Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications, 15864-15899 [2023-03944]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 49 (Tuesday, March 14, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 15864-15899]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-03944]



[[Page 15863]]

Vol. 88

Tuesday,

No. 49

March 14, 2023

Part II





Nuclear Regulatory Commission





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10 CFR Parts 20, 21, 26, et al.





Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event 
Notifications; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 49 / Tuesday, March 14, 2023 / Rules 
and Regulations

[[Page 15864]]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 20, 21, 26, 50, 70, 72, 73, 74, and 76

[NRC-2011-0014; NRC-2011-0015; NRC-2011-0017; NRC-2011-0018]
RIN 3150-AI49


Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event 
Notifications

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule and guidance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its 
regulations to implement its authority under Section 161A of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended. This final rule applies to several 
classes of facilities as well as activities involving the 
transportation of radioactive material and other property designated by 
the NRC. This final rule also revises the physical security event 
notification requirements for different classes of facilities and the 
transportation of radioactive material to add consistency and clarity. 
Further, the NRC is adding new event notification requirements 
associated with the possession of enhanced weapons and imminent or 
actual hostile acts, and new reporting requirements for suspicious 
activity. The NRC also is issuing a final implementation guidance for 
this final rule.

DATES: 
    Effective date: This final rule is effective April 13, 2023.
    Compliance date: Compliance with this final rule is required by 
January 8, 2024, for those licensed under parts 50, 52, 60, 63, 70, and 
72 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) and subject 
to Sec. Sec.  73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket IDs NRC-2011-0014, NRC-2011-0015, 
NRC-2011-0017, and NRC-2011-0018 when contacting the NRC about the 
availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly 
available information related to this action by any of the following 
methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket IDs NRC-2011-0014, NRC-2011-
0015, NRC-2011-0017, or NRC-2011-0018. Address questions about NRC 
dockets to Dawn Forder; telephone: 301-415-3407; email: 
[email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individuals 
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available 
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section. For the convenience of the reader, 
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in the document are 
also provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White 
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make 
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. eastern time, Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stewart Schneider, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, telephone: 301-415-4123; email: 
[email protected]; or Philip Brochman, Office of Nuclear 
Security and Incident Response, telephone: 301-287-3691; email: 
[email protected]. Both are staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Executive Summary

    This final rule has three distinct parts. Part 1 implements the 
Commission's authority under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended (AEA). Section 161A authorizes the Commission to 
designate those classes of licensees permitted to use firearms, 
weapons, ammunition, or devices, notwithstanding local, State, and 
certain Federal firearms laws and regulations prohibiting such use. 
Part 2 revises the requirements for physical security event 
notifications and adds two new notification requirements associated 
with imminent or actual hostile acts and possession of enhanced 
weapons. Additionally, Part 2 simplifies and reorganizes existing 
physical security event notification requirements into several 
timeliness categories (e.g., 15-minute, 1-hour, 4-hour, and 8-hour 
notifications). Part 3 adds requirements for reporting suspicious 
activities to law enforcement agencies and the NRC.

A. Need for the Regulatory Action

    Part 1 of this final rule amends the NRC's regulations to implement 
the Commission's authority under Section 161A of the AEA (Section 161A 
authority). Without implementing regulations, the Commission would need 
to grant Section 161A authority through confirmatory orders. This 
process is unnecessarily inefficient for licensees and the NRC. 
Additionally, this process lacks the transparency and regulatory 
certainty provided by regulations. These amendments will establish a 
clear and consistent regulatory process to enable licensees to apply 
for and effectively implement the Commission's Section 161A authority.
    Part 2 of this final rule amends the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR 
part 73 to modify the physical security event notification 
requirements. Currently, all physical security event notifications must 
be submitted to the NRC within 1-hour. The revised regulations provide 
a graded approach that takes into account the security significance of 
the physical security event, which in most cases will provide licensees 
greater flexibility. Additionally, this final rule adds new 
requirements to notify the NRC following actual or imminent hostile 
action as well as lost or stolen enhanced weapons. These new 
requirements will ensure licensees provide notification to the NRC of 
all appropriate physical security events.
    Part 3 of this final rule amends the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR 
part 73 to add requirements for licensees to report suspicious 
activities. Currently, licensees voluntarily report suspicious 
activities. Licensee implementation of voluntary suspicious activity 
reporting has been inconsistent in terms of both the types of data 
reported and the timeliness of reports. Because licensees' timely and 
consistent submission of suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the NRC 
and to law enforcement is an important part of the U.S. government's 
efforts to disrupt or dissuade malevolent acts against the nation's 
critical infrastructure, it is necessary to make suspicious activity 
reporting mandatory.

B. Major Provisions

    Major provisions of this final rule include:
     Implementation of the Commission's Section 161A authority.

[[Page 15865]]

Section 161A authorizes the Commission to designate those classes of 
licensees eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption authority or 
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority. Stand-
alone preemption authority allows regulated entities to possess and use 
weapons that would otherwise be prohibited by State, local, and certain 
Federal firearms laws. Combined preemption authority and enhanced 
weapons authority allows a regulated entity to possess and use a 
certain category of covered weapon called an ``enhanced weapon.'' 
Enhanced weapons include machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and 
short-barreled rifles.
     Modification of the requirements for physical security 
event notifications using a graded approach that reflects the security 
significance of the event. Additionally, this final rule adds new 
notification requirements for imminent or actual hostile actions and 
lost or stolen enhanced weapons.
     Establishment of new suspicious activity reporting 
requirements to clarify and ensure consistency in reporting to law 
enforcement agencies and the NRC.
    Concurrent with this final rule, the NRC is issuing Regulatory 
Guide (RG) 5.86, ``Enhanced Weapons Authority, Preemption Authority, 
and Firearms Background Checks''; RG 5.62, Revision 2, ``Physical 
Security Event Notifications, Reports and Records''; and RG 5.87, 
``Suspicious Activity Reports.''

C. Costs and Benefits

    The NRC has prepared a regulatory analysis to determine the 
expected quantitative costs and benefits of this final rule, as well as 
qualitative factors considered in the NRC's rulemaking decision. The 
quantitative analyses evaluate four attributes-industry implementation, 
industry operation, NRC implementation, and NRC operation. Qualitative 
analyses were prepared because monetizing the full impact of each 
attribute is not possible or practical. Monetizing the impact of these 
attributes would require estimation of factors such as the frequency of 
security-related events and the consequences of such events.
    The analysis concluded that this final rule will result in net 
quantified costs to the industry and the NRC. The total cost of the 
rule reflects, in part, the costs that will be incurred by eight NRC 
licensees at seven sites that were granted, by confirmatory order, 
stand-alone preemption authority and will need to update their 
applicable procedures, instructions, and training to reflect the 
requirements in this final rule.
    The total cost of the rule also reflects the implementation and 
operations costs to comply with the new physical security event 
notification and suspicious activity reporting requirements. These 
costs apply to the following licensed sites: production or utilization 
facilities licensed under Sec.  50.21 or Sec.  50.22 (including both 
operating and decommissioning power reactors and non-power reactors); 
away-from-reactor independent spent fuel storage installations 
(ISFSIs); and facilities that are licensed to possess special nuclear 
material (SNM). The costs result from these licensees having to update 
their procedures to reflect the new requirements, and estimated costs 
associated with providing event notification and suspicious activity 
reporting.
    NRC costs to implement this final rule include costs associated 
with oversight of licensees' transitioning from the confirmatory orders 
to the requirements of the final rule. NRC operational costs include 
reviewing and receiving both the physical security event notifications 
and SARs. The benefits to the NRC are avoided costs associated with not 
issuing confirmatory orders to future licensees requesting Section 161A 
authority. The regulatory analysis concludes that this final rule 
results in an estimated cost of between $2.85 million at a 7-percent 
discount rate and $3.07 million at a 3-percent discount rate.
    The regulatory analysis also considered the following qualitative 
considerations and associated benefits: security-related attributes, 
such as the occurrence of a possible attack and the successful 
thwarting and mitigation of the attack, flexibility of response to 
physical security events, suspicious activity reporting, and 
enhancements to regulatory efficiency. Based on the assessment of the 
costs and benefits of this final rule, including those benefits which 
are unquantified, the NRC has concluded that the final rule provisions 
are justified to protect public health and safety and the common 
defense and security. For more information, please see the regulatory 
analysis (ADAMS Accession No. ML19045A003).

Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Discussion
III. Opportunity for Public Comment
IV. Public Comment Analysis
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
VII. Regulatory Analysis
VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality
IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
X. Plain Writing
XI. Environmental Assessment and Final Finding of No Significant 
Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act
XIII. Congressional Review Act
XIV. Criminal Penalties
XV. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
XVI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XVII. Availability of Guidance
XVIII. Availability of Documents

I. Background

A. Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as Amended

    On August 8, 2005, President George W. Bush signed into law the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 
(2005). Section 653 of the EPAct amended the AEA by adding a new 
Section 161A, ``Use of Firearms by Security Personnel'' (42 U.S.C. 
2201a). Section 161A of the AEA provides the NRC with authority to 
permit a licensee's or certificate holder's security personnel to 
transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use weapons, 
devices, ammunition, or other firearms, notwithstanding State, local, 
and certain Federal firearms laws (and implementing regulations) that 
may prohibit or restrict these actions. This could include, if approved 
by the NRC, the use of enhanced weapons such as machine guns, short-
barreled shotguns, and short-barreled rifles.
    The Commission designates the classes of NRC licensees eligible to 
apply for Section 161A authority. Designated licensees may request 
permission from the Commission to transfer, receive, possess, 
transport, import, and use firearms, ammunition, or devices, 
notwithstanding local, State, and certain Federal firearms laws and 
regulations prohibiting such possession and use. For the purposes of 
this rule, this type of authority is referred to as ``stand-alone 
preemption authority.'' Additionally, designated licensees may request 
permission to transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use 
firearms, ammunition, or devices that require registration under the 
National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. Chapter 53). These types of weapons 
are typically referred to as ``enhanced weapons'' and for the purposes 
of this rule this type of authority is referred to as ``combined 
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.'' Enhanced weapons 
include machine guns, short-barreled shotguns and short-barreled 
rifles.
    Section 161A.b requires that licensees ensure that their security 
personnel that receive, possess, transport, import, or use a weapon, 
ammunition, or device otherwise prohibited by State, local, or certain 
Federal laws, including

[[Page 15866]]

regulations, shall be subject to a fingerprint-based background check 
by the U.S. Attorney General (AG) and a firearms background check 
against the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (NICS).

B. The Firearms Guidelines

    Section 161A.d of the AEA requires that the Commission, with the 
approval of the AG, develop and publish guidelines for the 
implementation of the authority granted to the Commission under section 
161A. The Firearms Guidelines provide guidance on how the Commission 
intends to implement the authority conferred on it by Section 161A of 
the AEA. On September 11, 2009, the NRC published the Firearms 
Guidelines in the Federal Register (74 FR 46800). Section 161A of the 
AEA took effect upon publication of the Firearms Guidelines. The NRC, 
with the approval of the AG, revised the Firearms Guidelines (Revision 
1) and published them in the Federal Register on June 25, 2014 (79 FR 
36100). Subsequently, the NRC, with the approval of the AG, revised the 
Firearms Guidelines again (Revision 2) and published them in the 
Federal Register on March 8, 2019 (84 FR 8546). The Firearms Guidelines 
are available at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2008-
0465.

C. October 2006 Proposed Rule

    In 2006, the NRC initiated a rulemaking that would, among other 
changes: (1) implement the new authority granted to the Commission in 
Section 161A of the AEA and (2) modify existing physical security event 
notification requirements. On October 26, 2006, the NRC published a 
proposed rule, ``Power Reactor Security Requirements,'' in the Federal 
Register (71 FR 62664) to implement the provisions of Section 161A as 
one component of a larger proposed amendment to its regulations under 
10 CFR parts 50, 72, and 73.
    That portion of the proposed rule implementing the authority 
granted the Commission under Section 161A of the AEA was consistent 
with ongoing discussions between the NRC and the U.S. Department of 
Justice on the development of the Firearms Guidelines. In those 
discussions, the NRC had proposed that the provisions of Section 161A 
of the AEA would apply only to nuclear power reactor facilities, 
including both operating and decommissioning nuclear power reactors, 
and Category I strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) facilities 
(i.e., facilities possessing or using formula quantities or greater of 
SSNM). This structure was proposed to permit these two highest-risk 
classes of licensed facilities to apply to the NRC for Section 161A 
authority. The NRC had also indicated that it would consider making 
Section 161A authority available to additional classes of facilities, 
radioactive material, or other property (including ISFSIs) in a 
separate, future rulemaking.
    On March 27, 2009, the NRC published the final rule, ``Power 
Reactor Security Requirements'' in the Federal Register (74 FR 13926). 
The requirements in the proposed rule to implement the NRC's authority 
under Section 161A of the AEA were not included in that final rule 
because the Firearms Guidelines had not been published and therefore 
the NRC's authority under Section 161A had not yet taken effect. 
Consequently, final regulations implementing the Commission's Section 
161A authority could not be promulgated at that time. The physical 
security event notification regulations were also not included in the 
``Power Reactor Security Requirements'' rule because the NRC intended 
to add new requirements associated with notifying local law enforcement 
of the theft or loss of enhanced weapons.

D. February 2011 Proposed Rule

    On February 3, 2011, the NRC published a proposed rule, ``Enhanced 
Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event 
Notifications,'' in the Federal Register (76 FR 6200). The proposed 
enhanced weapons rule was consistent with the approved 2009 Firearms 
Guidelines. With the publication of the Firearms Guidelines, Section 
161A of the AEA took effect. The 2011 proposed rule included provisions 
to implement the Commission's authority under Section 161A of the AEA. 
It also made several changes to the physical security event 
notification requirements in 10 CFR part 73 to address imminent attacks 
or threats against nuclear power reactors, as well as suspicious 
activities that could be indicative of potential preoperational 
reconnaissance, surveillance, or challenges to security systems by 
adversaries (hereinafter referred to as the event notifications part of 
the rule, which at that time also included the suspicious activity 
reporting part of the rule). The initial public comment period to 
review and comment on the 2011 proposed rule and associated guidance 
was 90 days. The comment period was extended to 180 days at the request 
of stakeholders.

E. Preemption Designation Orders and Confirmatory Orders

    Subsequent to the publication of the 2011 proposed rule, the NRC 
received requests from ten licensees (located at eight separate sites) 
to obtain stand-alone preemption authority. In response to these 
requests, the NRC issued designation Order EA-13-092 on June 14, 2013 
(78 FR 35984).
    Order EA-13-092 designated the ten licensees as an interim class of 
licensed facilities eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption 
authority under Section 161A of the AEA. Order EA-13-092 also contained 
direction related to completing firearms background checks for security 
personnel whose official duties require access to covered weapons, and 
contained direction for the licensees on submitting applications and 
supporting information to obtain stand-alone preemption authority via a 
confirmatory order. Subsequent to the NRC's issuance of Order EA-13-
092, two licensees (located at the same site) withdrew their 
applications for stand-alone preemption authority.
    The NRC approved applications for stand-alone preemption authority 
for the eight remaining licensees at seven sites under Order EA-15-006 
on September 4, 2015 (80 FR 53588), and under Orders EA-14-134, EA-14-
135, EA-14-136, EA-14-137, EA-14-138, EA-14-139, and EA-14-140 on 
January 15, 2016 (81 FR 2247).

F. January 2013 Supplemental Proposed Rule

    On January 10, 2013, the NRC published a supplemental proposed 
rule, ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security 
Event Notifications,'' (78 FR 2214) to add at-reactor ISFSIs as a class 
of designated facilities eligible to apply for Section 161A authority 
under the proposed Sec.  73.18(c) [renumbered Sec.  73.15(c) in this 
final rule]. The NRC had concluded that including at-reactor ISFSIs in 
the proposed rule would ensure a consistent transition from the 
designation order and confirmatory orders to the final implementing 
regulations for reactor licensees and any ISFSIs co-located at the 
reactor site.
    When a reactor facility and an ISFSI share a common security guard 
force, as is the case for at-reactor ISFSIs, the NRC staff recognizes 
that if the licensee applies for stand-alone preemption authority and 
is approved, it may be beneficial for both facilities at the site to 
have that authority. In the 2013 supplemental proposed rule, the NRC 
indicated that other classes of facilities and activities (e.g., away-
from-reactor

[[Page 15867]]

ISFSIs and transportation of spent nuclear fuel) would be addressed in 
a separate, future rulemaking (as originally discussed by the NRC in 
the October 2006 proposed rule). The public comment period for the 2013 
supplemental proposed rule was 45 days.

G. December 2013 Bifurcation of the Cyber Security Event Notification 
Requirements

    On December 20, 2013, in COMSECY-13-0031, ``Bifurcation of the 
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event 
Notifications Rule'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML13280A366), the NRC staff 
requested approval from the Commission to bifurcate the cyber security 
event notification (CSEN) requirements from the event notifications 
part of the enhanced weapons rule and to address these requirements in 
a separate rulemaking. In SRM-COMSECY-13-0031, ``Bifurcation of the 
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event 
Notification Rule'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML14023A860), the Commission 
approved the NRC staff's plan to bifurcate the CSEN requirements from 
the enhanced weapons rule. The NRC received comments on the proposed 
CSEN requirements contained in the 2011 proposed enhanced weapons rule. 
The NRC's responses to these comments were addressed in the ``Cyber 
Security Event Notifications'' final rule published in the Federal 
Register on November 2, 2015 (80 FR 67264) and are not addressed in 
this rulemaking.
    Additionally, draft Regulatory Guide (DG) 5019, Revision 1, 
``Reporting and Recording Safeguards Events'' (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML100830413), was issued for public comment on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 
6085). The portions of DG-5019, Revision 1, related to CSEN were also 
bifurcated from the original draft guide, and are now included in the 
final CSEN guidance in RG 5.83, ``Cyber Security Event Notifications'' 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14269A388).
    Accordingly, the NRC has removed all CSEN provisions from this 
final rule and associated guidance.

H. September 2015 Supplemental Proposed Rule

    On September 22, 2015, the NRC published a second supplemental 
proposed rule, ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and 
Security Event Notifications'' (80 FR 57106), to conform Part 1 of the 
rule with the 2014 Revision 1 to the Firearms Guidelines. The 2009 
Firearms Guidelines provided that the security personnel for all 
licensees and certificate holders that fall within the designated 
classes of facilities must undergo firearms background checks, whether 
or not a particular licensee or certificate holder intends to seek 
Section 161A authority. The NRC staff determined that this requirement 
placed an unnecessary cost on licensees who had not applied for Section 
161A authority without serving any relevant security purpose. 
Consequently, under Revision 1 of the 2014 Firearms Guidelines, the 
requirement for background checks applies to only those licensees and 
certificate holders who apply for Section 161A authority.
    In addition to conforming the 2011 proposed rule to Revision 1 of 
the 2014 Firearms Guidelines, the 2015 supplemental proposed rule also 
made three other changes. First, the 2015 supplemental proposed rule 
made several clarifying and corrective changes to the process for 
obtaining stand-alone preemption authority and the requirements for 
firearms background checks. This was based upon language approved by 
the Commission in the designation and confirmatory orders issued by the 
NRC, subsequent to the publication of the 2011 proposed rule (i.e., 
Orders EA-13-092, EA-14-134, EA-14-135, EA-14-136, EA-14-137, EA-14-
138, EA-14-139, EA-14-140, and EA-15-006).
    Second, the NRC made several additional changes to clarify the 
agency's review and acceptance criteria for evaluating applications for 
stand-alone preemption authority. These changes were based on lessons 
learned by the NRC staff in developing confirmatory orders for those 
licensees requesting stand-alone preemption authority, as well as 
comments received in response to prior versions of the proposed rule. 
Furthermore, to ensure consistency between processes, the NRC planned 
to make corresponding changes to the proposed process for obtaining 
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.
    Third, the NRC staff implemented Commission direction from SRM-
SECY-12-0125, ``Interim Actions to Execute Commission Preemption 
Authority Under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
Amended'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A653). In SRM-SECY-12-0125, the 
Commission directed the NRC staff to include a plan ``to sunset 
[withdraw] the interim designation order and the confirmatory orders'' 
in the final rule. Accordingly, the NRC included new language in 
Sec. Sec.  73.18(s) and 73.19(r) [renumbered Sec. Sec.  73.15(s) and 
73.17(r) in this final rule] of the 2015 supplemental proposed rule to 
accomplish the Commission's direction.
    Other changes in the 2015 supplemental proposed rule included the 
removal of the definition of ``standard weapon'' and the removal of 
references to standard weapons in the definitions of ``covered weapon'' 
and ``enhanced weapon.''

II. Discussion

    This final rule reflects the proposed changes from the 2011 
proposed rule and the 2013 and 2015 supplemental proposed rules. Part 1 
of the rule implements the NRC's authority under Section 161A of the 
AEA to permit a licensee security personnel to transfer, receive, 
possess, transport, import, and use weapons, devices, ammunition, or 
other firearms notwithstanding State, local, and certain Federal 
firearms laws (and any implementing regulations) that may prohibit or 
restrict these actions. The types of weapons include, for example, 
machine guns, semiautomatic assault weapons, and large-capacity 
ammunition feeding devices (i.e., magazines). As indicated in the 2011 
proposed rule, an NRC licensee may voluntarily apply to the NRC to 
obtain Section 161A authority (either stand-alone preemption authority 
or combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority). This 
part applies to nuclear power reactors, Category I SSNM facilities, 
ISFSIs, and the transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF).
    Part 2 of this final rule modifies existing physical security event 
notifications, written follow-up reports, and recordkeeping 
regulations, and adds new requirements for certain facilities or 
activities (e.g., transportation). The existing regulations require 
that all physical security event notifications be reported in one hour. 
This reporting requirement may not reflect the event's actual security 
significance. In this final rule, the NRC has applied a graded approach 
to these new and revised physical security event notification 
requirements that reflects the security significance of the event, the 
urgency of the notification, and the underlying security risks to 
public health and safety or to the common defense and security that are 
posed by the affected facility or material being transported. The final 
rule groups physical security events requiring notification into 
several timeliness categories, with events having a greater security 
significance requiring quicker notifications.
    These requirements apply to the following licensees:

[[Page 15868]]

     production or utilization facilities licensed under 
Sec. Sec.  50.21 or 50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning 
power reactors and non-power reactors);
     facilities that possess Category I, II, or III quantities 
of SSNM;
     facilities that possess Category II or III quantities of 
SNM;
     hot cell facilities subject to 10 CFR 73.50;
     ISFSIs;
     monitored retrievable storage installations (MRSs); and
     geologic repository operations areas (GROAs).
    The physical security event notification requirements also apply to 
the transportation of Category I, II, or III quantities of SSNM, 
Category II or III quantities of SNM, SNF, and high-level radioactive 
waste (HLW). This final rule also separates the physical security event 
notification requirements, written follow-up reports, and recordable 
security events into separate regulations to improve regulatory clarity 
and ease of use, and to improve the quality of information provided to 
the NRC. The NRC is also incorporating clarifying and editorial changes 
to these regulations.
    The NRC has also revised existing notification requirements for 
licensees transporting Category II quantities of SNM (i.e., SNM 
enriched to greater than 10 percent U-235) based upon a higher assessed 
security risk from this material.
    Additionally, the NRC has exempted most licensees subject to Sec.  
73.67 from certain, but not all, of the physical security event 
notification requirements in Sec.  73.1200. For example, the actual or 
attempted introduction of contraband into a controlled access area has 
been excluded given the existing physical security requirements of 
Sec.  73.67. These exemptions apply to licensees: (1) possessing 
Category III quantities of SSNM (Agreement State and NRC licensees); or 
(2) possessing Category II or III quantities of SNM (e.g., non-power 
reactors or fuel cycle facilities).
    Finally, the NRC has determined that the imposition of certain 
recordkeeping requirements in 10 CFR 73.1210(c) and (d) on licensees 
subject to Sec.  73.67 that possess or ship Category III quantities of 
SSNM (NRC and Agreement State licensees), or Category II or III 
quantities of SNM (NRC licensees only) is not warranted, given the low 
security risk associated with this material. Therefore, the staff has 
revised the draft final rule to exempt these licensees from these 
specific recordkeeping requirements. However, licensees subject to 
Sec.  73.67 (e.g., non-power reactors) that ship spent nuclear fuel 
under Sec.  73.37, ``Requirements for physical protection of irradiated 
reactor fuel in transit,'' remain subject to the existing recordkeeping 
requirements but only during spent nuclear fuel shipping activities.
    Following the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued guidance 
requesting licensees to voluntarily notify the NRC of actual or 
imminent hostile acts. This final rule makes these voluntary 
notification requirements mandatory and adds new reporting requirements 
for those licensees possessing enhanced weapons. Licensees that obtain 
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority are 
required to notify the NRC when the licensee makes a separate 
notification to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) and the applicable local law enforcement agency (LLEA) 
regarding a stolen or lost enhanced weapon. These requirements apply to 
nuclear power reactors, ISFSIs, Category I SSNM facilities, or those 
licensees engaged in the transportation of Category I SSNM or SNF.
    Part 3 of this final rule establishes new requirements for 
licensees to report suspicious activities to the LLEA, the FBI, the 
NRC, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) if the suspicious 
activity involves an aircraft. Following the events of September 11, 
2001, the NRC issued security advisories and other guidance on 
suspicious activities and requested that such activity be voluntarily 
reported to the NRC. The new requirements make the reporting of 
suspicious activities to these various agencies mandatory for certain 
licensees.
    Licensees' timely submission of SARs to the NRC and to law 
enforcement is an important part of the U.S. government's efforts to 
disrupt or dissuade malevolent acts against the nation's critical 
infrastructure. Attack planning and preparation generally proceed 
through several predictable stages, including intelligence gathering 
and pre-attack surveillance. Reporting suspicious activities that could 
be indicative of preoperational surveillance or reconnaissance efforts, 
challenges to security systems and protocols, or elicitation of non-
public information related to security or emergency response programs, 
offer law enforcement and security personnel the greatest opportunity 
to disrupt or dissuade acts of terrorism before they occur. 
Additionally, licensees' timely submission of SARs to the NRC supports 
one of the agency's primary mission essential functions of threat 
assessment for licensed facilities, materials, and shipping activities.
    In this new regulation, the NRC is seeking to balance agency and 
national objectives of reporting suspicious activities, while not 
imposing unnecessary or undue costs on licensees. In this regard, it is 
not the NRC's intent to dispute a licensee's conclusions about whether 
an event is considered to be suspicious. Accordingly, the NRC intends 
to focus any inspection and enforcement efforts regarding this new 
regulation on programmatic aspects (e.g., adherence to established 
procedures, training, points of contact, and the reporting process). 
The NRC objective is to increase the flow of information to the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities and thus, potentially disrupt 
or dissuade potential terrorist attacks. These new suspicious activity 
reporting requirements apply to:
     production or utilization facilities licensed under Sec.  
50.21 or Sec.  50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning 
power reactors and non-power reactors);
     fuel cycle facilities that possess a Category I quantity 
of SSNM;
     enrichment facilities that possess Category II or III 
quantities of SNM and use Restricted Data (RD) materials, technology, 
and information in the enrichment process;
     hot cell facilities subject to 10 CFR 73.50;
     ISFSIs;
     MRSs; and
     GROAs.
    These new suspicious activity reporting requirements also apply to 
licensees shipping SNF and Category I quantities of SSNM. This final 
rule does not apply these reporting requirements to licensees engaged 
in the fabrication of new fuel assemblies containing Category II or III 
quantities of SNM; NRC and Agreement State licensees possessing 
Category III quantities of SSNM; licensees possessing SSNM or SNM in a 
form that has been encapsulated into sealed sources that are used for 
research, development, and testing purposes; and licensees engaging in 
the transportation of Category II and III quantities of SSNM or SNM. 
The NRC has taken this approach because of the decreased security risk 
given the lower enrichment level, lower quantity possessed, or physical 
form of these materials. However, the NRC has applied these suspicious 
activity reporting requirements to Category II and III SNM enrichment 
facilities given the national security non-proliferation concerns 
associated with RD materials, technology, and information.
    The proposed rule contained the term ``certificate holder.'' As 
used in the

[[Page 15869]]

proposed rule, the term referred only to entities holding a 10 CFR part 
76 certificate of compliance (CoC), not to entities holding a 10 CFR 
part 72 CoC. Entities possessing a part 72 CoC are not authorized to 
possess radioactive material. Consequently, these entities have no need 
for Section 161A authority. Subsequent to the publication of the 2015 
supplemental proposed rule, the NRC terminated the remaining CoC for 
gaseous diffusion facilities certified to enrich SNM under 10 CFR part 
76. The NRC does not expect to issue any new CoCs under 10 CFR part 76. 
Therefore, consistent with plain language objectives and increased 
regulatory clarity, this final rule eliminates the terms ``certificate 
holder'' and ``certificate of compliance'' from the final rule text.
    The proposed rule also contained physical security event 
notification and recordkeeping requirements regarding the loss or theft 
of Safeguards Information. The NRC has reevaluated the need to address 
the loss or theft of Safeguards Information in the final rule. Based on 
this reevaluation, these provisions have been removed as the NRC has 
determined that it is preferable to retain the existing notification 
procedures in licensee security plans.

Withdrawal of Orders

    On June 14, 2013, the Commission issued Order EA-13-092, ``Order 
Designating an Interim Class of NRC-Licensed Facilities that are 
Eligible to Apply to the Commission for Authorization to Use the 
Authority Granted Under the Provisions of Section 161a of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as Amended.'' Between September 2015 and January 
2016 the Commission issued seven confirmatory orders to eight licensees 
authorizing them to use stand-alone preemption authority at seven 
sites.
    In SRM-SECY-12-0125, the Commission directed the NRC staff to 
include in the final rule a plan ``to sunset [withdraw] the interim 
designation order and the confirmatory orders'' that would later be 
issued by the Commission. This final rule designates the classes of 
facilities eligible to apply to use the Commission's Section 161A 
authority. Additionally, this final rule specifies that those licensees 
subject to confirmatory orders granting them stand-alone preemption 
authority must update their applicable procedures, instructions, and 
training, and come into compliance with the requirements of the rule as 
of the compliance date specified in the final rule. In accordance with 
the Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-12-0125, this final rule 
includes language in 10 CFR 73.15, ``Authorization for use of enhanced 
weapons and preemption of firearms laws,'' and 10 CFR 73.17, ``Firearms 
background checks for armed security personnel,'' to withdraw the 
designation order and confirmatory orders 300 days from the date of 
publication of the final rule.

III. Opportunity for Public Comment

    As stated in the background section, the NRC published the proposed 
rule and the two supplemental proposed rules for public comment in the 
Federal Register. Additionally, the NRC staff hosted three public 
meetings to discuss issues associated with the proposed rule, 
supplemental proposed rules, and the final rule. A public meeting was 
held at NRC Headquarters on June 1, 2011, to discuss the proposed 
implementation plan for the 2011 proposed rule published on February 3, 
2011 (76 FR 6200). A summary of the June 2011 public meeting is 
available in ADAMS under Package Accession No. ML111720007. The NRC did 
not hold a public meeting to discuss the 2013 supplemental proposed 
rule because of the limited scope of the proposed change. Another 
public meeting was held at NRC Headquarters on November 19, 2015, to 
discuss the 2015 supplemental proposed rule that was published for 
public comment on September 22, 2015 (80 FR 57106), and to discuss the 
implementation period for the final rule. A summary of the November 
2015 public meeting is available in ADAMS under Accession No. 
ML15348A082. The feedback from the two public meetings informed the NRC 
staff's recommended schedule for both the implementation of the 
background check requirements and for the implementation of the 
physical security event notification and suspicious activity reporting 
requirements.
    A third public meeting was held at NRC Headquarters on May 30, 
2019, to inform stakeholders of the final changes the staff was 
planning to make in this final rule. The NRC did not accept public 
comments at this meeting. A summary of the May 2019 public meeting is 
available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML19176A143.

IV. Public Comment Analysis

    The NRC received a total of 18 comment submissions on this 
rulemaking effort. Private citizens provided 8 comment submissions, 5 
licensees provided comment submissions, 1 Federal agency provided a 
comment submission, 2 nuclear industry organizations provided 3 comment 
submissions, and 1 U.S. Congressman provided a comment submission. Most 
comment submissions were generally supportive of the regulatory action. 
The public comment submittals are available on the Federal e-Rulemaking 
website at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID Nos. NRC-2011-
0014, NRC-2011-0015, NRC-2011-0017, and NRC-2011-0018.
    The NRC staff prepared a summary and analysis of public comments 
received on the 2011 proposed rule and the 2013 and 2015 supplemental 
proposed rules, respectively. This summary and analysis is available in 
ADAMS under Accession No. ML16264A004. Of the 18 comment submissions 
received, 6 included comments on the associated draft regulatory guides 
and draft weapons safety assessment document. The NRC prepared a 
separate summary and analysis of the public comments received on these 
guides and document, which is available in ADAMS under Accession No. 
ML17123A319.
    Responses to the public comments, including a description of how 
the final rule text or guidance changed as a result of the public 
comments, can be found in the two public comment analysis documents 
identified above. For more information about the associated supporting 
and guidance documents see the ``Availability of Guidance'' section of 
this final rule.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

    The following paragraphs describe the specific changes that are 
reflected in this final rule.

Sec.  20.2201 Reports of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material

    Paragraph 20.2201(c) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  73.1205. 
This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  21.2 Scope

    Paragraph 21.2(c) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec. Sec.  
73.1200 and 73.1205. This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  26.417 Recordkeeping and Reporting

    Paragraph (b)(1) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  73.1200. 
This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  26.719 Reporting Requirements

    Paragraph (a) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant

[[Page 15870]]

regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  73.1200. This final 
rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  50.55 Conditions of Construction Permits, Early Site Permits, 
Combined Licenses, and Manufacturing Licenses

    Paragraph 50.55(e)(8) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. 
The relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  
73.1205. This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear 
Power Reactors

    Paragraph 50.72(a), footnote 1, contains a cross reference to Sec.  
73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  70.20a General License To Possess Special Nuclear Material for 
Transport

    Paragraph 70.20a(e)(2) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. 
The relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  70.20b General License for Carriers of Transient Shipments of 
Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material, Special 
Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance, Special Nuclear 
Material of Low Strategic Significance, and Irradiated Reactor Fuel

    Paragraphs 70.20b(c), (d), and (e) contain a cross reference to 
Sec.  73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in 
Sec.  73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  72.74 Reports of Accidental Criticality or Loss of Special 
Nuclear Material

    Paragraph (c) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  73.1200. 
This final rule updates the cross reference.

Part 73--Physical Protection of Plants and Materials

    This final rule restructures 10 CFR part 73 to add Subparts A 
through T. The new structure uses subparts to provide a logical 
structure and increase clarity for part 73. These new subparts 
incorporate existing regulations, add new regulations, and provide for 
future regulations, within this logical structure. Subparts J through S 
are reserved for future rulemakings. The subpart structure is as 
follows:
     Subpart A--General Provisions: contains existing 
Sec. Sec.  73.1 through 73.8. Detailed descriptions of the revisions to 
Sec. Sec.  73.2 and 73.8 are provided later in this section. No 
amendments are made to the requirements for the remaining sections.
     Subpart B--Enhanced Weapons, Preemption, and Firearms 
Background Checks: contains new sections Sec. Sec.  73.15 and 73.17. 
These sections contain the requirements associated with implementation 
of stand-alone preemption authority, combined preemption authority and 
enhanced weapons authority, and firearms background checks pursuant to 
Section 161A of the AEA. Detailed descriptions of those sections are 
provided later in this section.
     Subpart C--General Performance Objective of Strategic 
Special Nuclear Material: contains the existing Sec.  73.20. No 
amendments are made to this section.
     Subpart D--Protection of Safeguards Information: contains 
the existing Sec. Sec.  73.21 through 73.23. Detailed descriptions of 
the revisions to Sec. Sec.  73.22 and 73.23 are provided later in this 
section. No amendments are made to the requirements for the remaining 
sections.
     Subpart E--Physical Protection Requirements of Special 
Nuclear Material and Spent Nuclear Fuel in Transit: contains the 
existing Sec. Sec.  73.24 through 73.38. Detailed descriptions of the 
revisions to Sec. Sec.  73.27 and 73.37 are provided later in this 
section. No amendments are made to the requirements for the remaining 
sections.
     Subpart F--Physical Protection Requirements at Fixed 
Sites: contains the existing Sec. Sec.  73.40 through 73.55. Detailed 
descriptions of the revisions to Sec. Sec.  73.46, 73.51, and 73.55 are 
provided later in this section. No amendments are made to the 
requirements for the remaining sections.
     Subpart G--Background Check and Access Authorization 
Requirements: contains the existing Sec. Sec.  73.56 through 73.67. 
Detailed descriptions of revisions to Sec.  73.67 are provided later in 
this section. No amendments are made to the requirements for the 
remaining sections.
     Subpart H--Records and Postings: contains the existing 
Sec. Sec.  73.70 through 73.75. Section 73.71 has been removed and 
reserved. No amendments are made to the requirements for the remaining 
sections.
     Subpart I--Enforcement: contains the existing Sec. Sec.  
73.76 through 73.81 with no amendments to the requirements in those 
sections.
     Subparts J through S--Reserved
     Subpart T--Security Notifications, Reports, and 
Recordkeeping: contains new Sec. Sec.  73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 
73.1215. These requirements were previously located in Sec.  73.71 and 
appendix G to 10 CFR part 73. This final rule also removes and reserves 
both Sec.  73.71 and appendix G to 10 CFR part 73. Detailed 
descriptions of those sections are provided later in this section.

Sec.  73.2 Definitions

    This final rule adds new terms to the list of defined terms in 
Sec.  73.2 and revises one existing term. Added terms include new 
definitions of Adverse firearms background check, Combined preemption 
authority and enhanced weapons authority, Covered weapon, Enhanced 
weapon, Firearms background check, NICS, NICS response, NICS 
transaction number, Satisfactory firearms background check, and Stand-
alone preemption authority. These terms are used in the Firearms 
Guidelines and in the new enhanced weapons regulations to describe the 
types of weapons, background check characteristics, and authority 
relevant to Section 161A of the AEA.
    Other new terms being added to clarify the physical event 
notification requirements, include: Contraband, Greater than class C 
waste, High-level radioactive waste, Independent spent fuel storage 
installation, Restricted Data, Special nuclear material, Spent nuclear 
fuel or spent fuel, and Time of discovery. This final rule also revises 
the existing term Movement control center.
    Additionally, this final rule adds new paragraphs (b) and (c) to 
Sec.  73.2, which provide cross references to appropriate ATF and FBI 
regulations for terms that are relevant to Section 161A activities 
(e.g., Handgun, Machine gun, or Short-barreled shotgun), which fall 
under the original purview of these agencies.

Sec.  73.8 Information Collection Requirements: OMB Approval

    This final rule revises paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec.  73.8 to 
update the list of paragraphs in 10 CFR part 73 that contain 
information collection requirements. Paragraph (b) removes Sec.  73.71 
and appendix G (which are removed from 10 CFR part 73) and adds new 
Sec. Sec.  73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215 (which contain 
notification, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements in 10 CFR part 
73).
    Paragraph (c) references three forms and their associated OMB 
control numbers. These control numbers are separate from the control 
number associated with 10 CFR part 73 itself. Two existing forms (NRC 
Form 366 and FBI Form FD-258) are used by NRC licensees and are added 
to this paragraph as a corrective change under

[[Page 15871]]

OMB control numbers 3150-0104 (NRC) and 1110-0046 (FBI), respectively. 
New NRC Form 754 is added to this paragraph under OMB control number 
3150-0204. The NRC Form 754 is used by licensees to submit security 
personnel for a firearms background check under the provisions of Sec.  
73.17. The NRC has also made conforming changes to NRC Form 366 to 
reflect the submission of written follow-up security event reports 
(under Sec.  73.1205) following notifications made by licensees, 
pursuant to Sec.  73.1200. Conforming changes to NRC Form 366 were 
necessary to reflect the restructuring of the physical security event 
notifications requirements in 10 CFR part 73.

Sec.  73.15 Authorization for Use of Enhanced Weapons and Preemption of 
Firearms Laws

    New Sec.  73.15 contains requirements for a licensee to apply for: 
(1) stand-alone preemption authority or (2) combined preemption 
authority and enhanced weapons authority, under Section 161A of the 
AEA.
    Paragraph (a) describes the purpose of the section and paragraph 
(b) contains general requirements applicable to both types of 
authority.
    Paragraph (c) lists the designated classes for either stand-alone 
preemption authority or combined preemption authority and enhanced 
weapons authority.
    Paragraph (d) sets forth the requirements and process for licensees 
who are included within the designated classes of facilities, 
radioactive material, and other property specified in Sec.  73.15(c)(1) 
and desire to voluntarily apply for stand-alone preemption authority 
under Section 161A of the AEA.
    Paragraph (e) sets forth the requirements and process for eligible 
licensees (as specified in Sec.  73.15(c)(2)) who choose to voluntarily 
apply for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority 
under Section 161A of the AEA. Paragraph (e) requires that the licensee 
in its application provide sufficient information to justify its 
request for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons 
authority and how that authority will be implemented. Applicants for 
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority that 
already have stand-alone preemption authority under Sec.  73.15(d) are 
not required to reapply for stand-alone preemption authority in their 
Sec.  73.15(e) application.
    Paragraph (f) requires the licensee to submit additional 
information to the NRC in support of a request for combined preemption 
authority and enhanced weapons authority addressing the specific 
enhanced weapons that the licensee requests permission to use and the 
required training for security personnel whose official duties require 
access to the enhanced weapons.
    Paragraph (g) requires licensees to provide a copy of the NRC's 
letter approving the licensee's request for combined preemption 
authority and enhanced weapons authority to the entity that will be 
transferring the enhanced weapons to the licensee. The ATF must 
approve, in advance, all transfers of enhanced weapons to an NRC 
licensee. This final rule revises Sec.  73.15(g)(1) and adds new 
subparagraphs (g)(2) and (g)(3) to cross-reference NRC-licensee 
responsibilities to comply with relevant ATF regulations in 27 CFR part 
479.
    Paragraph (h) requires licensees to ensure that security personnel 
complete training and qualification on any enhanced weapons prior to 
their use. Recurring training and requalification on any enhanced 
weapons are also required in accordance with the licensee's approved 
training and qualification plan.
    Paragraph (i) is reserved.
    Paragraph (j) lists those sections of part 73 that contain 
requirements applicable to the use of enhanced weapons by licensee 
security personnel.
    Paragraph (k) requires NRC licensees to notify the NRC of any 
adverse ATF inspection or enforcement findings received by the licensee 
regarding the receipt, possession, or transfer of enhanced weapons.
    Paragraph (l) is reserved.
    Paragraph (m) defines what constitutes a transfer of enhanced 
weapons. The paragraph describes requirements for the transfer of 
enhanced weapons including, but not limited to, prior approval from the 
ATF as well as records and reporting requirements. The issuance of an 
enhanced weapon by a licensee to a security individual with the 
subsequent return of the weapon to the licensee upon the individual's 
completion of official duties would not constitute a transfer under 
ATF's regulations.
    Paragraph (n) describes requirements to transport enhanced weapons 
for activities that are not considered a transfer of the enhanced 
weapons. Additionally, this final rule adds new subparagraph (6) to 
Sec.  73.15(n) to clarify that NRC licensees planning interstate 
transport of enhanced weapons must obtain prior ATF approval, as 
required by 27 CFR 478.28.
    Paragraph (o) describes requirements for conducting periodic 
inventories of enhanced weapons to verify that these weapons are not 
stolen or lost. These inventories include a monthly inventory that 
involves counting the number of enhanced weapons that are present at 
the licensee's facility and an annual inventory that verifies the 
serial number of each weapon that is present at the licensee's 
facility. The paragraph requires that records be maintained on 
inventory results. The paragraph also provides minimum requirements for 
tamper-indicating devices used for securing enhanced weapons. Finally, 
the paragraph requires that inventory discrepancies be resolved within 
24 hours of identification. Otherwise, the discrepancy should be 
treated as if an enhanced weapon had been stolen or lost.
    This final rule adds new subparagraph (8) to Sec.  73.15(o) to 
clarify that NRC licensees conducting periodic inventories while 
enhanced weapons are offsite for an authorized purpose must document 
the absence of such weapons in the periodic inventory.
    Paragraph (p) describes requirements for notification of the NRC 
and local law enforcement officials of lost or stolen enhanced weapons.
    Paragraph (q) describes the records requirements for licensees 
relating to the receipt, transfer, and transportation of enhanced 
weapons. Licensees are permitted to integrate any records required 
under this paragraph with records required by ATF relating to the 
possession of enhanced weapons. This final rule also includes 
conforming changes to Sec.  73.15(q)(1) to clarify the records 
requirements for the inventories in paragraph (o).
    Paragraph (r) describes requirements regarding the termination, 
modification, suspension, and revocation of a licensee's Section 161A 
authority. Licensees seeking termination or modification of their 
authority to possess enhanced weapons, or different types, calibers, 
gauges, or quantities of enhanced weapons, are required to apply to the 
NRC in accordance with Sec.  73.4 and the license amendment provisions 
of Sec. Sec.  50.90, 70.34, or 72.56 of this chapter. Licensees are 
required to transfer any enhanced weapons that they will no longer be 
authorized to possess to an appropriate party in accordance with ATF's 
requirements. Alternatively, the weapons can be surrendered to the ATF 
for destruction.
    This final rule revises paragraphs (r)(1) and (2) to include a 
cross reference to the license amendment application regulations in 
Sec.  72.56. This conforming change is made as a result of including

[[Page 15872]]

all ISFSIs within the scope of the rule. Additionally, consistent with 
the global removal of the term ``certificate holders'' from the final 
rule text, this final rule also removes the cross reference to Sec.  
76.45 (for amendments to a 10 CFR part 76 CoC) from paragraphs (r)(1) 
and (r)(2).
    Paragraph (s) adds provisions to provide for licensees' transitions 
from stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority 
and enhanced weapons authority previously approved by the NRC via 
orders to the requirements of this final rule. The NRC expects that a 
licensee would complete its transition to the requirements of this 
final rule without the need for any additional applications or 
notifications to the NRC. Paragraph (s)(4) of Sec.  73.15 provides that 
as of January 8, 2024, any orders implementing the Commission's Section 
161A authority are withdrawn.

Sec.  73.17 Firearms Background Checks for Armed Security Personnel

    New Sec.  73.17 contains requirements for a licensee to conduct 
firearms background checks mandated under Section 161A of the AEA. Only 
licensees that voluntarily apply for Section 161A authority under Sec.  
73.15 are required to conduct firearms background checks under Sec.  
73.17.
    Paragraph (a) states that the firearms background checks are 
intended to verify that the licensee's armed security personnel are not 
prohibited from receiving, possessing, transporting, importing, or 
using covered weapons under Federal, State, or local law or 
regulations.
    Paragraph (b) provides general requirements regarding the 
completion of firearm background checks, including the establishment 
and implementation of a Firearms Background Check Plan. The Firearms 
Background Check Plan is a component of the licensee's 10 CFR part 73, 
appendix B, required Training and Qualification plan for security 
personnel whose official duties require access to covered weapons.
    Paragraph (b)(2) describes the groups of individuals included 
within the phrase security personnel whose official duties require 
access to covered weapons.
    Paragraph (b)(3) specifies the elements of the Firearms Background 
Check Plan.
    Paragraphs (b)(4) through (b)(8) address the requirements for 
conducting firearms background checks and specify, among other things, 
that the licensee can only assign security personnel who have completed 
a satisfactory firearms background check to duties requiring access to 
covered weapons. This section also includes a requirement to remove 
individuals from duties requiring access to covered weapons, without 
delay, if they receive a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response.
    Paragraph (b)(9) requires licensees to complete a new satisfactory 
firearms background check for security personnel who experience a 
break-in-service.
    Paragraph (b)(10) specifies that changes in license ownership or 
changes in the licensee's security guard contractor do not constitute a 
break-in-service that would require a new firearms background check.
    Paragraph (b)(11) prohibits licensees from using a satisfactory 
firearms background check in lieu of completing other required criminal 
history records checks or background investigations specified in the 
NRC's access authorization or personnel security clearance programs 
under other provisions of 10 CFR chapter I.
    Paragraph (b)(12) specifies that a new firearms background check is 
not required for security personnel who have completed a satisfactory 
firearms background check, pursuant to a Commission designation order 
issued before the effective date of this final rule. However, these 
security personnel remain subject to the periodic firearms background 
checks and the break-in-service firearms background check requirements 
of Sec.  73.17.
    Paragraph (b)(13) requires a licensee to stop conducting firearms 
background checks if it withdraws its application for Section 161A 
authority.
    Paragraph (b)(14) requires a licensee to discontinue conducting 
firearms background checks if the NRC rescinds or revokes the 
licensee's Section 161A authority, in accordance with Sec.  73.15.
    Paragraph (c) is reserved.
    Paragraph (d) describes the components of a firearms background 
check. A firearms background check consists of two parts: (1) a check 
of an individual's fingerprints against the FBI's fingerprint system, 
and (2) a check of the individual's identity against the FBI's NICS 
databases.
    Paragraph (e) describes the information that a licensee must submit 
to the NRC for each individual subject to a firearms background check. 
This paragraph also specifies how long the licensee must retain this 
information as a record.
    Paragraph (f) describes the requirements for periodic firearms 
background checks, which are to be completed at least once every 5 
calendar years. The paragraph also specifies an allowance period for 
completion of a satisfactory periodic firearms background check of 
midnight of the end of the month that is 5 years from the date of the 
most recent firearms background check. Security personnel may remain 
assigned to duties requiring access to covered weapons, while pending 
completion of a periodic firearms background check (started before the 
end of the allowance period). However, if a satisfactory firearms 
background check is not completed by the end of the allowance period, 
then the security personnel must be removed from duties requiring 
access to covered weapons. Paragraph (f) also specifies that an 
individual who receives a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response 
during a periodic firearms background check must be removed, without 
delay, from duties requiring access to covered weapons.
    Paragraph (g) requires affected licensees to notify the NRC that an 
individual with access to covered weapons has been removed from all 
duties requiring such access because of the discovery of a 
disqualifying status condition or disqualifying event under applicable 
Federal, State, or local law. The licensee is required to maintain 
records of such removals under the Firearms Background Check Plan, as 
required under revised paragraph (b)(3)(vi).
    Paragraph (h) requires affected security personnel to make timely 
disclosure within 72 hours of the occurrence of a disqualifying event 
or status condition specified in 27 CFR 478.32 that would prevent them 
from receiving or possessing firearms.
    Paragraph (i) is reserved.
    Paragraph (j) requires training for security personnel who are 
subject to firearms background checks under the licensee's Firearms 
Background Check Plan on the following: (1) Federal and State 
disqualifying status conditions or disqualifying events specified in 27 
CFR 478.32, (2) ATF's implementing regulations defining such status 
conditions or disqualifying events, (3) the ongoing obligation of 
security personnel who are subject to a firearms background check to 
notify their licensee's security management of the occurrence of such a 
disqualifying status condition or disqualifying event, and (4) the 
process for appealing adverse firearms background check results. 
Finally, periodic refresher training on these modules is required 
annually.
    Paragraph (k) describes the requirements for processing fingerprint 
checks as part of the firearms background checks. This includes the 
submission of fingerprint cards or electronic fingerprint records to 
the NRC.

[[Page 15873]]

    Paragraph (l) is reserved.
    Paragraph (m) describes the requirements for fees associated with 
processing firearms background checks. The amount of the fee will be 
specified on the NRC's public website.
    Paragraph (n) describes NRC responsibilities regarding the 
processing of firearms background checks.
    Paragraph (o) is reserved.
    Paragraph (p) states that licensees may not assign security 
personnel who have received a ``denied'' or a ``delayed'' NICS response 
to any official duties requiring access to covered weapons during the 
pendency of an appeal of the firearms background check.
    Paragraph (q) requires licensees to establish and maintain a system 
of files and procedures to protect the firearms background check, NRC 
Form 754 records, and personal information from unauthorized 
disclosure.
    Paragraph (r) provides a cross reference to Sec.  73.15(s) for the 
withdrawal of the orders issued under Section 161A of the AEA.

Sec.  73.22 Protection of Safeguards Information: Specific Requirements

    Paragraph (f)(3) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  73.1200. 
This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  73.23 Protection of Safeguards Information-Modified Handling: 
Specific Requirements

    Paragraph (f)(3) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  73.1200. 
This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  73.27 Notification Requirements

    Paragraph (c) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec. Sec.  
73.1200 and 73.1205. This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  73.37 Requirements for Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor 
Fuel in Transit

    Paragraphs (b)(3)(iii) and (b)(3)(v)(C) contain a cross reference 
to Sec.  73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found 
in Sec.  73.1200. This final rule updates the cross references.
    New paragraph (b)(3)(viii) requires a licensee to ensure that the 
firearms background check requirements of Sec.  73.17 are met for all 
armed escorts whose official duties require access to covered weapons 
or who inventory enhanced weapons.

Sec.  73.46 Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, 
Components, and Procedures

    This final rule updates paragraph (b) to cross reference to the 
firearms background check requirements of Sec.  73.17 and requires that 
security personnel subject to Sec.  73.46 and who are using covered 
weapons are also subject to the firearms background check requirements 
in Sec.  73.17.

Sec.  73.51 Requirements for the Physical Protection of Stored Spent 
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste

    New paragraph (b)(4)(i) is added to Sec.  73.51 to cross reference 
to the firearms background check requirements of Sec.  73.17.
    Paragraph (d)(13) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  73.1210. 
This final rule updates the cross reference.
    Paragraph (e) is amended to add a paragraph heading.
    Paragraph (f) is added as a conforming change to Sec.  73.15(j) to 
reflect the potential for a specific license ISFSI to possess covered 
weapons. This modified provision follows from the change described in 
Sec.  73.15(c) in which all ISFSI licensees are included in the scope 
of this final rule, meaning all ISFSI licensees are eligible to apply 
for Section 161A authority. Paragraph (f) also requires ISFSI licensees 
employing covered weapons to train their security personnel on the use 
of sufficient force, including deadly force.

Sec.  73.55 Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities 
in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage

    This final rule updates Sec.  73.55(b)(12) to cross reference to 
the firearms background check requirements of Sec.  73.17. 
Additionally, Sec.  73.55(p)(3) is updated to reflect the reporting 
requirements for suspension of security measures in accordance with 
Sec. Sec.  73.1200 and 73.1205 instead of Sec.  73.71.

Sec.  73.67 Licensee Fixed Site and In-Transit Requirements for the 
Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate and Low 
Strategic Significance

    This final rule updates Sec.  73.67(e)(3)(vii) and (g)(3)(iii) to 
update the cross reference to the new Sec. Sec.  73.1200 and 73.1205.

Sec.  73.71 Reporting of Safeguard Events

    This final rule removes and reserves Sec.  73.71. The regulations 
on physical security event notifications, written follow-up reports, 
and lesser-significance recordable physical security events that were 
previously located in Sec.  73.71 and appendix G to 10 CFR part 73 are 
relocated to new Sec. Sec.  73.1200, 73.1205, and 73.1210, 
respectively.

Sec.  73.1200 Notification of Physical Security Events

    This final rule adds new Sec.  73.1200 on physical security event 
notifications. This section describes categories of physical security 
events and the timeframes by which the licensee must notify the NRC of 
these events.
    Paragraph (a) adds a 15-minute notification requirement for a 
licensee's initiation of a security response based on an imminent or 
actual hostile action against its facility or for a licensee being 
notified by LLEA or government officials of potential hostile action or 
sabotage anticipated within the next 12 hours. These notification 
requirements apply only to nuclear power reactors, fuel cycle 
facilities authorized to possess and use Category I quantities of SSNM, 
and ISFSIs. In addition, these requirements will apply to future 
licensees such as MRSs, GROAs, and production facilities.
    Paragraph (b) adds a 15-minute notification requirement for a 
licensee's initiation of a security response based on an imminent or 
actual hostile actions against shipments or for a licensee being 
notified by LLEA or government officials of potential sabotage 
anticipated within the next 12 hours. These notification requirements 
apply only to shipments of Category I SSNM, SNF, and HLW.
    Paragraph (c) clarifies the 1-hour notifications for significant 
security events against facilities. These notifications apply to:
     production or utilization facilities licensed under Sec.  
50.21 or Sec.  50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning 
power reactors and non-power reactors);
     facilities that possess Category I, II, or III quantities 
of SSNM;
     facilities that possess Category II or III quantities of 
SNM;
     hot cell facilities subject to 10 CFR 73.50;
     ISFSIs;
     MRSs; and
     GROAs.
    Significant security events requiring notification include actual, 
attempted, or a threat to cause: theft or diversion of Category I, II, 
or III quantities of SSNM or Category II or III quantities of SNM; 
significant physical damage to a facility; unauthorized operation, 
manipulation, or tampering that results in interruption of normal 
operation of a

[[Page 15874]]

reactor or an accidental criticality at a Category I SSNM facility; for 
facilities with a vehicle barrier, introduction of a quantity of 
explosives that exceeds the facility's adversary characteristics beyond 
a protected area's vehicle barrier system; and notification from LLEA 
or other government agency of potential hostile action or sabotage 
against a nuclear power reactor, SNF storage or disposal facility, or a 
Category I SSNM facility that is anticipated to occur in more than 12 
hours.
    Paragraph (d) adds 1-hour notifications for significant security 
events against shipments. These notifications apply to shipments of 
Category I, II, or III quantities of SSNM; SNF; HLW; and Category II or 
III quantities of SNM. The types of significant security events 
requiring notification include actual, attempted, or threat to cause: 
theft or diversion of a shipment; significant physical damage to a 
conveyance (vehicle) transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, 
Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW, or to the material itself; 
discovery of the loss of, and recovery or accounting for, a lost 
shipment of Category I SSNM; and notification from LLEA or other 
government agency of potential hostile action or sabotage against a 
shipment of Category I SSNM, SNF, or HLW that is anticipated within 
greater than the next 12 hours.
    Paragraph (e) adds 4-hour notifications for security events against 
facilities. These notifications apply to the same classes of facilities 
as specified under paragraph (c). Examples of events that require 
notification include but are not limited to: actual or attempted entry 
of an unauthorized individual into a protected area (PA), vital area 
(VA), material access area (MAA), or controlled access area (CAA); 
actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA; 
and an authorized weapon is lost or uncontrolled inside a PA, VA, or 
MAA.
    Paragraph (f) adds 4-hour notifications for security events against 
shipments. These notifications apply to many of the classes of 
shipments specified under paragraph (d). Examples of events that 
require notification include but are not limited to: actual or 
attempted entry of unauthorized persons into a transport vehicle or the 
material being transported, which involves shipment of a Category I or 
II quantity of SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW; and 
actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a transport vehicle 
or the material being transported, which involves shipment of a 
Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, 
or HLW.
    Paragraph (g) adds 8-hour notifications for security program 
failure events at facilities. These notifications apply to the same 
classes of facilities as specified under paragraph (c). A security 
program failure is a programmatic failure of a security system, 
process, or procedure. Examples of security program failures include 
but are not limited to: the failure, degradation, or vulnerability of a 
security system, process, or procedure (for which compensatory measures 
have not been implemented) that could have allowed an unauthorized 
individual into a PA, VA, MAA, or CAA, or could have allowed contraband 
into a PA, VA, or MAA or that could have allowed a quantity of 
explosives exceeding the facility's adversary characteristics beyond a 
vehicle barrier; and the unauthorized operation, manipulation, or 
tampering with a nuclear reactor's controls or structures, systems, or 
components (SSCs) that does not interrupt the normal operation of a 
reactor.
    Paragraph (h) adds 8-hour notifications for security program 
failure events for those classes of shipments as specified under 
paragraph (d). Examples of security program failures include but are 
not limited to: failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability (for 
which compensatory measures have not been implemented) that could have 
allowed an unauthorized individual or contraband into a transport 
vehicle or the material being transported.
    Paragraphs (i), (j), (k), and (l) are reserved.
    Paragraph (m) adds a requirement for licensees to notify the ATF 
immediately upon the discovery of any stolen or lost enhanced weapons. 
After which, licensees must notify the NRC as soon as possible, but not 
later than 1 hour.
    Paragraph (n) adds a requirement for a 24-hour notification to the 
NRC when a licensee receives an adverse inspection finding, enforcement 
finding, or other adverse notice from the ATF regarding any ATF-issued 
federal firearms license or the licensee's possession, receipt, 
transfer, transportation, or storage of enhanced weapons.
    Paragraph (o) adds requirements for making telephonic notifications 
to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center (i.e., the notification 
process) under Sec.  73.1200. Provisions address the communication of 
security events where the information contains safeguards or classified 
information.
    Paragraph (p) adds requirements for licensees providing significant 
supplementary information to a previously submitted notification to the 
NRC in compliance with paragraph (o).
    Paragraph (q) adds provisions regarding retraction of previous 
security event reports. Based upon the NRC's response to public 
comments, the retraction provisions have been expanded from only 
``invalid'' security events to also include ``not reportable'' security 
events.
    Paragraphs (r) and (s) add provisions clarifying the importance of 
emergency notifications and eliminating unnecessary duplication.
    Paragraph (t) adds provisions regarding the deliberate disclosure, 
theft, loss, compromise, or possible compromise of classified 
documents, information, or material. For such events, the licensee's 
notification should be made in accordance with the requirements of 
Sec.  95.57.

Sec.  73.1205 Written Follow-Up Reports of Physical Security Events

    This final rule adds new Sec.  73.1205 addressing the submission of 
written follow-up reports following a licensee's telephonic 
notification of a physical security event under Sec.  73.1200. This 
section is applicable to licensees who are also subject to the various 
provisions of Sec.  73.1200.
    Paragraph (a) adds the general requirement to submit written 
follow-up reports to the NRC within 60 days of the licensee's 
notification made under Sec.  73.1200. Paragraph (a) also adds several 
exemptions to the requirement to submit written follow-up reports for 
certain security events.
    Paragraph (b) adds criteria for written follow-up report 
development and submission, including the development of significant 
supplemental information.
    Paragraph (c) adds requirements on the contents of a written 
follow-up report.
    Paragraph (d) adds requirements regarding the transmission of a 
written follow-up report to the NRC.
    Paragraph (e) adds requirements for licensees to retain records of 
written follow-up reports submitted to the NRC for 3 years from the 
date of the report.

Sec.  73.1210 Recordkeeping of Physical Security Events

    This final rule adds new Sec.  73.1210 addressing the recordkeeping 
of less significant physical security events and conditions adverse to 
security. It consolidates and clarifies the safeguards event log 
requirements into this new section. This section is applicable to 
licensees who are also subject to the various provisions of Sec.  
73.1200.

[[Page 15875]]

    Paragraph (a) specifies the categories of events and conditions 
that must be recorded and adds the objective and purpose for recording 
such events. The recording of appropriate events is intended to 
facilitate the licensee's monitoring of the effectiveness of its 
physical security program as part of the licensee's overall quality 
assurance program.
    Paragraph (b) adds the general requirement to record the events or 
conditions specified in Sec.  73.1210(c) through (f) within 24 hours of 
the time of discovery. Paragraph (b)(2) provides record retention 
requirements. Paragraph (b)(3) adds flexibility by allowing licensees 
to record these events or conditions in either a standalone safeguards 
event log or in the licensee's corrective action program. Licensees 
must implement information security requirements of 10 CFR parts 73 or 
95, as applicable, on the protection of this information. Paragraph 
(b)(4) describes the content of the information in these records. 
Paragraph (b)(5) specifies that an event or condition, for which a 
notification was made under Sec.  73.1200, is not also required to be 
recorded under Sec.  73.1210. Paragraph (b)(6) specifies that an event 
or condition, for which a SAR was made under Sec.  73.1215, is not also 
required to be recorded under Sec.  73.1210.
    Paragraph (c) specifies compensated events which must be recorded 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(1). Compensated events include any failure, 
degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a security or safeguards 
system for which compensatory measures were established within the 
required timeframe and that could have resulted in a security event 
(e.g., entry of unauthorized personnel into a PA, VA, MAA, CAA, 
transport vehicle, or transported material; entry of contraband into a 
PA, VA, or MAA).
    Paragraph (d) specifies ammunition events which must be recorded 
pursuant to paragraph (b)(1). Ammunition events involve lost or 
uncontrolled small quantities of ammunition.
    Paragraph (e) is reserved.
    Paragraph (f) requires that events or conditions involving other 
decreases in the effectiveness of the physical security program be 
recorded in accordance with paragraph (b)(1).
    Paragraph (g) requires that events or conditions involving 
infractions, losses, compromises, or possible compromise of classified 
information or classified documents be recorded under the requirements 
found in Sec.  95.57.
    Paragraph (h) adds exemptions to the recording of physical security 
events for licensees who are subject to Sec.  73.67 and who possess or 
transport a Category III quantity of SSNM or a Category II or III 
quantity of SNM.

Sec.  73.1215 Suspicious Activity Reports

    This final rule adds a new Sec.  73.1215, which requires that 
licensees report suspicious activities to their LLEA, their FBI local 
field office, the NRC, and the local FAA control tower (for suspicious 
activities involving aircraft), as soon as possible, but within 4 hours 
of the time of discovery. The NRC's objective is to encourage licensees 
to use their best judgement to promptly assess whether an activity is 
suspicious and must be reported. As part of this assessment, licensees 
may discuss the activity with local authorities or review electronic 
information, such as surveillance video, before concluding that the 
activity is suspicious. The new suspicious activity reporting 
requirements are applicable to all licensees subject to the provisions 
of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.45, Sec.  73.46, Sec.  73.50, Sec.  73.51, 
Sec.  73.55, Sec.  73.60, or Sec.  73.67 with the exceptions noted in 
paragraphs (d) and (g).
    Paragraphs (a) and (b) add the NRC's purpose and objective of this 
new requirement.
    Paragraph (c) adds general requirements for the reporting of 
suspicious activities, the establishment of points of contact with the 
licensee's LLEA, local FBI field office, and local FAA control tower 
(for suspicious activities involving aircraft) and the inclusion of 
this information in security communication procedures.
    Paragraph (d) adds reporting of suspicious activities for 
facilities and material involving: challenges to the licensee's 
security systems and procedures; elicitation of non-public information 
from knowledgeable personnel relating to security or emergency response 
programs; or observed preoperational surveillance or reconnaissance 
activities. Paragraphs (d)(1) through (3) also specify which licensees 
are subject to suspicious activity reporting.
    Paragraph (e) adds reporting of suspicious activities for shipments 
involving: challenges to transportation communication systems or 
security systems; interference with in-progress shipments; elicitation 
of non-public information from knowledgeable personnel relating to 
security or emergency response programs; or observed preoperational 
surveillance or reconnaissance activities.
    Paragraph (f) adds reporting of suspicious activities for 
facilities engaged in the enrichment of SNM using RD technology. Such 
suspicious activities include, but are not limited to: aggressive 
noncompliance by visitors involving willful departure from tour groups 
or unauthorized entry into restricted areas; unauthorized recording or 
imaging of RD information, technology, or materials; or elicitation of 
non-public information from knowledgeable individuals regarding 
physical and information systems for protecting RD information, 
technology, or materials.
    Paragraph (f)(2) adds an exemption for the reporting of a 
licensee's identification of alleged or suspected activities involving 
actual, attempted, or conspiracies to obtain RD, communicate RD, remove 
RD, or disclose RD in violation of Sections 224, 225, 226, and 227 of 
the AEA under Sec.  95.57 instead of Sec.  73.1215.
    Paragraph (g) adds exemptions to the reporting of suspicious 
activities for (1) NRC and Agreement State licensees who are subject to 
Sec.  73.67 and who possess SSNM in quantities greater than 15 grams 
but less than the quantity necessary to form a critical mass per Sec.  
150.11(a); and (2) a particular NRC licensee who is authorized for 
possession of SSNM or SNM in the form of sealed sources that are used 
for research, development, and testing purposes.

Appendix A to Part 73--U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offices and 
Classified Mailing Addresses

    This final rule updates appendix A to 10 CFR part 73 to add a 
secure email address for licensees authorized to transmit classified 
information to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center. Paragraphs III 
and IV are also added to appendix A to require the use of classified 
telephone numbers, secure telephones, and secure email when licensees 
are communicating classified information to the NRC Headquarters 
Operations Center unless directed otherwise by the NRC.

Appendix B to Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel

    This final rule updates appendix B to 10 CFR part 73, section VI, 
paragraph B.1(a)(4), which contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.19. 
The relevant regulations from proposed Sec.  73.19 are now found in 
Sec.  73.17. This final rule corrects this cross reference. Appendix B 
is also revised to clarify employment suitability for armed security 
personnel.

Appendix G to Part 73--Reportable Safeguards Events

    This final rule removes and reserves appendix G to 10 CFR part 73. 
The regulations on physical security event

[[Page 15876]]

notifications, written follow-up reports, and lesser-significance 
recordable physical security events and conditions adverse to security, 
which were previously located in Sec.  73.71 and appendix G to 10 CFR 
part 73, are relocated to new Sec. Sec.  73.1200, 73.1205, and 73.1210, 
respectively.

Sec.  74.11 Reports of Loss or Theft or Attempted Theft or Unauthorized 
Production of Special Nuclear Material

    Paragraph 74.11(c) contains a cross reference to Sec.  73.71. The 
relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  73.1200. 
This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  76.113 Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material--
Category I

    Paragraph (b) to Sec.  76.113 contains a cross reference to Sec.  
73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  76.115 Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic 
Significance--Category II

    Paragraph (b) to Sec.  76.115 contains a cross reference to Sec.  
73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.

Sec.  76.117 Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance--
Category III

    Paragraph (b) to Sec.  76.117 contains a cross reference to Sec.  
73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec.  73.71 are now found in Sec.  
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule does not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
This final rule affects only the licensing, operation of, and 
transportation by:
     production or utilization facilities licensed under Sec.  
50.21or Sec.  50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning power 
reactors and non-power reactors);
     facilities that possess Category I, II, or III quantities 
of SSNM;
     facilities that possess Category II or III quantities of 
SNM;
     hot cell facilities subject to 10 CFR 73.50;
     ISFSIs;
     MRSs; and
     GROAs.
    The companies, universities, and government agencies that own and 
operate these facilities do not fall within the scope of the definition 
of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or 
the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).

VII. Regulatory Analysis

    The NRC has prepared a regulatory analysis for this final rule. The 
analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered 
by the NRC. The final regulatory analysis can be found under ADAMS 
Accession No. ML19045A003. The NRC requested comment on the draft 
regulatory analyses prepared for the 2011 proposed rule and the 2015 
supplemental proposed rule. No public comments were received.

VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality

    The provisions of this final rule implementing the statutory 
authority of Section 161A of the AEA are voluntary in nature. These 
amendments do not impose modifications or additions to existing 
licensee SSCs, designs, procedures, or organizations required to 
operate an NRC-licensed facility. Accordingly, the provisions of this 
final rule do not constitute backfitting, as defined in Sec. Sec.  
50.109, 70.76, and 72.62, and are not otherwise inconsistent with any 
issue finality provision in 10 CFR part 52.
    This final rule contains three requirements that were not imposed 
by order on the eight licensees with stand-alone preemption authority: 
notification of disqualifying events or conditions (Sec.  73.17(g)), 
training supporting notification of disqualifying events or conditions 
and information for appealing an adverse firearms background check to 
the FBI (Sec.  73.17(j)), and protection of information from 
unauthorized disclosure (Sec.  73.17(q)). Although these amendments 
represent new requirements, they involve recordkeeping, reporting 
requirements or an appeals process, which do not constitute backfitting 
as defined in 10 CFR Chapter I or a violation of issue finality in 10 
CFR part 52.
    This final rule also imposes new physical security event 
notification and suspicious activity reporting requirements. These 
amendments involve information collection and reporting activities, 
which are outside the purview of the backfitting and issue finality 
provisions. Therefore, a backfit analysis is not required and has not 
been prepared for this final rule.

IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation

    Cumulative Effects of Regulation (CER) consists of the challenges 
licensees may face in addressing the implementation of new regulatory 
positions, programs, and requirements (e.g., rulemaking, guidance, 
generic letters, backfits, inspections). The CER may manifest in 
several ways, including the total impact on licensees from simultaneous 
or consecutive regulatory actions that can adversely affect the 
licensee's capability to implement those requirements, while continuing 
to operate or construct its facility in a safe and secure manner.
    The goals of the NRC's CER effort were met throughout the 
development of this final rule. The NRC staff has engaged external 
stakeholders at public meetings and by soliciting public comments on 
the proposed rules and associated draft guidance documents. The 
proposed rule (76 FR 6199) was issued on February 3, 2011, for public 
comment. The staff also issued the draft guidance for public comment at 
the same time as the February 2011 proposed rule (February 3, 2011; 76 
FR 6085). A public meeting was held at NRC Headquarters on June 1, 2011 
(ADAMS Package Accession No. ML111720007), to discuss the proposed 
implementation plan for the February 2011 proposed rule (76 FR 6199). 
The staff also issued two supplemental proposed rules that: (1) 
expanded the scope of the rulemaking to include at-reactor ISFSIs 
(January 10, 2013; 78 FR 2214) and (2) revised the firearms background 
check requirements to align with the updated Firearms Guidelines from 
2014 (September 22, 2015; 80 FR 57106). A second public meeting was 
held at NRC Headquarters on November 19, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML15348A082), to discuss the supplemental proposed rule that was 
published on September 22, 2015 (80 FR 57106) and to discuss the 
implementation period for the final rule. The feedback from these two 
public meetings informed the staff's implementation schedule for both 
the background check requirements and the physical security event 
notifications requirements. The staff held a third public meeting at 
NRC Headquarters on May 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19176A143), to 
inform stakeholders of the final changes the staff was planning to make 
in this final rule. NRC did not accept public comments at this meeting.
    Based upon input from the public and affected licensees, and in 
consideration of the need to promulgate the regulations on Section 161A 
authority and to update the regulations on physical security event 
notifications, the NRC has specified that this final rule will take 
effect 30 days from the date of publication of this notice. The NRC is

[[Page 15877]]

not providing licensees a compliance period to apply for Section 161A 
authority because such application is voluntary. However, in Sec. Sec.  
73.15 and 73.17, the NRC is specifying a compliance period of 300 days 
from the date of publication of this final rule for licensees who have 
applied for and received stand-alone preemption authority via 
confirmatory orders to transition to the requirements of this final 
rule. Finally, the NRC is also specifying a compliance period of 300 
days from the date of publication of this final rule for licensees to 
implement and train key personnel on the revised physical security 
event notification and suspicious activity reporting requirements. 
Information on the effective and compliance dates for the various 
provisions of this final rule are found in the DATES section of this 
notice.

X. Plain Writing

    The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274) requires Federal 
agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized 
manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the 
Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain 
Language in Government Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 
31885).

XI. Environmental Assessment and Final Finding of No Significant 
Environmental Impact

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 
CFR part 51 subpart A that this final rule will not have a significant 
effect on the quality of the human environment and, therefore, an 
environmental impact statement is not required. The principal effect of 
this action is to revise the security regulations to implement Section 
161A of the AEA, to clarify existing requirements for notification of 
physical security events, and to add several new requirements for 
physical security event notification and suspicious activity reporting.
    Many of the changes in this final rule fall under a categorical 
exclusion for which the Commission has previously determined that such 
actions, neither individually nor cumulatively, will have significant 
impacts on the human environment. The NRC has determined that Parts 2 
and 3 of this final rule regarding physical security event 
notifications and the suspicious activity reporting requirements are 
subject to the exemptions in Sec. Sec.  51.22(c)(3)(ii), 
51.22(c)(3)(iii), and 51.22(c)(3)(iv). The NRC has also determined that 
the cross-reference changes are subject to the exemption in Sec.  
51.22(c)(2).
    The remaining changes in this final rule not qualifying for a 
categorical exclusion were evaluated for their environmental impacts 
and the effects of these changes are addressed in the Environmental 
Assessment. The determination of this Environmental Assessment is that 
there will be no significant radiological or non-radiological 
environmental impacts associated with this rule. The environmental 
assessment is available as indicated under the ``Availability of 
Documents'' section.

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This final rule contains new or amended collections of information 
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et. 
seq). The collections of information were approved by the Office of 
Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0253, 3150-0104, and 3150-
0204.
    The burden to the public for the information collections is 
estimated to average 2.4 hours per response for information collection 
requirements contained in part 73 and 2.2 hours per response for NRC 
Form 754, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching 
existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the information collection. There is no 
additional burden for NRC Form 366.
    The information collection contained in part 73 is being conducted 
to implement Section 161A of the AEA and to add several new 
requirements to event notification requirements that resulted from 
insights from implementation of the security orders, review of site 
security plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection 
program and force-on-force exercises. Responses to this collection of 
information are voluntary in the case of Section 161A authority. This 
information will be used by the NRC to review and approve applications 
for Section 161A authority. In the case of the physical security event 
notifications, responses to this collection of information are required 
under the new Sec.  73.1200. In the case of the written follow-up 
reports associated with the physical security event notifications, 
responses to this collection of information are required under the new 
Sec.  73.1205. The information will be used by the NRC to provide 
oversight of security events at licensed facilities. Information 
submitted on NRC Form 754 is being collected to fulfill requirements 
for the firearms background checks from Section 161A of the AEA. Use of 
NRC Form 754 is voluntary under Section 161A of the AEA and only those 
licensees that apply for Section 161A authority will be required to use 
the form to submit security personnel for firearms background checks 
against the FBI's NICS system. Confidential and proprietary information 
submitted to the NRC is protected in accordance with NRC regulations at 
Sec. Sec.  9.17(a), 9.301(a), and 2.390(b) of chapter I.
    You may submit comments on any aspect of the information 
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden, by the 
following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2011-0018.
     Mail comments to: FOIA, Library, and Information 
Collections Branch, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Mail Stop: 
T6-A10M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 
or to the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (3150-0253, 3150-0104, and 3150-0204), Attn: Desk Officer for 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 
20503; email: [email protected].

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting 
or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control 
number.

XIII. Congressional Review Act

    This final rule is a rule as defined in the Congressional Review 
Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808). However, the Office of Management and Budget 
has not found it to be a major rule as defined in the Congressional 
Review Act.

XIV. Criminal Penalties

    For the purposes of Section 223 of the AEA, the NRC is issuing this 
final rule that amends 10 CFR part 73 under one or more of Sections 
161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. Willful violations of the rule are 
subject to criminal enforcement. Criminal penalties as they apply to 
regulations in 10 CFR part 73 are already discussed in Sec.  73.81. 
Accordingly, Sec. Sec.  73.15, 73.17, 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 
73.1215 will not be included in Sec.  73.81(b).

XV. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations

    Under the ``Agreement State Program Policy Statement'' approved by 
the Commission on October 2, 2017, and published in the Federal 
Register (82

[[Page 15878]]

FR 48535; October 18, 2017), this rule is classified as compatibility 
``NRC.'' Compatibility is not required for Category ``NRC'' 
regulations. The NRC program elements in this category are those that 
relate directly to areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA 
or the provisions of 10 CFR, and although an Agreement State may not 
adopt program elements reserved to the NRC, it may wish to inform its 
licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is consistent 
with the particular State's administrative procedure laws but does not 
confer regulatory authority on the State.

XVI. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub. 
L. 104-113) requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that 
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, 
unless using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is 
otherwise impractical. In this final rule, the NRC is using standards 
from applicable firearms standards developed by nationally recognized 
firearms organizations or standard setting bodies or from standards 
developed by: (1) Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the U.S. 
Department of Energy's National Training Center, and the U.S. 
Department of Defense; (2) State law-enforcement training centers; or 
(3) State Division (or Department) of Criminal Justice Services 
Training Academies.

XVII. Availability of Guidance

    The NRC is issuing the following new or revised guidance documents 
in support of the implementation of the requirements set forth in this 
final rule:
     RG 5.62, Revision 2, ``Physical Security Event 
Notifications, Reports, and Records'';
     RG 5.86, ``Enhanced Weapons Authority, Preemption 
Authority, and Firearms Background Checks'';
     RG 5.87, ``Suspicious Activity Reports'';
     ``Weapons Safety Assessment,'' Volumes 1-4; and
     ``WSA Reference Information.''
    Revision 2 to RG 5.62, new RG 5.86, and new RG 5.87 are publicly 
available and may be found in ADAMS under Accession Nos. ML17131A285, 
ML17131A296, and ML17138A384, respectively. Volumes 1-4 of the Weapons 
Safety Assessment may be found in ADAMS under Package Accession No. 
ML18108A014. The WSA Reference Information volume may be found in ADAMS 
under Accession No. ML18115A418 but is not publicly available. 
Information and comment submissions related to the guidance can be 
accessed by searching on https://www.regulations.gov under Docket IDs 
NRC-2011-0014, NRC-2011-0015, and NRC-2011-0017. Analysis of public 
comments received on these guidance documents are discussed in Section 
IV, ``Public Comment Analysis.''
    The NRC is issuing RG 5.86 that contains detailed guidance on the 
implementation of the proposed requirements on applying for combined 
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority, stand-alone 
preemption authority, and conducting firearms background checks. The 
associated draft regulatory guide (DG-5020) and Revision 1 to DG-5020 
were published for public comment in conjunction with the 2011 proposed 
rule and the 2015 supplemental proposed rule, respectively. These draft 
regulatory guides and public comments can be found under docket ID NRC-
2011-0015. The final guidance reflects public comments received on both 
draft regulatory guides.
    The NRC has published a four volume ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' 
document as an acceptable method to assist licensees in completing the 
weapons safety assessment required under Sec.  73.15(e) as part of an 
application for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons 
authority. Volumes 1 and 3 contain introductory and explanatory 
material. Volume 2 contains a weapons safety assessment template that 
licensees may complete and submit with their applications under Sec.  
73.15. Licensees are not required to use the Volume 2 template in their 
application but may use their own methodology to evaluate the onsite 
and offsite risks associated with the deployment and potential use of a 
specific enhanced weapon and the need to implement preventive or 
mitigative measures to address those risks. Volume 4 contains a 
completed sample template for a hypothetical power reactor facility. 
The WSA Reference Information volume contains information on weapons 
capabilities and characteristics and is not publicly available for 
security reasons. Licensees that are considering applying for combined 
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority may request the WSA 
Reference Information volume through their NRC licensing project 
manager. The NRC considered public comments in developing the final 
weapons safety assessment. Additional information can be found under 
docket ID NRC-2011-0017.
    The NRC is also issuing a revision to RG 5.62. Revision 2 to RG 
5.62 provides guidance on the implementation of physical security event 
notification requirements, as modified by this final rule. The NRC 
published DG-5019, Revision 1, on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6085) for 
public comment after the publication of the 2011 proposed rule. The 
final guidance reflects public comments received on the draft 
regulatory guide.
    The NRC has bifurcated the guidance in DG-5019, Revision 1, 
regarding suspicious activity reporting into a separate new RG 5.87. 
The final guidance reflects public comments received on the draft 
regulatory guide.
    The NRC is temporarily withdrawing NUREG-1304, ``Reporting of 
Safeguards Events,'' dated February 1988, (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML16012A188). NUREG-1304 contains a set of questions and answers on 
physical security event notifications and reports. Since the new and 
old physical security event notification regulations differ, the NRC 
will temporarily withdraw this NUREG to prevent confusion. The NRC will 
conduct a workshop after licensees have implemented the revised 
physical security event notification, written follow-up report, and 
recordkeeping requirements. The NRC will publish the results of the 
workshop as NUREG-1304, Revision 1. The NRC will also conduct a 
separate workshop after licensees have implemented the suspicious 
activity reporting requirements and publish those results as a separate 
NUREG.
    The NRC is withdrawing Generic Letter (GL) 91-03, ``Reporting of 
Safeguards Events'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML031140131). This GL is no 
longer consistent with the revised physical security event notification 
regulations in Sec. Sec.  73.1200 and 73.1205 and will be withdrawn to 
prevent confusion. The staff has incorporated relevant topics from GL 
91-03 into the new revision of RG 5.62.

XVIII. Availability of Documents

    The documents identified in the following table are available to 
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as 
indicated.

[[Page 15879]]



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Document                              ADAMS Accession No./ Federal Register citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firearms Guidelines (September 11, 2009)........  74 FR 46800.
Firearms Guidelines, Revision 1 (June 25, 2014).  79 FR 36100.
Firearms Guidelines, Revision 2 (March 8, 2019).  84 FR 8546.
Environmental Assessment (July 2006 proposed      ML061920093.
 rule).
Environmental Assessment for Final Rule.........  ML16270A086.
Regulatory Analysis Regulatory Analysis-          ML061380803.
 appendices (May 2006 proposed rule).             ML061380796.
                                                  ML061440013.
Regulatory Analysis for Final Rule..............  ML19045A003.
Information Collection Analysis.................  ML092640277.
NRC Form 754, ``Armed Security Personnel          ML11321A240.
 Firearms Background Check''.
Commission: SECY-08-0050, ``Firearms Guidelines   ADAMS Package--ML072920478.\1\
 Implementing Section 161A of the Atomic Energy
 Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues''
 (April 17, 2008).
Commission: SECY-08-0050A, ``Firearms Guidelines  ML081910207.
 Implementing Section 161A of the Atomic Energy
 Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues--
 Supplemental Information'' (July 8, 2008).
Commission: SRM-SECY-08-0050/0050A, ``Firearms    ML082280364.
 Guidelines Implementing Section 161A of the
 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Associated Policy
 Issues'' (August 15, 2008).
Letter Opinion from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,   ML090080191.
 Firearms and Explosives' Office of Enforcement
 on the Transfer of Enhanced Weapons (January 5,
 2009).
Commission: SECY-10-0085, ``Proposed Rule:        ML101110121.
 Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks
 and Security Event Notifications (RIN: 3150-
 AI49)'' (June 27, 2010).
Commission: SRM-SECY-10-0085, ``Proposed Rule:    ML102920342.
 Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks
 and Security Event Notifications (RIN: 3150-
 AI49)'' (October 19, 2010).
Proposed Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background    76 FR 6199.
 Checks, and Security Event Notifications Rule
 (February 3, 2011).
Supplemental Proposed Enhanced Weapons Firearms   78 FR 2214.
 Background Checks and Security Event
 Notifications Rule (January 10, 2013).
Supplemental Proposed Enhanced Weapons Firearms   80 FR 57106.
 Background Checks and Security Event
 Notifications Rule (September 22, 2015).
Annotated Public Comments on: Enhanced Weapons,   ML22287A158.
 Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
 Notifications Rule and Supporting Regulatory
 Guidance Documents.
Public Comment Analysis for the Final Rule......  ML16264A004.
Public Comment Analysis for the Final Rule        ML17123A319.
 Supporting Regulatory Guides and Weapons Safety
 Assessment.
DG-5019, Revision 0, ``Reporting and Recording    ML071710233.
 Safeguards Events'' (June 2007).
DG-5019, Revision 1, ``Reporting and Recording    ML100830413.
 Safeguards Events'' (January 2011).
DG-5020, Revision 0, ``Applying.................  ML100321956.
for Enhanced Weapons Authority, Applying for
 Preemption Authority, and Accomplishing
 Firearms Background Checks under 10 CFR Part
 73'' (January 2011).
DG-5020, Revision 1, ``Applying for Enhanced      ML14322A847.
 Weapons Authority, Applying for Preemption
 Authority, and Accomplishing Firearms
 Background Checks under 10 CFR Part 73''
 (September 2015).
Regulatory Guide 5.62, Revision 2, ``Physical     ML17131A285.
 Security Event Notifications, Reports, and
 Records''.
Regulatory Guide 5.86, ``Enhanced Weapons         ML17131A296.
 Authority, Preemption Authority, and Firearms
 Background Checks''.
Regulatory Guide 5.87, ``Suspicious Activity      ML17138A384.
 Reports''.
Commission: SECY-12-0027, ``Preemption Authority  ML113130015.
 Pursuant to Section 161A, `Use of Firearms by
 Security Personnel,' of the Atomic Energy Act
 of 1954, as Amended'' (February 17, 2012).
Commission: SRM-SECY-12-0027, ``Preemption        ML12124A377.
 Authority Pursuant to Section 161A, `Use of
 Firearms by Security Personnel,' of the Atomic
 Energy Act of 1954, as Amended'' (May 3, 2012).
Commission: SECY-12-0125, ``Interim Actions to    ADAMS Package--ML12164A839.
 Execute Commission Preemption Authority Under
 Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
 as Amended'' (September 20, 2012).
Commission: SRM-SECY-12-0125, ``Interim Actions   ML12326A653.
 to Execute Commission Preemption Authority
 Under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of
 1954, as Amended'' (November 21, 2012).
NUREG/BR-0058, ``Regulatory Analysis Guidelines   ML042820192.
 of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,''
 Revision 4 (September 30, 2004).
Order EA-13-092, ``Order Designating an Interim   78 FR 35984.
 Class of NRC-Licensed Facilities That are
 Eligible to Apply to the Commission for
 Authorization to Use the Authority Granted
 Under the Provisions of Section 161a of the
 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended'' (June
 14, 2013).
Order EA-15-004, ``BWXT Preemption Order''        80 FR 53588.
 (September 4, 2015).
Orders EA-14-134, EA-14-135, EA-14-136, EA-14-    81 FR 2247.
 137, EA-14-138, EA-14-139, and EA-14-140,
 ``Reactor Preemption Orders'' (January 15,
 2016).
Draft OMB Supporting Statement for the second     ML15035A633.
 supplemental proposed rule.
OMB Supporting Statements for the Final Rule and  ADAMS Package--ML17067A164.
 Associated Forms.
``Weapons Safety Assessment'', Volumes 1-4......  ADAMS Package--ML18108A014.
``WSA Reference Information (non-publicly         ML18115A418.
 available).
Generic Letter 1991-003, ``Reporting of           ML031140131.
 Safeguards Events'' (March 6, 1991).
Commission: SECY-18-0058, ``Draft Final Rule--    ADAMS Package--ML16264A000.
 Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks,
 and Security Event Notifications'' (May 22,
 2018).
Commission: ``Supplement to SECY-18-0058: Draft   ML19017A025.
 Final Rule--Enhanced Weapons, Firearms
 Background Checks, And Security Event
 Notifications'' (February 4, 2020).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Enclosure 1 to SECY-08-0050 is not publicly available.


[[Page 15880]]

    Throughout the development of this rule, the NRC has posted 
documents related to this rule, including public comments, on the 
Federal Rulemaking website at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket 
IDs NRC-2011-0014, NRC-2011-0015, NRC-2011-0017, and NRC-2011-0018.

List of Subjects

10 CFR Part 20

    Byproduct material, Criminal penalties, Hazardous waste, Licensed 
material, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Occupational safety and health, Packaging and containers, 
Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Source material, Special nuclear material, Waste 
treatment and disposal.

10 CFR Part 21

    Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties, Radiation protection, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

10 CFR Part 26

    Administrative practice and procedure, Alcohol abuse, Alcohol 
testing, Appeals, Chemical testing, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Employee 
assistance programs, Fitness for duty, Management actions, Nuclear 
power plants and reactors, Privacy, Protection of information, 
Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

10 CFR Part 50

    Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Classified 
information, Criminal penalties, Education, Fire prevention, Fire 
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Penalties, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Whistleblowing.

10 CFR Part 70

    Classified information, Criminal penalties, Emergency medical 
services, Hazardous materials transportation, Material control and 
accounting, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Packaging and 
containers, Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Security measures, 
Special nuclear material, Whistleblowing.

10 CFR Part 72

    Administrative practice and procedure, Hazardous waste, Indians, 
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear energy, Penalties, Radiation 
protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security 
measures, Spent fuel, Whistleblowing.

10 CFR Part 73

    Criminal penalties, Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, 
Imports, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security 
measures.

10 CFR Part 74

    Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, 
Material control and accounting, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, 
Packaging and containers, Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear 
material.

10 CFR Part 76

    Certification, Criminal penalties, Nuclear energy, Penalties, 
Radiation protection, Reporting and record keeping requirements, 
Security measures, Special nuclear material, Uranium, Uranium 
enrichment by gaseous diffusion.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting 
the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 20, 21, 26, 50, 70, 72, 73, 
74, and 76:

PART 20--STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION

0
1. The authority citation for part 20 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 53, 63, 65, 81, 
103, 104, 161, 170H, 182, 186, 223, 234, 274, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 
2073, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2133, 2134, 2201, 2210h, 2232, 2236, 2273, 
2282, 2021, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 
202 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842); Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985, sec. 2 (42 U.S.C. 2021b); 44 U.S.C. 3504 
note.


Sec.  20.2201  [Amended]

0
2. In Sec.  20.2201(c), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1205''.

PART 21--REPORTING OF DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE

0
3. The authority citation for part 21 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 63, 81,103, 
104, 161, 223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2111, 2133, 2134, 
2201, 2273, 2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 
201, 206 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5846); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 
secs. 135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.


Sec.  21.2  [Amended]

0
4. In Sec.  21.2(c), remove the reference ``Sec.  73.71'' and add in 
its place the reference ``Sec. Sec.  73.1200 and 73.1205''.

PART 26--FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS

0
5. The authority citation for part 26 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 103, 104, 107, 
161, 223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2133, 2134, 2137, 2201, 2273, 
2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 
U.S.C. 5841, 5842); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.


Sec.  26.417  [Amended]

0
6. In Sec.  26.417(b)(1), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''.


Sec.  26.719  [Amended]

0
7. In Sec.  26.719(a), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''.

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 
FACILITIES

0
8. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 101, 102, 103, 
104, 105, 108, 122, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 
187, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 
2138, 2152, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 
2237, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 
201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act of 1982, sec. 306 (42 U.S.C. 10226); National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332); 44 U.S.C. 3504 
note; Sec. 109, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 783.


Sec.  50.55  [Amended]

0
9. In Sec.  50.55(e)(8), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1205''.


Sec.  50.72  [Amended]

0
10. In Sec.  50.72(a), footnote 1, remove the reference ``73.71'' and 
add in its place the reference ``73.1200''.

PART 70--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

0
11. The authority citation for part 70 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 51, 53, 57(d), 108, 
122, 161, 182, 183,

[[Page 15881]]

184, 186, 187, 193, 223, 234, 274, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 
2077(d), 2138, 2152, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2243, 2273, 
2282, 2021, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 
202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act of 1982, secs. 135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44 
U.S.C. 3504 note.


Sec.  70.20a  [Amended]

0
12. In Sec.  70.20a(e)(2), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in 
its place the reference ``73.1200''.


Sec.  70.20b  [Amended]

0
13. In Sec.  70.20b:
0
a. In paragraph (c), remove the reference ``73.71(b)'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200'';
0
b. In paragraph (d), remove the reference ``73.71(b)'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''; and
0
c. In paragraph (e), remove the reference ``73.71(b)'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''.

PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF 
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND REACTOR-
RELATED GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE

0
14. The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 
65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 223, 234, 274 (42 
U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2210e, 
2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2273, 2282, 2021); Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 
5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(42 U.S.C. 4332); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 117(a), 
132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 141, 145(g), 148, 218(a) (42 U.S.C. 
10137(a), 10152, 10153, 10154, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10165(g), 10168, 
10198(a)); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.


Sec.  72.74  [Amended]

0
15. In Sec.  72.74(c), remove the reference ``Sec.  73.71'' and add in 
its place the reference ``Sec.  73.1200''.

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

0
16. The authority citation for part 73 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 147, 149, 161, 
161A, 170D, 170E, 170H, 170I, 223, 229, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 
2167, 2169, 2201, 2201a, 2210d, 2210e, 2210h, 2210i, 2273, 2278a, 
2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 
U.S.C. 5841, 5842); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 135, 141 
(42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
    Section 73.37(b)(2) also issued under Sec. 301, Public Law 96-
295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

0
17. Remove undesignated center headings ``General Provisions,'' 
``Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in Transit,'' 
``Physical Protection Requirements at Fixed Sites,'' ``Physical 
Protection of Special Nuclear Material or Moderate and Low Strategic 
Significance,'' ``Records and Reports,'' and ``Enforcement.''


Sec.  Sec.  73.1 through 73.8  [Designated as Subpart A]

0
18. Designate Sec. Sec.  73.1 through 73.8 as subpart A and add a 
heading for newly designated subpart A to read as follows:

Subpart A--General Provisions

0
19. In Sec.  73.2:
0
a. In paragraph (a) remove the phrase ``and 70'' and add in its place 
the phrase ``70, and 95'';
0
b. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions for ``Adverse firearms 
background check'', ``Combined preemption authority and enhanced 
weapons authority'', ``Contraband'', ``Covered weapon'', ``Enhanced 
weapon'', ``Firearms background check'', ``Greater than class C 
waste'', ``High-level radioactive waste'', and ``Independent spent fuel 
storage installation'';
0
c. Revise the definition for Movement control center;
0
d. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions for ``NICS'', ``NICS 
response'', ``NICS transaction number'', ``Restricted Data'', 
``Satisfactory firearms background check'', ``Special nuclear material 
(SNM)'', ``Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or spent fuel'', ``Stand-alone 
preemption authority'', and ``Time of discovery''; and
0
e. Add paragraphs (b) and (c).
    The additions and revision read as follows:


Sec.  73.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    Adverse firearms background check means a firearms background check 
that has resulted in a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
* * * * *
    Combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority means 
the authority granted to the Commission, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201a, 
to authorize licensees or the designated security personnel of a 
licensee to transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use one 
or more categories of enhanced weapons, notwithstanding any State, 
local, or certain Federal firearms laws, including regulations, that 
prohibit or restrict such conduct.
* * * * *
    Contraband means unauthorized firearms, explosives, incendiaries, 
or other dangerous materials (e.g., disease causing agents), which are 
capable of causing acts of sabotage against a licensed facility or 
licensed radioactive material, as specified under 42 U.S.C. 2284. For 
licensees that possess or conduct activities involving classified 
national security information or classified Restricted Data (RD) as 
defined in Sec.  95.5 of this chapter, contraband also means 
unauthorized electronic devices or unauthorized electronic media that 
are capable of facilitating acts of espionage; unauthorized 
communication, transmission, disclosure, or receipt of RD; or tampering 
with RD, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 793 or 42 U.S.C. 2274-2276, 
respectively. Contraband items are banned from a licensee's protected 
area, vital area, materials access area, or controlled access area.
* * * * *
    Covered weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled 
shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semiautomatic assault weapon, machine 
gun, ammunition for any such weapons, or large capacity ammunition 
feeding device otherwise prohibited by State, local, or certain Federal 
firearms laws, including regulations, as specified under 42 U.S.C. 
2201a(b).
* * * * *
    Enhanced weapon means any short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled 
rifle, or machine gun. Enhanced weapons do not include destructive 
devices as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921(a).
* * * * *
    Firearms background check means a background check by the U.S. 
Attorney General pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201a that includes a check 
against the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) fingerprint 
system and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System.
* * * * *
    Greater than Class C waste or GTCC waste has the same meaning as 
defined in Sec.  72.3 of this chapter.
* * * * *
    High-level radioactive waste or HLW has the same meaning as defined 
in Sec.  72.3 of this chapter.
* * * * *
    Independent spent fuel storage installation or ISFSI has the same

[[Page 15882]]

meaning as defined in Sec.  72.3 of this chapter.
* * * * *
    Movement control center means an operations center which is remote 
from the transport activity and which maintains position information on 
the movement of special nuclear material or radioactive material; 
receives reports of actual or attempted attacks, thefts, or sabotage; 
provides a means for notifying these and other problems to the NRC and 
appropriate agencies; and can request and coordinate appropriate aid.
* * * * *
    NICS means the National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
established by Section 103(b) of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act, Public Law 103-159 (107 Stat. 1536), that is operated by the FBI's 
Criminal Justice Information Services Division.
    NICS response means a response provided by the FBI, as the result 
of a firearms background check against the NICS. A NICS response 
provided by the FBI may be ``proceed,'' ``delayed,'' or ``denied.''
    NICS transaction number or NTN means the identification number 
created by the FBI to track firearms background checks upon entry of 
the information into the FBI's system. The NICS response and the NTN 
are the information returned by the FBI, following a firearms 
background check.
* * * * *
    Restricted Data or RD has the same meaning as defined in Sec.  95.5 
of this chapter.
* * * * *
    Satisfactory firearms background check means a firearms background 
check that has resulted in a ``proceed'' NICS response.
* * * * *
    Special nuclear material (SNM) has the same meaning as defined in 
Sec.  70.4 of this chapter.
* * * * *
    Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or spent fuel means the fuel that has been 
withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation and has not been 
chemically separated into its constituent elements by reprocessing. 
Spent nuclear fuel includes the special nuclear material, byproduct 
material, source material, and other radioactive materials associated 
with a fuel assembly.
* * * * *
    Stand-alone preemption authority means the authority granted to the 
Commission, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201a, to authorize licensees or the 
designated security personnel of a licensee to transfer, receive, 
possess, transport, import, and use one or more categories of covered 
weapons, notwithstanding any State, local, or certain Federal firearms 
laws, including regulations, that prohibit or restrict such conduct. 
Such covered weapons do not include enhanced weapons as defined in this 
part.
* * * * *
    Time of discovery means the time at which a cognizant individual 
observes, identifies, or is notified of a security-significant event or 
condition. A cognizant individual is considered anyone who, by 
position, experience, and/or training, is expected to understand that a 
particular condition or event adversely impacts security.
* * * * *
    (b) The terms ``ammunition,'' ``handgun,'' ``rifle,'' ``machine 
gun,'' ``large capacity ammunition feeding device,'' ``semiautomatic 
assault weapon,'' ``short-barreled shotgun,'' ``short-barreled rifle,'' 
and ``shotgun'' specified in Sec. Sec.  73.15 and 73.17 have the same 
meaning as provided for these terms in the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' regulations at 27 CFR 478.11.
    (c) The terms ``delayed,'' ``denied,'' and ``proceed'' that are 
used in NICS responses specified in this section have the same meaning 
provided these terms in the FBI's regulations at 28 CFR 25.2.

0
20. In Sec.  73.8, paragraphs (b) and (c) are revised to read as 
follows:


Sec.  73.8  Information collection requirements: OMB approval.

* * * * *
    (b) The approved information collection requirements contained in 
this part appear in Sec. Sec.  73.5, 73.15, 73.17, 73.20, 73.21, 73.24, 
73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.54, 73.55, 
73.56, 73.57, 73.58, 73.60, 73.67, 73.70, 73.72, 73.73, 73.74, 73.1200, 
73.1205, 73.1210, 73.1215, and appendices B and C to this part.
    (c) This part contains information collection requirements in 
addition to those approved under the control number specified in 
paragraph (a) of this section. These information collection 
requirements and control numbers under which they are approved are as 
follows:
    (1) In Sec.  73.17, NRC Form 754 is approved under control number 
3150-0204;
    (2) In Sec. Sec.  73.17 and 73.57, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Form FD-258 is approved under control number 1110-0046; and
    (3) In Sec.  73.1205, NRC Form 366 is approved under control number 
3150-0104.

0
21. Add subpart B to read as follows:

Subpart B--Enhanced Weapons, Preemption, and Firearms Background 
Checks

Sec.
73.15 Authorization for use of enhanced weapons and preemption of 
firearms laws.
73.17 Firearms background checks for armed security personnel.


Sec.  73.15  Authorization for use of enhanced weapons and preemption 
of firearms laws.

    (a) Purpose. This section presents the requirements for licensees 
to obtain approval to use the authority provided to the Commission 
under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), 
in protecting Commission-designated classes of facilities, radioactive 
material, or other property. This authority includes ``stand-alone 
preemption authority'' and ``combined preemption authority and enhanced 
weapons authority.''
    (b) General Requirements. (1) Licensees of facilities, activities, 
and other property listed in paragraph (c) of this section may apply to 
the NRC, in accordance with the provisions of this section, to receive 
stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority and 
enhanced weapons authority.
    (2) With respect to the possession and use of firearms by all other 
NRC licensees, the Commission's requirements in effect before April 13, 
2023 remain applicable, except to the extent that those requirements 
are modified by an NRC order or regulations applicable to these 
licensees.
    (c) Applicability. (1) Stand-alone preemption authority. The 
license holders for the following classes of facilities, radioactive 
material, or other property are designated by the Commission as 
eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption authority pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. 2201a--
    (i) Nuclear power reactor facilities;
    (ii) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or 
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a 
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gray (Gy) (100 Rad) per hour at 
a distance of 1 meter (m) (3.3 feet (ft)), without regard to any 
intervening shielding;
    (iii) Independent spent fuel storage installations; and
    (iv) Spent nuclear fuel transportation.
    (2) Combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority. 
The license holders for the following classes of facilities, 
radioactive material, or other property are designated by the 
Commission as eligible to apply for

[[Page 15883]]

combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. 2201a--
    (i) Nuclear power reactor facilities;
    (ii) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or 
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a 
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gy (100 Rad) per hour at a 
distance of 1 m (3.3 ft), without regard to any intervening shielding;
    (iii) Independent spent fuel storage installations; and
    (iv) Spent nuclear fuel transportation.
    (d) Application process for stand-alone preemption authority. (1) 
Only licensees included within the classes of facilities, radioactive 
material, and other property listed in paragraph (c)(1) of this section 
may apply to the NRC for stand-alone preemption authority.
    (2) Licensees applying for stand-alone preemption authority must 
submit an application to the NRC using the procedures specified in this 
section.
    (3) The contents of the application must include the following 
information:
    (i) A statement indicating that the licensee is applying for stand-
alone preemption authority;
    (ii) The Commission-designated facility, radioactive material, or 
other property to be protected by the licensee's security personnel 
using the covered weapons;
    (iii) A description of the licensee's purposes and objectives in 
requesting stand-alone preemption authority. This description must 
include whether these covered weapons are currently employed as part of 
the licensee's existing protective strategy or whether these covered 
weapons will be used in a revised protective strategy; and
    (iv) A description of the licensee's Firearms Background Check 
Plan, as required by Sec.  73.17 of this part.
    (4) Once a licensee has been notified that its application for 
stand-alone preemption authority has been accepted for review by the 
NRC, the licensee must provide the following supplemental information 
once it becomes available:
    (i) A confirmation that a sufficient number of security personnel 
have completed a satisfactory firearms background check to meet the 
licensee's security personnel minimum staffing requirements, as 
specified in its physical security plan and any applicable fatigue 
requirements under part 26 of this chapter;
    (ii) A confirmation that the necessary training modules and 
notification procedures have been developed under its Firearms 
Background Check Plan; and
    (iii) A confirmation that all security personnel whose official 
duties require access to covered weapons have been trained on these 
modules and notification procedures.
    (5) The licensee must submit both the application and the 
supplementary information to the NRC in writing, under oath or 
affirmation, and in accordance with Sec.  73.4 of this part.
    (6) Upon the effective date of the NRC's approval of its 
application for stand-alone preemption authority, the licensee must 
only assign security personnel who have completed a satisfactory 
firearms background check to duties requiring access to any covered 
weapons.
    (e) Application process for combined preemption authority and 
enhanced weapons authority.
    (1) Only licensees included within the classes of facilities, 
radioactive material, and other property listed in paragraph (c)(2) of 
this section may apply to the NRC for combined preemption authority and 
enhanced weapons authority.
    (2) Licensees applying for combined preemption authority and 
enhanced weapons authority must submit an application to the NRC using 
the procedures specified in this section.
    (3) The contents of the application must include the following 
information:
    (i) A statement indicating that the licensee is applying for 
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority;
    (ii) The Commission-designated facility, radioactive material, or 
other property to be protected by the licensee's security personnel 
using the covered weapons, including enhanced weapons;
    (iii) A description of the licensee's purposes and objectives in 
requesting combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons 
authority. This must include whether these enhanced weapons are 
currently employed as part of the licensee's existing protective 
strategy or whether these enhanced weapons will be used in a revised 
protective strategy;
    (iv) The total quantities of enhanced weapons, including the types 
and calibers or gauges, requested; and
    (v) A description of the licensee's Firearms Background Check Plan, 
required by Sec.  73.17 of this part.
    (vi) If the NRC has previously approved the licensee's application 
for stand-alone preemption authority under either paragraph (d) of this 
section or under an NRC Order issued before April 13, 2023, then the 
licensee must include the effective date of the NRC's approval for 
stand-alone preemption authority in its application for combined 
preemption authority and enhanced weapons.
    (4) The licensee must include with its application the additional 
technical information required by paragraph (f) of this section.
    (5) Once a licensee has been notified that its application for 
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority has been 
accepted for review by the NRC, the licensee must provide the following 
supplemental information once it becomes available:
    (i) A confirmation that a sufficient number of security personnel 
have completed a satisfactory firearms background check to meet the 
licensee's security personnel minimum staffing requirements, as 
specified in its physical security plan, and any applicable fatigue 
requirements under part 26 of this chapter;
    (ii) A confirmation that the necessary training modules and 
notification procedures have been developed under its Firearms 
Background Check Plan; and
    (iii) A confirmation that security personnel, whose official duties 
require access to enhanced weapons, have been trained on these modules 
and notification procedures.
    (iv) Exceptions: Licensees that were previously approved by the NRC 
for stand-alone preemption authority do not have to submit the 
supplemental information required by paragraph (e)(5) since it has been 
previously submitted under paragraph (d)(4) of this section or in 
response to an NRC Order.
    (6) The licensee must submit its application in accordance with the 
applicable license amendment provisions specified in Sec.  50.90, Sec.  
70.34, or Sec.  72.56 of this chapter. The licensee must submit both 
the application and the supplementary information to the NRC in 
writing, under oath or affirmation, and in accordance with Sec.  73.4 
of this part.
    (7) If a licensee wishes to use a different type or caliber or 
gauge of an enhanced weapon or obtain a different quantity of enhanced 
weapons from that previously approved by the Commission under this 
section, then the licensee must submit a new application to the NRC in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this section (to address these 
different weapons or different quantities of weapons).
    (8) Upon the effective date of the NRC's approval of its 
application for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons 
authority, the licensee must only assign security personnel who have 
completed a satisfactory firearms background check

[[Page 15884]]

to duties requiring access to any covered weapons.
    (f) Application for combined preemption authority and enhanced 
weapons authority additional technical information. (1) A licensee must 
also submit to the NRC for prior review and approval the following 
plans and assessments. These plans and assessments must be specific to 
the facility, radioactive material, or other property being protected.
    (i) A new or revised physical security plan, security personnel 
training and qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan; and
    (ii) A new weapons safety assessment.
    (2) In addition to other requirements presented in this part, these 
plans and assessments must--
    (i) For the physical security plan, identify the quantities, types, 
and calibers or gauges of enhanced weapons that will be deployed;
    (ii) For the training and qualification plan, address the training 
and qualification requirements to use these specific enhanced weapons;
    (iii) For the safeguards contingency plan--
    (A) The licensee must address how these enhanced weapons will be 
employed by the security personnel in implementing the protective 
strategy, including tactical approaches and maneuvers;
    (B) In such instances where the addition of the enhanced weapons 
would not affect the content of the safeguards contingency plan, the 
required information on how the weapons will be employed may instead be 
incorporated into the licensee's physical security plan or an addendum 
thereto;
    (C) Furthermore, in such instances, the licensee's application 
shall indicate that the proposed enhanced weapons do not affect the 
content of the NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan and it remains 
unchanged; and
    (iv) For the weapons safety assessment, assess any potential safety 
impact by the use of enhanced weapons--
    (A) At the facility, radioactive material, or other property being 
protected;
    (B) On public or private facilities, public or private property, or 
on members of the public in areas outside of the site boundary; and
    (C) On public or private facilities, public or private property, or 
on members of the public from the use of these enhanced weapons at 
training facilities; and
    (D) Such assessments must consider both accidental and deliberate 
discharge of the enhanced weapons. However, licensees are not required 
to assess malevolent discharges of these enhanced weapons by trained 
and qualified security personnel, who have been screened and evaluated 
by the licensee's insider mitigation or human reliability programs.
    (3) The licensee's training and qualification plan for enhanced 
weapons must be based upon applicable firearms standards developed by 
nationally-recognized firearms organizations or standard setting bodies 
or from standards developed by--
    (i) Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the U.S. Department 
of Energy's National Training Center, and the U.S. Department of 
Defense;
    (ii) State law-enforcement training centers; or
    (iii) State Division (or Department) of Criminal Justice Services 
Training Academies.
    (g) Conditions of approval. (1) Licensees that have been approved 
by the NRC for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons 
authority must provide a copy of the NRC's authorization to the U.S. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) Federal 
firearms license (FFL) holder (i.e., the transferor) for inclusion with 
the application to request ATF's pre-approval of the transfer and 
registration of the enhanced weapons to the NRC licensee (i.e., the 
transferee).
    (2) Licensees receiving enhanced weapons must comply with 
applicable ATF regulations in 27 CFR part 479.
    (3) All enhanced weapons possessed by the licensee must be 
registered under the name of the licensee. Enhanced weapons may not be 
registered under the name of a licensee's security contractor.
    (4) Licensees obtaining enhanced weapons may, at their discretion, 
also apply to ATF to obtain an FFL or a special occupational tax stamp, 
in conjunction with obtaining these enhanced weapons.
    (h) Completion of training and qualification before deployment of 
enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees that have received combined preemption 
authority and enhanced weapons authority must ensure that their 
security personnel with access to enhanced weapons have completed the 
required firearms training and qualification, in accordance with the 
licensee's training and qualification plan.
    (2) Initial training and qualification on enhanced weapons must be 
completed before the security personnel's deployment of enhanced 
weapons to implement the licensee's protective strategy.
    (3) Recurring training and qualification on enhanced weapons by 
security personnel must be completed in accordance with the licensee's 
training and qualification plan.
    (4) All training must be documented in accordance with the 
requirements of the licensee's training and qualification plan.
    (i) [Reserved]
    (j) Use of enhanced weapons. The requirements regarding the use of 
force by the licensee's security personnel, in the performance of their 
official duties, are contained in Sec. Sec.  73.46, 73.51, and 73.55 
and in appendices B, C, and H of this part, as applicable.
    (k) Notification of adverse ATF findings. Requirements on 
notification of adverse ATF inspection or enforcement findings can be 
found under Sec.  73.1200 of this part.
    (l) [Reserved]
    (m) Transfer of enhanced weapons. (1)(i) A licensee's issuance of 
enhanced weapons to its security personnel is not considered a transfer 
of those weapons as specified under ATF's regulations in 27 CFR part 
479, provided the enhanced weapons remain within the site of a 
facility.
    (ii) Remaining within the site of a facility means within the site 
boundary, as defined by the licensee's safety analysis report submitted 
to the NRC.
    (2) A licensee's issuance of enhanced weapons to its security 
personnel for the permissible reasons specified in paragraph (m)(3) of 
this section, for activities that are outside of the facility's site 
boundary, are not considered a transfer under the provisions of 26 
U.S.C. chapter 53, as specified under ATF's regulations in 27 CFR part 
479, provided--
    (i) The security personnel possessing the enhanced weapons are 
employees of the licensee; or
    (ii) The security personnel possessing the enhanced weapons are 
employees of a contractor providing security services to the licensee 
and these contractor security personnel are under the direction of, and 
accompanied by, an authorized licensee employee.
    (3) Permissible reasons for removal of enhanced weapons from the 
licensee's facility include--
    (i) Removal of enhanced weapons for use at a firing range or 
training facility that is used by the licensee in accordance with its 
NRC-approved training and qualification plan for enhanced weapons;
    (ii) Removal of enhanced weapons for use in escorting shipments of

[[Page 15885]]

radioactive material or other property designated under paragraph (c) 
of this section that are being transported to or from the licensee's 
facility; or
    (iii) Removal of an enhanced weapon from a licensee's facility to a 
gunsmith for the purposes of repair or maintenance and the subsequent 
return of the enhanced weapon to the licensee's facility.
    (4) A licensee that has authorized the removal of enhanced weapons 
from its facility for any of the permissible reasons listed under 
paragraph (m)(3) of this section must verify that these weapons are 
returned to the facility upon the completion of the authorized 
activity.
    (5) Removal of enhanced weapons from and/or return of these weapons 
to the licensee's facility must be documented in accordance with the 
records requirements of paragraph (q) of this section.
    (6) Removal of enhanced weapons from a licensee's facility for 
reasons other than those set forth in paragraph (m)(3) of this section 
are considered a transfer as specified under ATF's regulations in 27 
CFR part 479.
    (7) The licensee may only transfer enhanced weapons pursuant to an 
ATF application to transfer and register the weapons that is approved 
by ATF in advance of the transfer, as required by ATF's regulations 
under 27 CFR part 479. Examples of transfers include, but are not 
limited to:
    (i) Sale or disposal of an enhanced weapon to another authorized 
NRC licensee;
    (ii) Sale or disposal of an enhanced weapon to an authorized 
Federal firearms license holder, government agency, or official police 
organization; or
    (iii) Abandonment of an enhanced weapon to ATF.
    (8) Following the completion of their official duties, security 
personnel must either--
    (i) Return issued enhanced weapons to a licensee's authorized 
enhanced weapons storage location, as specified in the licensee's 
physical security plan, or
    (ii) Turn over responsibility for the issued enhanced weapon to 
another on-shift security personnel authorized to use enhanced weapons 
as part of their official duties.
    (9) Enhanced weapons that are not returned to the licensee's 
facility, following permissible removal, must be considered a transfer 
of a weapon under this paragraph, or a stolen or lost weapon under 
paragraph (p) of this section, as applicable. Information on the 
transfer, theft, or loss of an enhanced weapon must be documented, as 
required under paragraph (q) of this section.
    (n) Transport of weapons. (1) Security personnel transporting 
enhanced weapons to or from a firing range or training facility used by 
the licensee must ensure that these weapons are unloaded and locked in 
a secure container during transport. Unloaded weapons and ammunition 
may be transported in the same locked secure container.
    (2) Security personnel transporting enhanced weapons to or from a 
licensee's facility following the completion of, or in preparation for, 
escorting shipments of radioactive material or other property must 
ensure that these weapons are unloaded and locked in a secure container 
during transport. Security personnel may transport unloaded weapons and 
ammunition in the same locked secure container.
    (3) Security personnel using enhanced weapons to protect shipments 
of radioactive material or other property that are being transported to 
or from the licensee's facility must ensure that these weapons are 
maintained in a state of loaded readiness and available for immediate 
use, except when otherwise prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 922(q).
    (4) Security personnel transporting enhanced weapons to or from the 
licensee's facility must also comply with the requirements of Sec.  
73.17 of this part.
    (5) Situations where security personnel transport enhanced weapons 
to or from the licensee's facility are not considered transfers of 
these weapons under ATF's regulations in 27 CFR part 479, provided--
    (i) The security personnel transporting the enhanced weapons are 
employees of the licensee; or
    (ii) The security personnel transporting the enhanced weapons are 
employees of a contractor providing security services to the licensee; 
and these contractor security personnel are under the direction of, and 
accompanied by, an authorized licensee employee.
    (6) For the interstate transportation of enhanced weapons, pursuant 
to this section, the licensee must obtain prior written approval from 
ATF, as required by 27 CFR part 478.
    (o) Periodic inventories of enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees 
possessing enhanced weapons under this section must conduct the 
following periodic accountability inventories of the enhanced weapons 
in their possession to verify the continued presence of each enhanced 
weapon that the licensee is authorized to possess.
    (2)(i) Licensees must conduct a monthly inventory to verify that 
the authorized quantity of enhanced weapons are present at the 
licensee's facility.
    (ii) Licensees must verify the presence of each individual enhanced 
weapon.
    (iii) Licensees that store enhanced weapons in a locked secure 
weapons container (e.g., a ready-service arms locker) located within a 
protected area, vital area, or material access area may verify the 
presence of an intact tamper-indicating device (TID) on the locked 
secure weapons container, instead of verifying the presence of each 
individual weapon.
    (iv) Verification of the presence of enhanced weapons via the 
presence of an intact TID must be documented in the inventory records 
and include the serial number of the TID.
    (v) Licensees may use electronic technology (e.g., bar-codes on the 
weapons) in conducting such inventories.
    (vi) The time interval from the previous monthly inventory must not 
exceed 30 + 7 days.
    (3)(i) Licensees must conduct an annual inventory to verify that 
each authorized enhanced weapon is present at the licensee's facility 
through the verification of the serial number of each enhanced weapon.
    (ii) Licensees must verify the presence of each enhanced weapon 
located in a locked secure weapons container (e.g., a ready-service 
arms locker) through the verification of the serial number of each 
enhanced weapon located within the container.
    (iii) The time interval from the previous annual inventory must not 
exceed 365 + 7 days.
    (iv) Licensees conducting an annual inventory may substitute this 
annual inventory in lieu of conducting the normal monthly inventory for 
that particular month, as required under paragraph (o) of this section.
    (4) Licensees must conduct periodic inventories of enhanced weapons 
using either a two-person team or a single individual, provided the 
individual is subject to the licensee's behavioral observation or human 
reliability programs.
    (5) The results of any periodic inventories of enhanced weapons 
must be retained in accordance with the records requirements of 
paragraph (q) of this section.
    (6) Licensees must inventory any locked secure weapons container 
that was sealed with a TID and has subsequently been opened and must

[[Page 15886]]

verify the serial number for each of the enhanced weapons stored in the 
weapons container. The inventoried weapons container must be relocked 
and resealed with a new TID and the new TID's serial number must be 
recorded in the periodic inventory records. The inventory must be 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (o)(4) of 
this section.
    (i) Licensees must use TIDs with unique serial numbers on locked 
secure weapons containers containing enhanced weapons.
    (ii) Licensees must store unused TIDs in a manner similar to other 
security access control devices (e.g., keys, lock cores, etc.) and must 
maintain a log of issued TID serial numbers.
    (7) Licensees must resolve any discrepancies identified during 
periodic inventories within 24 hours of their identification; 
otherwise, the discrepancy must be treated as a stolen or lost enhanced 
weapon and notifications must be made in accordance with paragraph (p) 
of this section.
    (8) As an exception, enhanced weapons that are offsite for 
authorized purposes, in accordance with paragraphs (m) and (n) of this 
section, are required to be included in a periodic inventory but are 
not considered lost or stolen solely because they are offsite. The 
licensee must document the absence of these weapon(s) from the 
licensee's facility in the report of the results of a completed 
periodic enhanced weapons inventory, as required under paragraph (q) of 
this section.
    (p) Stolen or lost enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees that discover 
that any enhanced weapons they are authorized to possess under this 
section are stolen or lost, must notify the NRC and local law 
enforcement officials in accordance with Sec.  73.1200 of this part.
    (2) Licensees that discover that any enhanced weapons they are 
authorized to possess under this section are stolen or lost are also 
required to notify ATF in accordance with ATF's regulations in 27 CFR 
part 479.
    (q) Records requirements. (1) Licensees possessing enhanced weapons 
under this section must maintain records relating to the receipt, 
transfer, transportation, and inventory of such enhanced weapons.
    (2) Licensees must maintain the following minimum records regarding 
the receipt of each enhanced weapon, including--
    (i) Date of receipt of the weapon;
    (ii) Name and address of the transferor who transferred the weapon 
to the licensee;
    (iii) Name of the manufacturer of the weapon, or the name of the 
importer (for weapons manufactured outside the U.S.); and
    (iv) Serial number, type, and caliber or gauge of the weapon.
    (3) Licensees must maintain the following minimum records regarding 
the transfer of each enhanced weapon--
    (i) Date of shipment of the weapon;
    (ii) Name and address of the transferee who received the weapon; 
and
    (iii) Serial number, type, and caliber or gauge of the weapon.
    (4) Licensees must maintain the following minimum records regarding 
the transportation of each enhanced weapon away from the licensee's 
facility--
    (i) Date of departure of the weapon;
    (ii) Date of return of the weapon;
    (iii) Purpose of the weapon's removal from the facility;
    (iv) Name(s) of the security personnel transporting the weapon;
    (v) Name(s) of the licensee employee accompanying and directing the 
transportation, where the security personnel transporting the weapons 
are employees of a security contractor providing security services to 
the licensee;
    (vi) Name of the person/facility to whom the weapon is being 
transported; and
    (vii) Serial number, type, and caliber or gauge of the weapon.
    (5) Licensees possessing enhanced weapons pursuant to this section 
must document in these records the discovery that any of these enhanced 
weapons are stolen or lost.
    (6) Licensees possessing enhanced weapons pursuant to this section 
must maintain records relating to the inventories of enhanced weapons 
for a period of up to one year after the licensee's authority to 
possess enhanced weapons is terminated, suspended, or revoked under 
paragraph (r) of this section and all enhanced weapons have been 
transferred from the licensee's facility.
    (7) Licensees may integrate any records required by this section 
with records maintained by the licensee pursuant to ATF's regulations.
    (8) Licensees must make any records required by this section 
available to NRC staff and ATF staff upon request.
    (r) Termination, modification, suspension, or revocation of Section 
161A authority.
    (1)(i) Licensees seeking to terminate their stand-alone preemption 
authority must apply to the NRC in writing, under oath or affirmation, 
and in accordance with Sec.  73.4.
    (ii) Licensees seeking to terminate their combined enhanced weapons 
authority and preemption authority must apply to the NRC in writing, 
under oath or affirmation, and in accordance with Sec.  73.4, and the 
license amendment provisions of Sec.  50.90, Sec.  70.34, or Sec.  
72.56 of this chapter, as applicable. These licensees must have 
transferred or disposed of any enhanced weapons, in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph (m) of this section, prior to the NRC approval 
of a request for termination of their authority.
    (2) Licensees seeking to modify their combined preemption authority 
and enhanced weapons authority, issued under this section, must apply 
to the NRC in writing, under oath or affirmation, and in accordance 
with Sec.  73.4, and the license amendment provisions of Sec.  50.90, 
Sec.  70.34, or Sec.  72.56 of this chapter, as applicable. Licensees' 
applications to modify their enhanced weapons authority must provide 
the information required under paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section.
    (i) Licensees seeking to replace their enhanced weapons with 
different types of enhanced weapons must amend their original 
application to include the different quantities, types, and calibers or 
gauges of the new enhanced weapons. This amended application must 
include a plan to transfer or dispose of their existing enhanced 
weapons once the new weapons are deployed.
    (ii) Licensees adding additional quantities or types of enhanced 
weapons do not require a transfer or disposal plan.
    (3) The Commission may revoke, suspend, or modify, in whole or in 
part, any approval issued under this section for any material false 
statement in the application or other statement of fact required of the 
licensee; or because of conditions revealed by the application or 
statement of fact or any report, record, inspection, or other means 
that would warrant the Commission refusing to grant approval of an 
original application; or for violation of, or for failure to observe, 
any of the terms and provisions of the act, regulations, license, 
permit, approval, or order of the Commission, or for any other reason 
that the Commission determines is appropriate.
    (4) Licensees that have their stand-alone preemption authority or 
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority 
terminated, suspended, or revoked may reapply for such authority by 
filing a new

[[Page 15887]]

application under the provisions of this section.
    (5) The NRC will notify ATF within 3 business days after taking 
action to terminate, modify, suspend, or revoke a licensee's stand-
alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority and 
enhanced weapons authority issued under this section.
    (s) Withdrawal of orders. For licensees that received an order 
issued under Section 161A (42 U.S.C. 2201a) prior to April 13, 2023, 
the following provisions apply.
    (1) Licensees are not required to reapply for this authority.
    (2) The requirements of such orders are superseded in their 
entirety by the requirements of this section and Sec.  73.17 of this 
part.
    (3) Licensees must complete their transition from the confirmatory 
orders to the requirements of this rule by January 8, 2024.
    (4) On January 8, 2024 the following orders are withdrawn:
    (i) Order EA-13-092, ``Order Designating an Interim Class of NRC-
Licensed Facilities that are Eligible to Apply to the Commission for 
Authorization to Use the Authority Granted Under the Provisions of 
Section 161a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended'' (78 FR 
35984; June 14, 2013);
    (ii) Confirmatory Order EA-15-006, ``In the Matter of BWXT Nuclear 
Operations Group, Inc.'' (80 FR 53588; September 4, 2015);
    (iii) Confirmatory Orders EA-14-135 and EA-14-136, ``In the Matter 
of Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.; Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, 
LLC; and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit (Nos. 1, 2, and 3)'' (81 FR 2247; January 15, 2016);
    (iv) Confirmatory Order EA-14-137, ``In the Matter of Entergy 
Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (James A. 
Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant)'' (81 FR 2247; January 15, 2016);
    (v) Confirmatory Order EA-14-138, ``In the Matter of Exelon 
Generation Company, LLC (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 
2)'' (81 FR 2247; January 15, 2016);
    (vi) Confirmatory Order EA-14-139, ``In the Matter of Exelon 
Generation Company, LLC (R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant)'' (81 FR 2247; 
January 15, 2016);
    (vii) Confirmatory Order EA-14-134, ``In the Matter of Pacific Gas 
and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, 
and DCPP Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation)'' (81 FR 2247; 
January 15, 2016); and
    (viii) Confirmatory Order EA-14-140, ``In the Mater of Southern 
California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 
2 and 3, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation)'' (81 FR 
2247; January 15, 2016).


Sec.  73.17  Firearms background checks for armed security personnel.

    (a) Purpose. This section presents the requirements for completion 
of firearms background checks pursuant to Section 161A of the Atomic 
Energy Act, as amended (AEA) (42 U.S.C. 2201a), for security personnel 
whose official duties require access to covered weapons at Commission-
designated classes of facilities, radioactive material, or other 
property specified in Sec.  73.15(c). Firearms background checks are 
intended to verify that such armed security personnel are not 
prohibited from receiving, possessing, transporting, importing, or 
using covered weapons under applicable Federal, State, or local law.
    (b) General Requirements. (1) Licensees that have applied to the 
NRC under Sec.  73.15 of this part for stand-alone preemption authority 
or for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority 
must comply with the provisions of this section. Such licensees must 
establish a Firearms Background Check Plan. Licensees must establish 
this plan as part of their overall NRC-approved Training and 
Qualification plan for security personnel whose official duties require 
access to covered weapons.
    (2) For the purposes of Sec.  73.15 and this section only, the term 
security personnel whose official duties require access to covered 
weapons includes, but is not limited to, the following groups of 
individuals:
    (i) Security officers using covered weapons to protect a 
Commission-designated facility, radioactive material, or other 
property;
    (ii) Security officers undergoing firearms training on covered 
weapons;
    (iii) Firearms-training instructors conducting training on covered 
weapons;
    (iv) Armorers conducting maintenance, repair, and testing of 
covered weapons;
    (v) Individuals with access to armories and weapons storage lockers 
containing covered weapons;
    (vi) Individuals conducting inventories of enhanced weapons;
    (vii) Individuals removing enhanced weapons from the site for 
repair, training, and escort-duty purposes; and
    (viii) Individuals whose duties require access to covered weapons, 
whether the individuals are employed directly by the licensee or 
employed by a security contractor who provides security services to the 
licensee.
    (3) The Firearms Background Check Plan must describe how the 
licensee will accomplish the following objectives:
    (i) Completing firearms background checks for all security 
personnel whose duties require, or will require, access to covered 
weapons;
    (ii) Establishing a process for completing initial, periodic, and 
break-in-service firearms background checks;
    (iii) Defining the training objectives and modules for security 
personnel who are subject to firearms background checks;
    (iv) Completing the initial and periodic training for security 
personnel whose official duties require access to covered weapons;
    (v) Maintaining records of completed firearms background checks, 
required training, and any supporting documents;
    (vi) Maintaining records of a decision to remove security personnel 
from duties requiring access to covered weapons, due to the 
identification or occurrence of any Federal or State disqualifying 
status condition or disqualifying event; and
    (vii) Developing and implementing procedures for notifying the NRC 
of the removal of security personnel from access to covered weapons, 
due to the identification or occurrence of any Federal or State 
disqualifying status condition or disqualifying event.
    (4)(i) Licensees that have applied to the NRC for stand-alone 
preemption authority or for combined preemption authority and enhanced 
weapons authority under Sec.  73.15 must ensure that a satisfactory 
firearms background check has been completed for all security personnel 
whose official duties require access to covered weapons.
    (ii) Security personal may continue to have access to covered 
weapons pending the results of the initial firearms background check.
    (5) Only licensees that have applied for Section 161A authority 
under Sec.  73.15 may conduct the firearms background checks required 
by this section.
    (6) The licensee must commence firearms background checks only 
after receiving notification from the NRC that the agency has accepted 
for review its application for stand-alone preemption authority or for 
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.

[[Page 15888]]

    (7)(i) Applicants for a license who have also submitted an 
application for Section 161A authority must only commence firearms 
background checks after:
    (A) The NRC has issued its license; and
    (B) The NRC has accepted its application for stand-alone preemption 
authority or for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons 
authority for review.
    (ii) Subsequent to April 13, 2023, applicants for a license who 
have also applied for Section 161A authority and been issued their 
license must ensure that a satisfactory firearms background check (as 
defined in Sec.  73.2) has been completed for all security personnel 
who require access to covered weapons, before the licensee's initial 
receipt of any source material, special nuclear material, or 
radioactive material specified under the license.
    (8) In response to an adverse firearms background check (as defined 
in Sec.  73.2),
    (i) The licensee must remove, without delay, from duties requiring 
access to covered weapons, any security personnel who receive a 
``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response.
    (ii) If the security personnel to be removed is on duty at the time 
of removal, then the licensee must fill the vacated position within the 
timeframe specified in its physical security plan.
    (9)(i) The licensee must complete a new satisfactory firearms 
background check for any of its security personnel that has had a 
break-in-service greater than 1 week.
    (ii) The licensee must complete a new satisfactory firearms 
background check if the security personnel has transferred from a 
different licensee.
    (iii) A break-in-service means the security personnel's cessation 
of employment with the licensee or its security contractor, 
notwithstanding that the previous licensee completed a satisfactory 
firearms background check on the individual within the last 5 years.
    (iv) Exceptions: (A) For the purposes of this section, a break-in-
service does not include a security personnel's temporary active duty 
with the U.S. military reserves or National Guard.
    (B) The licensee, in lieu of completing a new satisfactory firearms 
background check, may instead verify, via an industry-wide information-
sharing database, that the security personnel has completed a 
satisfactory firearms background check within the previous 12 months, 
provided that this previous firearms background check included a duty 
station location in the State or Territory where the licensee (who 
would otherwise be accomplishing the firearms background check) is 
located or the activity is solely occurring.
    (10) Changes in the licensee's ownership or its security contractor 
services are not considered a break-in-service for current security 
personnel whose duties require access to covered weapons. Licensees are 
not required to conduct a new firearms background check for these 
security personnel.
    (11) With regard to accomplishing the requirements for other 
background (e.g., criminal history records) checks or personnel 
security investigations under the NRC's access authorization or 
personal security clearance program requirements of this chapter, the 
licensee may not substitute a satisfactory firearms background check in 
lieu of completing these other required background checks or security 
investigations.
    (12) If a licensee has completed initial satisfactory firearms 
background checks pursuant to an NRC order issued before April 13, 
2023, then the licensee is not required to conduct a new initial 
firearms background check for its current security personnel. However, 
the licensee must conduct initial firearms background checks on new 
security personnel and periodic and break-in-service firearms 
background checks on current security personnel in accordance with the 
provisions of this section.
    (13) A licensee who withdraws its application for Section 161A 
authority or who has its application disapproved by the NRC, must 
discontinue conducting firearms background checks.
    (14) A licensee whose authority under Section 161A has been 
rescinded or whose authority has been revoked by the NRC must 
discontinue conducting firearms background checks.
    (c) [Reserved]
    (d) Firearms background check requirements. A firearms background 
check for security personnel must include--
    (1) A check of the individual's fingerprints against the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) fingerprint system; and
    (2) A check of the individual's identifying information against the 
FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).
    (e) Firearms background check submittals. (1) Licensees must submit 
to the NRC, in accordance with Sec.  73.4, for all security personnel 
requiring a firearms background check under this section--
    (i) A set of fingerprint impressions, in accordance with paragraph 
(k) of this section; and
    (ii) A completed NRC Form 754.
    (2) In lieu of submitting a copy of each individual completed NRC 
Form 754 to the NRC, licensees may submit a single document 
consolidating the NRC Forms 754 data for multiple security personnel.
    (3) Licensees submitting to the NRC via an electronic method an 
individual NRC Form 754 or consolidated data from multiple NRC Forms 
754 must ensure that any personally identifiable information contained 
within these documents is protected in accordance with Sec.  2.390 of 
this chapter.
    (4) Licensees must retain a copy of all NRC Forms 754 submitted to 
the NRC for one year subsequent to the termination or denial of an 
individual's access to covered weapons.
    (5) Licensees that are Federal agencies with authority to submit 
fingerprints directly to the FBI may do so provided that they also 
include the requested information from NRC Form 754. However, such 
licensees are still required to comply with the other provisions of 
this section.
    (f) Periodic firearms background checks. (1) Licensees must 
complete a satisfactory periodic firearms background check at least 
once every 5 calendar years for security personnel whose continuing 
duties require access to covered weapons.
    (2) Licensees must complete a periodic firearms background check 
within the same calendar month as the initial, or most recent, firearms 
background check with an allowance period to midnight (local time) of 
the last day of the calendar month of expiration.
    (3) The licensee may conduct periodic firearms background checks at 
an interval of less than once every 5 calendar years, at its 
discretion.
    (4)(i) Licensees may assign security personnel to duties requiring 
access to covered weapons while the results of the periodic firearms 
background check are pending.
    (ii) Licensees must remove security personnel from duties requiring 
access to covered weapons if the satisfactory completion of a periodic 
firearms background check does not occur before the expiration of the 
allowance period.
    (5) Licensees must remove, without delay, from duties requiring 
access to covered weapons, any security personnel who receive either a 
``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response during a periodic firearms 
background check.
    (g) Notification of removal. (1) Licensees must notify the NRC 
Headquarters Operations Center by telephone within 72 hours after 
removing security personnel from duties

[[Page 15889]]

requiring access to covered weapons due to the identification or 
occurrence of any Federal or State disqualifying status condition or 
disqualifying event that would prohibit them from possessing, 
receiving, or using firearms or ammunition. Licensees must contact the 
NRC Headquarters Operations Center at the phone numbers specified in 
Table 1 of appendix A of this part.
    (2) The NRC will subsequently inform the FBI of any notifications 
received under this paragraph.
    (h) Security personnel responsibilities. Security personnel 
assigned to duties requiring access to covered weapons must notify the 
licensee's security management within 72 hours of the identification or 
occurrence of any Federal or State disqualifying status condition or 
disqualifying event that would prohibit the individual from possessing, 
receiving, or using firearms or ammunition. This requirement is 
applicable to security personnel directly employed by the licensee or 
employed by a contractor providing security services to the licensee.
    (i) [Reserved]
    (j) Training for security personnel subject to firearms background 
checks on disqualifying status conditions and disqualifying events. (1) 
Licensees must include, within their Firearms Background Check Plan, 
training modules for security personnel assigned to official duties 
requiring access to covered weapons that provide training on the 
following topics:
    (i) Federal disqualifying status conditions or disqualifying events 
specified in 27 CFR 478.32;
    (ii) Applicable State disqualifying status conditions or 
disqualifying events;
    (iii) The responsibility of security personnel subject to a 
firearms background check and assigned to official duties that require 
access to covered weapons to promptly notify their employing licensee 
of the occurrence of any disqualifying status condition or 
disqualifying event; and
    (iv) Information for appealing an adverse firearms background check 
(i.e., a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response) to the FBI.
    (2) Licensees must conduct periodic refresher training on these 
modules at an annual frequency for security personnel assigned official 
duties requiring access to covered weapons.
    (k) Procedures for processing fingerprint checks. (1) Licensees, 
using an appropriate method listed in Sec.  73.4, must manually or 
electronically submit to the NRC one completed, legible standard 
fingerprint card (FBI Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, 
other electronic fingerprint records for each individual requiring a 
firearms background check. Information on how to obtain FBI Form FD-258 
and the process for manual or electronic submission of fingerprint 
records to the NRC is on the NRC's public website at: https://www.nrc.gov/security/chp.html.
    (2) Licensees must indicate on the fingerprint card (or other 
electronic fingerprint records) that the submittal is part of a 
firearms background check for personnel whose duties require, or will 
require, access to covered weapons. Licensees must add the following 
information to the FBI Form FD-258 fingerprint card or the electronic 
fingerprint records submitted to the NRC:
    (i) For fingerprints submitted to the NRC for the completion of a 
firearms background check only, the licensee must enter the terms 
``MDNRCNICZ'' in the ``ORI'' field and ``Firearms'' in the ``Reasons 
Fingerprinted'' field of the FBI Form FD-258 or the electronic 
fingerprint records submitted to the NRC.
    (ii) For fingerprints submitted to the NRC for the completion of 
both an access authorization check or personnel security clearance 
check and a firearms background check, the licensee must enter the 
terms ``MDNRC000Z'' in the ``ORI'' field and ``Employment and 
Firearms'' in the ``Reasons Fingerprinted'' field of the FBI Form FD-
258 or the electronic fingerprint records submitted to the NRC.
    (3) Licensees must establish procedures that produce high-quality 
fingerprint images, cards, and records with a minimal rejection rate.
    (4) The NRC will review fingerprints for firearms background checks 
for completeness. Any FBI Form FD-258 or other electronic fingerprint 
records containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to the 
licensee for correction. The fee for processing fingerprint checks 
includes one free resubmission if the initial submission is returned by 
the FBI because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The 
one free resubmission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number 
reflected on the resubmission. If additional submissions are necessary, 
they will be treated as an initial submittal and require a second 
payment of the processing fee. The payment of a new processing fee 
entitles the submitter to an additional free resubmittal, if necessary. 
Previously rejected submissions may not be included with the third 
submission because the submittal will be rejected automatically.
    (5) The NRC will forward to the submitting licensee all data 
received from the FBI as a result of the licensee's application(s) for 
a firearms background check. This will include the FBI's ``proceed,'' 
``delayed,'' or ``denied'' NICS response and the NICS transaction 
number.
    (l) [Reserved]
    (m) Fees. (1) Fees for the processing of firearms background checks 
are due upon application. The fee for the processing of a firearms 
background check consists of a fingerprint fee and a NICS check fee. 
Licensees must submit payment with the application for the processing 
of fingerprints, and payment must be made by corporate check, certified 
check, cashier's check, money order, or electronic payment, made 
payable to ``U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.'' Combined payment for 
multiple applications is acceptable. Licensees can find fee information 
for firearms background checks on the NRC's public website at: https://www.nrc.gov/security/chp.html.
    (2) The application fee for the processing of fingerprint checks is 
the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or 
other fingerprint records submitted by the NRC on behalf of a licensee, 
and an administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC. The NRC 
processing fee covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling 
of licensee fingerprint submissions.
    (3) The application fee for the processing of NICS checks is an 
administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC.
    (4) Licensees that are also Federal agencies and submit 
fingerprints and information contained in the NRC Form 754 directly to 
the FBI are not assessed an application fee by the NRC.
    (n) Processing of the NICS portion of a firearms background check. 
(1) The NRC will forward the information contained in the submitted NRC 
Form 754 to the FBI for evaluation against the NICS databases. Upon 
completion of the NICS portion of the firearms background check, the 
FBI will inform the NRC of the results with one of three responses 
under 28 CFR part 25; ``proceed,'' ``delayed,'' or ``denied,'' and the 
associated NICS transaction number (NTN). The NRC will forward these 
results and the associated NTN to the submitting licensee.
    (2) Licensees that are Federal agencies and submit fingerprints and 
information contained in the NRC Form 754 directly to the FBI for 
evaluation against the NICS databases will receive one of three 
responses under 28 CFR part 25;

[[Page 15890]]

``proceed,'' ``delayed,'' or ``denied,'' and the associated NTN.
    (3) The submitting licensee must provide these results to the 
individual who completed the NRC Form 754.
    (o) [Reserved]
    (p) Appeals and resolution of adverse firearms background checks. 
(1) Licensees may not assign security personnel who have received a 
``denied'' or a ``delayed'' NICS response to any official duties 
requiring access to covered weapons--
    (i) During the pendency of an appeal to the FBI of a ``denied'' 
NICS response; or
    (ii) During the pendency of providing to the FBI any necessary 
additional information to resolve a ``delayed'' NICS response.
    (2) Licensees must provide the NICS Transaction Number (NTN) or 
NTNs associated with the adverse firearms background check to the 
affected individual. It is the affected individual's responsibility to 
initiate an appeal or resolution of a ``delayed'' or ``denied'' NICS 
response.
    (3) Licensees may assign security personnel to official duties 
requiring access to covered weapons subsequent to the individual's 
satisfactorily resolving a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response.
    (q) Protection of information. (1) Each licensee that obtains a 
firearms background check and NRC Form 754 information on individuals 
under this section shall establish and maintain a system of files and 
procedures to protect these records and any enclosed personally 
identifiable information (PII) from unauthorized disclosure.
    (2) The licensee may not disclose these records or PII to persons 
other than the subject individual, his/her representative, or to those 
with a need to have access to the information in performing assigned 
duties in the process of granting access to covered weapons. No 
individual authorized to have access to this information may 
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a 
need to know.
    (3) The record or PII may be disclosed to an appropriate Federal or 
State agency in the performance of its official duties, in the course 
of an administrative or judicial proceeding, or in response to a 
Congressional inquiry.
    (4) The licensee must make firearms background check records and 
NRC Forms 754 obtained under this section available for examination by 
an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with 
applicable regulations and laws.
    (5) The record obtained on an individual from a firearms background 
check may be transferred to another licensee--
    (i) Upon an individual's written request to transfer the 
individual's record to the licensee identified in the written request; 
and
    (ii) Upon verification from the gaining licensee of the 
individual's name, date of birth, social security number, and sex.
    (r) Withdrawal of orders. In accordance with the provisions of 
Sec.  73.15(s), orders issued under Section 161A (42 U.S.C. 2201a) 
prior to April 13, 2023 are withdrawn. Accordingly, the requirements of 
those orders are superseded in their entirety by the requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  73.15 and 73.17.


Sec.  73.20  [Designated as Subpart C]

0
22. Designate Sec.  73.20 as subpart C and add a heading for the newly 
created subpart C to read as follows:

Subpart C--General Performance Objective for Protection of 
Strategic Special Nuclear Material


Sec.  Sec.  73.21 through 73.23  [Designated as Subpart D]

0
23. Designate Sec. Sec.  73.21 through 73.23 as subpart D and add a 
heading for the newly created subpart D to read as follows:

Subpart D--Protection of Safeguards Information


Sec.  73.22  [Amended]

0
24. In Sec.  73.22(f)(3), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''.


Sec.  73.23  [Amended]

0
25. In Sec.  73.23(f)(3), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''.


Sec.  Sec.  73.24 through 73.38  [Designated as Subpart E]

0
26. Designate Sec. Sec.  73.24 through 73.38 as subpart E and add a 
heading for the newly created subpart E to read as follows:

Subpart E--Physical Protection Requirements of Special Nuclear 
Material and Spent Nuclear Fuel in Transit


Sec.  73.27  [Amended]

0
27. In Sec.  73.27 (c), remove the reference ``Sec.  73.71'' and add in 
its place the reference ``Sec. Sec.  73.1200 and 73.1205''.

0
28. In Sec.  73.37:
0
a. In paragraphs (b)(3)(iii) and (b)(3)(v)(C), remove the reference 
``73.71'' and add in its place the reference ``73.1200''; and
0
b. Add paragraph (b)(3)(viii).
    The additions and revision read as follows:


Sec.  73.37  Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor 
fuel in transit.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (viii)(A) The licensee must ensure that the firearms background 
check requirements of Sec.  73.17 are met for all armed escorts whose 
official duties require access to covered weapons or who inventory 
enhanced weapons.
    (B) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to 
licensees subject to this section who are also subject to the firearms 
background check provisions of Sec.  73.17.
    (C) The provisions of this paragraph are not applicable to members 
of local law enforcement agencies serving as armed escorts or ship's 
officers serving as unarmed escorts.
* * * * *


Sec.  Sec.  73.40 through 73.55  [Designated as Subpart F]

0
29. Designate Sec. Sec.  73.40 through 73.55 as subpart F and add a 
heading for newly created subpart F to read as follows:.

Subpart F--Physical Protection Requirements at Fixed Sites

0
30. In Sec.  73.46, add paragraph (b)(13) to read as follows:


Sec.  73.46  Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, 
components, and procedures.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (13)(i) The licensee must ensure that the firearms background check 
requirements of Sec.  73.17 are met for all members of the security 
organization whose official duties require access to covered weapons or 
who inventory enhanced weapons.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to 
licensees subject to this section who are also subject to the firearms 
background check provisions of Sec.  73.17 of this part.
* * * * *

0
31. In Sec.  73.51:
0
a. In paragraph (d)(13), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1210''.
0
b. Add paragraph (b)(4), a heading to paragraph (e), and paragraph (f) 
to read as follows:
    The additions and revision read as follows:

[[Page 15891]]

Sec.  73.51  Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (4)(i) The licensee must ensure that the firearms background check 
requirements of Sec.  73.17 of this part are met for all members of the 
security organization whose official duties require access to covered 
weapons or who inventory enhanced weapons.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to 
licensees subject to this section who are also subject to the firearms 
background check provisions of Sec.  73.17 of this part.
* * * * *
    (e) GROA exemption. * * *
    (f) Response requirements. Licensees must train each armed member 
of the security organization with access to enhanced weapons on the use 
of deadly force when the armed member of the security organization has 
a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force is necessary in self-
defense or in the defense of others, or any other circumstances as 
authorized by applicable State or Federal law.

0
32. In Sec.  73.55, add paragraph (b)(12) and revise paragraph (p)(3) 
to read as follows:


Sec.  73.55  Requirements for physical protection of licensed 
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (12)(i) The licensee must ensure that the firearms background check 
requirements of Sec.  73.17 of this part are met for all members of the 
security organization whose official duties require access to covered 
weapons or who inventory enhanced weapons.
    (ii) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to 
licensees subject to this section that are also subject to the firearms 
background check provisions of Sec.  73.17 of this part.
* * * * *
    (p) * * *
    (3) The suspension of security measures must be reported and 
documented in accordance with the provisions of Sec. Sec.  73.1200 and 
73.1205 of this part.
* * * * *


 Sec. Sec.  73.56 through 73.67  [Designated as Subpart G]

0
33. Designate Sec. Sec.  73.56 through 73.67 as subpart G and add a 
heading to the newly created subpart G to read as follows:

Subpart G--Access Authorization and Access Control Requirements for 
the Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material

0
34. In Sec.  73.67, revise paragraphs (e)(3)(vii) and (g)(3)(iii) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  73.67  Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the 
physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low 
strategic significance.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (vii) Notify the NRC Operations Center after the discovery of the 
loss of the shipment and after recovery of or accounting for such lost 
shipment, in accordance with the provisions of Sec. Sec.  73.1200 and 
73.1205 of this part.
* * * * *
    (g) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii)(A) Immediately conduct a trace investigation of any shipment 
that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time; and
    (B) Notify the NRC Operations Center after the discovery of the 
loss of the shipment and after recovery of or accounting for such lost 
shipment, in accordance with the provisions of Sec. Sec.  73.1200 and 
73.1205 of this part.
* * * * *


Sec. Sec.  73.70 through 73.75  [Designated as Subpart H]

0
35. Designate Sec. Sec.  73.70 through 73.75 as subpart H and add a 
heading to newly created subpart H to read as follows:

Subpart H--Records and Postings


Sec.  73.71  [Reserved]

0
36. Remove and reserve Sec.  73.71.


Sec. Sec.  73.77 through 73.81  [Designated as Subpart I]

0
37. Designate Sec. Sec.  73.77 through 73.81 as subpart I and add a 
heading to newly created subpart I to read as follows:

Subpart I--Enforcement

Subparts J through S [Reserved]

0
38. Add and reserve subparts J through S.

0
39. Add subpart T to read as follows:

Subpart T--Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping

Sec.
73.1200 Notification of physical security events.
73.1205 Written follow-up reports of physical security events.
73.1210 Recordkeeping of physical security events.
73.1215 Suspicious activity reports.


Sec.  73.1200  Notification of physical security events.

    (a) 15-minute notifications--facilities. Each licensee subject to 
the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.45, Sec.  73.46, Sec.  73.51, 
or Sec.  73.55 of this part must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations 
Center, as soon as possible but within 15 minutes after--
    (1) The licensee's initiation of a security response in accordance 
with its safeguards contingency plan or protective strategy, based on 
an imminent or actual hostile action against a licensee's facility; or
    (2) The licensee's notification by law enforcement or government 
officials of a potential hostile action or act of sabotage anticipated 
within the next 12 hours against a licensee's facility.
    (3) Licensee notifications to the NRC must:
    (i) Identify the facility's name; and
    (ii) Briefly describe the nature of the hostile action or event, 
including:
    (A) The type of hostile action or event (e.g., armed assault, 
vehicle bomb, bomb threat, sabotage, etc.); and
    (B) The current status (i.e., imminent, in progress, or 
neutralized).
    (4) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (5) The licensee is not required to notify the NRC of security 
responses initiated as a result of threat or warning information 
communicated to the licensee from the NRC.
    (6) The licensee's request for immediate local law enforcement 
agency (LLEA) assistance or initiation of a contingency response may 
take precedence over the notification to the NRC. However, in such 
instances, the licensee must notify the NRC as soon as possible 
thereafter.
    (b) 15-minute notifications--shipments. Each licensee subject to 
the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.25, Sec.  73.26, or Sec.  73.37 
or its designated movement control center must notify the NRC 
Headquarters Operations Center, as soon as possible but within 15 
minutes after--
    (1) The licensee's initiation of a security response in accordance 
with its safeguards contingency plan or protective strategy, based on 
an imminent or actual hostile action against a shipment of Category I 
SSNM, spent nuclear fuel (SNF), or high-level radioactive waste (HLW); 
or
    (2) The licensee's notification by law enforcement or government 
officials of a potential hostile action or attempted act

[[Page 15892]]

of sabotage anticipated within less than the next 12 hours against a 
shipment of Category I SSNM, SNF, or HLW.
    (3) Licensee notifications to the NRC must:
    (i) Identify the name of the facility making the shipment, the 
material being shipped, and the last known location of the shipment; 
and
    (ii) Briefly describe the nature of the threat or event, including:
    (A) Type of hostile threat or event (e.g., armed assault, vehicle 
bomb, theft of shipment, sabotage, etc.); and
    (B) Threat or event status (i.e., imminent, in progress, or 
neutralized).
    (4) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (5) The licensee is not required to notify the NRC of security 
responses initiated as a result of threat or warning information 
communicated to the licensee from the NRC.
    (6) The licensee's request for immediate LLEA assistance may take 
precedence over the notification to the NRC. However, in such 
instances, the licensee must notify the NRC as soon as possible 
thereafter.
    (c) One-hour notifications--facilities. (1) Each licensee subject 
to the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.45, Sec.  73.46, Sec.  
73.50, Sec.  73.51, Sec.  73.55, Sec.  73.60, or Sec.  73.67 must 
notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as possible but 
no later than 1 hour after the time of discovery of the following 
significant facility security events involving--
    (i) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has 
committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a 
threat to commit or cause:
    (A) The theft or diversion of a Category I, II, or III quantity of 
SSNM or a Category II or III quantity of special nuclear material 
(SNM);
    (B) Significant physical damage to any nuclear power reactor, to a 
facility possessing a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, or to a 
facility storing or disposing of SNF and/or HLW;
    (C) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with any 
nuclear power reactor's controls or with structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) that results in the interruption of normal operation 
of the reactor; or
    (D) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with any 
Category I SSNM facility's SSCs that results in an accidental 
criticality.
    (ii)(A) For licensees required to have a vehicle barrier system 
protecting their facility, the introduction beyond the vehicle barrier 
of a quantity of unauthorized explosives that meets or exceeds the 
relevant facility's adversary characteristics.
    (B) This provision is applicable to facilities where the vehicle 
barrier system protecting the facility is located at the Protected Area 
boundary.
    (iii) The licensee's notification by law enforcement or government 
officials of a potential hostile action or act of sabotage anticipated 
within greater than 12 hours against a licensee's facility.
    (2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (3) Notifications made under paragraph (a) of this section are not 
required to be repeated under this paragraph.
    (4) As an exemption, licensees subject to Sec.  73.50, Sec.  73.60, 
or Sec.  73.67 are not required to make notifications for events listed 
under paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of this section.
    (d) One-hour notifications--shipments. (1) Each licensee subject to 
the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.25, Sec.  73.26, Sec.  73.27, 
Sec.  73.37, or Sec.  73.67 or its designated movement control center 
must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as possible 
but no later than 1 hour after the time of discovery of the following 
significant transportation security events involving--
    (i) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has 
committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a 
threat to commit or cause:
    (A) The theft or diversion of the Category I, II, or III quantity 
of SSNM; a Category II or III quantity of SNM; SNF; or HLW being 
transported;
    (B) Significant physical damage to any vehicle transporting a 
Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, 
or HLW; or
    (C) Significant physical damage to the Category I or II quantity of 
SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW being transported.
    (ii) The discovery of the loss of a shipment of Category I SSNM.
    (iii) The recovery of, or accounting for, a lost shipment of 
Category I SSNM.
    (iv) The licensee's notification by law enforcement or government 
officials of a potential hostile action or attempted act of sabotage 
anticipated within greater than the next 12 hours against a shipment of 
Category I quantities of SSNM, SNF, or HLW.
    (2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (3) Notifications made under paragraph (b) of this section are not 
required to be repeated under this paragraph.
    (e) Four-hour notifications--facilities. (1) Each licensee subject 
to the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.45, Sec.  73.46, Sec.  
73.50, Sec.  73.51, Sec.  73.55, Sec.  73.60, or Sec.  73.67 of this 
part must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within 4 hours 
after time of discovery of the following facility security events 
involving--
    (i) The actual access of an unauthorized person into a facility's 
protected area (PA), vital area (VA), material access area (MAA), or 
controlled access area (CAA);
    (ii) The attempted access of an unauthorized person into a PA, VA, 
MAA, or CAA;
    (iii) The actual introduction of contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA;
    (iv) The attempted introduction of contraband into a PA, VA, or 
MAA.
    (v)(A) The discovery that a weapon that is authorized by the 
licensee's security plan is lost or uncontrolled within a PA, VA, or 
MAA;
    (B) Uncontrolled authorized weapons are defined as weapons that are 
authorized by the licensee's security plan and are not in the 
possession of authorized personnel or are not in an authorized weapons 
storage location;
    (vi) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with 
any nuclear reactor or Category I SSNM facility's controls or SSCs that 
could prevent the implementation of the licensee's protective strategy 
for protecting any target set;
    (vii) The identification or discovery of a previously unrecognized 
or unidentified vulnerability that could prevent the implementation of 
the licensee's protective strategy for protecting any target set; or
    (viii)(A) For licensees required to have a vehicle barrier system 
protecting their facility, the identification or discovery at or beyond 
the vehicle barrier of unauthorized explosives.
    (B) This provision is applicable to facilities where the vehicle 
barrier system protecting the facility is located at a distance from 
the Protected Area boundary greater than that assumed in the facility's 
blast analysis.
    (2) An event related to the licensee's implementation of their 
security program for which a notification was made to local, State, or 
Federal law enforcement officials provided that the event does not 
otherwise require a notification under paragraphs (a) through (h) of 
this section.
    (3)(i) An event involving a law enforcement response to the 
facility that could reasonably be expected to result in public or media 
inquiries and that does not otherwise require a notification under 
paragraphs (a) through (h) of this

[[Page 15893]]

section, or in other NRC regulations such as Sec.  50.72(b)(2)(xi) of 
this chapter.
    (ii) As an exemption, licensees need not report law enforcement 
responses to minor incidents, such as traffic accidents.
    (4) For licensees subject to the provisions of Sec.  73.55 of this 
part, an event involving the licensee's suspension of security 
measures.
    (5) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (6) Notifications made under paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section 
are not required to be repeated under this paragraph.
    (f) Four-hour notifications--shipments. (1) Each licensee subject 
to the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.25, Sec.  73.26, Sec.  
73.27, Sec.  73.37, or Sec.  73.67 or its designated movement control 
center must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within 4 
hours after time of discovery of the following transportation security 
events involving--
    (i) The actual access of an unauthorized person into a transport 
vehicle transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II 
quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
    (ii) The attempted access of an unauthorized person into a 
transport vehicle transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a 
Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
    (iii) The actual access of an unauthorized person into the Category 
I or II quantity of SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW 
being transported;
    (iv) The attempted access of an unauthorized person into the 
Category I or II quantity of SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or 
HLW being transported;
    (v) The actual introduction of contraband into a transport vehicle 
transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II 
quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
    (vi) The attempted introduction of contraband into a transport 
vehicle transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II 
quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
    (vii) The actual introduction of contraband into the Category I or 
II quantity of SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW being 
transported;
    (viii) The attempted introduction of contraband into the Category I 
or II quantity of SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW being 
transported;
    (ix) The discovery of the loss of a shipment of Category II or III 
quantities of SSNM, Category II or III quantities of SNM, SNF, or HLW; 
or
    (x) The recovery of or accounting for a lost shipment of Category 
II or III quantities of SSNM, Category II or III quantities of SNM, 
SNF, or HLW.
    (2) An event related to the licensee's implementation of their 
security program for which a notification was made to local, State, or 
Federal law enforcement officials, provided that the event does not 
otherwise require a notification under paragraphs (a) through (h) of 
this section.
    (3) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (4) Notifications made under paragraphs (b) and (d) of this section 
are not required to be repeated under this paragraph.
    (g) Eight-hour notifications--facilities. (1) Each licensee subject 
to the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.45, Sec.  73.46, Sec.  
73.50, Sec.  73.51, Sec.  73.55, Sec.  73.60, or Sec.  73.67 must 
notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within 8 hours after time 
of discovery of the following facility security program failures 
involving--
    (i) Any failure, degradation, or vulnerability in a security or 
safeguards system, for which compensatory measures have not been 
employed within the required timeframe, that could allow unauthorized 
or undetected access of--
    (A) Unauthorized personnel into a PA, VA, MAA, or CAA; or
    (B) Contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA;
    (ii) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with 
any nuclear power reactor's controls or with SSCs that does not result 
in the interruption of normal operation of the reactor; or
    (iii) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with 
any Category I SSNM facility's SSCs that does not result in the 
interruption of normal operation of the facility or an accidental 
criticality.
    (2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (3) Notifications made under paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of this 
section are not required to be repeated under this paragraph.
    (h) Eight-hour notifications--shipments. (1) Each licensee subject 
to the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.25, Sec.  73.26, Sec.  
73.27, Sec.  73.37, or Sec.  73.67 or its designated movement control 
center must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within 8 
hours after time of discovery of the following transportation security 
program failures involving any failure, degradation, or vulnerability 
in a security or safeguards system, for which compensatory measures 
have not been employed within the required timeframe, that could allow 
unauthorized or undetected access of--
    (i) Personnel or contraband into a transport vehicle transporting a 
Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, 
or HLW; or
    (ii) Personnel or contraband into the Category I or II quantity of 
SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW being transported;
    (2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (3) Notifications made under paragraphs (b), (d), and (f) of this 
section are not required to be repeated under this paragraph.
    (i) through (l) [Reserved]
    (m) Enhanced weapons notifications--stolen or lost. (1) Each 
licensee possessing enhanced weapons in accordance with Sec.  73.15 
must--
    (i) Immediately notify the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) upon discovery of any stolen or lost 
enhanced weapons (see 27 CFR 479.141).
    (ii) Notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as 
possible, but not later than 1 hour, after notification to the ATF of 
the discovery of any stolen or lost enhanced weapons possessed by the 
licensee.
    (iii) Notify the appropriate local law enforcement agency (LLEA) 
officials as soon as possible, but not later than 48 hours, after the 
discovery of stolen or lost enhanced weapons. This notification must be 
made by telephone or in person to the appropriate LLEA officials. 
Licensees must include appropriate point of contact information in 
their security event notification procedures.
    (2) Notifications to the NRC must be made according to paragraph 
(o) of this section, as applicable.
    (n) Enhanced weapons--adverse ATF findings. (1) Each licensee 
possessing enhanced weapons in accordance with Sec.  73.15 must--
    (i) Notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as 
possible, but not later than 24 hours, after receipt of an adverse 
inspection finding, enforcement finding, or other adverse notice from 
the ATF regarding the licensee's possession, receipt, transfer, 
transportation, or storage of enhanced weapons; and
    (ii) Notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as 
possible, but not later than 24 hours after receipt

[[Page 15894]]

of an adverse inspection finding, enforcement finding or other adverse 
notice from the ATF regarding any ATF issued Federal firearms license 
to the NRC licensee.
    (2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this 
section, as applicable.
    (o) Notification process. (1) Each licensee must make the 
telephonic notifications to the NRC required by paragraphs (a) through 
(n) of this section to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center via any 
available telephone system. Commercial telephone numbers for the NRC 
Headquarters Operations Center are specified in Table 1 of appendix A 
of this part.
    (2) Licensees must make required telephonic notifications via any 
method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC 
Headquarters Operations Center or other specified government officials 
within the timeliness requirements of paragraphs (a) through (n) of 
this section, as applicable.
    (3) Notifications required by this section that contain Safeguards 
Information may be made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center 
without using secure communications systems under the exception of 
Sec.  73.22(f)(3) for the communication of emergency or extraordinary 
conditions.
    (4)(i) Notifications required by this section that contain 
classified national security information and/or classified restricted 
data must be made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center using 
secure communications systems appropriate to the classification level 
of the message. Licensees making classified telephonic notifications 
must contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Center at the commercial 
numbers specified in Table 1 of appendix A to this part and request a 
transfer to a secure telephone, as specified in paragraph III of 
appendix A to this part.
    (ii) If the licensee's secure communications capability is 
unavailable (e.g., due to the nature of the security event), the 
licensee must provide to the NRC the information required by this 
section, without revealing or discussing any classified information, in 
order to meet the timeliness requirements of this section. The licensee 
must also indicate to the NRC that its secure communications capability 
is unavailable.
    (iii) Licensees using a non-secure communications capability may be 
directed by the NRC emergency response management, in accordance with 
32 CFR 2001.52(a), to provide classified national security information 
to the NRC over the non-secure system, due to the significance of the 
ongoing security event. In such circumstances, the licensee must 
document this direction and any information provided to the NRC over a 
non-secure communications capability in the follow-up written report 
required in accordance with Sec.  73.1205.
    (5) For events reported under paragraph (a) of this section, the 
NRC may request that the licensee establish and maintain an open and 
continuous communications channel with the NRC Headquarters Operations 
Center as soon as possible.
    (i) Licensees must establish the requested continuous 
communications channel once the licensee has completed other required 
notifications under this section, Sec.  50.72 of this chapter, appendix 
E to part 50 of this chapter, Sec.  70.50 of this chapter; or Sec.  
72.75 of this chapter; as appropriate.
    (ii) Licensees must complete any immediate actions required to 
stabilize the plant, to place the plant in a safe condition, to 
implement defensive measures, or to request assistance from the LLEA.
    (iii) When established, the continuous communications channel must 
be staffed by a knowledgeable individual in the licensee's security, 
operations, or emergency response organizations from a location deemed 
appropriate by the licensee.
    (iv) The continuous communications channel may be established via 
any available telephone system.
    (6) For events reported under paragraph (b) of this section, the 
NRC may request that the licensee or its movement control center 
establish and maintain an open and continuous communications channel 
with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as possible.
    (i) Licensees must establish the requested continuous 
communications channel once the licensee or the movement control center 
has completed other required notifications under this section, Sec.  
50.72 of this chapter, appendix E to part 50 of this chapter, or Sec.  
70.50 of this chapter; Sec.  72.75 of this chapter; or requested 
assistance from the LLEA, as appropriate.
    (ii) When established, the continuous communications channel must 
be staffed by a knowledgeable individual in the licensee's security, 
operations, or emergency response organizations or the movement control 
center monitoring the shipment.
    (iii) The continuous communications channel may be established via 
any available telephone system.
    (7)(i) For events reported under paragraphs (c), (e), (g), and (m) 
of this section, the NRC may request that the licensee establish and 
maintain an open and continuous communications channel with the NRC 
Headquarters Operations Center.
    (ii) When established, the continuous communications channel must 
be staffed by a knowledgeable individual in the licensee's security, 
operations, or emergency response organizations from a location deemed 
appropriate by the licensee.
    (iii) The continuous communications channel may be established via 
any available telephone system.
    (8)(i) For events reported under paragraphs (d), (f), and (h) of 
this section, the NRC may request that the licensee or the movement 
control center establish and maintain an open and continuous 
communications channel with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center.
    (ii) When established, the continuous communications channel must 
be staffed by a knowledgeable individual in the movement control center 
monitoring the shipment.
    (iii) The continuous communications channel may be established via 
any available telephone system.
    (p) Significant supplemental information. Licensees identifying 
significant supplemental information for events reported under 
paragraphs (a) through (h), (m), and (n) of this section, subsequent to 
the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Headquarters Operations 
Center, must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center of such 
supplemental information under paragraph (o) of this section.
    (q) Retraction of previous security event reports. (1) Licensees 
desiring to retract a previous physical security event notification 
made under paragraphs (a) through (h), (m), and (n) of this section, 
which have been determined to be invalid, not reportable in accordance 
with the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (h), (m), and (n) of 
this section, or recharacterized as recordable under Sec.  73.1210 of 
this part (instead of reportable under Sec.  73.1200), must 
telephonically notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center in 
accordance with paragraph (o) of this section and indicate the report 
that is being retracted and the basis for the retraction.
    (2) Invalid, not reportable, or recharacterized events include, but 
are not limited to, events for which the licensee subsequently receives 
new information regarding the event or relevant information from an 
external entity (e.g., the initial information on a reportable event is 
subsequently determined to be incorrect or a law

[[Page 15895]]

enforcement determination is made on the absence of a malevolent 
intent).
    (r) Declaration of emergencies. Licensees notifying the NRC of the 
declaration of an emergency class must do so in accordance with 
Sec. Sec.  50.72, 63.73, 70.50, and 72.75 of this chapter, as 
applicable.
    (s) Elimination of duplication. Licensees with notification 
obligations under paragraphs (a) through (h), (m), and (n) of this 
section and Sec. Sec.  50.72, 63.73, 70.50, and 72.75 of this chapter 
may notify the NRC of events in a single communication. This 
communication must identify each regulation under which the licensee is 
reporting.
    (t) Classified information. Licensee notifications regarding 
security events associated with the deliberate disclosure, theft, loss, 
compromise, or possible compromise of classified documents, 
information, or material must comply with the requirements found in 
Sec.  95.57 of this chapter.


Sec.  73.1205  Written follow-up reports of physical security events.

    (a) General requirements. (1) Licensees making a telephonic 
notification under Sec.  73.1200 of this part must also submit a 
written follow-up report to the NRC within 60 days of such 
notifications, in accordance with Sec.  73.4.
    (2) As an exemption, licensees are not required to submit a written 
follow-up report subsequent to a telephonic notification made--
    (i) Under the provisions of Sec.  73.1200(e) and (f) regarding 
interactions with a Federal, State, or local law-enforcement agency;
    (ii) Under the provisions of Sec.  73.1200(m) regarding lost or 
stolen enhanced weapons; or
    (iii) Under the provisions of Sec.  73.1200(n) regarding adverse 
findings from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF) for enhanced weapons possessed by the licensee.
    (3)(i) Licensees are not required to submit a written follow-up 
report if the licensee subsequently retracts a telephonic notification 
made under Sec.  73.1200 as invalid, not reportable under Sec.  
73.1200, or recharacterized as recordable under Sec.  73.1210 (instead 
of reportable under Sec.  73.1200), and has not yet submitted a written 
follow-up report under this section.
    (ii) If the licensee subsequently retracts a telephonic 
notification made under Sec.  73.1200 after it has submitted a written 
follow-up report under this section, then the licensee must submit a 
revised written follow-up report documenting the retraction.
    (b) Submission criteria. (1) Each licensee must submit to the NRC 
written follow-up reports that contain sufficient information for NRC 
analysis and evaluation and are of a quality that will permit legible 
reproduction and processing.
    (2)(i) Licensees subject to Sec.  50.73 of this chapter must 
prepare the written follow-up report on NRC Form 366.
    (ii) Licensees not subject to Sec.  50.73 of this chapter must 
prepare the written follow-up report in a letter format.
    (3)(i) If significant supplemental information becomes available 
after the submission of the initial written follow-up report, then the 
licensee must submit a revised report with the revisions indicated.
    (ii) The revised written follow-up report must replace the previous 
written report in its entirety. The update must be complete and not be 
limited to only supplementary or revised information.
    (iii) Errors discovered in a written follow-up report must be 
corrected in a revised report with the revisions indicated.
    (c) Contents. A written follow-up report must contain:
    (1) A brief abstract describing the major occurrences during the 
event or condition, including all component or system failures that 
contributed to the event or condition, and significant corrective 
actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence.
    (2) A clear, specific, narrative description of what occurred so 
that a knowledgeable reader conversant with general security program 
requirements, but not familiar with the security requirements for the 
specific facility or activity, can understand the complete event.
    (3) The narrative description must include, as a minimum, the 
following information, as applicable--
    (i) The date and time the event or condition was discovered;
    (ii) The date and time the event or condition occurred;
    (iii) The affected structures, systems, components, equipment, or 
procedures;
    (iv) The environmental conditions at the time of the event or 
occurrence, if relevant;
    (v) The root cause of the event or condition;
    (vi) Whether any human performance errors were the cause or were a 
contributing factor to the event or condition, including: personnel 
errors, inadequate procedures, or inadequate training;
    (vii) Whether previous events or conditions are relevant to the 
current event or condition and whether corrective actions to prevent 
recurrence were ineffective or insufficient;
    (viii) Whether this event or condition is a recurring failure of a 
structure, system, component, or procedure important to security;
    (ix) What compensatory measures, if any, were implemented in 
response to the event or condition;
    (x) What corrective actions, if any, were taken in response to the 
event or condition; and
    (xi) When corrective actions, if any, were taken or will be 
completed.
    (d) Transmission criteria. (1) In addition to the addressees 
specified in Sec.  73.4, the licensee must also provide one copy of the 
written follow-up report addressed to the Director, Office of Nuclear 
Security and Incident Response (NSIR).
    (2) For copies of a classified written follow-up report, the 
licensee must transmit them to the NRC via either the NRC Headquarters 
classified mailing address specified in Table 2 of appendix A to this 
part or via the NRC's secure email address specified in Table 1 of 
appendix A to this part.
    (3) Each written follow-up report containing classified information 
must be created, stored, marked, labeled, handled, transmitted to the 
NRC, and destroyed in accordance with the requirements of part 95 of 
this chapter.
    (4) Each written follow-up report containing Safeguards Information 
must be created, stored, marked, labeled, handled, transmitted to the 
NRC, and destroyed in accordance with the requirements of Sec. Sec.  
73.21 and 73.22.
    (e) Records retention. Licensees must maintain a copy of a written 
follow-up report as a record for a period of 3 years from the date of 
the report or until termination of the license, whichever is later.


Sec.  73.1210  Recordkeeping of physical security events.

    (a) Objective and purpose. (1) Licensees with facilities or 
shipment activities subject to the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  
73.25, Sec.  73.26, Sec.  73.27, Sec.  73.37, Sec.  73.45, Sec.  73.46, 
Sec.  73.50, Sec.  73.51, Sec.  73.55, Sec.  73.60, or Sec.  73.67, 
must record the physical security events and conditions adverse to 
security that are specified in paragraphs (c) through (f) of this 
section.
    (2) These records facilitate the licensee's monitoring of the 
effectiveness of its physical security program. These records also 
facilitate the licensee's effective tracking, trending, and performance 
monitoring of these security events and conditions adverse to security; 
and the subsequent identification and implementation of corrective 
actions to prevent recurrence.
    (3) These physical security events and conditions adverse to 
security include,

[[Page 15896]]

but are not limited to, human performance security errors; failure to 
comply with security procedures; insufficient or inadequate security 
procedures; security equipment failures and malfunctions; security 
structures, systems, and components design deficiencies; and inadequate 
or insufficient security structures, systems, and components. This 
includes events or conditions where the licensee has implemented 
compensatory measures within the required timeframe specified in its 
physical security plan.
    (b) General requirements. (1) Licensees must record within 24 hours 
of the time of discovery the physical security events and conditions 
adverse to security specified in paragraphs (c) through (f) of this 
section.
    (2) Licensees must retain these records for a period up to 3 years 
after the last entry is recorded, or until their license is terminated, 
whichever is later.
    (3)(i) Licensees must record these physical security events and 
conditions adverse to security in either a stand-alone safeguards event 
log or as part of the licensee's corrective action program, as 
specified under the applicable quality assurance program provisions of 
parts 50, 52, 60, 63, 70, and 72 of this chapter, or both.
    (ii) Licensees choosing to use their corrective action program to 
record these physical security events and conditions adverse to 
security must ensure that the records contain sufficient information to 
permit the effective tracking, trending, and performance monitoring of 
these events and conditions and the implementation of corrective 
actions.
    (iii) Licensees must ensure that Safeguards Information or 
classified security information associated with these records is 
created, stored, and handled in accordance with the provisions of Sec.  
73.21, or of part 95 of this chapter, as applicable.
    (iv) Licensees choosing to use their corrective action program for 
these records may also choose to bifurcate the information in such 
records systems so as to maximize the use and advantages of their 
corrective action programs' tracking, trending, and performance 
monitoring capabilities while simultaneously compartmenting sensitive 
security information and security vulnerabilities (i.e., by controlling 
access and limiting need to know to necessary personnel), in order to 
ensure information protection requirements are effectively implemented.
    (4) These records must include, but are not limited to, information 
on the following data elements, as applicable--
    (i) The date and time the event or condition was discovered;
    (ii) The date and time the event or condition occurred;
    (iii) The affected structures, systems, components, equipment, or 
procedures;
    (iv) A description of the event or condition;
    (v) The environmental conditions at the time of the event or 
occurrence, if relevant;
    (vi) The root cause of the event or condition;
    (vii) Whether any human performance errors were the cause or were a 
contributing factor of the event or condition, including: personnel 
errors, inadequate procedures, or inadequate training;
    (viii) Whether previous events or conditions are relevant to the 
current event or condition and whether corrective actions were 
ineffective or insufficient;
    (ix) Whether this event or condition is a recurring failure of a 
structure, system, component, or procedure;
    (x) What compensatory measures, if any, were implemented in 
response to the event or condition;
    (xi) What corrective actions, if any, were taken in response to the 
event or condition; and
    (xii) When corrective actions, if any, were taken or will be 
completed.
    (5) Physical security events and conditions adverse to security for 
which notifications were made to the NRC under Sec.  73.1200 are not 
required to be recorded under this section.
    (6) Suspicious activities that are reported under Sec.  73.1215 are 
not required to be recorded under this section.
    (7) Enhanced weapons events that are reported under Sec.  73.1200 
are not required to be recorded under this section.
    (c) Compensated security events. The requirements of this section 
apply to any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a 
security or safeguards system for which compensatory measures were 
established within the required timeframe and for which the following 
could have resulted in--
    (1) Undetected access of unauthorized explosives beyond a required 
vehicle barrier;
    (2) Unauthorized personnel gaining access into a protected area 
(PA), vital area (VA), material access area (MAA), or controlled access 
area (CAA);
    (3) Undetected access of contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA;
    (4) Unauthorized personnel accessing a vehicle transporting a 
Category I or II quantity of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM), 
spent nuclear fuel (SNF), or high-level radioactive waste (HLW);
    (5) Unauthorized personnel accessing a Category I or II quantity of 
SSNM, SNF, or HLW being transported;
    (6) Undetected introduction of contraband into a vehicle 
transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, SNF, or HLW; or
    (7) Undetected introduction of contraband into the Category I or II 
quantity of SSNM, SNF, or HLW being transported.
    (d) Ammunition events. (1) For licensees with armed security 
personnel, the discovery that greater than a small quantity of live 
ammunition authorized by the licensee's security plan:
    (i) Has been lost inside a PA, VA, or MAA; or
    (ii) Has been found uncontrolled inside a PA, VA, or MAA.
    (2)(i) The discovery that greater than a small quantity of 
unauthorized live ammunition is inside a PA, VA, or MAA.
    (ii) A small quantity of live ammunition means five rounds or fewer 
of ammunition.
    (iii) Uncontrolled authorized ammunition means ammunition 
authorized by the licensee's security plans that is not in the 
possession of authorized personnel or is not in an authorized 
ammunition storage location.
    (iv) Unauthorized ammunition means ammunition that is not 
authorized by the licensee's security plans.
    (3) As exemptions, licensees are not required to record:
    (i) Ammunition that is in the possession of Federal, State, or 
local law-enforcement personnel performing official duties inside a PA, 
VA, or MAA is considered controlled and authorized; or
    (ii) Blank ammunition used for training purposes by the licensee.
    (e) [Reserved]
    (f) Decreases in the effectiveness of the physical security 
program. The requirements of this section apply to any other 
threatened, attempted, or committed act not previously defined in this 
section that has resulted in or has the potential for decreasing the 
effectiveness of the licensee's physical security program below that 
committed to in a licensee's NRC-approved physical security plan.
    (g) Classified Information. Licensee recordkeeping requirements 
regarding any security events or conditions adverse to security 
involving any infractions, losses, compromises, or possible compromise 
of classified information or classified documents are found in Sec.  
95.57 of this chapter.

[[Page 15897]]

    (h) Recordkeeping--exemptions. Licensees subject to Sec.  73.67 who 
possess or transport SSNM or special nuclear material (SNM) in the 
following categories are exempt from the provisions of this section:
    (1) Category III quantity of SSNM;
    (2) Category II quantity of SNM; or
    (3) Category III quantity of SNM.


Sec.  73.1215  Suspicious activity reports.

    (a) Purpose. This section sets forth the reporting criteria and 
process for licensees to use in reporting suspicious activities. 
Licensees are required to report suspicious activities to the local law 
enforcement agency (LLEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
local field office, the NRC, and the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) local control tower if aircraft are a part of the suspicious 
activity.
    (b) Objective. (1) A licensee's timely submission of suspicious 
activity reports (SARs) to Federal and local law enforcement agencies 
is an important part of the U.S. government's efforts to disrupt or 
dissuade malevolent acts against the nation's critical infrastructure. 
Despite the increasingly fluid and unpredictable nature of the threat 
environment, some elements of terrorist tactics, techniques, and 
procedures remain constant. For example, attack planning and 
preparation generally proceed through several predictable stages, 
including intelligence gathering and preattack surveillance or 
reconnaissance. These preattack stages, in particular, offer law 
enforcement and security personnel a significant opportunity to 
identify and disrupt or dissuade acts of terrorism before they occur. 
However, to use this information most effectively, timely reporting of 
suspicious activities by licensees to both Federal and local law 
enforcement is of vital importance.
    (2) Licensee's timely submission of SARs to the NRC supports one of 
the agency's primary mission essential functions of threat assessment 
for licensed facilities, materials, and shipping activities.
    (c) General requirements. (1)(i) Licensees subject to paragraphs 
(d), (e), and (f) of this section must report suspicious activities 
that are applicable to their facility, material, or shipping activity.
    (ii) If a suspicious activity requires a physical security event 
notification pursuant to Sec.  73.1200, then the licensee is not 
required to also report the occurrence as a suspicious activity 
pursuant to this section.
    (iii) If a suspicious activity report results in a LLEA response 
the licensee must notify the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 
Sec.  73.1200.
    (2)(i) Licensees must promptly assess whether an activity is 
suspicious. Licensees may review additional information as part of an 
assessment process, including interactions with their LLEA. However, 
such assessments and any subsequent reporting must be completed as soon 
as possible, but within 4 hours of the time of discovery. The licensee 
must base its assessment upon its best available information on the 
activity, which may include its knowledge of its locale and the local 
population.
    (ii) The licensee's assessment of a potential suspicious activity, 
and any discussion of this activity with its LLEA, does not constitute 
a conclusion, in and of itself, that the activity is suspicious.
    (iii) Licensees are not required to report activities that, based 
on their assessment, appear to be innocent or innocuous.
    (3) For a suspicious activity specified under paragraph (d) of this 
section, the licensee must make the following reports:
    (i) First, to their LLEA;
    (ii) Second, to their applicable FBI local field office;
    (iii) Third, to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center; and
    (iv) Lastly, to the local FAA control tower if the suspicious 
activity involves aircraft overflights in proximity to the licensee's 
facility.
    (4) For a suspicious activity specified under paragraphs (e) and 
(f) of this section, the licensee or its designated movement control 
center must make the following reports, in the order indicated:
    (i) First, to the applicable LLEA;
    (ii) Second, to the applicable FBI local field office; and
    (iii) Lastly, to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center.
    (iv) For licensees making such reports related to shipping 
activities, the licensee responsible for the security of the shipment 
must contact the applicable FBI local field office.
    (v) For a movement control center making such reports related to 
shipping activities, the applicable FBI local field office is as 
requested by the FBI. As such, the FBI may direct the use of the FBI 
local field office applicable to the movement control center itself or 
to the FBI local field office applicable to the licensee responsible 
for the security of the shipment.
    (5)(i) Licensees subject to paragraphs (d) and (f) of this section 
must establish a point of contact with their local FBI field office.
    (ii) Licensees subject to paragraph (d) of this section must 
establish a point of contact with their local FAA control tower.
    (6)(i) For licensees subject to paragraph (e) of this section who 
are responsible for the security of the shipment(s), the licensee must 
establish a point of contact with their local FBI field office.
    (ii) For licensees subject to paragraph (e) of this section who are 
employing the services of a movement control center, the movement 
control center must establish a point of contact with its local FBI 
field office.
    (7) Licensees and movement control centers reporting suspicious 
activities to the NRC must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations 
Center via the telephone number specified in Table 1 of appendix A of 
this part.
    (8)(i) Licensees and movement control centers reporting suspicious 
activities must document the LLEA and FBI points of contact in written 
security communication procedures or route approvals, as applicable.
    (ii) Licensees reporting suspicious aircraft overflight activities 
must document the FAA point of contact in written communication 
procedures.
    (d) Suspicious activities--facilities and materials. (1) For 
licensees subject to the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.45, Sec.  
73.46, Sec.  73.50, Sec.  73.51, Sec.  73.55, Sec.  73.60, or Sec.  
73.67, the licensees must report activities they assess are suspicious. 
Examples include, but are not limited to, the following:
    (i) Challenges to the licensee's security systems and procedures;
    (ii) Elicitation of non-public information from knowledgeable 
licensee or contractor personnel regarding the licensee's security or 
emergency response programs;
    (iii) Observed surveillance or reconnaissance activity from within 
posted or restricted areas (i.e., non-public areas), including surface 
activity, underwater activity, manned aerial activity, and unmanned 
aerial activity;
    (iv) Observed surveillance activity from public spaces outside of 
the licensee's control; or
    (v) Unauthorized aircraft activities in close proximity to the 
facility (i.e., above or near), involving either manned or unmanned 
aircraft, operating in a manner potentially indicative of surveillance 
or reconnaissance activity.
    (2) As an exemption, this paragraph does not apply to:
    (i) Licensees who are subject to the provisions of Sec.  73.67, and 
who are also engaged in the enrichment of special nuclear material 
using Restricted Data

[[Page 15898]]

(RD) information, technology, or materials.
    (ii) Licensees who are subject to the provisions of Sec.  73.67 of 
this part, and who are also engaged in the fabrication of new fuel 
assemblies.
    (3) Licensees are not required to report commercial or military 
aircraft activity that is assessed as routine or non-threatening.
    (e) Suspicious activity--shipping activities. (1) For licensees 
subject to the provisions of Sec.  73.20, Sec.  73.25, Sec.  73.26, 
Sec.  73.27, or Sec.  73.37, the licensee must report activities they 
assess are suspicious. Examples include, but are not limited to, the 
following:
    (i) Challenges to the licensee's or its transportation contractor's 
communications subsystems regarding the transport system;
    (ii) Challenges to the licensee's or its transportation 
contractor's security subsystems for the transport system;
    (iii) Interference with or harassment of in-progress shipments;
    (iv) Elicitation of non-public information from knowledgeable 
licensee personnel or the licensee's transportation contractor 
personnel regarding transportation program elements, including: 
security programs, operations programs, communication protocols, 
shipment routes, safe haven locations, and emergency response programs; 
or
    (v) Observed surveillance or reconnaissance activity of ongoing 
shipments.
    (2) For licensees using a movement control center for shipments of 
radioactive material or special nuclear material (SNM), the movement 
control center may report suspicious activities to LLEA, the FBI, and 
the NRC, in lieu of the licensee making such reports.
    (f) Suspicious activities--enrichment facilities. (1) For licensees 
subject to the provisions of Sec.  73.67, who are also engaged in the 
enrichment of SNM using RD information, technology, or materials; the 
licensee must report activities they assess are suspicious. Examples 
include, but are not limited to, the following:
    (i) Aggressive noncompliance by visitors to the licensee's facility 
involving willful unauthorized departure from a tour group or willful 
unauthorized entry into restricted areas;
    (ii) Unauthorized recording or imaging of sensitive technology, 
equipment, or materials; or
    (iii) Elicitation of non-public information from knowledgeable 
licensee or contractor personnel regarding physical or information 
security programs intended to protect RD information, technology, or 
materials.
    (2)(i) Licensees must report, in accordance with Sec.  95.57 of 
this chapter, alleged or suspected activities involving actual, 
attempted, or conspiracies to obtain RD, communicate RD, remove RD, or 
disclose RD in potential violation of Sections 224, 225, 226, and 227 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2274, 2275, 
2276, and 2277).
    (ii) As an exemption, the licensee is not required to also report 
such actual, attempted, or conspiracies to obtain RD, communicate RD, 
remove RD, or disclose RD as suspicious activities pursuant to this 
section.
    (g) Suspicious activities--exemptions. (1) Licensees subject to 
Sec.  73.67 who possess strategic special nuclear material in 
quantities greater than 15 grams but less than the quantity necessary 
to form a critical mass, as specified in Sec.  150.11(a) of this 
chapter, are exempt from the provisions of this section.
    (2) The following licensees are exempt from the provisions of this 
section:
    (i) Docket number 70-7020; and
    (ii) Docket number 70-7028.

0
40. In appendix A to part 73, designate the first table as Table 1 and 
add a heading to and revise the first row in newly designated table 1, 
designate the second table as Table 2 and add a heading to newly 
designated table 2, and add paragraphs III and IV to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 73--U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offices and 
Classified Mailing Addresses

                       Table 1--Mailing Addresses, Telephone Numbers, and Email Addresses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Address        Telephone (24-hour)                  Email
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Headquarters Operations       USNRC, Division of   (301) 816-5100;      [email protected]; [email protected]
 Center.                           Preparedness and     (301) 816-5151       (secure).
                                   Response,            (fax).
                                   Washington, DC
                                   20555-0001.
 
                                                  * * * * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 2--Classified Mailing Addresses

    III. Classified telephone calls must be made to the telephone 
numbers for the NRC Headquarters Operations Center in Table 1 of 
this appendix and the caller must request transfer to a secure 
telephone to communicate the classified information.
    IV. Classified emails must be sent to the secure email address 
specified in Table 1 of this appendix.

0
41. In appendix B to part 73:
0
a. Revise section I.A;
0
b. In section VI, paragraph B.1(a)(4), remove the reference ``10 CFR 
73.19'' and add in its place the reference ``Sec.  73.17''.
    The revision reads as follows:

Appendix B to Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel

* * * * *
    I. * * *
    A. Employment Suitability and Qualification.
    1. Suitability.
    (a) Before employment, or assignment to the security 
organization, an individual shall:
    (1) Possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent 
performance examination designed to measure basic mathematical, 
language, and reasoning skills, abilities, and knowledge required to 
perform security duties and responsibilities;
    (2) Have attained the age of 21 for an armed capacity or the age 
of 18 for an unarmed capacity;
    (3) Not have any felony convictions that reflect on the 
individual's reliability; and
    (4) Not be disqualified, in accordance with applicable state or 
Federal law from possessing or using firearms or ammunition.
    (i) Licensees may use the information that has been obtained 
during the completion of the individual's background investigation 
for unescorted access to determine suitability; or
    (ii) Licensees may use the satisfactory completion of a firearms 
background check for the individual under Sec.  73.17 of this part 
to also fulfill this requirement.
    (b) The qualification of each individual to perform assigned 
duties and responsibilities must be documented by a qualified 
training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
* * * * *

Appendix G to Part 73 [Reserved]

0
42. Remove and reserve appendix G to part 73.

[[Page 15899]]

PART 74--MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR 
MATERIAL

0
44. The authority citation for part 74 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 57, 161, 182, 
223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2273, 2282, 
2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 U.S.C. 
5841, 5842); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.


0
45. In Sec.  74.11, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  74.11  Reports of loss or theft or attempted theft or 
unauthorized production of special nuclear material.

* * * * *
    (c) Notifications required under Sec.  73.1200 of this chapter need 
not be duplicated under the requirements of this section.

PART 76--CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS

0
46. The authority citation for part 76 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 122, 161, 193(f), 
223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2152, 2201, 2243(f), 2273, 2282, 2297f); 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 
5841, 5846, 5851); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.


Sec.  76.113  [Amended]

0
47. In Sec.  76.113(b), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''.


Sec.  76.115  [Amended]

0
48. In Sec.  76.115(b), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''.


Sec.  76.117  [Amended]

0
49. In Sec.  76.117(b), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its 
place the reference ``73.1200''.

    Dated: February 22, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brooke P. Clark,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2023-03944 Filed 3-13-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P