Safety Advisory 2023-03; Accident Mitigation and Train Length, 27570-27573 [2023-09239]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 84 (Tuesday, May 2, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27570-27573]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-09239]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Safety Advisory 2023-03; Accident Mitigation and Train Length

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

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SUMMARY: Freight train length has increased in recent years, and while 
research is ongoing related to operational aspects of long trains, 
including brake system performance, it is known that the in-train 
forces longer trains experience are generally stronger and more complex 
than those in shorter train consists. FRA is issuing this Safety 
Advisory to ensure railroads and railroad employees are aware of the 
potential complexities associated with operating longer trains and to 
ensure they take appropriate measures to address those complexities to 
ensure the safe operation of such trains. Among other things, this 
Safety Advisory recommends that railroads review their operating rules 
and existing locomotive engineer certification programs to address 
operational complexities of train length, take appropriate action to 
prevent the loss of communications between end-of-train devices, and 
mitigate the impacts of long trains on blocked crossings.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christian Holt, Staff Director, 
Operating Practices Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New 
Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 366-0978.
    Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to 
DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws, 
regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety 
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not binding 
in any way. This document does not review or replace any previously 
issued guidance.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    Freight-train length, particularly for Class I railroads, has 
increased in recent years.\1\ The operation of longer trains presents 
different, more complex, operational challenges, which can be 
exacerbated by the weight and makeup of the trains.\2\ Accordingly, 
FRA's Office of Research, Development, and Technology is currently 
studying the air brake system performance and resulting train dynamics 
of trains comprised of up to 200 cars.\3\ Additionally, in response to 
the mandate of Section 22422 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs 
Act,\4\ the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 
(NAS) is conducting a study of the impacts of trains longer than 7,500 
feet.\5\ The estimate to complete both FRA and NAS's studies is 2024.
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    \1\ See GAO's May 2019 report titled RAIL SAFETY: Freight Trains 
Are Getting Longer, and Additional Information is Needed to Assess 
Their Impact, GAO-19-443 (available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-443.pdf).
    \2\ See FRA Safety Advisory 2023-02, Train Makeup and 
Operational Safety Concerns, for a discussion of how train makeup 
affects safety. FRA Safety Advisory 2023-02 is available at: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/11/2023-07579/safety-advisory-2023-02-train-makeup-and-operational-safety-concerns.
    \3\ See https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2022-12/2023_RDT_CurrentProjects_complete_FINAL.pdf.
    \4\ Public Law 117-58 (Nov. 15, 2021).
    \5\ See NAS https://www.nationalacademies.org/our-work/impacts-of-trains-longer-than-7500-feet.
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    While this research is ongoing, FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory 
to ensure railroads and railroad employees are aware of the potential 
complexities involved in the operation of longer trains, and 
appropriate actions are taken to address these complexities. This 
Safety Advisory also makes clear that train length is a critical factor 
to consider when building any train, just as consideration of a 
consist's

[[Page 27571]]

configuration is critical, as outlined in FRA Safety Advisory 2023-
02.\6\
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    \6\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/11/2023-07579/safety-advisory-2023-02-train-makeup-and-operational-safety-concerns.
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    FRA has identified three significant incidents (discussed below) 
that have occurred since 2022 involving trains with more than 200 cars, 
where train handling and train makeup is believed to have caused, or 
contributed to, the incidents. These incidents (which occurred in 
Springfield, Ohio; Ravenna, Ohio; and Rockwell, Iowa) involved trains 
that were 12,250 feet or longer and weighed over 17,000 trailing tons. 
FRA believes these incidents demonstrate the need for railroads and 
railroad employees to be particularly mindful of the complexities of 
operating longer trains, which include, but are not limited to: (1) 
train makeup and handling; (2) railroad braking and train handling 
rules, policies, and procedures; (3) protecting against the loss of 
end-of-train (EOT) device communications; and (4) where applicable, 
protecting against the loss of radio communications among crew members. 
These technical complexities make it critical that employees assigned 
to operate longer trains are adequately trained and qualified for the 
most demanding service for which they can be called. Additionally, 
these technical complexities make it necessary to ensure that a 
railroad's operational testing program adequately assesses and 
evaluates whether employees are appropriately equipped and demonstrate 
the capability to fully address those complexities in real world 
operating scenarios.

Springfield, Ohio--March 4, 2023

    On March 4, 2023, at approximately 4:54 p.m. a Norfolk Southern 
Railway (NS) 210-car, mixed-freight train totaling 13,470 feet and 
17,966 trailing tons with distributed power units (DPUs) experienced a 
derailment involving 28 cars, including 21 empty and 7 loaded cars in 
Springfield, Ohio. The train had 82 cars equipped with end-of-car 
cushioning devices, and 18 of those derailed. The train consisted of 
three head-end locomotives and two mid-train DPUs, with one head-end 
locomotive offline. The train was traveling on an ascending 0.6% grade 
with the heavier part of the consist (the back end) on a 0.7% downhill 
grade. The weight was mostly concentrated at the head and rear ends of 
the train. During the incident, dynamic braking was applied only to the 
head-end locomotive consist, while the DPUs were idle, making the train 
function like a conventional train. The derailment happened at the sag 
between ascending and descending grades, with short, empty rail cars 
designed to ship coiled steel being the first to derail. Buff forces 
peaked as the downhill portion of the train ran-in, causing the 
derailment of cars 70 through 72 (the short coil cars) and the 
subsequent pile-up. The train was classified as a key train,\7\ with 28 
loaded hazardous materials (hazmat) cars distributed throughout. No 
hazmat cars derailed. FRA's investigation into this incident is 
currently ongoing, but preliminary indications show excessive buff 
force due to train makeup and train handling are the primary causes of 
the incident.
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    \7\ As defined by Association of American Railroads (AAR) 
Circular OT-55, available at https://public.railinc.com/sites/default/files/documents/OT-55.pdf, a ``Key Train'' is any train 
with: (1) One tank car load of Poison or Toxic Inhalation Hazard 
(PIH or TIH) (Hazard Zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia 
(UN1005), or ammonia solutions (UN3318); (2) 20 car loads or 
intermodal portable tank loads of any combination of hazardous 
material; or (3) One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), 
High Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW).
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Ravenna, Ohio--November 1, 2022

    On November 1, 2022, at approximately 7:04 p.m., a NS 238-car, 
mixed-freight train totaling 15,657 feet and 24,538 trailing tons with 
DPUs experienced a derailment involving 22 cars, in Ravenna, Ohio. The 
train included 188 loads and 50 empties, and was powered by two head-
end locomotives and two mid-train DPUs. The incident occurred on the NS 
Keystone Subdivision main track. The derailment happened during an 
undesired emergency air brake application, the cause of which is still 
under investigation. The train was designated as a key train, and 2 of 
the 63 hazmat cars derailed, in addition to 20 other cars. In the 
consist, 56 cars were equipped with end-of-car cushioning devices. The 
train was initially operating with the energy management system 
engaged, but reverted to manual operation prior to the derailment. The 
railroad reported the cause of the incident as buffing or excessive 
slack action due to train makeup, but FRA's investigation is ongoing.

Rockwell, Iowa--March 24, 2022

    On March 24, 2022, at approximately 1:59 a.m., a southbound Union 
Pacific Railroad (UP) train totaling 12,250 feet long and 23,315 
trailing tons experienced a derailment of 37 cars in Rockwell, Iowa. 
The train was traveling at a speed of 46 miles per hour at the time of 
the incident. The train consisted of two head-end locomotives, one mid-
train DPU, one rear DPU, and a total of 204 cars consisting of 169 
loads and 35 empties. At the time of the incident, the energy 
management system was engaged, the train's head-end was ascending with 
the rear portion descending, causing the slack to run in, leading to 
compression at the middle of the train. This incident is still under 
investigation and the analysis of in-train forces is ongoing, but 
preliminary indications are that the primary cause of the incident was 
buffing or excessive slack action due to train makeup.

II. The Complexities of Operating Longer Trains

    As noted above, the operation of longer trains involves technical 
challenges pertaining to (1) train makeup and handling; (2) railroad 
braking and train handling rules, policies, and procedures; (3) 
protecting against the loss of EOT device communications; and (4) where 
applicable, protecting against the loss of radio communication among 
crew members.

Train Makeup and Handling

    FRA notes that recently issued Safety Advisory 2023-02 addresses 
train makeup and accompanying operational safety concerns. FRA 
reiterates the recommendations in that Safety Advisory as applied to 
longer trains.

Railroad Braking and Train Handling Rules, Policies, and Procedures

    Air brake and train handling (ABTH) rules are the basis for the 
safe operation of any train, but as noted above, longer trains may pose 
unique challenges that must be comprehensively addressed in railroads' 
ABTH rules. ABTH rules are developed from experience and are based on 
factors such as the designs and types of rolling equipment in a 
consist, whether the equipment is loaded or empty, and the placement of 
that equipment in a train's consist. FRA recognizes that railroads 
regularly update their ABTH rules, but FRA is concerned that some 
railroads' ABTH rules do not sufficiently address issues related to 
train length such as, but not limited to:
     The maximum number of powered axles in stretch (powered) 
and dynamic braking;
     Train consist comprised of long-short car combinations;
     The placement of loaded and empty cars within a train 
consist;
     End-of-car cushioning devices;
     Air brakes;
     The use of distributed power, if equipped;

[[Page 27572]]

     Operating over grades and through curves;
     Cold weather operations; and
     Train automatic operation (energy management systems), 
including transfer from automatic to manual operating scenarios.
    Accordingly, this Safety Advisory recommends that railroads review 
their existing ABTH rules and update those rules as necessary to ensure 
they comprehensively address the complexities associated with train 
length in the railroad's operations.

Protecting Against the Loss of EOT Device Communications

    Railroads have used EOT devices for years to monitor brake pipe 
pressure at the rear of the train. More recently, the functionality of 
these devices has expanded to assist in emergency braking. Two-way EOT 
device systems are comprised of a rear-of-train unit (rear unit) 
located on the last car of a train and a front-of-train unit (front 
unit) located in the cab of the locomotive controlling the train. An 
EOT system is linked by radio signals that will automatically transmit 
an emergency brake signal from the controlling locomotive to the rear 
of the train when an emergency brake application is initiated. The 
system additionally allows for the engineer in the controlling 
locomotive to manually activate a switch which sends a radio signal to 
the rear unit EOT device that is tied into the air brake system, opens 
an internal valve, and initiates an emergency brake application.
    Due to the distance EOT device signals must travel on longer 
trains, the greater the risk that signal communications may be lost 
between the front and rear units. Thus, longer trains are more prone to 
experience EOT device loss of signal communications than shorter train 
consists. Other factors, such as the local topography and weather 
conditions, can present further challenges to EOT devices maintaining 
communications. A loss of communication between EOT devices can be 
temporary or permanent, and can result in an emergency air brake signal 
from the controlling locomotive taking longer to propagate through the 
entire train (effectively slowing down braking of the entire consist), 
or in the event of a train air brake line blockage, a loss of 
communication between the EOT devices will result in the emergency 
signal not being transmitted to the rear EOT device, as evidenced by 
the fatal UP Granite Canyon accident that occurred on October 4, 2018.
    Accordingly, this Safety Advisory recommends that railroads 
implement technologies, policies, procedures, and any necessary 
hardware enhancements to ensure two-way EOT devices maintain continuous 
and undisrupted communications to and from the front and rear units. 
Additionally, this Safety Advisory recommends that railroads develop, 
implement, and maintain clear rules to follow in the event of a loss of 
communication between EOT devices.

Protecting Against the Loss of Radio Communications Among Crew Members

    Effective radio voice communications are crucial for ensuring the 
safety of railroad employees and train operations. A longer train can 
present a radio voice communication problem for an operating employee 
traveling a long distance away from the lead locomotive. Portable radio 
handsets generally used might not have sufficient radio signal strength 
to provide clear communication over great distances or undulating 
topography. This problem is particularly concerning during emergency 
situations, where clear communication is critical. For instance, if an 
operating employee is injured and unable to contact the locomotive 
engineer, delays in getting timely aid to the operating employee may 
occur.
    As a result, this Safety Advisory recommends that railroads adopt 
enhanced technologies and, as necessary, procedures for maintaining 
radio voice communications with a contingency plan if voice 
communications are lost between operating employees.

III. Employee Training and Qualification Considerations

Training Generally

    The potential complexities involved with the operation of longer 
trains make it particularly critical that locomotive engineers (and all 
other crew members) are adequately trained and qualified to safely 
perform their duties. FRA is concerned that certified locomotive 
engineers may receive basic train handling training that was typically 
satisfactory for historical operations over particular territories, but 
given railroads' current increased operation of longer trains, such 
training may no longer be adequate. FRA reminds railroads of the 
regulatory requirement at 49 CFR 240.211(a) for railroads to, prior to 
initially certifying or recertifying any person as a locomotive 
engineer, determine that the person has demonstrated the skills 
necessary to safely operate locomotives or trains in the most demanding 
class or type of service that the person will be permitted to perform. 
In the context of longer trains, the engineer must be adequately 
trained in their operation and demonstrate an ability to safely do so 
prior to being called for such operation. For example, an engineer who 
has safely operated a 100-car consist over a particular territory for 
the past five years, but has never been trained and qualified on a 
longer consist, should not be called to operate a 200-car train without 
additional training on the operational complexities involved.
    A locomotive engineer cannot be expected to safely operate in a 
more demanding service without proper additional training that covers 
the unique challenges and complexities those trains present. This 
training concern extends to the designated supervisors of locomotive 
engineers, who are responsible for understanding these territories, 
operations, and associated risks, and are expected to be involved in 
the training, testing, and qualifying of locomotive engineers.

Part 240 Locomotive Engineer Certification Programs

    Appendix B to 49 CFR part 240 outlines the procedures that 
railroads must describe in their locomotive engineer certification 
programs, and the level of detail required for the training, 
qualification, and certification of locomotive engineers. Accordingly, 
FRA expects each railroad to design its program to address that 
railroad's specific operations and FRA expects railroads to adjust 
their programs as the nature or circumstances of operations change. 
Specifically, if a railroad creates a more demanding operating 
environment through the operation of longer trains, that railroad's 
locomotive engineer certification program must be updated to reflect 
that more demanding environment. For this reason, FRA recommends that 
each railroad with a submitted program, review whether updates to their 
programs are necessary to ensure: (1) the complexities of that 
railroad's operations are adequately addressed in the program, and (2) 
its employees are adequately trained and qualified to operate in the 
most demanding service. FRA notes that the use of distributed power and 
energy management systems typically involved in longer train operations 
place new demands on locomotive engineers and, as such, those employees 
must be trained and qualified on these additional complexities.

Part 217 Operational Testing

    Under 49 CFR part 217, railroads are required to conduct 
operational tests. These operational tests are vital for determining 
that employees are

[[Page 27573]]

properly trained and fully aware of the rules and regulations governing 
safe operations. By identifying and addressing any potential training 
and compliance issues revealed by effective operational testing of 
longer trains, railroads can mitigate the potential risk of accidents 
and incidents. As new operations and technology are introduced, 
operational testing must be adjusted accordingly.

IV. Blocked Public Highway-Rail Grade Crossings

    Blocked crossings occur when trains occupy highway-rail grade 
crossings and impede the flow of motor vehicle or pedestrian traffic 
over railroad tracks for extended periods of time. Blocked crossings 
pose numerous potential safety risks--frustrated individuals may be 
tempted to crawl, on, over, under, or between stopped railcars and 
blocked crossings can hinder emergency services' access to individuals 
in need of fire, police, or EMS assistance. Residents of communities 
through which railroads operate often rely on specific highway-rail 
grade crossings for daily commutes and other essential activities. 
Local knowledge of these crossings has developed over time, allowing 
community members to navigate through those crossings safely and 
efficiently. However, longer trains may, in certain instances, mean 
that trains are occupying these crossings for longer periods, 
potentially blocking access to homes, hospitals, schools, or 
businesses, and causing unexpected disruptions. Local emergency 
responders, such as police, fire, and ambulance services, can be 
severely impacted if emergency responders must find an alternate route 
when a train is blocking a crossing or if there is no alternative 
route.
    Longer trains may also present challenges for pedestrians as the 
trains occupy pedestrian crossings for longer periods of time. Blocked 
crossings near schools are especially critical safety hazards due to 
the potential for children to cut through the idling trains.
    Depending on the length of time that a crossing is blocked, the 
type of vehicles at a blocked crossing, and the configuration of the 
highway, motor vehicle drivers could be expected to take greater risks 
and commit dangerous maneuvers in an attempt to seek an alternate 
route. Motor vehicle drivers may also be more tempted to ``outrun the 
train'' by speeding to cross the tracks before the oncoming train 
reaches the crossing, particularly at locations that are frequently 
blocked by trains. Although trains of any length may block highway-rail 
grade crossings for a variety of reasons, the operation of longer 
trains may, in certain instances, exacerbate the impact of blocked 
crossings on communities. Accordingly, FRA recommends that railroads 
identify geographic areas with highway-rail grade crossings that could 
be impacted by longer trains, and work with local communities and 
emergency responders to identify and implement methods of preventing, 
or at least mitigating, the impacts of such blockages. These actions 
could include: identifying alternative routes for critical emergency 
response needs, establishing and maintaining clear lines of 
communication between the railroad and local authorities, or developing 
protocols for resolving concerns surrounding emergency response and 
blocked crossings.

V. Recommended Actions

    Due to the complexities involved in the operation of longer trains, 
and to ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, their employees, 
and the general public, FRA recommends that freight railroads take the 
following actions:
    1. Review ABTH rules, or supplements, to ensure those rules 
adequately address the complexities associated with the railroad's 
operation of longer trains.
    2. Implement technologies, policies, procedures, and/or any 
necessary hardware enhancements to ensure two-way EOT devices maintain 
undisrupted communications to and from the head-end and rear-end units. 
Develop, implement, and maintain clear policies, procedures, and rules 
that address instances of the loss of communications between EOT 
devices.
    3. Adopt enhanced technologies and/or procedures for maintaining 
radio voice communications with a contingency plan if voice 
communications are lost between operating employees.
    4. Identify changes to crew training, train handling procedures, 
train makeup, DPU requirements, limitations to length or tonnage, speed 
restrictions, track, mechanical, and brake inspection and maintenance 
requirements necessary to ensure safe operations of longer trains.
    5. Review, and update as necessary, each railroad's current 49 CFR 
part 240 locomotive engineer certification program to ensure the 
program addresses all levels of operations, including the operation of 
longer trains.
    6. Review and evaluate existing operational testing data as 
required by 49 CFR 217.9(e) relevant to the operation of longer trains. 
If longer train operations are conducted, or if any potential training 
or compliance issues are identified, consider increasing the frequency 
of operational testing and/or modifying the types of operational 
testing performed to address those deficiencies.
    7. Identify geographic areas that could be impacted by longer 
trains at highway-rail grade crossings, take action to minimize blocked 
crossings by considering train length when taking any action that 
causes any part of a train to occupy a crossing, and work with local 
communities and emergency responders to prevent or at least mitigate 
the impacts of blocked crossings should they occur.
    8. Conduct post-accident simulator evaluations and assign accurate 
primary and contributing cause codes for reportable and accountable 
accidents and incidents. A detailed narrative is basic to an 
understanding of the factors leading to, and the consequences arising 
from, an accident.
    FRA encourages freight railroads to take actions consistent with 
the preceding recommendations. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 
2023-03, issue additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate 
action necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's 
railroads, including pursing other corrective measures under its rail 
safety authority.

    Issued in Washington, DC.
Amitabha Bose,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-09239 Filed 5-1-23; 8:45 am]
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