Rescinding the Rule on Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Benefits and Costs in the Clean Air Act Rulemaking Process, 44710-44721 [2023-14707]
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 133 / Thursday, July 13, 2023 / Rules and Regulations
and recordkeeping requirements, Sulfur
dioxide, Volatile organic compounds.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
Dated: July 3, 2023.
Martha Guzman Aceves,
Regional Administrator, Region IX.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, the Environmental Protection
Agency amends part 52, chapter I, title
40 of the Code of Federal Regulations as
follows:
PART 52—APPROVAL AND
PROMULGATION OF
IMPLEMENTATION PLANS
1. The authority citation for part 52
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
Subpart F—California
2. Section 52.220 is amended by
adding paragraph (c)(603) to read as
follows:
■
§ 52.220
Identification of plan—in part.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(604) The following plan was
submitted electronically on October 21,
2021, by the Governor’s designee as an
attachment to a letter dated October 20,
2021.
(i) [Reserved]
(ii) Additional materials. (A) Great
Basin Unified Air Pollution Control
District.
(1) Coso Junction PM10 Planning Area
Second 10-Year Maintenance Plan,
adopted on September 23, 2021.
(2) [Reserved]
(B) [Reserved]
[FR Doc. 2023–14688 Filed 7–12–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Part 83
[EPA–HQ–OAR–2020–0044; FRL–6530.8–
02–OAR]
RIN 2060–AV18
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Rescinding the Rule on Increasing
Consistency and Transparency in
Considering Benefits and Costs in the
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Process
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is finalizing the rescission
of the rule entitled, ‘‘Increasing
Consistency and Transparency in
SUMMARY:
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Considering Benefits and Costs in the
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Process’’
(hereinafter, the ‘‘Benefit-Cost Rule’’).
The EPA is rescinding the rule because
the changes advanced by the rule were
inadvisable, untethered to the Clean Air
Act (CAA), and not necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Act.
DATES: This final rule is effective on
August 14, 2023.
ADDRESSES: The EPA has established a
docket for this rulemaking under Docket
ID No. EPA–HQ–OAR–2020–0044. All
documents in the docket are listed on
the https://www.regulations.gov/
website. Although listed in the index,
some information is not publicly
available, e.g., Confidential Business
Information or other information whose
disclosure is restricted by statute.
Certain other material, such as
copyrighted material, is not placed on
the internet and will be publicly
available only in hard copy form.
Publicly available docket materials are
available electronically through https://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leif
Hockstad, Office of Air Policy and
Program Support, Office of Air and
Radiation, U.S. EPA, Mail Code 6103A,
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW,
Washington, DC 20460; telephone
number: (202) 343–9432; email address:
hockstad.leif@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Preamble Acronyms and Abbreviations
The EPA uses multiple acronyms and
terms in this preamble. While this list
may not be exhaustive, to ease the
reading of this preamble and for
reference purposes, the EPA defines the
following terms and acronyms here:
APA Administrative Procedure Act
BCA Benefit-Cost Analysis
CAA Clean Air Act
CBI Confidential Business Information
CDC Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRA Congressional Review Act
E.O. Executive Order
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FR Federal Register
HAP Hazardous Air Pollutants
MACT Maximum Achievable Control
Technology
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality
Standards
NRDC National Resources Defense Council
NTTAA National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
OIRA Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
SAB Science Advisory Board
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
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U.S. United States
U.S.C. United States Code
Organization of this document. The
information in this preamble is
organized as follows:
I. General Information
A. Does this action apply to me?
B. What is the Agency’s authority for
taking this action?
II. Background
III. Summary of the Final Rescission Rule
IV. Responses to Significant Comments
V. Judicial Review
VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory
Planning and Review and Executive
Order 14094: Modernizing Regulatory
Review
B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA)
E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation
and Coordination With Indian Tribal
Governments
G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of
Children From Environmental Health
Risks and Safety Risks
H. Executive Order 13211: Actions
Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
I. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act (NTTAA) and 1 CFR
Part 51
J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions
To Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations
K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)
I. General Information
A. Does this action apply to me?
This rule does not regulate the
conduct or determine the rights of any
entity or individual outside the Agency,
as this action pertains only to internal
EPA practices. However, the Agency
recognizes that any entity or individual
interested in the EPA’s regulations
promulgated under the CAA may be
interested in this rule. In addition, this
rule may be of particular interest to
entities and individuals interested in
how the EPA conducts and considers
benefit-cost analyses (BCA).
B. What is the Agency’s authority for
taking this action?
The Agency is taking this action
pursuant to CAA section 301(a)(1).1
Section 301(a)(1) provides authority to
the Administrator ‘‘to prescribe such
regulations as are necessary to carry out
his functions’’ under the CAA. As
discussed in section III of this preamble,
the EPA has determined that the
Benefit-Cost Rule was not ‘‘necessary’’
1 42
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and lacked a rational basis under CAA
section 301(a), and therefore the EPA
lacked authority to issue it; we are
accordingly rescinding the Rule.
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II. Background
On December 23, 2020, the EPA
finalized the Benefit-Cost Rule.2 The
Benefit-Cost Rule was a procedural rule
establishing requirements related to the
development and consideration of BCA
that the EPA would have been required
to undertake when promulgating certain
proposed and final regulations under
the CAA. Specifically, the Benefit-Cost
Rule (1) required a BCA for all
significant proposed and final
regulations under the CAA; (2) codified
specific practices for developing the
BCA; (3) required certain presentations
of the BCA results in the preamble; and
(4) required the EPA to consider the
BCA in promulgating the regulation
except where prohibited. The final
Benefit-Cost Rule was effective upon
publication in the Federal Register
based on the procedural-rule exemption
from delayed-effective-date
requirements in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(A). After publication, several
parties filed petitions for review of the
Benefit-Cost Rule in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia,
and these consolidated cases are
currently in abeyance.3
On January 20, 2021, President Biden
signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13990,
‘‘Protecting Public Health and the
Environment and Restoring Science To
Tackle the Climate Crisis,’’ 4 which,
among other things, directed the EPA to
immediately review and consider
suspending, revising, or rescinding the
Benefit-Cost Rule. Accordingly, the EPA
conducted a comprehensive review of
both the legal and factual predicates for
the Benefit-Cost Rule and, in particular,
the need for the regulations that the
Agency promulgated in the Benefit-Cost
Rule. Based on this review, the EPA
determined that the changes to Agency
practice required by the Benefit-Cost
Rule were inadvisable, not needed, and
untethered to the CAA. Therefore, in
May 2021, the EPA published an
interim final rule rescinding the BenefitCost Rule (hereinafter, the ‘‘Interim
Final Rule’’).5 The Interim Final Rule
became effective on June 14, 2021,
2 85
FR 84130.
of New York v. EPA, No. 21–1026 (D.C.
Cir.); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, No. 21–
1041 (D.C. Cir.); Envt’l Def. Fund v. EPA, No. 21–
1069 (D.C. Cir.). State of New York v. EPA, No. 21–
1026 (D.C. Cir.), Doc. No. 1886762 (Feb. 23, 2021)
(abeyance order).
4 86 FR 7037 (January 25, 2021).
5 86 FR 26406 (May 14, 2021).
which was 30 days after its publication
in the Federal Register.
While procedural rules are exempt
from the notice-and-public-comment
requirements in the APA, the EPA
nonetheless decided to voluntarily seek
post-promulgation public comment on
the Interim Final Rule.6 This final
action considers and responds to the
public comments the EPA received on
the Interim Final Rule. The EPA’s
process is consistent with
Administrative Conference of the
United States Recommendation 95–4,
which recommends that agencies
consider providing post-promulgation
notice and comment even where an
exemption is justified, be it a
substantive rule relying on the ‘‘good
cause’’ exception to notice and
comment, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), or a
procedural rule such as this one.7
III. Summary of the Final Rescission
Rule
In the Interim Final Rule, the EPA
concluded that the Benefit-Cost Rule
should be rescinded in its entirety. The
EPA has reviewed and considered
comments received on the Interim Final
Rule, as discussed in section IV, but
none of the comments received have led
the EPA to materially change our view,
as explained in the Interim Final Rule,
that the Benefit-Cost Rule is not needed
and does not further the CAA’s goals. As
such, the EPA is finalizing the
rescission of the Benefit-Cost Rule with
this action. Consistent with and as
discussed further in the Interim Final
Rule, the rationales for rescission are
summarized below.
In the Benefit-Cost Rule, the Agency
stated that it had authority to
promulgate the Rule under CAA section
301(a) because the Rule’s additional
procedures were necessary to ensure
consistency and transparency in CAA
rulemakings. However, as discussed in
the Interim Final Rule, the Agency
failed to articulate a rational basis for
the Benefit-Cost Rule and did not
explain how the existing CAA
rulemaking process had created or was
likely to create inconsistent or nontransparent outcomes, i.e., that an actual
or even theoretical problem existed.
After reviewing each element of the
Benefit-Cost Rule, we have determined
that the additional procedures required
were not needed, useful, or advisable
policy changes. In some cases, the new
3 State
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6 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)
(‘‘Agencies are free to grant additional procedural
rights in the exercise of their discretion.’’).
7 See ACUS Recommendation 95–4, Procedures
for Noncontroversial and Expedited Rulemaking
(1995).
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procedures established by the BenefitCost Rule could have hindered the
EPA’s compliance with the CAA and
may not have even furthered the Rule’s
stated purposes of consistency and
transparency. Our rationale for
rescinding each of the four independent
elements of the Benefit-Cost Rule is
severable and discussed in the Interim
Final Rule and summarized below. In
addition, as noted in the Interim Final
Rule, the existing public process
provides ample ability for the public to
participate in the EPA’s CAA
rulemakings.
First, the EPA has determined that the
Agency failed to provide a rational basis
to support the Benefit-Cost Rule or
explain why the Rule was needed or
reasonable. The Benefit-Cost Rule did
not provide any record evidence that the
guidance and administrative processes
already in place presented problems
that justified the mandate imposed by
the Rule. Indeed, the Benefit-Cost Rule
failed to point to a single example of a
rule promulgated under the CAA where
problems emerged that would have been
avoided had the mandate imposed by
the rule been in place. Furthermore,
there was no discussion of how the
requirements of the Benefit-Cost Rule
would have improved the Agency’s
ability to accomplish the CAA’s goals to
protect and enhance air quality.
Moreover, there has been an unbroken,
bipartisan, decades-long commitment
from Presidential Administrations to
conduct BCAs for economically
significant regulations issued in the
United States. These analyses are
rigorous, publicly available, subject to
interagency review, and are conducted
according to extensive peer-reviewed
guidelines from OMB and the EPA. We
are therefore finalizing rescission of the
Benefit-Cost Rule on the basis that it
failed to articulate a rational basis
justifying its promulgation.
Second, the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
expansion of BCA to all ‘‘significant’’
CAA rulemakings, rather than just those
that are significant under monetary
thresholds of E.O. 12866, is
unnecessary. The Benefit-Cost Rule
greatly expanded the universe of CAA
rulemakings for which the EPA would
have been required to conduct resourceintensive BCAs without justifying why
such expansion was necessary or
appropriate. In many cases, rules may
be designated ‘‘significant’’ by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) for
reasons other than economic
significance such that other types of
assessments of economic impact are
appropriate. Requiring BCA for all rules
designated ‘‘significant’’ by OMB, even
when the primary issues of importance
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are not economic, would have
unnecessarily complicated the
rulemaking process, potentially diverted
the Agency’s resources from those
aspects of the rule that warrant
additional consideration (i.e., the
reasons why the rule was designated
significant), and could have delayed
rules needed for protection of public
health and the environment. Existing
directives under E.O. 12866 and
guidance regarding BCAs for
economically significant rules, while
retaining flexibility for agencies to
analyze costs, benefits, and other factors
for non-economically significant rules,
strike the better balance between agency
resources and the information provided
by additional economic analysis for
such rules. Simply put, a BCA is not
warranted for every CAA rule that is
designated as significant under E.O.
12866.
Third, the codification of specific
practices for the development of BCA is
inadvisable because it is contrary to best
practices for preparing BCAs and could
have prevented the EPA from relying on
best available science. As articulated by
OMB and EPA guidelines, best practices
for conducting a high-quality BCA
cannot be established using a set
formula, and the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
codification of specific practices would
have prevented situation-specific
tailoring of the regulatory analysis to the
policies being proposed. In addition,
best practices evolve over time, and the
Benefit-Cost Rule would have locked
the EPA into using outdated practices
until those practices were amended via
rulemaking, which could have delayed
incorporation of new scientific
information and methods. Some of the
Benefit-Cost Rule’s ‘‘best practice’’
requirements did not even derive from
the EPA’s Guidelines for Preparing
Economic Analyses (hereinafter
‘‘Economic Guidelines’’),8 OMB’s
Circular A–4,9 or the EPA’s Science
Advisory Board (SAB) advice. As
discussed in more detail in the Interim
Final Rule, a number of the specific
provisions required by the Benefit-Cost
Rule, in particular those related to
health-benefits assessments, would have
promoted particular types of data in a
way that could have conflicted with the
use of best scientific practices or
arbitrarily caused the Agency to
disregard important or high-quality
8 U.S. EPA. 2010. Guidelines for Preparing
Economic Analyses. https://www.epa.gov/
environmental-economics/guidelines-preparingeconomic-analyses.
9 Exec. Office of the President, OMB, Circular A–
4: Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf.
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data. The Benefit-Cost Rule’s attempt to
craft a one-size-fits-all approach to
BCAs in fact demonstrated the difficulty
and inadvisability of codifying specific
practices appropriate for every BCA.
Fourth, the Benefit-Cost Rule required
the EPA to present net-benefit
calculations in regulatory preambles in
a manner that would have been
misleading and inconsistent with
economic best practices. Specifically,
the Rule required a presentation of only
the benefits ‘‘that pertain to the specific
objective (or objectives, as the case may
be) of the CAA provision or provisions
under which the significant regulation
is promulgated.’’ 40 CFR 83.4(b). The
Rule also required that if any benefits
and costs accrue to non-U.S.
populations, they must be reported
separately to the extent possible. This
information is duplicative of existing
information provided in EPA’s
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs)
because EPA already presents these
types of benefits in disaggregated form
in its RIAs, so these presentational
requirements would not have provided
additional transparency. EPA is careful,
however, not to use these disaggregated
subsets of benefits in calculating total
net benefits. Both EPA and OMB
guidelines, and economic best practice
generally, are clear that the purpose of
a BCA is to assess the economic
efficiency of policies, and in order to do
so accurately, net benefits are calculated
by subtracting total costs from total
benefits, regardless of whether the
benefits and costs arise from intended or
unintended consequences and
regardless of the particular recipients of
the benefits or costs. Even though the
Benefit-Cost Rule did not specifically
require incorrect partial net-benefit
calculations that excluded certain
impacts due to the regulation, we are
concerned that retaining the Rule’s
presentational requirements could have
invited such misleading partial
calculations. In fact, in one of the rules
that was promulgated during the same
time period as the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
requirements were being considered, the
EPA used calculations of segregated
benefits—like those required under the
Benefit-Cost Rule—to create tables of
misleading ‘‘net’’ benefit calculations
(i.e., benefits minus costs) that only
accounted for a subset of the rule’s
benefits.10
Fifth, we are rescinding the BenefitCost Rule because the Rule did not
reconcile its requirement that the
Agency ‘‘consider’’ in its CAA
rulemakings the required BCAs with the
10 See 84 FR 32520, 32572 tbl.10–12 (July 8,
2019).
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various and varied substantive
mandates of the CAA. The Benefit-Cost
Rule did not even identify the CAA
provisions to which it would apply.
This identification is critical because
the statute, not Agency procedural rules,
dictate what the Agency may or may not
‘‘consider’’ in the context of exercising
authority. For those CAA provisions
where EPA is prohibited from
considering costs, the Benefit-Cost
Rule’s requirement to prepare a BCA
and include it in the judicially
reviewable rulemaking record solely for
the purpose of providing ‘‘additional
information’’ is not necessary to effect
any purpose under the Act. Even for
those CAA authorities that permit
consideration of cost or other economic
factors, the Benefit-Cost Rule did not
establish why BCA specifically is an
appropriate way to consider cost. The
rule failed entirely to grapple with the
varied ways in which Congress granted
authority or directed the EPA whether
and how to consider benefits, costs, and
other factors, and how the Benefit-Cost
Rule’s requirement to consider BCA
should be reconciled with the need to
adhere to particular statutory language
and context. As noted in the Interim
Final Rule, we are finalizing rescission
of the Benefit-Cost Rule’s requirement to
prepare and consider BCA (followed by
a subsequent attempt to reconcile that
analysis with the CAA’s mandates) in
favor of the Agency’s current ‘‘statute
first’’ approach to decision making. That
is, we believe the traditional process of
statutory interpretation is superior,
wherein we first look to the text of the
relevant statutory provision to
determine whether Congress intended
or permitted the Agency to consider cost
or economic factors, and, if yes, we then
examine the statutory context,
legislative history, and nature of the
program or environmental problem to be
addressed to determine a reasonable
manner of considering that cost or
economic factor.
Finally, we are finalizing rescission of
the Benefit-Cost Rule on the basis that
its requirements are not needed with
respect to process, and that the preexisting administrative process,
including existing procedures under the
APA and, where applicable, CAA
section 307(d), provide for ample
consistency and transparency. These
requirements are more than adequate to
accomplish the general goodgovernment goals of ‘‘consistency’’ and
‘‘transparency,’’ and the Benefit-Cost
Rule failed to provide any support for
its contention that the pre-existing
process was deficient so as to warrant
the Rule’s new procedures.
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IV. Responses to Signficant Comments
This section of the preamble
summarizes significant comments
received on the Interim Final Rule 11
and the EPA’s responses to those
comments. All comments made on the
Interim Final Rule and the EPA’s
responses can be found in the
document, ‘‘Summary of Public
Comments and Responses for
Rescinding the Rule on Increasing
Consistency and Transparency in
Considering Benefits and Costs in the
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Process,’’
available in the docket for this
rulemaking.
Comment: Some commenters
supported retaining the Benefit-Cost
Rule and opposed the Interim Final
Rule rescinding it. Several of these
commenters cited their 2020 comments
on the proposed Benefit-Cost Rule,
asserting that in those comments, they
had raised examples of prior analyses
being performed by the EPA that were
inconsistent in their approaches or
methodologies or inappropriately relied
upon a ‘‘misuse of co-benefits.’’ The
commenters claimed that leaving the
Benefit-Cost Rule in place would have
addressed their concerns.
Response: The commenters to the
Interim Final Rule did not provide in
their comments, with any kind of
specificity, examples of how the
Benefit-Cost Rule would have resolved
any problems those commenters had
with prior BCAs performed by the EPA.
Nevertheless, the EPA has examined the
prior comments that were referenced to
determine whether any commenter
demonstrated that there was a
significant problem of inconsistency or
transparency that the Benefit-Cost
Rule’s requirements would have
resolved. After examining the
rulemaking record for the Benefit-Cost
Rule, we do not agree with these
commenters that they identified
concrete examples of how the BenefitCost Rule would have improved their
perceived flaws. To the contrary, the
comments in support of the Benefit-Cost
Rule proposal simply alleged broadly
that the EPA had ‘‘historically used
inconsistent approaches’’ to BCA, that
there was a need to ‘‘correct past
practices,’’ that there was
‘‘inconsistency in methodologies,’’ and
that EPA had ‘‘misused co-benefits.’’ We
do not agree that these general
complaints about past inconsistency,
without any specificity, provide an
adequate basis for establishing a
concrete problem, nor do they explain
11 86
FR 26406.
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how the Benefit-Cost Rule would have
addressed any such problem.
Comment: A commenter contended
that the EPA should not make a major
change, such as rescinding the BenefitCost Rule, through an Interim Final
Rule. The commenter stated that this
action, by itself, is an indication that the
EPA has already made up its mind to
rescind the rule. The commenter added
that, in developing the Benefit-Cost
Rule, the EPA went through a proposed
rulemaking process, so in rescinding the
rule, or revising it, the EPA should go
through a similar process and revise the
Benefit-Cost Rule only to the extent
necessary to address any concerns that
remain after properly considering public
comments.
Response: Agencies are always free to
adopt additional notice-and-comment
procedures, but to the extent that the
commenter suggests that such
procedures were required in this
instance, we do not agree. The BenefitCost Rule was a procedural rule, i.e., a
rule of agency organization, procedure,
or practice. A procedural rule does not
regulate any party outside of the EPA
but instead exclusively governs the
EPA’s internal process for conducting
business. As discussed in section IV of
the Interim Final Rule, procedural rules
are exempt from the APA’s notice-andcomment requirements, and therefore it
was permissible and appropriate to
make the rescission of that rule effective
using an interim final rule. However,
EPA recognizes the value of
transparency and public input and
therefore voluntarily sought public
comment on its decision to rescind,
consistent with Administrative
Conference of the United States
Recommendation 95–4, which
recommends that agencies consider
providing post-promulgation notice and
comment even where an exemption is
justified, be it a substantive rule relying
on the ‘‘good cause’’ exception to notice
and comment, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), or a
procedural rule such as this one.
Comment: Several commenters
requested that the EPA revise rather
than rescind the Benefit-Cost Rule in its
entirety. These commenters said that
they do not agree that the issues raised
by the EPA were significant enough to
warrant rescinding the Benefit-Cost
Rule. Some commenters urged the EPA
to reconsider each provision of the
Benefit-Cost Rule on an individual
basis, seek public comment on the issue,
and amend the provisions after
considering the comments. Another
commenter contended that the EPA
should have amended the scope of the
Benefit-Cost Rule to address concerns
raised in the Interim Final Rule
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44713
regarding burdensome requirements for
some non-economically significant
rules. One commenter noted that, rather
than rescinding the rule, the EPA could
have revised the rule to retain some
provisions as regulation and left some as
guidance, as the Agency’s Science
Advisory Board (SAB) had suggested as
a possible improvement in its comments
on the Benefit-Cost Rule. Some
commenters contended that EPA’s
decision to repeal the Benefit-Cost Rule
is in direct conflict with the January 27,
2021 memorandum, ‘‘Restoring Trust in
Government Through Scientific
Integrity and Evidenced-Based
Policymaking.’’ These commenters
stated that ensuring ‘‘evidence-based
decisions’’ that are ‘‘guided by the best
available science and data’’ requires the
EPA to undertake a rigorous and
objective BCA and to present the
analysis, including key uncertainties, in
a transparent manner.
Other commenters agreed with EPA’s
decision as explained in the Interim
Final Rule that the rule should be
rescinded in its entirety. These
commenters further stated that fixing
the rule through targeted amendments
was not viable because the problematic
elements were significant and difficult
to address in piecemeal fashion. The
commenters agreed the problems were
substantive and the Benefit-Cost Rule as
a whole should be rescinded.
Response: We disagree that the EPA
should have revised the Benefit-Cost
Rule rather than rescind it. The EPA
conducted a comprehensive review of
both the legal and factual predicates for
the Benefit-Cost Rule and, in particular,
the need for an imposition of and
codification of ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’
requirements governing economic
analyses for a large subset of regulations
promulgated under the CAA. We do not
agree that revision rather than rescission
would have resolved our concerns with
the Benefit-Cost Rule. The problematic
elements of the Rule were significant,
and many of those problems extended
across the entirety of the rule and could
not be excised and resolved on a caseby-case basis. For example, one
particularly problematic element of the
Benefit-Cost Rule was its codification of
methodologies and practices that we
think are better suited to guidance. As
explained in the preamble to the Interim
Final Rule and in section III of this
preamble, and as recognized by OMB
itself, guidance allows the EPA to tailor
economic analyses to the regulatory
question and problem at hand, and it
also facilitates using up-to-date
methodologies in those analyses
without first undergoing a notice-andcomment rule revision. Therefore, some
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of the revisions suggested by
commenters, such as amending the
scope of the Benefit-Cost Rule to
exclude non-economically significant
rules, would not have addressed this
fundamental problem.
With respect the SAB’s suggestion, we
do not agree that the SAB was
specifically endorsing revision of the
Benefit-Cost Rule over rescission. The
one sentence in the SAB’s cover letter
in which it ‘‘urges EPA to carefully
consider which aspects of BCA should
be included in the final [Benefit-Cost]
rule versus which aspects should be in
guidance,’’ should be read in context of
the significant and detailed concerns
detailed by the SAB with many of the
Rule’s specific requirements.12 The
more accurate overall message from the
SAB’s report is that the proposed rule as
drafted would have been problematic if
implemented, and that at the very least
the EPA should consider retaining some
requirements as guidance ‘‘given the
case-by-case nature of BCA.’’ In some
instances, the SAB acknowledged that
while it was providing specific
recommendations regarding how to
improve certain sections of the rule,
complete overhaul was preferable.13 We
also disagree with the commenters who
assert that repealing the Benefit-Cost
Rule is in direct conflict with the
January 27, 2021 memorandum,
‘‘Restoring Trust in Government
Through Scientific Integrity and
Evidenced-Based Policymaking.’’ To the
contrary, the Benefit-Cost Rule was not
necessary to making ‘‘evidence-based
decisions’’ ‘‘using best available science
and data,’’ and as we have explained,
could have hindered that outcome.
Comment: Numerous commenters
agreed with the EPA’s assertion that the
Benefit-Cost Rule codified certain
practices that conflicted with the best
science, particularly for quantifying the
health benefits of a rule. Other
commenters disagreed with the EPA’s
assertion that the Benefit-Cost Rule
codified certain practices that conflicted
with the best science. These
commenters asserted that the BenefitCost Rule directed the EPA to base its
decisions on the best available science
and in accordance with best practices
from science and fields such as
economics. The commenters argued that
this requirement was a broadly
12 U.S. EPA SAB. 2020. Science Advisory Board
(SAB) Consideration of the Scientific and Technical
Basis of EPA’s Proposed Rule titled ‘‘Increasing
Consistency and Transparency in Considering
Benefits and Costs in the Clean Air Rulemaking
Process.’’ EPA–SAB–20–012. September 30. (‘‘SAB
(2020)’’), available at https://sab.epa.gov/ords/sab/
f?p=100:12:6591070354315:::12::.
13 SAB (2020) at 12.
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supported principle for sound
regulatory decision making that has
enjoyed bipartisan support for decades,
as stated in E.O. 13563 and E.O. 12866.
One commenter asserted that the
Benefit-Cost Rule required the use of
best practices for risk assessment/
characterization and would have
prevented the Agency from taking
shortcuts in analyses or applying
assumptions that are not identified or
supportable.
Response: We agree that the EPA
should use the best available scientific
information and best scientific practices
for BCAs. However, we disagree that the
Benefit-Cost Rule was necessary to
promote best practices. Indeed, in
section III.C.3 of the preamble of the
Interim Final Rule, we provided several
examples of how implementation of
some of the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
requirements could have undermined
the scientific integrity of the EPA’s
BCAs for CAA regulations rather than
strengthened them. We also disagree
that the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
requirements regarding risk assessments
and characterization would have
prevented the Agency from taking
shortcuts or applying unsupportable
assumptions. As discussed in section
III.C.3 of the Interim Final Rule, those
requirements could have led to inferior
selection of health studies or the
potential exclusion of some health
endpoints altogether. By imposing a
requirement that studies or analyses
used to quantify concentration-response
relationships should ‘‘consider how
exposure is measured,’’ and favor
‘‘particularly those that provide
measurements at the level of the
individual and that provide actual
measurements of exposure,’’ the BenefitCost Rule introduced a bias against
methods that in some cases may have
been both higher quality and more
appropriate by discouraging
consideration of studies that combine
both measured and modeled
concentrations.14 We have also noted
how, rather than codifying a best
practice, the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
requirement to limit assessment of
human health benefit endpoints to
instances where there is ‘‘a clear causal
or likely causal relationship between
pollutant exposure and effect’’ was
unsupportable. It did not derive from
the Economic Guidelines, Circular A–4,
or SAB advice, and in fact was criticized
by the SAB.15 Finally, as noted in the
FR 84155 (40 CFR 83.3(a)(9)(iii)(D)).
e.g., SAB 2020 at 2–7 (suggesting that there
are a number of ways to interpret causal
relationship and the Benefit-Cost Rule is not clear
what evidence would be acceptable to demonstrate
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Interim Final Rule, we are concerned
that the Benefit-Cost Rule’s imposition
of highly specific and stringent
requirements for assessing benefits in
conjunction with substantially less
stringent requirements for assessing
costs would have led to unbalanced
BCAs. Moreover, these requirements
only applied to health benefits, which
created an inconsistency with other
categories of benefits (e.g., visibility,
ecological effects) that were not subject
to the requirements. By rescinding the
Benefit-Cost Rule, the EPA is not
forswearing BCAs, which it has
undertaken for decades consistent with
the Executive Orders cited by the
commenters. Rather, we think
undertaking those BCAs pursuant to
guidelines issued by EPA and OMB,
which provide for flexibility and
tailoring in order to permit
incorporation of evolving science and
best practices, will produce higher
quality analyses than if EPA conducted
BCAs subject to the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
rigid codification of particular practices
that were frozen at a moment in time,
and in some cases, were substantively
problematic.
Comment: Some commenters agreed
with the EPA’s assertion that the
Benefit-Cost Rule would have locked
the EPA into using outdated practices
until the rule could be amended.
Another commenter said the BenefitCost Rule would have weakened the
integrity of the BCA process for CAA
regulations by hindering EPA’s ability to
use the best scientific data available.
Another commenter asserted that if the
Benefit-Cost Rule had conflicted with
future changes to the Economic
Guidelines, the EPA would have had to
undergo a lengthy notice-and-comment
process to make updates to its rule, as
opposed to just updating the Economic
Guidelines already in existence, and
this process could seriously delay the
EPA’s ability to adapt to changes in best
practices and could hinder the
promulgation of public health and
environmental protections.
Other commenters argued that the
Benefit-Cost Rule would not have
stopped the adoption of new practices,
but instead would have required the
EPA to notify the public and seek public
comment on the basis for the Agency’s
decision to adopt the new procedures.
Some of these commenters said that 40
CFR 83.3(a)(11)(v) of the Benefit-Cost
Rule specifically authorized departures
from the Rule’s requirements if the EPA
14 85
15 See,
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causality), 8 (recommending that the EPA allow
inclusion in its benefits analyses of effects for
which causal or likely causal relationships may be
less certain, but the impact would be substantial).
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provided a ‘‘reasoned explanation,’’
including a discussion of the ‘‘likely
effect of the departures on the results of
the BCA.’’ The commenters argued that,
in response to changes in best practices,
the EPA could at any time simply
amend the Rule separate from or in
parallel with a new covered CAA
rulemaking after seeking notice and
comment and providing a reasoned
explanation. The commenters asserted
that rescission of the Benefit-Cost Rule
allows the EPA to make ad hoc
decisions without notification or
explanation. Another commenter
contended that the Benefit-Cost Rule
did not force the EPA to revise the rule
if best practices change over time. The
commenter pointed out that the BenefitCost Rule did not provide a specific
definition of best practices, and the
requirements of 40 CFR 83.3(a)(1)
through (12) were predominantly
general in nature without prescribing
exact methods. The commenter said that
many of the requirements in 40 CFR
83.3(a) addressed what information the
EPA was required to provide, not the
specific methodology the EPA had to
use to estimate benefits and costs.
Response: We agree that with the
Benefit-Cost Rule in place, if the latest
or best scientific practice differed from
the Rule’s requirements, the EPA would
have been required to amend the Rule
in order to be consistent with best
practice. The process of revising a rule
often takes a year or more to complete,
which would have prevented the EPA
from keeping up with evolving best
practices and required the EPA to rely
on potentially outdated methods until a
revised rulemaking could be completed.
We maintain this is inconsistent with
making decisions based on the best
scientific data available. As discussed in
section III.C.2 of the Interim Final Rule,
by freezing and defining what
constituted ‘‘best practices’’ at a single
point in time, the Benefit-Cost Rule
elevated ‘‘consistency’’ over the exercise
of sound judgment based on latest
scientific knowledge and, given that
revision by rulemaking could take a
long time, would have slowed or
discouraged progress in the
development and use of newer and
better methods. Promulgating updates to
the Benefit-Cost Rule every time the
Rule became outdated ‘‘in parallel with’’
substantive, statutorily required CAA
rules would have been no small
regulatory burden; it would have
required a significant amount of agency
resources to do so and created
uncertainty in the CAA rule, by linking
that rule to an unsettled regulatory
change to the Benefit-Cost Rule that was
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itself open to challenge and judicial
review.
We also do not agree with
commenters that the requirement in 40
CFR 83.3(a)(11)(v) that the EPA include
in every BCA ‘‘[a] reasoned explanation
for any departures from best practices in
the BCA, including a discussion of the
likely effect of the departures on the
results of the BCA’’ was an
authorization for the Agency to diverge
from the Benefit-Cost Rule. That
provision states that the EPA has to
explain why it has diverged from ‘‘best
practices,’’ not from the Benefit-Cost
Rule. ‘‘Best practices’’ is a term not
defined in the Benefit-Cost Rule, and is
on its face subject to interpretation. Far
from providing clear guidance to the
Agency on when it would have been
permitted to take an updated approach
to BCA absent a change to the BenefitCost Rule, we think that provision itself
bred a great deal of uncertainty—how,
for example, is the Agency to know
whether it has adequately explained the
‘‘likely effect’’ of its departures from
best practices (which, if the Agency is
taking such departure, it likely does not
believe to be ‘‘best practice’’)? As further
evidence of how best practices change
over time, we note that the Economic
Guidelines are in the process of being
updated as part of a periodic review
undertaken by the EPA. In addition,
President Biden issued a memorandum
on January 20, 2021, on Modernizing
Regulatory Review,16 which directs
OMB in consultation with other
agencies to recommend revisions to
Circular A–4. The confluence of updates
to these two documents, which
provided the ostensible underpinning to
the regulatory requirements of the
Benefit-Cost Rule, only highlights the
misguided nature of attempting to freeze
‘‘best practices’’ at one moment in time.
Finally, we do not agree with the
commenters who asserted that the
regulatory requirements of 40 CFR
83.3(a)(1) through (12) were
predominantly general in nature. For
example, as noted in the Interim Final
Rule, those provisions contained highly
prescriptive (but in many cases vague
and confusing) requirements for benefits
assessment and uncertainty analyses
(with no corresponding requirements for
how costs are calculated and
considered). In contrast, since guidance
is inherently less prescriptive than
regulation, it can be more flexible in
allowing agencies to keep up with the
evolution of best practices to support
CAA regulations.
Comment: Some commenters agreed
with the EPA’s assertion that the
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FR 7223.
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Benefit-Cost Rule was inconsistent with
the mandates in the CAA that
prohibited the EPA from considering
cost for some types of rulemakings.
They agreed with the EPA that the
Benefit-Cost Rule’s rationale for
including BCA in the records and
preambles of rulemakings in which the
agency is prohibited from considering
cost is not ‘‘necessary’’ to carry out the
statute within the meaning of CAA
section 301(a).
Other commenters disagreed with the
EPA’s assertion that the Benefit-Cost
Rule was inconsistent with the
mandates in the CAA that prohibited
the EPA from considering cost for some
types of rulemakings. These
commenters argued that the Benefit-Cost
Rule applied with respect to a
significant rule implementing the CAA
only when the CAA required or
permitted consideration of cost. These
commenters contended that the BenefitCost Rule did not violate the CAA
because it required (at 40 CFR 83.2(b))
EPA to consider the results of a BCA
except in those circumstances where the
applicable CAA provision(s) prohibited
that consideration. These commenters
added that when not prohibited by the
statute, the Benefit-Cost Rule left the
EPA significant discretion in how it
would consider the BCAs in individual
CAA rules to account for the significant
differences among statutory provisions
as long as the Agency provided the
public with a description in the
preamble. Another commenter said that
40 CFR 83.4(d) provided the EPA with
clear direction and appropriate
discretion in when and how to consider
the results of BCAs in making regulatory
decisions.
One commenter stated that, while the
EPA may be prohibited from
considering costs in some cases, such as
with revisions to the NAAQS, this did
not negate the need for the Rule’s
requirements with regard to how the
EPA calculates benefits. The commenter
also stated that the EPA routinely
presents cost information in addition to
benefits even in cases where the EPA is
prohibited from considering costs, such
as in the RIA for the 2015 ozone
NAAQS revision. The commenter
contended that such information is still
beneficial in that it informs the public
on the potential cost impacts of the
EPA’s regulatory actions, even if the
EPA cannot directly consider those cost
impacts. Another commenter argued
that the actual text of the CAA’s
substantive authorities (and most other
statutory provisions) rarely prohibits
benefit-cost balancing and arguably may
require it. The commenter stated that
Administrations have recognized that
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the public has a right to know the
projected benefits and costs of a new
rule even if the underlying statutory
provision (as in the case of CAA section
109 for setting NAAQS) has been
interpreted to prohibit the consideration
of costs. The commenter said elevating
BCA practices is consistent with the
recent Supreme Court decisions on
BCA, particularly Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009)
and Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699
(2015). The commenter asserted that
these decisions apply the fundamental
principle, established in Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463U.S. 29, 43 (1983),
that it is arbitrary for an agency to
neglect an important aspect of a
regulatory problem. Another commenter
also pointed out that Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), concluded that
when interpreting CAA section
112(n)(1)(A), ‘‘Read naturally in the
present context, the phrase ‘appropriate
and necessary’ requires at least some
attention to cost.’’
Response: We disagree that provisions
in the Benefit-Cost Rule’s regulations
granting EPA discretion in how and
when to consider the results of the
mandated BCA resolves the problems
presented by the Rule. Where the CAA
prohibits the EPA from considering cost
in implementing a provision, it cannot
be ‘‘necessary’’ to require the EPA to
conduct a BCA and include it in the
decisional rulemaking record. The EPA
is already conducting BCAs pursuant to
Executive Order in situations where it is
appropriate to do so, so commenters’
assertions that the Benefit-Cost Rule is
necessary for public information ring
hollow, and the commenters did not
address how incorporation of a BCA
into the agency’s rulemaking record
where Congress has instructed the
Agency not to consider cost is
consistent with the CAA. As one
commenter pointed out, the Agency’s
current practice for rules like the 2015
ozone NAAQS, where the rule is
economically significant but where the
statute does not permit the Agency to
consider cost, is to conduct RIAs but not
to include those in the record. The
Benefit-Cost Rule’s requirement that the
EPA include the BCA in its record is a
distinct change from its current practice,
and is both unnecessary and
inappropriate given the limits of EPA’s
statutory authority to consider cost.
We are also unconvinced by the
commenters who assert that the BenefitCost Rule is not inconsistent with the
CAA for those rules promulgated under
provisions that permit consideration of
cost just because the Rule left it to the
Agency’s discretion how it should
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consider cost. The fact remains that the
Rule did not explain why, for any
particular CAA provision, BCA is the
best or even a reasonable way for the
agency to consider cost. For CAA rules
that would have been impacted by the
Benefit-Cost Rule, the EPA believes it
would have needed to justify why
complying with the Rule’s requirement
to conduct and consider a BCA was
reasonable under the given CAA
provision; the existence of the Agency’s
own procedural rule requiring analysis
and consideration of a factor does not
create statutory authority to consider a
factor that Congress did not intend the
Agency to consider. We do not agree
that what would have been a case-bycase post-hoc rationalization of the
Benefit-Cost Rule as it applied to any
particular provision is superior to the
existing process of statutory
interpretation, where we first look to the
CAA to try to ascertain those factors
Congress intended the Agency to
consider, and whether the statutory
provision suggested how the EPA
should consider any such factor. We
disagree that any of the court decisions
cited by the commenters evince any
general principles that ‘‘elevate’’ BCA
over any other economic analysis. In
Entergy, the Court upheld as reasonable
the EPA’s choice to consider cost using
a BCA given particular statutory
language in the Clean Water Act. In
Michigan, the Court spoke only to
whether the EPA needed to consider
cost at all in implementing a CAA
provision and explicitly did not opine
on how the Agency might reasonably
consider cost. The Michigan Court’s
holding that a particular CAA phrase
required the Agency to consider cost is
more consistent with the EPA’s findings
today that it should look first to the
statute to determine what factors are
required under a State Farm analysis,
rather than start from an Agencygenerated procedural rule that
articulates a particular type of analysis
irrespective of statutory text.
Comment: Several commenters agreed
with the EPA’s assertion that the
administrative processes already in
place before the Benefit-Cost Rule was
promulgated provide ample consistency
and transparency in the rulemaking
process. One commenter asserted that
rather than increasing transparency, the
Benefit-Cost Rule’s requirements would
have obscured the basis of the EPA’s
decisions. Another commenter said that
the Benefit-Cost Rule did not support its
contention that the pre-existing
procedural requirements established by
Congress were deficient. A commenter
also noted that the EPA is already
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required to transparently share its data,
relevant statutory interpretations, and
methodology underlying its rulemaking,
and concerned parties are able to
supplement that data, raise arguments
that BCA should be integrated into a
rulemaking, make other
recommendations for consideration of
costs, or share any concerns that the
Agency has been insufficiently
transparent. Another commenter
asserted that the EPA failed to articulate
any inconsistency or lack of
transparency in existing BCAs that
would call for the drastic changes the
Benefit-Cost Rule would impose, and
that the EPA violated numerous
executive orders by, for example, failing
to consult with States on the BenefitCost Rule’s federalism implications and
failing to assess regulatory costs and
environmental justice impacts.
Other commenters disagreed with the
EPA’s assertion that the administrative
processes already in place before the
Benefit-Cost Rule was promulgated
provided ample consistency and
transparency in the rulemaking process.
Several of these commenters referenced
comments they had submitted on the
proposed Benefit-Cost Rule. The
commenters reiterated their comments
on the proposed Benefit-Cost Rule that
an overriding goal of the Agency should
be to present data regarding benefits and
costs to decisionmakers and the public
as objectively and accessibly as
possible.
Some commenters also pointed out
that the Benefit-Cost Rule included
additional procedural requirements to
increase transparency in the
presentation of results, such as
providing a summary of the overall
results of the BCA. A commenter noted
that while the EPA cannot consider the
result of the BCA in setting NAAQS, the
RIA does play an important role in
informing the public of the likely costs
and benefits of setting a new standard.
The commenter argued that the BenefitCost Rule further advanced
transparency by requiring more
objective analysis and explanation of
uncertainties in the benefit and cost
estimation. The commenter added that
the analyses should be consistent with
Circular A–4, establishing the
appropriate baseline, analyzing
alternatives, and estimating benefits and
costs. The commenter added that rules
should be fully transparent about the
many uncertainties underpinning their
cost and benefit estimates, including the
many embedded policy assumptions
made in developing the various
estimates of costs and benefits
associated with a rulemaking and the
significance of the impact of those
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assumptions on the final policy
decision. Another commenter asserted
that if the EPA decides to rescind the
Benefit-Cost Rule, then the EPA must
still maintain transparency in
calculating and reporting the ancillary
benefits associated with regulatory
actions under the CAA and all other
sources of regulatory authority.
Response: We disagree that the
administrative process already in place
before the Benefit-Cost Rule was
promulgated is inadequate. For CAA
rules that are subject to the rulemaking
requirements of CAA section 307(d),
which include many of the major CAA
rulemakings that would have been
subject to the Benefit-Cost Rule, the
CAA already requires proposed
rulemakings to include a statement of
basis and purpose, which must include
‘‘(A) the factual data on which the
proposed rule is based; (B) the
methodology used in obtaining the data
and in analyzing the data; [and] (C) the
major legal interpretations and policy
considerations underlying the proposed
rule.’’ CAA section 307(d)(3). The CAA
also requires that these statements ‘‘set
forth or summarize and provide a
reference to any pertinent findings,
recommendations, and comments by the
Scientific Review Committee, . . . and,
if the proposal differs in any important
respect from any of these
recommendations, an explanation of the
reasons for such differences.’’ Id.
Finally, the CAA already requires, for
rules subject to CAA section 307(d), that
‘‘[a]ll data, information, and documents
. . . on which the proposed rule relies
shall be included in the docket on the
date of publication of the proposed
rule.’’ Id. Those CAA rulemakings that
are not subject to these specific
requirements are still subject to the
requirements that apply to all proposed
rulemakings under the APA, which
similarly require the proposal to include
‘‘reference to the legal authority under
which the rule is proposed; and either
the terms or substance of the proposed
rule.’’ APA section 553(b). EPA must
also provide an opportunity for
comment on proposed rulemakings and
respond to all significant comments,
and all final rules are subject to judicial
review for EPA’s failure to adequately
respond to significant comments.
We agree that BCA requirements and
analyses should be clear and
transparent, and we agree that EPA
should follow OMB Circular A–4
guidance to present data regarding
benefits and costs to decisionmakers
and the public as objectively and
transparently as possible. We disagree
that this was not the case prior to the
promulgation of the Benefit-Cost Rule,
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and we disagree that EPA’s analyses of
its regulatory actions are inconsistent
with OMB Circular A–4. Then, as now,
in performing analyses of regulatory
actions, the EPA follows the guidance
laid out by OMB Circular A–4 and the
Economic Guidelines in areas such as
identifying the baseline, analyzing
alternatives, and estimating costs and
benefits, including ancillary benefits.
The analyses and results are subject to
internal review and an interagency
review process under E.O. 12866 that
involves application of the principles
and methods defined in Circular A–4.
The results of the analyses, documented
in RIAs, are also reviewed by OMB to
ensure consistency with Circular A–4.
While BCAs are similar for different
rules, as instructed in Circular A–4 and
the Economic Guidelines, the analyses
are often tailored to the specific source
category by considering a number of
variables, such as the type of pollutants
being controlled, available data, and the
location of the emission sources.
Additionally, we disagree with
commenters who contended that the
Benefits-Cost Rule would have
increased transparency in the
presentation of results. The EPA already
disaggregates benefit and cost estimates
in BCAs, so these narrow presentational
requirements do not provide additional
transparency. As discussed in the
Interim Final Rule, the Benefits-Cost
Rule would have required the preambles
of significant proposed and final CAA
regulations to include a separate
presentation that excluded certain
categories of benefits that Circular A–4
and the Economic Guidelines indicate
should be considered. This could have
resulted in misleading net-benefit
calculations that would have
inaccurately characterized the benefits
of a rulemaking and would have called
into question the significance of the
excluded benefits.
We disagree that RIAs are difficult to
find as they are always included in the
docket for significant rulemakings.
Additionally, all of the RIAs are
available online, and many can be found
at EPA’s website sorted by source
category: https://www.epa.gov/
economic-and-cost-analysis-airpollution-regulations/regulatory-impactanalyses-air-pollution. While the RIAs
are technical in nature, the EPA takes
steps to provide information to aid in
their interpretation by the public.
We also note that the overall summary
of BCA results that one of the
commenters supports, which present
the overall net benefits associated with
a rulemaking, are already recommended
by Circular A–4 and are thus included
in the RIAs for our rulemakings. The
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contents of the summary tables already
provided by the EPA are consistent with
the guidance for such summary tables in
Circular A–4 for all rulemakings. For
significant rules, the EPA also follows
Circular A–4 procedures that require
presenting a formal quantitative analysis
of the relevant uncertainties about
benefits and costs.
Comment: Some commenters agreed
with the EPA that the Benefit-Cost
Rule’s presentation requirements would
be misleading. These commenters
supported the EPA’s assertion that
requiring a separate presentation that
excluded certain categories of benefits
that Circular A–4 and the Economic
Guidelines indicate should be
considered could call into question the
significance of those benefits without
justification. They contended that
excluding co-benefits from a
presentation of benefits would violate
established economic principles,
established best practices, and
longstanding practices of previous
administrations. One commenter cited
Michigan v. EPA, stating that in its
view, the Supreme Court held that the
EPA needed to consider all advantages
and disadvantages in deciding whether
a regulation is appropriate, such as in
the case where a regulation controls
emissions but has the indirect effect of
causing new health harms.
Another commenter noted that, out of
the hundreds of pollutants the EPA
regulates under the CAA, the EPA only
has sufficient information on particulate
matter, and more than 90 percent of all
benefits that the EPA quantifies in its
BCAs are attributable to this one
pollutant. The commenter stated that
when significant benefits are missing
from the monetized estimate,
calculating a number that meaningfully
represents a rule’s net benefits is simply
a logical impossibility, and any
calculation that purports to do so is, as
OIRA itself acknowledges, ‘‘misleading’’
at best.
Other commenters opposed
rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
requirements regarding the presentation
of ancillary benefits and non-domestic
benefits. One commenter defended the
Benefit-Cost Rule on the basis that the
Rule did not prescribe any specific
requirement as to how EPA must
consider ancillary benefits or provide a
formula for when a rule ‘‘passes’’ a
benefit-cost test; the Benefit-Cost Rule
only required the EPA to better inform
the public about basic information
contained in BCAs and to differentiate
in a clear fashion what the ancillary
benefits are in a given rule. Other
commenters stated that the Benefit-Cost
Rule’s requirement to present statutory-
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objective benefits separately from
ancillary co-benefits and non-U.S. based
benefits would enhance transparency
and would not limit the Agency’s ability
to recognize and account for these
benefits. Another commenter contended
that, without the required clarity and
accounting for the sources of the
benefits, the public and decisionmakers
are more likely to be misled in
understanding the nature of the benefits
and whether those benefits could have
been achieved more efficiently under
other provisions of the statute. A
commenter re-iterated its previous
comment on the proposed Benefit-Cost
Rule that presenting disaggregated cost
and benefit information allows for
evaluation and consideration of possibly
disproportionate costs on one
population from a rule where the
benefits are primarily focused on
another population. The commenter
provided an example where it asserted
that the EPA’s BCA for the Clean Power
Plan estimated benefits using the global
social cost of carbon but compared those
benefits to costs within the U.S. The
commenter asserted that such a
comparison was misleading and could
have caused parties to not question
EPA’s justification of the Clean Power
Plan when they might have if the EPA
had disaggregated the benefits and costs
as required by the Benefit-Cost Rule.
Another commenter contended that
estimates of global benefits should be
reported separately in a manner
consistent with Circular A–4. The
commenter added that the EPA’s failure
to abide by OMB Circular A–4 by
reporting only global benefits resulted
in analyses that compared U.S. costs
with global benefits—an asymmetry that
should be fully disclosed.
Some commenters contended that the
EPA used ancillary benefits to justify
rules that did not quantify emission
reductions or that showed only minimal
emission reductions from pollutants
directly regulated. Another commenter
cited two greenhouse gas regulations,
the EPA’s Phase 2 rule for Medium and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles and
the Clean Power Plan, where the EPA
estimated substantial net economic
benefits due to the inclusion of the nonclimate effects of climate policies as cobenefits. Another commenter added that
the EPA used ancillary benefits to
support six major CAA rules that did
not quantify direct benefits, and in 21 of
26 major non-particulate matter
rulemakings analyzed from 1997 to
2011, the particulate matter ancillary
benefits accounted for more than half of
the total benefits. A commenter
contended that reliance on co-benefits
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to justify regulatory action circumvents
Congressional intent because it
disregards the target of the underlying
statutory provision and circumvents the
substantive focus and procedural
safeguards established under the law.
The commenter added that regulation
through co-benefits also undermines the
very purpose of BCA by obscuring the
question of whether the proposed action
accomplishes its intended purpose in a
reasonable and resource-efficient
manner. One commenter suggested that
the EPA can avoid using cost-ineffective
‘‘co-benefits’’ in the BCA by requiring a
robust regulatory baseline that reflects
all projected federal and state emission
reductions, as well as a robust
alternatives analysis that outlines the
opportunity costs of pursuing ‘‘cobenefits’’ through sub-optimal, if not
unnecessary, measures to achieve
standards.
Response: At the outset, we note that,
by definition, a BCA includes all the
costs and benefits of a rulemaking, i.e.,
the net benefits of a regulatory change,
in order to ascertain the economic
efficiency of that change. We believe
some commenters are mistaken in their
understanding of how the EPA currently
presents net benefits and also what the
Benefit-Cost Rule required. To clarify,
the EPA already disaggregates benefit
and cost estimates in its RIAs, per the
instructions in Chapter 11 of the
Economic Guidelines (Presentation of
Analysis and Results) and the OMB
Circular A–4 section on characterizing
uncertainty in benefits, costs, and net
benefits. The results of BCAs are
presented in RIAs. Both guidance
documents are clear that net benefits are
calculated by subtracting total costs
from total benefits, regardless of
whether the benefits and costs arise
from intended or unintended
consequences of the regulation. Section
6 of Circular A–4 instructs that the
‘‘analysis should look beyond the direct
benefits and direct costs of your
rulemaking and consider any important
ancillary benefits and countervailing
risks,’’ where an ancillary benefit is
defined as a ‘‘favorable impact of the
rule that is typically unrelated or
secondary to the statutory purpose of
the rulemaking.’’ 17 This is particularly
important in instances when
unintended effects are important
enough to potentially change the rank
ordering of the regulatory options
considered in the analysis or to
potentially generate a superior
regulatory option with strong ancillary
benefits and fewer countervailing risks.
17 We note that the specific term used in Circular
A–4 is ‘‘ancillary benefits’’ and not ‘‘co-benefits.’’
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Circular A–4 also notes that, ‘‘In some
cases the mere consideration of these
secondary effects may help in the
generation of a superior regulatory
alternative with strong ancillary benefits
and fewer countervailing risks.’’
In our view, the Benefit-Cost Rule’s
requirements would not have provided
additional transparency, and we are
concerned that the Rule’s requirements
may have led to misleading net-benefit
calculations. The Benefit-Cost Rule
required preambles of affected rules to
include a summary of both the overall
BCA results as well as an additional
reporting of subsets of the total benefits
of the rule. Specifically, the Benefit-Cost
Rule required a presentation of only the
benefits ‘‘that pertain to the specific
objective (or objectives, as the case may
be) of the CAA provision or provisions
under which the significant regulation
is promulgated.’’ The Benefit-Cost Rule
also required that if any benefits and
costs accrue to non-U.S. populations,
they must be reported separately to the
extent possible. These presentational
requirements are duplicative of
information the EPA already presents in
its RIAs, so they would not have
provided additional transparency. If,
however, these subsets of benefits were
compared to total costs and deemed to
be some type of limited net-benefits
calculation, we think that application of
the information would be misleading
and contrary to best economic practice.
In addition, requiring a separate
presentation that excluded certain
categories of benefits that Circular A–4
and the Economic Guidelines indicate
should be considered might lead the
public to question the significance of
those benefits without any justification.
The remainder of the comments
summarized above are outside the scope
of this action, and the question of
whether the EPA should rescind the
Benefit-Cost Rule. Specifically, with
respect to the suggestion that the EPA
should include in its baselines projected
federal and state emission reductions,
the Benefit-Cost Rule would not have
changed how the Agency calculates
baselines, and we do not agree that the
commenter’s suggestion would be
consistent with recommended
guidelines or advisable, to the extent
that the commenter is including in
‘‘projected’’ reductions any that are not
finalized and on-the-books. The EPA
follows Circular A–4 and the EPA’s
Economic Guidelines, which direct the
EPA to develop baselines that include
all significant projected federal emission
reductions for fully promulgated rules
and the future impacts of state
regulation to the extent they are known
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and on the books at the time of the
rulemaking.
Regarding the suggestion that the EPA
conduct a ‘‘robust alternatives analysis’’
looking at lost opportunity costs of
pursuing co-benefits through ‘‘suboptimal’’ if not unnecessary measures,
the comment is unclear but also appears
to be beyond the scope of this action.
We disagree that the EPA has designed
regulatory options to meet its statutory
obligations for the purpose of pursuing
reductions in other pollutants (or
ancillary benefits). It is simply a fact
that many of the control technologies
designed to reduce emissions of specific
pollutants also happen to reduce
emissions of other pollutants, in part
because sources that are targeted under
the Act often tend to emit many kinds
of pollutants and control of one
pollutant can often result in reductions
of other non-targeted pollutants.
Moreover, we disagree with
comments that the EPA used ancillary
benefits to justify regulations or
circumvent Congress, but in any case,
the Benefit-Cost Rule’s requirement to
report certain subsets of benefits
separately would not have addressed
these concerns. In general, the Agency
undertakes RIAs in order to comply
with E.O. 12866. Those Clean Air Act
rulemaking RIAs, in almost every
instance, are not part of the Agency’s
record basis for the action. They are not
included in the Agency’s record basis
for the action because they are not used
to justify the Agency’s decision making.
The net-benefits calculations in RIAs,
which, consistent with Circular A–4 and
the Economic Guidelines, include all
benefits, are provided in order to
comply with E.O. 12866 and for
illustrative and informational purposes
only. Therefore, even if the monetized
particulate matter benefits associated
with a number of CAA rules were
greater than the monetized benefits for
any other pollutant, it does not follow
that the EPA justified promulgation of
these rules based on particulate matter
benefits. Instead, it indicates that the
Agency may have more data and
information to monetize the benefits of
reducing that particular pollutant and
that it is extremely common for required
emissions controls to result in ancillary
benefits.
Commenters cited two examples of
EPA RIAs that they claimed would have
been conducted differently had the
Benefit-Cost Rule’s presentational
requirements for ancillary benefits been
in place—the 2016 Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Fuel Efficiency
Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty
Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2 Rule
and the 2015 Clean Power Plan, but we
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do not agree. Both examples adhered to
OMB Circular A–4. The RIAs provided
separate reporting for all categories of
both benefits and costs (see summary
beginning on page 8–71 of the Phase 2
Rule RIA and Tables ES–6 through ES–
8 and additional details in Chapter 4 of
the Clean Power Plan RIA). For
example, for the Phase 2 Rule RIA,
benefits in the form of savings in fuel
expenditures, increased vehicle use
associated with the fuel economy
‘‘rebound’’ effect, benefits of greenhouse
gas emission reductions, benefits of
non-greenhouse gas emissions
reductions, and the economic value of
improvements in U.S. energy security
are separately reported. We also
disagree with the commenter who cited
the Clean Power Plan RIA’s estimation
of climate benefits as an example of a
misleading analysis that could have
caused parties to not question EPA’s
justification of the Clean Power Plan
when they might have if the EPA had
disaggregated the climate benefits as
required by the Benefit-Cost Rule. In the
RIA, the EPA strove to be very
transparent and provided a lengthy
discussion of why EPA appropriately
centers attention on a global measure of
the social cost of carbon when
estimating climate benefits resulting
from reductions in this global pollutant.
In addition, the Agency clearly stated
that the monetized benefits analysis was
not EPA’s justification for the rule. As
explained in the preamble for the final
rule, ‘‘As required under Executive
Order 12866, the EPA conducts benefitcost analyses for major Clean Air Act
rules. While benefit-cost analysis can
help to inform policy decisions, as
permissible and appropriate under
governing statutory provisions, the EPA
does not use a benefit-cost test (i.e., a
determination of whether monetized
benefits exceed costs) as the sole or
primary decision tool when required to
consider costs or to determine whether
to issue regulations under the Clean Air
Act, and is not using such a test here.’’
Comment: One commenter noted that
the Benefit-Cost Rule’s limits on the
types of scientific data that the EPA can
consider, as well as its prescriptions
regarding the presentation of certain
categories of benefits, would have
impeded the adoption of additional
public health protections that are
critically needed to ensure breathable
air to overburdened communities. Some
commenters stated that the Benefit-Cost
Rule’s failure to undertake any analysis
of these potential environmental justice
impacts is directly contrary to the EPA’s
mission under the CAA. Some
commenters asserted that the Benefit-
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Cost Rule would have interfered with
the EPA’s efforts to address
distributional and environmental justice
impacts. These commenters said that
rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule
removed an unnecessary and
inappropriate impediment to the
Agency’s rigorous pursuit of its mission,
including its ability to advance
environmental justice. The commenters
asserted that the Interim Final Rule
reduced this risk and associated
negative environmental health and
safety risks that often disproportionately
affect children and residents of
environmental justice communities.
Some commenters said that the Interim
Final Rule was fully in line with the
Administration’s commitment to
advancing environmental justice, both
broadly and through specific agency
actions. Another commenter contended
that the Benefit-Cost Rule disregarded
the complex ways in which pollutants
interact within and across
environmental media, thereby
undermining environmental protections
and the existing regulatory programs
that are essential to public health,
protection of ecosystems and wildlife,
and local economies.
Some commenters argued that the
EPA’s development of the Benefit-Cost
Rule did not adequately reflect the
mandates of E.O. 12898 and 13045 or
comply with the required analysis. A
commenter contended that E.O. 12898
applies to programs, policies, and
activities, and the Benefit-Cost Rule was
clearly a policy, and therefore, should
have been subject to E.O. 12898
directives to consider environmental
justice. One commenter stated that the
Benefit-Cost Rule would have codified
value judgments that could impact the
evaluation and development of
regulations that can significantly affect
health risks to children and the
pollution burdens on environmental
justice communities. Another
commenter asserted that aggregating
those health benefits that can be
quantified overlooks communities of
color that have been subjected to racist
practices, such as redlining, that have
confined them to pollution hotspots or
areas of disinvestment. Another
commenter said that the Benefit-Cost
Rule would have applied benefits as an
average across societies instead of a
distributional analysis and that this was
extremely problematic and even
unethical because the approach masks
disparities in the location of polluting
facilities and resultant air pollution (and
health outcomes).
Other commenters said that ongoing
efforts are needed to ensure that the
EPA appropriately considers
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environmental justice implications
moving forward. A commenter asserted
that the EPA failed to recognize any
environmental justice considerations in
both its reasoning for rescinding the
Benefit-Cost Rule and its explanation for
returning to the pre-existing BCA
process. The commenter argued that
building environmental-justice
considerations into the BCA process is
needed to ensure that the EPA’s future
CAA actions do not re-enforce the
existing pollution-exposure
discrepancies underserved communities
face. Similarly, another commenter
asserted that low-income communities
and communities of color have long
been disproportionately harmed by air
pollution and other forms of
environmental degradation. The
commenter added that the Benefit-Cost
Rule would have obscured
environmental-justice implications
because the EPA’s BCA would be
required to focus on calculated net
benefits of actions and would ignore
distributional equities. Another
commenter requested that the EPA
promulgate a better Benefit-Cost Rule to
truly realize equality under the law and
environmental justice—a rule that
accurately accounts for cumulative and
aggregate impacts of pollutants on
overburdened communities and gives
unquantifiable and/or non-monetary
harms the attention they deserve.
Response: The EPA agrees that the
Benefit-Cost Rule did not address the
environmental justice impacts raised by
the commenters. While this final rule
rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule will
not directly address environmental
justice impacts, it should be noted that
a cornerstone goal of the EPA is to
provide an environment where all
people enjoy the same degree of
protection from environmental and
health hazards and equal access to the
decision-making process to maintain a
healthy environment in which to live,
learn, and work.
V. Judicial Review
Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA indicates
which federal courts of appeals are the
proper forum for petitions of review of
final actions by the EPA under the CAA.
This section provides, in part, that
petitions for review must be filed in the
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit for (i) ‘‘Any nationally
applicable regulations promulgated, or
final actions taken, by the
Administrator’’ or (ii) when such action
is locally or regionally applicable, if
‘‘such action is based on a
determination of nationwide scope or
effect and if in taking such action the
Administrator finds and publishes that
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such action is based on such a
determination.’’ For locally or regionally
applicable final actions, the CAA
reserves to the EPA complete discretion
whether to invoke the exception in (ii).
This final action is ‘‘nationally
applicable’’ within the meaning of
section 307(b)(1). Pursuant to CAA
section 307(b), any petitions for review
of this final action must be filed in the
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit within 60 days from
the date this final action is published in
the Federal Register.
VI. Statutory and Executive Order
Reviews
Additional information about these
statutes and Executive Orders can be
found at https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/laws-and-executive-orders.
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory
Planning and Review and Executive
Order 14094: Modernizing Regulatory
Review
This action is not a significant
regulatory action as defined in
Executive Order 12866. The EPA does
not anticipate that this rulemaking will
have an economic impact on regulated
entities. This is a rule of agency
procedure and practice. EPA notes the
release of E.O. 14094 after issuance of
the interim final rule, which amended
E.O. 12866. The discussion in this final
action relates to interpretation of E.O.
12866, which was the governing
executive order for the duration of when
the rule was in effect. The same
reasoning applies to the updated
definitions contained in E.O. 14094.
That is, the Benefit-Cost Rule expanded
the universe of CAA rulemakings for
which the EPA would be required to
conduct BCAs without justifying why
such expansion was necessary or
appropriate.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
This action does not contain any
information collection activities and
therefore does not impose an
information collection burden under the
PRA.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
I certify that this action will not have
a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities
under the RFA. This action would not
impose any requirements on small
entities. This action would not regulate
any entity outside the federal
government and is a rule of agency
procedure and practice.
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D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA)
This action does not contain any
unfunded mandate as described in
UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531–1538, and does
not significantly or uniquely affect small
governments. The action imposes no
enforceable duty on any state, local or
tribal governments or the private sector.
E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
This action does not have federalism
implications. It will not have substantial
direct effects on the states, on the
relationship between the national
government and the states, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation
and Coordination With Indian Tribal
Governments
This action does not have tribal
implications as specified in Executive
Order 13175. Thus, Executive Order
13175 does not apply to this action.
G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of
Children From Environmental Health
Risks and Safety Risks
The EPA interprets Executive Order
13045 as applying only to those
regulatory actions that concern
environmental health or safety risks that
the EPA has reason to believe may
disproportionately affect children, per
the definition of ‘‘covered regulatory
action’’ in section 2–202 of the
Executive Order. This action is not
subject to Executive Order 13045
because it does not concern an
environmental health risk or safety risk.
H. Executive Order 13211: Actions
Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
This action is not a ‘‘significant
energy action’’ because it is not likely to
have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution or use of energy
and has not otherwise been designated
as a significant energy action by the
Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs.
I. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act (NTTAA) and 1 CFR
Part 51
This rulemaking does not involve
technical standards.
J. Executive Order 12898: Federal
Actions To Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations
Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629,
February 16, 1994) directs federal
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agencies, to the greatest extent
practicable and permitted by law, to
make environmental justice part of their
mission by identifying and addressing,
as appropriate, disproportionately high
and adverse human health or
environmental effects of their programs,
policies and activities on minority
populations (people of color and/or
Indigenous peoples) and low-income
populations.
The EPA believes that this type of
action does not concern human health
or environmental conditions and
therefore cannot be evaluated with
respect to potentially disproportionate
and adverse effects on people of color,
low-income populations and/or
Indigenous peoples. This action has no
current or projected monetized costs or
benefits nor does it stipulate any
changes that may adversely affect
people of color, low-income populations
and/or Indigenous peoples. This rule
pertains only to internal EPA practices
in how the EPA conducts and considers
benefit-cost analyses. While this rule
does not directly address environmental
justice impacts, it should be noted that
a cornerstone goal of the EPA is to
provide an environment where all
people enjoy the same degree of
protection from environmental and
health hazards and equal access to the
decision-making process to maintain a
healthy environment in which to live,
learn, and work.
K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)
This rule is exempt from the CRA
because it is a rule of agency
organization, procedure, or practice that
does not substantially affect the rights or
obligations of non-agency parties.
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 83
Environmental protection,
Administrative practice and procedures,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Michael S. Regan,
Administrator.
PART 83—[REMOVED AND
RESERVED]
For the reasons stated in the preamble,
and under the authority of 42 U.S.C.
7601, the EPA removes and reserves 40
CFR part 83.
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■
[FR Doc. 2023–14707 Filed 7–12–23; 8:45 am]
CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND
COMMUNITY SERVICE
45 CFR Parts 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528,
2529, and 2530
RIN 3045–AA66
National Service Trust Education
Awards
Corporation for National and
Community Service.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Corporation for National
and Community Service (operating as
AmeriCorps) is finalizing revisions to its
National Service Trust regulations. The
National Service Trust is an account
from which AmeriCorps pays education
awards to eligible AmeriCorps
participants and interest on qualified
student loans for AmeriCorps
participants during their terms of
service in approved national service
positions. This rule improves the clarity
of regulations applicable to education
awards through use of consistent
terminology and more transparent
procedures for extensions, transfers, and
revocations of education awards; and
increases flexibility for those who earn
education awards to use and transfer
those awards. This rule also renumbers
sections related to national service
education awards to combine them all
into one CFR part with subpart
designations for easier navigation.
DATES: This rule is effective August 14,
2023.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Elizabeth Appel, Associate General
Counsel, AmeriCorps, 250 E Street SW,
Washington, DC 20525, (202) 967–5070,
eappel@cns.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Background
II. Overview of Final Rule
A. Renumbering To Combine Provisions
Into One CFR Part
B. Part-by-Part (New Subpart-by-Subpart)
Summary of Changes
1. Changes to Current Part 2525 (New
Subpart A)
2. Changes to Current Part 2526 (New
Subpart B)
3. Changes to Current Part 2527 (New
Subpart C)
4. Changes to Current Part 2528 (New
Subpart D)
5. Changes to Current Part 2529 (New
Subpart E)
6. Changes to Current Part 2530 (New
Subpart F)
III. Response to Public Comments
IV. Regulatory Analyses
I. Background
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
The National and Community Service
Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
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12501 et seq., aims to encourage United
States citizens to engage in national
service and to expand educational
opportunity by rewarding individuals
who participate in national service with
an increased ability to pursue higher
education or job training. Specifically,
the Act establishes the National Service
Trust and authorizes AmeriCorps to use
funds from that Trust to provide
education awards to eligible individuals
who have fulfilled a term of service in
an approved national service position
and meet other applicable requirements.
AmeriCorps’ regulations implementing
the Act are within 45 CFR parts 2525
through 2530 and address the National
Service Trust (the Trust), who is eligible
to receive education awards from the
Trust, how the amount of the education
awards is determined, the purposes for
which the education awards may be
used, the circumstances under which
AmeriCorps participants will receive
forbearance and payment of interest
expenses on qualified student loans,
and the circumstances in which
participants may transfer their
educational awards.
II. Overview of Final Rule
Overall, this final rule is intended to
improve clarity of the regulations
through use of consistent terminology
and plain language, improve the
transparency of the criteria and
procedures for extensions, transfers, and
revocations of education awards; and
increase flexibility for those who earn
education awards to use and transfer
those awards. To meet these objectives,
this rule makes changes to the following
CFR parts:
• Part 2525—National Service Trust:
Purpose and Definitions
• Part 2526—Eligibility for an
Education Award
• Part 2527—Determining the Amount
of an Education Award
• Part 2528—Using an Education
Award
• Part 2529—Payment of Accrued
Interest
• Part 2530—Transfer of an Education
Award
Some changes apply to all these CFR
parts, including updating references to
the Corporation for National and
Community Service to refer to it by its
operating name, AmeriCorps, rather
than ‘‘the Corporation.’’ Specific
mentions of AmeriCorps programs,
Silver Scholar, and Summer of Service
positions were replaced with the term
‘‘national service position,’’ where
appropriate. Other changes affect only
one or some CFR parts. Substantive
E:\FR\FM\13JYR1.SGM
13JYR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 133 (Thursday, July 13, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 44710-44721]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-14707]
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
40 CFR Part 83
[EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0044; FRL-6530.8-02-OAR]
RIN 2060-AV18
Rescinding the Rule on Increasing Consistency and Transparency in
Considering Benefits and Costs in the Clean Air Act Rulemaking Process
AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is finalizing the
rescission of the rule entitled, ``Increasing Consistency and
Transparency in Considering Benefits and Costs in the Clean Air Act
Rulemaking Process'' (hereinafter, the ``Benefit-Cost Rule''). The EPA
is rescinding the rule because the changes advanced by the rule were
inadvisable, untethered to the Clean Air Act (CAA), and not necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
DATES: This final rule is effective on August 14, 2023.
ADDRESSES: The EPA has established a docket for this rulemaking under
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2020-0044. All documents in the docket are
listed on the https://www.regulations.gov/ website. Although listed in
the index, some information is not publicly available, e.g.,
Confidential Business Information or other information whose disclosure
is restricted by statute. Certain other material, such as copyrighted
material, is not placed on the internet and will be publicly available
only in hard copy form. Publicly available docket materials are
available electronically through https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leif Hockstad, Office of Air Policy
and Program Support, Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA, Mail Code
6103A, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460; telephone
number: (202) 343-9432; email address: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Preamble Acronyms and Abbreviations
The EPA uses multiple acronyms and terms in this preamble. While
this list may not be exhaustive, to ease the reading of this preamble
and for reference purposes, the EPA defines the following terms and
acronyms here:
APA Administrative Procedure Act
BCA Benefit-Cost Analysis
CAA Clean Air Act
CBI Confidential Business Information
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRA Congressional Review Act
E.O. Executive Order
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FR Federal Register
HAP Hazardous Air Pollutants
MACT Maximum Achievable Control Technology
NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards
NRDC National Resources Defense Council
NTTAA National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
OIRA Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
SAB Science Advisory Board
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
U.S. United States
U.S.C. United States Code
Organization of this document. The information in this preamble is
organized as follows:
I. General Information
A. Does this action apply to me?
B. What is the Agency's authority for taking this action?
II. Background
III. Summary of the Final Rescission Rule
IV. Responses to Significant Comments
V. Judicial Review
VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and
Executive Order 14094: Modernizing Regulatory Review
B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With
Indian Tribal Governments
G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From
Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks
H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) and
1 CFR Part 51
J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations
K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)
I. General Information
A. Does this action apply to me?
This rule does not regulate the conduct or determine the rights of
any entity or individual outside the Agency, as this action pertains
only to internal EPA practices. However, the Agency recognizes that any
entity or individual interested in the EPA's regulations promulgated
under the CAA may be interested in this rule. In addition, this rule
may be of particular interest to entities and individuals interested in
how the EPA conducts and considers benefit-cost analyses (BCA).
B. What is the Agency's authority for taking this action?
The Agency is taking this action pursuant to CAA section
301(a)(1).\1\ Section 301(a)(1) provides authority to the Administrator
``to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his
functions'' under the CAA. As discussed in section III of this
preamble, the EPA has determined that the Benefit-Cost Rule was not
``necessary''
[[Page 44711]]
and lacked a rational basis under CAA section 301(a), and therefore the
EPA lacked authority to issue it; we are accordingly rescinding the
Rule.
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\1\ 42 U.S.C. 7601(a)(1).
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II. Background
On December 23, 2020, the EPA finalized the Benefit-Cost Rule.\2\
The Benefit-Cost Rule was a procedural rule establishing requirements
related to the development and consideration of BCA that the EPA would
have been required to undertake when promulgating certain proposed and
final regulations under the CAA. Specifically, the Benefit-Cost Rule
(1) required a BCA for all significant proposed and final regulations
under the CAA; (2) codified specific practices for developing the BCA;
(3) required certain presentations of the BCA results in the preamble;
and (4) required the EPA to consider the BCA in promulgating the
regulation except where prohibited. The final Benefit-Cost Rule was
effective upon publication in the Federal Register based on the
procedural-rule exemption from delayed-effective-date requirements in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). After
publication, several parties filed petitions for review of the Benefit-
Cost Rule in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
and these consolidated cases are currently in abeyance.\3\
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\2\ 85 FR 84130.
\3\ State of New York v. EPA, No. 21-1026 (D.C. Cir.); Cal.
Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, No. 21-1041 (D.C. Cir.); Envt'l Def.
Fund v. EPA, No. 21-1069 (D.C. Cir.). State of New York v. EPA, No.
21-1026 (D.C. Cir.), Doc. No. 1886762 (Feb. 23, 2021) (abeyance
order).
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On January 20, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order (E.O.)
13990, ``Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring
Science To Tackle the Climate Crisis,'' \4\ which, among other things,
directed the EPA to immediately review and consider suspending,
revising, or rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule. Accordingly, the EPA
conducted a comprehensive review of both the legal and factual
predicates for the Benefit-Cost Rule and, in particular, the need for
the regulations that the Agency promulgated in the Benefit-Cost Rule.
Based on this review, the EPA determined that the changes to Agency
practice required by the Benefit-Cost Rule were inadvisable, not
needed, and untethered to the CAA. Therefore, in May 2021, the EPA
published an interim final rule rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule
(hereinafter, the ``Interim Final Rule'').\5\ The Interim Final Rule
became effective on June 14, 2021, which was 30 days after its
publication in the Federal Register.
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\4\ 86 FR 7037 (January 25, 2021).
\5\ 86 FR 26406 (May 14, 2021).
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While procedural rules are exempt from the notice-and-public-
comment requirements in the APA, the EPA nonetheless decided to
voluntarily seek post-promulgation public comment on the Interim Final
Rule.\6\ This final action considers and responds to the public
comments the EPA received on the Interim Final Rule. The EPA's process
is consistent with Administrative Conference of the United States
Recommendation 95-4, which recommends that agencies consider providing
post-promulgation notice and comment even where an exemption is
justified, be it a substantive rule relying on the ``good cause''
exception to notice and comment, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), or a procedural
rule such as this one.\7\
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\6\ Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (``Agencies are free to grant
additional procedural rights in the exercise of their
discretion.'').
\7\ See ACUS Recommendation 95-4, Procedures for
Noncontroversial and Expedited Rulemaking (1995).
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III. Summary of the Final Rescission Rule
In the Interim Final Rule, the EPA concluded that the Benefit-Cost
Rule should be rescinded in its entirety. The EPA has reviewed and
considered comments received on the Interim Final Rule, as discussed in
section IV, but none of the comments received have led the EPA to
materially change our view, as explained in the Interim Final Rule,
that the Benefit-Cost Rule is not needed and does not further the CAA's
goals. As such, the EPA is finalizing the rescission of the Benefit-
Cost Rule with this action. Consistent with and as discussed further in
the Interim Final Rule, the rationales for rescission are summarized
below.
In the Benefit-Cost Rule, the Agency stated that it had authority
to promulgate the Rule under CAA section 301(a) because the Rule's
additional procedures were necessary to ensure consistency and
transparency in CAA rulemakings. However, as discussed in the Interim
Final Rule, the Agency failed to articulate a rational basis for the
Benefit-Cost Rule and did not explain how the existing CAA rulemaking
process had created or was likely to create inconsistent or non-
transparent outcomes, i.e., that an actual or even theoretical problem
existed. After reviewing each element of the Benefit-Cost Rule, we have
determined that the additional procedures required were not needed,
useful, or advisable policy changes. In some cases, the new procedures
established by the Benefit-Cost Rule could have hindered the EPA's
compliance with the CAA and may not have even furthered the Rule's
stated purposes of consistency and transparency. Our rationale for
rescinding each of the four independent elements of the Benefit-Cost
Rule is severable and discussed in the Interim Final Rule and
summarized below. In addition, as noted in the Interim Final Rule, the
existing public process provides ample ability for the public to
participate in the EPA's CAA rulemakings.
First, the EPA has determined that the Agency failed to provide a
rational basis to support the Benefit-Cost Rule or explain why the Rule
was needed or reasonable. The Benefit-Cost Rule did not provide any
record evidence that the guidance and administrative processes already
in place presented problems that justified the mandate imposed by the
Rule. Indeed, the Benefit-Cost Rule failed to point to a single example
of a rule promulgated under the CAA where problems emerged that would
have been avoided had the mandate imposed by the rule been in place.
Furthermore, there was no discussion of how the requirements of the
Benefit-Cost Rule would have improved the Agency's ability to
accomplish the CAA's goals to protect and enhance air quality.
Moreover, there has been an unbroken, bipartisan, decades-long
commitment from Presidential Administrations to conduct BCAs for
economically significant regulations issued in the United States. These
analyses are rigorous, publicly available, subject to interagency
review, and are conducted according to extensive peer-reviewed
guidelines from OMB and the EPA. We are therefore finalizing rescission
of the Benefit-Cost Rule on the basis that it failed to articulate a
rational basis justifying its promulgation.
Second, the Benefit-Cost Rule's expansion of BCA to all
``significant'' CAA rulemakings, rather than just those that are
significant under monetary thresholds of E.O. 12866, is unnecessary.
The Benefit-Cost Rule greatly expanded the universe of CAA rulemakings
for which the EPA would have been required to conduct resource-
intensive BCAs without justifying why such expansion was necessary or
appropriate. In many cases, rules may be designated ``significant'' by
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for reasons other than
economic significance such that other types of assessments of economic
impact are appropriate. Requiring BCA for all rules designated
``significant'' by OMB, even when the primary issues of importance
[[Page 44712]]
are not economic, would have unnecessarily complicated the rulemaking
process, potentially diverted the Agency's resources from those aspects
of the rule that warrant additional consideration (i.e., the reasons
why the rule was designated significant), and could have delayed rules
needed for protection of public health and the environment. Existing
directives under E.O. 12866 and guidance regarding BCAs for
economically significant rules, while retaining flexibility for
agencies to analyze costs, benefits, and other factors for non-
economically significant rules, strike the better balance between
agency resources and the information provided by additional economic
analysis for such rules. Simply put, a BCA is not warranted for every
CAA rule that is designated as significant under E.O. 12866.
Third, the codification of specific practices for the development
of BCA is inadvisable because it is contrary to best practices for
preparing BCAs and could have prevented the EPA from relying on best
available science. As articulated by OMB and EPA guidelines, best
practices for conducting a high-quality BCA cannot be established using
a set formula, and the Benefit-Cost Rule's codification of specific
practices would have prevented situation-specific tailoring of the
regulatory analysis to the policies being proposed. In addition, best
practices evolve over time, and the Benefit-Cost Rule would have locked
the EPA into using outdated practices until those practices were
amended via rulemaking, which could have delayed incorporation of new
scientific information and methods. Some of the Benefit-Cost Rule's
``best practice'' requirements did not even derive from the EPA's
Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (hereinafter ``Economic
Guidelines''),\8\ OMB's Circular A-4,\9\ or the EPA's Science Advisory
Board (SAB) advice. As discussed in more detail in the Interim Final
Rule, a number of the specific provisions required by the Benefit-Cost
Rule, in particular those related to health-benefits assessments, would
have promoted particular types of data in a way that could have
conflicted with the use of best scientific practices or arbitrarily
caused the Agency to disregard important or high-quality data. The
Benefit-Cost Rule's attempt to craft a one-size-fits-all approach to
BCAs in fact demonstrated the difficulty and inadvisability of
codifying specific practices appropriate for every BCA.
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\8\ U.S. EPA. 2010. Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses.
https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/guidelines-preparing-economic-analyses.
\9\ Exec. Office of the President, OMB, Circular A-4: Regulatory
Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf.
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Fourth, the Benefit-Cost Rule required the EPA to present net-
benefit calculations in regulatory preambles in a manner that would
have been misleading and inconsistent with economic best practices.
Specifically, the Rule required a presentation of only the benefits
``that pertain to the specific objective (or objectives, as the case
may be) of the CAA provision or provisions under which the significant
regulation is promulgated.'' 40 CFR 83.4(b). The Rule also required
that if any benefits and costs accrue to non-U.S. populations, they
must be reported separately to the extent possible. This information is
duplicative of existing information provided in EPA's Regulatory Impact
Analyses (RIAs) because EPA already presents these types of benefits in
disaggregated form in its RIAs, so these presentational requirements
would not have provided additional transparency. EPA is careful,
however, not to use these disaggregated subsets of benefits in
calculating total net benefits. Both EPA and OMB guidelines, and
economic best practice generally, are clear that the purpose of a BCA
is to assess the economic efficiency of policies, and in order to do so
accurately, net benefits are calculated by subtracting total costs from
total benefits, regardless of whether the benefits and costs arise from
intended or unintended consequences and regardless of the particular
recipients of the benefits or costs. Even though the Benefit-Cost Rule
did not specifically require incorrect partial net-benefit calculations
that excluded certain impacts due to the regulation, we are concerned
that retaining the Rule's presentational requirements could have
invited such misleading partial calculations. In fact, in one of the
rules that was promulgated during the same time period as the Benefit-
Cost Rule's requirements were being considered, the EPA used
calculations of segregated benefits--like those required under the
Benefit-Cost Rule--to create tables of misleading ``net'' benefit
calculations (i.e., benefits minus costs) that only accounted for a
subset of the rule's benefits.\10\
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\10\ See 84 FR 32520, 32572 tbl.10-12 (July 8, 2019).
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Fifth, we are rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule because the Rule did
not reconcile its requirement that the Agency ``consider'' in its CAA
rulemakings the required BCAs with the various and varied substantive
mandates of the CAA. The Benefit-Cost Rule did not even identify the
CAA provisions to which it would apply. This identification is critical
because the statute, not Agency procedural rules, dictate what the
Agency may or may not ``consider'' in the context of exercising
authority. For those CAA provisions where EPA is prohibited from
considering costs, the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirement to prepare a BCA
and include it in the judicially reviewable rulemaking record solely
for the purpose of providing ``additional information'' is not
necessary to effect any purpose under the Act. Even for those CAA
authorities that permit consideration of cost or other economic
factors, the Benefit-Cost Rule did not establish why BCA specifically
is an appropriate way to consider cost. The rule failed entirely to
grapple with the varied ways in which Congress granted authority or
directed the EPA whether and how to consider benefits, costs, and other
factors, and how the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirement to consider BCA
should be reconciled with the need to adhere to particular statutory
language and context. As noted in the Interim Final Rule, we are
finalizing rescission of the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirement to prepare
and consider BCA (followed by a subsequent attempt to reconcile that
analysis with the CAA's mandates) in favor of the Agency's current
``statute first'' approach to decision making. That is, we believe the
traditional process of statutory interpretation is superior, wherein we
first look to the text of the relevant statutory provision to determine
whether Congress intended or permitted the Agency to consider cost or
economic factors, and, if yes, we then examine the statutory context,
legislative history, and nature of the program or environmental problem
to be addressed to determine a reasonable manner of considering that
cost or economic factor.
Finally, we are finalizing rescission of the Benefit-Cost Rule on
the basis that its requirements are not needed with respect to process,
and that the pre-existing administrative process, including existing
procedures under the APA and, where applicable, CAA section 307(d),
provide for ample consistency and transparency. These requirements are
more than adequate to accomplish the general good-government goals of
``consistency'' and ``transparency,'' and the Benefit-Cost Rule failed
to provide any support for its contention that the pre-existing process
was deficient so as to warrant the Rule's new procedures.
[[Page 44713]]
IV. Responses to Signficant Comments
This section of the preamble summarizes significant comments
received on the Interim Final Rule \11\ and the EPA's responses to
those comments. All comments made on the Interim Final Rule and the
EPA's responses can be found in the document, ``Summary of Public
Comments and Responses for Rescinding the Rule on Increasing
Consistency and Transparency in Considering Benefits and Costs in the
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Process,'' available in the docket for this
rulemaking.
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\11\ 86 FR 26406.
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Comment: Some commenters supported retaining the Benefit-Cost Rule
and opposed the Interim Final Rule rescinding it. Several of these
commenters cited their 2020 comments on the proposed Benefit-Cost Rule,
asserting that in those comments, they had raised examples of prior
analyses being performed by the EPA that were inconsistent in their
approaches or methodologies or inappropriately relied upon a ``misuse
of co-benefits.'' The commenters claimed that leaving the Benefit-Cost
Rule in place would have addressed their concerns.
Response: The commenters to the Interim Final Rule did not provide
in their comments, with any kind of specificity, examples of how the
Benefit-Cost Rule would have resolved any problems those commenters had
with prior BCAs performed by the EPA. Nevertheless, the EPA has
examined the prior comments that were referenced to determine whether
any commenter demonstrated that there was a significant problem of
inconsistency or transparency that the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirements
would have resolved. After examining the rulemaking record for the
Benefit-Cost Rule, we do not agree with these commenters that they
identified concrete examples of how the Benefit-Cost Rule would have
improved their perceived flaws. To the contrary, the comments in
support of the Benefit-Cost Rule proposal simply alleged broadly that
the EPA had ``historically used inconsistent approaches'' to BCA, that
there was a need to ``correct past practices,'' that there was
``inconsistency in methodologies,'' and that EPA had ``misused co-
benefits.'' We do not agree that these general complaints about past
inconsistency, without any specificity, provide an adequate basis for
establishing a concrete problem, nor do they explain how the Benefit-
Cost Rule would have addressed any such problem.
Comment: A commenter contended that the EPA should not make a major
change, such as rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule, through an Interim
Final Rule. The commenter stated that this action, by itself, is an
indication that the EPA has already made up its mind to rescind the
rule. The commenter added that, in developing the Benefit-Cost Rule,
the EPA went through a proposed rulemaking process, so in rescinding
the rule, or revising it, the EPA should go through a similar process
and revise the Benefit-Cost Rule only to the extent necessary to
address any concerns that remain after properly considering public
comments.
Response: Agencies are always free to adopt additional notice-and-
comment procedures, but to the extent that the commenter suggests that
such procedures were required in this instance, we do not agree. The
Benefit-Cost Rule was a procedural rule, i.e., a rule of agency
organization, procedure, or practice. A procedural rule does not
regulate any party outside of the EPA but instead exclusively governs
the EPA's internal process for conducting business. As discussed in
section IV of the Interim Final Rule, procedural rules are exempt from
the APA's notice-and-comment requirements, and therefore it was
permissible and appropriate to make the rescission of that rule
effective using an interim final rule. However, EPA recognizes the
value of transparency and public input and therefore voluntarily sought
public comment on its decision to rescind, consistent with
Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendation 95-4,
which recommends that agencies consider providing post-promulgation
notice and comment even where an exemption is justified, be it a
substantive rule relying on the ``good cause'' exception to notice and
comment, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), or a procedural rule such as this one.
Comment: Several commenters requested that the EPA revise rather
than rescind the Benefit-Cost Rule in its entirety. These commenters
said that they do not agree that the issues raised by the EPA were
significant enough to warrant rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule. Some
commenters urged the EPA to reconsider each provision of the Benefit-
Cost Rule on an individual basis, seek public comment on the issue, and
amend the provisions after considering the comments. Another commenter
contended that the EPA should have amended the scope of the Benefit-
Cost Rule to address concerns raised in the Interim Final Rule
regarding burdensome requirements for some non-economically significant
rules. One commenter noted that, rather than rescinding the rule, the
EPA could have revised the rule to retain some provisions as regulation
and left some as guidance, as the Agency's Science Advisory Board (SAB)
had suggested as a possible improvement in its comments on the Benefit-
Cost Rule. Some commenters contended that EPA's decision to repeal the
Benefit-Cost Rule is in direct conflict with the January 27, 2021
memorandum, ``Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific
Integrity and Evidenced-Based Policymaking.'' These commenters stated
that ensuring ``evidence-based decisions'' that are ``guided by the
best available science and data'' requires the EPA to undertake a
rigorous and objective BCA and to present the analysis, including key
uncertainties, in a transparent manner.
Other commenters agreed with EPA's decision as explained in the
Interim Final Rule that the rule should be rescinded in its entirety.
These commenters further stated that fixing the rule through targeted
amendments was not viable because the problematic elements were
significant and difficult to address in piecemeal fashion. The
commenters agreed the problems were substantive and the Benefit-Cost
Rule as a whole should be rescinded.
Response: We disagree that the EPA should have revised the Benefit-
Cost Rule rather than rescind it. The EPA conducted a comprehensive
review of both the legal and factual predicates for the Benefit-Cost
Rule and, in particular, the need for an imposition of and codification
of ``one-size-fits-all'' requirements governing economic analyses for a
large subset of regulations promulgated under the CAA. We do not agree
that revision rather than rescission would have resolved our concerns
with the Benefit-Cost Rule. The problematic elements of the Rule were
significant, and many of those problems extended across the entirety of
the rule and could not be excised and resolved on a case-by-case basis.
For example, one particularly problematic element of the Benefit-Cost
Rule was its codification of methodologies and practices that we think
are better suited to guidance. As explained in the preamble to the
Interim Final Rule and in section III of this preamble, and as
recognized by OMB itself, guidance allows the EPA to tailor economic
analyses to the regulatory question and problem at hand, and it also
facilitates using up-to-date methodologies in those analyses without
first undergoing a notice-and-comment rule revision. Therefore, some
[[Page 44714]]
of the revisions suggested by commenters, such as amending the scope of
the Benefit-Cost Rule to exclude non-economically significant rules,
would not have addressed this fundamental problem.
With respect the SAB's suggestion, we do not agree that the SAB was
specifically endorsing revision of the Benefit-Cost Rule over
rescission. The one sentence in the SAB's cover letter in which it
``urges EPA to carefully consider which aspects of BCA should be
included in the final [Benefit-Cost] rule versus which aspects should
be in guidance,'' should be read in context of the significant and
detailed concerns detailed by the SAB with many of the Rule's specific
requirements.\12\ The more accurate overall message from the SAB's
report is that the proposed rule as drafted would have been problematic
if implemented, and that at the very least the EPA should consider
retaining some requirements as guidance ``given the case-by-case nature
of BCA.'' In some instances, the SAB acknowledged that while it was
providing specific recommendations regarding how to improve certain
sections of the rule, complete overhaul was preferable.\13\ We also
disagree with the commenters who assert that repealing the Benefit-Cost
Rule is in direct conflict with the January 27, 2021 memorandum,
``Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and
Evidenced-Based Policymaking.'' To the contrary, the Benefit-Cost Rule
was not necessary to making ``evidence-based decisions'' ``using best
available science and data,'' and as we have explained, could have
hindered that outcome.
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\12\ U.S. EPA SAB. 2020. Science Advisory Board (SAB)
Consideration of the Scientific and Technical Basis of EPA's
Proposed Rule titled ``Increasing Consistency and Transparency in
Considering Benefits and Costs in the Clean Air Rulemaking
Process.'' EPA-SAB-20-012. September 30. (``SAB (2020)''), available
at https://sab.epa.gov/ords/sab/f?p=100:12:6591070354315:::12::.
\13\ SAB (2020) at 12.
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Comment: Numerous commenters agreed with the EPA's assertion that
the Benefit-Cost Rule codified certain practices that conflicted with
the best science, particularly for quantifying the health benefits of a
rule. Other commenters disagreed with the EPA's assertion that the
Benefit-Cost Rule codified certain practices that conflicted with the
best science. These commenters asserted that the Benefit-Cost Rule
directed the EPA to base its decisions on the best available science
and in accordance with best practices from science and fields such as
economics. The commenters argued that this requirement was a broadly
supported principle for sound regulatory decision making that has
enjoyed bipartisan support for decades, as stated in E.O. 13563 and
E.O. 12866. One commenter asserted that the Benefit-Cost Rule required
the use of best practices for risk assessment/characterization and
would have prevented the Agency from taking shortcuts in analyses or
applying assumptions that are not identified or supportable.
Response: We agree that the EPA should use the best available
scientific information and best scientific practices for BCAs. However,
we disagree that the Benefit-Cost Rule was necessary to promote best
practices. Indeed, in section III.C.3 of the preamble of the Interim
Final Rule, we provided several examples of how implementation of some
of the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirements could have undermined the
scientific integrity of the EPA's BCAs for CAA regulations rather than
strengthened them. We also disagree that the Benefit-Cost Rule's
requirements regarding risk assessments and characterization would have
prevented the Agency from taking shortcuts or applying unsupportable
assumptions. As discussed in section III.C.3 of the Interim Final Rule,
those requirements could have led to inferior selection of health
studies or the potential exclusion of some health endpoints altogether.
By imposing a requirement that studies or analyses used to quantify
concentration-response relationships should ``consider how exposure is
measured,'' and favor ``particularly those that provide measurements at
the level of the individual and that provide actual measurements of
exposure,'' the Benefit-Cost Rule introduced a bias against methods
that in some cases may have been both higher quality and more
appropriate by discouraging consideration of studies that combine both
measured and modeled concentrations.\14\ We have also noted how, rather
than codifying a best practice, the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirement to
limit assessment of human health benefit endpoints to instances where
there is ``a clear causal or likely causal relationship between
pollutant exposure and effect'' was unsupportable. It did not derive
from the Economic Guidelines, Circular A-4, or SAB advice, and in fact
was criticized by the SAB.\15\ Finally, as noted in the Interim Final
Rule, we are concerned that the Benefit-Cost Rule's imposition of
highly specific and stringent requirements for assessing benefits in
conjunction with substantially less stringent requirements for
assessing costs would have led to unbalanced BCAs. Moreover, these
requirements only applied to health benefits, which created an
inconsistency with other categories of benefits (e.g., visibility,
ecological effects) that were not subject to the requirements. By
rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule, the EPA is not forswearing BCAs,
which it has undertaken for decades consistent with the Executive
Orders cited by the commenters. Rather, we think undertaking those BCAs
pursuant to guidelines issued by EPA and OMB, which provide for
flexibility and tailoring in order to permit incorporation of evolving
science and best practices, will produce higher quality analyses than
if EPA conducted BCAs subject to the Benefit-Cost Rule's rigid
codification of particular practices that were frozen at a moment in
time, and in some cases, were substantively problematic.
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\14\ 85 FR 84155 (40 CFR 83.3(a)(9)(iii)(D)).
\15\ See, e.g., SAB 2020 at 2-7 (suggesting that there are a
number of ways to interpret causal relationship and the Benefit-Cost
Rule is not clear what evidence would be acceptable to demonstrate
causality), 8 (recommending that the EPA allow inclusion in its
benefits analyses of effects for which causal or likely causal
relationships may be less certain, but the impact would be
substantial).
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Comment: Some commenters agreed with the EPA's assertion that the
Benefit-Cost Rule would have locked the EPA into using outdated
practices until the rule could be amended. Another commenter said the
Benefit-Cost Rule would have weakened the integrity of the BCA process
for CAA regulations by hindering EPA's ability to use the best
scientific data available. Another commenter asserted that if the
Benefit-Cost Rule had conflicted with future changes to the Economic
Guidelines, the EPA would have had to undergo a lengthy notice-and-
comment process to make updates to its rule, as opposed to just
updating the Economic Guidelines already in existence, and this process
could seriously delay the EPA's ability to adapt to changes in best
practices and could hinder the promulgation of public health and
environmental protections.
Other commenters argued that the Benefit-Cost Rule would not have
stopped the adoption of new practices, but instead would have required
the EPA to notify the public and seek public comment on the basis for
the Agency's decision to adopt the new procedures. Some of these
commenters said that 40 CFR 83.3(a)(11)(v) of the Benefit-Cost Rule
specifically authorized departures from the Rule's requirements if the
EPA
[[Page 44715]]
provided a ``reasoned explanation,'' including a discussion of the
``likely effect of the departures on the results of the BCA.'' The
commenters argued that, in response to changes in best practices, the
EPA could at any time simply amend the Rule separate from or in
parallel with a new covered CAA rulemaking after seeking notice and
comment and providing a reasoned explanation. The commenters asserted
that rescission of the Benefit-Cost Rule allows the EPA to make ad hoc
decisions without notification or explanation. Another commenter
contended that the Benefit-Cost Rule did not force the EPA to revise
the rule if best practices change over time. The commenter pointed out
that the Benefit-Cost Rule did not provide a specific definition of
best practices, and the requirements of 40 CFR 83.3(a)(1) through (12)
were predominantly general in nature without prescribing exact methods.
The commenter said that many of the requirements in 40 CFR 83.3(a)
addressed what information the EPA was required to provide, not the
specific methodology the EPA had to use to estimate benefits and costs.
Response: We agree that with the Benefit-Cost Rule in place, if the
latest or best scientific practice differed from the Rule's
requirements, the EPA would have been required to amend the Rule in
order to be consistent with best practice. The process of revising a
rule often takes a year or more to complete, which would have prevented
the EPA from keeping up with evolving best practices and required the
EPA to rely on potentially outdated methods until a revised rulemaking
could be completed. We maintain this is inconsistent with making
decisions based on the best scientific data available. As discussed in
section III.C.2 of the Interim Final Rule, by freezing and defining
what constituted ``best practices'' at a single point in time, the
Benefit-Cost Rule elevated ``consistency'' over the exercise of sound
judgment based on latest scientific knowledge and, given that revision
by rulemaking could take a long time, would have slowed or discouraged
progress in the development and use of newer and better methods.
Promulgating updates to the Benefit-Cost Rule every time the Rule
became outdated ``in parallel with'' substantive, statutorily required
CAA rules would have been no small regulatory burden; it would have
required a significant amount of agency resources to do so and created
uncertainty in the CAA rule, by linking that rule to an unsettled
regulatory change to the Benefit-Cost Rule that was itself open to
challenge and judicial review.
We also do not agree with commenters that the requirement in 40 CFR
83.3(a)(11)(v) that the EPA include in every BCA ``[a] reasoned
explanation for any departures from best practices in the BCA,
including a discussion of the likely effect of the departures on the
results of the BCA'' was an authorization for the Agency to diverge
from the Benefit-Cost Rule. That provision states that the EPA has to
explain why it has diverged from ``best practices,'' not from the
Benefit-Cost Rule. ``Best practices'' is a term not defined in the
Benefit-Cost Rule, and is on its face subject to interpretation. Far
from providing clear guidance to the Agency on when it would have been
permitted to take an updated approach to BCA absent a change to the
Benefit-Cost Rule, we think that provision itself bred a great deal of
uncertainty--how, for example, is the Agency to know whether it has
adequately explained the ``likely effect'' of its departures from best
practices (which, if the Agency is taking such departure, it likely
does not believe to be ``best practice'')? As further evidence of how
best practices change over time, we note that the Economic Guidelines
are in the process of being updated as part of a periodic review
undertaken by the EPA. In addition, President Biden issued a memorandum
on January 20, 2021, on Modernizing Regulatory Review,\16\ which
directs OMB in consultation with other agencies to recommend revisions
to Circular A-4. The confluence of updates to these two documents,
which provided the ostensible underpinning to the regulatory
requirements of the Benefit-Cost Rule, only highlights the misguided
nature of attempting to freeze ``best practices'' at one moment in
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 86 FR 7223.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we do not agree with the commenters who asserted that the
regulatory requirements of 40 CFR 83.3(a)(1) through (12) were
predominantly general in nature. For example, as noted in the Interim
Final Rule, those provisions contained highly prescriptive (but in many
cases vague and confusing) requirements for benefits assessment and
uncertainty analyses (with no corresponding requirements for how costs
are calculated and considered). In contrast, since guidance is
inherently less prescriptive than regulation, it can be more flexible
in allowing agencies to keep up with the evolution of best practices to
support CAA regulations.
Comment: Some commenters agreed with the EPA's assertion that the
Benefit-Cost Rule was inconsistent with the mandates in the CAA that
prohibited the EPA from considering cost for some types of rulemakings.
They agreed with the EPA that the Benefit-Cost Rule's rationale for
including BCA in the records and preambles of rulemakings in which the
agency is prohibited from considering cost is not ``necessary'' to
carry out the statute within the meaning of CAA section 301(a).
Other commenters disagreed with the EPA's assertion that the
Benefit-Cost Rule was inconsistent with the mandates in the CAA that
prohibited the EPA from considering cost for some types of rulemakings.
These commenters argued that the Benefit-Cost Rule applied with respect
to a significant rule implementing the CAA only when the CAA required
or permitted consideration of cost. These commenters contended that the
Benefit-Cost Rule did not violate the CAA because it required (at 40
CFR 83.2(b)) EPA to consider the results of a BCA except in those
circumstances where the applicable CAA provision(s) prohibited that
consideration. These commenters added that when not prohibited by the
statute, the Benefit-Cost Rule left the EPA significant discretion in
how it would consider the BCAs in individual CAA rules to account for
the significant differences among statutory provisions as long as the
Agency provided the public with a description in the preamble. Another
commenter said that 40 CFR 83.4(d) provided the EPA with clear
direction and appropriate discretion in when and how to consider the
results of BCAs in making regulatory decisions.
One commenter stated that, while the EPA may be prohibited from
considering costs in some cases, such as with revisions to the NAAQS,
this did not negate the need for the Rule's requirements with regard to
how the EPA calculates benefits. The commenter also stated that the EPA
routinely presents cost information in addition to benefits even in
cases where the EPA is prohibited from considering costs, such as in
the RIA for the 2015 ozone NAAQS revision. The commenter contended that
such information is still beneficial in that it informs the public on
the potential cost impacts of the EPA's regulatory actions, even if the
EPA cannot directly consider those cost impacts. Another commenter
argued that the actual text of the CAA's substantive authorities (and
most other statutory provisions) rarely prohibits benefit-cost
balancing and arguably may require it. The commenter stated that
Administrations have recognized that
[[Page 44716]]
the public has a right to know the projected benefits and costs of a
new rule even if the underlying statutory provision (as in the case of
CAA section 109 for setting NAAQS) has been interpreted to prohibit the
consideration of costs. The commenter said elevating BCA practices is
consistent with the recent Supreme Court decisions on BCA, particularly
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009) and Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). The commenter asserted that these
decisions apply the fundamental principle, established in Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463U.S. 29, 43
(1983), that it is arbitrary for an agency to neglect an important
aspect of a regulatory problem. Another commenter also pointed out that
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), concluded that when
interpreting CAA section 112(n)(1)(A), ``Read naturally in the present
context, the phrase `appropriate and necessary' requires at least some
attention to cost.''
Response: We disagree that provisions in the Benefit-Cost Rule's
regulations granting EPA discretion in how and when to consider the
results of the mandated BCA resolves the problems presented by the
Rule. Where the CAA prohibits the EPA from considering cost in
implementing a provision, it cannot be ``necessary'' to require the EPA
to conduct a BCA and include it in the decisional rulemaking record.
The EPA is already conducting BCAs pursuant to Executive Order in
situations where it is appropriate to do so, so commenters' assertions
that the Benefit-Cost Rule is necessary for public information ring
hollow, and the commenters did not address how incorporation of a BCA
into the agency's rulemaking record where Congress has instructed the
Agency not to consider cost is consistent with the CAA. As one
commenter pointed out, the Agency's current practice for rules like the
2015 ozone NAAQS, where the rule is economically significant but where
the statute does not permit the Agency to consider cost, is to conduct
RIAs but not to include those in the record. The Benefit-Cost Rule's
requirement that the EPA include the BCA in its record is a distinct
change from its current practice, and is both unnecessary and
inappropriate given the limits of EPA's statutory authority to consider
cost.
We are also unconvinced by the commenters who assert that the
Benefit-Cost Rule is not inconsistent with the CAA for those rules
promulgated under provisions that permit consideration of cost just
because the Rule left it to the Agency's discretion how it should
consider cost. The fact remains that the Rule did not explain why, for
any particular CAA provision, BCA is the best or even a reasonable way
for the agency to consider cost. For CAA rules that would have been
impacted by the Benefit-Cost Rule, the EPA believes it would have
needed to justify why complying with the Rule's requirement to conduct
and consider a BCA was reasonable under the given CAA provision; the
existence of the Agency's own procedural rule requiring analysis and
consideration of a factor does not create statutory authority to
consider a factor that Congress did not intend the Agency to consider.
We do not agree that what would have been a case-by-case post-hoc
rationalization of the Benefit-Cost Rule as it applied to any
particular provision is superior to the existing process of statutory
interpretation, where we first look to the CAA to try to ascertain
those factors Congress intended the Agency to consider, and whether the
statutory provision suggested how the EPA should consider any such
factor. We disagree that any of the court decisions cited by the
commenters evince any general principles that ``elevate'' BCA over any
other economic analysis. In Entergy, the Court upheld as reasonable the
EPA's choice to consider cost using a BCA given particular statutory
language in the Clean Water Act. In Michigan, the Court spoke only to
whether the EPA needed to consider cost at all in implementing a CAA
provision and explicitly did not opine on how the Agency might
reasonably consider cost. The Michigan Court's holding that a
particular CAA phrase required the Agency to consider cost is more
consistent with the EPA's findings today that it should look first to
the statute to determine what factors are required under a State Farm
analysis, rather than start from an Agency-generated procedural rule
that articulates a particular type of analysis irrespective of
statutory text.
Comment: Several commenters agreed with the EPA's assertion that
the administrative processes already in place before the Benefit-Cost
Rule was promulgated provide ample consistency and transparency in the
rulemaking process. One commenter asserted that rather than increasing
transparency, the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirements would have obscured
the basis of the EPA's decisions. Another commenter said that the
Benefit-Cost Rule did not support its contention that the pre-existing
procedural requirements established by Congress were deficient. A
commenter also noted that the EPA is already required to transparently
share its data, relevant statutory interpretations, and methodology
underlying its rulemaking, and concerned parties are able to supplement
that data, raise arguments that BCA should be integrated into a
rulemaking, make other recommendations for consideration of costs, or
share any concerns that the Agency has been insufficiently transparent.
Another commenter asserted that the EPA failed to articulate any
inconsistency or lack of transparency in existing BCAs that would call
for the drastic changes the Benefit-Cost Rule would impose, and that
the EPA violated numerous executive orders by, for example, failing to
consult with States on the Benefit-Cost Rule's federalism implications
and failing to assess regulatory costs and environmental justice
impacts.
Other commenters disagreed with the EPA's assertion that the
administrative processes already in place before the Benefit-Cost Rule
was promulgated provided ample consistency and transparency in the
rulemaking process. Several of these commenters referenced comments
they had submitted on the proposed Benefit-Cost Rule. The commenters
reiterated their comments on the proposed Benefit-Cost Rule that an
overriding goal of the Agency should be to present data regarding
benefits and costs to decisionmakers and the public as objectively and
accessibly as possible.
Some commenters also pointed out that the Benefit-Cost Rule
included additional procedural requirements to increase transparency in
the presentation of results, such as providing a summary of the overall
results of the BCA. A commenter noted that while the EPA cannot
consider the result of the BCA in setting NAAQS, the RIA does play an
important role in informing the public of the likely costs and benefits
of setting a new standard. The commenter argued that the Benefit-Cost
Rule further advanced transparency by requiring more objective analysis
and explanation of uncertainties in the benefit and cost estimation.
The commenter added that the analyses should be consistent with
Circular A-4, establishing the appropriate baseline, analyzing
alternatives, and estimating benefits and costs. The commenter added
that rules should be fully transparent about the many uncertainties
underpinning their cost and benefit estimates, including the many
embedded policy assumptions made in developing the various estimates of
costs and benefits associated with a rulemaking and the significance of
the impact of those
[[Page 44717]]
assumptions on the final policy decision. Another commenter asserted
that if the EPA decides to rescind the Benefit-Cost Rule, then the EPA
must still maintain transparency in calculating and reporting the
ancillary benefits associated with regulatory actions under the CAA and
all other sources of regulatory authority.
Response: We disagree that the administrative process already in
place before the Benefit-Cost Rule was promulgated is inadequate. For
CAA rules that are subject to the rulemaking requirements of CAA
section 307(d), which include many of the major CAA rulemakings that
would have been subject to the Benefit-Cost Rule, the CAA already
requires proposed rulemakings to include a statement of basis and
purpose, which must include ``(A) the factual data on which the
proposed rule is based; (B) the methodology used in obtaining the data
and in analyzing the data; [and] (C) the major legal interpretations
and policy considerations underlying the proposed rule.'' CAA section
307(d)(3). The CAA also requires that these statements ``set forth or
summarize and provide a reference to any pertinent findings,
recommendations, and comments by the Scientific Review Committee, . . .
and, if the proposal differs in any important respect from any of these
recommendations, an explanation of the reasons for such differences.''
Id. Finally, the CAA already requires, for rules subject to CAA section
307(d), that ``[a]ll data, information, and documents . . . on which
the proposed rule relies shall be included in the docket on the date of
publication of the proposed rule.'' Id. Those CAA rulemakings that are
not subject to these specific requirements are still subject to the
requirements that apply to all proposed rulemakings under the APA,
which similarly require the proposal to include ``reference to the
legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and either the terms
or substance of the proposed rule.'' APA section 553(b). EPA must also
provide an opportunity for comment on proposed rulemakings and respond
to all significant comments, and all final rules are subject to
judicial review for EPA's failure to adequately respond to significant
comments.
We agree that BCA requirements and analyses should be clear and
transparent, and we agree that EPA should follow OMB Circular A-4
guidance to present data regarding benefits and costs to decisionmakers
and the public as objectively and transparently as possible. We
disagree that this was not the case prior to the promulgation of the
Benefit-Cost Rule, and we disagree that EPA's analyses of its
regulatory actions are inconsistent with OMB Circular A-4. Then, as
now, in performing analyses of regulatory actions, the EPA follows the
guidance laid out by OMB Circular A-4 and the Economic Guidelines in
areas such as identifying the baseline, analyzing alternatives, and
estimating costs and benefits, including ancillary benefits. The
analyses and results are subject to internal review and an interagency
review process under E.O. 12866 that involves application of the
principles and methods defined in Circular A-4. The results of the
analyses, documented in RIAs, are also reviewed by OMB to ensure
consistency with Circular A-4. While BCAs are similar for different
rules, as instructed in Circular A-4 and the Economic Guidelines, the
analyses are often tailored to the specific source category by
considering a number of variables, such as the type of pollutants being
controlled, available data, and the location of the emission sources.
Additionally, we disagree with commenters who contended that the
Benefits-Cost Rule would have increased transparency in the
presentation of results. The EPA already disaggregates benefit and cost
estimates in BCAs, so these narrow presentational requirements do not
provide additional transparency. As discussed in the Interim Final
Rule, the Benefits-Cost Rule would have required the preambles of
significant proposed and final CAA regulations to include a separate
presentation that excluded certain categories of benefits that Circular
A-4 and the Economic Guidelines indicate should be considered. This
could have resulted in misleading net-benefit calculations that would
have inaccurately characterized the benefits of a rulemaking and would
have called into question the significance of the excluded benefits.
We disagree that RIAs are difficult to find as they are always
included in the docket for significant rulemakings. Additionally, all
of the RIAs are available online, and many can be found at EPA's
website sorted by source category: https://www.epa.gov/economic-and-cost-analysis-air-pollution-regulations/regulatory-impact-analyses-air-pollution. While the RIAs are technical in nature, the EPA takes steps
to provide information to aid in their interpretation by the public.
We also note that the overall summary of BCA results that one of
the commenters supports, which present the overall net benefits
associated with a rulemaking, are already recommended by Circular A-4
and are thus included in the RIAs for our rulemakings. The contents of
the summary tables already provided by the EPA are consistent with the
guidance for such summary tables in Circular A-4 for all rulemakings.
For significant rules, the EPA also follows Circular A-4 procedures
that require presenting a formal quantitative analysis of the relevant
uncertainties about benefits and costs.
Comment: Some commenters agreed with the EPA that the Benefit-Cost
Rule's presentation requirements would be misleading. These commenters
supported the EPA's assertion that requiring a separate presentation
that excluded certain categories of benefits that Circular A-4 and the
Economic Guidelines indicate should be considered could call into
question the significance of those benefits without justification. They
contended that excluding co-benefits from a presentation of benefits
would violate established economic principles, established best
practices, and longstanding practices of previous administrations. One
commenter cited Michigan v. EPA, stating that in its view, the Supreme
Court held that the EPA needed to consider all advantages and
disadvantages in deciding whether a regulation is appropriate, such as
in the case where a regulation controls emissions but has the indirect
effect of causing new health harms.
Another commenter noted that, out of the hundreds of pollutants the
EPA regulates under the CAA, the EPA only has sufficient information on
particulate matter, and more than 90 percent of all benefits that the
EPA quantifies in its BCAs are attributable to this one pollutant. The
commenter stated that when significant benefits are missing from the
monetized estimate, calculating a number that meaningfully represents a
rule's net benefits is simply a logical impossibility, and any
calculation that purports to do so is, as OIRA itself acknowledges,
``misleading'' at best.
Other commenters opposed rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule's
requirements regarding the presentation of ancillary benefits and non-
domestic benefits. One commenter defended the Benefit-Cost Rule on the
basis that the Rule did not prescribe any specific requirement as to
how EPA must consider ancillary benefits or provide a formula for when
a rule ``passes'' a benefit-cost test; the Benefit-Cost Rule only
required the EPA to better inform the public about basic information
contained in BCAs and to differentiate in a clear fashion what the
ancillary benefits are in a given rule. Other commenters stated that
the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirement to present statutory-
[[Page 44718]]
objective benefits separately from ancillary co-benefits and non-U.S.
based benefits would enhance transparency and would not limit the
Agency's ability to recognize and account for these benefits. Another
commenter contended that, without the required clarity and accounting
for the sources of the benefits, the public and decisionmakers are more
likely to be misled in understanding the nature of the benefits and
whether those benefits could have been achieved more efficiently under
other provisions of the statute. A commenter re-iterated its previous
comment on the proposed Benefit-Cost Rule that presenting disaggregated
cost and benefit information allows for evaluation and consideration of
possibly disproportionate costs on one population from a rule where the
benefits are primarily focused on another population. The commenter
provided an example where it asserted that the EPA's BCA for the Clean
Power Plan estimated benefits using the global social cost of carbon
but compared those benefits to costs within the U.S. The commenter
asserted that such a comparison was misleading and could have caused
parties to not question EPA's justification of the Clean Power Plan
when they might have if the EPA had disaggregated the benefits and
costs as required by the Benefit-Cost Rule. Another commenter contended
that estimates of global benefits should be reported separately in a
manner consistent with Circular A-4. The commenter added that the EPA's
failure to abide by OMB Circular A-4 by reporting only global benefits
resulted in analyses that compared U.S. costs with global benefits--an
asymmetry that should be fully disclosed.
Some commenters contended that the EPA used ancillary benefits to
justify rules that did not quantify emission reductions or that showed
only minimal emission reductions from pollutants directly regulated.
Another commenter cited two greenhouse gas regulations, the EPA's Phase
2 rule for Medium and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles and the Clean
Power Plan, where the EPA estimated substantial net economic benefits
due to the inclusion of the non-climate effects of climate policies as
co-benefits. Another commenter added that the EPA used ancillary
benefits to support six major CAA rules that did not quantify direct
benefits, and in 21 of 26 major non-particulate matter rulemakings
analyzed from 1997 to 2011, the particulate matter ancillary benefits
accounted for more than half of the total benefits. A commenter
contended that reliance on co-benefits to justify regulatory action
circumvents Congressional intent because it disregards the target of
the underlying statutory provision and circumvents the substantive
focus and procedural safeguards established under the law. The
commenter added that regulation through co-benefits also undermines the
very purpose of BCA by obscuring the question of whether the proposed
action accomplishes its intended purpose in a reasonable and resource-
efficient manner. One commenter suggested that the EPA can avoid using
cost-ineffective ``co-benefits'' in the BCA by requiring a robust
regulatory baseline that reflects all projected federal and state
emission reductions, as well as a robust alternatives analysis that
outlines the opportunity costs of pursuing ``co-benefits'' through sub-
optimal, if not unnecessary, measures to achieve standards.
Response: At the outset, we note that, by definition, a BCA
includes all the costs and benefits of a rulemaking, i.e., the net
benefits of a regulatory change, in order to ascertain the economic
efficiency of that change. We believe some commenters are mistaken in
their understanding of how the EPA currently presents net benefits and
also what the Benefit-Cost Rule required. To clarify, the EPA already
disaggregates benefit and cost estimates in its RIAs, per the
instructions in Chapter 11 of the Economic Guidelines (Presentation of
Analysis and Results) and the OMB Circular A-4 section on
characterizing uncertainty in benefits, costs, and net benefits. The
results of BCAs are presented in RIAs. Both guidance documents are
clear that net benefits are calculated by subtracting total costs from
total benefits, regardless of whether the benefits and costs arise from
intended or unintended consequences of the regulation. Section 6 of
Circular A-4 instructs that the ``analysis should look beyond the
direct benefits and direct costs of your rulemaking and consider any
important ancillary benefits and countervailing risks,'' where an
ancillary benefit is defined as a ``favorable impact of the rule that
is typically unrelated or secondary to the statutory purpose of the
rulemaking.'' \17\ This is particularly important in instances when
unintended effects are important enough to potentially change the rank
ordering of the regulatory options considered in the analysis or to
potentially generate a superior regulatory option with strong ancillary
benefits and fewer countervailing risks. Circular A-4 also notes that,
``In some cases the mere consideration of these secondary effects may
help in the generation of a superior regulatory alternative with strong
ancillary benefits and fewer countervailing risks.''
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\17\ We note that the specific term used in Circular A-4 is
``ancillary benefits'' and not ``co-benefits.''
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In our view, the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirements would not have
provided additional transparency, and we are concerned that the Rule's
requirements may have led to misleading net-benefit calculations. The
Benefit-Cost Rule required preambles of affected rules to include a
summary of both the overall BCA results as well as an additional
reporting of subsets of the total benefits of the rule. Specifically,
the Benefit-Cost Rule required a presentation of only the benefits
``that pertain to the specific objective (or objectives, as the case
may be) of the CAA provision or provisions under which the significant
regulation is promulgated.'' The Benefit-Cost Rule also required that
if any benefits and costs accrue to non-U.S. populations, they must be
reported separately to the extent possible. These presentational
requirements are duplicative of information the EPA already presents in
its RIAs, so they would not have provided additional transparency. If,
however, these subsets of benefits were compared to total costs and
deemed to be some type of limited net-benefits calculation, we think
that application of the information would be misleading and contrary to
best economic practice. In addition, requiring a separate presentation
that excluded certain categories of benefits that Circular A-4 and the
Economic Guidelines indicate should be considered might lead the public
to question the significance of those benefits without any
justification.
The remainder of the comments summarized above are outside the
scope of this action, and the question of whether the EPA should
rescind the Benefit-Cost Rule. Specifically, with respect to the
suggestion that the EPA should include in its baselines projected
federal and state emission reductions, the Benefit-Cost Rule would not
have changed how the Agency calculates baselines, and we do not agree
that the commenter's suggestion would be consistent with recommended
guidelines or advisable, to the extent that the commenter is including
in ``projected'' reductions any that are not finalized and on-the-
books. The EPA follows Circular A-4 and the EPA's Economic Guidelines,
which direct the EPA to develop baselines that include all significant
projected federal emission reductions for fully promulgated rules and
the future impacts of state regulation to the extent they are known
[[Page 44719]]
and on the books at the time of the rulemaking.
Regarding the suggestion that the EPA conduct a ``robust
alternatives analysis'' looking at lost opportunity costs of pursuing
co-benefits through ``sub-optimal'' if not unnecessary measures, the
comment is unclear but also appears to be beyond the scope of this
action. We disagree that the EPA has designed regulatory options to
meet its statutory obligations for the purpose of pursuing reductions
in other pollutants (or ancillary benefits). It is simply a fact that
many of the control technologies designed to reduce emissions of
specific pollutants also happen to reduce emissions of other
pollutants, in part because sources that are targeted under the Act
often tend to emit many kinds of pollutants and control of one
pollutant can often result in reductions of other non-targeted
pollutants.
Moreover, we disagree with comments that the EPA used ancillary
benefits to justify regulations or circumvent Congress, but in any
case, the Benefit-Cost Rule's requirement to report certain subsets of
benefits separately would not have addressed these concerns. In
general, the Agency undertakes RIAs in order to comply with E.O. 12866.
Those Clean Air Act rulemaking RIAs, in almost every instance, are not
part of the Agency's record basis for the action. They are not included
in the Agency's record basis for the action because they are not used
to justify the Agency's decision making. The net-benefits calculations
in RIAs, which, consistent with Circular A-4 and the Economic
Guidelines, include all benefits, are provided in order to comply with
E.O. 12866 and for illustrative and informational purposes only.
Therefore, even if the monetized particulate matter benefits associated
with a number of CAA rules were greater than the monetized benefits for
any other pollutant, it does not follow that the EPA justified
promulgation of these rules based on particulate matter benefits.
Instead, it indicates that the Agency may have more data and
information to monetize the benefits of reducing that particular
pollutant and that it is extremely common for required emissions
controls to result in ancillary benefits.
Commenters cited two examples of EPA RIAs that they claimed would
have been conducted differently had the Benefit-Cost Rule's
presentational requirements for ancillary benefits been in place--the
2016 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium-
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles--Phase 2 Rule and the 2015 Clean
Power Plan, but we do not agree. Both examples adhered to OMB Circular
A-4. The RIAs provided separate reporting for all categories of both
benefits and costs (see summary beginning on page 8-71 of the Phase 2
Rule RIA and Tables ES-6 through ES-8 and additional details in Chapter
4 of the Clean Power Plan RIA). For example, for the Phase 2 Rule RIA,
benefits in the form of savings in fuel expenditures, increased vehicle
use associated with the fuel economy ``rebound'' effect, benefits of
greenhouse gas emission reductions, benefits of non-greenhouse gas
emissions reductions, and the economic value of improvements in U.S.
energy security are separately reported. We also disagree with the
commenter who cited the Clean Power Plan RIA's estimation of climate
benefits as an example of a misleading analysis that could have caused
parties to not question EPA's justification of the Clean Power Plan
when they might have if the EPA had disaggregated the climate benefits
as required by the Benefit-Cost Rule. In the RIA, the EPA strove to be
very transparent and provided a lengthy discussion of why EPA
appropriately centers attention on a global measure of the social cost
of carbon when estimating climate benefits resulting from reductions in
this global pollutant. In addition, the Agency clearly stated that the
monetized benefits analysis was not EPA's justification for the rule.
As explained in the preamble for the final rule, ``As required under
Executive Order 12866, the EPA conducts benefit-cost analyses for major
Clean Air Act rules. While benefit-cost analysis can help to inform
policy decisions, as permissible and appropriate under governing
statutory provisions, the EPA does not use a benefit-cost test (i.e., a
determination of whether monetized benefits exceed costs) as the sole
or primary decision tool when required to consider costs or to
determine whether to issue regulations under the Clean Air Act, and is
not using such a test here.''
Comment: One commenter noted that the Benefit-Cost Rule's limits on
the types of scientific data that the EPA can consider, as well as its
prescriptions regarding the presentation of certain categories of
benefits, would have impeded the adoption of additional public health
protections that are critically needed to ensure breathable air to
overburdened communities. Some commenters stated that the Benefit-Cost
Rule's failure to undertake any analysis of these potential
environmental justice impacts is directly contrary to the EPA's mission
under the CAA. Some commenters asserted that the Benefit-Cost Rule
would have interfered with the EPA's efforts to address distributional
and environmental justice impacts. These commenters said that
rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule removed an unnecessary and
inappropriate impediment to the Agency's rigorous pursuit of its
mission, including its ability to advance environmental justice. The
commenters asserted that the Interim Final Rule reduced this risk and
associated negative environmental health and safety risks that often
disproportionately affect children and residents of environmental
justice communities. Some commenters said that the Interim Final Rule
was fully in line with the Administration's commitment to advancing
environmental justice, both broadly and through specific agency
actions. Another commenter contended that the Benefit-Cost Rule
disregarded the complex ways in which pollutants interact within and
across environmental media, thereby undermining environmental
protections and the existing regulatory programs that are essential to
public health, protection of ecosystems and wildlife, and local
economies.
Some commenters argued that the EPA's development of the Benefit-
Cost Rule did not adequately reflect the mandates of E.O. 12898 and
13045 or comply with the required analysis. A commenter contended that
E.O. 12898 applies to programs, policies, and activities, and the
Benefit-Cost Rule was clearly a policy, and therefore, should have been
subject to E.O. 12898 directives to consider environmental justice. One
commenter stated that the Benefit-Cost Rule would have codified value
judgments that could impact the evaluation and development of
regulations that can significantly affect health risks to children and
the pollution burdens on environmental justice communities. Another
commenter asserted that aggregating those health benefits that can be
quantified overlooks communities of color that have been subjected to
racist practices, such as redlining, that have confined them to
pollution hotspots or areas of disinvestment. Another commenter said
that the Benefit-Cost Rule would have applied benefits as an average
across societies instead of a distributional analysis and that this was
extremely problematic and even unethical because the approach masks
disparities in the location of polluting facilities and resultant air
pollution (and health outcomes).
Other commenters said that ongoing efforts are needed to ensure
that the EPA appropriately considers
[[Page 44720]]
environmental justice implications moving forward. A commenter asserted
that the EPA failed to recognize any environmental justice
considerations in both its reasoning for rescinding the Benefit-Cost
Rule and its explanation for returning to the pre-existing BCA process.
The commenter argued that building environmental-justice considerations
into the BCA process is needed to ensure that the EPA's future CAA
actions do not re-enforce the existing pollution-exposure discrepancies
underserved communities face. Similarly, another commenter asserted
that low-income communities and communities of color have long been
disproportionately harmed by air pollution and other forms of
environmental degradation. The commenter added that the Benefit-Cost
Rule would have obscured environmental-justice implications because the
EPA's BCA would be required to focus on calculated net benefits of
actions and would ignore distributional equities. Another commenter
requested that the EPA promulgate a better Benefit-Cost Rule to truly
realize equality under the law and environmental justice--a rule that
accurately accounts for cumulative and aggregate impacts of pollutants
on overburdened communities and gives unquantifiable and/or non-
monetary harms the attention they deserve.
Response: The EPA agrees that the Benefit-Cost Rule did not address
the environmental justice impacts raised by the commenters. While this
final rule rescinding the Benefit-Cost Rule will not directly address
environmental justice impacts, it should be noted that a cornerstone
goal of the EPA is to provide an environment where all people enjoy the
same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and
equal access to the decision-making process to maintain a healthy
environment in which to live, learn, and work.
V. Judicial Review
Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA indicates which federal courts of
appeals are the proper forum for petitions of review of final actions
by the EPA under the CAA. This section provides, in part, that
petitions for review must be filed in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit for (i) ``Any nationally applicable
regulations promulgated, or final actions taken, by the Administrator''
or (ii) when such action is locally or regionally applicable, if ``such
action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if
in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such
action is based on such a determination.'' For locally or regionally
applicable final actions, the CAA reserves to the EPA complete
discretion whether to invoke the exception in (ii).
This final action is ``nationally applicable'' within the meaning
of section 307(b)(1). Pursuant to CAA section 307(b), any petitions for
review of this final action must be filed in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit within 60 days from the date this
final action is published in the Federal Register.
VI. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
Additional information about these statutes and Executive Orders
can be found at https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders.
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and Executive
Order 14094: Modernizing Regulatory Review
This action is not a significant regulatory action as defined in
Executive Order 12866. The EPA does not anticipate that this rulemaking
will have an economic impact on regulated entities. This is a rule of
agency procedure and practice. EPA notes the release of E.O. 14094
after issuance of the interim final rule, which amended E.O. 12866. The
discussion in this final action relates to interpretation of E.O.
12866, which was the governing executive order for the duration of when
the rule was in effect. The same reasoning applies to the updated
definitions contained in E.O. 14094. That is, the Benefit-Cost Rule
expanded the universe of CAA rulemakings for which the EPA would be
required to conduct BCAs without justifying why such expansion was
necessary or appropriate.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
This action does not contain any information collection activities
and therefore does not impose an information collection burden under
the PRA.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
I certify that this action will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities under the RFA. This
action would not impose any requirements on small entities. This action
would not regulate any entity outside the federal government and is a
rule of agency procedure and practice.
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
This action does not contain any unfunded mandate as described in
UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, and does not significantly or uniquely affect
small governments. The action imposes no enforceable duty on any state,
local or tribal governments or the private sector.
E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
This action does not have federalism implications. It will not have
substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between
the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian
Tribal Governments
This action does not have tribal implications as specified in
Executive Order 13175. Thus, Executive Order 13175 does not apply to
this action.
G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental
Health Risks and Safety Risks
The EPA interprets Executive Order 13045 as applying only to those
regulatory actions that concern environmental health or safety risks
that the EPA has reason to believe may disproportionately affect
children, per the definition of ``covered regulatory action'' in
section 2-202 of the Executive Order. This action is not subject to
Executive Order 13045 because it does not concern an environmental
health risk or safety risk.
H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
This action is not a ``significant energy action'' because it is
not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution or use of energy and has not otherwise been designated as
a significant energy action by the Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs.
I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) and 1 CFR
Part 51
This rulemaking does not involve technical standards.
J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations
Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994) directs
federal
[[Page 44721]]
agencies, to the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, to
make environmental justice part of their mission by identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of their programs, policies and
activities on minority populations (people of color and/or Indigenous
peoples) and low-income populations.
The EPA believes that this type of action does not concern human
health or environmental conditions and therefore cannot be evaluated
with respect to potentially disproportionate and adverse effects on
people of color, low-income populations and/or Indigenous peoples. This
action has no current or projected monetized costs or benefits nor does
it stipulate any changes that may adversely affect people of color,
low-income populations and/or Indigenous peoples. This rule pertains
only to internal EPA practices in how the EPA conducts and considers
benefit-cost analyses. While this rule does not directly address
environmental justice impacts, it should be noted that a cornerstone
goal of the EPA is to provide an environment where all people enjoy the
same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and
equal access to the decision-making process to maintain a healthy
environment in which to live, learn, and work.
K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)
This rule is exempt from the CRA because it is a rule of agency
organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect
the rights or obligations of non-agency parties.
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 83
Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedures,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Michael S. Regan,
Administrator.
PART 83--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]
0
For the reasons stated in the preamble, and under the authority of 42
U.S.C. 7601, the EPA removes and reserves 40 CFR part 83.
[FR Doc. 2023-14707 Filed 7-12-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P