Safety Management Systems, 1932-1972 [2022-28583]
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 7 / Wednesday, January 11, 2023 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 5, 21, 91, 119, 121, and
135
[Docket No.: FAA–2021–0419; Notice No.
23–05]
RIN 2120–AL60
Safety Management Systems
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
The FAA proposes to update
and expand the requirements for safety
management systems (SMS) and require
certain certificate holders and
commercial air tour operators to
develop and implement an SMS. This
proposed rule would extend the
requirement for an SMS to all certificate
holders operating under the rules for
commuter and on-demand operations,
commercial air tour operators,
production certificate (PC) holders that
are holders or licensees of a type
certificate (TC) for the same product,
and holders of a TC who license out that
TC for production. The FAA also
proposes this rule in part to address a
Congressional mandate as well as
recommendations from the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and
two Aviation Rulemaking Committees
(ARCs). Additionally, the proposed rule
would more closely align the United
States with Annex 19 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation. This
proposed rule is intended to improve
aviation safety by requiring
organizations to implement a proactive
approach to managing safety.
DATES: Send comments on or before
March 13, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
by docket number FAA–2021–0419
using any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
www.regulations.gov and follow the
online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
• Mail: Send comments to Docket
Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
20590–0001.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
comments to Docket Operations in
Room W12–140 of the West Building
Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
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• Fax: Fax comments to Docket
Operations at 202–493–2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C.
553(c), DOT solicits comments from the
public to better inform its rulemaking
process. DOT posts these comments,
without edit, including any personal
information the commenter provides, to
www.regulations.gov, as described in
the system of records notice (DOT/ALL–
14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.
Docket: Background documents or
comments received may be read at
www.regulations.gov at any time.
Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to the Docket
Operations in Room W12–140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical questions concerning this
action, contact Scott Van Buren, Office
of Accident Investigation and
Prevention, AVP–4, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Room 300 East,
Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202)
494–8417; mail Scott.VanBuren@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of This NPRM
B. Summary of the Proposed Rule
C. Summary of Costs and Benefits
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
III. Purpose of This Rulemaking
IV. Background
A. SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committees
B. National Transportation Safety Board
Recommendations
C. Safety Management System Rulemaking
Efforts
D. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act
E. International Movement Toward SMS
V. Discussion of the Proposal
A. Applicability
B. General Requirements and Definitions
C. Components of Safety Management
Systems
D. Implementation of SMS
E. Proposed Changes to Sections 119.8,
91.147, 21.135, and 21.147
F. Scalability
G. Examples of Real World Scenarios
H. Data Reporting and Protection
VI. Guidance Material
A. Guidance for Aviation Service Providers
B. Guidance for Design and Production
Approval Holders
VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
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G. Environmental Analysis
H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate
Aviation in Alaska
VIII. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations
That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
C. Executive Order 13609, International
Cooperation
IX. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
B. Confidential Business Information
C. Request for Comments
D. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Frequently Used in This Document
AC—Advisory Circular
ACSAA—Aircraft Certification and
Accountability Act
ANPRM—Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
ARC—Aviation Rulemaking Committee
CBI—Confidential Business Information
CFR—Code of Federal Regulations
EASA—European Union Aviation Safety
Agency
FAA—Federal Aviation Administration
FOIA—Freedom of Information Act
ICAO—International Civil Aviation
Organization
IRFA—Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
LOA—Letter of Authorization
NAICS—North American Industry
Classification System
NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board
OMB—Office of Management and Budget
PC—Production Certificate
RFA—Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIA—Regulatory Impact Analysis
SBA—Small Business Administration
SMS—Safety Management System
TC—Type Certificate
U.S.C.—United States Code
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of This NPRM
A safety management system (SMS)
provides an organization-wide approach
to identifying safety hazards, assessing,
and managing safety risk, and assuring
the effectiveness of safety risk controls.
An SMS provides a set of decisionmaking processes and procedures that
can improve safety by assisting an
organization in planning, organizing,
directing, and controlling its aviationrelated business activities. Currently,
the SMS requirements of part 5 of Title
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) apply only to air carriers
certificated under part 119 and
conducting operations in accordance
with part 121 (part 121 operators). In
this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM), the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) proposes to
expand the applicability of the SMS
requirements to include additional
entities in an effort to enhance safety,
respond to a Congressional mandate,
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 7 / Wednesday, January 11, 2023 / Proposed Rules
and more closely align the FAA’s SMS
requirements with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex
19.
Historically, the approach to aviation
safety was based on the reactive analysis
of past accidents and the introduction of
corrective actions to prevent the
recurrence of those events. An SMS,
however, helps organizations to
proactively identify potential hazards in
the operating environment, analyze the
risks of those hazards, and mitigate
those risks to prevent an accident or
incident. In 2015, the FAA promulgated
14 CFR part 5, which required part 121
operators to develop and implement
SMS and set out the basic requirements
for those systems. The FAA believes
that the next step in improving aviation
safety is to extend SMS requirements to
additional organizations that play a
critical role in the design,
manufacturing, and operation of aircraft
(i.e., part 119 certificate holders
operating under part 135, Letter of
Authorization (LOA) holders operating
commercial air tours under § 91.147,
and certain certificate holders under
part 21). These organizations are in the
best position to prevent future incidents
and accidents because they are closest
to the hazards, and they know the most
about their operations and products. An
SMS provides a structured, repeatable,
systematic approach to proactively
identify hazards and manage safety risk.
With implementation of an SMS, these
organizations would be better able to
develop and implement mitigations that
are appropriate to their environment
and operational structure. The FAA
believes the implementation of SMS can
be used to avoid or mitigate future
accidents. Representative examples of
accidents that the FAA believes could
be avoided can be found in sections
V.G. and VII.A of this proposal. This
proposal is based on the
recommendations of two previous
Aviation Rulemaking Committees
(ARCs),1 the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB),2 and the Joint
Authorities Technical Review of the
Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control
System.3
Further, the Aircraft Certification
Safety and Accountability Act (Pub. L.
1 The
SMS ARCs are discussed in Section IV.A.
recommendations are discussed in
Section IV.B.
3 Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR),
Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System:
Observations, Findings, and Recommendations,
Washington, October 11, 2019.
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2 NTSB
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116–260, 134 Stat. 2309, hereafter
referred to as ACSAA), enacted on
December 27, 2020, mandated the
application of SMS regulatory
requirements to holders of both a Type
Certificate (TC) and a Production
Certificate (PC) issued under part 21.4
ACSAA further mandated that the FAA
include certain requirements in its
implementing regulations. The FAA
proposes amendments to part 5 in
accordance with this legislation.
Lastly, requiring SMS for certain
commercial operators, and design and
manufacturers would more closely align
the FAA’s SMS requirements with ICAO
Annex 19; therefore, this proposed rule
would increase U.S. alignment with
other civil aviation authorities that are
also implementing SMS requirements in
accordance with ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices.5
B. Summary of the Proposed Rule
An SMS requires four essential
components—safety policy, safety risk
management, safety assurance, and
safety promotion. Additionally, an SMS
requires that an organization document
the system itself and maintain any
records produced under that system. In
this NPRM, the FAA proposes to expand
the applicability of the SMS
requirements to include additional
entities, add new requirements to part 5,
and amend existing regulations in parts
5, 21, 91, and 119. Several of these
proposed amendments respond to the
statutory mandate in ACSAA.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to
expand the applicability of part 5
beyond part 121 operators to include
part 135 operators, § 91.147 air tour
operators, and certain certificate holders
under part 21. These entities would
receive the greatest safety benefits of an
SMS as they are best situated to prevent
future incidents and aviation accidents.
In response to the statutory
requirements in ACSAA, the FAA
proposes to add a requirement for each
SMS to include a code of ethics that
4 Section
102(a)(1) of ACSAA.
major civil aviation authorities have
established or are in the process of establishing
SMS requirements for air operators, air traffic
management, airports, and maintenance
organizations, including the European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Brazil, Canada,
Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. Fewer countries
have design and manufacturing organizations and,
therefore, they have not established SMS
requirements for those entities. However, New
Zealand, Japan, and EASA have established SMS
requirements for design and manufacturing
organizations.
5 Several
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applies to all employees and clarifies
that safety is the highest priority.
Consistent with ACSAA, the FAA also
proposes to revise the existing
requirement for a confidential employee
reporting system by adding a provision
to ensure that employees can report
without concern of reprisal.
Additionally, the FAA proposes
several amendments to part 5 that are
intended to increase the effectiveness of
SMS, including several new
requirements. The FAA proposes to
require organizations to develop a
system description, which is a summary
of aviation-related processes and
activities and a description of
interfacing persons that contribute to
the safety of the organization’s aviationrelated products and services. The FAA
proposes to add information that must
be considered during the system
analysis, which is conducted when a
person applies safety risk management.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to
require persons to consider the
interfaces of the system in conducting
the system analysis. The FAA also
proposes to require persons who
identify hazards to notify interfacing
persons who are best able to address or
mitigate the hazard. To account for
these new requirements, the FAA
proposes conforming amendments to
the SMS documentation and
recordkeeping requirements to ensure
organizations document the system
description and retain all
communications concerning the
notification of hazards to interfacing
persons. Furthermore, the FAA
proposes several amendments to part 5,
including a revision to the definition of
‘‘hazard’’ to ensure it encompasses
aviation incidents as well as accidents,
the relocation of the definitions to the
beginning of the subpart to facilitate
readability of part 5, and the removal of
all references to the term ‘‘certificate
holder’’ to conform to the new
applicability proposed by the rule. The
FAA also proposes amendments to
certain regulations in parts 21, 91, and
119 to conform with, and enable the
implementation of, the proposed
requirements in part 5.
The following table summarizes the
proposed provisions and provides the
proposed section(s) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations that contains the
provisions.
Table 1 provides a summary of the
major provisions of this proposed rule.
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 7 / Wednesday, January 11, 2023 / Proposed Rules
TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS
Provision
Proposed 14 CFR
§ affected
Summary of proposed provision
Applicability of part 5 .......................
Definition of ‘‘Hazard’’ ......................
5.1, 21.55, 21.135,
21.147, 91.147, and
119.8.
5.3 8 ................................
General Requirements .....................
5.5(b) .............................
Part 121 operators ...........................
5.7(a) .............................
Applicants seeking to operate under
part 121.
Part 135 operators and § 91.147 air
tour operators.
5.7(b) .............................
Applicants seeking to operate under
part 135 or § 91.147.
5.9(b) .............................
Holders of PC and TC for the same
product.
5.11 ................................
TC holders applying for a PC for
same product.
5.13 ................................
TC holders who have a licensing
agreement to allow other persons
to obtain a PC.
TC holders who enter into a licensing agreement to allow other persons to obtain a PC.
5.15(b) ...........................
Implementation plans .......................
5.17 ................................
Safety policy ....................................
5.21(a)(7) .......................
System analysis and hazard identification.
Safety performance monitoring and
measurement.
5.53(b)(5) .......................
Expand the applicability of part 5 (currently limited to part 121 operators) to make SMS requirements applicable to part 135 operators, § 91.147 air tour operators, and certain holders of a TC 6
and PC issued under part 21 for the same product.7
Revise the definition of ‘‘hazard’’ to also mean conditions or objects with the potential to cause or
contribute to an incident.
Add a new requirement to develop and maintain a system description that includes information
about the aviation products or services provided by the person and a description of the interfacing persons that contribute to the safety of the person’s products or services.
Require part 121 operators to revise their current SMS in accordance with the new requirements of
part 5 and to submit revisions no later than 12 months after effective date of final rule.
Require applicants seeking to operate under part 121 to develop and implement an SMS in accordance with part 5 and to submit a statement of compliance as part of the certification process.
Require part 135 operators and § 91.147 air tour operators to develop and implement an SMS in
accordance with part 5 and to submit a statement of compliance no later than 24 months after
the effective date of final rule.
Require applicants seeking to operate under part 135 or § 91.147 to develop and implement an
SMS in accordance with part 5 and to submit a statement of compliance as part of the certification or LOA process.
Require any person that holds a PC and TC 9 issued under part 21 for the same product to develop
an SMS in accordance with part 5; to submit an implementation plan for FAA approval no later
than December 27, 2024; and to implement the SMS no later than December 27, 2025.
Require TC holders 10 who apply for a PC for the same product to develop an SMS in accordance
with part 5, to submit an implementation plan for FAA approval during the certification process,
and to implement the SMS no later than one year after obtaining FAA approval.
Require TC holders, who have a licensing agreement to allow other persons to obtain a PC, to develop an SMS in accordance with part 5; to submit an implementation plan for FAA approval no
later than December 27, 2024; and to implement the SMS no later than December 27, 2025.
Require TC holders, who enter into a licensing agreement to allow other persons to obtain a PC, to
develop an SMS in accordance with part 5, to submit an implementation plan for FAA approval
when providing written licensing agreements to the FAA, and to implement the SMS no later than
one year after obtaining FAA approval.
Require implementation plans filed under §§ 5.11, 5.13, and 5.15 to include a description of how the
person intends to comply with part 5, and for the person to make available, upon request, all necessary information and data that demonstrates that the SMS has been or will be implemented in
accordance with the implementation plan.
Add a new requirement for the safety policy to include a code of ethics that is applicable to all employees, including management personnel and officers, which clarifies that safety is the organization’s highest priority.
Add a new requirement for the person conducting the system analysis to consider the interfaces of
the system.
Revise the requirement for a confidential employee reporting system by adding a provision to ensure that employees can report without concern of reprisal.
Add a new requirement for holders of both a TC and PC for the same product to submit a summary
of the confidential employee reports to the FAA every 6 months.
Add a new section to: (1) require the person who identifies a hazard to notify the interfacing person
who, to the best of their knowledge, could address the hazard or mitigate the risk; and (2) require
procedures for reporting and receiving hazard information with interfacing persons.
Add a new requirement for SMS documentation to include the system description.
Add a new requirement for persons to retain records of all communications provided under new
§ 5.94 for a minimum of 24 consecutive calendar months.
5.9(a) .............................
5.15(c) ............................
5.71(a)(7) .......................
5.71(c) ............................
Notification of hazards to interfacing
persons.
5.94 ................................
SMS documentation ........................
SMS records ....................................
5.95(c) ............................
5.97(d) ...........................
C. Summary of Costs and Benefits
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The FAA estimated quantified
annualized costs of $51.3 million using
a 7 percent discount rate over a 5-year
period of analysis. The costs represent
6 As discussed in Section V.A.3 of the preamble,
the FAA considers a licensee of a TC to be
equivalent to a holder of a TC. For purposes of this
table, each reference to ‘‘TC holder’’ or ‘‘holder of
a TC’’ is intended to encompass ‘‘licensee of a TC.’’
Thus, part 5 would also apply to a person who
holds a PC and is a licensee of a TC for the same
product.
7 Part 5 would also apply to applicants seeking to
operate under part 135 or § 91.147, and to an
applicant for a PC who is the holder or licensee of
a TC for the same product.
8 The definitions and general requirements
currently exist in §§ 5.5 and 5.3, respectively. The
FAA proposes to relocate the definitions to § 5.3
and the general requirements to § 5.5.
9 See footnote 7.
10 See footnote 7.
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resources to develop and implement an
SMS. Mitigation costs to reduce or
eliminate any hazards identified by an
SMS, which are yet to be identified and
thus unknown, are not quantified in the
analysis. The FAA evaluated benefits
qualitatively. The benefits are the value
that would result from avoided
fatalities, injuries, aircraft damage, and
investigation costs. Please see Section
VII. for more information.
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA’s authority to issue rules on
aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the
United States Code (U.S.C.). Subtitle I,
Section 106 describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
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In 2010, Congress mandated that the
FAA conduct rulemaking to require part
121 operators to implement an SMS in
the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010
(Pub. L. 111–216, 124 Stat. 2366).11
Subsequently, Congress enacted
section 102(a)(1) of the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability
Act (Pub. L. 116–260; 134 Stat. 2309,
hereafter referred to as ACSAA), on
December 27, 2020. Section 102, titled
‘‘Safety Management Systems,’’ requires
the FAA to initiate a rulemaking to
require manufacturers that hold both a
TC and a PC issued pursuant to 49
U.S.C. 44704 have an SMS consistent
with Standards and Recommended
Practices established by ICAO and
contained in Annex 19 to the
11 See
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Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), for such
systems. Section 102 of ACSAA requires
the implementing regulations to include
a confidential employee reporting
system through which employees can
report hazards, issues, concerns,
occurrences, and incidents, without
concern for reprisal for reporting, and a
code of ethics. This rulemaking
proposes regulations in accordance with
those requirements.
Additionally, given this clear
Congressional support for SMS as a
safety concept, the FAA is proposing to
use its discretion under the following
authorities to proactively extend SMS
requirements to part 119 certificate
holders authorized to operate under part
135 and LOA holders operating under
§ 91.147.
This rulemaking is promulgated
under the authority described in 49
U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the
authority of the Administrator to
promulgate regulations and rules. This
rulemaking is also promulgated under
49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) (‘‘The
Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall promote safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing regulations and minimum
standards for other practices, methods,
and procedure the Administrator finds
necessary for safety in air commerce and
national security’’); 44701(a)(2)(A)
(‘‘The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration shall promote
safe flight of civil aircraft in air
commerce by prescribing regulations
and minimum standards in the interest
of safety for inspecting, servicing, and
overhauling aircraft, aircraft engines,
propellers, and appliances’’); 44702(a)
(‘‘The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration may issue
airman certificates, design organization
certificates, type certificates, production
certificates, airworthiness certificates,
air carrier operating certificates, airport
operating certificates, air agency
certificates, and air navigation facility
certificates’’); and 44704(a)(1) (‘‘The
Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall issue a type
certificate for an aircraft, aircraft engine,
or propeller, or for an appliance
specified under paragraph (2)(A) of this
subsection when the Administrator
finds that the aircraft, aircraft engine,
propeller, or appliance is properly
designed and manufactured, performs
properly, and meets the regulations and
minimum standards’’). Additionally,
this rulemaking is consistent with the
requirements of 49 U.S.C.
44701(d)(1)(A) (‘‘When prescribing a
regulation or standard under [49 U.S.C.
chapter 447], the Administrator shall
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consider the duty of an air carrier to
provide service with the highest
possible degree of safety in the public
interest.’’).
Finally, 49 U.S.C. 44701(c) directs the
Administrator to ‘‘carry out this chapter
in a way that best tends to reduce or
eliminate the possibility or recurrence
of accidents in air transportation.’’ This
rulemaking is intended to require
certain entities that are regulated under
the foregoing statutory authorities to
develop and maintain an SMS to
improve the safety of their operations.
The development and implementation
of SMS may enhance safety in air
transportation and design and
manufacturing so that persons can
proactively identify and mitigate safety
hazards, thereby reducing the
possibility or recurrence of accidents in
air transportation consistent with the
mandate in § 44701(c). For these
reasons, the proposed regulations are
within the scope of the FAA’s authority
and are consistent with Congress’s
mandate that the FAA exercise its
authority to proactively—not just
reactively—promote safe flight of civil
aircraft and to reduce or eliminate
hazards that could result in accidents in
air transportation.
III. Purpose of This Rulemaking
An SMS is a formal, top-down,
organization-wide approach to
managing safety risk and ensuring the
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It
includes systematic procedures,
practices, and policies for the
management of safety risk. An SMS is
a management system integrated into an
organization’s operations that enforces
the concept that safety should be
managed with as much emphasis,
commitment, and focus as any other
critical area of an organization.
The purpose of an SMS is to reduce
incidents, accidents, and fatalities by
aiding organizations in identifying
hazards and mitigating those hazards
before they lead to an incident or
accident. Anecdotal evidence from SMS
voluntary program participants
indicates that SMS improves the safety
of organizations.12 Although the authors
of a 2012 study by the Australian
Transport Safety Board acknowledged
the prevalence of earlier studies that
were inconclusive, they ultimately
12 As described in the Regulatory Impact Analysis
for the rule, for example, one participant noted that
the compressed executive awareness time of new
safety related issues resulted in formal management
actions occurring in less than 90 days for low-risk
issues and within hours for high-risk issues.
Another participant noted that they have a seen a
substantial drop in the major risk categories that
they track.
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concluded that ‘‘recent studies have
demonstrated that well-implemented
SMS, especially those where the
organisation invests effort into the SMS,
are associated with enhanced safety
performance.’’ 13 Research by Tinsley,
Dillon, and Madsen 14 suggests that the
attention an SMS would bring to
seemingly smaller events, or near
accidents, could prevent catastrophes.
Tinsley, Dillon, and Madsen studied
near accidents in dozens of companies
across industries and in laboratory
simulations. They determined that
multiple near accidents preceded and
foreshadowed every disaster and
business crisis they studied, and that
most near accidents were ignored. The
authors found that identifying near
accidents and correcting root causes are
good investments for an organization.
Similarly, in examining large U.S.
commercial airlines that operated from
1990 to 2007, Madsen, Dillon, and
Tinsley 15 found that for airlines to
continue to improve safety they must
attend to the yet undiscovered or
unrecognized risks in the system
without waiting for an accident to bring
attention to them. Additionally, the
FAA contends that expanding the
implementation of SMS in the aviation
industry would increase overall safety
for each entity using an SMS, as well as
requiring communication across the
aviation industry with respect to
identified hazards.
The FAA previously forecasted a
reduction in fatalities as a result of
implementing SMS for part 121
certificate holders.16 The FAA still
expects an overall reduction in
fatalities, however quantifying the
effects of part 5 requirements on part
121 certificate holders cannot be done at
this time due to inadequate data. The
data available for 2020 and 2021 is both
significantly reduced and atypical due
to the COVID–19 pandemic.
Over the last few decades, accidents
involving commercial aviation operators
13 Thomas, Dr. Matthew J.W.; A Systematic
Review of the Effectiveness of Safety Management
Systems, Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2012,
p. 27. https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/
media/4053559/xr2011002_final.pdf.
14 Tinsley, Catherine H. et al., How to Avoid
Catastrophe. Harvard Business Review, Brighton,
2011. https://hbr.org/2011/04/how-to-avoidcatastrophe.
15 Madsen, Peter et al., Airline Safety
Improvement Through Experience with NearMisses: A Cautionary Tale. Risk Analysis, May
2016, Vol. 36, No. 5.
16 See Section V (Regulatory Notices and
Analysis) starting on page 1318 of 14 CFR part 5
final rule published January 8, 2015, 80 FR 1308.
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have decreased.17 Despite an overall
reduction in accidents, the FAA has
determined that many of the accidents
involving part 135 and § 91.147
operators could have been effectively
mitigated by the presence of an SMS.
These accidents highlight the systemic
improvement opportunities to safety as
described in the Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) for this rulemaking.
According to NTSB data, from 2015 to
2019, there were 215 accidents
involving part 135 operators, with a
total of 121 fatalities,18 as well as 33
accidents involving air tour operators
operating under § 91.147, with a total of
16 fatalities.19 The FAA identified 35 of
these accidents involving part 135
operators and four accidents involving
§ 91.147 operators which involved
fatalities and serious injuries that could
have been mitigated had those operators
implemented an SMS. Additional
accidents not involving fatalities or
serious injuries may also have been
avoided. The FAA also identified
several accidents across parts 91, 121,
and 135 involving design and
production issues that resulted in
fatalities and serious injuries that could
have been mitigated or prevented if the
design and manufacturing organizations
involved had implemented an SMS.20 A
full listing of each accident used to
inform the analysis of this rulemaking
(including a brief description of the
accident, a quantified estimate of the
probability of mitigation through the
adoption of SMS, and a rationale for
estimated probability) is included in
Appendix A to the RIA.
Given the rapid development, growth,
and increasing complexities of the
airspace, the FAA believes that SMS
requirements should extend to parties
that play a critical role in the design,
manufacturing, and operation of aircraft.
ACSAA requires the FAA to include
holders of both a TC and a PC among
those organizations that should be
required to implement an SMS.
Applying SMS to commuter and ondemand air carriers, air tours, and the
manufacturers responsible for design
and production of products would
continue to reduce incidents, accidents,
17 U.S. Air Carrier Safety Data, https://
www.bts.gov/content/us-air-carrier-safety-data.
Accessed March 22, 2022.
18 National Transportation Safety Board. U.S.
Civil Aviation Accident Rates. 2022. Available at:
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/Pages/research.aspx.
19 Data file of sightseeing accidents provided by
the NTSB April 2020.
20 These accidents include those identified by
NTSB accident numbers: DCA19MA086,
ERA18LA199, DCA18MA142, ERA18FA120,
DCA17FA021, WPR16FA153, DCA16FA199,
ERA16FA185, WPR16FA055, DCA16FA013,
CEN15MA290, ERA15FA254, and DCA15FA073.
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and fatalities and improve safety in
aviation by requiring these
organizations to proactively identify
hazards, assess risk of those hazards,
and develop and implement mitigations,
as necessary. The FAA anticipates that
this systemic safety effort will have a
measurable effect on the reduction in
fatalities as described in the RIA for this
rulemaking. ICAO, other civil aviation
authorities, industry advisory groups,
and the NTSB all agree that the use of
an SMS improves safety. An SMS has
been implemented by each part 121
operator, and many other organizations
have implemented an SMS following
the FAA’s SMS Voluntary Program. The
FAA has also implemented SMS within
many of its own organizations. The
FAA’s own experience has shown that
organizations that have an SMS may:
• Increase safety of products or
services by identifying and addressing
problems before they occur.
• Improve data-informed decision
making to prioritize resource allocation.
• Enhance communication regarding
safety by using common, consistent
terminology within the organization and
throughout the industry.
• Strengthen the organization’s safety
culture.
Further, expansion of the SMS
requirements would increase U.S.
alignment with other civil aviation
authorities that are also implementing
SMS requirements in accordance with
ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices. With an SMS, a U.S. company
would have an improved ability to
operate internationally due to better
alignment with ICAO standards and
recommended practices. Furthermore, a
U.S. company without an SMS could
even be barred from doing business in
a country where the civil aviation
authority requires them to have an SMS.
To date, SMS requirements have
mainly focused on internal
identification and mitigation of risk
within an organization. However, the
FAA is proposing to augment these
requirements to encourage a more
collaborative approach in which
persons required to have an SMS share
hazard information with each other and
work together to identify and address
hazards and safety issues. To enable this
more collaborative approach, this
proposal includes requirements to share
hazard information with other
organizations, which are intended to
ensure that relevant information is
shared with the person in the best
position to address the hazard. The
expanded applicability and hazard
information sharing among interfacing
organizations would enable a network of
organizations working collaboratively to
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manage risk, thereby enhancing the
safety benefits of SMS by assuring that
hazards are communicated and
mitigated effectively.
IV. Background
A. SMS Aviation Rulemaking
Committees
The FAA chartered two ARCs
composed of industry stakeholders to
provide advice on implementing SMS in
aviation regulations, including parts 21,
91, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145.
The industry stakeholders on these
ARCs included individual companies
and associations representing operators,
design and manufacturing
organizations, repair stations, and
training organizations. These ARCs
expressed industry support for SMS and
recommended that the FAA publish
rules requiring use of SMS.
1. SMS ARC (2009)
On February 12, 2009, the FAA
chartered the SMS ARC with
membership from across the aviation
industry to evaluate the public
comments submitted in response to an
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) on potential
rulemaking requiring certain part 21,
119, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145
certificate holders to develop an SMS 21
and provide its recommendations
regarding further action the agency
should consider in developing and
implementing SMS requirements.22
In its report, the ARC recommended
the FAA issue regulations on SMS and
that those regulations apply to
certificate holders under 14 CFR parts
21, 119, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and
145, as well as operators under 14 CFR
part 91 subpart K. This broad
applicability would more closely align
with ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices. The ARC,
however, recommended phased
promulgation of SMS regulations and
that the FAA prioritize new SMS
regulations based on the potential safety
benefit, as well as industry experience
and regulatory oversight readiness. The
FAA addressed these recommendations
by first focusing on part 121 by
promulgating 14 CFR part 5 on January
8, 2015 and proposing a rule to require
airports certificated under part 139 to
implement an SMS. Although the SMS
requirements in part 5 currently apply
only to part 121 operators, the FAA
21 74
FR 36414, July 23, 2009.
Management System (SMS) Aviation
Rulemaking Committee; Order 1110.152,
Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/
documents/media/SMSARC-2122009.pdf (as of
March 15, 2022).
22 Safety
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explained in that rulemaking that part 5
was designed for broader application
and the FAA intended for the SMS
requirements to apply to other FAAregulated entities in the future.23 The
rulemakings implementing SMS for part
121 operators and airports certificated
under part 139 are addressed in more
detail in Section IV.C. of this NPRM
preamble.
When considering this proposed rule,
the FAA explored applying part 5 SMS
requirements to additional certificate
holders and operators consistent with
the ARC recommendations, as well as
any certificate holders and operators
required by ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices in ICAO Annex
19 (i.e., parts 21, 135, 141, 142, 145, and
some operators under part 91).
However, in this proposed rule the FAA
is choosing to address the most
impactful parts to which ICAO Annex
19 is applicable (part 135 [operators],
part 21 [design and manufacturing], and
§ 91.147 [air tours]).
The ARC also recommended that the
FAA provide additional protections for
SMS safety information and proprietary
data. As discussed in more detail in
Section V.H., the FAA has addressed
data protection in this proposal.
The ARC recommended alignment
with the SMS framework developed by
ICAO in Annex 19, which would
facilitate SMS requirement
compatibility with States actively
engaged in developing and adopting
their own SMS requirements. The FAA
designed part 5 consistent with this
recommendation.
The ARC recommended that the FAA
recognize existing systems and
processes. For instance, some operators
have systems for internal auditing,
employee reporting, and revising
manuals, which could be leveraged in
the development of their SMS. The FAA
is incorporating this recommendation in
this proposed rule by encouraging
certificate holders and LOA holders to
leverage their existing systems and
processes to meet the requirements. In
addition, the FAA is proposing
guidance material that describes how
existing systems and processes may
align with SMS requirements.
Further, the ARC expressed concern
regarding the potential impact of SMS
requirements on small businesses. The
FAA addressed this concern. Just as
existing part 5 requirements are
performance-based and scalable, each
revision proposed in this NPRM is also
intended to be scalable. Scalability is
23 NPRM, ‘‘Safety Management Systems for Part
121 Certificate Holders,’’ 75 FR 68224, 68232
(November 5, 2010).
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discussed further in Section V.F. of this
NPRM preamble. In addition, the
proposed guidance accompanying this
NPRM should assist certificate holders
in appropriately scaling the
implementation of SMS to fit their
operations. The guidance material is
discussed further in Section VI. of this
preamble.
2. Part 21 SMS ARC (2012)
The Part 21 SMS ARC, established on
October 5, 2012,24 evaluated
improvements to the effectiveness and
efficiency of existing ‘‘certification
procedures for products and parts,’’ and
the benefits of incorporating SMS in the
design and manufacturing environment.
The FAA received the ARC’s final report
in October 2014.25
The ARC recommended establishing
regulatory requirements for
implementing SMS for design and
production approval organizations that
would be consistent with the part 5
requirements.26 The ARC recommended
that SMS requirements apply to
organizations that design or
manufacture products (under a TC or a
PC) and to those that design or
manufacture articles (under a technical
standard order authorization or parts
manufacturer approval), or that make
changes to products (under a
supplemental type certificate) that could
directly prevent continued safe flight
and landing if they fail.27
The FAA analyzed the ARC’s
recommendation and developed an
alternative (see Alternative 1 in Section
VII.A.5.) to the current proposal that
may have met the intent of the ARC’s
recommendation by extending SMS
requirements beyond holders of both a
TC and a PC for the same product. This
alternative would require SMS for
design and production approval holders
who design or produce products
typically used for compensation or hire
with some exceptions (described in
Alternative 1 in Section VII.A.5.). As
part of this alternative, the FAA
24 14 CFR 21/Safety Management Systems
Aviation Rulemaking Committee Charter. Available
at: https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/
rulemaking/committees/documents/media/
Part21ARC-10052012.pdf (visited March 15, 2022).
25 Part 21/Safety Management Systems (SMS)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee to the Federal
Aviation Administration: Recommendations on
Certification Procedures for Products and Parts.
October 5, 2014.
26 At the time the ARC submitted its final report
in 2014, the FAA had not finalized the proposed
part 5 requirements. Part 5 became effective March
9, 2015.
27 Part 21/Safety Management Systems (SMS)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee to the Federal
Aviation Administration: Recommendations on
Certification Procedures for Products and Parts,
page 31. October 5, 2014.
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considered permitting design and
production approval holders to apply to
be excluded from part 5 requirements if
the failure of the article or product
alteration would have little or no impact
on the continued safe flight and landing
of the aircraft. After analyzing the costs
and benefits, the FAA determined that
there were costs to including these
design and production approval
holders, but was unable to estimate the
magnitude of benefits. The analysis of
this alternative is provided in Section
VII.A.5. As a result, the FAA is not
proposing to adopt the full scope of the
ARC’s recommendation in this NPRM at
this time.
B. National Transportation Safety Board
Recommendations
The NTSB first recommended in 1997
that transportation organizations
implement an SMS, and early
recommendations were aimed at
improving safety in the maritime
industry. Since then, a number of NTSB
investigations related to various modes
of transportation, including aviation,
have cited organizational factors
contributing to accidents and have
recommended SMS as a way to prevent
future accidents and improve safety.
The NTSB issued 18 recommendations
regarding SMS for aviation
organizations over a 15-year period,
spanning 2007 through 2021.28 These
recommendations covered commercial
operations under 14 CFR parts 121 and
135, revenue passenger carrying
business operations under part 91, and
certificate holders under part 21. Eight
of the 18 NTSB recommendations were
issued to the FAA.29
The NTSB regularly publishes a Most
Wanted List, which ‘‘highlights
transportation safety improvements
needed now to prevent accidents,
reduce injuries, and save lives.’’ 30 The
NTSB 2021–2022 Most Wanted List
recommended that the FAA, ‘‘Require
and Verify the Effectiveness of Safety
Management Systems in all Revenue
28 NTSB Safety recommendations: A–07–010
(2007), A–09–016 (2009), A–09–089 (2009), A–09–
098 (2009), A–09–106 (2009), A–12–062 (2012), A–
12–063 (2012), A–14–105 (2014), A–14–106 (2014),
A–16–036 (2016), A–19–028 (2020), A–19–036
(2019), A–19–038 (2019), A–20–025 (2020), A–21–
007 (2021), A–21–013 (2021), A–21–014 (2021), and
A–21–048 (2021).
29 NTSB Safety recommendations: A–07–010
(2007), A–09–089 (2009), A–09–016 (2009), A–16–
036 (2016), A–19–028 (2020), A–21–013 (2021), A–
21–014 (2021), and A–21–048 (2021).
30 2021–2022 NTSB Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements,
www.ntsb.gov/mwl.
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Passenger-Carrying Aviation
Operations.’’ 31
C. Safety Management System
Rulemaking Efforts
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1. Safety Management Systems for
Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental
Operations
On July 23, 2009, the FAA published
an ANPRM to solicit public comments
on whether certain 14 CFR part 21, 119,
121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145
certificate holders, product
manufacturers, applicants, and
employers (product/service providers)
should be required to develop an
SMS.32 Subsequently, on August 1,
2010, Congress enacted the Airline
Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010
(Pub. L. 111–216, 124 Stat. 2366), which
directed the FAA to conduct rulemaking
to ‘‘require all part 121 air carriers to
implement a safety management
system.’’ 33 To meet the rulemaking
deadlines mandated by the Act, the
FAA decided not to immediately
address SMS for other product/service
providers.34 The FAA limited the SMS
rulemaking project to part 121 air
carriers, issuing an NPRM on November
5, 2010, 35 and subsequently
withdrawing the ANPRM.36
On January 8, 2015, the FAA
published the Safety Management
Systems for Domestic, Flag, and
Supplemental Operations Certificate
Holders final rule (SMS for part 121
final rule) requiring operators
authorized to conduct operations under
part 121 to develop and implement an
SMS to improve the safety of their
aviation related activities.37 The final
rule added part 5 to Title 14 of the CFR,
creating the SMS requirements for part
121 certificate holders, modeled on the
ICAO SMS framework in ICAO Annex
19 and consistent with the 2009 ARC
recommendations. The requirements in
part 5 were meant to be applicable to
organizations of various sizes and
complexities, as well as adaptable to fit
the different types of organizations in
31 2021–2022, NTSB Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements, Require and
Verify the Effectiveness of Safety Management
Systems in all Revenue Passenger-Carrying Aviation
Operations, https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/
Pages/mwl-21-22/mwl-as-01.aspx.
32 ANPRM, ‘‘Safety Management Systems,’’ 74 FR
36414. July 23, 2009.
33 See Sec. 215(a).
34 See ‘‘Safety Management System; Withdrawal,’’
76 FR 14592. March 17, 2011.
35 75 FR 68224.
36 See id.
37 80 FR 1308. The FAA published technical
amendments on January 13, 2015 (80 FR 1584) and
May 25, 2017 (82 FR 24009) to correct a date and
a reference in the rule, respectively.
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the air transportation system and
operations within an individual
company. The final rule also modified
14 CFR part 119 to specify applicability
and implementation of the new SMS
framework in part 5 for part 119
certificate holders authorized to conduct
operations under part 121. Part 121
operators met the requirement to have
an SMS acceptable to the FAA by 2018.
The FAA has seen continuous
improvement in 121 operators’ use of
SMS to manage the safety of their
operations and, therefore, is proposing
to expand part 5 applicability with this
rulemaking.
2. Safety Management Systems for Part
139 Airports
On July 14, 2016, the FAA published
the ‘‘Safety Management System for
Certificated Airports’’ supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking [(81 FR
45872)] (Airports SMS SNPRM). The
Airports SMS SNPRM proposed to
require airports that meet certain criteria
to develop and implement an SMS in
the airport’s movement and nonmovement areas. The FAA is working to
finalize that rule.
D. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act
The Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines
accidents involving the Boeing 737
MAX resulted in several investigations,
not only of the accidents, but also of the
FAA’s oversight and certification
processes. One such investigation,
convened by the FAA in April of 2019,
was the Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control
System Joint Authorities Technical
Review. The Joint Authorities Technical
Review included representatives from
the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the FAA, and several
foreign civil aviation authorities. One of
the Joint Authorities Technical Review
recommendations was that the FAA
encourage applicants to have a system
safety function, such as a safety
management system, that is
independent from their design
organization.38
Subsequently, on December 27, 2020,
Congress enacted ACSAA, which set
forth a variety of reforms intended to
address certain safety standards relating
to the aircraft certification process.
Section 102 of ACSAA requires that the
FAA promulgate rules to require holders
of both a TC and a PC issued under 14
CFR part 21 to implement an SMS.
ACSAA also establishes a timeline for
those certificate holders to adopt an
38 Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR),
Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System:
Observations, Findings, and Recommendations.
October 11, 2019.
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SMS (i.e., no later than four years after
the date of enactment, December 27,
2024), and it establishes certain
requirements for the rulemaking,
including a confidential employee
reporting system through which
employees can report hazards, issues,
concerns, occurrences, and incidents
without concern for reprisal for
reporting, and a code of ethics.
E. International Movement Toward SMS
ICAO Annex 19, Safety Management,
establishes a framework for member
States to develop and implement SMS
requirements within their State’s rules.
Several member States, including the
U.S., started developing and
implementing SMS requirements within
their countries after Annex 19 First
Edition was published in July 2013 and
became applicable in November 2013.39
Annex 19 currently requires States to
establish requirements for SMS for
international commercial air
transportation, design and
manufacturing, maintenance, air traffic
services, training organizations, and
certified aerodromes, as well as SMS
criteria for international general aviation
operators of large or turbojet airplanes.
Member States continue to make
progress in developing, implementing,
and maintaining requirements for SMS
that are aligned with ICAO’s SMS
standards and recommended practices,
including certificating authorities in
Canada, Brazil, the United Kingdom,
Japan, Australia, and Europe (European
Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)).
In the EASA regulatory framework, SMS
is mandatory for certificated operators
of airplanes and helicopters authorized
to conduct commercial air
transportation. Additionally, as a result
of recent EASA rulemaking efforts, SMS
will also be applicable for continuing
airworthiness of an aircraft and its
components. The EASA also adopted a
rule for design and production
organizations (part 21), which will
become applicable on March 7, 2023.40
FAA also notes that other civil
aviation authorities and interested
parties are initiating evaluations to
determine the effects of SMS post
implementation. Two evaluations of
note are discussed as follows.
In 2019 Transport Canada Civil
Aviation published an evaluation of the
impact of SMS on aviation safety 10
years after it was mandated for airline
operators, private operators, approved
39 The Second Edition of Annex 19 was published
in July 2016 and became applicable in November
2019.
40 European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/
203 of 14 February 2022.
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maintenance organizations that service
airline operator aircraft, air navigation
services, and aerodromes/airports/
heliports.41 The evaluation findings
were based on multiple lines of
evidence, including a survey of nearly
1800 aviation industry stakeholders
(operators, approved maintenance
organizations, aerodromes), case studies
involving eight enterprises and
interviews. The evaluation found that
many organizations have implemented
policies and practices associated with
an effective SMS, specifically, nonpunitive reporting, executive
commitment and hazard identification
and mitigation. The evaluation found
notable buy-in to SMS among those
surveyed. Although accident trends
declined over the 10-year evaluation
period it was also noted that a lack of
objective data limited ability to show
safety improvement directly attributable
to SMS because of the difficulty in
separating other effects that may also
benefit safety.
A Griffith University (Queensland
Australia) doctoral thesis paper
evaluated the impact of SMSs on safety
performance for commercial aviation
operations using two case studies.42
Legislation in Australia for the
implementation of an SMS for regular
public transport Air Operator Certificate
holders was mandated by the Civil
Aviation Safety Authority in 2009 with
phased implementation to be complete
by 2011.
The first case study examined SMSs
in the international general aviation and
charter operation sector while the
second case study reviewed SMSs in the
Australian airline sector. In the first case
study, researchers conducted an
analysis of de-identified Flight Safety
Foundation general aviation and charter
sector audit findings. A total of 7,625
audit findings were reviewed from
2011–2014 from a population of 117
operators. The determination of safety
performance was not possible for this
sample population using a conventional
accident rate metric due to the lack of
availability of flight departure data.
However, the study concluded that
safety performance had improved since
SMS implementation, showing a
uniform decrease in the number of
negative audit findings. Although the
41 Evaluation of Safety Management Systems in
Civil Aviation—Transport Canada, July 2019.
Available at: https://tc.canada.ca/sites/default/
files/2021-02/evaluation-safety-managementsystems-civil-aviation.pdf.
42 The Impact of Safety Management Systems on
Safety Performance: Commercial Aviation
Operations—Griffith University thesis paper. April
2015. Available at: https://researchrepository.griffith.edu.au/handle/10072/367145.
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study did not control for the number
and thoroughness of audits performed
during the years under study, the study
did present qualitative findings by year
and discipline, independent of the
number of audits conducted. The study
further concluded that a decrease in
findings for the last two years of the
study were likely due to the
improvements brought about by growing
and maturing safety management
systems.43
In the second case study, researchers
conducted a review of airline SMSs in
Australia by comparison of Civil
Aviation Safety Authority safety audit
indicators for the sampled population
before and after the implementation of
SMS. The study concluded that the
empirical evidence indicates that SMSs
improve the safety performance of
commercial aviation operations. The
study also showed that SMS safety
assurance plays the most critical role in
an effective SMS; its associated
subcomponents of continuous
improvement, safety performance
monitoring and measurement, and
management of change have the highest
net influence of all the SMS
components. FAA notes that the Griffith
University study conclusions and
multiple correlation analyses are based
on a short timeframe (three years of
fully implemented SMS) and study of
longer timeframes involving more
mature SMSs is desirable.
V. Discussion of the Proposal
The FAA proposes changes to part 5
to further the safety of flights for
compensation or hire and passenger
carrying operations. To that end, the
FAA considers that overall aerospace
system safety would be increased by
requiring entities beyond part 121
operators to implement SMS, including
other operators that fly for
compensation or hire and the designers
and manufacturers of products used in
the system. The FAA envisions these
safety management systems to be
scalable to the size and complexity of
the organization, and to not be unduly
burdensome. By requiring entities that
span the disparate sectors of aviation
from manufacturing and design to
operations to implement an SMS, the
FAA seeks to create a network of
organizations that speak the same
language of safety management and can
better communicate with one another
and share information about any
43 Yeun, Richard Chee Kin, The Impact of Safety
Management Systems on Safety Performance:
Commercial Aviation Operations, Ph.D. Thesis
(Queensland Australia: Griffith University, 2015),
See table 6.5, pp 122–123. https://hdl.handle.net/
10072/367145.
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1939
hazards they identify during the course
of their business. Although some part
121 operators may communicate with
one another voluntarily at this time, the
FAA considers that there would be
greater safety benefit if all aviation
organizations, from the manufacturer to
the operator, were to communicate
hazard information to one another. The
FAA considers that the benefits of safety
management systems are derived from
each of the components of an SMS and
that the proposed changes to part 5
would assist in maximizing the
potential of an SMS to increase safety
across the aerospace system.
A. Applicability
Part 5 currently applies only to
persons authorized to conduct
operations under part 121. The FAA
proposes to amend § 5.1 and expand the
applicability of part 5 to: (1) any person
authorized or applying to conduct
operations under part 135 or § 91.147;
(2) any person that holds or applies for
a PC issued under part 21 for a product
for which they are the TC holder or
licensee; and (3) TC holders who license
the TC for production.
Although the FAA recognizes the
value of the variety of voluntary safety
programs, their optional nature and lack
of comprehensive application of all
elements of part 5 may not yield as
much safety benefit as a mandatory SMS
that complies with all proposed
requirements of part 5. Therefore, to
ensure that the minimum standard is
met, the FAA is proposing to broaden
the application of part 5 SMS
requirements.
1. Part 135 Operators
As described in Section III, the FAA
identified a number of accidents
involving part 135 operators which
resulted in fatalities and serious injuries
that could have been mitigated through
SMS. These accidents involved both
passenger-carrying and cargo-only
operations. Each of these accidents
stemmed from different circumstances;
however, the accidents analyzed were a
representative cross section of the
overall circumstances that were present
in the balance of total part 135 accidents
that occurred. Therefore, the FAA
considers that an SMS would have been
effective in similar accidents among
those not analyzed.
The FAA proposes to require all part
119 certificate holders authorized to
operate under part 135 and applicants
for those certificates to develop and
implement an SMS that meets the part
5 requirements. This aligns the
proposed part 5 applicability with ICAO
Annex 19 and with other civil aviation
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authorities that generally do not
differentiate between size and
complexity of air carriers. SMS is
necessary for safety of air transportation
generally because anyone who engages
in air transportation must understand
the hazards associated with their
operation, effectively assess the risks,
and understand how to mitigate those
risks. The identification of hazards
through SMS may include analyzing the
potential risk associated with
crewmember fatigue when compounded
by variations in individual 135
operations, such as scheduling
variances, frequency of operations,
distance, and number of pilots.44
The FAA considered excluding part
135 operators who use only one pilotin-command in their operations from
the SMS requirements. Approximately
31 percent (594) of the part 135
operators use one pilot-in-command.
These operators have between 1 and 7
aircraft. Similar to most part 135
operators, these operators might also
meet the size standard for small
businesses (see Section VII.B for
details). However, as all part 135
operators conduct air transportation of
passengers and cargo, the FAA
determined such exclusion would not
be in the interest of safety as evidenced
by the part 135 accidents discussed in
Section III that could have been
mitigated through an SMS (including
those involving only one pilot-incommand).
As a fundamental matter, the flying
public expects safe carriage from
operators offering flight services for
hire. Irrespective of whether an operator
employs one pilot or a thousand, that
company has the same responsibility to
conduct safe operations. Part 135
operators employing just a single pilot
are not immune to accident or serious
injury; the FAA’s review of NTSB
reports from 2015 to 2020 showed that
part 135 operators employing just a
single pilot were involved in five
accidents involving a fatality or serious
injury. This record demonstrates that
very small and single pilot part 135
operators continue to face insufficiently
addressed safety hazards that cause the
loss of life. More importantly, the FAA
concluded that these operators could
have used basic components of SMS,
such as establishing safety policies,
performing safety risk management to
assess risk and develop controls, and
using safety assurance to verify risk
control effectiveness to address hazards
44 See report from the Part 135 Pilot and Duty
Rules Aviation Rulemaking Committee dated July 2,
2021, a copy of which has been placed in the docket
for this rule.
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that contributed to these accidents.
These SMS elements, which require the
operator to proactively monitor its
practices, procedures, and how it makes
decisions, are especially important for
small organizations Small organizations
by definition have fewer people and, as
a result, have fewer opportunities for
checks and balances on decisions that
can affect safety. SMS addresses this by
requiring small operators to create a
structure for proactively monitoring
their decision-making processes and
addressing deficiencies. Very small
operators may implement SMS
requirements differently than larger
operators. For example, with respect to
§ 5.93, small operators will have fewer
employees to communicate with than
large operators where personnel may
have a more narrow set of
responsibilities and less awareness of all
operations. At one end of the spectrum,
a one-person operator would have a
system for documenting their own
hazard information, actions, mitigations,
safety performance, etc. for future
reference. At the other end of the
spectrum, a large organization would
have a system capable of documenting
and sharing information with larger
groups of people. In particular, certain
aspects of SMS such as developing more
routine expectations for monitoring and
responding to hazards may be
particularly beneficial for smaller
operators. The FAA requests comment
regarding how SMS might present
unique opportunities or challenges for
smaller organizations.
The five accidents involving singlepilot part 135 operators between 2015
and 2020 resulted in 5 fatalities and 4
serious injuries.45 Appendix A of the
RIA describes how SMS could help
avoid similar accidents in the future.
The following discussion describes
three of those accidents and identifies
how having an SMS could have
addressed the hazards contributing to
the accidents. In each of these cases, if
the operator had invested in an
appropriately scaled SMS program on
the front end, it could have avoided
property damage, injury, and loss of life
on the back end.
According to the NTSB, the probable
cause of accident CEN18FA215 was the
pilot’s decision to fly over the river at
a low altitude and his failure to
maintain clearance with wires during
low-level flight. The FAA examined the
effect SMS would be expected to have
on this accident and determined that
SMS would have enabled the operator
45 NTSB accident numbers: CEN18FA215,
ANC18LA046, ANC16FA017, ANC17TA015, and
CEN17FA100.
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to identify hazards along waterways. As
a result of conducting safety risk
management (§§ 5.51–5.55) the
organization would develop a safety risk
control that would help prevent the
accident from occurring. Specifically,
the risk control might have established
a minimum altitude above known or
presumed obstructions (§ 5.55(c)). The
operator might have also established a
policy or control that whenever the pilot
is operating around wires, the pilot
would mark the location of the wires on
a map. This risk control would have
helped to mitigate the risk of the pilot
inadvertently flying into the wires
because these additional controls would
help to ensure the pilot’s situational
awareness regarding the location of the
wires in relation to the aircraft. In this
case, the pilot would monitor the safety
performance (§ 5.71), by validating the
location of the wires on the map and
updating the information as appropriate.
This is one way that the operator could
verify that risk controls were
appropriately applied and effective. In a
small organization the operator could
communicate (§ 5.93) the control to
others in the organization face-to-face,
via email, or other methods that the
company regularly uses to communicate
with its employees.
The probable cause of accident
ANC18LA046 was the pilot’s selection
of an unsuitable takeoff area with
unfavorable wind conditions, which
resulted in the airplane’s inability to
maintain a climb. The FAA determined
that the effect SMS would have had on
this accident was similar to that of
accident CEN18FA215. In this case, had
the operator conducted safety risk
management (§§ 5.51–5.55), it would
likely have developed risk controls to
ensure safer operations (§ 5.55(c)). For
example, the operator could establish
tools for a go/no-go decision customized
for its operations. This could include
special procedures specific to the
environment or operations. Another risk
control might be establishing
procedures to ensure that the equipment
is appropriate for the environment. Both
of these controls would be documented
using standard information tools already
in use within the company. Conducting
safety risk management could have
included identifying and evaluating
company approved unimproved landing
areas to include ingress/egress routes
and minimum acceptable weather
performance limits could mitigate these
hazards. In this case, safety performance
monitoring (§ 5.71) might include
periodic review of operations in nonstandard environments to ensure that
the controls provide the intended effect.
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Similar to the previous example, the
operator could communicate (§ 5.93) the
control to others in the organization
face-to-face, via email, or other methods
that the company regularly uses to
communicate with its employees.
The probable cause of accident
ANC16FA017 was the pilot’s
inadvertent turn toward terrain that was
higher-than-expected while trying to
avoid poor visibility conditions and his
subsequent attempt to clear terrain,
which reduced the airspeed and led to
the exceedance of the airplane’s critical
angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall
and spin was the probable cause of
accident. The FAA determined that
SMS would have had an effect on this
accident. In this case, with an SMS, the
operator would have conducted safety
risk management (§§ 5.51–5.55), and it
would likely have identified hazards
with low visibility hazards and
mountainous terrain. The operator
might develop safety risk controls
regarding route suitability (§ 5.55(c)).
These risk controls could include
setting higher alternative weather
minimums and selection of alternative
routes that are consistent with the
aircraft’s performance, along with
training to support these risk controls.
The operator would also monitor its
safety performance (§ 5.71), by
validating that the higher alternative
weather minimums and alternative
routes are appropriate mitigations.
Similar to other examples, the operator
could communicate (§ 5.93) the control
to others in the organization face-toface, via email, or other methods that
the company regularly uses to
communicate with its employees.
In addition to addressing risk in this
segment of the part 135 population, the
FAA considers that a part 119 certificate
holder authorized to operate under part
135 with only one pilot-in-command
receives the same privileges and
authorization as any other size or
complexity part 119 certificate holder
authorized to operate under part 135,
and should therefore be subject to the
same requirements with regard to SMS.
The FAA recognizes that the
implementation of part 5 requirements,
applicable to all part 135 operators,
must remain scalable to the size and
complexity of the organization. (For
more information regarding scalability,
please refer to Section V.F.).
Some part 119 certificate holders may
be authorized to operate under both
parts 121 and 135. The proposal would
extend the SMS requirements to
operations conducted by those
combination certificate holders
authorized to operate under both parts
121 and 135. Certificate holders that
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already have an SMS in place for only
their part 121 operations would have to
implement SMS for their part 135
operation.
2. Section 91.147 Letter of
Authorization Holders
The FAA is proposing to extend the
SMS requirements to all holders and
applicants of LOAs issued under
§ 91.147 to enhance the safety of
commercial air tour operations. Most
operations for compensation or hire are
conducted pursuant to a part 119
certification, however, nonstop
commercial air tours operated under a
§ 91.147 LOA conduct operations for
compensation or hire without a part 119
certificate. Because air tours operated
under § 91.147 carry passengers for
compensation or hire, the FAA is
proposing to apply part 5 to these
operations.
The FAA considered excluding some
smaller § 91.147 LOA holders from this
proposal (those conducting fewer than
100 flights per year). The FAA does not
collect data on number of flights
conducted under § 91.147 LOAs;
however, approximately 54 percent
(373) have only one aircraft registration.
These LOA holders might also meet the
size standard for small businesses, but
the FAA does not have data to make this
determination either (see Section VII.B
for details). Consistent with the
approach proposed for part 135
operators who use only one pilot-incommand in their operations, the FAA
believes such an exception would not
meet the safety objective.
FAA review of NTSB accident reports
from 2015 to 2020 identified one
accident involving a fatality or serious
injury in the segment of § 91.147 LOA
holders conducting fewer than 100
flights per year. As discussed in Section
V.A.1, small operators bear the same
responsibility for safety as large
operators.
The § 91.147 LOA holder accident
resulted in 5 fatalities involving an
operator conducting air tours.46
The NTSB indicated that the probable
cause of this accident was the operator’s
use of a passenger harness/tether
system, which caught on and activated
the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff
lever. As a result, the aircraft lost engine
power in-flight and ditched into the East
River. In addition, the operator allowed
outside influence on company
decisions. Moreover, they failed to
address foreseeable safety risks
associated with the harness/tether
device.
46 NTSB
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If the operator had an SMS in place
the company would have conducted
safety risk management prior to
installing the harness/tether device.
While conducting safety risk
management, the hazard of the harness/
tether device potentially shutting off the
fuel lever would have been identified
under § 5.53(a) and analyzed under
§ 5.55(a). Based on that analysis, the
company would assess the safety risk
(§ 5.55(b)) and implement appropriate
safety risk controls (§ 5.55(c)). After
developing safety risk controls, the
organization would communicate them
to the appropriate flight crews and
maintenance personnel (§ 5.93) face-toface, via email, or other methods that
the company regularly uses to
communicate with its employees.
In addition, all § 91.147 LOA holders
are authorized to provide the same
service, regardless of their size.
Improving aviation safety for all
passenger-carrying operations
conducted for compensation or hire
would require all § 91.147 LOA holders
to meet part 5 requirements for SMS, so
long as the implementation of those
requirements remains scalable to the
size and complexity of the organization.
(For more information regarding
scalability, please refer to Section V.F.).
As the requirements are scalable, so too
will be compliance costs.47 And, as
evidenced by the accident discussed,
there are safety benefits to be achieved
from implementation of SMS even
among these smaller operators.
The FAA is aware that there are
§ 91.147 LOA holders with low flight
volume, as well as 135 operators who
use only one pilot-in-command in their
operations.48 The FAA seeks supporting
information and data regarding whether
this applicability should be limited to a
certain subset of § 91.147 LOA holders
and part 135 operators, and if so, how?
3. Part 21 Certificate Holders
The FAA is proposing to require
holders of both a TC and a PC issued for
the same product under part 21 to
develop and implement an SMS that
complies with the part 5 requirements.
Section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA requires the
FAA to initiate a rulemaking proceeding
to require that, ‘‘manufacturers that hold
both a type certificate and a production
certificate issued pursuant to section
47 For example, in Section VII.B, Regulatory
Flexibility Act, the FAA finds that the annual costs
as a percentage of receipts for smaller operators
with 1 to 9 aircraft is about 0.1% to 0.4% compared
to those with a larger number of aircraft between
100 to 500 is about 0.2% to 0.3%.
48 There are some § 91.147 LOA holders that
conduct infrequent air tours even though that is not
their primary business (e.g., flight schools, aerial
applicators, or electronic news gathering, etc.).
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44704 of title 49, United States Code,
where the United States is the State of
Design and State of Manufacture, have
in place an SMS that is consistent with
the standards and recommended
practices established by ICAO.’’ As
discussed in Section IV.E., Annex 19
requires ICAO member States to
mandate SMS for the management of
safety risk in design and production of
aviation products. To meet the statutory
requirement and align U.S. aviation
design and manufacturing organizations
with safety management practices
followed by other international
organizations complying with Annex
19, the FAA proposes to require holders
of both a TC and a PC issued for the
same product under part 21 to develop
and implement an SMS that complies
with the part 5 requirements.
Additionally, the FAA proposes to
apply part 5 to: (1) persons who hold or
are licensees of a TC and are seeking a
PC for that same product, and (2)
persons who hold a PC for a product for
which the person is a licensee of the TC.
This approach ensures that there are no
gaps in SMS applicability for part 21
certificate holders because TC licensees
have the same privileges as TC holders
under § 21.45 and the same reporting
requirements as TC holders under § 21.3
for failures, malfunctions, and defects.
Therefore, in the context of an SMS, the
FAA considers a licensee of a TC to be
equivalent to a holder of a TC and
should be required to comply with the
requirements of this proposed rule.
Through ACSAA, Congress intended
for SMS requirements to apply to
entities that design and manufacture
products. The FAA further recognizes
that critical decisions are made during
design and development that impact the
safety of aviation products.
Consequently, companies that design a
product and allow other companies to
produce that product should be held to
the same regulatory requirements as a
person holding both the TC and a PC for
the same product. Upon evaluating
section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA, the FAA
determined that the implementing
regulations combined with the
regulatory framework of part 21 could
enable certain persons to avoid the
proposed requirements by licensing
their TC to another person to obtain a
PC.49 To address this gap, the FAA
49 Under §§ 21.47(a) and 21.55, a person who
holds a TC for a product may enter into a written
licensing agreement to allow another person to use
that TC to obtain a PC. As a result, the person
obtaining the PC would be allowed to use the TC
holder’s design approval to manufacture the
product. Therefore, some business relationships
result in one person holding the TC and a different
person holding the PC for the same product.
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proposes to apply part 5 to TC holders
who license their TC to other persons in
accordance with §§ 21.47 and 21.55.
The FAA notes that there may be
persons who manufacture products
under a TC in accordance with part 21
Subpart F. Section 21.123(g) requires
these persons to obtain a PC within 6
months after the date of issuance of the
TC. Therefore, these persons would be
required to comply with the proposed
rule because they have applied for a PC.
The FAA also notes that there may be
persons who hold a PC for a
supplemental type certificate. A
supplemental type certificate is a design
approval for a modification to a product.
A person who holds a PC for a
supplemental type certificate may
produce articles used to modify the
product but cannot produce a complete
product. Under the proposed rule, part
5 would not apply to either a
supplemental type certificate holder or
a PC holder for a supplemental type
certificate because these design and
production approvals are for
modifications to a product and not for
complete products. Similarly, there are
persons who may hold a TC and a PC
that is designated for the production of
parts or articles only. The proposed rule
would not apply because the PC is only
for the production of a part or an article
and not for the same product.
The FAA considered applying part 5
to certain persons holding other design
and production approvals such as
technical standard order authorizations,
parts manufacturer approvals, and
supplemental type certificates, an
approach that would be consistent with
the Part 21 SMS ARC recommendation.
Although there may be safety benefits to
applying SMS to this larger population,
the FAA could not substantiate these
benefits. The FAA invites comments as
to whether part 5 should apply to all
holders of TCs, PCs, supplemental type
certificates, technical standard order
authorizations, or parts manufacturer
approvals. The FAA requests that
comments specify whether any
exceptions should be made in the event
that the FAA extends part 5 to these
design and production approval holders
and what those exceptions should
entail. The FAA further requests
information and data related to the
safety benefits or impact of applying
part 5 to additional design and
production approval holders beyond the
applicability in this proposed rule.
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B. General Requirements and
Definitions
1. Definitions
The FAA is proposing to move the
definitions in part 5 from current § 5.5
to proposed § 5.3 and to amend the
definitions of ‘‘hazard’’ and ‘‘safety
policy.’’ Currently, the definition of
‘‘hazard’’ in part 5 is ‘‘a condition that
could foreseeably cause or contribute to
an aircraft accident as defined in 49 CFR
830.2.’’ In Annex 19, ICAO defines
‘‘hazard’’ as ‘‘a condition or an object
with the potential to cause or contribute
to an aircraft incident or accident.’’ 50
The FAA is proposing to amend the
definition of the term ‘‘hazard’’ to ‘‘a
condition or an object with the potential
to cause or contribute to an incident or
aircraft accident, as defined in 49 CFR
830.2,’’ to further align with the
internationally-recognized definition
published by ICAO. Although the FAA
previously did not include incidents in
the definition of hazard,51 the FAA now
considers that the definition of hazard
should include anything that affects or
could affect the safety of aviation
operations, not just those conditions or
objects that could result in serious
injury, death, or substantial damage.
This is because many of the same
circumstances that result in an incident
could just as easily result in an accident.
As discussed in Section III, Tinsley,
Dillon, Madsen studied near accidents
in dozens of companies across
industries and in laboratory
simulations. They determined that
multiple near accidents preceded and
foreshadowed every disaster and
business crisis they studied, and that
most near accidents were ignored. The
authors found that ‘‘surfacing near
misses and correcting root causes is one
[of] the soundest investments that
organizations can make.’’ 52 Therefore,
the FAA is proposing to add to the
definition of hazard, the term
‘‘incident’’ as defined in 49 CFR 830.2.
The FAA believes that this proposed
change would improve both
international alignment and the
identification of hazards. 49 CFR 830.2
defines ‘‘incident’’ as an occurrence
other than an accident, associated with
the operation of an aircraft, which
affects or could affect the safety of
operations. The FAA does not define a
50 International Civil Aviation Organization,
Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Safety Management, Second Edition, pp.
1–2. July 2016.
51 80 FR 1308.
52 Tinsley, Catherine H., Robin L. Dillon, and
Peter M. Madsen. How to Avoid Catastrophe.
Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2011/04/
how-to-avoid-catastrophe. 2011.
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threshold or de minimis standard for
what could affect aviation safety. The
FAA believes that organizations are in
the best position to determine what
occurrences would have the ability to
impact the safety of their products or
services, and as a part of developing
their SMS they may define thresholds
for what might entail a reportable
incident that could affect aviation
safety.53 They are also in the best
position to determine the processes and
tools they can use to communicate this
information to their employees. Because
safety risk management and safety
assurance are ongoing and iterative
processes, the organization will
continually improve its ability to
identify, communicate, and mitigate
hazards, preventing them from resulting
in incidents or accidents.
In addition, the FAA proposes two
other modifications to the definition of
‘‘hazard’’ to more closely align with the
ICAO definition: (1) while objects are a
subset of the term ‘‘condition,’’ the FAA
is proposing to add the term ‘‘object,’’
and (2) the FAA is proposing to change
‘‘foreseeably’’ to ‘‘the potential to.’’
These changes would align the
definition more closely with the ICAO
definition of ‘‘hazard’’.
In addition, the FAA proposes to
amend the definition of safety policy to
change ‘‘certificate holder’’ to ‘‘person.’’
This proposed change would make the
definition consistent with the revised
applicability proposed by this rule,
which includes persons who are not
certificate holders (e.g., LOA holders).
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2. Requirement To Develop and
Implement SMS
As discussed previously, the FAA is
proposing to move the General
Requirements for SMS currently
contained in § 5.3 to proposed § 5.5. For
clarity, the FAA would reorganize
proposed § 5.5 into three subparagraphs:
(1) general requirements for the
components of an SMS, (2) a new
proposed requirement for a system
description, and (3) the requirement to
maintain an SMS in accordance with
part 5. Additionally, the FAA is
proposing to remove certain provisions
from current § 5.3 as unnecessary.
The FAA proposes to add a
requirement for all persons subject to
part 5 to develop a system description.
A system description is a summary of
aviation-related processes and activities
and a description of interfacing persons
that contribute to the safety of the
53 For additional discussion on hazard
information sharing, please see section V.C.4.b.
(Safety Promotion (Subpart E), Proposed
amendments to subpart E).
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aviation-related products and services
provided. The FAA considers that
organizations that receive the aviationrelated products and services could
contribute to the safety of those
products and services and would,
therefore, be identified among the
interfacing persons.
A system description is important
because organizations are often made up
of a complex network of interactions
involving different internal departments
that also interface with external
organizations that contribute to the safe
operation of the organization. For an
organization to have an effective SMS,
it must fully understand its aviationrelated business operations and
activities that impact the management of
aviation safety. Without that
understanding, the SMS is unlikely to
be clearly defined, adequately applied,
or effectively executed. The use of an
organization system description would
also enable the organization to have a
clear picture of its many interactions.
Although the focus of this regulation
is on aviation, some organizations might
also extend their SMS to their nonaviation related activities, such as
security and occupational safety and
health issues. If an organization elects to
do so, the FAA would only conduct
oversight of the SMS related to its
aviation functions. The FAA is
proposing to limit the application of
SMS only to the aviation-related
activities conducted by the organization
under 14 CFR.
The FAA also proposes to add a
provision in § 5.5(c) to make clear that
the SMS requirements in part 5 are
continuing requirements. For example,
the requirements of part 5 do not cease
to apply the moment a person develops
and implements an SMS. Rather, a
person must also maintain SMS in
accordance with part 5. The new
provision in proposed § 5.5(c) is not
intended to impose a new requirement
on the regulated community; it is
intended only to clarify the existing
requirements.
Furthermore, to remove unnecessary
rule text, the FAA proposes to remove
the provisions that are currently
contained in § 5.3(b) and (c). Section
5.3(b), which requires the SMS to be
maintained in accordance with the
recordkeeping requirements of Subpart
F of part 5, is unnecessary because the
recordkeeping requirements of Subpart
F apply irrespective of this provision.
Additionally, § 5.3(c), which requires
compliance with the relevant regulatory
requirements of 14 CFR, is unnecessary
because persons must comply with
applicable regulatory requirements in 14
CFR irrespective of whether the FAA
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expressly requires compliance in
§ 5.3(c).
The FAA also proposes to remove two
requirements from current § 5.3(a). First,
the FAA proposes to remove the
requirement for the SMS to be
submitted to the Administrator for
acceptance. The proposal to expand the
applicability of part 5 has resulted in
the FAA proposing new regulations to
address the additional entities that
would be covered by part 5, namely
§§ 5.7, 5.9, 5.11, 5.13, and 5.15. These
proposed regulations would set forth the
requirements for each regulated entity,
including which documents the entity
must submit to the Administrator for
acceptance or approval. Second, the
FAA proposes to remove the
requirement for an SMS to be
appropriate to the size, scope, and
complexity of the organization’s
operation. The FAA has determined that
this provision is unnecessary because
the FAA’s SMS requirements are
performance-based and scalable. As
such, persons that are required to
develop an SMS under part 5 may scale
their SMS to the size and complexity of
their organizations. The FAA does not
need to expressly require scalability in
the regulations when the performancebased requirements are designed for that
purpose.
C. Components of Safety Management
Systems
An SMS is composed of four major
components: (1) safety policy, (2) safety
risk management, (3) safety assurance,
and (4) safety promotion. Additionally,
an SMS requires documentation and
recordkeeping. Currently, part 5
contains a subpart for each major
component and a subpart for
documentation and recordkeeping. The
proposed rule would retain these
subparts but includes proposed
amendments to each one.
1. Safety Policy (Subpart B)
Safety policy is the foundation for an
SMS and must be documented and
communicated throughout the
organization. All organizations must
define policies, processes, procedures,
and organizational structures to
accomplish their safety objectives and
goals. A documented safety policy
ensures that all employees of the
organization are aware of management’s
commitment to achieving the
organization’s safety objectives and are
aware of their own role in meeting the
safety objectives.
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a. Summary of Current Requirements in
Subpart B
Subpart B of part 5 sets forth the
requirements for the organization’s
safety policy. The safety policy
component of SMS includes safety
policy documentation, identification
accountability and authority in regard to
safety, designation and responsibilities
of safety management personnel, and
emergency response planning. Section
5.21 currently requires a documented
safety policy that: (1) establishes the
organization’s safety objectives, (2)
includes a commitment to fulfill those
safety objectives, (3) contains a
statement concerning the necessary
resources for implementation of the
SMS, (4) contains a safety reporting
policy, (5) defines unacceptable
behavior and conditions for disciplinary
action, and (6) establishes an emergency
response plan for transitioning from
normal to emergency operations.
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b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart B
The FAA is proposing to add a
requirement to § 5.21(a) that would
require the safety policy to include a
code of ethics that applies to all
employees, including management
personnel and officers. The code of
ethics would clarify that safety is the
organization’s highest priority. This
proposed requirement responds to
section 102(f) of ACSAA, which
mandates that ‘‘the regulations issued
under subsection (a) shall require a
safety management system to include
establishment of a code of ethics
applicable to all appropriate employees
of a certificate holder, including officers
(as determined by the FAA), which
confirms that safety is the organization’s
highest priority.’’ The FAA agrees that
a code of ethics is beneficial to overall
safety; therefore, this proposal would
fulfill that legislative mandate and
extend the requirement to all persons
required to have an SMS.
The FAA acknowledges that section
102(f) of ACSAA only requires the FAA
to apply the code of ethics requirement
to certain part 21 certificate holders.
However, to the greatest extent possible,
the FAA seeks consistency in the SMS
requirements. Furthermore, the FAA
believes having a code of ethics,
applicable to all employees of the
organization, would influence the safety
culture of the organization. If employees
see their management engaged with
safety as the highest priority, then that
same safety attitude would likely
prevail throughout the entire
organization. Therefore, all persons
required to have an SMS would benefit
from having a code of ethics that
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confirms that safety is the organization’s
highest priority. For that reason, the
FAA is proposing to apply this
requirement to all persons who would
be required to have a part 5-compliant
SMS.
Additionally, the FAA proposes
minor amendments to subpart B (§§ 5.21
through 5.27) to reflect the new
applicability requirements of the
proposed rule. Currently, these
regulations use the term ‘‘certificate
holder’’ because part 5 applies to part
119 certificate holders authorized to
conduct operations under part 121. The
FAA proposes to remove all references
to ‘‘certificate holder.’’ Instead, the
proposed rule refers to ‘‘person’’ to
reflect the new applicability set forth in
proposed § 5.1. Additionally, the FAA
proposes to amend the current
requirements of § 5.25 that refer only to
‘‘certificate(s)’’ by adding a reference to
‘‘Letter(s) of Authorization.’’ This would
ensure that the requirements of § 5.25
pertaining to the accountable executive
apply to § 91.147 LOA holders.
2. Safety Risk Management (Subpart C)
Another core component of an SMS is
safety risk management. A
comprehensive SMS using safety risk
management includes identifying
hazards, assessing risk, and developing
risk controls to reduce or eliminate risk
associated with those hazards. Safety
risk management allows an organization
to focus on the areas of greatest risk
from a safety perspective, taking into
account system complexity and scope of
the operations, and allows the
organization to implement appropriate
risk controls.
Organizations must apply safety risk
management when implementing new
or revising existing systems, developing
operational procedures, and to address
hazards or ineffective controls identified
through safety assurance processes. For
example, an organization would initiate
safety risk management after learning
that certain de-icing operations are not
effective and use safety risk
management to analyze the de-icing
operations.54 Safety risk management
includes the following: (1) system
analysis, (2) identifying hazards
associated with the system, (3)
analyzing the risk associated with the
hazards, (4) assessing risk associated
with the hazards to determine
acceptable safety risk, and (5)
controlling the risk of identified hazards
when necessary.
The system analysis serves as the
initial source for hazard identification
when new systems are designed, when
systems are revised, and when new
operational procedures are developed.
The system analysis also serves as a
basis for describing and organizing
information for risk analysis when
potential hazards or ineffective risk
controls are discovered in the safety
assurance process. The system analysis
processes ensure that information
regarding the function and purpose of
the system; the system’s operating
environment; outline of the system’s
processes and procedures; and the
personnel, equipment, and facilities that
the system requires for operation are
analyzed so that hazards may be
appropriately identified.
Next, an organization must use
established processes to identify
hazards within the context of the system
analysis. Any hazards that are identified
must be analyzed to the extent
necessary to determine possible
outcomes associated with each hazard.
The organization must then analyze
the outcomes to determine the severity
and likelihood (i.e., risk) associated
with the outcomes.55 Subsequently, the
organization must assess the safety risk,
which requires the certificate holder to
determine whether the safety risk is
acceptable or mitigation is required.
Finally, the organization would
develop and implement risk controls
where necessary. Risk controls may
mitigate the outcomes by reducing the
likelihood or severity of the outcome or
eliminating hazards by design. After
these controls are developed, but before
being implemented, the organization
must assess whether the controls are
likely to be effective and would not
introduce any new hazards. When the
54 There are existing regulations that prohibit a
takeoff when frost, ice, or snow (contamination) is
adhering to the wings, control surfaces, rotors or
propellers of an aircraft and some operations
require a de-icing program [§§ 91.527, 121.629, and
135.227]. However, this example describes how
operators can use SMS to focus on certain de-icing
operations that may not be performing adequately
and use a structured process to correct performance
deficiencies or identify design changes (additional
controls) using the SRM process. Current
regulations prohibit takeoff when certain conditions
are met, but there are no requirements for the
company to look more broadly at the system and
determine if or when there is a systemic issue with
de-icing.
55 As discussed in examples later in the preamble,
this analysis may be either qualitative or
quantitative depending on the size of the
organization, the nature of the safety issue being
addressed, and availability of relevant data, among
other factors. SRM, as with all components of the
SMS, should be scaled to fit the organization. Since
each safety issue is unique and each SMS is
developed to fit the organization, the FAA cannot
make general estimates or judgments regarding the
amount of time or documentation an organization
would need for any given identified hazard.
Consistent with the intent to scale this rule to the
organization and the issue, the FAA would look to
the organization to make that determination on a
case-by-case basis.
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risk controls are assessed and
determined to be acceptable, the
organization would implement them.
Those controls would then be
continuously monitored under the
processes developed under subpart D,
Safety Assurance, to ensure they are
effective.
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a. Summary of Current Requirements in
Subpart C
Subpart C of part 5 currently contains
the safety risk management
requirements for an SMS. Section 5.51
establishes when a certificate holder
would need to apply safety risk
management processes and procedures
to systems to identify the hazards and
assess the risk associated with the
systems. Once a certificate holder
determines that the processes of safety
risk management have been triggered
under § 5.51, it must conduct a system
analysis, as required by § 5.53. Section
5.53 provides information that must be
considered when conducting a system
analysis and identifying hazards.
Currently, when conducting a system
analysis, the following must be
considered: (1) function and purpose of
the system, (2) the system’s operating
environment, (3) an outline of the
system’s processes and procedures, and
(4) the personnel, equipment, and
facilities necessary for operation of the
system. Section 5.55 establishes the
requirements for safety risk assessment
and controls.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart C
The FAA is proposing several changes
to subpart C. First, as in the other
subparts, the FAA is proposing to
amend § 5.51 and § 5.55 by removing
the term ‘‘certificate holder’’ to reflect
the broadened applicability of the
proposed rule. Instead, these sections
will refer to ‘‘any person required to
have an SMS under this subpart.’’
Additionally, the FAA is proposing to
add a new requirement, § 5.53(b)(5),
which would add the interfaces of the
system to the list of items that must be
considered when conducting a system
analysis in accordance with § 5.53.
Interfaces are a point where two or more
operations, systems, subjects, or
organizations connect and interact.
Interfaces can be internal (e.g., between
functional groups in an organization,
between hardware/software components
of the system being analyzed, or
between processes in the system being
analyzed), or they can be external (e.g.,
between organizations, between the
system being analyzed and other
systems, or between a human using the
system and the system itself). The FAA
is proposing to include the interfaces of
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the system in the list of considerations
required when performing the system
analysis in § 5.53 because hazards can
exist with interfacing organizations,
processes, or systems in the way the two
interfacing parts interact with each
other. Understanding the interfaces
while conducting a system analysis is
important because the system analysis
serves as the basis for identifying and
analyzing hazards and their associated
risk. This addition would further
improve the ability of part 121 operators
to analyze risk. As the aviation system
becomes more complex, dynamic, and
integrated, understanding these
interfaces can assist in the identification
of related hazards and improve safety
overall. An SMS that looks both inward
and outward is more effective at
identifying hazards, a core function of
any operational SMS. The FAA
emphasizes that under this proposed
requirement interfaces would be
considered only to the extent that they
affect aviation safety. For example, the
interface between a part 21 aircraft
manufacturer’s engineering and payroll
departments would not be considered
when conducting a systems analysis
under § 5.53 because this interface
would not impact the aviation safety of
the aircraft design. Additionally, the use
of fall-arrestors in operator maintenance
facilities to protect individuals working
on aircraft would not be considered
when conducting a system analysis in
§ 5.53 either because the interface is an
occupational safety and health concern
and does not directly affect the quality
of work performed on the aircraft.
3. Safety Assurance (Subpart D)
Safety assurance verifies that the risk
controls put into place under safety risk
management continue to be effective in
managing risk and that the
organization’s safety performance is
meeting or exceeding its safety
objectives. Safety assurance has three
elements: (1) safety performance
monitoring and measurement; (2) safety
performance assessment; and (3)
continuous improvement.
Safety performance monitoring and
measurement requires the development
and maintenance of processes and
systems that monitor operational
processes and collect data on the
performance of the organization. Within
an organization, there are processes to
collect data, such as those to meet
regulatory requirements or voluntary
reporting programs. In addition, there
are external data sources, such as FAA
systems or information from other
organizations. Safety assurance
processes must also include
investigations of accidents and
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incidents. Employee reporting systems
provide another source of information
regarding the performance of the
organization.
The safety performance assessment is
used to assess the organization’s
performance against its safety
objectives. The safety performance
assessment includes verifying the
organization’s compliance with
established safety risk controls. In
addition, the safety performance
assessment identifies changes in
operational environments, potential
new hazards, and ineffective controls. If
the assessment reveals new hazards or
ineffective controls, the organization
must initiate safety risk management
processes. The accountable executive
designated in accordance with § 5.25
must review information from the safety
performance assessment on a regular
basis.
Finally, safety assurance requires
continuous improvement. The analysis
and assessment functions of safety
assurance are essential in alerting the
organization to significant changes in
the operating environment, possibly
indicating a need for system change to
maintain effective risk controls. As a
result, an organization with an SMS
must take steps to correct any safety
performance deficiencies identified in
the assessments.
a. Summary of Current Requirements in
Subpart D
Safety assurance requirements for an
SMS are established in subpart D of part
5. Section 5.71 covers safety
performance monitoring and
measurement, § 5.73 covers safety
performance assessment, and § 5.75
covers requirements for continuous
improvement. Pursuant to § 5.71(a), a
person must develop and maintain
processes and systems to acquire data
with respect to its operations, products,
and services to monitor the safety
performance of the organization. Section
5.71(a) prescribes specific data that
must be monitored, audited, evaluated,
and investigated. Among these
requirements, § 5.71(a)(7) requires the
processes and systems to include a
confidential employee reporting system
in which employees can report hazards,
issues, occurrences, and incidents, as
well as a means to propose solutions
and safety improvements. Once an
organization with an SMS collects data
through its safety monitoring and
measurement processes, it must use the
processes developed under § 5.71(b) to
analyze the data.
Specifically, § 5.73 requires the
organization to conduct assessments of
its safety performance against its safety
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objectives contained in its safety policy,
which include reviews by the
accountable executive to: (1) ensure
compliance with safety risk controls, (2)
evaluate the performance of the SMS,
(3) evaluate the effectiveness of safety
risk controls, (4) identify changes in the
environment that may introduce new
hazards, and (5) identify new hazards.
This analysis is used to transform raw
data into usable information that can
support informed decision-making
related to safety.
Finally, § 5.75 requires the
organization to establish and implement
processes to correct any safety
performance deficiencies that are
identified in the safety performance
assessment, which ensures continuous
improvement of the organization’s
safety performance.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart D
The FAA is proposing to remove the
word ‘‘operations’’ from § 5.71(a) to
clarify the requirement and avoid
confusion with the term ‘‘operator.’’ In
addition, the FAA is proposing to
amend §§ 5.71–5.75 by replacing
‘‘certificate holder’’ with ‘‘person’’ or ‘‘a
person required to have an SMS under
this subpart’’ to reflect the proposed
broadened applicability of the rule.
The FAA is also proposing to add the
text, ‘‘without concern of reprisal for
reporting’’ to the confidential employee
reporting system requirement in current
§ 5.71(a)(7) to meet section 102(e) of
ACSAA which mandates that the
proposed regulation:
[R]equire a safety management system
to include a confidential employee
reporting system through which
employees can report hazards, issues,
concerns, occurrences, and incidents. A
reporting system under this subsection
shall include provisions for reporting,
without concern for reprisal for
reporting, of such items by employees in
a manner consistent with confidential
employee reporting systems
administered by the Administrator.
Further, section 102 mandates that
regulations required by the statute shall
also require holders of both a TC and a
PC to submit a summary of confidential
employee reports received in
accordance with section 102 to the
Administrator at least twice per year.
Therefore, the FAA is proposing to add
a new § 5.71(c), which would require
holders of both a TC and a PC for the
same product to submit a summary of
the confidential employee reports
received under § 5.71(a)(7) to the FAA
once every six months.
The FAA recognizes that its proposed
rule language, which would require
holders of both a TC and a PC for the
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same product to submit a summary of
the confidential employee reports
received under § 5.71(a)(7) to the FAA
once every 6 months, slightly differs
from the statutory language. Section
102(e) of ACSAA requires the summary
of reports to be submitted at least ‘‘twice
a year.’’ As the statute does not require
a particular interval for submission of
the ‘‘twice a year’’ reports, the FAA
finds it reasonable to require the reports
every six months as it would preclude
a person from submitting the same
summary of reports twice in the same
month and provide the FAA with an
opportunity to assess reports received
throughout the year. Accordingly, the
FAA proposes to require the submission
of these reports once every 6 months.
Although the ACSAA mandate was
specific to part 21 certificate holders
with both a TC and a PC, employees of
all persons required to comply with part
5 should be protected from reprisal if
they report hazards, issues, concerns,
occurrences, or incidents. Further, the
intent of the confidential system would
be to provide some protection to
employees, so they are able to report
issues without concern of reprisal.
Therefore, the FAA is proposing to
apply the revision to the employee
reporting system requirements in
§ 5.71(a)(7) to all persons required to
comply with part 5. The FAA notes that
this protection extends to the reporting
of hazards, issues, concerns,
occurrences, or incidents. If the
individual reporting is responsible for
creation of the hazard due to intentional
actions or gross negligence, this
provision would not protect them from
employment actions based on the
underlying offense.
However, the FAA is proposing in
§ 5.71(c) to require only holders of both
a TC and a PC for the same product to
submit a summary of the confidential
employee reports to the FAA. This
proposed requirement is targeted at part
21 certificate holders as this additional
agency oversight is consistent with
ACSAA. Summaries of confidential
employee reports submitted by
certificate holders with both a TC and
a PC are protected from public
disclosure by 49 U.S.C. 44735(a)(2), if
the summaries are requested pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
The FAA is not proposing to extend this
requirement to all persons required to
have an SMS because the information
would not be protected under 49 U.S.C.
44735(a)(2) for persons that are not
covered by the ACSAA requirement.
4. Safety Promotion (Subpart E)
Safety promotion requires
communication to promote safety
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practices. Safety promotion also
requires that employees within an
organization attain and maintain the
competencies necessary to perform the
duties relevant to the operation and
performance of the SMS. Training to
maintain the SMS may vary depending
upon the position and responsibilities of
the employee and may range from
formal classroom training to simple
notices to employees. In addition to
training, an organization ensures that
employees are aware of the SMS
policies, processes, and tools that are
relevant to their responsibilities.
a. Summary of Current Requirements in
Subpart E
The requirements for safety
promotion are established in subpart E
of part 5. Section 5.91 requires training
for the employees of the organization to
ensure they attain and maintain the
competencies necessary to perform their
duties relevant to the operation and
performance of the SMS. Section 5.93
requires the organization to develop and
maintain a means of communicating
safety information that: (1) ensures
employees are aware of the SMS
policies, processes, and tools that are
relevant to their responsibilities; (2)
conveys hazard information relevant to
the employee’s responsibilities; (3)
explains why safety actions have been
taken; and (4) explains why safety
procedures are introduced or changed.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart E
The FAA is proposing two
amendments to the safety promotion
requirements of subpart E. First, as in
the other subparts, § 5.91 and § 5.93
would be amended to reflect the broader
applicability of proposed part 5 by
replacing ‘‘certificate holder’’ with ‘‘any
person required to have an SMS under
this part.’’ Second, the FAA proposes to
add new § 5.94 to require notification of
hazards to interfacing persons, and
require any person subject to part 5 to
develop and maintain procedures for
reporting hazard information to
interfacing persons and for receiving
hazard information from other parties.
In some circumstances, a hazard
might be identified by a person who is
not in a position to address the hazard
or there may be another person who
could implement a more effective
mitigation. For example, there may be a
hazard identified by an aircraft operator
that needs to be addressed by an aircraft
manufacturer to mitigate the hazard for
other operators. Similarly, an aircraft
manufacturer may identify a hazard for
which crew procedures or training are
an appropriate mitigation to be taken by
an operator. In § 5.94, the FAA proposes
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that persons required to have an SMS
under part 5 must share information
regarding identified hazards with
interfacing persons identified in their
system description under proposed § 5.5
who, to the best of their knowledge,
could address the hazard or mitigate the
risk. Interfacing persons may be other
private entities or a government entity,
including the FAA. For example, a
person required to have an SMS might
determine that, to the best of their
knowledge, the FAA’s Air Traffic
Organization is the interfacing person
who would be in the best position to
address the hazard. The number of
business connections that would fall
within the scope of an ‘‘interfacing
person’’ is not limitless, however. An
interfacing person would be an entity
providing a good or service connected to
aviation safety. A payroll accounting
firm, for example, would not fall within
this requirement. Within that boundary,
an organization’s total number of
interfacing persons would likely be
related to the size and complexity of the
operation. The more external entities an
organization relies on for aviation safety
purposes, the greater the number of
interfacing persons they would have for
the purposes of this rule.
There may be instances in which the
person with an SMS under part 5 is
required to communicate hazard
information to an interfacing person
who is not required to maintain an SMS
under part 5. In this case, there is still
a utility and benefit to safety in
communicating hazard information
even where the receiving party does not
have to comply with part 5 because the
receiving party may still address the
hazard. Further, while persons are only
required to share hazard information to
relevant interfacing entities who, to the
best of their knowledge, could address
the hazard, the proposed requirements
do not preclude anyone from sharing
additional information with additional
entities if they so choose.
The number of interfaces an
organization has depends on the type of
goods or services the organization
provides. FAA believes companies
already know who their interfaces are,
since the service providers, suppliers,
and customers are those with whom
they have an ongoing business
relationship.
In accordance with standard business
practices, these organizations already
have records of these relationships for
purchasing, payment, and shipment
purposes. Therefore, the FAA does not
believe it would be burdensome to
document these existing interfaces and
share information about hazards, when
appropriate, leveraging existing contacts
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and channels of communication. The
FAA anticipates that the organization
would update and revise contact
information for these interfaces as a
normal part of day-to-day business, as
they would even in the absence of this
proposed rule.
For example, an aircraft manufacturer
may identify that the interfacing persons
in their system description include
various suppliers. The manufacturer has
a business relationship with these
interfaces. As with most business
relationships, these relationships
include a way to communicate hazards
with all of these interfaces including
their suppliers, repair stations, and
customers. The manufacturer might
issue a service bulletin or an operator
information letter. It could also
communicate a hazard directly with a
supplier or through its supplier
management/purchasing organization.
The purpose of this proposed
requirement is to ensure that relevant
information is shared with the person in
the best position to address the hazard
or mitigate the associated risk prior to
an incident or accident occurring. This
sharing would enable a network of
organizations that would work
collaboratively and be more effective at
identifying hazards and mitigating risk
than an individual organization working
in isolation.56
The following examples illustrate the
network effect the FAA believes would
be created by the proposed requirement
to share hazard information.
Example 1: A part 121 operator
receives an employee report from a pilot
stating that the aircraft flight
management system deviated from the
expected landing approach at a
particular airport. The flight crew
notices the deviation and corrects the
flight path for a safe landing. The
operator’s management classifies this
employee report as a hazard because the
airport is surrounded by high elevation
terrain. Although this incident occurred
during daytime and in visual
meteorological conditions, management
determines that if the same issue
occurred during a night landing or in
instrument meteorological conditions,
the aircraft could be turned toward
terrain without detection by the flight
crew, potentially resulting in an
accident.
56 The FAA is not aware of other CAAs currently
requiring this type of collaborative approach.
However, industry has recognized the value of this
approach and it is discussed in the international
standard: SM–0001_Issue B—Implementing a Safety
Management System in Design, Manufacturing and
Maintenance Organizations, which was developed
by industry.
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The operator’s management mitigates
the risk through the safety risk
management process by publishing an
internal notice to all its flight crews
warning of the issue and requesting
them to avoid using that particular
approach when flying into the particular
airport. Additionally, the operator
determines that the best person to
mitigate the risk is outside its
organization and uses its system
description to identify the appropriate
interfacing person with whom the
information regarding this hazard
should be shared. Per proposed § 5.94,
the operator sends a hazard report to the
aircraft manufacturer. The aircraft
manufacturer, who is a TC and PC
holder, receives the hazard report and
begins an investigation of the issue. The
aircraft manufacturer also reports the
issue per proposed § 5.94 to the flight
management system supplier and
navigation database supplier, which,
although not required to have an SMS,
are interfacing persons identified in the
aircraft manufacturer’s system
description.
The aircraft manufacturer initiates
safety risk management on the issue.
Through computer simulation, the
aircraft manufacturer duplicates the
incident reported by the part 121
operator.57 The aircraft manufacturer
safety risk management team develops
and completes two actions: one short
term to mitigate the risk, and one long
term to eliminate the hazard. For the
short-term mitigation, the flight
management system database is updated
to remove the affected approach. This
database update occurs monthly, so all
airlines flying with the flight
management system automatically
receive the update. For the long-term
mitigation, the flight management
system software is updated to correct
the flight management system deviation.
The aircraft manufacturer issues a
service bulletin to all airlines
recommending incorporation of the
software update. Following the software
update incorporation, the affected
approach is added back into the
navigation database and all airlines
automatically receive it at the next
monthly update.
This example illustrates how an
employee report pursuant to § 5.71(a)(7)
and communication between
57 It is common for an Original Equipment
Manufacturer to replicate an incident after receiving
a report. Typically, the manufacturer would reach
out to the reporting entity (in this example, the
airline operator) to gather as much information as
available about the incident. While there are risks
with information transfer delays between the
interfacing entity and the reporting entity, FAA
believes these will be improved with the proposed
rule requiring hazard information sharing.
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organizations would assist in quickly
mitigating and later eliminating a
hazard that could result in an accident
if not addressed. The pilot reported the
incident, the airline performed the
organization’s safety risk management
process, and also reported the hazard to
the aircraft manufacturer pursuant to
§ 5.94. The aircraft manufacturer
reported the hazard to the flight
management system supplier pursuant
to § 5.94 and then performed safety risk
management to initially mitigate the risk
and ultimately eliminate the hazard.
Without applying this new
requirement, under the current process,
the part 121 operator would report the
incident to FAA flight standards under
§ 121.703(c). Flight standards would
evaluate the incident and, if determined
to be an airworthiness concern, would
report it to the appropriate Aircraft
Certification Office. The Aircraft
Certification Office would then
complete a risk analysis per FAA Order
8110.107. If the risk assessment was
determined to be unacceptable, the
aircraft certification office would work
the aircraft Original Equipment
Manufacturer to develop corrective
action. The proposed rule requires
direct hazard communication between
the operator and Original Equipment
Manufacturer which will facilitate more
timely resolution of the incident.
Example 2: Three pilots, who work
for a part 135 operator, report through
the operator’s employee reporting
system that markings at the operator’s
home base airport at a newly paved
intersection with a runway are
confusing and nearly resulted in a
runway incursion. The operator
determines the reports are valid and
notifies the airport authority of the
pilots’ observations in accordance with
proposed § 5.94. The airport then could
close that taxiway intersection and remark the pavement.
Example 3: A § 91.147 LOA holder
who conducts air tours in a Stearman
Biplane procures a radial engine from a
repair station that specializes in
overhauling radial engines. The rebuilt
engine is installed on the aircraft,
ground tested, and then flown for a 3hour maintenance test flight to ensure
the engine is operating correctly. During
the test flight, the engine seems to stop
producing power altogether when the
throttle is reduced to idle. On final
approach, the engine stops, and though
the aircraft lands without incident, the
engine cannot be restarted because the
idle jet in the carburetor vibrated out of
the tapped fitting. The LOA holder and
operator of the Stearman report the
issue to the part 145 repair station in
accordance with proposed § 5.94. While
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the repair station is not required to have
an SMS, they would have a duty to
conduct an investigation under
§ 145.221.58 The repair station
investigates its stock of carburetor jets
and finds five additional jets in a single
lot that were improperly threaded. The
repair station can then isolate the
nonconforming lot of jets and rebuild
the faulty carburetor. This example
illustrates that there is still benefit to
sharing hazard information with entities
that would not be required to have an
SMS.
Finally, the FAA acknowledges that
there may be some concern regarding
sharing information outside an
organization. The FAA does not expect
that sharing hazard information would
require the sharing of proprietary
information; it would only require the
organization to adequately describe the
hazard. The FAA expects that in
instances where the hazard cannot be
adequately described without the use of
proprietary information, the
organization itself would likely be in the
best position to address that hazard, and
therefore, information sharing would
not be necessary. The FAA seeks
comment on whether organizations can
share information about hazards
without disclosing proprietary
information. The FAA also seeks
comment on whether the holder of the
proprietary information would be in the
best position to address the hazard.
Please provide examples of any
situations in which the holder of
proprietary information would not be
able to share information about a hazard
without disclosing that proprietary
information.
5. SMS Documentation and
Recordkeeping (Subpart F)
Documentation of SMS processes,
procedures, and outputs is necessary for
persons to conduct a meaningful
analysis under safety risk management,
to review safety assurance activities,
and for the FAA to review for
compliance during inspections.
Documentation and recordkeeping also
preserve information that can be used to
make future safety-related decisions.
a. Summary of Current Requirements in
Subpart F
The documentation and
recordkeeping requirements for SMS
holders are currently contained in
58 Under this existing requirement, the repair
station must submit a Service Difficulty Report. In
the Service Difficulty Report, the repair station
must include the ‘‘apparent cause of the failure,
malfunction, or defect,’’ meaning that the repair
station would have to conduct an investigation to
determine the apparent cause.
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subpart F of part 5. As currently
described in § 5.95, the certificate
holder is required to document its safety
policy and SMS processes and
procedures. Organizations with an SMS
under part 5 are required to document
their safety policy and SMS processes
and procedures.
As described in § 5.97, the certificate
holder currently must maintain records
of the outputs (e.g., risk assessments and
implemented risk controls) of safety risk
management and safety assurance
processes. Outputs of safety risk
management processes must be retained
for as long as they remain relevant to the
operation. Records can be kept either
electronically or in paper format. In
addition, the certificate holder is
required to retain outputs of safety
assurance processes for a minimum of
five years, SMS training records for as
long as the individual is employed by
the person, and communication records
for a minimum of 24 months.
Communication records required to be
retained would be limited to any
communications related to SMS-related
policies, processes and tools, hazard
information, safety actions taken, and
why safety procedures were introduced
or changed. The timelines associated
with the retention of these documents
ensure that they are kept for a time
period that provides the certificate
holder with sufficient historical data to
assure compliance and to conduct the
required analyses and assessments. A
certificate holder may retain its
documents for longer time periods if
needed.
The documentation and records
keeping requirements, like the rest of
part 5, are designed to be scalable and
flexible to accommodate a wide variety
of business models and sizes. The
specific information to be documented,
and the means through which it is
documented and retained, may vary
depending on the scope and complexity
of the systems. Organizations are
currently required to maintain a myriad
of business records. We anticipate that
they will leverage existing systems or
methods of records retention to meet
these new requirements. The flexibility
in the requirements enable the
organization to use the most efficient
means to fit their operations. For more
information regarding scalability, please
refer to Section V.F.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart F
The FAA is proposing to amend
§§ 5.95 and 5.97 to change ‘‘certificate
holder’’ to ‘‘any person required to have
an SMS under this part.’’ In addition,
the FAA is proposing to add § 5.95(c) to
require the documentation of the system
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description developed under proposed
§ 5.5(b). The proposed addition is
necessary to ensure that the system
description would be documented.
The FAA is proposing to amend
§ 5.97(d) to require the persons required
to have an SMS to retain records of all
communications that occur under the
hazard reporting requirements of
proposed § 5.94 for a minimum of 24
consecutive calendar months. This
proposed requirement is necessary to
ensure consistency in the records for
communications required under § 5.93
and proposed § 5.94. Maintaining these
records would also enable traceability
between information that is received
from outside entities and actions taken
using safety assurance or safety risk
management processes. These records
would be kept either electronically or in
paper format. The timelines associated
with the retention of these documents
would ensure that they are kept for a
time period that provides the
organization with sufficient historical
data to assist the FAA with oversight.
Nothing in the proposed rule would
preclude a person required to have an
SMS under part 5 from retaining
documents for longer time periods if
they so choose.
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D. Implementation of SMS
1. Requirements for Part 121 Operators
Part 121 operators currently must
comply with the part 5 requirements.
The FAA is proposing to add § 5.7 to
establish certain new requirements and
compliance dates for part 121 operators.
Proposed § 5.7(a) would apply to all
part 121 operators that have an FAAaccepted SMS as of the effective date of
a final rule adopted pursuant to this
rulemaking. The requirements in
proposed § 5.7(a) are necessary to bring
part 121 operators into compliance with
the proposed revisions to part 5. Part
121 operators would be required to
revise their SMS to meet the new
requirements proposed in §§ 5.5(b)
(System Description), 5.21(a)(7) (Safety
Policy Code of Ethics), 5.53(b)(5) (Safety
Risk Management Interfaces), 5.71(a)(7)
(Employee Confidential Reporting
System), 5.94 (Hazard Notification),
5.95(c) (Documentation of System
Description), and 5.97(d) (SMS
Records), discussed in this section.
Because part 121 operators already have
an accepted SMS, the FAA considers
that these new requirements would
require minor adjustments. For
example, current part 121 operators
should be able to develop a system
description with relative ease because
they already have an FAA-accepted
SMS and all the information needed for
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development of the system description.
Also, a statement of compliance is
unnecessary because the FAA has
completed its review of the operator’s
SMS prior to the enactment of this rule.
The changes to this entity’s SMS are
minimal and the FAA can review such
changes in the normal course of its
oversight of the operator.
Because the proposed requirements
may be met with relative ease, the FAA
has determined that 12 months would
provide a sufficient amount of time for
current part 121 operators to implement
any necessary changes based upon the
amendments to part 5 and submit
revisions to their SMS to the FAA for
acceptance.
Under proposed § 5.7(a)(2), part 121
operators would have to submit
revisions to their SMS for FAA
acceptance in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator no later
than 12 months following the effective
date of the rule. The FAA expects that
current part 121 operators would submit
revisions to their SMS through the same
process they currently use for
submission of changes for acceptance by
the FAA.
Proposed § 5.7(b) would apply to any
person applying for authorization to
conduct operations under part 121 of
this chapter after the effective date of
the rule. New certificate holders
authorized to operate under part 121
would have to develop, implement, and
maintain an SMS that complies with the
requirements of part 5 as amended by
this rulemaking. Those seeking to
operate under part 121 would have to
submit the statement of compliance in
a form and manner acceptable to the
Administrator as part of the certification
process. Under this proposal, the FAA
would incorporate review of a person’s
compliance with part 5 requirements
into the certification review process.
The statement of compliance must
describe how part 5 requirements have
been met, and the FAA would review
that statement of compliance during the
certification process to assess the
applicant’s compliance with part 5. The
statement of compliance enables the
FAA to validate the applicant’s
compliance with part 5 prior to issuing
a certificate.
2. Requirements for Part 135 Operators
and Holders of § 91.147 Letters of
Authorization
The FAA is proposing to add new
§ 5.9 to establish requirements and
compliance dates for part 135 operators,
and holders of an LOA issued under
§ 91.147. Proposed § 5.9(a) would
require those certificate or LOA holders
to develop and implement an SMS in
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compliance with part 5 no later than 24
months after the effective date of the
proposed rule. The FAA expects
certificate holders or LOA holders to
submit the statement of compliance for
acceptance by the FAA within 24
months after the effective date of this
proposed rule. Proposed requirements
for statements of compliance are
described further in this section. This
rule would also require these operators
to maintain their SMS in accordance
with part 5.
Proposed § 5.9(b) would affect those
persons applying for a certificate under
part 135 or those applying for an LOA
under § 91.147 who have not yet
received their certificate or LOA prior to
the effective date of this proposed rule.
These persons would be required to
develop and implement an SMS that
meets the requirements of part 5 before
their certificate or LOA could be issued.
They would be required to submit a
statement of compliance in a form and
manner acceptable to the Administrator
during the certification process or LOA
issuance process. These operators
would also be required to maintain their
SMS in accordance with part 5.
Based on lessons learned and the
experience gained from part 121
operators who have previously
implemented SMS, as well as the
voluntary program implementation for
part 135 operators, the FAA proposes
that 24 months is adequate to
implement an SMS and provide a
statement of compliance to the FAA.
This timeframe allows the operator
sufficient time to implement SMS
without unnecessarily delaying the
realization of benefits derived from
SMS.
a. Statements of Compliance for Current
Part 135 Operators and § 91.147 Letter
of Authorization Holders and
Applicants
Under this proposal, part 135
operators, and § 91.147 LOA holders
would be required to develop an SMS
and integrate that SMS into the existing
operations of the certificate or LOA
holder. The certificate or LOA holder
would also be required to submit a
statement of compliance in a form and
manner acceptable to the Administrator
no later than 24 months following the
effective date of this proposed rule.
The statement of compliance notifies
the FAA that the organization has
complied with part 5 and prompts the
FAA to update its oversight tools to
include SMS. Although these statements
of compliance would not be subject to
an approval process, the FAA would
validate the part 135 operators’ and
§ 91.147 LOA holders’ compliance with
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part 5 and the accuracy of their
statements of compliance under existing
oversight processes. Because the
certificate or LOA holder would be
required to integrate the SMS into its
existing operations processes during
implementation, the FAA expects that
existing oversight processes are
sufficient to oversee and validate part 5
compliance. The FAA would review
statements of compliance upon
submission and would validate that the
organization’s SMS meets the part 5
requirements over the course of several
inspections. If, during those inspections,
the FAA finds that the SMS does not
meet the requirements of the proposed
rule, a notification in writing of the
deficiencies would follow.
The proposal would also require
applicants for authority to conduct
operations under part 135 or § 91.147 to
submit a statement of compliance to the
FAA for acceptance during the
certification or LOA application
process, as applicable. The statement of
compliance enables the FAA to validate
the applicant’s compliance with part 5
prior to issuing a certificate or LOA.
b. Statements of Compliance for Existing
Part 121/135 Combination Certificates
For those part 119 certificate holders
with combination certificates
authorizing them to operate under parts
121 and 135 that already have an SMS
in place due to the current part 5
requirements for part 121 operators, the
FAA would review the part 121/135
operator’s revised SMS submission.
Certificate holders authorized to operate
under parts 121 and 135 whose SMS
was previously acceptable to the FAA
for the part 121 portion of their
organizations may choose to expand
their existing SMS processes already in
place to include their part 135
operations. In this case, certificate
holders would submit the changes to
their SMS for acceptance as described
for the existing part 121 certificate
holders in Section V.D.1.
Certificate holders would also be
required to submit a statement of
compliance for the part 135 operations.
The FAA would accept the submitted
statement of compliance and validate
the operator’s compliance with part 5
using existing oversight processes, as
discussed in Section V.D.5. The FAA
expects that documenting the statement
of compliance for the part 135
operations would be comparatively
simple because the operator has already
met SMS requirements for the part 121
operations. Currently, of the seven
existing combined certificates, five have
already implemented SMS that covers
both part 121 and 135 operations.
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3. Requirements for Holders of Both
Type Certificates and Production
Certificates Issued for the Same Product
Under Part 21 and Certain Part 21
Production Certificate Applicants
The FAA proposes to add a new
§ 5.11 to establish certain SMS
requirements and compliance dates for
holders with a TC and a PC for the same
product issued under part 21. The FAA
proposes a person that holds both a TC
and a PC for the same product issued
under part 21 of this chapter on or
before the effective date of the proposed
rule would be required to: (1) develop
an SMS that meets the requirements of
this part; (2) submit an implementation
plan for FAA approval in a form and
manner acceptable to the Administrator
no later than December 27, 2024; (3)
implement the SMS in accordance with
the FAA-approved plan no later than
December 27, 2025; and (4) maintain the
SMS in accordance with this part.
As discussed in Section IV.D., the
proposed requirements are consistent
with section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA, which
requires that the FAA’s rulemaking
require these certificate holders to adopt
an SMS by four years from enactment of
the statute, December 27, 2024.59
Because the implementation plan would
require certificate holders to submit a
description of how they would comply
with the part 5 requirements, including
but not limited to the policies,
processes, and procedures used to meet
those requirements, the FAA considers
the certificate holder to have adopted
the SMS system at the time the
certificate holder files the
implementation plan. By filing the
implementation plan for FAA approval,
the certificate holders commit to
implementing the SMS described in the
implementation plan and any
modification to the SMS required by the
FAA during the implementation plan
approval process.
Under proposed § 5.13, the FAA
proposes a person that holds, is
applying for, or has a pending
application for a PC under part 21 of
this chapter for a product for which the
person holds or is a licensee for a TC,
would be required to: (1) develop an
SMS that meets the requirements of this
part; (2) submit an implementation plan
for FAA approval in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator during
the certification process; (3) implement
the SMS in accordance with the
approved plan no later than one year
from the FAA’s approval of the
implementation plan; and (4) maintain
the SMS in accordance with this part.
59 Section
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Furthermore, under proposed § 5.15,
the FAA is proposing to establish
certain SMS requirements for any
person that holds a TC for a product
who allows another person to use the
TC to manufacture a product under a
PC. However, the requirements
proposed in § 5.15 are consistent with
those proposed in §§ 5.11 and 5.13.
Persons subject to §§ 5.11, 5.13, or
5.15 would not be required to file a
statement of compliance under this
proposal because these organizations
would have to implement their SMS in
accordance with their FAA-approved
implementation plan which is sufficient
for the FAA to verify their compliance
with part 5.
4. Implementation Plans
a. Implementation Plans for Part 21
FAA proposes to add a new § 5.17 to
establish requirements for
implementation plans filed under
proposed §§ 5.11 (PC holders who are
holders or licensees of a TC for the same
product), 5.13 (TC holders or licensees
applying for a PC for the same product),
and 5.15 (TC holders who license their
TC to others to obtain a PC). The
implementation plan would include a
description of how the person intends to
comply with part 5, including, but not
limited to, new or existing policies,
processes, or procedures used to meet
the requirements of part 5. The
description would also demonstrate
how that person would comply with the
requirements of part 5 once the SMS is
implemented and may reference
manuals and other relevant
documentation.
Upon request by the FAA, any person
required to submit an implementation
plan under the proposal would have to
provide the FAA access to the data
necessary to demonstrate that the
person has developed and implemented
an SMS that meets the applicable part
5 requirements. This data could include
the outputs of safety risk management.
For a person that holds both a TC and
a PC for the same product issued under
part 21 of this chapter (§ 5.11), or for
persons that hold a TC that have
licensed their TC to allow another
person to use that TC to obtain a PC
(§ 5.15(a)), on or before the effective date
of the final rule, the person would
submit an implementation plan to the
FAA for approval in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator by
December 27, 2024. Section 102(a)(1) of
ACSAA requires the FAA’s rulemaking
to require holders of both a TC and a PC
to adopt an SMS by December 27, 2024.
The FAA recognizes that ACSAA does
not apply to persons who license their
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TC to allow another person to obtain a
PC. However, the FAA is proposing the
same compliance deadlines for
consistency purposes. The FAA invites
comments about whether the FAA
should extend the compliance timelines
for persons who license their TC to
other persons and, if so, what timelines
the FAA should establish. The FAA
requests that responsive comments
include the commenter’s rationale for
the proposed compliance timelines.
Section 102 of ACSAA also requires
the FAA to: (1) promulgate rules to
require SMS for holders of both a TC
and PC, and (2) approve the certificate
holders’ SMS. By approving the
implementation plans from part 21
certificate holders, the FAA would
review the submission and would
determine whether the implementation
plan appropriately describes how the
entity intends to comply with the
requirements of the proposed part 5.
Additional information regarding the
form and manner of submission would
be available in Advisory Circular (AC)
21–58, Safety Management Systems for
Part 21 Type and Production Certificate
Holders.
The implementation plan would
include a description of how the person
intends to comply with the
requirements of the proposed rule. The
FAA would review and approve the
implementation plan and provide
confirmation to the person of FAA’s
approval of the implementation plan.
The person would then be required to
implement the FAA-approved SMS by
December 27, 2025, and maintain the
SMS in accordance with the approved
implementation plan.
After the effective date of the
proposed rule, a person applying for a
PC under part 21 for a product for
which the person holds a TC, or for
which an application is pending, would
submit the implementation plan for
FAA approval during the certification
process. For persons who hold a TC and
are entering into a licensing agreement
to allow another person to use that TC
to obtain a PC, the TC holder would
submit the implementation plan for
FAA approval when providing the
written licensing agreement in
accordance with § 21.55. The FAA
would review the applicant’s
implementation plan and approve the
means by which the person intends to
comply with the applicable sections of
the proposed rule. The person would
then be required to implement the FAAapproved SMS within one year after
FAA’s approval and maintain the SMS
in accordance with the implementation
plan.
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b. Removal of Implementation Plan
Requirement
Currently, § 5.1(b) states that a part
119 certificate holder must submit an
implementation plan to the FAA for
review no later than September 9, 2015,
and the implementation must be
approved no later than March 9, 2016.
Additionally, current § 5.1(c) states that
the implementation plan may include
any of the certificate holder’s existing
programs, policies, or procedures that it
intends to use to meet the requirements
of part 5, including components of an
existing SMS. These requirements
applied to part 119 certificate holders
who were authorized to conduct
operations under part 121 as of the
effective date of the 2015 final rule. The
FAA adopted these requirements to
ensure that part 121 operators properly
developed SMS within the required
timeframe. The FAA proposes to remove
these requirements because the dates
have passed, and the requirements are
no longer necessary. All part 121
operators have developed and
implemented SMS in accordance with
part 5.
The FAA recognizes that the proposed
rule would extend the SMS
requirements to additional entities who
already hold certificates, and these
certificate holders would have to
develop and implement an SMS in
accordance with part 5. Based on the
FAA’s experience with part 121
operators complying with part 5 and
those entities participating in the
voluntary SMS program, the FAA
proposes to require new applicants for
certificates to operate under part 121, as
well as certificate holders under part
135 and LOA holders under § 91.147 to
submit a statement of compliance in
lieu of an implementation plan.
Certificate holders receive continuous
oversight and are regularly inspected by
the FAA. The FAA has determined that
the existing oversight processes such as
FAA’s Safety Assurance System,60
would be sufficient to ensure
compliance with part 5 by certificate
holders under parts 121 and 135 and
§ 91.147 LOA holders, and therefore it is
not necessary to require an
implementation plan.
60 The Safety Assurance System is the Federal
Aviation Administration’s oversight tool to perform
certification, surveillance, and Continued
Operational Safety. The Safety Assurance System
includes policy, processes, and associated software
the FAA Flight Standards Service uses to capture
data when conducting oversight. For more
information see: https://www.faa.gov/about/
initiatives/sas.
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5. Compliance
In accordance with the FAA’s
compliance program, FAA personnel
investigate apparent violations of FAA
statutes and regulations and have a
range of options available for addressing
apparent violations, when appropriate,
including compliance, administrative,
and enforcement action. The FAA’s goal
is to use the most effective and
appropriate means to ensure compliance
with part 5 and prevent recurrence. The
underlying principles and oversight
processes that form the foundation of
FAA’s approach to compliance would
not change under this proposed rule.
E. Proposed Changes to Sections 119.8,
91.147, 21.135, and 21.147
1. Proposed Amendments to Section
119.8
The FAA is proposing to revise
§ 119.8 to require certificate holders
authorized to conduct operations under
part 121 or 135 to comply with the
applicable requirements of part 5.
Currently, § 119.8 only requires
certificate holders authorized to conduct
operations under part 121 to comply
with the SMS requirements in part 5;
the proposed revision would add part
135 operators. Additionally, the FAA is
revising § 119.8 to remove the
compliance dates which have passed
and are no longer applicable.
2. Proposed Amendments to Section
91.147
As discussed in Section V.A.2., the
FAA proposes to require LOA holders
operating under § 91.147 to meet the
requirements of part 5. Specifically, the
FAA proposes to amend § 91.147 to
require an operator conducting
passenger carrying flights for
compensation or hire to have an FAAaccepted safety management system that
meets the requirements of part 5, and to
add a requirement for an LOA applicant
to submit with the application the
statement of compliance required under
part 5. The FAA also proposes nonsubstantive changes, including
organizational changes to improve the
readability of the section.
The requirement for LOA holders and
applicants to develop an SMS that
complies with part 5 would be found in
both part 5 and in § 91.147. Although
part 5 would be applicable to § 91.147
LOA holders under proposed 5.1, this
amendment is necessary to make
compliance with part 5 a requirement
for operation.
Because § 91.147(c) contains a
complete list of all documents that
applicants for an LOA must submit as
part of their application, the FAA is
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proposing to add the statement of
compliance required under proposed
§ 5.9(b)(2) to the list of documents
submitted when applying for an LOA.
To eliminate redundancy in the
regulations, the FAA is proposing to
remove the phrase ‘‘for drug and alcohol
testing’’ from current § 91.147(a), which
defines ‘‘operator’’ for the purposes of
§ 91.147 and for drug and alcohol
testing.61 The drug and alcohol testing
requirements are contained in part 120
of 14 CFR. Under part 120, the
regulations reference ‘‘operator as
defined in § 91.147’’ numerous times. In
light of these cross-references, which
expressly refer to the definition of
operator in § 91.147, the FAA has
determined that it is unnecessary and
redundant for current § 91.147(a) to
state that the definition of operator is
‘‘for drug and alcohol testing.’’
3. Proposed Amendments to Sections
21.55, 21.135, and 21.147(b)
The FAA proposes to add a new
paragraph (c) under § 21.135 to require
each applicant for or holder of a PC to
meet the applicable requirements of part
5. A conforming edit is also proposed
for § 21.147(b) to add the proposed
§ 21.135(c) to the list of requirements
with which applicants for an
amendment to a PC must comply.
Because ACSAA requires the
Administrator to approve a part 21
certificate holder’s SMS, the FAA is
proposing these changes to part 21 to
ensure that compliance with part 5
would be a pre-requisite for obtaining or
amending a PC.
Additionally, the FAA is proposing to
revise § 21.55 to require a type
certificate holder, who allows a person
to use the type certificate to
manufacture a product to meet the
applicable requirements of part 5. The
FAA is also proposing to revise the
heading of this section to account for
the additional rule language.
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F. Scalability
Under this proposal, part 5 would
apply SMS requirements to
organizations that are diverse in size
and complexity (i.e., aircraft fleet size,
operations, product types and
production volume, services, and
number of employees). As the proposal
is performance-based, the procedures
61 One reason § 91.147 was added to the
regulations was to clarify the applicability of drug
and alcohol programs (Final Rule; National Air
Tour Safety Standards, 72 FR 6884, Feb. 13, 2007).
The FAA notes that part 120 was added two years
later (Final Rule; Drug and Alcohol Testing
Program, 74 FR 22649, May 14, 2009), which
further functioned to eliminate confusion and
streamlined the requirements of the drug and
alcohol program.
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and documentation for compliance are
scalable to accommodate a wide variety
of business models and sizes. This
proposed rule specifies a basic set of
processes to form a framework for the
SMS, but does not specify particular
methods for implementing these
processes. This provides a balance
between standardization and a robust
SMS structure while allowing
considerable flexibility for how an
individual aviation organization
chooses to establish its SMS.
The SMS ARC recommended that part
5 be both scalable and flexible to
accommodate many business models.62
This recommendation was incorporated
into the current requirements of part 5.
The four components of SMS (safety
policy, safety risk management, safety
assurance, and safety promotion) set
forth in part 5, identify the system’s
requirements, but do not prescribe the
means of achieving these requirements.
Each organization has the flexibility to
tailor an SMS that works for the
organization’s size, scope, and
complexity to comply with the
proposed rule. To enable scalability and
flexibility, part 5 would continue to
describe the desired measurable
outcomes that must be accomplished.
This performance-based approach
would grant flexibility by enabling
regulated persons to develop methods,
processes, or other means of compliance
that are appropriate to the size, scope,
and complexity of their organization
and operations.
For example, the objective of safety
risk management—to identify hazards,
assess safety risk, and develop and
monitor controls within the
organization’s SMS—would be the same
regardless of the size of the organization
even though methods used might be
different. The FAA does not anticipate
that small organizations will need
additional management and staff to
satisfy the requirement elements of
safety risk management. For example,
smaller organizations, with few aircraft
operating in a limited geographic area,
might record, and track the results of the
safety risk management process with
paper records or digital files using
common word processing or
spreadsheet applications.
Additionally, persons required to
have an SMS under the proposed rule
would be able to comply with part 5
SMS requirements through a variety of
means. The FAA considers that
organizations may be able to leverage
consensus or community standards,
which are typically developed by third62 SMS ARC Recommendations Final Report, p.2.
March 31, 2010.
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party consultants or trade associations,
to meet the requirements of part 5. In
addition, the FAA recognizes that
persons may already have systems and
processes in place that meet the part 5
requirements.
In addition, aviation organizations
that perform more than one service
would be able to adapt their SMS to
align with the complexity of their
operations. For example, some aviation
organizations have multiple certificates
(e.g., the aviation organization might
have multiple certificates authorizing it
to conduct flight operations and to
perform aircraft maintenance for other
organizations, or the aviation
organization might have multiple
certificates authorizing it to
manufacture certain products and
perform flight operations or aircraft
maintenance). An aviation organization
with multiple types of certificates may
choose to implement a separate SMS for
each certificate by following the
acceptance or approval process as
applicable for each type of certificate.
Although not required to do so, these
aviation organizations may only want to
implement one SMS that encompasses
all their aviation-related safety
activities. An aviation organization with
multiple certificates would be required
to meet the part 5 statement of
compliance or implementation plan
requirements as applicable for its
certificates.
A single pilot operator would build an
SMS using tools and procedures
commensurate with the size,
complexity, and sophistication of the
organization. Small organizations are
likely to rely on the same tools that they
already use in their day-to-day
operations. For example, an operator
may rely on standard word processing
software, Excel spreadsheets, email, or
even paper record books to document
the system, policies, processes, and
procedures. The single pilot operator
would choose based on their own
preferences and comfort level with the
different types of technologies. This is a
business decision the operator will
make to maximize its own efficiencies,
and it may look very different even
among organizations of comparable size.
In the discussion that follows, the FAA
provides examples of how an SMS
might be scaled to particular persons
who would be required to comply with
this proposed rule.
The following example illustrates
how a small single pilot operator could
scale implementation of SMS to fit its
organization. The responsible
individual would first develop a system
description, which would identify the
aviation operations that would be
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covered by the SMS and its
organizational interfaces. This might be
a hand-written document or a digital file
on a computer. The organization would
then document its safety policy; again,
this could be done on paper or in a
digital file. The example provided in the
appendix in AC 120–92 could be used
as a starting point, but there are also
various examples available on the
internet that could be used as a starting
point.
To meet safety risk management and
safety assurance requirements, the
operator could use a tool such as the
Web-Based Analytical Technology
(WBAT) platform which is FAAsupported software, to support
employee reporting and SMS. The
platform could also be used to meet
recordkeeping and documentation
requirements. However, simpler options
such as digital files on a computer or
paper files could be used as well. For
instance, AC 120–92 provides
worksheets that the operator could use
to meet most safety risk management
requirements. To meet safety assurance
requirements in a simpler way in a
single pilot operator, the pilot could
observe how an operation is working
and identify trends in real-time. If there
are issues, the pilot could take
appropriate action and reevaluate the
results. Any operational process could
be observed and does not necessarily
require formal audits or forms. Again,
all of this could be documented on
paper or in a digital file.
To meet communication requirements
a small operator might use existing
email applications to share information
within its organization and with
interfacing organizations, as
appropriate. To meet documentation
and recordkeeping requirements, the
organization could use paper or digital
files just as they might do for other areas
of their operations such as invoicing,
service and rental agreements, etc. The
organization could document this using
a medium of their choosing, including
something as simple as a notebook.
The example above references
resources available through or
supported by the FAA. However, as
previously noted, third-party
consultants and trade associations are
also resources available to assist in the
development of an SMS. Further,
aviation colleges and universities,
ICAO, and other civil aviation
authorities such as EASA and Transport
Canada Civil Aviation have material
that can be used to help develop an
SMS.
The following example illustrates
how SMS might operate in a small, low
complexity operator. This example
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company has two helicopters and four
pilots, and it provides air tour services
within a 25 nautical mile range of its
home airport. The company has
developed a safety policy under § 5.21
that reminds everyone safety is the
company’s number one priority. It
contains in bold letters at the bottom, ‘‘If
you see something unsafe, say
something.’’ This policy statement is
one page, signed by the company owner,
and posted inside the office for all to
see.
After a flight, one of the pilots reports
to the air tour operator’s home base that
there is a new hazard in the flightpath
of their desired tour route. The hazard
is a power line across a canyon and
there are no visibility markers on that
line. The report of the hazard is the start
of the safety risk management process
under § 5.51(d). Under § 5.53, the air
tour operator researches the location
and height of the power line relative to
the flight path in the area. The operator
calls the power company and learns that
the line is 1⁄2-inch thick and an expected
date of installation for the markers is
unknown due to manufacturing delays.
This information is recorded in a
notebook or digital file. Even the
process for conducting this analysis
under § 5.53(c) can also be located in
the notebook or in a digital file.
Under § 5.53, the air tour operator
determines the unmarked power line is
an operational hazard. Knowing that
helicopters and unseen power lines are
a high risk, and realizing that the
company’s air tour route places them in
the exact spot of the canyon where the
unmarked power line exists, makes this
particular risk assessment easy. The air
tour company determines the severity of
hitting that power line would be
catastrophic and the likelihood of
encountering that power line is high
due to their route of flight. Using a risk
matrix, the operator qualitatively
determines that the risk of conducting
tours with the presence of the unmarked
power line is unacceptable and requires
risk controls be implemented to reduce
the risk to an acceptable level. All this
information is placed into the notebook.
The operator develops risk controls
under § 5.55(c), which, in this case, is a
deviation to the planned air tour route.
The evaluation of the risk acceptance
under § 5.55(d) is done by talking to
other employees, brainstorming, or
engaging with other operators. The
records of meetings or conversations, as
well as the risk controls themselves, are
documented using a medium of their
choosing, including something as
simple as a notebook or digital file
consistent with the recordkeeping
requirements of § 5.97.
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The operator’s next step is to monitor
the controls it put into place through its
safety assurance program. The operator
will check on the deviation to the route
it put in place under § 5.71(a)(1) through
proposed (a)(7). This can be done by
tracking the flight path or auditing the
new procedures and keeping those notes
in the notebook. Under § 5.93, the
operator will promote safety by
informing the pilots of the hazard and
communicating the safety action taken,
which was providing the air tour route
with a deviation. Each pilot can be
issued a safety alert via a memo that can
be handed to them upon check in and
perhaps sent via email before the flight
starts.
This example illustrates how aviation
safety is improved because current
regulations do not require operators to
have a process to identify and manage
hazards. For example, operators are not
currently required to: have a process to
proactively identify hazards before they
become accidents, establish a structured
method to assure hazards are controlled,
have formal communication methods
that notify all company personnel of
new procedures, or keep records
regarding safety actions taken to prevent
possible accidents.
The FAA recognizes that there is a
spectrum of complexity within
organizations across the aviation
product and service provider industry.
As discussed earlier in this section,
there are relatively low-cost
implementation resources available to
assist persons to meet part 5
requirements, including online
platforms such as the Web-Based
Analytical Technology (WBAT)
platform. This platform supports all
aspects of an SMS and it includes the
following tools: SMS implementation
manager, safety risk management, safety
assurance, employee reporting, and data
sharing. Additionally, the FAA has
drafted guidance in which there are
numerous scalability examples of how
various organizations can meet the
pertinent SMS requirements based upon
where an organization may fall on the
spectrum of complexity. The proposed
Advisory Circulars (AC 21–58, Safety
Management Systems for Part 21 Type
and Production Certificate Holders and
AC 120–92, Safety Management for
Aviation Service Providers), provide indepth discussions on how to meet each
of the part 5 requirements, what tools/
methods may be employed, how they
may be employed, who would be
involved, and includes sample tools and
worksheets. For further information, see
the draft AC 21–58, Safety Management
Systems for Part 21 Type and
Production Certificate Holders and AC
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120–92 Safety Management for Aviation
Service Providers, which are included
in the docket of this proposed rule.
G. Examples of Real World Scenarios
The following accident summaries
provide examples of ways that an
organization having an SMS under the
proposed rule might provide mitigation
in real world scenarios. To illustrate
how SMS would be used by different
entities under the proposed rule, the
following accident summaries have
been arranged by the type of operator or
certificate holder involved in the
accident.
1. Accident Involving Design and
Production Under Part 21
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On June 28, 2015, a single engine
aircraft crashed following a total loss of
engine power due to the failure of the
alternator drive coupling. The pilot and
two passengers were fatally injured, and
the airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire. The manufacturer of the
aircraft and aircraft engine were issued
type and production certificates and the
manufacturer of the installed
replacement alternator coupling had
been issued a parts manufacturer
approval for the coupling pursuant to 14
CFR part 21. The instructions provided
by the engine manufacturer did not
advise that a loose or improperly tight
coupling could lead to a loss of power.
The NTSB report highlighted a review
of the engine manufacturer’s warranty
records for the 5 years preceding the
accident revealed six claims relating to
the alternator coupling.63 If an engine
manufacturer in this circumstance were
required to comply with the proposed
rule, the warranty information would be
used to prevent future safety issues.
Under § 5.71, the engine manufacturer
would develop a process for warranty
data it receives and conduct an
investigation under § 5.71(a)(6). The
engine manufacturer would conduct
audits of its processes and the
instructions it provided on how to
inspect or measure the alternator
coupling under § 5.71(a)(3) before
distributing the coupling. In this
accident, the NTSB report also
mentioned there were 10 events filed in
the FAA Service Difficulty Report
System relating to the alternator
coupling.64 The engine manufacturer
63 In this example, the organization is a mediumsized company that manufactures engines. The FAA
does not have detailed data on the number of
warranty claims during the five-year period.
64 Service Difficulty Reports are evaluated by
FAA flight standards offices. If the initial evaluation
indicates a serious airworthiness problem, the FAA
Aircraft Certification Office and the Aircraft
Evaluation Division responsible for the product
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would analyze those reports under
§ 5.71(b), which could have also
revealed the inadequacy of the
procedures. Then, under § 5.73, the
engine manufacturer would conduct an
assessment of its safety performance and
ensure compliance with the risk control
it established in developing new
instructions for the inspection and
measuring of that alternator coupling.
Section 5.51(d) would require the
engine manufacturer to apply the safety
risk management process to the
information collected under § 5.71 that
indicated the identification of hazards
or ineffective risk controls. Section
5.53(a) would require the engine
manufacturer to analyze its systems
resulting in a focused evaluation of the
maintenance instructions and tooling
requirements provided with the
distribution of the alternator coupling.
Then, under § 5.55, the engine
manufacturer would analyze the safety
risk associated with the procedures that
inadequately ensured that the coupling
was properly tightened, determine
whether the risk was unacceptable, and
may develop risk controls that could
result in a different set of maintenance
instructions.
2. Accident Involving Part 135 Operator
On June 25, 2015, a single-engine,
turbine-powered, float-equipped
airplane, operated by a part 135 ondemand air carrier, collided with
mountainous, tree-covered terrain about
24 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan,
Alaska.65 The pilot and eight passengers
sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane
was destroyed.
The NTSB established the probable
cause of this accident as the pilot’s
decision to continue visual flight into an
area of instrument meteorological
conditions, which resulted in his
geographic disorientation and
controlled flight into terrain. The NTSB
report listed several contributing factors:
(1) the operator’s company culture,
which tacitly endorsed flying in
hazardous weather and failed to manage
the risk associated with the competitive
pressures affecting Ketchikan-area air
tour operators, (2) the operator’s lack of
a formal safety program, including not
having an SMS, and (3) the operator’s
inadequate operational control of flight
releases. The NTSB found that the
operator’s management did not hold
must be informed of the equipment service
difficulty and any recommendations for corrective
actions. Original Equipment Manufacturers are not
notified when a Service Difficulty Report is logged.
Currently, manufacturers are not required to
proactively scan the Service Difficulty Reports
database.
65 NTSB accident number ANC15MA041.
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themselves accountable for conducting
safe operations and fostered a company
culture that condoned operating in
weather conditions with inadequate
visibility for visual flight.
If the proposed rule had been in effect
during this time, the operator would
have had requirements that may have
prevented or mitigated an accident such
as this one.66 With an SMS, the operator
would have a safety policy that clearly
articulates the company’s safety
objectives and its commitment to safety
as required by § 5.21. Under §§ 5.23 and
5.25, the operator would have to define
accountability for safety within the
organization and identify those
members of management that are
responsible for hazard identification,
safety risk assessment, and safety
promotion within their areas of
responsibility. The operator allowed the
operational control functions to be
delegated to flight schedulers.
Operational control provides for
management of planning, departure, and
inflight decision making to assure the
safety of flights. These operational
control functions were not performed
adequately by those flight schedulers,
leading to a loss of effective operational
control. Section 5.23 requires all
members of management to be
accountable for their area of
responsibility. Operational control
responsibility resides with the Director
of Operations, a required management
position for an air carrier.
Section 5.51 would require the
operator to apply safety risk
management in the development of
operational procedures. The operator
had a policy that both the pilot and
flight scheduler must agree that the
flight can be conducted safely before a
flight may be launched. This action did
not take place and, more importantly,
the decision to initiate that particular
flight was made by a new pilot who was
subject to cultural and peer influences.
Section 5.51 would help close this gap
by requiring the operator to conduct
safety risk management when
developing its procedures, policies, and
training. During the safety risk
management process, § 5.53 would
require the operator to analyze its
procedures and policies of operational
control with the consideration of the
operating environment of Ketchikan and
the pressure of getting those passengers
back to their cruise ship on time.
Section 5.55 would require the operator
to assess its risk and develop risk
controls so the pilot would not be the
sole decision maker regarding whether
66 In this example, the operator employed
approximately 30 to 40 people.
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the flight should proceed.67 Section 5.55
would also add an additional control to
its training program, requiring the
inclusion of the risk of the operating
environment and the hazardous local
weather patterns.
The safety assurance requirements of
§ 5.71 would require the operator to
monitor its operational processes and
operational environment, to include
auditing its processes and procedures.
Any of these monitoring actions could
have revealed that the company
procedures relating to operational
control of their flights were not
followed. Upon discovering those
discrepancies, the operator would enter
back into the safety risk management
process and carefully look at those
procedures to include interfaces, such
as training of personnel involved, to
ensure all company personnel are
adequately trained to follow the
company procedures. Additionally,
auditing of the operator’s pilot training
program under § 5.71 might reveal the
exclusion of two items, training of
hazardous local weather patterns and
controlled flight into terrain avoidance
training. Both are essential training
items for this environment, which
potentially could be identified during
an analysis under § 5.53.
Under § 5.91, the operator would be
required to provide SMS training to
management personnel. This SMS
training could positively affect the
safety culture of the entire organization.
Section 5.93 would require the operator
to explain why safety actions and
procedures are introduced or changed,
thus also having an effect on the safety
culture.
The FAA recognizes that in this
example, the operator was already in
violation of its internal company
policies. Although the company’s policy
included a requirement not required by
regulation, the documentation that the
company was not adhering to its own
policies could be evidence that the
organization is not maintaining its SMS
per this proposed rule. Documentation
requirements under an SMS create
objective evidence that the organization
is identifying hazards, assessing risk,
and mitigating that risk as needed. The
FAA may audit this evidence at any
time. Where the person has failed to
comply with FAA regulations, including
SMS regulatory requirements, the FAA
may take enforcement action. This
would also help the FAA identify
safety-deficient organizations.
67 In this example, the operator already had a
policy requiring more than one person to decide
whether the flight should be initiated. Therefore,
the operator was not in conformance with its
company policy related to operational control.
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Knowledge that adherence to its SMS
policies could be audited by the FAA
may encourage an organization to
develop a stronger safety culture.
3. Accident Involving Helicopter Air
Tour Conducted Under Section 91.147
On February 18, 2006, a helicopter
operated by an air tour operator crashed
into the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of
Hawaii, after attempting an emergency
landing following a maintenance
malfunction of the main rotor.68 Three
of the passengers were able to exit the
helicopter but one passenger was
trapped inside and drowned.
The NTSB determined the probable
cause of this accident was the in-flight
failure of the engine to transmission
drive shaft due to improper
maintenance, which resulted in low
main rotor rpm and a subsequent hard
landing on water.
The NTSB highlighted in its findings
a failure of adequate managerial
oversight during a critical maintenance
task on the aircraft. A rated mechanic
was not present throughout the removal,
inspection, and reinstallation of the
engine-to-transmission drive shaft.
Additionally, maintenance records
revealed no entries for the required
annual inspection, or the 100-hour
inspections and several required
component inspections were overdue.
Even though both of these deficiencies
were violations of existing regulations,
the FAA believes that an SMS would
have allowed for the organization to
self-identify, correct, and prevent the
issue, negating the need for after-the-fact
enforcement of non-compliance with
the current regulation. If the operator
implemented an SMS as proposed by
this rule, the accountability for all
members of management regarding their
area of responsibility would have been
explicitly defined, as required by § 5.23.
The NTSB final accident report
indicated the accident was caused by
the in-flight failure of the engine-totransmission drive shaft due to some
missed maintenance processes. Under
§ 5.71, the organization could have
identified the missing steps in the
maintenance process. NTSB’s review of
maintenance records revealed no entries
pertaining to a current annual
inspection or 100-hour inspection. An
auditing process under § 5.71 could
have identified this deficiency.
Additionally, a component inspection
sheet provided by the operator revealed
that several required component
inspections were overdue and had not
been completed at the time of the
68 National Transportation Safety Board accident
number WPR16FA072.
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accident. The operator reported to the
NTSB that he knew those inspections
were coming due but did not realize the
helicopter had flown such that it
exceeded the inspection interval (which
was a violation of existing regulatory
requirements). Therefore, the owner did
not know those items were overdue
until he printed the status sheet for the
investigation of the accident. If the
operator monitored its operational
processes as would be required under
§ 5.71, it would have conducted safety
risk management under § 5.51 that
would have identified hazards involving
the lack of procedural actions resulting
in overdue inspections. The
organization would then develop and
implement additional safety risk
controls by applying § 5.55, such as
management oversight, thus preventing
future occurrences.
In this example, the operator was in
violation of existing safety regulations.
As with the previous example where an
internal company policy was not
followed, SMS documentation
requirements would either create the
objective evidence that the organization
is identifying hazards, assessing risk,
and mitigating risk as needed, or the
lack of proper SMS documentation may
demonstrate that the organization is in
violation of regulation, including SMS
regulatory requirements. The FAA may
audit this evidence at any time. The
evidence created through the SMS
would help the FAA to identify safetydeficient organizations more effectively.
Where deficiencies exist, the FAA may
take enforcement action; however a
single safety incident would not
necessarily indicate that an organization
is out of compliance with its SMS.
H. Data Reporting and Protection
In accordance with proposed § 5.94,
any organization that identifies a hazard
in the operating environment would be
required to provide notice of the hazard
to the interfacing person or persons
identified in the system description,
who, to the best of their knowledge,
would be able to address the hazard or
mitigate the risk.
Title 49 U.S.C. 44735 provides
protection from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act,69 for
certain reports, data, or other
information that are submitted to the
FAA voluntarily and are not required to
be submitted to the Administrator under
any other provision of law. Section
44735(b)(4) limits disclosure of ‘‘reports,
data, or other information produced or
collected for purposes of developing
and implementing a safety management
69 See
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system acceptable to the
Administrator.’’ Section 44735(b)(4) also
limits disclosure of ‘‘reports, analyses,
and directed studies, based in whole or
in part on reports, data or other
information’’ related to the development
and implementation of a SMS.
The protections of 49 U.S.C. 44735 do
not extend to information that is
required to be submitted to the FAA.70
Therefore, if § 5.94 requires that notice
of a hazard be submitted to the FAA
(because the FAA is an interfacing
party), that submission is not protected
from disclosure under 49 U.S.C. 44735.
However, if that notice of hazard
submitted to the FAA contains trade
secrets, or confidential commercial or
financial information, the FAA must
protect the information from public
disclosure under 18 U.S.C. 1905 or 5
U.S.C. 552(b)(4). If a person voluntarily
shares hazard information with the FAA
and such data is not required to be
submitted under § 5.94, then such
information would be protected from
disclosure under section 44735.
The FAA does not control data shared
by a person under proposed § 5.94 with
other interfacing persons such as other
governmental entities or private parties.
Certain protections might be available
under a private, legally-binding
agreement to protect the information
(e.g., non-disclosure agreement)
amongst the parties sharing the
information, or under certain state or
local laws or regulations.
Persons that would be subject to
§ 5.94 may seek legal guidance to
determine the most appropriate way to
handle and protect data and information
submitted to, or received from,
interfacing persons. The FAA
encourages these persons to assess
applicable State legal frameworks to
determine how to comply with data
sharing, privacy laws, and reporting
requirements, and how to best protect
the data shared or received. These
persons should evaluate whether states
afford data sharing and information
protection mechanisms through local
statutes or regulations, or through other
legal or contractual arrangements, such
as confidential disclosure agreements.
The FAA expects that industry already
has agreements or other arrangements
with those interfaces they interact with
the most to protect their data and
prevent unauthorized disclosures.71 The
70 As discussed earlier in this preamble, for
summaries of confidential employee reports to the
FAA that would be required under proposed
§ 5.71(c), 49 U.S.C. 44735(a)(2) offers statutory
protection from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)(B).
71 As discussed earlier in the preamble, interfaces
are often entities like suppliers or companies that
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FAA considers that industry would be
best able to determine how to effectively
share hazard information with
interfacing parties.
VI. Guidance Material
The FAA provides guidance to the
industry on potential methods to
comply with part 5. Included in the
docket for this proposed rule are draft
updates to FAA’s existing SMS
guidance material, AC 120–92: Safety
Management Systems for Aviation
Service Providers, and new draft
guidance in AC 21–58: Safety
Management Systems for Type and
Production Certificate Holders.
A. Guidance for Aviation Service
Providers
The FAA is revising AC 120–92:
Safety Management Systems for
Aviation Service Providers, to provide
guidance in meeting the new
requirements of part 5, and for all types
of certificate holders and LOA holders
who would be required to have an SMS
under the proposed rule. The draft AC
also describes methods of scalability for
the service providers to meet the
proposed requirements based on their
size and the services they provide.
Lastly, this draft AC has been updated
to include current information and best
practices. The AC would continue to
support the FAA SMS Voluntary
Program participants.
B. Guidance for Design and Production
Approval Holders
The FAA has drafted a new AC 21–
58: Safety Management Systems for
Type and Production Certificate Holders
that would assist part 21 TC and PC
holders and applicants in developing
and implementing an SMS compliant
with the proposed part 5 requirements.
This new draft advisory circular is
similar to the updated AC 120–92,
geared toward the needs of part 21
certificate holders, and is consistent
with AC 120–92 to facilitate corporatewide SMS implementation for part 21
certificate holders that also have other
certificates under 14 CFR.
the certificate holder contracts with for services. In
these cases, contracts likely already exist, so the
need to share hazard information could be added
to those existing contracts or included in future
contracts. The FAA notes that there are analogous
information sharing agreements already present in
the aviation industry. For example, an aircraft
owner is provided with an Airplane Flight Manual.
If the operator finds errors in the manual there is
a means to report this to the Original Equipment
Manufacturer. The manufacturer may make the
change and then send out modifications to all the
owners of that type of aircraft, therefore providing
a closed loop communication system.
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VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Federal agencies consider impacts of
regulatory actions under a variety of
executive orders and other
requirements. First, Executive Order
12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct
that each Federal agency shall propose
or adopt a regulation only upon a
reasoned determination that the benefits
of the intended regulation justify the
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility
Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic
impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits
agencies from setting standards that
create unnecessary obstacles to the
foreign commerce of the United States.
In developing U.S. standards, this Trade
Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis of
U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104–4) requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
that may result in the expenditure by
State, local, and tribal governments, in
the aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100,000,000 or more (adjusted
annually for inflation) in any one year.
The current threshold after adjustment
for inflation is $165,000,000, using the
most current (2021) Implicit Price
Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product.
The FAA has provided a detailed RIA in
the docket for this rulemaking. This
portion of the preamble summarizes the
FAA’s analysis of the economic impacts
of this rule.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA
has determined that this rule: (1) will
generate benefits that justify costs; (2) is
a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as
defined in section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866; (3) will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities; (4) will not
create unnecessary obstacles to the
foreign commerce of the United States;
and (5) will not impose an unfunded
mandate on State, local, or tribal
governments, or on the private sector.
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
In summary, the FAA estimated
quantified annualized costs of $51.3
million using a 7 percent discount rate
over a 5-year period of analysis. The
costs represent the value of resources
needed for regulated entities to develop
and implement a safety management
system. Mitigation costs to reduce or
eliminate any hazards identified by an
SMS, which are yet to be identified and
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thus unknown, are not included in the
analysis. The FAA evaluated benefits
qualitatively. The benefits are the value
that would result from avoided
fatalities, serious injuries, aircraft
damage, and investigation costs.
1. Baseline for the Analysis
The baseline for the analysis of
incremental benefits and costs of the
proposed rule includes existing
regulations and standards, existing
practices, affected entities, and current
risks of aircraft accidents and incidents.
The FAA already requires part 121
operators to implement an SMS. The
FAA also provides a voluntary SMS
program for certificate holders under
parts 21, 135, and 145. The SMS
voluntary program is based on the
requirements in existing part 5. There
are over 200 participants in the
voluntary program, including 40
participants in active conformance (full
implementation of the certificate
holder’s SMS).72 In addition, some part
121 operators have covered their part
135 operations and part 145 repair
station services under their SMS.
Finally, certain aircraft design and
production approval holders and
certificated repair stations subject to
EASA requirements will be required to
develop and implement an SMS under
that agency’s SMS requirements.73
The FAA estimated that the proposed
rule would apply to approximately 65
holders of both a type certificate and a
production certificate for the same
product. Also, there are approximately
1,907 part 135 operators that would be
required to implement an SMS, which
includes 272 entities that also hold an
LOA to conduct commercial air tours
under § 91.147. Additionally, there are
694 LOA holders operating under
§ 91.147 that are not associated with a
part 135 certificate that would be
required to implement an SMS under
the proposed rule.
With respect to aircraft accidents,
although the risk associated with
regularly scheduled commercial air
carriers under part 121 in the United
States is low, there have been accidents
involving fatalities and serious injuries.
Under part 135, there has been an
average of 43 accidents and 24 fatalities
annually from 2015 to 2019, mostly
within on-demand operations. There
have also been recent fatal accidents of
72 See FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 17, Chapter 3,
‘‘Safety Management System Voluntary Program’’.
73 EASA adopted a rule to require SMS for
maintenance organizations (part 145), which will
become applicable on December 2, 2022. EASA also
adopted a rule for design and production
organizations (part 21), which will become
applicable on March 7, 2023.
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air tours conducted under § 91.147, an
average of 7 accidents and 3 fatalities
annually from 2015 to 2019.
2. Benefits
The benefits of the proposed rule
would include the value of the
reductions in safety risks associated
with requiring additional entities to
implement SMS. The information
available for estimating such benefits
includes data on accident consequences,
accident investigation reports
identifying the probable causes, and
information on the values associated
with avoiding consequences. The FAA
relied largely on aviation accident data
from the NTSB for the years 2015 to
2019 (the most recent available at the
time of the analysis) and standard
values for estimating avoided
consequences including fatalities,
serious injuries, property damage, and
investigation costs.
The FAA evaluated benefits by
determining annual average aviation
accident consequences, the share of
those consequences that could be
mitigated under the proposed rule, and
probability of mitigation. The FAA
determined the share of consequences
that could potentially be mitigatable by
the rule by looking at the causes of
individual accidents. Requiring certain
aircraft design and production approval
holders (14 CFR part 21) to implement
SMS has the potential to mitigate
accidents in operations conducted
under 14 CFR parts 121, 135, and 91.
Requiring part 135 operators and
§ 91.147 LOA holders to implement
SMS has the potential to mitigate
accidents in operations under part 135
and § 91.147. The probability of
mitigation is uncertain.
The FAA used accident data from
2015 to 2019, focusing on those
involving fatalities and serious injuries
(1,954 out of 6,718 accidents across
parts 91, 121, and 135). The FAA
identified 11 accidents of which the risk
could have been mitigated by requiring
SMS for part 21 approval holders. The
FAA also identified 35 part 135
accidents and 4 § 91.147 accidents of
which the risk could have been
mitigated by the proposed rule. There
are a number of uncertainties in the
analysis, including that not all accidents
indicative of the potential for benefits
from the proposed rule may have been
identified. In particular, requiring SMS
for certain part 21 design and
production approval holders will have
beneficial impacts beyond domestic
operations (i.e., to citizens of foreign
countries).
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3. Costs
To estimate compliance costs, the
FAA developed average onetime SMS
development costs and recurring SMS
implementation costs. Then, the FAA
extrapolated these costs to entities that
would fall under the expanded
applicability of part 5 who would not
already be required to implement an
SMS and are not already implementing
an SMS voluntarily. To develop these
estimates, the FAA conducted limited
outreach to industry participants in the
FAA’s voluntary SMS program to obtain
data on implementation costs. In order
to properly scale costs for company size,
the FAA calculated these costs per
employee for certificate holders under
part 21 and per aircraft for operators
under part 135 and § 91.147. The FAA
then extrapolated the costs based on
number of employees or number of
aircraft. The FAA estimated only minor
costs for entities that have already
implemented an SMS voluntarily.
There are a number of uncertainties in
the analysis, including that costs are
based on a small sample. As a result,
costs could be lower or higher than
estimated. The outreach indicated a
high level of variability depending on
the individual circumstances of the
entity (e.g., existing processes and
capabilities). For this analysis, the FAA
intends for the estimates to represent an
average across entities.
4. Summary
Table 2 provides a summary of
annualized and present value costs
using 3 percent and 7 percent discount
rates.
TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF COSTS
[Millions $2021]
Category
3% Discount Rate:
Part 21 .......................
Part 135 .....................
§ 91.147 .....................
Part 121 .....................
Annualized
Present
value
(5 years)
$5.0
39.5
7.2
0.1
$22.8
180.8
33.0
0.3
Total ....................
7% Discount Rate:
Part 21 1 .....................
Part 135 .....................
§ 91.147 .....................
Part 121 .....................
51.7
236.9
5.0
39.1
7.1
0.1
20.6
160.4
29.3
0.3
Total ....................
51.3
210.6
n.e. = not estimated.
1 Based on quantified impacts. Excludes costs of
mitigation, which FAA was unable to estimate.
Considering particular uncertainties
associated with estimating benefits (e.g.,
SMS effectiveness), the FAA estimated
the number of accident consequences
(fatalities, serious injuries, and
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destroyed airplanes) that would have to
be avoided for benefits to equal costs.
These estimates are based on the
estimated costs if mitigation costs are
minimal. Although mitigation costs are
not included, neither are cost savings,
such as from potential efficiency gains.
For example, SMS can result in doing
things differently but not always more
costly.
However, the breakeven analysis is
limited for providing insight on the
relationship of benefits and costs
because net benefits will also depend on
the magnitude of mitigation costs,
which have not been quantified due to
lack of data. Therefore, the FAA also
calculates the breakeven level of
consequences for an illustrative
example of mitigation costs equal to 25
percent of compliance costs. Avoided
consequences would need to be higher
if mitigation costs are greater than 25
percent of compliance costs. The FAA
requests comment and data on the costs
of mitigations that could have prevented
the accidents described in the analysis.
The breakeven analysis suggests that
the proposed rule would break even,
across all parts, if an average of four
fatalities are avoided annually (5
fatalities in the example assuming
mitigation costs are 25 percent of
compliance costs). Requiring SMS for
certain part 21 design and production
approval holders would break even if an
average of four serious injuries are
avoided annually (5 serious injuries
assuming mitigation costs are 25 percent
of compliance costs). The SMS
requirements for part 135 operators
would break even if an average of 3
fatalities are avoided annually (4
fatalities assuming mitigation costs are
25 percent of compliance costs). The
SMS requirements for § 91.147 LOA
holders would break even if an average
of 1 fatality is avoided annually (1
fatality also assuming mitigation costs
are 25 percent of compliance costs). The
benefits of the proposed rule could also
equal costs with other combinations of
avoided accident consequences.
5. Regulatory Alternatives
The FAA considered two alternatives
to the proposed rule. Each proposed
alternative would change the
applicability of the requirements for an
SMS:
• Alternative 1: Extend applicability
of part 5 to include most design and
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production approval holders under part
21, with some exceptions.
• Alternative 2: Exclude from the
applicability of part 5 the part 135
operators that use only one pilot-incommand in their operations and the
§ 91.147 LOA holders that conduct
fewer than 100 flights per year.
The FAA considered an alternative to
the proposed part 21 applicability based
on recommendations from a part 21
SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committee.
Under Alternative 1, the SMS
requirements would apply beyond
holders of both a type and production
certificate for the same product and
would include most design and
production approval holders. This
alternative would exclude design and
production approval holders of
products, articles, or changes to existing
type certificated products that are not
typically used for carrying passengers or
property for compensation or hire. Also,
as part of this alternative, the FAA
considered a process that would allow
design and production approval holders
to apply to be excluded from SMS
requirements if their article or approved
product alteration would have little or
no effect on the continued safe flight or
landing of the aircraft. Under
Alternative 1, the FAA estimated that
over 3,000 additional entities would be
required to implement SMS. The FAA
also estimated that over 3,000 additional
entities (not associated with the entities
in the previous sentence) would likely
apply for an exception from the SMS
requirements.
Alternative 1 would increase benefits
through SMS implementation by the
approximately 3,000 entities who design
or produce certain safety-critical parts
under any design or production
approval. The alternative would also
hold entities who design and produce
interchangeable safety-critical parts to
the same SMS standard required of
entities holding both a type certificate
and a production certificate for the same
product. However, as of the date of this
analysis, the FAA was not able to
estimate these risks or benefits due to a
lack of specific data and lack of
certainty at this time.
The FAA estimated that costs could
be $39.4 million for Alternative 1, using
a number of assumptions because the
agency does not have information for
these entities on the size of their
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aviation design and production
processes. The costs would include
SMS development and implementation
costs, application costs for an exception
to implementing SMS, and FAA review
and approval costs. Compared to the
proposed rule, the increased costs
would be approximately $34.4 million
(annualized using a 7% discount rate).
The FAA considered an alternative for
part 135 and § 91.147 that would limit
the number of small operators affected.
Under Alternative 2, the FAA
considered excluding from the
applicability of part 5 the part 135
operators that use only one pilot-incommand in their operations and the
§ 91.147 LOA holders that conduct
fewer than 100 flights per year. The
FAA estimated that 1,313 part 135
operators would be affected under
Alternative 2 compared to 1,907 under
the proposed rule. The FAA does not
have data on the number of § 91.147
LOA holders that conduct less than 100
flights per year. However, for this
analysis, the FAA used LOA holders
with one registered aircraft as an
estimate of LOA holders that would not
be affected under the alternative. The
FAA estimated that 321 § 91.147 LOA
holders would be affected under
Alternative 2 compared to 694 under the
proposed rule.
The reduced applicability under
Alternative 2 would lower both the
benefits and costs. For part 135, costs
would be $3.4 million lower compared
to the proposed rule. For § 91.147, costs
would be $1.7 million lower compared
to the proposed rule. With respect to
benefits, the FAA identified five
potentially mitigatable accidents
involving operators that use only one
pilot-in-command and one potentially
mitigatable accident involving a
§ 91.147 LOA holder with one aircraft
registration. These types of operators
would not be required to implement an
SMS.
Table 3 provides a summary of the
analysis of alternatives. The uncertainty
associated with the estimation of
benefits and costs of the proposal also
applies to the estimates of the
alternatives. Section V.A., Applicability,
of the preamble to the proposed rule
provides the agency’s rationale for
selecting the proposed option.
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TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS
Change from proposed rule
Scenario
Alternative 1: Extend applicability to include additional design
and production approval holders under part 21.
Alternative 2: Limit applicability for certain part 135 operators
(exclude operators that use only one pilot-in-command)
and § 91.147 LOA holders (exclude fewer than 100 flights
per year).
Please see the RIA available in the
docket for the more details.
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B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
of 1980, Public Law 96–354, 94 Stat.
1164 (5 U.S.C. 601–612), as amended by
the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub.
L. 104–121, 110 Stat. 857, Mar. 29,
1996), and the Small Business Jobs Act
of 2010 (Pub. L. 111–240, 124 Stat. 2504
Sept. 27, 2010), requires Federal
agencies to consider the effects of the
regulatory action on small business and
other small entities and to minimize any
significant economic impact. The term
‘‘small entities’’ comprises small
businesses and not-for-profit
organizations that are independently
owned and operated and are not
dominant in their fields, and
governmental jurisdictions with
populations of less than 50,000.
The FAA is publishing this Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
to aid the public in commenting on the
potential impacts to small entities from
this proposal. The FAA invites
interested parties to submit data and
information regarding the potential
economic impact that would result from
the proposal. The FAA will consider
comments when making a
determination or when completing a
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.
An IRFA must contain the following:
(1) A description of the reasons why
the action by the agency is being
considered;
(2) A succinct statement of the
objective of, and legal basis for, the
proposed rule;
(3) A description of and, where
feasible, an estimate of the number of
small entities to which the proposed
rule will apply;
Costs
(millions)
Affected entities
Benefits
SMS: +3,000 .........
Exception: +3,000.
Part 135: ¥594 .....
§ 91.147: ¥373.
Data not available to quantify
change in risk.
Lower (would not mitigate risks identified in 5 part 135 and 1 § 91.147
accidents).
+$34.4.
Part 135: ¥$3.4.
§ 91.147: ¥$1.7.
(4) A description of the projected
reporting, recordkeeping, and other
compliance requirements of the
proposed rule, including an estimate of
the classes of small entities which will
be subject to the requirement and the
type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record;
(5) An identification, to the extent
practicable, of all relevant Federal rules
that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict
with the proposed rule; and
(6) A description of any significant
alternatives to the proposed rule which
accomplish the stated objectives of
applicable statutes, and which minimize
any significant economic impact of the
proposed rule on small entities.
135 operators, § 91.147 LOA holders,
and certain part 21 design and
production approval holders. The
proposed rule would also increase the
opportunities for communication of
identified hazards between part 119
certificate holders, § 91.147 LOA
holders, and manufacturers. The
proposed rule is therefore intended to
increase the overall safety of the
national airspace system. Additionally,
the proposed rule would fulfill the
statutory mandate in section 102 of
ACSAA. Section II of this preamble
describes the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety under Title 49
U.S.C. and the Congressional mandate
in section 102 of ACSAA.
1. Reasons the Action Is Being
Considered
As described elsewhere in this
preamble, the proposed ruled addresses
a Congressional mandate as well as
recommendations from the NTSB.
Additionally, the proposed rule would
move the United States closer to
harmonizing with ICAO Annex 19. The
FAA intends for the proposed rule to
improve aviation safety by requiring
organizations to implement a proactive
approach to managing the safety
performance of an organization. The
successful use of SMS by part 121
operators suggests potential benefits of
expanding SMS into other sectors of the
aviation system.
3. Description and Estimate of the
Number of Small Entities
2. Objectives and Legal Basis of the
Proposed Rule
The objective of implementing an
SMS is to proactively identify hazards,
assess the risk of those hazards, and
apply effective mitigations before an
accident or incident occurs. The
proposed rule would expand the use of
SMS in the aviation industry by making
the SMS requirements applicable to part
FAA used the definition of small
entities in the RFA for this analysis. The
RFA defines small entities as small
businesses, small governmental
jurisdictions, or small organizations. In
5 U.S.C. 601(3), the RFA defines ‘‘small
business’’ to have the same meaning as
‘‘small business concern’’ under section
3 of the Small Business Act. The Small
Business Act authorizes the Small
Business Administration (SBA) to
define ‘‘small business’’ by issuing
regulations.
SBA has established size standards for
various types of economic activities, or
industries, under the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS).
These size standards generally define
small businesses based on the number
of employees or annual receipts. Table
4 shows the SBA size standards for
example industrial classification codes
relevant for the proposed rule. Note that
the SBA definition of a small business
applies to the parent company and all
affiliates as a single entity.
TABLE 4—SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS: AIR TRANSPORTATION
NAICS code
Description
336411 .........................
336412 .........................
Aircraft Manufacturing .................................................................................................................
Aircraft Engine and Engine Parts Manufacturing ........................................................................
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Size standard
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1,500 employees.
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TABLE 4—SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS: AIR TRANSPORTATION—Continued
NAICS code
336413
481111
481112
481211
481212
481219
487990
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
Description
Size standard
Other Aircraft Part and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing .......................................................
Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation ...................................................................................
Scheduled Freight Air Transportation .........................................................................................
Nonscheduled Chartered Passenger Air Transportation ............................................................
Nonscheduled Chartered Freight Air Transportation ..................................................................
Other Nonscheduled Air Transportation ......................................................................................
Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation, Other ...........................................................................
1,250 employees.
1,500 employees.
1,500 employees.
1,500 employees.
1,500 employees.
$16.5 million.
$8.0 million.
NAICS = North American Industrial Classification System.
a. Part 21
As described in the RIA, the FAA
estimated that there may be
approximately 65 design or production
approval holders under part 21 that may
need to implement SMS under the
proposed rule. Fifteen of these entities
are already implementing SMS under
the FAA’s voluntary program or are
large businesses (based on publicly
available information regarding number
of employees). Of the remaining 50
entities, 31 may meet the size standard
for a small business in Aerospace
Product and Parts Manufacturing
(NAICS 33641).
b. Part 135
Approximately 1,907 part 119
certificate holders operating under part
135 would need to implement SMS
under the proposed rule. Internal FAA
data indicate that all but three of these
certificate holders have fewer than 1,500
employees. Thus, to the extent that the
industrial classification of the parent
company of these entities is scheduled
passenger or freight, or nonscheduled
chartered passenger or freight air
transportation (NAICS 481111, 481112,
481211, or 481212), over 1,900 would be
small businesses. Table 5 shows the
distribution of certificate holders by
total employment.
TABLE 5—DISTRIBUTION OF PART 135 EMPLOYMENT
Number of
certificate holders
Number of employees
1 ...................................................................................................................................................
2–9 ...............................................................................................................................................
10–19 ...........................................................................................................................................
20–49 ...........................................................................................................................................
50–99 ...........................................................................................................................................
100–499 .......................................................................................................................................
500–999 .......................................................................................................................................
1000+ ...........................................................................................................................................
292
877
275
264
106
76
13
4
Percent of
certificate holders
15
46
14
14
6
4
1
0
Source: FAA data as of March 2021.
c. Section 91.147
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Approximately 694 air tour operators
would have to implement SMS under
the proposed rule. To the extent that the
industrial classification of the parent
company of these entities is Scenic and
Sightseeing Transportation, Other, the
relevant size standard is $8.0 million.
Internal FAA data does not include
revenue or number of flights for these
operations. However, 362 of these LOA
holders have only one aircraft listed on
the LOA. Many may meet the small
business size standard. The FAA
requests data and information that may
enable determination of whether these
air tour operators would meet the SBA
small size threshold.
4. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping,
and Other Compliance Requirements
Section V.C.4 of this preamble
discusses the reporting requirements of
the proposed rule. Affected entities who
identify a hazard in their operating
environment must provide notice of the
hazard to the interfacing person or
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persons who would best be able to
address the hazard or mitigate the risk.
Section V.C.5 of this preamble
describes the recordkeeping
requirements of the proposed rule.
Affected entities must maintain records
of the outputs of safety risk management
and safety assurance processes for as
long as they remain relevant to the
operation. In addition, entities must
retain outputs of safety assurance
processes for a minimum of 5 years,
SMS training records for as long as the
individual is employed by the person,
and communication records for a
minimum of 24 months.
Recordkeeping and reporting
requirements, like the rest of part 5, are
scalable to a wide variety of business
models and sizes, as discussed in
Section V.F. of this preamble. As a
result, entities could potentially
accomplish the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements through the use
of existing personnel rather than require
additional professional skills.
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Section V.C of the preamble describes
the primary requirements for an SMS,
which include safety policy, safety risk
management, safety assurance, and
safety promotion, as well as
documentation. As described in the
RIA, the FAA estimated the cost of
compliance with all the proposed
requirements based on number of
employees for part 21 certificate holders
and based on fleet size for part 135
operators and § 91.147 LOA holders.
Table 6 and Table 7 provide the results
for example size categories and
expressed as a percentage of overall
average receipts (using NAICS 336411
for part 21 and 336411 for part 135 as
examples).74 Not included in the costs
74 The ratios are similar using NACIS 336412 and
336413 for part 21 and 481112, 481113, 481211,
481212, and 481213 for part 135. For § 91.147, the
FAA does not have number of employees associated
with the number of aircraft on the LOA. However,
assuming LOA holders of 1 and 2 registered aircraft
have less than 5 employees, the ratios for one-time
and annual costs as a percentage of inflation
adjusted receipts in this smallest employment size
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are mitigation costs which are yet
unknown. The RIA provides additional
detail on the cost estimates.
unknown. The RIA provides additional
detail on the cost estimates.
TABLE 6—EXAMPLE SMS COMPLIANCE COSTS BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES: PART 21
Number of employees
One-time cost
1–99 .................................................................................
100–499 ...........................................................................
500–10,000 ......................................................................
$7,500–$26,050
26,320–131,320
131,580–2,631,590
Annual cost
One-time
cost/receipts 1
(%)
$500–$10,130
10,230–51,050
51,150–1,023,000
Annual
cost/receipts 1
(%)
0.2–1.2
0.2–1.2
0.03–0.1
0.1–0.1
0.1–0.5
0.01–0.04
1 Source for receipts: 2017 County Business Patterns and Economic Census (https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb/tables/2017/us_
state_naics_detailedsizes_2017.xlsx). Adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index. Based on NAICS 336411.
TABLE 7—EXAMPLE SMS COMPLIANCE COSTS BY NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT: PART 135 AND 91.147
Number of aircraft
One-time cost
1–9 ...................................................................................
10–49 ...............................................................................
50–99 ...............................................................................
100–500 ...........................................................................
$7,500–$38,120
42,360–207,560
211,800–419,370
423,600–2,118,010
Annual cost
One-time
cost/receipts 1
(%)
$4,380–$39,420
43,800–214,640
219,020–433,670
438,050–2,190,230
0.1–0.7
0.1–0.9
0.2–0.9
0.2–0.3
Annual
cost/receipts 1
(%)
0.1–0.4
0.1–0.9
0.2–0.9
0.2–0.3
1 Source for receipts: 2017 County Business Patterns and Economic Census (https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb/tables/2017/us_
state_naics_detailedsizes_2017.xlsx). Adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index. Based on NAICS 481111 and median number of
employees per number of aircraft for part 135 operators.
Total annualized costs (using a 7
percent discount rate) for small
businesses may be in the range of $0.3
million for part 21 and $37.4 million for
part 135. The FAA does not have data
to identify § 91.147 LOA holders that
may meet the size standard. However,
total annualized costs for this sector are
$7.1 million.
Although the proposed requirements
are scalable to fit the size or complexity
of the organization, any adverse impacts
of compliance costs could
disproportionately fall on small entities.
Like large entities, small entities will
likely pass the costs on in the form of
price increases.
5. All Federal Rules That May
Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict
There are no relevant Federal rules
that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict
with the proposed rule.
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6. Significant Alternatives Considered
The FAA considered extending the
applicability of part 5 to include most
design and production approval holders
under part 21, with some exceptions.
Compared to the proposed option, the
FAA estimated that more than an
additional 3,000 entities would need to
implement an SMS and more than 3,000
would likely apply for an exception
under this alternative. To the extent that
category in NAICS 487990 would be 1.8% and
1.1%, respectively.
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the industrial classification of these
entities is in aircraft manufacturing, the
industry data in Table 2 suggests that a
large percentage are likely small
businesses (i.e., given at least 92 percent
of this sector meet the size standard).
The FAA considered excluding from
the SMS certificate holders under part
135 that use only one pilot-in-command
in their operations and § 91.147 LOA
holders that conduct less than 100
flights per year. This alternative would
reduce affected part 135 operators by 31
percent and § 91.147 LOA holders by 54
percent. For part 135, costs would be
$3.4 million lower compared to the
proposed rule. For § 91.147, costs would
be $5.9 million lower compared to the
proposed rule. However, the alternative
would also reduce benefits. The FAA
identified five potentially mitigatable
accidents involving operators that use
only one pilot-in-command and one
potentially mitigatable accident
involving a § 91.147 LOA holder with
one aircraft registration. These types of
operators would not be required to
implement an SMS.
C. International Trade Impact
Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub.
L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies
75 The FAA notes that because this proposed rule
would not apply to products where the state of
manufacture is not the United States, aircraft
manufacturers who are manufacturing abroad
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from establishing standards or engaging
in related activities that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States.
Pursuant to these Acts, the
establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to
the foreign commerce of the United
States, so long as the standard has a
legitimate domestic objective, such as
the protection of safety, and does not
operate in a manner that excludes
imports that meet this objective. The
statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for
U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed
the potential effect of this rule and
determined that it will improve aviation
safety and does not exclude imports that
meet this objective.75 As a result, the
FAA does not consider this rule as
creating an unnecessary obstacle to
foreign commerce.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4)
requires each Federal agency to prepare
a written statement assessing the effects
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or
final agency rule that may result in an
expenditure of $100 million or more (in
1995 dollars) in any one year by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the
would not be required to have an SMS under part
5 but may have SMS requirements imposed by the
state of manufacture.
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aggregate, or by the private sector; such
a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant
regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $165
million in lieu of $100 million. An
unfunded mandate is a regulation that
requires a State, local, or tribal
government or the private sector to
incur direct costs without the Federal
government having first provided the
funds to pay those costs. The FAA
determined that the proposed rule will
not result in the expenditure of
$165,000,000 or more by State, local, or
tribal governments in the aggregate, or
the private sector, in any one year.76
Therefore, the requirements of Title II of
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the
FAA consider the impact of paperwork
and other information collection
burdens imposed on the public.
According to the 1995 amendments to
the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR
1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not
collect or sponsor the collection of
information, nor may it impose an
information collection requirement
unless it displays a valid Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) control
number.
This proposed rule contains new
information collection requirements and
amendments to the existing information
collection requirements previously
approved under OMB Control Number
2120–0675. As required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted
these proposed information collection
amendments to OMB for its review.
1. Summary
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS5
In this rule, the FAA is proposing to
require that all certificate holders
operating under part 135, all LOA
holders operating under § 91.147, and
certain certificate holders under part 21
76 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
defines ‘‘Federal private sector mandate’’ as ‘‘any
provision in legislation, statute, or regulation that
. . . would impose an enforceable duty upon the
private sector . . . or would reduce or eliminate the
amount of authorization of appropriations for
Federal financial assistance that will be provided to
the private sector for the purposes of ensuring
compliance with such duty.’’ Public Law 104–4
section 658 (1995).
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establish an SMS to improve safety for
their operations, and to amend the
requirements for certificate holders
operating under part 121.77 An SMS is
a formalized approach to managing
safety by developing an organizationwide safety policy, developing formal
methods for identifying hazards,
analyzing and mitigating risk,
developing methods for ensuring
continuous safety improvement, and
creating organization-wide safety
promotion strategies.
Under this proposed rule, certificate
and authorization holders required to
comply would be burdened with the
following information collection
activities: 78
(1) Develop a system description—
§ 5.5(b)(1).
(2) Revise and maintain the system
description to reflect changes in the
organization—§ 5.5(b)(2).
(3) Submit the revisions of the SMS to
meet the requirements of §§ 5.5(b),
5.21(a)(7), 5.53(b)(5), 5.94, 5.95(c), and
5.97(d) for FAA-acceptance in a form
and manner acceptable to the
Administrator—§ 5.7(a)(2).
(4) Submit a statement of compliance
in a form and manner acceptable to the
Administrator—§ 5.7(b)(2) and
§ 5.9(a)(2).
(5) Submit an implementation plan in
accordance with § 5.17of this subpart for
FAA approval in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator—
§ 5.11(b) and § 5.13(b)(2).
(6) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part to have a safety
policy—§ 5.21(a).
(7) Any person that holds both a type
certificate and a production certificate
for the same product issued under part
21 of this chapter must submit a
summary of the confidential employee
reports received under § 5.71(a)(7) to the
Administrator every 6 months—
§ 5.71(c).
(8) If a person identifies a hazard in
the operating environment, the person
must provide notice of the hazard to the
interfacing person or persons identified
in the system description who, to the
best of their knowledge, could address
77 Proposed part 121 requirements would be
amended in the corresponding OMB Control
Number 2120–0675.
78 Proposed part 121 requirements not reflected in
corresponding OMB Control Number 2120–0675 are
system description and notification of hazards.
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the hazard or mitigate the risk—
§ 5.94(a); any person required to have an
SMS under this part to develop and
maintain procedures for reporting and
receiving hazard information—§ 5.94(b).
(9) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part to develop and
maintain SMS documentation
containing (a) safety policy, (b) SMS
processes and procedures, (c) system
description—§ 5.95.
(10) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part to maintain SMS
records: (a) records of outputs of safety
risk management processes for as long
as the control remains relevant to the
operation, (b) records of outputs of
safety assurance processes for a
minimum of 5 years, (c) records of all
training provided under § 5.91 for each
individual for as long as the individual
is employed by the person, (d) records
of all communications provided under
§ 5.93 or § 5.94 for a minimum of 24
consecutive calendar months—§ 5.97.
2. Use
The information collection will be
used to provide a basis for the FAA’s
review during the development and
implementing phases, used by the
certificate or LOA holder in its SMS
processes and procedures, and used to
demonstrate compliance with the part 5
requirements.
Collection and analysis of safety data
is an essential part of an SMS. Types of
data to be collected, retention
procedures, analysis processes, and
organizational structures for review and
evaluation will be documented in the
SMS. These records will be used by a
certificate holder or LOA holder in the
operation of its SMS and to facilitate
continuous improvement through
evaluation and monitoring. While this
proposed rule does not require a
certificate holder or LOA holder to
submit these records to the FAA, it
would require a certificate holder or
LOA holder to make these records
available upon request.
3. Respondents (Including Number of)
Table 8 provides the FAA’s estimates
of the number of respondents by
affected entity category (by part 121
approval holders, part 135 operators,
and § 91.147 LOA holders) that would
be impacted by the paperwork
requirements in this rule.
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1963
TABLE 8—NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
Number of
respondents
Affected entity category
System Description:
Part 21 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
Part 121 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
65
1,907
694
66
Total .......................................................................................................................................................................................
Statement of compliance:
Part 135 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
Part 121 1 ......................................................................................................................................................................................
2,732
Total .......................................................................................................................................................................................
Implementation plan:
Part 21 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Safety policy:
Part 21 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
2,602
Total .......................................................................................................................................................................................
Summary of employee reports:
Part 21 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Notification of hazards:
Part 21 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
Part 121 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
2,666
Total .......................................................................................................................................................................................
SMS documentation:
Part 21 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
2,732
Total .......................................................................................................................................................................................
SMS records:
Part 21 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
2,666
Total .......................................................................................................................................................................................
2,666
1 Estimate
1,907
694
1
65
65
1,907
694
65
65
1,907
694
66
65
1,907
694
65
1,907
694
based on one new 121 operator over last 3 years. Not applicable to existing 121 operators.
4. Frequency
The frequency of new information
collection requirements and
amendments to the existing information
collection requirements is shown below
in Table 13 with the annual burden
estimate for each.
5. Annual Burden Estimate
The FAA estimated the paperwork
burden for up to 2,732 certificate and
approval holders impacted by the rule
as shown below in Table 9.
TABLE 9—PAPERWORK BURDEN
Number of
respondents
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS5
Category
System Description:
Part 21 ..........................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................
Part 121 ........................................................................
Frequency of
response 1
Total
number of
responses
Burden
hours 2
Costs
(millions) 3
65
1,907
694
66
1
1
1
1
65
1,907
694
66
520
15,256
5,552
528
$0.05
1.36
0.49
0.05
Total .......................................................................
Statement of compliance:
Part 135 ........................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................
Part 121 ........................................................................
2,732
NA
2,732
21,856
1.94
1,907
694
1
3
3
3
5,721
2,082
3
61,024
22,208
32
5.43
1.98
0.00
Total .......................................................................
2,602
NA
7,806
83,264
7.41
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TABLE 9—PAPERWORK BURDEN—Continued
Number of
respondents
Category
Implementation plan:
Part 21 ..........................................................................
Safety policy:
Part 21 ..........................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................
§ 91.147 LOA ................................................................
Frequency of
response 1
Total
number of
responses
Costs
(millions) 3
Burden
hours 2
65
3
195
2,080
0.19
65
1,907
694
1
1
1
65
1,907
694
260
7,628
2,776
0.02
0.68
0.25
Total .......................................................................
Summary of employee reports:
Part 21 ..........................................................................
Notification of hazards:
Part 21 ..........................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................
Part 121 ........................................................................
2,666
NA
2,666
10,664
0.94
65
6
390
1,560
0.14
65
1,907
694
66
3
3
3
3
195
5,721
2,082
198
1,560
45,768
16,656
1,584
0.14
4.07
1.48
0.14
Total .......................................................................
SMS documentation:
Part 21 ..........................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................
2,732
NA
8,196
65,568
5.83
65
1,907
694
3
3
3
195
5,721
2,082
2,080
61,024
22,208
0.19
5.43
1.98
Total .......................................................................
SMS records:
Part 21 ..........................................................................
Part 135 ........................................................................
§ 91.147 ........................................................................
2,666
NA
7,998
85,312
7.59
65
1,907
694
3
3
3
195
5,721
2,082
1,560
45,768
16,656
0.14
4.07
1.48
Total .......................................................................
2,666
NA
7,99822,791
63,984
5.69
NA = not applicable.
1 Frequency over three-year period.
2 Calculated as number of respondents × hours per respondent.
3 Calculated as burden hours × average labor rate including benefits. The FAA used an average wage including benefits of $88.97, which is
the mean average wage for aerospace engineers ($59.12) divided by the percent of total employer costs of employee compensation represented
by wages (66%) to account for benefits (34%). Wages and benefits information available at: https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes172011.htm and
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t04.htm#ect_table4.f.1.
Table 10 provides a summary of the
implied annual responses and burden
(total divided by three).
TABLE 10—SUMMARY OF ANNUAL BURDEN 1
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS5
Category
Reporting
System description:
Number of respondents ......................................................................................................
Number of responses per respondent ...............................................................................
Time per response (hours) .................................................................................................
Total number of responses ................................................................................................
Total burden (hours) ...........................................................................................................
Statement of compliance:
Number of respondents ......................................................................................................
Number of responses per respondent ...............................................................................
Time per response (hours) .................................................................................................
Total number of responses ................................................................................................
Total burden (hours) ...........................................................................................................
Implementation plan:
Number of respondents ......................................................................................................
Number of responses per respondent ...............................................................................
Time per response (hours) .................................................................................................
Total number of responses ................................................................................................
Total burden (hours) ...........................................................................................................
Safety policy:
Number of respondents ......................................................................................................
Number of responses per respondent ...............................................................................
Time per response (hours) .................................................................................................
Total number of responses ................................................................................................
Total burden (hours) ...........................................................................................................
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Recordkeeping
Disclosure
911
0.3
3
911
7,285
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,602
1
10.7
2,602
27,755
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
65
1
10.7
65
693
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
889
0.3
1.3
889
3,555
0
0
0
0
0
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 7 / Wednesday, January 11, 2023 / Proposed Rules
TABLE 10—SUMMARY OF ANNUAL BURDEN 1—Continued
Category
Reporting
Summary of employee reports:
Number of respondents ......................................................................................................
Number of responses per respondent ...............................................................................
Time per response (hours) .................................................................................................
Total number of responses ................................................................................................
Total burden (hours) ...........................................................................................................
Notification of hazards:
Number of respondents ......................................................................................................
Number of responses per respondent ...............................................................................
Time per response (hours) .................................................................................................
Total number of responses ................................................................................................
Total burden (hours) ...........................................................................................................
SMS documentation:
Number of respondents ......................................................................................................
Number of responses per respondent ...............................................................................
Time per response (hours) .................................................................................................
Total number of responses ................................................................................................
Total burden (hours) ...........................................................................................................
SMS records:
Number of respondents ......................................................................................................
Number of responses per respondent ...............................................................................
Time per response (hours) .................................................................................................
Total number of responses ................................................................................................
Total burden (hours) ....................................................................................................
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS5
The agency is soliciting comments
to—
(a) Evaluate whether the proposed
information requirement is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(b) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden;
(c) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(d) Minimize the burden of collecting
information on those who are to
respond, including by using appropriate
automated, electronic, mechanical, or
other technological collection
techniques or other forms of information
technology.
Individuals and organizations may
send comments on the information
collection requirement to the address
listed in the ADDRESSES section at the
beginning of this preamble by March 13,
2023. Comments also should be
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk
Officer for FAA, New Executive
Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street
NW, Washington, DC 20053.
F. International Compatibility
ICAO Annex 19 establishes an SMS
Framework for managing aviation safety
risk, as well as identifies the types of
organizations that should implement an
SMS. This rulemaking would move the
United States closer to harmonization
with ICAO Annex 19. The proposed rule
would align with Annex 19 by requiring
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the following service providers to
implement SMS: (1) commercial
operators of airplanes or helicopters,
and (2) certain organizations responsible
for the design or manufacture of
products. The FAA has already
implemented SMS across the FAA’s Air
Traffic Organization.79 Additionally, the
FAA is proposing SMS implementation
for certain airports through a separate
rulemaking effort. Both of these efforts
bring us closer to alignment with ICAO
Annex 19 because Annex 19 also
includes air traffic service providers and
airports.
When part 5 was originally
constructed, it was based on the SMS
framework in ICAO Annex 19. Part 5
currently also includes requirements for
recordkeeping, which are not part of the
ICAO’s SMS framework. However,
recordkeeping requirements facilitate
FAA’s oversight functions, and they
assist the person implementing SMS in
demonstrating compliance with the
regulations. In addition, the proposed
rule would require the use of a system
description and the communication of
information regarding safety hazards.
While these requirements are not in the
ICAO’s SMS framework, the FAA
believes that they are beneficial to the
persons implementing SMS and
consistent with ICAO’s intent as ICAO
notes in Annex 19 that other
organizations that interface with a
79 More information regarding the Air Traffic
Organization’s SMS is available at: https://
www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms/specifics_by_
aviation_industry_type/air_traffic.
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Recordkeeping
Disclosure
65
2
4
130
520
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,732
1
8
2,732
21,856
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,666
1
10.7
2,666
28,437
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,666
1
8
2,666
21,328
0
0
0
0
0
product or service provider can make a
significant contribution to the safety of
its products or services.
1. Air Carriers and Operators
The ICAO SMS requirements for
commercial operators are contained in
Annex 19, but Annex 6 defines the
scope of the requirements. Part I of
Annex 6 covers international
commercial operations in airplanes.
This part of Annex 6 makes no
distinction in its requirements on the
basis of an organization’s size. The
Annex applies to all commercial air
transportation operations in airplanes.
In the United States, this includes
operators certificated under both part
121 and part 135. Part III of Annex 6
covers commercial air transportation
operators of helicopters. In the United
States, these operations are conducted
under part 135. Annex 6, part I
addresses international flight
operations; in the United States, these
international flights are operated under
either part 121 or part 135. The FAA
currently requires part 121 operators to
implement and maintain an SMS, and
this proposed rule would extend the
requirement for an SMS to part 135
operators, further harmonizing the
United States with ICAO’s SMS
requirements.
2. Aircraft Design and Manufacturing
ICAO Annex 19 requires SMS for
organizations responsible for the type
design or manufacture of aircraft,
engines, or propellers. This proposal
extends part 5 applicability to holders of
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both a TC and a PC for the same
product, applicants for a PC where the
applicant is the holder or licensee of the
TC, and holders of a TC who allow other
persons to use their TC to obtain a PC.
This proposal would bring the United
States into closer harmonization with
the ICAO Annex 19 SMS requirement
for certain organizations responsible for
design or manufacturing of products.
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3. Development and Implementation of
SMS by Foreign Jurisdictions
Many States have made significant
progress in developing, implementing,
and maintaining requirements for SMS,
aligned with ICAO’s SMS framework,
including certificating authorities in
Europe (EASA), Canada, Brazil, the
United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia.
Of those authorities, most have SMS
requirements for international
commercial operations, and some have
SMS requirements for design and
manufacturing. Most that do not have
SMS requirements for design and
manufacturing plan to adopt such
requirements in the future. Several
States also have SMS requirements for
other operations in the aviation system:
airports, maintenance organizations,
training organizations, international
general aviation operations, and for
safety data collection, protection, and
exchange.
Harmonization of requirements, to the
extent feasible, is important to reduce
the regulatory burden on those holding
certificates or authorizations from
multiple States. The FAA continues to
work with other States to harmonize
SMS requirements. The proposed rule
aligns with sections of the ICAO SMS
framework and furthers harmonization
with other States requiring SMS. United
States-based certificate holders
providing products or services
internationally could be limited or
asked to provide duplicative
information to other States’ approval
authorities to show compliance with incountry SMS requirements. If adopted
as proposed, the rule would reduce the
regulatory burden on those holding
certificates or authorizations across
multiple States.
4. Other FAA Support for
Harmonization and Standards
Development
The FAA is a founding member and
active participant in the Safety
Management International Collaboration
Group, a group representing 18
international regulatory authorities. The
primary purpose of the Safety
Management International Collaboration
Group is to promote international
harmonization of SMS regulations,
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guidance material, and oversight
strategies. The FAA is also an active
participant on the ICAO Safety
Management Panel.
The FAA also participated with the
Aerospace Industries Association to
develop an international industry
standard for SMS: ‘‘Implementing a
Safety Management System in Design,
Manufacturing and Maintenance
Organizations.’’ This Standard is
intended to enable the aviation industry
to implement an SMS consistent with
the ICAO Annex 19 ‘‘Safety
Management’’ Second Edition,
Appendix 2.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA
actions that are categorically excluded
from preparation of an environmental
assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances.
The FAA has determined this
rulemaking action qualifies for the
categorical exclusion identified in
paragraph 5–6.6f for regulations and
involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate
Aviation in Alaska
Section 1205 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the Administrator, when
modifying regulations in 14 CFR in a
manner affecting intrastate aviation in
Alaska, to consider the extent to which
Alaska is not served by transportation
modes other than aviation, and to
establish appropriate regulatory
distinctions. Because this proposed rule
would apply to: (1) any person
authorized to conduct operations under
part 135, (2) any person operating under
an LOA issued under § 91.147, and (3)
holders of both a TC and a PC for the
same product, as well as applicants for
a PC where the applicant is the holder
or licensee of the TC, it could, if
adopted, affect intrastate aviation in
Alaska. The use of SMS would improve
aviation safety in Alaska. The FAA
analyzed NTSB part 135 accident data
from 2015 to 2019 and found that of all
part 135 air carrier accidents studied, 43
percent of these accidents occurred in
Alaska. Because implementation of SMS
can be scaled to the size and complexity
of an organization, SMS requirements
would not be overly burdensome for
smaller part 135 operators. The increase
in safety benefits to intrastate operations
in Alaska would positively impact air
commerce in Alaska with the same
requirements applicable to every
organization under part 5. The FAA
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specifically requests comments on
whether there is justification for
applying the proposed rule differently
in intrastate operations in Alaska.
VIII. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed
rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The
agency has determined that this action
would not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, or the relationship
between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and,
therefore, would not have Federalism
implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations
That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this proposed rule
under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations that
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The
agency has determined that it would not
be a ‘‘significant energy action’’ under
the executive order and would not be
likely to have a significant adverse effect
on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, International
Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting
International Regulatory Cooperation,
promotes international regulatory
cooperation to meet shared challenges
involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to
reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements. The FAA has analyzed
this action under the policies and
agency responsibilities of Executive
Order 13609, and has determined that
this action may improve regulatory
cooperation by moving FAA
requirements for SMS closer to ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices
that other States are adopting or
considering adopting.
IX. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or
views. The agency also invites
comments relating to the economic,
environmental, energy, or federalism
impacts that might result from adopting
the proposals in this document. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the proposal, explain
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the reason for any recommended
change, and include supporting data. To
ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, commenters
should send only one copy of written
comments, or if comments are filed
electronically, commenters should
submit only one time.
The FAA will file in the docket all
comments it receives, as well as a report
summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerning
this proposed rulemaking. Before acting
on this proposal, the FAA will consider
all comments it receives on or before the
closing date for comments. The FAA
will consider comments filed after the
comment period has closed if it is
possible to do so without incurring
expense or delay. The agency may
change this proposal considering the
comments it receives.
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B. Confidential Business Information
Confidential Business Information
(CBI) is commercial or financial
information that is both customarily and
actually treated as private by its owner.
Under the FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is
exempt from public disclosure. If your
comments responsive to this NPRM
contain commercial or financial
information that is customarily treated
as private, that you actually treat as
private, and that is relevant or
responsive to this NPRM, it is important
that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each
page of your submission containing CBI
as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA will treat such
marked submissions as confidential
under the FOIA, and they will not be
placed in the public docket of this
NPRM. Submissions containing
Confidential Business Information
should be sent to the person in the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document. Any commentary that
the FAA receives which is not
specifically designated as CBI will be
placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.
C. Request for Comments
In the preamble under Section V.,
Discussion of the Proposal, the FAA
requested comments pertaining to
specific issues. To facilitate submission
of public comments, the specific
requests for comments are also listed
below. When responding to the
comments, please identify the issue by
using the question numbers used here:
(1) The FAA requests comment
regarding how SMS might present
unique opportunities or challenges for
smaller organizations.
(2) The FAA is aware that there are
135 operators that use only one pilot-in-
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command in their operations, as well as
§ 91.147 LOA holders with low flight
volume. The FAA seeks supporting
information and data regarding whether
this applicability should be limited to a
certain subset of part 135 operators and
§ 91.147 LOA holders, and if so, how?
If the applicability is limited to a
particular subset of part 135 operators
and § 91.147 LOA holders, please
provide any recommendations for
alternatives that would achieve the
same safety objectives as SMS for those
operators that would not be included
under SMS.
(3) The FAA considers that there may
be safety benefits to applying SMS to a
larger portion of the aviation industry
that could lead to safety improvements
in the aviation ecosystem as a whole.
The FAA invites comments as to
whether part 5 should apply to all
holders of a TC, PC, supplemental type
certificates, technical standard order
authorizations, or parts manufacturer
approvals. The FAA requests that
comments specify whether any
exceptions should be made in the event
that the FAA extends part 5 to these
design and production approval
holders, and what those exceptions
should entail. The FAA further requests
information and data related to the
safety benefits or impact of applying
part 5 to additional design and
production approval holders beyond the
applicability in this proposed rule.
(4) Under § 5.15(a), the FAA is
proposing that any person that holds a
TC for a product who allows another
person to use the TC to manufacture a
product under a PC to be required to
submit an implementation plan for FAA
approval in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator no later
than December 27, 2024, and implement
the SMS in accordance with the FAAapproved plan no later than December
27, 2025. These proposed compliance
dates are consistent with the proposal
under § 5.11 for holders with a TC and
a PC for the same product issued under
part 21. The FAA invites comments
about whether the FAA should extend
the compliance timelines for persons
who license their TC to other persons
and, if so, what timelines the FAA
should establish. The FAA requests that
responsive comments include the
commenter’s rationale.
(5) The FAA seeks comment on
whether organizations can share
information about hazards without
disclosing proprietary information. The
FAA also seeks comment on whether
the holder of the proprietary
information would be in the best
position to address the hazard. Please
provide examples of any situations in
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which the holder of proprietary
information would not be able to share
information about a hazard without
disclosing that proprietary information
(6) The FAA seeks comments
regarding the Annual Burden Estimate
for the Paperwork Reduction Act to—
(a) Evaluate whether the proposed
information requirement is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(b) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden;
(c) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(d) Minimize the burden of collecting
information on those who are to
respond, including by using appropriate
automated, electronic, mechanical, or
other technological collection
techniques or other forms of information
technology.
(7) Is there data or other evidence of
the effectiveness of SMS in mitigating
accidents and incidents?
(8) Appendix A of the RIA lists the
accidents that inform the RIA and
includes the FAA’s assessment of the
effectiveness of SMS mitigating the
accident as well as the FAA’s rationale:
(a) Has the FAA accurately estimated
the most likely effectiveness of
mitigation of any specific accidents
through the proposed rule? Please
provide any data or analysis to support
your assessment.
(b) Does the FAA’s rationale
accurately assess how the use of an SMS
would potentially mitigate the hazards
that caused the accidents?
(c) What would be a reasonable
intervention to mitigate the specific
hazards identified, and what would be
a reasonable estimation for the cost of
the intervention or mitigation? Please
provide data or analysis to support your
response.
(d) Are there additional accidents or
incidents that SMS could have
meaningfully mitigated?
(9) The FAA seeks comments and
information regarding expanding the
applicability of part 5 in the future.
Should the FAA consider a future
rulemaking project to expand the
applicability of part 5 to include repair
stations certificated under part 145?
Repair stations perform a wide range of
repair and maintenance work on an
equally wide range of aircraft and
components. Some repair stations do
not perform work on aircraft used for
passenger-carrying operations. Should
the FAA consider applying part 5 to all
certificated part 145 repair stations?
Should applicability be limited to a
subset of part 145 repair stations? The
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FAA seeks information and supporting
data regarding how the applicability
should be limited to a subset (i.e., to
which repair stations should part 5 be
applicable).
D. Availability of Rulemaking
Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking
documents may be obtained from the
internet by—
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking
Portal at www.regulations.gov;
2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and
Policies web page at www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/; or
3. Accessing the Government Printing
Office’s web page at www.GovInfo.com.
Copies may also be obtained by
sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of
Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or
by calling (202) 267–9677. Commenters
must identify the docket or notice
number of this rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in
developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and
technical reports, may be accessed from
the internet through the Federal
eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 5
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen,
Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Safety,
Transportation.
14 CFR Part 21
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Exports,
Imports, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
14 CFR Part 91
Air carriers, Air taxis, Aircraft,
Airmen, Aviation safety, Charter flights,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
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14 CFR Part 119
Administrative practice and
procedure, Air carriers, Aircraft,
Aviation safety, Charter flights,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety,
Charter flights, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Safety,
Transportation.
14 CFR Part 135
Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation
safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
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The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
proposes to amend chapter I of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 5—SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS
1. The authority citation for part 5 is
revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101,
40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701–44702,
44705, 44709–44711, 44713, 44716–44717,
44722, 46105; Sec. 102, Pub. L. 116–260, 134
Stat. 2309; Sec 215, Pub. L. 111–216, 124
Stat. 2366.
■
2. Revise Subpart A to read as follows
Subpart A—General
Sec.
5.1
5.3
5.5
5.7
Applicability.
Definitions.
General requirements.
Requirements for domestic, flag, and
supplemental operations.
5.9 Requirements for commuter and ondemand operations or passenger carrying
flights for compensation or hire.
5.11 Requirements for certificate holders
with both type certificates and
production certificates.
5.13 Requirements for type certificate
holders or licensees applying for a
production certificate for the same
product.
5.15 Requirements for type certificate
holders who allow another person to use
the type certificate to obtain a
production certificate for the same
product.
5.17 Implementation plan.
Subpart A—General
§ 5.1
Applicability.
This part applies to all of the
following:
(a) Any person that holds or applies
for a certificate issued under part 119 of
this chapter authorizing the person to
conduct operations under part 121 of
this chapter.
(b) Any person that holds or applies
for a certificate issued under part 119 of
this chapter authorizing the person to
conduct operations under part 135 of
this chapter.
(c) Any person that holds or applies
for a Letter of Authorization issued
under § 91.147 of this chapter.
(d) Any person that holds both a type
certificate and a production certificate
issued under part 21 of this chapter for
the same product.
(e) Any person who holds a
production certificate under part 21 of
this chapter for a product for which the
person is a licensee of the type
certificate.
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(f) Any person who applies for a
production certificate under part 21 of
this chapter for a product for which the
person is the holder or licensee of the
type certificate.
(g) Any person who holds a type
certificate under part 21 of this chapter
for a product who allows another person
to use the type certificate to
manufacture the same product under a
production certificate.
§ 5.3
Definitions.
Hazard means a condition or an
object with the potential to cause or
contribute to an incident or aircraft
accident, as defined in 49 CFR 830.2.
Risk means the composite of
predicted severity and likelihood of the
potential effect of a hazard.
Risk control means a means to reduce
or eliminate the effects of hazards.
Safety assurance means processes
within the SMS that function
systematically to ensure the
performance and effectiveness of safety
risk controls and that the organization
meets or exceeds its safety objectives
through the collection, analysis, and
assessment of information.
Safety Management System (SMS)
means the formal, top-down,
organization-wide approach to
managing safety risk and assuring the
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It
includes systematic procedures,
practices, and policies for the
management of safety risk.
Safety objective means a measurable
goal or desirable outcome related to
safety.
Safety performance means realized or
actual safety accomplishment relative to
the organization’s safety objectives.
Safety policy means the person’s
documented commitment to safety,
which defines its safety objectives and
the accountabilities and responsibilities
of its employees in regards to safety.
Safety promotion means a
combination of training and
communication of safety information to
support the implementation and
operation of an SMS in an organization.
Safety Risk Management means a
process within the SMS composed of
describing the system, identifying the
hazards, and analyzing, assessing, and
controlling risk.
§ 5.5
General requirements.
(a) SMS components. An SMS under
this part must include, at a minimum,
all of the following components:
(1) Safety policy that meets the
requirements of subpart B of this part.
(2) Safety risk management that meets
the requirements of subpart C of this
part.
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(3) Safety assurance that meets the
requirements of subpart D of this part.
(4) Safety promotion that meets the
requirements of subpart E of this part.
(b) System description. Any person
required to have an SMS under this part
must:
(1) Develop a system description that
includes, at a minimum, the following
information about the safety of the
aviation products or services provided
by the person:
(i) The person’s aviation-related
processes, procedures, and activities.
(ii) The function and purpose of the
aviation products or services provided.
(iii) The operating environment.
(iv) The personnel, equipment, and
facilities necessary for operation.
(v) Interfacing persons that contribute
to the safety of the aviation-related
products and services provided.
(2) Revise the system description to
reflect changes to the information in
(b)(1) of this section.
(c) Continuing requirements. Any
person required to develop and
implement an SMS under this part must
maintain the SMS in accordance with
this part.
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§ 5.7 Requirements for domestic, flag, and
supplemental operations.
(a) Any person authorized to conduct
operations under part 121 of this
chapter that has an SMS acceptable to
the FAA on or before [EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Revise its SMS to meet the
requirements of this part in effect on
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL
RULE].
(2) Submit the revisions for FAA
acceptance in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator no later
than [12 MONTHS AFTER EFFECTIVE
DATE OF FINAL RULE].
(3) Make available to the
Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that
demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set
forth in this part.
(4) Maintain the SMS as long as the
person is authorized to conduct
operations under part 121 of this
chapter.
(b) Any person applying for
authorization to conduct operations
under part 121 of this chapter or with
such application pending on or after
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL
RULE], must:
(1) Develop and implement an SMS
that meets the requirements of this part.
(2) Submit a statement of compliance
with this part to the FAA in a form and
manner acceptable to the Administrator
as part of the certification process.
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(3) Make available to the
Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that
demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set
forth in this part.
(4) Maintain the SMS as long as the
person is authorized to conduct
operations under part 121 of this
chapter.
§ 5.9 Requirements for commuter and ondemand operations or passenger carrying
flights for compensation or hire.
(a) Any person authorized to conduct
operations under part 135 of this
chapter or that holds a Letter of
Authorization issued under § 91.147 of
this chapter before [EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Develop and implement an SMS
that meets the requirements of this part
no later than [24 MONTHS AFTER
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL
RULE].
(2) Submit to the FAA, a statement of
compliance with this part in a form and
manner acceptable to the Administrator
no later than [24 MONTHS AFTER
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL
RULE].
(b) Any person applying for
authorization to conduct operations
under part 135 of this chapter or a Letter
of Authorization under § 91.147 of this
chapter, or with such application
pending on or after [EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Develop and implement an SMS
that meets the requirements of this part.
(2) Submit a statement of compliance
with this part to the FAA in a form and
manner acceptable to the Administrator
as part of the certification or Letter of
Authorization process.
(c) Any person required to develop
and implement an SMS under this
section must maintain the SMS as long
as the person is authorized to conduct
operations under either part 135 or
§ 91.147 of this chapter.
(d) Any person required to develop
and implement an SMS under this
section must make available to the
Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that
demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set
forth in this part.
§ 5.11 Requirements for production
certificate holders who are holders or
licensees of a type certificate for the same
product.
Any person that holds a production
certificate issued under part 21 of this
chapter for a product for which the
person is the holder or licensee of the
type certificate on or before [EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
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(a) Develop an SMS that meets the
requirements of this part.
(b) Submit to the FAA, an
implementation plan in accordance
with § 5.17 for FAA approval in a form
and manner acceptable to the
Administrator no later than December
27, 2024.
(c) Implement the SMS in accordance
with this part no later than December
27, 2025.
(d) Make available to the
Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that
demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set
forth in this part.
(e) Maintain the SMS as long as the
person is both a holder of a production
certificate and a holder or licensee of a
type certificate for the same product.
§ 5.13 Requirements for type certificate
holders or licensees applying for a
production certificate for the same product.
(a) This section applies to any holder
or licensee of a type certificate for a
product who either:
(1) Applies for a production certificate
for that same product under part 21 of
this chapter on or after [I EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], or
(2) Has an application for a
production certificate for that same
product under part 21 of this chapter
pending on [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
FINAL RULE].
(b) Any person who meets paragraph
(a) of this section must:
(1) Develop an SMS that meets the
requirements of this part.
(2) Submit an implementation plan in
accordance with § 5.17 for FAA
approval in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator, during
the certification process.
(3) Implement the SMS in accordance
with this part no later than one year
from the FAA’s approval of the person’s
implementation plan.
(4) Make available to the
Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that
demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set
forth in this part.
(5) Maintain the SMS as long as the
person is both a holder of a production
certificate and a holder or licensee of a
type certificate for the same product.
§ 5.15 Requirements for type certificate
holders who allow another person to use
the type certificate to obtain a production
certificate for the same product.
(a) This section applies to any person
that holds a type certificate for a
product that allows another person to
use the type certificate to manufacture
a product under a production certificate.
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(b) Any person that meets paragraph
(a) and has a licensing agreement in
accordance with § 21.55 of this chapter
on [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL
RULE], must:
(1) Develop an SMS that meets the
requirements of this part.
(2) Submit an implementation plan in
accordance with § 5.17 for FAA
approval in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator no later
than December 27, 2024.
(3) Implement the SMS in accordance
with this part no later than December
27, 2025.
(4) Make available to the
Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that
demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set
forth in this part.
(5) Maintain the SMS as long as the
person continues to meet paragraph (a)
of this section.
(c) Any person that meets paragraph
(a) and enters into a licensing agreement
in accordance with § 21.55 of this
chapter after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF
THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Develop an SMS that meets the
requirements of this part.
(2) Submit an implementation plan in
accordance with § 5.17 for FAA
approval in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator when
providing written licensing agreements
in accordance with § 21.55 of this
chapter.
(3) Implement the SMS in accordance
with this part no later than one year
from the FAA’s approval of the person’s
implementation plan.
(4) Make available to the
Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that
demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set
forth in this part.
(5) Maintain the SMS as long as the
person continues to meet paragraph (a)
of this section.
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§ 5.17
Implementation plan.
(a) An implementation plan filed
under this part must include a
description of the means of compliance
(including but not limited to new or
existing policies, processes, or
procedures) used to meet the
requirements of this part.
(b) A person required to submit an
implementation plan under this part
must make available to the
Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that
demonstrates that the SMS has been or
will be implemented in accordance with
the implementation plan.
■ 3. Amend § 5.21 by:
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a. Revising the introductory text of
paragraph (a), paragraphs (a)(1) and
(a)(2).
■ b. Adding paragraph (a)(7).
■ c. Revising paragraphs (c) and (d).
The revisions and addition read as
follows:
■
§ 5.21
Safety policy.
(a) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part must have a safety
policy that includes at least the
following:
(1) The person’s safety objectives.
(2) The person’s commitment to fulfill
the safety objectives.
*
*
*
*
*
(7) A code of ethics that is applicable
to all employees, including management
personnel and officers, which clarifies
that safety is the organization’s highest
priority.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) The safety policy must be
documented and communicated
throughout the person’s organization.
(d) The safety policy must be
regularly reviewed by the accountable
executive to ensure it remains relevant
and appropriate to the person.
■ 4. Amend § 5.23 by revising the
introductory text of paragraph (a), and
revising paragraphs (a)(3) and (b) to read
as follows:
§ 5.23
Safety accountability and authority.
(a) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part must define in its
safety policy the accountability for
safety of the following individuals:
*
*
*
*
*
(3) Employees relative to the person’s
safety performance.
(b) The person must identify the
levels of management with the authority
to make decisions regarding safety risk
acceptance.
■ 5. Revise § 5.25 to read as follows:
§ 5.25 Designation and responsibilities of
required safety management personnel.
(a) Designation of the accountable
executive. Any person required to have
an SMS under this part must identify an
accountable executive who, irrespective
of other functions, satisfies the
following:
(1) Is the final authority over
operations authorized to be conducted
under the person’s certificate(s) or
Letter(s) of Authorization.
(2) Controls the financial resources
required for the operations to be
conducted under the person’s
certificate(s) or Letter(s) of
Authorization.
(3) Controls the human resources
required for the operations authorized to
be conducted under the person’s
PO 00000
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
certificate(s) or Letter(s) of
Authorization.
(4) Retains ultimate responsibility for
the safety performance of the operations
conducted under the person’s
certificate(s) or Letter(s) of
Authorization.
(b) Responsibilities of the accountable
executive. The accountable executive
must accomplish the following:
(1) Ensure that the SMS is properly
implemented and is performing across
all pertinent areas.
(2) Develop and sign the safety policy.
(3) Communicate the safety policy
throughout the person’s organization.
(4) Regularly review the safety policy
to ensure it remains relevant and
appropriate to the person.
(5) Regularly review the safety
performance and direct actions
necessary to address substandard safety
performance in accordance with § 5.75.
(c) Designation of management
personnel. The accountable executive
must designate sufficient management
personnel who, on behalf of the
accountable executive, are responsible
for the following:
(1) Coordinate implementation,
maintenance, and integration of the
SMS throughout the person’s
organization.
(2) Facilitate hazard identification and
safety risk analysis.
(3) Monitor the effectiveness of safety
risk controls.
(4) Ensure safety promotion
throughout the person’s organization as
required in subpart E of this part.
(5) Regularly report to the accountable
executive on the performance of the
SMS and on any need for improvement.
■ 6. Revise § 5.27 to read as follows:
§ 5.27 Coordination of emergency
response planning.
Where emergency response
procedures are necessary, any person
required to have an SMS under this part
must develop, and the accountable
executive must approve as part of the
safety policy, an emergency response
plan that addresses at least the
following:
(a) Delegation of emergency authority
throughout the person’s organization.
(b) Assignment of employee
responsibilities during the emergency.
(c) Coordination of the emergency
response plans with the emergency
response plans of other organizations it
must interface with during the provision
of its services.
■ 7. Revise the introductory text of
§ 5.51 to read as follows:
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§ 5.51
Applicability.
Any person required to have an SMS
under this part must apply safety risk
management to the following:
*
*
*
*
*
■ 8. Amend § 5.53 by:
■ a. Revising paragraph (a).
■ b. Adding paragraph (b)(5).
■ c. Revising paragraph (c).
The revisions and addition read as
follows:
§ 5.53 System analysis and hazard
identification.
(a) When applying safety risk
management, any person required to
have an SMS under this part must
analyze the systems identified in § 5.51.
Those system analyses must be used to
identify hazards under paragraph (c) of
this section, and in developing and
implementing risk controls related to
the system under § 5.55(c).
(b) * * *
(5) The interfaces of the system.
(c) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part must develop and
maintain processes to identify hazards
within the context of the system
analysis.
■ 9. Revise § 5.55 to read as follows:
§ 5.55
Safety risk assessment and control.
Any person required to have an SMS
under this part must:
(a) Develop and maintain processes to
analyze safety risk associated with the
hazards identified in § 5.53(c).
(b) Define a process for conducting
risk assessment that allows for the
determination of acceptable safety risk.
(c) Develop and maintain processes to
develop safety risk controls that are
necessary as a result of the safety risk
assessment process under paragraph (b)
of this section.
(d) Evaluate whether the risk will be
acceptable with the proposed safety risk
control applied before the safety risk
control is implemented.
■ 10. Amend § 5.71 by:
■ a. Revising the introductory text of
paragraph (a).
■ b. Revising paragraphs (a)(6), (a)(7),
and (b).
■ c. Adding paragraph (c).
The revisions and addition read as
follows:
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§ 5.71 Safety performance monitoring and
measurement.
(a) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part must develop and
maintain processes and systems to
acquire data with respect to its products
and services to monitor the safety
performance of the organization. These
processes and systems must include, at
a minimum, the following:
*
*
*
*
*
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Jkt 259001
(6) Investigations of reports regarding
potential non-compliance with
regulatory standards or other safety risk
controls established by the person
through the safety risk management
process established in subpart C of this
part.
(7) A confidential employee reporting
system in which employees can report
hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences,
incidents, as well as propose solutions
and safety improvements, without
concern of reprisal for reporting.
(b) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part must develop and
maintain processes that analyze the data
acquired through the processes and
systems identified under paragraph (a)
of this section and any other relevant
data with respect to its products and
services.
(c) Any person that holds both a type
certificate and a production certificate
issued under part 21 of this chapter for
the same product must submit a
summary of the confidential employee
reports received under paragraph (a)(7)
of this section to the Administrator once
every 6 months.
■ 11. Amend § 5.73 by revising the
introductory text of paragraph (a), and
revising paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) to read
as follows:
■
§ 5.73
§ 5.95
Safety performance assessment.
(a) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part must conduct
assessments of its safety performance
against its safety objectives, which
include reviews by the accountable
executive, to:
(1) Ensure compliance with the safety
risk controls established by the person.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Upon completion of the
assessment, if ineffective controls or
new hazards are identified under
paragraphs (a)(2) through (5) of this
section, the person must use the safety
risk management process described in
subpart C of this part.
■ 12. Revise § 5.75 to read as follows:
§ 5.75
Continuous improvement.
Any person required to have an SMS
under this part must establish and
implement processes to correct safety
performance deficiencies identified in
the assessments conducted under § 5.73.
■ 13. Revise § 5.91 to read as follows:
§ 5.91
Competencies and training.
Any person required to have an SMS
under this part must provide training to
each individual identified in § 5.23 to
ensure the individuals attain and
maintain the competencies necessary to
perform their duties relevant to the
operation and performance of the SMS.
PO 00000
Frm 00041
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4702
1971
14. Amend § 5.93 by revising the
introductory text to read as follows:
§ 5.93
Safety communication.
Any person required to have an SMS
under this part must develop and
maintain a means for communicating
safety information that, at a minimum:
*
*
*
*
*
■ 15. Add § 5.94 to read as follows:
§ 5.94 Notification of hazards to
interfacing persons.
(a) If a person required to have an
SMS under this part identifies a hazard
in the operating environment, the
person must provide notice of the
hazard to the interfacing person or
persons identified in the system
description maintained under § 5.5(b)
who, to the best of their knowledge,
could address the hazard or mitigate the
risk.
(b) Any person required to have an
SMS under this part must develop and
maintain procedures for reporting and
receiving hazard information in
accordance with subsection (a).
■ 16. Amend § 5.95 by revising the
introductory text and adding paragraph
(c) to read as follows:
SMS documentation.
Any person required to have an SMS
under this part must develop and
maintain the following SMS
documentation:
*
*
*
*
*
(c) System description.
■ 17. Revise § 5.97 to read as follows:
§ 5.97
SMS records.
Any person required to have an SMS
under this part must:
(a) Maintain records of outputs of
safety risk management processes as
described in subpart C of this part. Such
records must be retained for as long as
the control remains relevant to the
operation.
(b) Maintain records of outputs of
safety assurance processes as described
in subpart D of this part. Such records
must be retained for a minimum of 5
years.
(c) Maintain a record of all training
provided under § 5.91 for each
individual. Such records must be
retained for as long as the individual is
employed by the person.
(d) Retain records of all
communications provided under § 5.93
or § 5.94 for a minimum of 24
consecutive calendar months.
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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 7 / Wednesday, January 11, 2023 / Proposed Rules
PART 21—CERTIFICATION
PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND
ARTICLES
18. The authority citation for part 21
is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C.
106(f), 106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702,
44704, 44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715,
45303; Pub. L. 116–260; 134 Stat. 2309.
■
19. Amend § 21.55 to read as follows:
§ 21.55 Responsibility of type certificate
holders that provide written licensing
agreements.
A type certificate holder who allows
a person to use the type certificate to
manufacture a new aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller must meet the
applicable requirements of part 5 of this
chapter and provide that person with a
written licensing agreement acceptable
to the FAA.
■ 20. Amend § 21.135 by adding
paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 21.135
Organization.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Each applicant for or holder of a
production certificate, except those
based only on a supplemental type
certificate or on the rights to the benefits
of a supplemental type certificate under
a licensing agreement, must meet the
applicable requirements of part 5 of this
chapter.
■ 21. Amend § 21.147 by revising
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
§ 21.147 Amendment of production
certificates.
*
*
*
*
(b) An applicant for an amendment to
a production certificate to add a type
certificate or model, or both, must
comply with §§ 21.135(c), 21.137,
21.138, and 21.150.
*
*
*
*
*
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*
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PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND
FLIGHT RULES
22. The authority citation for part 91
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101,
40103, 40105, 40113, 40120, 44101, 44111,
44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715,
44716, 44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316,
46504, 46506–46507, 47122, 47508, 47528–
47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114–190, 130 Stat. 615
(49 U.S.C. 44703 note); articles 12 and 29 of
the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).
■
23. Revise § 91.147 to read as follows:
§ 91.147 Passenger carrying flights for
compensation or hire.
(a) Definitions. For the purposes of
this section Operator means any person
conducting nonstop passenger-carrying
flights in an airplane or helicopter for
compensation or hire in accordance
with §§ 119.1(e)(2), 135.1(a)(5), or
121.1(d), of this chapter that begin and
end at the same airport and are
conducted within a 25-statute mile
radius of that airport.
(b) General requirements. An Operator
conducting passenger-carrying flights
for compensation or hire must meet the
following requirements unless all flights
are conducted under § 91.146. The
Operator must:
(1) Comply with the safety provisions
of part 136, subpart A of this chapter.
(2) Register and implement its drug
and alcohol testing programs in
accordance with part 120 of this
chapter.
(3) Comply with the applicable
requirements of part 5 of this chapter.
(4) Apply for and receive a Letter of
Authorization from the responsible
Flight Standards office.
(c) Letter of Authorization. Each
application for a Letter of Authorization
must include the following information:
(1) Name of Operator, agent, and any
d/b/a (doing-business-as) under which
that Operator does business.
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Frm 00042
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
(2) Principal business address and
mailing address.
(3) Principal place of business (if
different from business address).
(4) Name of person responsible for
management of the business.
(5) Name of person responsible for
aircraft maintenance.
(6) Type of aircraft, registration
number(s), and make/model/series.
(7) Antidrug and Alcohol Misuse
Prevention Program registration.
(8) The statement of compliance
required under part 5 of this chapter.
(d) Compliance. The Operator must
comply with the provisions of the Letter
of Authorization received.
PART 119—CERTIFICATION: AIR
CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL
OPERATORS
24. The authority citation for part 119
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Pub. L. 111–216, sec. 215
(August 1, 2010); 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g),
1153, 40101, 40102, 40103, 40113, 44105,
44106, 44111, 44701–44717, 44722, 44901,
44903, 44904, 44906, 44912, 44914, 44936,
44938, 46103, 46105.
■
25. Revise § 119.8 to read as follows:
§ 119.8
Safety Management Systems.
No certificate holder authorized to
conduct operations under part 121 or
135 of this chapter may operate an
aircraft under that certificate unless the
certificate holder complies with the
applicable requirements of part 5 of this
chapter.
Issued under authority provided by 49
U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a), and 44703 in
Washington, DC.
Warren S. Randolph,
Deputy Executive Director, Office of Accident
Investigation and Prevention. Federal
Aviation Administration.
[FR Doc. 2022–28583 Filed 1–10–23; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 7 (Wednesday, January 11, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 1932-1972]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-28583]
[[Page 1931]]
Vol. 88
Wednesday,
No. 7
January 11, 2023
Part VI
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 5, 21, 91, et al.
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Safety Management Systems; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 7 / Wednesday, January 11, 2023 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 1932]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 5, 21, 91, 119, 121, and 135
[Docket No.: FAA-2021-0419; Notice No. 23-05]
RIN 2120-AL60
Safety Management Systems
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to update and expand the requirements for
safety management systems (SMS) and require certain certificate holders
and commercial air tour operators to develop and implement an SMS. This
proposed rule would extend the requirement for an SMS to all
certificate holders operating under the rules for commuter and on-
demand operations, commercial air tour operators, production
certificate (PC) holders that are holders or licensees of a type
certificate (TC) for the same product, and holders of a TC who license
out that TC for production. The FAA also proposes this rule in part to
address a Congressional mandate as well as recommendations from the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and two Aviation Rulemaking
Committees (ARCs). Additionally, the proposed rule would more closely
align the United States with Annex 19 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. This proposed rule is intended to improve
aviation safety by requiring organizations to implement a proactive
approach to managing safety.
DATES: Send comments on or before March 13, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2021-0419
using any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to www.regulations.gov and
follow the online instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action, contact Scott Van Buren, Office of Accident Investigation
and Prevention, AVP-4, Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue SW, Room 300 East, Washington, DC 20591, telephone
(202) 494-8417; mail [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of This NPRM
B. Summary of the Proposed Rule
C. Summary of Costs and Benefits
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
III. Purpose of This Rulemaking
IV. Background
A. SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committees
B. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
C. Safety Management System Rulemaking Efforts
D. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act
E. International Movement Toward SMS
V. Discussion of the Proposal
A. Applicability
B. General Requirements and Definitions
C. Components of Safety Management Systems
D. Implementation of SMS
E. Proposed Changes to Sections 119.8, 91.147, 21.135, and
21.147
F. Scalability
G. Examples of Real World Scenarios
H. Data Reporting and Protection
VI. Guidance Material
A. Guidance for Aviation Service Providers
B. Guidance for Design and Production Approval Holders
VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. International Compatibility
G. Environmental Analysis
H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
VIII. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation
IX. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
B. Confidential Business Information
C. Request for Comments
D. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document
AC--Advisory Circular
ACSAA--Aircraft Certification and Accountability Act
ANPRM--Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
ARC--Aviation Rulemaking Committee
CBI--Confidential Business Information
CFR--Code of Federal Regulations
EASA--European Union Aviation Safety Agency
FAA--Federal Aviation Administration
FOIA--Freedom of Information Act
ICAO--International Civil Aviation Organization
IRFA--Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
LOA--Letter of Authorization
NAICS--North American Industry Classification System
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
PC--Production Certificate
RFA--Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIA--Regulatory Impact Analysis
SBA--Small Business Administration
SMS--Safety Management System
TC--Type Certificate
U.S.C.--United States Code
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of This NPRM
A safety management system (SMS) provides an organization-wide
approach to identifying safety hazards, assessing, and managing safety
risk, and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. An SMS
provides a set of decision-making processes and procedures that can
improve safety by assisting an organization in planning, organizing,
directing, and controlling its aviation-related business activities.
Currently, the SMS requirements of part 5 of Title 14 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) apply only to air carriers certificated under
part 119 and conducting operations in accordance with part 121 (part
121 operators). In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes to expand the
applicability of the SMS requirements to include additional entities in
an effort to enhance safety, respond to a Congressional mandate,
[[Page 1933]]
and more closely align the FAA's SMS requirements with International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 19.
Historically, the approach to aviation safety was based on the
reactive analysis of past accidents and the introduction of corrective
actions to prevent the recurrence of those events. An SMS, however,
helps organizations to proactively identify potential hazards in the
operating environment, analyze the risks of those hazards, and mitigate
those risks to prevent an accident or incident. In 2015, the FAA
promulgated 14 CFR part 5, which required part 121 operators to develop
and implement SMS and set out the basic requirements for those systems.
The FAA believes that the next step in improving aviation safety is to
extend SMS requirements to additional organizations that play a
critical role in the design, manufacturing, and operation of aircraft
(i.e., part 119 certificate holders operating under part 135, Letter of
Authorization (LOA) holders operating commercial air tours under Sec.
91.147, and certain certificate holders under part 21). These
organizations are in the best position to prevent future incidents and
accidents because they are closest to the hazards, and they know the
most about their operations and products. An SMS provides a structured,
repeatable, systematic approach to proactively identify hazards and
manage safety risk. With implementation of an SMS, these organizations
would be better able to develop and implement mitigations that are
appropriate to their environment and operational structure. The FAA
believes the implementation of SMS can be used to avoid or mitigate
future accidents. Representative examples of accidents that the FAA
believes could be avoided can be found in sections V.G. and VII.A of
this proposal. This proposal is based on the recommendations of two
previous Aviation Rulemaking Committees (ARCs),\1\ the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),\2\ and the Joint Authorities
Technical Review of the Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The SMS ARCs are discussed in Section IV.A.
\2\ NTSB recommendations are discussed in Section IV.B.
\3\ Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), Boeing 737 MAX
Flight Control System: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations,
Washington, October 11, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the Aircraft Certification Safety and Accountability Act
(Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 2309, hereafter referred to as ACSAA),
enacted on December 27, 2020, mandated the application of SMS
regulatory requirements to holders of both a Type Certificate (TC) and
a Production Certificate (PC) issued under part 21.\4\ ACSAA further
mandated that the FAA include certain requirements in its implementing
regulations. The FAA proposes amendments to part 5 in accordance with
this legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lastly, requiring SMS for certain commercial operators, and design
and manufacturers would more closely align the FAA's SMS requirements
with ICAO Annex 19; therefore, this proposed rule would increase U.S.
alignment with other civil aviation authorities that are also
implementing SMS requirements in accordance with ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Several major civil aviation authorities have established or
are in the process of establishing SMS requirements for air
operators, air traffic management, airports, and maintenance
organizations, including the European Union Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), Brazil, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. Fewer
countries have design and manufacturing organizations and,
therefore, they have not established SMS requirements for those
entities. However, New Zealand, Japan, and EASA have established SMS
requirements for design and manufacturing organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Summary of the Proposed Rule
An SMS requires four essential components--safety policy, safety
risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. Additionally,
an SMS requires that an organization document the system itself and
maintain any records produced under that system. In this NPRM, the FAA
proposes to expand the applicability of the SMS requirements to include
additional entities, add new requirements to part 5, and amend existing
regulations in parts 5, 21, 91, and 119. Several of these proposed
amendments respond to the statutory mandate in ACSAA.
Specifically, the FAA proposes to expand the applicability of part
5 beyond part 121 operators to include part 135 operators, Sec. 91.147
air tour operators, and certain certificate holders under part 21.
These entities would receive the greatest safety benefits of an SMS as
they are best situated to prevent future incidents and aviation
accidents.
In response to the statutory requirements in ACSAA, the FAA
proposes to add a requirement for each SMS to include a code of ethics
that applies to all employees and clarifies that safety is the highest
priority. Consistent with ACSAA, the FAA also proposes to revise the
existing requirement for a confidential employee reporting system by
adding a provision to ensure that employees can report without concern
of reprisal.
Additionally, the FAA proposes several amendments to part 5 that
are intended to increase the effectiveness of SMS, including several
new requirements. The FAA proposes to require organizations to develop
a system description, which is a summary of aviation-related processes
and activities and a description of interfacing persons that contribute
to the safety of the organization's aviation-related products and
services. The FAA proposes to add information that must be considered
during the system analysis, which is conducted when a person applies
safety risk management. Specifically, the FAA proposes to require
persons to consider the interfaces of the system in conducting the
system analysis. The FAA also proposes to require persons who identify
hazards to notify interfacing persons who are best able to address or
mitigate the hazard. To account for these new requirements, the FAA
proposes conforming amendments to the SMS documentation and
recordkeeping requirements to ensure organizations document the system
description and retain all communications concerning the notification
of hazards to interfacing persons. Furthermore, the FAA proposes
several amendments to part 5, including a revision to the definition of
``hazard'' to ensure it encompasses aviation incidents as well as
accidents, the relocation of the definitions to the beginning of the
subpart to facilitate readability of part 5, and the removal of all
references to the term ``certificate holder'' to conform to the new
applicability proposed by the rule. The FAA also proposes amendments to
certain regulations in parts 21, 91, and 119 to conform with, and
enable the implementation of, the proposed requirements in part 5.
The following table summarizes the proposed provisions and provides
the proposed section(s) of the Federal Aviation Regulations that
contains the provisions.
Table 1 provides a summary of the major provisions of this proposed
rule.
[[Page 1934]]
Table 1--Summary of Major Provisions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed 14 CFR Sec.
Provision affected Summary of proposed provision
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applicability of part 5.................. 5.1, 21.55, 21.135, 21.147, Expand the applicability of part 5
91.147, and 119.8. (currently limited to part 121
operators) to make SMS requirements
applicable to part 135 operators, Sec.
91.147 air tour operators, and certain
holders of a TC \6\ and PC issued under
part 21 for the same product.\7\
Definition of ``Hazard''................. 5.3 \8\.................... Revise the definition of ``hazard'' to
also mean conditions or objects with
the potential to cause or contribute to
an incident.
General Requirements..................... 5.5(b)..................... Add a new requirement to develop and
maintain a system description that
includes information about the aviation
products or services provided by the
person and a description of the
interfacing persons that contribute to
the safety of the person's products or
services.
Part 121 operators....................... 5.7(a)..................... Require part 121 operators to revise
their current SMS in accordance with
the new requirements of part 5 and to
submit revisions no later than 12
months after effective date of final
rule.
Applicants seeking to operate under part 5.7(b)..................... Require applicants seeking to operate
121. under part 121 to develop and implement
an SMS in accordance with part 5 and to
submit a statement of compliance as
part of the certification process.
Part 135 operators and Sec. 91.147 air 5.9(a)..................... Require part 135 operators and Sec.
tour operators. 91.147 air tour operators to develop
and implement an SMS in accordance with
part 5 and to submit a statement of
compliance no later than 24 months
after the effective date of final rule.
Applicants seeking to operate under part 5.9(b)..................... Require applicants seeking to operate
135 or Sec. 91.147. under part 135 or Sec. 91.147 to
develop and implement an SMS in
accordance with part 5 and to submit a
statement of compliance as part of the
certification or LOA process.
Holders of PC and TC for the same product 5.11....................... Require any person that holds a PC and
TC \9\ issued under part 21 for the
same product to develop an SMS in
accordance with part 5; to submit an
implementation plan for FAA approval no
later than December 27, 2024; and to
implement the SMS no later than
December 27, 2025.
TC holders applying for a PC for same 5.13....................... Require TC holders \10\ who apply for a
product. PC for the same product to develop an
SMS in accordance with part 5, to
submit an implementation plan for FAA
approval during the certification
process, and to implement the SMS no
later than one year after obtaining FAA
approval.
TC holders who have a licensing agreement 5.15(b).................... Require TC holders, who have a licensing
to allow other persons to obtain a PC. agreement to allow other persons to
obtain a PC, to develop an SMS in
accordance with part 5; to submit an
implementation plan for FAA approval no
later than December 27, 2024; and to
implement the SMS no later than
December 27, 2025.
TC holders who enter into a licensing 5.15(c).................... Require TC holders, who enter into a
agreement to allow other persons to licensing agreement to allow other
obtain a PC. persons to obtain a PC, to develop an
SMS in accordance with part 5, to
submit an implementation plan for FAA
approval when providing written
licensing agreements to the FAA, and to
implement the SMS no later than one
year after obtaining FAA approval.
Implementation plans..................... 5.17....................... Require implementation plans filed under
Sec. Sec. 5.11, 5.13, and 5.15 to
include a description of how the person
intends to comply with part 5, and for
the person to make available, upon
request, all necessary information and
data that demonstrates that the SMS has
been or will be implemented in
accordance with the implementation
plan.
Safety policy............................ 5.21(a)(7)................. Add a new requirement for the safety
policy to include a code of ethics that
is applicable to all employees,
including management personnel and
officers, which clarifies that safety
is the organization's highest priority.
System analysis and hazard identification 5.53(b)(5)................. Add a new requirement for the person
conducting the system analysis to
consider the interfaces of the system.
Safety performance monitoring and 5.71(a)(7)................. Revise the requirement for a
measurement. confidential employee reporting system
by adding a provision to ensure that
employees can report without concern of
reprisal.
5.71(c).................... Add a new requirement for holders of
both a TC and PC for the same product
to submit a summary of the confidential
employee reports to the FAA every 6
months.
Notification of hazards to interfacing 5.94....................... Add a new section to: (1) require the
persons. person who identifies a hazard to
notify the interfacing person who, to
the best of their knowledge, could
address the hazard or mitigate the
risk; and (2) require procedures for
reporting and receiving hazard
information with interfacing persons.
SMS documentation........................ 5.95(c).................... Add a new requirement for SMS
documentation to include the system
description.
SMS records.............................. 5.97(d).................... Add a new requirement for persons to
retain records of all communications
provided under new Sec. 5.94 for a
minimum of 24 consecutive calendar
months.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Summary of Costs and Benefits
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\6\ As discussed in Section V.A.3 of the preamble, the FAA
considers a licensee of a TC to be equivalent to a holder of a TC.
For purposes of this table, each reference to ``TC holder'' or
``holder of a TC'' is intended to encompass ``licensee of a TC.''
Thus, part 5 would also apply to a person who holds a PC and is a
licensee of a TC for the same product.
\7\ Part 5 would also apply to applicants seeking to operate
under part 135 or Sec. 91.147, and to an applicant for a PC who is
the holder or licensee of a TC for the same product.
\8\ The definitions and general requirements currently exist in
Sec. Sec. 5.5 and 5.3, respectively. The FAA proposes to relocate
the definitions to Sec. 5.3 and the general requirements to Sec.
5.5.
\9\ See footnote 7.
\10\ See footnote 7.
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The FAA estimated quantified annualized costs of $51.3 million
using a 7 percent discount rate over a 5-year period of analysis. The
costs represent resources to develop and implement an SMS. Mitigation
costs to reduce or eliminate any hazards identified by an SMS, which
are yet to be identified and thus unknown, are not quantified in the
analysis. The FAA evaluated benefits qualitatively. The benefits are
the value that would result from avoided fatalities, injuries, aircraft
damage, and investigation costs. Please see Section VII. for more
information.
II. Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). Subtitle I, Section 106
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
In 2010, Congress mandated that the FAA conduct rulemaking to
require part 121 operators to implement an SMS in the Airline Safety
and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-
216, 124 Stat. 2366).\11\
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\11\ See Sec. 215(a).
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Subsequently, Congress enacted section 102(a)(1) of the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (Pub. L. 116-260; 134
Stat. 2309, hereafter referred to as ACSAA), on December 27, 2020.
Section 102, titled ``Safety Management Systems,'' requires the FAA to
initiate a rulemaking to require manufacturers that hold both a TC and
a PC issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44704 have an SMS consistent with
Standards and Recommended Practices established by ICAO and contained
in Annex 19 to the
[[Page 1935]]
Convention on International Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), for such
systems. Section 102 of ACSAA requires the implementing regulations to
include a confidential employee reporting system through which
employees can report hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and
incidents, without concern for reprisal for reporting, and a code of
ethics. This rulemaking proposes regulations in accordance with those
requirements.
Additionally, given this clear Congressional support for SMS as a
safety concept, the FAA is proposing to use its discretion under the
following authorities to proactively extend SMS requirements to part
119 certificate holders authorized to operate under part 135 and LOA
holders operating under Sec. 91.147.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 49
U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the authority of the Administrator to
promulgate regulations and rules. This rulemaking is also promulgated
under 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) (``The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum standards for other
practices, methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce and national security''); 44701(a)(2)(A) (``The
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe
flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and
minimum standards in the interest of safety for inspecting, servicing,
and overhauling aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and
appliances''); 44702(a) (``The Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration may issue airman certificates, design organization
certificates, type certificates, production certificates, airworthiness
certificates, air carrier operating certificates, airport operating
certificates, air agency certificates, and air navigation facility
certificates''); and 44704(a)(1) (``The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration shall issue a type certificate for an aircraft,
aircraft engine, or propeller, or for an appliance specified under
paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection when the Administrator finds that
the aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance is properly
designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations
and minimum standards''). Additionally, this rulemaking is consistent
with the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 44701(d)(1)(A) (``When prescribing a
regulation or standard under [49 U.S.C. chapter 447], the Administrator
shall consider the duty of an air carrier to provide service with the
highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.'').
Finally, 49 U.S.C. 44701(c) directs the Administrator to ``carry
out this chapter in a way that best tends to reduce or eliminate the
possibility or recurrence of accidents in air transportation.'' This
rulemaking is intended to require certain entities that are regulated
under the foregoing statutory authorities to develop and maintain an
SMS to improve the safety of their operations. The development and
implementation of SMS may enhance safety in air transportation and
design and manufacturing so that persons can proactively identify and
mitigate safety hazards, thereby reducing the possibility or recurrence
of accidents in air transportation consistent with the mandate in Sec.
44701(c). For these reasons, the proposed regulations are within the
scope of the FAA's authority and are consistent with Congress's mandate
that the FAA exercise its authority to proactively--not just
reactively--promote safe flight of civil aircraft and to reduce or
eliminate hazards that could result in accidents in air transportation.
III. Purpose of This Rulemaking
An SMS is a formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to
managing safety risk and ensuring the effectiveness of safety risk
controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies
for the management of safety risk. An SMS is a management system
integrated into an organization's operations that enforces the concept
that safety should be managed with as much emphasis, commitment, and
focus as any other critical area of an organization.
The purpose of an SMS is to reduce incidents, accidents, and
fatalities by aiding organizations in identifying hazards and
mitigating those hazards before they lead to an incident or accident.
Anecdotal evidence from SMS voluntary program participants indicates
that SMS improves the safety of organizations.\12\ Although the authors
of a 2012 study by the Australian Transport Safety Board acknowledged
the prevalence of earlier studies that were inconclusive, they
ultimately concluded that ``recent studies have demonstrated that well-
implemented SMS, especially those where the organisation invests effort
into the SMS, are associated with enhanced safety performance.'' \13\
Research by Tinsley, Dillon, and Madsen \14\ suggests that the
attention an SMS would bring to seemingly smaller events, or near
accidents, could prevent catastrophes. Tinsley, Dillon, and Madsen
studied near accidents in dozens of companies across industries and in
laboratory simulations. They determined that multiple near accidents
preceded and foreshadowed every disaster and business crisis they
studied, and that most near accidents were ignored. The authors found
that identifying near accidents and correcting root causes are good
investments for an organization. Similarly, in examining large U.S.
commercial airlines that operated from 1990 to 2007, Madsen, Dillon,
and Tinsley \15\ found that for airlines to continue to improve safety
they must attend to the yet undiscovered or unrecognized risks in the
system without waiting for an accident to bring attention to them.
Additionally, the FAA contends that expanding the implementation of SMS
in the aviation industry would increase overall safety for each entity
using an SMS, as well as requiring communication across the aviation
industry with respect to identified hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ As described in the Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
rule, for example, one participant noted that the compressed
executive awareness time of new safety related issues resulted in
formal management actions occurring in less than 90 days for low-
risk issues and within hours for high-risk issues. Another
participant noted that they have a seen a substantial drop in the
major risk categories that they track.
\13\ Thomas, Dr. Matthew J.W.; A Systematic Review of the
Effectiveness of Safety Management Systems, Australian Transport
Safety Bureau, 2012, p. 27. https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/4053559/xr2011002_final.pdf.
\14\ Tinsley, Catherine H. et al., How to Avoid Catastrophe.
Harvard Business Review, Brighton, 2011. https://hbr.org/2011/04/how-to-avoid-catastrophe.
\15\ Madsen, Peter et al., Airline Safety Improvement Through
Experience with Near-Misses: A Cautionary Tale. Risk Analysis, May
2016, Vol. 36, No. 5.
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The FAA previously forecasted a reduction in fatalities as a result
of implementing SMS for part 121 certificate holders.\16\ The FAA still
expects an overall reduction in fatalities, however quantifying the
effects of part 5 requirements on part 121 certificate holders cannot
be done at this time due to inadequate data. The data available for
2020 and 2021 is both significantly reduced and atypical due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Section V (Regulatory Notices and Analysis) starting on
page 1318 of 14 CFR part 5 final rule published January 8, 2015, 80
FR 1308.
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Over the last few decades, accidents involving commercial aviation
operators
[[Page 1936]]
have decreased.\17\ Despite an overall reduction in accidents, the FAA
has determined that many of the accidents involving part 135 and Sec.
91.147 operators could have been effectively mitigated by the presence
of an SMS. These accidents highlight the systemic improvement
opportunities to safety as described in the Regulatory Impact Analysis
(RIA) for this rulemaking. According to NTSB data, from 2015 to 2019,
there were 215 accidents involving part 135 operators, with a total of
121 fatalities,\18\ as well as 33 accidents involving air tour
operators operating under Sec. 91.147, with a total of 16
fatalities.\19\ The FAA identified 35 of these accidents involving part
135 operators and four accidents involving Sec. 91.147 operators which
involved fatalities and serious injuries that could have been mitigated
had those operators implemented an SMS. Additional accidents not
involving fatalities or serious injuries may also have been avoided.
The FAA also identified several accidents across parts 91, 121, and 135
involving design and production issues that resulted in fatalities and
serious injuries that could have been mitigated or prevented if the
design and manufacturing organizations involved had implemented an
SMS.\20\ A full listing of each accident used to inform the analysis of
this rulemaking (including a brief description of the accident, a
quantified estimate of the probability of mitigation through the
adoption of SMS, and a rationale for estimated probability) is included
in Appendix A to the RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ U.S. Air Carrier Safety Data, https://www.bts.gov/content/us-air-carrier-safety-data. Accessed March 22, 2022.
\18\ National Transportation Safety Board. U.S. Civil Aviation
Accident Rates. 2022. Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/Pages/research.aspx.
\19\ Data file of sightseeing accidents provided by the NTSB
April 2020.
\20\ These accidents include those identified by NTSB accident
numbers: DCA19MA086, ERA18LA199, DCA18MA142, ERA18FA120, DCA17FA021,
WPR16FA153, DCA16FA199, ERA16FA185, WPR16FA055, DCA16FA013,
CEN15MA290, ERA15FA254, and DCA15FA073.
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Given the rapid development, growth, and increasing complexities of
the airspace, the FAA believes that SMS requirements should extend to
parties that play a critical role in the design, manufacturing, and
operation of aircraft. ACSAA requires the FAA to include holders of
both a TC and a PC among those organizations that should be required to
implement an SMS. Applying SMS to commuter and on-demand air carriers,
air tours, and the manufacturers responsible for design and production
of products would continue to reduce incidents, accidents, and
fatalities and improve safety in aviation by requiring these
organizations to proactively identify hazards, assess risk of those
hazards, and develop and implement mitigations, as necessary. The FAA
anticipates that this systemic safety effort will have a measurable
effect on the reduction in fatalities as described in the RIA for this
rulemaking. ICAO, other civil aviation authorities, industry advisory
groups, and the NTSB all agree that the use of an SMS improves safety.
An SMS has been implemented by each part 121 operator, and many other
organizations have implemented an SMS following the FAA's SMS Voluntary
Program. The FAA has also implemented SMS within many of its own
organizations. The FAA's own experience has shown that organizations
that have an SMS may:
Increase safety of products or services by identifying and
addressing problems before they occur.
Improve data-informed decision making to prioritize
resource allocation.
Enhance communication regarding safety by using common,
consistent terminology within the organization and throughout the
industry.
Strengthen the organization's safety culture.
Further, expansion of the SMS requirements would increase U.S.
alignment with other civil aviation authorities that are also
implementing SMS requirements in accordance with ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices. With an SMS, a U.S. company would have an
improved ability to operate internationally due to better alignment
with ICAO standards and recommended practices. Furthermore, a U.S.
company without an SMS could even be barred from doing business in a
country where the civil aviation authority requires them to have an
SMS.
To date, SMS requirements have mainly focused on internal
identification and mitigation of risk within an organization. However,
the FAA is proposing to augment these requirements to encourage a more
collaborative approach in which persons required to have an SMS share
hazard information with each other and work together to identify and
address hazards and safety issues. To enable this more collaborative
approach, this proposal includes requirements to share hazard
information with other organizations, which are intended to ensure that
relevant information is shared with the person in the best position to
address the hazard. The expanded applicability and hazard information
sharing among interfacing organizations would enable a network of
organizations working collaboratively to manage risk, thereby enhancing
the safety benefits of SMS by assuring that hazards are communicated
and mitigated effectively.
IV. Background
A. SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committees
The FAA chartered two ARCs composed of industry stakeholders to
provide advice on implementing SMS in aviation regulations, including
parts 21, 91, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145. The industry
stakeholders on these ARCs included individual companies and
associations representing operators, design and manufacturing
organizations, repair stations, and training organizations. These ARCs
expressed industry support for SMS and recommended that the FAA publish
rules requiring use of SMS.
1. SMS ARC (2009)
On February 12, 2009, the FAA chartered the SMS ARC with membership
from across the aviation industry to evaluate the public comments
submitted in response to an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) on potential rulemaking requiring certain part 21, 119, 121,
125, 135, 141, 142, and 145 certificate holders to develop an SMS \21\
and provide its recommendations regarding further action the agency
should consider in developing and implementing SMS requirements.\22\
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\21\ 74 FR 36414, July 23, 2009.
\22\ Safety Management System (SMS) Aviation Rulemaking
Committee; Order 1110.152, Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/SMSARC-2122009.pdf (as of March 15, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its report, the ARC recommended the FAA issue regulations on SMS
and that those regulations apply to certificate holders under 14 CFR
parts 21, 119, 121, 125, 135, 141, 142, and 145, as well as operators
under 14 CFR part 91 subpart K. This broad applicability would more
closely align with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices. The ARC,
however, recommended phased promulgation of SMS regulations and that
the FAA prioritize new SMS regulations based on the potential safety
benefit, as well as industry experience and regulatory oversight
readiness. The FAA addressed these recommendations by first focusing on
part 121 by promulgating 14 CFR part 5 on January 8, 2015 and proposing
a rule to require airports certificated under part 139 to implement an
SMS. Although the SMS requirements in part 5 currently apply only to
part 121 operators, the FAA
[[Page 1937]]
explained in that rulemaking that part 5 was designed for broader
application and the FAA intended for the SMS requirements to apply to
other FAA-regulated entities in the future.\23\ The rulemakings
implementing SMS for part 121 operators and airports certificated under
part 139 are addressed in more detail in Section IV.C. of this NPRM
preamble.
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\23\ NPRM, ``Safety Management Systems for Part 121 Certificate
Holders,'' 75 FR 68224, 68232 (November 5, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When considering this proposed rule, the FAA explored applying part
5 SMS requirements to additional certificate holders and operators
consistent with the ARC recommendations, as well as any certificate
holders and operators required by ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices in ICAO Annex 19 (i.e., parts 21, 135, 141, 142, 145, and
some operators under part 91). However, in this proposed rule the FAA
is choosing to address the most impactful parts to which ICAO Annex 19
is applicable (part 135 [operators], part 21 [design and
manufacturing], and Sec. 91.147 [air tours]).
The ARC also recommended that the FAA provide additional
protections for SMS safety information and proprietary data. As
discussed in more detail in Section V.H., the FAA has addressed data
protection in this proposal.
The ARC recommended alignment with the SMS framework developed by
ICAO in Annex 19, which would facilitate SMS requirement compatibility
with States actively engaged in developing and adopting their own SMS
requirements. The FAA designed part 5 consistent with this
recommendation.
The ARC recommended that the FAA recognize existing systems and
processes. For instance, some operators have systems for internal
auditing, employee reporting, and revising manuals, which could be
leveraged in the development of their SMS. The FAA is incorporating
this recommendation in this proposed rule by encouraging certificate
holders and LOA holders to leverage their existing systems and
processes to meet the requirements. In addition, the FAA is proposing
guidance material that describes how existing systems and processes may
align with SMS requirements.
Further, the ARC expressed concern regarding the potential impact
of SMS requirements on small businesses. The FAA addressed this
concern. Just as existing part 5 requirements are performance-based and
scalable, each revision proposed in this NPRM is also intended to be
scalable. Scalability is discussed further in Section V.F. of this NPRM
preamble. In addition, the proposed guidance accompanying this NPRM
should assist certificate holders in appropriately scaling the
implementation of SMS to fit their operations. The guidance material is
discussed further in Section VI. of this preamble.
2. Part 21 SMS ARC (2012)
The Part 21 SMS ARC, established on October 5, 2012,\24\ evaluated
improvements to the effectiveness and efficiency of existing
``certification procedures for products and parts,'' and the benefits
of incorporating SMS in the design and manufacturing environment. The
FAA received the ARC's final report in October 2014.\25\
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\24\ 14 CFR 21/Safety Management Systems Aviation Rulemaking
Committee Charter. Available at: https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/Part21ARC-10052012.pdf (visited March 15, 2022).
\25\ Part 21/Safety Management Systems (SMS) Aviation Rulemaking
Committee to the Federal Aviation Administration: Recommendations on
Certification Procedures for Products and Parts. October 5, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ARC recommended establishing regulatory requirements for
implementing SMS for design and production approval organizations that
would be consistent with the part 5 requirements.\26\ The ARC
recommended that SMS requirements apply to organizations that design or
manufacture products (under a TC or a PC) and to those that design or
manufacture articles (under a technical standard order authorization or
parts manufacturer approval), or that make changes to products (under a
supplemental type certificate) that could directly prevent continued
safe flight and landing if they fail.\27\
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\26\ At the time the ARC submitted its final report in 2014, the
FAA had not finalized the proposed part 5 requirements. Part 5
became effective March 9, 2015.
\27\ Part 21/Safety Management Systems (SMS) Aviation Rulemaking
Committee to the Federal Aviation Administration: Recommendations on
Certification Procedures for Products and Parts, page 31. October 5,
2014.
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The FAA analyzed the ARC's recommendation and developed an
alternative (see Alternative 1 in Section VII.A.5.) to the current
proposal that may have met the intent of the ARC's recommendation by
extending SMS requirements beyond holders of both a TC and a PC for the
same product. This alternative would require SMS for design and
production approval holders who design or produce products typically
used for compensation or hire with some exceptions (described in
Alternative 1 in Section VII.A.5.). As part of this alternative, the
FAA considered permitting design and production approval holders to
apply to be excluded from part 5 requirements if the failure of the
article or product alteration would have little or no impact on the
continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft. After analyzing the
costs and benefits, the FAA determined that there were costs to
including these design and production approval holders, but was unable
to estimate the magnitude of benefits. The analysis of this alternative
is provided in Section VII.A.5. As a result, the FAA is not proposing
to adopt the full scope of the ARC's recommendation in this NPRM at
this time.
B. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
The NTSB first recommended in 1997 that transportation
organizations implement an SMS, and early recommendations were aimed at
improving safety in the maritime industry. Since then, a number of NTSB
investigations related to various modes of transportation, including
aviation, have cited organizational factors contributing to accidents
and have recommended SMS as a way to prevent future accidents and
improve safety. The NTSB issued 18 recommendations regarding SMS for
aviation organizations over a 15-year period, spanning 2007 through
2021.\28\ These recommendations covered commercial operations under 14
CFR parts 121 and 135, revenue passenger carrying business operations
under part 91, and certificate holders under part 21. Eight of the 18
NTSB recommendations were issued to the FAA.\29\
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\28\ NTSB Safety recommendations: A-07-010 (2007), A-09-016
(2009), A-09-089 (2009), A-09-098 (2009), A-09-106 (2009), A-12-062
(2012), A-12-063 (2012), A-14-105 (2014), A-14-106 (2014), A-16-036
(2016), A-19-028 (2020), A-19-036 (2019), A-19-038 (2019), A-20-025
(2020), A-21-007 (2021), A-21-013 (2021), A-21-014 (2021), and A-21-
048 (2021).
\29\ NTSB Safety recommendations: A-07-010 (2007), A-09-089
(2009), A-09-016 (2009), A-16-036 (2016), A-19-028 (2020), A-21-013
(2021), A-21-014 (2021), and A-21-048 (2021).
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The NTSB regularly publishes a Most Wanted List, which ``highlights
transportation safety improvements needed now to prevent accidents,
reduce injuries, and save lives.'' \30\ The NTSB 2021-2022 Most Wanted
List recommended that the FAA, ``Require and Verify the Effectiveness
of Safety Management Systems in all Revenue
[[Page 1938]]
Passenger-Carrying Aviation Operations.'' \31\
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\30\ 2021-2022 NTSB Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements, www.ntsb.gov/mwl.
\31\ 2021-2022, NTSB Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements, Require and Verify the Effectiveness of Safety
Management Systems in all Revenue Passenger-Carrying Aviation
Operations, https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/Pages/mwl-21-22/mwl-as-01.aspx.
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C. Safety Management System Rulemaking Efforts
1. Safety Management Systems for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental
Operations
On July 23, 2009, the FAA published an ANPRM to solicit public
comments on whether certain 14 CFR part 21, 119, 121, 125, 135, 141,
142, and 145 certificate holders, product manufacturers, applicants,
and employers (product/service providers) should be required to develop
an SMS.\32\ Subsequently, on August 1, 2010, Congress enacted the
Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of
2010 (Pub. L. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2366), which directed the FAA to
conduct rulemaking to ``require all part 121 air carriers to implement
a safety management system.'' \33\ To meet the rulemaking deadlines
mandated by the Act, the FAA decided not to immediately address SMS for
other product/service providers.\34\ The FAA limited the SMS rulemaking
project to part 121 air carriers, issuing an NPRM on November 5, 2010,
\35\ and subsequently withdrawing the ANPRM.\36\
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\32\ ANPRM, ``Safety Management Systems,'' 74 FR 36414. July 23,
2009.
\33\ See Sec. 215(a).
\34\ See ``Safety Management System; Withdrawal,'' 76 FR 14592.
March 17, 2011.
\35\ 75 FR 68224.
\36\ See id.
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On January 8, 2015, the FAA published the Safety Management Systems
for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations Certificate Holders
final rule (SMS for part 121 final rule) requiring operators authorized
to conduct operations under part 121 to develop and implement an SMS to
improve the safety of their aviation related activities.\37\ The final
rule added part 5 to Title 14 of the CFR, creating the SMS requirements
for part 121 certificate holders, modeled on the ICAO SMS framework in
ICAO Annex 19 and consistent with the 2009 ARC recommendations. The
requirements in part 5 were meant to be applicable to organizations of
various sizes and complexities, as well as adaptable to fit the
different types of organizations in the air transportation system and
operations within an individual company. The final rule also modified
14 CFR part 119 to specify applicability and implementation of the new
SMS framework in part 5 for part 119 certificate holders authorized to
conduct operations under part 121. Part 121 operators met the
requirement to have an SMS acceptable to the FAA by 2018. The FAA has
seen continuous improvement in 121 operators' use of SMS to manage the
safety of their operations and, therefore, is proposing to expand part
5 applicability with this rulemaking.
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\37\ 80 FR 1308. The FAA published technical amendments on
January 13, 2015 (80 FR 1584) and May 25, 2017 (82 FR 24009) to
correct a date and a reference in the rule, respectively.
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2. Safety Management Systems for Part 139 Airports
On July 14, 2016, the FAA published the ``Safety Management System
for Certificated Airports'' supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking
[(81 FR 45872)] (Airports SMS SNPRM). The Airports SMS SNPRM proposed
to require airports that meet certain criteria to develop and implement
an SMS in the airport's movement and non-movement areas. The FAA is
working to finalize that rule.
D. Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act
The Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents involving the Boeing
737 MAX resulted in several investigations, not only of the accidents,
but also of the FAA's oversight and certification processes. One such
investigation, convened by the FAA in April of 2019, was the Boeing 737
MAX Flight Control System Joint Authorities Technical Review. The Joint
Authorities Technical Review included representatives from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the FAA, and several foreign
civil aviation authorities. One of the Joint Authorities Technical
Review recommendations was that the FAA encourage applicants to have a
system safety function, such as a safety management system, that is
independent from their design organization.\38\
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\38\ Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR), Boeing 737 MAX
Flight Control System: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations.
October 11, 2019.
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Subsequently, on December 27, 2020, Congress enacted ACSAA, which
set forth a variety of reforms intended to address certain safety
standards relating to the aircraft certification process. Section 102
of ACSAA requires that the FAA promulgate rules to require holders of
both a TC and a PC issued under 14 CFR part 21 to implement an SMS.
ACSAA also establishes a timeline for those certificate holders to
adopt an SMS (i.e., no later than four years after the date of
enactment, December 27, 2024), and it establishes certain requirements
for the rulemaking, including a confidential employee reporting system
through which employees can report hazards, issues, concerns,
occurrences, and incidents without concern for reprisal for reporting,
and a code of ethics.
E. International Movement Toward SMS
ICAO Annex 19, Safety Management, establishes a framework for
member States to develop and implement SMS requirements within their
State's rules. Several member States, including the U.S., started
developing and implementing SMS requirements within their countries
after Annex 19 First Edition was published in July 2013 and became
applicable in November 2013.\39\ Annex 19 currently requires States to
establish requirements for SMS for international commercial air
transportation, design and manufacturing, maintenance, air traffic
services, training organizations, and certified aerodromes, as well as
SMS criteria for international general aviation operators of large or
turbojet airplanes.
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\39\ The Second Edition of Annex 19 was published in July 2016
and became applicable in November 2019.
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Member States continue to make progress in developing,
implementing, and maintaining requirements for SMS that are aligned
with ICAO's SMS standards and recommended practices, including
certificating authorities in Canada, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Japan,
Australia, and Europe (European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)).
In the EASA regulatory framework, SMS is mandatory for certificated
operators of airplanes and helicopters authorized to conduct commercial
air transportation. Additionally, as a result of recent EASA rulemaking
efforts, SMS will also be applicable for continuing airworthiness of an
aircraft and its components. The EASA also adopted a rule for design
and production organizations (part 21), which will become applicable on
March 7, 2023.\40\
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\40\ European Union Aviation Safety Agency Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/203 of 14 February 2022.
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FAA also notes that other civil aviation authorities and interested
parties are initiating evaluations to determine the effects of SMS post
implementation. Two evaluations of note are discussed as follows.
In 2019 Transport Canada Civil Aviation published an evaluation of
the impact of SMS on aviation safety 10 years after it was mandated for
airline operators, private operators, approved
[[Page 1939]]
maintenance organizations that service airline operator aircraft, air
navigation services, and aerodromes/airports/heliports.\41\ The
evaluation findings were based on multiple lines of evidence, including
a survey of nearly 1800 aviation industry stakeholders (operators,
approved maintenance organizations, aerodromes), case studies involving
eight enterprises and interviews. The evaluation found that many
organizations have implemented policies and practices associated with
an effective SMS, specifically, non-punitive reporting, executive
commitment and hazard identification and mitigation. The evaluation
found notable buy-in to SMS among those surveyed. Although accident
trends declined over the 10-year evaluation period it was also noted
that a lack of objective data limited ability to show safety
improvement directly attributable to SMS because of the difficulty in
separating other effects that may also benefit safety.
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\41\ Evaluation of Safety Management Systems in Civil Aviation--
Transport Canada, July 2019. Available at: https://tc.canada.ca/sites/default/files/2021-02/evaluation-safety-management-systems-civil-aviation.pdf.
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A Griffith University (Queensland Australia) doctoral thesis paper
evaluated the impact of SMSs on safety performance for commercial
aviation operations using two case studies.\42\ Legislation in
Australia for the implementation of an SMS for regular public transport
Air Operator Certificate holders was mandated by the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority in 2009 with phased implementation to be complete by
2011.
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\42\ The Impact of Safety Management Systems on Safety
Performance: Commercial Aviation Operations--Griffith University
thesis paper. April 2015. Available at: https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/handle/10072/367145.
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The first case study examined SMSs in the international general
aviation and charter operation sector while the second case study
reviewed SMSs in the Australian airline sector. In the first case
study, researchers conducted an analysis of de-identified Flight Safety
Foundation general aviation and charter sector audit findings. A total
of 7,625 audit findings were reviewed from 2011-2014 from a population
of 117 operators. The determination of safety performance was not
possible for this sample population using a conventional accident rate
metric due to the lack of availability of flight departure data.
However, the study concluded that safety performance had improved since
SMS implementation, showing a uniform decrease in the number of
negative audit findings. Although the study did not control for the
number and thoroughness of audits performed during the years under
study, the study did present qualitative findings by year and
discipline, independent of the number of audits conducted. The study
further concluded that a decrease in findings for the last two years of
the study were likely due to the improvements brought about by growing
and maturing safety management systems.\43\
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\43\ Yeun, Richard Chee Kin, The Impact of Safety Management
Systems on Safety Performance: Commercial Aviation Operations, Ph.D.
Thesis (Queensland Australia: Griffith University, 2015), See table
6.5, pp 122-123. https://hdl.handle.net/10072/367145.
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In the second case study, researchers conducted a review of airline
SMSs in Australia by comparison of Civil Aviation Safety Authority
safety audit indicators for the sampled population before and after the
implementation of SMS. The study concluded that the empirical evidence
indicates that SMSs improve the safety performance of commercial
aviation operations. The study also showed that SMS safety assurance
plays the most critical role in an effective SMS; its associated
subcomponents of continuous improvement, safety performance monitoring
and measurement, and management of change have the highest net
influence of all the SMS components. FAA notes that the Griffith
University study conclusions and multiple correlation analyses are
based on a short timeframe (three years of fully implemented SMS) and
study of longer timeframes involving more mature SMSs is desirable.
V. Discussion of the Proposal
The FAA proposes changes to part 5 to further the safety of flights
for compensation or hire and passenger carrying operations. To that
end, the FAA considers that overall aerospace system safety would be
increased by requiring entities beyond part 121 operators to implement
SMS, including other operators that fly for compensation or hire and
the designers and manufacturers of products used in the system. The FAA
envisions these safety management systems to be scalable to the size
and complexity of the organization, and to not be unduly burdensome. By
requiring entities that span the disparate sectors of aviation from
manufacturing and design to operations to implement an SMS, the FAA
seeks to create a network of organizations that speak the same language
of safety management and can better communicate with one another and
share information about any hazards they identify during the course of
their business. Although some part 121 operators may communicate with
one another voluntarily at this time, the FAA considers that there
would be greater safety benefit if all aviation organizations, from the
manufacturer to the operator, were to communicate hazard information to
one another. The FAA considers that the benefits of safety management
systems are derived from each of the components of an SMS and that the
proposed changes to part 5 would assist in maximizing the potential of
an SMS to increase safety across the aerospace system.
A. Applicability
Part 5 currently applies only to persons authorized to conduct
operations under part 121. The FAA proposes to amend Sec. 5.1 and
expand the applicability of part 5 to: (1) any person authorized or
applying to conduct operations under part 135 or Sec. 91.147; (2) any
person that holds or applies for a PC issued under part 21 for a
product for which they are the TC holder or licensee; and (3) TC
holders who license the TC for production.
Although the FAA recognizes the value of the variety of voluntary
safety programs, their optional nature and lack of comprehensive
application of all elements of part 5 may not yield as much safety
benefit as a mandatory SMS that complies with all proposed requirements
of part 5. Therefore, to ensure that the minimum standard is met, the
FAA is proposing to broaden the application of part 5 SMS requirements.
1. Part 135 Operators
As described in Section III, the FAA identified a number of
accidents involving part 135 operators which resulted in fatalities and
serious injuries that could have been mitigated through SMS. These
accidents involved both passenger-carrying and cargo-only operations.
Each of these accidents stemmed from different circumstances; however,
the accidents analyzed were a representative cross section of the
overall circumstances that were present in the balance of total part
135 accidents that occurred. Therefore, the FAA considers that an SMS
would have been effective in similar accidents among those not
analyzed.
The FAA proposes to require all part 119 certificate holders
authorized to operate under part 135 and applicants for those
certificates to develop and implement an SMS that meets the part 5
requirements. This aligns the proposed part 5 applicability with ICAO
Annex 19 and with other civil aviation
[[Page 1940]]
authorities that generally do not differentiate between size and
complexity of air carriers. SMS is necessary for safety of air
transportation generally because anyone who engages in air
transportation must understand the hazards associated with their
operation, effectively assess the risks, and understand how to mitigate
those risks. The identification of hazards through SMS may include
analyzing the potential risk associated with crewmember fatigue when
compounded by variations in individual 135 operations, such as
scheduling variances, frequency of operations, distance, and number of
pilots.\44\
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\44\ See report from the Part 135 Pilot and Duty Rules Aviation
Rulemaking Committee dated July 2, 2021, a copy of which has been
placed in the docket for this rule.
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The FAA considered excluding part 135 operators who use only one
pilot-in-command in their operations from the SMS requirements.
Approximately 31 percent (594) of the part 135 operators use one pilot-
in-command. These operators have between 1 and 7 aircraft. Similar to
most part 135 operators, these operators might also meet the size
standard for small businesses (see Section VII.B for details). However,
as all part 135 operators conduct air transportation of passengers and
cargo, the FAA determined such exclusion would not be in the interest
of safety as evidenced by the part 135 accidents discussed in Section
III that could have been mitigated through an SMS (including those
involving only one pilot-in-command).
As a fundamental matter, the flying public expects safe carriage
from operators offering flight services for hire. Irrespective of
whether an operator employs one pilot or a thousand, that company has
the same responsibility to conduct safe operations. Part 135 operators
employing just a single pilot are not immune to accident or serious
injury; the FAA's review of NTSB reports from 2015 to 2020 showed that
part 135 operators employing just a single pilot were involved in five
accidents involving a fatality or serious injury. This record
demonstrates that very small and single pilot part 135 operators
continue to face insufficiently addressed safety hazards that cause the
loss of life. More importantly, the FAA concluded that these operators
could have used basic components of SMS, such as establishing safety
policies, performing safety risk management to assess risk and develop
controls, and using safety assurance to verify risk control
effectiveness to address hazards that contributed to these accidents.
These SMS elements, which require the operator to proactively monitor
its practices, procedures, and how it makes decisions, are especially
important for small organizations Small organizations by definition
have fewer people and, as a result, have fewer opportunities for checks
and balances on decisions that can affect safety. SMS addresses this by
requiring small operators to create a structure for proactively
monitoring their decision-making processes and addressing deficiencies.
Very small operators may implement SMS requirements differently than
larger operators. For example, with respect to Sec. 5.93, small
operators will have fewer employees to communicate with than large
operators where personnel may have a more narrow set of
responsibilities and less awareness of all operations. At one end of
the spectrum, a one-person operator would have a system for documenting
their own hazard information, actions, mitigations, safety performance,
etc. for future reference. At the other end of the spectrum, a large
organization would have a system capable of documenting and sharing
information with larger groups of people. In particular, certain
aspects of SMS such as developing more routine expectations for
monitoring and responding to hazards may be particularly beneficial for
smaller operators. The FAA requests comment regarding how SMS might
present unique opportunities or challenges for smaller organizations.
The five accidents involving single-pilot part 135 operators
between 2015 and 2020 resulted in 5 fatalities and 4 serious
injuries.\45\ Appendix A of the RIA describes how SMS could help avoid
similar accidents in the future. The following discussion describes
three of those accidents and identifies how having an SMS could have
addressed the hazards contributing to the accidents. In each of these
cases, if the operator had invested in an appropriately scaled SMS
program on the front end, it could have avoided property damage,
injury, and loss of life on the back end.
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\45\ NTSB accident numbers: CEN18FA215, ANC18LA046, ANC16FA017,
ANC17TA015, and CEN17FA100.
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According to the NTSB, the probable cause of accident CEN18FA215
was the pilot's decision to fly over the river at a low altitude and
his failure to maintain clearance with wires during low-level flight.
The FAA examined the effect SMS would be expected to have on this
accident and determined that SMS would have enabled the operator to
identify hazards along waterways. As a result of conducting safety risk
management (Sec. Sec. 5.51-5.55) the organization would develop a
safety risk control that would help prevent the accident from
occurring. Specifically, the risk control might have established a
minimum altitude above known or presumed obstructions (Sec. 5.55(c)).
The operator might have also established a policy or control that
whenever the pilot is operating around wires, the pilot would mark the
location of the wires on a map. This risk control would have helped to
mitigate the risk of the pilot inadvertently flying into the wires
because these additional controls would help to ensure the pilot's
situational awareness regarding the location of the wires in relation
to the aircraft. In this case, the pilot would monitor the safety
performance (Sec. 5.71), by validating the location of the wires on
the map and updating the information as appropriate. This is one way
that the operator could verify that risk controls were appropriately
applied and effective. In a small organization the operator could
communicate (Sec. 5.93) the control to others in the organization
face-to-face, via email, or other methods that the company regularly
uses to communicate with its employees.
The probable cause of accident ANC18LA046 was the pilot's selection
of an unsuitable takeoff area with unfavorable wind conditions, which
resulted in the airplane's inability to maintain a climb. The FAA
determined that the effect SMS would have had on this accident was
similar to that of accident CEN18FA215. In this case, had the operator
conducted safety risk management (Sec. Sec. 5.51-5.55), it would
likely have developed risk controls to ensure safer operations (Sec.
5.55(c)). For example, the operator could establish tools for a go/no-
go decision customized for its operations. This could include special
procedures specific to the environment or operations. Another risk
control might be establishing procedures to ensure that the equipment
is appropriate for the environment. Both of these controls would be
documented using standard information tools already in use within the
company. Conducting safety risk management could have included
identifying and evaluating company approved unimproved landing areas to
include ingress/egress routes and minimum acceptable weather
performance limits could mitigate these hazards. In this case, safety
performance monitoring (Sec. 5.71) might include periodic review of
operations in non-standard environments to ensure that the controls
provide the intended effect.
[[Page 1941]]
Similar to the previous example, the operator could communicate (Sec.
5.93) the control to others in the organization face-to-face, via
email, or other methods that the company regularly uses to communicate
with its employees.
The probable cause of accident ANC16FA017 was the pilot's
inadvertent turn toward terrain that was higher-than-expected while
trying to avoid poor visibility conditions and his subsequent attempt
to clear terrain, which reduced the airspeed and led to the exceedance
of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall and
spin was the probable cause of accident. The FAA determined that SMS
would have had an effect on this accident. In this case, with an SMS,
the operator would have conducted safety risk management (Sec. Sec.
5.51-5.55), and it would likely have identified hazards with low
visibility hazards and mountainous terrain. The operator might develop
safety risk controls regarding route suitability (Sec. 5.55(c)). These
risk controls could include setting higher alternative weather minimums
and selection of alternative routes that are consistent with the
aircraft's performance, along with training to support these risk
controls. The operator would also monitor its safety performance (Sec.
5.71), by validating that the higher alternative weather minimums and
alternative routes are appropriate mitigations. Similar to other
examples, the operator could communicate (Sec. 5.93) the control to
others in the organization face-to-face, via email, or other methods
that the company regularly uses to communicate with its employees.
In addition to addressing risk in this segment of the part 135
population, the FAA considers that a part 119 certificate holder
authorized to operate under part 135 with only one pilot-in-command
receives the same privileges and authorization as any other size or
complexity part 119 certificate holder authorized to operate under part
135, and should therefore be subject to the same requirements with
regard to SMS. The FAA recognizes that the implementation of part 5
requirements, applicable to all part 135 operators, must remain
scalable to the size and complexity of the organization. (For more
information regarding scalability, please refer to Section V.F.).
Some part 119 certificate holders may be authorized to operate
under both parts 121 and 135. The proposal would extend the SMS
requirements to operations conducted by those combination certificate
holders authorized to operate under both parts 121 and 135. Certificate
holders that already have an SMS in place for only their part 121
operations would have to implement SMS for their part 135 operation.
2. Section 91.147 Letter of Authorization Holders
The FAA is proposing to extend the SMS requirements to all holders
and applicants of LOAs issued under Sec. 91.147 to enhance the safety
of commercial air tour operations. Most operations for compensation or
hire are conducted pursuant to a part 119 certification, however,
nonstop commercial air tours operated under a Sec. 91.147 LOA conduct
operations for compensation or hire without a part 119 certificate.
Because air tours operated under Sec. 91.147 carry passengers for
compensation or hire, the FAA is proposing to apply part 5 to these
operations.
The FAA considered excluding some smaller Sec. 91.147 LOA holders
from this proposal (those conducting fewer than 100 flights per year).
The FAA does not collect data on number of flights conducted under
Sec. 91.147 LOAs; however, approximately 54 percent (373) have only
one aircraft registration. These LOA holders might also meet the size
standard for small businesses, but the FAA does not have data to make
this determination either (see Section VII.B for details). Consistent
with the approach proposed for part 135 operators who use only one
pilot-in-command in their operations, the FAA believes such an
exception would not meet the safety objective.
FAA review of NTSB accident reports from 2015 to 2020 identified
one accident involving a fatality or serious injury in the segment of
Sec. 91.147 LOA holders conducting fewer than 100 flights per year. As
discussed in Section V.A.1, small operators bear the same
responsibility for safety as large operators.
The Sec. 91.147 LOA holder accident resulted in 5 fatalities
involving an operator conducting air tours.\46\
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\46\ NTSB accident number: ERA18MA099.
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The NTSB indicated that the probable cause of this accident was the
operator's use of a passenger harness/tether system, which caught on
and activated the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever. As a result,
the aircraft lost engine power in-flight and ditched into the East
River. In addition, the operator allowed outside influence on company
decisions. Moreover, they failed to address foreseeable safety risks
associated with the harness/tether device.
If the operator had an SMS in place the company would have
conducted safety risk management prior to installing the harness/tether
device. While conducting safety risk management, the hazard of the
harness/tether device potentially shutting off the fuel lever would
have been identified under Sec. 5.53(a) and analyzed under Sec.
5.55(a). Based on that analysis, the company would assess the safety
risk (Sec. 5.55(b)) and implement appropriate safety risk controls
(Sec. 5.55(c)). After developing safety risk controls, the
organization would communicate them to the appropriate flight crews and
maintenance personnel (Sec. 5.93) face-to-face, via email, or other
methods that the company regularly uses to communicate with its
employees.
In addition, all Sec. 91.147 LOA holders are authorized to provide
the same service, regardless of their size. Improving aviation safety
for all passenger-carrying operations conducted for compensation or
hire would require all Sec. 91.147 LOA holders to meet part 5
requirements for SMS, so long as the implementation of those
requirements remains scalable to the size and complexity of the
organization. (For more information regarding scalability, please refer
to Section V.F.). As the requirements are scalable, so too will be
compliance costs.\47\ And, as evidenced by the accident discussed,
there are safety benefits to be achieved from implementation of SMS
even among these smaller operators.
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\47\ For example, in Section VII.B, Regulatory Flexibility Act,
the FAA finds that the annual costs as a percentage of receipts for
smaller operators with 1 to 9 aircraft is about 0.1% to 0.4%
compared to those with a larger number of aircraft between 100 to
500 is about 0.2% to 0.3%.
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The FAA is aware that there are Sec. 91.147 LOA holders with low
flight volume, as well as 135 operators who use only one pilot-in-
command in their operations.\48\ The FAA seeks supporting information
and data regarding whether this applicability should be limited to a
certain subset of Sec. 91.147 LOA holders and part 135 operators, and
if so, how?
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\48\ There are some Sec. 91.147 LOA holders that conduct
infrequent air tours even though that is not their primary business
(e.g., flight schools, aerial applicators, or electronic news
gathering, etc.).
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3. Part 21 Certificate Holders
The FAA is proposing to require holders of both a TC and a PC
issued for the same product under part 21 to develop and implement an
SMS that complies with the part 5 requirements. Section 102(a)(1) of
ACSAA requires the FAA to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to require
that, ``manufacturers that hold both a type certificate and a
production certificate issued pursuant to section
[[Page 1942]]
44704 of title 49, United States Code, where the United States is the
State of Design and State of Manufacture, have in place an SMS that is
consistent with the standards and recommended practices established by
ICAO.'' As discussed in Section IV.E., Annex 19 requires ICAO member
States to mandate SMS for the management of safety risk in design and
production of aviation products. To meet the statutory requirement and
align U.S. aviation design and manufacturing organizations with safety
management practices followed by other international organizations
complying with Annex 19, the FAA proposes to require holders of both a
TC and a PC issued for the same product under part 21 to develop and
implement an SMS that complies with the part 5 requirements.
Additionally, the FAA proposes to apply part 5 to: (1) persons who
hold or are licensees of a TC and are seeking a PC for that same
product, and (2) persons who hold a PC for a product for which the
person is a licensee of the TC. This approach ensures that there are no
gaps in SMS applicability for part 21 certificate holders because TC
licensees have the same privileges as TC holders under Sec. 21.45 and
the same reporting requirements as TC holders under Sec. 21.3 for
failures, malfunctions, and defects. Therefore, in the context of an
SMS, the FAA considers a licensee of a TC to be equivalent to a holder
of a TC and should be required to comply with the requirements of this
proposed rule.
Through ACSAA, Congress intended for SMS requirements to apply to
entities that design and manufacture products. The FAA further
recognizes that critical decisions are made during design and
development that impact the safety of aviation products. Consequently,
companies that design a product and allow other companies to produce
that product should be held to the same regulatory requirements as a
person holding both the TC and a PC for the same product. Upon
evaluating section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA, the FAA determined that the
implementing regulations combined with the regulatory framework of part
21 could enable certain persons to avoid the proposed requirements by
licensing their TC to another person to obtain a PC.\49\ To address
this gap, the FAA proposes to apply part 5 to TC holders who license
their TC to other persons in accordance with Sec. Sec. 21.47 and
21.55.
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\49\ Under Sec. Sec. 21.47(a) and 21.55, a person who holds a
TC for a product may enter into a written licensing agreement to
allow another person to use that TC to obtain a PC. As a result, the
person obtaining the PC would be allowed to use the TC holder's
design approval to manufacture the product. Therefore, some business
relationships result in one person holding the TC and a different
person holding the PC for the same product.
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The FAA notes that there may be persons who manufacture products
under a TC in accordance with part 21 Subpart F. Section 21.123(g)
requires these persons to obtain a PC within 6 months after the date of
issuance of the TC. Therefore, these persons would be required to
comply with the proposed rule because they have applied for a PC.
The FAA also notes that there may be persons who hold a PC for a
supplemental type certificate. A supplemental type certificate is a
design approval for a modification to a product. A person who holds a
PC for a supplemental type certificate may produce articles used to
modify the product but cannot produce a complete product. Under the
proposed rule, part 5 would not apply to either a supplemental type
certificate holder or a PC holder for a supplemental type certificate
because these design and production approvals are for modifications to
a product and not for complete products. Similarly, there are persons
who may hold a TC and a PC that is designated for the production of
parts or articles only. The proposed rule would not apply because the
PC is only for the production of a part or an article and not for the
same product.
The FAA considered applying part 5 to certain persons holding other
design and production approvals such as technical standard order
authorizations, parts manufacturer approvals, and supplemental type
certificates, an approach that would be consistent with the Part 21 SMS
ARC recommendation. Although there may be safety benefits to applying
SMS to this larger population, the FAA could not substantiate these
benefits. The FAA invites comments as to whether part 5 should apply to
all holders of TCs, PCs, supplemental type certificates, technical
standard order authorizations, or parts manufacturer approvals. The FAA
requests that comments specify whether any exceptions should be made in
the event that the FAA extends part 5 to these design and production
approval holders and what those exceptions should entail. The FAA
further requests information and data related to the safety benefits or
impact of applying part 5 to additional design and production approval
holders beyond the applicability in this proposed rule.
B. General Requirements and Definitions
1. Definitions
The FAA is proposing to move the definitions in part 5 from current
Sec. 5.5 to proposed Sec. 5.3 and to amend the definitions of
``hazard'' and ``safety policy.'' Currently, the definition of
``hazard'' in part 5 is ``a condition that could foreseeably cause or
contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in 49 CFR 830.2.'' In
Annex 19, ICAO defines ``hazard'' as ``a condition or an object with
the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or
accident.'' \50\ The FAA is proposing to amend the definition of the
term ``hazard'' to ``a condition or an object with the potential to
cause or contribute to an incident or aircraft accident, as defined in
49 CFR 830.2,'' to further align with the internationally-recognized
definition published by ICAO. Although the FAA previously did not
include incidents in the definition of hazard,\51\ the FAA now
considers that the definition of hazard should include anything that
affects or could affect the safety of aviation operations, not just
those conditions or objects that could result in serious injury, death,
or substantial damage. This is because many of the same circumstances
that result in an incident could just as easily result in an accident.
As discussed in Section III, Tinsley, Dillon, Madsen studied near
accidents in dozens of companies across industries and in laboratory
simulations. They determined that multiple near accidents preceded and
foreshadowed every disaster and business crisis they studied, and that
most near accidents were ignored. The authors found that ``surfacing
near misses and correcting root causes is one [of] the soundest
investments that organizations can make.'' \52\ Therefore, the FAA is
proposing to add to the definition of hazard, the term ``incident'' as
defined in 49 CFR 830.2. The FAA believes that this proposed change
would improve both international alignment and the identification of
hazards. 49 CFR 830.2 defines ``incident'' as an occurrence other than
an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which
affects or could affect the safety of operations. The FAA does not
define a
[[Page 1943]]
threshold or de minimis standard for what could affect aviation safety.
The FAA believes that organizations are in the best position to
determine what occurrences would have the ability to impact the safety
of their products or services, and as a part of developing their SMS
they may define thresholds for what might entail a reportable incident
that could affect aviation safety.\53\ They are also in the best
position to determine the processes and tools they can use to
communicate this information to their employees. Because safety risk
management and safety assurance are ongoing and iterative processes,
the organization will continually improve its ability to identify,
communicate, and mitigate hazards, preventing them from resulting in
incidents or accidents.
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\50\ International Civil Aviation Organization, Annex 19 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Safety Management,
Second Edition, pp. 1-2. July 2016.
\51\ 80 FR 1308.
\52\ Tinsley, Catherine H., Robin L. Dillon, and Peter M.
Madsen. How to Avoid Catastrophe. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2011/04/how-to-avoid-catastrophe. 2011.
\53\ For additional discussion on hazard information sharing,
please see section V.C.4.b. (Safety Promotion (Subpart E), Proposed
amendments to subpart E).
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In addition, the FAA proposes two other modifications to the
definition of ``hazard'' to more closely align with the ICAO
definition: (1) while objects are a subset of the term ``condition,''
the FAA is proposing to add the term ``object,'' and (2) the FAA is
proposing to change ``foreseeably'' to ``the potential to.'' These
changes would align the definition more closely with the ICAO
definition of ``hazard''.
In addition, the FAA proposes to amend the definition of safety
policy to change ``certificate holder'' to ``person.'' This proposed
change would make the definition consistent with the revised
applicability proposed by this rule, which includes persons who are not
certificate holders (e.g., LOA holders).
2. Requirement To Develop and Implement SMS
As discussed previously, the FAA is proposing to move the General
Requirements for SMS currently contained in Sec. 5.3 to proposed Sec.
5.5. For clarity, the FAA would reorganize proposed Sec. 5.5 into
three subparagraphs: (1) general requirements for the components of an
SMS, (2) a new proposed requirement for a system description, and (3)
the requirement to maintain an SMS in accordance with part 5.
Additionally, the FAA is proposing to remove certain provisions from
current Sec. 5.3 as unnecessary.
The FAA proposes to add a requirement for all persons subject to
part 5 to develop a system description. A system description is a
summary of aviation-related processes and activities and a description
of interfacing persons that contribute to the safety of the aviation-
related products and services provided. The FAA considers that
organizations that receive the aviation-related products and services
could contribute to the safety of those products and services and
would, therefore, be identified among the interfacing persons.
A system description is important because organizations are often
made up of a complex network of interactions involving different
internal departments that also interface with external organizations
that contribute to the safe operation of the organization. For an
organization to have an effective SMS, it must fully understand its
aviation-related business operations and activities that impact the
management of aviation safety. Without that understanding, the SMS is
unlikely to be clearly defined, adequately applied, or effectively
executed. The use of an organization system description would also
enable the organization to have a clear picture of its many
interactions.
Although the focus of this regulation is on aviation, some
organizations might also extend their SMS to their non-aviation related
activities, such as security and occupational safety and health issues.
If an organization elects to do so, the FAA would only conduct
oversight of the SMS related to its aviation functions. The FAA is
proposing to limit the application of SMS only to the aviation-related
activities conducted by the organization under 14 CFR.
The FAA also proposes to add a provision in Sec. 5.5(c) to make
clear that the SMS requirements in part 5 are continuing requirements.
For example, the requirements of part 5 do not cease to apply the
moment a person develops and implements an SMS. Rather, a person must
also maintain SMS in accordance with part 5. The new provision in
proposed Sec. 5.5(c) is not intended to impose a new requirement on
the regulated community; it is intended only to clarify the existing
requirements.
Furthermore, to remove unnecessary rule text, the FAA proposes to
remove the provisions that are currently contained in Sec. 5.3(b) and
(c). Section 5.3(b), which requires the SMS to be maintained in
accordance with the recordkeeping requirements of Subpart F of part 5,
is unnecessary because the recordkeeping requirements of Subpart F
apply irrespective of this provision. Additionally, Sec. 5.3(c), which
requires compliance with the relevant regulatory requirements of 14
CFR, is unnecessary because persons must comply with applicable
regulatory requirements in 14 CFR irrespective of whether the FAA
expressly requires compliance in Sec. 5.3(c).
The FAA also proposes to remove two requirements from current Sec.
5.3(a). First, the FAA proposes to remove the requirement for the SMS
to be submitted to the Administrator for acceptance. The proposal to
expand the applicability of part 5 has resulted in the FAA proposing
new regulations to address the additional entities that would be
covered by part 5, namely Sec. Sec. 5.7, 5.9, 5.11, 5.13, and 5.15.
These proposed regulations would set forth the requirements for each
regulated entity, including which documents the entity must submit to
the Administrator for acceptance or approval. Second, the FAA proposes
to remove the requirement for an SMS to be appropriate to the size,
scope, and complexity of the organization's operation. The FAA has
determined that this provision is unnecessary because the FAA's SMS
requirements are performance-based and scalable. As such, persons that
are required to develop an SMS under part 5 may scale their SMS to the
size and complexity of their organizations. The FAA does not need to
expressly require scalability in the regulations when the performance-
based requirements are designed for that purpose.
C. Components of Safety Management Systems
An SMS is composed of four major components: (1) safety policy, (2)
safety risk management, (3) safety assurance, and (4) safety promotion.
Additionally, an SMS requires documentation and recordkeeping.
Currently, part 5 contains a subpart for each major component and a
subpart for documentation and recordkeeping. The proposed rule would
retain these subparts but includes proposed amendments to each one.
1. Safety Policy (Subpart B)
Safety policy is the foundation for an SMS and must be documented
and communicated throughout the organization. All organizations must
define policies, processes, procedures, and organizational structures
to accomplish their safety objectives and goals. A documented safety
policy ensures that all employees of the organization are aware of
management's commitment to achieving the organization's safety
objectives and are aware of their own role in meeting the safety
objectives.
[[Page 1944]]
a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart B
Subpart B of part 5 sets forth the requirements for the
organization's safety policy. The safety policy component of SMS
includes safety policy documentation, identification accountability and
authority in regard to safety, designation and responsibilities of
safety management personnel, and emergency response planning. Section
5.21 currently requires a documented safety policy that: (1)
establishes the organization's safety objectives, (2) includes a
commitment to fulfill those safety objectives, (3) contains a statement
concerning the necessary resources for implementation of the SMS, (4)
contains a safety reporting policy, (5) defines unacceptable behavior
and conditions for disciplinary action, and (6) establishes an
emergency response plan for transitioning from normal to emergency
operations.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart B
The FAA is proposing to add a requirement to Sec. 5.21(a) that
would require the safety policy to include a code of ethics that
applies to all employees, including management personnel and officers.
The code of ethics would clarify that safety is the organization's
highest priority. This proposed requirement responds to section 102(f)
of ACSAA, which mandates that ``the regulations issued under subsection
(a) shall require a safety management system to include establishment
of a code of ethics applicable to all appropriate employees of a
certificate holder, including officers (as determined by the FAA),
which confirms that safety is the organization's highest priority.''
The FAA agrees that a code of ethics is beneficial to overall safety;
therefore, this proposal would fulfill that legislative mandate and
extend the requirement to all persons required to have an SMS.
The FAA acknowledges that section 102(f) of ACSAA only requires the
FAA to apply the code of ethics requirement to certain part 21
certificate holders. However, to the greatest extent possible, the FAA
seeks consistency in the SMS requirements. Furthermore, the FAA
believes having a code of ethics, applicable to all employees of the
organization, would influence the safety culture of the organization.
If employees see their management engaged with safety as the highest
priority, then that same safety attitude would likely prevail
throughout the entire organization. Therefore, all persons required to
have an SMS would benefit from having a code of ethics that confirms
that safety is the organization's highest priority. For that reason,
the FAA is proposing to apply this requirement to all persons who would
be required to have a part 5-compliant SMS.
Additionally, the FAA proposes minor amendments to subpart B
(Sec. Sec. 5.21 through 5.27) to reflect the new applicability
requirements of the proposed rule. Currently, these regulations use the
term ``certificate holder'' because part 5 applies to part 119
certificate holders authorized to conduct operations under part 121.
The FAA proposes to remove all references to ``certificate holder.''
Instead, the proposed rule refers to ``person'' to reflect the new
applicability set forth in proposed Sec. 5.1. Additionally, the FAA
proposes to amend the current requirements of Sec. 5.25 that refer
only to ``certificate(s)'' by adding a reference to ``Letter(s) of
Authorization.'' This would ensure that the requirements of Sec. 5.25
pertaining to the accountable executive apply to Sec. 91.147 LOA
holders.
2. Safety Risk Management (Subpart C)
Another core component of an SMS is safety risk management. A
comprehensive SMS using safety risk management includes identifying
hazards, assessing risk, and developing risk controls to reduce or
eliminate risk associated with those hazards. Safety risk management
allows an organization to focus on the areas of greatest risk from a
safety perspective, taking into account system complexity and scope of
the operations, and allows the organization to implement appropriate
risk controls.
Organizations must apply safety risk management when implementing
new or revising existing systems, developing operational procedures,
and to address hazards or ineffective controls identified through
safety assurance processes. For example, an organization would initiate
safety risk management after learning that certain de-icing operations
are not effective and use safety risk management to analyze the de-
icing operations.\54\ Safety risk management includes the following:
(1) system analysis, (2) identifying hazards associated with the
system, (3) analyzing the risk associated with the hazards, (4)
assessing risk associated with the hazards to determine acceptable
safety risk, and (5) controlling the risk of identified hazards when
necessary.
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\54\ There are existing regulations that prohibit a takeoff when
frost, ice, or snow (contamination) is adhering to the wings,
control surfaces, rotors or propellers of an aircraft and some
operations require a de-icing program [Sec. Sec. 91.527, 121.629,
and 135.227]. However, this example describes how operators can use
SMS to focus on certain de-icing operations that may not be
performing adequately and use a structured process to correct
performance deficiencies or identify design changes (additional
controls) using the SRM process. Current regulations prohibit
takeoff when certain conditions are met, but there are no
requirements for the company to look more broadly at the system and
determine if or when there is a systemic issue with de-icing.
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The system analysis serves as the initial source for hazard
identification when new systems are designed, when systems are revised,
and when new operational procedures are developed. The system analysis
also serves as a basis for describing and organizing information for
risk analysis when potential hazards or ineffective risk controls are
discovered in the safety assurance process. The system analysis
processes ensure that information regarding the function and purpose of
the system; the system's operating environment; outline of the system's
processes and procedures; and the personnel, equipment, and facilities
that the system requires for operation are analyzed so that hazards may
be appropriately identified.
Next, an organization must use established processes to identify
hazards within the context of the system analysis. Any hazards that are
identified must be analyzed to the extent necessary to determine
possible outcomes associated with each hazard.
The organization must then analyze the outcomes to determine the
severity and likelihood (i.e., risk) associated with the outcomes.\55\
Subsequently, the organization must assess the safety risk, which
requires the certificate holder to determine whether the safety risk is
acceptable or mitigation is required.
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\55\ As discussed in examples later in the preamble, this
analysis may be either qualitative or quantitative depending on the
size of the organization, the nature of the safety issue being
addressed, and availability of relevant data, among other factors.
SRM, as with all components of the SMS, should be scaled to fit the
organization. Since each safety issue is unique and each SMS is
developed to fit the organization, the FAA cannot make general
estimates or judgments regarding the amount of time or documentation
an organization would need for any given identified hazard.
Consistent with the intent to scale this rule to the organization
and the issue, the FAA would look to the organization to make that
determination on a case-by-case basis.
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Finally, the organization would develop and implement risk controls
where necessary. Risk controls may mitigate the outcomes by reducing
the likelihood or severity of the outcome or eliminating hazards by
design. After these controls are developed, but before being
implemented, the organization must assess whether the controls are
likely to be effective and would not introduce any new hazards. When
the
[[Page 1945]]
risk controls are assessed and determined to be acceptable, the
organization would implement them. Those controls would then be
continuously monitored under the processes developed under subpart D,
Safety Assurance, to ensure they are effective.
a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart C
Subpart C of part 5 currently contains the safety risk management
requirements for an SMS. Section 5.51 establishes when a certificate
holder would need to apply safety risk management processes and
procedures to systems to identify the hazards and assess the risk
associated with the systems. Once a certificate holder determines that
the processes of safety risk management have been triggered under Sec.
5.51, it must conduct a system analysis, as required by Sec. 5.53.
Section 5.53 provides information that must be considered when
conducting a system analysis and identifying hazards. Currently, when
conducting a system analysis, the following must be considered: (1)
function and purpose of the system, (2) the system's operating
environment, (3) an outline of the system's processes and procedures,
and (4) the personnel, equipment, and facilities necessary for
operation of the system. Section 5.55 establishes the requirements for
safety risk assessment and controls.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart C
The FAA is proposing several changes to subpart C. First, as in the
other subparts, the FAA is proposing to amend Sec. 5.51 and Sec. 5.55
by removing the term ``certificate holder'' to reflect the broadened
applicability of the proposed rule. Instead, these sections will refer
to ``any person required to have an SMS under this subpart.''
Additionally, the FAA is proposing to add a new requirement, Sec.
5.53(b)(5), which would add the interfaces of the system to the list of
items that must be considered when conducting a system analysis in
accordance with Sec. 5.53. Interfaces are a point where two or more
operations, systems, subjects, or organizations connect and interact.
Interfaces can be internal (e.g., between functional groups in an
organization, between hardware/software components of the system being
analyzed, or between processes in the system being analyzed), or they
can be external (e.g., between organizations, between the system being
analyzed and other systems, or between a human using the system and the
system itself). The FAA is proposing to include the interfaces of the
system in the list of considerations required when performing the
system analysis in Sec. 5.53 because hazards can exist with
interfacing organizations, processes, or systems in the way the two
interfacing parts interact with each other. Understanding the
interfaces while conducting a system analysis is important because the
system analysis serves as the basis for identifying and analyzing
hazards and their associated risk. This addition would further improve
the ability of part 121 operators to analyze risk. As the aviation
system becomes more complex, dynamic, and integrated, understanding
these interfaces can assist in the identification of related hazards
and improve safety overall. An SMS that looks both inward and outward
is more effective at identifying hazards, a core function of any
operational SMS. The FAA emphasizes that under this proposed
requirement interfaces would be considered only to the extent that they
affect aviation safety. For example, the interface between a part 21
aircraft manufacturer's engineering and payroll departments would not
be considered when conducting a systems analysis under Sec. 5.53
because this interface would not impact the aviation safety of the
aircraft design. Additionally, the use of fall-arrestors in operator
maintenance facilities to protect individuals working on aircraft would
not be considered when conducting a system analysis in Sec. 5.53
either because the interface is an occupational safety and health
concern and does not directly affect the quality of work performed on
the aircraft.
3. Safety Assurance (Subpart D)
Safety assurance verifies that the risk controls put into place
under safety risk management continue to be effective in managing risk
and that the organization's safety performance is meeting or exceeding
its safety objectives. Safety assurance has three elements: (1) safety
performance monitoring and measurement; (2) safety performance
assessment; and (3) continuous improvement.
Safety performance monitoring and measurement requires the
development and maintenance of processes and systems that monitor
operational processes and collect data on the performance of the
organization. Within an organization, there are processes to collect
data, such as those to meet regulatory requirements or voluntary
reporting programs. In addition, there are external data sources, such
as FAA systems or information from other organizations. Safety
assurance processes must also include investigations of accidents and
incidents. Employee reporting systems provide another source of
information regarding the performance of the organization.
The safety performance assessment is used to assess the
organization's performance against its safety objectives. The safety
performance assessment includes verifying the organization's compliance
with established safety risk controls. In addition, the safety
performance assessment identifies changes in operational environments,
potential new hazards, and ineffective controls. If the assessment
reveals new hazards or ineffective controls, the organization must
initiate safety risk management processes. The accountable executive
designated in accordance with Sec. 5.25 must review information from
the safety performance assessment on a regular basis.
Finally, safety assurance requires continuous improvement. The
analysis and assessment functions of safety assurance are essential in
alerting the organization to significant changes in the operating
environment, possibly indicating a need for system change to maintain
effective risk controls. As a result, an organization with an SMS must
take steps to correct any safety performance deficiencies identified in
the assessments.
a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart D
Safety assurance requirements for an SMS are established in subpart
D of part 5. Section 5.71 covers safety performance monitoring and
measurement, Sec. 5.73 covers safety performance assessment, and Sec.
5.75 covers requirements for continuous improvement. Pursuant to Sec.
5.71(a), a person must develop and maintain processes and systems to
acquire data with respect to its operations, products, and services to
monitor the safety performance of the organization. Section 5.71(a)
prescribes specific data that must be monitored, audited, evaluated,
and investigated. Among these requirements, Sec. 5.71(a)(7) requires
the processes and systems to include a confidential employee reporting
system in which employees can report hazards, issues, occurrences, and
incidents, as well as a means to propose solutions and safety
improvements. Once an organization with an SMS collects data through
its safety monitoring and measurement processes, it must use the
processes developed under Sec. 5.71(b) to analyze the data.
Specifically, Sec. 5.73 requires the organization to conduct
assessments of its safety performance against its safety
[[Page 1946]]
objectives contained in its safety policy, which include reviews by the
accountable executive to: (1) ensure compliance with safety risk
controls, (2) evaluate the performance of the SMS, (3) evaluate the
effectiveness of safety risk controls, (4) identify changes in the
environment that may introduce new hazards, and (5) identify new
hazards. This analysis is used to transform raw data into usable
information that can support informed decision-making related to
safety.
Finally, Sec. 5.75 requires the organization to establish and
implement processes to correct any safety performance deficiencies that
are identified in the safety performance assessment, which ensures
continuous improvement of the organization's safety performance.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart D
The FAA is proposing to remove the word ``operations'' from Sec.
5.71(a) to clarify the requirement and avoid confusion with the term
``operator.'' In addition, the FAA is proposing to amend Sec. Sec.
5.71-5.75 by replacing ``certificate holder'' with ``person'' or ``a
person required to have an SMS under this subpart'' to reflect the
proposed broadened applicability of the rule.
The FAA is also proposing to add the text, ``without concern of
reprisal for reporting'' to the confidential employee reporting system
requirement in current Sec. 5.71(a)(7) to meet section 102(e) of ACSAA
which mandates that the proposed regulation:
[R]equire a safety management system to include a confidential
employee reporting system through which employees can report hazards,
issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents. A reporting system under
this subsection shall include provisions for reporting, without concern
for reprisal for reporting, of such items by employees in a manner
consistent with confidential employee reporting systems administered by
the Administrator.
Further, section 102 mandates that regulations required by the
statute shall also require holders of both a TC and a PC to submit a
summary of confidential employee reports received in accordance with
section 102 to the Administrator at least twice per year. Therefore,
the FAA is proposing to add a new Sec. 5.71(c), which would require
holders of both a TC and a PC for the same product to submit a summary
of the confidential employee reports received under Sec. 5.71(a)(7) to
the FAA once every six months.
The FAA recognizes that its proposed rule language, which would
require holders of both a TC and a PC for the same product to submit a
summary of the confidential employee reports received under Sec.
5.71(a)(7) to the FAA once every 6 months, slightly differs from the
statutory language. Section 102(e) of ACSAA requires the summary of
reports to be submitted at least ``twice a year.'' As the statute does
not require a particular interval for submission of the ``twice a
year'' reports, the FAA finds it reasonable to require the reports
every six months as it would preclude a person from submitting the same
summary of reports twice in the same month and provide the FAA with an
opportunity to assess reports received throughout the year.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes to require the submission of these
reports once every 6 months.
Although the ACSAA mandate was specific to part 21 certificate
holders with both a TC and a PC, employees of all persons required to
comply with part 5 should be protected from reprisal if they report
hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, or incidents. Further, the
intent of the confidential system would be to provide some protection
to employees, so they are able to report issues without concern of
reprisal. Therefore, the FAA is proposing to apply the revision to the
employee reporting system requirements in Sec. 5.71(a)(7) to all
persons required to comply with part 5. The FAA notes that this
protection extends to the reporting of hazards, issues, concerns,
occurrences, or incidents. If the individual reporting is responsible
for creation of the hazard due to intentional actions or gross
negligence, this provision would not protect them from employment
actions based on the underlying offense.
However, the FAA is proposing in Sec. 5.71(c) to require only
holders of both a TC and a PC for the same product to submit a summary
of the confidential employee reports to the FAA. This proposed
requirement is targeted at part 21 certificate holders as this
additional agency oversight is consistent with ACSAA. Summaries of
confidential employee reports submitted by certificate holders with
both a TC and a PC are protected from public disclosure by 49 U.S.C.
44735(a)(2), if the summaries are requested pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). The FAA is not proposing to extend this
requirement to all persons required to have an SMS because the
information would not be protected under 49 U.S.C. 44735(a)(2) for
persons that are not covered by the ACSAA requirement.
4. Safety Promotion (Subpart E)
Safety promotion requires communication to promote safety
practices. Safety promotion also requires that employees within an
organization attain and maintain the competencies necessary to perform
the duties relevant to the operation and performance of the SMS.
Training to maintain the SMS may vary depending upon the position and
responsibilities of the employee and may range from formal classroom
training to simple notices to employees. In addition to training, an
organization ensures that employees are aware of the SMS policies,
processes, and tools that are relevant to their responsibilities.
a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart E
The requirements for safety promotion are established in subpart E
of part 5. Section 5.91 requires training for the employees of the
organization to ensure they attain and maintain the competencies
necessary to perform their duties relevant to the operation and
performance of the SMS. Section 5.93 requires the organization to
develop and maintain a means of communicating safety information that:
(1) ensures employees are aware of the SMS policies, processes, and
tools that are relevant to their responsibilities; (2) conveys hazard
information relevant to the employee's responsibilities; (3) explains
why safety actions have been taken; and (4) explains why safety
procedures are introduced or changed.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart E
The FAA is proposing two amendments to the safety promotion
requirements of subpart E. First, as in the other subparts, Sec. 5.91
and Sec. 5.93 would be amended to reflect the broader applicability of
proposed part 5 by replacing ``certificate holder'' with ``any person
required to have an SMS under this part.'' Second, the FAA proposes to
add new Sec. 5.94 to require notification of hazards to interfacing
persons, and require any person subject to part 5 to develop and
maintain procedures for reporting hazard information to interfacing
persons and for receiving hazard information from other parties.
In some circumstances, a hazard might be identified by a person who
is not in a position to address the hazard or there may be another
person who could implement a more effective mitigation. For example,
there may be a hazard identified by an aircraft operator that needs to
be addressed by an aircraft manufacturer to mitigate the hazard for
other operators. Similarly, an aircraft manufacturer may identify a
hazard for which crew procedures or training are an appropriate
mitigation to be taken by an operator. In Sec. 5.94, the FAA proposes
[[Page 1947]]
that persons required to have an SMS under part 5 must share
information regarding identified hazards with interfacing persons
identified in their system description under proposed Sec. 5.5 who, to
the best of their knowledge, could address the hazard or mitigate the
risk. Interfacing persons may be other private entities or a government
entity, including the FAA. For example, a person required to have an
SMS might determine that, to the best of their knowledge, the FAA's Air
Traffic Organization is the interfacing person who would be in the best
position to address the hazard. The number of business connections that
would fall within the scope of an ``interfacing person'' is not
limitless, however. An interfacing person would be an entity providing
a good or service connected to aviation safety. A payroll accounting
firm, for example, would not fall within this requirement. Within that
boundary, an organization's total number of interfacing persons would
likely be related to the size and complexity of the operation. The more
external entities an organization relies on for aviation safety
purposes, the greater the number of interfacing persons they would have
for the purposes of this rule.
There may be instances in which the person with an SMS under part 5
is required to communicate hazard information to an interfacing person
who is not required to maintain an SMS under part 5. In this case,
there is still a utility and benefit to safety in communicating hazard
information even where the receiving party does not have to comply with
part 5 because the receiving party may still address the hazard.
Further, while persons are only required to share hazard information to
relevant interfacing entities who, to the best of their knowledge,
could address the hazard, the proposed requirements do not preclude
anyone from sharing additional information with additional entities if
they so choose.
The number of interfaces an organization has depends on the type of
goods or services the organization provides. FAA believes companies
already know who their interfaces are, since the service providers,
suppliers, and customers are those with whom they have an ongoing
business relationship.
In accordance with standard business practices, these organizations
already have records of these relationships for purchasing, payment,
and shipment purposes. Therefore, the FAA does not believe it would be
burdensome to document these existing interfaces and share information
about hazards, when appropriate, leveraging existing contacts and
channels of communication. The FAA anticipates that the organization
would update and revise contact information for these interfaces as a
normal part of day-to-day business, as they would even in the absence
of this proposed rule.
For example, an aircraft manufacturer may identify that the
interfacing persons in their system description include various
suppliers. The manufacturer has a business relationship with these
interfaces. As with most business relationships, these relationships
include a way to communicate hazards with all of these interfaces
including their suppliers, repair stations, and customers. The
manufacturer might issue a service bulletin or an operator information
letter. It could also communicate a hazard directly with a supplier or
through its supplier management/purchasing organization.
The purpose of this proposed requirement is to ensure that relevant
information is shared with the person in the best position to address
the hazard or mitigate the associated risk prior to an incident or
accident occurring. This sharing would enable a network of
organizations that would work collaboratively and be more effective at
identifying hazards and mitigating risk than an individual organization
working in isolation.\56\
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\56\ The FAA is not aware of other CAAs currently requiring this
type of collaborative approach. However, industry has recognized the
value of this approach and it is discussed in the international
standard: SM-0001_Issue B--Implementing a Safety Management System
in Design, Manufacturing and Maintenance Organizations, which was
developed by industry.
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The following examples illustrate the network effect the FAA
believes would be created by the proposed requirement to share hazard
information.
Example 1: A part 121 operator receives an employee report from a
pilot stating that the aircraft flight management system deviated from
the expected landing approach at a particular airport. The flight crew
notices the deviation and corrects the flight path for a safe landing.
The operator's management classifies this employee report as a hazard
because the airport is surrounded by high elevation terrain. Although
this incident occurred during daytime and in visual meteorological
conditions, management determines that if the same issue occurred
during a night landing or in instrument meteorological conditions, the
aircraft could be turned toward terrain without detection by the flight
crew, potentially resulting in an accident.
The operator's management mitigates the risk through the safety
risk management process by publishing an internal notice to all its
flight crews warning of the issue and requesting them to avoid using
that particular approach when flying into the particular airport.
Additionally, the operator determines that the best person to mitigate
the risk is outside its organization and uses its system description to
identify the appropriate interfacing person with whom the information
regarding this hazard should be shared. Per proposed Sec. 5.94, the
operator sends a hazard report to the aircraft manufacturer. The
aircraft manufacturer, who is a TC and PC holder, receives the hazard
report and begins an investigation of the issue. The aircraft
manufacturer also reports the issue per proposed Sec. 5.94 to the
flight management system supplier and navigation database supplier,
which, although not required to have an SMS, are interfacing persons
identified in the aircraft manufacturer's system description.
The aircraft manufacturer initiates safety risk management on the
issue. Through computer simulation, the aircraft manufacturer
duplicates the incident reported by the part 121 operator.\57\ The
aircraft manufacturer safety risk management team develops and
completes two actions: one short term to mitigate the risk, and one
long term to eliminate the hazard. For the short-term mitigation, the
flight management system database is updated to remove the affected
approach. This database update occurs monthly, so all airlines flying
with the flight management system automatically receive the update. For
the long-term mitigation, the flight management system software is
updated to correct the flight management system deviation. The aircraft
manufacturer issues a service bulletin to all airlines recommending
incorporation of the software update. Following the software update
incorporation, the affected approach is added back into the navigation
database and all airlines automatically receive it at the next monthly
update.
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\57\ It is common for an Original Equipment Manufacturer to
replicate an incident after receiving a report. Typically, the
manufacturer would reach out to the reporting entity (in this
example, the airline operator) to gather as much information as
available about the incident. While there are risks with information
transfer delays between the interfacing entity and the reporting
entity, FAA believes these will be improved with the proposed rule
requiring hazard information sharing.
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This example illustrates how an employee report pursuant to Sec.
5.71(a)(7) and communication between
[[Page 1948]]
organizations would assist in quickly mitigating and later eliminating
a hazard that could result in an accident if not addressed. The pilot
reported the incident, the airline performed the organization's safety
risk management process, and also reported the hazard to the aircraft
manufacturer pursuant to Sec. 5.94. The aircraft manufacturer reported
the hazard to the flight management system supplier pursuant to Sec.
5.94 and then performed safety risk management to initially mitigate
the risk and ultimately eliminate the hazard.
Without applying this new requirement, under the current process,
the part 121 operator would report the incident to FAA flight standards
under Sec. 121.703(c). Flight standards would evaluate the incident
and, if determined to be an airworthiness concern, would report it to
the appropriate Aircraft Certification Office. The Aircraft
Certification Office would then complete a risk analysis per FAA Order
8110.107. If the risk assessment was determined to be unacceptable, the
aircraft certification office would work the aircraft Original
Equipment Manufacturer to develop corrective action. The proposed rule
requires direct hazard communication between the operator and Original
Equipment Manufacturer which will facilitate more timely resolution of
the incident.
Example 2: Three pilots, who work for a part 135 operator, report
through the operator's employee reporting system that markings at the
operator's home base airport at a newly paved intersection with a
runway are confusing and nearly resulted in a runway incursion. The
operator determines the reports are valid and notifies the airport
authority of the pilots' observations in accordance with proposed Sec.
5.94. The airport then could close that taxiway intersection and re-
mark the pavement.
Example 3: A Sec. 91.147 LOA holder who conducts air tours in a
Stearman Biplane procures a radial engine from a repair station that
specializes in overhauling radial engines. The rebuilt engine is
installed on the aircraft, ground tested, and then flown for a 3-hour
maintenance test flight to ensure the engine is operating correctly.
During the test flight, the engine seems to stop producing power
altogether when the throttle is reduced to idle. On final approach, the
engine stops, and though the aircraft lands without incident, the
engine cannot be restarted because the idle jet in the carburetor
vibrated out of the tapped fitting. The LOA holder and operator of the
Stearman report the issue to the part 145 repair station in accordance
with proposed Sec. 5.94. While the repair station is not required to
have an SMS, they would have a duty to conduct an investigation under
Sec. 145.221.\58\ The repair station investigates its stock of
carburetor jets and finds five additional jets in a single lot that
were improperly threaded. The repair station can then isolate the
nonconforming lot of jets and rebuild the faulty carburetor. This
example illustrates that there is still benefit to sharing hazard
information with entities that would not be required to have an SMS.
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\58\ Under this existing requirement, the repair station must
submit a Service Difficulty Report. In the Service Difficulty
Report, the repair station must include the ``apparent cause of the
failure, malfunction, or defect,'' meaning that the repair station
would have to conduct an investigation to determine the apparent
cause.
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Finally, the FAA acknowledges that there may be some concern
regarding sharing information outside an organization. The FAA does not
expect that sharing hazard information would require the sharing of
proprietary information; it would only require the organization to
adequately describe the hazard. The FAA expects that in instances where
the hazard cannot be adequately described without the use of
proprietary information, the organization itself would likely be in the
best position to address that hazard, and therefore, information
sharing would not be necessary. The FAA seeks comment on whether
organizations can share information about hazards without disclosing
proprietary information. The FAA also seeks comment on whether the
holder of the proprietary information would be in the best position to
address the hazard. Please provide examples of any situations in which
the holder of proprietary information would not be able to share
information about a hazard without disclosing that proprietary
information.
5. SMS Documentation and Recordkeeping (Subpart F)
Documentation of SMS processes, procedures, and outputs is
necessary for persons to conduct a meaningful analysis under safety
risk management, to review safety assurance activities, and for the FAA
to review for compliance during inspections. Documentation and
recordkeeping also preserve information that can be used to make future
safety-related decisions.
a. Summary of Current Requirements in Subpart F
The documentation and recordkeeping requirements for SMS holders
are currently contained in subpart F of part 5. As currently described
in Sec. 5.95, the certificate holder is required to document its
safety policy and SMS processes and procedures. Organizations with an
SMS under part 5 are required to document their safety policy and SMS
processes and procedures.
As described in Sec. 5.97, the certificate holder currently must
maintain records of the outputs (e.g., risk assessments and implemented
risk controls) of safety risk management and safety assurance
processes. Outputs of safety risk management processes must be retained
for as long as they remain relevant to the operation. Records can be
kept either electronically or in paper format. In addition, the
certificate holder is required to retain outputs of safety assurance
processes for a minimum of five years, SMS training records for as long
as the individual is employed by the person, and communication records
for a minimum of 24 months. Communication records required to be
retained would be limited to any communications related to SMS-related
policies, processes and tools, hazard information, safety actions
taken, and why safety procedures were introduced or changed. The
timelines associated with the retention of these documents ensure that
they are kept for a time period that provides the certificate holder
with sufficient historical data to assure compliance and to conduct the
required analyses and assessments. A certificate holder may retain its
documents for longer time periods if needed.
The documentation and records keeping requirements, like the rest
of part 5, are designed to be scalable and flexible to accommodate a
wide variety of business models and sizes. The specific information to
be documented, and the means through which it is documented and
retained, may vary depending on the scope and complexity of the
systems. Organizations are currently required to maintain a myriad of
business records. We anticipate that they will leverage existing
systems or methods of records retention to meet these new requirements.
The flexibility in the requirements enable the organization to use the
most efficient means to fit their operations. For more information
regarding scalability, please refer to Section V.F.
b. Proposed Amendments to Subpart F
The FAA is proposing to amend Sec. Sec. 5.95 and 5.97 to change
``certificate holder'' to ``any person required to have an SMS under
this part.'' In addition, the FAA is proposing to add Sec. 5.95(c) to
require the documentation of the system
[[Page 1949]]
description developed under proposed Sec. 5.5(b). The proposed
addition is necessary to ensure that the system description would be
documented.
The FAA is proposing to amend Sec. 5.97(d) to require the persons
required to have an SMS to retain records of all communications that
occur under the hazard reporting requirements of proposed Sec. 5.94
for a minimum of 24 consecutive calendar months. This proposed
requirement is necessary to ensure consistency in the records for
communications required under Sec. 5.93 and proposed Sec. 5.94.
Maintaining these records would also enable traceability between
information that is received from outside entities and actions taken
using safety assurance or safety risk management processes. These
records would be kept either electronically or in paper format. The
timelines associated with the retention of these documents would ensure
that they are kept for a time period that provides the organization
with sufficient historical data to assist the FAA with oversight.
Nothing in the proposed rule would preclude a person required to have
an SMS under part 5 from retaining documents for longer time periods if
they so choose.
D. Implementation of SMS
1. Requirements for Part 121 Operators
Part 121 operators currently must comply with the part 5
requirements. The FAA is proposing to add Sec. 5.7 to establish
certain new requirements and compliance dates for part 121 operators.
Proposed Sec. 5.7(a) would apply to all part 121 operators that
have an FAA-accepted SMS as of the effective date of a final rule
adopted pursuant to this rulemaking. The requirements in proposed Sec.
5.7(a) are necessary to bring part 121 operators into compliance with
the proposed revisions to part 5. Part 121 operators would be required
to revise their SMS to meet the new requirements proposed in Sec. Sec.
5.5(b) (System Description), 5.21(a)(7) (Safety Policy Code of Ethics),
5.53(b)(5) (Safety Risk Management Interfaces), 5.71(a)(7) (Employee
Confidential Reporting System), 5.94 (Hazard Notification), 5.95(c)
(Documentation of System Description), and 5.97(d) (SMS Records),
discussed in this section. Because part 121 operators already have an
accepted SMS, the FAA considers that these new requirements would
require minor adjustments. For example, current part 121 operators
should be able to develop a system description with relative ease
because they already have an FAA-accepted SMS and all the information
needed for development of the system description. Also, a statement of
compliance is unnecessary because the FAA has completed its review of
the operator's SMS prior to the enactment of this rule. The changes to
this entity's SMS are minimal and the FAA can review such changes in
the normal course of its oversight of the operator.
Because the proposed requirements may be met with relative ease,
the FAA has determined that 12 months would provide a sufficient amount
of time for current part 121 operators to implement any necessary
changes based upon the amendments to part 5 and submit revisions to
their SMS to the FAA for acceptance.
Under proposed Sec. 5.7(a)(2), part 121 operators would have to
submit revisions to their SMS for FAA acceptance in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator no later than 12 months following the
effective date of the rule. The FAA expects that current part 121
operators would submit revisions to their SMS through the same process
they currently use for submission of changes for acceptance by the FAA.
Proposed Sec. 5.7(b) would apply to any person applying for
authorization to conduct operations under part 121 of this chapter
after the effective date of the rule. New certificate holders
authorized to operate under part 121 would have to develop, implement,
and maintain an SMS that complies with the requirements of part 5 as
amended by this rulemaking. Those seeking to operate under part 121
would have to submit the statement of compliance in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator as part of the certification process.
Under this proposal, the FAA would incorporate review of a person's
compliance with part 5 requirements into the certification review
process.
The statement of compliance must describe how part 5 requirements
have been met, and the FAA would review that statement of compliance
during the certification process to assess the applicant's compliance
with part 5. The statement of compliance enables the FAA to validate
the applicant's compliance with part 5 prior to issuing a certificate.
2. Requirements for Part 135 Operators and Holders of Sec. 91.147
Letters of Authorization
The FAA is proposing to add new Sec. 5.9 to establish requirements
and compliance dates for part 135 operators, and holders of an LOA
issued under Sec. 91.147. Proposed Sec. 5.9(a) would require those
certificate or LOA holders to develop and implement an SMS in
compliance with part 5 no later than 24 months after the effective date
of the proposed rule. The FAA expects certificate holders or LOA
holders to submit the statement of compliance for acceptance by the FAA
within 24 months after the effective date of this proposed rule.
Proposed requirements for statements of compliance are described
further in this section. This rule would also require these operators
to maintain their SMS in accordance with part 5.
Proposed Sec. 5.9(b) would affect those persons applying for a
certificate under part 135 or those applying for an LOA under Sec.
91.147 who have not yet received their certificate or LOA prior to the
effective date of this proposed rule. These persons would be required
to develop and implement an SMS that meets the requirements of part 5
before their certificate or LOA could be issued. They would be required
to submit a statement of compliance in a form and manner acceptable to
the Administrator during the certification process or LOA issuance
process. These operators would also be required to maintain their SMS
in accordance with part 5.
Based on lessons learned and the experience gained from part 121
operators who have previously implemented SMS, as well as the voluntary
program implementation for part 135 operators, the FAA proposes that 24
months is adequate to implement an SMS and provide a statement of
compliance to the FAA. This timeframe allows the operator sufficient
time to implement SMS without unnecessarily delaying the realization of
benefits derived from SMS.
a. Statements of Compliance for Current Part 135 Operators and Sec.
91.147 Letter of Authorization Holders and Applicants
Under this proposal, part 135 operators, and Sec. 91.147 LOA
holders would be required to develop an SMS and integrate that SMS into
the existing operations of the certificate or LOA holder. The
certificate or LOA holder would also be required to submit a statement
of compliance in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator no
later than 24 months following the effective date of this proposed
rule.
The statement of compliance notifies the FAA that the organization
has complied with part 5 and prompts the FAA to update its oversight
tools to include SMS. Although these statements of compliance would not
be subject to an approval process, the FAA would validate the part 135
operators' and Sec. 91.147 LOA holders' compliance with
[[Page 1950]]
part 5 and the accuracy of their statements of compliance under
existing oversight processes. Because the certificate or LOA holder
would be required to integrate the SMS into its existing operations
processes during implementation, the FAA expects that existing
oversight processes are sufficient to oversee and validate part 5
compliance. The FAA would review statements of compliance upon
submission and would validate that the organization's SMS meets the
part 5 requirements over the course of several inspections. If, during
those inspections, the FAA finds that the SMS does not meet the
requirements of the proposed rule, a notification in writing of the
deficiencies would follow.
The proposal would also require applicants for authority to conduct
operations under part 135 or Sec. 91.147 to submit a statement of
compliance to the FAA for acceptance during the certification or LOA
application process, as applicable. The statement of compliance enables
the FAA to validate the applicant's compliance with part 5 prior to
issuing a certificate or LOA.
b. Statements of Compliance for Existing Part 121/135 Combination
Certificates
For those part 119 certificate holders with combination
certificates authorizing them to operate under parts 121 and 135 that
already have an SMS in place due to the current part 5 requirements for
part 121 operators, the FAA would review the part 121/135 operator's
revised SMS submission. Certificate holders authorized to operate under
parts 121 and 135 whose SMS was previously acceptable to the FAA for
the part 121 portion of their organizations may choose to expand their
existing SMS processes already in place to include their part 135
operations. In this case, certificate holders would submit the changes
to their SMS for acceptance as described for the existing part 121
certificate holders in Section V.D.1.
Certificate holders would also be required to submit a statement of
compliance for the part 135 operations. The FAA would accept the
submitted statement of compliance and validate the operator's
compliance with part 5 using existing oversight processes, as discussed
in Section V.D.5. The FAA expects that documenting the statement of
compliance for the part 135 operations would be comparatively simple
because the operator has already met SMS requirements for the part 121
operations. Currently, of the seven existing combined certificates,
five have already implemented SMS that covers both part 121 and 135
operations.
3. Requirements for Holders of Both Type Certificates and Production
Certificates Issued for the Same Product Under Part 21 and Certain Part
21 Production Certificate Applicants
The FAA proposes to add a new Sec. 5.11 to establish certain SMS
requirements and compliance dates for holders with a TC and a PC for
the same product issued under part 21. The FAA proposes a person that
holds both a TC and a PC for the same product issued under part 21 of
this chapter on or before the effective date of the proposed rule would
be required to: (1) develop an SMS that meets the requirements of this
part; (2) submit an implementation plan for FAA approval in a form and
manner acceptable to the Administrator no later than December 27, 2024;
(3) implement the SMS in accordance with the FAA-approved plan no later
than December 27, 2025; and (4) maintain the SMS in accordance with
this part.
As discussed in Section IV.D., the proposed requirements are
consistent with section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA, which requires that the
FAA's rulemaking require these certificate holders to adopt an SMS by
four years from enactment of the statute, December 27, 2024.\59\
Because the implementation plan would require certificate holders to
submit a description of how they would comply with the part 5
requirements, including but not limited to the policies, processes, and
procedures used to meet those requirements, the FAA considers the
certificate holder to have adopted the SMS system at the time the
certificate holder files the implementation plan. By filing the
implementation plan for FAA approval, the certificate holders commit to
implementing the SMS described in the implementation plan and any
modification to the SMS required by the FAA during the implementation
plan approval process.
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\59\ Section 102(a)(2)(D) of ACSAA.
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Under proposed Sec. 5.13, the FAA proposes a person that holds, is
applying for, or has a pending application for a PC under part 21 of
this chapter for a product for which the person holds or is a licensee
for a TC, would be required to: (1) develop an SMS that meets the
requirements of this part; (2) submit an implementation plan for FAA
approval in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator during
the certification process; (3) implement the SMS in accordance with the
approved plan no later than one year from the FAA's approval of the
implementation plan; and (4) maintain the SMS in accordance with this
part.
Furthermore, under proposed Sec. 5.15, the FAA is proposing to
establish certain SMS requirements for any person that holds a TC for a
product who allows another person to use the TC to manufacture a
product under a PC. However, the requirements proposed in Sec. 5.15
are consistent with those proposed in Sec. Sec. 5.11 and 5.13.
Persons subject to Sec. Sec. 5.11, 5.13, or 5.15 would not be
required to file a statement of compliance under this proposal because
these organizations would have to implement their SMS in accordance
with their FAA-approved implementation plan which is sufficient for the
FAA to verify their compliance with part 5.
4. Implementation Plans
a. Implementation Plans for Part 21
FAA proposes to add a new Sec. 5.17 to establish requirements for
implementation plans filed under proposed Sec. Sec. 5.11 (PC holders
who are holders or licensees of a TC for the same product), 5.13 (TC
holders or licensees applying for a PC for the same product), and 5.15
(TC holders who license their TC to others to obtain a PC). The
implementation plan would include a description of how the person
intends to comply with part 5, including, but not limited to, new or
existing policies, processes, or procedures used to meet the
requirements of part 5. The description would also demonstrate how that
person would comply with the requirements of part 5 once the SMS is
implemented and may reference manuals and other relevant documentation.
Upon request by the FAA, any person required to submit an
implementation plan under the proposal would have to provide the FAA
access to the data necessary to demonstrate that the person has
developed and implemented an SMS that meets the applicable part 5
requirements. This data could include the outputs of safety risk
management.
For a person that holds both a TC and a PC for the same product
issued under part 21 of this chapter (Sec. 5.11), or for persons that
hold a TC that have licensed their TC to allow another person to use
that TC to obtain a PC (Sec. 5.15(a)), on or before the effective date
of the final rule, the person would submit an implementation plan to
the FAA for approval in a form and manner acceptable to the
Administrator by December 27, 2024. Section 102(a)(1) of ACSAA requires
the FAA's rulemaking to require holders of both a TC and a PC to adopt
an SMS by December 27, 2024. The FAA recognizes that ACSAA does not
apply to persons who license their
[[Page 1951]]
TC to allow another person to obtain a PC. However, the FAA is
proposing the same compliance deadlines for consistency purposes. The
FAA invites comments about whether the FAA should extend the compliance
timelines for persons who license their TC to other persons and, if so,
what timelines the FAA should establish. The FAA requests that
responsive comments include the commenter's rationale for the proposed
compliance timelines.
Section 102 of ACSAA also requires the FAA to: (1) promulgate rules
to require SMS for holders of both a TC and PC, and (2) approve the
certificate holders' SMS. By approving the implementation plans from
part 21 certificate holders, the FAA would review the submission and
would determine whether the implementation plan appropriately describes
how the entity intends to comply with the requirements of the proposed
part 5. Additional information regarding the form and manner of
submission would be available in Advisory Circular (AC) 21-58, Safety
Management Systems for Part 21 Type and Production Certificate Holders.
The implementation plan would include a description of how the
person intends to comply with the requirements of the proposed rule.
The FAA would review and approve the implementation plan and provide
confirmation to the person of FAA's approval of the implementation
plan. The person would then be required to implement the FAA-approved
SMS by December 27, 2025, and maintain the SMS in accordance with the
approved implementation plan.
After the effective date of the proposed rule, a person applying
for a PC under part 21 for a product for which the person holds a TC,
or for which an application is pending, would submit the implementation
plan for FAA approval during the certification process. For persons who
hold a TC and are entering into a licensing agreement to allow another
person to use that TC to obtain a PC, the TC holder would submit the
implementation plan for FAA approval when providing the written
licensing agreement in accordance with Sec. 21.55. The FAA would
review the applicant's implementation plan and approve the means by
which the person intends to comply with the applicable sections of the
proposed rule. The person would then be required to implement the FAA-
approved SMS within one year after FAA's approval and maintain the SMS
in accordance with the implementation plan.
b. Removal of Implementation Plan Requirement
Currently, Sec. 5.1(b) states that a part 119 certificate holder
must submit an implementation plan to the FAA for review no later than
September 9, 2015, and the implementation must be approved no later
than March 9, 2016. Additionally, current Sec. 5.1(c) states that the
implementation plan may include any of the certificate holder's
existing programs, policies, or procedures that it intends to use to
meet the requirements of part 5, including components of an existing
SMS. These requirements applied to part 119 certificate holders who
were authorized to conduct operations under part 121 as of the
effective date of the 2015 final rule. The FAA adopted these
requirements to ensure that part 121 operators properly developed SMS
within the required timeframe. The FAA proposes to remove these
requirements because the dates have passed, and the requirements are no
longer necessary. All part 121 operators have developed and implemented
SMS in accordance with part 5.
The FAA recognizes that the proposed rule would extend the SMS
requirements to additional entities who already hold certificates, and
these certificate holders would have to develop and implement an SMS in
accordance with part 5. Based on the FAA's experience with part 121
operators complying with part 5 and those entities participating in the
voluntary SMS program, the FAA proposes to require new applicants for
certificates to operate under part 121, as well as certificate holders
under part 135 and LOA holders under Sec. 91.147 to submit a statement
of compliance in lieu of an implementation plan. Certificate holders
receive continuous oversight and are regularly inspected by the FAA.
The FAA has determined that the existing oversight processes such as
FAA's Safety Assurance System,\60\ would be sufficient to ensure
compliance with part 5 by certificate holders under parts 121 and 135
and Sec. 91.147 LOA holders, and therefore it is not necessary to
require an implementation plan.
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\60\ The Safety Assurance System is the Federal Aviation
Administration's oversight tool to perform certification,
surveillance, and Continued Operational Safety. The Safety Assurance
System includes policy, processes, and associated software the FAA
Flight Standards Service uses to capture data when conducting
oversight. For more information see: https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sas.
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5. Compliance
In accordance with the FAA's compliance program, FAA personnel
investigate apparent violations of FAA statutes and regulations and
have a range of options available for addressing apparent violations,
when appropriate, including compliance, administrative, and enforcement
action. The FAA's goal is to use the most effective and appropriate
means to ensure compliance with part 5 and prevent recurrence. The
underlying principles and oversight processes that form the foundation
of FAA's approach to compliance would not change under this proposed
rule.
E. Proposed Changes to Sections 119.8, 91.147, 21.135, and 21.147
1. Proposed Amendments to Section 119.8
The FAA is proposing to revise Sec. 119.8 to require certificate
holders authorized to conduct operations under part 121 or 135 to
comply with the applicable requirements of part 5. Currently, Sec.
119.8 only requires certificate holders authorized to conduct
operations under part 121 to comply with the SMS requirements in part
5; the proposed revision would add part 135 operators. Additionally,
the FAA is revising Sec. 119.8 to remove the compliance dates which
have passed and are no longer applicable.
2. Proposed Amendments to Section 91.147
As discussed in Section V.A.2., the FAA proposes to require LOA
holders operating under Sec. 91.147 to meet the requirements of part
5. Specifically, the FAA proposes to amend Sec. 91.147 to require an
operator conducting passenger carrying flights for compensation or hire
to have an FAA-accepted safety management system that meets the
requirements of part 5, and to add a requirement for an LOA applicant
to submit with the application the statement of compliance required
under part 5. The FAA also proposes non-substantive changes, including
organizational changes to improve the readability of the section.
The requirement for LOA holders and applicants to develop an SMS
that complies with part 5 would be found in both part 5 and in Sec.
91.147. Although part 5 would be applicable to Sec. 91.147 LOA holders
under proposed 5.1, this amendment is necessary to make compliance with
part 5 a requirement for operation.
Because Sec. 91.147(c) contains a complete list of all documents
that applicants for an LOA must submit as part of their application,
the FAA is
[[Page 1952]]
proposing to add the statement of compliance required under proposed
Sec. 5.9(b)(2) to the list of documents submitted when applying for an
LOA.
To eliminate redundancy in the regulations, the FAA is proposing to
remove the phrase ``for drug and alcohol testing'' from current Sec.
91.147(a), which defines ``operator'' for the purposes of Sec. 91.147
and for drug and alcohol testing.\61\ The drug and alcohol testing
requirements are contained in part 120 of 14 CFR. Under part 120, the
regulations reference ``operator as defined in Sec. 91.147'' numerous
times. In light of these cross-references, which expressly refer to the
definition of operator in Sec. 91.147, the FAA has determined that it
is unnecessary and redundant for current Sec. 91.147(a) to state that
the definition of operator is ``for drug and alcohol testing.''
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\61\ One reason Sec. 91.147 was added to the regulations was to
clarify the applicability of drug and alcohol programs (Final Rule;
National Air Tour Safety Standards, 72 FR 6884, Feb. 13, 2007). The
FAA notes that part 120 was added two years later (Final Rule; Drug
and Alcohol Testing Program, 74 FR 22649, May 14, 2009), which
further functioned to eliminate confusion and streamlined the
requirements of the drug and alcohol program.
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3. Proposed Amendments to Sections 21.55, 21.135, and 21.147(b)
The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph (c) under Sec. 21.135 to
require each applicant for or holder of a PC to meet the applicable
requirements of part 5. A conforming edit is also proposed for Sec.
21.147(b) to add the proposed Sec. 21.135(c) to the list of
requirements with which applicants for an amendment to a PC must
comply. Because ACSAA requires the Administrator to approve a part 21
certificate holder's SMS, the FAA is proposing these changes to part 21
to ensure that compliance with part 5 would be a pre-requisite for
obtaining or amending a PC.
Additionally, the FAA is proposing to revise Sec. 21.55 to require
a type certificate holder, who allows a person to use the type
certificate to manufacture a product to meet the applicable
requirements of part 5. The FAA is also proposing to revise the heading
of this section to account for the additional rule language.
F. Scalability
Under this proposal, part 5 would apply SMS requirements to
organizations that are diverse in size and complexity (i.e., aircraft
fleet size, operations, product types and production volume, services,
and number of employees). As the proposal is performance-based, the
procedures and documentation for compliance are scalable to accommodate
a wide variety of business models and sizes. This proposed rule
specifies a basic set of processes to form a framework for the SMS, but
does not specify particular methods for implementing these processes.
This provides a balance between standardization and a robust SMS
structure while allowing considerable flexibility for how an individual
aviation organization chooses to establish its SMS.
The SMS ARC recommended that part 5 be both scalable and flexible
to accommodate many business models.\62\ This recommendation was
incorporated into the current requirements of part 5. The four
components of SMS (safety policy, safety risk management, safety
assurance, and safety promotion) set forth in part 5, identify the
system's requirements, but do not prescribe the means of achieving
these requirements. Each organization has the flexibility to tailor an
SMS that works for the organization's size, scope, and complexity to
comply with the proposed rule. To enable scalability and flexibility,
part 5 would continue to describe the desired measurable outcomes that
must be accomplished. This performance-based approach would grant
flexibility by enabling regulated persons to develop methods,
processes, or other means of compliance that are appropriate to the
size, scope, and complexity of their organization and operations.
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\62\ SMS ARC Recommendations Final Report, p.2. March 31, 2010.
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For example, the objective of safety risk management--to identify
hazards, assess safety risk, and develop and monitor controls within
the organization's SMS--would be the same regardless of the size of the
organization even though methods used might be different. The FAA does
not anticipate that small organizations will need additional management
and staff to satisfy the requirement elements of safety risk
management. For example, smaller organizations, with few aircraft
operating in a limited geographic area, might record, and track the
results of the safety risk management process with paper records or
digital files using common word processing or spreadsheet applications.
Additionally, persons required to have an SMS under the proposed
rule would be able to comply with part 5 SMS requirements through a
variety of means. The FAA considers that organizations may be able to
leverage consensus or community standards, which are typically
developed by third-party consultants or trade associations, to meet the
requirements of part 5. In addition, the FAA recognizes that persons
may already have systems and processes in place that meet the part 5
requirements.
In addition, aviation organizations that perform more than one
service would be able to adapt their SMS to align with the complexity
of their operations. For example, some aviation organizations have
multiple certificates (e.g., the aviation organization might have
multiple certificates authorizing it to conduct flight operations and
to perform aircraft maintenance for other organizations, or the
aviation organization might have multiple certificates authorizing it
to manufacture certain products and perform flight operations or
aircraft maintenance). An aviation organization with multiple types of
certificates may choose to implement a separate SMS for each
certificate by following the acceptance or approval process as
applicable for each type of certificate. Although not required to do
so, these aviation organizations may only want to implement one SMS
that encompasses all their aviation-related safety activities. An
aviation organization with multiple certificates would be required to
meet the part 5 statement of compliance or implementation plan
requirements as applicable for its certificates.
A single pilot operator would build an SMS using tools and
procedures commensurate with the size, complexity, and sophistication
of the organization. Small organizations are likely to rely on the same
tools that they already use in their day-to-day operations. For
example, an operator may rely on standard word processing software,
Excel spreadsheets, email, or even paper record books to document the
system, policies, processes, and procedures. The single pilot operator
would choose based on their own preferences and comfort level with the
different types of technologies. This is a business decision the
operator will make to maximize its own efficiencies, and it may look
very different even among organizations of comparable size. In the
discussion that follows, the FAA provides examples of how an SMS might
be scaled to particular persons who would be required to comply with
this proposed rule.
The following example illustrates how a small single pilot operator
could scale implementation of SMS to fit its organization. The
responsible individual would first develop a system description, which
would identify the aviation operations that would be
[[Page 1953]]
covered by the SMS and its organizational interfaces. This might be a
hand-written document or a digital file on a computer. The organization
would then document its safety policy; again, this could be done on
paper or in a digital file. The example provided in the appendix in AC
120-92 could be used as a starting point, but there are also various
examples available on the internet that could be used as a starting
point.
To meet safety risk management and safety assurance requirements,
the operator could use a tool such as the Web-Based Analytical
Technology (WBAT) platform which is FAA-supported software, to support
employee reporting and SMS. The platform could also be used to meet
recordkeeping and documentation requirements. However, simpler options
such as digital files on a computer or paper files could be used as
well. For instance, AC 120-92 provides worksheets that the operator
could use to meet most safety risk management requirements. To meet
safety assurance requirements in a simpler way in a single pilot
operator, the pilot could observe how an operation is working and
identify trends in real-time. If there are issues, the pilot could take
appropriate action and reevaluate the results. Any operational process
could be observed and does not necessarily require formal audits or
forms. Again, all of this could be documented on paper or in a digital
file.
To meet communication requirements a small operator might use
existing email applications to share information within its
organization and with interfacing organizations, as appropriate. To
meet documentation and recordkeeping requirements, the organization
could use paper or digital files just as they might do for other areas
of their operations such as invoicing, service and rental agreements,
etc. The organization could document this using a medium of their
choosing, including something as simple as a notebook.
The example above references resources available through or
supported by the FAA. However, as previously noted, third-party
consultants and trade associations are also resources available to
assist in the development of an SMS. Further, aviation colleges and
universities, ICAO, and other civil aviation authorities such as EASA
and Transport Canada Civil Aviation have material that can be used to
help develop an SMS.
The following example illustrates how SMS might operate in a small,
low complexity operator. This example company has two helicopters and
four pilots, and it provides air tour services within a 25 nautical
mile range of its home airport. The company has developed a safety
policy under Sec. 5.21 that reminds everyone safety is the company's
number one priority. It contains in bold letters at the bottom, ``If
you see something unsafe, say something.'' This policy statement is one
page, signed by the company owner, and posted inside the office for all
to see.
After a flight, one of the pilots reports to the air tour
operator's home base that there is a new hazard in the flightpath of
their desired tour route. The hazard is a power line across a canyon
and there are no visibility markers on that line. The report of the
hazard is the start of the safety risk management process under Sec.
5.51(d). Under Sec. 5.53, the air tour operator researches the
location and height of the power line relative to the flight path in
the area. The operator calls the power company and learns that the line
is \1/2\-inch thick and an expected date of installation for the
markers is unknown due to manufacturing delays. This information is
recorded in a notebook or digital file. Even the process for conducting
this analysis under Sec. 5.53(c) can also be located in the notebook
or in a digital file.
Under Sec. 5.53, the air tour operator determines the unmarked
power line is an operational hazard. Knowing that helicopters and
unseen power lines are a high risk, and realizing that the company's
air tour route places them in the exact spot of the canyon where the
unmarked power line exists, makes this particular risk assessment easy.
The air tour company determines the severity of hitting that power line
would be catastrophic and the likelihood of encountering that power
line is high due to their route of flight. Using a risk matrix, the
operator qualitatively determines that the risk of conducting tours
with the presence of the unmarked power line is unacceptable and
requires risk controls be implemented to reduce the risk to an
acceptable level. All this information is placed into the notebook. The
operator develops risk controls under Sec. 5.55(c), which, in this
case, is a deviation to the planned air tour route. The evaluation of
the risk acceptance under Sec. 5.55(d) is done by talking to other
employees, brainstorming, or engaging with other operators. The records
of meetings or conversations, as well as the risk controls themselves,
are documented using a medium of their choosing, including something as
simple as a notebook or digital file consistent with the recordkeeping
requirements of Sec. 5.97.
The operator's next step is to monitor the controls it put into
place through its safety assurance program. The operator will check on
the deviation to the route it put in place under Sec. 5.71(a)(1)
through proposed (a)(7). This can be done by tracking the flight path
or auditing the new procedures and keeping those notes in the notebook.
Under Sec. 5.93, the operator will promote safety by informing the
pilots of the hazard and communicating the safety action taken, which
was providing the air tour route with a deviation. Each pilot can be
issued a safety alert via a memo that can be handed to them upon check
in and perhaps sent via email before the flight starts.
This example illustrates how aviation safety is improved because
current regulations do not require operators to have a process to
identify and manage hazards. For example, operators are not currently
required to: have a process to proactively identify hazards before they
become accidents, establish a structured method to assure hazards are
controlled, have formal communication methods that notify all company
personnel of new procedures, or keep records regarding safety actions
taken to prevent possible accidents.
The FAA recognizes that there is a spectrum of complexity within
organizations across the aviation product and service provider
industry. As discussed earlier in this section, there are relatively
low-cost implementation resources available to assist persons to meet
part 5 requirements, including online platforms such as the Web-Based
Analytical Technology (WBAT) platform. This platform supports all
aspects of an SMS and it includes the following tools: SMS
implementation manager, safety risk management, safety assurance,
employee reporting, and data sharing. Additionally, the FAA has drafted
guidance in which there are numerous scalability examples of how
various organizations can meet the pertinent SMS requirements based
upon where an organization may fall on the spectrum of complexity. The
proposed Advisory Circulars (AC 21-58, Safety Management Systems for
Part 21 Type and Production Certificate Holders and AC 120-92, Safety
Management for Aviation Service Providers), provide in-depth
discussions on how to meet each of the part 5 requirements, what tools/
methods may be employed, how they may be employed, who would be
involved, and includes sample tools and worksheets. For further
information, see the draft AC 21-58, Safety Management Systems for Part
21 Type and Production Certificate Holders and AC
[[Page 1954]]
120-92 Safety Management for Aviation Service Providers, which are
included in the docket of this proposed rule.
G. Examples of Real World Scenarios
The following accident summaries provide examples of ways that an
organization having an SMS under the proposed rule might provide
mitigation in real world scenarios. To illustrate how SMS would be used
by different entities under the proposed rule, the following accident
summaries have been arranged by the type of operator or certificate
holder involved in the accident.
1. Accident Involving Design and Production Under Part 21
On June 28, 2015, a single engine aircraft crashed following a
total loss of engine power due to the failure of the alternator drive
coupling. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured, and the
airplane was destroyed by a post-crash fire. The manufacturer of the
aircraft and aircraft engine were issued type and production
certificates and the manufacturer of the installed replacement
alternator coupling had been issued a parts manufacturer approval for
the coupling pursuant to 14 CFR part 21. The instructions provided by
the engine manufacturer did not advise that a loose or improperly tight
coupling could lead to a loss of power.
The NTSB report highlighted a review of the engine manufacturer's
warranty records for the 5 years preceding the accident revealed six
claims relating to the alternator coupling.\63\ If an engine
manufacturer in this circumstance were required to comply with the
proposed rule, the warranty information would be used to prevent future
safety issues. Under Sec. 5.71, the engine manufacturer would develop
a process for warranty data it receives and conduct an investigation
under Sec. 5.71(a)(6). The engine manufacturer would conduct audits of
its processes and the instructions it provided on how to inspect or
measure the alternator coupling under Sec. 5.71(a)(3) before
distributing the coupling. In this accident, the NTSB report also
mentioned there were 10 events filed in the FAA Service Difficulty
Report System relating to the alternator coupling.\64\ The engine
manufacturer would analyze those reports under Sec. 5.71(b), which
could have also revealed the inadequacy of the procedures. Then, under
Sec. 5.73, the engine manufacturer would conduct an assessment of its
safety performance and ensure compliance with the risk control it
established in developing new instructions for the inspection and
measuring of that alternator coupling.
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\63\ In this example, the organization is a medium-sized company
that manufactures engines. The FAA does not have detailed data on
the number of warranty claims during the five-year period.
\64\ Service Difficulty Reports are evaluated by FAA flight
standards offices. If the initial evaluation indicates a serious
airworthiness problem, the FAA Aircraft Certification Office and the
Aircraft Evaluation Division responsible for the product must be
informed of the equipment service difficulty and any recommendations
for corrective actions. Original Equipment Manufacturers are not
notified when a Service Difficulty Report is logged. Currently,
manufacturers are not required to proactively scan the Service
Difficulty Reports database.
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Section 5.51(d) would require the engine manufacturer to apply the
safety risk management process to the information collected under Sec.
5.71 that indicated the identification of hazards or ineffective risk
controls. Section 5.53(a) would require the engine manufacturer to
analyze its systems resulting in a focused evaluation of the
maintenance instructions and tooling requirements provided with the
distribution of the alternator coupling. Then, under Sec. 5.55, the
engine manufacturer would analyze the safety risk associated with the
procedures that inadequately ensured that the coupling was properly
tightened, determine whether the risk was unacceptable, and may develop
risk controls that could result in a different set of maintenance
instructions.
2. Accident Involving Part 135 Operator
On June 25, 2015, a single-engine, turbine-powered, float-equipped
airplane, operated by a part 135 on-demand air carrier, collided with
mountainous, tree-covered terrain about 24 miles east-northeast of
Ketchikan, Alaska.\65\ The pilot and eight passengers sustained fatal
injuries, and the airplane was destroyed.
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\65\ NTSB accident number ANC15MA041.
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The NTSB established the probable cause of this accident as the
pilot's decision to continue visual flight into an area of instrument
meteorological conditions, which resulted in his geographic
disorientation and controlled flight into terrain. The NTSB report
listed several contributing factors: (1) the operator's company
culture, which tacitly endorsed flying in hazardous weather and failed
to manage the risk associated with the competitive pressures affecting
Ketchikan-area air tour operators, (2) the operator's lack of a formal
safety program, including not having an SMS, and (3) the operator's
inadequate operational control of flight releases. The NTSB found that
the operator's management did not hold themselves accountable for
conducting safe operations and fostered a company culture that condoned
operating in weather conditions with inadequate visibility for visual
flight.
If the proposed rule had been in effect during this time, the
operator would have had requirements that may have prevented or
mitigated an accident such as this one.\66\ With an SMS, the operator
would have a safety policy that clearly articulates the company's
safety objectives and its commitment to safety as required by Sec.
5.21. Under Sec. Sec. 5.23 and 5.25, the operator would have to define
accountability for safety within the organization and identify those
members of management that are responsible for hazard identification,
safety risk assessment, and safety promotion within their areas of
responsibility. The operator allowed the operational control functions
to be delegated to flight schedulers. Operational control provides for
management of planning, departure, and inflight decision making to
assure the safety of flights. These operational control functions were
not performed adequately by those flight schedulers, leading to a loss
of effective operational control. Section 5.23 requires all members of
management to be accountable for their area of responsibility.
Operational control responsibility resides with the Director of
Operations, a required management position for an air carrier.
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\66\ In this example, the operator employed approximately 30 to
40 people.
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Section 5.51 would require the operator to apply safety risk
management in the development of operational procedures. The operator
had a policy that both the pilot and flight scheduler must agree that
the flight can be conducted safely before a flight may be launched.
This action did not take place and, more importantly, the decision to
initiate that particular flight was made by a new pilot who was subject
to cultural and peer influences. Section 5.51 would help close this gap
by requiring the operator to conduct safety risk management when
developing its procedures, policies, and training. During the safety
risk management process, Sec. 5.53 would require the operator to
analyze its procedures and policies of operational control with the
consideration of the operating environment of Ketchikan and the
pressure of getting those passengers back to their cruise ship on time.
Section 5.55 would require the operator to assess its risk and develop
risk controls so the pilot would not be the sole decision maker
regarding whether
[[Page 1955]]
the flight should proceed.\67\ Section 5.55 would also add an
additional control to its training program, requiring the inclusion of
the risk of the operating environment and the hazardous local weather
patterns.
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\67\ In this example, the operator already had a policy
requiring more than one person to decide whether the flight should
be initiated. Therefore, the operator was not in conformance with
its company policy related to operational control.
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The safety assurance requirements of Sec. 5.71 would require the
operator to monitor its operational processes and operational
environment, to include auditing its processes and procedures. Any of
these monitoring actions could have revealed that the company
procedures relating to operational control of their flights were not
followed. Upon discovering those discrepancies, the operator would
enter back into the safety risk management process and carefully look
at those procedures to include interfaces, such as training of
personnel involved, to ensure all company personnel are adequately
trained to follow the company procedures. Additionally, auditing of the
operator's pilot training program under Sec. 5.71 might reveal the
exclusion of two items, training of hazardous local weather patterns
and controlled flight into terrain avoidance training. Both are
essential training items for this environment, which potentially could
be identified during an analysis under Sec. 5.53.
Under Sec. 5.91, the operator would be required to provide SMS
training to management personnel. This SMS training could positively
affect the safety culture of the entire organization. Section 5.93
would require the operator to explain why safety actions and procedures
are introduced or changed, thus also having an effect on the safety
culture.
The FAA recognizes that in this example, the operator was already
in violation of its internal company policies. Although the company's
policy included a requirement not required by regulation, the
documentation that the company was not adhering to its own policies
could be evidence that the organization is not maintaining its SMS per
this proposed rule. Documentation requirements under an SMS create
objective evidence that the organization is identifying hazards,
assessing risk, and mitigating that risk as needed. The FAA may audit
this evidence at any time. Where the person has failed to comply with
FAA regulations, including SMS regulatory requirements, the FAA may
take enforcement action. This would also help the FAA identify safety-
deficient organizations. Knowledge that adherence to its SMS policies
could be audited by the FAA may encourage an organization to develop a
stronger safety culture.
3. Accident Involving Helicopter Air Tour Conducted Under Section
91.147
On February 18, 2006, a helicopter operated by an air tour operator
crashed into the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Hawaii, after
attempting an emergency landing following a maintenance malfunction of
the main rotor.\68\ Three of the passengers were able to exit the
helicopter but one passenger was trapped inside and drowned.
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\68\ National Transportation Safety Board accident number
WPR16FA072.
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The NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident was the in-
flight failure of the engine to transmission drive shaft due to
improper maintenance, which resulted in low main rotor rpm and a
subsequent hard landing on water.
The NTSB highlighted in its findings a failure of adequate
managerial oversight during a critical maintenance task on the
aircraft. A rated mechanic was not present throughout the removal,
inspection, and reinstallation of the engine-to-transmission drive
shaft. Additionally, maintenance records revealed no entries for the
required annual inspection, or the 100-hour inspections and several
required component inspections were overdue. Even though both of these
deficiencies were violations of existing regulations, the FAA believes
that an SMS would have allowed for the organization to self-identify,
correct, and prevent the issue, negating the need for after-the-fact
enforcement of non-compliance with the current regulation. If the
operator implemented an SMS as proposed by this rule, the
accountability for all members of management regarding their area of
responsibility would have been explicitly defined, as required by Sec.
5.23.
The NTSB final accident report indicated the accident was caused by
the in-flight failure of the engine-to-transmission drive shaft due to
some missed maintenance processes. Under Sec. 5.71, the organization
could have identified the missing steps in the maintenance process.
NTSB's review of maintenance records revealed no entries pertaining to
a current annual inspection or 100-hour inspection. An auditing process
under Sec. 5.71 could have identified this deficiency. Additionally, a
component inspection sheet provided by the operator revealed that
several required component inspections were overdue and had not been
completed at the time of the accident. The operator reported to the
NTSB that he knew those inspections were coming due but did not realize
the helicopter had flown such that it exceeded the inspection interval
(which was a violation of existing regulatory requirements). Therefore,
the owner did not know those items were overdue until he printed the
status sheet for the investigation of the accident. If the operator
monitored its operational processes as would be required under Sec.
5.71, it would have conducted safety risk management under Sec. 5.51
that would have identified hazards involving the lack of procedural
actions resulting in overdue inspections. The organization would then
develop and implement additional safety risk controls by applying Sec.
5.55, such as management oversight, thus preventing future occurrences.
In this example, the operator was in violation of existing safety
regulations. As with the previous example where an internal company
policy was not followed, SMS documentation requirements would either
create the objective evidence that the organization is identifying
hazards, assessing risk, and mitigating risk as needed, or the lack of
proper SMS documentation may demonstrate that the organization is in
violation of regulation, including SMS regulatory requirements. The FAA
may audit this evidence at any time. The evidence created through the
SMS would help the FAA to identify safety-deficient organizations more
effectively. Where deficiencies exist, the FAA may take enforcement
action; however a single safety incident would not necessarily indicate
that an organization is out of compliance with its SMS.
H. Data Reporting and Protection
In accordance with proposed Sec. 5.94, any organization that
identifies a hazard in the operating environment would be required to
provide notice of the hazard to the interfacing person or persons
identified in the system description, who, to the best of their
knowledge, would be able to address the hazard or mitigate the risk.
Title 49 U.S.C. 44735 provides protection from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act,\69\ for certain reports, data, or other
information that are submitted to the FAA voluntarily and are not
required to be submitted to the Administrator under any other provision
of law. Section 44735(b)(4) limits disclosure of ``reports, data, or
other information produced or collected for purposes of developing and
implementing a safety management
[[Page 1956]]
system acceptable to the Administrator.'' Section 44735(b)(4) also
limits disclosure of ``reports, analyses, and directed studies, based
in whole or in part on reports, data or other information'' related to
the development and implementation of a SMS.
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\69\ See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)(B).
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The protections of 49 U.S.C. 44735 do not extend to information
that is required to be submitted to the FAA.\70\ Therefore, if Sec.
5.94 requires that notice of a hazard be submitted to the FAA (because
the FAA is an interfacing party), that submission is not protected from
disclosure under 49 U.S.C. 44735. However, if that notice of hazard
submitted to the FAA contains trade secrets, or confidential commercial
or financial information, the FAA must protect the information from
public disclosure under 18 U.S.C. 1905 or 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). If a
person voluntarily shares hazard information with the FAA and such data
is not required to be submitted under Sec. 5.94, then such information
would be protected from disclosure under section 44735.
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\70\ As discussed earlier in this preamble, for summaries of
confidential employee reports to the FAA that would be required
under proposed Sec. 5.71(c), 49 U.S.C. 44735(a)(2) offers statutory
protection from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)(B).
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The FAA does not control data shared by a person under proposed
Sec. 5.94 with other interfacing persons such as other governmental
entities or private parties. Certain protections might be available
under a private, legally-binding agreement to protect the information
(e.g., non-disclosure agreement) amongst the parties sharing the
information, or under certain state or local laws or regulations.
Persons that would be subject to Sec. 5.94 may seek legal guidance
to determine the most appropriate way to handle and protect data and
information submitted to, or received from, interfacing persons. The
FAA encourages these persons to assess applicable State legal
frameworks to determine how to comply with data sharing, privacy laws,
and reporting requirements, and how to best protect the data shared or
received. These persons should evaluate whether states afford data
sharing and information protection mechanisms through local statutes or
regulations, or through other legal or contractual arrangements, such
as confidential disclosure agreements. The FAA expects that industry
already has agreements or other arrangements with those interfaces they
interact with the most to protect their data and prevent unauthorized
disclosures.\71\ The FAA considers that industry would be best able to
determine how to effectively share hazard information with interfacing
parties.
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\71\ As discussed earlier in the preamble, interfaces are often
entities like suppliers or companies that the certificate holder
contracts with for services. In these cases, contracts likely
already exist, so the need to share hazard information could be
added to those existing contracts or included in future contracts.
The FAA notes that there are analogous information sharing
agreements already present in the aviation industry. For example, an
aircraft owner is provided with an Airplane Flight Manual. If the
operator finds errors in the manual there is a means to report this
to the Original Equipment Manufacturer. The manufacturer may make
the change and then send out modifications to all the owners of that
type of aircraft, therefore providing a closed loop communication
system.
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VI. Guidance Material
The FAA provides guidance to the industry on potential methods to
comply with part 5. Included in the docket for this proposed rule are
draft updates to FAA's existing SMS guidance material, AC 120-92:
Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers, and new draft
guidance in AC 21-58: Safety Management Systems for Type and Production
Certificate Holders.
A. Guidance for Aviation Service Providers
The FAA is revising AC 120-92: Safety Management Systems for
Aviation Service Providers, to provide guidance in meeting the new
requirements of part 5, and for all types of certificate holders and
LOA holders who would be required to have an SMS under the proposed
rule. The draft AC also describes methods of scalability for the
service providers to meet the proposed requirements based on their size
and the services they provide. Lastly, this draft AC has been updated
to include current information and best practices. The AC would
continue to support the FAA SMS Voluntary Program participants.
B. Guidance for Design and Production Approval Holders
The FAA has drafted a new AC 21-58: Safety Management Systems for
Type and Production Certificate Holders that would assist part 21 TC
and PC holders and applicants in developing and implementing an SMS
compliant with the proposed part 5 requirements. This new draft
advisory circular is similar to the updated AC 120-92, geared toward
the needs of part 21 certificate holders, and is consistent with AC
120-92 to facilitate corporate-wide SMS implementation for part 21
certificate holders that also have other certificates under 14 CFR.
VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Federal agencies consider impacts of regulatory actions under a
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive
Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563 direct that each Federal agency
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the costs. Second,
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39)
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing
U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in
any one year. The current threshold after adjustment for inflation is
$165,000,000, using the most current (2021) Implicit Price Deflator for
the Gross Domestic Product. The FAA has provided a detailed RIA in the
docket for this rulemaking. This portion of the preamble summarizes the
FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this rule.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this
rule: (1) will generate benefits that justify costs; (2) is a
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866; (3) will have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities; (4) will not create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and (5) will
not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or tribal governments,
or on the private sector.
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
In summary, the FAA estimated quantified annualized costs of $51.3
million using a 7 percent discount rate over a 5-year period of
analysis. The costs represent the value of resources needed for
regulated entities to develop and implement a safety management system.
Mitigation costs to reduce or eliminate any hazards identified by an
SMS, which are yet to be identified and
[[Page 1957]]
thus unknown, are not included in the analysis. The FAA evaluated
benefits qualitatively. The benefits are the value that would result
from avoided fatalities, serious injuries, aircraft damage, and
investigation costs.
1. Baseline for the Analysis
The baseline for the analysis of incremental benefits and costs of
the proposed rule includes existing regulations and standards, existing
practices, affected entities, and current risks of aircraft accidents
and incidents. The FAA already requires part 121 operators to implement
an SMS. The FAA also provides a voluntary SMS program for certificate
holders under parts 21, 135, and 145. The SMS voluntary program is
based on the requirements in existing part 5. There are over 200
participants in the voluntary program, including 40 participants in
active conformance (full implementation of the certificate holder's
SMS).\72\ In addition, some part 121 operators have covered their part
135 operations and part 145 repair station services under their SMS.
Finally, certain aircraft design and production approval holders and
certificated repair stations subject to EASA requirements will be
required to develop and implement an SMS under that agency's SMS
requirements.\73\
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\72\ See FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 17, Chapter 3, ``Safety
Management System Voluntary Program''.
\73\ EASA adopted a rule to require SMS for maintenance
organizations (part 145), which will become applicable on December
2, 2022. EASA also adopted a rule for design and production
organizations (part 21), which will become applicable on March 7,
2023.
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The FAA estimated that the proposed rule would apply to
approximately 65 holders of both a type certificate and a production
certificate for the same product. Also, there are approximately 1,907
part 135 operators that would be required to implement an SMS, which
includes 272 entities that also hold an LOA to conduct commercial air
tours under Sec. 91.147. Additionally, there are 694 LOA holders
operating under Sec. 91.147 that are not associated with a part 135
certificate that would be required to implement an SMS under the
proposed rule.
With respect to aircraft accidents, although the risk associated
with regularly scheduled commercial air carriers under part 121 in the
United States is low, there have been accidents involving fatalities
and serious injuries. Under part 135, there has been an average of 43
accidents and 24 fatalities annually from 2015 to 2019, mostly within
on-demand operations. There have also been recent fatal accidents of
air tours conducted under Sec. 91.147, an average of 7 accidents and 3
fatalities annually from 2015 to 2019.
2. Benefits
The benefits of the proposed rule would include the value of the
reductions in safety risks associated with requiring additional
entities to implement SMS. The information available for estimating
such benefits includes data on accident consequences, accident
investigation reports identifying the probable causes, and information
on the values associated with avoiding consequences. The FAA relied
largely on aviation accident data from the NTSB for the years 2015 to
2019 (the most recent available at the time of the analysis) and
standard values for estimating avoided consequences including
fatalities, serious injuries, property damage, and investigation costs.
The FAA evaluated benefits by determining annual average aviation
accident consequences, the share of those consequences that could be
mitigated under the proposed rule, and probability of mitigation. The
FAA determined the share of consequences that could potentially be
mitigatable by the rule by looking at the causes of individual
accidents. Requiring certain aircraft design and production approval
holders (14 CFR part 21) to implement SMS has the potential to mitigate
accidents in operations conducted under 14 CFR parts 121, 135, and 91.
Requiring part 135 operators and Sec. 91.147 LOA holders to implement
SMS has the potential to mitigate accidents in operations under part
135 and Sec. 91.147. The probability of mitigation is uncertain.
The FAA used accident data from 2015 to 2019, focusing on those
involving fatalities and serious injuries (1,954 out of 6,718 accidents
across parts 91, 121, and 135). The FAA identified 11 accidents of
which the risk could have been mitigated by requiring SMS for part 21
approval holders. The FAA also identified 35 part 135 accidents and 4
Sec. 91.147 accidents of which the risk could have been mitigated by
the proposed rule. There are a number of uncertainties in the analysis,
including that not all accidents indicative of the potential for
benefits from the proposed rule may have been identified. In
particular, requiring SMS for certain part 21 design and production
approval holders will have beneficial impacts beyond domestic
operations (i.e., to citizens of foreign countries).
3. Costs
To estimate compliance costs, the FAA developed average onetime SMS
development costs and recurring SMS implementation costs. Then, the FAA
extrapolated these costs to entities that would fall under the expanded
applicability of part 5 who would not already be required to implement
an SMS and are not already implementing an SMS voluntarily. To develop
these estimates, the FAA conducted limited outreach to industry
participants in the FAA's voluntary SMS program to obtain data on
implementation costs. In order to properly scale costs for company
size, the FAA calculated these costs per employee for certificate
holders under part 21 and per aircraft for operators under part 135 and
Sec. 91.147. The FAA then extrapolated the costs based on number of
employees or number of aircraft. The FAA estimated only minor costs for
entities that have already implemented an SMS voluntarily.
There are a number of uncertainties in the analysis, including that
costs are based on a small sample. As a result, costs could be lower or
higher than estimated. The outreach indicated a high level of
variability depending on the individual circumstances of the entity
(e.g., existing processes and capabilities). For this analysis, the FAA
intends for the estimates to represent an average across entities.
4. Summary
Table 2 provides a summary of annualized and present value costs
using 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates.
Table 2--Summary of Costs
[Millions $2021]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present
Category Annualized value (5
years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% Discount Rate:
Part 21...................................... $5.0 $22.8
Part 135..................................... 39.5 180.8
Sec. 91.147................................ 7.2 33.0
Part 121..................................... 0.1 0.3
------------------------
Total.................................... 51.7 236.9
7% Discount Rate:
Part 21 \1\.................................. 5.0 20.6
Part 135..................................... 39.1 160.4
Sec. 91.147................................ 7.1 29.3
Part 121..................................... 0.1 0.3
------------------------
Total.................................... 51.3 210.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
n.e. = not estimated.
\1\ Based on quantified impacts. Excludes costs of mitigation, which
FAA was unable to estimate.
Considering particular uncertainties associated with estimating
benefits (e.g., SMS effectiveness), the FAA estimated the number of
accident consequences (fatalities, serious injuries, and
[[Page 1958]]
destroyed airplanes) that would have to be avoided for benefits to
equal costs. These estimates are based on the estimated costs if
mitigation costs are minimal. Although mitigation costs are not
included, neither are cost savings, such as from potential efficiency
gains. For example, SMS can result in doing things differently but not
always more costly.
However, the breakeven analysis is limited for providing insight on
the relationship of benefits and costs because net benefits will also
depend on the magnitude of mitigation costs, which have not been
quantified due to lack of data. Therefore, the FAA also calculates the
breakeven level of consequences for an illustrative example of
mitigation costs equal to 25 percent of compliance costs. Avoided
consequences would need to be higher if mitigation costs are greater
than 25 percent of compliance costs. The FAA requests comment and data
on the costs of mitigations that could have prevented the accidents
described in the analysis.
The breakeven analysis suggests that the proposed rule would break
even, across all parts, if an average of four fatalities are avoided
annually (5 fatalities in the example assuming mitigation costs are 25
percent of compliance costs). Requiring SMS for certain part 21 design
and production approval holders would break even if an average of four
serious injuries are avoided annually (5 serious injuries assuming
mitigation costs are 25 percent of compliance costs). The SMS
requirements for part 135 operators would break even if an average of 3
fatalities are avoided annually (4 fatalities assuming mitigation costs
are 25 percent of compliance costs). The SMS requirements for Sec.
91.147 LOA holders would break even if an average of 1 fatality is
avoided annually (1 fatality also assuming mitigation costs are 25
percent of compliance costs). The benefits of the proposed rule could
also equal costs with other combinations of avoided accident
consequences.
5. Regulatory Alternatives
The FAA considered two alternatives to the proposed rule. Each
proposed alternative would change the applicability of the requirements
for an SMS:
Alternative 1: Extend applicability of part 5 to include
most design and production approval holders under part 21, with some
exceptions.
Alternative 2: Exclude from the applicability of part 5
the part 135 operators that use only one pilot-in-command in their
operations and the Sec. 91.147 LOA holders that conduct fewer than 100
flights per year.
The FAA considered an alternative to the proposed part 21
applicability based on recommendations from a part 21 SMS Aviation
Rulemaking Committee. Under Alternative 1, the SMS requirements would
apply beyond holders of both a type and production certificate for the
same product and would include most design and production approval
holders. This alternative would exclude design and production approval
holders of products, articles, or changes to existing type certificated
products that are not typically used for carrying passengers or
property for compensation or hire. Also, as part of this alternative,
the FAA considered a process that would allow design and production
approval holders to apply to be excluded from SMS requirements if their
article or approved product alteration would have little or no effect
on the continued safe flight or landing of the aircraft. Under
Alternative 1, the FAA estimated that over 3,000 additional entities
would be required to implement SMS. The FAA also estimated that over
3,000 additional entities (not associated with the entities in the
previous sentence) would likely apply for an exception from the SMS
requirements.
Alternative 1 would increase benefits through SMS implementation by
the approximately 3,000 entities who design or produce certain safety-
critical parts under any design or production approval. The alternative
would also hold entities who design and produce interchangeable safety-
critical parts to the same SMS standard required of entities holding
both a type certificate and a production certificate for the same
product. However, as of the date of this analysis, the FAA was not able
to estimate these risks or benefits due to a lack of specific data and
lack of certainty at this time.
The FAA estimated that costs could be $39.4 million for Alternative
1, using a number of assumptions because the agency does not have
information for these entities on the size of their aviation design and
production processes. The costs would include SMS development and
implementation costs, application costs for an exception to
implementing SMS, and FAA review and approval costs. Compared to the
proposed rule, the increased costs would be approximately $34.4 million
(annualized using a 7% discount rate).
The FAA considered an alternative for part 135 and Sec. 91.147
that would limit the number of small operators affected. Under
Alternative 2, the FAA considered excluding from the applicability of
part 5 the part 135 operators that use only one pilot-in-command in
their operations and the Sec. 91.147 LOA holders that conduct fewer
than 100 flights per year. The FAA estimated that 1,313 part 135
operators would be affected under Alternative 2 compared to 1,907 under
the proposed rule. The FAA does not have data on the number of Sec.
91.147 LOA holders that conduct less than 100 flights per year.
However, for this analysis, the FAA used LOA holders with one
registered aircraft as an estimate of LOA holders that would not be
affected under the alternative. The FAA estimated that 321 Sec. 91.147
LOA holders would be affected under Alternative 2 compared to 694 under
the proposed rule.
The reduced applicability under Alternative 2 would lower both the
benefits and costs. For part 135, costs would be $3.4 million lower
compared to the proposed rule. For Sec. 91.147, costs would be $1.7
million lower compared to the proposed rule. With respect to benefits,
the FAA identified five potentially mitigatable accidents involving
operators that use only one pilot-in-command and one potentially
mitigatable accident involving a Sec. 91.147 LOA holder with one
aircraft registration. These types of operators would not be required
to implement an SMS.
Table 3 provides a summary of the analysis of alternatives. The
uncertainty associated with the estimation of benefits and costs of the
proposal also applies to the estimates of the alternatives. Section
V.A., Applicability, of the preamble to the proposed rule provides the
agency's rationale for selecting the proposed option.
[[Page 1959]]
Table 3--Summary of Alternatives Analysis
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Change from proposed rule
Scenario ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected entities Benefits Costs (millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative 1: Extend SMS: +3,000................ Data not available +$34.4.
applicability to include Exception: +3,000.......... to quantify change
additional design and production in risk.
approval holders under part 21.
Alternative 2: Limit Part 135: -594............. Lower (would not Part 135: -$3.4.
applicability for certain part Sec. 91.147: -373........ mitigate risks Sec. 91.147: -$1.7.
135 operators (exclude operators identified in 5
that use only one pilot-in- part 135 and 1
command) and Sec. 91.147 LOA Sec. 91.147
holders (exclude fewer than 100 accidents).
flights per year).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please see the RIA available in the docket for the more details.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, Public Law 96-354, 94
Stat. 1164 (5 U.S.C. 601-612), as amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat.
857, Mar. 29, 1996), and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Pub. L.
111-240, 124 Stat. 2504 Sept. 27, 2010), requires Federal agencies to
consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and
other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact.
The term ``small entities'' comprises small businesses and not-for-
profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are
not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with
populations of less than 50,000.
The FAA is publishing this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(IRFA) to aid the public in commenting on the potential impacts to
small entities from this proposal. The FAA invites interested parties
to submit data and information regarding the potential economic impact
that would result from the proposal. The FAA will consider comments
when making a determination or when completing a Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis.
An IRFA must contain the following:
(1) A description of the reasons why the action by the agency is
being considered;
(2) A succinct statement of the objective of, and legal basis for,
the proposed rule;
(3) A description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number
of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply;
(4) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and
other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, including an
estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record;
(5) An identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant
Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the
proposed rule; and
(6) A description of any significant alternatives to the proposed
rule which accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and
which minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on
small entities.
1. Reasons the Action Is Being Considered
As described elsewhere in this preamble, the proposed ruled
addresses a Congressional mandate as well as recommendations from the
NTSB. Additionally, the proposed rule would move the United States
closer to harmonizing with ICAO Annex 19. The FAA intends for the
proposed rule to improve aviation safety by requiring organizations to
implement a proactive approach to managing the safety performance of an
organization. The successful use of SMS by part 121 operators suggests
potential benefits of expanding SMS into other sectors of the aviation
system.
2. Objectives and Legal Basis of the Proposed Rule
The objective of implementing an SMS is to proactively identify
hazards, assess the risk of those hazards, and apply effective
mitigations before an accident or incident occurs. The proposed rule
would expand the use of SMS in the aviation industry by making the SMS
requirements applicable to part 135 operators, Sec. 91.147 LOA
holders, and certain part 21 design and production approval holders.
The proposed rule would also increase the opportunities for
communication of identified hazards between part 119 certificate
holders, Sec. 91.147 LOA holders, and manufacturers. The proposed rule
is therefore intended to increase the overall safety of the national
airspace system. Additionally, the proposed rule would fulfill the
statutory mandate in section 102 of ACSAA. Section II of this preamble
describes the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety under
Title 49 U.S.C. and the Congressional mandate in section 102 of ACSAA.
3. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities
FAA used the definition of small entities in the RFA for this
analysis. The RFA defines small entities as small businesses, small
governmental jurisdictions, or small organizations. In 5 U.S.C. 601(3),
the RFA defines ``small business'' to have the same meaning as ``small
business concern'' under section 3 of the Small Business Act. The Small
Business Act authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to
define ``small business'' by issuing regulations.
SBA has established size standards for various types of economic
activities, or industries, under the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS). These size standards generally define
small businesses based on the number of employees or annual receipts.
Table 4 shows the SBA size standards for example industrial
classification codes relevant for the proposed rule. Note that the SBA
definition of a small business applies to the parent company and all
affiliates as a single entity.
Table 4--Small Business Size Standards: Air Transportation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS code Description Size standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------
336411........................ Aircraft Manufacturing 1,500 employees.
336412........................ Aircraft Engine and 1,500 employees.
Engine Parts
Manufacturing.
[[Page 1960]]
336413........................ Other Aircraft Part 1,250 employees.
and Auxiliary
Equipment
Manufacturing.
481111........................ Scheduled Passenger 1,500 employees.
Air Transportation.
481112........................ Scheduled Freight Air 1,500 employees.
Transportation.
481211........................ Nonscheduled Chartered 1,500 employees.
Passenger Air
Transportation.
481212........................ Nonscheduled Chartered 1,500 employees.
Freight Air
Transportation.
481219........................ Other Nonscheduled Air $16.5 million.
Transportation.
487990........................ Scenic and Sightseeing $8.0 million.
Transportation, Other.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS = North American Industrial Classification System.
a. Part 21
As described in the RIA, the FAA estimated that there may be
approximately 65 design or production approval holders under part 21
that may need to implement SMS under the proposed rule. Fifteen of
these entities are already implementing SMS under the FAA's voluntary
program or are large businesses (based on publicly available
information regarding number of employees). Of the remaining 50
entities, 31 may meet the size standard for a small business in
Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing (NAICS 33641).
b. Part 135
Approximately 1,907 part 119 certificate holders operating under
part 135 would need to implement SMS under the proposed rule. Internal
FAA data indicate that all but three of these certificate holders have
fewer than 1,500 employees. Thus, to the extent that the industrial
classification of the parent company of these entities is scheduled
passenger or freight, or nonscheduled chartered passenger or freight
air transportation (NAICS 481111, 481112, 481211, or 481212), over
1,900 would be small businesses. Table 5 shows the distribution of
certificate holders by total employment.
Table 5--Distribution of Part 135 Employment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of certificate Percent of
Number of employees holders certificate holders
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................................................................. 292 15
2-9............................................................... 877 46
10-19............................................................. 275 14
20-49............................................................. 264 14
50-99............................................................. 106 6
100-499........................................................... 76 4
500-999........................................................... 13 1
1000+............................................................. 4 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: FAA data as of March 2021.
c. Section 91.147
Approximately 694 air tour operators would have to implement SMS
under the proposed rule. To the extent that the industrial
classification of the parent company of these entities is Scenic and
Sightseeing Transportation, Other, the relevant size standard is $8.0
million. Internal FAA data does not include revenue or number of
flights for these operations. However, 362 of these LOA holders have
only one aircraft listed on the LOA. Many may meet the small business
size standard. The FAA requests data and information that may enable
determination of whether these air tour operators would meet the SBA
small size threshold.
4. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements
Section V.C.4 of this preamble discusses the reporting requirements
of the proposed rule. Affected entities who identify a hazard in their
operating environment must provide notice of the hazard to the
interfacing person or persons who would best be able to address the
hazard or mitigate the risk.
Section V.C.5 of this preamble describes the recordkeeping
requirements of the proposed rule. Affected entities must maintain
records of the outputs of safety risk management and safety assurance
processes for as long as they remain relevant to the operation. In
addition, entities must retain outputs of safety assurance processes
for a minimum of 5 years, SMS training records for as long as the
individual is employed by the person, and communication records for a
minimum of 24 months.
Recordkeeping and reporting requirements, like the rest of part 5,
are scalable to a wide variety of business models and sizes, as
discussed in Section V.F. of this preamble. As a result, entities could
potentially accomplish the recordkeeping and reporting requirements
through the use of existing personnel rather than require additional
professional skills.
Section V.C of the preamble describes the primary requirements for
an SMS, which include safety policy, safety risk management, safety
assurance, and safety promotion, as well as documentation. As described
in the RIA, the FAA estimated the cost of compliance with all the
proposed requirements based on number of employees for part 21
certificate holders and based on fleet size for part 135 operators and
Sec. 91.147 LOA holders. Table 6 and Table 7 provide the results for
example size categories and expressed as a percentage of overall
average receipts (using NAICS 336411 for part 21 and 336411 for part
135 as examples).\74\ Not included in the costs
[[Page 1961]]
are mitigation costs which are yet unknown. The RIA provides additional
detail on the cost estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ The ratios are similar using NACIS 336412 and 336413 for
part 21 and 481112, 481113, 481211, 481212, and 481213 for part 135.
For Sec. 91.147, the FAA does not have number of employees
associated with the number of aircraft on the LOA. However, assuming
LOA holders of 1 and 2 registered aircraft have less than 5
employees, the ratios for one-time and annual costs as a percentage
of inflation adjusted receipts in this smallest employment size
category in NAICS 487990 would be 1.8% and 1.1%, respectively.
Table 6--Example SMS Compliance Costs by Number of Employees: Part 21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One-time cost/ Annual cost/
Number of employees One-time cost Annual cost receipts \1\ (%) receipts \1\ (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-99............................ $7,500-$26,050 $500-$10,130 0.2-1.2 0.1-0.1
100-499......................... 26,320-131,320 10,230-51,050 0.2-1.2 0.1-0.5
500-10,000...................... 131,580-2,631,590 51,150-1,023,000 0.03-0.1 0.01-0.04
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source for receipts: 2017 County Business Patterns and Economic Census (https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb/tables/2017/us_state_naics_detailedsizes_2017.xlsx). Adjusted for inflation using the Consumer
Price Index. Based on NAICS 336411.
Table 7--Example SMS Compliance Costs By Number of Aircraft: Part 135 and 91.147
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One-time cost/ Annual cost/
Number of aircraft One-time cost Annual cost receipts \1\ (%) receipts \1\ (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-9............................. $7,500-$38,120 $4,380-$39,420 0.1-0.7 0.1-0.4
10-49........................... 42,360-207,560 43,800-214,640 0.1-0.9 0.1-0.9
50-99........................... 211,800-419,370 219,020-433,670 0.2-0.9 0.2-0.9
100-500......................... 423,600-2,118,010 438,050-2,190,230 0.2-0.3 0.2-0.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source for receipts: 2017 County Business Patterns and Economic Census (https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb/tables/2017/us_state_naics_detailedsizes_2017.xlsx). Adjusted for inflation using the Consumer
Price Index. Based on NAICS 481111 and median number of employees per number of aircraft for part 135
operators.
Total annualized costs (using a 7 percent discount rate) for small
businesses may be in the range of $0.3 million for part 21 and $37.4
million for part 135. The FAA does not have data to identify Sec.
91.147 LOA holders that may meet the size standard. However, total
annualized costs for this sector are $7.1 million.
Although the proposed requirements are scalable to fit the size or
complexity of the organization, any adverse impacts of compliance costs
could disproportionately fall on small entities. Like large entities,
small entities will likely pass the costs on in the form of price
increases.
5. All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict
There are no relevant Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or
conflict with the proposed rule.
6. Significant Alternatives Considered
The FAA considered extending the applicability of part 5 to include
most design and production approval holders under part 21, with some
exceptions. Compared to the proposed option, the FAA estimated that
more than an additional 3,000 entities would need to implement an SMS
and more than 3,000 would likely apply for an exception under this
alternative. To the extent that the industrial classification of these
entities is in aircraft manufacturing, the industry data in Table 2
suggests that a large percentage are likely small businesses (i.e.,
given at least 92 percent of this sector meet the size standard).
The FAA considered excluding from the SMS certificate holders under
part 135 that use only one pilot-in-command in their operations and
Sec. 91.147 LOA holders that conduct less than 100 flights per year.
This alternative would reduce affected part 135 operators by 31 percent
and Sec. 91.147 LOA holders by 54 percent. For part 135, costs would
be $3.4 million lower compared to the proposed rule. For Sec. 91.147,
costs would be $5.9 million lower compared to the proposed rule.
However, the alternative would also reduce benefits. The FAA identified
five potentially mitigatable accidents involving operators that use
only one pilot-in-command and one potentially mitigatable accident
involving a Sec. 91.147 LOA holder with one aircraft registration.
These types of operators would not be required to implement an SMS.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this rule and determined that it will
improve aviation safety and does not exclude imports that meet this
objective.\75\ As a result, the FAA does not consider this rule as
creating an unnecessary obstacle to foreign commerce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ The FAA notes that because this proposed rule would not
apply to products where the state of manufacture is not the United
States, aircraft manufacturers who are manufacturing abroad would
not be required to have an SMS under part 5 but may have SMS
requirements imposed by the state of manufacture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the
[[Page 1962]]
aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a
``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently uses an inflation-
adjusted value of $165 million in lieu of $100 million. An unfunded
mandate is a regulation that requires a State, local, or tribal
government or the private sector to incur direct costs without the
Federal government having first provided the funds to pay those costs.
The FAA determined that the proposed rule will not result in the
expenditure of $165,000,000 or more by State, local, or tribal
governments in the aggregate, or the private sector, in any one
year.\76\ Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 defines ``Federal
private sector mandate'' as ``any provision in legislation, statute,
or regulation that . . . would impose an enforceable duty upon the
private sector . . . or would reduce or eliminate the amount of
authorization of appropriations for Federal financial assistance
that will be provided to the private sector for the purposes of
ensuring compliance with such duty.'' Public Law 104-4 section 658
(1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. According to the 1995
amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an
agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, nor
may it impose an information collection requirement unless it displays
a valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.
This proposed rule contains new information collection requirements
and amendments to the existing information collection requirements
previously approved under OMB Control Number 2120-0675. As required by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has
submitted these proposed information collection amendments to OMB for
its review.
1. Summary
In this rule, the FAA is proposing to require that all certificate
holders operating under part 135, all LOA holders operating under Sec.
91.147, and certain certificate holders under part 21 establish an SMS
to improve safety for their operations, and to amend the requirements
for certificate holders operating under part 121.\77\ An SMS is a
formalized approach to managing safety by developing an organization-
wide safety policy, developing formal methods for identifying hazards,
analyzing and mitigating risk, developing methods for ensuring
continuous safety improvement, and creating organization-wide safety
promotion strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ Proposed part 121 requirements would be amended in the
corresponding OMB Control Number 2120-0675.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under this proposed rule, certificate and authorization holders
required to comply would be burdened with the following information
collection activities: \78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Proposed part 121 requirements not reflected in
corresponding OMB Control Number 2120-0675 are system description
and notification of hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Develop a system description--Sec. 5.5(b)(1).
(2) Revise and maintain the system description to reflect changes
in the organization--Sec. 5.5(b)(2).
(3) Submit the revisions of the SMS to meet the requirements of
Sec. Sec. 5.5(b), 5.21(a)(7), 5.53(b)(5), 5.94, 5.95(c), and 5.97(d)
for FAA-acceptance in a form and manner acceptable to the
Administrator--Sec. 5.7(a)(2).
(4) Submit a statement of compliance in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator--Sec. 5.7(b)(2) and Sec. 5.9(a)(2).
(5) Submit an implementation plan in accordance with Sec. 5.17of
this subpart for FAA approval in a form and manner acceptable to the
Administrator--Sec. 5.11(b) and Sec. 5.13(b)(2).
(6) Any person required to have an SMS under this part to have a
safety policy--Sec. 5.21(a).
(7) Any person that holds both a type certificate and a production
certificate for the same product issued under part 21 of this chapter
must submit a summary of the confidential employee reports received
under Sec. 5.71(a)(7) to the Administrator every 6 months--Sec.
5.71(c).
(8) If a person identifies a hazard in the operating environment,
the person must provide notice of the hazard to the interfacing person
or persons identified in the system description who, to the best of
their knowledge, could address the hazard or mitigate the risk--Sec.
5.94(a); any person required to have an SMS under this part to develop
and maintain procedures for reporting and receiving hazard
information--Sec. 5.94(b).
(9) Any person required to have an SMS under this part to develop
and maintain SMS documentation containing (a) safety policy, (b) SMS
processes and procedures, (c) system description--Sec. 5.95.
(10) Any person required to have an SMS under this part to maintain
SMS records: (a) records of outputs of safety risk management processes
for as long as the control remains relevant to the operation, (b)
records of outputs of safety assurance processes for a minimum of 5
years, (c) records of all training provided under Sec. 5.91 for each
individual for as long as the individual is employed by the person, (d)
records of all communications provided under Sec. 5.93 or Sec. 5.94
for a minimum of 24 consecutive calendar months--Sec. 5.97.
2. Use
The information collection will be used to provide a basis for the
FAA's review during the development and implementing phases, used by
the certificate or LOA holder in its SMS processes and procedures, and
used to demonstrate compliance with the part 5 requirements.
Collection and analysis of safety data is an essential part of an
SMS. Types of data to be collected, retention procedures, analysis
processes, and organizational structures for review and evaluation will
be documented in the SMS. These records will be used by a certificate
holder or LOA holder in the operation of its SMS and to facilitate
continuous improvement through evaluation and monitoring. While this
proposed rule does not require a certificate holder or LOA holder to
submit these records to the FAA, it would require a certificate holder
or LOA holder to make these records available upon request.
3. Respondents (Including Number of)
Table 8 provides the FAA's estimates of the number of respondents
by affected entity category (by part 121 approval holders, part 135
operators, and Sec. 91.147 LOA holders) that would be impacted by the
paperwork requirements in this rule.
[[Page 1963]]
Table 8--Number of Respondents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Affected entity category respondents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Description:
Part 21............................................. 65
Part 135............................................ 1,907
Sec. 91.147....................................... 694
Part 121............................................ 66
---------------
Total........................................... 2,732
Statement of compliance:
Part 135............................................ 1,907
Sec. 91.147....................................... 694
Part 121 \1\........................................ 1
---------------
Total........................................... 2,602
Implementation plan:
Part 21............................................. 65
Safety policy:
Part 21............................................. 65
Part 135............................................ 1,907
Sec. 91.147....................................... 694
---------------
Total........................................... 2,666
Summary of employee reports:
Part 21............................................. 65
Notification of hazards:
Part 21............................................. 65
Part 135............................................ 1,907
Sec. 91.147....................................... 694
Part 121............................................ 66
---------------
Total........................................... 2,732
SMS documentation:
Part 21............................................. 65
Part 135............................................ 1,907
Sec. 91.147....................................... 694
---------------
Total........................................... 2,666
SMS records:
Part 21............................................. 65
Part 135............................................ 1,907
Sec. 91.147....................................... 694
---------------
Total........................................... 2,666
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimate based on one new 121 operator over last 3 years. Not
applicable to existing 121 operators.
4. Frequency
The frequency of new information collection requirements and
amendments to the existing information collection requirements is shown
below in Table 13 with the annual burden estimate for each.
5. Annual Burden Estimate
The FAA estimated the paperwork burden for up to 2,732 certificate
and approval holders impacted by the rule as shown below in Table 9.
Table 9--Paperwork Burden
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Frequency of Total number Burden hours Costs
Category respondents response \1\ of responses \2\ (millions) \3\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Description:
Part 21..................... 65 1 65 520 $0.05
Part 135.................... 1,907 1 1,907 15,256 1.36
Sec. 91.147............... 694 1 694 5,552 0.49
Part 121.................... 66 1 66 528 0.05
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 2,732 NA 2,732 21,856 1.94
Statement of compliance:
Part 135.................... 1,907 3 5,721 61,024 5.43
Sec. 91.147............... 694 3 2,082 22,208 1.98
Part 121.................... 1 3 3 32 0.00
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 2,602 NA 7,806 83,264 7.41
[[Page 1964]]
Implementation plan:
Part 21..................... 65 3 195 2,080 0.19
Safety policy:
Part 21..................... 65 1 65 260 0.02
Part 135.................... 1,907 1 1,907 7,628 0.68
Sec. 91.147 LOA........... 694 1 694 2,776 0.25
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 2,666 NA 2,666 10,664 0.94
Summary of employee reports:
Part 21..................... 65 6 390 1,560 0.14
Notification of hazards:
Part 21..................... 65 3 195 1,560 0.14
Part 135.................... 1,907 3 5,721 45,768 4.07
Sec. 91.147............... 694 3 2,082 16,656 1.48
Part 121.................... 66 3 198 1,584 0.14
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 2,732 NA 8,196 65,568 5.83
SMS documentation:
Part 21..................... 65 3 195 2,080 0.19
Part 135.................... 1,907 3 5,721 61,024 5.43
Sec. 91.147............... 694 3 2,082 22,208 1.98
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 2,666 NA 7,998 85,312 7.59
SMS records:
Part 21..................... 65 3 195 1,560 0.14
Part 135.................... 1,907 3 5,721 45,768 4.07
Sec. 91.147............... 694 3 2,082 16,656 1.48
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................... 2,666 NA 7,99822,791 63,984 5.69
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NA = not applicable.
\1\ Frequency over three-year period.
\2\ Calculated as number of respondents x hours per respondent.
\3\ Calculated as burden hours x average labor rate including benefits. The FAA used an average wage including
benefits of $88.97, which is the mean average wage for aerospace engineers ($59.12) divided by the percent of
total employer costs of employee compensation represented by wages (66%) to account for benefits (34%). Wages
and benefits information available at: https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes172011.htm and https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t04.htm#ect_table4.f.1.
Table 10 provides a summary of the implied annual responses and
burden (total divided by three).
Table 10--Summary of Annual Burden \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Reporting Recordkeeping Disclosure
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System description:
Number of respondents...................................... 911 0 0
Number of responses per respondent......................... 0.3 0 0
Time per response (hours).................................. 3 0 0
Total number of responses.................................. 911 0 0
Total burden (hours)....................................... 7,285 0 0
Statement of compliance:
Number of respondents...................................... 2,602 0 0
Number of responses per respondent......................... 1 0 0
Time per response (hours).................................. 10.7 0 0
Total number of responses.................................. 2,602 0 0
Total burden (hours)....................................... 27,755 0 0
Implementation plan:
Number of respondents...................................... 65 0 0
Number of responses per respondent......................... 1 0 0
Time per response (hours).................................. 10.7 0 0
Total number of responses.................................. 65 0 0
Total burden (hours)....................................... 693 0 0
Safety policy:
Number of respondents...................................... 0 889 0
Number of responses per respondent......................... 0 0.3 0
Time per response (hours).................................. 0 1.3 0
Total number of responses.................................. 0 889 0
Total burden (hours)....................................... 0 3,555 0
[[Page 1965]]
Summary of employee reports:
Number of respondents...................................... 65 0 0
Number of responses per respondent......................... 2 0 0
Time per response (hours).................................. 4 0 0
Total number of responses.................................. 130 0 0
Total burden (hours)....................................... 520 0 0
Notification of hazards:
Number of respondents...................................... 2,732 0 0
Number of responses per respondent......................... 1 0 0
Time per response (hours).................................. 8 0 0
Total number of responses.................................. 2,732 0 0
Total burden (hours)....................................... 21,856 0 0
SMS documentation:
Number of respondents...................................... 0 2,666 0
Number of responses per respondent......................... 0 1 0
Time per response (hours).................................. 0 10.7 0
Total number of responses.................................. 0 2,666 0
Total burden (hours)....................................... 0 28,437 0
SMS records:
Number of respondents...................................... 0 2,666 0
Number of responses per respondent......................... 0 1 0
Time per response (hours).................................. 0 8 0
Total number of responses.................................. 0 2,666 0
Total burden (hours)................................... 0 21,328 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency is soliciting comments to--
(a) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency,
including whether the information will have practical utility;
(b) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
(c) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
(d) Minimize the burden of collecting information on those who are
to respond, including by using appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology.
Individuals and organizations may send comments on the information
collection requirement to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section
at the beginning of this preamble by March 13, 2023. Comments also
should be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer for FAA,
New Executive Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC
20053.
F. International Compatibility
ICAO Annex 19 establishes an SMS Framework for managing aviation
safety risk, as well as identifies the types of organizations that
should implement an SMS. This rulemaking would move the United States
closer to harmonization with ICAO Annex 19. The proposed rule would
align with Annex 19 by requiring the following service providers to
implement SMS: (1) commercial operators of airplanes or helicopters,
and (2) certain organizations responsible for the design or manufacture
of products. The FAA has already implemented SMS across the FAA's Air
Traffic Organization.\79\ Additionally, the FAA is proposing SMS
implementation for certain airports through a separate rulemaking
effort. Both of these efforts bring us closer to alignment with ICAO
Annex 19 because Annex 19 also includes air traffic service providers
and airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ More information regarding the Air Traffic Organization's
SMS is available at: https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms/specifics_by_aviation_industry_type/air_traffic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When part 5 was originally constructed, it was based on the SMS
framework in ICAO Annex 19. Part 5 currently also includes requirements
for recordkeeping, which are not part of the ICAO's SMS framework.
However, recordkeeping requirements facilitate FAA's oversight
functions, and they assist the person implementing SMS in demonstrating
compliance with the regulations. In addition, the proposed rule would
require the use of a system description and the communication of
information regarding safety hazards. While these requirements are not
in the ICAO's SMS framework, the FAA believes that they are beneficial
to the persons implementing SMS and consistent with ICAO's intent as
ICAO notes in Annex 19 that other organizations that interface with a
product or service provider can make a significant contribution to the
safety of its products or services.
1. Air Carriers and Operators
The ICAO SMS requirements for commercial operators are contained in
Annex 19, but Annex 6 defines the scope of the requirements. Part I of
Annex 6 covers international commercial operations in airplanes. This
part of Annex 6 makes no distinction in its requirements on the basis
of an organization's size. The Annex applies to all commercial air
transportation operations in airplanes. In the United States, this
includes operators certificated under both part 121 and part 135. Part
III of Annex 6 covers commercial air transportation operators of
helicopters. In the United States, these operations are conducted under
part 135. Annex 6, part I addresses international flight operations; in
the United States, these international flights are operated under
either part 121 or part 135. The FAA currently requires part 121
operators to implement and maintain an SMS, and this proposed rule
would extend the requirement for an SMS to part 135 operators, further
harmonizing the United States with ICAO's SMS requirements.
2. Aircraft Design and Manufacturing
ICAO Annex 19 requires SMS for organizations responsible for the
type design or manufacture of aircraft, engines, or propellers. This
proposal extends part 5 applicability to holders of
[[Page 1966]]
both a TC and a PC for the same product, applicants for a PC where the
applicant is the holder or licensee of the TC, and holders of a TC who
allow other persons to use their TC to obtain a PC. This proposal would
bring the United States into closer harmonization with the ICAO Annex
19 SMS requirement for certain organizations responsible for design or
manufacturing of products.
3. Development and Implementation of SMS by Foreign Jurisdictions
Many States have made significant progress in developing,
implementing, and maintaining requirements for SMS, aligned with ICAO's
SMS framework, including certificating authorities in Europe (EASA),
Canada, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia. Of those
authorities, most have SMS requirements for international commercial
operations, and some have SMS requirements for design and
manufacturing. Most that do not have SMS requirements for design and
manufacturing plan to adopt such requirements in the future. Several
States also have SMS requirements for other operations in the aviation
system: airports, maintenance organizations, training organizations,
international general aviation operations, and for safety data
collection, protection, and exchange.
Harmonization of requirements, to the extent feasible, is important
to reduce the regulatory burden on those holding certificates or
authorizations from multiple States. The FAA continues to work with
other States to harmonize SMS requirements. The proposed rule aligns
with sections of the ICAO SMS framework and furthers harmonization with
other States requiring SMS. United States-based certificate holders
providing products or services internationally could be limited or
asked to provide duplicative information to other States' approval
authorities to show compliance with in-country SMS requirements. If
adopted as proposed, the rule would reduce the regulatory burden on
those holding certificates or authorizations across multiple States.
4. Other FAA Support for Harmonization and Standards Development
The FAA is a founding member and active participant in the Safety
Management International Collaboration Group, a group representing 18
international regulatory authorities. The primary purpose of the Safety
Management International Collaboration Group is to promote
international harmonization of SMS regulations, guidance material, and
oversight strategies. The FAA is also an active participant on the ICAO
Safety Management Panel.
The FAA also participated with the Aerospace Industries Association
to develop an international industry standard for SMS: ``Implementing a
Safety Management System in Design, Manufacturing and Maintenance
Organizations.'' This Standard is intended to enable the aviation
industry to implement an SMS consistent with the ICAO Annex 19 ``Safety
Management'' Second Edition, Appendix 2.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 5-6.6f for regulations and involves
no extraordinary circumstances.
H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in 14 CFR
in a manner affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the
extent to which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than
aviation, and to establish appropriate regulatory distinctions. Because
this proposed rule would apply to: (1) any person authorized to conduct
operations under part 135, (2) any person operating under an LOA issued
under Sec. 91.147, and (3) holders of both a TC and a PC for the same
product, as well as applicants for a PC where the applicant is the
holder or licensee of the TC, it could, if adopted, affect intrastate
aviation in Alaska. The use of SMS would improve aviation safety in
Alaska. The FAA analyzed NTSB part 135 accident data from 2015 to 2019
and found that of all part 135 air carrier accidents studied, 43
percent of these accidents occurred in Alaska. Because implementation
of SMS can be scaled to the size and complexity of an organization, SMS
requirements would not be overly burdensome for smaller part 135
operators. The increase in safety benefits to intrastate operations in
Alaska would positively impact air commerce in Alaska with the same
requirements applicable to every organization under part 5. The FAA
specifically requests comments on whether there is justification for
applying the proposed rule differently in intrastate operations in
Alaska.
VIII. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has
determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have
Federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
would not be a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order
and would not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action may improve
regulatory cooperation by moving FAA requirements for SMS closer to
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices that other States are adopting
or considering adopting.
IX. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The agency
also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy,
or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion
of the proposal, explain
[[Page 1967]]
the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To
ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters
should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed
electronically, commenters should submit only one time.
The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this
proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before
the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed
after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without
incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this proposal
considering the comments it receives.
B. Confidential Business Information
Confidential Business Information (CBI) is commercial or financial
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by
its owner. Under the FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to
this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public
docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing Confidential Business
Information should be sent to the person in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document. Any commentary that the FAA receives
which is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the
public docket for this rulemaking.
C. Request for Comments
In the preamble under Section V., Discussion of the Proposal, the
FAA requested comments pertaining to specific issues. To facilitate
submission of public comments, the specific requests for comments are
also listed below. When responding to the comments, please identify the
issue by using the question numbers used here:
(1) The FAA requests comment regarding how SMS might present unique
opportunities or challenges for smaller organizations.
(2) The FAA is aware that there are 135 operators that use only one
pilot-in-command in their operations, as well as Sec. 91.147 LOA
holders with low flight volume. The FAA seeks supporting information
and data regarding whether this applicability should be limited to a
certain subset of part 135 operators and Sec. 91.147 LOA holders, and
if so, how? If the applicability is limited to a particular subset of
part 135 operators and Sec. 91.147 LOA holders, please provide any
recommendations for alternatives that would achieve the same safety
objectives as SMS for those operators that would not be included under
SMS.
(3) The FAA considers that there may be safety benefits to applying
SMS to a larger portion of the aviation industry that could lead to
safety improvements in the aviation ecosystem as a whole. The FAA
invites comments as to whether part 5 should apply to all holders of a
TC, PC, supplemental type certificates, technical standard order
authorizations, or parts manufacturer approvals. The FAA requests that
comments specify whether any exceptions should be made in the event
that the FAA extends part 5 to these design and production approval
holders, and what those exceptions should entail. The FAA further
requests information and data related to the safety benefits or impact
of applying part 5 to additional design and production approval holders
beyond the applicability in this proposed rule.
(4) Under Sec. 5.15(a), the FAA is proposing that any person that
holds a TC for a product who allows another person to use the TC to
manufacture a product under a PC to be required to submit an
implementation plan for FAA approval in a form and manner acceptable to
the Administrator no later than December 27, 2024, and implement the
SMS in accordance with the FAA-approved plan no later than December 27,
2025. These proposed compliance dates are consistent with the proposal
under Sec. 5.11 for holders with a TC and a PC for the same product
issued under part 21. The FAA invites comments about whether the FAA
should extend the compliance timelines for persons who license their TC
to other persons and, if so, what timelines the FAA should establish.
The FAA requests that responsive comments include the commenter's
rationale.
(5) The FAA seeks comment on whether organizations can share
information about hazards without disclosing proprietary information.
The FAA also seeks comment on whether the holder of the proprietary
information would be in the best position to address the hazard. Please
provide examples of any situations in which the holder of proprietary
information would not be able to share information about a hazard
without disclosing that proprietary information
(6) The FAA seeks comments regarding the Annual Burden Estimate for
the Paperwork Reduction Act to--
(a) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency,
including whether the information will have practical utility;
(b) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
(c) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
(d) Minimize the burden of collecting information on those who are
to respond, including by using appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology.
(7) Is there data or other evidence of the effectiveness of SMS in
mitigating accidents and incidents?
(8) Appendix A of the RIA lists the accidents that inform the RIA
and includes the FAA's assessment of the effectiveness of SMS
mitigating the accident as well as the FAA's rationale:
(a) Has the FAA accurately estimated the most likely effectiveness
of mitigation of any specific accidents through the proposed rule?
Please provide any data or analysis to support your assessment.
(b) Does the FAA's rationale accurately assess how the use of an
SMS would potentially mitigate the hazards that caused the accidents?
(c) What would be a reasonable intervention to mitigate the
specific hazards identified, and what would be a reasonable estimation
for the cost of the intervention or mitigation? Please provide data or
analysis to support your response.
(d) Are there additional accidents or incidents that SMS could have
meaningfully mitigated?
(9) The FAA seeks comments and information regarding expanding the
applicability of part 5 in the future. Should the FAA consider a future
rulemaking project to expand the applicability of part 5 to include
repair stations certificated under part 145? Repair stations perform a
wide range of repair and maintenance work on an equally wide range of
aircraft and components. Some repair stations do not perform work on
aircraft used for passenger-carrying operations. Should the FAA
consider applying part 5 to all certificated part 145 repair stations?
Should applicability be limited to a subset of part 145 repair
stations? The
[[Page 1968]]
FAA seeks information and supporting data regarding how the
applicability should be limited to a subset (i.e., to which repair
stations should part 5 be applicable).
D. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the
internet by--
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal at www.regulations.gov;
2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at
www.GovInfo.com.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this
rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from
the internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 5
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Transportation.
14 CFR Part 21
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Exports, Imports, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
14 CFR Part 91
Air carriers, Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Charter
flights, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
14 CFR Part 119
Administrative practice and procedure, Air carriers, Aircraft,
Aviation safety, Charter flights, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Charter flights, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Transportation.
14 CFR Part 135
Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 5--SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
0
1. The authority citation for part 5 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101, 40113, 40119,
41706, 44101, 44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717,
44722, 46105; Sec. 102, Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 2309; Sec 215,
Pub. L. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2366.
0
2. Revise Subpart A to read as follows
Subpart A--General
Sec.
5.1 Applicability.
5.3 Definitions.
5.5 General requirements.
5.7 Requirements for domestic, flag, and supplemental operations.
5.9 Requirements for commuter and on-demand operations or passenger
carrying flights for compensation or hire.
5.11 Requirements for certificate holders with both type
certificates and production certificates.
5.13 Requirements for type certificate holders or licensees applying
for a production certificate for the same product.
5.15 Requirements for type certificate holders who allow another
person to use the type certificate to obtain a production
certificate for the same product.
5.17 Implementation plan.
Subpart A--General
Sec. 5.1 Applicability.
This part applies to all of the following:
(a) Any person that holds or applies for a certificate issued under
part 119 of this chapter authorizing the person to conduct operations
under part 121 of this chapter.
(b) Any person that holds or applies for a certificate issued under
part 119 of this chapter authorizing the person to conduct operations
under part 135 of this chapter.
(c) Any person that holds or applies for a Letter of Authorization
issued under Sec. 91.147 of this chapter.
(d) Any person that holds both a type certificate and a production
certificate issued under part 21 of this chapter for the same product.
(e) Any person who holds a production certificate under part 21 of
this chapter for a product for which the person is a licensee of the
type certificate.
(f) Any person who applies for a production certificate under part
21 of this chapter for a product for which the person is the holder or
licensee of the type certificate.
(g) Any person who holds a type certificate under part 21 of this
chapter for a product who allows another person to use the type
certificate to manufacture the same product under a production
certificate.
Sec. 5.3 Definitions.
Hazard means a condition or an object with the potential to cause
or contribute to an incident or aircraft accident, as defined in 49 CFR
830.2.
Risk means the composite of predicted severity and likelihood of
the potential effect of a hazard.
Risk control means a means to reduce or eliminate the effects of
hazards.
Safety assurance means processes within the SMS that function
systematically to ensure the performance and effectiveness of safety
risk controls and that the organization meets or exceeds its safety
objectives through the collection, analysis, and assessment of
information.
Safety Management System (SMS) means the formal, top-down,
organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic
procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety risk.
Safety objective means a measurable goal or desirable outcome
related to safety.
Safety performance means realized or actual safety accomplishment
relative to the organization's safety objectives.
Safety policy means the person's documented commitment to safety,
which defines its safety objectives and the accountabilities and
responsibilities of its employees in regards to safety.
Safety promotion means a combination of training and communication
of safety information to support the implementation and operation of an
SMS in an organization.
Safety Risk Management means a process within the SMS composed of
describing the system, identifying the hazards, and analyzing,
assessing, and controlling risk.
Sec. 5.5 General requirements.
(a) SMS components. An SMS under this part must include, at a
minimum, all of the following components:
(1) Safety policy that meets the requirements of subpart B of this
part.
(2) Safety risk management that meets the requirements of subpart C
of this part.
[[Page 1969]]
(3) Safety assurance that meets the requirements of subpart D of
this part.
(4) Safety promotion that meets the requirements of subpart E of
this part.
(b) System description. Any person required to have an SMS under
this part must:
(1) Develop a system description that includes, at a minimum, the
following information about the safety of the aviation products or
services provided by the person:
(i) The person's aviation-related processes, procedures, and
activities.
(ii) The function and purpose of the aviation products or services
provided.
(iii) The operating environment.
(iv) The personnel, equipment, and facilities necessary for
operation.
(v) Interfacing persons that contribute to the safety of the
aviation-related products and services provided.
(2) Revise the system description to reflect changes to the
information in (b)(1) of this section.
(c) Continuing requirements. Any person required to develop and
implement an SMS under this part must maintain the SMS in accordance
with this part.
Sec. 5.7 Requirements for domestic, flag, and supplemental
operations.
(a) Any person authorized to conduct operations under part 121 of
this chapter that has an SMS acceptable to the FAA on or before
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Revise its SMS to meet the requirements of this part in effect
on [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE].
(2) Submit the revisions for FAA acceptance in a form and manner
acceptable to the Administrator no later than [12 MONTHS AFTER
EFFECTIVE DATE OF FINAL RULE].
(3) Make available to the Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set forth in this part.
(4) Maintain the SMS as long as the person is authorized to conduct
operations under part 121 of this chapter.
(b) Any person applying for authorization to conduct operations
under part 121 of this chapter or with such application pending on or
after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Develop and implement an SMS that meets the requirements of
this part.
(2) Submit a statement of compliance with this part to the FAA in a
form and manner acceptable to the Administrator as part of the
certification process.
(3) Make available to the Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set forth in this part.
(4) Maintain the SMS as long as the person is authorized to conduct
operations under part 121 of this chapter.
Sec. 5.9 Requirements for commuter and on-demand operations or
passenger carrying flights for compensation or hire.
(a) Any person authorized to conduct operations under part 135 of
this chapter or that holds a Letter of Authorization issued under Sec.
91.147 of this chapter before [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Develop and implement an SMS that meets the requirements of
this part no later than [24 MONTHS AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL
RULE].
(2) Submit to the FAA, a statement of compliance with this part in
a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator no later than [24
MONTHS AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE].
(b) Any person applying for authorization to conduct operations
under part 135 of this chapter or a Letter of Authorization under Sec.
91.147 of this chapter, or with such application pending on or after
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Develop and implement an SMS that meets the requirements of
this part.
(2) Submit a statement of compliance with this part to the FAA in a
form and manner acceptable to the Administrator as part of the
certification or Letter of Authorization process.
(c) Any person required to develop and implement an SMS under this
section must maintain the SMS as long as the person is authorized to
conduct operations under either part 135 or Sec. 91.147 of this
chapter.
(d) Any person required to develop and implement an SMS under this
section must make available to the Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set forth in this part.
Sec. 5.11 Requirements for production certificate holders who are
holders or licensees of a type certificate for the same product.
Any person that holds a production certificate issued under part 21
of this chapter for a product for which the person is the holder or
licensee of the type certificate on or before [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
FINAL RULE], must:
(a) Develop an SMS that meets the requirements of this part.
(b) Submit to the FAA, an implementation plan in accordance with
Sec. 5.17 for FAA approval in a form and manner acceptable to the
Administrator no later than December 27, 2024.
(c) Implement the SMS in accordance with this part no later than
December 27, 2025.
(d) Make available to the Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set forth in this part.
(e) Maintain the SMS as long as the person is both a holder of a
production certificate and a holder or licensee of a type certificate
for the same product.
Sec. 5.13 Requirements for type certificate holders or licensees
applying for a production certificate for the same product.
(a) This section applies to any holder or licensee of a type
certificate for a product who either:
(1) Applies for a production certificate for that same product
under part 21 of this chapter on or after [I EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
FINAL RULE], or
(2) Has an application for a production certificate for that same
product under part 21 of this chapter pending on [EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
FINAL RULE].
(b) Any person who meets paragraph (a) of this section must:
(1) Develop an SMS that meets the requirements of this part.
(2) Submit an implementation plan in accordance with Sec. 5.17 for
FAA approval in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator,
during the certification process.
(3) Implement the SMS in accordance with this part no later than
one year from the FAA's approval of the person's implementation plan.
(4) Make available to the Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set forth in this part.
(5) Maintain the SMS as long as the person is both a holder of a
production certificate and a holder or licensee of a type certificate
for the same product.
Sec. 5.15 Requirements for type certificate holders who allow
another person to use the type certificate to obtain a production
certificate for the same product.
(a) This section applies to any person that holds a type
certificate for a product that allows another person to use the type
certificate to manufacture a product under a production certificate.
[[Page 1970]]
(b) Any person that meets paragraph (a) and has a licensing
agreement in accordance with Sec. 21.55 of this chapter on [EFFECTIVE
DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Develop an SMS that meets the requirements of this part.
(2) Submit an implementation plan in accordance with Sec. 5.17 for
FAA approval in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator no
later than December 27, 2024.
(3) Implement the SMS in accordance with this part no later than
December 27, 2025.
(4) Make available to the Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set forth in this part.
(5) Maintain the SMS as long as the person continues to meet
paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) Any person that meets paragraph (a) and enters into a licensing
agreement in accordance with Sec. 21.55 of this chapter after
[EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE FINAL RULE], must:
(1) Develop an SMS that meets the requirements of this part.
(2) Submit an implementation plan in accordance with Sec. 5.17 for
FAA approval in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator when
providing written licensing agreements in accordance with Sec. 21.55
of this chapter.
(3) Implement the SMS in accordance with this part no later than
one year from the FAA's approval of the person's implementation plan.
(4) Make available to the Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that demonstrates that the person has an
SMS that meets the requirements set forth in this part.
(5) Maintain the SMS as long as the person continues to meet
paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 5.17 Implementation plan.
(a) An implementation plan filed under this part must include a
description of the means of compliance (including but not limited to
new or existing policies, processes, or procedures) used to meet the
requirements of this part.
(b) A person required to submit an implementation plan under this
part must make available to the Administrator, upon request, all
necessary information and data that demonstrates that the SMS has been
or will be implemented in accordance with the implementation plan.
0
3. Amend Sec. 5.21 by:
0
a. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (a), paragraphs (a)(1)
and (a)(2).
0
b. Adding paragraph (a)(7).
0
c. Revising paragraphs (c) and (d).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 5.21 Safety policy.
(a) Any person required to have an SMS under this part must have a
safety policy that includes at least the following:
(1) The person's safety objectives.
(2) The person's commitment to fulfill the safety objectives.
* * * * *
(7) A code of ethics that is applicable to all employees, including
management personnel and officers, which clarifies that safety is the
organization's highest priority.
* * * * *
(c) The safety policy must be documented and communicated
throughout the person's organization.
(d) The safety policy must be regularly reviewed by the accountable
executive to ensure it remains relevant and appropriate to the person.
0
4. Amend Sec. 5.23 by revising the introductory text of paragraph (a),
and revising paragraphs (a)(3) and (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 5.23 Safety accountability and authority.
(a) Any person required to have an SMS under this part must define
in its safety policy the accountability for safety of the following
individuals:
* * * * *
(3) Employees relative to the person's safety performance.
(b) The person must identify the levels of management with the
authority to make decisions regarding safety risk acceptance.
0
5. Revise Sec. 5.25 to read as follows:
Sec. 5.25 Designation and responsibilities of required safety
management personnel.
(a) Designation of the accountable executive. Any person required
to have an SMS under this part must identify an accountable executive
who, irrespective of other functions, satisfies the following:
(1) Is the final authority over operations authorized to be
conducted under the person's certificate(s) or Letter(s) of
Authorization.
(2) Controls the financial resources required for the operations to
be conducted under the person's certificate(s) or Letter(s) of
Authorization.
(3) Controls the human resources required for the operations
authorized to be conducted under the person's certificate(s) or
Letter(s) of Authorization.
(4) Retains ultimate responsibility for the safety performance of
the operations conducted under the person's certificate(s) or Letter(s)
of Authorization.
(b) Responsibilities of the accountable executive. The accountable
executive must accomplish the following:
(1) Ensure that the SMS is properly implemented and is performing
across all pertinent areas.
(2) Develop and sign the safety policy.
(3) Communicate the safety policy throughout the person's
organization.
(4) Regularly review the safety policy to ensure it remains
relevant and appropriate to the person.
(5) Regularly review the safety performance and direct actions
necessary to address substandard safety performance in accordance with
Sec. 5.75.
(c) Designation of management personnel. The accountable executive
must designate sufficient management personnel who, on behalf of the
accountable executive, are responsible for the following:
(1) Coordinate implementation, maintenance, and integration of the
SMS throughout the person's organization.
(2) Facilitate hazard identification and safety risk analysis.
(3) Monitor the effectiveness of safety risk controls.
(4) Ensure safety promotion throughout the person's organization as
required in subpart E of this part.
(5) Regularly report to the accountable executive on the
performance of the SMS and on any need for improvement.
0
6. Revise Sec. 5.27 to read as follows:
Sec. 5.27 Coordination of emergency response planning.
Where emergency response procedures are necessary, any person
required to have an SMS under this part must develop, and the
accountable executive must approve as part of the safety policy, an
emergency response plan that addresses at least the following:
(a) Delegation of emergency authority throughout the person's
organization.
(b) Assignment of employee responsibilities during the emergency.
(c) Coordination of the emergency response plans with the emergency
response plans of other organizations it must interface with during the
provision of its services.
0
7. Revise the introductory text of Sec. 5.51 to read as follows:
[[Page 1971]]
Sec. 5.51 Applicability.
Any person required to have an SMS under this part must apply
safety risk management to the following:
* * * * *
0
8. Amend Sec. 5.53 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a).
0
b. Adding paragraph (b)(5).
0
c. Revising paragraph (c).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 5.53 System analysis and hazard identification.
(a) When applying safety risk management, any person required to
have an SMS under this part must analyze the systems identified in
Sec. 5.51. Those system analyses must be used to identify hazards
under paragraph (c) of this section, and in developing and implementing
risk controls related to the system under Sec. 5.55(c).
(b) * * *
(5) The interfaces of the system.
(c) Any person required to have an SMS under this part must develop
and maintain processes to identify hazards within the context of the
system analysis.
0
9. Revise Sec. 5.55 to read as follows:
Sec. 5.55 Safety risk assessment and control.
Any person required to have an SMS under this part must:
(a) Develop and maintain processes to analyze safety risk
associated with the hazards identified in Sec. 5.53(c).
(b) Define a process for conducting risk assessment that allows for
the determination of acceptable safety risk.
(c) Develop and maintain processes to develop safety risk controls
that are necessary as a result of the safety risk assessment process
under paragraph (b) of this section.
(d) Evaluate whether the risk will be acceptable with the proposed
safety risk control applied before the safety risk control is
implemented.
0
10. Amend Sec. 5.71 by:
0
a. Revising the introductory text of paragraph (a).
0
b. Revising paragraphs (a)(6), (a)(7), and (b).
0
c. Adding paragraph (c).
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 5.71 Safety performance monitoring and measurement.
(a) Any person required to have an SMS under this part must develop
and maintain processes and systems to acquire data with respect to its
products and services to monitor the safety performance of the
organization. These processes and systems must include, at a minimum,
the following:
* * * * *
(6) Investigations of reports regarding potential non-compliance
with regulatory standards or other safety risk controls established by
the person through the safety risk management process established in
subpart C of this part.
(7) A confidential employee reporting system in which employees can
report hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, incidents, as well as
propose solutions and safety improvements, without concern of reprisal
for reporting.
(b) Any person required to have an SMS under this part must develop
and maintain processes that analyze the data acquired through the
processes and systems identified under paragraph (a) of this section
and any other relevant data with respect to its products and services.
(c) Any person that holds both a type certificate and a production
certificate issued under part 21 of this chapter for the same product
must submit a summary of the confidential employee reports received
under paragraph (a)(7) of this section to the Administrator once every
6 months.
0
11. Amend Sec. 5.73 by revising the introductory text of paragraph
(a), and revising paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 5.73 Safety performance assessment.
(a) Any person required to have an SMS under this part must conduct
assessments of its safety performance against its safety objectives,
which include reviews by the accountable executive, to:
(1) Ensure compliance with the safety risk controls established by
the person.
* * * * *
(b) Upon completion of the assessment, if ineffective controls or
new hazards are identified under paragraphs (a)(2) through (5) of this
section, the person must use the safety risk management process
described in subpart C of this part.
0
12. Revise Sec. 5.75 to read as follows:
Sec. 5.75 Continuous improvement.
Any person required to have an SMS under this part must establish
and implement processes to correct safety performance deficiencies
identified in the assessments conducted under Sec. 5.73.
0
13. Revise Sec. 5.91 to read as follows:
Sec. 5.91 Competencies and training.
Any person required to have an SMS under this part must provide
training to each individual identified in Sec. 5.23 to ensure the
individuals attain and maintain the competencies necessary to perform
their duties relevant to the operation and performance of the SMS.
0
14. Amend Sec. 5.93 by revising the introductory text to read as
follows:
Sec. 5.93 Safety communication.
Any person required to have an SMS under this part must develop and
maintain a means for communicating safety information that, at a
minimum:
* * * * *
0
15. Add Sec. 5.94 to read as follows:
Sec. 5.94 Notification of hazards to interfacing persons.
(a) If a person required to have an SMS under this part identifies
a hazard in the operating environment, the person must provide notice
of the hazard to the interfacing person or persons identified in the
system description maintained under Sec. 5.5(b) who, to the best of
their knowledge, could address the hazard or mitigate the risk.
(b) Any person required to have an SMS under this part must develop
and maintain procedures for reporting and receiving hazard information
in accordance with subsection (a).
0
16. Amend Sec. 5.95 by revising the introductory text and adding
paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 5.95 SMS documentation.
Any person required to have an SMS under this part must develop and
maintain the following SMS documentation:
* * * * *
(c) System description.
0
17. Revise Sec. 5.97 to read as follows:
Sec. 5.97 SMS records.
Any person required to have an SMS under this part must:
(a) Maintain records of outputs of safety risk management processes
as described in subpart C of this part. Such records must be retained
for as long as the control remains relevant to the operation.
(b) Maintain records of outputs of safety assurance processes as
described in subpart D of this part. Such records must be retained for
a minimum of 5 years.
(c) Maintain a record of all training provided under Sec. 5.91 for
each individual. Such records must be retained for as long as the
individual is employed by the person.
(d) Retain records of all communications provided under Sec. 5.93
or Sec. 5.94 for a minimum of 24 consecutive calendar months.
[[Page 1972]]
PART 21--CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND ARTICLES
0
18. The authority citation for part 21 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40105,
40113, 44701-44702, 44704, 44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303;
Pub. L. 116-260; 134 Stat. 2309.
0
19. Amend Sec. 21.55 to read as follows:
Sec. 21.55 Responsibility of type certificate holders that provide
written licensing agreements.
A type certificate holder who allows a person to use the type
certificate to manufacture a new aircraft, aircraft engine, or
propeller must meet the applicable requirements of part 5 of this
chapter and provide that person with a written licensing agreement
acceptable to the FAA.
0
20. Amend Sec. 21.135 by adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 21.135 Organization.
* * * * *
(c) Each applicant for or holder of a production certificate,
except those based only on a supplemental type certificate or on the
rights to the benefits of a supplemental type certificate under a
licensing agreement, must meet the applicable requirements of part 5 of
this chapter.
0
21. Amend Sec. 21.147 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 21.147 Amendment of production certificates.
* * * * *
(b) An applicant for an amendment to a production certificate to
add a type certificate or model, or both, must comply with Sec. Sec.
21.135(c), 21.137, 21.138, and 21.150.
* * * * *
PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
22. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101, 40103, 40105,
40113, 40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712,
44715, 44716, 44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507,
47122, 47508, 47528-47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49
U.S.C. 44703 note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).
0
23. Revise Sec. 91.147 to read as follows:
Sec. 91.147 Passenger carrying flights for compensation or hire.
(a) Definitions. For the purposes of this section Operator means
any person conducting nonstop passenger-carrying flights in an airplane
or helicopter for compensation or hire in accordance with Sec. Sec.
119.1(e)(2), 135.1(a)(5), or 121.1(d), of this chapter that begin and
end at the same airport and are conducted within a 25-statute mile
radius of that airport.
(b) General requirements. An Operator conducting passenger-carrying
flights for compensation or hire must meet the following requirements
unless all flights are conducted under Sec. 91.146. The Operator must:
(1) Comply with the safety provisions of part 136, subpart A of
this chapter.
(2) Register and implement its drug and alcohol testing programs in
accordance with part 120 of this chapter.
(3) Comply with the applicable requirements of part 5 of this
chapter.
(4) Apply for and receive a Letter of Authorization from the
responsible Flight Standards office.
(c) Letter of Authorization. Each application for a Letter of
Authorization must include the following information:
(1) Name of Operator, agent, and any d/b/a (doing-business-as)
under which that Operator does business.
(2) Principal business address and mailing address.
(3) Principal place of business (if different from business
address).
(4) Name of person responsible for management of the business.
(5) Name of person responsible for aircraft maintenance.
(6) Type of aircraft, registration number(s), and make/model/
series.
(7) Antidrug and Alcohol Misuse Prevention Program registration.
(8) The statement of compliance required under part 5 of this
chapter.
(d) Compliance. The Operator must comply with the provisions of the
Letter of Authorization received.
PART 119--CERTIFICATION: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS
0
24. The authority citation for part 119 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 111-216, sec. 215 (August 1, 2010); 49 U.S.C.
106(f), 106(g), 1153, 40101, 40102, 40103, 40113, 44105, 44106,
44111, 44701-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903, 44904, 44906, 44912, 44914,
44936, 44938, 46103, 46105.
0
25. Revise Sec. 119.8 to read as follows:
Sec. 119.8 Safety Management Systems.
No certificate holder authorized to conduct operations under part
121 or 135 of this chapter may operate an aircraft under that
certificate unless the certificate holder complies with the applicable
requirements of part 5 of this chapter.
Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a),
and 44703 in Washington, DC.
Warren S. Randolph,
Deputy Executive Director, Office of Accident Investigation and
Prevention. Federal Aviation Administration.
[FR Doc. 2022-28583 Filed 1-10-23; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P