Normal and Transport Category Rotorcraft Certification, 8729-8740 [2023-02771]
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Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
Vol. 88, No. 28
Friday, February 10, 2023
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains regulatory documents having general
applicability and legal effect, most of which
are keyed to and codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations, which is published under
50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by
the Superintendent of Documents.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 27 and 29
[Docket No.: FAA–2017–0990; Amdt. Nos.
27–51, 29–59]
RIN 2120–AK80
Normal and Transport Category
Rotorcraft Certification
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The FAA is amending the
certification standards of normal and
transport category rotorcraft. These
changes are necessary to address
modern designs currently used in the
rotorcraft industry and will reduce the
burden on applicants for certification of
new rotorcraft designs. The changes will
reduce or eliminate the need for certain
special conditions currently required to
obtain certification of modern rotorcraft.
These changes also incorporate the
provisions of equivalent level of safety
findings and means of compliance issue
papers that the FAA has made when
approving certain design features.
DATES: Effective April 11, 2023.
ADDRESSES: For information on where to
obtain copies of rulemaking documents
and other information related to this
final rule, see ‘‘How To Obtain
Additional Information’’ in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
questions concerning this action,
contact Sandra Shelley, Aviation Safety
Engineer, Safety Management Group,
FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort
Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222–
5110; email Sandra.Shelley@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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SUMMARY:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA’s authority to issue rules on
aviation safety is found in title 49 of the
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United States Code. Subtitle I, section
106 describes the authority of the FAA
Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the
scope of the agency’s authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated
under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, sections
44701 and 44704. Under section 44701,
the FAA is charged with prescribing
regulations promoting safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
minimum standards required in the
interest of safety for the design and
performance of aircraft. Under section
44704, the Administrator issues type
certificates for aircraft, aircraft engines,
propellers, and specified appliances
when the Administrator finds the
product is properly designed and
manufactured, performs properly, and
meets the regulations and minimum
standards prescribed under section
44701(a). This rulemaking is within the
scope of these authorities because it
promotes safety by updating the
minimum prescribed standards used
during the type certification process.
I. Overview of Final Rule
This final rule revises regulations in
title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) part 27 (Airworthiness Standards:
Normal Category Rotorcraft) and part 29
(Airworthiness Standards: Transport
Category Rotorcraft) related to the
certification of rotorcraft. These changes
are necessary due to the extensive
application of advancing technologies to
rotorcraft. Current airworthiness
standards do not adequately address
increasing design complexity. To
address these advances, the FAA has
been issuing reoccurring special
conditions, equivalent level of safety
(ELOS) findings, and means of
compliance (MOC) issue papers. This
final rule addresses these areas by
updating those standards that have been
addressed by these special conditions,
ELOS findings and MOC issue papers.
Compliance with the regulatory changes
implemented by this final rule will
continue to be shown by the same
testing, analysis, and inspections
required by existing special conditions,
ELOS findings and MOC issue papers.
However, there will be a reduced
administrative burden, to both the
rotorcraft industry and the FAA,
through the reduction or elimination of
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reoccurring special conditions, ELOS
findings, and MOC issue papers.
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
This final rule updates parts 27 and
29 because the regulations in these parts
were originally published in 1964 and
past revisions to the airworthiness
standards have not kept pace with
advances in technology for rotorcraft.
The FAA addresses these changes to
technology by issuing reoccurring
special conditions, ELOS findings, and
MOC issue papers. These three
processes are necessary to address new
design features for which airworthiness
standards are lacking, compliance with
a rule cannot be achieved, or alternative
methods of compliance are proposed.
Special conditions are prescribed under
14 CFR 21.16 when the FAA finds the
applicable airworthiness standards do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards because of a novel or
unusual design feature. The FAA issues
ELOS findings under § 21.21(b)(1)
where a design does not comply with
the airworthiness standards, but
compensating factors exist that provide
an equivalent level of safety. MOC issue
papers document compliance
methodologies that fall outside existing
guidance and policies.
The process of developing, drafting
and finalizing these special conditions,
ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers
has an impact on both the FAA’s and
the applicants’ resources. In addition,
they impact applicants’ schedules for
obtaining FAA approval of their
products. By updating the affected
standards, many of these special
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC
issue papers are now unnecessary, thus
reducing the burden on both the FAA
and industry.
In some cases, advancements in
technology have rendered the
regulations in parts 27 and 29 obsolete.
This final rule revises those regulations.
This final rule also updates a few of
these rules to correct typographical
errors.
B. National Transportation Safety Board
Recommendations
As a result of incidents involving
smoke and fire caused by failure of
lithium batteries installed on Boeing
787 aircraft, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) issued Safety
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Recommendations A–14–032 through
036 to the FAA on May 22, 2014.1 The
NTSB recommended the FAA develop
abuse tests to simulate failures observed
in the incidents investigated and to
address findings in recent research (A–
14–032), perform these tests on new
aircraft for certain installations (A–14–
033), develop guidance on acceptable
methods to induce thermal runaway
that reliably simulates battery failures
(A–14–034), review methods of
compliance used to certificate in-service
lithium-ion battery aircraft installations
to ensure that they adequately protect
against adverse effects of a cell thermal
runaway (A–14–035), and develop
policy to establish a panel of technical
experts to advise on compliance and
best practices for safely installing new
technology (A–14–036). This final rule
incorporates these NTSB
recommendations as they relate to
rotorcraft into §§ 27.1353 and 29.1353.
C. Summary of the NPRM
On November 1, 2017, the FAA
published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM), ‘‘Normal and
Transport Category Rotorcraft
Certification’’ (82 FR 50583). In the
NPRM, the FAA proposed changes
necessary to address modern designs
currently used in the rotorcraft industry
and to reduce the burden on applicants
for certification of new rotorcraft
designs. The FAA proposed changes
that would reduce or eliminate the need
for certain special conditions that were
often required to obtain certification of
modern rotorcraft. The FAA also
proposed to incorporate the provisions
of ELOS findings and MOC issue papers
that the FAA has made when approving
certain design features.
The comment period closed on
January 30, 2018.
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D. General Overview of Comments
The FAA received comments from 22
commenters. About half of the
commenters were individuals. The
remaining commenters included the
NTSB, aviation manufacturers, industry
groups and organizations, and foreign
civil aviation authorities. One
commenter, the Aircraft Electronics
Association, supported the proposed
rule without change. Most commenters
were generally supportive of the
proposal but some suggested changes to
the proposed rule, as discussed in more
detail later in this preamble. Some
comments were beyond the scope of the
proposal.
1 https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/
recletters/A-14-032-036.pdf.
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III. Discussion of Public Comments and
Final Rule
A. Engines (§ 27.903(d))
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to
reformat the paragraph designation in
§ 27.903(d) to be consistent with
§ 29.903(e). When § 27.903(d) was
adopted, the paragraph designation of
§ 29.903(e) was not used even though
the FAA intended the requirements to
be identical. This designation led to
confusion. This final rule eliminates the
confusion by reformatting the paragraph
designation in § 27.903(d) as proposed
in the NPRM. The restart capability
requirements of § 27.903(d) are not
being changed in this rulemaking.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell)
and the General Aviation Manufacturers
Association (GAMA) requested that part
27 appendix C be revised to remove the
need for compliance with § 29.903(e), as
the requirements are identical to
proposed § 27.903(d). The FAA agrees
and has removed the reference to
§ 29.903(e) from appendix C of part 27.
B. Powerplant Instruments (§§ 27.1305
and 29.1305)
Current §§ 27.1305 and 29.1305
prescribe the specific required
powerplant instruments for rotorcraft.
The changes to these sections will allow
for other means of compliance for
certain powerplant instrument
indicators. Additionally, for § 29.1305,
the FAA will permit an optional feature
to simulate one engine inoperative (OEI)
conditions without damaging the
engines. Rotorcraft with OEI Training
Mode will require additional
indications to differentiate the
simulated OEI conditions from actual
engine failure.
Airbus Helicopters requested that the
FAA use different wording to describe
a synthesized power indicator (SPI) for
an instrument that provides a single
indicator of engine performance,
because presenting the information as a
percentage of power to the nearest
engine limit is only one of the methods
of informing the flightcrew.
The commenter’s request did not
pertain to the proposed regulatory text
but rather to industry examples in the
NPRM preamble. However, the guidance
associated with this final rule, Advisory
Circulars (AC) 27–1B, Certification of
Normal Category Rotorcraft and AC 29–
2C, Certification of Transport Category
Rotorcraft, identifies other concepts of
showing proximity to engine limits
other than as a percentage.
Airbus Helicopters also commented
that certification of SPIs can be
accomplished using the existing rules,
and provided examples of two designs
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that have been approved by the
European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA). These technologies could only
be certificated in the past by the FAA
through processes such as that
necessary for an ELOS finding. A key
purpose of this rulemaking is to reduce
or eliminate the need for reoccurring
special conditions, ELOS findings, and
MOC issue papers. Therefore, the FAA
has made no changes to the regulatory
text in response to this comment.
Bell, GAMA, Transport Canada, and
an individual requested the FAA
expand the changes to §§ 27.1305 and
29.1305 to allow synthesized dual/triple
tachometers. This requested change is
beyond the scope of the proposal. A key
purpose of this rulemaking is to reduce
or eliminate the need for reoccurring
special conditions, ELOS findings, and
MOC issue papers. The FAA has not
issued any of these documents for
synthesized dual or triple tachometers.
EASA requested that the FAA change
the reference in the proposed
§ 27.1305(o) from engine ‘‘torque’’ to
engine ‘‘power’’ to be consistent with
§ 29.1305(a)(16) and allowing for other
forms of power determination. The
requirement in § 27.1305(o) to display
engine torque to the pilot is contingent
on the establishment of a torque
limitation for the engine under
§ 27.1521(e). Therefore, the requested
change would create an incompatibility
between §§ 27.1305(o) and 27.1521(e).
The FAA did not make any changes in
response to this comment.
Transport Canada requested that the
FAA correct a typographical error in the
current § 27.1305(k)(2) and change ‘‘or’’
to ‘‘and.’’ Transport Canada noted that
this correction would make the wording
of § 27.1305(k)(2) identical to that
section’s part 29 counterpart,
§ 29.1305(a)(14)(ii). The FAA notes that
the word ‘‘or’’ in § 27.1305(k)(2) is not
a typographical error. The difference in
wording between § 27.1305(k)(2) and
§ 29.1305(a)(14)(ii) has existed in the
Federal Aviation Regulations from the
promulgation of parts 27 and 29 to
replace the Civil Air Regulations.2
Moreover, the requested change would
increase the regulatory requirement. The
FAA did not make any changes in
response to this comment.
Transport Canada also requested the
FAA change the wording in proposed
§ 29.1305(a)(5) from ‘‘a means to
indicate manifold pressure for each
reciprocation engine, of the altitude
type’’ to ‘‘a means to indicate manifold
pressure for each altitude engine’’ to
align the reference to this type of
2 29 FR 15694 (Nov. 24, 1964); 29 FR 16148 (Dec.
3, 1964).
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reciprocating engine with references to
this same engine type used throughout
part 27. The FAA agrees and has made
this change. Additionally, this change
provides consistency with § 27.1305(e)
and with the identification of this type
of engine elsewhere in part 29, and the
term ‘‘altitude engine’’ is as type of
engine that is a reciprocating engine.
Bell, GAMA, and an individual
proposed new language for § 27.1305
that would permit OEI training mode
capability. OEI Training Mode is a
design feature for Category A training
purposes. As explained by the FAA in
the NPRM, the FAA did not propose
these changes because part 27 Category
A rotorcraft are approved under
appendix C to part 27, which requires
compliance with § 29.1305. The FAA
did not make any changes in response
to these comments.
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C. Rotorcraft Equipment, Systems, and
Installations (§§ 27.1309, 29.1309, and
Appendix C to Part 27)
Sections 27.1309 and 29.1309 require
applicants to assess the effects of
failures resulting from installed systems
and equipment. The changes to
§ 27.1309 made by this final rule now
address advances in technology and
increases in performance of normal
category rotorcraft that were not
envisioned when the rule was originally
promulgated, and eliminate the
distinction between single-engine and
multi-engine rotorcraft. The final rule
broadens the scope of the previous
performance-based requirement to
include catastrophic failure conditions,
thus eliminating the need for recurring
special conditions. The final rule also
more closely aligns with current
industry practices and accommodates
potential future changes in industry
failure analysis techniques.
EASA requested the FAA reserve the
paragraph numbering and allocate new
paragraph numbers for the new
regulatory text to avoid confusion
between the proposed regulations and
previous amendments. The FAA has
determined that this requested change is
impracticable as it would result in
numerous regulatory paragraphs
without content. Part 21 requires
aviation manufacturers to be familiar
with the airworthiness standards that
are effective as the certification basis as
of the date of their application for a type
certificate. EASA also suggested
designating the first paragraph under
§§ 27.1309 and 29.1309 as ‘‘(a)’’ for
clarity. The FAA did not add such a
designation because the first two
sentences of §§ 27.1309 and 29.1309 are
generally applicable requirements.
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Bell, GAMA, Robinson Helicopter
Company (Robinson), and two
individuals commented that the
proposed changes to § 27.1309 would
increase the amount of analysis
necessary to show compliance for
normal category rotorcraft. GAMA and
Bell stated that the proposed changes
would exceed what is required to
address complex systems, eliminate the
distinction between single and multiengine rotorcraft, and fail to maintain
sufficient distinction from § 29.1309.
Bell and GAMA also expressed that an
increase in certification burden would
be imposed by the changes, and be
likely to cause significant economic
damage to the rotorcraft industry.
Similarly, Robinson stated that the
proposed changes to § 27.1309 would
significantly increase the regulatory
burden on normal category rotorcraft by
removing the distinction between single
and multi-engine. According to
Robinson, this would require additional
failure analysis by the applicant, and
alerting means in the design, resulting
in a significant increase in the cost and
complexity of small helicopters. Bell
and GAMA requested that the proposed
§ 27.1309 be replaced with the recently
promulgated § 23.2510, while Robinson
requested that none of the proposed
changes be made to § 27.1309.
This rulemaking does not change the
current industry standard and
compliance means for non-critical and
noncomplex (simple) systems and
equipment installed in normal category
rotorcraft. As explained in the NPRM,
the distinction between single and
multi-engines no longer reflects the
level of complexity of the systems
installed in rotorcraft. Most applicants
have been using industry standard
methods, such as SAE/ARP 4761, for
conducting their system safety analyses
to show compliance with § 27.1309.
These methods require assessment at
the aircraft level regardless of whether
the proposed design is a single or multiengine configuration. As stated in the
NPRM, the applicant’s method for
conducting the failure analysis remains
the same. The changes eliminate the
need for special conditions by
incorporating prior special condition
requirements for catastrophic and
hazardous failure conditions into the
rule text. The changes also provide a
means for the integration of new
technology into part 27 rotorcraft. A
means of compliance for noncomplex
(simple) systems is already provided in
the guidance material for normal and
transport category rotorcraft. Finally, the
request to incorporate § 23.2510, a
performance-based regulation
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contingent on the use of consensus
standards, is beyond the scope of the
NPRM.
Bell, GAMA, and Robinson
commented that the changes to
§ 27.1309 eliminate an applicant’s use of
the FAA’s safety continuum policy for
part 27 rotorcraft. The FAA clarifies that
the safety continuum policy, Policy No.
PS–ASW–27–15, dated June 30, 2017,3
provides a tiered approach for
compliance with § 27.1309, based upon
the rotorcraft’s weight, occupant
capacity, and number and type of
engines. This policy remains applicable
as an option for any applicant. Under
the policy, the certification rigor for
simpler, less complex rotorcraft and
systems differs from that which is
necessary for more complex rotorcraft
and systems to show compliance with
§ 27.1309.
EASA, Transport Canada, and an
individual requested additional
definition of the applicability of
§§ 27.1309 and 29.1309. The
commenters stated there will be
confusion regarding whether to apply
§§ 27.1309 and 29.1309 to systems
outside of the current subpart. The FAA
recognized the need to be clear about
the applicability of the regulation;
therefore, the proposed introductory
text published in the NPRM for
§§ 27.1309 and 29.1309 clarified that the
rule would apply to any system or
equipment whose failure has not been
specifically addressed by another
requirement in chapter I of title 14 of
the CFR. The FAA has determined that
the proposed regulatory text is
adequately clear and has adopted it
without change in this final rule.
EASA and Thales AVS France
commented on the proposed ACs
intended to provide acceptable means to
comply with §§ 27.1309 and 29.1309.
These commenters requested that the
AC text providing that ‘‘the catastrophic
failure condition should not result from
a single failure’’ should be included in
the regulation to resolve the
inconsistency resulting from the
inclusion of such language in the AC
but not the regulatory text. The
guidance materials provide analysis
techniques for showing how an
applicant can achieve ‘‘extremely
improbable’’ in conjunction with a
single failure. Single failures are not the
only failure conditions that need to be
addressed in order for the analysis to be
complete. The FAA has clarified this in
AC 27–1B and AC 29–2C, which
3 https://drs.faa.gov/browse/
excelExternalWindow/
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provide acceptable means to comply
with §§ 27.1309 and 29.1309.
Bell and GAMA requested the FAA
not adopt the proposed requirement in
§§ 27.1309(a) and 29.1309(a) for
equipment, systems, and installations to
be analyzed for hazards both
individually and with regard to their
integration with the rest of the aircraft.
The commenters stated that the
appropriate safety analysis
methodologies for the equipment to be
installed are already covered by
paragraph (d) in §§ 27.1309 and
29.1309. The commenters stated the
specific analysis is defined in guidance,
and that including this statement in the
regulation imposes a significant increase
in the certification burden. This is
incorrect. The requirement the
commenters opposed for inclusion in
paragraph (a) is already present in
§ 29.1309 and is included in special
conditions for part 27 to certify
proposed design features such as
autopilot systems. In addition, this
regulatory text does not dictate a
specific analysis methodology to be
used to show compliance; therefore,
there is no increase in the certification
burden.
GAMA, EASA, and Thales AVS
France requested that the FAA change
proposed §§ 27.1309(b) and 29.1309(b)
to specify three levels of failure
classification: catastrophic, hazardous,
and major. In the NPRM, the FAA
proposed a top level failure
classification (catastrophic), a bottom
level (minor), and any other level in
between as long as the probability of the
failure condition is inversely
proportional to its consequences. EASA
and GAMA stated that the proposed rule
change would increase the regulatory
burden by requiring the same analysis
for minor failure conditions as for other,
more severe failure conditions.
The FAA recognizes that proposed
§§ 27.1309(b)(2) and 29.1309(b)(2)
would have inadvertently raised the
regulatory burden. That was not the
FAA’s intent, so in this final rule the
FAA has revised §§ 27.1309(b)(2) and
29.1309(b)(2) to change the bottom level
failure classification to major, in order
to maintain the current regulatory
requirement.
The final rule provides flexibility for
future changes in industry standards
and practices by allowing as many
levels of failure classification as an
applicant wishes to propose, as long as
the probability of the failure condition
is inversely proportional to its
consequences.
GAMA and an individual requested
that the FAA make the language in
§§ 27.1309(c) and 29.1309(c) consistent
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with one another, in that the word
‘‘and’’ is missing from § 27.1309(c). As
explained in the NPRM, the FAA
intended for these two sections to be
consistent and thus, has corrected this
error in this final rule such that ‘‘and’’
is included in § 27.1309(c), consistent
with current § 29.1309(c).
Bell and GAMA commented on the
FAA proposal to remove
§§ 29.1309(b)(2) and 29.1309(e), which
are specific to Category A rotorcraft,
stating that these provisions are
necessary companions to § 29.903(b)
engine systems isolation requirements.
The commenters stated that without a
specific regulation for Category A
systems and equipment, § 29.903(b)
becomes the specific regulation and
applies rather than § 29.1309. The
commenters provided an example that,
in order to show compliance with
§ 29.903(b), it would be necessary to
show physical isolation between left
engine and right engine indication
systems, instead of providing integrated
displays with redundancy rather than
isolation with an appropriate
probability for failure conditions that
might affect both engine’s indications.
The commenters are correct that
§ 29.903(b) is the specific regulation for
Category A engine isolation
requirements. However, the § 29.903(b)
analysis is limited to systems required
for engine operations. The commenters’
application of this analysis to engine
indication systems and displays, which
do not affect engine operation, is
misplaced. Section 29.1309 requires
applicants to assess the effects of
failures resulting from installed systems
and equipment, such as engine
indicators or displays that may be
necessary for performing Category A
operations. These requirements are
unchanged by the proposals in the
NPRM.
GAMA requested that proposed
§§ 27.1309(d)(2) and 29.1309(d)(2),
which require an analysis of ‘‘[t]he
effect of multiple failures and latent
failures,’’ be revised to preclude future
interpretations of this paragraph as
requiring consideration of multiple
failures of unrelated functions or
systems.
Although there are cases where the
failures of unrelated functions or
systems should be considered, the FAA
shares the commenter’s concern on the
need to limit multiple failure analysis so
that every combination of failures of
unrelated functions or systems will not
need to be considered. The FAA has
changed the guidance material, AC 27–
1B and AC 29–2C, to provide guidance
to help applicants determine the depth
of analysis necessary when considering
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multiple failures in complying with
§§ 27.1309(d)(2) and 29.1309(d)(2).
GAMA and Transport Canada
requested that for the analysis of crew
warning cues in proposed
§§ 27.1309(d)(4) and 29.1309(d)(4), the
FAA correct the word ‘‘warning.’’ In the
NPRM, the FAA proposed to replace the
term ‘‘warning’’ with ‘‘annunciation,’’
but in §§ 27.1309(d)(4) and
29.1309(d)(4) the term ‘‘warning’’
remained in the proposed regulatory
text. However, Transport Canada
suggested that ‘‘warning’’ be replaced
with ‘‘alerting.’’
The FAA has determined that the
term ‘‘alerting’’ is generally understood
to include warnings and cautions that
may include aural and visual types of
cues to the pilot as appropriate. The
FAA agrees that ‘‘alerting’’ more
accurately conveys the requirement, and
so has included it in this final rule.
An individual requested the FAA
address the additional costs that may be
incurred by U.S. applicants seeking
validation of type-certificated products
by EASA. The commenter states that the
FAA’s changes to §§ 27.1309 and
29.1309 compromise the rules’
harmonization with EASA’s rules.
The FAA’s changes in this final rule
incorporate the provisions of prior
special conditions. EASA has validated
several aircraft designs with the
provisions of these special conditions.
Therefore, the commenter’s concern
about additional costs during validation
is not warranted.
D. Automatic Pilot and Flight Guidance
System (§§ 27.1329 and 29.1329)
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to
revise §§ 27.1329 and 29.1329 by
combining the existing requirements for
automatic pilot with those of §§ 27.1335
and 29.1335 for flight director systems
into one rule for automatic pilot and
flight guidance systems. EASA noted
the FAA proposed to change the
requirements in §§ 27.1329(a)(1) and
29.1329(a)(1) so that the system can be
overpowered by ‘‘one pilot’’ to ‘‘the
pilot’’ and in §§ 27.1329(a)(2) and
29.1329(a)(2) that the system can be
disengaged by ‘‘each pilot’’ to ‘‘the
pilot.’’ EASA stated that these changes
reduce the level of safety, as the prior
rules required that the effort of one pilot
be enough to overpower the system. The
effect of the proposed language as
described by EASA was not the FAA’s
intent. Accordingly, the final rule refers
to ‘‘one pilot,’’ in §§ 27.1329(a)(1) and
29.1329(a)(1) and ‘‘each pilot’’ in
§§ 27.1329(a)(2) and 29.1329(a)(2) to be
consistent with the existing regulatory
requirement.
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Transport Canada noted that the
proposed rule appeared to include flyby-wire in its definition of an automatic
flight guidance and control system, and
that manufacturers would not be able to
comply with a requirement to
completely disengage a fly-by-wire
system. Transport Canada therefore
requested the rule be changed so that a
proposed design would only have to
only disengage ‘‘any malfunctioning
components of’’ the system.
The FAA did not intend for
§§ 27.1329 and 29.1329 to cover flight
control systems, including fly-by-wire.
The section title and the introductory
sentence have been changed in this final
rule to remove references to ‘‘control.’’
Sections 27.1329(a)(2) and 29.1329(a)(2)
have also been changed in this final rule
so that applicants may design the
system to either disengage the entire
system, any malfunctioning component
of the system, or both.
Bell, GAMA, Transport Canada, and
Thales AVS France commented that the
proposed §§ 27.1329(d) and 29.1329(d)
would have eliminated the condition of
‘‘assuming that corrective action begins
within a reasonable period of time.’’ The
commenters stated that the FAA did not
explain the elimination of this
statement.
The existing text identified by
commenters was inadvertently omitted
from the NPRM, but is included in this
final rule.
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E. Instrument Systems (§ 29.1333 and
Appendix B to Parts 27 and 29)
Current § 29.1333(a) requires isolating
the pilot instrument system from any
other operating systems because at the
time the rule was promulgated, these
systems were federated, and connecting
the systems increased the likelihood
that a fault in one system could cause
a failure in the pilot instrument system.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to
revise § 29.1333(a) and section
VIII(b)(5)(i) of appendix B to parts 27
and 29 limiting it to pneumatic systems,
allowing for the use of current
technology to display integrated
information to the pilot.
Airbus Helicopters requested that the
FAA change the word ‘‘system’’ to
‘‘parts’’ so that the requirement for
physical independence only applies to
the pneumatic parts of a system.
The FAA intended for only the
pneumatic portion of the system to have
physical independence. The FAA is not
changing the proposed rule text as
suggested by the commenter because the
word ‘‘parts,’’ could be interpreted as a
component as opposed to only the
pneumatic portion of the system. This
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section of the rule is adopted as
proposed in the NPRM.
F. Energy Storage System (§§ 27.1353
and 29.1353)
The FAA’s current regulations
pertaining to batteries for rotorcraft
include requirements specific to leadacid batteries and nickel-cadmium
batteries. In the NPRM, the FAA
proposed performance-based
requirements to accommodate any
energy storage system. As a result, this
final rule incorporates, for rotorcraft, the
NTSB’s recommendation that the FAA
require aircraft manufacturers to
demonstrate acceptable performance as
part of the certification of any new
aircraft design that incorporates the
installation of lithium-ion batteries.
Bell and GAMA requested that the
FAA modify proposed §§ 27.1353(a) and
29.1353(a) by removing the word
‘‘automatic’’ from the protective design
features required for hazard mitigation,
and expressed concern that a
requirement that the features be
‘‘automatic’’ would increase
certification requirements. Current
§§ 27.1353(g) and 29.1353(c) contain a
similar requirement for automatic
features to monitor the battery system
for nickel-cadmium batteries and
prevent or mitigate an over temperature
condition or battery failure. Special
conditions issued by the FAA to
certificate lithium battery installations
have required automatic features to
monitor the battery system and protect
the aircraft. The proposed regulation
does not change this requirement but
rather incorporates it into a rule that
accommodates any energy storage
system. Some energy storage system
hazards may occur too rapidly to be
mitigated by pilot action; therefore,
automatic monitoring and control is
necessary which would not increase
certification requirements.
In another comment, the NTSB
suggested including more prescriptive
language in §§ 27.1353(a) and 29.1353(a)
to address all possible mitigation
strategies. By using performance-based
requirements, this final rule allows both
current and future mitigation strategies.
A prescriptive list of current acceptable
mitigation strategies may not allow for
future energy storage technologies.
Accordingly, in this final rule, the FAA
has adopted §§ 27.1353(a) and
29.1353(a) as proposed.
Bell and GAMA requested modifying
proposed §§ 27.1353(b) and 29.1353(b),
because they would have required
venting as the means of limiting the
accumulation of hazardous gases, fluids,
and smoke. The FAA agrees with these
comments and has adopted Bell and
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GAMA’s recommended language in this
final rule, in order to allow other types
of hazard mitigation. The intent of the
rule is to require that emissions not
accumulate in hazardous (flammability,
toxicity, visibility, etc.) quantities.
Designs may accomplish this through
venting or through other means.
Bell and GAMA commented that the
term ‘‘damage’’ in §§ 27.1353(c) and
29.1353(c) is unclear and requested that
the rule be revised from ‘‘must not
damage surrounding structures, adjacent
equipment, or systems necessary for
continued safe flight and landing’’ to
‘‘must not result in any hazardous effect
on structures, equipment, or systems
necessary for continued safe flight and
landing.’’ The language proposed in the
NPRM was retained from the current
rule and accurately captures the
requirement. The commenter’s
suggested change would allow damage
to occur undetected until it evolved into
a hazardous condition, which was not
the intent of the rule. Accordingly, in
this final rule, the FAA has adopted
§§ 27.1353(c) and 29.1353(c) as
proposed.
The NTSB requested that proposed
§§ 27.1353(d) and 29.1353(d) be revised
to address the maximum amount of
pressure from an energy storage system
failure. The FAA agrees, since a rapid
increase in pressure that exceeds the
maximum amount for an energy storage
system that is not contained may result
in damage to surrounding systems or
structure. Proposed §§ 27.1353(d) and
29.1353(d) have been revised consistent
with the NTSB comment.
GAMA commented that the
§§ 27.1353(e) and 29.1353(e)
requirement to provide a means to
monitor and inform the pilot of energy
storage system health precludes other
mitigating design features and may be
unnecessary when effective
containment measures are used. GAMA
requested adding an alternative
requirement to allow sufficient
containment of the energy storage
system.
GAMA’s requested change to
§§ 27.1353(e) and 29.1353(e) would
invalidate the requirement that the pilot
be notified of all critical system
parameters. The pilot must know the
health of the required energy storage
system. The regulation does not
preclude other mitigating strategies but
these must include a means for the pilot
to know the condition of all critical
system parameters. Accordingly, in this
final rule, the FAA has adopted
§§ 27.1353(e) and 29.1353(e) as
proposed.
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G. Airspeed Indicator (§ 27.1545)
Current § 27.1545 requires
instruments to be marked with a green
arc and red radial lines. In the NPRM,
the FAA proposed to remove the
restrictive requirement for some
instrument markings to allow
alternative means of compliance.
Bell and GAMA requested the rule
specify when VNE must be displayed,
allow provisions for variable VNE
information, and clarify that a VNE
caution range is not always applicable.
These requested changes are beyond the
scope of this rulemaking, which was to
make the color and depiction of the
airspeed indicator markings less
prescriptive. In addition, the suggested
wording would be more prescriptive,
and therefore restrict traditional systems
from being approved.
An individual requested the FAA
change the term ‘‘yellow arc’’ in
§ 27.1545(b)(3) to ‘‘amber arc’’ to be
consistent with § 27.1322(b). The
requested change is beyond the scope of
this rulemaking, which was to eliminate
the need for reoccurring MOC issue
papers for a lack of green arc in modern
electronic displays. The FAA has not
created any issue papers because of the
requirement for a ‘‘yellow’’ arc.
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H. Powerplant Instruments (§ 27.1549)
The current regulation requires
instruments to be marked with a green
arc and red radial lines. In the NPRM,
the FAA proposed to remove these
requirements for some instrument
markings.
EASA suggested the term ‘‘radial’’ in
§§ 27.1549(a) and 29.1549(a) be replaced
with ‘‘range,’’ similar to the proposed
§§ 27.1549(d) and 29.1549(d). Sections
27.1549(a) and 29.1549(a) specify the
requirement for marking of maximum
and minimum safe operating limits. A
red line is a defined limit. A range, in
this context, would allow a level of
ambiguity in the marking of the
indicator. The FAA did not make any
changes in response to the comment.
Transport Canada requested that the
term ‘‘marked’’ be changed to
‘‘displayed’’ throughout §§ 27.1549 and
29.1549. The term ‘‘marked’’ is more
consistent with the other instrument
regulations for rotorcraft and airplanes.
The FAA did not make any changes in
response to the comment.
An individual requested the FAA
change the term ‘‘yellow arc’’ in
§§ 29.1549(b)(3) and 29.1549(c) to
‘‘amber arc’’ to be consistent with
§ 27.1322(b). The requested change is
beyond the scope of this rulemaking,
which was to eliminate the need for
reoccurring MOC issue papers for a lack
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of green arc in modern electronic
displays. The FAA has not created any
issue papers because of the requirement
for a ‘‘yellow’’ arc.
Bell and GAMA requested that the
word ‘‘propeller’’ be changed to ‘‘rotor’’
in §§ 27.1549(d) and 29.1549(d). The
word ‘‘propeller’’ comes from a prior
rule amendment to parts 27 and 29 that
was based on a part 25 rule. Although
‘‘propeller’’ is an appropriate term for
airplanes, ‘‘rotor’’ is the more
appropriate term for rotorcraft. The FAA
agrees and has made the requested
change.
One commenter noted the
typographical omission of the word
‘‘and’’ between the proposed
§§ 27.1549(d) and 27.1549(e). The FAA
has corrected this error in this final rule
by including ‘‘and’’ at the end of
paragraph (d), consistent with the
current rule.
I. Control Marking (§§ 27.1555 and
29.1555)
The control marking regulations
required marking the usable fuel
capacity at the fuel quantity indicator.
The intent of these regulations was to
provide a continuous indication of
usable fuel capacity at the fuel quantity
indicator. Older, analog gauges used a
placard to comply with this
requirement. In the NPRM, the FAA
proposed performance-based
requirements to permit other means of
informing the pilot of the usable fuel
system capacity. However, this final
rule requires that alternative methods
address any lack of continuous display
by ensuring the information is readily
accessible to the pilot.
Bell and GAMA requested modifying
proposed §§ 27.1555(c)(1) and
29.1555(c)(1) to require ‘‘a means to
provide the usable fuel capacity to the
pilot.’’ The intent of the language
proposed in the NPRM was to keep the
existing requirement for applicants that
choose to follow that method, while
providing an additional, less
prescriptive method.
Similarly, EASA requested the FAA
make the requirement more generic by
eliminating the reference ‘‘to the pilot’’
within §§ 27.1555(c)(1)(i) and
29.1555(c)(1)(i), since this information
is also used during maintenance and
servicing. However, removing the
requirement that the information be
accessible to the pilot would not ensure
that the pilot always has access to the
data, which is the purpose of this rule.
GAMA also requested modifying
§§ 27.1555(c)(2) and 29.1555(c)(2),
which contains usable fuel capacity
requirements for fuel systems with
selector controls, to match the proposed
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language in §§ 27.1555(c)(1) and
29.1555(c)(1) for fuel systems with no
selector controls. The changes in the
NPRM were proposed to eliminate the
issues associated with placarding a
digital display in a modern glass
cockpit. Placarding near or at the
selector switches does not create these
issues.
Additionally, GAMA requested that
the FAA update §§ 27.1583(b)(3) and
29.1583(b)(3) to require that the flight
manual include the usable fuel capacity
information required per
§§ 27.1555(c)(1) and 29.1555(c)(1)
respectively. This requested change is
not appropriate, because the
requirement to add the capacity
information into the flight manual is
only necessary if it is not continuously
displayed at the indicator. The
commenter’s requested language would
require the information in the flight
manual for all designs.
Airbus Helicopters requested that the
FAA clarify whether ‘‘usable fuel
capacity’’ refers to the actual remaining
fuel or to the total usable capacity of the
fuel system. The FAA notes that the
term ‘‘usable fuel capacity’’ refers to the
total usable capacity of the fuel system.
The requirements for indicating the
actual usable quantity are contained
within §§ 27.1305, 27.1337, 29.1305,
and 29.1337. In the NPRM, the FAA did
not propose modifying the language or
meaning of ‘‘usable fuel capacity.’’
Changing the meaning is outside the
scope of this rulemaking. The proposed
rule language provides an alternative,
less prescriptive requirement allowing
the applicant to relay the fuel system
capacity to the crew by means other
than a placard at the fuel quantity
indicator.
J. Undue Burden on Industry
In the NPRM preamble, the FAA
stated that this rulemaking would
update several rules that cause
unnecessary burdens in cost and time to
both the FAA and the rotorcraft
industry. These changes are necessary
due to the extensive application of
advancing technologies to rotorcraft,
which the airworthiness standards did
not adequately address. The FAA
proposed that, by updating the affected
standards, many special conditions,
ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers
would become unnecessary, thus
reducing the burden of cost and time on
the FAA and industry.
GAMA requested rewording or
deleting ‘‘reduced burden for the
rotorcraft industry,’’ because showing
compliance by the same testing analysis
and inspections strongly implies there is
no reduced burden. Additionally,
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GAMA requested that the FAA perform
an analysis of the economic impact of
the regulatory changes on small entities
and provide access to the results of such
analysis in the proposed rulemaking.
This rule updates parts 27 and 29 to
address changes in technology and to
include updated airworthiness
standards. The FAA maintains that
while compliance is shown by the same
testing, analysis, and inspections, there
will be savings to both the FAA and
industry from updating the
airworthiness standards. Updating the
airworthiness standards reduces the
number of reoccurring special
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC
issue papers and the administration
burden associated with processing one
of the three documents.
Further information regarding final
rule revisions that address comments on
this issue is provided in discussions, C.
Rotorcraft Equipment, Systems, and
Installations (§§ 27.1309, 29.1309, and
Appendix C to Part 27) and F. Energy
Storage System (§§ 27.1353 and
29.1353). Additionally, the FAA has
complied with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act for this rulemaking and
certified that a regulatory flexibility
analysis is not required, as this rule will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities.
K. Other Comments
One individual requested guidance
for installing antennas on helicopters for
both part 27 and 29. Two other
individuals requested the FAA adopt
rules to address accident rates, such as
adding § 25.1302 to parts 27 and 29 and
implementing Terrain Awareness and
Warning Systems and Radar Altimeters.
Another individual provided comments
about minimum backup systems for
VFR-only rotorcraft. The FAA
appreciates the interest in aviation
safety from these commenters; however,
these comments were beyond the scope
of this rulemaking effort.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
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A. Regulatory Evaluation
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Order 12866 and
Executive Order 13563 direct that each
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a
regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.
Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic
impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements
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Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies
from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, the Trade
Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis of
U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104–4) requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995).
This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the
economic impacts of this final rule.
This final rule revises regulations in
14 CFR part 27 (Airworthiness
Standards: Normal Category Rotorcraft)
and part 29 (Airworthiness Standards:
Transport Category Rotorcraft) related to
the certification of rotorcraft. The
changes are necessary because the
airworthiness standards did not
adequately address the increases in
design complexity resulting from
advancing technologies. As a result,
many regulatory sections have been
subject to reoccurring special
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC
issue papers. This rulemaking addresses
these items by updating the rules that
cause unnecessary burdens in cost and
time to both the rotorcraft industry and
the FAA.
The FAA received comments on the
NPRM that was published on November
1, 2017. The comments and the FAA’s
response to them are discussed in ‘‘III.
Discussion of Public Comments and
Final Rule,’’ in the preamble to this final
rule. The FAA made changes to the
proposed rule as a result of the public
comments. However, the changes
assisted the FAA in clarifying and
updating the proposal to ensure there
will not be additional costs from this
rulemaking. These changes did not
result in additional costs to industry or
the FAA. The FAA expects this rule will
not result in additional costs to industry
since it incorporates current industry
practice. In addition, the rule will
provide small savings to industry and
the FAA by avoiding the burden and
costs associated with developing special
conditions, ELOS findings and MOC
issue papers. The rule affects U.S.
manufacturers of normal and transport
category rotorcraft plus any rotorcraft
operator or owner who applies for a
supplemental type certificate (STC). The
remainder of this section provides
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8735
discussion of the impact and savings of
this final rule by topic.
1. Powerplant Instruments (§§ 27.1305
and 29.1305)
Changes to these sections will allow
for other means of compliance for
certain powerplant instrument
indicators. These means of compliance
are voluntary and do not impose any
new cost but could be cost relieving for
applicants that choose to use them.
Additionally, for § 29.1305, the FAA
will permit an optional feature to
simulate OEI conditions without
damaging the engines. Rotorcraft with
OEI Training Mode must have
additional indications to differentiate
the simulated OEI condition from actual
engine failure. The OEI Training Mode
is often installed in modern multiengine rotorcraft. The FAA finds that
this change will not result in additional
costs to industry. The OEI Training
Mode is optional and this change
removes the need to issue special
conditions for those manufacturers or
modifiers including OEI training modes
in their rotorcraft.
2. Normal Category Rotorcraft
Equipment, Systems, and Installations
(§ 27.1309 and Appendix C to Part 27)
The FAA revises the failure analysis
requirement for equipment, systems,
and installations to reduce the need for
special conditions. These changes more
closely align with current industry
practices and also accommodate future
changes in industry failure analysis
techniques. Additionally, the FAA
eliminates the distinction between
single-engine and multi-engine
rotorcraft. This distinction is no longer
relevant because current analysis tools
for technologies and associated failure
effects no longer consider the number of
engines. This will reduce the need to
issue recurring special conditions,
potentially providing small savings for
manufacturers and anybody who
modifies the rotorcraft. As these are
current industry practice, the FAA finds
there are no additional costs associated
with these changes.
3. Transport Category Rotorcraft
Equipment, Systems, and Installation
(§ 29.1309)
This section is updated to be
consistent with industry standards and
practices for conducting failure analysis.
The rule clarifies the requirement to
perform a failure analysis and
recognizes that the severity of failures
can vary. Additionally, this section
accommodates future changes in
industry failure analysis techniques and
reflects current certification practices.
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The rule allows for other options that
will reduce the need to issue recurring
special conditions, potentially
providing small savings for
manufacturers and applicants looking to
modify a rotorcraft.
4. Automatic Pilot and Flight Guidance
Systems (§§ 27.1329, 27.1335, 29.1329,
and 29.1335)
This rule standardizes terminology
and combines the requirements for
automatic pilot and flight director
systems into one rule. Modern designs
combine both automatic pilot and flight
director systems and are now referred to
as automatic pilot and flight guidance
systems.
5. Instrument Systems (§ 29.1333 and
Appendix B to Parts 27 and 29)
The change allows for the use of more
modern integrated systems to monitor
and display highly integrated
information regarding the rotorcraft.
This section does not impose additional
costs as the updates reflect modern
industry practices of integrating
instrument systems.
6. Electrical Systems and Equipment
(§ 29.1351) and Energy Storage Systems
(§§ 27.1353 and 29.1353)
The changes accommodate different
energy storage systems. The regulation
applies to lead acid, nickel-cadmium,
and lithium batteries without imposing
additional requirements. The changes
will provide the flexibility necessary for
the regulations to keep up with changes
in technology.
7. Instrument Markings (§§ 27.1545,
29.1545, 27.1549, and 29.1549)
The final rule provides flexibility for
some instrument markings. Allowing for
other markings will not result in
additional mandatory costs and may be
possibly cost relieving for
manufacturers that elect to outfit the
rotorcraft with different instrument
markings.
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8. Control Markings (§§ 27.1555 and
29.1555)
The rule permits more than one
method to inform the pilot of the usable
fuel system capacity. However,
alternative methods must address the
lack of continuous display currently
required. Changes to this section allow
for more than one means of compliance
at no additional costs. Offering
alternative means of compliance allows
industry to meet the requirement with
the least costly option, which can be
cost relieving.
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9. Typographical and Standardizing
Corrections (§§ 27.87, 27.903, 29.955,
29.977, 29.1019, 29.1517, and 29.1587)
There are no additional costs for
changes to these sections as these are
typographical or standardizing
corrections.
Based on the discussion above, the
FAA has determined that this final rule
is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’
as defined in section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a
principle of regulatory issuance that
agencies shall endeavor, consistent with
the objectives of the rule and of
applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and
informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and
governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation. To achieve this principle,
agencies are required to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals
and to explain the rationale for their
actions to assure that such proposals are
given serious consideration.’’ The RFA
covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to
determine whether a rule will have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. If
the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis as described in the
RFA.
However, if an agency determines that
a rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the RFA provides that
the head of the agency may so certify
and a regulatory flexibility analysis is
not required. The certification must
include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and
the reasoning should be clear.
This final rule amends the
certification standards of normal and
transport category rotorcraft to
incorporate modern designs currently
used in the rotorcraft industry.
Currently, changes in technology are
addressed by issuing reoccurring special
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC
issue papers. These three processes are
necessary to address new design
features for which airworthiness
standards are lacking, compliance with
a rule cannot be achieved, or alternative
methods of compliance are proposed.
These special conditions, ELOS
findings, and MOC issue papers impact
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FAA and industry resources as well as
applicants’ schedules for obtaining FAA
approval of their products. By updating
the affected standards with this final
rule, many special conditions, ELOS
findings, and MOC issue papers will
become unnecessary, thus reducing both
the FAA and industry’s administration
burden associated with processing one
of the three documents.
As the rule reduces the administrative
burden and does not include any new
regulatory burden, the FAA expects this
rule will not result in additional costs
and may result in small cost savings for
any small entity affected by this
rulemaking action. If an agency
determines that a rulemaking will not
result in a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities, the head of the agency may so
certify under section 605(b) of the RFA.
Therefore, as provided in section 605(b),
the head of the FAA certifies that this
rulemaking will not result in a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
C. International Trade Impact
Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub.
L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies
from establishing standards or engaging
in related activities that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States.
Pursuant to these Acts, the
establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to
the foreign commerce of the United
States, so long as the standard has a
legitimate domestic objective, such as
the protection of safety, and does not
operate in a manner that excludes
imports that meet this objective. The
statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for
U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the potential
effect of this final rule and determined
that the potential benefits are available
to both domestic and international
firms, which would either have no effect
or a positive effect on international
trade.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4)
requires each Federal agency to prepare
a written statement assessing the effects
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or
final agency rule that may result in an
expenditure of $100 million or more (in
1995 dollars) in any one year by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the
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aggregate, or by the private sector; such
a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant
regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $155
million in lieu of $100 million.
This final rule does not contain such
a mandate; therefore, the requirements
of Title II of the Act do not apply.
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The
agency has determined that it will not
be a ‘‘significant energy action’’ under
the executive order and will not be
likely to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the
FAA consider the impact of paperwork
and other information collection
burdens imposed on the public. The
FAA has determined that there would
be no new requirement for information
collection associated with this final
rule.
VI. How To Obtain Additional
Information
F. International Compatibility and
Cooperation
In keeping with U.S. obligations
under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to
conform to International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the
maximum extent practicable. The FAA
has determined that there are no ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these final
regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA
actions that are categorically excluded
from preparation of an environmental
assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances.
The FAA has determined this
rulemaking action qualifies for the
categorical exclusion identified in
paragraph 5–6.6.f and involves no
extraordinary circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with RULES1
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this rule under
the principles and criteria of Executive
Order 13132, Federalism. The agency
has determined that this action will not
have a substantial direct effect on the
States, or the relationship between the
Federal Government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, and, therefore,
would not have Federalism
implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations
That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this rule under
Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations that
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:43 Feb 09, 2023
Jkt 259001
A. Rulemaking Documents
B. Comments Submitted to the Docket
Comments received may be viewed by
going to https://www.regulations.gov
and following the online instructions to
search the docket number for this
action. Anyone is able to search the
electronic form of all comments
received into any of the FAA’s dockets
by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
C. Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with
small entity requests for information or
advice about compliance with statutes
and regulations within its jurisdiction.
A small entity with questions regarding
this document, may contact its local
FAA official, or the person listed under
the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
heading at the beginning of the
preamble. To find out more about
SBREFA on the internet, visit https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/
rulemaking/sbre_act/.
14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 29
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
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The Amendments
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
amends chapter I of title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 27 and
29 as follows:
PART 27—AIRWORTHINESS
STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY
ROTORCRAFT
1. The authority citation for part 27
continues to read as follows:
■
An electronic copy of a rulemaking
document may be obtained from the
internet by—
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking
Portal (www.regulations.gov);
2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and
Policies web page at www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/; or
3. Accessing the Government Printing
Office’s web page at www.GovInfo.gov.
Copies may also be obtained by
sending a request (identified by notice,
amendment, or docket number of this
rulemaking) to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Rulemaking,
ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue SW,
Washington, DC 20591, or by calling
(202) 267–9680.
List of Subjects
8737
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–
44702, 44704.
2. Amend § 27.87 by revising the
section heading and paragraph (a)
introductory text to read as follows:
■
§ 27.87
Height-velocity envelope.
(a) If there is any combination of
height and forward velocity (including
hover) under which a safe landing
cannot be made under the applicable
power failure condition in paragraph (b)
of this section, a limiting height-velocity
envelope must be established (including
all pertinent information) for that
condition, throughout the ranges of—
*
*
*
*
*
■ 3. Amend § 27.903 by revising
paragraph (d) to read as follows:
§ 27.903
Engines.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) Restart capability. (1) A means to
restart any engine in flight must be
provided.
(2) Except for the in-flight shutdown
of all engines, engine restart capability
must be demonstrated throughout a
flight envelope for the rotorcraft.
(3) Following the in-flight shutdown
of all engines, in-flight engine restart
capability must be provided.
■ 4. Amend § 27.1305 by revising
paragraphs (e), (k) introductory text, (n),
and (o) to read as follows:
§ 27.1305
Powerplant instruments.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) A means to indicate manifold
pressure for each altitude engine.
*
*
*
*
*
(k) A means to indicate the r.p.m. of
each engine and at least one tachometer,
as applicable, for:
*
*
*
*
*
(n) A means to indicate the gas
temperature for each turbine engine.
(o) A means to enable the pilot to
determine the torque of each turbine
engine, if a torque limitation is
established for that engine under
§ 27.1521(e).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 5. Revise § 27.1309 to read as follows:
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 28 / Friday, February 10, 2023 / Rules and Regulations
§ 27.1309 Equipment, systems, and
installations.
§ 27.1329 Automatic pilot and flight
guidance system.
The equipment, systems, and
installations whose functioning is
required by this subchapter must be
designed and installed to ensure that
they perform their intended functions
under any foreseeable operating
condition. For any item of equipment or
system whose failure has not been
specifically addressed by another
requirement in this chapter, the
following requirements also apply:
(a) The design of each item of
equipment, system, and installation
must be analyzed separately and in
relation to other rotorcraft systems and
installations to determine and identify
any failure that would affect the
capability of the rotorcraft or the ability
of the crew to perform their duties in all
operating conditions.
(b) Each item of equipment, system,
and installation must be designed and
installed so that:
(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic
failure condition is extremely
improbable;
(2) The occurrence of any major
failure condition is no more than
improbable; and
(3) For the occurrence of any other
failure condition between major and
catastrophic, the probability of the
failure condition must be inversely
proportional to its consequences.
(c) A means to alert the crew in the
event of a failure must be provided
when an unsafe system operating
condition exists and to enable them to
take corrective action. Systems,
controls, and associated monitoring and
crew alerting means must be designed to
minimize crew errors that could create
additional hazards.
(d) Compliance with the requirements
of this section must be shown by
analysis and, where necessary, by
ground, flight, or simulator tests. The
analysis must account for:
(1) Possible modes of failure,
including malfunctions and misleading
data and input from external sources;
(2) The effect of multiple failures and
latent failures;
(3) The resulting effects on the
rotorcraft and occupants, considering
the stage of flight and operating
conditions; and
(4) The crew alerting cues and the
corrective action required.
For the purpose of this subpart, an
automatic pilot and flight guidance
system may consist of an autopilot,
flight director, or a component that
interacts with stability augmentation or
trim.
(a) Each automatic pilot and flight
guidance system must be designed so
that it:
(1) Can be overpowered by one pilot
to allow control of the rotorcraft;
(2) Provides a means to disengage the
system, or any malfunctioning
component of the system, by each pilot
to prevent it from interfering with the
control of the rotorcraft; and
(3) Provides a means to indicate to the
flight crew its current mode of
operation. Selector switch position is
not acceptable as a means of indication.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) The system must be designed so
that, within the range of adjustment
available to the pilot, it cannot produce
hazardous loads on the rotorcraft, or
create hazardous deviations in the flight
path, under any flight condition
appropriate to its use or in the event of
a malfunction, assuming that corrective
action begins within a reasonable period
of time.
(e) If the automatic pilot and flight
guidance system integrates signals from
auxiliary controls or furnishes signals
for operation of other equipment, there
must be a means to prevent improper
operation.
*
*
*
*
*
6. Amend § 27.1329 by revising the
section heading, adding introductory
text, and revising paragraphs (a), (d),
and (e) to read as follows:
■
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:43 Feb 09, 2023
Jkt 259001
§ 27.1335
■
■
[Removed]
7. Remove § 27.1335.
8. Revise § 27.1353 to read as follows:
§ 27.1353
Energy storage systems.
Energy storage systems must be
designed and installed as follows:
(a) Energy storage systems must
provide automatic protective features
for any conditions that could prevent
continued safe flight and landing.
(b) Energy storage systems must not
emit any flammable, explosive, or toxic
gases, smoke, or fluids that could
accumulate in hazardous quantities
within the rotorcraft.
(c) Corrosive fluids or gases that
escape from the system must not
damage surrounding structures, adjacent
equipment, or systems necessary for
continued safe flight and landing.
(d) The maximum amount of heat and
pressure that can be generated during
any operation or under any failure
condition of the energy storage system
or its individual components must not
result in any hazardous effect on
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
rotorcraft structure, equipment, or
systems necessary for continued safe
flight and landing.
(e) Energy storage system installations
required for continued safe flight and
landing of the rotorcraft must have
monitoring features and a means to
indicate to the pilot the status of all
critical system parameters.
■ 9. Amend § 27.1545 by revising
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
§ 27.1545
Airspeed indicator.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) The following markings must be
made:
(1) A red line—
(i) For rotorcraft other than
helicopters, at VNE.
(ii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-on).
(iii) For helicopters, at VNE (poweroff). If VNE (power-off) is less than VNE
(power-on) and both are simultaneously
displayed, the red line at VNE (poweroff) must be clearly distinguishable from
the red line at VNE (power-on).
(2) [Reserved]
(3) For the caution range, a yellow
range.
(4) For the normal operating range, a
green or unmarked range.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 10. Amend § 27.1549 by revising
paragraphs (a) through (d) to read as
follows:
§ 27.1549
Powerplant instruments.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) Each maximum and, if applicable,
minimum safe operating limit must be
marked with a red line;
(b) Each normal operating range must
be marked as a green or unmarked
range;
(c) Each takeoff and precautionary
range must be marked with a yellow
range or yellow line;
(d) Each engine or rotor range that is
restricted because of excessive vibration
stresses must be marked with red ranges
or red lines; and
*
*
*
*
*
■ 11. Amend § 27.1555 by revising
paragraph (c)(1) to read as follows:
§ 27.1555
Control markings.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) For fuel systems having no selector
controls, the usable fuel capacity of the
system must be indicated at the fuel
quantity indicator unless it is:
(i) Provided by another system or
equipment readily accessible to the
pilot; and
(ii) Contained in the limitations
section of the rotorcraft flight manual.
*
*
*
*
*
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 28 / Friday, February 10, 2023 / Rules and Regulations
12. Amend § 27.1587 by revising
paragraph (a)(1) to read as follows:
■
§ 27.1587
Performance information.
(a) * * *
(1) Enough information to determine
the limiting height-velocity envelope.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 13. Amend appendix B to part 27 by
revising paragraphs VIII introductory
text and VIII(b)(5)(i) to read as follows:
Appendix B to Part 27—Airworthiness
Criteria for Helicopter Instrument
Flight
*
*
*
*
*
VIII. Equipment, systems, and installation.
The basic equipment and installation must
comply with §§ 29.1303, 29.1431, and
29.1433, with the following exceptions and
additions:
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(5) * * *
(i) For pneumatic systems, only the
required flight instruments for the first pilot
may be connected to that operating system;
*
*
*
*
*
■ 14. In appendix C to part 27 amend
section ‘‘C27.2 Applicable part 29
sections’’ by removing ‘‘29.1309(b)(2)(i)
and (d)—Equipment, systems, and
installations’’ and by revising
‘‘29.903(b)(c) and (e)—Engines’’ to read
as follows:
Appendix C to Part 27—Criteria for
Category A
*
*
*
*
*
29.903 (b) and (c)—Engines.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 29—AIRWORTHINESS
STANDARDS: TRANSPORT
CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
§ 29.1019
Oil strainer or filter.
(a) * * *
(5) An oil strainer or filter that has no
bypass, except one that is installed at an
oil tank outlet, must have a means to
connect it to the warning system
required in § 29.1305(a)(19).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 19. Amend § 29.1305 by revising
paragraphs (a)(5), (11), and (12) and
adding (b)(4) to read as follows:
§ 29.1305
Powerplant instruments.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) * * *
(5) A means to indicate manifold
pressure for each altitude engine;
*
*
*
*
*
(11) A means to indicate the gas
temperature for each turbine engine;
(12) A means to indicate the gas
producer speed for each turbine engine;
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(4) For each Category A rotorcraft for
which OEI Training Mode is requested,
a means must be provided to indicate to
the pilot the simulation of an engine
failure, the annunciation of that
simulation, and a representation of the
OEI power being provided.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 20. Revise § 29.1309 to read as
follows:
■
15. The authority citation for part 29
continues to read as follows:
§ 29.1309 Equipment, systems, and
installations.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113,
44701–44702, 44704.
The equipment, systems, and
installations whose functioning is
required by this subchapter must be
designed and installed to ensure that
they perform their intended functions
under any foreseeable operating
condition. For any item of equipment or
system whose failure has not been
specifically addressed by another
requirement in this chapter, the
following requirements also apply:
(a) The design of each item of
equipment, system, and installation
must be analyzed separately and in
relation to other rotorcraft systems and
installations to determine and identify
any failure that would affect the
capability of the rotorcraft or the ability
of the crew to perform their duties in all
operating conditions.
16. Amend § 29.955 by revising
paragraph (a)(7) to read as follows:
■
§ 29.955
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(1) For reciprocating engine powered
rotorcraft, have 8 to 16 meshes per inch;
and
(2) For turbine engine powered
rotorcraft, prevent the passage of any
object that could restrict fuel flow or
damage any fuel system component.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 18. Amend § 29.1019 by revising
paragraph (a)(5) to read as follows:
Fuel flow.
(a) * * *
(7) The fuel filter required by § 29.997
is blocked to the degree necessary to
simulate the accumulation of fuel
contamination required to activate the
indicator required by § 29.1305(a)(18).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 17. Amend § 29.977 by revising
paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) to read as
follows:
§ 29.977
Fuel tank outlet.
(a) * * *
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8739
(b) Each item of equipment, system,
and installation must be designed and
installed so that:
(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic
failure condition is extremely
improbable;
(2) The occurrence of any major
failure condition is no more than
improbable; and
(3) For the occurrence of any other
failure condition in between major and
catastrophic, the probability of the
failure condition must be inversely
proportional to its consequences.
(c) A means to alert the crew in the
event of a failure must be provided
when an unsafe system operating
condition exists and to enable them to
take corrective action. Systems,
controls, and associated monitoring and
crew alerting means must be designed to
minimize crew errors that could create
additional hazards.
(d) Compliance with the requirements
of this section must be shown by
analysis and, where necessary, by
ground, flight, or simulator tests. The
analysis must account for:
(1) Possible modes of failure,
including malfunctions and misleading
data and input from external sources;
(2) The effect of multiple failures and
latent failures;
(3) The resulting effects on the
rotorcraft and occupants, considering
the stage of flight and operating
conditions; and
(4) The crew alerting cues and the
corrective action required.
■ 21. Amend § 29.1329 by revising the
section heading, adding introductory
text, and revising paragraphs (a), (d),
and (e) to read as follows:
§ 29.1329 Automatic pilot and flight
guidance system.
For the purpose of this subpart, an
automatic pilot and flight guidance
system may consist of an autopilot,
flight director, or a component that
interacts with stability augmentation or
trim.
(a) Each automatic pilot and flight
guidance system must be designed so
that it:
(1) Can be overpowered by one pilot
to allow control of the rotorcraft;
(2) Provides a means to disengage the
system, or any malfunctioning
component of the system, by each pilot
to prevent it from interfering with the
control of the rotorcraft; and
(3) Provides a means to indicate to the
flight crew its current mode of
operation. Selector switch position is
not acceptable as a means of indication.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) The system must be designed so
that, within the range of adjustment
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 28 / Friday, February 10, 2023 / Rules and Regulations
available to the pilot, it cannot produce
hazardous loads on the rotorcraft, or
create hazardous deviations in the flight
path, under any flight condition
appropriate to its use or in the event of
a malfunction, assuming that corrective
action begins within a reasonable period
of time.
(e) If the automatic pilot and flight
guidance system integrates signals from
auxiliary controls or furnishes signals
for operation of other equipment, there
must be a means to prevent improper
operation.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 22. Amend § 29.1333 by revising
paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 29.1333
Instrument systems.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) For pneumatic systems, only the
required flight instruments for the first
pilot may be connected to that operating
system.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 29.1335
[Removed]
23. Remove § 29.1335.
24. Amend § 29.1351 by adding
paragraphs (e) and (f) to read as follows:
■
■
§ 29.1351
General.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) Electrical equipment, controls, and
wiring must be installed so that
operation of any one unit or system of
units will not adversely affect the
simultaneous operation of any other
electrical unit or system essential to safe
operation.
(f) Cables must be grouped, routed,
and spaced so that damage to essential
circuits will be minimized if there are
faults in heavy current-carrying cables.
■ 25. Revise § 29.1353 to read as
follows:
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§ 29.1353
Energy storage systems.
Energy storage systems must be
designed and installed as follows:
(a) Energy storage systems must
provide automatic protective features
for any conditions that could prevent
continued safe flight and landing.
(b) Energy storage systems must not
emit any flammable, explosive, or toxic
gases, smoke, or fluids that could
accumulate in hazardous quantities
within the rotorcraft.
(c) Corrosive fluids or gases that
escape from the system must not
damage surrounding structures, adjacent
equipment, or systems necessary for
continued safe flight and landing.
(d) The maximum amount of heat and
pressure that can be generated during
any operation or under any failure
condition of the energy storage system
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:43 Feb 09, 2023
Jkt 259001
or its individual components must not
result in any hazardous effect on
rotorcraft structure, equipment, or
systems necessary for continued safe
flight and landing.
(e) Energy storage system installations
required for continued safe flight and
landing of the rotorcraft must have
monitoring features and a means to
indicate to the pilot the status of all
critical system parameters.
■ 26. Amend § 29.1517 by revising the
section heading to read as follows:
§ 29.1517 Limiting height-velocity
envelope.
*
*
*
*
*
27. Amend § 29.1545 by revising
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
■
§ 29.1545
Airspeed indicator.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) The following markings must be
made:
(1) A red line:
(i) For rotorcraft other than
helicopters, at VNE.
(ii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-on).
(iii) For helicopters, at VNE (poweroff). If VNE (power-off) is less than VNE
(power-on) and both are simultaneously
displayed, the red line at VNE (poweroff) must be clearly distinguishable from
the red line at VNE (power-on).
(2) [Reserved]
(3) For the caution range, a yellow
range.
(4) For the normal operating range, a
green or unmarked range.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 28. Amend § 29.1549 by revising
paragraphs (a) through (d) to read as
follows:
§ 29.1549
Powerplant instruments.
*
*
*
*
(a) Each maximum and, if applicable,
minimum safe operating limit must be
marked with a red line;
(b) Each normal operating range must
be marked as a green or unmarked
range;
(c) Each takeoff and precautionary
range must be marked with a yellow
range or yellow line;
(d) Each engine or rotor range that is
restricted because of excessive vibration
stresses must be marked with red ranges
or red lines; and
*
*
*
*
*
■ 29. Amend § 29.1555 by revising
paragraph (c)(1) to read as follows:
system must be indicated at the fuel
quantity indicator unless it is:
(i) Provided by another system or
equipment readily accessible to the
pilot; and
(ii) Contained in the limitations
section of the rotorcraft flight manual.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 30. Amend § 29.1587 by revising
paragraph (b)(6) to read as follows:
§ 29.1587
Performance information.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(6) The height-velocity envelope
except for rotorcraft incorporating this
as an operating limitation;
*
*
*
*
*
■ 31. Amend appendix B to part 29 by
revising paragraphs VIII introductory
text and VIII(b)(5)(i) to read as follows:
Appendix B to Part 29—Airworthiness
Criteria for Helicopter Instrument
Flight
*
*
*
*
*
VIII. Equipment, systems, and installation.
The basic equipment and installation must
comply with §§ 29.1303, 29.1431, and
29.1433, with the following exceptions and
additions:
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(5) * * *
(i) For pneumatic systems, only the
required flight instruments for the first pilot
may be connected to that operating system;
*
*
*
*
*
Issued in Washington, DC, on or about
February 6, 2023.
Billy Nolen,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023–02771 Filed 2–9–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
*
§ 29.1555
Control markings.
*
Frm 00012
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2022–1411; Project
Identifier MCAI–2022–00912–T; Amendment
39–22320; AD 2023–02–13]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Dassault
Aviation Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The FAA is superseding
Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020–21–
19, which applied to certain Dassault
Aviation Model FALCON 900EX
airplanes. AD 2020–21–19 required
SUMMARY:
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) For fuel systems having no selector
controls, the usable fuel capacity of the
PO 00000
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 28 (Friday, February 10, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 8729-8740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-02771]
========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 28 / Friday, February 10, 2023 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 8729]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 27 and 29
[Docket No.: FAA-2017-0990; Amdt. Nos. 27-51, 29-59]
RIN 2120-AK80
Normal and Transport Category Rotorcraft Certification
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The FAA is amending the certification standards of normal and
transport category rotorcraft. These changes are necessary to address
modern designs currently used in the rotorcraft industry and will
reduce the burden on applicants for certification of new rotorcraft
designs. The changes will reduce or eliminate the need for certain
special conditions currently required to obtain certification of modern
rotorcraft. These changes also incorporate the provisions of equivalent
level of safety findings and means of compliance issue papers that the
FAA has made when approving certain design features.
DATES: Effective April 11, 2023.
ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking
documents and other information related to this final rule, see ``How
To Obtain Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions concerning this action,
contact Sandra Shelley, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management
Group, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817)
222-5110; email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, sections 44701 and 44704. Under
section 44701, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
minimum standards required in the interest of safety for the design and
performance of aircraft. Under section 44704, the Administrator issues
type certificates for aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and
specified appliances when the Administrator finds the product is
properly designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the
regulations and minimum standards prescribed under section 44701(a).
This rulemaking is within the scope of these authorities because it
promotes safety by updating the minimum prescribed standards used
during the type certification process.
I. Overview of Final Rule
This final rule revises regulations in title 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (14 CFR) part 27 (Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category
Rotorcraft) and part 29 (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category
Rotorcraft) related to the certification of rotorcraft. These changes
are necessary due to the extensive application of advancing
technologies to rotorcraft. Current airworthiness standards do not
adequately address increasing design complexity. To address these
advances, the FAA has been issuing reoccurring special conditions,
equivalent level of safety (ELOS) findings, and means of compliance
(MOC) issue papers. This final rule addresses these areas by updating
those standards that have been addressed by these special conditions,
ELOS findings and MOC issue papers. Compliance with the regulatory
changes implemented by this final rule will continue to be shown by the
same testing, analysis, and inspections required by existing special
conditions, ELOS findings and MOC issue papers. However, there will be
a reduced administrative burden, to both the rotorcraft industry and
the FAA, through the reduction or elimination of reoccurring special
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers.
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
This final rule updates parts 27 and 29 because the regulations in
these parts were originally published in 1964 and past revisions to the
airworthiness standards have not kept pace with advances in technology
for rotorcraft. The FAA addresses these changes to technology by
issuing reoccurring special conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue
papers. These three processes are necessary to address new design
features for which airworthiness standards are lacking, compliance with
a rule cannot be achieved, or alternative methods of compliance are
proposed. Special conditions are prescribed under 14 CFR 21.16 when the
FAA finds the applicable airworthiness standards do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards because of a novel or unusual
design feature. The FAA issues ELOS findings under Sec. 21.21(b)(1)
where a design does not comply with the airworthiness standards, but
compensating factors exist that provide an equivalent level of safety.
MOC issue papers document compliance methodologies that fall outside
existing guidance and policies.
The process of developing, drafting and finalizing these special
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers has an impact on both
the FAA's and the applicants' resources. In addition, they impact
applicants' schedules for obtaining FAA approval of their products. By
updating the affected standards, many of these special conditions, ELOS
findings, and MOC issue papers are now unnecessary, thus reducing the
burden on both the FAA and industry.
In some cases, advancements in technology have rendered the
regulations in parts 27 and 29 obsolete. This final rule revises those
regulations. This final rule also updates a few of these rules to
correct typographical errors.
B. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
As a result of incidents involving smoke and fire caused by failure
of lithium batteries installed on Boeing 787 aircraft, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued Safety
[[Page 8730]]
Recommendations A-14-032 through 036 to the FAA on May 22, 2014.\1\ The
NTSB recommended the FAA develop abuse tests to simulate failures
observed in the incidents investigated and to address findings in
recent research (A-14-032), perform these tests on new aircraft for
certain installations (A-14-033), develop guidance on acceptable
methods to induce thermal runaway that reliably simulates battery
failures (A-14-034), review methods of compliance used to certificate
in-service lithium-ion battery aircraft installations to ensure that
they adequately protect against adverse effects of a cell thermal
runaway (A-14-035), and develop policy to establish a panel of
technical experts to advise on compliance and best practices for safely
installing new technology (A-14-036). This final rule incorporates
these NTSB recommendations as they relate to rotorcraft into Sec. Sec.
27.1353 and 29.1353.
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\1\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-14-032-036.pdf.
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C. Summary of the NPRM
On November 1, 2017, the FAA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM), ``Normal and Transport Category Rotorcraft
Certification'' (82 FR 50583). In the NPRM, the FAA proposed changes
necessary to address modern designs currently used in the rotorcraft
industry and to reduce the burden on applicants for certification of
new rotorcraft designs. The FAA proposed changes that would reduce or
eliminate the need for certain special conditions that were often
required to obtain certification of modern rotorcraft. The FAA also
proposed to incorporate the provisions of ELOS findings and MOC issue
papers that the FAA has made when approving certain design features.
The comment period closed on January 30, 2018.
D. General Overview of Comments
The FAA received comments from 22 commenters. About half of the
commenters were individuals. The remaining commenters included the
NTSB, aviation manufacturers, industry groups and organizations, and
foreign civil aviation authorities. One commenter, the Aircraft
Electronics Association, supported the proposed rule without change.
Most commenters were generally supportive of the proposal but some
suggested changes to the proposed rule, as discussed in more detail
later in this preamble. Some comments were beyond the scope of the
proposal.
III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule
A. Engines (Sec. 27.903(d))
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to reformat the paragraph designation
in Sec. 27.903(d) to be consistent with Sec. 29.903(e). When Sec.
27.903(d) was adopted, the paragraph designation of Sec. 29.903(e) was
not used even though the FAA intended the requirements to be identical.
This designation led to confusion. This final rule eliminates the
confusion by reformatting the paragraph designation in Sec. 27.903(d)
as proposed in the NPRM. The restart capability requirements of Sec.
27.903(d) are not being changed in this rulemaking.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell) and the General Aviation
Manufacturers Association (GAMA) requested that part 27 appendix C be
revised to remove the need for compliance with Sec. 29.903(e), as the
requirements are identical to proposed Sec. 27.903(d). The FAA agrees
and has removed the reference to Sec. 29.903(e) from appendix C of
part 27.
B. Powerplant Instruments (Sec. Sec. 27.1305 and 29.1305)
Current Sec. Sec. 27.1305 and 29.1305 prescribe the specific
required powerplant instruments for rotorcraft. The changes to these
sections will allow for other means of compliance for certain
powerplant instrument indicators. Additionally, for Sec. 29.1305, the
FAA will permit an optional feature to simulate one engine inoperative
(OEI) conditions without damaging the engines. Rotorcraft with OEI
Training Mode will require additional indications to differentiate the
simulated OEI conditions from actual engine failure.
Airbus Helicopters requested that the FAA use different wording to
describe a synthesized power indicator (SPI) for an instrument that
provides a single indicator of engine performance, because presenting
the information as a percentage of power to the nearest engine limit is
only one of the methods of informing the flightcrew.
The commenter's request did not pertain to the proposed regulatory
text but rather to industry examples in the NPRM preamble. However, the
guidance associated with this final rule, Advisory Circulars (AC) 27-
1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft and AC 29-2C,
Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft, identifies other
concepts of showing proximity to engine limits other than as a
percentage.
Airbus Helicopters also commented that certification of SPIs can be
accomplished using the existing rules, and provided examples of two
designs that have been approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA). These technologies could only be certificated in the past by
the FAA through processes such as that necessary for an ELOS finding. A
key purpose of this rulemaking is to reduce or eliminate the need for
reoccurring special conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers.
Therefore, the FAA has made no changes to the regulatory text in
response to this comment.
Bell, GAMA, Transport Canada, and an individual requested the FAA
expand the changes to Sec. Sec. 27.1305 and 29.1305 to allow
synthesized dual/triple tachometers. This requested change is beyond
the scope of the proposal. A key purpose of this rulemaking is to
reduce or eliminate the need for reoccurring special conditions, ELOS
findings, and MOC issue papers. The FAA has not issued any of these
documents for synthesized dual or triple tachometers.
EASA requested that the FAA change the reference in the proposed
Sec. 27.1305(o) from engine ``torque'' to engine ``power'' to be
consistent with Sec. 29.1305(a)(16) and allowing for other forms of
power determination. The requirement in Sec. 27.1305(o) to display
engine torque to the pilot is contingent on the establishment of a
torque limitation for the engine under Sec. 27.1521(e). Therefore, the
requested change would create an incompatibility between Sec. Sec.
27.1305(o) and 27.1521(e). The FAA did not make any changes in response
to this comment.
Transport Canada requested that the FAA correct a typographical
error in the current Sec. 27.1305(k)(2) and change ``or'' to ``and.''
Transport Canada noted that this correction would make the wording of
Sec. 27.1305(k)(2) identical to that section's part 29 counterpart,
Sec. 29.1305(a)(14)(ii). The FAA notes that the word ``or'' in Sec.
27.1305(k)(2) is not a typographical error. The difference in wording
between Sec. 27.1305(k)(2) and Sec. 29.1305(a)(14)(ii) has existed in
the Federal Aviation Regulations from the promulgation of parts 27 and
29 to replace the Civil Air Regulations.\2\ Moreover, the requested
change would increase the regulatory requirement. The FAA did not make
any changes in response to this comment.
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\2\ 29 FR 15694 (Nov. 24, 1964); 29 FR 16148 (Dec. 3, 1964).
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Transport Canada also requested the FAA change the wording in
proposed Sec. 29.1305(a)(5) from ``a means to indicate manifold
pressure for each reciprocation engine, of the altitude type'' to ``a
means to indicate manifold pressure for each altitude engine'' to align
the reference to this type of
[[Page 8731]]
reciprocating engine with references to this same engine type used
throughout part 27. The FAA agrees and has made this change.
Additionally, this change provides consistency with Sec. 27.1305(e)
and with the identification of this type of engine elsewhere in part
29, and the term ``altitude engine'' is as type of engine that is a
reciprocating engine.
Bell, GAMA, and an individual proposed new language for Sec.
27.1305 that would permit OEI training mode capability. OEI Training
Mode is a design feature for Category A training purposes. As explained
by the FAA in the NPRM, the FAA did not propose these changes because
part 27 Category A rotorcraft are approved under appendix C to part 27,
which requires compliance with Sec. 29.1305. The FAA did not make any
changes in response to these comments.
C. Rotorcraft Equipment, Systems, and Installations (Sec. Sec.
27.1309, 29.1309, and Appendix C to Part 27)
Sections 27.1309 and 29.1309 require applicants to assess the
effects of failures resulting from installed systems and equipment. The
changes to Sec. 27.1309 made by this final rule now address advances
in technology and increases in performance of normal category
rotorcraft that were not envisioned when the rule was originally
promulgated, and eliminate the distinction between single-engine and
multi-engine rotorcraft. The final rule broadens the scope of the
previous performance-based requirement to include catastrophic failure
conditions, thus eliminating the need for recurring special conditions.
The final rule also more closely aligns with current industry practices
and accommodates potential future changes in industry failure analysis
techniques.
EASA requested the FAA reserve the paragraph numbering and allocate
new paragraph numbers for the new regulatory text to avoid confusion
between the proposed regulations and previous amendments. The FAA has
determined that this requested change is impracticable as it would
result in numerous regulatory paragraphs without content. Part 21
requires aviation manufacturers to be familiar with the airworthiness
standards that are effective as the certification basis as of the date
of their application for a type certificate. EASA also suggested
designating the first paragraph under Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and 29.1309 as
``(a)'' for clarity. The FAA did not add such a designation because the
first two sentences of Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and 29.1309 are generally
applicable requirements.
Bell, GAMA, Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson), and two
individuals commented that the proposed changes to Sec. 27.1309 would
increase the amount of analysis necessary to show compliance for normal
category rotorcraft. GAMA and Bell stated that the proposed changes
would exceed what is required to address complex systems, eliminate the
distinction between single and multi-engine rotorcraft, and fail to
maintain sufficient distinction from Sec. 29.1309. Bell and GAMA also
expressed that an increase in certification burden would be imposed by
the changes, and be likely to cause significant economic damage to the
rotorcraft industry. Similarly, Robinson stated that the proposed
changes to Sec. 27.1309 would significantly increase the regulatory
burden on normal category rotorcraft by removing the distinction
between single and multi-engine. According to Robinson, this would
require additional failure analysis by the applicant, and alerting
means in the design, resulting in a significant increase in the cost
and complexity of small helicopters. Bell and GAMA requested that the
proposed Sec. 27.1309 be replaced with the recently promulgated Sec.
23.2510, while Robinson requested that none of the proposed changes be
made to Sec. 27.1309.
This rulemaking does not change the current industry standard and
compliance means for non-critical and noncomplex (simple) systems and
equipment installed in normal category rotorcraft. As explained in the
NPRM, the distinction between single and multi-engines no longer
reflects the level of complexity of the systems installed in
rotorcraft. Most applicants have been using industry standard methods,
such as SAE/ARP 4761, for conducting their system safety analyses to
show compliance with Sec. 27.1309. These methods require assessment at
the aircraft level regardless of whether the proposed design is a
single or multi-engine configuration. As stated in the NPRM, the
applicant's method for conducting the failure analysis remains the
same. The changes eliminate the need for special conditions by
incorporating prior special condition requirements for catastrophic and
hazardous failure conditions into the rule text. The changes also
provide a means for the integration of new technology into part 27
rotorcraft. A means of compliance for noncomplex (simple) systems is
already provided in the guidance material for normal and transport
category rotorcraft. Finally, the request to incorporate Sec. 23.2510,
a performance-based regulation contingent on the use of consensus
standards, is beyond the scope of the NPRM.
Bell, GAMA, and Robinson commented that the changes to Sec.
27.1309 eliminate an applicant's use of the FAA's safety continuum
policy for part 27 rotorcraft. The FAA clarifies that the safety
continuum policy, Policy No. PS-ASW-27-15, dated June 30, 2017,\3\
provides a tiered approach for compliance with Sec. 27.1309, based
upon the rotorcraft's weight, occupant capacity, and number and type of
engines. This policy remains applicable as an option for any applicant.
Under the policy, the certification rigor for simpler, less complex
rotorcraft and systems differs from that which is necessary for more
complex rotorcraft and systems to show compliance with Sec. 27.1309.
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\3\ https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExternalWindow/0D4AF6EE7F3013848625815600705441.0001.
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EASA, Transport Canada, and an individual requested additional
definition of the applicability of Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and 29.1309. The
commenters stated there will be confusion regarding whether to apply
Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and 29.1309 to systems outside of the current
subpart. The FAA recognized the need to be clear about the
applicability of the regulation; therefore, the proposed introductory
text published in the NPRM for Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and 29.1309 clarified
that the rule would apply to any system or equipment whose failure has
not been specifically addressed by another requirement in chapter I of
title 14 of the CFR. The FAA has determined that the proposed
regulatory text is adequately clear and has adopted it without change
in this final rule.
EASA and Thales AVS France commented on the proposed ACs intended
to provide acceptable means to comply with Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and
29.1309. These commenters requested that the AC text providing that
``the catastrophic failure condition should not result from a single
failure'' should be included in the regulation to resolve the
inconsistency resulting from the inclusion of such language in the AC
but not the regulatory text. The guidance materials provide analysis
techniques for showing how an applicant can achieve ``extremely
improbable'' in conjunction with a single failure. Single failures are
not the only failure conditions that need to be addressed in order for
the analysis to be complete. The FAA has clarified this in AC 27-1B and
AC 29-2C, which
[[Page 8732]]
provide acceptable means to comply with Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and 29.1309.
Bell and GAMA requested the FAA not adopt the proposed requirement
in Sec. Sec. 27.1309(a) and 29.1309(a) for equipment, systems, and
installations to be analyzed for hazards both individually and with
regard to their integration with the rest of the aircraft. The
commenters stated that the appropriate safety analysis methodologies
for the equipment to be installed are already covered by paragraph (d)
in Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and 29.1309. The commenters stated the specific
analysis is defined in guidance, and that including this statement in
the regulation imposes a significant increase in the certification
burden. This is incorrect. The requirement the commenters opposed for
inclusion in paragraph (a) is already present in Sec. 29.1309 and is
included in special conditions for part 27 to certify proposed design
features such as autopilot systems. In addition, this regulatory text
does not dictate a specific analysis methodology to be used to show
compliance; therefore, there is no increase in the certification
burden.
GAMA, EASA, and Thales AVS France requested that the FAA change
proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1309(b) and 29.1309(b) to specify three levels
of failure classification: catastrophic, hazardous, and major. In the
NPRM, the FAA proposed a top level failure classification
(catastrophic), a bottom level (minor), and any other level in between
as long as the probability of the failure condition is inversely
proportional to its consequences. EASA and GAMA stated that the
proposed rule change would increase the regulatory burden by requiring
the same analysis for minor failure conditions as for other, more
severe failure conditions.
The FAA recognizes that proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1309(b)(2) and
29.1309(b)(2) would have inadvertently raised the regulatory burden.
That was not the FAA's intent, so in this final rule the FAA has
revised Sec. Sec. 27.1309(b)(2) and 29.1309(b)(2) to change the bottom
level failure classification to major, in order to maintain the current
regulatory requirement.
The final rule provides flexibility for future changes in industry
standards and practices by allowing as many levels of failure
classification as an applicant wishes to propose, as long as the
probability of the failure condition is inversely proportional to its
consequences.
GAMA and an individual requested that the FAA make the language in
Sec. Sec. 27.1309(c) and 29.1309(c) consistent with one another, in
that the word ``and'' is missing from Sec. 27.1309(c). As explained in
the NPRM, the FAA intended for these two sections to be consistent and
thus, has corrected this error in this final rule such that ``and'' is
included in Sec. 27.1309(c), consistent with current Sec. 29.1309(c).
Bell and GAMA commented on the FAA proposal to remove Sec. Sec.
29.1309(b)(2) and 29.1309(e), which are specific to Category A
rotorcraft, stating that these provisions are necessary companions to
Sec. 29.903(b) engine systems isolation requirements. The commenters
stated that without a specific regulation for Category A systems and
equipment, Sec. 29.903(b) becomes the specific regulation and applies
rather than Sec. 29.1309. The commenters provided an example that, in
order to show compliance with Sec. 29.903(b), it would be necessary to
show physical isolation between left engine and right engine indication
systems, instead of providing integrated displays with redundancy
rather than isolation with an appropriate probability for failure
conditions that might affect both engine's indications. The commenters
are correct that Sec. 29.903(b) is the specific regulation for
Category A engine isolation requirements. However, the Sec. 29.903(b)
analysis is limited to systems required for engine operations. The
commenters' application of this analysis to engine indication systems
and displays, which do not affect engine operation, is misplaced.
Section 29.1309 requires applicants to assess the effects of failures
resulting from installed systems and equipment, such as engine
indicators or displays that may be necessary for performing Category A
operations. These requirements are unchanged by the proposals in the
NPRM.
GAMA requested that proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1309(d)(2) and
29.1309(d)(2), which require an analysis of ``[t]he effect of multiple
failures and latent failures,'' be revised to preclude future
interpretations of this paragraph as requiring consideration of
multiple failures of unrelated functions or systems.
Although there are cases where the failures of unrelated functions
or systems should be considered, the FAA shares the commenter's concern
on the need to limit multiple failure analysis so that every
combination of failures of unrelated functions or systems will not need
to be considered. The FAA has changed the guidance material, AC 27-1B
and AC 29-2C, to provide guidance to help applicants determine the
depth of analysis necessary when considering multiple failures in
complying with Sec. Sec. 27.1309(d)(2) and 29.1309(d)(2).
GAMA and Transport Canada requested that for the analysis of crew
warning cues in proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1309(d)(4) and 29.1309(d)(4),
the FAA correct the word ``warning.'' In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to
replace the term ``warning'' with ``annunciation,'' but in Sec. Sec.
27.1309(d)(4) and 29.1309(d)(4) the term ``warning'' remained in the
proposed regulatory text. However, Transport Canada suggested that
``warning'' be replaced with ``alerting.''
The FAA has determined that the term ``alerting'' is generally
understood to include warnings and cautions that may include aural and
visual types of cues to the pilot as appropriate. The FAA agrees that
``alerting'' more accurately conveys the requirement, and so has
included it in this final rule.
An individual requested the FAA address the additional costs that
may be incurred by U.S. applicants seeking validation of type-
certificated products by EASA. The commenter states that the FAA's
changes to Sec. Sec. 27.1309 and 29.1309 compromise the rules'
harmonization with EASA's rules.
The FAA's changes in this final rule incorporate the provisions of
prior special conditions. EASA has validated several aircraft designs
with the provisions of these special conditions. Therefore, the
commenter's concern about additional costs during validation is not
warranted.
D. Automatic Pilot and Flight Guidance System (Sec. Sec. 27.1329 and
29.1329)
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise Sec. Sec. 27.1329 and
29.1329 by combining the existing requirements for automatic pilot with
those of Sec. Sec. 27.1335 and 29.1335 for flight director systems
into one rule for automatic pilot and flight guidance systems. EASA
noted the FAA proposed to change the requirements in Sec. Sec.
27.1329(a)(1) and 29.1329(a)(1) so that the system can be overpowered
by ``one pilot'' to ``the pilot'' and in Sec. Sec. 27.1329(a)(2) and
29.1329(a)(2) that the system can be disengaged by ``each pilot'' to
``the pilot.'' EASA stated that these changes reduce the level of
safety, as the prior rules required that the effort of one pilot be
enough to overpower the system. The effect of the proposed language as
described by EASA was not the FAA's intent. Accordingly, the final rule
refers to ``one pilot,'' in Sec. Sec. 27.1329(a)(1) and 29.1329(a)(1)
and ``each pilot'' in Sec. Sec. 27.1329(a)(2) and 29.1329(a)(2) to be
consistent with the existing regulatory requirement.
[[Page 8733]]
Transport Canada noted that the proposed rule appeared to include
fly-by-wire in its definition of an automatic flight guidance and
control system, and that manufacturers would not be able to comply with
a requirement to completely disengage a fly-by-wire system. Transport
Canada therefore requested the rule be changed so that a proposed
design would only have to only disengage ``any malfunctioning
components of'' the system.
The FAA did not intend for Sec. Sec. 27.1329 and 29.1329 to cover
flight control systems, including fly-by-wire. The section title and
the introductory sentence have been changed in this final rule to
remove references to ``control.'' Sections 27.1329(a)(2) and
29.1329(a)(2) have also been changed in this final rule so that
applicants may design the system to either disengage the entire system,
any malfunctioning component of the system, or both.
Bell, GAMA, Transport Canada, and Thales AVS France commented that
the proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1329(d) and 29.1329(d) would have eliminated
the condition of ``assuming that corrective action begins within a
reasonable period of time.'' The commenters stated that the FAA did not
explain the elimination of this statement.
The existing text identified by commenters was inadvertently
omitted from the NPRM, but is included in this final rule.
E. Instrument Systems (Sec. 29.1333 and Appendix B to Parts 27 and 29)
Current Sec. 29.1333(a) requires isolating the pilot instrument
system from any other operating systems because at the time the rule
was promulgated, these systems were federated, and connecting the
systems increased the likelihood that a fault in one system could cause
a failure in the pilot instrument system. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed
to revise Sec. 29.1333(a) and section VIII(b)(5)(i) of appendix B to
parts 27 and 29 limiting it to pneumatic systems, allowing for the use
of current technology to display integrated information to the pilot.
Airbus Helicopters requested that the FAA change the word
``system'' to ``parts'' so that the requirement for physical
independence only applies to the pneumatic parts of a system.
The FAA intended for only the pneumatic portion of the system to
have physical independence. The FAA is not changing the proposed rule
text as suggested by the commenter because the word ``parts,'' could be
interpreted as a component as opposed to only the pneumatic portion of
the system. This section of the rule is adopted as proposed in the
NPRM.
F. Energy Storage System (Sec. Sec. 27.1353 and 29.1353)
The FAA's current regulations pertaining to batteries for
rotorcraft include requirements specific to lead-acid batteries and
nickel-cadmium batteries. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed performance-
based requirements to accommodate any energy storage system. As a
result, this final rule incorporates, for rotorcraft, the NTSB's
recommendation that the FAA require aircraft manufacturers to
demonstrate acceptable performance as part of the certification of any
new aircraft design that incorporates the installation of lithium-ion
batteries.
Bell and GAMA requested that the FAA modify proposed Sec. Sec.
27.1353(a) and 29.1353(a) by removing the word ``automatic'' from the
protective design features required for hazard mitigation, and
expressed concern that a requirement that the features be ``automatic''
would increase certification requirements. Current Sec. Sec.
27.1353(g) and 29.1353(c) contain a similar requirement for automatic
features to monitor the battery system for nickel-cadmium batteries and
prevent or mitigate an over temperature condition or battery failure.
Special conditions issued by the FAA to certificate lithium battery
installations have required automatic features to monitor the battery
system and protect the aircraft. The proposed regulation does not
change this requirement but rather incorporates it into a rule that
accommodates any energy storage system. Some energy storage system
hazards may occur too rapidly to be mitigated by pilot action;
therefore, automatic monitoring and control is necessary which would
not increase certification requirements.
In another comment, the NTSB suggested including more prescriptive
language in Sec. Sec. 27.1353(a) and 29.1353(a) to address all
possible mitigation strategies. By using performance-based
requirements, this final rule allows both current and future mitigation
strategies. A prescriptive list of current acceptable mitigation
strategies may not allow for future energy storage technologies.
Accordingly, in this final rule, the FAA has adopted Sec. Sec.
27.1353(a) and 29.1353(a) as proposed.
Bell and GAMA requested modifying proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1353(b)
and 29.1353(b), because they would have required venting as the means
of limiting the accumulation of hazardous gases, fluids, and smoke. The
FAA agrees with these comments and has adopted Bell and GAMA's
recommended language in this final rule, in order to allow other types
of hazard mitigation. The intent of the rule is to require that
emissions not accumulate in hazardous (flammability, toxicity,
visibility, etc.) quantities. Designs may accomplish this through
venting or through other means.
Bell and GAMA commented that the term ``damage'' in Sec. Sec.
27.1353(c) and 29.1353(c) is unclear and requested that the rule be
revised from ``must not damage surrounding structures, adjacent
equipment, or systems necessary for continued safe flight and landing''
to ``must not result in any hazardous effect on structures, equipment,
or systems necessary for continued safe flight and landing.'' The
language proposed in the NPRM was retained from the current rule and
accurately captures the requirement. The commenter's suggested change
would allow damage to occur undetected until it evolved into a
hazardous condition, which was not the intent of the rule. Accordingly,
in this final rule, the FAA has adopted Sec. Sec. 27.1353(c) and
29.1353(c) as proposed.
The NTSB requested that proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1353(d) and
29.1353(d) be revised to address the maximum amount of pressure from an
energy storage system failure. The FAA agrees, since a rapid increase
in pressure that exceeds the maximum amount for an energy storage
system that is not contained may result in damage to surrounding
systems or structure. Proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1353(d) and 29.1353(d)
have been revised consistent with the NTSB comment.
GAMA commented that the Sec. Sec. 27.1353(e) and 29.1353(e)
requirement to provide a means to monitor and inform the pilot of
energy storage system health precludes other mitigating design features
and may be unnecessary when effective containment measures are used.
GAMA requested adding an alternative requirement to allow sufficient
containment of the energy storage system.
GAMA's requested change to Sec. Sec. 27.1353(e) and 29.1353(e)
would invalidate the requirement that the pilot be notified of all
critical system parameters. The pilot must know the health of the
required energy storage system. The regulation does not preclude other
mitigating strategies but these must include a means for the pilot to
know the condition of all critical system parameters. Accordingly, in
this final rule, the FAA has adopted Sec. Sec. 27.1353(e) and
29.1353(e) as proposed.
[[Page 8734]]
G. Airspeed Indicator (Sec. 27.1545)
Current Sec. 27.1545 requires instruments to be marked with a
green arc and red radial lines. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to remove
the restrictive requirement for some instrument markings to allow
alternative means of compliance.
Bell and GAMA requested the rule specify when VNE must
be displayed, allow provisions for variable VNE information,
and clarify that a VNE caution range is not always
applicable. These requested changes are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking, which was to make the color and depiction of the airspeed
indicator markings less prescriptive. In addition, the suggested
wording would be more prescriptive, and therefore restrict traditional
systems from being approved.
An individual requested the FAA change the term ``yellow arc'' in
Sec. 27.1545(b)(3) to ``amber arc'' to be consistent with Sec.
27.1322(b). The requested change is beyond the scope of this
rulemaking, which was to eliminate the need for reoccurring MOC issue
papers for a lack of green arc in modern electronic displays. The FAA
has not created any issue papers because of the requirement for a
``yellow'' arc.
H. Powerplant Instruments (Sec. 27.1549)
The current regulation requires instruments to be marked with a
green arc and red radial lines. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to remove
these requirements for some instrument markings.
EASA suggested the term ``radial'' in Sec. Sec. 27.1549(a) and
29.1549(a) be replaced with ``range,'' similar to the proposed
Sec. Sec. 27.1549(d) and 29.1549(d). Sections 27.1549(a) and
29.1549(a) specify the requirement for marking of maximum and minimum
safe operating limits. A red line is a defined limit. A range, in this
context, would allow a level of ambiguity in the marking of the
indicator. The FAA did not make any changes in response to the comment.
Transport Canada requested that the term ``marked'' be changed to
``displayed'' throughout Sec. Sec. 27.1549 and 29.1549. The term
``marked'' is more consistent with the other instrument regulations for
rotorcraft and airplanes. The FAA did not make any changes in response
to the comment.
An individual requested the FAA change the term ``yellow arc'' in
Sec. Sec. 29.1549(b)(3) and 29.1549(c) to ``amber arc'' to be
consistent with Sec. 27.1322(b). The requested change is beyond the
scope of this rulemaking, which was to eliminate the need for
reoccurring MOC issue papers for a lack of green arc in modern
electronic displays. The FAA has not created any issue papers because
of the requirement for a ``yellow'' arc.
Bell and GAMA requested that the word ``propeller'' be changed to
``rotor'' in Sec. Sec. 27.1549(d) and 29.1549(d). The word
``propeller'' comes from a prior rule amendment to parts 27 and 29 that
was based on a part 25 rule. Although ``propeller'' is an appropriate
term for airplanes, ``rotor'' is the more appropriate term for
rotorcraft. The FAA agrees and has made the requested change.
One commenter noted the typographical omission of the word ``and''
between the proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1549(d) and 27.1549(e). The FAA has
corrected this error in this final rule by including ``and'' at the end
of paragraph (d), consistent with the current rule.
I. Control Marking (Sec. Sec. 27.1555 and 29.1555)
The control marking regulations required marking the usable fuel
capacity at the fuel quantity indicator. The intent of these
regulations was to provide a continuous indication of usable fuel
capacity at the fuel quantity indicator. Older, analog gauges used a
placard to comply with this requirement. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed
performance-based requirements to permit other means of informing the
pilot of the usable fuel system capacity. However, this final rule
requires that alternative methods address any lack of continuous
display by ensuring the information is readily accessible to the pilot.
Bell and GAMA requested modifying proposed Sec. Sec. 27.1555(c)(1)
and 29.1555(c)(1) to require ``a means to provide the usable fuel
capacity to the pilot.'' The intent of the language proposed in the
NPRM was to keep the existing requirement for applicants that choose to
follow that method, while providing an additional, less prescriptive
method.
Similarly, EASA requested the FAA make the requirement more generic
by eliminating the reference ``to the pilot'' within Sec. Sec.
27.1555(c)(1)(i) and 29.1555(c)(1)(i), since this information is also
used during maintenance and servicing. However, removing the
requirement that the information be accessible to the pilot would not
ensure that the pilot always has access to the data, which is the
purpose of this rule.
GAMA also requested modifying Sec. Sec. 27.1555(c)(2) and
29.1555(c)(2), which contains usable fuel capacity requirements for
fuel systems with selector controls, to match the proposed language in
Sec. Sec. 27.1555(c)(1) and 29.1555(c)(1) for fuel systems with no
selector controls. The changes in the NPRM were proposed to eliminate
the issues associated with placarding a digital display in a modern
glass cockpit. Placarding near or at the selector switches does not
create these issues.
Additionally, GAMA requested that the FAA update Sec. Sec.
27.1583(b)(3) and 29.1583(b)(3) to require that the flight manual
include the usable fuel capacity information required per Sec. Sec.
27.1555(c)(1) and 29.1555(c)(1) respectively. This requested change is
not appropriate, because the requirement to add the capacity
information into the flight manual is only necessary if it is not
continuously displayed at the indicator. The commenter's requested
language would require the information in the flight manual for all
designs.
Airbus Helicopters requested that the FAA clarify whether ``usable
fuel capacity'' refers to the actual remaining fuel or to the total
usable capacity of the fuel system. The FAA notes that the term
``usable fuel capacity'' refers to the total usable capacity of the
fuel system. The requirements for indicating the actual usable quantity
are contained within Sec. Sec. 27.1305, 27.1337, 29.1305, and 29.1337.
In the NPRM, the FAA did not propose modifying the language or meaning
of ``usable fuel capacity.'' Changing the meaning is outside the scope
of this rulemaking. The proposed rule language provides an alternative,
less prescriptive requirement allowing the applicant to relay the fuel
system capacity to the crew by means other than a placard at the fuel
quantity indicator.
J. Undue Burden on Industry
In the NPRM preamble, the FAA stated that this rulemaking would
update several rules that cause unnecessary burdens in cost and time to
both the FAA and the rotorcraft industry. These changes are necessary
due to the extensive application of advancing technologies to
rotorcraft, which the airworthiness standards did not adequately
address. The FAA proposed that, by updating the affected standards,
many special conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers would
become unnecessary, thus reducing the burden of cost and time on the
FAA and industry.
GAMA requested rewording or deleting ``reduced burden for the
rotorcraft industry,'' because showing compliance by the same testing
analysis and inspections strongly implies there is no reduced burden.
Additionally,
[[Page 8735]]
GAMA requested that the FAA perform an analysis of the economic impact
of the regulatory changes on small entities and provide access to the
results of such analysis in the proposed rulemaking.
This rule updates parts 27 and 29 to address changes in technology
and to include updated airworthiness standards. The FAA maintains that
while compliance is shown by the same testing, analysis, and
inspections, there will be savings to both the FAA and industry from
updating the airworthiness standards. Updating the airworthiness
standards reduces the number of reoccurring special conditions, ELOS
findings, and MOC issue papers and the administration burden associated
with processing one of the three documents.
Further information regarding final rule revisions that address
comments on this issue is provided in discussions, C. Rotorcraft
Equipment, Systems, and Installations (Sec. Sec. 27.1309, 29.1309, and
Appendix C to Part 27) and F. Energy Storage System (Sec. Sec. 27.1353
and 29.1353). Additionally, the FAA has complied with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act for this rulemaking and certified that a regulatory
flexibility analysis is not required, as this rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
K. Other Comments
One individual requested guidance for installing antennas on
helicopters for both part 27 and 29. Two other individuals requested
the FAA adopt rules to address accident rates, such as adding Sec.
25.1302 to parts 27 and 29 and implementing Terrain Awareness and
Warning Systems and Radar Altimeters. Another individual provided
comments about minimum backup systems for VFR-only rotorcraft. The FAA
appreciates the interest in aviation safety from these commenters;
however, these comments were beyond the scope of this rulemaking
effort.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct
that each Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub.
L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of
regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act
(Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with
base year of 1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's
analysis of the economic impacts of this final rule.
This final rule revises regulations in 14 CFR part 27
(Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category Rotorcraft) and part 29
(Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Rotorcraft) related to the
certification of rotorcraft. The changes are necessary because the
airworthiness standards did not adequately address the increases in
design complexity resulting from advancing technologies. As a result,
many regulatory sections have been subject to reoccurring special
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers. This rulemaking
addresses these items by updating the rules that cause unnecessary
burdens in cost and time to both the rotorcraft industry and the FAA.
The FAA received comments on the NPRM that was published on
November 1, 2017. The comments and the FAA's response to them are
discussed in ``III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule,'' in
the preamble to this final rule. The FAA made changes to the proposed
rule as a result of the public comments. However, the changes assisted
the FAA in clarifying and updating the proposal to ensure there will
not be additional costs from this rulemaking. These changes did not
result in additional costs to industry or the FAA. The FAA expects this
rule will not result in additional costs to industry since it
incorporates current industry practice. In addition, the rule will
provide small savings to industry and the FAA by avoiding the burden
and costs associated with developing special conditions, ELOS findings
and MOC issue papers. The rule affects U.S. manufacturers of normal and
transport category rotorcraft plus any rotorcraft operator or owner who
applies for a supplemental type certificate (STC). The remainder of
this section provides discussion of the impact and savings of this
final rule by topic.
1. Powerplant Instruments (Sec. Sec. 27.1305 and 29.1305)
Changes to these sections will allow for other means of compliance
for certain powerplant instrument indicators. These means of compliance
are voluntary and do not impose any new cost but could be cost
relieving for applicants that choose to use them. Additionally, for
Sec. 29.1305, the FAA will permit an optional feature to simulate OEI
conditions without damaging the engines. Rotorcraft with OEI Training
Mode must have additional indications to differentiate the simulated
OEI condition from actual engine failure. The OEI Training Mode is
often installed in modern multi-engine rotorcraft. The FAA finds that
this change will not result in additional costs to industry. The OEI
Training Mode is optional and this change removes the need to issue
special conditions for those manufacturers or modifiers including OEI
training modes in their rotorcraft.
2. Normal Category Rotorcraft Equipment, Systems, and Installations
(Sec. 27.1309 and Appendix C to Part 27)
The FAA revises the failure analysis requirement for equipment,
systems, and installations to reduce the need for special conditions.
These changes more closely align with current industry practices and
also accommodate future changes in industry failure analysis
techniques. Additionally, the FAA eliminates the distinction between
single-engine and multi-engine rotorcraft. This distinction is no
longer relevant because current analysis tools for technologies and
associated failure effects no longer consider the number of engines.
This will reduce the need to issue recurring special conditions,
potentially providing small savings for manufacturers and anybody who
modifies the rotorcraft. As these are current industry practice, the
FAA finds there are no additional costs associated with these changes.
3. Transport Category Rotorcraft Equipment, Systems, and Installation
(Sec. 29.1309)
This section is updated to be consistent with industry standards
and practices for conducting failure analysis. The rule clarifies the
requirement to perform a failure analysis and recognizes that the
severity of failures can vary. Additionally, this section accommodates
future changes in industry failure analysis techniques and reflects
current certification practices.
[[Page 8736]]
The rule allows for other options that will reduce the need to issue
recurring special conditions, potentially providing small savings for
manufacturers and applicants looking to modify a rotorcraft.
4. Automatic Pilot and Flight Guidance Systems (Sec. Sec. 27.1329,
27.1335, 29.1329, and 29.1335)
This rule standardizes terminology and combines the requirements
for automatic pilot and flight director systems into one rule. Modern
designs combine both automatic pilot and flight director systems and
are now referred to as automatic pilot and flight guidance systems.
5. Instrument Systems (Sec. 29.1333 and Appendix B to Parts 27 and 29)
The change allows for the use of more modern integrated systems to
monitor and display highly integrated information regarding the
rotorcraft. This section does not impose additional costs as the
updates reflect modern industry practices of integrating instrument
systems.
6. Electrical Systems and Equipment (Sec. 29.1351) and Energy Storage
Systems (Sec. Sec. 27.1353 and 29.1353)
The changes accommodate different energy storage systems. The
regulation applies to lead acid, nickel-cadmium, and lithium batteries
without imposing additional requirements. The changes will provide the
flexibility necessary for the regulations to keep up with changes in
technology.
7. Instrument Markings (Sec. Sec. 27.1545, 29.1545, 27.1549, and
29.1549)
The final rule provides flexibility for some instrument markings.
Allowing for other markings will not result in additional mandatory
costs and may be possibly cost relieving for manufacturers that elect
to outfit the rotorcraft with different instrument markings.
8. Control Markings (Sec. Sec. 27.1555 and 29.1555)
The rule permits more than one method to inform the pilot of the
usable fuel system capacity. However, alternative methods must address
the lack of continuous display currently required. Changes to this
section allow for more than one means of compliance at no additional
costs. Offering alternative means of compliance allows industry to meet
the requirement with the least costly option, which can be cost
relieving.
9. Typographical and Standardizing Corrections (Sec. Sec. 27.87,
27.903, 29.955, 29.977, 29.1019, 29.1517, and 29.1587)
There are no additional costs for changes to these sections as
these are typographical or standardizing corrections.
Based on the discussion above, the FAA has determined that this
final rule is not a ``significant regulatory action'' as defined in
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required. The certification must include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
This final rule amends the certification standards of normal and
transport category rotorcraft to incorporate modern designs currently
used in the rotorcraft industry. Currently, changes in technology are
addressed by issuing reoccurring special conditions, ELOS findings, and
MOC issue papers. These three processes are necessary to address new
design features for which airworthiness standards are lacking,
compliance with a rule cannot be achieved, or alternative methods of
compliance are proposed. These special conditions, ELOS findings, and
MOC issue papers impact FAA and industry resources as well as
applicants' schedules for obtaining FAA approval of their products. By
updating the affected standards with this final rule, many special
conditions, ELOS findings, and MOC issue papers will become
unnecessary, thus reducing both the FAA and industry's administration
burden associated with processing one of the three documents.
As the rule reduces the administrative burden and does not include
any new regulatory burden, the FAA expects this rule will not result in
additional costs and may result in small cost savings for any small
entity affected by this rulemaking action. If an agency determines that
a rulemaking will not result in a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities, the head of the agency may so
certify under section 605(b) of the RFA. Therefore, as provided in
section 605(b), the head of the FAA certifies that this rulemaking will
not result in a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and
determined that the potential benefits are available to both domestic
and international firms, which would either have no effect or a
positive effect on international trade.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the
[[Page 8737]]
aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a
``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently uses an inflation-
adjusted value of $155 million in lieu of $100 million.
This final rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there would be no new requirement for information collection associated
with this final rule.
F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these final regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 5-6.6.f and involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has determined that this
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the
relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government, and, therefore, would not have Federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
will not be a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order
and will not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy.
VI. How To Obtain Additional Information
A. Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of a rulemaking document may be obtained from
the internet by--
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.regulations.gov);
2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at
www.GovInfo.gov.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by
notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.
B. Comments Submitted to the Docket
Comments received may be viewed by going to https://www.regulations.gov and following the online instructions to search the
docket number for this action. Anyone is able to search the electronic
form of all comments received into any of the FAA's dockets by the name
of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).
C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document,
may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble.
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 29
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The Amendments
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) parts 27 and 29 as follows:
PART 27--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
0
1. The authority citation for part 27 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.
0
2. Amend Sec. 27.87 by revising the section heading and paragraph (a)
introductory text to read as follows:
Sec. 27.87 Height-velocity envelope.
(a) If there is any combination of height and forward velocity
(including hover) under which a safe landing cannot be made under the
applicable power failure condition in paragraph (b) of this section, a
limiting height-velocity envelope must be established (including all
pertinent information) for that condition, throughout the ranges of--
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec. 27.903 by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 27.903 Engines.
* * * * *
(d) Restart capability. (1) A means to restart any engine in flight
must be provided.
(2) Except for the in-flight shutdown of all engines, engine
restart capability must be demonstrated throughout a flight envelope
for the rotorcraft.
(3) Following the in-flight shutdown of all engines, in-flight
engine restart capability must be provided.
0
4. Amend Sec. 27.1305 by revising paragraphs (e), (k) introductory
text, (n), and (o) to read as follows:
Sec. 27.1305 Powerplant instruments.
* * * * *
(e) A means to indicate manifold pressure for each altitude engine.
* * * * *
(k) A means to indicate the r.p.m. of each engine and at least one
tachometer, as applicable, for:
* * * * *
(n) A means to indicate the gas temperature for each turbine
engine.
(o) A means to enable the pilot to determine the torque of each
turbine engine, if a torque limitation is established for that engine
under Sec. 27.1521(e).
* * * * *
0
5. Revise Sec. 27.1309 to read as follows:
[[Page 8738]]
Sec. 27.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.
The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is
required by this subchapter must be designed and installed to ensure
that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable
operating condition. For any item of equipment or system whose failure
has not been specifically addressed by another requirement in this
chapter, the following requirements also apply:
(a) The design of each item of equipment, system, and installation
must be analyzed separately and in relation to other rotorcraft systems
and installations to determine and identify any failure that would
affect the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to
perform their duties in all operating conditions.
(b) Each item of equipment, system, and installation must be
designed and installed so that:
(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is
extremely improbable;
(2) The occurrence of any major failure condition is no more than
improbable; and
(3) For the occurrence of any other failure condition between major
and catastrophic, the probability of the failure condition must be
inversely proportional to its consequences.
(c) A means to alert the crew in the event of a failure must be
provided when an unsafe system operating condition exists and to enable
them to take corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated
monitoring and crew alerting means must be designed to minimize crew
errors that could create additional hazards.
(d) Compliance with the requirements of this section must be shown
by analysis and, where necessary, by ground, flight, or simulator
tests. The analysis must account for:
(1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and
misleading data and input from external sources;
(2) The effect of multiple failures and latent failures;
(3) The resulting effects on the rotorcraft and occupants,
considering the stage of flight and operating conditions; and
(4) The crew alerting cues and the corrective action required.
0
6. Amend Sec. 27.1329 by revising the section heading, adding
introductory text, and revising paragraphs (a), (d), and (e) to read as
follows:
Sec. 27.1329 Automatic pilot and flight guidance system.
For the purpose of this subpart, an automatic pilot and flight
guidance system may consist of an autopilot, flight director, or a
component that interacts with stability augmentation or trim.
(a) Each automatic pilot and flight guidance system must be
designed so that it:
(1) Can be overpowered by one pilot to allow control of the
rotorcraft;
(2) Provides a means to disengage the system, or any malfunctioning
component of the system, by each pilot to prevent it from interfering
with the control of the rotorcraft; and
(3) Provides a means to indicate to the flight crew its current
mode of operation. Selector switch position is not acceptable as a
means of indication.
* * * * *
(d) The system must be designed so that, within the range of
adjustment available to the pilot, it cannot produce hazardous loads on
the rotorcraft, or create hazardous deviations in the flight path,
under any flight condition appropriate to its use or in the event of a
malfunction, assuming that corrective action begins within a reasonable
period of time.
(e) If the automatic pilot and flight guidance system integrates
signals from auxiliary controls or furnishes signals for operation of
other equipment, there must be a means to prevent improper operation.
* * * * *
Sec. 27.1335 [Removed]
0
7. Remove Sec. 27.1335.
0
8. Revise Sec. 27.1353 to read as follows:
Sec. 27.1353 Energy storage systems.
Energy storage systems must be designed and installed as follows:
(a) Energy storage systems must provide automatic protective
features for any conditions that could prevent continued safe flight
and landing.
(b) Energy storage systems must not emit any flammable, explosive,
or toxic gases, smoke, or fluids that could accumulate in hazardous
quantities within the rotorcraft.
(c) Corrosive fluids or gases that escape from the system must not
damage surrounding structures, adjacent equipment, or systems necessary
for continued safe flight and landing.
(d) The maximum amount of heat and pressure that can be generated
during any operation or under any failure condition of the energy
storage system or its individual components must not result in any
hazardous effect on rotorcraft structure, equipment, or systems
necessary for continued safe flight and landing.
(e) Energy storage system installations required for continued safe
flight and landing of the rotorcraft must have monitoring features and
a means to indicate to the pilot the status of all critical system
parameters.
0
9. Amend Sec. 27.1545 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 27.1545 Airspeed indicator.
* * * * *
(b) The following markings must be made:
(1) A red line--
(i) For rotorcraft other than helicopters, at VNE.
(ii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-on).
(iii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-off). If
VNE (power-off) is less than VNE (power-on) and
both are simultaneously displayed, the red line at VNE
(power-off) must be clearly distinguishable from the red line at
VNE (power-on).
(2) [Reserved]
(3) For the caution range, a yellow range.
(4) For the normal operating range, a green or unmarked range.
* * * * *
0
10. Amend Sec. 27.1549 by revising paragraphs (a) through (d) to read
as follows:
Sec. 27.1549 Powerplant instruments.
* * * * *
(a) Each maximum and, if applicable, minimum safe operating limit
must be marked with a red line;
(b) Each normal operating range must be marked as a green or
unmarked range;
(c) Each takeoff and precautionary range must be marked with a
yellow range or yellow line;
(d) Each engine or rotor range that is restricted because of
excessive vibration stresses must be marked with red ranges or red
lines; and
* * * * *
0
11. Amend Sec. 27.1555 by revising paragraph (c)(1) to read as
follows:
Sec. 27.1555 Control markings.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) For fuel systems having no selector controls, the usable fuel
capacity of the system must be indicated at the fuel quantity indicator
unless it is:
(i) Provided by another system or equipment readily accessible to
the pilot; and
(ii) Contained in the limitations section of the rotorcraft flight
manual.
* * * * *
[[Page 8739]]
0
12. Amend Sec. 27.1587 by revising paragraph (a)(1) to read as
follows:
Sec. 27.1587 Performance information.
(a) * * *
(1) Enough information to determine the limiting height-velocity
envelope.
* * * * *
0
13. Amend appendix B to part 27 by revising paragraphs VIII
introductory text and VIII(b)(5)(i) to read as follows:
Appendix B to Part 27--Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument
Flight
* * * * *
VIII. Equipment, systems, and installation. The basic equipment
and installation must comply with Sec. Sec. 29.1303, 29.1431, and
29.1433, with the following exceptions and additions:
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) * * *
(i) For pneumatic systems, only the required flight instruments
for the first pilot may be connected to that operating system;
* * * * *
0
14. In appendix C to part 27 amend section ``C27.2 Applicable part 29
sections'' by removing ``29.1309(b)(2)(i) and (d)--Equipment, systems,
and installations'' and by revising ``29.903(b)(c) and (e)--Engines''
to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 27--Criteria for Category A
* * * * *
29.903 (b) and (c)--Engines.
* * * * *
PART 29--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
0
15. The authority citation for part 29 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.
0
16. Amend Sec. 29.955 by revising paragraph (a)(7) to read as follows:
Sec. 29.955 Fuel flow.
(a) * * *
(7) The fuel filter required by Sec. 29.997 is blocked to the
degree necessary to simulate the accumulation of fuel contamination
required to activate the indicator required by Sec. 29.1305(a)(18).
* * * * *
0
17. Amend Sec. 29.977 by revising paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 29.977 Fuel tank outlet.
(a) * * *
(1) For reciprocating engine powered rotorcraft, have 8 to 16
meshes per inch; and
(2) For turbine engine powered rotorcraft, prevent the passage of
any object that could restrict fuel flow or damage any fuel system
component.
* * * * *
0
18. Amend Sec. 29.1019 by revising paragraph (a)(5) to read as
follows:
Sec. 29.1019 Oil strainer or filter.
(a) * * *
(5) An oil strainer or filter that has no bypass, except one that
is installed at an oil tank outlet, must have a means to connect it to
the warning system required in Sec. 29.1305(a)(19).
* * * * *
0
19. Amend Sec. 29.1305 by revising paragraphs (a)(5), (11), and (12)
and adding (b)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 29.1305 Powerplant instruments.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(5) A means to indicate manifold pressure for each altitude engine;
* * * * *
(11) A means to indicate the gas temperature for each turbine
engine;
(12) A means to indicate the gas producer speed for each turbine
engine;
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4) For each Category A rotorcraft for which OEI Training Mode is
requested, a means must be provided to indicate to the pilot the
simulation of an engine failure, the annunciation of that simulation,
and a representation of the OEI power being provided.
* * * * *
0
20. Revise Sec. 29.1309 to read as follows:
Sec. 29.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.
The equipment, systems, and installations whose functioning is
required by this subchapter must be designed and installed to ensure
that they perform their intended functions under any foreseeable
operating condition. For any item of equipment or system whose failure
has not been specifically addressed by another requirement in this
chapter, the following requirements also apply:
(a) The design of each item of equipment, system, and installation
must be analyzed separately and in relation to other rotorcraft systems
and installations to determine and identify any failure that would
affect the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to
perform their duties in all operating conditions.
(b) Each item of equipment, system, and installation must be
designed and installed so that:
(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is
extremely improbable;
(2) The occurrence of any major failure condition is no more than
improbable; and
(3) For the occurrence of any other failure condition in between
major and catastrophic, the probability of the failure condition must
be inversely proportional to its consequences.
(c) A means to alert the crew in the event of a failure must be
provided when an unsafe system operating condition exists and to enable
them to take corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated
monitoring and crew alerting means must be designed to minimize crew
errors that could create additional hazards.
(d) Compliance with the requirements of this section must be shown
by analysis and, where necessary, by ground, flight, or simulator
tests. The analysis must account for:
(1) Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and
misleading data and input from external sources;
(2) The effect of multiple failures and latent failures;
(3) The resulting effects on the rotorcraft and occupants,
considering the stage of flight and operating conditions; and
(4) The crew alerting cues and the corrective action required.
0
21. Amend Sec. 29.1329 by revising the section heading, adding
introductory text, and revising paragraphs (a), (d), and (e) to read as
follows:
Sec. 29.1329 Automatic pilot and flight guidance system.
For the purpose of this subpart, an automatic pilot and flight
guidance system may consist of an autopilot, flight director, or a
component that interacts with stability augmentation or trim.
(a) Each automatic pilot and flight guidance system must be
designed so that it:
(1) Can be overpowered by one pilot to allow control of the
rotorcraft;
(2) Provides a means to disengage the system, or any malfunctioning
component of the system, by each pilot to prevent it from interfering
with the control of the rotorcraft; and
(3) Provides a means to indicate to the flight crew its current
mode of operation. Selector switch position is not acceptable as a
means of indication.
* * * * *
(d) The system must be designed so that, within the range of
adjustment
[[Page 8740]]
available to the pilot, it cannot produce hazardous loads on the
rotorcraft, or create hazardous deviations in the flight path, under
any flight condition appropriate to its use or in the event of a
malfunction, assuming that corrective action begins within a reasonable
period of time.
(e) If the automatic pilot and flight guidance system integrates
signals from auxiliary controls or furnishes signals for operation of
other equipment, there must be a means to prevent improper operation.
* * * * *
0
22. Amend Sec. 29.1333 by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 29.1333 Instrument systems.
* * * * *
(a) For pneumatic systems, only the required flight instruments for
the first pilot may be connected to that operating system.
* * * * *
Sec. 29.1335 [Removed]
0
23. Remove Sec. 29.1335.
0
24. Amend Sec. 29.1351 by adding paragraphs (e) and (f) to read as
follows:
Sec. 29.1351 General.
* * * * *
(e) Electrical equipment, controls, and wiring must be installed so
that operation of any one unit or system of units will not adversely
affect the simultaneous operation of any other electrical unit or
system essential to safe operation.
(f) Cables must be grouped, routed, and spaced so that damage to
essential circuits will be minimized if there are faults in heavy
current-carrying cables.
0
25. Revise Sec. 29.1353 to read as follows:
Sec. 29.1353 Energy storage systems.
Energy storage systems must be designed and installed as follows:
(a) Energy storage systems must provide automatic protective
features for any conditions that could prevent continued safe flight
and landing.
(b) Energy storage systems must not emit any flammable, explosive,
or toxic gases, smoke, or fluids that could accumulate in hazardous
quantities within the rotorcraft.
(c) Corrosive fluids or gases that escape from the system must not
damage surrounding structures, adjacent equipment, or systems necessary
for continued safe flight and landing.
(d) The maximum amount of heat and pressure that can be generated
during any operation or under any failure condition of the energy
storage system or its individual components must not result in any
hazardous effect on rotorcraft structure, equipment, or systems
necessary for continued safe flight and landing.
(e) Energy storage system installations required for continued safe
flight and landing of the rotorcraft must have monitoring features and
a means to indicate to the pilot the status of all critical system
parameters.
0
26. Amend Sec. 29.1517 by revising the section heading to read as
follows:
Sec. 29.1517 Limiting height-velocity envelope.
* * * * *
0
27. Amend Sec. 29.1545 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 29.1545 Airspeed indicator.
* * * * *
(b) The following markings must be made:
(1) A red line:
(i) For rotorcraft other than helicopters, at VNE.
(ii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-on).
(iii) For helicopters, at VNE (power-off). If
VNE (power-off) is less than VNE (power-on) and
both are simultaneously displayed, the red line at VNE
(power-off) must be clearly distinguishable from the red line at
VNE (power-on).
(2) [Reserved]
(3) For the caution range, a yellow range.
(4) For the normal operating range, a green or unmarked range.
* * * * *
0
28. Amend Sec. 29.1549 by revising paragraphs (a) through (d) to read
as follows:
Sec. 29.1549 Powerplant instruments.
* * * * *
(a) Each maximum and, if applicable, minimum safe operating limit
must be marked with a red line;
(b) Each normal operating range must be marked as a green or
unmarked range;
(c) Each takeoff and precautionary range must be marked with a
yellow range or yellow line;
(d) Each engine or rotor range that is restricted because of
excessive vibration stresses must be marked with red ranges or red
lines; and
* * * * *
0
29. Amend Sec. 29.1555 by revising paragraph (c)(1) to read as
follows:
Sec. 29.1555 Control markings.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) For fuel systems having no selector controls, the usable fuel
capacity of the system must be indicated at the fuel quantity indicator
unless it is:
(i) Provided by another system or equipment readily accessible to
the pilot; and
(ii) Contained in the limitations section of the rotorcraft flight
manual.
* * * * *
0
30. Amend Sec. 29.1587 by revising paragraph (b)(6) to read as
follows:
Sec. 29.1587 Performance information.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(6) The height-velocity envelope except for rotorcraft
incorporating this as an operating limitation;
* * * * *
0
31. Amend appendix B to part 29 by revising paragraphs VIII
introductory text and VIII(b)(5)(i) to read as follows:
Appendix B to Part 29--Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument
Flight
* * * * *
VIII. Equipment, systems, and installation. The basic equipment
and installation must comply with Sec. Sec. 29.1303, 29.1431, and
29.1433, with the following exceptions and additions:
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) * * *
(i) For pneumatic systems, only the required flight instruments
for the first pilot may be connected to that operating system;
* * * * *
Issued in Washington, DC, on or about February 6, 2023.
Billy Nolen,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-02771 Filed 2-9-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
