UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight Operations, 33855-33857 [2023-11024]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 101 / Thursday, May 25, 2023 / Proposed Rules
(2) If, during any inspection or records
review required by paragraph (i)(1) of this
AD, an upper splitter fairing assembly P/N
KH60375 is found on any engine of an
airplane: Except as specified by paragraph (j)
of this AD, at the applicable times specified
in the ‘‘Compliance’’ paragraph of Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin B787–81205–
SB720007–00 RB, Issue 001, dated December
12, 2022, do all applicable actions identified
in, and in accordance with, the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin B787–81205–
SB720007–00 RB, Issue 001, dated December
12, 2022, for each affected engine.
Accomplishing the actions required by this
paragraph on all affected engines of an
airplane terminates the actions required by
paragraph (g) of this AD for that airplane.
Note 2 to paragraph (i)(2): Guidance for
accomplishing the actions required by this
AD can be found in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin B787–81205–SB720007–00, Issue
001, dated December 12, 2022, which is
referred to in Boeing Alert Requirements
Bulletin B787–81205–SB720007–00 RB, Issue
001, dated December 12, 2022.
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
(j) Exceptions to Service Information
Specifications for Paragraph (i)(2) of This
AD
Where the ‘‘Effectivity’’ paragraph and the
Condition and Compliance Time columns of
the tables in the ‘‘Compliance’’ paragraph of
Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin B787–
81205–SB720007–00 RB, Issue 001, dated
December 12, 2022, use the phrase ‘‘the
original issue date of Requirements Bulletin
B787–81205–SB720007–00 RB,’’ this AD
requires using ‘‘the effective date of this AD.’’
(k) Parts Installation Prohibition
(1) For airplanes with an original
airworthiness certificate or original export
certificate of airworthiness issued after the
effective date of this AD, except for airplanes
listed in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
B787–81205–SB720007–00 RB, Issue 001,
dated December 12, 2022: As of the effective
date of this AD, no person may install an
engine with an upper splitter fairing
assembly P/N KH60375 on any airplane.
(2) For airplanes with original
airworthiness certificate or original export
certificate of airworthiness issued on or
before the effective date of this AD and for
airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Requirements
Bulletin B787–81205–SB720007–00 RB, Issue
001, dated December 12, 2022: At the
applicable time specified in paragraph
(k)(2)(i) or (ii) of this AD, no person may
install an engine with an upper splitter
fairing assembly P/N KH60375 on any
airplane.
(i) For airplanes on which no upper splitter
fairing assembly P/N KH60375 was found
during the inspection required by paragraph
(i)(1) of this AD: After accomplishing the
inspection required by paragraph (i)(1) of this
AD.
(ii) For airplanes on which an upper
splitter fairing assembly P/N KH60375 was
found during the inspection required by
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD: At the applicable
time specified in paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(A) or (B)
of this AD.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:08 May 24, 2023
Jkt 259001
(A) For an engine on which an upper
splitter fairing assembly P/N KH60375 was
not found: After accomplishing the
inspection required by paragraph (i)(1) of this
AD.
(B) For an engine on which an upper
splitter fairing assembly P/N KH60375 was
found: After replacing an affected upper
splitter fairing assembly part number with a
new upper splitter fairing assembly part
number for that engine as required by
paragraph (i)(2) of this AD.
(l) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, AIR–520 Continued
Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or responsible Flight Standards Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the certification office,
send it to the attention of the person
identified in paragraph (m) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable
level of safety may be used for any repair,
modification, or alteration required by this
AD if it is approved by The Boeing Company
Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA) that has been authorized by the
Manager, AIR–520 Continued Operational
Safety Branch, FAA, to make those findings.
To be approved, the repair method,
modification deviation, or alteration
deviation must meet the certification basis of
the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(m) Related Information
For more information about this AD,
contact Tak Kobayashi, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Section, West Certification
Branch, FAA, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, CA 90712–4137; telephone: 206–
231–3553; email: takahisa.kobayashi@
faa.gov.
(n) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
(IBR) of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(3) The following service information was
approved for IBR on [DATE 35 DAYS AFTER
PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL RULE].
(i) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
B787–81205–SB720007–00 RB, Issue 001,
dated December 12, 2022.
(ii) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
B787–81205–SB780041–00, Issue 002, dated
December 21, 2021.
(4) The following service information was
approved for IBR on January 27, 2021 (85 FR
83755, December 23, 2020).
PO 00000
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
33855
(i) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
B787–81205–SB780041–00 RB, Issue 001,
dated March 31, 2020.
(ii) [Reserved]
(5) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data
Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster
Boulevard, MC 110–SK57, Seal Beach, CA
90740–5600; telephone 562–797–1717;
website: myboeingfleet.com.
(6) You may view this service information
at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th
Street, Des Moines, WA. For information on
the availability of this material at the FAA,
call 206–231–3195.
(7) You may view this service information
that is incorporated by reference at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA,
fr.inspection@nara.gov, or go to:
www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.
Issued on May 8, 2023.
Gaetano A. Sciortino,
Acting Director, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2023–11064 Filed 5–24–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 61, 91, 107, and 135
[Docket No.: FAA–2023–1256]
UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight
Operations
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Request for comment.
AGENCY:
As the FAA reviews the
recommendations of the UAS Beyond
Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)
Operations Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC), the FAA is
considering the expansion of BVLOS
operations in certain operating
environments with the appropriate
safety mitigations to ensure no adverse
safety impact. The FAA is seeking
comment to gather additional technical
input on key concepts and potential
approaches that the FAA is
contemplating for use in future
exemptions.
SUMMARY:
Comments on this petition must
identify the petition docket number and
must be received on or before June 14,
2023.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
by docket number FAA–2023–1256
using any of the following methods:
DATES:
E:\FR\FM\25MYP1.SGM
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33856
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 101 / Thursday, May 25, 2023 / Proposed Rules
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and follow
the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
• Mail: Send comments to Docket
Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
20590–0001.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
comments to Docket Operations in
Room W12–140 of the West Building
Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590–
0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
• Fax: Fax comments to Docket
Operations at (202) 493–2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C.
553(c), DOT solicits comments from the
public to better inform its rulemaking
process. DOT posts these comments,
without edit, including any personal
information the commenter provides, to
https://www.regulations.gov, as
described in the system of records
notice (DOT/ALL–14 FDMS), which can
be reviewed at https://www.dot.gov/
privacy.
Docket: Background documents or
comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov at any time.
Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to the Docket
Operations in Room W12–140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
20590–0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan
Ngo, 202–267–9677, Office of
Rulemaking, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
Background
In March 2022, the UAS Beyond
Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)
Operations Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) issued its final report,
which included a comprehensive set of
recommendations for implementation to
support expanded unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) operations, such as
linear infrastructure and package
delivery. The FAA recognizes BVLOS
operations provide significant safety,
societal, and economic advantages and
benefits. Several petitioners have
proposed various methods to safely
operate UAS BVLOS under petitions for
exemptions. Along those lines, the FAA
has received several petitions for
exemptions to conduct several types of
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:08 May 24, 2023
Jkt 259001
BVLOS operations, which the FAA is
looking to leverage in enabling the next
phase of BVLOS operations. The FAA
will be separately publishing summaries
in the Federal Register for the
individual petitions on the affected
projects and seeking comments on each
of those petitions for exemption. In this
document, the FAA seeks public
comments that address how advances in
technology, standards, and operational
strategies to safely demonstrate UAS
BVLOS operations can be applied
without adversely affecting safety.
Specific questions are included in this
request for comments immediately
following the discussion of the relevant
issues. The FAA asks that commenters
provide as much information as possible
on any questions of interest to the
commenter. Whenever possible, please
provide citations and copies of any
relevant studies or reports on which you
rely, including cost data as well as any
additional data which supports your
comment. It is also helpful to explain
the basis and reasoning underlying your
comment. Each commenting party
should include the identifying number
of the specific question(s) to which it is
responding.
A. Detect and Avoid Systems
Performance Standards
The FAA recognizes that several
industry standards have been published
that may be useful in defining the
performance of Detect and Avoid (DAA)
systems, a major component of BVLOS
operations. However, any single
standard may not be fully appropriate
for the uses intended by applicants
operating at and below 400 feet above
ground level (AGL). Therefore, the FAA
is reviewing these standards, as well as
ways for operators to demonstrate that
their DAA system meets specific
requirements in a combination of
published standards. These include:
1. ASTM F3442/F3442M–23,
Standard Specification for Detect and
Avoid System Performance
Requirements, dated February 28, 2023.
2. RTCA DO–381, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) for Ground Based Surveillance
Systems (GBSS) for Traffic Surveillance,
dated March 26, 2020.
3. RTCA DO–365C, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) for Detect and Avoid (DAA)
Systems, dated September 15, 2022.
4. RTCA DO–396, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for
Airborne Collision Avoidance System
sXu (ACAS sXu), dated December 15,
2022.
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Sfmt 4702
• A1. In which circumstances or
operating environments should the FAA
allow this combination approach?
• A2. Conversely, are there
circumstances or operating
environments where no combination of
current standards would provide an
acceptable level of safety?
B. Declarations of Compliance for Detect
and Avoid
As the FAA is contemplating
operations beyond visual line of sight,
the FAA is considering allowing
operators to declare that they are
utilizing DAA systems that meet the
DAA standard(s) referenced above.
• B1. In which circumstances or
operating environments should the FAA
allow this declaration approach? What
supporting documentation or data
should the FAA require prior to
authorization to operating under an
exemption?
• B2. Conversely, are there
circumstances or operating
environments in which the FAA should
require operators to submit details of
their DAA system for approval and
validation prior to operation?
C. Well-Clear Boundary
ASTM F3442/F3442M–23, Standard
Specification for Detect and Avoid
System Performance Requirements,
referenced previously, suggests
maintaining a horizontal distance of
2,000 feet and a vertical distance of 250
feet between a small UAS and crewed
aircraft, described as a ‘‘hockey-puckshaped’’ area of airspace surrounding
the small UAS.
• C1. In which circumstances or
operating environments would this
standard be appropriate?
• C2. If not this standard, what wellclear boundary should the FAA
consider for operations under an
exemption, and under what
circumstances or operating
environments?
D. DAA Systems That Include ThirdParty Services/Associated Elements (AE)
There are numerous technologies and
architectures that may be suitable when
implementing DAA solutions. Some
systems may have sensors and DAA
logic that are fully contained onboard
the aircraft with information relayed to
the pilot control station. A remote pilot
may be involved in executing avoidance
maneuvers, or may monitor the aircraft’s
automated response. Other systems may
rely on ground-based sensors that are
connected to, but distinct from, the UA
and its control station. Yet other DAA
systems may use a combination of those
approaches.
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 101 / Thursday, May 25, 2023 / Proposed Rules
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Under 14 CFR 1.1, a UAS is defined
as the UA and its associated elements
necessary to support the safe flight of
the UA. However, in various petitions
for exemptions, the FAA has understood
some DAA system components are
intended to be reused by multiple
operators. These components are
generally not directly controlled by
either the UAS manufacturer or the
operator; rather, they are controlled by
a third-party service provider. Thirdparty services may directly support the
DAA solution by, for example, detecting
crewed aircraft in a defined geographic
region, or by relaying such information
through a managed command and
control (C2) link on behalf of multiple
operators.
Therefore, the FAA is considering
new ways to evaluate and recognize
these components as distinct elements.
Additionally, section 377 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L.
115–254) directs the Administrator to
‘‘determine if certain UTM [Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Traffic Management]
services may operate safely in the
national airspace system before
completion of the implementation plan
required by Section 376.’’
• D1. The FAA is considering
separating the UTM service provider
approval from the exemption for relief
from parts 91 and 61. In order to
operate, the UTM service provider
would need to receive its approval, and
the applicant’s exemption would be
contingent on use of an approved
service. Other operators seeking to use
that same service would present their
specific use case with the approved
UTM service. Should the FAA separate
the approval of the UTM service
provider from the exemption? Why or
why not?
• D2. Conversely, the FAA is also
considering including the approval of
the UTM service within the exemption,
similar to how the FAA has
implemented 49 U.S.C. 44807 to date.
Should the FAA consolidate these
approvals? Why or why not?
E. Use of UTM Services for Strategic
Deconfliction
At present, the FAA has not
determined an acceptable level of risk
for collision between two UA. However,
FAA is concerned that with increasing
numbers of BVLOS UAS operations, two
UA could collide, resulting in falling
debris that could cause property
damage, injuries, or fatalities to nonparticipants on the ground.
• E1. One proposal the FAA is
considering would be to require all
BVLOS operations in controlled
airspace or within the lateral limits of a
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:08 May 24, 2023
Jkt 259001
Mode C Veil under an exemption to use
a strategic deconfliction and
conformance monitoring capability
(both terms as described in FAA’s UTM
Concept of Operations v2.0). This could
be fulfilled if the operator provisions
their own capability that meets the
requirements of a published standard; or
by using a UTM service. Should the
FAA impose this requirement? Why or
why not?
• E2. Alternatively, the FAA is
considering requiring all BVLOS
operations under an exemption,
including in Class G airspace, to use a
strategic deconfliction and conformance
monitoring capability. Should the FAA
impose this requirement? Why or why
not?
• E3. The FAA is aware of one
published standard that could be used
to meet a requirement to have a strategic
deconfliction and conformance
monitoring capability. It is referenced as
ASTM F3548–21, Standard
Specification for UAS Traffic
Management (UTM) UAS Service
Supplier (USS) Interoperability, dated
March 8, 2022. What alternative means
exist, preferably using published
standards, that the FAA should
consider? What evidence exists for the
safety benefit and operational efficiency
of any alternative means?
F. Detect and Avoid Between
Unmanned Aircraft
FAA views strategic deconfliction and
conformance monitoring as two layers
of a new, conceptual conflict
management strategy for UAS. The FAA
is also considering requiring a third
layer, in the form of detect-and-avoid
between UA, leveraging some form of
vehicle-to-vehicle communications
method.
• F1. One proposal would be to use
the ACAS sXu standard (RTCA DO–
396). What communications method
should be used in conjunction with this
approach? Should the FAA impose this
requirement, including use of a specific
communications method? Why or why
not?
• F2. What evidence exists that the
requirement in the above question
would sufficiently manage the risk of
collision between UA? Should such a
requirement be in addition to, or in lieu
of, any requirement to use strategic
deconfliction and conformance
monitoring?
• F3. If the FAA imposes a
requirement for UA-to-UA DAA, should
it also prescribe technical requirements
to ensure interoperability of the solution
across all BVLOS UAS? Why or why
not?
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Fmt 4702
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33857
G. Beyond Visual Line of Sight Shielded
Operations
The BVLOS ARC report proposed
labeling certain type of BVLOS
operations as shielded operations. These
operations would occur in a shielded
area defined by the ARC as ‘‘a volume
of airspace that includes 100′ above the
vertical extent of an obstacle or critical
infrastructure and is within 100 feet of
the lateral extent of the same obstacle or
critical infrastructure as defined in 42
U.S.C. 5195(c).’’ Furthermore, the ARC
recommended that shielded operations
be given right-of-way privileges based
on the unique nature of those operations
and the limited likelihood of crewed
aircraft operations in the specified areas.
The FAA is considering a similar
framework based on safety analysis and
some ability to detect and avoid crewed
aircraft operations.
• G1. In which circumstances or
operating environments should the FAA
authorize shielded operations? The 42
U.S.C. 5195(c) definition of critical
infrastructure has a broad applicability.
Should the FAA further limit or expand
the applicability?
• G2. Conversely, are there
circumstances or operating
environments in which the FAA should
not authorize shielded operations?
• G3. The ARC report describes the
appropriate offset as 100′ above, and
100′ lateral. Is this the appropriate
standard? Why or why not? If not, what
other standard should be used, and
what evidence exists for the
appropriateness and safety of an
alternative standard?
• G4. What type of notification (e.g.,
email/phone call, web portal, mobile
phone application using UTM services,
etc.) should operators conducting
BVLOS shielded operations provide to
the local aviation communities?
Issued in Washington, DC.
David H. Boulter,
Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation
Safety.
[FR Doc. 2023–11024 Filed 5–23–23; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION
16 CFR Part 1512
[Docket No. CPSC–2023–0023]
Petition Requesting Rulemaking To
Revoke the Footbrake Requirement for
Sidewalk Bicycles
Consumer Product Safety
Commission.
AGENCY:
E:\FR\FM\25MYP1.SGM
25MYP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 101 (Thursday, May 25, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 33855-33857]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-11024]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 61, 91, 107, and 135
[Docket No.: FAA-2023-1256]
UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight Operations
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Request for comment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: As the FAA reviews the recommendations of the UAS Beyond
Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS) Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee
(ARC), the FAA is considering the expansion of BVLOS operations in
certain operating environments with the appropriate safety mitigations
to ensure no adverse safety impact. The FAA is seeking comment to
gather additional technical input on key concepts and potential
approaches that the FAA is contemplating for use in future exemptions.
DATES: Comments on this petition must identify the petition docket
number and must be received on or before June 14, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2023-1256
using any of the following methods:
[[Page 33856]]
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140,
West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to https://www.regulations.gov, as described in the
system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
https://www.dot.gov/privacy.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Ngo, 202-267-9677, Office of
Rulemaking, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue
SW, Washington, DC 20591.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In March 2022, the UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)
Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) issued its final report,
which included a comprehensive set of recommendations for
implementation to support expanded unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
operations, such as linear infrastructure and package delivery. The FAA
recognizes BVLOS operations provide significant safety, societal, and
economic advantages and benefits. Several petitioners have proposed
various methods to safely operate UAS BVLOS under petitions for
exemptions. Along those lines, the FAA has received several petitions
for exemptions to conduct several types of BVLOS operations, which the
FAA is looking to leverage in enabling the next phase of BVLOS
operations. The FAA will be separately publishing summaries in the
Federal Register for the individual petitions on the affected projects
and seeking comments on each of those petitions for exemption. In this
document, the FAA seeks public comments that address how advances in
technology, standards, and operational strategies to safely demonstrate
UAS BVLOS operations can be applied without adversely affecting safety.
Specific questions are included in this request for comments
immediately following the discussion of the relevant issues. The FAA
asks that commenters provide as much information as possible on any
questions of interest to the commenter. Whenever possible, please
provide citations and copies of any relevant studies or reports on
which you rely, including cost data as well as any additional data
which supports your comment. It is also helpful to explain the basis
and reasoning underlying your comment. Each commenting party should
include the identifying number of the specific question(s) to which it
is responding.
A. Detect and Avoid Systems Performance Standards
The FAA recognizes that several industry standards have been
published that may be useful in defining the performance of Detect and
Avoid (DAA) systems, a major component of BVLOS operations. However,
any single standard may not be fully appropriate for the uses intended
by applicants operating at and below 400 feet above ground level (AGL).
Therefore, the FAA is reviewing these standards, as well as ways for
operators to demonstrate that their DAA system meets specific
requirements in a combination of published standards. These include:
1. ASTM F3442/F3442M-23, Standard Specification for Detect and
Avoid System Performance Requirements, dated February 28, 2023.
2. RTCA DO-381, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
for Ground Based Surveillance Systems (GBSS) for Traffic Surveillance,
dated March 26, 2020.
3. RTCA DO-365C, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
for Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems, dated September 15, 2022.
4. RTCA DO-396, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for
Airborne Collision Avoidance System sXu (ACAS sXu), dated December 15,
2022.
A1. In which circumstances or operating environments
should the FAA allow this combination approach?
A2. Conversely, are there circumstances or operating
environments where no combination of current standards would provide an
acceptable level of safety?
B. Declarations of Compliance for Detect and Avoid
As the FAA is contemplating operations beyond visual line of sight,
the FAA is considering allowing operators to declare that they are
utilizing DAA systems that meet the DAA standard(s) referenced above.
B1. In which circumstances or operating environments
should the FAA allow this declaration approach? What supporting
documentation or data should the FAA require prior to authorization to
operating under an exemption?
B2. Conversely, are there circumstances or operating
environments in which the FAA should require operators to submit
details of their DAA system for approval and validation prior to
operation?
C. Well-Clear Boundary
ASTM F3442/F3442M-23, Standard Specification for Detect and Avoid
System Performance Requirements, referenced previously, suggests
maintaining a horizontal distance of 2,000 feet and a vertical distance
of 250 feet between a small UAS and crewed aircraft, described as a
``hockey-puck-shaped'' area of airspace surrounding the small UAS.
C1. In which circumstances or operating environments would
this standard be appropriate?
C2. If not this standard, what well-clear boundary should
the FAA consider for operations under an exemption, and under what
circumstances or operating environments?
D. DAA Systems That Include Third-Party Services/Associated Elements
(AE)
There are numerous technologies and architectures that may be
suitable when implementing DAA solutions. Some systems may have sensors
and DAA logic that are fully contained onboard the aircraft with
information relayed to the pilot control station. A remote pilot may be
involved in executing avoidance maneuvers, or may monitor the
aircraft's automated response. Other systems may rely on ground-based
sensors that are connected to, but distinct from, the UA and its
control station. Yet other DAA systems may use a combination of those
approaches.
[[Page 33857]]
Under 14 CFR 1.1, a UAS is defined as the UA and its associated
elements necessary to support the safe flight of the UA. However, in
various petitions for exemptions, the FAA has understood some DAA
system components are intended to be reused by multiple operators.
These components are generally not directly controlled by either the
UAS manufacturer or the operator; rather, they are controlled by a
third-party service provider. Third-party services may directly support
the DAA solution by, for example, detecting crewed aircraft in a
defined geographic region, or by relaying such information through a
managed command and control (C2) link on behalf of multiple operators.
Therefore, the FAA is considering new ways to evaluate and
recognize these components as distinct elements. Additionally, section
377 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-254) directs
the Administrator to ``determine if certain UTM [Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Traffic Management] services may operate safely in the national
airspace system before completion of the implementation plan required
by Section 376.''
D1. The FAA is considering separating the UTM service
provider approval from the exemption for relief from parts 91 and 61.
In order to operate, the UTM service provider would need to receive its
approval, and the applicant's exemption would be contingent on use of
an approved service. Other operators seeking to use that same service
would present their specific use case with the approved UTM service.
Should the FAA separate the approval of the UTM service provider from
the exemption? Why or why not?
D2. Conversely, the FAA is also considering including the
approval of the UTM service within the exemption, similar to how the
FAA has implemented 49 U.S.C. 44807 to date. Should the FAA consolidate
these approvals? Why or why not?
E. Use of UTM Services for Strategic Deconfliction
At present, the FAA has not determined an acceptable level of risk
for collision between two UA. However, FAA is concerned that with
increasing numbers of BVLOS UAS operations, two UA could collide,
resulting in falling debris that could cause property damage, injuries,
or fatalities to non-participants on the ground.
E1. One proposal the FAA is considering would be to
require all BVLOS operations in controlled airspace or within the
lateral limits of a Mode C Veil under an exemption to use a strategic
deconfliction and conformance monitoring capability (both terms as
described in FAA's UTM Concept of Operations v2.0). This could be
fulfilled if the operator provisions their own capability that meets
the requirements of a published standard; or by using a UTM service.
Should the FAA impose this requirement? Why or why not?
E2. Alternatively, the FAA is considering requiring all
BVLOS operations under an exemption, including in Class G airspace, to
use a strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring capability.
Should the FAA impose this requirement? Why or why not?
E3. The FAA is aware of one published standard that could
be used to meet a requirement to have a strategic deconfliction and
conformance monitoring capability. It is referenced as ASTM F3548-21,
Standard Specification for UAS Traffic Management (UTM) UAS Service
Supplier (USS) Interoperability, dated March 8, 2022. What alternative
means exist, preferably using published standards, that the FAA should
consider? What evidence exists for the safety benefit and operational
efficiency of any alternative means?
F. Detect and Avoid Between Unmanned Aircraft
FAA views strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring as two
layers of a new, conceptual conflict management strategy for UAS. The
FAA is also considering requiring a third layer, in the form of detect-
and-avoid between UA, leveraging some form of vehicle-to-vehicle
communications method.
F1. One proposal would be to use the ACAS sXu standard
(RTCA DO-396). What communications method should be used in conjunction
with this approach? Should the FAA impose this requirement, including
use of a specific communications method? Why or why not?
F2. What evidence exists that the requirement in the above
question would sufficiently manage the risk of collision between UA?
Should such a requirement be in addition to, or in lieu of, any
requirement to use strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring?
F3. If the FAA imposes a requirement for UA-to-UA DAA,
should it also prescribe technical requirements to ensure
interoperability of the solution across all BVLOS UAS? Why or why not?
G. Beyond Visual Line of Sight Shielded Operations
The BVLOS ARC report proposed labeling certain type of BVLOS
operations as shielded operations. These operations would occur in a
shielded area defined by the ARC as ``a volume of airspace that
includes 100' above the vertical extent of an obstacle or critical
infrastructure and is within 100 feet of the lateral extent of the same
obstacle or critical infrastructure as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195(c).''
Furthermore, the ARC recommended that shielded operations be given
right-of-way privileges based on the unique nature of those operations
and the limited likelihood of crewed aircraft operations in the
specified areas.
The FAA is considering a similar framework based on safety analysis
and some ability to detect and avoid crewed aircraft operations.
G1. In which circumstances or operating environments
should the FAA authorize shielded operations? The 42 U.S.C. 5195(c)
definition of critical infrastructure has a broad applicability. Should
the FAA further limit or expand the applicability?
G2. Conversely, are there circumstances or operating
environments in which the FAA should not authorize shielded operations?
G3. The ARC report describes the appropriate offset as
100' above, and 100' lateral. Is this the appropriate standard? Why or
why not? If not, what other standard should be used, and what evidence
exists for the appropriateness and safety of an alternative standard?
G4. What type of notification (e.g., email/phone call, web
portal, mobile phone application using UTM services, etc.) should
operators conducting BVLOS shielded operations provide to the local
aviation communities?
Issued in Washington, DC.
David H. Boulter,
Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety.
[FR Doc. 2023-11024 Filed 5-23-23; 11:15 am]
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