Morris & Dickson Co., LLC; Decision and Order, 34523-34543 [2023-11369]
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 103 / Tuesday, May 30, 2023 / Notices
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
DEA. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Scott Brinks,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug
Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2023–11370 Filed 5–26–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 18–31]
Morris & Dickson Co., LLC; Decision
and Order
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On May 2, 2018, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government), issued an Order to Show
Cause (OSC) and Immediate Suspension
of Registration (ISO) to Morris &
Dickson Co., LLC (Respondent), of
Louisiana. Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Exhibit (ALJX) 1, at 1. The OSC
informed Respondent of the immediate
suspension of its Certificates of
Registration Nos. RM0314790 and
RM0335732 (registrations) 1 and
proposed their revocation pursuant to
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4) and 823(b) because
it alleged that Respondent’s continued
registrations were inconsistent with the
public interest. Id.
Respondent requested a hearing
before a DEA ALJ, which was conducted
from May 13 to May 16, 2019. On
August 29, 2019, the ALJ issued a
Recommended Decision (RD), which
was transmitted to the Agency along
with the administrative record on
November 26, 2019.2 The Agency has
incorporated portions of the ALJ’s RD
herein.
The Government presented a prima
facie case. Respondent ultimately
admitted to and accepted some
responsibility for its failures in
effectively applying its customer due
1 Respondent sought and obtained a temporary
restraining order against enforcement of the ISO.
See ALJX 89, at 7. On May 18, 2018, the DEA
Acting Administrator rescinded the ISO issued on
May 2, 2018. Tr. 12; see Stip. 26.
2 On October 8, 2019, Respondent filed
Exceptions to the Recommended Decision (Resp
Exceptions) and on November 7, 2019, the
Government filed a response to Respondent’s
Exceptions. On January 5, 2022, Respondent filed
a Motion to Reopen the Administrative Record. On
January 14, 2022, the Government filed an
opposition to this motion and on January 21, 2022,
Respondent filed a Reply Memorandum in Support
of its Motion to Reopen the Administrative Record.
The Agency addresses the Exceptions throughout
and the Motion to Reopen at the end of this
Decision.
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diligence in assessing orders of
controlled substances, its failures to
implement a suspicious order
monitoring system ‘‘consistent with best
practices for compliance,’’ and its
failures to adequately resolve red flags
on orders that it shipped. See infra
section V. Respondent also admitted
that its three suspicious order reports to
DEA during the relevant time period
were insufficient. Id. Nonetheless,
Respondent presented testimony and
evidence aimed at rebutting the
Government’s case with regard to the
scope of its regulatory noncompliance
during the relevant time period.
After thoroughly reviewing the entire
record, the Agency finds substantial
record evidence that Respondent’s
continued registration is inconsistent
with the public interest in light of the
long-term, egregious failures of
Respondent in its responsibility as a
distributor to maintain effective controls
against diversion of controlled
substances. Furthermore, the Agency
finds that Respondent has failed to
demonstrate that the Agency should
continue to entrust it with its controlled
substance registrations.
I. Summary of the Allegations
1. The OSC primarily alleged that
Respondent failed to maintain effective
controls against diversion when it failed
to report to DEA thousands of unusually
large orders for hydrocodone and
oxycodone, which constituted potential
suspicious orders, and when it shipped
orders to customers without resolving
red flags of diversion or reporting the
orders to DEA in violation of 21 U.S.C.
823(b)(1) and (e)(1) as well as 21 CFR
1301.71(a) and 1301.74(b). OSC, at 2.
Further, the OSC alleged that
Respondent failed to adequately design
and operate a system to alert
Respondent to suspicious orders of
controlled substances and failed to
report the suspicious orders to DEA in
violation of 21 CFR 1301.74(b). Id.
2. The allegations included that, from
January 2014 until April 2018,
Respondent shipped approximately
7,000 unusually large orders of
oxycodone and almost 5,000 unusually
large orders of hydrocodone. OSC, at 5;
Govt Prehearing, at 8. During this time,
Respondent filed a total of only three
suspicious order reports with DEA.
3. Furthermore, the OSC alleged that,
from approximately January 2014 to
April 2018,3 Respondent failed to carry
3 The allegations for three of the exemplar
pharmacies only spanned a subset of this
timeframe: Wellness Pharmacy, January 2014–
December 2017; Wilkinson Family Pharmacy,
January 2014–April 2017; Hephzibah Pharmacy,
April 2017–May 2017. Govt Prehearing, at 3.
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out its due diligence and suspicious
order monitoring policies and failed to
conduct or failed to document the
resolution of meaningful due diligence
into orders placed by the following
pharmacies: Wallace Drug Company,
Inc.; Bordelon’s Super-Save Pharmacy;
Folse Pharmacy; Pharmacy Specialties
Group, Inc.; Dave’s Pharmacy; the
Wellness Pharmacy, Inc.; Wilkinson
Family Pharmacy; and Hephzibah
Pharmacy, L.L.C. (hereinafter, the
exemplar pharmacies).
II. The Witnesses
A. The Government’s Witnesses
The Government presented its case
through the testimony of six witnesses
and the introduction of 70 exhibits. The
Government’s first witness was the
Acting Section Chief of the
Pharmaceutical Investigation Section of
the DEA (the Section Chief), who
testified generally regarding the
regulatory requirements for distributors.
Tr. 47–87. The Government also
presented testimony from two Diversion
Investigators (DI 1 and DI 2) regarding
the history of the investigation and the
identification of Government exhibits.4
See RD, at 11–12 (citing Tr. 94–101;
144–177). Next, the Government
presented testimony from the Chief of
the Statistical Services Section of DEA,
G.R., who was qualified without
objection as an expert in ‘‘developing
and implementing statistical models
and methods of analyzing large and
complex data sets.’’ RD, at 13 (citing Tr.
192). G.R. testified to the methodology
he employed in analyzing the statistical
data that was used by DEA in its
determination that Respondent had
failed to report suspicious orders.5 RD,
at 12–15 (citing Tr. 187–245). The
Government also presented testimony
from the Group Supervisor of the New
Orleans Field Division (the GS), who
was accepted as an expert in ‘‘the
identification of common red flags
suggestive of an illicit pharmaceutical
operation and as well [as] with respect
to the requirements imposed on DEA
registrants to identify and investigate
4 The Government presented testimony from a
third Diversion Investigator (DI 3) to rebut the
testimony of Respondent’s witness, however, the
Agency agrees with the RD that the testimony of DI
3 was not essential to the case and is therefore not
including it herein. RD, at 20.
5 G.R. testified that he had corrected DEA’s
admitted error in the calculations in the OSC,
which applied a Three Interquartile Range (IQR) to
the median of the data set, or the 50th percentile,
instead of the 75th percentile, and as a result,
produced a larger group of outliers. Tr. 204, 208–
09. G.R. further acknowledged that the error was
identified by Respondent’s expert. Tr. 218.
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such red flags when they become aware
of them.’’ RD, at 16 (citing Tr. 282).6
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B. Respondent’s Witnesses
Respondent presented its case
through the testimony of three witnesses
and the introduction of ten exhibits.
Respondent’s first witness was Kenneth
A. Weinstein, Tr. 501–689, who was the
Vice President of the consulting firm
Analysis Group, Inc. (AGI), and was
accepted without objection as an expert
in statistical analysis related to
controlled substance distribution and in
pharmacy ordering and inventory
management. RD, at 22 (citing Tr. 513–
14; 520–21). Weinstein authenticated
Respondent Exhibit (RX) 14, pages 15–
19, and RX 28 and 29. Tr. 506, 562–68.
Weinstein testified generally regarding
the use of the Tukey analytical model in
developing Suspicious Order
Monitoring systems and testified
specifically regarding what he found to
be deficiencies in G.R.’s statistical
analysis in this case. Weinstein also
testified regarding AGI’s compliance
work for Respondent after DEA had
issued the OSC.
Respondent’s second witness was
Scott Irelan, Tr. 693–840, who had
worked for Respondent for 31 years
before becoming the Director of
Corporate Compliance and Security in
May 2018 after the OSC was issued.
Irelan testified regarding his current role
at Respondent, the remedial measures
that Respondent had put in place since
the issuance of the OSC, Respondent’s
preexisting compliance measures during
the relevant time period, and
Respondent’s acceptance of
responsibility.
Respondent’s final witness was Louis
Milione,7 Tr. 841–1057, who was, at the
time, the Senior Managing Director of
Guidepost Solutions. Respondent hired
Guidepost Solutions to enhance
Respondent’s compliance system. Tr.
878–79. Milione was previously the
Assistant Administrator of the Diversion
Control Division at DEA and was offered
and accepted without objection as an
expert ‘‘in diversion.’’ Tr. 851. He
testified regarding his factual
interactions with Respondent during his
tenure at DEA 8 and regarding the work
6 The Agency adopts the ALJ’s credibility findings
regarding the Section Chief, the DIs, G.R., and the
GS. RD, at 11–12, 15, 19.
7 Milione is currently the Principal Deputy
Administrator of DEA. Despite his return to the
Agency, it is noted that Milione has not had any
contacts with the Administrator nor anyone
participating in the decisionmaking in this matter
about and due to his prior involvement with this
case.
8 Respondent presented evidence, including
testimony from Milione, about a meeting with
Respondent at Respondent’s invitation that
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Guidepost performed for Respondent to
improve its compliance with DEA
requirements.9
III. Findings of Fact
The Parties agree to 47 stipulations
(Stips.), which are accepted as facts in
these proceedings. The Agency
incorporates all of these into the
record—the most relevant of which are
summarized here. See RD, at 33–38.
Between January 2014 and May 2018,
Respondent submitted a total of three
suspicious order reports to DEA. Stip. 7.
In this same approximate timeframe,
Respondent supplied controlled
substances, including oxycodone and
hydrocodone, to Wallace, Bordelon’s,
Folse, Pharmacy Specialties, and Dave’s
pharmacies. Respondent also supplied
Hephzibah with controlled substances,
including oxycodone and hydrocodone,
between April and May 2017, Wellness
Pharmacy between January 2014 and
December 2017, and Wilkinson 10
between January and April 2017. See
Stips. 11–20. The timeframe of the
allegations in the OSC are hereinafter
referred to as ‘‘the relevant timeframe.’’
A. DEA’s Investigation
In 2017, while investigating
pharmacies in Louisiana selling high
volumes of oxycodone and
hydrocodone, the DEA New Orleans
Division discovered that some of those
pharmacies were supplied by
Respondent. Tr. 92. During a subsequent
audit, Respondent told DEA that it used
Pro Compliance Reports and its
employees to identify suspicious orders.
Tr. 93.
occurred in August 2016 when Milione was in the
role of Assistant Administrator of the Diversion
Control Division at DEA. Tr. 856–861; RX 21; RX
11 (PowerPoint slide deck). Milione testified that,
at that meeting, he believed that Paul Dickson, Sr.,
was committed to his regulatory obligations and
sincere. Tr. 873. The powerpoint slides from that
meeting, which Respondent submitted into
evidence, generally support Respondent’s
statements regarding the workings of its previous
SOM at a high level and its termination of
customers pursuant to its due diligence efforts. RX
11; see infra n.61 regarding termination of
Respondent’s customers, and infra n.89 regarding
evidence of the sincerity of Paul Dickson, Sr.
9 The testimonies of Weinstein, Milione, and
Irelan are afforded full credibility in this Decision
on all points that are within their expertise and
relevant to the final decision as further found
herein. This Decision has found all major points of
conflict between the Government’s and
Respondent’s witnesses to be largely irrelevant to
the Agency’s adjudication of the allegations. The
Agency analyzes the evidentiary weight of portions
of the testimony of these witnesses in balance with
other evidence on the record where relevant. It is
noted that, although Irelan’s testimony regarding
acceptance of responsibility is analyzed in the
Sanction Section infra, it is afforded full credibility.
10 Wilkinson Family Pharmacy voluntarily
surrendered its DEA Certificate of Registration for
Cause. Stip. 20.
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DEA served Respondent with three
separate subpoenas and several requests
for clarification between February 1,
2018, and April 2018.11 RD, at 44–50.
The subpoenas related to Respondent’s
identification of suspicious orders, due
diligence, internal investigations, and
internal policies and practices, and also
identified specific pharmacies.
Government Exhibits (GX) 7, 8, 10, 12,
15. Respondent responded via letters
and produced some documentation. For
example, GX 9 contains an undated
letter from Jacob Dickson, stating that
Respondent submitted only two
suspicious order reports to DEA because
it ‘‘utilizes a pro-active approach to
avoid diversion of controlled drugs,
including: screening new pharmacy
customers; aggressively monitoring
orders for controlled drugs; and
eliminating pharmacy customers who
fill orders for controlled drugs in excess
of acceptable ratios, accept cash
payments, fill prescriptions for the
‘Holy Trinity’ and/or other unacceptable
practices.’’ GX 9, at 1; Tr. 319. The
undated letter also states that ‘‘DEA and
applicable regulations do not require
that a wholesale distributor maintain
records of each and every internal
investigation conducted on possible
suspicious orders.’’ GX 9, at 1–2
(emphasis in original); Tr. 319–20. The
letter further explained that once
Respondent has cleared a possible
suspicious order, ‘‘no record is
maintained.’’ GX 9, at 2. The undated
letter explained that Respondent used a
‘‘four-fold approach to monitor all
prescription drug orders and detect
unusual ordering patterns, amounts, and
cash payments to identify potentially
suspicious orders.’’ GX 9, at 2; Tr. 321.
The four-fold approach included: use of
Pro Compliance Reports; preparing a
Market Basket Report of each customer
on a monthly basis; since April 2017,
use of software that identifies orders
that are more than 10 times the ‘‘average
dosage units ordered on a given drug on
a certain day with the last 90 days of
ordering patterns of the same drug’’; the
experience of the employees who fill the
orders for controlled substances; and the
input of delivery drivers and salesmen.
GX 9, at 3–4.
Government Exhibit 11 is
Respondent’s (signed by Paul Dickson)
supplemental undated response to DEA
following up on subpoenas issued to
Respondent. Tr. 144–45, 324; GX 11, at
2. This response states that ‘‘[b]ecause
formal records are not kept in the
regular course of business on the
11 The Agency adopts the findings of fact in the
RD related to these subpoenas and Respondent’s
response and summarizes herein. RD, at 44–50.
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investigation of orders which do not
result in the finding of a ‘suspicious
order’ per 21 CFR 1301.74, the email
communications produced herewith
represent the most responsive records
maintained.’’ GX 11, at 2; Tr. 324.
At the same time, Respondent
produced an external hard drive
containing documents in response to the
February subpoenas. Tr. 146. Again,
DEA emailed Respondent to ensure a
complete response, which Respondent
generally affirmed and also then
provided a phone log 12 with the earliest
entry dated January 5, 2016. GX 12–14.
In response to the subpoena for policies
and trainings, Respondent informed
DEA that its training of employees on
suspicious order monitoring ‘‘does not
necessitate or result in the production of
documents.’’ GX 16, at 1. Respondent’s
reply included two policy and
procedure documents, which
Respondent described as containing
‘‘some limited direction as to suspicious
order monitoring.’’ Id.; Tr. 174–76; GX
17, 18.
B. General Regulatory Obligations
21 CFR 1301.74(b) requires
distributors to
. . . design and operate a system to disclose
to the registrant suspicious orders of
controlled substances. The registrant shall
inform the Field Division Office of the
Administration in his area of suspicious
orders when discovered by the registrant.
Suspicious orders include orders of unusual
size, orders deviating substantially from a
normal pattern, and orders of unusual
frequency.
Id.
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Respondent received a copy of a letter
sent on September 27, 2006, by DEA to
distributors of controlled substances. Tr.
62–63; GX 3, at 1. The letter emphasized
that ‘‘[d]istributors are, of course, one of
the key components of the distribution
chain. If the closed system is to function
properly as Congress envisioned,
12 Regarding the exemplar pharmacies, the phone
log contains two entries concerning the Pharmacy
Specialties Group, with a DEA registration number
ending in ‘‘589.’’ GX 14, at 4, 31; GX 23, at 1. Those
entries are dated March 7, 2016, and December 13,
2017. GX 14, at 4, 31. There is one entry concerning
Dave’s Pharmacy, with a DEA registration number
ending in ‘‘386.’’ GX 14, at 23; GX 24, at 1. That
entry is dated February 16, 2017. GX 14, at 23.
There are three entries concerning Hephzibah
Pharmacy, with a DEA registration number ending
in ‘‘695.’’ GX 14, at 23, 26; GX 25, at 1. Those
entries are dated March 17 and 21, 2017, and June
20, 2017. GX 14, at 23, 26. There are five entries
concerning Wilkinson Family Pharmacy, with a
DEA registration number ending in ‘‘198.’’ GX 14,
at 24; GX 27, at 1. Those entries are dated April 19,
20, 21, and 24, 2017. GX 14, at 24. There are three
entries concerning Wallace Drugs, with a DEA
registration number ending in ‘‘363.’’ GX 14, at 31;
GX 20, at 1. Those entries are all dated January 9,
2018. GX 14, at 31; RD, at n.12. See supra section
III.D.
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distributors must be vigilant in deciding
whether a prospective customer can be
trusted to deliver controlled substances
only for lawful purposes.’’ GX 3, at 1.
The letter therefore, reminded
distributors of their ‘‘responsibilities
. . . in view of the prescription drug
abuse problem our nation currently
faces.’’ Id. Further, the letter reminded
distributors of their duty under the
regulation to ‘‘design and operate a
system to disclose to the registrant
suspicious orders of controlled
substances,’’ and their duty to report
suspicious orders to DEA upon
discovering the suspicious order. Id. at
2. In addition, the letter reminded
distributors of their duty to exercise due
diligence to avoid filling suspicious
orders. Id. Finally, the letter provided
distributors with 14 examples derived
from DEA investigations of a customer’s
behavior that might be indicative of
diversion. Id. at 3. The letter states that
these examples are not all-inclusive and
that ‘‘[d]istributors should consider the
totality of the circumstances when
evaluating an order for controlled
substances, just as DEA will do when
determining whether the filling of an
order is consistent with the public
interest within the meaning of 21 U.S.C.
823(e).’’ Id. DEA sent the same letter a
second time on February 7, 2007. Tr.
64–65; GX 69.
Government Exhibit 4 is a December
20, 2007 letter that the DEA sent to
every distributor of controlled
substances. Tr. 63–64; GX 4, at 1. The
stated purpose of this letter was to again
remind distributors of the requirement
to inform DEA of suspicious orders. GX
4, at 1. The letter reminded distributors
that in addition to ‘‘maintain[ing]
effective controls against diversion,’’
they are also required to ‘‘report
suspicious orders of controlled
substances.’’ Id. The letter reminded
registrants that the regulation requires
that these orders be reported ‘‘when
discovered by the registrant.’’ Id.
(emphasis in original). The letter also
reminded distributors ‘‘that their
responsibility does not end merely with
the filing of a suspicious order report.
Registrants must conduct an
independent analysis of suspicious
orders prior to completing a sale to
determine whether the controlled
substances are likely to be diverted from
legitimate channels’’ in accordance with
their requirements to maintain effective
controls against diversion in 21 U.S.C.
823(e). Id. The letter also informed
registrants that DEA interpreted the list
of types of suspicious orders to be
‘‘disjunctive and [ ] not all inclusive.’’
21 CFR 1301.74(b).
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DEA maintains an Automation of
Reports and Consolidated Orders
System (ARCOS). Tr. 69–70.
Distributors are required to report to
ARCOS all shipments of controlled
substances in schedules I and II and all
narcotic controlled substances in
schedule III. Stip. 9; Tr. 70. In April
2008, DEA met with Respondent’s
President Paul Dickson, Sr., and
discussed Respondent’s legal
obligations and requirements as a
distributor, including suspicious order
requirements, the need to know its
customers, and the need to conduct due
diligence. Tr. 67–68. At the time, DEA
reviewed its ARCOS data with
Respondent to show customers who had
anomalies and to demonstrate ‘‘things
that [Respondent] should be looking at
and questioning [its] customers
[about].’’ Tr. 68–69. In 2013 and 2015,
DEA conducted distributor conferences
and Jacob Dickson, Respondent’s
compliance officer,13 attended both
conferences. Tr. 66–67. Both sides also
presented evidence about a meeting
with Jacob Dickson, Paul Dickson Sr.,
C.G. (a former compliance officer at
Respondent) and officials from DEA,
including Milione, in which
Respondent presented its Suspicious
Order Monitoring (SOM) system to DEA.
See RX 11 (powerpoint); see supra n.8.
Respondent filed three suspicious
order reports during the relevant time
period. Stip. 7. The first, dated April 7,
2014, states that ‘‘[a]t this time, and
pending further review by you or M&D,
M&D has stopped selling schedule II
through schedule V drugs to the
captioned pharmacy.’’ GX 6, at 1. The
next report is dated April 26, 2017, and
states that the pharmacy in question
‘‘purchased a quantity of 60 cartons of
prefilled 10 mg morphine sulphate
syringes . . . This was a substantial
increase over a total sales of one carton
in the prior four months.’’ GX 6, at 35.
The letter states that the order was
investigated but does not discuss the
resolution of this investigation, nor
whether the order was filled. Id. The
final report was filed on the same day,
April 26, 2017, and gives no facts
related to what order was deemed
suspicious nor any information about an
investigation or whether the order was
shipped. GX 6, at 36.
Distributors are required to design
and operate a suspicious order
monitoring system that identifies
suspicious orders. 21 CFR 1301.74(b).
Suspicious orders include, but are not
13 The GS testified that ‘‘one time [Jacob Dickson]
was marked as president and then in the other time
it was compliance officer.’’ Tr. 67. In a letter to DEA
in response to subpoenas, Jacob Dickson’s title was
listed as Vice President, SOM Manager. GX 9, at 4.
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limited to, three stated criteria: orders of
unusual size, orders deviating
substantially from a normal pattern, and
orders of unusual frequency. Id.
Additionally, a distributor’s general
duty to prevent diversion includes the
duty to perform due diligence on its
customers. Southwood Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 72 FR 36487, 36500 (2007); see also
Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 80 FR
55418, 55476 (2015), pet. for review
denied, Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Drug Enf’t Admin., 861 F.3d 206 (D.C.
Cir. 2017). The GS testified that if the
required due diligence at the customer
level identifies red flags indicative of
diversion, Tr. 328, those red flags render
an individual order suspicious and
trigger the investigation or reporting
requirement, even if the regulatory
criteria in 21 CFR 1301.74(b) are not
present, e.g., the order size is not
unusual. Tr. 477–478; see also Masters
Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55477 (stating
that ‘‘an order is not only suspicious by
virtue of its internal properties—i.e.,
being of unusual size, pattern, or
frequency—but by virtue of the
suspicious nature of the pharmacy
which placed [the order]’’).
The Agency’s decision in Masters sets
forth that a distributor must either
investigate suspicious circumstances on
an order and resolve all indicia of
diversion or decline to fill the order and
report it to DEA. Masters Pharm., Inc.,
80 FR at 55478.
C. Red Flags—Customer Due Diligence
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The record evidence establishes that
customer red flags indicative of
potential diversion include a pharmacy
customer that: dispenses a high volume
of narcotics; dispenses the trinity drug
cocktail; 14 dispenses disproportionally
more controlled substances than noncontrolled substances; 15 fills
14 The trinity drug cocktail consists of an opioid,
such as hydrocodone, a benzodiazepine, such as
alprazolam, and a muscle relaxer, such as Soma,
and the combination of substances is still a red flag
even if each element is prescribed by different
prescribers. Tr. 55, 300, 344.
15 The record contains varying evidence as to the
threshold percentage of a pharmacy customer’s
controlled substance fills relative to its noncontrolled substance fills that would trigger a red
flag for the distributor. See Tr. 351, 461 (The GS
testifying that if the percentage of controlled
substance prescriptions filled exceeds 15 percent of
total prescriptions, it is a red flag); Tr. 1030
(Milione testifying that if a pharmacy is filling
controlled substance prescriptions at a percentage
exceeding the national average, then the distributor
can resolve the red flag without reporting a
suspicious order); Tr. 867 (Irelan testifying that the
previous SOM system involved monitoring ‘‘for
customers that were getting a little closer to 20
percent of that ratio’’); RD, at n.5 (noting that the
Masters decision found the threshold to be around
20 percent for controlled versus 80 to 90 percent
for non-controlled, Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at
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prescriptions for customers who live far
away from the pharmacy; fills
prescriptions for a high volume of
patients who pay for prescriptions in
cash; 16 fills prescriptions for
practitioners whose DEA registrations
cannot be verified; 17 fills a
55480, but finding that the GS presented the most
credible evidence at 15 percent).
The Agency finds the exact percentage threshold
to be largely irrelevant to determine in this case,
because in every instance of the Government’s
allegations, this particular red flag was flagged by
the Pro Compliance Reports that were created for
Respondent. Furthermore, all of the pharmacy
customers in the allegations were dispensing
controlled substances at 20 percent or more of their
total dispensing—with one customer at one point
dispensing as high as 69 percent controlled
substances, see GX 26, at 11 (Wellness). The only
exception was Bordelon’s dispensing at 17 percent
controlled substances, but which Pro Compliance
reported as being ‘‘slightly higher than national
average.’’ GX 21, at 6. Furthermore, seven of the
eight exemplar pharmacies demonstrated multiple
red flags in addition to this one. It is indisputable
that Respondent was aware of this red flag for each
of these customers at a customer level due to the
Pro Compliance Reports in its possession.
16 The record contains varying evidence as to the
threshold percentage of cash payments for
controlled substance prescription fills at a
pharmacy customer that would trigger a red flag for
the distributor. See Tr. 328 (The GS testifying that
any pharmacy customer exceeding 9 percent cash
payments from customers should raise red flags);
see also 1036–37 (Milione testifying that a high
percentage of cash in controlled versus non
controlled prescriptions is a red flag, but can be
resolved with due diligence, the records of which
must be maintained); Tr. 681 (Weinstein testifying
that if a pharmacy has ‘‘a substantially higher
percentage of cash payments for controlled
substances than it did for a non-controlled
substances, that would be a [potential] red flag of
diversion,’’ but that he does not have ‘‘a particular
definition of substantial or significant,’’ because it
was more of a ‘‘relative comparison’’); but see Tr.
649 (Weinstein answered that it was ‘‘fair’’ to say
that when a distributor becomes aware of factors,
such as cash payments, ‘‘they’re significant red flags
of diversion.’’).
Again, the Agency finds the exact percentage
threshold for cash payments to be largely irrelevant
to determine in this case, because in every instance
of the Government’s allegations, this particular red
flag was flagged by the Pro Compliance Reports that
were created for Respondent. As detailed herein,
the percentages of cash paid by Respondent’s
customers at issue were also particularly high, see,
e.g., 41 percent, GX 22, at 12 (Folse). It is
indisputable that Respondent was aware of this red
flag for each of these customers at a customer-level
based on the Pro Compliance Reports in its
possession.
17 The Pro Compliance Reports additionally
contain reports of prescribers whose DEA
controlled substance registrations ‘‘could not be
verified through DEA-Verify.com’’ and whose
controlled substance prescriptions were filled by
Respondent’s customers. See, e.g., GX 22, at 17; Tr.
336 (June 2017 Report showing that Folse filled
controlled substances prescribed by 23 practitioners
whose registrations could not be verified). Both
Irelan and Milione testified that the portion of the
Pro Compliance Reports concerning the verification
of prescriber DEA numbers is unreliable. Tr. 765–
66, 797, 901. Milione also testified that a distributor
needs to hold and report a suspicious order if it is
aware that a customer is filling prescriptions for a
practitioner with no DEA registration. Tr. 1025.
Although the Agency agrees with the RD, at n.14,
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disproportionate volume of controlled
substance prescriptions written by only
a few prescribers; and/or orders
excessive quantities of a limited variety
of controlled substances. Tr. 297, 299–
301, 335, 411, 427, 489–90, 648–49, 681,
1037; see also Pro Compliance Reports
GX 20–56. Weinstein noted that red
flags are visible in a pharmacy’s
dispensing data and not its ordering
data.18 Tr. 679. Irelan admitted that,
during the relevant time period, due
diligence was not being applied at the
ordering level.19 Tr. 722–23.
The GS testified that when
Respondent received the Pro
Compliance Reports in GX 20–56 that
demonstrated red flags of diversion, it
was obligated to resolve the red flags
and document their resolution. Tr. 474–
76. Based on the record testimony of the
experts, and the Masters decision, the
Agency finds that when a distributor is
aware of red flags indicating diversion
of controlled substances from a
customer, at a minimum, it is obligated
to investigate further and resolve the red
flags, or, if it chooses not to investigate
and resolve, it must report the order as
suspicious to DEA and not ship the
controlled substances. See infra, section
IV.A.4.
that during the relevant timeframe, there is no
evidence in the record that Respondent resolved the
red flags presented by these reports demonstrating
unverified registrations, even if they were
unreliable, the Agency also finds that there is more
than enough evidence on the record that
Respondent did not resolve the other clearly
established red flags of diversion and therefore
finds it unnecessary to address these additional red
flags in this Decision.
18 The fact that the red flags applied to the
customer generally and not to each individual
order, see ALJX 89, at 99, is irrelevant to this
adjudication, because under the relevant legal
requirements, Respondent cannot ignore red flags
that demonstrate that its customers are potentially
diverting controlled substances and continue to fill
those individual orders without resolving each of
those red flags. See Tr. 477–478. At a minimum,
Respondent must either have stopped the
shipments and reported orders to DEA or resolved
and documented each of the red flags. See Masters
Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 222–23.
19 It is noted that Respondent attempted to
introduce and the ALJ rejected, Exhibit 32C, based
on lack of identification. Tr. 447. Respondent’s
stated purpose was to impeach the Government’s
witness in demonstrating that Respondent’s due
diligence files did include photographs as described
in its policy, Tr. 447, contrary to the GS’s testimony
that he did not ‘‘recall any’’ photographs, Tr. 322;
RX 32C. The GS testified credibly that he did not
recall seeing the file with the photograph ‘‘at all.’’
Tr. 447. The Agency has reviewed the document
and notes that it did include a photograph;
however, the Agency is not finding that
Respondent’s compliance with its policy on this
issue is relevant to this decision and, therefore, the
exhibit marked for identification as RX 32C plays
no role in the adjudication of this matter. Further,
if this exhibit had been included in the record,
standing alone, it bodes poorly for Respondent
concerning its failure to report suspicious orders for
terminated customers. See infra n.61.
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D. Pro Compliance and Market Basket
Reports
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In conducting customer due diligence,
Respondent used, at least up to and
including during the hearing, Pro
Compliance Reports,20 which provide
analysis of a pharmacy’s dispensing
data to include key indicators of red
flags of diversion, such as the
percentage of a customer’s business that
represents controlled substance
dispensing, the volume of cash
payments, and the amount of trinity
drug cocktails filled. Tr. 464–65, 716–
17. In this case, the reports in
Respondent’s possession for the
exemplar pharmacies demonstrated
numerous red flags of diversion, and the
Agency finds substantial record
evidence that Respondent did not
adequately document the resolution of
those red flags or report the orders to
DEA as suspicious.21 Additionally, the
reports in evidence for the exemplar
pharmacies appear to demonstrate
violations of Respondent’s purported
policy of ‘‘eliminating pharmacy
customers who fill orders for controlled
drugs in excess of acceptable ratios,
accept cash payments, prescribe the
‘Holy Trinity’ and/or other unacceptable
practices.’’ GX 9, at 1. According to
Respondent, Market Basket Reports 22
were prepared for each customer on a
monthly basis as part of its due
diligence. GX 9, at 3–4. The reports
identified percentages of controlled
substances in total dispensing. Id.; see,
e.g., GX 59. Respondent no longer uses
Market Basket reports but continues to
use Pro Compliance Reports. Tr. 716.
20 Each Pro Compliance Report contains a
statement regarding the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) requirement on manufacturers and
distributors to design and operate a system that will
disclose suspicious orders of controlled substances.
See, e.g., GX 23, at 11; Tr. 355.
21 Respondent argues that ‘‘the Government
offered no evidence to demonstrate that Respondent
failed to dispel suspicion.’’ ALJX 89, at 100. The
Agency finds this argument to be circular.
Respondent did not maintain adequate
documentation of its resolution of red flags or
suspicious orders, so there is no evidence to
demonstrate whether it did or did not conduct the
due diligence necessary to resolve the red flags. See
infra n.80. As described herein, the Agency requires
documentation of Respondent’s due diligence for
many reasons.
22 Respondent points out that the GS’s testimony
regarding the Market Basket reports was possibly
based on a misinterpretation of the numbers. ALJX
89, at 30 (citing Tr. 409, 423–425). In adjudicating
the allegations, this Decision focuses on the Pro
Compliance Reports in which there is more than
enough information to support the Agency’s finding
that the alleged customers presented red flags of
diversion, the resolution of which was not
adequately documented, yet Respondent continued
to ship. The Market Basket Reports are only
considered to demonstrate that Respondent was
conducting some due diligence.
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The GS testified that he did not find
evidence that Respondent ever rejected
a controlled substance order from any of
the exemplar pharmacies, nor did he
find documentation that Respondent
dispelled all of the red flags in these
reports. Tr. 385–86, 316,23 413.
1. Folse Pharmacy
The record evidence demonstrates
that the Pro Compliance Initial Risk
Evaluation Report provided to
Respondent for Folse Pharmacy
designated the pharmacy as ‘‘high risk.’’
GX 22, at 5; Tr. 328. Further, Pro
Compliance Reports for Folse Pharmacy
in Respondent’s possession
demonstrated that during the time
period of the allegations, Folse
Pharmacy’s dispensing practices raised
numerous red flags, including: high
percentages 24 of controlled substance
prescriptions, high percentages of
controlled substance prescriptions paid
for in cash,25 an increase 26 in the
number of oxycodone dosage units
dispensed, and dispensing of trinity
cocktail prescriptions.27 See RD, at 51–
53. Furthermore, in June 2017, a Pro
Compliance Report recommended that
Respondent engage with Folse’s owner
to ‘‘gain a better understanding of [its]
dispensing practices . . . .’’ GX 22, at
17. The record does not include
evidence of an investigation into or
resolution of the red flags identified.
Further, the record is clear that
Respondent did not report any orders
from this customer to DEA as suspicious
and there is no record evidence that
Respondent stopped shipping to this
customer as a result of these reports. Tr.
340; Stip. 13.
23 Respondent points to Irelan’s testimony to
contest the notion that Respondent was not
stopping shipments based on reports; however, the
citations to his testimony support that Respondent
was generally conducting some due diligence as it
had described in its letters to DEA in response to
the subpoena, not that the red flags at issue for the
exemplar pharmacies were resolved. ALJX 89, at 16;
see also, e.g., RX 31.001 (notes on pharmacies other
than exemplar).
24 According to the Pro Compliance Reports in
evidence, percentages of controlled substances
during the relevant time period ranged from
approximately 30 to 36 percent of Folse’s total
dispensing. GX 22, at 12–17.
25 According to the Pro Compliance Reports in
evidence, percentages of controlled substance
dispensing paid for in cash ranged from
approximately 18 to 41 percent. GX 22, at 12–14,
17.
26 Between September 2013 and November 2014,
the number of oxycodone dosage units dispensed
increased from 40,812 to 52,571. GX 22, at 12; Tr.
330–31 (The GS describing this increase as ‘‘a very
big red flag’’); see also Tr. 471–74.
27 In June 2017, Folse dispensed nine trinity drug
cocktails and in September 2016, Folse dispensed
twenty-two trinity drug cocktails. GX 22, at 17, 14;
Tr. 300, 335–36.
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2. Bordelon’s
Pro Compliance Reports for
Bordelon’s Super Save Pharmacy in
Respondent’s possession demonstrated
that during the time period of the
allegations, Bordelon’s dispensing
practices raised numerous red flags,
including: high percentages 28 of
controlled substance prescriptions,
higher than average oxycodone and
hydrocodone units, and dispensing of
trinity cocktail prescriptions.29 See RD,
at 53–54. In March 2017, a Pro
Compliance Report recommended that
Respondent engage with Bordelon’s
owner to ‘‘gain a better understanding of
[its] dispensing practices . . . .’’ GX 21,
at 6. The record is clear that Respondent
did not report any orders from this
customer to DEA as suspicious and
there is no record evidence that
Respondent stopped shipping to this
customer as a result of these reports. Tr.
347–48; Stip. 12.
3. Wallace Drug Company
Pro Compliance Reports for Wallace
in Respondent’s possession
demonstrated that during the time
period of the allegations, Wallace’s
dispensing practices raised numerous
red flags, including, but not limited to:
high percentages of controlled substance
prescriptions paid for in cash,30 higher
than average dosages of oxycodone and
hydrocodone, and dispensing of trinity
cocktail prescriptions.31 See RD, at 54–
55. In August 2017, a Pro Compliance
Report recommended that Respondent
engage with Wallace’s owner to ‘‘gain a
better understanding of [its] dispensing
practices.’’ GX 20, at 6. Respondent
produced phone log entries on January
9, 2018, for Wallace. See GX 14, at 31
(note stating that the pharmacy
salesman had been contacted and
Respondent recommended that he
return the order, noting ‘‘might need to
check on this guy’’ and ‘‘looks like he
is hitting this stuff hard!’’). Another note
on the same date states that the
customer was contacted and the
customer explained the large order.
According to the note, Respondent’s
employee recommended the return of
the hydrocodone and the customer
returned it. This note did not occur
28 In March 2017, the percentage of controlled
substances dispensed represented 17 percent of
Bordelon’s total dispensing, which Pro Compliance
reported to be ‘‘slightly higher than national
averages.’’ GX 21, at 5–6.
29 In March 2017, Bordelon’s dispensed four
trinity drug cocktails. GX 20, at 5–6.
30 In August 2017, 31 percent of controlled
substance prescriptions filled by Wallace were paid
for in cash. GX 20, at 5.
31 In August 2017, Wallace dispensed three trinity
drug cocktails. GX 20, at 5–6; Tr. 349–50.
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until five months after the Pro
Compliance Report for Wallace, which
demonstrated multiple additional red
flags of diversion for which there is no
documented resolution. Therefore, it is
unclear whether the employee flagging
this particular order knew that there
might be further reason to suspect that
this pharmacy was engaging in
diversion in order to be able to
adequately resolve the suspicious
circumstances surrounding the order.
Even if this note arguably provided a
documented resolution of an unusually
large order, the other red flags for this
customer are unresolved and
unaccounted for. There is also no record
evidence that Respondent reported the
unusually large order or any orders from
this customer to DEA and there is no
record evidence that Respondent
stopped shipping to this customer as a
result of these reports or notes. Tr. 353;
Stip. 11.
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4. Pharmacy Specialties Group
Pro Compliance Reports for Pharmacy
Specialties in Respondent’s possession
demonstrated that during the time
period of the allegations, Pharmacy
Specialties’ dispensing practices raised
numerous red flags, including: high
percentages 32 of controlled substance
prescriptions, high percentages of
controlled substance prescriptions paid
for in cash,33 an increase 34 in the
number of hydrocodone, oxycodone,
and benzodiazepine dosage units
dispensed, and dispensing of trinity
cocktail prescriptions.35 See RD, at 55–
57. In February 2016, a Pro Compliance
Report recommended that Respondent
engage with Pharmacy Specialties’
owner to ‘‘gain a better understanding of
[its] dispensing practices.’’ GX 23, at 6.
Respondent’s phone logs demonstrate
that an employee raised a concern on
March 7, 2016, regarding Pharmacy
Specialties Group; however, there is no
record documentation of how the
concern was resolved and Respondent
32 According to the Pro Compliance Reports in
evidence, the percentages of controlled substances
ranged from approximately 24 to 30 percent of
Pharmacy Specialties’ total dispensing. GX 23, at 5,
18; Tr. 353–54.
33 According to the Pro Compliance Reports in
evidence, the percentages of controlled substances
dispensing paid for in cash ranged from
approximately 28 percent to 31 percent. GX 23, at
5–6, 16, 18, 18.
34 From February 2016 to October 2016, the
number of hydrocodone dosage units dispensed
increased by 25 percent, while from October 2016
to September 2017, the number of dosage units of
oxycodone, hydrocodone, and benzodiazepines
dispensed increased by 148, 89, and 106 percent
respectively. GX 23, at 16, 18; Tr. 358–59.
35 In February 2016, October 2016, and September
2017, Pharmacy Specialties dispensed trinity drug
cocktails. GX 23, at 6, 16; Tr. 355, 358–59.
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continued to distribute. See GX 14, at 4
(‘‘[C]heck out this guys usage for item [ ]
compared to his overall warehouse
purchasing, this seems quite elevated to
me. . . . .???? ’’). This note identifies a
suspicious order; however, according to
the record evidence, Respondent did not
report the order to DEA. Further, there
is no documented investigation or
resolution of the concern raised by the
employee in the record. On December
13, 2017, another note reads, ‘‘Henry
will give the customer a warning about
his Oxy purchases. Too much cash, too
much growth. Will re-run and if no
improvement will either restrict or cut
off completely.’’ Id. at 31. Although this
note seems to set forth a plan for
compliance, it does not include any
indication of an investigation into or
resolution of the red flags identified.
Further, the record evidence is clear that
Respondent did not report this order or
any orders from this customer to DEA
and there is no record evidence that
Respondent stopped shipping to this
customer as a result of these reports. Tr.
362; Stip. 14.
5. Dave’s Pharmacy
Pro Compliance Reports for Dave’s
Pharmacy in Respondent’s possession
demonstrated that during the time
period of the allegations, Dave’s
dispensing practices raised numerous
red flags, including: high percentages 36
of controlled substance prescriptions,
high percentages of controlled substance
prescriptions paid for in cash,37
increases 38 in the number of oxycodone
dosage units dispensed, and dispensing
of trinity cocktail prescriptions.39 See
RD, at 57–59. In March 2014, a Pro
Compliance Report recommended that
Respondent engage with Dave’s owner
to ‘‘gain a better understanding of [its]
36 According to the Pro Compliance Reports in
evidence, percentages of controlled substances
during the relevant time period ranged from
approximately 20 to 22 percent of Dave’s total
dispensing. GX 24, at 5, 18–21, 24, 30; Tr. 362–67.
37 According to the Pro Compliance Reports in
evidence, percentages of controlled substance
dispensing paid for in cash ranged from
approximately 17 to 35 percent. GX 24, at 18–21,
23, 24, 30; Tr. 364–67.
38 For example, from March 2014 to January 2015,
the number of oxycodone dosage units dispensed
increased from 17,889 to 29,994, and from May
2014 compared to December 2015, the number of
dosage units of oxycodone increased by 205
percent. GX 24, at 18, 19, 21; Tr. 364; see also RD,
at 57–59.
39 Between March 2014 and January 2015, Dave’s
dispensed 57 trinity drug cocktails. GX 24, at 18;
Tr. 364. Between May 2014 and December 2015,
Dave’s dispensed 27 trinity drug cocktails, and
between December 2015 and June 2016, Dave’s
dispensed 33 trinity drug cocktails. GX 24, at 19–
20. Tr. 365–66. Further, between June and
November 2016, Dave’s dispensed 37 trinity drug
cocktails and in June 2017, Dave’s dispensed 14. GX
24, at 21, 24.
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dispensing practices. . . .’’ 40 GX 24, at
6. It also states that this pharmacy
‘‘represents a relatively high risk to
[Respondent].’’ Id. (emphasis in
original). A year later, on February 16,
2017, Respondent’s phone logs contain
the following note about Dave’s:
‘‘Talked to [D.J.] about the issues at his
store. He will let the doctors know that
he will no longer be filling these
scripts.’’ GX 14, at 23. According to the
record evidence, Respondent did not
elicit or document an explanation for
the red flags and the record is clear that
Respondent never reported this order or
any orders from this customer to DEA.
Further, there is no record evidence that
Respondent stopped shipping to this
customer as a result of these reports. Tr.
384–85; Stip. 15.
6. Hephzibah Pharmacy
A Pro Compliance Report for
Hephzibah Pharmacy in Respondent’s
possession demonstrated that during the
time period of the allegations,
Hephzibah’s dispensing practices raised
numerous red flags, including: high
percentages 41 of controlled substance
prescriptions, high percentages of
controlled substance prescriptions paid
for in cash,42 and dispensing of trinity
cocktail prescriptions.43 See RD, at 59–
60. In February 2017, a Pro Compliance
Report recommended that Respondent
engage with Hephzibah’s owner to ‘‘gain
a better understanding of [its]
dispensing practices. . . .’’ GX 25, at 6.
Jacob Dickson sent an email to a DI
stating that Respondent had ceased
business with Hephzibah because
Respondent did not support the
customers who ‘‘wished to change their
business model;’’ however, Respondent
‘‘did not find these accounts to exhibit
suspicious activity or excessive orders.’’
GX 72, at 1. Respondent’s phone logs
state on March 17, 2017, that ‘‘they must
work on clearing up issues that Pro
Compliance found, high cash, trinity &
high quantities on Hydrocodone and
Oxycodone. Will re-run in 90 days.’’ GX
14, at 23. On March 21, 2017, there is
a follow up entry that states, ‘‘After a
couple of months, they decided they
would rather change wholesalers than
cooperate with our compliance
program.’’ Id. at 26. Although the notes
demonstrate that Respondent was
40 This Pro Compliance Report identifies Dave’s
second highest prescriber as having eighty-five
incidents of prescribing trinity drug cocktails.
41 In February 2017, controlled substance
prescriptions constituted 27 percent of Hephzibah’s
total dispensing. GX 25, at 6; Tr. 370–71.
42 In February 2017, the percentage of controlled
substance dispensing paid for in cash was 36
percent. GX 25, at 6, 12; Tr. 371.
43 In February 2017, Hephzibah dispensed nine
trinity drug cocktails. GX 25, at 5–6; Tr. 371.
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conducting some due diligence, this
statement contradicts Jacob Dickson’s
email asserting that Respondent
terminated the business relationship
and also that Respondent did not find
the accounts to exhibit suspicious
activity when it clearly had identified
red flags through Pro Compliance
Reports. See GX 72, at 1 (listing
Hephzibah Pharmacy as an account that
Respondent ‘‘chose to close’’).44
7. The Wellness Pharmacy
Pro Compliance Reports for the
Wellness Pharmacy in Respondent’s
possession demonstrated that during the
time period of the allegations,
Wellness’s dispensing practices raised
red flags of very high percentages of
controlled substance prescriptions and
high numbers of dosage units of
hydrocodone and oxycodone. See RD, at
60–61. Although Pro Compliance’s
initial risk assessment evaluated
Wellness as ‘‘low risk,’’ it also revealed
that between April and June 2013, 67
percent of all prescriptions dispensed
by Wellness were for controlled
substances. Further Pro Compliance
Reports during the relevant time period
demonstrated that Wellness’s
percentage of controlled substance
prescriptions continued to range from
approximately 64 to 69 percent. GX 26,
at 10–12, 14, 21; Tr. 374. There is no
record evidence that Respondent
reported these orders to DEA or any
orders from this pharmacy, documented
the resolution of the red flags, or
stopped shipping to this customer as a
result of the red flags that these reports
identified. Tr. 384–85; Stip. 17.
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8. Wilkinson Family Pharmacy
Pro Compliance Reports for
Wilkinson Family Pharmacy in
Respondent’s possession demonstrated
that during the time period of the
allegations, Wilkinson’s dispensing
practices raised numerous red flags,
including: high percentages 45 of
controlled substance prescriptions,
increases in oxycodone, high
percentages of controlled substance
prescriptions paid for in cash,46 higher
44 The Agency agrees with the ALJ’s finding that
the phone log note deserves more weight as to what
occurred with this pharmacy than Jacob Dickson’s
email. RD, at 136 n.60.
45 According to the Pro Compliance Reports in
evidence, percentages of controlled substances
during the relevant time period ranged from
approximately 9 to 42 percent of Wilkinson’s total
dispensing. GX 27, at 20–23. 25–26; Tr. 367, 378–
380.
46 According to the Pro Compliance Reports in
evidence, percentages of controlled substance
dispensing paid for in cash ranged from
approximately 17 to 38 percent and cash paid for
non-controlled substance prescriptions was
significantly lower. GX 27, at 20–23; Tr. 378–380.
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than average dosages of oxycodone and
hydrocodone, and dispensing of trinity
cocktail prescriptions.47 See RD, at 61–
63. In January 2017, a Pro Compliance
Report recommended that Respondent
engage with Wilkinson’s owner to ‘‘gain
a better understanding of [its]
dispensing practices.’’ GX 27, at 26.48
There is no record evidence that
Respondent reported these orders or any
orders from this customer to DEA, or
stopped shipping to this customer as a
result of these reports. Tr. 384–85; Stip.
19.
The Government has presented
substantial record evidence that
Respondent distributed controlled
substances to the exemplar pharmacies
during the relevant time period in the
face of red flags of diversion, including
high percentages of controlled substance
prescriptions, high percentages of
controlled substance prescriptions paid
for in cash, dispensing of trinity cocktail
prescriptions, and increases and higher
than average dosages of particular
schedule II controlled substances. All of
these red flags were specifically
identified by Pro Compliance Reports in
Respondent’s possession. Although
some of the notations provided by
Respondent demonstrated that
employees had suspicions about certain
orders and had made some contacts,
47 Between March 2014 and January 2015,
Wilkinson dispensed twenty-six trinity drug
cocktails. GX 27, at 21; Tr. 378. Between January
2015 and January 2016, Wilkinson dispensed
twenty-one trinity drug cocktails, and between
December January 2016, and August 2016,
Wilkinson dispensed twenty trinity drug cocktails.
GX 27, at 22–23. Tr. 379. Further, in January 2017,
Wilkinson dispensed fourteen trinity drug cocktails,
and in June 2017, Wilkinson dispensed 14. GX 27,
at 26, 32.
48 Respondent produced an email from March 4,
2014, from Wilkinson, which appeared to be in
response to a Pro Compliance Report that
Respondent had sent to Wilkinson. Wilkinson’s
explanation primarily focuses on cash payments.
RX 05.001. The GS testified that this showed
‘‘some’’ due diligence. Tr. 452. There was extensive
dispute about the introduction of this exhibit
during the hearing. Tr. 453–458. It appeared that
Respondent did try to offer the exhibit into
evidence, Tr. 453, and then offered it subject to
connection. Tr. 455. The ALJ ultimately determined
to send it to the Agency as part of the
administrative record. RD, at 104 n.41. The Agency
has considered this exhibit because the contested
nature of the hearing at this point has made it
difficult to determine whether this exhibit was
offered. The exhibit demonstrates that Respondent
conducted ‘‘some’’ due diligence on Wilkinson.
However, it is noted that the document does not
demonstrate the resolution of each of the red flags
of diversion, nor does it reflect any independent
analysis of Respondent’s statements regarding the
cash red flag. Ultimately, the Agency accepts that
Respondent conducted ‘‘some’’ due diligence for
Wilkinson. Further, even if Respondent had
adequately resolved the red flags for this pharmacy,
there is more than enough evidence of Respondent’s
failures to conduct due diligence to support the
Agency’s finding that Respondent’s registrations are
inconsistent with the public interest.
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none of the notations adequately
resolved the red flags and none of the
orders were reported to DEA as
suspicious. In the documents
Respondent produced to DEA, the GS
did not find any indication that the
Compliance officer stopped shipment of
any order of controlled substances
identified as suspicious. Tr. 315–16,
385. It is noted that most of these
customers displayed not just one red
flag, but multiple red flags of
diversion—most of them well over any
arguable threshold that would require
investigation, see supra notes 15–16—
and there is insufficient record evidence
that Respondent conducted or
documented due diligence to resolve
these numerous red flags of diversion
presented by its customers.
E. Suspicious Orders Under 21 CFR
1301.74(b)
The Government alleged that
Respondent failed to design and operate
an effective system to disclose to
Respondent suspicious orders and to
report those orders to DEA. OSC, at 8.
DEA used statistical analysis of orders
placed by Respondent’s customers for
oxycodone and hydrocodone to
‘‘identify extremely large individual
pharmacy transactions and extremely
large monthly volume totals,’’ in order
to demonstrate the failures of
Respondent’s SOM system and
reporting. Id. The GS explained that the
reporting of suspicious orders is
particularly important for DEA to be
able to ‘‘conduct an investigation’’ and
identify potential diversion. Tr. 284–86.
G.R. testified regarding the statistical
analysis that he performed for the
investigation, including his use of a
statistical methodology called the Tukey
method to identify outlier transactions
that represented possible suspicious
orders. Tr. 225; 236–37. G.R. testified
that Tukey uses an interquartile range,
which is the difference between the first
and third quartiles, and then is
multiplied by a factor of one-and-a-half
to six (IQR multiplier). Tr. 202.
Although there is no single multiplier to
use, Tr. 523, the higher the IQR
multiplier, the fewer outliers will be
identified. Tr. 523–24. G.R. used an IQR
multiplier of 3 to calculate a smaller
group of outliers to identify ‘‘what are
called far out or extreme outliers.’’ Tr.
203, 233, 242. G.R. testified that the
transactions that he identified using
three IQR above the 75th percentile
represented unusually large
transactions, which would normally
occur less than one percent of the time.
Tr. 238–39.
G.R. testified that he analyzed
Respondent’s sales of oxycodone and
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hydrocodone from January 1, 2014, to
April 30, 2018, and compared every
transaction the pharmacy made from
January 1, 2014, to April 30, 2018,
against every other transaction made
during the same time period to the same
pharmacy, which he called a ‘‘fixedframe analysis.’’ Tr. 197–98; 226–27. He
credibly testified that he used the fixedSubstance
2014
Oxycodone .......................................................................
Hydrocodone ....................................................................
Tr. 212–13; GX 65–66, at Summary tab;
Government Demonstrative Exhibit
(GDX), at 10.
G.R.’s corrected analysis also
identified approximately 450 potential
outliers for Respondent’s oxycodone
and hydrocodone sales for seven 50 of
the exemplar pharmacies from January
1, 2014, to April 30, 2018. Tr. 213–14,
216–17, 243; GDX, at 11.51 See RD, at 68
for table. The Agency is considering the
review of the exemplar pharmacies’
unusually large orders for oxycodone
and hydrocodone only to further
demonstrate the general failure of
Respondent to identify, investigate and
report suspicious orders.52
In response to criticism from
Respondent’s expert, G.R. also
conducted a ‘‘look-back analysis,’’
which, according to G.R., produced
results ‘‘consistent with what [he] found
using the’’ 53 fixed-frame analysis
49 January
1, 2018, to April 30, 2018. Tr. 212, 226.
corrected analysis did not identify any
unusually large transactions of oxycodone or
hydrocodone that Respondent shipped to
Hephzibah Pharmacy. ALJX 14, at 4; Tr. 230.
However, the Pro Compliance Report for Hephzibah
Pharmacy demonstrated multiple red flags of
diversion. Supra section III.D.6.
51 The tables reflect transaction size, not
frequency. Tr. 244.
52 It is noted that Weinstein conducted a ‘‘lookback’’ analysis of G.R.’s data; Tr. 537–38, 550–51,
693, RDX–4; see also RD, at 73 (table analyzing
these amounts). The Agency acknowledges that
Respondent demonstrated Weinstein’s analysis
produced significantly lower results; ‘‘nearly half of
the outlier transactions he identified in 2017 and
2018 would not have been identified as outliers.’’
ALJX 89, at 38 (citing Tr. 529–30, 568; RX 28 and
29)).
53 Respondent argued in its Exceptions that G.R.’s
look-back analysis could not be characterized as
‘‘substantially similar’’ to the fixed-frame analysis
because although the numerical size of outliers was
similar, each analysis found substantially different
outliers. Resp Exceptions, at 41–42. Respondent’s
point is noted; however, both analyses identified
numerous outliers and, ultimately, the number of
outliers that could have represented suspicious
orders under both analyses far exceeded the three
that Respondent reported to DEA during the
relevant timeframe. Further, Respondent did not
demonstrate adequate documentation of its
resolution of suspicious orders nor is there
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50 G.R.’s
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well as the results of G.R.’s corrected
analysis using the above-described
methodology. Tr. 71–72. GX 65, 66; Tr.
71–72, 211–12. G.R.’s corrected analysis
identified the following amounts of
Respondent’s oxycodone and
hydrocodone sales as outliers, i.e.,
unusually large, from January 1, 2014, to
April 30, 2018.
frame analysis because he was looking
for ‘‘a ballpark estimate of scale, size of
outlier population,’’ as opposed to the
exact number of outliers. Tr. 227, 234.
Government Exhibits 65 and 66
contain all of the transactions
concerning oxycodone shipments that
Respondent reported to DEA between
January 1, 2014, and April 30, 2018, as
2,097
1,919
2015
2016
1,857
1,314
1,546
1,006
method. Tr. 228, 235. In his look-back
analysis, G.R. looked at ‘‘the entire
population’’ and not only the seven
exemplar pharmacies in the OSC
showing unusually large transactions.
Tr. 230. G.R. testified that statistical
analysis is ‘‘one piece of the analysis
that is necessary to comply with DEA’s
regulations governing distributors.’’ Tr.
223–24, 1084–90. See GX 73 and 74
(analysis using the look-back
methodology that Weinstein
recommended). The look-back analysis
for oxycodone transactions revealed
6,816 outlier transactions, a 6 percent
reduction when compared to the fixedframe analysis of 7,252 that the
Government previously found. Tr. 1091;
GX 73, at Summary tab. The look-back
analysis for hydrocodone transactions
revealed 5,222 outlier transactions, a 5.5
percent increase when compared to the
fixed-frame analysis of 4,948 that the
Government previously found. Tr. 1092;
GX 74, at Summary tab.54
Respondent presented the testimony
of its own expert, Weinstein, who
opined that G.R.’s analysis failed to
reliably identify unusually large or
suspicious orders. Tr. 558. Weinstein
based his criticism of G.R.’s analysis on
four factors: (1) the use of a four-year
fixed-frame as opposed to the look-back
method; (2) the failure to consider the
schedule change of hydrocodone in late
2014 from schedule III to schedule II; (3)
the failure to consider package size and
formulation; and (4) the use of the line
item approach as opposed to a
information on the record that Respondent stopped
shipping.
54 Respondent contests the Government’s
introduction of this rebuttal evidence in its
Exceptions. Resp Exceptions, at 40–41. As further
explained herein, the Agency credits Weinstein’s
criticism of G.R.’s analysis. The exact number of
unreported suspicious orders is unnecessary for the
Government to prove or the Agency to conclude in
finding a violation because Respondent was
responsible for creating and maintaining an
adequate SOM system and identifying and reporting
suspicious orders. Here, it is clear from the
evidence that Respondent’s SOM system during the
relevant timeframe was inadequate.
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2017
1,361
536
49 2018
391
173
Total
7,252
4,948
cumulative approach. RD, at 70; Tr.
525–28, 541–46, 558.
Weinstein credibly explained his
criticisms of G.R.’s analysis in detail,
opining that the factors he identified
both over-estimated, see, e.g., Tr. 552,
and under-estimated, see, e.g., Tr. 552–
53, the number of outliers that could
have potentially constituted suspicious
orders.
Weinstein notably ‘‘did not conduct
an original analysis to determine,
retrospectively, which of Respondent’s
orders from 2014 through 2018 should
have been identified as suspicious.’’
Resp Exceptions, at 40; see also RD, at
25, 75. Respondent argues that it is not
Respondent’s burden to do so. Resp
Exceptions, at 40 (citing Steadman v.
Securities and Exchange Comm’n, 450
U.S. 91, 100–03 (1981); Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 80 FR at 55473; 21 CFR 130.44(e)).
Even if the Agency fully credits
Weinstein’s criticism of G.R.’s analysis,
the Government has clearly
demonstrated its prima facie case that
Respondent failed to design and operate
a system to identify suspicious orders
and report them to DEA and Respondent
admits as much. See, e.g., Tr. 666
(Weinstein testifying that the numbers
run in early 2018 would have identified
suspicious orders in similar quantities
to what Respondent is currently
reporting); Tr. 813 (Irelan testifying that
he accepts responsibility for the
Government’s allegations in the OSC,
paragraph 10, regarding the failure to
design and operate an adequate SOM
system). The G.R. analysis, according to
G.R.’s credible testimony, offered a
ballpark estimate of the scale of
suspicious orders that Respondent
neglected to identify and report to DEA.
RD, at 12, and 136; accord Tr. 404 (The
GS testifying that he asked G.R. to
conduct an analysis ‘‘to get a sense of
just mathematically quantifying how
many suspicious orders could
theoretically have been missed by
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Morris & Dickson’’ 55). Respondent
argued that the Government’s case was
founded 56 on establishing specific
outliers that Respondent failed report to
DEA as suspicious orders. Resp
Exceptions, at 43 (citing e.g., OSC, at 37,
46, 54, 65, 74, 84, 93); see also ALJX 52,
at 20. However, the Agency does not
find it necessary to count and identify
the exact number of specific outliers,
and the reason why is simple.
Respondent is charged with violating a
non-prescriptive regulation, which
clearly places the burden on the
distributor to design and operate a
system to disclose to the distributor
suspicious orders of controlled
substances under Agency guidelines.57
The DEA regulations notably do not
prescribe exactly what SOM system to
use or what constitutes a suspicious
order—what constitutes an order of
unusual size, an order deviating
substantially from a normal pattern, etc.
Respondent, in its defense, did not
attempt to demonstrate that the system
that it had in place during the relevant
time period adequately identified
suspicious orders—in fact, Irelan took
responsibility for Respondent’s SOM
system failures and failure to adequately
report suspicious orders to DEA. Tr.
731, 733. Based on the evidence in the
record and Respondent’s admitted
failures, the Agency finds that
Respondent clearly violated 21 CFR
55 It is noted that Respondent uses a different
quote from the GS that stated that the intent of the
analysis was ‘‘to quantify, you know, just how
many orders are we talking about that fell outside
of just a normal pattern or set amount’’ and that
‘‘the analysis showed that there were roughly,
14,000 orders that should have been reported as
suspicious based on the quantity that was ordered.’’
Respondent’s Exceptions, at 45 (quoting Tr. 293).
Given the several contextual parameters that the GS
used in these statements, like ‘‘just a normal pattern
or set amount’’ and ‘‘based on the quantity that was
ordered,’’ the Agency does not find this statement
to be inconsistent with the GS’s statement at Tr.
404, regarding the purpose of G.R.’s analysis.
56 The Government’s Prehearing Statement states
that G.R. ‘‘will testify that a standard statistical
outlier analysis is a reasonable method to identify
unusual transactions in the context of
pharmaceutical distribution.’’ ALJX 7, at 6. The
description of G.R.’s testimony in both the
Government’s Prehearing Statement and Third
Supplemental Prehearing Statement discusses the
manner in which G.R. arrived at his calculations
and established reasonable thresholds. Id. at 6–8;
ALJX 52, at 20 (‘‘G.R. will testify that his analysis
identified the following unusually large
transactions for the exemplar pharmacies.’’). The
Agency additionally agrees with the rationale of the
ALJ that G.R.’s testimony regarding the intent of his
statistical analysis did not give rise to a new
allegation. See RD, at 96 n.33.
57 The December 20, 2007 letter that DEA sent to
manufacturers and distributors stated that ‘‘[t]he
regulation clearly indicates that it is the sole
responsibility of the registrant to design and operate
such a system. Accordingly, DEA does not approve
or otherwise endorse any specific system for
reporting suspicious orders.’’ GX 4, at 1.
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1301.74(b) in failing to design and
operate its system and in failing to
investigate or report suspicious orders
to DEA. Respondent’s attempts to
distract the Agency from the notion that
it did not adequately meet the
regulatory obligation by picking apart
DEA’s ballpark estimate demonstrating
the potential magnitude of Respondent’s
violations are unavailing. The Agency
notes that Respondent contests the
quantity of suspicious orders that G.R.
identified as unreported to DEA; but
G.R.’s analysis, which he notably
calibrated to only identify extreme
outliers, Tr. 203, shows that the number
of unreported suspicious orders for
these two controlled substances during
the relevant timeframe could have
potentially been in the thousands.58
F. Respondent’s Policies and Procedures
During the Relevant Timeframe
Respondent produced a Policies and
Procedure Manual and a Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) Manual in
response to DEA’s investigation. GX 17
and 18. The Policies and Procedure
Manual states, ‘‘Where a Compliance
Officer sees a ratio of controlled drugs
ordered out of the normal range, or the
overall quantity is too high compared
with the volume of the account, the
Compliance Officer has a duty to
investigate by calling the account. The
Compliance Officer may stop shipment
on any order if he or she finds the order
to be unusually suspicious.’’ GX 17, at
12. The Policies and Procedures Manual
notably does not indicate an obligation
to report suspicious orders to DEA. The
GS testified that in his review of
Respondent’s records, he did not see
documentation of stopped suspicious
orders. Tr. 315–16. The SOP Manual 59
states that Respondent ‘‘keeps a system
in operation which is designed to
discover those purchasing patterns of
controlled substances which exceed the
norm and could possibly be related to
diversion activities.’’ GX 18, at 19. The
GS testified that this statement does not
adequately reflect the obligations in 21
CFR 1301.74(b). Tr. 307. Further,
although the SOP Manual describes
various analytical reports regarding drug
sales and drug volumes, the GS testified
that he did not see any references to
these reports in Respondent’s relevant
58 Respondent further made arguments related to
what it determined as inconsistent analysis in the
RD related to G.R.’s outlier numbers. Resp
Exceptions, at 44–46. The Agency finds that G.R.’s
analysis provides a ballpark of the egregiousness of
Respondent’s failures to design and operate the
required system. See Tr. 227, 224.
59 The SOP Manual states that the details of
Respondent’s suspicious order monitoring program
‘‘are confidential and therefore are not made a part
of this manual.’’ Tr. 306; GX 18, at 17.
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records. Tr. 308–09, 491. The SOP
Manual does clearly state that ‘‘[w]hen
a suspicious pattern or purchase is
identified by any of the above methods
the customer is contacted in some but
not all cases and asked for a written
explanation for the unusual order. In all
cases,60 a letter is sent to the DEA
indicating a possible suspicious order.’’
GX 18, at 20.
G. Respondent’s Former SOM System
Irelan testified that Respondent’s
SOM system during the time period
comprising the allegations (former SOM
System) was ‘‘not as robust as what we
have today.’’ Tr. 738–40 (citing e.g., GX
19, at 3); see also RX 31.001 and 31.002
(notes that were part of Respondent’s
former SOM System). The former SOM
system included: know your customer
efforts; an electronic customer profile
(ECP); a market basket system; reports
from Pro Compliance; direct contact
with and soliciting of information from
customers; and reliance on
Respondent’s sales force and those who
actually filled orders for controlled
substances. Tr. 866–70; GX 9, at 2–3; GX
17, at 12; GX 18, at 19–20.
Irelan testified that Respondent’s
former SOM system would send an
email or text message to the compliance
officer, C.G., when an order was flagged
as suspicious and the order would ship
if C.G. did not take action to stop it. Tr.
728, 778.
Irelan testified that Respondent’s
former SOM system was ‘‘not consistent
with best practices . . . . because it
didn’t hold the order. It didn’t give an
opportunity to resolve red flags before
shipping.’’ Tr. 729. Additionally, Irelan
testified that ‘‘the calculation that the
system was using [to identify potentially
suspicious orders] was only using ten
times a 90-day average,’’ which made it
‘‘inadequate.’’ Tr. 729; see also Tr. 321–
22 (The GS testimony that 8 times the
average could still be a suspicious
order); Tr. 652 (Weinstein testifying that
this calculation was not sufficient based
on DEA guidance). Regarding the former
SOM system, Milione testified that his
‘‘understanding is they accepted that
there were things wrong with it, that the
60 The GS testified that customers should be
contacted in all cases. Tr. 484. Masters may provide
some room for nuance if Respondent stops
shipment of the orders and reports to DEA;
however, none of this nuance is represented in the
SOP Manual. Additionally, the policy states that
‘‘in all cases,’’ DEA is required to be notified, when
in fact, DEA was only notified three times during
the relevant time period and the record evidence
established that Respondent neither reported to
DEA nor adequately documented the resolution of
red flags for the exemplar pharmacies or generally
for suspicious orders during the relevant time
period. See supra III.D.
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reporting to DEA was insufficient.’’ Tr.
989. Further, he stated, ‘‘it was clear
that there was an issue’’ and that after
reviewing the system, his company told
Respondent that ‘‘there are certain
things that should be enhanced knowing
what DEA expected.’’ Tr. 990–91. For
example, ‘‘one of the big things was a
way to flag orders [in] real time and in
an appropriate way with some kind of
an algorithm and then report those
flagged orders to DEA.’’ Tr. 991.
Respondent also argues that as a
result of its former SOM system, it had
ceased supplying controlled substances
to 42 pharmacies from 2014 to 2016. RX
11, at 14 (powerpoint slide); Tr. 871.
Respondent’s expert acknowledged that
if those customers had been terminated
based on Respondent’s SOM program, it
should have filed suspicious order
reports with DEA. Tr. 1015–16; see also
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55477
(holding that a distributor discovering a
suspicious order must either stop
shipping and report to DEA or
investigate and resolve the red flags). If
Respondent stopped shipping and
terminated a customer as a result of
discovering a suspicious order, that
order should have been reported to
DEA. There is no evidence that the 42
customers from 2014 to 2016 were
reported to DEA—in fact, the evidence
establishes that there was only one
suspicious order report filed during this
timeframe on April 7, 2014. See GX 6,
at 1.61
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61 It
is also noted that Jacob Dickson’s letter stated
that Respondent had ceased supplying 142 retail
pharmacies ‘‘due to questions and concerns that the
pharmacies were overdispensing controlled
substances. After ceasing doing business with these
‘bad accounts’ [Respondent] has seen very few
examples which would justify the reporting of a
suspicious order.’’ GX 9, at 5. Milione testified that
Mr. Dickson ‘‘specifically took pride in being able
to say, look, this—every year there has been this—
this many customers that they focused on and
identified. And I think—I don’t know the exact
math. It was 125, 135 customers from 2008 to 2016
that were terminated or suspended . . . based upon
their compliance suspicious order monitoring
program.’’ Tr. 870–71. Respondent provided
transcribed testimony from Mr. Dickson in a
separate hearing stating that Respondent eliminated
142 customers ‘‘because in some form or fashion
they might have been suspicious and diverting.’’ RX
1, at 61. It is unclear how many of these customers
were terminated during the relevant timeframe—
other than the 42 customers that were terminated
during 2014 to 2016. Without the benefit of
evidence or testimony regarding the circumstances
of the terminations during the relevant timeframe,
it is difficult for the Agency to determine what
weight to give these terminations, see RD, at n.32;
however, the language on the record describing
these orders as ‘‘suspicious and diverting’’ or
‘‘overdispensing’’ or ‘‘bad accounts’’ certainly
brings into question whether they could constitute
additional violations of the suspicious order
reporting requirement. See also RD, at 136. In sum,
without further evidence explaining the
circumstances of the terminations or the reasons
why they were unreported to DEA, the Agency
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H. Respondent’s New SOM System
Respondent requested confidentiality
related to its current SOM system and
policies; therefore, this Decision
incorporates by reference the findings of
the RD related to Respondent’s system
and summarizes herein at as high a level
as possible while appropriately
adjudicating the facts.62 See RD, at 75–
82. Guidepost 63 undertook seven
corrective measures on Respondent’s
behalf. Tr. 882. Those measures
included: (1) establishing an antidiversion compliance regulatory affairs
team; (2) enhancing Respondent’s SOM
system; (3) redeveloping Respondent’s
ECP; (4) enhancing Respondent’s ‘‘know
your customer protocols’’; (5) enhancing
Respondent’s due diligence
investigative protocols; (6) conducting
employee training; and (7) documenting
everything and reporting to DEA. Tr.
882–900. The Analysis Group, Inc.,
(AGI) was also brought in to develop a
live real-time order monitoring system
that would identify suspicious orders.
Tr. 885. Between May 14, 2018, and July
29, 2018, Respondent submitted 58
suspicious order reports to the DEA. RX
20. In those 58 reports, Respondent
informed the DEA of approximately
3,915 suspicious orders. Id. Applying
Respondent’s new SOM program to its
orders from early 2018, Weinstein
identified a similar number of
suspicious orders.64 Tr. 666, 676, 682–
cannot give Respondent’s terminations during the
relevant timeframe the weight that Respondent
requests to demonstrate its compliance. These
terminations are not being considered as further
violations of DEA regulations, but they are also not
given weight for Respondent in the public interest
inquiry. Finally, the Agency notes that whether
Respondent’s SOM System was adequate prior to
the relevant timeframe is not a matter currently
before the Agency.
62 See, e.g., Tr. 15 (Respondent requesting
confidentiality based on ‘‘proprietary trade secrets
of the Analysis Group regarding the customized
suspicious order monitoring system that they have
developed for the Respondent, as well as all of the
different functionality of the Respondent’s
suspicious order monitoring system.’’); ALJX 82.
The Agency has provided a high-level summary of
these improvements to demonstrate consideration
of the scope of Respondent’s remedial measures.
The numbers of suspicious orders have been
included because the Agency finds this information
to be relevant to the adjudication of this matter.
63 Respondent paid Guidepost a large sum of
money between the time the OSC/ISO was issued
and May 2019 to be brought into compliance with
DEA regulations. Tr. 973–74, 992 (see RD, at 76 for
further details). Milione testified that Respondent
has ‘‘spared no expense’’ in becoming compliant
with DEA regulations. Tr. 992.
64 Although Respondent did not run its new
system on the old data during the time period
covered by the OSC, Tr. 682, 686, Weinstein did
testify that Respondent applied its current SOM
system to the orders Respondent received in early
2018 (covering some of the allegations in the OSC)
and Weinstein testified that using the current SOM
system ‘‘[c]ertainly there were some that would
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83. Respondent’s current SOM system
holds customer’s orders as ‘‘potentially
suspicious’’ and prevents the orders
from being shipped until the
Compliance team has reviewed. Tr.
668–69, 672; 582. Furthermore,
Respondent currently documents its due
diligence regarding suspicious orders in
the Enhanced Customer Profiles in a
readily-retrievable format. Tr. 737, 716;
RD, at 79.
IV. Analysis
A distributor’s registration may be
suspended or revoked upon a finding
that the distributor ‘‘has committed
such acts as would render [its]
registration under section 823 of this
title inconsistent with the public
interest as determined under such
section . . . .’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). With
regard to distributors of schedule II
controlled substances, Congress has set
forth five factors to consider when
determining whether the distributor’s
registration would be in the public
interest. The factors to be considered
are:
(1) maintenance of effective control against
diversion of particular controlled substances
into other than legitimate medical, scientific,
and industrial channels;
(2) compliance with applicable State and
local law;
(3) prior conviction record of applicant
under Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
such substances;
(4) past experience in the distribution of
controlled substances; and
(5) such other factors as may be relevant to
and consistent with the public health and
safety.
21 U.S.C. 823(b).65
have been identified in those months. And in a
similar number to what’s being identified
currently.’’ Tr. 666; see also Tr. 676 (data from April
2018 (in the relevant timeframe) produced a
roughly similar volume of flagged orders, which
‘‘tends to be in the hundreds each month that are
identified by the thresholds’’). It is noted that these
numbers reflect the quantity of orders that would
have been flagged for suspicion and does not ‘‘take
into account any due diligence’’ etc. Tr. 677. This
testimony is not included in this Decision to prove
the number of suspicious orders that DEA should
have received in early 2018, but, instead, is
included to further support the Agency’s finding
that Respondent’s suspicious order monitoring and
reporting during the relevant timeframe was
insufficient to meet the regulatory requirements.
65 21 U.S.C. 823(e) also applies to distributors of
controlled substances. The section sets forth the
identical factors to be considered regarding a
registration to distribute controlled substances in
schedules III, IV, and V, as are contained in 21
U.S.C. 823(b) concerning schedules I and II. The
Government’s allegations are focused primarily on
Respondent’s distribution of schedule II controlled
substances, but in 2014, during the time period of
the allegations, hydrocodone was changed from a
schedule III to a schedule II controlled substance.
Tr. 539. Additionally, Respondent is a registered
distributor of controlled substances in schedules II–
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The Agency considers these public
interest factors in the disjunctive and
may rely on any one or a combination
of factors and give each factor the
weight the Agency deems appropriate in
determining whether to revoke a
registration or to deny a pending
application for renewal of a registration.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55472
(applying DEA decisions on the public
interest factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(f) to the
public interest factors for distributors in
21 U.S.C. 823(b) and (e)); see also
Southwood Pharm, Inc., 72 FR at
36497–98. Any one factor, or
combination of factors, may be decisive.
David H. Gillis, M.D., 58 FR 37507,
37508 (1993). There is no need to enter
findings on each of the factors.66 Hoxie
v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 482
(6th Cir. 2005); Masters Pharm., Inc., 80
FR at 55473.
The Government bears the initial
burden of proof and must justify
revocation by a preponderance of the
evidence. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 100–
03; Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at
55473; 21 CFR 1301.44(e). If the
Government makes a prima facie case
for revocation, then the burden of proof
shifts to the registrant to show why its
continued registration would not be
inconsistent with the public interest.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55473;
see also Med. Shoppe—Jonesborough,
73 FR 364, 387 (2008).
In this case, the Government contends
that Respondent’s continued
registrations are inconsistent with the
public interest based on Factors One
and Four. ALJ–90, at 27–29.
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A. Respondent’s Failure To Maintain
Effective Controls Against Diversion and
its Experience With Controlled
Substances (Factors One and Four) 67
With respect to Factor One,
concerning the maintenance of effective
V; therefore, the Agency, even when referring only
to (b), considers the identical public interest factors
under both sections 823(b) and (e) in this section.
66 Respondent argues that ‘‘an independent
consideration of each of these [five] factors [at 21
U.S.C. 823(b)(1–5)] weigh[s] against a finding that
Respondent’s continued registration is inconsistent
with the public interest.’’ ALJX 89, para. 291. In
other words, although the Government only
submitted evidence relevant to Factor One and
Factor Four, Respondent urges the Agency to find
evidence relevant to all five Factors. The Agency
declines to adjudicate, at Respondent’s request,
arguments that the Government did not make, yet
notes that if it were to do as Respondent requests,
the ensuing analysis of all five Factors would
continue to point to the revocation of Respondent’s
registration.
67 While listing the five public interest factors of
21 U.S.C. 823(b), the Government specifically notes
that it does not rely on Factors Three or Five and
makes no argument concerning Factor Two. ALJ–
90, at 27–29 & n.12. Further, the Government
combines its analysis of Factors One and Four. Id.
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controls against diversion, DEA has
promulgated regulations to guide the
regulated community. Specifically,
All applicants and registrants shall provide
effective controls and procedures to guard
against theft and diversion of controlled
substances. In order to determine whether a
registrant has provided effective controls
against diversion, the Administrator shall use
the security requirements set forth in [21
CFR] 1301.72–1301.76 as standards for the
physical security controls and operating
procedures necessary to prevent diversion.
21 CFR 1301.71(a).
DEA’s security regulations further
provide that:
The registrant shall design and operate a
system to disclose to the registrant suspicious
orders of controlled substances. The
registrant shall inform the Field Division
Office of the Administration in his area of
suspicious orders when discovered by the
registrant. Suspicious orders include orders
of unusual size, orders deviating
substantially from a normal pattern, and
orders of unusual frequency.
21 CFR 1301.74(b).
The OSC alleges that Respondent
failed to maintain ‘‘effective controls
against diversion of particular
controlled substances into other than
legitimate medical, scientific, and
industrial channels,’’ in violation of 21
U.S.C. 823(b)(1) and 21 CFR 1301.71(a).
ALJX 1, at 3, paras. 7, 10. Second, the
OSC alleges that Respondent failed to
adequately ‘‘design and operate a
system to disclose to the registrant
suspicious orders of controlled
substances’’ and report them to DEA, in
violation of 21 CFR 1301.74(b). ALJX 1,
at 3, paras. 8, 10.
Factor Four involves a registrant’s
past experience in the distribution of
controlled substances, which the
Government has argued is appropriately
considered along with its maintenance
of effective controls against diversion.
See, e.g., Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at
55473. In this case, Respondent argues
that its experience in the distribution of
controlled substances ‘‘is extensive,’’ as
it was ‘‘founded in 1841 and distributes
more than 33,000 products,’’ and that its
history of compliance weighs against a
finding that Respondent’s registration is
inconsistent with the public interest.
ALJX 89, at 115–116 (citing RX 1, at
13:16, 15:10). Although Respondent’s
arguments have been considered,
Respondent’s misconduct as described
further herein precludes a finding that
Respondent’s experience establishes a
at 28–44. The Government notes that where it has
not made allegations with respect to Factors Three
and Five, the factors do not weigh for or against
revocation. See ALJX 90, at n.12. As such, although
the Agency has considered all five factors, its
analysis focuses on Factors One and Four.
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‘‘history of compliance.’’ See Novelty
Distributors, Inc., 73 FR 52689, 52702
(2008) (analyzing the identical factor for
distributors under 21 U.S.C. 823(h)).
1. A Suspicious Order
To begin, the regulations require
distributors to ‘‘design and operate a
system to disclose to the registrant
suspicious orders of controlled
substances.’’ 21 CFR 1301.74(b). The
regulations provide that, at minimum, a
suspicious order includes ‘‘orders of
unusual size, orders deviating
substantially from a normal pattern, and
orders of unusual frequency.’’ Id.; see
section IV.A.3. These three criteria are
non-exclusive and registrants may
encounter other considerations beyond
those spelled out in the regulation that
could qualify an order as suspicious.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55473–
74; Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at
221 (noting the regulatory criteria for
suspicion are ‘‘exemplary rather than
exhaustive’’). For example, a distributor
might find a pharmacy’s orders for
controlled substances to be suspicious
not only based on their exhibiting the
characteristics set forth in the
regulation, but also based upon the
‘‘pharmacy’s business model,
dispensing patterns, or other
characteristics.’’ Masters Pharm., Inc.,
80 FR at 55473–74; see also id. at 55477
(stating that ‘‘an order is not only
suspicious by virtue of its internal
properties—i.e., being of unusual size,
pattern, or frequency—but by virtue of
the suspicious nature of the pharmacy
which placed [the order]’’). The
identification of a suspicious order that
is based on the nature of the pharmacy’s
business takes place at the customerlevel. See infra section IV.A.4.
In order to conclude that an order for
controlled substances is suspicious, a
‘‘distributor is not required to establish,
to a statistical certainty, that a pharmacy
was likely diverting controlled
substances.’’ Masters Pharm., Inc., 80
FR at 55480. In fact, suspicion is a low
standard, defined as merely one’s
‘‘ ‘apprehension or imagination of the
existence of something wrong based
only on inconclusive or slight evidence,
or possibly no evidence.’ ’’ Masters
Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55478 (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 1585 (9th ed.
2009)). Thus, if a distributor is aware of
any indication of ‘‘the existence of
something wrong’’ concerning the size,
frequency, or pattern of an order, then
the distributor is obligated to report it to
the DEA. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at
55478. Because suspicion is a low
standard, a distributor’s obligation to
report suspicious orders is triggered
long before the distributor would have
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probable cause to believe that a
customer is engaged in diversion. Id. As
Masters explains, suspicion is not
contingent on evidence that the order
will be diverted or that the customer is
engaged in diversion. Id. With regard to
the reporting requirement, the Agency’s
emphasis is on suspicion and not
conclusive proof of diversion. Id. at
55420 (explaining that tying suspicion
to evidence of diversion ‘‘imposes a
higher standard than that of the plain
language of the regulation, which
requires only that the order be
suspicious’’).
2. Respondent’s Failure To Adequately
Design and Operate a Suspicious Order
Monitoring System
When a distributor’s suspicious order
monitoring (SOM) system places a hold
on a customer’s order for controlled
substances because the order is of
unusual size, pattern, or frequency, the
order meets the specific criteria of being
suspicious. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR
at 55479; Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d
at 216–17 (affirming the Acting
Administrator’s ruling that ‘‘orders held
by the [distributor’s SOM systems] met
the regulatory definition of ‘suspicious
orders’ ’’). DEA has made clear that it
does not endorse any particular system
for identifying suspicious orders. GX 4,
at 1; Tr. 59–60, 76, 210, 497, 646.
In this case, Respondent’s SOM
system during the relevant time period
did not have the capability to hold an
order that was flagged as ‘‘potentially
suspicious.’’ Tr. 728, 778. Therefore, the
system could not comply with the DEA
legal requirements. Tr. 729 (Irelan
testifying that the SOM system was ‘‘not
consistent with best practices’’ because
‘‘[i]t didn’t give an opportunity to
resolve red flags before shipping.’’)
Additionally, the witnesses were in
agreement that Respondent’s SOM
system during the relevant time period
was inadequate to identify orders of
unusual size in that it only flagged
orders that were ‘‘ten times a 90-day
average,’’ Tr. 729–30, 321, 652.68
Further, while Respondent had
written policies and procedures, those
policies and procedures only identified
three suspicious orders over a period of
four years and four months that were
reported to the DEA. Respondent admits
that its previous policies were
inadequate. Tr. 720–21. Respondent had
a policy of producing monthly and daily
reports, yet none is apparent in the
Administrative Record, and although
68 DEA
sent a letter in December 20, 2007,
warning distributors that a SOM system ‘‘rely[ing]
on rigid formulas to define whether an order is
suspicious may be failing to detect suspicious
orders.’’ GX 4, at 2.
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3. Respondent’s Failure To Report
Suspicious Orders Under the Listed
Criteria in 21 CFR 1301.74(b)
As explained above, DEA regulations
obligate distributors of controlled
substances to not only design and
operate a system to identify suspicious
orders, but to also report all suspicious
orders to DEA. 21 CFR 1301.74(b). In
other words, DEA regulations require
distributors like Respondent ‘‘to alert
DEA when their retail-pharmacy
customers attempt to obtain unusual
amounts of a controlled substance,
because such attempts are powerful
evidence that the pharmacies are
operating illegally.’’ Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 861 F.3d at 217–18 (emphasis in
original).69 Moreover, the Agency has
previously held that filing ARCOS
reports does not satisfy a distributor’s
obligation to notify DEA of suspicious
orders, Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR
at 36501, nor does filing reports on a
routine or periodic schedule. Masters
Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55478.
The purpose of the DEA’s reporting
requirement is ‘‘to provide investigators
in the field with information regarding
potential illegal activity in an
expeditious manner.’’ Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 80 FR at 55483 n.169 (quoting
Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at
36501). As such, when a distributor
obtains ‘‘information that an order is
suspicious but then chooses to ignore
that information and fails to report the
order,’’ the distributor violates its
regulatory obligation. Id. at 55478.
Here, DEA presented evidence using
the Tukey statistical model to determine
a ballpark number of suspicious orders
that an adequate SOM system might
have identified during the time period
in the allegations both for the eight
exemplar pharmacies and for
Respondent’s customer base at large for
two frequently abused controlled
substances: oxycodone and
hydrocodone. The ballpark estimate
found numerous potential suspicious
orders for seven out of the eight
exemplar pharmacies, and for the
overall customers, it found that 7,252
sales of oxycodone and 4,948 sales of
hydrocodone during this time period
should have possibly been reported as
suspicious to DEA.70
The ballpark numbers constitute
substantial evidence that there were far
more suspicious orders that should have
been identified, investigated, or
reported than the mere three that
Respondent reported during the time
period. Even taking into consideration
all of the criticism levied on DEA’s
modeling by Respondent’s expert, he
himself admitted that the data run
during the beginning of 2018 produced
similar results to the quantity that
Respondent was reporting under the
new system, which, in a little over a
year, amounted to 3,915 suspicious
orders. As such, the Agency agrees with
the ALJ that the three suspicious order
reports filed during the relevant
timeframe ‘‘barely scratched the
surface,’’ RD, at 140, and finds it clear
that the Government has proven by
substantial evidence that Respondent
failed to investigate or report potentially
thousands of suspicious orders of
oxycodone and hydrocodone to DEA.
Supra section III.E.
Furthermore, the Southwood decision
explained that even after a suspicious
order is reported to DEA, a distributor
must conduct some due diligence and
only ship the order ‘‘if it is able to
determine that the order is not likely to
be diverted into illegal channels.’’
Masters Pharmaceuticals, 861 F.3d 206
(2017) (citing Southwood Pharm., Inc.,
72 FR at 36500). Here, it is undisputed
that Respondent submitted three
suspicious order reports to DEA during
the relevant time period. The GS
testified that Respondent shipped these
orders without documenting any
resolution of the suspicious
circumstances that caused Respondent
to report them to DEA. Tr. 294. Thus,
the Agency finds substantial record
evidence that Respondent’s lack of
documentation of its investigation into
and resolution of these red flags,
69 Suspicious orders meeting the definition in 21
CFR 1301.74(b) must be reported to DEA, and
Respondent did not argue otherwise. See, e.g., Tr.
732, 1024; RX 20.001, at 1. There is additionally no
record evidence that Respondent investigated these
suspicious orders and resolved them at any time.
70 It is noted that the ballpark numbers that G.R.
testified to support a conclusion that Respondent
failed to identify, resolve, or report suspicious
orders under the criteria in § 1301.74(b) to DEA—
not whether Respondent failed to conduct customer
due diligence generally.
Respondent maintained a proprietary
database, RX 11, at 5, there is no record
evidence from this database.
Finally, although Respondent argues
that the record supports that it was
conducting due diligence into its
customers, Respondent admits that it
did not adequately document that due
diligence, nor did it apply that due
diligence at an order level. See infra
section IV.A.4. Respondent’s policy of
not documenting its due diligence, GX
9, was also inconsistent with the
Masters decision. See id.
In sum, the Agency finds substantial
record evidence that Respondent failed
to design and operate an adequate SOM
system in violation of 21 CFR
1301.74(b).
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coupled with its shipping of the
suspicious orders, demonstrates
additional violations of Respondent’s
regulatory obligations to provide
effective controls and procedures to
guard against diversion of controlled
substances.
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4. Customer Due Diligence and Red
Flags
It is inherent in the obligation under
21 CFR 1301.71(a) to maintain ‘‘effective
controls’’ against diversion that ‘‘a
registrant has an affirmative duty to
protect against diversion by knowing its
customers and the nature of [their
controlled substances] sales.’’ Holloway
Distributing, 72 FR 42118, 42124
(2007).71 Therefore, a distributor is
required to act on ‘‘ ‘information which
raise[s] serious doubt as to the legality
of [the customer’s] business practices,’ ’’
also referred to as red flags,72 indicative
of diversion. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80
FR at 55477 (alteration in original)
(quoting Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR
at 36498). A distributor must also
‘‘conduct a reasonable investigation to
determine the nature of a potential
customer’s business before it sells to the
customer.’’ Id. Furthermore, a
distributor has a continuing obligation
to perform due diligence of a customer
throughout the distributor’s relationship
with that customer. Id. at 55477.
Masters clarified that ‘‘although a
distributor’s investigation of the order
(coupled with its previous due diligence
efforts) may properly lead it to conclude
that the order is not suspicious, the
investigation must dispel all red flags
indicating that a customer is engaged in
diversion to render the order nonsuspicious and exempt it from the
requirement that the distributor ‘inform’
the Agency about the order.’’ Id. at
55478.
The record evidence and testimony
from multiple experts in this case, the
Pro Compliance Reports themselves,
71 See also Holloway Distributing, 72 FR 42118,
42124 (2007) (finding that a distributor of List I
chemicals’ ‘‘policy—which is fairly characterized as
‘see no evil, hear no evil’—is fundamentally
inconsistent with the obligations of a DEA
registrant’’).
72 It is noted that Agency Adjudications have
used the term ‘‘red flag’’ as early as 1998 and
federal courts have used the term as early as 1986.
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., & SND
Health Care, L.L.C., 81 FR 79188, 79195 n.23 (2016),
pet. for rev. denied, 881 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2018).
In general, a red flag is any ‘‘circumstance that does
or should raise a reasonable suspicion as to the
validity of a prescription [or order].’’ Pharmacy
Doctors Enters. d/b/a Zion Clinic Pharmacy, 83 FR
at 10896 n.31 (quoting Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 FR
at 49839). Red flags are, in essence, ‘‘warning signs’’
or ‘‘suspicious circumstances’’ that alert the
registrant that something is not right. Jones Total
Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., & SND Health Care,
L.L.C., 81 FR at 79195 n.23.
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and prior DEA decisions have all clearly
demonstrated that such suspicious
circumstances, or red flags, include a
pharmacy that: dispenses a high volume
of narcotics; 73 dispenses the trinity drug
cocktail; 74 dispenses disproportionally
more controlled substances than noncontrolled substances; 75 fills
prescriptions for a high volume of
patients who pay for prescriptions in
cash; 76 fills a disproportionate volume
of controlled substance prescriptions
written by only a few prescribers; 77 and
orders excessive quantities of a limited
variety of controlled substances.78 See
supra section III.C. A distributor fails to
maintain effective controls against
diversion when the distributor
continues to distribute controlled
substances to a pharmacy that exhibits
red flags of diversion without resolving
those red flags. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80
FR at 55457 (faulting the distributor for
supplying controlled substances ‘‘while
ignoring numerous red flags as to the
legitimacy of the pharmacy’s dispensing
of controlled substances’’); cf. Top RX
Pharmacy, 78 FR 26069, 26082 (2013)
(applying a similar principle to
pharmacies filling prescriptions that
contain red flags of abuse or diversion);
see also Novelty Distributors, Inc., 73 FR
52689, 52699 (2008) (applying a similar
principle to list I chemical distributors
under 21 U.S.C. 823(h) (‘‘Fundamental
to its obligation to maintain effective
controls against diversion, a distributor
must review every order and identify
suspicious transactions. Further, it must
do so prior to shipping the products.
Indeed, a distributor has an affirmative
duty to forgo a transaction if, upon
investigation, it is unable to determine
that the proposed transaction is for
73 Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 5548–81 n.168
(explaining where a distributor had information
that 50 percent of the prescriptions filled by a
pharmacy were for controlled substances, while the
average pharmacy only fills about 20 percent, the
distributor ‘‘had substantial information which
raised a strong suspicion as to the legitimacy of [the
pharmacy’s] dispensing practices’’); GX 3, at 3.
74 Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., &
SND Health Care, L.L.C., 81 FR at 79194 (‘‘The
combination of a benzodiazepine, a narcotic and
carisoprodol is ‘well known in the pharmacy
profession’ as being used ‘by patients abusing
prescription drugs.’ ’’ (quoting E. Main St.
Pharmacy, 75 FR 66149, 66163 (2010))).
75 Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55456; GX 3, at
3.
76 Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., &
SND Health Care, L.L.C., 81 FR at 79194 (‘‘ ‘[A]ny
reasonable pharmacist knows that a patient that
(sic) wants to pay cash for a large quantity of
controlled substances is immediately suspect.’ ’’
(quoting E. Main St. Pharmacy, 75 FR 66149, 66158
(2010))).
77 GX 3, at 3.
78 Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55421; GX 3, at
3.
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legitimate purposes.’’)).79 A distributor
has an obligation to guard against
diversion, and as such, must resolve red
flags of diversion presented by its
customers or decline to ship the
controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. 823(b),
(e); 21 CFR 1301.71(a).
When a customer demonstrates red
flags of diversion, the distributor must
report a suspicious order to DEA unless
the distributor conducts a due diligence
investigation, which ‘‘must dispel all
red flags indicative that a customer is
engaged in diversion.’’ Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 80 FR at 55478. ‘‘Put another way,
if, even after investigating the order,
there is any remaining basis to suspect
that a customer is engaged in diversion,
the order must be deemed suspicious
and the [DEA] must be informed.’’ Id.;
see also id. at 55479 n.164 (same).
In upholding DEA’s interpretation of
the due diligence requirement in the
Masters decision, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals stated:
As we have emphasized throughout this
opinion, it is not necessary for a distributor
of controlled substances to investigate
suspicious orders if it reports them to DEA
and declines to fill them. But if a distributor
chooses to shoulder the burden of dispelling
suspicion in the hopes of shipping any it
finds to be non-suspicious, and the
distributor uses something like the SOMS
Protocol to guide its efforts, then the
distributor must actually undertake the
79 Respondent introduced testimony regarding
whether Respondent could continue to ship during
a due diligence investigation into customer-level
red flags of diversion—arguing that there is a
certain amount of discretion involved and that
stopping shipments would disrupt the supply
chain. See, e.g., Tr. 1049, 1050, 1042; 649. The
record does not support a finding that Respondent
did, in fact, adequately dispel all of the red flags
on these customers at any time (before or after
distributing), or that Respondent adequately
documented purported resolutions of the red flags.
The Masters decision cannot be read to intend to
create a loophole in which a distributor could avoid
reporting requirements and continue to ship orders
of controlled substances while conducting lengthy
investigations into red flags. Such an interpretation
would not meet the requirement that a distributor
maintain effective controls against diversion. To the
extent that, as Respondent argues, there may be
some discretion in the decision of when to ship, it
is abundantly clear that a distributor cannot ship if
it cannot determine that the ‘‘proposed transaction
is for legitimate purposes,’’ Novelty Distributors 73
FR at 52699, or without resolving ‘‘ ‘information
which raise[s] serious doubt as to the legality of [a
potential or existing customer’s] business
practices.’ ’’ Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55477
(alteration in original) (quoting Southwood Pharm.,
Inc., 72 FR at 36,498). Further, Respondent’s supply
chain argument is weakened by the fact that
Respondent had a duty to and was purportedly
running reports on prospective customers;
therefore, it knew about many of the red flags in the
eight exemplar pharmacies before engaging in
business with them. See, e.g., GX 25, at 4 (Initial
Risk Evaluation Report for Hephzibah Pharmacy
LLC); RX 11, at 15 (powerpoint demonstrating
turned down prospective accounts based on Pro
Compliance Reports).
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investigation. For example, when an
employee uses the SOMS Protocol to confirm
or dispel suspicion based on the amount of
controlled medication the pharmacy is
selling, the employee must request a ‘UR,’
i.e., a document showing the pharmacy’s
‘actual dispensing[s] . . . of each drug.’
[Masters Pharm., Inc.,] 80 FR [55418,] 55420
[(2015)]. Moreover, the investigating
employee must ‘document’ customers’
explanations for suspicious orders, so that he
or she can verify those explanations and
make sure they are consistent over time. Id.
at 55428 n.21. Additionally, if a customer’s
explanation for its order is ‘inconsistent with
other information the investigator has
obtained about or from the customer, . . . the
[investigator] must conduct ‘additional
investigation to determine whether [its
customer is] filling legitimate prescriptions.’
Id. at 55477. Finally, the investigation must
dispel all of the ‘red flags’ that gave rise to
the suspicion that the customer was diverting
controlled substances. Id. at 55478. The
Administrator recognized that, if
investigating employees fail to take such
basic steps, the SOMS (or similar protocol)
does not function as an effective tool for
dispelling suspicion.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 222–
23. The D.C. Circuit made clear that all
red flags must be resolved or the order
must be reported to DEA as suspicious.
In this case, Respondent received
numerous Pro Compliance Reports that
raised multiple red flags for each of the
relevant customers during the relevant
time period. See GX 20–56; supra
section III.D. The Pro Compliance
Reports themselves clearly identify
specific red flags in Respondent’s
customers’ data and frequently
recommend further discussions and
onsite visits to resolve them. See, e.g.,
GX 21, at 6; supra III.E. Although
Respondent produced some minimal
evidence consisting of phone logs for
some of the exemplar pharmacies in the
OSC, see supra n.12 and section III.D.,
which indicated a few instances over
the several year timeframe where
Respondent had engaged with these
customers regarding red flags and/or
suspicious orders, there is not adequate
documentation as to how Respondent
resolved the red flags, even as
Respondent continued to fill these
orders without reporting them to DEA.
Moreover, the GS credibly testified that
documentation was an essential
component of due diligence. Tr. 298–99
(‘‘[I]f you don’t document it how are you
going to remember it, how are you going
to be able to prove it happened’’). The
Masters decision further pointed out
that documentation is essential in
maintaining effective controls against
diversion to ensure that customers are
consistent in their explanations
regarding red flags. Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 80 FR at 55428 n.21. The D.C.
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Circuit also affirmed the Agency’s
position that if a distributor undertakes
an investigation into its customer’s
potential diversion, then it must
document and ‘‘dispel all of the ‘red
flags’ that gave rise to the suspicion that
the customer was diverting controlled
substances’’ to avoid the requirement to
report the suspicious order to DEA.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 222–
23.
Here, Respondent acknowledged the
paucity of documentation in its records
that might show that it had resolved red
flags. See, e.g., Tr. 720; GX 9, at 1–2.
Contrary to Respondent’s argument
(ALJ–89, at 101–03, paras. 272–75), the
absence of documentation of resolving
red flags does indeed constitute
evidence that the red flags were never
resolved. See Masters Pharm., Inc., 861
F.3d at 218.80 While Respondent did
conduct some due diligence, such as by
obtaining Pro Compliance Reports and
by preparing its own monthly Market
Basket Reports of its customers,
ordering the reports without taking
appropriate action based on the content
of those reports does not come close to
satisfying the regulatory obligation to
conduct due diligence. These Pro
Compliance Reports identify multiple
red flags from Respondent’s pharmacy
customers—demonstrating that
Respondent was aware of these red
flags—while the records it produced do
not resolve them in any substantive way
to demonstrate effective controls against
80 To permit Respondent to escape any liability
for its lack of adequate controls to protect against
diversion merely because Respondent created a
policy that did not require documentation of how
those controls were exercised would nullify the
purpose of the statutory and regulatory
requirements. Further, the Agency agrees with the
ALJ that Respondent’s intentional strategy of not
presenting the testimony of any witness who was
actually involved in Respondent’s purported
resolution of red flags further undermines its
argument that the red flags were actually resolved.
Id. Finally, Agency decisions have frequently
described the importance of documentation to meet
DEA regulatory requirements in other contexts. See
Kaniz F. Khan-Jaffery, M.D., 85 FR 45667, 45686
(2020) (‘‘DEA’s ability to assess whether controlled
substances registrations are consistent with the
public interest is predicated upon the ability to
consider the evidence and rationale of the
practitioner at the time that she prescribed a
controlled substance—adequate documentation is
critical to that assessment.’’ (citing Cynthia M.
Cadet, M.D., 76 FR 19450, 19464 (2011))). In
particular, the Masters decision affirmatively stated
the requirement for distributors to document their
resolutions of red flags and gave a rational basis for
that requirement—ensuring that the information is
memorialized for the resolution of future indicia of
diversion. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55,428
n.21. This basis is very apparent here where
Respondent’s customer base is large and the
shipments are numerous. As such, the Agency finds
that Respondent’s failure to maintain adequate
documentation indicates a violation of the
requirements to maintain effective controls against
diversion.
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diversion. See, e.g., GX 20–56 (the Pro
Compliance Reports for the exemplar
pharmacies). Respondent’s employees
even noted occasions where information
in the Pro Compliance Reports was
specifically concerning to them or
where they were aware of additional
indicia of diversion or suspicious
orders, yet these orders were neither
reported to DEA nor is there record
evidence to support a finding that
Respondent resolved all of the red flags
that gave rise to the suspicion. See, e.g.,
Respondent’s employee’s comments, at
GX 14, at 4 (‘‘[T]his seems quite
elevated to me. . . . .????’’) and 31
(‘‘Henry will give the customer a
warning about his Oxy purchases. Too
much cash, too much growth. Will rerun and if no improvement will either
restrict or cut off completely.’’). The
note documenting this interaction not
only fails to offer any resolution of the
suspicious circumstances or indicate
any reporting to DEA, but also indicates
that Respondent knew of the existence
of a suspicious order and that the
customer was given a warning—
providing it with a chance to amend its
behavior and further avoid detection
from DEA. The regulations require
resolution or reporting, not
implementation of a ‘‘second chance’’ or
‘‘three strikes you’re out’’ program.
A distributor fails to conduct
meaningful due diligence that satisfies
its regulatory duties where it merely
‘‘accept[s] at face value whatever
superficial explanation’’ the pharmacy
offers and then fails to independently
verify it. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at
55457. Further, conducting due
diligence but then failing to act on the
findings is also inadequate. See
Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at 36500
(finding the distributor’s due diligence
efforts to be inadequate where the
distributor possessed information that
customers were diverting controlled
substances yet the distributor continued
to provide them with controlled
substances). Thus, as the GS credibly
testified as an expert witness, the
Agency finds that even though
Respondent produced some due
diligence files to DEA, Respondent
seemed to ‘‘conduct due diligence and
ignore the red flags that are in [its] face
and continue to ship’’ without
documenting the resolution of red flags
or reporting to DEA, in violation of DEA
regulations. Tr. 463; see also Tr. 80
(testimony of the Section Chief: ‘‘[Y]ou
can ask for all these things, but you have
to do something with it.’’). As the
evidence shows, Respondent continued
to distribute controlled substances
despite the red flags raised in its due
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diligence files and without either
adequately documenting an
investigation or resolution of the red
flags or refusing to ship and reporting
the orders to DEA. As such,
Respondent’s due diligence was clearly
insufficient to meet DEA’s legal
requirements. See also RD, at 120–128
(finding that Respondent did not either
dispel all red flags for Folse, Bordelon’s,
Wallace, Pharmacy Specialties, Dave’s
Pharmacy, Hephzibah, Wellness, and
Wilkinson or report the customers to
DEA and refuse to ship).
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5. Summary of Public Interest Factors
There is substantial record evidence
that Respondent failed to adequately
design a suspicious order monitoring
system and failed to report suspicious
orders to DEA. Further, Respondent
failed to report controlled substance
orders from customers displaying red
flags of diversion and in such cases
failed to either cease shipment, or,
alternatively, to investigate, resolve, and
document the resolution of the red flags.
Thus, the Agency finds that Respondent
failed to maintain effective controls
against diversion of controlled
substances into other than legitimate
medical, scientific, and industrial
channels in violation of 21 CFR
1301.71(a). The Agency also finds that
Respondent failed to adequately design
and operate a system to disclose to the
registrant suspicious orders of
controlled substances and report those
orders to DEA in violation of 21 CFR
1301.74(b). See also RD, at 138. These
violations constitute failures to maintain
effective controls against diversion
under 21 U.S.C. 823(b)(1) and
demonstrate negative experience in
distribution under 21 U.S.C. 823(b)(4)
and weigh strongly in favor of revoking
Respondent’s Certificates of
Registration.
B. Respondent’s Integrated Enterprise
DEA has requested revocation of both
Respondent’s registration at its
distribution center in Shreveport,
Louisiana, and Respondent’s second
registration in New Orleans (Jefferson
Parish). Respondent argues that DEA
has not ‘‘alleged any misconduct to have
occurred at Respondent’s Jefferson
location or adduced any evidence or
testimony at the hearing regarding
Respondent’s Jefferson registration.’’
Resp Exceptions, at 49.
The Agency has frequently ‘‘treat[ed]
two separately organized business
entities as one integrated enterprise . . .
based on the overlap of ownership,
management, and operations of the two
entities.’’ Jones Total Health Care
Pharmacy, L.L.C., and SND Health Care,
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L.L.C., 81 FR 79188, 79222 (2016) (citing
MB Wholesale, Inc., 72 FR 71956, 71958
(2007)). ‘‘[W]here misconduct has
previously been proved with respect to
the owners, officers, or key employees
of a pharmacy, the Agency can deny an
application or revoke a registration of a
second or subsequent pharmacy where
the Government shows that such
individuals have influence over the
management or control of the second
pharmacy.’’ Superior Pharmacy I and
Superior Pharmacy II, 81 FR 31310,
31341, n.71 (2016). Further, the Agency
may revoke a registration without
misconduct attributable to that
particular registration if the Agency
finds that the registrant committed
egregious misconduct under a second
registration. Roberto Zayas, M.D., 82 FR
21410, 21430 (2017) (revoking
physician’s DEA registration in Florida
due to conduct attributed to a Texas
registration that had expired).
When a practitioner registrant acts in
a manner inconsistent with the public
interest, in determining whether to
revoke, DEA looks to whether the
practitioner can be entrusted with a
registration. See, e.g. Arvinder Singh,
M.D., 81 FR 8247, 8248 (2016). If a
practitioner holding multiple
registrations cannot be entrusted with
one, then it would be difficult to justify
entrusting the same practitioner with
another in a separate location. Similarly,
when a corporate entity is owned and
operated by individuals who have acted
inconsistently with the public interest
and have misused one of their
registrations, the Agency cannot ignore
this fact when considering whether to
entrust those same individuals with
another registration. Furthermore, even
if Respondent has not used the Jefferson
registration for distribution, this fact
does not prevent it from using its
registration for distribution in the
future.81 See Suntree Pharmacy and
Suntree Medical Equipment, LLC, 85 FR
73753, 73766 (2020).
The lens through which Congress has
instructed the Agency to assess each
distributor registration is whether or not
such registration is consistent with the
public interest. 21 U.S.C. 823(b). In this
case, if Respondent was allowed to
simply shift its operations to an entity
with the same ownership, then the
effect of the violations found herein
against Respondent would be a nullity
and there would be nothing to prevent
Respondent’s Jefferson location from
continuing to act inconsistently with the
81 The ALJ noted that Respondent’s exhibits
demonstrate that it uses the Jefferson location to
‘‘secure controlled substances’’ and makes
distributions out of its Shreveport facility. RD, at
156 (citing RX 1, at 15, 16).
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34537
public interest. It would be inconsistent
with the intent of the CSA to permit
such an easily implementable loophole,
while it is consistent with Agency
decisions to close the loophole by
treating the two overlapping entities as
one integrated enterprise for purposes of
sanction.
Therefore, due to the uncontested
commonality of ownership,
management, and operations, see RD, at
154, the Agency finds that it is
appropriate to treat Respondent’s two
registrations as one integrated
enterprise.
V. Sanction
The Government has established a
prima facie case to revoke Respondent’s
registration; therefore, the Agency will
review any evidence and argument that
Respondent submitted to determine
whether or not Respondent has
presented ‘‘sufficient mitigating
evidence to assure the Administrator
that [it] can be trusted with the
responsibility carried by such a
registration.’’ Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S.,
72 FR 23848, 23853 (2007) (quoting Leo
R. Miller, M.D., 53 FR 21931, 21932
(1988)). ‘‘ ‘Moreover, because ‘‘past
performance is the best predictor of
future performance,’’ ALRA Labs, Inc. v.
Drug Enf’t Admin., 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th
Cir. 1995), [the Agency] has repeatedly
held that where a registrant has
committed acts inconsistent with the
public interest, the registrant must
accept responsibility for [the
registrant’s] actions and demonstrate
that [registrant] will not engage in future
misconduct.’ ’’ Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74
FR 459, 463 (2009) (quoting Medicine
Shoppe, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008)); see also
Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 FR at
23853; John H. Kennnedy, M.D., 71 FR
35705, 35709 (2006); Prince George
Daniels, D.D.S., 60 FR 62884, 62887
(1995). The issue of trust is necessarily
a fact-dependent determination based
on the circumstances presented by the
individual respondent; therefore, the
Agency looks at factors, such as the
acceptance of responsibility and the
credibility of that acceptance as it
relates to the probability of repeat
violations or behavior and the nature of
the misconduct that forms the basis for
sanction, while also considering the
Agency’s interest in deterring similar
acts. See Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR
8247, 8248 (2016).
A. Acceptance of Responsibility
1. Standing and Authority To Accept
Responsibility
Respondent contends that it has
unequivocally accepted responsibility
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for the proven misconduct and that
Irelan, as its Controlled Substance
Compliance Officer, was both
authorized by Respondent and an
appropriate person to accept
responsibility on behalf of Respondent.
Resp Exceptions, at 8. The Agency
agrees that neither Agency regulations
nor prior Agency decisions clearly
preclude Irelan from accepting
responsibility on behalf of Respondent
and will therefore consider his
acceptance of responsibility on its
merits. Further, the Agency finds that
the record supports that Mr. Irelan is
responsible for preventing the
reoccurrence of Respondent’s
compliance failures and accepts that
Irelan obtained authority from
Respondent to accept responsibility at
the hearing. See Tr. 803 (Irelan is
responsible for continued remedial
measures), Tr. 1072–74; 82 but see Tr.
804 (decisions also go through the chain
of command and to the Board).
Ultimately, as explained above, the
Agency has long stated that when the
Government has presented a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the respondent
to demonstrate why it can still be
entrusted with a registration in spite of
its misconduct and the Agency has
emphatically emphasized the
requirement that respondent
unequivocally accept responsibility to
establish that trust. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019);
see also Leo R. Miller, M.D., 53 FR
21931, 21932 (1988) (describing
revocation as a remedial measure
‘‘based upon the public interest and the
necessity to protect the public from
those individuals who have misused
controlled substances or their DEA
Certificate of Registration, and who have
not presented sufficient mitigating
evidence to assure the Administrator
that they can be trusted with the
responsibility carried by such a
registration’’). For several reasons,
Irelan’s testimony has not adequately
convinced the Agency that Respondent
unequivocally accepts responsibility for
its past misconduct.
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2. Minimization and Characterization of
the Misconduct
Here, Irelan accepted responsibility
for Respondent failing to effectively
apply its customer due diligence in
assessing orders of controlled
substances, Tr. 722–23, for Respondent
failing to implement and maintain a
suspicious order monitoring system
82 The
ALJ did not admit RX 54; however, the
Agency accepts that Irelan had authority to make
compliance decisions and speak for Respondent in
the proceeding.
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‘‘consistent with best practices for
compliance,’’ Tr. 729, 731,83 and for the
fact that ‘‘[t]he reporting that was being
done, there were three suspicious order
reports to the DEA, and that was
insufficient,’’ Tr. 731, 733. Irelan also
testified that he accepted responsibility
for Respondent shipping orders of
controlled substances from January 2014
to May 2018 without resolving red flags
and testified that he is responsible ‘‘for
preventing reoccurrence of the
company’s past failures with respect to
application of customer due diligence.’’
Tr. 807, 721.84
In discussing his acceptance of
responsibility for Respondent’s failure
to apply its customer due diligence,
Irelan specifically testified that, based
on his review of Respondent’s records
before May 2018, Respondent
conducted ‘‘a tremendous amount of
due diligence’’ on its customers. Tr.
704–05, 710. Irelan caveated that
Respondent did not keep the due
diligence documentation ‘‘in such a way
as to make it . . . easily accessible.’’ Tr.
705 (referring to ‘‘notes on paper,’’
‘‘notes . . . kept in a database’’ and
‘‘limited notes in our enhanced
customer profile’’). Nonetheless, the
Agency finds that Irelan’s statements
claiming a ‘‘tremendous amount of due
diligence’’ were aimed at minimizing
the extent of Respondent’s misconduct,
which the Agency has previously
weighed against a finding of
unequivocal acceptance of
responsibility. See Ronald Lynch, M.D.,
75 FR 78745, 78754 (2010) (finding that
83 Compare Tr. 731 (Respondent’s counsel asked
whether the SOM system ‘‘was consistent with best
practices and compliance’’ (emphasis added)).
Whether or not this distinction from the previous
statement was an error of speech, the Agency finds
this statement to not differ significantly from the
previous statement—in both, there was clearly a
purposeful avoidance of taking responsibility for
the full scope of Respondent’s actions and an
attempt to characterize the DEA regulations as being
merely best practices as opposed to affirmative legal
requirements.
84 When Government Counsel asked him whether
he accepted responsibility in several specific
paragraphs of the OSC, Irelan either refused or
testified that he was not in a position to answer. See
RD, at 86. For a few of the paragraphs, Irelan’s
reservations seemed to be that Respondent
conducted at least some additional due diligence on
some of the eight pharmacies, but Irelan admitted
that the due diligence was not properly applied.
See, e.g., Tr. 832–33, 828–29. Given the contested
nature of this part of the hearing, the Agency does
not find these failures to accept responsibility to
imply that Irelan has not accepted responsibility for
the misconduct. See Resp Exceptions, at 24 (arguing
that these were not proven allegations). However,
the Agency does find, as explained herein, that
Irelan’s continual insistence on referring to all of
the due diligence that Respondent was
conducting—while not documenting it in a
retrievable manner nor applying it to the orders—
was clearly intended to minimize Respondent’s
misconduct.
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Respondent did not accept
responsibility after noting that he
‘‘repeatedly attempted to minimize his
[egregious] misconduct’’; see also
Michael White, M.D., 79 FR 62957,
62967 (2014)). Additionally, Irelan’s
insistence that Respondent was
conducting this ‘‘tremendous amount’’
of due diligence ‘‘but it was not applied
at the order level,’’ e.g., Tr. 828, not only
minimizes the violation but fails to
acknowledge its scope. At the end of the
day, the fact that Respondent was not
applying the due diligence to the orders
(investigating/stopping/reporting) is
possibly the most impactful aspect of
Respondent’s violation. If Respondent
was conducting due diligence that was
not documented or could not be
retrieved such that it could be applied
to the actual filling of orders, then
Respondent was not exercising effective
controls against diversion because
employees filling future orders would
not know if there were customer-level
red flags or whether they were resolved.
Further, Irelan’s statements regarding
whether Respondent’s monitoring
systems were ‘‘consistent with best
practices’’ also clearly minimized the
scope of Respondent’s misconduct and
did not demonstrate a full grasp of the
breadth of the misconduct alleged—
which was that Respondent had
violated DEA regulations,85 not failed to
implement ‘‘best practices.’’
Respondent’s attempt to characterize the
DEA regulations as being merely best
practices as opposed to affirmative legal
requirements both minimizes the
severity of the violations and also
demonstrates a failure to grasp of the
significance of the requirements.
3. Scope of the Misconduct
The requisite acceptance of
responsibility hinges on the respondent
demonstrating an understanding both of
the past misconduct and its extent. See
Jones, 881 F.3d at 833. Here, the ALJ
found that Irelan did not ‘‘acknowledge
the scope of the Respondent’s
misconduct,’’ and therefore, his
acceptance was equivocal. RD, at 151
(citing Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR at
8250–51).
As Respondent stated in its
Exceptions:
Multiple United States Courts of Appeal
have upheld DEA’s acceptance of
responsibility requirement as rational on the
grounds that if a respondent ‘‘does not
understand the extent of the past misconduct
or its current responsibilities under the law,
85 Even if Respondent chose its language to avoid
drawing legal conclusions, the use of the term ‘‘best
practices’’ was not sufficient to accurately describe
the violations found herein and was clearly aimed
at minimizing them. See supra n.83.
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the DEA rationally could doubt that the
[respondent] would faithfully comply in the
future with its obligations under the CSA.’’
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v.
[Drug Enf’t Admin.], 881 F.3d 823, 833 (11th
Cir. 2018); accord MacKay v. [Drug Enf’t
Admin.], 664 F.3d 808, 820 (10th Cir. 2011)
(admittance of fault is relevant to
Administrator’s consideration of whether a
respondent will change its future behavior).
As Respondent’s current Compliance
Director, Mr. Irelan has assessed
Respondent’s past controlled substance
compliance failures and is responsible for
preventing their reoccurrence.
Resp Exceptions, at 13.
In contrast to Respondent’s final
statement above, there were a few times
where Irelan’s limited involvement and
knowledge of the misconduct
indisputably impeded his ability to
accept full responsibility, such as when,
regarding Wellness Pharmacy, he was
unable to state what due diligence
‘‘specifically was performed for that
account.’’ Tr. 831. The Agency finds
that Irelan’s admission that he had not
familiarized himself with the specific
due diligence performed by Respondent
for the exemplar pharmacies
demonstrates that he did not actually
have the knowledge required to accept
unequivocal responsibility on behalf of
Respondent for the full extent of the
violations found. Irelan’s assertion that
Respondent did conduct a ‘‘tremendous
amount’’ of due diligence is also
inconsistent with his stated lack of
knowledge regarding the amount of due
diligence conducted for the limited
number of customers included in the
OSC’s allegations. It seems logical that
in cultivating an understanding of
Respondent’s violations in order to
adequately accept responsibility, Irelan
would have focused his review on the
customers most relevant to the
allegations. Therefore, Irelan does not
seem to have been equipped to meet
Respondent’s burden in accepting
responsibility.
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4. Trust in Respondent
Although the Agency does not
challenge Irelan’s authority to act on
behalf of Respondent in accepting
responsibility, the burden is on
Respondent to credibly and candidly
demonstrate that it can be entrusted
with a registration. Respondent chose to
meet that burden by presenting Irelan’s
testimony in lieu of a principal or an
individual who had knowledge of the
full scope of the violations. Although
the Agency does not contest that
Respondent could choose Irelan to
accept responsibility on its behalf, that
finding does not mean that Irelan was
equipped to do so unequivocally.
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It is noted that the Agency has long
held that the misconduct of an entity’s
principal is properly considered in
determining whether to revoke the
entity’s registration. Chip RX, L.L.C.,
d/b/a City Ctr. Pharmacy, 82 FR 51433,
51438 (2017) (citing G & O Pharmacy of
Paducah, 68 FR 43752, 43753 (2003)).
An essential element of Respondent’s
showing of trust is that the registrant
and its principals accept responsibility
for their misconduct by acknowledging
their wrongdoing. Sun & Lake
Pharmacy, 76 FR 24533 (citing Medicine
Shoppe, 73 FR at 387; Jackson, 72 FR at
23853; Kennedy, 71 FR at 35709). In this
case, at least one of Respondent’s
principals, Paul Dickson, Sr., bears at
least some responsibility for the
misconduct, and Irelan bears none. See
Tr. 723.
Irelan opined that C.G. and Jacob
Dickson, who were in charge of
compliance during the relevant time
period, were responsible for
Respondent’s misconduct, but was not
sure enough of the ‘‘dynamics’’ or
‘‘reporting process’’ to opine about
whether Paul Dickson, Sr., carried any
responsibility. Tr. 808–09. The extent of
the misconduct is an important factor in
the Agency’s ability to determine
whether to entrust Respondent with a
registration and Irelan’s inability to
testify to the level of involvement and
knowledge of Respondent’s principals
in the misconduct demonstrates another
reason why the Agency cannot deem his
acceptance of responsibility to be
adequate such that the Agency can
entrust Respondent with a registration.
In fact, Respondent’s submitted
evidence includes testimony from the
Hearing on the Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order 86 in which Paul
Dickson, Respondent’s president,
testified that he was primarily
responsible for development of
Respondent’s SOM program and that he
designed the system. RX 1, at 33. Paul
Dickson further told the Court that in
designing the system, he knew that he
86 It is noted that the ALJ excluded pages 147 to
216 of this transcript as irrelevant, but allowed
pages 1 through 146 because Respondent offered it
as remedial, mitigation, or community impact
evidence. ALJX 59, at 6 (citing ALJX 29, at 2, 4.)
Although it is also noted that the hearing in which
these statements were made was related to the
public interest in the context of the ISO, the ALJ
found, and the Agency agrees, that this evidence
bears some relevance to the current inquiry. Id.
Furthermore, Respondent argues in its Exceptions
that ‘‘[t]his testimony is relevant evidence of
Respondent’s credibility and good faith intent in
working with DEA to stop diversion.’’ Resp
Exceptions, at 31. For the reasons stated above, the
Agency finds that, if anything, Paul Dickson’s
remarks seem indignant that DEA is pursuing
enforcement, seem aimed at minimizing the
misconduct, and display a lack of understanding
and respect for the regulatory requirements.
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34539
‘‘didn’t do a perfect job,’’ but that ‘‘it
was the best that [he] could do. And [he]
think[s] it’s dang good. And [he doesn’t]
think a single person has gotten hurt by
[their] drugs. [He] sure do[esn’t] know of
one . . . . So [he] think[s] it works.’’ RX
1, at 57. These statements from the
president of a family-owned and
-operated company so strongly miss the
point of the requirements of a DEA
registrant that they further undercut the
Agency’s ability to entrust Respondent
with a registration. To equate a
registrant’s compliance with an agency’s
closed regulatory system with the
consequence of knowing whether
anyone was hurt ‘‘by [their] drugs’’
exhibits a stark misunderstanding of the
regulatory requirement.
The Agency finds that Irelan’s
inability to describe Paul Dickson’s
involvement in the proven misconduct
further demonstrates the inadequacy of
Respondent’s acceptance of
responsibility in this proceeding. In all,
Irelan’s lack of understanding and
recognition of the full scope of the
misconduct and attempts to minimize
the misconduct lead the Agency to
conclude that Respondent’s acceptance
of responsibility was equivocal and
insufficient to ensure that Respondent
can be entrusted with a registration.
B. Remedial Measures
When a registrant fails to make the
threshold showing of acceptance of
responsibility, the Agency has stated
that it need not address the registrant’s
remedial measures. Daniel A. Glick,
D.D.S., 80 FR 74800, 74,810 (2015); see
also Ajay S. Ahuja, M.D., 84 FR at 5498
n.33; Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy,
L.L.C., & SND Health Care, L.L.C., 81 FR
at 79202; The Medicine Shoppe, 79 FR
59504, 59510 (2014). A registrant does
not unequivocally accept responsibility
for its actions simply by taking remedial
measures. Holiday CVS, L.L.C., d/b/a
CVS/Pharmacy Nos. 219 & 5195, 77 FR
62316, 62346 (2012). Refusal to
acknowledge the full scope of
misconduct, even with remedial
measures, is a risk to the public interest.
Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR 8247,
8250–51 (2016) (emphasis added).
The ALJ characterized Respondent’s
remedial measures as ‘‘impressive.’’ RD,
at 152. The Agency similarly credits the
efforts that the record reflects
Respondent undertook to improve its
compliance with DEA’s requirements
after being served with the OSC. As the
ALJ appropriately stated, the Agency
has also made it abundantly clear that
remediation alone is not adequate to
avoid a sanction and that limited-to-noweight is given to remedial measures
when the effort is not made until after
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enforcement begins. See Mireille
Lalanne, M.D., 78 FR 47750, 47777
(2013) (quoting Liddy’s Pharmacy,
L.L.C., 76 FR 48887, 48897 (2011) (‘‘The
Agency has recognized that a cessation
of illegal behavior only when ‘DEA
comes knocking at one’s door,’ can be
afforded a diminished weight borne of
its own opportunistic timing.’’)); see
also Southwood Pharm. Inc., 72 FR at
36503 (giving no weight to respondent’s
‘‘stroke-of-midnight decision’’ to cease
supplying suspect pharmacies with
controlled substances and to employ a
compliance officer).87
Additionally, the ALJ found that,
based on prior Agency decisions, he
could give no weight to Respondent’s
remedial measures given the lack of
Respondent’s unequivocal acceptance of
responsibility. RD, at 152.88 89 As the
87 In its Exceptions, Respondent points to the
factual distinctions between cited cases in the RD
and the circumstances in this case and also points
to numerous other settled cases that, in
Respondent’s opinion, demonstrate that the
sanction here is unfair. Resp Exceptions, at 25 and
33. However, ‘‘the issue of trust is necessarily a factdependent determination based on the
circumstances presented by the individual
respondent,’’ and it is the respondent’s burden to
bear. See, e.g., Stein, 84 FR at 46,972. And contrary
to Respondent’s arguments, the proposed sanction
is supported by similar sanctions in other recent
distributor adjudications where the Agency
similarly found that respondents’ registrations were
inconsistent with the public interest and that those
respondents had not demonstrated that they could
be entrusted with a registration. See Southwood
Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at 36487 (rejecting the ALJ’s
sanction because it was ‘‘insufficient to protect the
public interest. While [the Agency is] mindful of
the corrective measures engaged in by Respondent,
its sales of extraordinary quantities of controlled
substances to entities which it had reason to know
were diverting the drugs caused extraordinary harm
to public health and safety.’’); see also Masters
Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55501.
88 Respondent repeatedly asserts that these
adjudications are difficult to defend due to what it
claims is an unfair system—that Respondent must
accept responsibility prior to knowing what
misconduct has been proven. Resp Exceptions, at 7.
Respondent chose litigation strategies presumably
based on the longstanding structure and content of
Agency decisions in these adjudications and the
Agency does not fault it for those decisions. In the
end, Respondent had the burden to prove that it
could be entrusted with a registration and it has
failed to meet that burden. See Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 861 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (rejecting
arguments that DEA’s structure of requiring
acceptance of responsibility is unfair, because
‘‘under longstanding DEA precedent, once DEA
presents enough evidence at hearing to show that
a registered vendor or distributor of controlled
substances has ‘committed acts inconsistent with
the public interest,’ the ‘registrant must present[]
. . . mitigating evidence’ including evidence that it
has ‘accept[ed] responsibility for its actions and
demonstrate[d] that it will not engage in future
misconduct’’’ (quoting Medicine ShoppeJonesborough, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008)). Furthermore,
the Agency’s finding on this issue does not hinge
on whether Irelan has accepted responsibility for
each proven allegation, but instead hinges on
Irelan’s persistent minimization of the misconduct
and further on Respondent’s overall failure to
demonstrate that Respondent has unequivocally
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Agency has consistently held, ‘‘past
performance is the best predictor of
future performance.’’ Lesly Pompy,
M.D., 84 FR 57749, 57761 (2019); see
also Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy,
LLC v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 881 F.3d 823,
833 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming refusal to
consider remedial measures where
registrant did not accept responsibility
for its misconduct); Pharmacy Doctors
Enterprises, Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
789 F. App’x 724, 2019 WL 4565481, at
*7–8 (11th Cir. Sept. 20, 2019) (same).90
In this case, even if the Agency gave
weight to Respondent’s remedial
measures, the measures are outweighed
by the fact that it has not adequately
established that Respondent as an entity
fully understands the scope of the
misconduct such that it can be entrusted
with regulatory compliance in the
future.
C. The Extent of the Misconduct
The record demonstrates that
Respondent’s violations of the law were
not isolated occurrences, but took place
over the course of four years and
involved multiple customers. See
Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR at
18910 (collecting cases) (‘‘The
egregiousness and extent of [the]
misconduct are significant factors in
determining the appropriate sanction.’’).
In spite of its self-described status as a
privately-owned company that has been
in business for 177 years,91 Respondent
accepted responsibility and can be trusted with a
registration.
89 Respondent argues that Milione’s testimony
regarding the August 2016 meeting with Paul
Dickson, Sr., supra n.8, demonstrates Respondent’s
‘‘good faith and sincerity, which flatly contradict
the ALJ’s intent-laden description of Respondent’s
compliance as ‘cavalier’’’ and argues that this fact
is relevant in considering Respondent’s likelihood
towards recidivism. Resp Exceptions, at 30 (citing
RD, at 156). The Agency cannot give this meeting
or Paul Dickson’s sincerity during this moment in
time the weight that Respondent requests it be
afforded given that the evidence demonstrates that
for approximately two years prior to this meeting
and two years afterwards, Respondent was not
complying with DEA regulations. Further,
Respondent did not present the Agency with Paul
Dickson’s testimony at this hearing to be able to
weigh his credibility and sincerity either in 2016,
when this meeting occurred, or at the time of the
hearing. The transcribed testimony that Respondent
did submit from Paul Dickson demonstrated that he
believed his SOM system to be ‘‘dang good’’—a
statement with which the Agency emphatically
disagrees. See RX 1, at 57.
90 See also Hills Pharmacy, LLC, 81 FR 49815,
49847 (2016) (‘‘[T]here is no need to consider
Respondent’s remedial efforts as they are rendered
irrelevant by its failure to acknowledge its
misconduct.’’); Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR
74800, 74810 (2015) (‘‘[S]ince the Respondent has
not tendered an unequivocal acceptance of
responsibility, under established Agency precedent,
[it] is foreclosed from a favorable result in these
proceedings and the issue of remedial actions is
irrelevant.’’).
91 See also RX 1, at 21 (estimating Respondent’s
number of retail pharmacy customers at
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maintained sparse documentation of its
SOM procedures generally and
maintained very little documentation of
its resolution of red flags of diversion
displayed by its customers or of
individual suspicious orders. The
record evidence demonstrates that
Respondent attended two conferences,
held a personal meeting with DEA, and
received multiple letters in which DEA
emphasized the critical importance of a
distributor’s role in preventing
diversion given the opioid crisis in the
nation and reminded distributors of
their obligations under the law. A letter
from DEA dated September 27, 2006,
stated ‘‘[G]iven the extent of
prescription drug abuse in the United
States, along with the dangerous and
potentially lethal consequences of such
abuse, even just one distributor that
uses its DEA registration to facilitate
diversion can cause enormous harm.’’
GX 3, at 2. In spite of Respondent’s
established knowledge regarding the
criticality of its role in preventing
‘‘dangerous and potentially lethal
consequences,’’ Respondent did not
adequately resolve or document
investigation into the numerous red
flags indicating diversion that its own
Pro Compliance Reports identified on
the exemplar pharmacies and failed to
report a multitude of suspicious orders
to DEA.
D. Deterrence
Finally, both specific and general
deterrence strongly weigh in favor of
revoking Respondent’s registration. See
Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR at 74810.
The record demonstrates that
Respondent violated DEA regulations
over a lengthy time period—failing to
report a multitude of suspicious orders
to DEA and depriving DEA of valuable
information about pharmacies and
practitioners who might have been
engaging in diversion or violating their
obligations as DEA registrants, thus
contributing to the country’s devastating
prescription drug abuse problem. Under
these circumstances and on this record,
a sanction less than revocation 92 would
‘‘approximately 600 primary . . . and another 200
secondary that fluctuates’’) and 22–23 (‘‘[O]nly
competition are what’s called ‘the big three,’ the
global companies’’).
92 Respondent argues without support that a
sanction short of revocation would serve the same
deterrence goals and would prevent harm to the
community that would result from closing
Respondent. Resp Exceptions, at 28, 31. The
Agency does not consider community impact in its
decisions. See infra n.96. As Respondent notes, it
is difficult to know what level of sanction would
deter future non-compliance in the registrant
community, but in Respondent’s case, where the
violations were blatant, long-term, and impactful,
the Agency finds, given the record before it, that
revocation offers an appropriate deterrent effect.
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send a message to the current and
prospective registrant community that
compliance with DEA regulations is not
a condition precedent to maintaining a
DEA registration and that a distributor
can spend years insufficiently reporting
suspicious orders and inadequately
resolving red flags presented by its
customers, so long as it finally invests
in the procedures it should have had in
place all along after it is caught and
faces potential consequences.93
Although Respondent has
implemented remedial measures, it has
not adequately demonstrated that its
leadership can be entrusted to continue
these measures and prevent
reoccurrence of what happened prior to
the issuance of the OSC, which
amounted to a SOM system that was not
designed or operated in a way that
would adequately prevent diversion of
controlled substances nor provide DEA
with information critical to its mission.
Respondent argues that the ALJ erred in
finding that ‘‘the continued registration
of a fully remediated registrant with an
‘impressive’ anti-diversion regime,
along with evidence of good faith desire
to prevent diversion, does not serve the
public interest.’’ 94 Resp Exceptions, at
Furthermore, again, Respondent has not adequately
established trust, see supra Section V.A.4, which is
crucial to demonstrate the appropriateness of a
sanction less than revocation under the Agency’s
consideration of specific deterrence. Respondent
also argues that the ALJ erred in its deterrence
analysis by failing to consider the Government’s
purported unwillingness to engage Respondent in
settlement negotiations. Resp Exceptions, at 33–35.
While a settlement agreement between the
Government and a respondent may be a way to
provide enforceable assurances of the respondent’s
future compliance, the parties have not reached
such a settlement here. Accordingly, and although
the Agency has considered alternative sanctions as
Respondent has requested, it has decided that
revocation currently is the most appropriate
sanction as explained herein.
93 DEA decisions have demonstrated concern that
giving weight to last minute remedial measures
would show the regulated community that a
registrant ‘‘can unlawfully distribute controlled
substances until [it] gets caught, and as long as [it]
then acknowledges wrongdoing and puts on
evidence that [it] has reformed, [it] will get a slap
on the wrist.’’ David Ruben, M.D., 78 FR 38363,
38387 (2013); see also Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72
FR 36487, 36504 (2007) (‘‘A precedent which
ignores how irresponsibly a registrant has acted and
allows it to maintain its registration based on its
claim of having reformed its business practices,
could well prompt other registrants to ignore their
obligations under the Act and sell massive
quantities of controlled substances to diverters.’’).
94 Respondent argues that its ‘‘current conduct is
the best evidence that its continued registration is
consistent with the public interest.’’ Resp
Exceptions, at 7. However, remediation is notably
not an enumerated public interest factor under 21
U.S.C. 823(b). Remediation is a factor that the
Administrator considers in reviewing the extent to
which sanctions are appropriate and only after the
Government has made a prima facie case
demonstrating that the allegations support a finding
that Respondent’s continued registration is not in
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1. However, Respondent’s argument
neglects to mention that remediation is
irrelevant without continued trust.
Respondent wants credit for
‘‘commission[ing] former top DEA
officials to design their ideal antidiversion system,’’ id., because it
believes that as long as it has invested
the money now, it will prevent DEA
from enforcing against it. There are
several considerations other than
remediation that the Agency uses in
determining sanction as explained
herein. The fact is that, under these
circumstances and on this record,
Respondent has not adequately
convinced the Agency that it can be
entrusted with a registration—its
acceptance of responsibility did not
prove that it or its principals understand
the full extent of their wrongdoing, the
effect that it had on the Agency and the
American public, and the potential
harm that it caused.95 It was
Respondent’s burden to prove that it
could be entrusted to protect the public
interest in maintaining a DEA
registration—and it has failed to do so.
Having reviewed the record in its
entirety, the Agency finds that
Respondent cannot be entrusted with a
DEA registration and orders that its
registration be revoked. The Agency
addresses collateral matters and
additional issues raised in Respondent’s
Exceptions before issuing a final Order.
remediation.96 Although not specifically
contemplated in the CSA or regulations,
DEA decisions have repeatedly held that
the Administrator may, in her
discretion, order that the administrative
record be reopened. The party moving
to reopen, however, bears a heavy
burden. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94,
110 (1988); see also Cities of Campbell
v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1180, 1191 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (‘‘Reopening an evidentiary
hearing is a matter of agency discretion
and is reserved for extraordinary
circumstances.’’ (citations omitted));
Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 717 (9th
Cir. 1981).
The Agency finds that Respondent
has not met its burden to reopen the
record. In all DEA administrative
proceedings, there is inevitably at least
some delay between the hearing and the
final decision of the Administrator.97
Allowing parties to reopen the record to
introduce evidence of acceptance of
responsibility and remedial measures
taken during that delay would create a
recursive loop further delaying the
conclusion of proceedings to the
detriment of the public interest. See,
e.g., Abudu, 485 U.S. at 107; Qoku v.
Gonzales, 156 F. App’x. 703, 705 (5th
Cir. 2005). As the Supreme Court
observed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, ‘‘[a]dministrative
consideration of evidence . . . always
creates a gap between the time the
VI. Motion To Reopen
96 Respondent also requests to reopen the record
to introduce evidence of the impact revoking its
registration would have on the community. Motion
to Reopen, at 20–22. The Agency has consistently
found that community impact is not a relevant
consideration under the public interest factors. E.g.,
Stephen E. Owusu, D.P.M., 87 FR 3343, 3351 n.21
(2022); George Pursley, M.D., 85 FR 80,162, 80,188
n. 82 (2020); Frank Joseph Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR
45229, 45239 (2020). Accordingly, Respondent’s
community impact evidence is not grounds to
reopen the record. Further, Respondent made
arguments that it should be allowed to introduce
evidence that it concedes is not an independent
basis to reopen the record but argues is properly
admitted if the record is reopened. Reply ISO
Motion to Reopen, at 12. Nonetheless, the Agency
is not reaching a finding on the admissibility of this
evidence because it is not granting Respondent’s
Motion to Reopen.
97 The delay between the hearing and the
issuance of the final decision in this matter was
longer than is typical for the Agency, but the
proceedings were delayed partially at Respondent’s
request. On March 9, 2020, Respondent wrote a
letter to the then-Acting Administrator asking that
the Agency postpone issuing a Final Order ‘‘to
allow the COVID–19 crisis to abate or the parties
to reach a final settlement . . . .’’ See Letter from
Respondent. Respondent then requested yet another
delay in its Motion to Reopen asking that the
Administrator delay the issuance of a final order
‘‘until after [Respondent’s] new counsel has had an
opportunity to resolve the matter with DEA’s Chief
Counsel.’’ Motion to Reopen, at 4, n.4. Respondent
cannot request to delay the proceedings and then
claim that a failure to reopen the record is somehow
prejudicial to Respondent because of its requested
delay.
On January 5, 2022, Respondent filed
a Motion to Reopen the Administrative
Record. Respondent seeks to introduce
evidence of post-hearing conduct that it
argues demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility and successful
the public interest. See, e.g., Samuel S. Jackson,
D.D.S., 72 FR at 23,853.
95 Respondent attached to its Exceptions the
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) September 2019 Review of the Drug
Enforcement Administration’s Regulatory and
Enforcement Efforts to Control the Diversion of
Opioids—claiming that the report is DEA’s
motivation for pursuing ‘‘the harshest sanction’’
against Respondent. The report is dated September
2019—a month after the ALJ’s issuance of the RD.
Furthermore, DEA subpoenaed Respondent as early
as February 1, 2018; therefore, temporally, the OIG’s
findings could not have motivated the Agency’s
investigation into Respondent. Such allegations are
a distraction from the issue at hand—Respondent
failed to comply with its regulatory obligations and
neither the Agency nor the country could possibly
have the ability to know what might have happened
had those suspicious orders been reported to DEA
and to what extent diversion and abuse might have
been prevented. What the Agency does know is that
Respondent’s failures were monumental, and
Respondent clearly misses the point in arguing that
‘‘had the Respondent more consistently reported
suspicious orders with the DEA, it has been
established that the reports would have been
ignored.’’ Resp Exceptions, at 5.
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record is closed and the time the
administrative decision is promulgated
. . . . If upon the coming down of the
order litigants might demand rehearings
as a matter of law because some new
circumstance has arisen, some new
trend has been observed, or some new
fact discovered, there would be little
hope that the administrative process
could ever be consummated in an order
that would not be subject to reopening.’’
435 U.S. 519, 554–55 (1978) (quoting
ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 514
(1944) (citing Northern Lines Merger
Cases, 396 U.S. 491, 521 (1970)).
Respondent had the opportunity to,
and did, introduce evidence related to
its acceptance of responsibility and
remedial measures at the hearing. That
evidence was entered into the record
and considered in the ALJ’s
Recommended Decision and this Final
Order.
VII. Lucia
The Agency has carefully considered
Respondent’s Exceptions to the
Recommended Decision, has addressed
them throughout the record, and
addresses the remaining herein.
In its Exceptions, Respondent notes
that ‘‘as [it] has repeatedly and
consistently objected, including at the
hearing, this entire proceeding was
unconstitutional.’’ (citing Tr. 20:23–
22:17). Respondent contends that ‘‘[t]he
presiding ALJ in this matter was
unconstitutionally appointed when
these proceedings began and
unconstitutionally continued to preside
over these proceedings after the
Attorney General purportedly ratified
his appointment.’’ (citing Lucia v.
Securities and Exchange Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (hereinafter,
Lucia)). The Agency will note the
factual sequence of events surrounding
Respondent’s Lucia claims.
Respondent’s Prehearing Statement,
filed on August 3, 2018, averred,
‘‘Respondent may file a motion before
this Tribunal related to the
constitutionality of the DEA’s
administrative process given the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent decision in
[Lucia].’’ ALJX 8, at 37. During the
Prehearing Conference, Respondent’s
attorney stated, ‘‘with regards to the
Lucia case, this is obviously no
disrespect intended to the Court but we
do think that it’s a significant issue that
should we proceed to hearing, we do
want to address and I would like to file
a motion about it.’’ The ALJ replied,
‘‘Well, if you’re going to file a motion
about it, I obviously would need to take
a look at it . . . . Apparently, if you file
a motion, there’s a good chance you’ll
wind up with a different Judge . . . .
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17:16 May 26, 2023
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I’m just putting you on notice that that’s
what’s likely to happen.’’ Prehearing,
Tr. 36. The ALJ ordered that ‘‘[y]ou
obviously can file motions tomorrow if
you want to but any motions I’m going
to need to rule on I would like to have
no later than October 23rd. . . .’’ Tr.
42–43.
On October 26, 2018, Respondent
submitted a letter on the record alerting
the Tribunal that it had commenced an
action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Louisiana seeking an ‘‘injunction
enjoining DEA and DOJ from requiring
Morris & Dickson to appear in any
administrative proceeding, including
the upcoming hearing scheduled for
November 13, 2018, unless and until a
constitutionally valid administrative
system has been established.’’ ALJX 26,
at 1. On October 31, 2018, Respondent
filed another letter with the Tribunal
explaining that it did not file a motion
with the ALJ because the Agency ‘‘has
no authority to entertain a facial
constitutional challenge’’ and that ‘‘[t]he
Louisiana Court will resolve that
question. Morris & Dickson simply
provides this Tribunal notice of that
filing and requests sufficient time to
allow the Louisiana Court (and, if
necessary, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals) to make its ruling.’’ ALJX 34,
at 1–2.
On December 31, 2018, Respondent
submitted a letter notifying the Tribunal
that ‘‘[o]n December 28, 2018, the
District Court in the Western District of
Louisiana dismissed Respondent’s
complaint without prejudice, finding
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
Morris & Dickson’s claims’’ and
attaching the decision. ALJX 47, at 1.
The Decision stated that, although
Respondent’s argument was ‘‘somewhat
close,’’ ‘‘in light of the policy problem
created by crafting a ‘constitutional
claim’ exception to Congress’s ability to
channel initial review through agencies,
the Court finds that Morris & Dickson’s
separation-of-powers claims are not
‘wholly collateral’ to the proceeding
before Judge Dorman because they were
raised in an attempt to delay or defeat
administrative enforcement of the
CSA.’’ Id. at 30.
On January 15, 2019, the ALJ issued
an Order Lifting the Stay and Third
Prehearing Ruling. ALJX 51. The Order
stated that Respondent indicated during
a telephonic conference on the previous
day that it ‘‘w[ould] not seek to
maintain the stay in this case pending
its appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’’ 98 and that
98 Respondent’s appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was dismissed by
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‘‘it w[ould] not file a motion seeking to
recuse [the ALJ] from this case based on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia
. . . .’’ Id. at 1.
The next time Respondent raised the
Lucia issue was at the beginning of the
hearing on May 13, 2019. Respondent’s
lawyer made a self-described ‘‘statement
of the record, simply,’’ Tr. 23, that ‘‘we
respectfully renew for the record our
objection to the hearing and
proceeding.’’ Tr. 22. However,
Respondent’s lawyer also agreed that
Respondent was ready to go to hearing
that day and made no further motions
or requests for a new ALJ. Tr. 24.
On October 25, 2018, the Attorney
General ratified the prior appointment
of the DEA ALJs, including ALJ Dorman,
and ‘‘approved their appointments as
his own under the Constitution.’’ See
Office of the Attorney General, Order
No. 4.315–2018.99 It is noted that, at the
time that the hearing took place in this
matter, ALJ Dorman’s appointment as an
Administrative Law Judge had been
ratified. Respondent never formally
requested reassignment nor availed
itself of the opportunity to request
interlocutory review to the
Administrator on any ruling of the ALJ
or any Lucia-related issue pursuant to
21 CFR 1316.62. Had Respondent
contested the matter formally with the
Agency, the Agency would have
assigned another ALJ, see Prehearing,
Tr. 36, and saved significant Agency
resources. The Agency further finds that
ALJ Dorman’s appointment was ratified
before the hearing. Due to Respondent’s
calculated choice to preserve the matter
for the record, Tr. 23, but not raise it in
any way that the Agency might have
had the capacity to address and remedy
itself, the Agency considers the
argument waived for purposes of
finalizing this adjudication.
Having found that Respondent cannot
be entrusted with a DEA registration,
the Agency issues the following Order
revoking Respondent’s DEA
registrations.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4) and 21 U.S.C. 823(b), (e), I
hereby revoke DEA Certificates of
Registration Nos. RM0314790 and
RM0335732 issued to Morris & Dickson,
Co., LLC. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR
0.100(b) and the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4) and 21 U.S.C.
its own motion. See Morris and Dickson v. William
Barr, et al., No. 19–30043, 2019 WL 3230978 (5th
Cir. Apr. 1, 2019).
99 Although not considered material to this
Decision, a copy of this Order will be included in
the administrative record for future reference.
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823(b), (e), I hereby deny any pending
application of Morris & Dickson, Co.,
LLC to renew or modify these
registrations, as well as any other
pending application of Morris &
Dickson, Co., LLC. This Order is
effective August 28, 2023.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug
Enforcement Administration was signed
on May 19, 2023, by Administrator
Anne Milgram. That document with the
original signature and date is
maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
DEA. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Scott Brinks,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug
Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2023–11369 Filed 5–26–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Information Collection Activities;
Comment Request
Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Department of Labor.
ACTION: Notice of information collection;
request for comment.
AGENCY:
The Department of Labor, as
part of its continuing effort to reduce
paperwork and respondent burden,
conducts a pre-clearance consultation
program to provide the general public
and Federal agencies with an
opportunity to comment on proposed
and/or continuing collections of
information in accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. This
program helps to ensure that requested
data can be provided in the desired
format, reporting burden (time and
financial resources) is minimized,
collection instruments are clearly
understood, and the impact of collection
requirements on respondents can be
properly assessed. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) is soliciting comments
concerning the proposed revision of the
‘‘Current Population Survey (CPS).’’ A
copy of the proposed information
collection request can be obtained by
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
SUMMARY:
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17:16 May 26, 2023
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contacting the individual listed below
in the ADDRESSES section of this notice.
DATES: Written comments must be
submitted to the office listed in the
ADDRESSES section of this notice on or
before July 31, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Send comments to Erin
Good, BLS Clearance Officer, Division
of Management Systems, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Room G225, 2
Massachusetts Avenue NE, Washington,
DC 20212. Written comments also may
be transmitted by email to BLS_PRA_
Public@bls.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Erin
Good, BLS Clearance Officer, at 202–
691–7628 (this is not a toll free number).
(See ADDRESSES section.)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The CPS has been the principal
source of the official Government
statistics on employment and
unemployment for over 75 years. The
CPS is a monthly sample survey of
60,000 eligible households. The labor
force information gathered through the
survey is of paramount importance in
keeping track of the economic health of
the Nation. The survey is the only
source of monthly data on total
employment and unemployment. The
Employment Situation news release
contains data from this survey and is
designated as a Principal Federal
Economic Indicator (PFEI). Moreover,
the survey also yields data on the
characteristics of persons not in the
labor force. The CPS data are used
monthly, in conjunction with data from
other sources, to analyze the extent to
which, and with what success, the
various components of the American
population are participating in the
economic life of the Nation.
The labor force data gathered through
the CPS are provided to users in the
greatest detail possible, in conjunction
with the demographic information
obtained in the survey. In brief, the
labor force data can be broken down by
sex, age, race, ethnicity, marital status,
family composition, educational level,
veteran status, certification and
licensing status, disability status, and
other characteristics. Through such
breakdowns, one can focus on the
employment situation of specific
population groups as well as on general
trends in employment and
unemployment. Information of this type
can be obtained only through
demographically oriented surveys such
as the CPS.
The basic CPS data also are used as
an important platform on which to base
the data derived from the various
PO 00000
Frm 00078
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
34543
supplemental questions that are
administered in conjunction with the
survey. By coupling the basic data from
the monthly survey with the special
data from the supplements, one can get
valuable insights on the behavior of
American workers and on the social and
economic health of their families.
There is wide interest in the monthly
CPS data among Government
policymakers, legislators, economists,
the media, and the general public.
While the data from the CPS are used in
conjunction with data from other
surveys in assessing the economic
health of the Nation, they are unique in
various ways. Specifically, they are the
basis for much of the monthly
Employment Situation report, a PFEI.
They provide a monthly, nationally
representative measure of total
employment, including farm work, selfemployment, and unpaid family work;
other surveys are generally restricted to
the nonagricultural wage and salary
sector, or provide less timely
information. The CPS provides data on
all job seekers, and on all persons
outside the labor force, while payrollbased surveys cannot, by definition,
cover these sectors of the population.
Finally, the CPS data on employment,
unemployment, and on persons not in
the labor force can be linked to the
demographic characteristics of the many
groups that make up the Nation’s
population, while the data from other
surveys often have limited demographic
information. Many groups, both in the
government and in the private sector,
are eager to analyze this wealth of
demographic and labor force data.
II. Current Action
Office of Management and Budget
clearance is being sought for a revision
of the Current Population Survey. BLS
is seeking approval to remove two
questions that collected information
about the impact of the COVID–19
pandemic on where people worked.
These questions, which ask about
telework or work at home in February
2020, have been included on the CPS
since October 2022 to measure the
impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on
the labor force. BLS feels that enough
time has passed since the onset of the
pandemic and its impact on how people
work. These questions would not
provide meaningful data going forward.
III. Desired Focus of Comments
The Bureau of Labor Statistics is
particularly interested in comments
that:
• Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
E:\FR\FM\30MYN1.SGM
30MYN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 103 (Tuesday, May 30, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34523-34543]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-11369]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 18-31]
Morris & Dickson Co., LLC; Decision and Order
On May 2, 2018, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government), issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) and Immediate
Suspension of Registration (ISO) to Morris & Dickson Co., LLC
(Respondent), of Louisiana. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Exhibit
(ALJX) 1, at 1. The OSC informed Respondent of the immediate suspension
of its Certificates of Registration Nos. RM0314790 and RM0335732
(registrations) \1\ and proposed their revocation pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4) and 823(b) because it alleged that Respondent's continued
registrations were inconsistent with the public interest. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Respondent sought and obtained a temporary restraining order
against enforcement of the ISO. See ALJX 89, at 7. On May 18, 2018,
the DEA Acting Administrator rescinded the ISO issued on May 2,
2018. Tr. 12; see Stip. 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent requested a hearing before a DEA ALJ, which was
conducted from May 13 to May 16, 2019. On August 29, 2019, the ALJ
issued a Recommended Decision (RD), which was transmitted to the Agency
along with the administrative record on November 26, 2019.\2\ The
Agency has incorporated portions of the ALJ's RD herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ On October 8, 2019, Respondent filed Exceptions to the
Recommended Decision (Resp Exceptions) and on November 7, 2019, the
Government filed a response to Respondent's Exceptions. On January
5, 2022, Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen the Administrative
Record. On January 14, 2022, the Government filed an opposition to
this motion and on January 21, 2022, Respondent filed a Reply
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Reopen the Administrative
Record. The Agency addresses the Exceptions throughout and the
Motion to Reopen at the end of this Decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government presented a prima facie case. Respondent ultimately
admitted to and accepted some responsibility for its failures in
effectively applying its customer due diligence in assessing orders of
controlled substances, its failures to implement a suspicious order
monitoring system ``consistent with best practices for compliance,''
and its failures to adequately resolve red flags on orders that it
shipped. See infra section V. Respondent also admitted that its three
suspicious order reports to DEA during the relevant time period were
insufficient. Id. Nonetheless, Respondent presented testimony and
evidence aimed at rebutting the Government's case with regard to the
scope of its regulatory noncompliance during the relevant time period.
After thoroughly reviewing the entire record, the Agency finds
substantial record evidence that Respondent's continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest in light of the long-term,
egregious failures of Respondent in its responsibility as a distributor
to maintain effective controls against diversion of controlled
substances. Furthermore, the Agency finds that Respondent has failed to
demonstrate that the Agency should continue to entrust it with its
controlled substance registrations.
I. Summary of the Allegations
1. The OSC primarily alleged that Respondent failed to maintain
effective controls against diversion when it failed to report to DEA
thousands of unusually large orders for hydrocodone and oxycodone,
which constituted potential suspicious orders, and when it shipped
orders to customers without resolving red flags of diversion or
reporting the orders to DEA in violation of 21 U.S.C. 823(b)(1) and
(e)(1) as well as 21 CFR 1301.71(a) and 1301.74(b). OSC, at 2. Further,
the OSC alleged that Respondent failed to adequately design and operate
a system to alert Respondent to suspicious orders of controlled
substances and failed to report the suspicious orders to DEA in
violation of 21 CFR 1301.74(b). Id.
2. The allegations included that, from January 2014 until April
2018, Respondent shipped approximately 7,000 unusually large orders of
oxycodone and almost 5,000 unusually large orders of hydrocodone. OSC,
at 5; Govt Prehearing, at 8. During this time, Respondent filed a total
of only three suspicious order reports with DEA.
3. Furthermore, the OSC alleged that, from approximately January
2014 to April 2018,\3\ Respondent failed to carry out its due diligence
and suspicious order monitoring policies and failed to conduct or
failed to document the resolution of meaningful due diligence into
orders placed by the following pharmacies: Wallace Drug Company, Inc.;
Bordelon's Super-Save Pharmacy; Folse Pharmacy; Pharmacy Specialties
Group, Inc.; Dave's Pharmacy; the Wellness Pharmacy, Inc.; Wilkinson
Family Pharmacy; and Hephzibah Pharmacy, L.L.C. (hereinafter, the
exemplar pharmacies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The allegations for three of the exemplar pharmacies only
spanned a subset of this timeframe: Wellness Pharmacy, January 2014-
December 2017; Wilkinson Family Pharmacy, January 2014-April 2017;
Hephzibah Pharmacy, April 2017-May 2017. Govt Prehearing, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. The Witnesses
A. The Government's Witnesses
The Government presented its case through the testimony of six
witnesses and the introduction of 70 exhibits. The Government's first
witness was the Acting Section Chief of the Pharmaceutical
Investigation Section of the DEA (the Section Chief), who testified
generally regarding the regulatory requirements for distributors. Tr.
47-87. The Government also presented testimony from two Diversion
Investigators (DI 1 and DI 2) regarding the history of the
investigation and the identification of Government exhibits.\4\ See RD,
at 11-12 (citing Tr. 94-101; 144-177). Next, the Government presented
testimony from the Chief of the Statistical Services Section of DEA,
G.R., who was qualified without objection as an expert in ``developing
and implementing statistical models and methods of analyzing large and
complex data sets.'' RD, at 13 (citing Tr. 192). G.R. testified to the
methodology he employed in analyzing the statistical data that was used
by DEA in its determination that Respondent had failed to report
suspicious orders.\5\ RD, at 12-15 (citing Tr. 187-245). The Government
also presented testimony from the Group Supervisor of the New Orleans
Field Division (the GS), who was accepted as an expert in ``the
identification of common red flags suggestive of an illicit
pharmaceutical operation and as well [as] with respect to the
requirements imposed on DEA registrants to identify and investigate
[[Page 34524]]
such red flags when they become aware of them.'' RD, at 16 (citing Tr.
282).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The Government presented testimony from a third Diversion
Investigator (DI 3) to rebut the testimony of Respondent's witness,
however, the Agency agrees with the RD that the testimony of DI 3
was not essential to the case and is therefore not including it
herein. RD, at 20.
\5\ G.R. testified that he had corrected DEA's admitted error in
the calculations in the OSC, which applied a Three Interquartile
Range (IQR) to the median of the data set, or the 50th percentile,
instead of the 75th percentile, and as a result, produced a larger
group of outliers. Tr. 204, 208-09. G.R. further acknowledged that
the error was identified by Respondent's expert. Tr. 218.
\6\ The Agency adopts the ALJ's credibility findings regarding
the Section Chief, the DIs, G.R., and the GS. RD, at 11-12, 15, 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Respondent's Witnesses
Respondent presented its case through the testimony of three
witnesses and the introduction of ten exhibits. Respondent's first
witness was Kenneth A. Weinstein, Tr. 501-689, who was the Vice
President of the consulting firm Analysis Group, Inc. (AGI), and was
accepted without objection as an expert in statistical analysis related
to controlled substance distribution and in pharmacy ordering and
inventory management. RD, at 22 (citing Tr. 513-14; 520-21). Weinstein
authenticated Respondent Exhibit (RX) 14, pages 15-19, and RX 28 and
29. Tr. 506, 562-68. Weinstein testified generally regarding the use of
the Tukey analytical model in developing Suspicious Order Monitoring
systems and testified specifically regarding what he found to be
deficiencies in G.R.'s statistical analysis in this case. Weinstein
also testified regarding AGI's compliance work for Respondent after DEA
had issued the OSC.
Respondent's second witness was Scott Irelan, Tr. 693-840, who had
worked for Respondent for 31 years before becoming the Director of
Corporate Compliance and Security in May 2018 after the OSC was issued.
Irelan testified regarding his current role at Respondent, the remedial
measures that Respondent had put in place since the issuance of the
OSC, Respondent's preexisting compliance measures during the relevant
time period, and Respondent's acceptance of responsibility.
Respondent's final witness was Louis Milione,\7\ Tr. 841-1057, who
was, at the time, the Senior Managing Director of Guidepost Solutions.
Respondent hired Guidepost Solutions to enhance Respondent's compliance
system. Tr. 878-79. Milione was previously the Assistant Administrator
of the Diversion Control Division at DEA and was offered and accepted
without objection as an expert ``in diversion.'' Tr. 851. He testified
regarding his factual interactions with Respondent during his tenure at
DEA \8\ and regarding the work Guidepost performed for Respondent to
improve its compliance with DEA requirements.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Milione is currently the Principal Deputy Administrator of
DEA. Despite his return to the Agency, it is noted that Milione has
not had any contacts with the Administrator nor anyone participating
in the decisionmaking in this matter about and due to his prior
involvement with this case.
\8\ Respondent presented evidence, including testimony from
Milione, about a meeting with Respondent at Respondent's invitation
that occurred in August 2016 when Milione was in the role of
Assistant Administrator of the Diversion Control Division at DEA.
Tr. 856-861; RX 21; RX 11 (PowerPoint slide deck). Milione testified
that, at that meeting, he believed that Paul Dickson, Sr., was
committed to his regulatory obligations and sincere. Tr. 873. The
powerpoint slides from that meeting, which Respondent submitted into
evidence, generally support Respondent's statements regarding the
workings of its previous SOM at a high level and its termination of
customers pursuant to its due diligence efforts. RX 11; see infra
n.61 regarding termination of Respondent's customers, and infra n.89
regarding evidence of the sincerity of Paul Dickson, Sr.
\9\ The testimonies of Weinstein, Milione, and Irelan are
afforded full credibility in this Decision on all points that are
within their expertise and relevant to the final decision as further
found herein. This Decision has found all major points of conflict
between the Government's and Respondent's witnesses to be largely
irrelevant to the Agency's adjudication of the allegations. The
Agency analyzes the evidentiary weight of portions of the testimony
of these witnesses in balance with other evidence on the record
where relevant. It is noted that, although Irelan's testimony
regarding acceptance of responsibility is analyzed in the Sanction
Section infra, it is afforded full credibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Findings of Fact
The Parties agree to 47 stipulations (Stips.), which are accepted
as facts in these proceedings. The Agency incorporates all of these
into the record--the most relevant of which are summarized here. See
RD, at 33-38. Between January 2014 and May 2018, Respondent submitted a
total of three suspicious order reports to DEA. Stip. 7. In this same
approximate timeframe, Respondent supplied controlled substances,
including oxycodone and hydrocodone, to Wallace, Bordelon's, Folse,
Pharmacy Specialties, and Dave's pharmacies. Respondent also supplied
Hephzibah with controlled substances, including oxycodone and
hydrocodone, between April and May 2017, Wellness Pharmacy between
January 2014 and December 2017, and Wilkinson \10\ between January and
April 2017. See Stips. 11-20. The timeframe of the allegations in the
OSC are hereinafter referred to as ``the relevant timeframe.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Wilkinson Family Pharmacy voluntarily surrendered its DEA
Certificate of Registration for Cause. Stip. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. DEA's Investigation
In 2017, while investigating pharmacies in Louisiana selling high
volumes of oxycodone and hydrocodone, the DEA New Orleans Division
discovered that some of those pharmacies were supplied by Respondent.
Tr. 92. During a subsequent audit, Respondent told DEA that it used Pro
Compliance Reports and its employees to identify suspicious orders. Tr.
93.
DEA served Respondent with three separate subpoenas and several
requests for clarification between February 1, 2018, and April
2018.\11\ RD, at 44-50. The subpoenas related to Respondent's
identification of suspicious orders, due diligence, internal
investigations, and internal policies and practices, and also
identified specific pharmacies. Government Exhibits (GX) 7, 8, 10, 12,
15. Respondent responded via letters and produced some documentation.
For example, GX 9 contains an undated letter from Jacob Dickson,
stating that Respondent submitted only two suspicious order reports to
DEA because it ``utilizes a pro-active approach to avoid diversion of
controlled drugs, including: screening new pharmacy customers;
aggressively monitoring orders for controlled drugs; and eliminating
pharmacy customers who fill orders for controlled drugs in excess of
acceptable ratios, accept cash payments, fill prescriptions for the
`Holy Trinity' and/or other unacceptable practices.'' GX 9, at 1; Tr.
319. The undated letter also states that ``DEA and applicable
regulations do not require that a wholesale distributor maintain
records of each and every internal investigation conducted on possible
suspicious orders.'' GX 9, at 1-2 (emphasis in original); Tr. 319-20.
The letter further explained that once Respondent has cleared a
possible suspicious order, ``no record is maintained.'' GX 9, at 2. The
undated letter explained that Respondent used a ``four-fold approach to
monitor all prescription drug orders and detect unusual ordering
patterns, amounts, and cash payments to identify potentially suspicious
orders.'' GX 9, at 2; Tr. 321. The four-fold approach included: use of
Pro Compliance Reports; preparing a Market Basket Report of each
customer on a monthly basis; since April 2017, use of software that
identifies orders that are more than 10 times the ``average dosage
units ordered on a given drug on a certain day with the last 90 days of
ordering patterns of the same drug''; the experience of the employees
who fill the orders for controlled substances; and the input of
delivery drivers and salesmen. GX 9, at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The Agency adopts the findings of fact in the RD related to
these subpoenas and Respondent's response and summarizes herein. RD,
at 44-50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Government Exhibit 11 is Respondent's (signed by Paul Dickson)
supplemental undated response to DEA following up on subpoenas issued
to Respondent. Tr. 144-45, 324; GX 11, at 2. This response states that
``[b]ecause formal records are not kept in the regular course of
business on the
[[Page 34525]]
investigation of orders which do not result in the finding of a
`suspicious order' per 21 CFR 1301.74, the email communications
produced herewith represent the most responsive records maintained.''
GX 11, at 2; Tr. 324.
At the same time, Respondent produced an external hard drive
containing documents in response to the February subpoenas. Tr. 146.
Again, DEA emailed Respondent to ensure a complete response, which
Respondent generally affirmed and also then provided a phone log \12\
with the earliest entry dated January 5, 2016. GX 12-14. In response to
the subpoena for policies and trainings, Respondent informed DEA that
its training of employees on suspicious order monitoring ``does not
necessitate or result in the production of documents.'' GX 16, at 1.
Respondent's reply included two policy and procedure documents, which
Respondent described as containing ``some limited direction as to
suspicious order monitoring.'' Id.; Tr. 174-76; GX 17, 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Regarding the exemplar pharmacies, the phone log contains
two entries concerning the Pharmacy Specialties Group, with a DEA
registration number ending in ``589.'' GX 14, at 4, 31; GX 23, at 1.
Those entries are dated March 7, 2016, and December 13, 2017. GX 14,
at 4, 31. There is one entry concerning Dave's Pharmacy, with a DEA
registration number ending in ``386.'' GX 14, at 23; GX 24, at 1.
That entry is dated February 16, 2017. GX 14, at 23. There are three
entries concerning Hephzibah Pharmacy, with a DEA registration
number ending in ``695.'' GX 14, at 23, 26; GX 25, at 1. Those
entries are dated March 17 and 21, 2017, and June 20, 2017. GX 14,
at 23, 26. There are five entries concerning Wilkinson Family
Pharmacy, with a DEA registration number ending in ``198.'' GX 14,
at 24; GX 27, at 1. Those entries are dated April 19, 20, 21, and
24, 2017. GX 14, at 24. There are three entries concerning Wallace
Drugs, with a DEA registration number ending in ``363.'' GX 14, at
31; GX 20, at 1. Those entries are all dated January 9, 2018. GX 14,
at 31; RD, at n.12. See supra section III.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. General Regulatory Obligations
21 CFR 1301.74(b) requires distributors to
. . . design and operate a system to disclose to the registrant
suspicious orders of controlled substances. The registrant shall
inform the Field Division Office of the Administration in his area
of suspicious orders when discovered by the registrant. Suspicious
orders include orders of unusual size, orders deviating
substantially from a normal pattern, and orders of unusual
frequency.
Id.
Respondent received a copy of a letter sent on September 27, 2006,
by DEA to distributors of controlled substances. Tr. 62-63; GX 3, at 1.
The letter emphasized that ``[d]istributors are, of course, one of the
key components of the distribution chain. If the closed system is to
function properly as Congress envisioned, distributors must be vigilant
in deciding whether a prospective customer can be trusted to deliver
controlled substances only for lawful purposes.'' GX 3, at 1. The
letter therefore, reminded distributors of their ``responsibilities . .
. in view of the prescription drug abuse problem our nation currently
faces.'' Id. Further, the letter reminded distributors of their duty
under the regulation to ``design and operate a system to disclose to
the registrant suspicious orders of controlled substances,'' and their
duty to report suspicious orders to DEA upon discovering the suspicious
order. Id. at 2. In addition, the letter reminded distributors of their
duty to exercise due diligence to avoid filling suspicious orders. Id.
Finally, the letter provided distributors with 14 examples derived from
DEA investigations of a customer's behavior that might be indicative of
diversion. Id. at 3. The letter states that these examples are not all-
inclusive and that ``[d]istributors should consider the totality of the
circumstances when evaluating an order for controlled substances, just
as DEA will do when determining whether the filling of an order is
consistent with the public interest within the meaning of 21 U.S.C.
823(e).'' Id. DEA sent the same letter a second time on February 7,
2007. Tr. 64-65; GX 69.
Government Exhibit 4 is a December 20, 2007 letter that the DEA
sent to every distributor of controlled substances. Tr. 63-64; GX 4, at
1. The stated purpose of this letter was to again remind distributors
of the requirement to inform DEA of suspicious orders. GX 4, at 1. The
letter reminded distributors that in addition to ``maintain[ing]
effective controls against diversion,'' they are also required to
``report suspicious orders of controlled substances.'' Id. The letter
reminded registrants that the regulation requires that these orders be
reported ``when discovered by the registrant.'' Id. (emphasis in
original). The letter also reminded distributors ``that their
responsibility does not end merely with the filing of a suspicious
order report. Registrants must conduct an independent analysis of
suspicious orders prior to completing a sale to determine whether the
controlled substances are likely to be diverted from legitimate
channels'' in accordance with their requirements to maintain effective
controls against diversion in 21 U.S.C. 823(e). Id. The letter also
informed registrants that DEA interpreted the list of types of
suspicious orders to be ``disjunctive and [ ] not all inclusive.'' 21
CFR 1301.74(b).
DEA maintains an Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders
System (ARCOS). Tr. 69-70. Distributors are required to report to ARCOS
all shipments of controlled substances in schedules I and II and all
narcotic controlled substances in schedule III. Stip. 9; Tr. 70. In
April 2008, DEA met with Respondent's President Paul Dickson, Sr., and
discussed Respondent's legal obligations and requirements as a
distributor, including suspicious order requirements, the need to know
its customers, and the need to conduct due diligence. Tr. 67-68. At the
time, DEA reviewed its ARCOS data with Respondent to show customers who
had anomalies and to demonstrate ``things that [Respondent] should be
looking at and questioning [its] customers [about].'' Tr. 68-69. In
2013 and 2015, DEA conducted distributor conferences and Jacob Dickson,
Respondent's compliance officer,\13\ attended both conferences. Tr. 66-
67. Both sides also presented evidence about a meeting with Jacob
Dickson, Paul Dickson Sr., C.G. (a former compliance officer at
Respondent) and officials from DEA, including Milione, in which
Respondent presented its Suspicious Order Monitoring (SOM) system to
DEA. See RX 11 (powerpoint); see supra n.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The GS testified that ``one time [Jacob Dickson] was marked
as president and then in the other time it was compliance officer.''
Tr. 67. In a letter to DEA in response to subpoenas, Jacob Dickson's
title was listed as Vice President, SOM Manager. GX 9, at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent filed three suspicious order reports during the relevant
time period. Stip. 7. The first, dated April 7, 2014, states that
``[a]t this time, and pending further review by you or M&D, M&D has
stopped selling schedule II through schedule V drugs to the captioned
pharmacy.'' GX 6, at 1. The next report is dated April 26, 2017, and
states that the pharmacy in question ``purchased a quantity of 60
cartons of prefilled 10 mg morphine sulphate syringes . . . This was a
substantial increase over a total sales of one carton in the prior four
months.'' GX 6, at 35. The letter states that the order was
investigated but does not discuss the resolution of this investigation,
nor whether the order was filled. Id. The final report was filed on the
same day, April 26, 2017, and gives no facts related to what order was
deemed suspicious nor any information about an investigation or whether
the order was shipped. GX 6, at 36.
Distributors are required to design and operate a suspicious order
monitoring system that identifies suspicious orders. 21 CFR 1301.74(b).
Suspicious orders include, but are not
[[Page 34526]]
limited to, three stated criteria: orders of unusual size, orders
deviating substantially from a normal pattern, and orders of unusual
frequency. Id.
Additionally, a distributor's general duty to prevent diversion
includes the duty to perform due diligence on its customers. Southwood
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 72 FR 36487, 36500 (2007); see also Masters
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 80 FR 55418, 55476 (2015), pet. for review
denied, Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 861 F.3d
206 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The GS testified that if the required due
diligence at the customer level identifies red flags indicative of
diversion, Tr. 328, those red flags render an individual order
suspicious and trigger the investigation or reporting requirement, even
if the regulatory criteria in 21 CFR 1301.74(b) are not present, e.g.,
the order size is not unusual. Tr. 477-478; see also Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 80 FR at 55477 (stating that ``an order is not only suspicious by
virtue of its internal properties--i.e., being of unusual size,
pattern, or frequency--but by virtue of the suspicious nature of the
pharmacy which placed [the order]'').
The Agency's decision in Masters sets forth that a distributor must
either investigate suspicious circumstances on an order and resolve all
indicia of diversion or decline to fill the order and report it to DEA.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55478.
C. Red Flags--Customer Due Diligence
The record evidence establishes that customer red flags indicative
of potential diversion include a pharmacy customer that: dispenses a
high volume of narcotics; dispenses the trinity drug cocktail; \14\
dispenses disproportionally more controlled substances than non-
controlled substances; \15\ fills prescriptions for customers who live
far away from the pharmacy; fills prescriptions for a high volume of
patients who pay for prescriptions in cash; \16\ fills prescriptions
for practitioners whose DEA registrations cannot be verified; \17\
fills a disproportionate volume of controlled substance prescriptions
written by only a few prescribers; and/or orders excessive quantities
of a limited variety of controlled substances. Tr. 297, 299-301, 335,
411, 427, 489-90, 648-49, 681, 1037; see also Pro Compliance Reports GX
20-56. Weinstein noted that red flags are visible in a pharmacy's
dispensing data and not its ordering data.\18\ Tr. 679. Irelan admitted
that, during the relevant time period, due diligence was not being
applied at the ordering level.\19\ Tr. 722-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The trinity drug cocktail consists of an opioid, such as
hydrocodone, a benzodiazepine, such as alprazolam, and a muscle
relaxer, such as Soma, and the combination of substances is still a
red flag even if each element is prescribed by different
prescribers. Tr. 55, 300, 344.
\15\ The record contains varying evidence as to the threshold
percentage of a pharmacy customer's controlled substance fills
relative to its non-controlled substance fills that would trigger a
red flag for the distributor. See Tr. 351, 461 (The GS testifying
that if the percentage of controlled substance prescriptions filled
exceeds 15 percent of total prescriptions, it is a red flag); Tr.
1030 (Milione testifying that if a pharmacy is filling controlled
substance prescriptions at a percentage exceeding the national
average, then the distributor can resolve the red flag without
reporting a suspicious order); Tr. 867 (Irelan testifying that the
previous SOM system involved monitoring ``for customers that were
getting a little closer to 20 percent of that ratio''); RD, at n.5
(noting that the Masters decision found the threshold to be around
20 percent for controlled versus 80 to 90 percent for non-
controlled, Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55480, but finding that
the GS presented the most credible evidence at 15 percent).
The Agency finds the exact percentage threshold to be largely
irrelevant to determine in this case, because in every instance of
the Government's allegations, this particular red flag was flagged
by the Pro Compliance Reports that were created for Respondent.
Furthermore, all of the pharmacy customers in the allegations were
dispensing controlled substances at 20 percent or more of their
total dispensing--with one customer at one point dispensing as high
as 69 percent controlled substances, see GX 26, at 11 (Wellness).
The only exception was Bordelon's dispensing at 17 percent
controlled substances, but which Pro Compliance reported as being
``slightly higher than national average.'' GX 21, at 6. Furthermore,
seven of the eight exemplar pharmacies demonstrated multiple red
flags in addition to this one. It is indisputable that Respondent
was aware of this red flag for each of these customers at a customer
level due to the Pro Compliance Reports in its possession.
\16\ The record contains varying evidence as to the threshold
percentage of cash payments for controlled substance prescription
fills at a pharmacy customer that would trigger a red flag for the
distributor. See Tr. 328 (The GS testifying that any pharmacy
customer exceeding 9 percent cash payments from customers should
raise red flags); see also 1036-37 (Milione testifying that a high
percentage of cash in controlled versus non controlled prescriptions
is a red flag, but can be resolved with due diligence, the records
of which must be maintained); Tr. 681 (Weinstein testifying that if
a pharmacy has ``a substantially higher percentage of cash payments
for controlled substances than it did for a non-controlled
substances, that would be a [potential] red flag of diversion,'' but
that he does not have ``a particular definition of substantial or
significant,'' because it was more of a ``relative comparison'');
but see Tr. 649 (Weinstein answered that it was ``fair'' to say that
when a distributor becomes aware of factors, such as cash payments,
``they're significant red flags of diversion.'').
Again, the Agency finds the exact percentage threshold for cash
payments to be largely irrelevant to determine in this case, because
in every instance of the Government's allegations, this particular
red flag was flagged by the Pro Compliance Reports that were created
for Respondent. As detailed herein, the percentages of cash paid by
Respondent's customers at issue were also particularly high, see,
e.g., 41 percent, GX 22, at 12 (Folse). It is indisputable that
Respondent was aware of this red flag for each of these customers at
a customer-level based on the Pro Compliance Reports in its
possession.
\17\ The Pro Compliance Reports additionally contain reports of
prescribers whose DEA controlled substance registrations ``could not
be verified through DEA-Verify.com'' and whose controlled substance
prescriptions were filled by Respondent's customers. See, e.g., GX
22, at 17; Tr. 336 (June 2017 Report showing that Folse filled
controlled substances prescribed by 23 practitioners whose
registrations could not be verified). Both Irelan and Milione
testified that the portion of the Pro Compliance Reports concerning
the verification of prescriber DEA numbers is unreliable. Tr. 765-
66, 797, 901. Milione also testified that a distributor needs to
hold and report a suspicious order if it is aware that a customer is
filling prescriptions for a practitioner with no DEA registration.
Tr. 1025. Although the Agency agrees with the RD, at n.14, that
during the relevant timeframe, there is no evidence in the record
that Respondent resolved the red flags presented by these reports
demonstrating unverified registrations, even if they were
unreliable, the Agency also finds that there is more than enough
evidence on the record that Respondent did not resolve the other
clearly established red flags of diversion and therefore finds it
unnecessary to address these additional red flags in this Decision.
\18\ The fact that the red flags applied to the customer
generally and not to each individual order, see ALJX 89, at 99, is
irrelevant to this adjudication, because under the relevant legal
requirements, Respondent cannot ignore red flags that demonstrate
that its customers are potentially diverting controlled substances
and continue to fill those individual orders without resolving each
of those red flags. See Tr. 477-478. At a minimum, Respondent must
either have stopped the shipments and reported orders to DEA or
resolved and documented each of the red flags. See Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 861 F.3d at 222-23.
\19\ It is noted that Respondent attempted to introduce and the
ALJ rejected, Exhibit 32C, based on lack of identification. Tr. 447.
Respondent's stated purpose was to impeach the Government's witness
in demonstrating that Respondent's due diligence files did include
photographs as described in its policy, Tr. 447, contrary to the
GS's testimony that he did not ``recall any'' photographs, Tr. 322;
RX 32C. The GS testified credibly that he did not recall seeing the
file with the photograph ``at all.'' Tr. 447. The Agency has
reviewed the document and notes that it did include a photograph;
however, the Agency is not finding that Respondent's compliance with
its policy on this issue is relevant to this decision and,
therefore, the exhibit marked for identification as RX 32C plays no
role in the adjudication of this matter. Further, if this exhibit
had been included in the record, standing alone, it bodes poorly for
Respondent concerning its failure to report suspicious orders for
terminated customers. See infra n.61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GS testified that when Respondent received the Pro Compliance
Reports in GX 20-56 that demonstrated red flags of diversion, it was
obligated to resolve the red flags and document their resolution. Tr.
474-76. Based on the record testimony of the experts, and the Masters
decision, the Agency finds that when a distributor is aware of red
flags indicating diversion of controlled substances from a customer, at
a minimum, it is obligated to investigate further and resolve the red
flags, or, if it chooses not to investigate and resolve, it must report
the order as suspicious to DEA and not ship the controlled substances.
See infra, section IV.A.4.
[[Page 34527]]
D. Pro Compliance and Market Basket Reports
In conducting customer due diligence, Respondent used, at least up
to and including during the hearing, Pro Compliance Reports,\20\ which
provide analysis of a pharmacy's dispensing data to include key
indicators of red flags of diversion, such as the percentage of a
customer's business that represents controlled substance dispensing,
the volume of cash payments, and the amount of trinity drug cocktails
filled. Tr. 464-65, 716-17. In this case, the reports in Respondent's
possession for the exemplar pharmacies demonstrated numerous red flags
of diversion, and the Agency finds substantial record evidence that
Respondent did not adequately document the resolution of those red
flags or report the orders to DEA as suspicious.\21\ Additionally, the
reports in evidence for the exemplar pharmacies appear to demonstrate
violations of Respondent's purported policy of ``eliminating pharmacy
customers who fill orders for controlled drugs in excess of acceptable
ratios, accept cash payments, prescribe the `Holy Trinity' and/or other
unacceptable practices.'' GX 9, at 1. According to Respondent, Market
Basket Reports \22\ were prepared for each customer on a monthly basis
as part of its due diligence. GX 9, at 3-4. The reports identified
percentages of controlled substances in total dispensing. Id.; see,
e.g., GX 59. Respondent no longer uses Market Basket reports but
continues to use Pro Compliance Reports. Tr. 716.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Each Pro Compliance Report contains a statement regarding
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) requirement on manufacturers and
distributors to design and operate a system that will disclose
suspicious orders of controlled substances. See, e.g., GX 23, at 11;
Tr. 355.
\21\ Respondent argues that ``the Government offered no evidence
to demonstrate that Respondent failed to dispel suspicion.'' ALJX
89, at 100. The Agency finds this argument to be circular.
Respondent did not maintain adequate documentation of its resolution
of red flags or suspicious orders, so there is no evidence to
demonstrate whether it did or did not conduct the due diligence
necessary to resolve the red flags. See infra n.80. As described
herein, the Agency requires documentation of Respondent's due
diligence for many reasons.
\22\ Respondent points out that the GS's testimony regarding the
Market Basket reports was possibly based on a misinterpretation of
the numbers. ALJX 89, at 30 (citing Tr. 409, 423-425). In
adjudicating the allegations, this Decision focuses on the Pro
Compliance Reports in which there is more than enough information to
support the Agency's finding that the alleged customers presented
red flags of diversion, the resolution of which was not adequately
documented, yet Respondent continued to ship. The Market Basket
Reports are only considered to demonstrate that Respondent was
conducting some due diligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GS testified that he did not find evidence that Respondent ever
rejected a controlled substance order from any of the exemplar
pharmacies, nor did he find documentation that Respondent dispelled all
of the red flags in these reports. Tr. 385-86, 316,\23\ 413.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Respondent points to Irelan's testimony to contest the
notion that Respondent was not stopping shipments based on reports;
however, the citations to his testimony support that Respondent was
generally conducting some due diligence as it had described in its
letters to DEA in response to the subpoena, not that the red flags
at issue for the exemplar pharmacies were resolved. ALJX 89, at 16;
see also, e.g., RX 31.001 (notes on pharmacies other than exemplar).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Folse Pharmacy
The record evidence demonstrates that the Pro Compliance Initial
Risk Evaluation Report provided to Respondent for Folse Pharmacy
designated the pharmacy as ``high risk.'' GX 22, at 5; Tr. 328.
Further, Pro Compliance Reports for Folse Pharmacy in Respondent's
possession demonstrated that during the time period of the allegations,
Folse Pharmacy's dispensing practices raised numerous red flags,
including: high percentages \24\ of controlled substance prescriptions,
high percentages of controlled substance prescriptions paid for in
cash,\25\ an increase \26\ in the number of oxycodone dosage units
dispensed, and dispensing of trinity cocktail prescriptions.\27\ See
RD, at 51-53. Furthermore, in June 2017, a Pro Compliance Report
recommended that Respondent engage with Folse's owner to ``gain a
better understanding of [its] dispensing practices . . . .'' GX 22, at
17. The record does not include evidence of an investigation into or
resolution of the red flags identified. Further, the record is clear
that Respondent did not report any orders from this customer to DEA as
suspicious and there is no record evidence that Respondent stopped
shipping to this customer as a result of these reports. Tr. 340; Stip.
13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ According to the Pro Compliance Reports in evidence,
percentages of controlled substances during the relevant time period
ranged from approximately 30 to 36 percent of Folse's total
dispensing. GX 22, at 12-17.
\25\ According to the Pro Compliance Reports in evidence,
percentages of controlled substance dispensing paid for in cash
ranged from approximately 18 to 41 percent. GX 22, at 12-14, 17.
\26\ Between September 2013 and November 2014, the number of
oxycodone dosage units dispensed increased from 40,812 to 52,571. GX
22, at 12; Tr. 330-31 (The GS describing this increase as ``a very
big red flag''); see also Tr. 471-74.
\27\ In June 2017, Folse dispensed nine trinity drug cocktails
and in September 2016, Folse dispensed twenty-two trinity drug
cocktails. GX 22, at 17, 14; Tr. 300, 335-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Bordelon's
Pro Compliance Reports for Bordelon's Super Save Pharmacy in
Respondent's possession demonstrated that during the time period of the
allegations, Bordelon's dispensing practices raised numerous red flags,
including: high percentages \28\ of controlled substance prescriptions,
higher than average oxycodone and hydrocodone units, and dispensing of
trinity cocktail prescriptions.\29\ See RD, at 53-54. In March 2017, a
Pro Compliance Report recommended that Respondent engage with
Bordelon's owner to ``gain a better understanding of [its] dispensing
practices . . . .'' GX 21, at 6. The record is clear that Respondent
did not report any orders from this customer to DEA as suspicious and
there is no record evidence that Respondent stopped shipping to this
customer as a result of these reports. Tr. 347-48; Stip. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ In March 2017, the percentage of controlled substances
dispensed represented 17 percent of Bordelon's total dispensing,
which Pro Compliance reported to be ``slightly higher than national
averages.'' GX 21, at 5-6.
\29\ In March 2017, Bordelon's dispensed four trinity drug
cocktails. GX 20, at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Wallace Drug Company
Pro Compliance Reports for Wallace in Respondent's possession
demonstrated that during the time period of the allegations, Wallace's
dispensing practices raised numerous red flags, including, but not
limited to: high percentages of controlled substance prescriptions paid
for in cash,\30\ higher than average dosages of oxycodone and
hydrocodone, and dispensing of trinity cocktail prescriptions.\31\ See
RD, at 54-55. In August 2017, a Pro Compliance Report recommended that
Respondent engage with Wallace's owner to ``gain a better understanding
of [its] dispensing practices.'' GX 20, at 6. Respondent produced phone
log entries on January 9, 2018, for Wallace. See GX 14, at 31 (note
stating that the pharmacy salesman had been contacted and Respondent
recommended that he return the order, noting ``might need to check on
this guy'' and ``looks like he is hitting this stuff hard!''). Another
note on the same date states that the customer was contacted and the
customer explained the large order. According to the note, Respondent's
employee recommended the return of the hydrocodone and the customer
returned it. This note did not occur
[[Page 34528]]
until five months after the Pro Compliance Report for Wallace, which
demonstrated multiple additional red flags of diversion for which there
is no documented resolution. Therefore, it is unclear whether the
employee flagging this particular order knew that there might be
further reason to suspect that this pharmacy was engaging in diversion
in order to be able to adequately resolve the suspicious circumstances
surrounding the order. Even if this note arguably provided a documented
resolution of an unusually large order, the other red flags for this
customer are unresolved and unaccounted for. There is also no record
evidence that Respondent reported the unusually large order or any
orders from this customer to DEA and there is no record evidence that
Respondent stopped shipping to this customer as a result of these
reports or notes. Tr. 353; Stip. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ In August 2017, 31 percent of controlled substance
prescriptions filled by Wallace were paid for in cash. GX 20, at 5.
\31\ In August 2017, Wallace dispensed three trinity drug
cocktails. GX 20, at 5-6; Tr. 349-50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Pharmacy Specialties Group
Pro Compliance Reports for Pharmacy Specialties in Respondent's
possession demonstrated that during the time period of the allegations,
Pharmacy Specialties' dispensing practices raised numerous red flags,
including: high percentages \32\ of controlled substance prescriptions,
high percentages of controlled substance prescriptions paid for in
cash,\33\ an increase \34\ in the number of hydrocodone, oxycodone, and
benzodiazepine dosage units dispensed, and dispensing of trinity
cocktail prescriptions.\35\ See RD, at 55-57. In February 2016, a Pro
Compliance Report recommended that Respondent engage with Pharmacy
Specialties' owner to ``gain a better understanding of [its] dispensing
practices.'' GX 23, at 6. Respondent's phone logs demonstrate that an
employee raised a concern on March 7, 2016, regarding Pharmacy
Specialties Group; however, there is no record documentation of how the
concern was resolved and Respondent continued to distribute. See GX 14,
at 4 (``[C]heck out this guys usage for item [ ] compared to his
overall warehouse purchasing, this seems quite elevated to me. . . .
.???? ''). This note identifies a suspicious order; however, according
to the record evidence, Respondent did not report the order to DEA.
Further, there is no documented investigation or resolution of the
concern raised by the employee in the record. On December 13, 2017,
another note reads, ``Henry will give the customer a warning about his
Oxy purchases. Too much cash, too much growth. Will re-run and if no
improvement will either restrict or cut off completely.'' Id. at 31.
Although this note seems to set forth a plan for compliance, it does
not include any indication of an investigation into or resolution of
the red flags identified. Further, the record evidence is clear that
Respondent did not report this order or any orders from this customer
to DEA and there is no record evidence that Respondent stopped shipping
to this customer as a result of these reports. Tr. 362; Stip. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ According to the Pro Compliance Reports in evidence, the
percentages of controlled substances ranged from approximately 24 to
30 percent of Pharmacy Specialties' total dispensing. GX 23, at 5,
18; Tr. 353-54.
\33\ According to the Pro Compliance Reports in evidence, the
percentages of controlled substances dispensing paid for in cash
ranged from approximately 28 percent to 31 percent. GX 23, at 5-6,
16, 18, 18.
\34\ From February 2016 to October 2016, the number of
hydrocodone dosage units dispensed increased by 25 percent, while
from October 2016 to September 2017, the number of dosage units of
oxycodone, hydrocodone, and benzodiazepines dispensed increased by
148, 89, and 106 percent respectively. GX 23, at 16, 18; Tr. 358-59.
\35\ In February 2016, October 2016, and September 2017,
Pharmacy Specialties dispensed trinity drug cocktails. GX 23, at 6,
16; Tr. 355, 358-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Dave's Pharmacy
Pro Compliance Reports for Dave's Pharmacy in Respondent's
possession demonstrated that during the time period of the allegations,
Dave's dispensing practices raised numerous red flags, including: high
percentages \36\ of controlled substance prescriptions, high
percentages of controlled substance prescriptions paid for in cash,\37\
increases \38\ in the number of oxycodone dosage units dispensed, and
dispensing of trinity cocktail prescriptions.\39\ See RD, at 57-59. In
March 2014, a Pro Compliance Report recommended that Respondent engage
with Dave's owner to ``gain a better understanding of [its] dispensing
practices. . . .'' \40\ GX 24, at 6. It also states that this pharmacy
``represents a relatively high risk to [Respondent].'' Id. (emphasis in
original). A year later, on February 16, 2017, Respondent's phone logs
contain the following note about Dave's: ``Talked to [D.J.] about the
issues at his store. He will let the doctors know that he will no
longer be filling these scripts.'' GX 14, at 23. According to the
record evidence, Respondent did not elicit or document an explanation
for the red flags and the record is clear that Respondent never
reported this order or any orders from this customer to DEA. Further,
there is no record evidence that Respondent stopped shipping to this
customer as a result of these reports. Tr. 384-85; Stip. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ According to the Pro Compliance Reports in evidence,
percentages of controlled substances during the relevant time period
ranged from approximately 20 to 22 percent of Dave's total
dispensing. GX 24, at 5, 18-21, 24, 30; Tr. 362-67.
\37\ According to the Pro Compliance Reports in evidence,
percentages of controlled substance dispensing paid for in cash
ranged from approximately 17 to 35 percent. GX 24, at 18-21, 23, 24,
30; Tr. 364-67.
\38\ For example, from March 2014 to January 2015, the number of
oxycodone dosage units dispensed increased from 17,889 to 29,994,
and from May 2014 compared to December 2015, the number of dosage
units of oxycodone increased by 205 percent. GX 24, at 18, 19, 21;
Tr. 364; see also RD, at 57-59.
\39\ Between March 2014 and January 2015, Dave's dispensed 57
trinity drug cocktails. GX 24, at 18; Tr. 364. Between May 2014 and
December 2015, Dave's dispensed 27 trinity drug cocktails, and
between December 2015 and June 2016, Dave's dispensed 33 trinity
drug cocktails. GX 24, at 19-20. Tr. 365-66. Further, between June
and November 2016, Dave's dispensed 37 trinity drug cocktails and in
June 2017, Dave's dispensed 14. GX 24, at 21, 24.
\40\ This Pro Compliance Report identifies Dave's second highest
prescriber as having eighty-five incidents of prescribing trinity
drug cocktails.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Hephzibah Pharmacy
A Pro Compliance Report for Hephzibah Pharmacy in Respondent's
possession demonstrated that during the time period of the allegations,
Hephzibah's dispensing practices raised numerous red flags, including:
high percentages \41\ of controlled substance prescriptions, high
percentages of controlled substance prescriptions paid for in cash,\42\
and dispensing of trinity cocktail prescriptions.\43\ See RD, at 59-60.
In February 2017, a Pro Compliance Report recommended that Respondent
engage with Hephzibah's owner to ``gain a better understanding of [its]
dispensing practices. . . .'' GX 25, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ In February 2017, controlled substance prescriptions
constituted 27 percent of Hephzibah's total dispensing. GX 25, at 6;
Tr. 370-71.
\42\ In February 2017, the percentage of controlled substance
dispensing paid for in cash was 36 percent. GX 25, at 6, 12; Tr.
371.
\43\ In February 2017, Hephzibah dispensed nine trinity drug
cocktails. GX 25, at 5-6; Tr. 371.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jacob Dickson sent an email to a DI stating that Respondent had
ceased business with Hephzibah because Respondent did not support the
customers who ``wished to change their business model;'' however,
Respondent ``did not find these accounts to exhibit suspicious activity
or excessive orders.'' GX 72, at 1. Respondent's phone logs state on
March 17, 2017, that ``they must work on clearing up issues that Pro
Compliance found, high cash, trinity & high quantities on Hydrocodone
and Oxycodone. Will re-run in 90 days.'' GX 14, at 23. On March 21,
2017, there is a follow up entry that states, ``After a couple of
months, they decided they would rather change wholesalers than
cooperate with our compliance program.'' Id. at 26. Although the notes
demonstrate that Respondent was
[[Page 34529]]
conducting some due diligence, this statement contradicts Jacob
Dickson's email asserting that Respondent terminated the business
relationship and also that Respondent did not find the accounts to
exhibit suspicious activity when it clearly had identified red flags
through Pro Compliance Reports. See GX 72, at 1 (listing Hephzibah
Pharmacy as an account that Respondent ``chose to close'').\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ The Agency agrees with the ALJ's finding that the phone log
note deserves more weight as to what occurred with this pharmacy
than Jacob Dickson's email. RD, at 136 n.60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. The Wellness Pharmacy
Pro Compliance Reports for the Wellness Pharmacy in Respondent's
possession demonstrated that during the time period of the allegations,
Wellness's dispensing practices raised red flags of very high
percentages of controlled substance prescriptions and high numbers of
dosage units of hydrocodone and oxycodone. See RD, at 60-61. Although
Pro Compliance's initial risk assessment evaluated Wellness as ``low
risk,'' it also revealed that between April and June 2013, 67 percent
of all prescriptions dispensed by Wellness were for controlled
substances. Further Pro Compliance Reports during the relevant time
period demonstrated that Wellness's percentage of controlled substance
prescriptions continued to range from approximately 64 to 69 percent.
GX 26, at 10-12, 14, 21; Tr. 374. There is no record evidence that
Respondent reported these orders to DEA or any orders from this
pharmacy, documented the resolution of the red flags, or stopped
shipping to this customer as a result of the red flags that these
reports identified. Tr. 384-85; Stip. 17.
8. Wilkinson Family Pharmacy
Pro Compliance Reports for Wilkinson Family Pharmacy in
Respondent's possession demonstrated that during the time period of the
allegations, Wilkinson's dispensing practices raised numerous red
flags, including: high percentages \45\ of controlled substance
prescriptions, increases in oxycodone, high percentages of controlled
substance prescriptions paid for in cash,\46\ higher than average
dosages of oxycodone and hydrocodone, and dispensing of trinity
cocktail prescriptions.\47\ See RD, at 61-63. In January 2017, a Pro
Compliance Report recommended that Respondent engage with Wilkinson's
owner to ``gain a better understanding of [its] dispensing practices.''
GX 27, at 26.\48\ There is no record evidence that Respondent reported
these orders or any orders from this customer to DEA, or stopped
shipping to this customer as a result of these reports. Tr. 384-85;
Stip. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ According to the Pro Compliance Reports in evidence,
percentages of controlled substances during the relevant time period
ranged from approximately 9 to 42 percent of Wilkinson's total
dispensing. GX 27, at 20-23. 25-26; Tr. 367, 378-380.
\46\ According to the Pro Compliance Reports in evidence,
percentages of controlled substance dispensing paid for in cash
ranged from approximately 17 to 38 percent and cash paid for non-
controlled substance prescriptions was significantly lower. GX 27,
at 20-23; Tr. 378-380.
\47\ Between March 2014 and January 2015, Wilkinson dispensed
twenty-six trinity drug cocktails. GX 27, at 21; Tr. 378. Between
January 2015 and January 2016, Wilkinson dispensed twenty-one
trinity drug cocktails, and between December January 2016, and
August 2016, Wilkinson dispensed twenty trinity drug cocktails. GX
27, at 22-23. Tr. 379. Further, in January 2017, Wilkinson dispensed
fourteen trinity drug cocktails, and in June 2017, Wilkinson
dispensed 14. GX 27, at 26, 32.
\48\ Respondent produced an email from March 4, 2014, from
Wilkinson, which appeared to be in response to a Pro Compliance
Report that Respondent had sent to Wilkinson. Wilkinson's
explanation primarily focuses on cash payments. RX 05.001. The GS
testified that this showed ``some'' due diligence. Tr. 452. There
was extensive dispute about the introduction of this exhibit during
the hearing. Tr. 453-458. It appeared that Respondent did try to
offer the exhibit into evidence, Tr. 453, and then offered it
subject to connection. Tr. 455. The ALJ ultimately determined to
send it to the Agency as part of the administrative record. RD, at
104 n.41. The Agency has considered this exhibit because the
contested nature of the hearing at this point has made it difficult
to determine whether this exhibit was offered. The exhibit
demonstrates that Respondent conducted ``some'' due diligence on
Wilkinson. However, it is noted that the document does not
demonstrate the resolution of each of the red flags of diversion,
nor does it reflect any independent analysis of Respondent's
statements regarding the cash red flag. Ultimately, the Agency
accepts that Respondent conducted ``some'' due diligence for
Wilkinson. Further, even if Respondent had adequately resolved the
red flags for this pharmacy, there is more than enough evidence of
Respondent's failures to conduct due diligence to support the
Agency's finding that Respondent's registrations are inconsistent
with the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government has presented substantial record evidence that
Respondent distributed controlled substances to the exemplar pharmacies
during the relevant time period in the face of red flags of diversion,
including high percentages of controlled substance prescriptions, high
percentages of controlled substance prescriptions paid for in cash,
dispensing of trinity cocktail prescriptions, and increases and higher
than average dosages of particular schedule II controlled substances.
All of these red flags were specifically identified by Pro Compliance
Reports in Respondent's possession. Although some of the notations
provided by Respondent demonstrated that employees had suspicions about
certain orders and had made some contacts, none of the notations
adequately resolved the red flags and none of the orders were reported
to DEA as suspicious. In the documents Respondent produced to DEA, the
GS did not find any indication that the Compliance officer stopped
shipment of any order of controlled substances identified as
suspicious. Tr. 315-16, 385. It is noted that most of these customers
displayed not just one red flag, but multiple red flags of diversion--
most of them well over any arguable threshold that would require
investigation, see supra notes 15-16--and there is insufficient record
evidence that Respondent conducted or documented due diligence to
resolve these numerous red flags of diversion presented by its
customers.
E. Suspicious Orders Under 21 CFR 1301.74(b)
The Government alleged that Respondent failed to design and operate
an effective system to disclose to Respondent suspicious orders and to
report those orders to DEA. OSC, at 8. DEA used statistical analysis of
orders placed by Respondent's customers for oxycodone and hydrocodone
to ``identify extremely large individual pharmacy transactions and
extremely large monthly volume totals,'' in order to demonstrate the
failures of Respondent's SOM system and reporting. Id. The GS explained
that the reporting of suspicious orders is particularly important for
DEA to be able to ``conduct an investigation'' and identify potential
diversion. Tr. 284-86.
G.R. testified regarding the statistical analysis that he performed
for the investigation, including his use of a statistical methodology
called the Tukey method to identify outlier transactions that
represented possible suspicious orders. Tr. 225; 236-37. G.R. testified
that Tukey uses an interquartile range, which is the difference between
the first and third quartiles, and then is multiplied by a factor of
one-and-a-half to six (IQR multiplier). Tr. 202. Although there is no
single multiplier to use, Tr. 523, the higher the IQR multiplier, the
fewer outliers will be identified. Tr. 523-24. G.R. used an IQR
multiplier of 3 to calculate a smaller group of outliers to identify
``what are called far out or extreme outliers.'' Tr. 203, 233, 242.
G.R. testified that the transactions that he identified using three IQR
above the 75th percentile represented unusually large transactions,
which would normally occur less than one percent of the time. Tr. 238-
39.
G.R. testified that he analyzed Respondent's sales of oxycodone and
[[Page 34530]]
hydrocodone from January 1, 2014, to April 30, 2018, and compared every
transaction the pharmacy made from January 1, 2014, to April 30, 2018,
against every other transaction made during the same time period to the
same pharmacy, which he called a ``fixed-frame analysis.'' Tr. 197-98;
226-27. He credibly testified that he used the fixed-frame analysis
because he was looking for ``a ballpark estimate of scale, size of
outlier population,'' as opposed to the exact number of outliers. Tr.
227, 234.
Government Exhibits 65 and 66 contain all of the transactions
concerning oxycodone shipments that Respondent reported to DEA between
January 1, 2014, and April 30, 2018, as well as the results of G.R.'s
corrected analysis using the above-described methodology. Tr. 71-72. GX
65, 66; Tr. 71-72, 211-12. G.R.'s corrected analysis identified the
following amounts of Respondent's oxycodone and hydrocodone sales as
outliers, i.e., unusually large, from January 1, 2014, to April 30,
2018.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Substance 2014 2015 2016 2017 \49\ 2018 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oxycodone......................... 2,097 1,857 1,546 1,361 391 7,252
Hydrocodone....................... 1,919 1,314 1,006 536 173 4,948
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tr. 212-13; GX 65-66, at Summary tab; Government Demonstrative Exhibit
(GDX), at 10.
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\49\ January 1, 2018, to April 30, 2018. Tr. 212, 226.
G.R.'s corrected analysis also identified approximately 450
potential outliers for Respondent's oxycodone and hydrocodone sales for
seven \50\ of the exemplar pharmacies from January 1, 2014, to April
30, 2018. Tr. 213-14, 216-17, 243; GDX, at 11.\51\ See RD, at 68 for
table. The Agency is considering the review of the exemplar pharmacies'
unusually large orders for oxycodone and hydrocodone only to further
demonstrate the general failure of Respondent to identify, investigate
and report suspicious orders.\52\
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\50\ G.R.'s corrected analysis did not identify any unusually
large transactions of oxycodone or hydrocodone that Respondent
shipped to Hephzibah Pharmacy. ALJX 14, at 4; Tr. 230. However, the
Pro Compliance Report for Hephzibah Pharmacy demonstrated multiple
red flags of diversion. Supra section III.D.6.
\51\ The tables reflect transaction size, not frequency. Tr.
244.
\52\ It is noted that Weinstein conducted a ``look-back''
analysis of G.R.'s data; Tr. 537-38, 550-51, 693, RDX-4; see also
RD, at 73 (table analyzing these amounts). The Agency acknowledges
that Respondent demonstrated Weinstein's analysis produced
significantly lower results; ``nearly half of the outlier
transactions he identified in 2017 and 2018 would not have been
identified as outliers.'' ALJX 89, at 38 (citing Tr. 529-30, 568; RX
28 and 29)).
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In response to criticism from Respondent's expert, G.R. also
conducted a ``look-back analysis,'' which, according to G.R., produced
results ``consistent with what [he] found using the'' \53\ fixed-frame
analysis method. Tr. 228, 235. In his look-back analysis, G.R. looked
at ``the entire population'' and not only the seven exemplar pharmacies
in the OSC showing unusually large transactions. Tr. 230. G.R.
testified that statistical analysis is ``one piece of the analysis that
is necessary to comply with DEA's regulations governing distributors.''
Tr. 223-24, 1084-90. See GX 73 and 74 (analysis using the look-back
methodology that Weinstein recommended). The look-back analysis for
oxycodone transactions revealed 6,816 outlier transactions, a 6 percent
reduction when compared to the fixed-frame analysis of 7,252 that the
Government previously found. Tr. 1091; GX 73, at Summary tab. The look-
back analysis for hydrocodone transactions revealed 5,222 outlier
transactions, a 5.5 percent increase when compared to the fixed-frame
analysis of 4,948 that the Government previously found. Tr. 1092; GX
74, at Summary tab.\54\
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\53\ Respondent argued in its Exceptions that G.R.'s look-back
analysis could not be characterized as ``substantially similar'' to
the fixed-frame analysis because although the numerical size of
outliers was similar, each analysis found substantially different
outliers. Resp Exceptions, at 41-42. Respondent's point is noted;
however, both analyses identified numerous outliers and, ultimately,
the number of outliers that could have represented suspicious orders
under both analyses far exceeded the three that Respondent reported
to DEA during the relevant timeframe. Further, Respondent did not
demonstrate adequate documentation of its resolution of suspicious
orders nor is there information on the record that Respondent
stopped shipping.
\54\ Respondent contests the Government's introduction of this
rebuttal evidence in its Exceptions. Resp Exceptions, at 40-41. As
further explained herein, the Agency credits Weinstein's criticism
of G.R.'s analysis. The exact number of unreported suspicious orders
is unnecessary for the Government to prove or the Agency to conclude
in finding a violation because Respondent was responsible for
creating and maintaining an adequate SOM system and identifying and
reporting suspicious orders. Here, it is clear from the evidence
that Respondent's SOM system during the relevant timeframe was
inadequate.
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Respondent presented the testimony of its own expert, Weinstein,
who opined that G.R.'s analysis failed to reliably identify unusually
large or suspicious orders. Tr. 558. Weinstein based his criticism of
G.R.'s analysis on four factors: (1) the use of a four-year fixed-frame
as opposed to the look-back method; (2) the failure to consider the
schedule change of hydrocodone in late 2014 from schedule III to
schedule II; (3) the failure to consider package size and formulation;
and (4) the use of the line item approach as opposed to a cumulative
approach. RD, at 70; Tr. 525-28, 541-46, 558.
Weinstein credibly explained his criticisms of G.R.'s analysis in
detail, opining that the factors he identified both over-estimated,
see, e.g., Tr. 552, and under-estimated, see, e.g., Tr. 552-53, the
number of outliers that could have potentially constituted suspicious
orders.
Weinstein notably ``did not conduct an original analysis to
determine, retrospectively, which of Respondent's orders from 2014
through 2018 should have been identified as suspicious.'' Resp
Exceptions, at 40; see also RD, at 25, 75. Respondent argues that it is
not Respondent's burden to do so. Resp Exceptions, at 40 (citing
Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 450 U.S. 91, 100-03 (1981);
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55473; 21 CFR 130.44(e)).
Even if the Agency fully credits Weinstein's criticism of G.R.'s
analysis, the Government has clearly demonstrated its prima facie case
that Respondent failed to design and operate a system to identify
suspicious orders and report them to DEA and Respondent admits as much.
See, e.g., Tr. 666 (Weinstein testifying that the numbers run in early
2018 would have identified suspicious orders in similar quantities to
what Respondent is currently reporting); Tr. 813 (Irelan testifying
that he accepts responsibility for the Government's allegations in the
OSC, paragraph 10, regarding the failure to design and operate an
adequate SOM system). The G.R. analysis, according to G.R.'s credible
testimony, offered a ballpark estimate of the scale of suspicious
orders that Respondent neglected to identify and report to DEA. RD, at
12, and 136; accord Tr. 404 (The GS testifying that he asked G.R. to
conduct an analysis ``to get a sense of just mathematically quantifying
how many suspicious orders could theoretically have been missed by
[[Page 34531]]
Morris & Dickson'' \55\). Respondent argued that the Government's case
was founded \56\ on establishing specific outliers that Respondent
failed report to DEA as suspicious orders. Resp Exceptions, at 43
(citing e.g., OSC, at 37, 46, 54, 65, 74, 84, 93); see also ALJX 52, at
20. However, the Agency does not find it necessary to count and
identify the exact number of specific outliers, and the reason why is
simple. Respondent is charged with violating a non-prescriptive
regulation, which clearly places the burden on the distributor to
design and operate a system to disclose to the distributor suspicious
orders of controlled substances under Agency guidelines.\57\ The DEA
regulations notably do not prescribe exactly what SOM system to use or
what constitutes a suspicious order--what constitutes an order of
unusual size, an order deviating substantially from a normal pattern,
etc. Respondent, in its defense, did not attempt to demonstrate that
the system that it had in place during the relevant time period
adequately identified suspicious orders--in fact, Irelan took
responsibility for Respondent's SOM system failures and failure to
adequately report suspicious orders to DEA. Tr. 731, 733. Based on the
evidence in the record and Respondent's admitted failures, the Agency
finds that Respondent clearly violated 21 CFR 1301.74(b) in failing to
design and operate its system and in failing to investigate or report
suspicious orders to DEA. Respondent's attempts to distract the Agency
from the notion that it did not adequately meet the regulatory
obligation by picking apart DEA's ballpark estimate demonstrating the
potential magnitude of Respondent's violations are unavailing. The
Agency notes that Respondent contests the quantity of suspicious orders
that G.R. identified as unreported to DEA; but G.R.'s analysis, which
he notably calibrated to only identify extreme outliers, Tr. 203, shows
that the number of unreported suspicious orders for these two
controlled substances during the relevant timeframe could have
potentially been in the thousands.\58\
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\55\ It is noted that Respondent uses a different quote from the
GS that stated that the intent of the analysis was ``to quantify,
you know, just how many orders are we talking about that fell
outside of just a normal pattern or set amount'' and that ``the
analysis showed that there were roughly, 14,000 orders that should
have been reported as suspicious based on the quantity that was
ordered.'' Respondent's Exceptions, at 45 (quoting Tr. 293). Given
the several contextual parameters that the GS used in these
statements, like ``just a normal pattern or set amount'' and ``based
on the quantity that was ordered,'' the Agency does not find this
statement to be inconsistent with the GS's statement at Tr. 404,
regarding the purpose of G.R.'s analysis.
\56\ The Government's Prehearing Statement states that G.R.
``will testify that a standard statistical outlier analysis is a
reasonable method to identify unusual transactions in the context of
pharmaceutical distribution.'' ALJX 7, at 6. The description of
G.R.'s testimony in both the Government's Prehearing Statement and
Third Supplemental Prehearing Statement discusses the manner in
which G.R. arrived at his calculations and established reasonable
thresholds. Id. at 6-8; ALJX 52, at 20 (``G.R. will testify that his
analysis identified the following unusually large transactions for
the exemplar pharmacies.''). The Agency additionally agrees with the
rationale of the ALJ that G.R.'s testimony regarding the intent of
his statistical analysis did not give rise to a new allegation. See
RD, at 96 n.33.
\57\ The December 20, 2007 letter that DEA sent to manufacturers
and distributors stated that ``[t]he regulation clearly indicates
that it is the sole responsibility of the registrant to design and
operate such a system. Accordingly, DEA does not approve or
otherwise endorse any specific system for reporting suspicious
orders.'' GX 4, at 1.
\58\ Respondent further made arguments related to what it
determined as inconsistent analysis in the RD related to G.R.'s
outlier numbers. Resp Exceptions, at 44-46. The Agency finds that
G.R.'s analysis provides a ballpark of the egregiousness of
Respondent's failures to design and operate the required system. See
Tr. 227, 224.
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F. Respondent's Policies and Procedures During the Relevant Timeframe
Respondent produced a Policies and Procedure Manual and a Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) Manual in response to DEA's investigation.
GX 17 and 18. The Policies and Procedure Manual states, ``Where a
Compliance Officer sees a ratio of controlled drugs ordered out of the
normal range, or the overall quantity is too high compared with the
volume of the account, the Compliance Officer has a duty to investigate
by calling the account. The Compliance Officer may stop shipment on any
order if he or she finds the order to be unusually suspicious.'' GX 17,
at 12. The Policies and Procedures Manual notably does not indicate an
obligation to report suspicious orders to DEA. The GS testified that in
his review of Respondent's records, he did not see documentation of
stopped suspicious orders. Tr. 315-16. The SOP Manual \59\ states that
Respondent ``keeps a system in operation which is designed to discover
those purchasing patterns of controlled substances which exceed the
norm and could possibly be related to diversion activities.'' GX 18, at
19. The GS testified that this statement does not adequately reflect
the obligations in 21 CFR 1301.74(b). Tr. 307. Further, although the
SOP Manual describes various analytical reports regarding drug sales
and drug volumes, the GS testified that he did not see any references
to these reports in Respondent's relevant records. Tr. 308-09, 491. The
SOP Manual does clearly state that ``[w]hen a suspicious pattern or
purchase is identified by any of the above methods the customer is
contacted in some but not all cases and asked for a written explanation
for the unusual order. In all cases,\60\ a letter is sent to the DEA
indicating a possible suspicious order.'' GX 18, at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ The SOP Manual states that the details of Respondent's
suspicious order monitoring program ``are confidential and therefore
are not made a part of this manual.'' Tr. 306; GX 18, at 17.
\60\ The GS testified that customers should be contacted in all
cases. Tr. 484. Masters may provide some room for nuance if
Respondent stops shipment of the orders and reports to DEA; however,
none of this nuance is represented in the SOP Manual. Additionally,
the policy states that ``in all cases,'' DEA is required to be
notified, when in fact, DEA was only notified three times during the
relevant time period and the record evidence established that
Respondent neither reported to DEA nor adequately documented the
resolution of red flags for the exemplar pharmacies or generally for
suspicious orders during the relevant time period. See supra III.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Respondent's Former SOM System
Irelan testified that Respondent's SOM system during the time
period comprising the allegations (former SOM System) was ``not as
robust as what we have today.'' Tr. 738-40 (citing e.g., GX 19, at 3);
see also RX 31.001 and 31.002 (notes that were part of Respondent's
former SOM System). The former SOM system included: know your customer
efforts; an electronic customer profile (ECP); a market basket system;
reports from Pro Compliance; direct contact with and soliciting of
information from customers; and reliance on Respondent's sales force
and those who actually filled orders for controlled substances. Tr.
866-70; GX 9, at 2-3; GX 17, at 12; GX 18, at 19-20.
Irelan testified that Respondent's former SOM system would send an
email or text message to the compliance officer, C.G., when an order
was flagged as suspicious and the order would ship if C.G. did not take
action to stop it. Tr. 728, 778.
Irelan testified that Respondent's former SOM system was ``not
consistent with best practices . . . . because it didn't hold the
order. It didn't give an opportunity to resolve red flags before
shipping.'' Tr. 729. Additionally, Irelan testified that ``the
calculation that the system was using [to identify potentially
suspicious orders] was only using ten times a 90-day average,'' which
made it ``inadequate.'' Tr. 729; see also Tr. 321-22 (The GS testimony
that 8 times the average could still be a suspicious order); Tr. 652
(Weinstein testifying that this calculation was not sufficient based on
DEA guidance). Regarding the former SOM system, Milione testified that
his ``understanding is they accepted that there were things wrong with
it, that the
[[Page 34532]]
reporting to DEA was insufficient.'' Tr. 989. Further, he stated, ``it
was clear that there was an issue'' and that after reviewing the
system, his company told Respondent that ``there are certain things
that should be enhanced knowing what DEA expected.'' Tr. 990-91. For
example, ``one of the big things was a way to flag orders [in] real
time and in an appropriate way with some kind of an algorithm and then
report those flagged orders to DEA.'' Tr. 991.
Respondent also argues that as a result of its former SOM system,
it had ceased supplying controlled substances to 42 pharmacies from
2014 to 2016. RX 11, at 14 (powerpoint slide); Tr. 871. Respondent's
expert acknowledged that if those customers had been terminated based
on Respondent's SOM program, it should have filed suspicious order
reports with DEA. Tr. 1015-16; see also Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at
55477 (holding that a distributor discovering a suspicious order must
either stop shipping and report to DEA or investigate and resolve the
red flags). If Respondent stopped shipping and terminated a customer as
a result of discovering a suspicious order, that order should have been
reported to DEA. There is no evidence that the 42 customers from 2014
to 2016 were reported to DEA--in fact, the evidence establishes that
there was only one suspicious order report filed during this timeframe
on April 7, 2014. See GX 6, at 1.\61\
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\61\ It is also noted that Jacob Dickson's letter stated that
Respondent had ceased supplying 142 retail pharmacies ``due to
questions and concerns that the pharmacies were overdispensing
controlled substances. After ceasing doing business with these `bad
accounts' [Respondent] has seen very few examples which would
justify the reporting of a suspicious order.'' GX 9, at 5. Milione
testified that Mr. Dickson ``specifically took pride in being able
to say, look, this--every year there has been this--this many
customers that they focused on and identified. And I think--I don't
know the exact math. It was 125, 135 customers from 2008 to 2016
that were terminated or suspended . . . based upon their compliance
suspicious order monitoring program.'' Tr. 870-71. Respondent
provided transcribed testimony from Mr. Dickson in a separate
hearing stating that Respondent eliminated 142 customers ``because
in some form or fashion they might have been suspicious and
diverting.'' RX 1, at 61. It is unclear how many of these customers
were terminated during the relevant timeframe--other than the 42
customers that were terminated during 2014 to 2016. Without the
benefit of evidence or testimony regarding the circumstances of the
terminations during the relevant timeframe, it is difficult for the
Agency to determine what weight to give these terminations, see RD,
at n.32; however, the language on the record describing these orders
as ``suspicious and diverting'' or ``overdispensing'' or ``bad
accounts'' certainly brings into question whether they could
constitute additional violations of the suspicious order reporting
requirement. See also RD, at 136. In sum, without further evidence
explaining the circumstances of the terminations or the reasons why
they were unreported to DEA, the Agency cannot give Respondent's
terminations during the relevant timeframe the weight that
Respondent requests to demonstrate its compliance. These
terminations are not being considered as further violations of DEA
regulations, but they are also not given weight for Respondent in
the public interest inquiry. Finally, the Agency notes that whether
Respondent's SOM System was adequate prior to the relevant timeframe
is not a matter currently before the Agency.
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H. Respondent's New SOM System
Respondent requested confidentiality related to its current SOM
system and policies; therefore, this Decision incorporates by reference
the findings of the RD related to Respondent's system and summarizes
herein at as high a level as possible while appropriately adjudicating
the facts.\62\ See RD, at 75-82. Guidepost \63\ undertook seven
corrective measures on Respondent's behalf. Tr. 882. Those measures
included: (1) establishing an anti-diversion compliance regulatory
affairs team; (2) enhancing Respondent's SOM system; (3) redeveloping
Respondent's ECP; (4) enhancing Respondent's ``know your customer
protocols''; (5) enhancing Respondent's due diligence investigative
protocols; (6) conducting employee training; and (7) documenting
everything and reporting to DEA. Tr. 882-900. The Analysis Group, Inc.,
(AGI) was also brought in to develop a live real-time order monitoring
system that would identify suspicious orders. Tr. 885. Between May 14,
2018, and July 29, 2018, Respondent submitted 58 suspicious order
reports to the DEA. RX 20. In those 58 reports, Respondent informed the
DEA of approximately 3,915 suspicious orders. Id. Applying Respondent's
new SOM program to its orders from early 2018, Weinstein identified a
similar number of suspicious orders.\64\ Tr. 666, 676, 682-83.
Respondent's current SOM system holds customer's orders as
``potentially suspicious'' and prevents the orders from being shipped
until the Compliance team has reviewed. Tr. 668-69, 672; 582.
Furthermore, Respondent currently documents its due diligence regarding
suspicious orders in the Enhanced Customer Profiles in a readily-
retrievable format. Tr. 737, 716; RD, at 79.
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\62\ See, e.g., Tr. 15 (Respondent requesting confidentiality
based on ``proprietary trade secrets of the Analysis Group regarding
the customized suspicious order monitoring system that they have
developed for the Respondent, as well as all of the different
functionality of the Respondent's suspicious order monitoring
system.''); ALJX 82. The Agency has provided a high-level summary of
these improvements to demonstrate consideration of the scope of
Respondent's remedial measures. The numbers of suspicious orders
have been included because the Agency finds this information to be
relevant to the adjudication of this matter.
\63\ Respondent paid Guidepost a large sum of money between the
time the OSC/ISO was issued and May 2019 to be brought into
compliance with DEA regulations. Tr. 973-74, 992 (see RD, at 76 for
further details). Milione testified that Respondent has ``spared no
expense'' in becoming compliant with DEA regulations. Tr. 992.
\64\ Although Respondent did not run its new system on the old
data during the time period covered by the OSC, Tr. 682, 686,
Weinstein did testify that Respondent applied its current SOM system
to the orders Respondent received in early 2018 (covering some of
the allegations in the OSC) and Weinstein testified that using the
current SOM system ``[c]ertainly there were some that would have
been identified in those months. And in a similar number to what's
being identified currently.'' Tr. 666; see also Tr. 676 (data from
April 2018 (in the relevant timeframe) produced a roughly similar
volume of flagged orders, which ``tends to be in the hundreds each
month that are identified by the thresholds''). It is noted that
these numbers reflect the quantity of orders that would have been
flagged for suspicion and does not ``take into account any due
diligence'' etc. Tr. 677. This testimony is not included in this
Decision to prove the number of suspicious orders that DEA should
have received in early 2018, but, instead, is included to further
support the Agency's finding that Respondent's suspicious order
monitoring and reporting during the relevant timeframe was
insufficient to meet the regulatory requirements.
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IV. Analysis
A distributor's registration may be suspended or revoked upon a
finding that the distributor ``has committed such acts as would render
[its] registration under section 823 of this title inconsistent with
the public interest as determined under such section . . . .'' 21
U.S.C. 824(a)(4). With regard to distributors of schedule II controlled
substances, Congress has set forth five factors to consider when
determining whether the distributor's registration would be in the
public interest. The factors to be considered are:
(1) maintenance of effective control against diversion of
particular controlled substances into other than legitimate medical,
scientific, and industrial channels;
(2) compliance with applicable State and local law;
(3) prior conviction record of applicant under Federal or State
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
such substances;
(4) past experience in the distribution of controlled
substances; and
(5) such other factors as may be relevant to and consistent with
the public health and safety.
21 U.S.C. 823(b).\65\
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\65\ 21 U.S.C. 823(e) also applies to distributors of controlled
substances. The section sets forth the identical factors to be
considered regarding a registration to distribute controlled
substances in schedules III, IV, and V, as are contained in 21
U.S.C. 823(b) concerning schedules I and II. The Government's
allegations are focused primarily on Respondent's distribution of
schedule II controlled substances, but in 2014, during the time
period of the allegations, hydrocodone was changed from a schedule
III to a schedule II controlled substance. Tr. 539. Additionally,
Respondent is a registered distributor of controlled substances in
schedules II-V; therefore, the Agency, even when referring only to
(b), considers the identical public interest factors under both
sections 823(b) and (e) in this section.
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[[Page 34533]]
The Agency considers these public interest factors in the
disjunctive and may rely on any one or a combination of factors and
give each factor the weight the Agency deems appropriate in determining
whether to revoke a registration or to deny a pending application for
renewal of a registration. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55472
(applying DEA decisions on the public interest factors in 21 U.S.C.
823(f) to the public interest factors for distributors in 21 U.S.C.
823(b) and (e)); see also Southwood Pharm, Inc., 72 FR at 36497-98. Any
one factor, or combination of factors, may be decisive. David H.
Gillis, M.D., 58 FR 37507, 37508 (1993). There is no need to enter
findings on each of the factors.\66\ Hoxie v. Drug Enf't Admin., 419
F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55473.
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\66\ Respondent argues that ``an independent consideration of
each of these [five] factors [at 21 U.S.C. 823(b)(1-5)] weigh[s]
against a finding that Respondent's continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest.'' ALJX 89, para. 291. In
other words, although the Government only submitted evidence
relevant to Factor One and Factor Four, Respondent urges the Agency
to find evidence relevant to all five Factors. The Agency declines
to adjudicate, at Respondent's request, arguments that the
Government did not make, yet notes that if it were to do as
Respondent requests, the ensuing analysis of all five Factors would
continue to point to the revocation of Respondent's registration.
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The Government bears the initial burden of proof and must justify
revocation by a preponderance of the evidence. Steadman, 450 U.S. at
100-03; Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55473; 21 CFR 1301.44(e). If the
Government makes a prima facie case for revocation, then the burden of
proof shifts to the registrant to show why its continued registration
would not be inconsistent with the public interest. Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 80 FR at 55473; see also Med. Shoppe--Jonesborough, 73 FR 364,
387 (2008).
In this case, the Government contends that Respondent's continued
registrations are inconsistent with the public interest based on
Factors One and Four. ALJ-90, at 27-29.
A. Respondent's Failure To Maintain Effective Controls Against
Diversion and its Experience With Controlled Substances (Factors One
and Four) 67
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\67\ While listing the five public interest factors of 21 U.S.C.
823(b), the Government specifically notes that it does not rely on
Factors Three or Five and makes no argument concerning Factor Two.
ALJ-90, at 27-29 & n.12. Further, the Government combines its
analysis of Factors One and Four. Id. at 28-44. The Government notes
that where it has not made allegations with respect to Factors Three
and Five, the factors do not weigh for or against revocation. See
ALJX 90, at n.12. As such, although the Agency has considered all
five factors, its analysis focuses on Factors One and Four.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to Factor One, concerning the maintenance of effective
controls against diversion, DEA has promulgated regulations to guide
the regulated community. Specifically,
All applicants and registrants shall provide effective controls
and procedures to guard against theft and diversion of controlled
substances. In order to determine whether a registrant has provided
effective controls against diversion, the Administrator shall use
the security requirements set forth in [21 CFR] 1301.72-1301.76 as
standards for the physical security controls and operating
procedures necessary to prevent diversion.
21 CFR 1301.71(a).
DEA's security regulations further provide that:
The registrant shall design and operate a system to disclose to
the registrant suspicious orders of controlled substances. The
registrant shall inform the Field Division Office of the
Administration in his area of suspicious orders when discovered by
the registrant. Suspicious orders include orders of unusual size,
orders deviating substantially from a normal pattern, and orders of
unusual frequency.
21 CFR 1301.74(b).
The OSC alleges that Respondent failed to maintain ``effective
controls against diversion of particular controlled substances into
other than legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial channels,''
in violation of 21 U.S.C. 823(b)(1) and 21 CFR 1301.71(a). ALJX 1, at
3, paras. 7, 10. Second, the OSC alleges that Respondent failed to
adequately ``design and operate a system to disclose to the registrant
suspicious orders of controlled substances'' and report them to DEA, in
violation of 21 CFR 1301.74(b). ALJX 1, at 3, paras. 8, 10.
Factor Four involves a registrant's past experience in the
distribution of controlled substances, which the Government has argued
is appropriately considered along with its maintenance of effective
controls against diversion. See, e.g., Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at
55473. In this case, Respondent argues that its experience in the
distribution of controlled substances ``is extensive,'' as it was
``founded in 1841 and distributes more than 33,000 products,'' and that
its history of compliance weighs against a finding that Respondent's
registration is inconsistent with the public interest. ALJX 89, at 115-
116 (citing RX 1, at 13:16, 15:10). Although Respondent's arguments
have been considered, Respondent's misconduct as described further
herein precludes a finding that Respondent's experience establishes a
``history of compliance.'' See Novelty Distributors, Inc., 73 FR 52689,
52702 (2008) (analyzing the identical factor for distributors under 21
U.S.C. 823(h)).
1. A Suspicious Order
To begin, the regulations require distributors to ``design and
operate a system to disclose to the registrant suspicious orders of
controlled substances.'' 21 CFR 1301.74(b). The regulations provide
that, at minimum, a suspicious order includes ``orders of unusual size,
orders deviating substantially from a normal pattern, and orders of
unusual frequency.'' Id.; see section IV.A.3. These three criteria are
non-exclusive and registrants may encounter other considerations beyond
those spelled out in the regulation that could qualify an order as
suspicious. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55473-74; Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 861 F.3d at 221 (noting the regulatory criteria for suspicion are
``exemplary rather than exhaustive''). For example, a distributor might
find a pharmacy's orders for controlled substances to be suspicious not
only based on their exhibiting the characteristics set forth in the
regulation, but also based upon the ``pharmacy's business model,
dispensing patterns, or other characteristics.'' Masters Pharm., Inc.,
80 FR at 55473-74; see also id. at 55477 (stating that ``an order is
not only suspicious by virtue of its internal properties--i.e., being
of unusual size, pattern, or frequency--but by virtue of the suspicious
nature of the pharmacy which placed [the order]''). The identification
of a suspicious order that is based on the nature of the pharmacy's
business takes place at the customer-level. See infra section IV.A.4.
In order to conclude that an order for controlled substances is
suspicious, a ``distributor is not required to establish, to a
statistical certainty, that a pharmacy was likely diverting controlled
substances.'' Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55480. In fact, suspicion
is a low standard, defined as merely one's `` `apprehension or
imagination of the existence of something wrong based only on
inconclusive or slight evidence, or possibly no evidence.' '' Masters
Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55478 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1585 (9th
ed. 2009)). Thus, if a distributor is aware of any indication of ``the
existence of something wrong'' concerning the size, frequency, or
pattern of an order, then the distributor is obligated to report it to
the DEA. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55478. Because suspicion is a
low standard, a distributor's obligation to report suspicious orders is
triggered long before the distributor would have
[[Page 34534]]
probable cause to believe that a customer is engaged in diversion. Id.
As Masters explains, suspicion is not contingent on evidence that the
order will be diverted or that the customer is engaged in diversion.
Id. With regard to the reporting requirement, the Agency's emphasis is
on suspicion and not conclusive proof of diversion. Id. at 55420
(explaining that tying suspicion to evidence of diversion ``imposes a
higher standard than that of the plain language of the regulation,
which requires only that the order be suspicious'').
2. Respondent's Failure To Adequately Design and Operate a Suspicious
Order Monitoring System
When a distributor's suspicious order monitoring (SOM) system
places a hold on a customer's order for controlled substances because
the order is of unusual size, pattern, or frequency, the order meets
the specific criteria of being suspicious. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR
at 55479; Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 216-17 (affirming the
Acting Administrator's ruling that ``orders held by the [distributor's
SOM systems] met the regulatory definition of `suspicious orders' '').
DEA has made clear that it does not endorse any particular system for
identifying suspicious orders. GX 4, at 1; Tr. 59-60, 76, 210, 497,
646.
In this case, Respondent's SOM system during the relevant time
period did not have the capability to hold an order that was flagged as
``potentially suspicious.'' Tr. 728, 778. Therefore, the system could
not comply with the DEA legal requirements. Tr. 729 (Irelan testifying
that the SOM system was ``not consistent with best practices'' because
``[i]t didn't give an opportunity to resolve red flags before
shipping.'')
Additionally, the witnesses were in agreement that Respondent's SOM
system during the relevant time period was inadequate to identify
orders of unusual size in that it only flagged orders that were ``ten
times a 90-day average,'' Tr. 729-30, 321, 652.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ DEA sent a letter in December 20, 2007, warning
distributors that a SOM system ``rely[ing] on rigid formulas to
define whether an order is suspicious may be failing to detect
suspicious orders.'' GX 4, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, while Respondent had written policies and procedures,
those policies and procedures only identified three suspicious orders
over a period of four years and four months that were reported to the
DEA. Respondent admits that its previous policies were inadequate. Tr.
720-21. Respondent had a policy of producing monthly and daily reports,
yet none is apparent in the Administrative Record, and although
Respondent maintained a proprietary database, RX 11, at 5, there is no
record evidence from this database.
Finally, although Respondent argues that the record supports that
it was conducting due diligence into its customers, Respondent admits
that it did not adequately document that due diligence, nor did it
apply that due diligence at an order level. See infra section IV.A.4.
Respondent's policy of not documenting its due diligence, GX 9, was
also inconsistent with the Masters decision. See id.
In sum, the Agency finds substantial record evidence that
Respondent failed to design and operate an adequate SOM system in
violation of 21 CFR 1301.74(b).
3. Respondent's Failure To Report Suspicious Orders Under the Listed
Criteria in 21 CFR 1301.74(b)
As explained above, DEA regulations obligate distributors of
controlled substances to not only design and operate a system to
identify suspicious orders, but to also report all suspicious orders to
DEA. 21 CFR 1301.74(b). In other words, DEA regulations require
distributors like Respondent ``to alert DEA when their retail-pharmacy
customers attempt to obtain unusual amounts of a controlled substance,
because such attempts are powerful evidence that the pharmacies are
operating illegally.'' Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 217-18
(emphasis in original).\69\ Moreover, the Agency has previously held
that filing ARCOS reports does not satisfy a distributor's obligation
to notify DEA of suspicious orders, Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at
36501, nor does filing reports on a routine or periodic schedule.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55478.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Suspicious orders meeting the definition in 21 CFR
1301.74(b) must be reported to DEA, and Respondent did not argue
otherwise. See, e.g., Tr. 732, 1024; RX 20.001, at 1. There is
additionally no record evidence that Respondent investigated these
suspicious orders and resolved them at any time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The purpose of the DEA's reporting requirement is ``to provide
investigators in the field with information regarding potential illegal
activity in an expeditious manner.'' Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at
55483 n.169 (quoting Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at 36501). As such,
when a distributor obtains ``information that an order is suspicious
but then chooses to ignore that information and fails to report the
order,'' the distributor violates its regulatory obligation. Id. at
55478.
Here, DEA presented evidence using the Tukey statistical model to
determine a ballpark number of suspicious orders that an adequate SOM
system might have identified during the time period in the allegations
both for the eight exemplar pharmacies and for Respondent's customer
base at large for two frequently abused controlled substances:
oxycodone and hydrocodone. The ballpark estimate found numerous
potential suspicious orders for seven out of the eight exemplar
pharmacies, and for the overall customers, it found that 7,252 sales of
oxycodone and 4,948 sales of hydrocodone during this time period should
have possibly been reported as suspicious to DEA.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ It is noted that the ballpark numbers that G.R. testified
to support a conclusion that Respondent failed to identify, resolve,
or report suspicious orders under the criteria in Sec. 1301.74(b)
to DEA--not whether Respondent failed to conduct customer due
diligence generally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ballpark numbers constitute substantial evidence that there
were far more suspicious orders that should have been identified,
investigated, or reported than the mere three that Respondent reported
during the time period. Even taking into consideration all of the
criticism levied on DEA's modeling by Respondent's expert, he himself
admitted that the data run during the beginning of 2018 produced
similar results to the quantity that Respondent was reporting under the
new system, which, in a little over a year, amounted to 3,915
suspicious orders. As such, the Agency agrees with the ALJ that the
three suspicious order reports filed during the relevant timeframe
``barely scratched the surface,'' RD, at 140, and finds it clear that
the Government has proven by substantial evidence that Respondent
failed to investigate or report potentially thousands of suspicious
orders of oxycodone and hydrocodone to DEA. Supra section III.E.
Furthermore, the Southwood decision explained that even after a
suspicious order is reported to DEA, a distributor must conduct some
due diligence and only ship the order ``if it is able to determine that
the order is not likely to be diverted into illegal channels.'' Masters
Pharmaceuticals, 861 F.3d 206 (2017) (citing Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72
FR at 36500). Here, it is undisputed that Respondent submitted three
suspicious order reports to DEA during the relevant time period. The GS
testified that Respondent shipped these orders without documenting any
resolution of the suspicious circumstances that caused Respondent to
report them to DEA. Tr. 294. Thus, the Agency finds substantial record
evidence that Respondent's lack of documentation of its investigation
into and resolution of these red flags,
[[Page 34535]]
coupled with its shipping of the suspicious orders, demonstrates
additional violations of Respondent's regulatory obligations to provide
effective controls and procedures to guard against diversion of
controlled substances.
4. Customer Due Diligence and Red Flags
It is inherent in the obligation under 21 CFR 1301.71(a) to
maintain ``effective controls'' against diversion that ``a registrant
has an affirmative duty to protect against diversion by knowing its
customers and the nature of [their controlled substances] sales.''
Holloway Distributing, 72 FR 42118, 42124 (2007).\71\ Therefore, a
distributor is required to act on `` `information which raise[s]
serious doubt as to the legality of [the customer's] business
practices,' '' also referred to as red flags,\72\ indicative of
diversion. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55477 (alteration in
original) (quoting Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at 36498). A
distributor must also ``conduct a reasonable investigation to determine
the nature of a potential customer's business before it sells to the
customer.'' Id. Furthermore, a distributor has a continuing obligation
to perform due diligence of a customer throughout the distributor's
relationship with that customer. Id. at 55477. Masters clarified that
``although a distributor's investigation of the order (coupled with its
previous due diligence efforts) may properly lead it to conclude that
the order is not suspicious, the investigation must dispel all red
flags indicating that a customer is engaged in diversion to render the
order non-suspicious and exempt it from the requirement that the
distributor `inform' the Agency about the order.'' Id. at 55478.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ See also Holloway Distributing, 72 FR 42118, 42124 (2007)
(finding that a distributor of List I chemicals' ``policy--which is
fairly characterized as `see no evil, hear no evil'--is
fundamentally inconsistent with the obligations of a DEA
registrant'').
\72\ It is noted that Agency Adjudications have used the term
``red flag'' as early as 1998 and federal courts have used the term
as early as 1986. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., & SND
Health Care, L.L.C., 81 FR 79188, 79195 n.23 (2016), pet. for rev.
denied, 881 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2018). In general, a red flag is any
``circumstance that does or should raise a reasonable suspicion as
to the validity of a prescription [or order].'' Pharmacy Doctors
Enters. d/b/a Zion Clinic Pharmacy, 83 FR at 10896 n.31 (quoting
Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 FR at 49839). Red flags are, in essence,
``warning signs'' or ``suspicious circumstances'' that alert the
registrant that something is not right. Jones Total Health Care
Pharmacy, L.L.C., & SND Health Care, L.L.C., 81 FR at 79195 n.23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The record evidence and testimony from multiple experts in this
case, the Pro Compliance Reports themselves, and prior DEA decisions
have all clearly demonstrated that such suspicious circumstances, or
red flags, include a pharmacy that: dispenses a high volume of
narcotics; \73\ dispenses the trinity drug cocktail; \74\ dispenses
disproportionally more controlled substances than non-controlled
substances; \75\ fills prescriptions for a high volume of patients who
pay for prescriptions in cash; \76\ fills a disproportionate volume of
controlled substance prescriptions written by only a few prescribers;
\77\ and orders excessive quantities of a limited variety of controlled
substances.\78\ See supra section III.C. A distributor fails to
maintain effective controls against diversion when the distributor
continues to distribute controlled substances to a pharmacy that
exhibits red flags of diversion without resolving those red flags.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55457 (faulting the distributor for
supplying controlled substances ``while ignoring numerous red flags as
to the legitimacy of the pharmacy's dispensing of controlled
substances''); cf. Top RX Pharmacy, 78 FR 26069, 26082 (2013) (applying
a similar principle to pharmacies filling prescriptions that contain
red flags of abuse or diversion); see also Novelty Distributors, Inc.,
73 FR 52689, 52699 (2008) (applying a similar principle to list I
chemical distributors under 21 U.S.C. 823(h) (``Fundamental to its
obligation to maintain effective controls against diversion, a
distributor must review every order and identify suspicious
transactions. Further, it must do so prior to shipping the products.
Indeed, a distributor has an affirmative duty to forgo a transaction
if, upon investigation, it is unable to determine that the proposed
transaction is for legitimate purposes.'')).\79\ A distributor has an
obligation to guard against diversion, and as such, must resolve red
flags of diversion presented by its customers or decline to ship the
controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. 823(b), (e); 21 CFR 1301.71(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 5548-81 n.168 (explaining
where a distributor had information that 50 percent of the
prescriptions filled by a pharmacy were for controlled substances,
while the average pharmacy only fills about 20 percent, the
distributor ``had substantial information which raised a strong
suspicion as to the legitimacy of [the pharmacy's] dispensing
practices''); GX 3, at 3.
\74\ Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., & SND Health
Care, L.L.C., 81 FR at 79194 (``The combination of a benzodiazepine,
a narcotic and carisoprodol is `well known in the pharmacy
profession' as being used `by patients abusing prescription drugs.'
'' (quoting E. Main St. Pharmacy, 75 FR 66149, 66163 (2010))).
\75\ Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55456; GX 3, at 3.
\76\ Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., & SND Health
Care, L.L.C., 81 FR at 79194 (`` `[A]ny reasonable pharmacist knows
that a patient that (sic) wants to pay cash for a large quantity of
controlled substances is immediately suspect.' '' (quoting E. Main
St. Pharmacy, 75 FR 66149, 66158 (2010))).
\77\ GX 3, at 3.
\78\ Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55421; GX 3, at 3.
\79\ Respondent introduced testimony regarding whether
Respondent could continue to ship during a due diligence
investigation into customer-level red flags of diversion--arguing
that there is a certain amount of discretion involved and that
stopping shipments would disrupt the supply chain. See, e.g., Tr.
1049, 1050, 1042; 649. The record does not support a finding that
Respondent did, in fact, adequately dispel all of the red flags on
these customers at any time (before or after distributing), or that
Respondent adequately documented purported resolutions of the red
flags. The Masters decision cannot be read to intend to create a
loophole in which a distributor could avoid reporting requirements
and continue to ship orders of controlled substances while
conducting lengthy investigations into red flags. Such an
interpretation would not meet the requirement that a distributor
maintain effective controls against diversion. To the extent that,
as Respondent argues, there may be some discretion in the decision
of when to ship, it is abundantly clear that a distributor cannot
ship if it cannot determine that the ``proposed transaction is for
legitimate purposes,'' Novelty Distributors 73 FR at 52699, or
without resolving `` `information which raise[s] serious doubt as to
the legality of [a potential or existing customer's] business
practices.' '' Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55477 (alteration in
original) (quoting Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at 36,498).
Further, Respondent's supply chain argument is weakened by the fact
that Respondent had a duty to and was purportedly running reports on
prospective customers; therefore, it knew about many of the red
flags in the eight exemplar pharmacies before engaging in business
with them. See, e.g., GX 25, at 4 (Initial Risk Evaluation Report
for Hephzibah Pharmacy LLC); RX 11, at 15 (powerpoint demonstrating
turned down prospective accounts based on Pro Compliance Reports).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When a customer demonstrates red flags of diversion, the
distributor must report a suspicious order to DEA unless the
distributor conducts a due diligence investigation, which ``must dispel
all red flags indicative that a customer is engaged in diversion.''
Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55478. ``Put another way, if, even after
investigating the order, there is any remaining basis to suspect that a
customer is engaged in diversion, the order must be deemed suspicious
and the [DEA] must be informed.'' Id.; see also id. at 55479 n.164
(same).
In upholding DEA's interpretation of the due diligence requirement
in the Masters decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
As we have emphasized throughout this opinion, it is not
necessary for a distributor of controlled substances to investigate
suspicious orders if it reports them to DEA and declines to fill
them. But if a distributor chooses to shoulder the burden of
dispelling suspicion in the hopes of shipping any it finds to be
non-suspicious, and the distributor uses something like the SOMS
Protocol to guide its efforts, then the distributor must actually
undertake the
[[Page 34536]]
investigation. For example, when an employee uses the SOMS Protocol
to confirm or dispel suspicion based on the amount of controlled
medication the pharmacy is selling, the employee must request a
`UR,' i.e., a document showing the pharmacy's `actual dispensing[s]
. . . of each drug.' [Masters Pharm., Inc.,] 80 FR [55418,] 55420
[(2015)]. Moreover, the investigating employee must `document'
customers' explanations for suspicious orders, so that he or she can
verify those explanations and make sure they are consistent over
time. Id. at 55428 n.21. Additionally, if a customer's explanation
for its order is `inconsistent with other information the
investigator has obtained about or from the customer, . . . the
[investigator] must conduct `additional investigation to determine
whether [its customer is] filling legitimate prescriptions.' Id. at
55477. Finally, the investigation must dispel all of the `red flags'
that gave rise to the suspicion that the customer was diverting
controlled substances. Id. at 55478. The Administrator recognized
that, if investigating employees fail to take such basic steps, the
SOMS (or similar protocol) does not function as an effective tool
for dispelling suspicion.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 222-23. The D.C. Circuit made clear
that all red flags must be resolved or the order must be reported to
DEA as suspicious.
In this case, Respondent received numerous Pro Compliance Reports
that raised multiple red flags for each of the relevant customers
during the relevant time period. See GX 20-56; supra section III.D. The
Pro Compliance Reports themselves clearly identify specific red flags
in Respondent's customers' data and frequently recommend further
discussions and onsite visits to resolve them. See, e.g., GX 21, at 6;
supra III.E. Although Respondent produced some minimal evidence
consisting of phone logs for some of the exemplar pharmacies in the
OSC, see supra n.12 and section III.D., which indicated a few instances
over the several year timeframe where Respondent had engaged with these
customers regarding red flags and/or suspicious orders, there is not
adequate documentation as to how Respondent resolved the red flags,
even as Respondent continued to fill these orders without reporting
them to DEA. Moreover, the GS credibly testified that documentation was
an essential component of due diligence. Tr. 298-99 (``[I]f you don't
document it how are you going to remember it, how are you going to be
able to prove it happened''). The Masters decision further pointed out
that documentation is essential in maintaining effective controls
against diversion to ensure that customers are consistent in their
explanations regarding red flags. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55428
n.21. The D.C. Circuit also affirmed the Agency's position that if a
distributor undertakes an investigation into its customer's potential
diversion, then it must document and ``dispel all of the `red flags'
that gave rise to the suspicion that the customer was diverting
controlled substances'' to avoid the requirement to report the
suspicious order to DEA. Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 222-23.
Here, Respondent acknowledged the paucity of documentation in its
records that might show that it had resolved red flags. See, e.g., Tr.
720; GX 9, at 1-2. Contrary to Respondent's argument (ALJ-89, at 101-
03, paras. 272-75), the absence of documentation of resolving red flags
does indeed constitute evidence that the red flags were never resolved.
See Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 218.\80\ While Respondent did
conduct some due diligence, such as by obtaining Pro Compliance Reports
and by preparing its own monthly Market Basket Reports of its
customers, ordering the reports without taking appropriate action based
on the content of those reports does not come close to satisfying the
regulatory obligation to conduct due diligence. These Pro Compliance
Reports identify multiple red flags from Respondent's pharmacy
customers--demonstrating that Respondent was aware of these red flags--
while the records it produced do not resolve them in any substantive
way to demonstrate effective controls against diversion. See, e.g., GX
20-56 (the Pro Compliance Reports for the exemplar pharmacies).
Respondent's employees even noted occasions where information in the
Pro Compliance Reports was specifically concerning to them or where
they were aware of additional indicia of diversion or suspicious
orders, yet these orders were neither reported to DEA nor is there
record evidence to support a finding that Respondent resolved all of
the red flags that gave rise to the suspicion. See, e.g., Respondent's
employee's comments, at GX 14, at 4 (``[T]his seems quite elevated to
me. . . . .????'') and 31 (``Henry will give the customer a warning
about his Oxy purchases. Too much cash, too much growth. Will re-run
and if no improvement will either restrict or cut off completely.'').
The note documenting this interaction not only fails to offer any
resolution of the suspicious circumstances or indicate any reporting to
DEA, but also indicates that Respondent knew of the existence of a
suspicious order and that the customer was given a warning--providing
it with a chance to amend its behavior and further avoid detection from
DEA. The regulations require resolution or reporting, not
implementation of a ``second chance'' or ``three strikes you're out''
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ To permit Respondent to escape any liability for its lack
of adequate controls to protect against diversion merely because
Respondent created a policy that did not require documentation of
how those controls were exercised would nullify the purpose of the
statutory and regulatory requirements. Further, the Agency agrees
with the ALJ that Respondent's intentional strategy of not
presenting the testimony of any witness who was actually involved in
Respondent's purported resolution of red flags further undermines
its argument that the red flags were actually resolved. Id. Finally,
Agency decisions have frequently described the importance of
documentation to meet DEA regulatory requirements in other contexts.
See Kaniz F. Khan-Jaffery, M.D., 85 FR 45667, 45686 (2020) (``DEA's
ability to assess whether controlled substances registrations are
consistent with the public interest is predicated upon the ability
to consider the evidence and rationale of the practitioner at the
time that she prescribed a controlled substance--adequate
documentation is critical to that assessment.'' (citing Cynthia M.
Cadet, M.D., 76 FR 19450, 19464 (2011))). In particular, the Masters
decision affirmatively stated the requirement for distributors to
document their resolutions of red flags and gave a rational basis
for that requirement--ensuring that the information is memorialized
for the resolution of future indicia of diversion. Masters Pharm.,
Inc., 80 FR at 55,428 n.21. This basis is very apparent here where
Respondent's customer base is large and the shipments are numerous.
As such, the Agency finds that Respondent's failure to maintain
adequate documentation indicates a violation of the requirements to
maintain effective controls against diversion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A distributor fails to conduct meaningful due diligence that
satisfies its regulatory duties where it merely ``accept[s] at face
value whatever superficial explanation'' the pharmacy offers and then
fails to independently verify it. Masters Pharm., Inc., 80 FR at 55457.
Further, conducting due diligence but then failing to act on the
findings is also inadequate. See Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at 36500
(finding the distributor's due diligence efforts to be inadequate where
the distributor possessed information that customers were diverting
controlled substances yet the distributor continued to provide them
with controlled substances). Thus, as the GS credibly testified as an
expert witness, the Agency finds that even though Respondent produced
some due diligence files to DEA, Respondent seemed to ``conduct due
diligence and ignore the red flags that are in [its] face and continue
to ship'' without documenting the resolution of red flags or reporting
to DEA, in violation of DEA regulations. Tr. 463; see also Tr. 80
(testimony of the Section Chief: ``[Y]ou can ask for all these things,
but you have to do something with it.''). As the evidence shows,
Respondent continued to distribute controlled substances despite the
red flags raised in its due
[[Page 34537]]
diligence files and without either adequately documenting an
investigation or resolution of the red flags or refusing to ship and
reporting the orders to DEA. As such, Respondent's due diligence was
clearly insufficient to meet DEA's legal requirements. See also RD, at
120-128 (finding that Respondent did not either dispel all red flags
for Folse, Bordelon's, Wallace, Pharmacy Specialties, Dave's Pharmacy,
Hephzibah, Wellness, and Wilkinson or report the customers to DEA and
refuse to ship).
5. Summary of Public Interest Factors
There is substantial record evidence that Respondent failed to
adequately design a suspicious order monitoring system and failed to
report suspicious orders to DEA. Further, Respondent failed to report
controlled substance orders from customers displaying red flags of
diversion and in such cases failed to either cease shipment, or,
alternatively, to investigate, resolve, and document the resolution of
the red flags. Thus, the Agency finds that Respondent failed to
maintain effective controls against diversion of controlled substances
into other than legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial channels
in violation of 21 CFR 1301.71(a). The Agency also finds that
Respondent failed to adequately design and operate a system to disclose
to the registrant suspicious orders of controlled substances and report
those orders to DEA in violation of 21 CFR 1301.74(b). See also RD, at
138. These violations constitute failures to maintain effective
controls against diversion under 21 U.S.C. 823(b)(1) and demonstrate
negative experience in distribution under 21 U.S.C. 823(b)(4) and weigh
strongly in favor of revoking Respondent's Certificates of
Registration.
B. Respondent's Integrated Enterprise
DEA has requested revocation of both Respondent's registration at
its distribution center in Shreveport, Louisiana, and Respondent's
second registration in New Orleans (Jefferson Parish). Respondent
argues that DEA has not ``alleged any misconduct to have occurred at
Respondent's Jefferson location or adduced any evidence or testimony at
the hearing regarding Respondent's Jefferson registration.'' Resp
Exceptions, at 49.
The Agency has frequently ``treat[ed] two separately organized
business entities as one integrated enterprise . . . based on the
overlap of ownership, management, and operations of the two entities.''
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., and SND Health Care, L.L.C.,
81 FR 79188, 79222 (2016) (citing MB Wholesale, Inc., 72 FR 71956,
71958 (2007)). ``[W]here misconduct has previously been proved with
respect to the owners, officers, or key employees of a pharmacy, the
Agency can deny an application or revoke a registration of a second or
subsequent pharmacy where the Government shows that such individuals
have influence over the management or control of the second pharmacy.''
Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 FR 31310, 31341, n.71
(2016). Further, the Agency may revoke a registration without
misconduct attributable to that particular registration if the Agency
finds that the registrant committed egregious misconduct under a second
registration. Roberto Zayas, M.D., 82 FR 21410, 21430 (2017) (revoking
physician's DEA registration in Florida due to conduct attributed to a
Texas registration that had expired).
When a practitioner registrant acts in a manner inconsistent with
the public interest, in determining whether to revoke, DEA looks to
whether the practitioner can be entrusted with a registration. See,
e.g. Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR 8247, 8248 (2016). If a practitioner
holding multiple registrations cannot be entrusted with one, then it
would be difficult to justify entrusting the same practitioner with
another in a separate location. Similarly, when a corporate entity is
owned and operated by individuals who have acted inconsistently with
the public interest and have misused one of their registrations, the
Agency cannot ignore this fact when considering whether to entrust
those same individuals with another registration. Furthermore, even if
Respondent has not used the Jefferson registration for distribution,
this fact does not prevent it from using its registration for
distribution in the future.\81\ See Suntree Pharmacy and Suntree
Medical Equipment, LLC, 85 FR 73753, 73766 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ The ALJ noted that Respondent's exhibits demonstrate that
it uses the Jefferson location to ``secure controlled substances''
and makes distributions out of its Shreveport facility. RD, at 156
(citing RX 1, at 15, 16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lens through which Congress has instructed the Agency to assess
each distributor registration is whether or not such registration is
consistent with the public interest. 21 U.S.C. 823(b). In this case, if
Respondent was allowed to simply shift its operations to an entity with
the same ownership, then the effect of the violations found herein
against Respondent would be a nullity and there would be nothing to
prevent Respondent's Jefferson location from continuing to act
inconsistently with the public interest. It would be inconsistent with
the intent of the CSA to permit such an easily implementable loophole,
while it is consistent with Agency decisions to close the loophole by
treating the two overlapping entities as one integrated enterprise for
purposes of sanction.
Therefore, due to the uncontested commonality of ownership,
management, and operations, see RD, at 154, the Agency finds that it is
appropriate to treat Respondent's two registrations as one integrated
enterprise.
V. Sanction
The Government has established a prima facie case to revoke
Respondent's registration; therefore, the Agency will review any
evidence and argument that Respondent submitted to determine whether or
not Respondent has presented ``sufficient mitigating evidence to assure
the Administrator that [it] can be trusted with the responsibility
carried by such a registration.'' Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 FR
23848, 23853 (2007) (quoting Leo R. Miller, M.D., 53 FR 21931, 21932
(1988)). `` `Moreover, because ``past performance is the best predictor
of future performance,'' ALRA Labs, Inc. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 54 F.3d
450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995), [the Agency] has repeatedly held that where a
registrant has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest,
the registrant must accept responsibility for [the registrant's]
actions and demonstrate that [registrant] will not engage in future
misconduct.' '' Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 459, 463 (2009) (quoting
Medicine Shoppe, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008)); see also Samuel S. Jackson,
D.D.S., 72 FR at 23853; John H. Kennnedy, M.D., 71 FR 35705, 35709
(2006); Prince George Daniels, D.D.S., 60 FR 62884, 62887 (1995). The
issue of trust is necessarily a fact-dependent determination based on
the circumstances presented by the individual respondent; therefore,
the Agency looks at factors, such as the acceptance of responsibility
and the credibility of that acceptance as it relates to the probability
of repeat violations or behavior and the nature of the misconduct that
forms the basis for sanction, while also considering the Agency's
interest in deterring similar acts. See Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR
8247, 8248 (2016).
A. Acceptance of Responsibility
1. Standing and Authority To Accept Responsibility
Respondent contends that it has unequivocally accepted
responsibility
[[Page 34538]]
for the proven misconduct and that Irelan, as its Controlled Substance
Compliance Officer, was both authorized by Respondent and an
appropriate person to accept responsibility on behalf of Respondent.
Resp Exceptions, at 8. The Agency agrees that neither Agency
regulations nor prior Agency decisions clearly preclude Irelan from
accepting responsibility on behalf of Respondent and will therefore
consider his acceptance of responsibility on its merits. Further, the
Agency finds that the record supports that Mr. Irelan is responsible
for preventing the reoccurrence of Respondent's compliance failures and
accepts that Irelan obtained authority from Respondent to accept
responsibility at the hearing. See Tr. 803 (Irelan is responsible for
continued remedial measures), Tr. 1072-74; \82\ but see Tr. 804
(decisions also go through the chain of command and to the Board).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ The ALJ did not admit RX 54; however, the Agency accepts
that Irelan had authority to make compliance decisions and speak for
Respondent in the proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultimately, as explained above, the Agency has long stated that
when the Government has presented a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the respondent to demonstrate why it can still be entrusted with a
registration in spite of its misconduct and the Agency has emphatically
emphasized the requirement that respondent unequivocally accept
responsibility to establish that trust. See, e.g., Jeffrey Stein, M.D.,
84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019); see also Leo R. Miller, M.D., 53 FR 21931,
21932 (1988) (describing revocation as a remedial measure ``based upon
the public interest and the necessity to protect the public from those
individuals who have misused controlled substances or their DEA
Certificate of Registration, and who have not presented sufficient
mitigating evidence to assure the Administrator that they can be
trusted with the responsibility carried by such a registration''). For
several reasons, Irelan's testimony has not adequately convinced the
Agency that Respondent unequivocally accepts responsibility for its
past misconduct.
2. Minimization and Characterization of the Misconduct
Here, Irelan accepted responsibility for Respondent failing to
effectively apply its customer due diligence in assessing orders of
controlled substances, Tr. 722-23, for Respondent failing to implement
and maintain a suspicious order monitoring system ``consistent with
best practices for compliance,'' Tr. 729, 731,\83\ and for the fact
that ``[t]he reporting that was being done, there were three suspicious
order reports to the DEA, and that was insufficient,'' Tr. 731, 733.
Irelan also testified that he accepted responsibility for Respondent
shipping orders of controlled substances from January 2014 to May 2018
without resolving red flags and testified that he is responsible ``for
preventing reoccurrence of the company's past failures with respect to
application of customer due diligence.'' Tr. 807, 721.\84\
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\83\ Compare Tr. 731 (Respondent's counsel asked whether the SOM
system ``was consistent with best practices and compliance''
(emphasis added)). Whether or not this distinction from the previous
statement was an error of speech, the Agency finds this statement to
not differ significantly from the previous statement--in both, there
was clearly a purposeful avoidance of taking responsibility for the
full scope of Respondent's actions and an attempt to characterize
the DEA regulations as being merely best practices as opposed to
affirmative legal requirements.
\84\ When Government Counsel asked him whether he accepted
responsibility in several specific paragraphs of the OSC, Irelan
either refused or testified that he was not in a position to answer.
See RD, at 86. For a few of the paragraphs, Irelan's reservations
seemed to be that Respondent conducted at least some additional due
diligence on some of the eight pharmacies, but Irelan admitted that
the due diligence was not properly applied. See, e.g., Tr. 832-33,
828-29. Given the contested nature of this part of the hearing, the
Agency does not find these failures to accept responsibility to
imply that Irelan has not accepted responsibility for the
misconduct. See Resp Exceptions, at 24 (arguing that these were not
proven allegations). However, the Agency does find, as explained
herein, that Irelan's continual insistence on referring to all of
the due diligence that Respondent was conducting--while not
documenting it in a retrievable manner nor applying it to the
orders--was clearly intended to minimize Respondent's misconduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In discussing his acceptance of responsibility for Respondent's
failure to apply its customer due diligence, Irelan specifically
testified that, based on his review of Respondent's records before May
2018, Respondent conducted ``a tremendous amount of due diligence'' on
its customers. Tr. 704-05, 710. Irelan caveated that Respondent did not
keep the due diligence documentation ``in such a way as to make it . .
. easily accessible.'' Tr. 705 (referring to ``notes on paper,''
``notes . . . kept in a database'' and ``limited notes in our enhanced
customer profile''). Nonetheless, the Agency finds that Irelan's
statements claiming a ``tremendous amount of due diligence'' were aimed
at minimizing the extent of Respondent's misconduct, which the Agency
has previously weighed against a finding of unequivocal acceptance of
responsibility. See Ronald Lynch, M.D., 75 FR 78745, 78754 (2010)
(finding that Respondent did not accept responsibility after noting
that he ``repeatedly attempted to minimize his [egregious]
misconduct''; see also Michael White, M.D., 79 FR 62957, 62967 (2014)).
Additionally, Irelan's insistence that Respondent was conducting this
``tremendous amount'' of due diligence ``but it was not applied at the
order level,'' e.g., Tr. 828, not only minimizes the violation but
fails to acknowledge its scope. At the end of the day, the fact that
Respondent was not applying the due diligence to the orders
(investigating/stopping/reporting) is possibly the most impactful
aspect of Respondent's violation. If Respondent was conducting due
diligence that was not documented or could not be retrieved such that
it could be applied to the actual filling of orders, then Respondent
was not exercising effective controls against diversion because
employees filling future orders would not know if there were customer-
level red flags or whether they were resolved.
Further, Irelan's statements regarding whether Respondent's
monitoring systems were ``consistent with best practices'' also clearly
minimized the scope of Respondent's misconduct and did not demonstrate
a full grasp of the breadth of the misconduct alleged--which was that
Respondent had violated DEA regulations,\85\ not failed to implement
``best practices.'' Respondent's attempt to characterize the DEA
regulations as being merely best practices as opposed to affirmative
legal requirements both minimizes the severity of the violations and
also demonstrates a failure to grasp of the significance of the
requirements.
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\85\ Even if Respondent chose its language to avoid drawing
legal conclusions, the use of the term ``best practices'' was not
sufficient to accurately describe the violations found herein and
was clearly aimed at minimizing them. See supra n.83.
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3. Scope of the Misconduct
The requisite acceptance of responsibility hinges on the respondent
demonstrating an understanding both of the past misconduct and its
extent. See Jones, 881 F.3d at 833. Here, the ALJ found that Irelan did
not ``acknowledge the scope of the Respondent's misconduct,'' and
therefore, his acceptance was equivocal. RD, at 151 (citing Arvinder
Singh, M.D., 81 FR at 8250-51).
As Respondent stated in its Exceptions:
Multiple United States Courts of Appeal have upheld DEA's
acceptance of responsibility requirement as rational on the grounds
that if a respondent ``does not understand the extent of the past
misconduct or its current responsibilities under the law,
[[Page 34539]]
the DEA rationally could doubt that the [respondent] would
faithfully comply in the future with its obligations under the
CSA.'' Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. [Drug Enf't Admin.],
881 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2018); accord MacKay v. [Drug Enf't
Admin.], 664 F.3d 808, 820 (10th Cir. 2011) (admittance of fault is
relevant to Administrator's consideration of whether a respondent
will change its future behavior). As Respondent's current Compliance
Director, Mr. Irelan has assessed Respondent's past controlled
substance compliance failures and is responsible for preventing
their reoccurrence.
Resp Exceptions, at 13.
In contrast to Respondent's final statement above, there were a few
times where Irelan's limited involvement and knowledge of the
misconduct indisputably impeded his ability to accept full
responsibility, such as when, regarding Wellness Pharmacy, he was
unable to state what due diligence ``specifically was performed for
that account.'' Tr. 831. The Agency finds that Irelan's admission that
he had not familiarized himself with the specific due diligence
performed by Respondent for the exemplar pharmacies demonstrates that
he did not actually have the knowledge required to accept unequivocal
responsibility on behalf of Respondent for the full extent of the
violations found. Irelan's assertion that Respondent did conduct a
``tremendous amount'' of due diligence is also inconsistent with his
stated lack of knowledge regarding the amount of due diligence
conducted for the limited number of customers included in the OSC's
allegations. It seems logical that in cultivating an understanding of
Respondent's violations in order to adequately accept responsibility,
Irelan would have focused his review on the customers most relevant to
the allegations. Therefore, Irelan does not seem to have been equipped
to meet Respondent's burden in accepting responsibility.
4. Trust in Respondent
Although the Agency does not challenge Irelan's authority to act on
behalf of Respondent in accepting responsibility, the burden is on
Respondent to credibly and candidly demonstrate that it can be
entrusted with a registration. Respondent chose to meet that burden by
presenting Irelan's testimony in lieu of a principal or an individual
who had knowledge of the full scope of the violations. Although the
Agency does not contest that Respondent could choose Irelan to accept
responsibility on its behalf, that finding does not mean that Irelan
was equipped to do so unequivocally.
It is noted that the Agency has long held that the misconduct of an
entity's principal is properly considered in determining whether to
revoke the entity's registration. Chip RX, L.L.C., d/b/a City Ctr.
Pharmacy, 82 FR 51433, 51438 (2017) (citing G & O Pharmacy of Paducah,
68 FR 43752, 43753 (2003)). An essential element of Respondent's
showing of trust is that the registrant and its principals accept
responsibility for their misconduct by acknowledging their wrongdoing.
Sun & Lake Pharmacy, 76 FR 24533 (citing Medicine Shoppe, 73 FR at 387;
Jackson, 72 FR at 23853; Kennedy, 71 FR at 35709). In this case, at
least one of Respondent's principals, Paul Dickson, Sr., bears at least
some responsibility for the misconduct, and Irelan bears none. See Tr.
723.
Irelan opined that C.G. and Jacob Dickson, who were in charge of
compliance during the relevant time period, were responsible for
Respondent's misconduct, but was not sure enough of the ``dynamics'' or
``reporting process'' to opine about whether Paul Dickson, Sr., carried
any responsibility. Tr. 808-09. The extent of the misconduct is an
important factor in the Agency's ability to determine whether to
entrust Respondent with a registration and Irelan's inability to
testify to the level of involvement and knowledge of Respondent's
principals in the misconduct demonstrates another reason why the Agency
cannot deem his acceptance of responsibility to be adequate such that
the Agency can entrust Respondent with a registration. In fact,
Respondent's submitted evidence includes testimony from the Hearing on
the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order \86\ in which Paul Dickson,
Respondent's president, testified that he was primarily responsible for
development of Respondent's SOM program and that he designed the
system. RX 1, at 33. Paul Dickson further told the Court that in
designing the system, he knew that he ``didn't do a perfect job,'' but
that ``it was the best that [he] could do. And [he] think[s] it's dang
good. And [he doesn't] think a single person has gotten hurt by [their]
drugs. [He] sure do[esn't] know of one . . . . So [he] think[s] it
works.'' RX 1, at 57. These statements from the president of a family-
owned and -operated company so strongly miss the point of the
requirements of a DEA registrant that they further undercut the
Agency's ability to entrust Respondent with a registration. To equate a
registrant's compliance with an agency's closed regulatory system with
the consequence of knowing whether anyone was hurt ``by [their] drugs''
exhibits a stark misunderstanding of the regulatory requirement.
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\86\ It is noted that the ALJ excluded pages 147 to 216 of this
transcript as irrelevant, but allowed pages 1 through 146 because
Respondent offered it as remedial, mitigation, or community impact
evidence. ALJX 59, at 6 (citing ALJX 29, at 2, 4.) Although it is
also noted that the hearing in which these statements were made was
related to the public interest in the context of the ISO, the ALJ
found, and the Agency agrees, that this evidence bears some
relevance to the current inquiry. Id. Furthermore, Respondent argues
in its Exceptions that ``[t]his testimony is relevant evidence of
Respondent's credibility and good faith intent in working with DEA
to stop diversion.'' Resp Exceptions, at 31. For the reasons stated
above, the Agency finds that, if anything, Paul Dickson's remarks
seem indignant that DEA is pursuing enforcement, seem aimed at
minimizing the misconduct, and display a lack of understanding and
respect for the regulatory requirements.
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The Agency finds that Irelan's inability to describe Paul Dickson's
involvement in the proven misconduct further demonstrates the
inadequacy of Respondent's acceptance of responsibility in this
proceeding. In all, Irelan's lack of understanding and recognition of
the full scope of the misconduct and attempts to minimize the
misconduct lead the Agency to conclude that Respondent's acceptance of
responsibility was equivocal and insufficient to ensure that Respondent
can be entrusted with a registration.
B. Remedial Measures
When a registrant fails to make the threshold showing of acceptance
of responsibility, the Agency has stated that it need not address the
registrant's remedial measures. Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 74800,
74,810 (2015); see also Ajay S. Ahuja, M.D., 84 FR at 5498 n.33; Jones
Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., & SND Health Care, L.L.C., 81 FR at
79202; The Medicine Shoppe, 79 FR 59504, 59510 (2014). A registrant
does not unequivocally accept responsibility for its actions simply by
taking remedial measures. Holiday CVS, L.L.C., d/b/a CVS/Pharmacy Nos.
219 & 5195, 77 FR 62316, 62346 (2012). Refusal to acknowledge the full
scope of misconduct, even with remedial measures, is a risk to the
public interest. Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR 8247, 8250-51 (2016)
(emphasis added).
The ALJ characterized Respondent's remedial measures as
``impressive.'' RD, at 152. The Agency similarly credits the efforts
that the record reflects Respondent undertook to improve its compliance
with DEA's requirements after being served with the OSC. As the ALJ
appropriately stated, the Agency has also made it abundantly clear that
remediation alone is not adequate to avoid a sanction and that limited-
to-no-weight is given to remedial measures when the effort is not made
until after
[[Page 34540]]
enforcement begins. See Mireille Lalanne, M.D., 78 FR 47750, 47777
(2013) (quoting Liddy's Pharmacy, L.L.C., 76 FR 48887, 48897 (2011)
(``The Agency has recognized that a cessation of illegal behavior only
when `DEA comes knocking at one's door,' can be afforded a diminished
weight borne of its own opportunistic timing.'')); see also Southwood
Pharm. Inc., 72 FR at 36503 (giving no weight to respondent's ``stroke-
of-midnight decision'' to cease supplying suspect pharmacies with
controlled substances and to employ a compliance officer).\87\
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\87\ In its Exceptions, Respondent points to the factual
distinctions between cited cases in the RD and the circumstances in
this case and also points to numerous other settled cases that, in
Respondent's opinion, demonstrate that the sanction here is unfair.
Resp Exceptions, at 25 and 33. However, ``the issue of trust is
necessarily a fact-dependent determination based on the
circumstances presented by the individual respondent,'' and it is
the respondent's burden to bear. See, e.g., Stein, 84 FR at 46,972.
And contrary to Respondent's arguments, the proposed sanction is
supported by similar sanctions in other recent distributor
adjudications where the Agency similarly found that respondents'
registrations were inconsistent with the public interest and that
those respondents had not demonstrated that they could be entrusted
with a registration. See Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR at 36487
(rejecting the ALJ's sanction because it was ``insufficient to
protect the public interest. While [the Agency is] mindful of the
corrective measures engaged in by Respondent, its sales of
extraordinary quantities of controlled substances to entities which
it had reason to know were diverting the drugs caused extraordinary
harm to public health and safety.''); see also Masters Pharm., Inc.,
80 FR at 55501.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the ALJ found that, based on prior Agency decisions,
he could give no weight to Respondent's remedial measures given the
lack of Respondent's unequivocal acceptance of responsibility. RD, at
152.88 89 As the Agency has consistently held, ``past
performance is the best predictor of future performance.'' Lesly Pompy,
M.D., 84 FR 57749, 57761 (2019); see also Jones Total Health Care
Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2018)
(affirming refusal to consider remedial measures where registrant did
not accept responsibility for its misconduct); Pharmacy Doctors
Enterprises, Inc. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 789 F. App'x 724, 2019 WL
4565481, at *7-8 (11th Cir. Sept. 20, 2019) (same).\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Respondent repeatedly asserts that these adjudications are
difficult to defend due to what it claims is an unfair system--that
Respondent must accept responsibility prior to knowing what
misconduct has been proven. Resp Exceptions, at 7. Respondent chose
litigation strategies presumably based on the longstanding structure
and content of Agency decisions in these adjudications and the
Agency does not fault it for those decisions. In the end, Respondent
had the burden to prove that it could be entrusted with a
registration and it has failed to meet that burden. See Masters
Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (rejecting arguments
that DEA's structure of requiring acceptance of responsibility is
unfair, because ``under longstanding DEA precedent, once DEA
presents enough evidence at hearing to show that a registered vendor
or distributor of controlled substances has `committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest,' the `registrant must
present[] . . . mitigating evidence' including evidence that it has
`accept[ed] responsibility for its actions and demonstrate[d] that
it will not engage in future misconduct''' (quoting Medicine Shoppe-
Jonesborough, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008)). Furthermore, the Agency's
finding on this issue does not hinge on whether Irelan has accepted
responsibility for each proven allegation, but instead hinges on
Irelan's persistent minimization of the misconduct and further on
Respondent's overall failure to demonstrate that Respondent has
unequivocally accepted responsibility and can be trusted with a
registration.
\89\ Respondent argues that Milione's testimony regarding the
August 2016 meeting with Paul Dickson, Sr., supra n.8, demonstrates
Respondent's ``good faith and sincerity, which flatly contradict the
ALJ's intent-laden description of Respondent's compliance as
`cavalier''' and argues that this fact is relevant in considering
Respondent's likelihood towards recidivism. Resp Exceptions, at 30
(citing RD, at 156). The Agency cannot give this meeting or Paul
Dickson's sincerity during this moment in time the weight that
Respondent requests it be afforded given that the evidence
demonstrates that for approximately two years prior to this meeting
and two years afterwards, Respondent was not complying with DEA
regulations. Further, Respondent did not present the Agency with
Paul Dickson's testimony at this hearing to be able to weigh his
credibility and sincerity either in 2016, when this meeting
occurred, or at the time of the hearing. The transcribed testimony
that Respondent did submit from Paul Dickson demonstrated that he
believed his SOM system to be ``dang good''--a statement with which
the Agency emphatically disagrees. See RX 1, at 57.
\90\ See also Hills Pharmacy, LLC, 81 FR 49815, 49847 (2016)
(``[T]here is no need to consider Respondent's remedial efforts as
they are rendered irrelevant by its failure to acknowledge its
misconduct.''); Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 74800, 74810 (2015)
(``[S]ince the Respondent has not tendered an unequivocal acceptance
of responsibility, under established Agency precedent, [it] is
foreclosed from a favorable result in these proceedings and the
issue of remedial actions is irrelevant.'').
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In this case, even if the Agency gave weight to Respondent's
remedial measures, the measures are outweighed by the fact that it has
not adequately established that Respondent as an entity fully
understands the scope of the misconduct such that it can be entrusted
with regulatory compliance in the future.
C. The Extent of the Misconduct
The record demonstrates that Respondent's violations of the law
were not isolated occurrences, but took place over the course of four
years and involved multiple customers. See Garrett Howard Smith, M.D.,
83 FR at 18910 (collecting cases) (``The egregiousness and extent of
[the] misconduct are significant factors in determining the appropriate
sanction.''). In spite of its self-described status as a privately-
owned company that has been in business for 177 years,\91\ Respondent
maintained sparse documentation of its SOM procedures generally and
maintained very little documentation of its resolution of red flags of
diversion displayed by its customers or of individual suspicious
orders. The record evidence demonstrates that Respondent attended two
conferences, held a personal meeting with DEA, and received multiple
letters in which DEA emphasized the critical importance of a
distributor's role in preventing diversion given the opioid crisis in
the nation and reminded distributors of their obligations under the
law. A letter from DEA dated September 27, 2006, stated ``[G]iven the
extent of prescription drug abuse in the United States, along with the
dangerous and potentially lethal consequences of such abuse, even just
one distributor that uses its DEA registration to facilitate diversion
can cause enormous harm.'' GX 3, at 2. In spite of Respondent's
established knowledge regarding the criticality of its role in
preventing ``dangerous and potentially lethal consequences,''
Respondent did not adequately resolve or document investigation into
the numerous red flags indicating diversion that its own Pro Compliance
Reports identified on the exemplar pharmacies and failed to report a
multitude of suspicious orders to DEA.
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\91\ See also RX 1, at 21 (estimating Respondent's number of
retail pharmacy customers at ``approximately 600 primary . . . and
another 200 secondary that fluctuates'') and 22-23 (``[O]nly
competition are what's called `the big three,' the global
companies'').
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D. Deterrence
Finally, both specific and general deterrence strongly weigh in
favor of revoking Respondent's registration. See Daniel A. Glick,
D.D.S., 80 FR at 74810. The record demonstrates that Respondent
violated DEA regulations over a lengthy time period--failing to report
a multitude of suspicious orders to DEA and depriving DEA of valuable
information about pharmacies and practitioners who might have been
engaging in diversion or violating their obligations as DEA
registrants, thus contributing to the country's devastating
prescription drug abuse problem. Under these circumstances and on this
record, a sanction less than revocation \92\ would
[[Page 34541]]
send a message to the current and prospective registrant community that
compliance with DEA regulations is not a condition precedent to
maintaining a DEA registration and that a distributor can spend years
insufficiently reporting suspicious orders and inadequately resolving
red flags presented by its customers, so long as it finally invests in
the procedures it should have had in place all along after it is caught
and faces potential consequences.\93\
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\92\ Respondent argues without support that a sanction short of
revocation would serve the same deterrence goals and would prevent
harm to the community that would result from closing Respondent.
Resp Exceptions, at 28, 31. The Agency does not consider community
impact in its decisions. See infra n.96. As Respondent notes, it is
difficult to know what level of sanction would deter future non-
compliance in the registrant community, but in Respondent's case,
where the violations were blatant, long-term, and impactful, the
Agency finds, given the record before it, that revocation offers an
appropriate deterrent effect. Furthermore, again, Respondent has not
adequately established trust, see supra Section V.A.4, which is
crucial to demonstrate the appropriateness of a sanction less than
revocation under the Agency's consideration of specific deterrence.
Respondent also argues that the ALJ erred in its deterrence analysis
by failing to consider the Government's purported unwillingness to
engage Respondent in settlement negotiations. Resp Exceptions, at
33-35. While a settlement agreement between the Government and a
respondent may be a way to provide enforceable assurances of the
respondent's future compliance, the parties have not reached such a
settlement here. Accordingly, and although the Agency has considered
alternative sanctions as Respondent has requested, it has decided
that revocation currently is the most appropriate sanction as
explained herein.
\93\ DEA decisions have demonstrated concern that giving weight
to last minute remedial measures would show the regulated community
that a registrant ``can unlawfully distribute controlled substances
until [it] gets caught, and as long as [it] then acknowledges
wrongdoing and puts on evidence that [it] has reformed, [it] will
get a slap on the wrist.'' David Ruben, M.D., 78 FR 38363, 38387
(2013); see also Southwood Pharm., Inc., 72 FR 36487, 36504 (2007)
(``A precedent which ignores how irresponsibly a registrant has
acted and allows it to maintain its registration based on its claim
of having reformed its business practices, could well prompt other
registrants to ignore their obligations under the Act and sell
massive quantities of controlled substances to diverters.'').
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Although Respondent has implemented remedial measures, it has not
adequately demonstrated that its leadership can be entrusted to
continue these measures and prevent reoccurrence of what happened prior
to the issuance of the OSC, which amounted to a SOM system that was not
designed or operated in a way that would adequately prevent diversion
of controlled substances nor provide DEA with information critical to
its mission. Respondent argues that the ALJ erred in finding that ``the
continued registration of a fully remediated registrant with an
`impressive' anti-diversion regime, along with evidence of good faith
desire to prevent diversion, does not serve the public interest.'' \94\
Resp Exceptions, at 1. However, Respondent's argument neglects to
mention that remediation is irrelevant without continued trust.
Respondent wants credit for ``commission[ing] former top DEA officials
to design their ideal anti-diversion system,'' id., because it believes
that as long as it has invested the money now, it will prevent DEA from
enforcing against it. There are several considerations other than
remediation that the Agency uses in determining sanction as explained
herein. The fact is that, under these circumstances and on this record,
Respondent has not adequately convinced the Agency that it can be
entrusted with a registration--its acceptance of responsibility did not
prove that it or its principals understand the full extent of their
wrongdoing, the effect that it had on the Agency and the American
public, and the potential harm that it caused.\95\ It was Respondent's
burden to prove that it could be entrusted to protect the public
interest in maintaining a DEA registration--and it has failed to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Respondent argues that its ``current conduct is the best
evidence that its continued registration is consistent with the
public interest.'' Resp Exceptions, at 7. However, remediation is
notably not an enumerated public interest factor under 21 U.S.C.
823(b). Remediation is a factor that the Administrator considers in
reviewing the extent to which sanctions are appropriate and only
after the Government has made a prima facie case demonstrating that
the allegations support a finding that Respondent's continued
registration is not in the public interest. See, e.g., Samuel S.
Jackson, D.D.S., 72 FR at 23,853.
\95\ Respondent attached to its Exceptions the Department of
Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) September 2019 Review
of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Regulatory and Enforcement
Efforts to Control the Diversion of Opioids--claiming that the
report is DEA's motivation for pursuing ``the harshest sanction''
against Respondent. The report is dated September 2019--a month
after the ALJ's issuance of the RD. Furthermore, DEA subpoenaed
Respondent as early as February 1, 2018; therefore, temporally, the
OIG's findings could not have motivated the Agency's investigation
into Respondent. Such allegations are a distraction from the issue
at hand--Respondent failed to comply with its regulatory obligations
and neither the Agency nor the country could possibly have the
ability to know what might have happened had those suspicious orders
been reported to DEA and to what extent diversion and abuse might
have been prevented. What the Agency does know is that Respondent's
failures were monumental, and Respondent clearly misses the point in
arguing that ``had the Respondent more consistently reported
suspicious orders with the DEA, it has been established that the
reports would have been ignored.'' Resp Exceptions, at 5.
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Having reviewed the record in its entirety, the Agency finds that
Respondent cannot be entrusted with a DEA registration and orders that
its registration be revoked. The Agency addresses collateral matters
and additional issues raised in Respondent's Exceptions before issuing
a final Order.
VI. Motion To Reopen
On January 5, 2022, Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen the
Administrative Record. Respondent seeks to introduce evidence of post-
hearing conduct that it argues demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility and successful remediation.\96\ Although not
specifically contemplated in the CSA or regulations, DEA decisions have
repeatedly held that the Administrator may, in her discretion, order
that the administrative record be reopened. The party moving to reopen,
however, bears a heavy burden. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110
(1988); see also Cities of Campbell v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1180, 1191 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (``Reopening an evidentiary hearing is a matter of agency
discretion and is reserved for extraordinary circumstances.''
(citations omitted)); Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 717 (9th Cir. 1981).
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\96\ Respondent also requests to reopen the record to introduce
evidence of the impact revoking its registration would have on the
community. Motion to Reopen, at 20-22. The Agency has consistently
found that community impact is not a relevant consideration under
the public interest factors. E.g., Stephen E. Owusu, D.P.M., 87 FR
3343, 3351 n.21 (2022); George Pursley, M.D., 85 FR 80,162, 80,188
n. 82 (2020); Frank Joseph Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR 45229, 45239
(2020). Accordingly, Respondent's community impact evidence is not
grounds to reopen the record. Further, Respondent made arguments
that it should be allowed to introduce evidence that it concedes is
not an independent basis to reopen the record but argues is properly
admitted if the record is reopened. Reply ISO Motion to Reopen, at
12. Nonetheless, the Agency is not reaching a finding on the
admissibility of this evidence because it is not granting
Respondent's Motion to Reopen.
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The Agency finds that Respondent has not met its burden to reopen
the record. In all DEA administrative proceedings, there is inevitably
at least some delay between the hearing and the final decision of the
Administrator.\97\ Allowing parties to reopen the record to introduce
evidence of acceptance of responsibility and remedial measures taken
during that delay would create a recursive loop further delaying the
conclusion of proceedings to the detriment of the public interest. See,
e.g., Abudu, 485 U.S. at 107; Qoku v. Gonzales, 156 F. App'x. 703, 705
(5th Cir. 2005). As the Supreme Court observed in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, ``[a]dministrative consideration of
evidence . . . always creates a gap between the time the
[[Page 34542]]
record is closed and the time the administrative decision is
promulgated . . . . If upon the coming down of the order litigants
might demand rehearings as a matter of law because some new
circumstance has arisen, some new trend has been observed, or some new
fact discovered, there would be little hope that the administrative
process could ever be consummated in an order that would not be subject
to reopening.'' 435 U.S. 519, 554-55 (1978) (quoting ICC v. Jersey
City, 322 U.S. 503, 514 (1944) (citing Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396
U.S. 491, 521 (1970)).
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\97\ The delay between the hearing and the issuance of the final
decision in this matter was longer than is typical for the Agency,
but the proceedings were delayed partially at Respondent's request.
On March 9, 2020, Respondent wrote a letter to the then-Acting
Administrator asking that the Agency postpone issuing a Final Order
``to allow the COVID-19 crisis to abate or the parties to reach a
final settlement . . . .'' See Letter from Respondent. Respondent
then requested yet another delay in its Motion to Reopen asking that
the Administrator delay the issuance of a final order ``until after
[Respondent's] new counsel has had an opportunity to resolve the
matter with DEA's Chief Counsel.'' Motion to Reopen, at 4, n.4.
Respondent cannot request to delay the proceedings and then claim
that a failure to reopen the record is somehow prejudicial to
Respondent because of its requested delay.
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Respondent had the opportunity to, and did, introduce evidence
related to its acceptance of responsibility and remedial measures at
the hearing. That evidence was entered into the record and considered
in the ALJ's Recommended Decision and this Final Order.
VII. Lucia
The Agency has carefully considered Respondent's Exceptions to the
Recommended Decision, has addressed them throughout the record, and
addresses the remaining herein.
In its Exceptions, Respondent notes that ``as [it] has repeatedly
and consistently objected, including at the hearing, this entire
proceeding was unconstitutional.'' (citing Tr. 20:23-22:17). Respondent
contends that ``[t]he presiding ALJ in this matter was
unconstitutionally appointed when these proceedings began and
unconstitutionally continued to preside over these proceedings after
the Attorney General purportedly ratified his appointment.'' (citing
Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018)
(hereinafter, Lucia)). The Agency will note the factual sequence of
events surrounding Respondent's Lucia claims.
Respondent's Prehearing Statement, filed on August 3, 2018,
averred, ``Respondent may file a motion before this Tribunal related to
the constitutionality of the DEA's administrative process given the
U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in [Lucia].'' ALJX 8, at 37.
During the Prehearing Conference, Respondent's attorney stated, ``with
regards to the Lucia case, this is obviously no disrespect intended to
the Court but we do think that it's a significant issue that should we
proceed to hearing, we do want to address and I would like to file a
motion about it.'' The ALJ replied, ``Well, if you're going to file a
motion about it, I obviously would need to take a look at it . . . .
Apparently, if you file a motion, there's a good chance you'll wind up
with a different Judge . . . . I'm just putting you on notice that
that's what's likely to happen.'' Prehearing, Tr. 36. The ALJ ordered
that ``[y]ou obviously can file motions tomorrow if you want to but any
motions I'm going to need to rule on I would like to have no later than
October 23rd. . . .'' Tr. 42-43.
On October 26, 2018, Respondent submitted a letter on the record
alerting the Tribunal that it had commenced an action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana seeking an
``injunction enjoining DEA and DOJ from requiring Morris & Dickson to
appear in any administrative proceeding, including the upcoming hearing
scheduled for November 13, 2018, unless and until a constitutionally
valid administrative system has been established.'' ALJX 26, at 1. On
October 31, 2018, Respondent filed another letter with the Tribunal
explaining that it did not file a motion with the ALJ because the
Agency ``has no authority to entertain a facial constitutional
challenge'' and that ``[t]he Louisiana Court will resolve that
question. Morris & Dickson simply provides this Tribunal notice of that
filing and requests sufficient time to allow the Louisiana Court (and,
if necessary, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals) to make its ruling.''
ALJX 34, at 1-2.
On December 31, 2018, Respondent submitted a letter notifying the
Tribunal that ``[o]n December 28, 2018, the District Court in the
Western District of Louisiana dismissed Respondent's complaint without
prejudice, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Morris &
Dickson's claims'' and attaching the decision. ALJX 47, at 1. The
Decision stated that, although Respondent's argument was ``somewhat
close,'' ``in light of the policy problem created by crafting a
`constitutional claim' exception to Congress's ability to channel
initial review through agencies, the Court finds that Morris &
Dickson's separation-of-powers claims are not `wholly collateral' to
the proceeding before Judge Dorman because they were raised in an
attempt to delay or defeat administrative enforcement of the CSA.'' Id.
at 30.
On January 15, 2019, the ALJ issued an Order Lifting the Stay and
Third Prehearing Ruling. ALJX 51. The Order stated that Respondent
indicated during a telephonic conference on the previous day that it
``w[ould] not seek to maintain the stay in this case pending its appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit'' \98\ and
that ``it w[ould] not file a motion seeking to recuse [the ALJ] from
this case based on the Supreme Court's decision in Lucia . . . .'' Id.
at 1.
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\98\ Respondent's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was dismissed by its own motion. See Morris
and Dickson v. William Barr, et al., No. 19-30043, 2019 WL 3230978
(5th Cir. Apr. 1, 2019).
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The next time Respondent raised the Lucia issue was at the
beginning of the hearing on May 13, 2019. Respondent's lawyer made a
self-described ``statement of the record, simply,'' Tr. 23, that ``we
respectfully renew for the record our objection to the hearing and
proceeding.'' Tr. 22. However, Respondent's lawyer also agreed that
Respondent was ready to go to hearing that day and made no further
motions or requests for a new ALJ. Tr. 24.
On October 25, 2018, the Attorney General ratified the prior
appointment of the DEA ALJs, including ALJ Dorman, and ``approved their
appointments as his own under the Constitution.'' See Office of the
Attorney General, Order No. 4.315-2018.\99\ It is noted that, at the
time that the hearing took place in this matter, ALJ Dorman's
appointment as an Administrative Law Judge had been ratified.
Respondent never formally requested reassignment nor availed itself of
the opportunity to request interlocutory review to the Administrator on
any ruling of the ALJ or any Lucia-related issue pursuant to 21 CFR
1316.62. Had Respondent contested the matter formally with the Agency,
the Agency would have assigned another ALJ, see Prehearing, Tr. 36, and
saved significant Agency resources. The Agency further finds that ALJ
Dorman's appointment was ratified before the hearing. Due to
Respondent's calculated choice to preserve the matter for the record,
Tr. 23, but not raise it in any way that the Agency might have had the
capacity to address and remedy itself, the Agency considers the
argument waived for purposes of finalizing this adjudication.
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\99\ Although not considered material to this Decision, a copy
of this Order will be included in the administrative record for
future reference.
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Having found that Respondent cannot be entrusted with a DEA
registration, the Agency issues the following Order revoking
Respondent's DEA registrations.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a)(4) and 21 U.S.C. 823(b), (e), I hereby revoke DEA
Certificates of Registration Nos. RM0314790 and RM0335732 issued to
Morris & Dickson, Co., LLC. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and
the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4) and 21 U.S.C.
[[Page 34543]]
823(b), (e), I hereby deny any pending application of Morris & Dickson,
Co., LLC to renew or modify these registrations, as well as any other
pending application of Morris & Dickson, Co., LLC. This Order is
effective August 28, 2023.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
May 19, 2023, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with the
original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the
Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer
has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic
format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This
administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Scott Brinks,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2023-11369 Filed 5-26-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P