounds for termination and is otherwise necessary or
appropriate.
At the same time, this provision would implement important
guardrails to limit adjudicators' termination authority. See 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(G) (proposed) (precluding termination by the Board for
purely humanitarian reasons unless DHS expressly consents to
termination, joins in a motion to terminate, or affirmatively indicates
its non-opposition to a noncitizen's motion), 1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(G)
(proposed) (same for immigration judges); see also 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(2)(iii) (proposed) (providing that in proceedings other than
removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings, nothing in the proposed
regulatory provisions authorizes the Board to terminate proceedings
where prohibited by another regulatory provision), 1003.18(d)(2)(iii)
(proposed) (same for immigration judges). The Department acknowledges
that termination of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings is
inappropriate in certain circumstances. The proposed rule would not
change the longstanding principle that immigration judges and Appellate
Immigration Judges have no authority to review or second-guess DHS's
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, including its decision whether to
commence removal proceedings. See, e.g., Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25
I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011)
[[Page 62265]]
(holding that an immigration judge could not second-guess DHS exercise
of prosecutorial discretion to place an arriving noncitizen directly in
removal proceedings rather than the expedited removal process); Matter
of J-A-B- & I-J-V-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 168, 170 (BIA 2017) (explaining that
immigration judges and the Board do not have the authority to review a
DHS decision to initiate removal proceedings in a particular case);
Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. at 284 (stating that the decision to
institute deportation proceedings is not a decision that the
immigration judge or Board may review because it is an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion); see also Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d
1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that neither immigration judges
nor the Board possess the authority to review DHS's ``discretion
regarding when and whether to initiate [removal] proceedings'' (citing
authorities)). Similarly, an adjudicator may not terminate removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings for purely humanitarian reasons
unless DHS expressly consents to such termination, joins in a motion
for termination, or affirmatively states its non-opposition to a motion
for termination on such a basis. See Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d
1302, 1303 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that immigration judges have no
statutory or inherent power to terminate deportation proceedings over
the objection of INS to provide humanitarian relief not authorized by
the statute to a deportable noncitizen).
Moreover, in light of these proposed standards governing
termination of proceedings, the Department proposes to remove and
reserve 8 CFR 1239.2(f) as newly proposed language would cover the
circumstances currently addressed in that subsection. Compare 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(1)(ii)(B) (proposed) (authorizing termination by the Board
where a noncitizen demonstrates prima facie eligibility for relief from
removal or for a lawful status based on a petition, application, or
other action that USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate, including
naturalization or adjustment of status), and 1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(B)
(proposed) (same authorization for immigration judges), with 8 CFR
1239.2(f) (authorizing an immigration judge to terminate a noncitizen's
removal proceedings in order to pursue a pending application or
petition for naturalization).
Finally, although such scenarios may be rare, the proposed rule
also explicitly provides for termination in proceedings other than
removal, deportation, or exclusion. See 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(2) (proposed),
1003.18(d)(2) (proposed). Such proceeding types include, among others,
withholding-only, asylum-only, credible fear, reasonable fear,
rescission, and claimed status. The Department believes that providing
immigration judges and the Board with termination authority in these
limited proceedings will ensure that adjudicators are not limited from
reaching a proper resolution, as determined by the specific facts of
each case.
Substantively, as with removal, deportation, and exclusion
proceedings, the proposed rule requires immigration judges and the
Board to terminate these other proceedings where the parties have
jointly filed a motion to terminate, or one party has filed a motion to
terminate and the other party has affirmatively indicated its non-
opposition, unless the adjudicator articulates unusual, clearly
identified, and supported reasons for denying the motion. See 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(2)(i) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(2)(i) (proposed). The proposed
rule further requires immigration judges and the Board to terminate
these other proceedings when required by law, including by statute,
regulation, or binding Board or court decision. Id. In all other
circumstances, the proposed rule provides adjudicators with the general
discretionary authority to terminate these proceedings where necessary
or appropriate for the disposition or alternate resolution of the case,
subject to the same limitations as in removal proceedings. 8 CFR
1003.1(m)(2)(ii) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(2)(ii) (proposed). Finally, the
proposed rule specifies that nothing in the new provision allows
adjudicators to terminate proceedings where prohibited by another
regulatory provision; in other words, this new provision is not
intended to trump other regulatory provisions governing these
proceedings. 8 CFR 1003.1(m)(2)(iii) (proposed), 1003.18(d)(2)(iii)
(proposed).
The Department notes that, in some scenarios in these other
proceedings, alternative options to termination are available. For
example, it may be that an applicant in withholding-only proceedings is
mentally incompetent and adequate safeguards are unavailable, but the
adjudicator believes it would be inappropriate to terminate the
proceedings because doing so would leave the applicant without any
protection from removal, such as when, for example, a noncitizen is
subject to reinstatement of a prior removal order under section
241(a)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), and eligible only for
withholding of removal. In such a situation, administrative closure
would be available and would allow for the case to be recalendared in
the future if appropriate.
The Department seeks public comment on whether the proposed
termination standards are warranted and whether these standards should
be broadened, narrowed, or altered. Additionally, the Department seeks
comment on the evidence that would best support certain proposed
grounds for termination, for example, whether evidence of filings with
USCIS should be required in some cases. The Department also seeks
comment on the proposed framework in 8 CFR 1239.2(b) that would
distinguish between the exercise of dismissal authority, which applies
to a decision on a DHS motion to dismiss for the reasons specified in 8
CFR 239.2(a), and termination authority, which applies when an EOIR
adjudicator terminates proceedings for the reasons specified in
proposed 8 CFR 1003.1(m) and 1003.18(d).
Further, the Department seeks public comment on whether the
regulations should impose additional constraints on the termination
authority. Finally, the Department seeks comment on whether the
regulations should specify that termination should generally be without
prejudice to DHS's ability to recommence removal proceedings if
circumstances change except where the termination was based on DHS's
failure to sustain the removal charges. Similarly, the Department seeks
comment on whether immigration judges or Appellate Immigration Judges
may terminate a case only on a party's motion or whether there are
situations where EOIR adjudicators may exercise termination authority
sua sponte.
D. Sua Sponte Reopening or Reconsideration and Self-Certification
The Department proposes to amend its regulations at 8 CFR 1003.2(a)
and 1003.23(b), respectively, governing the ability of immigration
judges and the Board to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a case by
restoring the regulatory standard in effect before the promulgation of
the AA96 Final Rule.\40\ The restored standard provides that an
immigration judge and the Board may
[[Page 62266]]
reopen or reconsider a case upon their own motion at any time after
they have rendered a decision if they have jurisdiction.
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\40\ The Department recognizes that an action is not, by its
literal definition, ``sua sponte'' when the action is undertaken
pursuant to a request made by a party to the proceedings. See Sua
sponte, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (``Without prompting
or suggestion; on its own motion.''). Nonetheless, immigration
judges and the Board have long entertained motions for sua sponte
reopening, Djie v. Garland, 39 F.4th 280, 282 n.1 (5th Cir. 2022),
and the Department will continue to use this term for motions that
may be granted in ``exceptional situations,'' Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N
Dec. 1132, 1133 (BIA 1999); Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976, 985
(BIA 1997).
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Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the original regulation conferring
authority to sua sponte reopen or reconsider cases had been in effect
since 1958, see Dada, 554 U.S. at 12-13, and had served as a vital tool
to prevent injustices in the immigration system. See, e.g., Matter of
X-G-W-, 22 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 1998) (holding that, in a specific
circumstance, a fundamental change in asylum law that made the
noncitizen eligible for relief warranted sua sponte reopening); see
also P-O-J-, No.: AXXX-XXI-700, 2016 WL 1084517, at *1 (BIA Feb. 24,
2016) (non-precedential) (sua sponte reopening and terminating because
noncitizen obtained asylee status). For example, without the
availability of such a tool, noncitizens who would otherwise be
eligible for an initial grant of, or return to, lawful status may be
removed from the United States. See Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F.
Supp. 3d at 971 (stating that ``elimination [of sua sponte authority]
will foreclose the only avenue of relief for some noncitizens who would
otherwise be eligible for relief from removal'').
The strong need for sua sponte authority in certain limited
circumstances is underscored by the fact that, in promulgating prior
regulations implementing statutory motions to reopen and reconsider,
the Department specifically declined to add a good cause exception to
the statutory time and number limits on such motions due to the
availability of sua sponte reopening and reconsideration. See 61 FR at
18902. Removing sua sponte authority without creating a similar safety
valve would prevent EOIR adjudicators from remedying the types of
exceptional circumstances described above.
Moreover, the longstanding availability of sua sponte reopening and
reconsideration operated under a workable scheme. For example, the
Board has published decisions applying the ``exceptional
circumstances'' standard in specific situations and has the ability to
publish further decisions clarifying the standard as necessary. See,
e.g., Matter of Yauri, 25 I&N Dec. 103, 110-11 (BIA 2009) (applying
standard to case involving a pending application before DHS); Matter of
G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999) (applying standard to request based
on a change in law). Maintaining the exceptional circumstances standard
allows adjudicators sufficient discretion to reopen in meritorious
circumstances.
Similarly, the Department is aware of no evidence that immigration
judges or the Board routinely used sua sponte authority to reopen cases
in which a motion to reopen would have been time- or number-barred
without considering whether the ``exceptional circumstances'' standard
was met. See, e.g., AA96 Final Rule, 85 FR at 81631 (raising concerns
that sua sponte reopening could be used to cure filing defects or
circumvent regulations). Additionally, at the immigration court level,
an immigration judge's exercise of sua sponte authority is subject to
appellate review by the Board, and the Board can remand where such
authority has been used improperly. See 8 CFR 1003.2(a); see also
Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. at 1132.
The Department finds that the need for sua sponte authority in
certain cases outweighs any finality concerns in this context. See,
e.g., AA96 Final Rule, 85 FR at 81632 (raising finality concerns
regarding sua sponte motions). Sua sponte reopening and reconsideration
are reserved for truly exceptional cases and, with limited exceptions,
are fully committed to agency discretion. See Menendez-Gonzalez v.
Barr, 929 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that sua sponte
reopening authority is committed to agency discretion and that the
court may only review for legal or constitutional error). As
noncitizens are not entitled to sua sponte reopening or
reconsideration, immigration judges and the Board can ensure that such
authority only disturbs the finality of proceedings in the limited
number of meritorious cases involving exceptional circumstances.
For similar reasons as those described above, the Department
proposes to reinstate the authority of the Board to accept untimely or
defective appeals through self-certification. 8 CFR 1003.1(c)
(proposed).
E. Board Findings of Fact--Administrative Notice
The Department proposes to rescind all of the changes that the AA96
Final Rule made to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) regarding administrative
notice at the Board. The Board, like federal courts, has long had the
power to take administrative notice of facts not reasonably subject to
dispute. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to
Improve Case Management, 67 FR 54877 (Aug. 26, 2002) (implementing
regulations that codified administrative notice authority). The AA96
Final Rule expanded the Board's administrative notice authority to
allow it to resolve certain factual disputes in the first instance and
to rely on those determinations to overturn a grant of relief or
protection. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (``The Board will not engage in
de novo review of findings of fact determined by an immigration
judge.''). The Department recognizes that it would be unnecessary and
inefficient for the Board to remand a case to the immigration judge for
facts that are not truly in dispute and would not be disputed once they
are called to the parties' attention. However, upon review, the
Department believes that the AA96 Final Rule's provisions could invite
impermissible factfinding in practice, in contravention of the
Department's longstanding regulatory approach. Accordingly, the
Department proposes changes regarding administrative notice procedures.
See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (proposed).
In addition, the Department proposes to rescind the AA96 Final
Rule's restrictions on the Board's authority to remand to the
immigration court for further findings of fact, as discussed in further
detail below. Accordingly, the Department finds it unnecessary to
retain broad and possibly confusing standards for administrative notice
that may prejudice noncitizens, particularly pro se noncitizens, as the
Board will have the discretion to either take administrative notice or
remand for further fact-finding, as appropriate. See 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (proposed) (``If further factfinding is needed in a
particular case, the Board may remand the proceeding to the immigration
judge or, as appropriate, to DHS.'').
Additionally, the AA96 Final Rule, if made operative, would permit
the Board to rely on any ``undisputed fact[ ] in the record'' to
overturn a grant of relief even if the parties did not have a
meaningful opportunity to address that fact in the proceedings at the
immigration-judge level because, for example, neither the parties nor
the immigration judge found it necessary to dispute or probe further
about the fact because it appeared irrelevant or tangential. See 85 FR
at 81651 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A)(4)). Relatedly, the AA96 Final Rule
added a new provision that would allow the Board to affirm the
underlying decision ``on any basis supported by the record'' including
by relying on ``facts that are not reasonably subject to dispute.'' See
id. (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(v)).
Although the AA96 Final Rule, if enforced, would afford the parties
an opportunity to respond to administratively noticed facts if those
facts were used to overturn a grant of relief or protection, 85 FR at
81603 (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(B)), in practice this could be confusing
to noncitizens, particularly those who are pro se.
[[Page 62267]]
Accordingly, the Department does not believe the AA96 Final Rule's
opportunity-to-respond provision provides adequate procedural
protections to noncitizens, such as allowing sufficient opportunity to
be heard, to present testimony, and to develop the record on disputed
facts. Cf. Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 626 (4th Cir. 2021)
(``Today, we join the broad consensus among our sister circuits by
holding that immigration judges have a legal duty to fully develop the
record in the cases that come before them. Like the [Board] and the
other circuits to have considered this issue, we are persuaded that
such a duty necessarily arises from the dictates of [INA 240(b)(1),] 8
U.S.C. 1229a(b)(1) . . .'').
The Department is also concerned that the AA96 Final Rule, if
effectuated, would permit the Board to affirm a denial of relief or
protection on the basis of facts that may not have been developed by
the parties or even considered by the immigration judge during removal
proceedings, and which did not factor into the immigration judge's
denial. Indeed, the AA96 Final Rule does not provide any requirement of
notice or opportunity to respond if the Board relies on
administratively noticed facts to affirm an immigration judge's
decision to deny relief, even if those facts were not relied on by the
immigration judge or developed at the hearing.
F. Board Findings of Fact--Voluntary Departure
Generally, the proposed rule would retain the voluntary departure-
related changes adopted by the AA96 Final Rule, which prohibited the
Board from remanding to the immigration judge for consideration of
voluntary departure, as described at Section III.F.2 of this preamble.
The Department believes that the changes adopted by the AA96 Final Rule
with respect to voluntary departure created a workable framework that
improved adjudicatory efficiency. See Section III.F.2 of this preamble
(``Prior to the AA96 Final Rule, the regulations described an
immigration judge's authority to grant voluntary departure but did not
articulate the Board's authority to do so.'' (citation omitted)).
However, the Department proposes to amend 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7) and
1240.26(k)(1) to allow the Board to remand cases to the immigration
court for the consideration of voluntary departure in the limited
circumstances where further fact-finding is needed.
Specifically, the Department proposes to remove the AA96 Final
Rule's mandate that ``[i]f the Board does not grant the request for
voluntary departure, it must deny the request.'' 85 FR at 81652 (8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(iv)). In cases where the Board has a complete record and
the immigration judge has made sufficient findings of fact, it is
generally inefficient and unnecessary for the Board to remand to the
immigration judge solely for consideration of the issue of voluntary
departure. However, where the voluntary departure record is incomplete
or otherwise requires further fact-finding to adjudicate the request,
the Board should be permitted to remand the case to the immigration
judge to consider the voluntary departure request.
One such example is when a noncitizen makes multiple applications
for relief or protection, including voluntary departure. In that case,
the immigration judge may choose to grant at least one application but
not address other applications, including voluntary departure. If DHS
appeals the immigration judge's decision and the Board determines that
the noncitizen is not eligible for the relief granted, the voluntary
departure record is likely to be incomplete or additional fact-finding
may be required to adjudicate the voluntary departure request. See 85
FR at 81639-40 (describing commenter concerns with respect to this
example).
The AA96 Final Rule, if effectuated, would not allow the Board the
option to remand. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(iv) (``If the Board [did] not
grant the request for voluntary departure, it must deny the
request.''). However, under the circumstances described above, the
Board should be permitted to remand the case to the immigration court
to consider the voluntary departure request rather than mandate denial
of a potentially eligible request or invite the possibility of improper
fact-finding, in violation of 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (proposed).
Accordingly, to make this remand authority clear, the Department also
proposes to add a sentence to the end of 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)
(proposed), stating that ``[if] the record does not contain sufficient
factual findings regarding eligibility for voluntary departure, the
Board may remand the decision to the immigration judge for further
factfinding.''
Additionally, the Department proposes to remove the AA96 Final
Rule's prohibition on remands to the immigration judge to consider
voluntary departure and to amend the regulations to state that the
Board ``may,'' rather than ``shall,'' consider a request for voluntary
departure de novo. 8 CFR 1240.26(k)(1) (proposed). As described above,
in cases where the Board has a complete record and the immigration
judge has made sufficient findings of fact, it is generally inefficient
and unnecessary for the Board to remand to the immigration judge solely
to consider the issue of eligibility for voluntary departure. However,
where the voluntary departure record is incomplete or otherwise
requires further fact-finding to adjudicate the request, the Board
should be permitted to remand the case to the immigration judge to
consider the voluntary departure request.
Except as described above, this proposed rule would not make
further amendments to the voluntary departure provisions enacted by the
AA96 Final Rule.
When the Board grants voluntary departure in the first instance,
written voluntary departure advisals served electronically or by mail
in conjunction with the Board's order will provide adequate notice to
noncitizens for purposes of voluntary departure. See 8 CFR
1003.3(g)(6)(i)-(ii) (providing for electronic service in eligible
cases). In making this decision, the Department considered that the Act
authorizes service of the Notice to Appear by mail, including advisals
of the consequences for failure to comply with certain requirements
described in the Notice to Appear and the consequences for failure to
appear. See INA 239(a)(1)(F)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(F)(iii)
(consequences for failure to provide updated address and telephone
information), INA 239(a)(1)(G)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1)(G)(ii)
(consequences for failure to appear). The Department believes that
given Congress's authorization of service by mail of such advisals,
notwithstanding the significant consequences associated with failure to
comply with such requirements, electronic or mail service is also
sufficient for voluntary departure advisals.
G. Board Remand Authority--Additional Findings of Fact
The Department proposes to rescind all changes that the AA96 Final
Rule made to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) and proposes to remove the AA96
Final Rule's addition of 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(v) \41\--the provisions of
the AA96 Final Rule that eliminated the Board's authority to grant a
motion to remand based on new evidence that arises while a noncitizen's
case is on appeal before the Board. Rescinding these changes would
reinstate the
[[Page 62268]]
Board's previous authority to remand based on new evidence (in addition
to intervening changes in law) that could impact the basis for the
immigration judge's removability determination or that could provide
the noncitizen with a form of relief or protection, or other
immigration benefit, that would obviate the need for continued removal
proceedings or the Board's adjudication of the appeal. 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3) (proposed). Similar to the provisions of the AA96 Final
Rule that eliminated the authority of immigration judges and the Board
to grant sua sponte reopening or administrative closure, the AA96 Final
Rule's provisions that eliminated the Board's authority to remand sua
sponte based on new evidence could impede certain noncitizens from
obtaining an immigration benefit or relief from removal for which they
have become prima facie eligible.
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\41\ As discussed above in Section IV.E of this preamble, the
proposed rule would retain some of the administrative notice
language at 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A) but would move it to 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3)(iv) and remove paragraph (A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon review, the Department believes that the AA96 Final Rule's
limitations on the Board's remand authority raise fairness concerns and
would create inefficiencies that contravene the rule's stated
justification. For example, although the AA96 Final Rule would permit
remands based on new evidence pertaining to grounds of removability,
such as to allow DHS to present new facts regarding a noncitizen's
removability, see 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(D) (barring remands except as
provided in 8 CFR(d)(7)(v)(B)), 1003.1(d)(7)(v)(B) (not precluding
remands for further fact-finding related to ``a question regarding a
ground or grounds of removability specified in section 212 or 237 of
the Act''), it would preclude the Board from remanding a case at the
noncitizen's request for further fact-finding where the noncitizen
became prima facie eligible for relief or protection, or other
immigration benefit.
This limitation is overly restrictive and raises fairness concerns
due to the imbalance between the parties. First, it would not be fair
to permit DHS to seek remand based on new evidence discovered during
background or security checks that could render an individual
ineligible for relief, 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(v)(B), but not on the basis
of new evidence that could render an individual eligible for relief.
Second, the AA96 Final Rule ignored that new evidence can relate not
just to a ground of removability, but also to grounds for relief. If
new evidence indicates that noncitizens have become eligible for new
forms of relief from removal, protection, or other immigration benefit,
the Board should be able to remand for consideration of that evidence.
Such forms of relief from removal, protection, or other immigration
benefit may include: special immigrant juvenile status, adjustment of
status, cancellation of removal for certain lawful permanent residents
(for example if the noncitizen is successful in obtaining vacatur of a
criminal conviction that otherwise precluded applying for that relief
before the immigration judge), or asylum or similar protection based on
new evidence that only came to light during the appeal process.
Additionally, the AA96 Final Rule suggested that an individual who
wishes to obtain relief based on new evidence must file a motion to
reopen in accordance with the standard procedures for such motions. See
85 FR at 81589. While this is technically an available option,
substantive and procedural limitations on motions to reopen might make
this option more difficult or unavailable for many noncitizens, which
raises fairness concerns for noncitizens in proceedings, as well as
questions of efficiency, given that additional motions practice invites
further litigation that could draw out the resolution of a proceeding.
See, e.g., 8 CFR 1003.2(c)(2) (time and number bar on motions to
reopen), 1103.7(b)(2) (filing fee for motions to reopen, but not
motions to remand); cf. Garcia-DeLeon, 999 F.3d at 992 (``True, a
noncitizen in removal proceedings whose case is not administratively
closed may still submit an I-601 Waiver of Inadmissibility after they
complete their consular interview and are determined inadmissible. This
old path, however, deterred noncitizens in removal proceedings from
obtaining legal status as permanent residents . . . Thus,
administrative closure for the limited purpose of permitting
noncitizens to apply for provisional unlawful presence waivers
increases the likelihood that noncitizens will obtain legal status and
resolve their immigration proceedings.'').
In addition to fairness and efficiency concerns, the AA96 Final
Rule's limitations on remands for new evidence also conflict with a
permanent injunction to which the agency is subject in some
circumstances. The permanent injunction requires the Board to accept
new evidence related to mental health and to order a limited remand to
assess an unrepresented, detained noncitizen's competency to represent
themselves in proceedings before EOIR. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder,
No. 10-02211, 2013 WL 8115423 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013); Franco-
Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-02211, 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
2014). In addition, since the issuance of that injunction, EOIR has
adopted similar procedures pursuant to its nationwide policy to provide
enhanced procedural protections to unrepresented immigration detainees
with serious mental disorders or conditions \42\ (``Nationwide
Policy'') for similarly situated individuals detained outside of the
three states covered by the Franco-Gonzalez injunction. Thus, adherence
to the AA96 Final Rule would be irreconcilable with adherence to court-
ordered permanent injunctions in effect in three States and
irreconcilable with EOIR's Nationwide Policy. The Department notes that
the AA96 Final Rule would still preclude the Board from remanding
proceedings to the immigration judge for the requisite factual findings
required by the Nationwide Policy and permanent injunction even if the
Board would have been permitted to accept new evidence related to
mental competency.
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\42\ See Press Release, EOIR, Department of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for
Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or
Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/department-justice-and-department-homeland-security-announce-safeguards-unrepresented.
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The Department believes that Appellate Immigration Judges have the
expertise, knowledge, and training to determine when further fact-
finding might be needed given the variables to consider on a case-by-
case basis when adjudicating an appeal and that it is in the interest
of justice to charge Appellate Immigration Judges with doing so, rather
than burdening litigants, many of whom are pro se, with strictly
complying with the numerous, inflexible requirements that the AA96
Final Rule set forth at 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(D)(1)-(5).\43\ As
discussed below, the Department also proposes to reinstate the Board's
authority to remand cases based upon a ``totality of the
circumstances'' analysis.
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\43\ For example, if enforced, the Board would only be permitted
to remand a case based on a change in the law if the change were to
render the initial decision legally erroneous or where the
immigration judge's factual findings were ``clearly erroneous.''
Thus, the AA96 Final Rule would not have permitted remands for a
change in circumstances, or in a case where the immigration judge
failed to make any finding of fact that the Board might consider
important to the case. There are undoubtedly other examples of
scenarios where it might be appropriate to remand for further fact-
finding but that would not have been captured by the AA96 Final
Rule. That concern supports leaving the Board the flexibility to
make case-by-case determinations.
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Accordingly, given the fairness and efficiency concerns implicated
in the AA96 Final Rule's limitation on the Board's ability to remand
cases, the Department proposes to rescind the AA96 Final Rule's changes
to section 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). Rescinding these
[[Page 62269]]
provisions would allow the Board to retain its prior authority to
remand in cases involving new evidence that could impact a noncitizen's
removability or render the individual prima facie eligible for relief.
The AA96 Final Rule also precluded immigration judges from
considering, on remand, any issues outside of the scope of the Board's
remand order, unless pertaining to a question of the immigration
judge's continuing jurisdiction over the case. But developments related
to a noncitizen's removability or eligibility for protection or relief
from removal could arise after a remand. In the Department's view, the
better policy is to avoid inefficiencies that result from limiting the
scope of a remand, which can lengthen proceedings by precluding
immigration judges from addressing all relevant issues in the remanded
proceedings. While the Department is cognizant that ``[b]oth the public
and the Board have significant . . . interests in the finality of
immigration proceedings,'' Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 118 F.3d
1034, 1042 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Abudu v. INS, 485 U.S. 94, 106-08
(1988)), the Department does not believe that finality interests
outweigh the fairness and efficiency concerns that the AA96 Final
Rule's inflexible approach creates. Hence, for similar reasons to those
described above, the Department proposes to remove this restriction on
the immigration judge's authority when considering a case on remand.
The proposed rule would also add to 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) a
statement that ``[i]f new evidence is submitted on appeal, that
submission may be deemed a motion to remand and considered
accordingly.'' This addition would make clear that new evidence
submitted on appeal need not be dismissed solely because the party did
not file a pleading entitled a ``motion to remand.'' This is in keeping
with pre-AA96 Final Rule guidance pertaining to motions to reopen,
which the Department also proposes to republish as part of this
rulemaking. See 8 CFR 1003.2(c)(4) (2019); 8 CFR 1003.2(c)(4)
(proposed). These amendments would clarify that the Board has
discretion to consider new facts presented on appeal as a motion to
remand. This parallels the pre-AA96 Final Rule treatment of new facts
presented as part of a motion to reopen prior to the conclusion of
proceedings.
H. Board Remand Authority--Errors in Fact or Law
The Department proposes to rescind all of the AA96 Final Rule's
restrictions on the Board's authority to remand decisions based upon
errors of fact or law, specifically, all changes made to 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(i), and proposes to remove 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii), (iii),
and (v). As discussed above in Section IV.F of this preamble, the
Department proposes to retain, with modifications, 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(7)(iv) (addressing voluntary departure), and to renumber that
paragraph as 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii). These proposed changes would
restore the Board's broad authority to remand decisions to the
immigration judge or DHS for ``further action as may be appropriate.''
8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(i) (proposed).
As previously noted in Section III.H.2 of this preamble, the AA96
Final Rule restricted the Board from remanding a decision due to an
error of law or fact in the immigration judge's decision if it did not
identify the standard of review it applied and the specific error or
errors made by the adjudicator. 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(A). The
Department believes that, because the Board's standards of review are
expressly delineated by regulation, it is unnecessary to require the
Board to explicitly include them in every remand order. See 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(3) (requiring factual findings to be reviewed for clear error
and legal determinations to be reviewed de novo).
Additionally, as explained in Section III.H.2 of this preamble, the
AA96 Final Rule prohibited the Board from remanding a case: (1) based
upon a ``totality of the circumstances,'' 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(B);
(2) based on new arguments or evidence, except where the new argument
or evidence pertained to a material change in fact or law and
substantial evidence supported the change vitiated all grounds of
removal, 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(C); or (3) sua sponte, subject to
limited exceptions, 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii)(D).
The Department is now proposing to rescind these provisions, thus
recodifying the longstanding, more flexible standard that allows the
Board to return the case ``to DHS or an immigration judge for such
further action as may be appropriate.'' 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(i)
(proposed). The Department now believes that this longstanding standard
is workable and sufficiently flexible to allow for remands in
situations where an error of fact or law warrants remand, or where
fairness or efficiency concerns may otherwise be implicated. Given the
numerous variables that each case may present, the Department believes
the Board requires the flexibility to conduct appellate review,
including remanding proceedings when necessary, rather than being
limited by the rigid restrictions that the AA96 Final Rule set forth at
8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(ii).
Specifically, the Department believes that Appellate Immigration
Judges have the expertise, knowledge, and training to determine when an
error of fact or law warrants remand to the immigration judge without
the need for significant restrictions on such determinations. In
addition, providing the Board with maximum flexibility to remand due to
errors of fact or law ensures that the immigration court, which is most
familiar with the record as the court tasked with receiving evidence,
is able to correct any errors and issue revised orders based on those
corrections in the first instance.
Moreover, the Board may determine, under the totality of the
circumstances, that remand is warranted in other situations, including
based on fairness or efficiency concerns. For example, under the AA96
Final Rule, the Board would arguably be unable to remand--as it has,
for example, pursuant to Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. at 462-63--in
situations where an immigration judge decision contains only a brief
summary of the testimony and an ultimate pronouncement on the merits,
without thorough discussion of each of the elements of the application
for relief or protection. See Matter of Rodriguez-Carillo, 22 I&N Dec.
1031, 1033 (BIA 1999) (discussing fairness concerns implicated by
cursory decisions).\44\ The Department thus believes that rescinding
the AA96 Final Rule's provision prohibiting a remand based upon a
totality of the circumstances will return the longstanding flexibility
to the Board to remand cases for further action as appropriate based on
the circumstances presented in each case.
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\44\ The Department also acknowledges that commenters previously
raised concerns, in conjunction with the AA96 rulemaking, that the
AA96 Final Rule does not provide an independent ground to remand
based on superseding or intervening case law--including litigation
surrounding regulations or precedential decisions that were the
basis for denying relief--to the extent that such changes do not
raise a question of jurisdiction, vitiate all grounds of
removability, or relate to an error of law. See 85 FR at 81611
(listing commenter concerns); see also (8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)
(discussing remand authority). The Department also now believes that
this omission unduly restricts appellate review, particularly in
light of the increasing number of significant litigation
developments pertaining to immigration law in recent years. In some
circumstances, for example, Appellate Immigration Judges may deem it
appropriate to remand for immigration judges to consider in the
first instance the effect of intervening case law, without
determining whether the decision under review contains an error of
law under this intervening case law. The Department's proposal to
restore the Board's broad authority to remand decisions would
correct such limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, under the AA96 Final Rule, the Board would be prohibited
from
[[Page 62270]]
remanding based upon the availability of new evidence where the new
evidence did not vitiate all grounds of removability applicable to the
noncitizen, even where it might impact the noncitizen's eligibility for
relief from removal. Accordingly, as discussed in Section IV.G of this
preamble, this prohibition on remands would result in inefficiencies
given that such a prohibition would invite additional motions practice
and further litigation that could unnecessarily prolong the ultimate
resolution of a proceeding. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the
Department proposes to largely rescind these restrictions that the AA96
Final Rule placed on the Board's remand authority so as to restore the
Board's flexibility to remand decisions to the immigration judge or DHS
for ``further action as may be appropriate.'' 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(7)(i)
(proposed).
I. Background Check
The Department proposes to amend 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6) regarding the
completion or updating of background checks when a case is pending
before the Board. Generally, the proposed rule would retain the
background check-related changes from the AA96 Final Rule, which were
intended to reduce the availability of Board remands to the immigration
court due to background check concerns. The Department believes that
the pre-AA96 Final Rule practice of remanding to the immigration court
solely for a background check to be completed is an unnecessary
procedural action that creates inefficiencies in case processing.\45\
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\45\ The Department recognizes that such procedures necessitate
service of notices and advisals electronically or by mail, as
opposed to in-person service, and the Department believes that such
service is sufficient for the same reasons as those described above
with respect to advisals related to voluntary departure. See Section
IV.F of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar to the AA96 Final Rule, this NPRM proposes that, when
completing or updating a background check is necessary to adjudicate an
appeal or motion at the Board, the Board will issue a notice to the
parties holding the case until such a check is completed and the
results are reported to the Board. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(ii)
(proposed). The Board's notice to the parties will explain that DHS
will contact the noncitizen with instructions for completing or
updating any necessary checks if DHS is otherwise unable to
independently update them. Id. The Board's notice will also advise the
noncitizen of the consequences of failing to comply with these
requirements. Id.
However, this proposed rule includes a number of changes from the
AA96 Final Rule's background check language. First, the Department is
removing language that the AA96 Final Rule added to 8 CFR
1003.1(d)(6)(iii) that would deem a noncitizen's failure to comply with
these background check requirements at the Board as an automatic
abandonment of their underlying relief application absent a showing of
good cause. Instead, the Department proposes to revert to the pre-AA96
Final Rule language, which provides that the Board retains the
discretion to, on DHS's motion, remand to the immigration judge to
consider such noncompliance in determining whether the underlying
relief should be denied. See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iii) (2019).
Second, the Department proposes to allow the Board the option of
further holding a case where DHS has failed to report the results of
background checks within 180 days from the date of the Board's notice,
rather than requiring the Board to remand to the immigration judge. 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(iii) (proposed). This would account for cases where
180 days may not be a sufficient reporting period or where the case was
placed on hold for other reasons. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(iii)
(proposed) (specifying when cases may be placed on hold). This change
will help ensure that cases are not unnecessarily remanded to an
immigration judge when the Board determines that further holding the
case would more efficiently contribute to the completion of the case.
Lastly, the Department proposes to add a minor clarification to 8
CFR 1003.1(d)(6)(v) that this background check section applies to
applications for withholding of removal under the Act and applications
for protection under the Convention Against Torture, by referencing
``immigration relief or protection.'' See Matter of M-D-, 24 I&N Dec.
138, 140 n.1 (BIA 2007) (``When referenced in connection with the
background check regulations, the term `relief' includes any form of
relief that permits [a noncitizen] to reside in the United States,
including withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
Against Torture . . .'').
J. Adjudication Timelines
The Department proposes to retain the 90- and 180-day processing
timelines for single-member and three-member Board decisions but amend
8 CFR 1003.1(e)(1) and (e)(8), regarding internal processing timelines
at the Board. The AA96 Final Rule added or modified a number of Board
internal processing timelines, requiring: (1) screening panel review
within 14 days of filing or receipt; (2) transcript ordering within
seven days after the screening panel completes its review; (3) issuance
of briefing schedules within seven days after receiving the transcript
or, if no transcript is required, within seven days after the screening
panel completes its review; (4) review by a single Appellate
Immigration Judge within 14 days of assignment to determine whether a
single- or a three-member panel should adjudicate the appeal; (5)
summary dismissal of qualifying cases within 30 days of the appeal's
filing date; (6) adjudication of interlocutory appeals within 30 days
of the appeal's filing date; and (7) completion of three-member
decisions within 180 days of the record being complete, rather than 180
days from assignment to the three-member panel. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(1),
(8). The AA96 Final Rule also added tracking and accountability
requirements for the Chairman at 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(v).
After further review, the Department has determined that these
internal timelines are overly rigid and concern internal Board
operations and processes that are not suitable for regulatory action.
Given the wide variety of cases before the Board, the varying
circumstances of different parties, and possible changes to EOIR's
dockets, codifying strict internal timelines in regulatory text does
not afford the Board adequate flexibility to process cases efficiently
and fairly. Furthermore, processing timelines may be accomplished
through internal guidance as necessary. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A)
(exempting ``rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice''
from the APA's notice and comment requirements); see also 8 CFR
1003.1(a)(2)(i)(C) (providing the Chairman with the authority to ``set
priorities or time frames for the resolution of cases''). As a result,
the proposed rule would remove the specific processing timelines from
EOIR's regulations, retaining only the more general 90- and 180-day
processing timelines for single-member and three-member Board
decisions. This will ensure that the Board continues to resolve cases
expeditiously, while giving the Board appropriate flexibility to set
internal case management deadlines based on the particular
circumstances of the cases at issue and possible changes to EOIR's
dockets.
To calculate the 180-day adjudication deadline for three-member
panels, the Department believes that starting the
[[Page 62271]]
adjudication period at the time of panel assignment is most
appropriate. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i) (proposed). Three-member
decisions require robust discussion among members of the panel, as well
as detailed, thorough decisions, given that three-member decisions are
intended to address significant legal issues. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(6)
(explaining that three-member panel decisions are intended to address,
among other issues, the need to establish precedent construing the
meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures, or cases or controversies
of national import). Thus, upon reconsideration, the Department is now
of the belief that providing less time for the Board to consider and
issue three-member panel decisions would be inefficient, as this
truncated timeline could negatively affect the Board's ability to: (1)
settle inconsistencies at the immigration court; (2) establish
precedent that would clarify significant legal issues; (3) review
decisions that may not be in conformity with the law or applicable
precedent; (4) resolve cases or controversies of major national import;
(5) review clearly erroneous factual determinations; (6) reverse
decisions if appropriate to do so; or (7) resolve complex, novel,
unusual, or recurring issues of law or fact. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(6)
(2018). This, in turn, could have a cascading negative impact on all
EOIR adjudications due to a resultant lack of clarity, consistency, or
meaningful review and resolution of important issues that come before
EOIR. Conversely, given that single-member Board decisions,
historically, have been appropriate for the disposition of unopposed
motions, 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(2), affirmances without opinion, 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(4), or ``brief orders,'' 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(5), the Department
continues to believe that calculating the 90-day adjudication period
from the time of completion of the record on appeal is appropriate. See
8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i) (proposed). Returning the adjudicatory processing
timelines to the pre-AA96 Final Rule standards would ensure that there
is sufficient time for the Board to fully consider and address
important issues requiring three-member panel decisions, while still
allowing for flexibility and expediency in issuing single-member
decisions.
Additionally, the Department proposes to include all ``rare
circumstances'' listed in the regulatory text prior to the AA96 Final
Rule under which the Chairman was permitted to hold adjudication of a
case or cases. Specifically, the Department proposes that the Board may
hold a case or group of cases where an impending decision by the United
States Supreme Court or the relevant United States Court of Appeals,
impending Department regulatory amendments, or an impending en banc
Board decision might substantially determine the outcome of the case or
group of cases. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(iii) (proposed). The Department also
proposes to amend the pre-AA96 Final Rule language to account for the
potential of ``rare circumstances'' other than those explicitly
described by the regulation in which a hold may be appropriate. Id.
Accordingly, the Department proposes to add the term ``such as'' before
describing the rare circumstances to make clear that these
circumstances are non-exhaustive. Id.
K. Director's Authority To Issue Decisions
The Department proposes to amend 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8) to remove the
EOIR Director's authority to adjudicate cases that are pending beyond
the Board's regulatory adjudication timelines. As a result, the
Department also proposes to remove the cross-reference prohibiting
delegation of the Director's authority--as was set forth in 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)--from the regulations at 8 CFR 1003.0(b)(2)(ii). The
Department is proposing this change for clarity, as that cross-
reference to the Director's authority in 8 CFR 1003.0(b)(2)(ii) would
be rendered nonsensical if the changes to proposed 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)
are finalized.
As a general rule, the EOIR Director does not have the authority to
adjudicate, or direct the adjudication of, cases before EOIR. See 8 CFR
1003.0(c) (``Except as provided by statute, regulation, or delegation
of authority from the Attorney General, or when acting as a designee of
the Attorney General, the Director shall have no authority to
adjudicate cases arising under the Act or regulations or to direct the
result of an adjudication assigned to the Board, an immigration judge,
the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, or an Administrative Law
Judge.''). Two recent Department rulemakings, however, provided
exceptions by allowing the EOIR Director to adjudicate Board cases that
are not completed within their regulatory adjudication timelines.
In general, the regulations require single-member appeals to be
completed within 90 days of completion of the record, and three-member
appeals to be completed within 180 days. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(i). An
August 26, 2019, interim final rule amended this section to require
that if a case is not completed within the time limit and any
extension, the Chairman must either assign the case to themselves or a
Board Vice Chairman or refer the case to EOIR's Director for
adjudication. See 84 FR at 44539-40; 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii);
Organization of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 85 FR
69465, 69481 (Nov. 3, 2020) (adopting as final). Subsequently, the
separate AA96 Final Rule further amended this section to require the
Chairman to refer any case to the EOIR Director that is pending
adjudication for more than 335 days after the appeal, motion, or remand
was filed or received by the Board, subject to certain exceptions. See
85 FR at 81591. Taken together, these rulemakings significantly
expanded the EOIR Director's authority to adjudicate cases before EOIR.
After further review, the Department has determined that providing
the EOIR Director with such expansive adjudicatory authority is
unnecessary. The Department proposes to remove the amendments made to 8
CFR 1003.1(e)(8) by both the August 2019 interim final rule and the
related final rule, as well as the AA96 Final Rule, and revert the
language back to instructing the Board to refer cases that are not
adjudicated in the time required to the Attorney General for decision.
8 CFR 1003.1(e)(8)(ii) (proposed). Further, consistent with the
Department's longstanding understanding of the EOIR Director's
authorities and limitations, this proposed rule ``highlight[s] the
Director's role as EOIR's manager,'' as opposed to an adjudicator,
which is more properly the function of the immigration courts and the
Board. See 65 FR at 81434 (detailing the EOIR Director's broad
authority to direct and supervise EOIR's components).
In the event that a Board case passes its regulatory deadline
without adjudication, the Department believes that such cases are
better addressed internally at the Board, including through the
Chairman and Vice Chairman referrals included in this proposed rule, as
well as any modified internal procedures, training, and hiring, as
necessary. Therefore, the Department proposes to amend 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8) to remove the EOIR Director's authority to adjudicate
Board cases that remain pending past regulatory deadlines.
L. Quality Assurance Certification
The Department proposes to remove and reserve 8 CFR 1003.1(k),
which was added by the AA96 Final Rule to create a procedure for
immigration judges to certify cases remanded to them by the Board and
allegedly involving Board
[[Page 62272]]
error to the EOIR Director. In addition, the Department proposes to
remove language added by the AA96 Final Rule that references the EOIR
Director's authority to remand cases as part of the quality assurance
certification process. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e) (proposed).
After further review, the Department believes that the pre-AA96
Final Rule procedures are sufficient to address potential Board errors.
As explained above, a party dissatisfied with a Board decision may file
a motion to reconsider, 8 CFR 1003.2(a), the noncitizen may pursue a
petition for review of a final order of removal in the federal courts
of appeals, INA 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(1), and DHS may also seek
to refer a Board decision to the Attorney General for further review, 8
CFR 1003.1(h). Within the Department, the Attorney General may certify
a decision on the Attorney General's own initiative; an immigration
judge may certify to the Board any case that is appealable to the
Board; and the Board may reconsider a decision involving an error using
the Board's sua sponte authority as described elsewhere in this
proposed rule. See 8 CFR 1003.1(c), (h), 1003.2(a). All of these
options that are already available to immigration judges, the Board,
the Attorney General, and the parties to the case permit addressing
alleged Board errors without the need for a lengthy ancillary process
outside of the normal adjudicatory case flow.
The AA96 Final Rule unnecessarily inserted the EOIR Director into
the adjudication process. As previously explained, the EOIR Director
has historically not possessed the authority to adjudicate, or direct
the adjudication of, cases before EOIR, with limited exceptions. See 8
CFR 1003.0(c). The AA96 Final Rule created a substantial exception to
that general limitation on the Director's authority by allowing the
EOIR Director to ``exercise delegated authority from the Attorney
General identical to that of the Board . . . [including] the authority
to issue a precedent decision, and the authority to refer the case to
the Attorney General for review'' after certification from an
immigration judge. 85 FR at 81653; 8 CFR 1003.1(k)(3). In effect, the
AA96 Final Rule granted the EOIR Director broad authority to issue
precedential decisions if an immigration judge certified a case to the
EOIR Director alleging, for example, that the Board decision on remand
was contrary to law or was vague, ambiguous, or internally
inconsistent, among other reasons. 8 CFR 1003.1(k)(1)(iii). However,
given the myriad other responsibilities of the EOIR Director, see 8 CFR
1003.0(b)(1), and because other existing agency procedures are
sufficient to address potential errors, the Department believes this
broadening of the EOIR Director's adjudicative authority is unnecessary
and unwarranted at this time.
M. Forwarding of Record on Appeal
The Department proposes to amend the regulations at 8 CFR 1003.5
regarding the forwarding of the record on appeal by largely returning
to the regulatory text in effect prior to the AA96 Final Rule. First,
the proposed rule would reinstate the requirements for immigration
judges to review their oral decision transcripts and approve them
within specified timeframes. 8 CFR 1003.5(a) (proposed). Second, the
proposed rule would remove a reference to the EOIR Director when
discussing the authority to manage the transcription process. Id.\46\
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\46\ The proposed rule retains, however, changes made by the
AA96 Final Rule to delete references to DHS procedures in paragraph
(b) that are not relevant to EOIR and to change the phrase ``improve
[transcript] quality'' to ``ensure [transcript] quality.'' 8 CFR
1003.5(a), (b) (proposed). Due to the high quality of EOIR's digital
audio recording system, the role of the Chairman and Chief
Immigration Judge in the transcription process is more accurately
defined as ensuring the continued quality of transcription, rather
than improving it.
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The Department originally instituted timelines for immigration
judges to review oral decision transcripts in order to ``expedite the
handling of cases by the Board.'' Board of Immigration Appeals:
Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 FR 7309, 7311 (Feb.
19, 2002) (proposed rule); 67 FR 54878, 54895 (Aug. 26, 2002) (final
rule). Subsequently, the AA96 Final Rule completely removed the
immigration judge transcript review process to further expedite the
appeal process, stating that such review was no longer needed. 85 FR at
81639. However, after further consideration, the Department proposes to
reinstate the prior review procedures as necessary to ensure that
accurate transcripts are produced. As the source of the oral decision,
the immigration judge is in the best position to review the transcript
to ensure it is an accurate written version of their oral decision.
Moreover, the Department believes that the 14-day review period does
not lengthen the appeal process sufficiently to justify completely
removing the immigration judge review process. In retaining the
immigration judge transcript review process, the Department notes that
the process is not intended to allow immigration judges to change their
decision after the fact but rather to ensure that the written
transcript accurately captures the immigration judge's oral decision,
particularly because minor transcription errors have the potential to
cause outsized issues.
The AA96 Final Rule also inserted a reference to the EOIR Director
into 8 CFR 1003.5(a), regarding the management of the transcription
process, but did not provide an explanation for the addition. On
further review, the Department proposes to remove the reference to the
EOIR Director in the management of the transcription process as
unnecessary. The Chairman and the Chief Immigration Judge will continue
to manage the transcription process.
The Department also proposes to retain pre-AA96 Final Rule language
at 8 CFR 1003.5(b) regarding procedures for appeals from DHS officer
decisions to provide clarity to parties about how to manage the record
of proceeding in cases where DHS, upon reconsideration, decides to
grant a benefit that has been requested in the appeal to the Board.
N. Definitional Changes
The Department proposes adding two definitions to 8 CFR 1001.1.
Specifically, the Department proposes to define the terms
``noncitizen'' and ``unaccompanied child.'' See 8 CFR 1001.1(gg)-(hh)
(proposed).
First, the proposed rule would define ``noncitizen'' to be
synonymous with the term ``alien,'' which is defined by statute to mean
``any person not a citizen or national of the United States.'' INA
101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(3). This change would be consistent with
recent terminology usage changes at EOIR. See EOIR PM 21-27,
Terminology (July 26, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/book/file/1415216/download; see also Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1446 n.2
(2020) (noting that the opinion ``uses the term `noncitizen' as
equivalent to the statutory term `alien' ''). The Department notes that
a person may claim United States citizenship or nationality during
immigration court proceedings or may obtain United States citizenship
or nationality after immigration court proceedings have commenced. The
Department proposes to use the term ``noncitizen'' as equivalent to the
term ``alien'' as used in the regulations to denote a person who is in
immigration proceedings before EOIR, including those that claim or
later obtain United States citizenship or nationality. The Department
requests comments on whether there is an alternative term or terms that
would better capture this concept.\47\
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\47\ The term ``respondent'' as defined in 8 CFR 1001.1(r) does
not cover all persons appearing for proceedings before EOIR but
instead describes noncitizens in removal or deportation proceedings.
See 8 CFR 1001.1(r) (defining respondent ``as a person named in a
notice to appear or an order to show cause''); INA 239(a)(1), 8
U.S.C. 1229(a)(1) (defining a notice to appear as the charging
document that initiates removal proceedings). EOIR conducts other
proceedings including ``withholding-only'' proceedings and ``asylum-
only'' proceedings. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(C) (asylum-
only proceedings), 1208.2(c)(2) (withholding-only proceedings).
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[[Page 62273]]
Second, the proposed rule would define ``unaccompanied child'' to
be synonymous with ``unaccompanied alien child'' and its statutory
definition at 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2). Similar to the proposed
``noncitizen'' definitional change, this change is more consistent with
current terminology usage.
O. Technical Changes
The Department proposes technical changes in paragraphs amended as
noted in this section. Specifically, the Department proposes to replace
gendered language with gender-neutral language at 8 CFR
1003.1(e)(8)(ii), 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(1), 1003.23(b)(1)(iii), and
1240.26. The Department also proposes to decapitalize the term
``Immigration Judge'' where appropriate. Lastly, the Department
proposes to replace references to ``the Service'' with ``DHS'' and
references to ``alien'' with ``noncitizen'' where appropriate.
P. Request for Comment
In Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), the Board of
Immigration Appeals held that court orders that vacate a noncitizen's
conviction will be given effect for immigration purposes only when they
are based on a substantive or procedural defect in the underlying
criminal proceeding. In Matter of Thomas & Thompson, 27 I&N Dec. 674
(A.G. 2019), Attorney General Barr overruled three prior Board
decisions--Matter of Cota-Vargas, 37 I&N Dec. 849 (BIA 2005), Matter of
Song, 23 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001), and Matter of Estrada, 26 I&N Dec.
749 (BIA 2016)--and held that state-court orders that modify, clarify,
or otherwise alter a noncitizen's criminal sentence will similarly be
given effect for immigration purposes only when they are based on a
substantive or procedural defect in the underlying criminal proceeding,
and not when based on reasons unrelated to the merits, such as
rehabilitation or avoiding immigration consequences.
Recently, a circuit split has emerged on whether Matter of Thomas &
Thompson may be applied retroactively in immigration proceedings to
orders or criminal proceedings that predated the Attorney General's
decision. Compare Zaragoza v. Garland, 52 F.4th 1006, 1010 (7th Cir.
2022) (holding that applying Matter of Thomas & Thompson to a
preexisting sentence-modification order ``is an impermissibly
retroactive application of a new rule''), with Edwards v. U.S. Attorney
General, 56 F.4th 951, 962 (11th Cir. 2022) (finding ``no retroactivity
problem'' in similar circumstances). Questions have also arisen over
how Matter of Thomas & Thompson and Pickering apply to particular types
of orders. See, e.g., Matter of Sotelo, 2019 WL 8197756, at *2 (BIA
Dec. 23, 2019) (giving effect to a vacatur order issued under Cal.
Penal Code Sec. 1473.7); Khatkarh v. Becerra, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1277,
1285-86 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (discussing Board decision denying effect to a
vacatur order issued under Cal. Penal Code Sec. 1473.7); Talamantes-
Enriquez v. U.S. Attorney General, 12 F.4th 1340, 1354-55 (11th Cir.
2021) (denying effect to a clarification order where the original
sentence was not ambiguous, but distinguishing a ``sentence order
[that] was ambiguous and needed clarification'').
The Department invites comment on whether--and if so, to what
extent--Matter of Thomas & Thompson should be given retroactive effect.
In particular, the Department seeks comment and information on the
appropriate reference point for the retroactivity inquiry; the extent
to which individuals reasonably relied on the Board decisions
overturned by Matter of Thomas & Thompson (e.g., in entering guilty
pleas, in going to trial, in pursuing state-court modifications,
clarifications, or alterations, or otherwise); the burden that
retroactive application would impose (e.g., the consequence of removal
and obstacles individuals may now face to obtaining relief that would
satisfy Thomas & Thompson or in demonstrating case-specific reliance);
and the interests, if any, in applying Matter of Thomas & Thompson
retroactively. See, e.g., Zaragoza, 52 F.4th at 1023; Retail, Wholesale
& Dep't Store Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir.
1972); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314-21 (2001). The
Department also seeks comment on how Matter of Thomas & Thompson and
Pickering apply to particular types of orders, such as those referenced
in Matter of Sotelo, Katkarh, and Talamantes-Enriquez. Reconsideration
of the approach of Matter of Thomas & Thompson or Pickering is beyond
the scope of this rulemaking, which focuses on the application of those
decisions without reaffirming or reconsidering their approach.
Q. Reliance Interests
The Department perceives no reliance interest on the part of any
party or entity in any existing policies implicated or effected by the
proposed rule, apart from those discussed in the request for comment in
Section IV.P of this preamble. Nonetheless, the Department invites
commenters to identify any serious reliance interests that may be
implicated by the provisions of this proposed rule. See FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (requiring agencies
to consider cognizable ``serious reliance interests'' when changing
policies).
V. Regulatory Requirements
A. Administrative Procedure Act
The Department is providing a 60-day comment period for this
proposed rule to provide the public with ``an opportunity to
participate in the rule making'' as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act and in accordance with the guidance provided by Executive
Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563. See APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(c); E.O.
12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(stating that rulemakings ``in most cases should include a comment
period of not less than 60 days''); E.O. 13563, Improving Regulation
and Regulatory Review, 76 FR 3821, 3821-22 (Jan. 18, 2011) (``To the
extent feasible and permitted by law, each agency shall afford the
public . . . a comment period that should generally be at least 60
days.'').
The Department reiterates that it proposes discrete changes to the
appellate process, decisional finality, and administrative closure.
Should rulemakings arise prior to finalization of this proposed rule
that impact the changes proposed herein, the Department intends to
identify and explain the projected impact that this proposed rule, if
finalized, would have on EOIR's operations in conjunction with those
future rules in order to give the public notice of the projected
intersection between related rulemaking efforts and the opportunity to
comment, where appropriate.
The Department does not anticipate that the comment period for this
proposed rule will overlap or coincide with other rules, Attorney
General decisions, or Board decisions that would affect the effect of
the regulatory changes proposed by this NPRM. The Department invites
the public to submit comments during the 60-day comment
[[Page 62274]]
period regarding anticipated interaction with related rules.\48\ For
further information, the Department notes the most recent publication
of the Unified Agenda outlining the Department's anticipated rulemaking
activity through spring 2024. See Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Spring 2023 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory
Actions, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ The Department recognizes that litigation is pending for
many of the rules noted by the court in Centro Legal de la Raza. 524
F. Supp. 3d at 959-62. As provided in the Department's Unified
Agenda submission, the Department anticipates modifying or
rescinding the following rules identified by the court: Executive
Office for Immigration Review; Fee Review, 85 FR 82750 (Dec. 18,
2020); Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible
Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 FR 80274 (Dec. 11, 2020); and
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 FR 81698 (Dec.
16, 2020). Further, rescission of the AA96 Final Rule addresses the
court's concerns with the interactions of two other proposed rules--
Motions to Reopen and Reconsider; Effect of Departure; Stay of
Removal, 85 FR 75942 (Nov. 27, 2020), and Good Cause for a
Continuance in Immigration Proceedings, 85 FR 75925 (Nov. 27, 2020).
Specifically, the court was concerned that the Department's
responses in the AA96 Final Rule to various comments relied on
regulatory provisions that it later proposed to amend. Centro Legal
de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 959-62. Publishing this new NPRM,
which proposes to rescind the AA96 Final Rule, containing the
responses causing concern, thereby eliminates such concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Department has reviewed this NPRM in accordance with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)) and certifies that this
NPRM will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The proposed rule will not regulate ``small
entities,'' as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(6). In the main,
this proposed rule reverses the amendments made by the AA96 Final Rule
and restores and expands on previously existing authorities exercised
by EOIR adjudicators and processes governing appeals filed with the
Board. Accordingly, this proposed rule regulates the conduct of
immigration proceedings before EOIR and therefore may have a direct
impact on noncitizens in such proceedings. The proposed rule may
indirectly affect resources or business operations for legal providers
representing noncitizens in proceedings before EOIR, but the proposed
rule imposes no mandates or requirements on such entities and,
therefore, the Department believes that the proposed rule will not have
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Moreover, the Department believes it is unlikely that small
entities, including legal service providers, have changed their
practices since the AA96 Final Rule was enjoined, thus further
minimizing the proposed rule's impact on small entities. The AA96 Final
Rule was enjoined soon after becoming effective. Thus, the pre-AA96
Final Rule status quo has been in effect since the injunction. Given
that the proposed rule generally adopts the pre-AA96 Final Rule status
quo--the framework that is currently in place--with only a few
alterations, the Department does not expect the changes proposed by
this NPRM to have a significant impact on any small entities, as it is
unlikely to require any significant change in operations to accommodate
the changes proposed herein.
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
This proposed rule would not result in the expenditure by State,
local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more in any one year (adjusted annually for
inflation), and it will not significantly or uniquely affect small
governments. Therefore, no actions were deemed necessary under the
provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. See 2 U.S.C.
1532(a).
D. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), Executive
Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and Executive
Order 14094 (Modernizing Regulatory Review)
The Department has determined that this proposed rule is a
``significant regulatory action'' under section 3(f) of Executive Order
12866, as amended. Accordingly, this proposed rule has been submitted
to the Office of Management and Budget for review.
The Department certifies that this proposed rule has been drafted
in accordance with the principles of Executive Order 12866, Executive
Order 13563, and Executive Order 14094, Modernizing Regulatory Review,
88 FR 21879 (Apr. 6, 2023). Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14094
direct agencies to assess the costs and benefits of available
regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select
regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health, and safety effects,
distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the
importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, reducing costs,
harmonizing rules, and promoting flexibility.
Overall, the Department believes that the changes proposed in this
NPRM will provide significant benefits to adjudicators, the parties,
and the broader public, which outweigh the potential costs.
For example, the proposed rule's provisions for the exercise of
administrative closure, termination, and dismissal authority strike a
balance between providing sufficient guidance for adjudicators and
regulated parties while, at the same time, preserving flexibility that
will promote fairer, more efficient, and more uniform case processing
and adjudication. Likewise, eliminating projected inefficiencies that
could have resulted from implementation of the AA96 standards,
including rescinding restrictions on sua sponte authority for
adjudicators to reopen or reconsider cases, would codify additional
flexibility for adjudicators, which could provide significant benefits
to noncitizens in certain cases with exceptional circumstances, as
discussed above. Further, reinstating Board remand authority will also
codify similar flexibility for adjudicators, and is expected to have
efficiency benefits as noted in the preamble above. The Department
believes that the costs of these provisions mainly relate to any
necessary familiarization with the rule, but such costs should be de
minimis, given that the AA96 Final Rule has never been implemented and
this NPRM is proposing to codify the operative status quo. Further, the
NPRM is largely either proposing to codify prior longstanding
regulatory provisions (sua sponte authority, Board remand authority) or
longstanding case law (administrative closure). On balance, overall,
the Department believes that the fairness and efficiency benefits
gained by the aforementioned proposed changes outweigh the potential de
minimis costs.
Similarly, many of the other proposed changes, including to
briefing schedules, background check procedures, Board adjudication
timelines, quality assurance certification, forwarding of the record on
appeal, and the EOIR Director's case adjudication authority are largely
internal case-processing measures with no measurable costs to the
public. Moreover, many of these provisions will revert in large part to
longstanding pre-AA96 Final Rule regulatory language, with which
adjudicators and the parties should already be familiar. Additionally,
to the extent that any provisions of the AA96 Final Rule are retained,
such as the background check procedures allowing a case to be held at
[[Page 62275]]
the Board pending a background check, rather than remanded to the
immigration court, the Department believes that such provisions will
provide efficiencies to the immigration system, which will in turn
benefit adjudicators and the parties.
In sum, any changes contemplated by the NPRM would not impact on
the public in a way that would render the proposed rule in conflict
with the principles of Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14094.
E. Executive Order 13132--Federalism
This proposed rule would not have substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the National Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with section 6
of Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this proposed rule does
not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement.
F. Executive Order 12988--Civil Justice Reform
This proposed rule meets the applicable standards set forth in
sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
This NPRM does not propose new or revisions to existing
``collection[s] of information'' as that term is defined under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, 109 Stat. 163, 44
U.S.C. chapter 35), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320.
H. Congressional Review Act
This proposed rule is not a major rule as defined by section 804 of
the Congressional Review Act. 5 U.S.C. 804.
List of Subjects
8 CFR Part 1001
Administrative practice and procedure, Immigration.
8 CFR Part 1003
Administrative practice and procedure, Immigration.
8 CFR Part 1239
Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration.
8 CFR Part 1240
Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, the
Department proposes to amend 8 CFR parts 1001, 1003, 1239, and 1240 as
follows:
PART 1001--DEFINITIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 1001 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103; Pub. L. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135; Title VII of Pub. L. 110-229.
0
2. Amend Sec. 1001.1 by adding paragraphs (gg) and (hh) to read as
follows:
Sec. 1001.1 Definitions.
* * * * *
(gg) The term noncitizen means any person not a citizen or national
of the United States.
(hh) The term unaccompanied child means, and is synonymous with,
the term ``unaccompanied alien child,'' as defined in 6 U.S.C.
279(g)(2).
PART 1003--EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
0
3. The authority citation for part 1003 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 6 U.S.C. 521; 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103,
1154, 1155, 1158, 1182, 1226, 1229, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c, 1231,
1254a, 1255, 1324d, 1330, 1361, 1362; 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 1746; sec.
2 Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1950; 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 1002;
section 203 of Pub. L. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2196-200; sections 1506
and 1510 of Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1527-29, 1531-32; section
1505 of Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-326 to -328.
0
4. Amend Sec. 1003.0 by revising paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read as
follows:
Sec. 1003.0 Executive Office for Immigration Review.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) The Director may not delegate the authority assigned to the
Director in Sec. 1292.18 of this chapter and may not delegate any
other authority to adjudicate cases arising under the Act or
regulations of this chapter unless expressly authorized to do so.
* * * * *
0
5. Amend Sec. 1003.1 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i)(E), (c), (d)(1) introductory text,
(d)(1)(ii), (d)(3)(iii) and (iv);
0
b. Removing paragraph (d)(3)(v);
0
c. Revising paragraphs (d)(6)(ii) and (iii), (d)(6)(v), (d)(7), (e)
introductory text, (e)(1) through (3), (e)(4)(i) introductory text,
(e)(4)(ii), (e)(7), (e)(8) introductory text, (e)(8)(i) through (iii),
and (v), and (f);
0
d. Removing and reserving paragraph (k); and
0
e. Adding paragraphs (l) and (m).
The additions and revisions read as follows:
Sec. 1003.1 Organization, jurisdiction, and powers of the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) * * *
(E) Adjudicate cases as a Board member, including the authority to
administratively close and recalendar cases in accordance with
paragraph (l) of this section; and
* * * * *
(c) Jurisdiction by certification. The Secretary, or any other duly
authorized officer of DHS, an immigration judge, or the Board may in
any case arising under paragraph (b) of this section certify such case
to the Board for adjudication. The Board, in its discretion, may review
any such case by certification without regard to the provisions of
Sec. 1003.7 if it determines that the parties have already been given
a fair opportunity to make representations before the Board regarding
the case, including the opportunity to request oral argument and to
submit a brief.
(d) * * *
(1) Generally. The Board shall function as an appellate body
charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the
Act that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it. The Board
shall resolve the questions before it in a manner that is timely,
impartial, and consistent with the Act and regulations. In addition,
the Board, through precedent decisions, shall provide clear and uniform
guidance to DHS, the immigration judges, and the general public on the
proper interpretation and administration of the Act and its
implementing regulations.
* * * * *
(ii) Subject to the governing standards set forth in paragraph
(d)(1)(i) of this section, Board members shall exercise their
independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the
cases coming before the Board, and a panel or Board member to whom a
case is assigned may take any action consistent with their authorities
under the Act and the regulations as necessary or appropriate for the
disposition or alternative resolution of the case. Such actions include
administrative closure, termination of proceedings, and dismissal of
proceedings. The standards for the administrative closure, dismissal,
and termination of cases are set forth in paragraph (l) of this
section, 8 CFR
[[Page 62276]]
1239.2(c), and paragraph (m) of this section, respectively.
* * * * *
(3) * * *
(iii) The Board may review de novo all questions arising in appeals
from decisions issued by DHS officers.
(iv) Except for taking administrative notice of commonly known
facts such as current events or the contents of official documents, the
Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding cases. A
party asserting that the Board cannot properly resolve an appeal
without further factfinding must file a motion for remand. If new
evidence is submitted on appeal, that submission may be deemed a motion
to remand and considered accordingly. If further factfinding is needed
in a particular case, the Board may remand the proceeding to the
immigration judge or, as appropriate, to DHS.
* * * * *
(6) * * *
(ii) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(6)(iv) of this section, if
identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations
are necessary in order to adjudicate the appeal or motion, the Board
will provide notice to both parties that the case is being placed on
hold until such time as all identity, law enforcement, or security
investigations or examinations are completed or updated and the results
have been reported to the Board. The Board's notice will notify the
noncitizen that DHS will contact the noncitizen with instructions,
consistent with Sec. 1003.47(d), to take any additional steps
necessary to complete or update the identity, law enforcement, or
security investigations or examinations only if DHS is unable to
independently update the necessary identity, law enforcement, or
security investigations or examinations. The Board's notice will also
advise the noncitizen of the consequences for failing to comply with
the requirements of this section. DHS is responsible for obtaining
biometrics and other biographical information to complete or update the
identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations
with respect to any noncitizen in detention.
(iii) In any case placed on hold under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this
section, DHS shall report to the Board promptly when the identity, law
enforcement, or security investigations or examinations have been
completed or updated. If DHS obtains relevant information as a result
of the identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or
examinations, or if the noncitizen fails to comply with the necessary
procedures for collecting biometrics or other biographical information
after receiving instructions from DHS under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of
this section, DHS may move the Board to remand the record to the
immigration judge for consideration of whether, in view of the new
information, or the noncitizen's failure to comply with the necessary
procedures for collecting biometrics or other biographical information
after receiving instructions from DHS under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of
this section, immigration relief or protection should be denied, either
on grounds of ineligibility as a matter of law or as a matter of
discretion. If DHS fails to report the results of timely completed or
updated identity, law enforcement or security investigations or
examinations within 180 days from the date of the Board's notice under
paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this section, the Board may continue to hold
the case under paragraph (d)(6)(ii) of this section, as needed, or
remand the case to the immigration judge for further proceedings under
Sec. 1003.47(h).
* * * * *
(v) The immigration relief or protection described in Sec.
1003.47(b) and granted by the Board shall take effect as provided in
Sec. 1003.47(i).
(7) * * *
(i) The decision of the Board shall be final except in those cases
reviewed by the Attorney General in accordance with paragraph (h) of
this section. The Board may return a case to DHS or an immigration
judge for such further action as may be appropriate without entering a
final decision on the merits of the case.
(ii) In cases involving voluntary departure, the Board may issue an
order of voluntary departure under section 240B of the Act, with an
alternate order of removal, if the noncitizen requested voluntary
departure before an immigration judge, the noncitizen's notice of
appeal specified that the noncitizen is appealing the immigration
judge's denial of voluntary departure and identified the specific
factual and legal findings that the noncitizen is challenging, and the
Board finds that the noncitizen is otherwise eligible for voluntary
departure, as provided in 8 CFR 1240.26(k). In order to grant voluntary
departure, the Board must find that all applicable statutory and
regulatory criteria have been met, based on the record and within the
scope of its review authority on appeal, and that the noncitizen merits
voluntary departure as a matter of discretion. If the record does not
contain sufficient factual findings regarding eligibility for voluntary
departure, the Board may remand the decision to the immigration judge
for further factfinding.
(e) Case management system. The Chairman shall establish a case
management system to screen all cases and to manage the Board's
caseload. Unless a case meets the standards for assignment to a three-
member panel under paragraph (e)(6) of this section, all cases shall be
assigned to a single Board member for disposition. The Chairman, under
the supervision of the Director, shall be responsible for the success
of the case management system. The Chairman shall designate, from time
to time, a screening panel comprising a sufficient number of Board
members who are authorized, acting alone, to adjudicate appeals as
provided in this paragraph (e). The provisions of this paragraph (e)
shall apply to all cases before the Board, regardless of whether they
were initiated by filing a Notice of Appeal, filing a motion, or
receipt of a remand from Federal court or the Attorney General.
(1) Initial screening. All cases shall be referred to the screening
panel for review. Appeals subject to summary dismissal as provided in
paragraph (d)(2) of this section should be promptly dismissed.
(2) Miscellaneous dispositions. A single Board member may grant an
unopposed motion or a motion to withdraw an appeal pending before the
Board. In addition, a single Board member may adjudicate a DHS motion
to remand any appeal from the decision of a DHS officer where DHS
requests that the matter be remanded to DHS for further consideration
of the appellant's arguments or evidence raised on appeal; a case where
remand is required because of a defective or missing transcript; and
other procedural or ministerial issues as provided by the case
management plan.
(3) Merits review. In any case that has not been summarily
dismissed, the case management system shall arrange for the prompt
completion of the record of proceeding and transcript, and the issuance
of a briefing schedule, as appropriate. A single Board member assigned
under the case management system shall determine the appeal on the
merits as provided in paragraph (e)(4) or (5) of this section, unless
the Board member determines that the case is appropriate for review and
decision by a three-member panel under the standards of paragraph
(e)(6) of this section. The Board member may summarily dismiss an
appeal after completion of the record of proceeding.
(4) * * *
(i) The Board member to whom a case is assigned shall affirm the
decision of
[[Page 62277]]
the DHS officer or the immigration judge without opinion if the Board
member determines that the result reached in the decision under review
was correct; that any errors in the decision under review were harmless
or nonmaterial; and that
* * * * *
(ii) If the Board member determines that the decision should be
affirmed without opinion, the Board shall issue an order that reads as
follows: ``The Board affirms, without opinion, the result of the
decision below. The decision below is, therefore, the final agency
determination. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4).'' An order affirming without
opinion issued under authority of this provision shall not include
further explanation or reasoning. Such an order approves the result
reached in the decision below; it does not necessarily imply approval
of all of the reasoning of that decision but does signify the Board's
conclusion that any errors in the decision of the immigration judge or
DHS were harmless or nonmaterial.
* * * * *
(7) Oral argument. When an appeal has been taken, a request for
oral argument if desired shall be included in the Notice of Appeal. A
three-member panel or the Board en banc may hear oral argument, as a
matter of discretion, at such date and time as is established under the
Board's case management plan. Oral argument shall be held at the
offices of the Board unless the Deputy Attorney General or the Attorney
General's designee authorizes oral argument to be held elsewhere. DHS
may be represented before the Board by an officer or counsel of DHS
designated by DHS. No oral argument will be allowed in a case that is
assigned for disposition by a single Board member.
(8) Timeliness. As provided under the case management system, the
Board shall promptly enter orders of summary dismissal, or other
miscellaneous dispositions, in appropriate cases consistent with
paragraph (e)(1) of this section. In all other cases, after completion
of the record on appeal, including any briefs, motions, or other
submissions on appeal, the Board member or panel to which the case is
assigned shall issue a decision on the merits as soon as practicable,
with a priority for cases or custody appeals involving detained
noncitizens.
(i) Except in exigent circumstances as determined by the Chairman,
or as provided in paragraph (d)(6) of this section, the Board shall
dispose of all cases assigned to a single Board member within 90 days
of completion of the record, or within 180 days after a case is
assigned to a three-member panel (including any additional opinion by a
member of the panel).
(ii) In exigent circumstances, the Chairman may grant an extension
in particular cases of up to 60 days as a matter of discretion. Except
as provided in paragraph (e)(8)(iii) or (iv) of this section, in those
cases where the panel is unable to issue a decision within the
established time limits, as extended, the Chairman shall either self-
assign the case or assign the case to a Vice Chairman for final
decision within 14 days or shall refer the case to the Attorney General
for decision. If a dissenting or concurring panel member fails to
complete the member's opinion by the end of the extension period, the
decision of the majority will be issued without the separate opinion.
(iii) In rare circumstances, such as when an impending decision by
the United States Supreme Court or a United States Court of Appeals, or
impending Department regulatory amendments, or an impending en banc
Board decision may substantially determine the outcome of a case or
group of cases pending before the Board, the Chairman may hold the case
or cases until such decision is rendered, temporarily suspending the
time limits described in this paragraph (e)(8).
* * * * *
(v) The Chairman shall notify the Director of EOIR and the Attorney
General if a Board member consistently fails to meet the assigned
deadlines for the disposition of appeals, or otherwise fails to adhere
to the standards of the case management system. The Chairman shall also
prepare a report assessing the timeliness of the disposition of cases
by each Board member on an annual basis.
* * * * *
(f) Service of Board decisions. The decision of the Board shall be
in writing. The Board shall transmit a copy to DHS and serve a copy
upon the noncitizen or the noncitizen's representative, as provided in
8 CFR part 1292.
* * * * *
(l) Administrative closure and recalendaring. Administrative
closure is the temporary suspension of a case. Administrative closure
removes a case from the Board's docket until the case is recalendared.
Recalendaring places a case back on the Board's docket.
(1) Administrative closure before the Board. Board members may, in
the exercise of discretion, administratively close a case upon the
motion of a party, after applying the standard set forth at paragraph
(l)(3) of this section. The administrative closure authority described
in this section is not limited by the authority provided in any other
provisions in this chapter V that separately authorize or require
administrative closure in certain circumstances, including 8 CFR
214.15(l) and (p)(4), 1214.2(a), 1214.3, 1240.62(b), 1240.70(f)
through(h), 1245.13, 1245.15(p)(4)(i), and 1245.21(c).
(2) Recalendaring before the Board. At any time after a case has
been administratively closed under paragraph (l)(1) of this section,
the Board may, in the exercise of discretion, recalendar the case
pursuant to a party's motion to recalendar. In deciding whether to
grant such a motion, the Board shall apply the standard set forth at
paragraph (l)(3) of this section.
(3) Standard for administrative closure and recalendaring. The
Board shall grant a motion to administratively close or recalendar
filed jointly by both parties, or filed by one party where the other
party has affirmatively indicated its non-opposition, unless the Board
articulates unusual, clearly identified, and supported reasons for
denying the motion. In all other cases, in deciding whether to
administratively close or to recalendar a case, the Board shall
consider the totality of the circumstances, including as many of the
factors listed under paragraphs (l)(3)(i) and (ii) of this section as
are relevant to the particular case. The Board may also consider other
factors where appropriate. No single factor is dispositive.
Accordingly, the Board, having considered the totality of the
circumstances, may grant a motion to administratively close or to
recalendar a particular case over the objection of a party. Although
administrative closure may be appropriate where a petition,
application, or other action is pending outside of proceedings before
the Board, such a pending petition, application, or other action is not
required for a case to be administratively closed.
(i) As the circumstances of the case warrant, the factors relevant
to a decision to administratively close a case include:
(A) The reason administrative closure is sought;
(B) The basis for any opposition to administrative closure;
(C) Any requirement that a case be administratively closed in order
for a petition, application, or other action to be filed with, or
granted by, DHS;
(D) The likelihood the noncitizen will succeed on any petition,
application, or other action that the noncitizen is pursuing, or that
the noncitizen states in writing or on the record at a hearing that
[[Page 62278]]
they plan to pursue, outside of proceedings before the Board;
(E) The anticipated duration of the administrative closure;
(F) The responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to
any current or anticipated delay; and
(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome of the case.
(ii) As the circumstances of the case warrant, the factors relevant
to a decision to recalendar a case include:
(A) The reason recalendaring is sought;
(B) The basis for any opposition to recalendaring;
(C) The length of time elapsed since the case was administratively
closed;
(D) If the case was administratively closed to allow the noncitizen
to file a petition, application, or other action outside of proceedings
before the Board, whether the noncitizen filed the petition,
application, or other action and, if so, the length of time that
elapsed between when the case was administratively closed and when the
noncitizen filed the petition, application, or other action;
(E) If a petition, application, or other action that was pending
outside of proceedings before the Board has been adjudicated, the
result of that adjudication;
(F) If a petition, application, or other action remains pending
outside of proceedings before the Board, the likelihood the noncitizen
will succeed on that petition, application, or other action; and
(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome if the case is recalendared.
(m) Termination. The Board shall have the authority to terminate
cases before it as set forth in paragraphs (m)(1) and (2) of this
section. A motion to dismiss a case in removal proceedings before the
Board for a reason other than authorized by 8 CFR 1239.2(c) shall be
deemed a motion to terminate under paragraph (m)(1) of this section.
(1) Removal, deportation, and exclusion proceedings--(i) Mandatory
termination. In removal, deportation, and exclusion proceedings, the
Board shall terminate the case where at least one of the requirements
in paragraphs (m)(1)(i)(A) through (G) of this section is met.
(A) No charge of deportability, inadmissibility, or excludability
can be sustained.
(B) Fundamentally fair proceedings are not possible because the
noncitizen is mentally incompetent and adequate safeguards are
unavailable.
(C) The noncitizen has, since the initiation of proceedings,
obtained United States citizenship.
(D) The noncitizen has, since the initiation of proceedings,
obtained at least one status listed in paragraphs (m)(1)(i)(D)(1)
through (4) of this section, provided that the status has not been
revoked or terminated, and the noncitizen would not have been
deportable, inadmissible, or excludable as charged if the noncitizen
had obtained such status before the initiation of proceedings.
(1) Lawful permanent resident status.
(2) Refugee status.
(3) Asylee status.
(4) Nonimmigrant status as defined in section 101(a)(15)(S), (T),
or (U) of the Act.
(E) Termination is required under 8 CFR 1245.13(l).
(F) Termination is otherwise required by law.
(G) The parties jointly filed a motion to terminate, or one party
filed a motion to terminate and the other party affirmatively indicated
its non-opposition, unless the Board articulates unusual, clearly
identified, and supported reasons for denying the motion.
(ii) Discretionary termination. In removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings, the Board may, in the exercise of discretion,
terminate the case where at least one of the requirements listed in
paragraphs (m)(1)(ii) (A) through (G) of this section is met.
(A) An unaccompanied child, as defined in 8 CFR 1001.1(hh), states
an intent in writing or on the record at a hearing to seek asylum with
USCIS, and USCIS has initial jurisdiction over the application pursuant
to section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act.
(B) The noncitizen demonstrates prima facie eligibility for relief
from removal or for a lawful status based on a petition, application,
or other action that USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate, including
naturalization or adjustment of status.
(C) The noncitizen is a beneficiary of Temporary Protected Status,
deferred action, or Deferred Enforced Departure.
(D) USCIS has granted the noncitizen's application for a
provisional unlawful presence waiver pursuant to 8 CFR 212.7(e).
(E) Termination is authorized by 8 CFR 1216.4(a)(6) or 1238.1(e).
(F) The parties have filed a motion to terminate under 8 CFR
214.11(d)(1)(i) or 214.14(c)(1)(i).
(G) Due to circumstances comparable to those described in
paragraphs (m)(1)(ii)(A) through (F) of this section, termination is
similarly necessary or appropriate for the disposition or alternative
resolution of the case. However, the Board may not terminate a case for
purely humanitarian reasons, unless DHS expressly consents to such
termination, joins in a motion to terminate, or affirmatively indicates
its non-opposition to a noncitizen's motion.
(2) Other proceedings--(i) Mandatory termination. In proceedings
other than removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings, the Board
shall terminate the case where the parties have jointly filed a motion
to terminate, or one party has filed a motion to terminate and the
other party has affirmatively indicated its non-opposition, unless the
Board articulates unusual, clearly identified, and supported reasons
for denying the motion. In addition, the Board shall terminate such a
case where required by law.
(ii) Discretionary termination. In proceedings other than removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings, the Board may, in the exercise
of discretion, terminate the case where one party has requested
termination, and terminating the case is necessary or appropriate for
the disposition or alternative resolution of the case. However, the
Board may not terminate the case for purely humanitarian reasons,
unless DHS expressly consents to such termination, joins in a motion to
terminate, or affirmatively indicates its non-opposition to a
noncitizen's motion.
(iii) Limitation on Termination. Nothing in paragraphs (m)(2)(i)
and (ii) of this section authorizes the Board to terminate a case where
prohibited by another regulatory provision.
0
6. Amend Sec. 1003.2 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (a) and (b)(1);
0
b. Removing the words ``Immigration Judge'' and adding in their place
``immigration judge'' in paragraph (c)(2);
0
c. Revising paragraphs (c)(3)(iii) and (iv);
0
d. Removing paragraphs (c)(3)(v) through (vii);
0
e. Adding paragraph (c)(4); and
0
f. Revising paragraphs (f), (g)(3), and (i).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 1003.2 Reopening or reconsideration before the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
(a) General. The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its
own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. A request by
DHS or by the party affected by the decision to reopen or reconsider a
case the Board has decided must be in the form of a written motion to
the Board. The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or
reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the
[[Page 62279]]
restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion
to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for
relief.
(b) * * *
(1) A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion
by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and
shall be supported by pertinent authority. When a motion to reconsider
the decision of an immigration judge or of a DHS officer is pending at
the time an appeal is filed with the Board, or when such motion is
filed subsequent to the filing with the Board of an appeal from the
decision sought to be reconsidered, the motion may be deemed a motion
to remand the decision for further proceedings before the immigration
judge or the DHS officer from whose decision the appeal was taken. Such
motion may be consolidated with and considered by the Board in
connection with the appeal to the Board.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(iii) Agreed upon by all parties and jointly filed. Notwithstanding
such agreement, the parties may contest the issues in a reopened
proceeding; or
(iv) Filed by DHS in exclusion or deportation proceedings when the
basis of the motion is fraud in the original proceeding or a crime that
would support termination of asylum in accordance with 8 CFR 1208.24.
(4) A motion to reopen a decision rendered by an immigration judge
or DHS officer that is pending when an appeal is filed, or that is
filed while an appeal is pending before the Board, may be deemed a
motion to remand for further proceedings before the immigration judge
or the DHS officer from whose decision the appeal was taken. Such
motion may be consolidated with, and considered by the Board in
connection with, the appeal to the Board.
* * * * *
(f) Stay of deportation. Except where a motion is filed pursuant to
the provisions of Sec. 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) and (b)(4)(iii)(A), the
filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not stay
the execution of any decision made in the case. Execution of such
decision shall proceed unless a stay of execution is specifically
granted by the Board, the immigration judge, or an authorized DHS
officer.
(g) * * *
(3) Briefs and response. The moving party may file a brief if it is
included with the motion. If the motion is filed directly with the
Board pursuant to paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this section, the opposing
party shall have 21 days from the date of service of the motion to file
a brief in opposition to the motion directly with the Board. If the
motion is filed with a DHS office pursuant to paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of
this section, the opposing party shall have 21 days from the date of
filing of the motion to file a brief in opposition to the motion
directly with DHS. In all cases, briefs and any other filings made in
conjunction with a motion shall include proof of service on the
opposing party. The Board, in its discretion, may extend the time
within which such brief is to be submitted and may authorize the filing
of a brief directly with the Board. A motion shall be deemed unopposed
unless a timely response is made. The Board may, in its discretion,
consider a brief filed out of time.
* * * * *
(i) Ruling on motion. Rulings upon motions to reopen or motions to
reconsider shall be by written order. Any motion for reconsideration or
reopening of a decision issued by a single Board member will be
referred to the screening panel for disposition by a single Board
member, unless the screening panel member determines, in the exercise
of judgment, that the motion for reconsideration or reopening should be
assigned to a three-member panel under the standards of Sec.
1003.1(e)(6). If the order directs a reopening and further proceedings
are necessary, the record shall be returned to the Immigration Court or
the DHS officer having administrative control over the place where the
reopened proceedings are to be conducted. If the motion to reconsider
is granted, the decision upon such reconsideration shall affirm,
modify, or reverse the original decision made in the case.
0
7. Amend Sec. 1003.3 by revising paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 1003.3 Notice of appeal.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) Appeal from decision of an immigration judge. Briefs in support
of or in opposition to an appeal from a decision of an immigration
judge shall be filed directly with the Board. In those cases that are
transcribed, the briefing schedule shall be set by the Board after the
transcript is available. In cases involving noncitizens in custody, the
parties shall be provided 21 days in which to file simultaneous briefs
unless a shorter period is specified by the Board. Reply briefs shall
be permitted only by leave of the Board and only if filed within 21
days of the deadline for the initial briefs. In cases involving
noncitizens who are not in custody, the appellant shall be provided 21
days in which to file a brief, unless a shorter period is specified by
the Board. The appellee shall have the same period of time in which to
file a reply brief that was initially granted to the appellant to file
their brief. The time to file a reply brief commences from the date
upon which the appellant's brief was due, as originally set or extended
by the Board. The Board, upon written motion, may extend the period for
filing a brief or a reply brief for up to 90 days for good cause shown.
In its discretion, the Board may consider a brief that has been filed
out of time. In its discretion, the Board may request supplemental
briefing from the parties after the expiration of the briefing
deadline. All briefs, filings, and motions filed in conjunction with an
appeal shall include proof of service on the opposing party.
(2) Appeal from decision of a DHS officer. Briefs in support of or
in opposition to an appeal from a decision of a DHS officer shall be
filed directly with DHS in accordance with the instructions in the
decision of the DHS officer. The applicant or petitioner and DHS shall
be provided 21 days in which to file a brief, unless a shorter period
is specified by the DHS officer from whose decision the appeal is
taken, and reply briefs shall be permitted only by leave of the Board.
Upon written request of the noncitizen, the DHS officer from whose
decision the appeal is taken or the Board may extend the period for
filing a brief for good cause shown. The Board may authorize the filing
of briefs directly with the Board. In its discretion, the Board may
consider a brief that has been filed out of time. All briefs and other
documents filed in conjunction with an appeal, unless filed by a
noncitizen directly with a DHS office, shall include proof of service
on the opposing party.
* * * * *
0
8. Revise Sec. 1003.5 to read as follows:
Sec. 1003.5 Forwarding of record on appeal.
(a) Appeal from decision of an immigration judge. If an appeal is
taken from a decision of an immigration judge, the record of proceeding
shall be promptly forwarded to the Board upon the request or the order
of the Board. Where transcription of an oral decision is required, the
immigration judge shall review the transcript and approve the decision
within 14 days of receipt, or within 7 days after the immigration judge
returns to their duty station if the immigration judge was on leave or
detailed to another location. The Chairman and the Chief Immigration
[[Page 62280]]
Judge shall determine the most effective and expeditious way to
transcribe proceedings before the immigration judges, and shall take
such steps as necessary to reduce the time required to produce
transcripts of those proceedings and to ensure their quality.
(b) Appeal from decision of a DHS officer. If an appeal is taken
from a decision of a DHS officer, the record of proceeding shall be
forwarded to the Board by the DHS officer promptly upon receipt of the
briefs of the parties, or upon expiration of the time allowed for the
submission of such briefs. A DHS officer need not forward such an
appeal to the Board, but may reopen and reconsider any decision made by
the officer if the new decision will grant the benefit that has been
requested in the appeal. The new decision must be served on the
appealing party within 45 days of receipt of any briefs or upon
expiration of the time allowed for the submission of any briefs. If the
new decision is not served within these time limits or the appealing
party does not agree that the new decision disposes of the matter, the
record of proceeding shall be immediately forwarded to the Board.
Sec. 1003.7 [Amended].
0
9. Amend Sec. 1003.7 by:
0
a. Removing the words ``Immigration Judge'' and adding in their place
the words ``immigration judge'' wherever they appear; and
0
b. Removing the word ``Service'' and the words ``the Service'' and
adding in their place the word ``DHS'' wherever they appear.
0
10. Amend Sec. 1003.9 by revising paragraph (b)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 1003.9 Office of the Chief Immigration Judge.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) Adjudicate cases as an immigration judge, including the
authority to administratively close and recalendar cases in accordance
with Sec. 1003.18(c); and
* * * * *
0
11. Amend Sec. 1003.10 in paragraph (b) by:
0
a. Revising the second sentence;
0
b. Adding two sentences following the second sentence;
0
c. Revising the newly redesignated fifth sentence; and
0
d. Removing the newly redesignated eight and ninth sentences.
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 1003.10 Immigration judges.
* * * * *
(b) * * * In deciding the individual cases before them, and subject
to the applicable governing standards set forth in paragraph (d) of
this section, immigration judges shall exercise their independent
judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with their
authorities under the Act and regulations that is necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or alternative resolution of such
cases. Such actions include administrative closure, termination of
proceedings, and dismissal of proceedings. The standards for the
administrative closure, dismissal, and termination of cases are set
forth in Sec. 1003.18(c), 8 CFR 1239.2(c), and Sec. 1003.18(d),
respectively. Immigration judges shall administer oaths, receive
evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine noncitizens and
any witnesses. * * *
* * * * *
0
12. Amend Sec. 1003.18 by revising the section heading, adding
paragraph headings to paragraphs (a) and (b), and adding paragraphs (c)
and (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 1003.18 Docket management.
(a) Scheduling. * * *
(b) Notice. * * *
(c) Administrative closure and recalendaring. Administrative
closure is the temporary suspension of a case. Administrative closure
removes a case from the immigration court's active calendar until the
case is recalendared. Recalendaring places a case back on the
immigration court's active calendar.
(1) Administrative closure before immigration judges. An
immigration judge may, in the exercise of discretion, administratively
close a case upon the motion of a party, after applying the standard
set forth at paragraph (c)(3) of this section. The administrative
closure authority described in this section is not limited by the
authority provided in any other provisions in this chapter that
separately authorize or require administrative closure in certain
circumstances, including 8 CFR 214.15(l), and (p)(4), 1214.2(a),
1214.3, 1240.62(b), 1240.70(f) through (h), 1245.13, 1245.15(p)(4)(i),
and 1245.21(c).
(2) Recalendaring before immigration judges. At any time after a
case has been administratively closed under paragraph (c)(1) of this
section, an immigration judge may, in the exercise of discretion,
recalendar the case pursuant to a party's motion to recalendar. In
deciding whether to grant such a motion, the immigration judge shall
apply the standard set forth at paragraph (c)(3) of this section.
(3) Standard for administrative closure and recalendaring. An
immigration judge shall grant a motion to administratively close or
recalendar filed jointly by both parties, or filed by one party where
the other party has affirmatively indicated its non-opposition, unless
the immigration judge articulates unusual, clearly identified, and
supported reasons for denying the motion. In all other cases, in
deciding whether to administratively close or to recalendar a case, an
immigration judge shall consider the totality of the circumstances,
including as many of the factors listed under paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and
(ii) of this section as are relevant to the particular case. The
immigration judge may also consider other factors where appropriate. No
single factor is dispositive. Accordingly, the immigration judge,
having considered the totality of the circumstances, may grant a motion
to administratively close or to recalendar a particular case over the
objection of a party. Although administrative closure may be
appropriate where a petition, application, or other action is pending
outside of proceedings before the immigration judge, such a pending
petition, application, or other action is not required for a case to be
administratively closed.
(i) As the circumstances of the case warrant, the factors relevant
to a decision to administratively close a case include:
(A) The reason administrative closure is sought;
(B) The basis for any opposition to administrative closure;
(C) Any requirement that a case be administratively closed in order
for a petition, application, or other action to be filed with, or
granted by, DHS;
(D) The likelihood the noncitizen will succeed on any petition,
application, or other action that the noncitizen is pursuing, or that
the noncitizen states in writing or on the record at a hearing that
they plan to pursue, outside of proceedings before the immigration
judge;
(E) The anticipated duration of the administrative closure;
(F) The responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to
any current or anticipated delay; and
(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome of the case.
(ii) As the circumstances of the case warrant, the factors relevant
to a decision to recalendar a case include:
(A) The reason recalendaring is sought;
(B) The basis for any opposition to recalendaring;
[[Page 62281]]
(C) The length of time elapsed since the case was administratively
closed;
(D) If the case was administratively closed to allow the noncitizen
to file a petition, application, or other action outside of proceedings
before the immigration judge, whether the noncitizen filed the
petition, application, or other action and, if so, the length of time
that elapsed between when the case was administratively closed and when
the noncitizen filed the petition, application, or other action;
(E) If a petition, application, or other action that was pending
outside of proceedings before the immigration judge has been
adjudicated, the result of that adjudication;
(F) If a petition, application, or other action remains pending
outside of proceedings before the immigration judge, the likelihood the
noncitizen will succeed on that petition, application, or other action;
and
(G) The ultimate anticipated outcome if the case is recalendared.
(d) Termination. Immigration judges shall have the authority to
terminate cases before them as set forth in paragraphs (d)(1) and (2)
of this section. A motion to dismiss a case in removal proceedings
before an immigration judge for a reason other than authorized by 8 CFR
1239.2(c) shall be deemed a motion to terminate under paragraph (d)(1)
of this section.
(1) Removal, deportation, and exclusion proceedings--(i) Mandatory
termination. In removal, deportation, and exclusion proceedings,
immigration judges shall terminate the case where at least one of the
requirements in paragraphs (d)(1)(i)(A) through (G) of this section is
met.
(A) No charge of deportability, inadmissibility, or excludability
can be sustained.
(B) Fundamentally fair proceedings are not possible because the
noncitizen is mentally incompetent and adequate safeguards are
unavailable.
(C) The noncitizen has, since the initiation of proceedings,
obtained United States citizenship.
(D) The noncitizen has, since the initiation of proceedings,
obtained at least one status listed in paragraphs (d)(1)(i)(D)(1)
through (4) of this section, provided that the status has not been
revoked or terminated, and the noncitizen would not have been
deportable, inadmissible, or excludable as charged if the noncitizen
had obtained such status before the initiation of proceedings.
(1) Lawful permanent resident status.
(2) Refugee status.
(3) Asylee status.
(4) Nonimmigrant status as defined in section 101(a)(15)(S), (T),
or (U) of the Act.
(E) Termination is required under 8 CFR 1245.13(l).
(F) Termination is otherwise required by law.
(G) The parties jointly filed a motion to terminate, or one party
filed a motion to terminate and the other party affirmatively indicated
its non-opposition, unless the immigration judge articulates unusual,
clearly identified, and supported reasons for denying the motion.
(ii) Discretionary termination. In removal, deportation, or
exclusion proceedings, immigration judges may, in the exercise of
discretion, terminate the case where at least one of the requirements
listed in paragraphs (d)(1)(ii)(A) through (G) of this section is met.
(A) An unaccompanied child, as defined in 8 CFR 1001.1(hh), states
an intent in writing or on the record at a hearing to seek asylum with
USCIS, and USCIS has initial jurisdiction over the application pursuant
to section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act.
(B) The noncitizen demonstrates prima facie eligibility for relief
from removal or for a lawful status based on a petition, application,
or other action that USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate, including
naturalization or adjustment of status.
(C) The noncitizen is a beneficiary of Temporary Protected Status,
deferred action, or Deferred Enforced Departure.
(D) USCIS has granted the noncitizen's application for a
provisional unlawful presence waiver pursuant to 8 CFR 212.7(e).
(E) Termination is authorized by 8 CFR 1216.4(a)(6) or 1238.1(e).
(F) The parties have filed a motion to terminate under 8 CFR
214.11(d)(1)(i) or 214.14(c)(1)(i).
(G) Due to circumstances comparable to those described in
paragraphs (d)(1)(ii)(A) through (F) of this section, termination is
similarly necessary or appropriate for the disposition or alternative
resolution of the case. However, immigration judges may not terminate a
case for purely humanitarian reasons, unless DHS expressly consents to
such termination, joins in a motion to terminate, or affirmatively
indicates its non-opposition to a noncitizen's motion.
(2) Other proceedings--(i) Mandatory termination. In proceedings
other than removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings, immigration
judges shall terminate the case where the parties have jointly filed a
motion to terminate, or one party has filed a motion to terminate and
the other party has affirmatively indicated its non-opposition, unless
the immigration judge articulates unusual, clearly identified, and
supported reasons for denying the motion. In addition, immigration
judges shall terminate such a case where required by law.
(ii) Discretionary termination. In proceedings other than removal,
deportation, or exclusion proceedings, immigration judges may, in the
exercise of discretion, terminate the case where one party has
requested termination, and terminating the case is necessary or
appropriate for the disposition or alternative resolution of the case.
However, immigration judges may not terminate a case for purely
humanitarian reasons, unless DHS expressly consents to such
termination, joins in a motion to terminate, or affirmatively indicates
its non-opposition to a noncitizen's motion.
(iii) Limitation on termination. Nothing in paragraphs (d)(2)(i)
and (ii) of this section authorizes immigration judges to terminate a
case where prohibited by another regulatory provision.
0
13. Amend Sec. 1003.23 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a);
0
b. Revising the first sentence and removing the second sentence of
paragraph (b)(1) introductory text;
0
c. In paragraph (b)(1), removing the words ``the Service'' and adding
in their place the word ``DHS'', wherever they appear;
0
d. Revising paragraphs (b)(1)(iii) through (v), (b)(2) and (3), and
(b)(4)(i) and (ii);
0
e. In paragraph (b)(4)(iii)(B), removing the words ``Immigration
Judge'' and adding in their place the words ``immigration judge''; and
0
f. Removing paragraphs (b)(4)(v) and (vi).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 1003.23 Reopening or reconsideration before the Immigration
Court.
(a) Pre-decision motions. Unless otherwise permitted by the
immigration judge, motions submitted prior to the final order of an
immigration judge shall be in writing and shall state, with
particularity the grounds therefor, the relief sought, and the
jurisdiction. The immigration judge may set and extend time limits for
the making of motions and replies thereto. A motion shall be deemed
unopposed unless timely response is made.
(b) * * *
(1) In general. An immigration judge may upon the immigration
judge's own motion at any time, or upon motion of DHS or the
noncitizen, reopen or
[[Page 62282]]
reconsider any case in which the judge has rendered a decision, unless
jurisdiction is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals. * * *
* * * * *
(iii) Assignment to an immigration judge. If the immigration judge
is unavailable or unable to adjudicate the motion to reopen or
reconsider, the Chief Immigration Judge or a delegate of the Chief
Immigration Judge shall reassign such motion to another immigration
judge.
(iv) Replies to motions; decision. The immigration judge may set
and extend time limits for replies to motions to reopen or reconsider.
A motion shall be deemed unopposed unless timely response is made. The
decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider
is within the discretion of the immigration judge.
(v) Stays. Except in cases involving in absentia orders, the filing
of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not stay the
execution of any decision made in the case. Execution of such decision
shall proceed unless a stay of execution is specifically granted by the
immigration judge, the Board, or an authorized DHS officer.
(2) Motion to reconsider. A motion to reconsider shall state the
reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the
immigration judge's prior decision and shall be supported by pertinent
authority. Such motion may not seek reconsideration of a decision
denying a previous motion to reconsider.
(3) Motion to reopen. A motion to reopen proceedings shall state
the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion
is granted and shall be supported by affidavits and other evidentiary
material. Any motion to reopen for the purpose of acting on an
application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate
application for relief and all supporting documents. A motion to reopen
will not be granted unless the immigration judge is satisfied that
evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and
could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. A
motion to reopen for the purpose of providing the noncitizen an
opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief will not be
granted if it appears that the noncitizen's right to apply for such
relief was fully explained to them by the immigration judge and an
opportunity to apply therefor was afforded at the hearing, unless the
relief is sought on the basis of circumstances that have arisen
subsequent to the hearing. Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Act, a
motion to reopen proceedings for consideration or further consideration
of an application for relief under section 240A(a) of the Act
(cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents) or 240A(b) of
the Act (cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain
nonpermanent residents) may be granted only upon demonstration that the
noncitizen was statutorily eligible for such relief prior to the
service of a Notice to Appear, or prior to the commission of an offense
referred to in section 212(a)(2) of the Act that renders the noncitizen
inadmissible or removable under sections 237(a)(2) or (a)(4) of the
Act, whichever is earliest. The immigration judge has discretion to
deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has established a
prima facie case for relief.
(4) * * *
(i) Asylum and withholding of removal. The time and numerical
limitations set forth in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall not
apply if the basis of the motion is to apply for asylum under section
208 of the Act or withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the
Act or withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, and
is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of
nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such
evidence is material and was not available and could not have been
discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. The filing of a
motion to reopen under this section shall not automatically stay the
removal of the noncitizen. However, the noncitizen may request a stay
and, if granted by the immigration judge, the noncitizen shall not be
removed pending disposition of the motion by the immigration judge. If
the original asylum application was denied based upon a finding that it
was frivolous, then the noncitizen is ineligible to file either a
motion to reopen or reconsider, or for a stay of removal.
(ii) Order entered in absentia or in removal proceedings. An order
of removal entered in absentia or in removal proceedings pursuant to
section 240(b)(5) of the Act may be rescinded only upon a motion to
reopen filed within 180 days after the date of the order of removal, if
the noncitizen demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of
exceptional circumstances as defined in section 240(e)(1) of the Act.
An order entered in absentia pursuant to section 240(b)(5) may be
rescinded upon a motion to reopen filed at any time upon the
noncitizen's demonstration of lack of notice in accordance with section
239(a)(1) or (2) of the Act, or upon the noncitizen's demonstration of
the noncitizen's Federal or State custody and the failure to appear was
through no fault of the noncitizen. However, in accordance with section
240(b)(5)(B) of the Act, no written notice of a change in time or place
of proceeding shall be required if the noncitizen has failed to provide
the address required under section 239(a)(1)(F) of the Act. The filing
of a motion under this paragraph shall stay the removal of the
noncitizen pending disposition of the motion by the immigration judge.
A noncitizen may file only one motion pursuant to this paragraph
(b)(4)(ii).
* * * * *
PART 1239--INITIATION OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
0
14. The authority citation for part 1239 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1221, 1229.
0
15. Amend Sec. 1239.2 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (b); and
0
b. Removing and reserving paragraph (f).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 1239.2 Cancellation of notice to appear.
* * * * *
(b) Ordering termination or dismissal. After commencement of
proceedings, an immigration judge or Board member shall have authority
to resolve or dispose of a case through an order of dismissal or an
order of termination. An immigration judge or Board member may enter an
order of dismissal in cases where DHS moves for dismissal pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this section. A motion to dismiss removal proceedings
for a reason other than those authorized by paragraph (c) of this
section shall be deemed a motion to terminate and adjudicated pursuant
to 8 CFR 1003.1(m), pertaining to cases before the Board, or 8 CFR
1003.18(d), pertaining to cases before the immigration court, as
applicable.
* * * * *
PART 1240--PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE REMOVABILITY OF NONCITIZENS IN
THE UNITED STATES
0
16. The authority citation for part 1240 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, 1182, 1186a, 1186b, 1225, 1226,
1227, 1228, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c, 1252 note, 1361, 1362; secs. 202
and 203, Pub. L. 105-100 (111 Stat. 2160, 2193); sec. 902, Pub. L.
105-277 (112 Stat. 2681).
0
17. The heading for part 1240 is revised to read as set forth above.
[[Page 62283]]
0
18. Amend Sec. 1240.26 by:
0
a. As shown in the following table, removing the words in the left
column and adding in their place the words in the right column wherever
they appear:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
An alien.................................. A noncitizen.
an alien.................................. a noncitizen.
the alien................................. the noncitizen.
alien's................................... noncitizen's.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0
b. By removing the words ``his or her'' and adding in their place the
words ``the noncitizen's'' in paragraphs (b)(3)(i) introductory text,
(b)(3)(i)(A), (b)(4)(ii), and (i);
0
c. By removing the words ``his or her'' and adding in their place the
words ``the ICE Field Office Director's'' in paragraph (c)(4); and
0
d. revising paragraphs (k)(1), (k)(2) introductory text, (k)(3)
introductory text, (k)(4), and (l).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 1240.26 Voluntary departure--authority of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review.
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(1) If the Board finds that an immigration judge incorrectly denied
a noncitizen's request for voluntary departure or failed to provide
appropriate advisals, the Board may consider the noncitizen's request
for voluntary departure de novo and, if warranted, may enter its own
order of voluntary departure with an alternate order of removal.
(2) In cases in which a noncitizen has appealed an immigration
judge's decision or in which DHS and the noncitizen have both appealed
an immigration judge's decision, the Board shall not grant voluntary
departure under section 240B(a) of the Act unless:
* * * * *
(3) In cases in which DHS has appealed an immigration judge's
decision, the Board shall not grant voluntary departure under section
240B(b) of the Act unless:
* * * * *
(4) The Board may impose such conditions as it deems necessary to
ensure the noncitizen's timely departure from the United States, if
supported by the record on appeal and within the scope of the Board's
authority on appeal. Unless otherwise indicated in this section, the
Board shall advise the noncitizen in writing of the conditions set by
the Board, consistent with the conditions set forth in paragraphs (b),
(c), (d), (e), (h), and (i) of this section (other than paragraph
(c)(3)(ii) of this section), except that the Board shall advise the
noncitizen of the duty to post the bond with the ICE Field Office
Director within 10 business days of the Board's order granting
voluntary departure. If documentation sufficient to assure lawful entry
into the country to which the noncitizen is departing is not contained
in the record, but the noncitizen continues to assert a request for
voluntary departure under section 240B of the Act and the Board finds
that the noncitizen is otherwise eligible for voluntary departure under
the Act, the Board may grant voluntary departure for a period not to
exceed 120 days, subject to the condition that the noncitizen within 60
days must secure such documentation and present it to DHS and the
Board. If the Board imposes conditions beyond those specifically
enumerated, the Board shall advise the noncitizen in writing of such
conditions. The noncitizen may accept or decline the grant of voluntary
departure and may manifest a declination either by written notice to
the Board, by failing to timely post any required bond, or by otherwise
failing to comply with the Board's order. The grant of voluntary
departure shall automatically terminate upon a filing by the noncitizen
of a motion to reopen or reconsider the Board's decision, or by filing
a timely petition for review of the Board's decision. The noncitizen
may decline voluntary departure when unwilling to accept the amount of
the bond or other conditions.
(l) Penalty for failure to depart. There shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the civil penalty for failure to depart, pursuant to
section 240B(d)(1)(A) of the Act, shall be set at $3,000 unless the
immigration judge or the Board specifically orders a higher or lower
amount at the time of granting voluntary departure within the
permissible range allowed by law. The immigration judge or the Board
shall advise the noncitizen of the amount of this civil penalty at the
time of granting voluntary departure.
Dated: August 18, 2023.
Merrick B. Garland,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 2023-18199 Filed 9-7-23; 8:45 am]
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