One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather Vulnerability Assessments Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and Electric System Reliability, 41477-41499 [2023-13268]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 122 (Tuesday, June 27, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 41477-41499]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-13268]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 141

[Docket Nos. RM22-16-000, AD21-13-000; Order No. 897]


One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather Vulnerability 
Assessments Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and Electric System 
Reliability

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is 
adopting a reporting requirement to direct transmission providers to 
file one-time informational reports describing their current or planned 
policies and processes for conducting extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments. The Commission defines an extreme weather vulnerability 
assessment as any analysis that identifies where and under what 
conditions jurisdictional transmission assets and operations are at 
risk from the impacts of extreme weather events, how those risks will 
manifest themselves, and what the consequences will be for system 
operations. Specifically, the Commission requires transmission 
providers to file a one-time informational report on whether, and if so 
how, they establish a scope, develop inputs, identify vulnerabilities 
and exposure to extreme weather hazards, and estimate the costs of 
impacts in their extreme weather vulnerability assessments, as well as 
how they use the results of those assessments to develop risk 
mitigation measures.

DATES: This rule is effective September 25, 2023. Each transmission 
provider must file the one-time informational report required by this 
final rule by October 25, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Alyssa Meyer (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and 
Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6835, [email protected]
Neal Anderson (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, 
DC 20426, (202) 502-8760, [email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

 
                                                               Paragraph
                                                                 Nos.
 
I. Introduction.............................................           1
II. Background..............................................           5
III. Need for Reports.......................................          15
    A. NOPR Proposal........................................          15
    B. Comments.............................................          16
    C. Commission Determination.............................          20
IV. Discussion on Required Reports..........................          29
    A. Reporting Requirement................................          29
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          29
        2. Comments.........................................          34
        3. Commission Determination.........................          47
    B. Scope................................................          62
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          62
        2. Comments.........................................          63
        3. Commission Determination.........................          68
    C. Inputs...............................................          71
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          71
        2. Comments.........................................          72
        3. Commission Determination.........................          77

[[Page 41478]]

 
    D. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather                82
     Hazards................................................
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          82
        2. Comments.........................................          83
        3. Commission Determination.........................          84
    E. Costs of Impacts.....................................          86
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          86
        2. Comments.........................................          87
        3. Commission Determination.........................          89
    F. Risk Mitigation......................................          91
        1. NOPR Proposal....................................          91
        2. Comments.........................................          92
        3. Commission Determination.........................          95
    G. Compliance Issues....................................          98
        1. Deadline for Filing the One-Time Informational             98
         Reports............................................
        2. Public Comment on the One-Time Informational              101
         Reports............................................
        3. Treatment of Confidential Information............         107
    H. Issues Outside the Scope of This Final Rule..........         110
        1. Comments.........................................         110
        2. Commission Determination.........................         113
V. Information Collection Statement.........................         114
VI. Environmental Analysis..................................         117
VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act.............................         118
VIII. Document Availability.................................         121
IX. Effective Date and Congressional Notification...........         124
X. Appendix A: Report Questions
    A. Scope
    B. Inputs
    C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather
     Hazards
    D. Costs of Impacts
    E. Risk Mitigation
XI. Appendix B: Edits Demonstrating Modifications To Report
 Questions Proposed in the NOPR
    A. Scope
    B. Inputs
    C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather
     Hazards
    D. Cost of Impacts
    E. Risk Mitigation
 

I. Introduction

    1. In this final rule, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(Commission) directs transmission providers to file one-time 
informational reports, pursuant to section 304 of the Federal Power Act 
(FPA),\1\ describing their current or planned policies and processes 
for conducting extreme weather vulnerability assessments of their 
Commission-jurisdictional transmission assets and operations. For the 
purpose of these reports, we define an extreme weather vulnerability 
assessment as an analysis that identifies where and under what 
conditions jurisdictional transmission assets and operations are at 
risk from the impacts of extreme weather events, how those risks will 
manifest themselves, and what the consequences will be for system 
operations.
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    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 825c.
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    2. As explained in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR),\2\ we 
find that while weather events have impacted the transmission grid 
throughout its history, the frequency and severity of extreme weather 
events is increasing.\3\ A robust and growing body of scientific 
evidence attributes this trend to climate change and indicates that 
this trend will persist.\4\ For the reasons discussed below, we find 
that that the trend threatens livelihoods, electric system reliability, 
and the Commission's ability to ensure just and reasonable 
jurisdictional rates. Our actions in this final rule will result in a 
fuller record as to whether and how transmission providers assess and 
mitigate vulnerabilities to extreme weather and will enable 
coordination among transmission providers as well as information 
sharing on best practices.
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    \2\ One-Time Informational Reps. on Extreme Weather 
Vulnerability Assessments, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 87 FR 39 
414 (July 1, 2022), 179 FERC ] 61,196 (2022) (NOPR).
    \3\ See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration., 
National Centers for Environmental. Information, U.S. Billion-Dollar 
Weather and Climate Disasters (2023), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/; Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change 
Indicators: Weather and Climate (May 12, 2021) (EPA Climate Change 
Indicators), https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-climate; 
see also NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 2.
    \4\ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 
2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2022); National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Attribution of 
Extreme Weather Events in the Context of Climate Change (2016); 
Herring, S.C., N. Christidis, A. Hoell, M.P. Hoerling, and P.A. 
Stott, Eds., Explaining Extreme Events of 2020 from a Climate 
Perspective, 103 Bulletin of the American Meteoreorological Society 
3 (2022).
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    3. As discussed further below, in this final rule, we direct each 
transmission provider \5\ to file, in the above-captioned dockets, a 
one-time informational report on its extreme weather vulnerability 
assessment and risk mitigation efforts within 120 days of the 
publication of this final rule in the Federal Register. This one-time 
informational report should include whether, and if so how, 
transmission providers: (1) establish a scope; (2) develop inputs; (3) 
identify vulnerabilities and exposure to extreme weather hazards; (4) 
estimate the costs

[[Page 41479]]

of impacts in their extreme weather vulnerability assessments; and (5) 
use the results of those assessments to develop risk mitigation 
measures. This final rule only seeks to gather information on current 
and planned policies and processes from transmission providers, not to 
establish new requirements.
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    \5\ See infra PP 47-50. In this final rule, unless otherwise 
noted, we use the term ``transmission provider'' to mean any public 
utility that owns, controls, or operates facilities used for the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. See 16 
U.S.C. 824(e); 18 CFR 35.28 (2022). To be clear, this term 
encompasses public utility transmission owners that are members of 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and Independent System 
Operators (ISO). Accordingly, the reports we are proposing herein 
would be filed by either the public utility members of RTOs/ISOs, 
the RTOs/ISOs themselves, or both, as well as other public utility 
transmission providers outside of RTO/ISO regions.
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    4. We largely adopt the Commission's proposal in the NOPR issued on 
June 16, 2022, with certain modifications. Among other things, we have 
revised aspects of the NOPR proposal to ask how each transmission 
provider defines extreme weather in its vulnerability assessments and 
how RTOs/ISOs account for differences between transmission owner 
members' assessment assumptions and results. Additionally, we revise 
questions 8 and 19, which were proposed in the NOPR, by replacing 
references to disadvantaged and vulnerable communities, and affected 
and frontline communities, respectively, with the term ``affected 
communities.'' We use the term ``affected communities'' in this final 
rule to include disadvantaged,\6\ vulnerable, and frontline 
communities,\7\ and any other community or stakeholder group 
respondents consider in their extreme weather vulnerability assessments 
that may be affected, currently or in the future, by the impacts of 
extreme weather on jurisdictional electric transmission assets and 
operations.
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    \6\ Exact definitions and thresholds used to identify 
disadvantaged communities vary. However, we note that the California 
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) explains that ``[d]isadvantaged 
communities refers to the areas throughout California which most 
suffer from a combination of economic, health, and environmental 
burdens. These burdens include poverty, high unemployment, air and 
water pollution, presence of hazardous wastes as well as high 
incidence of asthma and heart disease.'' CPUC, Disadvantaged 
Communities (last visited May 17, 2023), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/infrastructure/
disadvantaged-communities#:~:text=Disadvantaged%20communities%20refer
s%20to%20the,of%20asthma%20and%20heart%20disease.
    \7\ Georgetown Climate Center explains that ``[f]rontline 
communities include people who are both highly exposed to climate 
risks (because of the places they live and the projected changes 
expected to occur in those places) and have fewer resources, 
capacity, safety nets, or political power to respond to those risks 
(e.g., these people may lack insurance or savings, inflexible jobs, 
low levels of influence over elected officials, etc.).'' Georgetown 
Climate Center, Equitable Adaptation Legal & Policy Toolkit (last 
visited May 18, 2023), https://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/toolkits/equitable-adaptation-toolkit/introduction.html.
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II. Background

    5. The NOPR, as supplemented by the record in this proceeding, as 
well as recent events illustrate the increasing frequency and severity 
of extreme weather events and their impact on reliability and rates.
    6. While the nature of extreme weather and the extent of 
transmission impairments will vary across different regions of the 
U.S., no region will be unaffected. Indeed, in its 2022 Long-Term 
Reliability Assessment, the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) lists the need for the industry and policymakers to 
include extreme weather scenarios in resource and system planning among 
its top recommendations to address reliability risks.\8\ Similarly, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in May 2021 
stating that climate change is expected to have far-reaching effects on 
the electric grid that could cost billions of dollars and could affect 
the ability of grid operators to transmit electricity.\9\ GAO 
identified potential impacts of climate change-driven extreme weather 
to the grid in every region of the U.S. and discussed the risk that, 
absent measures to increase resilience, more frequent and severe 
weather associated with climate change is likely to increase the cost 
of outages, imposing billions of dollars in costs on utility 
customers.\10\ GAO recommended that the Commission take steps to 
identify and assess climate change risks to the grid in order to ensure 
the Commission is well-positioned to determine the actions needed to 
enhance resilience to those risks.\11\
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    \8\ NERC, 2022 Long-term Reliability Assessment 8 (Dec. 2022), 
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_LTRA_2022.pdf.
    \9\ GAO, Electricity Grid Resilience: Climate Change Is Expected 
to Have Far-Reaching Effects and DOE and FERC Should Take Actions 
(Mar. 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-423t.pdf.
    \10\ Id. at 4.
    \11\ Id. at 8.
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    7. In early 2023, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's (NOAA) National Centers for Environmental Information 
released the final update to its 2022 figures on weather and climate 
disasters. That update identifies each disaster that caused damages 
exceeding one billion dollars,\12\ using insurance data to estimate 
damage costs.\13\ The update shows that the U.S. experienced 18 
separate billion-dollar weather and climate disasters in 2022, as well 
as a macro-level trend of increasingly costly, numerous, and intense 
disasters. NOAA reports that 2022 had the third highest number of 
billion-dollar weather and climate disasters since it began tracking in 
1980, tied with 2011 and 2017, and that, at $165 billion in damages, 
2022 also ranked third highest in total damage costs, behind 2017 and 
2005.\14\
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    \12\ NOAA, Adam Smith, 2022 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and 
Climate Disasters in Historical Context (last visited June 1, 2023), 
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/.
    \13\ See Adam B. Smith, Richard W. Katz, U.S. Billion-dollar 
Weather and Climate Disasters: Data Sources, Trends, Accuracy, and 
Biases, 67 Natural Hazards 387 (Feb. 3, 2013), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/monitoring-content/billions/docs/smith-and-katz-2013.pdf.
    \14\ NOAA, Adam Smith, 2022 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and 
Climate Disasters in Historical Context (last visited June 1, 2023), 
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/. NOAA notes that 
increasing population and material wealth throughout the country, 
especially in regions vulnerable to extreme weather events, is an 
important factor in the rising costs described. NOAA also notes that 
2022's figures may rise by several billion additional dollars when 
the costs of Winter Storm Elliot in the Central and Eastern United 
States are fully accounted for. Furthermore, this total only 
captures the costs of those weather and climate disasters that 
exceeded $1 billion in damages, based on insurance data.
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    8. Reliable electric service is vital to the nation's economy, 
national security, public health, and safety. Yet, in the past three 
years alone, region-wide heat waves, cold snaps, hurricanes, and 
wildfires have resulted in outages or other significant reliability 
impacts, often while contributing to substantial consumer costs.\15\
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    \15\ Indeed, NERC found that all of the days in 2021 with the 
highest severity risk index, a quantitative measure of the relative 
severity of risks to the bulk-power system, were attributed to some 
type of weather occurrence. NERC, 2022 State of Reliability Report 
20 (2022), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/PA/Performance%20Analysis%20DL/NERC_SOR_2022.pdf.
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    9. In December 2022, Winter Storm Elliot impacted a swath of the 
U.S. with record cold temperatures and blizzard conditions in some 
areas, causing 1.6 million customers to lose power.\16\ PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) and Midcontinent Independent System 
Operator, Inc. (MISO) saw high load forecast errors during this period 
due to the unprecedented nature and scale of that storm. As unusually 
low temperatures drove electricity demand up, almost 65 GW of 
generating capacity was forced offline between these two RTOs/ISOs.\17\ 
These outages highlight, first, the difficulty in preparing for extreme 
weather patterns that increasingly diverge from historical trends, and 
second, how extreme weather events can often drive the need for 
potentially lifesaving energy when it

[[Page 41480]]

is most difficult for the bulk-power system to deliver it.
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    \16\ FERC, 2022 State of the Markets (Mar. 16, 2023), https://www.ferc.gov/media/report-2022-state-market.
    \17\ See MISO, Overview of Winter Storm Elliott December 23, 
Maximum Generation Event 10 (Jan. 17, 2023), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20230117%20RSC%20Item%2005%20Winter%20Storm%20Elliott%20Preliminary%20Report627535.pdf; PJM, Winter Storm Elliott 11 (2023), https://pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/2023/20230111/item---winter-storm-elliott-overview.ashx.
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    10. Hurricane Ian, a strong Category 4 storm in September 2022, 
left 2.6 million customers without power and caused an estimated $113 
billion of damage.\18\ Hurricane Ida resulted in outages for more than 
one million customers across eight states in August 2021,\19\ with the 
most severe impacts in Louisiana, which saw the collapse of a 
transmission tower and an outage of more than 2,000 miles of 
transmission lines outside of New Orleans.\20\ Some customers were 
without electricity for nearly a month after Hurricane Ida's 
landfall.\21\ In July 2021, wildfires in Oregon limited the ability to 
import electricity into California as temperatures soared above 100 
degrees Fahrenheit, ultimately triggering emergency demand response 
measures to avoid reliability impacts.\22\ During Winter Storm Uri in 
February 2021, more than four and half million people in Texas alone 
lost power, and in some cases the outages contributed to loss of 
life.\23\ Winter Storm Uri caused over 65 GW of unplanned generation 
outages, the nation's largest controlled firm load shed, at 23,418 MW, 
and drove energy prices to historic levels across Texas and the South-
Central U.S.\24\ In August 2020, California experienced rolling outages 
during a West-wide extreme heat event that impacted nearly 500,000 
customers.\25\
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    \18\ NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, 
September 2022 National Climate Report: Hurricane Ian Special 
Summary (Oct. 2022), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/monitoring/monthly-report/national/202209/supplemental/page-5.
    \19\ U.S. Energy Information Administration., Hurricane Ida 
Caused At Least 1.2 Million Customers to Lose Power (Sept. 15, 
2021), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49556.
    \20\ See S. Van Voorhis, Transmission Tower Destroyed by Ida 
Likely to Complicate Power Restoration in New Orleans, Experts Say, 
Utility Dive (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/transmission-tower-destroyed-by-ida-likely-to-complicate-power-restoration/605826/.
    \21\ U.S. Department of Energy, Hurricanes Ida and Nicholas 
Update # 20 (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-09/TLP-WHITE_DOE%20Situation%20Update_Hurricane%20Ida_20.pdf.
    \22\ See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., California ISO Issues 
Flex Alert for Monday, July 12 Due to Wildfires, Heat (July 11, 
2021), https://www.caiso.com/Documents/California-ISO-Issues-Flex-Alert-for-Monday-July-12-due-to-Wildfires-Heat.pdf.
    \23\ FERC, FERC-NERC-Regional Entity Staff Report: The February 
2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United 
States 9 (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-south-central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and.
    \24\ Id. at 8-9; see also Elec. Reliability Council of Texas, 
Review of February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event 22 (2021), 
https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/03/03/Texas_Legislature_Hearings_2-25-2021.pdf (average system wide 
pricing during event greater than $6000/MWh compared to $18-20/MWh 
in more typical conditions); Sw. Power Pool, Inc, A Comprehensive 
Review of SPP's Response to the February 2021 Winter Storm 72 
(2021), https://spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%20of%20spp's%20response%20to%20the%20feb.%2020
21%20winter%20storm%202021%2007%2019.pdf (``SPP experienced 
historically high market settlements for the impacted operating 
days''); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, The February Artic 
Event: Event Details, Lessons Learned, and Implications for MISO's 
Reliability Imperative 45 (2021), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2021%20Arctic%20Event%20Report554429.pdf (Independent Market Monitor 
reports average energy prices rose 226 percent in February because 
of the Artic Event in February).
    \25\ See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Final Root Cause 
Analysis: Mid-August 2020 Extreme Heat Wave 35 (Jan. 13, 2021), 
https://www.caiso.com/Documents/Final-Root-Cause-Analysis-Mid-August-2020-Extreme-Heat-Wave.pdf.
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    11. The record shows that extreme weather events can also increase 
electricity prices because grid operators are forced to dispatch 
higher-priced generators to account for transmission line outages.\26\ 
The level of increased electricity prices depends on a number of 
variables, including the clearing price for electricity, the duration 
of the outage, and the load.\27\ For example, Winter Storm Uri had a 
significant impact on consumers as energy prices rose to historic 
levels in the wholesale markets serving Texas and the South-Central 
region during the event.\28\ Above-average temperatures exacerbate 
reliability risks by contributing to prolonged periods of high 
electricity demand, decreased transmission capacity, and higher forced 
outage rates for generation and other elements of the bulk-power 
system. The historic 2021 drought across much of the western U.S. also 
reduced hydropower generation, a key component of the generation fleet 
in that region, to 48% below the 10-year average in California and 14% 
below the 10-year average in the Pacific Northwest.\29\ Heavy 
precipitation during winter 2022-2023 has since reduced the area of the 
western U.S. classified as ``in drought'' from 74% to 25% \30\ and 
increased snowpack from 22% of the historic median to 232%.\31\ 
However, although the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
forecasts a 72% increase in California hydropower generation in 2023, 
it forecasts total hydropower generation to remain roughly equal to 
2022 levels due to continued below normal precipitation and a mixed 
water supply forecast in the Pacific Northwest.\32\
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    \26\ See, e.g., Dale et al., Assessing the Impact of Wildfires 
on the California Electricity Grid: A report for California's Fourth 
Climate Assessment 16-18 (Aug. 2018), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/Forests_CCCA4-CEC-2018-002_ada.pdf 
(estimating multi-million-dollar cost increases per event due to 
disruption of transmission paths caused by wildfires).
    \27\ Id.
    \28\ See Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Review of February 
2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event 22 (2021), https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2021/03/03/Texas_Legislature_Hearings_2-25-2021.pdf 
(average system wide pricing during event greater than $6000/MWh 
compared to $18-20/MWh in more typical conditions); Sw. Power Pool, 
Inc., A Comprehensive Review of SPP's Response to the February 2021 
Winter Storm 72 (2021), https://spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%20of%20spp's%20response%20to%20the%20feb.%2020
21%20winter%20storm%202021%2007%2019.pdf (``SPP experienced 
historically high market settlements for the impacted operating days 
. . . .''); MISO, The February Artic Event: Event Details, Lessons 
Learned, and Implications for MISO's Reliability Imperative 45 
(2021), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2021%20Arctic%20Event%20Report554429.pdf (Independent Market Monitor 
reports average energy prices rose 226% in February because of the 
Artic Event in February).
    \29\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Drought Effects on 
Hydroelectricity Generation in Western U.S. Differed by Region in 
2021 (Mar. 30, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51839.
    \30\ Jennifer Yachnin, NOAA Reports Big Decrease in Western 
Drought Conditions, E&E NewsPM (4:15PM May 9, 2023).
    \31\ FERC, Summer Energy Market and Electric Reliability 
Assessment 3, 43-44 (May 2023), https://www.ferc.gov/media/report-2023-summer-energy-market-and-electric-reliability-assessment.
    \32\ EIA, Mixed Water Supply Condition Across Western States 
Affects 2023 Hydropower Outlook (May 2023), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=56440.
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    12. On June 1-2, 2021, in the aftermath of Winter Storm Uri's 
impact on the South-Central U.S., Commission staff hosted a technical 
conference on Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and Electric System 
Reliability. The technical conference and comments underscored the 
importance of planning appropriately for extreme weather. But the 
record did not provide the Commission with a clear understanding of 
whether and to what extent transmission providers are currently 
conducting, or planning to conduct, extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments, the method(s) used to conduct those assessments, and what 
is done with the information from those assessments.\33\
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    \33\ Based on the record developed during the technical 
conference, these assessments did not appear to be widespread among 
transmission providers at that time. In addition, of the six 
jurisdictional RTOs/ISOs, only New York Independent System Operator, 
Inc. appeared to have conducted such an assessment. Yet not every 
RTO/ISO or transmission provider has indicated whether or not it 
performs these assessments. Therefore, we believe that this one-time 
informational reporting requirement will provide the necessary 
information for the Commission to understand the extent to which 
transmission providers are currently performing these assessments.
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    13. On June 16, 2022, the Commission issued the NOPR in this 
proceeding and

[[Page 41481]]

proposed to require transmission providers to report on whether and how 
they assess and mitigate the risks of extreme weather to jurisdictional 
transmission assets and operations. In response to the NOPR, the 
Commission received 18 comments from a diverse set of stakeholders.
    14. On July 12, 2022, the Commission issued an errata notice to 
correct a series of NOPR question paragraphs with numbering errors.\34\ 
In this final rule, we refer to the questions as listed in Appendix A.
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    \34\ One-Time Informational Reps. on Extreme Weather 
Vulnerability Assessments, Errata Notice, 180 FERC ] 61,020, at 1 
(2022).
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III. Need for Reports

A. NOPR Proposal

    15. In the NOPR, the Commission stressed that the trend of the 
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events threatens 
livelihoods, electric system reliability, and the Commission's ability 
to ensure just and reasonable jurisdictional rates. The Commission 
found that it does not yet know enough about how transmission providers 
assess and mitigate the threat of extreme weather to their transmission 
assets and operations. Accordingly, the Commission proposed to require 
one-time informational reports on extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments and mitigation efforts pursuant to FPA section 304, which 
allows the Commission to order reports as ``necessary or appropriate to 
assist the Commission in the proper administration of [the FPA].'' \35\ 
The Commission preliminarily found that the proposed reports could also 
facilitate coordination among transmission providers and promote 
information sharing about extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
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    \35\ 16 U.S.C. 825c.
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B. Comments

    16. Most commenters support the Commission's proposal to require 
transmission providers to file one-time informational reports on 
extreme weather vulnerability assessments, including: Ameren Services 
Company (Ameren), Bureau of Reclamation, Edison Electric Institute 
(EEI), Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), Electric Reliability 
Organization Enterprise (ERO Enterprise),\36\ Environmental Defense 
Fund and Columbia Law School's Sabin Center for Climate Change Law 
(EDF/Sabin Center), Eversource Energy Service Company (Eversource), 
Indicated PJM Transmission Owners (PJM TO),\37\ MISO Transmission 
Owners (MISO TO),\38\ National Association of Mutual Insurance 
Companies (NAMIC), National Mining Association, PJM, Public Interest 
Organizations,\39\ San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), and WE ACT 
for Environmental Justice (WE ACT).\40\ ERO Enterprise notes that 
extreme weather events, particularly extreme heat and cold conditions, 
have threatened reliability multiple times over the past decade, and 
that the grid is increasingly vulnerable to the effects of extreme 
weather.\41\ Public Interest Organizations state that in February 2022, 
the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
reported that the effects of climate change are already pervasive and 
acknowledged that more frequent and intense extreme weather events are 
putting stress on the grid.\42\ Public Interest Organizations argue 
that it is imperative that the Commission understand the impacts of 
extreme weather on the transmission system and how transmission 
providers are addressing them.\43\ EEI agrees that the informational 
reports can help the Commission understand the extent to which 
transmission providers are assessing extreme weather vulnerabilities 
and help inform transmission providers when developing their own 
extreme weather vulnerability assessment practices.\44\ EPSA notes that 
data from recent seasonal assessments highlights that extreme weather 
impacts not only all regions but all resource types in some manner. 
EPSA argues that information on whether and how transmission providers 
are assessing weather and other reliability risks over the near- and 
longer-term will be critical in establishing a reality-based 
understanding of how transmission providers are addressing these 
issues, what may need to be reformed, and whether to reassess 
reliability planning criteria, capacity accreditation approaches, and 
new products or services to mitigate extreme weather reliability 
risks.\45\ EDF/Sabin Center highlight a 2020 study that found that 
failing to build resilience into infrastructure from the start could 
lead to a 25% increase in transmission and distribution spending each 
year by 2090.\46\ Conversely, the same study found that building such 
infrastructure for projected climate conditions can halve the expected 
annual costs of climate change experienced by 2090.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ ERO Enterprise includes NERC and the six Regional Entities.
    \37\ PJM TOs include: Exelon Corporation; the FirstEnergy 
Transmission Companies, including American Transmission Systems, 
Incorporated, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Mid-Atlantic 
Interstate Transmission LLC, West Penn Power Company, The Potomac 
Edison Company, Monongahela Power Company; PPL Electric Utilities 
Corporation; Public Service Electric and Gas Company; and Virginia 
Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia.
    \38\ MISO TOs consist of: Ameren Services Company, as agent for 
Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri, Ameren Illinois 
Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois and Ameren Transmission Company of 
Illinois; American Transmission Company LLC; Big Rivers Electric 
Corporation; Central Minnesota Municipal Power Agency; City Water, 
Light & Power (Springfield, IL); Cleco Power LLC; Cooperative 
Energy; Dairyland Power Cooperative; Duke Energy Business Services, 
LLC for Duke Energy Indiana, LLC; East Texas Electric Cooperative; 
Entergy Arkansas, LLC; Entergy Louisiana, LLC; Entergy Mississippi, 
LLC; Entergy New Orleans, LLC; Entergy Texas, Inc.; Great River 
Energy; GridLiance Heartland LLC; Hoosier Energy Rural Electric 
Cooperative, Inc.; Indiana Municipal Power Agency; Indianapolis 
Power & Light Company; International Transmission Company d/b/a ITC 
Transmission; ITC Midwest LLC; Lafayette Utilities System; Michigan 
Electric Transmission Company, LLC; MidAmerican Energy Company; 
Minnesota Power (and its subsidiary Superior Water, L&P); Missouri 
River Energy Services; Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.; Northern 
Indiana Public Service Company LLC; Northern States Power Company, a 
Minnesota corporation, and Northern States Power Company, a 
Wisconsin corporation, subsidiaries of Xcel Energy Inc.; 
Northwestern Wisconsin Electric Company; Otter Tail Power Company; 
Prairie Power, Inc.; Republic Transmission, LLC; Southern Illinois 
Power Cooperative; Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company (d/b/a 
CenterPoint Energy Indiana South); Southern Minnesota Municipal 
Power Agency; Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.; and Wolverine 
Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.
    \39\ Public Interest Organizations consist of: Sustainable FERC 
Project, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Southern 
Environmental Law Center, and Western Resource Advocates.
    \40\ Ameren Comments at 1, 4; Bureau of Reclamation Comments at 
1; EDF/Sabin Center Comments 3-4; EEI Comments at 3; EPSA Comments 
at 3; ERO Enterprise Comments at 2, 4-5; Eversource Comments at 3; 
MISO TOs Comments at 2, 4; NAMIC Comments at 2; National Mining 
Association Comments at 2; PJM Comments at 3; PJM TOs Comments at 2; 
Public Interest Organizations Comments at 1; SDG&E Comments at 1; WE 
ACT Comments at 2.
    \41\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 4.
    \42\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 1-2 (citing IPCC, 
Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability--Summary 
for Policymakers 7 (Feb. 27, 2022), https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg2/pdf/IPCCAR6WGIISummaryForPolicymakers.pdf).
    \43\ Id. at 2.
    \44\ EEI Comments at 3.
    \45\ EPSA Comments at 7.
    \46\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 10 (citing Charles Fant et 
al., Climate Change Impacts and Costs to U.S. Electricity 
Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure, 195 Energy 116,899, at 
1, 7 (Mar. 2020)).
    \47\ Id. (citing Charles Fant et al., Climate Change Impacts and 
Costs to U.S. Electricity Transmission and Distribution 
Infrastructure, 195 Energy 116,899, at 7 (Mar. 2020)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    17. Several commenters express concern over the impact extreme 
weather will have on jurisdictional rates. Public Interest 
Organizations aver that the extent to which transmission providers 
assess their vulnerabilities to

[[Page 41482]]

extreme weather events is unclear, and without access to this 
information, the Commission cannot assess whether and how those 
practices are leading to unjust and unreasonable rates.\48\ NAMIC 
states that extreme weather, coupled with inadequate resiliency, will 
impact insurance markets and the public in addition to the power 
sector. NAMIC asserts that federal and state energy regulators' failure 
to ensure grid resiliency will negatively impact consumers and the 
broader economy.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 4 (arguing that 
if transmission providers do not assess their vulnerability to 
extreme weather, or do so inadequately, consumers ultimately bear 
the cost of increased outages and replacing damaged facilities).
    \49\ NAMIC Comments at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    18. Commenters also agree that the Commission has authority to 
direct reports on extreme weather vulnerability assessments.\50\ Public 
Interest Organizations agree with the Commission that if transmission 
providers do not assess their vulnerability to extreme weather, or do 
so inadequately, consumers ultimately bear the cost of increased 
outages and replacing damaged facilities.\51\ ERO Enterprise notes 
that, while the Commission proposed these reports to aid in its 
statutory obligations under FPA section 215, the reports will also aid 
ERO Enterprise in carrying out its own statutory obligations with 
respect to reliability.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 11-13; Public Interest 
Organizations Comments at 3-4.
    \51\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 4 (citing NOPR, 
179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 16).
    \52\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    19. Many commenters argue that the one-time reports will offer a 
record to develop best practices.\53\ SDG&E contends that the proposed 
one-time reports could be a useful means of sharing information and 
best practices and aiding transmission provider efforts to manage 
reliability risks.\54\ Similarly, ERO Enterprise agrees that the 
proposed reports would improve transparency and information sharing 
between transmission providers, which could ultimately benefit 
reliability.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ E.g., Eversource Comments at 3; Xcel Comments at 5-6.
    \54\ SDG&E Comments at 3.
    \55\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Commission Determination

    20. FPA section 304 authorizes the Commission to require the filing 
of special reports the Commission ``prescribe[s] as necessary or 
appropriate to assist the Commission in the proper administration of 
[the FPA].'' \56\ FPA section 215 provides the Commission with 
jurisdiction for overseeing the development and enforcement of 
reliability standards for the bulk-power system.\57\ Additionally, FPA 
sections 205 and 206 require that the Commission ensure that the rates, 
terms, and conditions of Commission-jurisdictional services are just 
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ 16 U.S.C. 825c.
    \57\ Id. 824o; see NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 15.
    \58\ 16 U.S.C. 824d, 824e; see NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    21. As discussed above, the frequency and severity of extreme 
weather events have been increasing, are likely to continue to 
increase, and, thereby, will likely continue to jeopardize system 
reliability and affect jurisdictional electric rates.
    22. The record shows that extreme weather events can significantly 
impact reliability of the bulk-power system. The events outlined above 
exemplify the reliability impacts of Hurricane Ian in September 2022, 
Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022, Winter Storm Uri in February 
2021, and Hurricane Ida in August 2021, as well as the wildfires in 
July 2021 and the extreme west-wide heat event in August 2020.
    23. Generally, as the Commission explained in the NOPR, the failure 
to assess and mitigate the risks of extreme weather could increase the 
frequency of loss of load events, burden consumers with more frequent 
outages and costs, and lead to higher prices for wholesale 
electricity.\59\ SDG&E notes that the frequency, intensity, and 
duration of wildfires in southern California are increasing due to 
climate change, which threatens public safety and also requires 
mitigation efforts in the form of public safety power shutoff.\60\ 
Public Interest Organizations similarly argue that more frequent and 
intense extreme weather events will put stress on the grid, leading to 
the loss of power and increasing consumer prices. Public Interest 
Organizations agree with the NOPR that the failure of transmission 
providers to adequately assess their vulnerabilities to such extreme 
weather events will result in increased outages and consumer costs.\61\ 
EDF/Sabin Center also agree that the increasing frequency, severity, 
and duration of extreme weather poses a reliability threat to the bulk-
power system.\62\ NERC reports on short- and long-term reliability 
issues highlight the impact of extreme weather on system reliability, 
as well as the Commission's concern that such events are likely to 
increase in frequency and severity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 16; see also GAO, Electricity 
Grid Resilience: Climate Change Is Expected to Have Far-Reaching 
Effects and DOE and FERC Should Take Actions 4, 5-6 (Mar. 2021), 
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-423t; Public Interest 
Organizations Comments at 4; EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 10.
    \60\ SDG&E Comments at 3.
    \61\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 1-2, 4.
    \62\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    24. The record shows that extreme weather events can also impact 
jurisdictional rates. EDF/Sabin Center agree that considering and 
planning for the impacts of extreme weather can help reduce the need 
for costly future retrofits.\63\ Public Interest Organizations point 
out that consumers will bear the costs of increased outages and 
replacing facilities damaged during extreme weather events, which flow 
through into transmission rates.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Id. at 10.
    \64\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    25. As discussed above, the record before the Commission 
demonstrates a lack of consistency in whether and how transmission 
providers plan for the impacts of extreme weather.\65\ Based on the 
foregoing, we find that requiring transmission providers to file one-
time informational reports is justified because the reports will allow 
the Commission to understand whether and how transmission providers 
assess their vulnerabilities to extreme weather events and enhance the 
Commission's ability to fulfill its obligations to ensure system 
reliability and just and reasonable rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See supra P 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    26. In addition to our finding that the reports will assist the 
Commission in administering the FPA, the record shows that the reports 
will provide the opportunity to facilitate coordination among 
transmission providers and promote information sharing about 
vulnerability assessments, including best practices for vulnerability 
assessments among transmission providers. Several commenters, including 
SDG&E, Xcel, and Eversource explained that the reports could be used to 
establish such best practices. For instance, as explained by ERO 
Enterprise, the proposed reports will improve transparency and 
information sharing between transmission providers, which could 
ultimately benefit reliability.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    27. Several commenters acknowledged the value of extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments, such as helping transmission providers 
mitigate extreme weather risks to the bulk-power system.\67\ While we 
expect that the reports will promote information sharing about how

[[Page 41483]]

transmission providers conduct extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments, in this final rule we do not require transmission 
providers to conduct extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 8-9; ERO Enterprise Comments 
at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    28. Some commenters ask that the Commission indicate how it plans 
to use the information provided in the reports and establish additional 
procedures, such as disseminating best practices or setting extreme 
weather vulnerability assessment requirements.\68\ We do not set forth 
in this final rule what additional steps, if any, the Commission may 
take in the future in response to the informational reports. After the 
reports are filed and the public comments on them, the Commission will 
consider any further action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See, e.g., EEI Comments at 7-8; Eversource Comments at 5; 
MISO TOs Comments at 3-5; PJM TOs Comments at 2-3; Xcel Comments at 
5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Discussion on Required Reports

A. Reporting Requirement

1. NOPR Proposal
    29. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require transmission 
providers to file one-time informational reports describing their 
current or planned policies and processes for conducting extreme 
weather vulnerability assessments and mitigating identified extreme 
weather risks within 90 days of the publication of any final rule in 
this proceeding in the Federal Register.
    30. For the purposes of this rulemaking, the Commission proposed to 
define an extreme weather vulnerability assessment as any analysis that 
identifies where and under what conditions jurisdictional transmission 
assets and operations are at risk from the impacts of extreme weather 
events, how those risks will manifest themselves, and what the 
consequences will be for transmission system operations. The Commission 
further stated that the extreme weather threats analyzed by these 
reports may include those extreme weather events exacerbated by climate 
change (e.g., extended heat waves or storm surge due to sea level 
rise).\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    31. The Commission explained that transmission providers may use 
such extreme weather vulnerability assessments to develop mitigation 
solutions in the form of extreme weather resilience plans, which 
outline measures to reduce risks to vulnerable assets and operations. 
The Commission further explained that extreme weather resilience 
efforts can take many forms but generally involve both measures to 
prevent or minimize damage to vulnerable assets (e.g., investments in 
asset hardening or relocation) and to manage the consequences of such 
damage when it occurs (e.g., investments in system recoverability).\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ R.M. Webb, M. Panfil, and S. Ladin, Climate Risk in the 
Electric Sector: Legal Obligations to Advance Climate Resilience 
Planning by Electric Utilities 10 (Dec. 2020), https://perma.cc/V25A-KBNP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. The Commission stated that it did not intend in the NOPR to 
require transmission providers to conduct extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments where they do not do so already, or to require transmission 
providers to change how they conduct or plan to conduct such 
assessments.\71\ Instead, the Commission expressly stated that the goal 
of this proceeding is to gather information, not to establish new 
requirements. In addition, the Commission did not propose for 
transmission providers to file their actual vulnerability assessments, 
the results of their extreme weather vulnerability assessments, or 
lists of affected assets and operations, specific vulnerabilities, or 
asset- or operation-specific mitigation strategies in the informational 
reports. Rather, the Commission proposed that the one-time 
informational reports focus on describing current or planned policies 
and processes to assess and mitigate extreme weather risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ Similarly, while the NOPR proposed that transmission 
providers may describe what they ``plan'' to do with respect to 
various issues, the Commission explained that the proposed reporting 
requirement was meant only to capture plans that have already been 
made, but not yet been implemented. The NOPR emphasized that 
transmission providers would not be required to speculate on how 
they would conduct extreme weather vulnerability analysis where they 
have no firm plans to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    33. Finally, the Commission stated that while individual extreme 
weather vulnerability assessments may not follow the same processes or 
include the same analyses, the topic areas included in the NOPR (and 
adopted in this final rule)--Scope, Inputs, Vulnerabilities and 
Exposure to Extreme Weather Hazards, Costs of Impacts, Risk 
Mitigation--reflect typical practices and considerations in the 
development of extreme weather vulnerability assessments. If 
respondents' policies and processes for developing their own extreme 
weather vulnerability assessments differ from those the Commission 
described, the Commission proposed to require that transmission 
providers still describe in their one-time reports the policies and 
processes that most closely align with the topics discussed.
2. Comments
    34. Commenters generally support the proposed reporting requirement 
in the NOPR. EPSA argues that it is important to have transparency and 
current data available to inform discussions on assessment, planning, 
operational, and market approaches to ensuring grid reliability.\72\ 
EPSA and EEI specifically support the five areas of inquiry set out in 
the NOPR.\73\ MISO, however, argues the reporting requirement is 
redundant because it submitted pre- and post-conference comments in 
Docket No. AD21-13-000 detailing its current and planned actions under 
its Reliability Imperative, on which MISO continues to focus.\74\ MISO 
further explains that it, with ERO Enterprise, participated in a 
Commission technical conference on generator winter readiness.\75\ MISO 
asserts that preparing the report would be complex and, because of 
resource constraints related to its ongoing reliability work, it 
requests a four-week extension if the Commission moves forward with 
requiring these reports.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ EPSA Comments at 3.
    \73\ EEI Comments at 5; EPSA Comments at 7.
    \74\ MISO Comments at 1-2.
    \75\ Id. at 3.
    \76\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    35. With respect to who has to file the reports, Ameren agrees with 
the NOPR that public utility transmission providers, including both 
RTOs/ISOs and transmission owner members, are the appropriate entities 
covered under the reporting obligation.\77\ Ameren explains that 
requiring RTOs/ISOs to file, in addition to having the transmission-
owning members of the RTOs/ISOs file, makes sense because the RTOs/ISOs 
have a wider view than individual transmission owner members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ Ameren Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    36. However, other commenters suggest allowing transmission 
providers to file their informational reports either individually or 
jointly with their RTO/ISO.\78\ Public Interest Organizations suggest 
that RTOs/ISOs could report on the effects of extreme weather on their 
market in a single RTO/ISO filing.\79\ PJM adds that RTO/ISO 
transmission owner members could supplement joint reports with 
additional information on their own transmission facilities.\80\ PJM 
TOs, Eversource, and EEI contend that joint reports have two benefits: 
they would

[[Page 41484]]

incorporate regional extreme weather assessment practices absent from 
individual reports and align the reporting process with the joint 
nature of system planning and operation.\81\ PJM TOs similarly contend 
that joint reports would provide the Commission with a more holistic 
view of extreme weather assessment and preparation because they would 
incorporate the perspectives of RTOs/ISOs and their transmission owner 
members in a single report.\82\ MISO TOs state that much of the 
information the Commission proposes to collect is aggregated at the 
RTO/ISO level and that RTOs/ISOs are more capable of providing much of 
the information than their transmission owner members.\83\ MISO TOs 
explain that MISO itself does most weather forecasting and risk 
mitigation for its region, evaluates issues like winter readiness and 
resource availability, and coordinates with neighboring entities.\84\ 
MISO TOs add that RTOs/ISOs can provide information on vulnerability 
assessments over wide areas and among planning regions.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ EEI Comments at 6-7; Eversource Comments at 6; PJM Comments 
at 8; PJM TOs Comments at 6-7.
    \79\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 7.
    \80\ PJM Comments at 8.
    \81\ EEI Comments at 6; Eversource Comments at 6; PJM TOs 
Comments at 6-7.
    \82\ PJM TOs Comments at 6-7.
    \83\ MISO TOs Comments at 6.
    \84\ Id. at 6-7.
    \85\ Id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    37. Commenters have different views on the proposed definitions of 
an extreme weather vulnerability assessment and an extreme weather 
event. EPSA, Ameren, EEI, and Eversource, support the NOPR's definition 
of an extreme weather vulnerability assessment, and Ameren, EEI, and 
Eversource state that the definition is sufficiently flexible to allow 
transmission providers to describe their practices and processes, even 
if they differ from the NOPR's conceptualization of extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments.\86\ Other commenters, by contrast, suggest 
that the definition of extreme weather vulnerability assessment may be 
too narrow. Xcel states that the NOPR's definition may be too narrow 
and exclude other types of studies that inform transmission providers' 
responses to extreme weather risks.\87\ For example, Xcel states that 
utilities are constantly collecting and evaluating operating and 
performance data, and may perform studies on specific extreme weather 
system impacts that could inform the utility's response.\88\ Given 
this, Xcel requests the Commission be prescriptive about the types of 
studies and evaluations it is seeking reports on.\89\ Xcel states that 
doing so would prevent transmission providers from failing to report or 
underreporting.\90\ Public Interest Organizations similarly request 
that the Commission expand the definition of extreme weather 
vulnerability assessment.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ Ameren at 5; EEI Comments at 3-4; EPSA Comments at 7; 
Eversource Comments at 3.
    \87\ Xcel Comments at 3-4.
    \88\ Id. at 4.
    \89\ Id. at 5.
    \90\ Id. at 5-6.
    \91\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    38. PJM TOs request that the Commission provide guidance on what 
constitutes an extreme weather event.\92\ PJM TOs point out that the 
NOPR neither defines the term ``extreme weather'' nor provide guidance 
or criteria for what constitutes an ``extreme weather'' event.\93\ As a 
result, PJM TOs contend that in response to a final rule, transmission 
providers would have to determine, for example, whether winter storms 
in the northeast or hurricanes in the southeast are ``extreme weather 
events'' or ordinary weather events.\94\ PJM TOs suggest the Commission 
could distinguish weather events between those that may be deemed 
``predictable'' or ``expected'' based on historical trends and those 
that are associated with climate change.\95\ Given that intermittent 
generation will increase in the future, PJM TOs contend that cloud 
cover or lack of wind, especially over extended periods of time, may 
need to be included in the definition of extreme weather events and in 
planning studies.\96\ PJM TOs argue that although transmission 
providers already incorporate weather events into transmission planning 
and vulnerability assessments, extreme and ordinary weather events will 
vary greatly depending on geography.\97\ At the same time, PJM TOs 
caution that the Commission should not starkly delineate extreme 
weather impacts from other low-probability, high impact events that 
transmission providers should also plan for to improve overall grid 
resiliency.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ PJM TOs Comments at 3.
    \93\ Id.
    \94\ Id. at 4.
    \95\ Id.
    \96\ Id. at 4-5.
    \97\ Id. at 3-4.
    \98\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    39. Other commenters argue that extreme weather should be defined 
broadly. PJM and Xcel assert that the definition for extreme weather 
should allow for regional flexibility as to what types of extreme 
weather events should be included in the one-time reports.\99\ PJM 
suggests including windstorms, ice/snowstorms, and geo-magnetic 
disturbance within the definition of ``extreme weather events.'' \100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ PJM Comments at 6; Xcel Comments at 6.
    \100\ PJM Comments at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    40. Some commenters suggest expanding the reporting requirement. 
EDF/Sabin Center suggest adding climate-related risks to the scope of 
the reporting requirement because the reasons the Commission cites in 
the NOPR for requiring reports on extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments apply equally to climate-related impacts to the grid.\101\ 
EDF/Sabin Center argue that changing climate baselines will impact the 
operation of transmission infrastructure, as well as generation and 
distribution assets, in ways that could impair the reliability of the 
electric system. EDF/Sabin Center explain that increasing air and water 
temperatures can reduce the capacity of the bulk-power system to 
generate and transmit electricity and decrease asset lifetimes.\102\ 
EDF/Sabin Center also explain that shifting precipitation patterns 
could reduce hydroelectric operations by reducing snowmelt and 
increasing drought.\103\ Finally, EDF/Sabin Center explain that, as sea 
levels rise, more bulk-power systems will be at risk of nuisance 
flooding, storm surge, and permanent inundation.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 3, 13-14.
    \102\ Id. at 4-6 (citing Jayant Sathaye et al., Estimating Risk 
to California Energy Infrastructure from Projected Climate Change 
25-27 (2011), https://doi.org/10.2172/1026811; Craig D. Zamuda et 
al., Energy Supply, Delivery, and Demand, in Impacts, Risks, and 
Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, 
Volume II 174, 181 (D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018), https://perma.cc/ZP2G-JJRK; Dennis Wamsted and Seth Feaster, May Heat Wave 
Exposes Myth of Fossil Fuel Reliability as Texas Coal- and Gas-fired 
Generators Fail Early Season Performance Test, Inst. for Energy 
Econs. and Fin. Analysis (June 27, 2022), https://ieefa.org/resources/may-heat-wave-exposes-myth-fossil-fuel-reliability-texascoal-and-gas-fired-generators; U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. 
Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather 
10-11 (2013), https://perma.cc/FMB6-RSRK).
    \103\ Id. at 6 (citing D.R. Easterling et al., Precipitation 
Change in the United States, in Climate Science Special Report: 
Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume I 207, 207, 217 (D.J. 
Wuebbels et al. eds., 2017), https://perma.cc/MV9S-NMAS; U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, 
Climate Change and the Electricity Sector: Guide for Climate 
Resilience Planning 10-11 (Sept. 2016), https://toolkit.climate.gov/sites/default/files/Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Electricity%20Sector%20Guide%20for%20Climate%20Change%20Resilience%20Planning%20September%202016_0.pdf 
(DOE Guide for Resilience Planning)).
    \104\ Id. at 7 (citing DOE Guide for Resilience Planning at 89-
90).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    41. EDF/Sabin Center also argue that the reporting requirement 
should be expanded to include information on whether and how 
transmission providers incorporate risks to interconnected generators, 
electric

[[Page 41485]]

demand, and distribution system assets in their assessments.\105\ In 
particular, EDF/Sabin Center contend that questions 6, 8, 14, and 15 
should specifically request information on whether the transmission 
provider includes generation assets and operations in its assessments 
and whether the transmission provider considers interdependencies of 
its assets with independently-owned generation assets.\106\ EDF/Sabin 
Center note that relationships between transmission providers and 
generation owners can take a number of different forms that could 
affect whether and how the transmission provider assesses climate risks 
to generating units.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ Id. at 3, 16.
    \106\ Id. at 16.
    \107\ Id. at 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    42. Public Interest Organizations similarly request that the 
Commission expand the reporting requirement to include generation 
assets and demand side resources; specifically, they request that the 
definition include any analysis concerning where and under what 
conditions generation assets or demand-side resources within the 
transmission provider's footprint are at risk from the impacts of 
extreme weather events, how those risks will manifest themselves, and 
what the consequences will be for the ability to serve load. Public 
Interest Organizations argue that the reporting requirement should be 
expanded because ``even if a transmission provider does not also own 
generation or demand-side resources, it will need to understand the 
effect of extreme weather on those resources because they are often 
large contingencies within its footprint.'' \108\ In addition, Public 
Interest Organizations aver that the NOPR only mentions disadvantaged 
communities in the context of transmission providers' stakeholder 
outreach; they argue that, instead, the Commission should require 
transmission providers to file information on whether, and if so how, 
they consider the effects on these communities in each section of the 
NOPR.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 7.
    \109\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    43. Some commenters raise concerns that a one-time reporting 
requirement may be insufficient. Ameren agrees that a one-time 
reporting requirement is appropriate but expresses concern that report 
collection alone may not make information and insights accessible 
enough to the industry and suggests that the Commission also convene a 
forum on extreme weather vulnerability assessments and barriers to 
transmission providers improving assessments.\110\ Similarly, Bureau of 
Reclamation asserts that one-time informational reports may be useful 
to establish a baseline regarding extreme weather event information, 
but it is unlikely that one-time submissions alone will satisfy the 
Commission's desire for this information.\111\ EPSA urges that, in 
order to move forward as expeditiously as possible, the Commission 
convene a technical conference soon after the reports are filed in 
order to (1) assess the information gathered, (2) highlight best 
practices, and (3) publicly discuss information sharing avenues.\112\ 
WE ACT contends that the Commission should assess any gaps or 
deficiencies revealed by the reports and require transmission providers 
to develop appropriate mitigation strategies that promote resilience 
and affordable rates.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ Ameren Comments at 4, 6.
    \111\ Bureau of Reclamation Comments at 1.
    \112\ EPSA Comments at 4.
    \113\ WE ACT Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    44. Commenters offer the following comments on the reporting 
burden. EPSA states that the reporting requirement will minimally 
burden transmission providers.\114\ It explains that this is because 
the Commission is only seeking information on policies and processes 
already in place or planned by each transmission provider and 
concerning only one aspect of reliability risks, and does not seek the 
results or conclusions reached by any individual transmission 
provider.\115\ Ameren, EEI, and Eversource agree that transmission 
providers should not have to hypothesize how they might conduct an 
extreme weather vulnerability assessment if they have no plans of doing 
so.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ EPSA Comments at 7.
    \115\ Id. at 7-8.
    \116\ Ameren Comments at 5; EEI Comments at 4; Eversource 
Comments at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. Bureau of Reclamation recommends that the Commission use an 
online or electronic database or form with fillable fields to collect 
the information to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information collected and to minimize the burden on responding 
entities.\117\ Xcel also requests that the Commission specify in what 
form or format transmission providers should file their reports to 
minimize the burden of the data request.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ Bureau of Reclamation Comments at 2.
    \118\ Xcel Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    46. Lastly, EDF/Sabin Center offer several suggestions on best 
practices for conducting extreme weather vulnerability assessments. 
EDF/Sabin Center explain that resilience planning should prevent 
maladaptation by identifying measures consistent with reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions that exacerbate climate risks.\119\ EDF/Sabin 
Center explain that forward-looking climate resilience planning with a 
long-range view that considers interactions between sectors can 
identify climate-related risks that other planning processes that rely 
on historic weather data may miss, and ensure that transmission 
providers make informed investments based on future conditions within 
the lifespan of their assets.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 10.
    \120\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    47. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require one-time informational 
reports from all transmission providers, including RTOs/ISOs and their 
transmission owner members, and adopt, with modification, the questions 
proposed in the NOPR.\121\ We find that the reporting requirement is 
necessary for the Commission's proper administration of the FPA by 
providing the Commission with information related to its statutory 
responsibilities regarding reliability and rates.\122\ We also find 
that the reporting requirement will also promote information sharing 
and best practices about extreme weather vulnerability assessments as 
well as coordination among transmission providers. The questions for 
transmission providers as modified by this final rule are listed in 
Appendix A below.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 1.
    \122\ 16 U.S.C. 825c. FPA section 304(a) states ``Such reports 
shall be made under oath unless the Commission otherwise 
specifies.'' We specify that the one-time informational reports 
filed under this final rule need not be made under oath. Id. 
825c(a).
    \123\ See infra Appendix A--Report Questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    48. We modify the proposal to allow each transmission owner that is 
a member of an RTO/ISO to either file its one-time informational report 
individually or jointly with its RTO/ISO. That is, a transmission owner 
member of an RTO/ISO and an RTO/ISO may satisfy its reporting 
requirement by filing a joint one-time informational report without 
needing to also file separate one-time informational reports. For 
example, an RTO/ISO could work with all of its interested transmission 
owner members to complete and submit a joint one-time report.
    49. We find that RTOs/ISOs and their transmission owner members 
will have a unique view of their own practices with respect to 
assessing and mitigating vulnerabilities. By allowing joint one-time 
informational reports from RTOs/

[[Page 41486]]

ISOs and their transmission owner members, any joint reports will 
provide the perspectives of multiple entities in a single filing, align 
the reporting process with the joint and collaborative nature of system 
planning and operation, and potentially streamline the reporting 
process.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See EEI Comments at 6; Eversource Comments at 6; PJM TOs 
Comments at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    50. In a joint informational report, the RTO/ISO itself must also 
convey information about its own extreme weather vulnerability 
assessment as well as information provided by its transmission owner 
members about any extreme weather vulnerability assessments they 
conduct. Joint informational reports must include each participating 
transmission owner member's response to every question listed in this 
final rule. Joint filers must list the RTO/ISO and transmission owner 
members that participated in the development of the joint informational 
report.
    51. To reiterate the expectation stated in the NOPR, we do not 
intend to require transmission providers to conduct extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments where they do not do so already, or to 
require transmission providers to change how they conduct or plan to 
conduct such assessments.\125\ The goal of this proceeding is to allow 
the Commission to understand whether and how transmission providers 
currently assess their vulnerabilities to extreme weather events, not 
to establish new requirements.\126\ If a transmission provider does not 
currently assess its vulnerabilities to extreme weather events, it 
should report that in its responses. If transmission providers' 
policies and processes for developing their own extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments differ from those described in the questions 
in Appendix A, transmission providers must still describe their 
relevant policies and processes, or indicate their lack thereof, in 
their responses. We note that the final rule does not require 
transmission providers to file the results of their extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments or include lists of affected assets and 
operations, specific vulnerabilities, or asset- or operation-specific 
mitigation.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ While we require transmission providers to describe what 
they ``plan'' to do with respect to various issues, this is meant 
only to capture plans that have been made but not yet implemented; 
transmission providers are not required to speculate on how they 
would conduct extreme weather vulnerability analysis where they have 
no plans to do so.
    \126\ See NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 22.
    \127\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    52. For the purposes of the required reporting, we adopt the 
definition of extreme weather vulnerability assessment proposed in the 
NOPR: an extreme weather vulnerability assessment is any analysis that 
identifies where and under what conditions jurisdictional transmission 
assets and operations are at risk from the impacts of extreme weather 
events, how those risks will manifest themselves, and what the 
consequences will be for system operations. We find that this 
definition provides sufficient guidance to transmission providers on 
which analyses should be described in their reporting. Further, this 
definition ensures that the Commission receives information regarding 
the transmission assets and operations that are within its 
jurisdiction; it also ensures that the Commission receives information 
relevant to its statutory responsibilities regarding reliability and 
rates.
    53. Further, as noted by Ameren, EEI, and Eversource, this 
definition provides flexibility for transmission providers to describe 
their practices and processes. In contrast, Xcel expresses concern that 
the Commission's definition of an extreme weather vulnerability 
assessment may be too narrow. We disagree with Xcel. As a threshold 
matter, this definition of extreme weather vulnerability assessment was 
crafted to guide transmission providers filing in compliance with the 
one-time reports required by this final rule. These reports are meant 
to aid the Commission's understanding of these issues with respect to 
jurisdictional transmission assets and operations.\128\ In that 
context, we find that the definition the Commission proposed for 
extreme weather vulnerability assessments properly focuses the 
reporting requirement on analyses that evaluate impacts of extreme 
weather and provides flexibility for respondents to report on their 
analyses that fall within this description.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Our use of this definition for these reports in no way 
limits the ability of transmission providers or others to assess 
vulnerabilities to other assets and operations, such as those for 
generation and distribution systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    54. To preserve the flexibility of the definition of extreme 
weather vulnerability assessments and to avoid making the reporting 
requirement too narrow, we decline to define the term ``extreme 
weather,'' as requested by some commenters. One of the purposes of the 
required reports is to share information and best practices, including 
on how transmission providers define extreme weather for purposes of 
assessing vulnerabilities. A specific definition of ``extreme weather'' 
would hinder this purpose by unnecessarily narrowing the reporting.
    55. However, to further the purpose of the sharing of information 
and best practices for extreme weather vulnerability assessments, we 
will require each transmission provider to explain how it defines 
extreme weather in its vulnerability assessments by responding to a new 
question, question 3, in the list of questions in Appendix A. In 
responding to question 3, a transmission provider will explain whether, 
and if so how, it defines extreme weather events in relation to 
ordinary or historical weather events or patterns for the purposes of 
their extreme weather vulnerability assessments. For instance, a 
transmission provider's definition of extreme weather may be consistent 
with the explanation from NOAA that extreme weather can be considered 
as a weather event in which the magnitude of one or more variables 
(such as temperature, precipitation, drought, flooding, or duration) 
falls outside a certain threshold relative to historical measurements, 
or one whose estimated probability of occurrence falls below a certain 
historical value.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ David Herring, What Is an `Extreme Event'? Is There 
Evidence that Global Warming Has Caused or Contributed to Any 
Particular Extreme Event?, NOAA (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-qa/what-extreme-event-there-evidence-global-warming-has-caused-or-contributed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    56. We find that this approach to the term ``extreme weather'' and 
the new question will promote information sharing and best practices 
and further the overall goal of the required reporting to assist the 
Commission in fulfilling its statutory responsibilities regarding 
reliability and rates. We note that some commenters identified best 
practices in their comments \130\ and we believe that the one-time 
informational reports will foster such information sharing. We find 
that this modification to the NOPR proposal also accommodates the 
flexibility requested by PJM to consider events such as windstorms, 
ice/snowstorms, and geo-magnetic disturbance as extreme weather events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    57. We decline to adopt EDF/Sabin Center's recommendation to 
require transmission providers to report on whether, and if so how, 
they evaluate climate risks beyond those risks caused by extreme 
weather. The focus of this rulemaking and the one-time informational 
reports is on risks and mitigation of the effects of extreme weather 
events such as those described above. Although we acknowledge that 
climate change is expected to exacerbate

[[Page 41487]]

the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, we believe that 
climate risks manifest in wider, more gradually onsetting risks that 
are not the focus of this proceeding.\131\ In addition, question 9 
requires respondents to describe the ``methods and processes the 
transmission provider uses, or plans to use, to determine the 
meteorological data needed for its assessment'' and question 10 
requires respondents to describe how they determine whether to use 
scenario analysis. We adopt these questions in this final rule and, as 
discussed further in the Inputs section, expect respondents to discuss 
in their reports the extent to which they incorporate or consider 
climatic trends in determining the meteorological data needed and 
identifying and/or developing extreme weather projections or scenarios 
for their assessments, if applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ Respondents may of course voluntarily describe the extent 
to which they analyze climate risks, if they so desire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    58. Public Interest Organizations and EDF/Sabin Center seek to 
expand the scope of the reporting requirement beyond transmission 
assets and operations to include analysis of generation, distribution, 
and demand side resources. We decline to expand the reporting 
requirement. As discussed above, the focus of this rulemaking is 
extreme weather impacts to jurisdictional transmission assets and 
operations. We have chosen to focus this rulemaking on jurisdictional 
transmission providers because of the key role that the transmission 
system can play in ensuring reliability and resilience. In addition, 
expanding the scope of this final rule would result in adding a 
significant number of additional respondents; increase the burden on 
respondents that own transmission as well as generation and/or 
distribution; and increase the burden on the Commission to review and 
analyze the responses.
    59. We further disagree with MISO's assertion that the NOPR's 
proposed reporting requirement would provide the Commission with little 
new information on how transmission providers assess and mitigate the 
impacts of extreme weather to their systems. We instead find that the 
information provided through these reports will help the Commission 
carry out its responsibilities under the FPA to oversee the development 
and enforcement of reliability standards for the bulk-power system and 
ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of Commission-
jurisdictional services are just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.
    60. Regarding commenters' assertions that a one-time information 
collection may not be sufficient, and that the NOPR's proposed 
reporting requirement could likely lead to additional information 
collections or technical conferences, we reiterate that we are neither 
requiring a recurring reporting requirement nor are we establishing 
further proceedings at this time. We are not persuaded by commenters 
that request that the Commission also commit at this time to convene a 
technical conference or forum to address these issues after the reports 
are filed. The Commission will assess whether further actions are 
appropriate after reviewing the reports. As discussed herein, and 
consistent with the Commission's broad discretion in formulating its 
procedures, we find that the approach in this final rule that requires 
transmission providers to file the one-time informational reports to be 
appropriate.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978) (agencies have broad 
discretion over the formulation of their procedures); Stowers Oil & 
Gas Co., 27 FERC ] 61,001 (1984) (stating that the Commission is 
generally the master of its own calendar and procedures).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    61. Finally, we decline Bureau of Reclamation's request that the 
Commission collect informational reports using an online form. 
Respondents must file reports using the Commission's eFiling portal, as 
they would with any other submission to the Commission. Likewise, in 
response to Xcel's request for guidance on report formatting, we 
confirm that transmission providers should provide narrative responses 
to each individual question listed in Appendix A. They may file their 
reports in these dockets using a file format allowable under the 
eFiling portal.

B. Scope

1. NOPR Proposal
    62. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require each 
transmission provider to explain, as a threshold matter, whether it 
conducts extreme weather vulnerability assessments. Further, the 
Commission proposed to require each transmission provider to file 
information on the policies and processes it employs, or plans to 
employ, in determining the scope of its extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments. Specifically, through the questions on scope, the 
Commission proposed to seek a description of the types of extreme 
weather events for which the transmission provider conducts, or plans 
to conduct, vulnerability assessments, if any, as well as a description 
of how the transmission provider determined which extreme weather 
hazards and which transmission assets and operations to examine. The 
Commission also proposed to seek a description of how the transmission 
provider determines the assessment's geographic or regional scope, and 
whether the transmission provider also considers, or plans to consider, 
external interdependencies (such as other critical infrastructure 
sectors and supply chain-related vulnerabilities). The Commission 
further proposed to seek information on whether, and to what extent, 
the transmission provider coordinates, or plans to coordinate, with 
neighboring utilities or other relevant entities while completing their 
assessment. Finally, the Commission proposed to seek information on 
whether, and to what extent, the transmission provider engages, or 
plans to engage, with stakeholders in the scoping phase of the 
assessment, inclusive of processes used to identify and engage with 
relevant groups, including disadvantaged and vulnerable communities, 
and incorporate relevant feedback.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    63. Commenters generally support the questions in the NOPR on the 
scope of the extreme weather vulnerability assessments. Ameren agrees 
that the six scope-related questions--ranging from a description of the 
types of extreme weather events for which the transmission provider 
conducts, or would conduct, extreme weather vulnerability assessments, 
to whether and to what extent the transmission provider considers, or 
plans to consider, external interdependencies--are reasonable.\134\ WE 
ACT supports transmission providers incorporating broad geographic or 
regional scopes and assessing long-term extreme weather events such as 
drought.\135\ WE ACT also praises the Commission for highlighting PG&E 
as a case study for exemplifying the consideration of external 
interdependencies including utilities and community- and customer-level 
resilience.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \134\ Ameren Comments at 7.
    \135\ WE ACT Comments at 5-6.
    \136\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    64. Some commenters contend that the scope of the extreme weather 
vulnerability assessment should be modified in various ways. EDF/Sabin 
Center argue that transmission providers

[[Page 41488]]

should be required to specifically report on the frequency with which 
assessments are conducted or updated.\137\ WE ACT asserts that 
transmission providers should also assess vulnerabilities to upstream 
and downstream interdependencies, such as water, telecommunications, 
and community and customer-level resilience.\138\ Public Interest 
Organizations similarly argue the Commission should require 
transmission providers to report on gas-electric coordination, 
including ``natural gas production, storage, and transportation 
systems'' as critical interdependencies with the bulk-power 
system.\139\ PJM contends that transmission providers should be 
required to describe any steps being taken to enhance gas-electric 
coordination to better integrate the development of new natural gas 
infrastructure with the development of new generation 
infrastructure.\140\ EDF/Sabin Center similarly assert that some 
questions, such as question 6, should be expanded to request specific 
information on whether and how the transmission provider coordinates 
with distribution system operators and considers interdependencies with 
the distribution system.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 14-15.
    \138\ WE ACT Comments at 5-6.
    \139\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 8.
    \140\ PJM TOs Comments at 7-8.
    \141\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 17-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    65. EDF/Sabin Center and WE ACT assert that transmission providers 
should engage in a process of vulnerability assessment and resilience 
planning regularly, assessing climate-related vulnerabilities and any 
updates to methodologies, while evaluating measures to reduce those 
vulnerabilities.\142\ WE ACT supports periodic reports and states that 
they may allow the Commission to stay up-to-date with climate science 
and evolving extreme weather vulnerability assessment 
methodologies.\143\ EDF/Sabin Center state that although these risks 
will vary on a regional basis, there are certain general principles for 
assessing and planning for the impacts of climate change that all 
transmission providers should follow.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ Id. at 8-9; WE ACT Comments at 5.
    \143\ WE ACT Comments at 5.
    \144\ Id.; EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 9 (stating that climate 
vulnerability assessments should (1) be based on scientifically 
credible climate projections that anticipate future conditions; (2) 
examine long time horizons and all possible climate change impacts 
that could occur over assets' useful lives; and (3) recognize 
interactions between the bulk-power system, distribution systems, 
load impacts, and other sectors).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    66. Commenters argue that the reports should also highlight impacts 
on disadvantaged communities. Public Interest Organizations contend 
that transmission providers should report on how they engage with 
disadvantaged and vulnerable communities as stakeholders, arguing that 
these communities have distinct perspectives on how extreme weather 
impacts on the power system affect them, and that it is insufficient 
for transmission providers only to seek information on these 
communities from other stakeholders.\145\ Public Interest Organizations 
further argue that the Commission should require transmission providers 
to report on any ways in which they consider the effect of extreme 
weather vulnerabilities on disadvantaged or vulnerable communities in 
their extreme weather vulnerability assessments.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 11.
    \146\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    67. WE ACT agrees that transmission providers should report on 
their efforts to identify and engage with disadvantaged communities, as 
well as community and environmental justice groups, during the scoping 
phase of their extreme weather vulnerability assessments and how they 
incorporate feedback from such engagement into their assessment 
process.\147\ WE ACT notes that communities of color and environmental 
justice and frontline communities experience disproportionately higher 
burdens from extreme weather due to higher energy burdens, lack of 
backup supplies and backup generators, higher reliance on electrical 
medical equipment, lower prioritization for power outage restoration, 
historic underinvestment in infrastructure, and disinvestment from 
redlining.\148\ WE ACT asserts that transmission providers should 
report on the processes used to identify and engage them and to 
incorporate their feedback into the extreme weather vulnerability 
assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \147\ WE ACT Comments at 6.
    \148\ Id. at 1-2 (citing Reuters, Creaky U.S. Power Grid 
Threatens Progress on Renewables, EVs (May 12, 2022 10:00 a.m.), 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-renewables-electric-grid/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    68. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require transmission providers to 
report on how they determine the scope of their extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments. However, as explained below we modify the 
threshold reporting question, question 1, so that the question 
addresses frequency of assessments. We also add question 3 on the 
definition of extreme weather as discussed below. Otherwise, the 
Commission in this final rule is requiring transmission providers to 
respond to the set of questions regarding scope as proposed in the 
NOPR, set forth as question 2 and questions 4 through 8.
    69. We modify the NOPR proposal to require transmission providers 
to report on the frequency with which they conduct extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments.\149\ Such responses will help the Commission 
understand the extent to which transmission providers are performing 
extreme weather vulnerability assessments, a point noted by EDF/Sabin 
Center.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ For clarity, we have modified the NOPR's proposed 
threshold question into a standalone question, question 1, in the 
reporting requirement. Although the question was previously set 
forth in the body of the NOPR, this modification will help ensure 
respondents fully comply with the reporting requirement.
    \150\ EDF/Sabin Center at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    70. With respect to commenters' assertions that the Commission 
should require transmission providers to report specifically on gas-
electric coordination, we find that no modification of the NOPR 
proposal is necessary. Question 6 requires transmission providers to 
describe ``whether and to what extent the transmission provider 
considers, or plans to consider, external interdependencies, such as 
interconnected utilities, other critical infrastructure sectors (e.g., 
water, telecommunications) and supply chain-related vulnerabilities, in 
the [extreme weather vulnerability] assessment.'' Natural gas delivery 
systems qualify as a type of external interdependency and would fall 
under this description. Therefore, to the extent that a transmission 
provider considers gas-electric interdependencies in its extreme 
weather vulnerability assessment, it should report on how it evaluates 
such interdependencies in its report.

C. Inputs

1. NOPR Proposal
    71. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require each 
transmission provider to provide information about the inputs it uses, 
or plans to use, for any extreme weather vulnerability assessment. 
Specifically, through the questions on inputs, the Commission proposed 
to seek a description of methods and processes the transmission 
provider uses, or plans to use, to determine the meteorological data 
needed for its assessment. The Commission requested that the 
description include how the

[[Page 41489]]

transmission provider determines whether it can rely on existing 
extreme weather projections, and if so, whether such projections are 
adequately robust. The Commission also proposed to seek a description 
of how the transmission provider determines whether to use scenario 
analysis, and if so, whether the analysis includes multiple scenarios. 
The Commission proposed that the transmission provider discuss the 
extent to which it reviews neighboring transmission providers' extreme 
weather vulnerability assessments, if available, to evaluate the 
consistency of extreme weather projections between transmission 
providers, as well as the timeframe(s) and discount rate(s) selected 
for the extreme weather vulnerability assessment. Finally, the 
Commission proposed to seek a description of the methods and processes 
the transmission provider uses, or plans to use, to create an inventory 
of potentially vulnerable assets and operations.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ See NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    72. Commenters generally support the questions on extreme weather 
vulnerability assessment inputs proposed in the NOPR.\152\ Ameren avers 
that the questions are generally appropriate and answerable in a 
narrative format. Eversource supports the flexibility the Commission 
proposed to grant to transmission providers to determine the timeframes 
selected for the reports.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ Ameren Comments at 9; Public Interest Organizations 
Comments at 13.
    \153\ Eversource Comments at 3 (citing NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 
at P 32).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    73. Several commenters, however, provide suggestions on specific 
questions. In response to question 11, regarding the extent to which a 
transmission provider reviews neighboring transmission providers' 
extreme weather vulnerability assessments, Public Interest 
Organizations recommend that the Commission require transmission 
providers to report on how they coordinate and share their assessment 
information with neighboring transmission providers, rather than only 
requiring transmission providers to report on how they review their 
neighbors' assessments.\154\ Ameren also notes that question 11 assumes 
a level of information sharing and/or alignment on extreme weather 
events between neighboring transmission providers that may not 
exist.\155\ Therefore, Ameren recommends the Commission also (1) ask 
transmission providers whether, and to what extent, they share 
information and align on events with neighboring transmission 
providers, and (2) ask RTOs/ISOs how they account for differences in 
transmission owner members' assumptions about extreme weather 
events.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ Public Interest Organizations at 3, 13.
    \155\ Ameren Comments at 9-10.
    \156\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    74. Public Interest Organizations recommend that the Commission 
``add more specificity to the inputs the transmission provider must 
report on.'' \157\ Public Interest Organizations recommend that the 
Commission require transmission providers to explain whether they use 
historical or forward-looking weather data, whether and how they 
account for how climate change increases the frequency and magnitude of 
extreme weather events, and whether and how they account for the 
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather in their 
analyses.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 3.
    \158\ Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    75. EDF/Sabin Center assert that transmission providers should be 
required to describe the sources or data underlying the climate 
projections they use, how they determine whether existing projections 
are adequate or whether new projections are required, and whether they 
have a process for identifying or generating new projections or 
updating previously-used ones to make them more robust.\159\ EDF/Sabin 
Center also assert that a question should be added to the inputs 
section requesting information on ``methods, processes, and data 
sources the transmission provider uses to determine anticipated 
electric demand.'' \160\ Additionally, EDF/Sabin Center argue that the 
questions about scenario analysis will not enable the Commission to 
determine whether transmission providers analyze worst-case 
scenarios.\161\ EDF/Sabin Center recommend that the Commission request 
information on whether and how transmission providers determine which 
scenarios to use in their assessments.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 15.
    \160\ Id. at 17-18.
    \161\ Id. at 15.
    \162\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    76. PJM states that it currently uses forecasting data to perform 
vulnerability analyses for the development of operating plans, 
generation owner/operator and transmission owner outage coordination, 
and interregional coordination. PJM argues that these assessments 
should be used as the framework for any extreme weather vulnerability 
assessment and be reviewed to incorporate appropriate levels of extreme 
weather testing.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ PJM Comments at 5 (citing PJM Technical Conference 
Comments, Docket AD21-13, at 3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    77. We adopt, with one modification, the NOPR proposal to require 
each transmission provider to report on the inputs it uses, or plans to 
use, for its extreme weather vulnerability assessment. Thus, we require 
transmission providers to respond to the set of questions regarding 
inputs as proposed in the NOPR, set forth as questions 9 through 13, 
with modification to question 11 requiring that each RTO/ISO provide a 
description of how it accounts for differences between transmission 
owner members' extreme weather vulnerability assessment assumptions and 
results.
    78. We find that this revision, as proposed by Ameren, will allow 
RTOs/ISOs to describe how they account for differences in transmission 
owner members' assumptions about extreme weather events. Such 
information will give the Commission and the public a better 
understanding of how RTOs'/ISOs' own extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments address the variations in assumptions among their members. 
As Ameren expressed in its comments, this information will also avoid 
assuming that transmission providers use any information from 
neighboring transmission providers.
    79. In response to Public Interest Organizations' and Ameren's 
concerns that the Commission should require transmission providers to 
report on coordination with neighboring transmission providers, we note 
that question 7 requires such reporting. It requires reporting on 
coordination with neighboring transmission providers as well as with 
neighboring utilities and other entities that could be relevant to the 
extreme weather vulnerability assessment. Additionally, question 11 
requires reporting on the extent to which transmission providers review 
neighboring transmission providers' extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments. In response to commenters' requests that the Commission 
require reporting on whether, and to what extent, transmission 
providers share information with neighboring transmission providers, in 
question 19 transmission providers must explain how they inform, or 
plan to inform, relevant stakeholders of identified extreme weather 
risks, including neighboring transmission providers.

[[Page 41490]]

    80. We decline to require transmission providers to provide more 
specific information regarding the inputs used in their assessments. 
The questions regarding inputs address more broadly the policies and 
processes each transmission provider uses to select inputs as part of 
its extreme weather vulnerability assessment. For instance, question 9 
requires a transmission provider to report on how it determines whether 
it can rely on existing extreme weather projections and whether its 
extreme weather projections are adequately robust. To the extent that a 
transmission provider considers historical versus forward-looking data 
as a factor in determining whether a projection is reliable and/or 
adequately robust, it may describe such considerations in its report.
    81. Similarly, we decline to require reporting on whether and how 
transmission providers account for the increasing frequency and 
severity of extreme weather, as requested by Public Interest 
Organizations. To the extent that a transmission provider considers 
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events in 
evaluating extreme weather projections or in their scenario analysis, 
we find question 9 on extreme weather projection and question 10 on 
scenario analysis will allow the Commission to understand whether 
transmission providers account for these considerations.

D. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather Hazards

1. NOPR Proposal
    82. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to direct each 
transmission provider to provide information about the methods or 
processes it uses, or plans to use, to assess the vulnerability of its 
transmission assets and operations to extreme weather events. 
Specifically, through the questions on this topic, the Commission 
proposed to require each transmission provider to describe how it: (1) 
identifies the transmission assets or operations vulnerable to the 
extreme weather events for which it conducts assessments; (2) uses, or 
plans to use, screening analyses to test for potential vulnerabilities; 
and (3) examines, or plans to examine, the sensitivities of the 
transmission assets and operations being studied to types and 
magnitudes of extreme weather events.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    83. While Ameren supports the type of information the NOPR proposes 
to require, it also expresses concern that making information on how 
transmission providers identify vulnerable assets publicly available 
could expose vulnerabilities in transmission providers' processes that 
could be taken advantage of.\165\ Therefore, Ameren suggests the 
Commission reconsider these questions to prevent the potential for 
information to be released that could be used by bad actors.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ Ameren Comments at 11.
    \166\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    84. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require transmission providers to 
report on the methods or processes they use, or plan to use, in their 
extreme weather vulnerability assessments to identify vulnerabilities 
and determine exposure to extreme weather hazards of their transmission 
assets and operations. Thus, we require transmission providers to 
respond to questions 14 and 15 regarding this topic.
    85. As discussed below, the one-time informational reports do not 
require submission of the extreme weather vulnerability assessments 
themselves and should avoid the need for respondents to file Critical 
Energy/Electric Infrastructure Information.\167\ We find that Ameren 
has not explained why disclosing information on how transmission 
providers identify assets that are vulnerable to extreme weather could, 
by itself, expose vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a bad 
actor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ See infra P 109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Costs of Impacts

1. NOPR Proposal
    86. The Commission proposed to require each transmission provider 
to provide information on whether, and if so how, it estimates, or 
plans to estimate, the costs associated with extreme weather impacts in 
its extreme weather vulnerability assessments. Specifically, through 
the questions on costs of impacts, the Commission proposed to seek a 
description of the methodology or process, if any, the transmission 
provider uses, or plans to use, to estimate the potential costs of 
extreme weather impacts on identified vulnerable transmission assets 
and operations. If the transmission provider estimates such potential 
costs, the Commission further proposed to seek a description of: (a) 
direct costs, such as replacements or repair costs, restoration costs, 
associated labor costs, or opportunity costs of lost sales; and (b) 
indirect costs, such as costs associated with loss of service to 
electric customers and other utilities that purchase power from the 
transmission provider, including equipment damage, spoilage, and health 
and safety effects, in calculating the costs of extreme weather 
impacts.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    87. Commenters generally support the Commission's proposal.\169\ 
EEI states that additional flexibility may be necessary with respect to 
how transmission providers can define direct costs and indirect costs 
as they relate to extreme weather impacts.\170\ EEI elaborates that 
there is currently no broad agreement across the industry on 
methodologies for calculating the costs of extreme weather 
impacts.\171\ Therefore, EEI requests that the Commission clarify that 
it will not require reporting of such information where agreed-upon 
methodologies are not yet developed.\172\ Ameren's comments similarly 
underscore the need for flexibility, noting that some transmission 
providers may use value of lost load to assess impacts without directly 
quantifying economic losses.\173\ Therefore, Ameren suggests that the 
Commission may want to consider seeking information on that approach 
and thresholds used.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ See, e.g., Ameren Comments at 12.
    \170\ EEI Comments at 5-6.
    \171\ Id. at 6.
    \172\ Id.
    \173\ Ameren Comments at 12.
    \174\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    88. WE ACT notes that low-income communities and communities of 
color, who already experience higher energy burdens, will be 
disproportionately impacted by rising energy costs due to rebuilding 
the grid from and adapting it to extreme weather.\175\ Public Interest 
Organizations assert that the Commission should revise the NOPR 
proposal to require information about how transmission providers 
consider extreme weather impacts on disadvantaged and vulnerable 
communities in each section of the report and to report on how they 
consider the costs of extreme weather vulnerabilities to these 
communities, at each time interval of the outage, for example, 15 
minutes out, hourly, or daily.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ WE ACT Comments at 3.
    \176\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    89. We adopt, with one modification, the NOPR proposal to require 
transmission providers to report on how they estimate, or plan to 
estimate, the costs associated with extreme weather impacts in their 
extreme weather

[[Page 41491]]

vulnerability assessments. Thus, we require transmission providers to 
respond to the questions regarding costs of impacts as proposed in the 
NOPR, set forth as questions 16 and 17.
    90. In response to EEI's concerns around flexibility regarding the 
reporting of costs, as stated in the NOPR,\177\ transmission providers 
that neither currently estimate nor plan to estimate the costs 
associated with extreme weather impacts in their extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments--or that do not conduct extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments at all--are not required to develop new 
methods to comply with this reporting requirement and may simply state 
that they do not perform such cost estimations. In response to Ameren's 
similar concerns about flexibility, we clarify that transmission 
providers should describe any methodologies or processes used to 
estimate the potential costs of extreme weather impacts on identified 
vulnerable transmission assets and operations, such as value of lost 
load, including those that do not directly quantify economic losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \177\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Risk Mitigation

1. NOPR Proposal
    91. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to require each 
transmission provider to report on the policies and processes it uses, 
or plans to use, to determine and implement appropriate measures for 
mitigating extreme weather risks identified by its vulnerability 
assessments. Specifically, through the questions on risk mitigation, 
the Commission proposed to require transmission providers to provide 
information regarding how they currently, or plan to: (1) use extreme 
weather vulnerability assessment results to identify appropriate 
mitigation actions, including methods for determining highest impact 
and lowest cost mitigation measure portfolios; (2) inform relevant 
stakeholders and government agencies of vulnerabilities and mitigation 
plans; (3) incorporate extreme weather risk mitigation into local and 
regional transmission planning processes; and (4) measure the success 
of risk mitigation measures and incorporate findings into future 
mitigation actions.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ Id. P 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Comments
    92. Ameren supports the NOPR's proposed questions on risk 
mitigation. Ameren states that Winter Storm Uri provides a recent 
example of the widespread effects of an extreme weather event. Ameren 
argues that it is incumbent on transmission providers to assess these 
and other types of extreme weather events and plan to have robust 
transmission systems and operational arrangements in place.\179\ Public 
Interest Organizations generally support the proposed questions on risk 
mitigation.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ Ameren Comments at 13.
    \180\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    93. Public Interest Organizations and WE ACT support requiring 
information on how transmission providers inform disadvantaged, 
vulnerable, and frontline communities of extreme weather risks and 
mitigation measures.\181\ Public Interest Organizations recommend that 
the Commission expand the list of relevant stakeholders in question 19 
to include disadvantaged and vulnerable communities and market 
monitors.\182\ Public Interest Organizations further urge the 
Commission to require transmission providers to discuss whether they 
consider performance impacts in specific disadvantaged or vulnerable 
communities when evaluating extreme weather risk mitigation 
measures.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ Id. at 15; WE ACT Comments at 6.
    \182\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 15.
    \183\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    94. PJM suggests that the questions should not necessarily be 
limited to ``extreme weather risks and mitigation measures'' but should 
also include additional questions such as how local and regional 
planning address the potential need for storm hardening of certain 
facilities and the steps being taken to reduce the criticality of CIP-
14 facilities \184\ through their planning processes.\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ CIP-14 facilities are transmission stations and 
substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if 
rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack 
could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or 
cascading within an interconnection.
    \185\ PJM Comments at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Commission Determination
    95. We adopt the NOPR proposal to require transmission providers to 
report on the policies and processes they use, or plan to use, to 
determine and implement appropriate measures to mitigate risks 
identified by their extreme weather vulnerability assessments. Thus, we 
require transmission providers to respond to the set of questions 
regarding risk mitigation as proposed in the NOPR, set forth as 
questions 18 through 21.
    96. With respect to the list of relevant stakeholders in question 
19, that list was intended to provide examples of relevant 
stakeholders, it was not intended to be exhaustive of all potential 
stakeholders. To the extent that transmission providers inform, or plan 
to inform, all affected communities, market monitors, or any other 
relevant stakeholder groups not listed in question 19 of identified 
extreme weather risks and selected mitigation measures, they should 
report on how they currently, or plan to, do so.
    97. Regarding PJM's request to require reporting on how local and 
regional transmission planning processes address the need for storm 
hardening, we find no modification of the NOPR proposal is necessary. 
Question 20 requires respondents to report ``[a] description of the 
extent to which the transmission provider incorporates, or plans to 
incorporate, identified extreme weather risks and mitigation measures 
into local and regional transmission planning processes.'' Therefore, 
to the extent transmission providers incorporate, or plan to 
incorporate, identified risk mitigation measures into, and seek to 
address that risk through, local or regional transmission planning 
processes, they should report on that.

G. Compliance Issues

1. Deadline for Filing the One-Time Informational Reports
a. NOPR Proposal
    98. The Commission proposed to require transmission providers to 
file the one-time informational reports within 90 days of the 
publication of any final rule in this proceeding in the Federal 
Register.
b. Comments
    99. Commenters have different views about the proposed 90-day 
deadline for filing the one-time reports. Eversource, EEI, and MISO 
request that the Commission extend the submission period to at least 
120 days after the publication of a final rule. Eversource states that 
a 120-day deadline would balance the urgency of the issues and the 
sensitivity of the information.\186\ Eversource and EEI argue that a 
transmission provider's policies and practices would have to be 
internally vetted to avoid disclosing sensitive information.\187\ EEI 
states that, in some cases, subject to the transmission provider's 
development of such policies and practices, the reporting requirement 
may require it to expend significant time and resources.\188\ MISO 
asserts that preparing the report will be complex

[[Page 41492]]

and that its work on the Reliability Imperative causes resource 
constraints, and therefore requests a four-week extension.\189\ PJM TOs 
prefer a longer timeline of 180 days, which they argue is more 
reasonable if transmission providers are required to develop and 
implement new protocols and metrics or acquire new software and 
technology to assess their extreme weather vulnerabilities.\190\ On the 
other hand, EPSA argues that the information the Commission proposes to 
collect could be gathered more quickly than proposed.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ Eversource Comments at 3-4.
    \187\ Id.; EEI Comments at 8.
    \188\ EEI Comments at 8.
    \189\ MISO Comments at 4.
    \190\ PJM TOs Comments at 5-6.
    \191\ EPSA Comments at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Commission Determination
    100. We extend the submission deadline proposed in the NOPR and, 
accordingly, we alter the proposed compliance schedule. Specifically, 
we require transmission providers to file in the above-captioned 
dockets (that is, RM22-16-000 and AD21-13-000) the one-time reports 
within 120 days after the publication of this final rule in the Federal 
Register. We agree with commenters that extending the deadline could 
improve the quality of responses and facilitate coordination. We do not 
require transmission providers to develop new metrics, and therefore, 
we find that an extension beyond 120 days is unnecessary.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ See NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Public Comment on the One-Time Informational Reports
a. NOPR Proposal
    101. The Commission proposed to seek public comment on the reports 
30 days after they are filed.
b. Comments
    102. EEI, Eversource, and Ameren do not support the Commission's 
proposal to seek public comments on the reports, while EDF/Sabin Center 
request that the comment period be extended to 60 days after the 
reports are filed.\193\ EEI and Eversource claim that, generally, the 
Commission does not allow public comment on informational reports 
provided to the Commission and doing so would be a departure from 
Commission precedent.\194\ EEI and Eversource state that informational 
reporting, including the one-time report proposed in the NOPR, is 
inappropriate for public comment because it threatens to turn good-
faith and impartial information sharing into a de facto adversarial 
proceeding in which entities are compelled to defend themselves.\195\ 
Eversource adds that an adversarial proceeding may undermine the 
Commission's use of the reports to assist its administration of the FPA 
and industry efforts to improve extreme weather policies and 
procedures.\196\ Ameren asserts that comments on the substance of a 
particular transmission provider's report are likely of little value 
because the proposed rule seeks descriptive information about the 
transmission provider's policies and practices without a standard by 
which to measure or judge them.\197\ Ameren contends that the 
Commission did not contemplate an opportunity for transmission 
providers to respond to comments on the transmission provider's 
explanations or propose reforms. Eversource and Ameren add that if the 
Commission decides to pursue future reforms, including updates to its 
regulations, based on the information filed in the one-time reports, 
that proceeding would be the appropriate place to seek comments.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ Ameren Comments at 14; EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 19; 
EEI Comments at 8-9; Eversource Comments at 4-5.
    \194\ Eversource Comments at 4.
    \195\ EEI Comments at 8-9; Eversource Comments at 4-5.
    \196\ Eversource Comments at 4-5.
    \197\ Ameren Comments at 14.
    \198\ Id.; Eversource Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    103. Conversely, EPSA states that while the public should be 
afforded the opportunity to comment on Commission action, that part of 
the timeline is extremely compressed for any entity that may be 
impacted by multiple transmission providers.\199\ EDF/Sabin Center 
assert that the Commission should allow at least 60 days for 
stakeholders to review and submit comments on the one-time 
reports.\200\ WE ACT asserts that the reports should be available for 
public scrutiny, and notes that the Commission's Office of Public 
Participation could play an important role in facilitating vigorous and 
meaningful public engagement.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ EPSA Comments at 3-4.
    \200\ EDF/Sabin Center Comments at 18-19.
    \201\ WE ACT Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Commission Determination
    104. We adopt the NOPR proposal to provide for public comment on 
the one-time informational reports.\202\ We modify the due date for 
public comments so that public comments are due 60 days after the due 
date for filing the informational reports. By allowing the filing of 
comments 60 days after the due date for the filing of informational 
reports (rather than 30 days after as proposed), we address EPSA's 
concern that the comment period is extremely compressed for any entity 
that may be impacted by multiple transmission providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at PP 10, 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    105. Given the impacts of extreme weather on transmission assets 
and operations, we believe that the Commission, transmission providers, 
and the stakeholder community at large will benefit from comments on 
the informational reports by establishing a more robust record. In 
turn, a record that includes public comments would better meet the 
goals of this reporting requirement to provide the Commission with 
information related to its statutory responsibilities regarding 
reliability and rates as well as to promote information sharing and 
best practices.
    106. In response to EEI's and Eversource's statement that, 
generally, the Commission does not allow public comment on 
informational reports provided to the Commission and that doing so 
would be a departure from Commission precedent, we note that the 
Commission has previously allowed public comment on informational 
reports filed with the Commission.\203\ We disagree with Ameren's claim 
that public comments are likely of little value. As stated above, we 
believe public comment will in fact be beneficial because it will help 
establish a more robust record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ E.g., Modernizing Wholesale Elec. Mkt. Design, 179 FERC ] 
61,029, at P 1 (2022); Grid Resilience in Reg'l Transmission Orgs. 
and Independent System Operators, 162 FERC ] 61,012, at P 19 (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Treatment of Confidential Information
a. NOPR Proposal
    107. The Commission suggested that transmission providers should 
not need to file Critical Energy/Electric Infrastructure Information 
(CEII) given the focus of the one-time informational reports on 
policies and processes for assessing vulnerabilities rather than the 
assessments themselves. The Commission proposed that to the extent 
transmission providers believe that information they file warrants 
protections, they may make a request for such treatment pursuant to 
Sec. Sec.  388.112 and 388.113 of the Commission's regulations.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \204\ 18 CFR 388.112-113 (2022); NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 
22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Comments
    108. Commenters raised concerns about the sensitive nature of 
information about proposed or existing critical infrastructure. EEI and 
Eversource state that, because vulnerability assessments contain 
highly-sensitive information, they agree with the Commission's decision 
to

[[Page 41493]]

require transmission providers to report process-related information, 
rather than outcomes.\205\ EEI states that transmission providers 
should be able to request protective treatment for certain information 
they file in their reports.\206\ ERO Enterprise requests that the 
Commission share on a confidential basis with ERO Enterprise all 
reliability information filed to the Commission in these dockets that 
is afforded privileged treatment.\207\ Eversource contends that the 
Commission should grant requests for privileged treatment in 
information contained in the reports marked as Critical Energy/Electric 
Infrastructure Information, or as confidential business or commercial 
information.\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ EEI Comments at 4; Eversource Comments at 3.
    \206\ EEI Comments at 5.
    \207\ ERO Enterprise Comments at 6.
    \208\ Eversource Comments at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Commission Determination
    109. We reiterate that the Commission did not propose to require 
that transmission providers file extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments. Instead, the Commission proposed that the one-time 
informational reports focus on describing the current or planned 
policies and processes that respondents have in place, or plan to 
implement, to assess and mitigate extreme weather risks.\209\ As stated 
in the NOPR, we continue to believe that this focus of the one-time 
informational reports should avoid the need for respondents to file 
privileged information or CEII.\210\ However, to the extent a 
transmission provider believes that information it will file warrants 
protections, it may make a request for privileged or CEII treatment 
pursuant to Sec. Sec.  388.112 and 388.113 of the Commission's 
regulations, and the Commission will address requests for privileged 
information or CEII consistent with applicable Commission 
regulations.\211\ But again, we reiterate that we do not expect 
privileged information or CEII will need to be included in these one-
time reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 at P 22.
    \210\ Id.
    \211\ 18 CFR 388.112-113. Section 388.112 of the Commission's 
regulations specifies that any person submitting a document to the 
Commission may request privileged treatment for some or all of the 
information contained in a particular document that it claims is 
exempt from the mandatory public disclosure requirements of the 
Freedom of Information Act, and that should be withheld from public 
disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. 552. Section 388.113 of the Commission's 
regulations governs the procedures for submitting, designating, 
handling, sharing, and disseminating Critical Energy/Electric 
Infrastructure Information submitted to or generated by the 
Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Issues Outside the Scope of This Final Rule

1. Comments
    110. National Mining Association expresses concern that the 
retirement of coal generation could exacerbate extreme weather risks to 
the bulk-power system.\212\ National Mining Association asserts that 
baseload coal generation is essential to ensuring grid reliability, 
especially during adverse weather events such as those contemplated by 
the Commission.\213\ Ampjack states that today's grid calls for a new 
holistic approach that brings together all utilities to fully maximize 
existing transmission line assets to increase capacity and optimize 
operating revenue.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ National Mining Association Comments at 2-3.
    \213\ Id. at 7.
    \214\ Ampjack Comments at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    111. WE ACT argues that the Commission should reframe its approach 
to regulation to center on environmental justice and encourage a more 
holistic and accurate accounting of extreme weather impacts, inclusive 
of acknowledging inequitable energy burdens and how distributed 
renewables can increase resilience and lower costs for ratepayers.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ WE ACT Comments at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    112. Public Interest Organizations contend that RTO/ISOs should be 
required to describe what, if any, effect extreme weather has on their 
markets.\216\ Public Interest Organizations also recommend that the 
Commission require RTOs/ISOs to explain how they use extreme weather 
vulnerability assessment results to revise their market rules to 
mitigate extreme weather risks.\217\ Public Interest Organizations 
argue that, because extreme weather impacts market functions, the 
Commission needs to understand how RTOs/ISOs use information on extreme 
weather risks in market formation.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ Public Interest Organizations Comments at 7.
    \217\ Id. at 15.
    \218\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Commission Determination
    113. The NOPR focuses on whether and how transmission providers are 
assessing and mitigating extreme weather risks to Commission-
jurisdictional transmission assets and operations. Therefore, these 
comments are outside the scope of this proceeding and will not be 
addressed here.

V. Information Collection Statement

    114. The information collection requirements contained in this 
final rule are subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995.\219\ OMB's regulations require approval of certain information 
collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\220\ Upon approval of 
a collection of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and 
an expiration date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of a 
rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to the collection of 
information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB 
control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2022).
    \220\ 5 CFR 1320.11 (2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    115. This final rule, pursuant to FPA section 304, requires 
transmission providers \221\ to file one-time reports on their extreme 
weather vulnerability assessment policies and processes. The Commission 
believes requiring transmission providers to submit a one-time 
informational report on their current or planned efforts to assess the 
vulnerabilities of their jurisdictional transmission assets and 
operations to extreme weather events will assist in the proper 
administration of the FPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ As noted above, in this final rule, unless otherwise 
noted, we use the term ``transmission provider'' to mean any public 
utility that owns, controls, or operates facilities used for the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. See 16 
U.S.C. 824(e); 18 CFR 35.28. To be clear, this term encompasses 
public utility transmission owners that are members of RTOs/ISOs. 
Accordingly, the reports we are proposing herein would be filed by 
either the public utility members of RTOs/ISOs, the RTOs/ISOs 
themselves, or both, as well as other public utility transmission 
providers outside of RTO/ISO regions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Title: One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather 
Vulnerability Assessments.
    Action: Newly Implemented FERC-1004 collection of information in 
accordance with Docket Nos. RM22-16-000 and AD21-13-000.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-TBD.
    Respondents: Transmission providers (including public utility 
transmission owners that are members of RTOs/ISOs and the RTOs/ISOs 
themselves).
    Frequency of Information Collection: One time.
    Necessity of Information: The Commission seeks to address the 
increasing risks of extreme weather to bulk-power system reliability 
and jurisdictional rates, and to better understand how transmission 
providers assess and mitigate those risks. The Commission believes the 
informational reports directed by this rulemaking will assist the 
Commission in the proper administration of the FPA.
    Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed the reporting 
requirement and

[[Page 41494]]

has determined that such a requirement is necessary. These requirements 
conform to the Commission's need for efficient information collection, 
communication, and management within the energy industry. The 
Commission has specific, objective support for the burden estimates 
associated with the information collection requirements. Interested 
persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by 
contacting Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426 
via email ([email protected]) or telephone ((202) 502-8663).
    Public Reporting Burden: Our estimates are based on the NERC 
Compliance Registry as of April 7, 2023 and each RTO/ISO's list of 
participating transmission owners per their websites, which indicates 
that there are 47 transmission providers \222\ (including the six RTOs/
ISOs) and 81 transmission owners that are registered with NERC within 
the United States and are subject to this rulemaking.\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ The transmission service provider (TSP) function is a NERC 
registration function which is similar to the transmission provider 
that is referenced in the pro forma Open Access Transmission Tariff. 
The TSP function is being used as a proxy to estimate the number of 
transmission providers that are impacted by this proposed 
rulemaking.
    \223\ The number of entities listed from the NERC Compliance 
Registry reflects the omission of the Texas RE registered entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    116. The Commission estimates that the burden \224\ and cost of the 
FERC-1004 are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ ``Burden'' is the total time, effort, or financial 
resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or 
disclose or provide information to or for a Federal agency. For 
further explanation of what is included in the information 
collection burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3 (2022).
    \225\ Commission staff estimates that respondents' hourly wages 
plus benefits are comparable to those of FERC employees. Therefore, 
the hourly cost used in this analysis is $91.00 (or $188,922 per 
year).
    \226\ The number of entities listed from the NERC Compliance 
Registry reflects the omission of the Texas RE registered entities.

                          FERC-1004, Final Rule in Docket Nos. RM22-16-000 and AD21-13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      C. Annual
                                                      estimated       D. Average burden      E. Total estimated
    A. Area of modification      B. Annual number     number of       hours & cost \225\    burden hours & total
                                  of respondents     responses (1        per response          estimated cost
                                                   per respondent)                         (column C x column D)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report on Extreme Weather       128 (47 TPs \226\             128   Year 1: 94.5 hours;    Year 1: 12,096 hours;
 Vulnerability Assessment (one-  and 81 TOs).                        $8,599.50.             $1,100,736.
 time).                                                              Subsequent Years: 0    Subsequent Years: 0
                                                                     hours per year; $0.    hours per year; $0.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Environmental Analysis

    117. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may 
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\227\ The 
actions proposed to be taken here fall within categorical exclusions in 
the Commission's regulations for rules regarding information gathering, 
analysis, and dissemination, and for rules regarding sales, exchange, 
and transportation of natural gas that require no construction of 
facilities.\228\ Therefore, an environmental review is unnecessary and 
has not been prepared in this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ Reguls. Implementing the Nat'l Env't Pol'y Act, Order No. 
486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 
(1987) (cross-referenced at 41 FERC ] 61,284).
    \228\ See 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii), 380.4(a)(5) & 380.4(a)(27) 
(2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    118. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \229\ generally 
requires a description and analysis of proposed rules that will have 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The RFA mandates consideration of regulatory alternatives that 
accomplish the stated objectives of a proposed rule and minimize any 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.\230\ The Small Business Administration (SBA) sets the 
threshold for what constitutes a small business. Under SBA's size 
standards,\231\ transmission providers (including RTOs/ISOs) and 
transmission owners fall under the category of Electric Bulk Power 
Transmission and Control (NAICS code 221121),\232\ with a size 
threshold of 950 employees (including the entity and its 
associates).\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \229\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
    \230\ Id. 603(c).
    \231\ 13 CFR 121.201 (2022).
    \232\ The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
is an industry classification system that Federal statistical 
agencies use to categorize businesses for the purpose of collecting, 
analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. 
economy. United States Census Bureau, North American Industry 
Classification System, https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/.
    \233\ The threshold for the number of employees indicates the 
maximum allowed for an entity and its affiliates to be considered 
small. 13 CFR 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    119. We estimate that there are 128 total transmission providers 
and owners that (including the six RTOs/ISOs) are affected by the final 
rule. Using the list of transmission service providers from the NERC 
Registry (dated April 7, 2023), we estimate that approximately 19% of 
those entities are small entities. We estimate an additional average 
one-time cost of $8,599.50 for each of the 128 entities affected by the 
final rule.
    120. According to SBA guidance, the determination of significance 
of impact ``should be seen as relative to the size of the business, the 
size of the competitor's business, and the impact the regulation has on 
larger competitors.'' \234\ We do not consider the estimated cost to be 
a significant economic impact. As a result, pursuant to section 605(b) 
of the RFA,\235\ the Commission certifies that the final rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ U.S. Small Business Administration, A Guide for Government 
Agencies How to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act 18 
(August 2017), https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/21110349/How-to-Comply-with-the-RFA.pdf.
    \235\ 16 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Document Availability

    121. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in 
the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
internet through the Commission's Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov).
    122. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this 
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is 
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, 
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type 
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in 
the docket number field.
    123. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's 
website during normal business hours from the

[[Page 41495]]

Commission's Online Support at (202) 502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-
3676) or email at [email protected], or the Public Reference 
Room at (202) 502-8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. Email the Public Reference 
Room at [email protected].

IX. Effective Date and Congressional Notification

    124. This rule will become effective September 25, 2023. Each 
transmission provider must file the one-time informational report 
required by this final rule by October 25, 2023. The Commission has 
determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a 
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.
    By the Commission.
    Chairman Phillips and Commissioner Clements are concurring with a 
joint statement attached.
    Commissioner Danly is concurring in part with a separate statement 
attached.

    Issued: June 15, 2023.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.

    Note:  The following appendices will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

X. Appendix A: Report Questions

    For the reasons discussed in this final rule we direct transmission 
providers to file a one-time informational report related to their 
extreme weather vulnerability assessment policies and processes, if 
any. The report must respond to the following questions.
    (Q1) As a threshold matter, state whether the transmission provider 
conducts extreme weather vulnerability assessments, and if so, how 
frequently it conducts those assessments.

A. Scope

    (Q2) A description of the types of extreme weather events for which 
the transmission provider conducts, or plans to conduct, extreme 
weather vulnerability assessments, if any. For transmission providers 
that conduct, or plan to conduct, such assessments, a description of 
how the transmission provider determined which extreme weather hazards 
to include in the assessment (e.g., extreme storms such as hurricanes 
and the associated flooding and high winds, wildfires, extreme 
prolonged heat or cold, or drought conditions);
    (Q3) A description of how the transmission provider defines an 
extreme weather event for the purposes of its extreme weather 
vulnerability assessment, including what thresholds it uses relative to 
historical measurements or probabilities of occurrence, if applicable;
    (Q4) A description of how the transmission provider selects, or 
plans to select, the set of assets and operations that will be 
examined;
    (Q5) A description of how the transmission provider determines, or 
plans to determine, the geographic or regional scope of the analysis;
    (Q6) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission 
provider considers, or plans to consider, external interdependencies, 
such as interconnected utilities, other critical infrastructure sectors 
(e.g., water, telecommunications) and supply chain-related 
vulnerabilities, in the assessment;
    (Q7) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission 
provider coordinates, or plans to coordinate, with neighboring 
utilities and/or entities in other sectors that could potentially be 
relevant to the assessment;
    (Q8) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission 
provider engages, or plans to engage, with stakeholders in the scoping 
phase of the assessment, including the processes used to identify and 
engage relevant stakeholder groups and incorporate stakeholder feedback 
into the extreme weather vulnerability assessment, including all 
affected communities.

B. Inputs

    (Q9) A description of methods and processes the transmission 
provider uses, or plans to use, to determine the meteorological data 
needed for its assessment. In particular, how the transmission provider 
determines whether it can rely on existing extreme weather projections, 
and if so, whether such projections are adequately robust;
    (Q10) A description of how the transmission provider determines 
whether to use scenario analysis, and if so, whether to do so with 
multiple scenarios;
    (Q11) The extent to which it reviews neighboring transmission 
providers' extreme weather vulnerability assessments, if available, to 
evaluate the consistency of extreme weather projections between 
transmission providers. Further, for RTOs/ISOs, a description of how it 
accounts for differences between transmission owner members' extreme 
weather vulnerability assessment assumptions and results;
    (Q12) The timeframe(s) and discount rate(s) selected for the 
extreme weather vulnerability assessment;
    (Q13) A description of the methods and processes the transmission 
provider uses, or plans to use, to create an inventory of potentially 
vulnerable assets and operations.

C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather Hazards

    (Q14) A description of how the transmission provider identifies the 
transmission assets or operations vulnerable to the extreme weather 
events for which it conducts assessments;
    (Q15) A description of how the transmission provider uses, or plans 
to use, screening analyses to test for potential vulnerabilities, as 
well as how the transmission provider examines, or plans to examine, 
the sensitivities of the transmission assets and operations being 
studied to types and magnitudes of extreme weather events.

D. Costs of Impacts

    (Q16) A description of the methodology or process, if any, the 
transmission provider uses, or plans to use, to estimate the potential 
costs of extreme weather impacts on identified vulnerable assets and 
operations;
    (Q17) If the transmission provider estimates such potential costs, 
a description of the types of: (a) direct costs, such as replacements 
or repair costs, restoration costs, associated labor costs, or 
opportunity costs of lost sales, and (b) indirect costs, such as costs 
associated with loss of service to electric customers and other 
utilities that purchase power from the transmission provider, including 
equipment damage, spoilage, and health and safety effects, in 
calculating the costs of extreme weather impacts.

E. Risk Mitigation

    (Q18) A description of how the transmission provider uses, or plans 
to use, the results of its assessment to develop measures to mitigate 
extreme weather risks, including:
    i. How the transmission provider determines which risks should be 
mitigated and the appropriate time horizon for mitigation;
    ii. How the transmission provider determines appropriate extreme 
weather risk mitigation measures, including any analyses used to 
determine the lowest-cost or most impactful portfolio of measures;
    (Q19) A description of how the transmission provider informs, or 
plans to inform, relevant stakeholders--such as neighboring 
transmission providers, RTOs/ISOs of which the transmission provider is 
a member, electric customers, all affected communities, emergency 
management agencies, local and state administrations, and state

[[Page 41496]]

utility regulators--of identified extreme weather risks and selected 
mitigation measures;
    (Q20) A description of the extent to which the transmission 
provider incorporates, or plans to incorporate, identified extreme 
weather risks and mitigation measures into local and regional 
transmission planning processes;
    (Q21) A description of how the transmission provider measures, or 
plans to measure, the progress and success of extreme weather risk 
mitigation measures (e.g., through reduced outages) and how it 
incorporates these observations into ongoing and future extreme weather 
risk mitigation actions.

XI. Appendix B: Edits Demonstrating Modifications To Report Questions 
Proposed in the NOPR

    The following compares the reporting requirement proposed in the 
NOPR with the reporting requirement adopted in this final rule. 
Deletions from the NOPR proposal appear in brackets and additions 
appear in italics. Please note that this convention does not apply to 
question numbers, which appear as they do in the final rule:
    For the reasons discussed in this final rule we direct transmission 
providers to file a one-time informational report related to their 
extreme weather vulnerability assessment policies and processes, if 
any. The report must respond to the following questions.
    (Q1) As a threshold matter, state whether the transmission provider 
conducts extreme weather vulnerability assessments, and if so, how 
frequently it conducts those assessments.

A. Scope

    [As a threshold matter, we propose that each transmission provider 
state whether it conducts extreme weather vulnerability analyses. 
Further, we propose to require each transmission provider to provide 
the following information on the policies and processes they employ, or 
plan to employ, for determining the scope of extreme weather 
vulnerability assessments:]
    (Q2) A description of the types of extreme weather events for which 
the transmission provider conducts, or plans to conduct, extreme 
weather vulnerability assessments, if any. For transmission providers 
that conduct, or plan to conduct, such assessments, a description of 
how the transmission provider determined which extreme weather hazards 
to include in the assessment (e.g., extreme storms such as hurricanes 
and the associated flooding and high winds, wildfires, extreme 
prolonged heat or cold, or drought conditions);
    (Q3) A description of how the transmission provider defines an 
extreme weather event for the purposes of its extreme weather 
vulnerability assessment, including what thresholds it uses relative to 
historical measurements or probabilities of occurrence, if applicable;
    (Q4) A description of how the transmission provider selects, or 
plans to select, the set of assets and operations that will be 
examined;
    (Q5) A description of how the transmission provider determines, or 
plans to determine, the geographic or regional scope of the analysis;
    (Q6) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission 
provider considers, or plans to consider, external interdependencies, 
such as interconnected utilities, other critical infrastructure sectors 
(e.g., water, telecommunications) and supply chain-related 
vulnerabilities, in the assessment;
    (Q7) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission 
provider coordinates, or plans to coordinate, with neighboring 
utilities and/or entities in other sectors that could potentially be 
relevant to the assessment;
    (Q8) A description of whether and to what extent the transmission 
provider engages, or plans to engage, with stakeholders in the scoping 
phase of the assessment, including the processes used to identify and 
engage relevant stakeholder groups and incorporate stakeholder feedback 
into the extreme weather vulnerability assessment, [especially with 
regard to disadvantaged or vulnerable] including all affected 
communities.

B. Inputs

    (Q9) A description of methods and processes the transmission 
provider uses, or plans to use, to determine the meteorological data 
needed for its assessment. In particular, how the transmission provider 
determines whether it can rely on existing extreme weather projections, 
and if so, whether such projections are adequately robust;
    (Q10) A description of how the transmission provider determines 
whether to use scenario analysis, and if so, whether to do so with 
multiple scenarios;
    (Q11) The extent to which it reviews neighboring transmission 
providers' extreme weather vulnerability assessments, if available, to 
evaluate the consistency of extreme weather projections between 
transmission providers. Further, for RTOs/ISOs, a description of how it 
accounts for differences between transmission owner members' extreme 
weather vulnerability assessment assumptions and results;
    (Q12) The timeframe(s) and discount rate(s) selected for the 
extreme weather vulnerability assessment;
    (Q13) A description of the methods and processes the transmission 
provider uses, or plans to use, to create an inventory of potentially 
vulnerable assets and operations.

C. Vulnerabilities and Exposure to Extreme Weather Hazards

    (Q14) A description of how the transmission provider identifies the 
transmission assets or operations vulnerable to the extreme weather 
events for which it conducts assessments;
    (Q15) A description of how the transmission provider uses, or plans 
to use, screening analyses to test for potential vulnerabilities, as 
well as how the transmission provider examines, or plans to examine, 
the sensitivities of the transmission assets and operations being 
studied to types and magnitudes of extreme weather events.

D. Cost of Impacts

    (Q16) A description of the methodology or process, if any, the 
transmission provider uses, or plans to use, to estimate the potential 
costs of extreme weather impacts on identified vulnerable assets and 
operations;
    (Q17) If the transmission provider estimates such potential costs, 
a description of the types of: (a) direct costs, such as replacements 
or repair costs, restoration costs, associated labor costs, or 
opportunity costs of lost sales, and (b) indirect costs, such as costs 
associated with loss of service to electric customers and other 
utilities that purchase power from the transmission provider, including 
equipment damage, spoilage, and health and safety effects, in 
calculating the costs of extreme weather impacts.

E. Risk Mitigation

    (Q18) A description of how the transmission provider uses, or plans 
to use, the results of its assessment to develop measures to mitigate 
extreme weather risks, including:
    i. How the transmission provider determines which risks should be 
mitigated and the appropriate time horizon for mitigation;
    ii. How the transmission provider determines appropriate extreme 
weather risk mitigation measures, including any analyses used to 
determine the lowest-cost or most impactful portfolio of measures;

[[Page 41497]]

    (Q19) A description of how the transmission provider informs, or 
plans to inform, relevant stakeholders--such as neighboring 
transmission providers, RTOs/ISOs of which the transmission provider is 
a member, electric customers, all affected [and frontline] communities, 
[shareholders and investors,] emergency management agencies, local and 
state administrations, and state utility regulators--of identified 
extreme weather risks and selected mitigation measures;
    (Q20) A description of the extent to which the transmission 
provider incorporates, or plans to incorporate, identified extreme 
weather risks and mitigation measures into local and regional 
transmission planning processes;
    (Q21) A description of how the transmission provider measures, or 
plans to measure, the progress and success of extreme weather risk 
mitigation measures (e.g., through reduced outages) and how it 
incorporates these observations into ongoing and future extreme risk 
mitigation actions.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Docket Nos.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme   RM22-16-000
 Weather Vulnerability Assessments.
Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and        AD21-13-000
 Electric System Reliability.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHILLIPS, Chairman, and CLEMENTS, Commissioner, concurring:
    1. Today's final rule will facilitate better preparation for 
extreme weather by requiring transmission providers to file one-time 
informational reports with the Commission discussing vulnerability 
assessments that they carry out. We write separately to encourage 
transmission providers to include within those reports a discussion of 
the intersection of these assessments and disadvantaged and vulnerable 
communities.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Commission is requiring these reports pursuant to 
section 304 of the Federal Power Act. Section 304 empowers the 
Commission to seek information ``necessary or appropriate to assist 
the Commission in the proper administration of [the FPA].'' 16 
U.S.C. 825c(a). Congress provided such reports could be on a broad 
range of topics. These topics include ``among other things, full 
information as to assets and liabilities . . . generation, 
transmission, distribution, delivery, use, and sale of electric 
energy.'' Id. Although some have asked that the Commission indicate 
what it plans to do with the information, as the final rule makes 
clear, ``the Commission will assess whether further actions are 
appropriate after viewing the reports.'' Final Rule at P 61; see 
also J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corp., 142 FERC ] 61,150 at PP 11-
12 (2013) (stating that ``the Commission controls its own dockets 
and has substantial discretion to manage its proceedings.''); Fla. 
Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 315 F.3d 362, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(noting that administrative agencies enjoy broad discretion to 
manage their own dockets).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. In this proceeding and in response to a recent Commission-led 
Roundtable on Environmental Justice and Equity in Infrastructure 
Permitting, commenters highlighted that disadvantaged communities may 
face disproportionate risks from the increasing frequency and severity 
of extreme weather events, including higher utility prices and 
prolonged outages.\2\ Panelists and commenters underscored that 
environmental justice communities are particularly vulnerable to 
Commission decisions on electric and gas rates, reliability, 
resiliency, and resource mix because they suffer from higher energy 
burden \3\ and often are both more vulnerable to and more at risk of 
outages.\4\ For example, during Winter Storm Uri, low-income Texans 
bore the brunt of prolonged power loss. Commenters noted that areas 
with lower household incomes and higher percentages of ethnic 
minorities remained without power for longer.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ See WE ACT Comments at 2-4; WE ACT Comments, Docket No. 
AD23-5-000, at 6-7 (filed May 16, 2023); Center for Biological 
Diversity Comments, Docket No. AD23-5-000, at 6 (filed May 12, 
2023).
    \3\ Energy burden is defined as the percentage of a household's 
annual income spent on energy consumption. High energy burdens are 
often defined as allocating greater than 6% of income towards energy 
costs, while severe energy burdens are those greater than 10% of 
income. Department of Health and Human Servs., LIHEAP Energy Burden 
Evaluation Study 8 (2005), www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocs/comm_liheap_energyburdenstudy_apprise.pdf.
    \4\ Environmental Defense Fund Comments, Docket No. AD23-5-000, 
at 4 (filed May 15, 2023).
    \5\ Americans for a Clean Energy Grid Comments, Docket No. AD23-
5-000, at 4-5 (filed May 15, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Reports to the Commission could address how transmission 
providers respond to these impacts in several ways. First, in answering 
question eight regarding stakeholder engagement, we encourage 
transmission providers to specifically report on how they engage with 
disadvantaged and vulnerable communities as stakeholders, rather than 
merely discussing how they obtain information about these communities 
from other stakeholders.\6\ Transmission providers should report on how 
they incorporate feedback from disadvantaged and vulnerable community 
stakeholders into their extreme weather vulnerability assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See WE ACT Comments at 6; Public Interest Organizations 
Comments at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Second, beyond addressing the questions set forth in this final 
rule, we encourage transmission providers to discuss how they estimate 
or evaluate the cost of extreme weather vulnerabilities of transmission 
assets and operations that will be specifically borne by disadvantaged 
and vulnerable communities. Such discussion would benefit from a 
description of how such estimates or evaluations are carried out, 
including what types of direct, indirect, and/or other costs are 
considered in such analyses, and whether and how duration of extreme 
weather impacts are included in such estimates or evaluations. 
Providing the Commission and the public with information on how 
transmission providers evaluate impacts to disadvantaged and vulnerable 
communities in their footprints could be a first step in developing 
industry best practices for considering impacts to disadvantaged and 
vulnerable communities of extreme weather risks.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ WE ACT argues that ``transmission planners need to assess 
vulnerabilities and mitigate'' the risks of extreme weather events 
``on the electric grid, including the negative consequences for 
areas of low-income and communities of color.'' WE ACT Comments at 
5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Third, we encourage transmission providers, in responding to 
question 21, to include a description of how the transmission provider 
measures, or plans to measure the progress and success of mitigation 
measures, specifically in disadvantaged and vulnerable communities. The 
final rule requires transmission providers to describe how they inform 
affected and frontline communities, and other stakeholders, of risks 
identified by extreme weather vulnerability assessments and selected 
mitigation measures.\8\ Including a specific description of how 
mitigation measures in disadvantaged and vulnerable communities will be 
evaluated will help provide the Commission with a more complete picture 
of how transmission providers address impacts generally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See Final Rule, Question 19 (requiring a ``description of 
how the transmission provider informs, or plans to inform relevant 
stakeholders--such as . . . all affected communities''); P 4 (``We 
use the term `affected communities' in this final rule to include 
disadvantaged, vulnerable, and frontline communities'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, we respectfully concur.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Willie L. Phillips,
Chairman.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Allison Clements,
Commissioner.

[[Page 41498]]



------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Docket Nos.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme   RM22-16-000
 Weather Vulnerability Assessments.
Climate Change, Extreme Weather, and        AD21-13-000
 Electric System Reliability.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

    DANLY, Commissioner, concurring in the result:
    1. Last June, I concurred with the Commission's Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NOPR) requiring one-time informational reports on extreme 
weather vulnerability assessments.\9\ I wrote separately to express 
that, while the question of the weather's effect on reliability is a 
subject that doubtless merits study and planning, misguided government 
policies (not weather) have been the root cause of the impending 
reliability crises facing our markets.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather 
Vulnerability Assessments, 179 FERC ] 61,196 (2022) (Danly, Comm'r, 
concurring) (NOPR).
    \10\ Id. (Danly, Comm'r, concurring at PP 2-5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Today, I write separately, not to repeat my assessment that the 
United States is heading toward a reliability crisis (a prediction that 
is widely shared),\11\ but to caution the Commission that it should not 
lose sights of the limits of its authority under the Federal Power Act 
(FPA). I acknowledge that the final rule generally adopts the NOPR 
without significant modification,\12\ and that in my concurrence, I 
agreed that informational reports may help the Commission identify 
opportunities to avoid adverse rate impacts.\13\ However, a question 
repeated by nearly a third of the commenters has given me pause and 
forced me to reconsider the information requested: How exactly does the 
Commission intend to use the information provided in the one-time 
informational reports?\14\ In posing that question, one must also ask 
the question of whether the Commission can or should request that 
information in the first instance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See Full Committee Hearing to Examine the Reliability & 
Resiliency of Elec. Servs. in the U.S. in Light of Recent 
Reliability Assessments & Alerts Before the S. Comm. on Energy & 
Natural Res., 118th Cong. (2023), https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2023/6/full-committee-hearing-to-examine-the-reliability-
and-resiliency-of-electric-services-in-the-u-s-in-light-of-recent-
reliability-assessments-and-alerts (statements of North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation President and CEO Jim Robb and PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C. President and CEO Manu Asthana in response 
to Senator Hoeven citing FERC Commissioners Mark Christie and 
Danly).
    \12\ See One-Time Informational Reports on Extreme Weather 
Vulnerability Assessments, Final Rule, 183 FERC ] 61,192 (2023) 
(Final Rule).
    \13\ NOPR, 179 FERC ] 61,196 (Danly, Comm'r, at P 2).
    \14\ See Edison Electric Institute, August 31, 2022 Initial 
Comments, at 3 (``the Commission should . . . clarify how the one-
time informational reports will be used.''); id. at 7 (``The 
Commission should specify how it plans to use the information 
contained in the onetime reports. While the Commission notes that 
the reports `will enhance the Commission's understanding of whether, 
and if so, how transmission providers are assessing risks to 
transmission assets and operations as a result of extreme weather 
events,' and that `it is important for the Commission to understand 
whether and to what extent such assessments are being conducted to 
assist the Commission in the proper administration of the [Federal 
Power Act],' it does not detail how it plans to utilize the 
information included in the reports to accomplish these ends.'') 
(footnote omitted); Eversource Energy Service Co., August 30, 2022 
Comments, at 5 (``Eversource also respectfully requests that the 
Commission clarify how it will use the one-time reports and the 
information contained therein.''); PJM Transmission Owners, August 
30, 2022 Comments, at 2 (``The Commission should provide 
clarification regarding how the one-time reports will be used for 
developing future transmission planning requirements.''); id. 
(``[T]he Indicated PJM Transmission Owners would like to better 
understand how the Commission intends to use this data.''); MISO 
Transmission Owners, August 30, 2022 Comments, at 2. (``[T]he MISO 
Transmission Owners encourage the Commission to explain in the final 
rule how it intends to act on the information provided by 
respondents.''1); id. at 4 (``The Extreme Weather Reports NOPR does 
not explain how these one-time reports will assist the Commission in 
accomplishing its goals.''); Xcel Energy Services, August 29, 2022 
Initial Comments, at 5 (``the Commission should provide clarity 
about how it intends to use the information provided under this 
NOPR, if adopted''); id. at 6 (``[T]he manner in which the 
Commission intends to use information obtained through this NOPR, if 
adopted, is unclear.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. While FPA section 304 \15\ empowers the Commission to require 
special reports, it does not give the Commission carte blanche to 
require public utilities to file special reports disclosing anything it 
sees fit. The Commission must find that the special report is 
``necessary or appropriate to assist [it] in the proper 
administration'' of the FPA \16\--that is, the information sought must 
``aid the Commission in exercising its powers.'' \17\ For instance, 
information on a public utilities' community service, which had no 
effect on the rates charged, would not ``aid[] the Commission in 
exercising its powers.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ 16 U.S.C. 825c(a).
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 505 (1949) 
(discussing the similar power set forth in section 10(a) of the 
Natural Gas Act (NGA)). ``It is, of course, well settled that the 
comparable provisions of the [NGA] and the [FPA] are to be construed 
in pari materia.'' Ky. Utils. Co. v. FERC, 760 F.2d 1321, 1325 n.6 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Case law involving the FPA has 
stated similarly. See Duke Power Co. v. FPC, 401 F.2d 930, 947 & 
n.131 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (``utilities are required . . . to supply the 
Commission with essential information'') (emphasis added) (citing 16 
U.S.C. 825(b), 825(c)(a)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. In addition, the Paperwork Reduction Act requires that the 
Commission only collect information that is ``necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the 
information [will] have practical utility'' \18\ Can the agency ``use 
[the] information'' it collects? \19\ If the information proposed to be 
collected by an agency is found ``unnecessary[,] for any reason, the 
[Commission] may not engage in the collection of [the] information.'' 
\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 44 U.S.C. 3508; id. Sec.  3502(11) (defining ``practical 
utility'' as meaning ``the ability of an agency to use information, 
particularly the capability to process such information in a timely 
and useful fashion'').
    \19\ Id. section 3502(11).
    \20\ Id. section 3508.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. The final rule declares that the one-time informational report 
on policies and processes related to extreme weather vulnerability 
assessments is ``necessary or appropriate'' for the Commission to 
oversee the development and enforcement of reliability standards under 
FPA section 215 and to ensure that rates, terms, and conditions are 
just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential under 
FPA sections 205 and 206.\21\ A persuasive case can be made that most 
of the information to be collected in the one-time informational 
reports could aid the Commission in exercising these powers. However, 
the practical utility of the information sought from two of the 
questions is uncertain at best: first, question 8, which asks how a 
transmission provider identifies and engages ``affected communities'' 
and incorporates those communities' feedback into its extreme weather 
vulnerability assessment,\22\ and second, question 19, which asks how a 
transmission provider informs ``affected communities'' of identified 
extreme weather risks and selected mitigation measures.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Final Rule, 183 FERC ] 61,192 at PP 20, 59.
    \22\ Id. App. A, Question 8.
    \23\ Id. App. A, Question 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. How exactly are ``affected communities'' relevant here, and 
under what provision of the FPA? FPA sections 205 and 206 empower the 
Commission to ensure that wholesale transmission rates, terms, and 
conditions are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential. FPA section 215 empowers the Commission to oversee the 
development and enforcement of mandatory standards to ensure the 
reliability of the bulk-power system, which ``does not include 
facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.'' \24\ A 
``community,'' defined as

[[Page 41499]]

a ``neighborhood, vicinity, or locality,'' \25\ does not exactly evoke 
an image of a customer paying wholesale transmission rates. Rather, one 
imagines local retail customers paying the local utility to deliver 
electricity on a distribution line to power one's business or dwelling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (emphasis added).
    \25\ Community, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    7. I wonder what we expect to hear back in response. Under what 
circumstances would a wholesaler ever engage with and inform a retail 
customer? Would we expect a wholesale food vendor, Sysco, for example, 
to engage with a restaurant's retail customers on how it plans for 
potential disruptions of the beef supply, and to then inform those 
customers when supplies have been disrupted and then further consult 
with them on how limited supplies will be allocated? No. Put in the 
terms of the FPA, would engaging retail customers in forecasting or 
informing retail customers of risks and mitigation measures render 
otherwise unlawful wholesale transmission rates just and reasonable? 
Doubtful. Could it be that the Commission envisions that transmission 
providers will submit information on some type of ``flex alert'' 
initiative that encourages retail customers to voluntarily conserve 
electricity, which may relate to the adequate reliability of the bulk-
power system under FPA section 215? Perhaps. But if so, why not just 
make that clear.
    8. The Commission ought to be more judicious in use of FPA section 
304. Its powers are not without limit. Congress has declared that the 
burdens of these reports should be minimized, and that the usefulness 
of information collected by the government maximized.\26\ We should 
better explain why we are asking for this data or not collect it at 
all. The Commission should not require transmission providers to file 
information for which it has no use or is unwilling to explain why it 
is being asked for in the first place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See 44 U.S.C. 3501.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the result.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
James P. Danly,
Commissioner.

[FR Doc. 2023-13268 Filed 6-26-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P