Ratification of Security Directives, 36919-36921 [2023-11941]
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36919
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
Vol. 88, No. 108
Tuesday, June 6, 2023
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains regulatory documents having general
applicability and legal effect, most of which
are keyed to and codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations, which is published under
50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by
the Superintendent of Documents.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
6 CFR Chapter I
49 CFR Chapter XII
Ratification of Security Directives
Office of Strategy, Policy, and
Plans, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
ACTION: Notification of ratification of
security directives.
AGENCY:
DHS is publishing official
notification that the Transportation
Security Oversight Board (TSOB) has
ratified Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Security Directive
Pipeline–2021–01B and Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–02C applicable
to owners and operators of critical oil
and natural gas pipeline infrastructure
(owner/operators). Security Directive
Pipeline–2021–01B extended the
expiration date of cybersecurity
measures initially required by Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–01, issued on
May 27, 2022, for an additional year.
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–02C
revised the cybersecurity measures
originally required by Security Directive
Pipeline–2021–02, issued on July 19,
2021, to be more performance-based and
less prescriptive than the original
requirements. This performance-based
approach ensures the mandated critical
security outcomes are achieved while
allowing covered owner/operators
options to implement security measures
for their specific systems and
operations.
DATES: The TSOB ratified Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–01B on June
24, 2021 and ratified Security Directive
Pipeline–2021–02C on August 19, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Thomas McDermott, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk
and Resilience Policy at 202–834–5803
or thomas.mcdermott@hq.dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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SUMMARY:
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I. Background
A. Cybersecurity Threat
The cyber threat to the country’s
critical infrastructure, including
pipelines, has remained elevated since
the ransomware attack on the Colonial
Pipeline Company on May 8, 2021. That
attack temporarily disrupted critical
supplies of gasoline and other refined
petroleum products throughout the East
Coast and demonstrated the significant
threat such attacks pose to the country’s
infrastructure and economic well-being.
The cyber threat posed by both criminal
enterprises and nation-state actors
continues to expand and become more
complex. Ransomware tactics and
techniques continue to evolve,
exhibiting threat actors’ growing
technological sophistication and an
increased ransomware threat to
organizations globally.1 The intelligence
community has assessed that both the
People’s Republic of China and the
Russian Federation have the capability
to target critical infrastructure with
cyber operations.2
In 2022, the threat was heightened
further in light of the Russian
Federation’s attack on Ukraine.3
Throughout the ongoing Russia-Ukraine
conflict there has been an increase in
activity by politically or ideologicallymotivated cyber groups and criminal
cyber groups, who may act
independently and without official
support from a nation-state government,
to target critical infrastructure,
including the transportation sector.
Illustrating the threat, on March 24,
2022, the U.S. Department of Justice
unsealed indictments of three Russian
Federal Security Service (FSB) officers
and employees of a State Research
Center of the Russian Federation FGUP
Central Scientific Research Institute of
1 Alert (AA22–040A), 2021 Trends Show
Increased Globalized Threat of Ransomware,
released by CISA on February 10, 2022 (as revised).
2 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, 8, 12 (February 2022).
3 Joint Cybersecurity Alert—Alert (AA22–011A),
Understanding and Mitigating Russian StateSponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical
Infrastructure, released by CISA, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security
Agency (NSA) on January 11, 2022 (as revised);
Joint Cybersecurity Alert—Alert (AA22–110A),
Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber
Threats to Critical Infrastructure, released
cybersecurity authorities of the United States,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom on April 20, 2022 (as revised).
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Chemistry and Mechanics (also known
as ‘‘TsNIIKhM’’) for their involvement
in intrusion campaigns against U.S. and
international oil refineries, nuclear
facilities, and energy companies.
Documents revealed that the FSB
conducted a multi-stage campaign in
which they gained remote access to U.S.
and international energy sector
networks, deployed industrial control
systems (ICS)-focused malware, and
collected and exfiltrated enterprise and
ICS-related data.4 Since April 15, 2022,
a pro-Russian hacking group known as
‘‘Killnet’’ has targeted a number of
transportation entities, including U.S.
and European airports and a U.S. oil
and natural gas company. Killnet
claimed responsibility for an October
10, 2022, cyber incident targeting the
public-facing website of 48 airports
across the United States, resulting in a
number of these websites being
unavailable for a period of time.
B. Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01B
On May 27, 2021, TSA issued
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01,
which was the first of two security
directives issued by TSA to enhance the
cybersecurity of critical pipeline
systems in response to the attack on
Colonial Pipeline. Security Directive
Pipeline–2021–01, and the subsequent
amendments in this series, required
covered owner/operators to: (1) report
cybersecurity incidents to CISA; (2)
appoint a cybersecurity coordinator to
be available 24/7 to coordinate with
TSA and CISA; and (3) conduct a selfassessment of cybersecurity practices,
identify any gaps, and develop a plan
and timeline for remediation.5 This first
security directive went into effect on
May 28, 2021 and was ratified by the
TSOB on July 3, 2021.6
On December 1, 2021, TSA amended
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01 to
update the definition of cybersecurity
incident to ensure the consistent
identification of incidents that must be
reported to CISA across all modes of
4 Press Release 22–285, Four Russian Government
Employees Charged in Two Historical Hacking
Campaigns Targeting Critical Infrastructure
Worldwide, Department of Justice, issued on March
24, 2022, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/four-russian-government-employees-chargedtwo-historical-hacking-campaigns-targeting-critical.
5 Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01: Enhancing
Pipeline Cybersecurity.
6 See 86 FR 38209 (July 20, 2021).
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 6, 2023 / Rules and Regulations
transportation.7 This amended directive,
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01A,
was ratified by the TSOB on December
29, 2021.8
In light of the continuing and
evolving threat, as reflected in recent
and ongoing intelligence, TSA
determined that the measures required
by the Security Directive Pipeline–
2021–01 series remain necessary to
protect the Nation’s critical pipeline
infrastructure beyond Security Directive
Pipeline–2021–01A’s expiration date of
May 28, 2022. On May 27, 2022, TSA
issued Security Directive Pipeline–
2021–01B to extend the requirements of
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01A
for an additional year. Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–01B became
effective May 29, 2022 and expires on
May 29, 2023. Security Directive
Pipeline 2021–01B is available online in
TSA’s Surface Transportation
Cybersecurity Toolkit.9
The only substantive change in
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01B to
the prior requirements is an increase in
the amount of time covered entities
have to report cybersecurity incidents to
CISA from 12 hours to 24 hours after an
incident is identified. This change
aligned the reporting timeline for
critical pipeline entities to mirror the
reporting requirements applicable to
other surface transportation entities and
aviation entities. TSA reached the
determination to extend the reporting
deadline to 24 hours following
engagement with industry stakeholders
and in consultation with CISA.
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C. Security Directive Pipeline–2021–02C
Due to the extent of the threat to
pipeline cybersecurity reflected by
intelligence, and the need for
widespread best practices to be
mandated within the industry, TSA
issued Security Directive Pipeline–
2021–02 on July 19, 2021. This directive
required owner/operators to implement
additional cybersecurity measures to
prevent disruption and degradation to
their infrastructure in response to the
ongoing threat. Specifically, Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–02, which
7 To counter the persistent and growing cyber
threat to critical transportation infrastructure, TSA
took action over the course of 2021 to require
entities across the modes of transportation regulated
by TSA to institute the same critical measures
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01 required in the
pipeline context. To date, TSA has issued security
directives to high-risk freight railroad carriers,
passenger railroad carriers, and rail transit systems
and, in the aviation sector, issued security program
amendments to airports and aircraft operators.
8 See 87 FR 31093 (May 23, 2022).
9 TSA Surface Transportation Cybersecurity
Toolkit, available at https://www.tsa.gov/forindustry/surface-transportation-cybersecuritytoolkit.
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became effective on July 26, 2021, and
was set to expire on July 26, 2022,
required owner/operators to take the
following additional actions:
• Implement an array of specified
mitigation measures to reduce the risk
of compromise from a cyberattack;
• Develop a Cybersecurity
Contingency/Response Plan to reduce
the risk of operational disruption or
functional degradation of information
technology and operational technology
systems in the event of a malicious
cyber intrusion; and
• Test the effectiveness their
cybersecurity practices through an
annual cybersecurity architecture design
review conducted by a third party.
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–02
was ratified by the TSOB on August 17,
2021.10
On December 17, 2021, TSA issued
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–02B,
amending Security Directive Pipeline–
2021–02 in response to industry input.
Specifically, the amended directive
revised the time limits for owner/
operators to install security software
updates and patches for operating
systems, applications, drivers, and
firmware on Information Technology
systems. The TSOB ratified Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–02B on January
13, 2022.11
In response to the persistent threat to
critical oil and natural gas pipelines,
TSA determined that it remains
necessary for owner/operators of the
most critical oil and natural pipelines to
implement and maintain cybersecurity
measures to prevent disruption and
degradation to their infrastructure. On
July 21, 2022, TSA issued Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–02C requiring
owner/operators of the most critical oil
and natural gas pipelines to continue to
implement necessary cybersecurity
measures. The directive became
effective on July 27, 2022, and is set to
expire on July 27, 2023.
In order to best achieve the critical
security outcomes necessary to counter
the threat, Security Directive Pipeline–
2021–02C transitioned the original
requirements to a performance-based
model. The directive maintains the
security objectives of the previous
versions, but implements them through
performance-based standards rather
than requiring specific prescriptive
measures. This approach enhances
security by allowing owner/operators to
choose the most appropriate
cybersecurity measures to protect their
specific systems, while mandating that
certain security outcomes are achieved.
10 See
11 See
PO 00000
86 FR 52953 (September 24, 2021).
87 FR 31093 (May 23, 2022).
Frm 00002
Fmt 4700
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It also provides owner/operators greater
ability to be agile and adaptive in
leveraging innovative technologies in a
changing threat environment.
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–02C
identifies four critical security outcomes
that covered entities are required to
achieve:
• Implement network segmentation
policies and controls to ensure that the
Operational Technology (OT) system
can continue to safely operate in the
event that an Information Technology
(IT) system has been compromised;
• Implement access control measures
to secure and prevent unauthorized
access to critical cyber systems;
• Implement continuous monitoring
and detection policies and procedures
to detect cybersecurity threats and
correct anomalies that affect critical
cyber system operations; and
• Reduce the risk of exploitation of
unpatched systems through the
application of security patches and
updates for operating systems,
applications, drivers and firmware on
critical cyber systems in a timely
manner using a risk-based methodology.
For each of these performance
outcomes, the directive includes
specific issues that must be addressed
and provides options for achieving the
required outcomes.
To ensure that the critical security
outcomes identified are achieved under
this performance-based framework,
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–02C
requires that owner/operators:
• Establish and implement a TSAapproved Cybersecurity Implementation
Plan that describes the specific
cybersecurity measures employed and
the schedule for achieving the security
outcomes identified;
• Develop and maintain an up-to-date
Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan to
reduce the risk of operational
disruption, or the risk of other
significant impacts on necessary
capacity, as defined in the directive,
should the Information and/or
Operational Technology systems of a gas
or liquid pipeline be affected by a
cybersecurity incident; and
• Establish a Cybersecurity
Assessment Program and submit an
annual plan that describes how the
Owner/Operator will proactively and
regularly assess the effectiveness of
cybersecurity measures and identify and
resolve device, network, and/or system
vulnerabilities.
Cybersecurity experts from TSA and
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) contributed to
the development of the requirements
and performance-based standards in
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–02C to
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 108 / Tuesday, June 6, 2023 / Rules and Regulations
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
ensure the efficacy of the requirements
in mitigating vulnerabilities. The
directive also reflects input from
stakeholders and for a transition to a
performance-based, security outcomefocused model. Security Directive
Pipeline–2021–02C is available online
in TSA’s Surface Transportation
Cybersecurity Toolkit.12
II. TSOB Ratification
TSA has broad statutory
responsibility and authority to safeguard
the nation’s transportation system.13
The TSOB—a body consisting of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Transportation, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Director of National Intelligence, or
their designees, and a representative of
the National Security Council—reviews
certain TSA regulations and security
directives consistent with law.14 TSA
issued both of these security directives
under 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(A), which
authorizes TSA to issue emergency
regulations or security directives
without providing notice or public
comment where ‘‘the Administrator
determines that a regulation or security
directive must be issued immediately in
order to protect transportation
security. . . .’’. Security directives
issued pursuant to the procedures in 49
U.S.C. 114(l)(2) ‘‘shall remain effective
for a period not to exceed 90 days
unless ratified or disapproved by the
Board or rescinded by the
Administrator.’’ 15
Following the issuance of Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–01B on May
27, 2022, the chairman of the TSOB
convened the board for the purpose of
reviewing the directive. In reviewing
Security Directive Pipeline–2021–01B,
the TSOB considered the continuing
need for TSA to maintain the directive’s
requirements pursuant to its emergency
authority under 49 U.S.C. 114(1)(2) to
prevent the disruption and degradation
of the country’s critical transportation
infrastructure and the change in the
deadline for reporting cybersecurity
incidents to CISA from 12 hours to 24
hours. Following its review, the TSOB
ratified Security Directive Pipeline–
2021–01B on June 24, 2022.
Following the issuance of Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–02C on July 21,
2022, the chairman again convened the
board for the purpose of reviewing that
12 TSA Surface Transportation Cybersecurity
Toolkit, available at https://www.tsa.gov/forindustry/surface-transportation-cybersecuritytoolkit.
13 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 114(d), (f), (l), (m).
14 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 115; 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(B).
15 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(B).
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directive. In reviewing Security
Directive Pipeline–2021–02C, the TSOB
considered its transition to a
performance-based approach to
requiring owner/operators of critical oil
and natural gas pipelines to address
persistent and evolving cyber threats
that threaten the country’s critical
pipeline infrastructure as well as the
need for TSA to issue the directive’s
requirements using its emergency
authority under 49 U.S.C. ll4(l)(2)(A).
The TSOB also considered whether to
authorize TSA to extend the security
directive beyond its current expiration
date of July 27, 2023, subject to certain
conditions, should the TSA
Administrator believe such an extension
is necessary to address the evolving
threat that may continue beyond the
original expiration date.
Following its review, the TSOB
ratified Security Directive Pipeline–
2021–02C on August 19, 2022. The
TSOB also authorized TSA to extend the
security directive beyond its current
expiration date, should the TSA
Administrator determine such an
extension is necessary to address the
evolving threat that may continue
beyond the original expiration date.
Such an extension is subject to the
following conditions: (1) there are no
changes to the security directive other
than an extended expiration date; (2) the
TSA Administrator makes an affirmative
determination that conditions warrant
the extension of the directive’s
requirements; and (3) the TSA
Administrator documents such a
determination and notifies the TSOB.
John K. Tien,
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security &
Chairman of the Transportation Security
Oversight Board.
[FR Doc. 2023–11941 Filed 6–5–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–9M–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
6 CFR Chapter I
49 CFR Chapter XII
Ratification of Security Directives
Office of Strategy, Policy, and
Plans, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
ACTION: Notification of ratification of
security directives.
AGENCY:
DHS is publishing official
notification that the Transportation
Security Oversight Board (TSOB) has
ratified Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Security Directive
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4700
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36921
1580–21–01A, Security Directive 1582–
21–01A, and Security Directive 1580/
82–2022–01 applicable to owners and
operators of critical railroad
infrastructure (owner/operators).
Security Directive 1580–21–01A and
Security Directive 1582–21–01A amend
and extend previously ratified security
directives issued to critical rail entities
to maintain the cybersecurity measures
required by those directives. Security
Directive 1580/82–2022–01 requires
owner/operators to implement
performance-based cybersecurity
measures necessary to prevent the
disruption and degradation of critical
rail infrastructure.
DATES: The TSOB ratified Security
Directive 1580–21–01A, Security
Directive 1582–21–01A, and Security
Directive 1580/82–2022–01 on
November 16, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Thomas McDermott, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk
and Resilience Policy at 202–834–5803
or thomas.mcdermott@hq.dhs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Cybersecurity Threat
The cyber threat to the country’s
critical infrastructure, including freight
and passenger rail, remains elevated and
poses a risk to the national and
economic security of the United States.
Malicious actors have increasingly
demonstrated the capability to conduct
cyber-attacks exploiting the
vulnerabilities of the internet-accessible
Operational Technology (OT) assets and
Information Technology (IT) systems of
the surface transportation sector. In
recent years, cyber attackers have
maliciously targeted surface
transportation modes in the U.S.,
including freight railroads, passenger
railroads, and rail transit systems, with
multiple cyberattack and cyber
espionage campaigns.1 By targeting the
1 These activities include the April 2021 breach
of New York City’s Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (the nation’s largest mass transit agency)
by hackers linked to the Chinese government; the
December 2020 ‘‘Sunburst’’ attack on transit
agencies; the August 2020 attack on the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority; the 2017 ransomware attack on the
Sacramento Regional Transit District; and the
November 2016 ransomware attack on the San
Francisco Municipal Transportation agency. This
threat is ongoing: on November 17, 2021 the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the
Australian Cyber Security Centre, and the United
Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre issued a
joint cybersecurity advisory highlighting ongoing
malicious cyber activity by an advanced persistent
threat group (APT) that these agencies associated
with the government of Iran. The advisory states
E:\FR\FM\06JNR1.SGM
Continued
06JNR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 108 (Tuesday, June 6, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 36919-36921]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-11941]
========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 108 / Tuesday, June 6, 2023 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 36919]]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
6 CFR Chapter I
49 CFR Chapter XII
Ratification of Security Directives
AGENCY: Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
ACTION: Notification of ratification of security directives.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: DHS is publishing official notification that the
Transportation Security Oversight Board (TSOB) has ratified
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-01B and Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C applicable
to owners and operators of critical oil and natural gas pipeline
infrastructure (owner/operators). Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01B
extended the expiration date of cybersecurity measures initially
required by Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01, issued on May 27,
2022, for an additional year. Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C
revised the cybersecurity measures originally required by Security
Directive Pipeline-2021-02, issued on July 19, 2021, to be more
performance-based and less prescriptive than the original requirements.
This performance-based approach ensures the mandated critical security
outcomes are achieved while allowing covered owner/operators options to
implement security measures for their specific systems and operations.
DATES: The TSOB ratified Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01B on June
24, 2021 and ratified Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C on August
19, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas McDermott, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk and Resilience Policy at 202-
834-5803 or [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Cybersecurity Threat
The cyber threat to the country's critical infrastructure,
including pipelines, has remained elevated since the ransomware attack
on the Colonial Pipeline Company on May 8, 2021. That attack
temporarily disrupted critical supplies of gasoline and other refined
petroleum products throughout the East Coast and demonstrated the
significant threat such attacks pose to the country's infrastructure
and economic well-being. The cyber threat posed by both criminal
enterprises and nation-state actors continues to expand and become more
complex. Ransomware tactics and techniques continue to evolve,
exhibiting threat actors' growing technological sophistication and an
increased ransomware threat to organizations globally.\1\ The
intelligence community has assessed that both the People's Republic of
China and the Russian Federation have the capability to target critical
infrastructure with cyber operations.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Alert (AA22-040A), 2021 Trends Show Increased Globalized
Threat of Ransomware, released by CISA on February 10, 2022 (as
revised).
\2\ Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 8, 12 (February
2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2022, the threat was heightened further in light of the Russian
Federation's attack on Ukraine.\3\ Throughout the ongoing Russia-
Ukraine conflict there has been an increase in activity by politically
or ideologically-motivated cyber groups and criminal cyber groups, who
may act independently and without official support from a nation-state
government, to target critical infrastructure, including the
transportation sector. Illustrating the threat, on March 24, 2022, the
U.S. Department of Justice unsealed indictments of three Russian
Federal Security Service (FSB) officers and employees of a State
Research Center of the Russian Federation FGUP Central Scientific
Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics (also known as
``TsNIIKhM'') for their involvement in intrusion campaigns against U.S.
and international oil refineries, nuclear facilities, and energy
companies. Documents revealed that the FSB conducted a multi-stage
campaign in which they gained remote access to U.S. and international
energy sector networks, deployed industrial control systems (ICS)-
focused malware, and collected and exfiltrated enterprise and ICS-
related data.\4\ Since April 15, 2022, a pro-Russian hacking group
known as ``Killnet'' has targeted a number of transportation entities,
including U.S. and European airports and a U.S. oil and natural gas
company. Killnet claimed responsibility for an October 10, 2022, cyber
incident targeting the public-facing website of 48 airports across the
United States, resulting in a number of these websites being
unavailable for a period of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Joint Cybersecurity Alert--Alert (AA22-011A), Understanding
and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S.
Critical Infrastructure, released by CISA, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) on
January 11, 2022 (as revised); Joint Cybersecurity Alert--Alert
(AA22-110A), Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to
Critical Infrastructure, released cybersecurity authorities of the
United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom on April 20, 2022 (as revised).
\4\ Press Release 22-285, Four Russian Government Employees
Charged in Two Historical Hacking Campaigns Targeting Critical
Infrastructure Worldwide, Department of Justice, issued on March 24,
2022, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-russian-government-employees-charged-two-historical-hacking-campaigns-targeting-critical.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01B
On May 27, 2021, TSA issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01,
which was the first of two security directives issued by TSA to enhance
the cybersecurity of critical pipeline systems in response to the
attack on Colonial Pipeline. Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01, and
the subsequent amendments in this series, required covered owner/
operators to: (1) report cybersecurity incidents to CISA; (2) appoint a
cybersecurity coordinator to be available 24/7 to coordinate with TSA
and CISA; and (3) conduct a self-assessment of cybersecurity practices,
identify any gaps, and develop a plan and timeline for remediation.\5\
This first security directive went into effect on May 28, 2021 and was
ratified by the TSOB on July 3, 2021.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01: Enhancing Pipeline
Cybersecurity.
\6\ See 86 FR 38209 (July 20, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 1, 2021, TSA amended Security Directive Pipeline-2021-
01 to update the definition of cybersecurity incident to ensure the
consistent identification of incidents that must be reported to CISA
across all modes of
[[Page 36920]]
transportation.\7\ This amended directive, Security Directive Pipeline-
2021-01A, was ratified by the TSOB on December 29, 2021.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ To counter the persistent and growing cyber threat to
critical transportation infrastructure, TSA took action over the
course of 2021 to require entities across the modes of
transportation regulated by TSA to institute the same critical
measures Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 required in the
pipeline context. To date, TSA has issued security directives to
high-risk freight railroad carriers, passenger railroad carriers,
and rail transit systems and, in the aviation sector, issued
security program amendments to airports and aircraft operators.
\8\ See 87 FR 31093 (May 23, 2022).
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In light of the continuing and evolving threat, as reflected in
recent and ongoing intelligence, TSA determined that the measures
required by the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 series remain
necessary to protect the Nation's critical pipeline infrastructure
beyond Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01A's expiration date of May
28, 2022. On May 27, 2022, TSA issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-
01B to extend the requirements of Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01A
for an additional year. Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01B became
effective May 29, 2022 and expires on May 29, 2023. Security Directive
Pipeline 2021-01B is available online in TSA's Surface Transportation
Cybersecurity Toolkit.\9\
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\9\ TSA Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Toolkit, available
at https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation-cybersecurity-toolkit.
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The only substantive change in Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01B
to the prior requirements is an increase in the amount of time covered
entities have to report cybersecurity incidents to CISA from 12 hours
to 24 hours after an incident is identified. This change aligned the
reporting timeline for critical pipeline entities to mirror the
reporting requirements applicable to other surface transportation
entities and aviation entities. TSA reached the determination to extend
the reporting deadline to 24 hours following engagement with industry
stakeholders and in consultation with CISA.
C. Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C
Due to the extent of the threat to pipeline cybersecurity reflected
by intelligence, and the need for widespread best practices to be
mandated within the industry, TSA issued Security Directive Pipeline-
2021-02 on July 19, 2021. This directive required owner/operators to
implement additional cybersecurity measures to prevent disruption and
degradation to their infrastructure in response to the ongoing threat.
Specifically, Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02, which became
effective on July 26, 2021, and was set to expire on July 26, 2022,
required owner/operators to take the following additional actions:
Implement an array of specified mitigation measures to
reduce the risk of compromise from a cyberattack;
Develop a Cybersecurity Contingency/Response Plan to
reduce the risk of operational disruption or functional degradation of
information technology and operational technology systems in the event
of a malicious cyber intrusion; and
Test the effectiveness their cybersecurity practices
through an annual cybersecurity architecture design review conducted by
a third party.
Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 was ratified by the TSOB on
August 17, 2021.\10\
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\10\ See 86 FR 52953 (September 24, 2021).
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On December 17, 2021, TSA issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-
02B, amending Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 in response to
industry input. Specifically, the amended directive revised the time
limits for owner/operators to install security software updates and
patches for operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware on
Information Technology systems. The TSOB ratified Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-02B on January 13, 2022.\11\
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\11\ See 87 FR 31093 (May 23, 2022).
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In response to the persistent threat to critical oil and natural
gas pipelines, TSA determined that it remains necessary for owner/
operators of the most critical oil and natural pipelines to implement
and maintain cybersecurity measures to prevent disruption and
degradation to their infrastructure. On July 21, 2022, TSA issued
Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C requiring owner/operators of the
most critical oil and natural gas pipelines to continue to implement
necessary cybersecurity measures. The directive became effective on
July 27, 2022, and is set to expire on July 27, 2023.
In order to best achieve the critical security outcomes necessary
to counter the threat, Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C
transitioned the original requirements to a performance-based model.
The directive maintains the security objectives of the previous
versions, but implements them through performance-based standards
rather than requiring specific prescriptive measures. This approach
enhances security by allowing owner/operators to choose the most
appropriate cybersecurity measures to protect their specific systems,
while mandating that certain security outcomes are achieved. It also
provides owner/operators greater ability to be agile and adaptive in
leveraging innovative technologies in a changing threat environment.
Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C identifies four critical
security outcomes that covered entities are required to achieve:
Implement network segmentation policies and controls to
ensure that the Operational Technology (OT) system can continue to
safely operate in the event that an Information Technology (IT) system
has been compromised;
Implement access control measures to secure and prevent
unauthorized access to critical cyber systems;
Implement continuous monitoring and detection policies and
procedures to detect cybersecurity threats and correct anomalies that
affect critical cyber system operations; and
Reduce the risk of exploitation of unpatched systems
through the application of security patches and updates for operating
systems, applications, drivers and firmware on critical cyber systems
in a timely manner using a risk-based methodology.
For each of these performance outcomes, the directive includes
specific issues that must be addressed and provides options for
achieving the required outcomes.
To ensure that the critical security outcomes identified are
achieved under this performance-based framework, Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-02C requires that owner/operators:
Establish and implement a TSA-approved Cybersecurity
Implementation Plan that describes the specific cybersecurity measures
employed and the schedule for achieving the security outcomes
identified;
Develop and maintain an up-to-date Cybersecurity Incident
Response Plan to reduce the risk of operational disruption, or the risk
of other significant impacts on necessary capacity, as defined in the
directive, should the Information and/or Operational Technology systems
of a gas or liquid pipeline be affected by a cybersecurity incident;
and
Establish a Cybersecurity Assessment Program and submit an
annual plan that describes how the Owner/Operator will proactively and
regularly assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity measures and
identify and resolve device, network, and/or system vulnerabilities.
Cybersecurity experts from TSA and the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) contributed to the development of
the requirements and performance-based standards in Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-02C to
[[Page 36921]]
ensure the efficacy of the requirements in mitigating vulnerabilities.
The directive also reflects input from stakeholders and for a
transition to a performance-based, security outcome-focused model.
Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C is available online in TSA's
Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Toolkit.\12\
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\12\ TSA Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Toolkit, available
at https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation-cybersecurity-toolkit.
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II. TSOB Ratification
TSA has broad statutory responsibility and authority to safeguard
the nation's transportation system.\13\ The TSOB--a body consisting of
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Transportation,
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Director of National Intelligence, or their designees,
and a representative of the National Security Council--reviews certain
TSA regulations and security directives consistent with law.\14\ TSA
issued both of these security directives under 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(A),
which authorizes TSA to issue emergency regulations or security
directives without providing notice or public comment where ``the
Administrator determines that a regulation or security directive must
be issued immediately in order to protect transportation security. . .
.''. Security directives issued pursuant to the procedures in 49 U.S.C.
114(l)(2) ``shall remain effective for a period not to exceed 90 days
unless ratified or disapproved by the Board or rescinded by the
Administrator.'' \15\
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\13\ See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 114(d), (f), (l), (m).
\14\ See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 115; 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(B).
\15\ 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2)(B).
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Following the issuance of Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01B on
May 27, 2022, the chairman of the TSOB convened the board for the
purpose of reviewing the directive. In reviewing Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-01B, the TSOB considered the continuing need for TSA to
maintain the directive's requirements pursuant to its emergency
authority under 49 U.S.C. 114(1)(2) to prevent the disruption and
degradation of the country's critical transportation infrastructure and
the change in the deadline for reporting cybersecurity incidents to
CISA from 12 hours to 24 hours. Following its review, the TSOB ratified
Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01B on June 24, 2022.
Following the issuance of Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02C on
July 21, 2022, the chairman again convened the board for the purpose of
reviewing that directive. In reviewing Security Directive Pipeline-
2021-02C, the TSOB considered its transition to a performance-based
approach to requiring owner/operators of critical oil and natural gas
pipelines to address persistent and evolving cyber threats that
threaten the country's critical pipeline infrastructure as well as the
need for TSA to issue the directive's requirements using its emergency
authority under 49 U.S.C. ll4(l)(2)(A). The TSOB also considered
whether to authorize TSA to extend the security directive beyond its
current expiration date of July 27, 2023, subject to certain
conditions, should the TSA Administrator believe such an extension is
necessary to address the evolving threat that may continue beyond the
original expiration date.
Following its review, the TSOB ratified Security Directive
Pipeline-2021-02C on August 19, 2022. The TSOB also authorized TSA to
extend the security directive beyond its current expiration date,
should the TSA Administrator determine such an extension is necessary
to address the evolving threat that may continue beyond the original
expiration date. Such an extension is subject to the following
conditions: (1) there are no changes to the security directive other
than an extended expiration date; (2) the TSA Administrator makes an
affirmative determination that conditions warrant the extension of the
directive's requirements; and (3) the TSA Administrator documents such
a determination and notifies the TSOB.
John K. Tien,
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security & Chairman of the Transportation
Security Oversight Board.
[FR Doc. 2023-11941 Filed 6-5-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-9M-P