Yaw Maneuver Conditions-Rudder Reversals, 71203-71210 [2022-25291]
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Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
Vol. 87, No. 224
Tuesday, November 22, 2022
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains regulatory documents having general
applicability and legal effect, most of which
are keyed to and codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations, which is published under
50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by
the Superintendent of Documents.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No.: FAA–2018–0653; Amdt. No.
25–147]
RIN 2120–AK89
Yaw Maneuver Conditions—Rudder
Reversals
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The FAA is adding a new
load condition to the design standards
for transport category airplanes. The
new load condition requires such
airplanes to be designed to withstand
the loads caused by rapid reversals of
the rudder pedals, and applies to
transport category airplanes that have a
powered rudder control surface or
surfaces. This rule is necessary because
accident and incident data show that
pilots sometimes make rudder reversals
during flight, even though such
reversals are unnecessary and
discouraged by flightcrew training
programs. The current design standards
do not require the airplane structure to
withstand the loads that may result from
such reversals. If the loads on the
airplane exceed those for which it is
designed, the airplane structure may
fail, resulting in catastrophic loss of
control of the airplane. This final rule
aims to prevent structural failure of the
rudder and vertical stabilizer that may
result from these rudder reversals.
DATES: Effective January 23, 2023.
ADDRESSES: For information on where to
obtain copies of rulemaking documents
and other information related to this
final rule, see ‘‘How To Obtain
Additional Information’’ in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical questions concerning this
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SUMMARY:
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action, contact Todd Martin, Materials
and Structural Properties Section, AIR–
621, Policy and Innovation Division,
Aircraft Certification Service, Federal
Aviation Administration, 2200 South
216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198;
telephone and fax (206) 231–3210; email
Todd.Martin@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA’s authority to issue rules on
aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the
United States Code. Subtitle I, Section
106 describes the authority of the FAA
Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the
scope of the agency’s authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated
under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section
44701, ‘‘General Requirements.’’ Under
that section, the FAA is charged with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
and minimum standards for the design
and performance of aircraft that the
Administrator finds necessary for safety
in air commerce. This regulation is
within the scope of that authority. It
prescribes new safety standards for the
design of transport-category airplanes.
I. Overview of Final Rule
This rule adds a new load condition
to the design standards in title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25,
to require transport category airplanes
that have a powered rudder control
surface or surfaces to be designed to
withstand the loads caused by rapid
reversals of the rudder pedals.
Specifically, applicants for design
approval must show that their proposed
airplane design can withstand an initial
full rudder pedal input, followed by
three full-pedal reversals at the
maximum sideslip angle, followed by
return of the rudder to neutral. Due to
the rarity of such multiple reversals, the
rule specifies the new load condition is
an ultimate load condition rather than a
limit load condition. Consequently, the
applicant does not have to apply an
additional factor of safety to the
calculated load levels.1
1 The terms ‘‘limit,’’ ‘‘ultimate,’’ and ‘‘factor of
safety’’ are addressed in §§ 25.301, 25.303, and
25.305. To summarize, design loads are typically
expressed in terms of limit loads, which are then
multiplied by a factor of safety, usually 1.5, to
determine ultimate loads. In this final rule, the
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This final rule affects manufacturers
of transport category airplanes applying
for a new type certificate after the
effective date of the final rule. The rule
may also affect applicants applying for
an amended or supplemental type
certificate as determined under 14 CFR
21.101, ‘‘Designation of applicable
regulations,’’ after the effective date of
the final rule.
The final rule will entail minimal
cost, with expected net safety benefits
from the reduced risk of rudder reversal
accidents.
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
The rudder is a vertical control
surface on the tail of most airplanes that
helps the airplane to turn. Rudder
control systems are either powered or
unpowered.2 Accident and incident
data show pilots sometimes make
multiple and unnecessary rudder
reversals during flight. In addition,
FAA-sponsored research 3 indicates that
pilots use the rudder more often than
previously expected and often in ways
not recommended by manufacturers.
Section 25.1583(a)(3)(ii) requires
manufacturers to provide
documentation that warns pilots against
making large and rapid control
reversals, as they may result in
design loads are expressed as ultimate loads and no
additional safety factor is applied.
2 A powered rudder control surface is one in
which the force required to deflect the surface
against the airstream is generated or augmented by
non-mechanical means, such as hydraulic or
electric systems. Powered rudder control systems
include fly-by-wire and hydro-mechanical systems.
An unpowered rudder control surface is one for
which the force required to deflect the rudder
control surface is transmitted from the pilot’s
rudder pedal directly to the rudder control surface
through mechanical means. Unpowered rudder
control systems are also known as mechanical
systems. Incorporation of a powered yaw damper
into an otherwise unpowered rudder control system
does not constitute a powered rudder control
system. Other powered systems, such as electrical,
hydraulic, or pneumatic systems, may aid in the
reduction of pedal forces required for single engineout operations or to trim out pedal force to maintain
a steady heading. However, if such a powered
systems does not contribute to hinge moment
generation (the twisting force on the rudder surface)
during maneuvering of a fully operational airplane,
it is not a powered rudder control system.
3 Report No. DOT/FAA/AM–10/14, ‘‘An
International Survey of Transport Airplane Pilots’
Experiences and Perspectives of Lateral/Directional
Control Events and Rudder Issues in Transport
Airplanes (Rudder Survey),’’ dated October 2010, is
available in the Docket and at https://www.faa.gov/
data_research/research/med_humanfacs/
oamtechreports/2010s/media/201014.pdf.
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structural failures at any speed,
including airspeeds below the design
maneuvering speed (VA). Despite the
§ 25.1583(a)(3)(ii) requirement, and that
such rudder reversals are unnecessary
and discouraged by flightcrew training
programs, these events continue to
occur.
Section 25.351 (‘‘Yaw maneuver
conditions’’), which sets forth the
standard for protecting the airplane’s
vertical stabilizer from pilotcommanded maneuver loads, only
addresses a single, full rudder input at
airspeeds up to the design diving speed
(VD).4 This design standard does not
protect the airplane from the loads
imposed by repeated inputs in opposing
directions, or rudder reversals.5 If the
loads on the vertical stabilizer exceed
those for which it is designed, the
vertical stabilizer may fail, resulting in
the catastrophic loss of airplane control.
The primary example of this risk is
the crash of American Airlines Flight
587 (AA587), which occurred near
Queens, New York, on November 12,
2001, and resulted in the death of all
260 passengers and crew aboard and of
five persons on the ground. The
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) found that the probable cause of
the accident was ‘‘the in-flight
separation of the vertical stabilizer
[airplane fin] as a result of loads above
ultimate design created by the first
officer’s unnecessary and excessive
rudder pedal inputs.’’ 6 The NTSB also
noted that contributing to these rudder
pedal inputs were characteristics of the
Airbus A300–600 rudder system design
and elements of the American Airlines
Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering
Program.
Although the AA587 accident is the
only catastrophic accident resulting
from rudder reversals, other notable
accidents and incidents involving
airplanes that have a powered control
ruder surface have occurred.7 Ultimate
4 V is the design diving speed: the maximum
D
speed at which the airplane is certified to fly. See
14 CFR 1.2 and 25.335.
5 A rudder ‘‘reversal’’ is a continuous, pilotcommanded control movement starting from
control displacement in one direction followed by
control displacement in the opposite direction.
6 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–04/
04, ‘‘In-flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer,
American Airlines Flight 587, Airbus Industrie
A300–605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York,
November 12, 2001,’’ dated October 26, 2004,
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Accident
Reports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf, p. 160.
7 FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.
Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group.
‘‘Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal
Recommendation Report,’’ November 7, 2013.
(ARAC Rudder Reversal Report). This Report
identifies four notable rudder events to which the
FAA adds the Interflug incident discussed in the
NTSB AA587 Report.
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loads were exceeded in two of the other
notable rudder reversal events: an
incident involving Interflug (Moscow,
February 11, 1991) and an accident
involving American Airlines Flight 903
(AA903) (near West Palm Beach,
Florida, May 12, 1997).8 The Interflug
incident involved multiple rudder
reversals, and loads of 1.55 and 1.35
times the limit load were recorded. For
the AA903 incident, eight rudder
reversals occurred, and a load of 1.53
times the limit load was recorded.9 A
catastrophe similar to AA587 was
averted in these two events only
because the vertical stabilizers were
stronger than required by design
standards.10 In another event, an
incident involving Air Canada Flight
190 (AC190) (over the state of
Washington, January 10, 2008), four
rudder reversals occurred, and the limit
load was exceeded by 29 percent.11
Finally, in an incident involving
Provincial Airlines Limited (St. John’s,
Newfoundland and Labrador, May 27,
2005), the pilot commanded a pedal
reversal during climb-out, when the
airplane entered an aerodynamic stall.12
The loads occurring during this event
were less than limit loads, but this
incident is additional evidence that
pedal reversals occur in service.
In 2006, the FAA sponsored a
survey 13 to better comprehend transport
category pilots’ understanding and use
of the rudder. This survey inquired of
transport pilots from all over the world.
The FAA’s analysis of the survey data
found that—
• Pilots use the rudder more than
FAA experts previously thought and
often in ways not recommended by
manufacturers.
• Pilots make erroneous rudder pedal
inputs, some of which include rudder
reversals.
• Even after specific training, many
pilots are not aware that they should not
make rudder reversals, even below VA.
Over the last several years, training and
changes to airplane flight manuals
directed the pilot to avoid making cyclic
8 NTSB
Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–04/
04, pp. 106–109.
9 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–04/
04, pp. 104.
10 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, pp. 38–39.
11 Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)
Aviation Investigation Report A08W0007,
‘‘Encounter with Wake Turbulence,’’ https://
www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/
2008/A08W0007/A08W0007.html.
12 TSB Aviation Investigation Report A05A0059,
‘‘Stall and Loss of Control During Climb,’’ https://
www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/
2005/a05a0059/a05a0059.html.
13 Report No. DOT/FAA/AM–10/14 (see footnote
3), OMB Control No. 2120–0712.
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control inputs. The rudder reversals that
caused the AC190 incident in 2008 and
the Provincial Airlines Limited incident
in 2005 occurred despite these efforts.
Pilots in airplane upset situations
(e.g., wake vortex encounters) may
revert to prior training and make
sequential rudder reversals. Based on
information from the survey, the FAA
expects that repeated rudder reversals
will continue to occur despite
flightcrew training, because training
alone cannot address all potential
flightcrew behaviors that can lead to
such inputs. For example, the
relationship between rudder inputs and
the roll and yaw responses of the
airplane can become confusing to pilots.
This is particularly true with the large
yaw and roll rates that result from large
rudder inputs, combined with naturallyoccurring delays between pedal input
and airplane response that result from
transport airplane flight dynamics. Such
confusion might lead pilots to command
repeated rudder reversals.
B. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) Recommendation
Following the AA587 accident, the
NTSB submitted safety
recommendations to the FAA. The
NTSB stated, ‘‘[f]or airplanes with
variable stop rudder travel limiter
systems, protection from dangerous
structural loads resulting from sustained
alternating large rudder pedal inputs
can be achieved by reducing the
sensitivity of the rudder control system
(for example, by increasing the pedal
forces), which would make it harder for
pilots to quickly perform alternating full
rudder inputs.’’ 14 In Safety
Recommendation A–04–056,15 the
NTSB recommended the FAA modify
part 25 to ‘‘include a certification
standard that will ensure safe handling
qualities in the yaw axis throughout the
flight envelope, including limits for
rudder pedal sensitivity.’’ This final rule
addresses this recommendation and will
reduce the likelihood of an event that
would be similar to the AA587 accident.
C. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC) Activity
In 2011, the FAA tasked the ARAC to
consider the need to add a new flight
maneuver load condition to part 25,
subpart C, that would ‘‘ensure airplane
structural capability in the presence of
14 NTSB Safety Recommendation, November 10,
2004, at p. 2. This document is available in the
docket and at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safetyrecs/RecLetters/A04_56_62.pdf.
15 NTSB Safety Recommendation A–04–056,
dated November 10, 2004, is available in the docket
and at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/
RecLetters/A04_56_62.pdf.
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rudder reversals’’ and increasing
sideslip angles (yaw angles) at airspeeds
up to VD. The FAA also tasked the
ARAC to consider whether other
airworthiness standards would address
this concern, such as pedal
characteristics that would discourage
pilots from making rudder reversals.16
The ARAC delegated this task to the
Transport Airplane and Engine
subcommittee, which assigned it to the
Flight Controls Harmonization Working
Group (FCHWG) of the subcommittee.
The ARAC FCHWG completed its
report in November 2013.17 ARAC
approved the report and submitted it to
the FAA on December 30, 2013. One of
the recommendations of the ARAC
FCHWG Rudder Reversal Report was to
require transport category airplanes to
be able to withstand safely the loads
imposed by three rudder reversals.18
This final rule adopts that
recommendation. The ARAC report
indicates that requiring transport
category airplanes to operate safely with
the vertical stabilizer loads imposed by
three full-pedal reversals accounts for
most of the attainable safety benefits.
With more than three rudder reversals,
the ARAC FCHWG found little increase
in vertical stabilizer loads.
The report’s findings and
recommendations guided the formation
of the FAA’s Yaw Maneuver
Conditions—Rudder Reversals notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (83 FR
32087, July 16, 2018) and this final rule.
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D. Summary of the NPRM
On July 16, 2018, the FAA published
an NPRM that proposed to add a new
regulation to address rudder reversal
conditions on transport category
airplanes (83 FR 32087). The FAA
intended that this new requirement
would prevent structural failure of the
rudder and vertical stabilizer caused by
reversals of the rudder pedals. Thus, the
FAA proposed to require that airplanes
16 The FAA published this notice of ARAC
tasking in the Federal Register on March 28, 2011.
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee;
Transport Airplane and Engine Issues—New Task,
76 FR 17183.
17 ARAC FCHWG Recommendation Report,
‘‘Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal,’’ dated
November 7, 2013, is available in the Docket and
at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/
rulemaking/committees/documents/media/TAEfchrpsrr-3282011.pdf.
18 One member of the ARAC FCHWG did not
support any rulemaking. The remaining members of
the ARAC FCHWG found that a yaw maneuver load
condition would be the optimal way to protect the
airplane from the excessive loads that can result
from multiple rudder reversals because they found
systems solutions, such as fly-by-wire systems and
manual systems with appropriate yaw dampers, to
be too design-prescriptive. The members of the
ARAC FCHWG held divided opinions, however, on
what the load condition should be.
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be able to withstand the structural loads
caused by three full reversals (doublets)
of the rudder pedals. The FAA proposed
to apply the requirement only to
airplanes with powered rudder control
surfaces.
E. Rulemaking by the European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
On November 5, 2018, EASA
published amendment 22 to
Certification Specifications 25 (CS–25).
This amendment included a new
regulation, CS 25.353, ‘‘Rudder control
reversal conditions,’’ as well as
Acceptable Means of Compliance
25.353. EASA’s new regulation is
similar to this final rule except that the
final rule adopted by the FAA applies
only to airplanes that have a powered
rudder control surface or surfaces.
F. Advisory Material
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25.353–
1, ‘‘Rudder Control Reversal
Conditions,’’ which accompanies this
rule, provides guidance on acceptable
means, but not the only means, of
showing compliance with § 25.353. AC
25.353–1 is available in the public
docket for this rulemaking.
III. Discussion of Public Comments and
Final Rule
The FAA received comments from the
NTSB, Airline Pilots Association,
International (ALPA), ATR, Crew
Systems, Textron Aviation, Airbus, The
Boeing Company, and Bombardier
Aerospace. The NTSB, ALPA, ATR, and
Crew Systems supported the proposal
and did not suggest changes to it.
Textron Aviation and Airbus requested
that the rule specify a single, full-pedal
command followed by one rudder
reversal and return to neutral, rather
than three rudder reversals as proposed
in the NPRM. Those two companies,
along with Boeing, also requested other
changes, as described in this section of
the preamble. Bombardier Aerospace
commented on the rule’s cost,
suggesting that the FAA issue guidance
to limit the rule’s applicability.
A. Necessity of Three Reversals
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a
design load condition that consists of a
single, full-pedal command followed by
three full-pedal reversals and return to
neutral. Two airplane manufacturers,
Textron Aviation and Airbus, requested
that the rule instead specify a single,
full-pedal command followed by one
rudder reversal and return to neutral.
These companies believed this
condition was more appropriate given
the rarity of rudder reversals and the
uniqueness of the AA587 accident
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airplane. They advocated that a single,
full-pedal command followed by one
rudder reversal and return to neutral
would cover all other known incidents,
stated their concern that the proposed
criteria could result in weight penalties
or detrimental system changes, and
proposed that enhanced flightcrew
training would be more effective than
designing for multiple rudder reversals.
The FAA emphasizes that while
rudder reversals are rare, they can lead
to serious consequences. The AA587
accident and four other accidents and
incidents involved multiple rudder
reversals, some of which were full-pedal
reversals. Since these accidents
occurred, modern airplane design
requirements have not changed in a
manner that would deter pilots from
making such multiple reversals.
Additionally, based on information
received in response to the 2006 pilot
survey, the FAA found that some
respondents reported making rudder
pedal reversals (cyclic rudder-pedal
commands).19 Moreover, an analysis in
the ARAC report shows that loads
would continue to increase upon
subsequent pedal reversals. Therefore, a
single, full-pedal command followed by
one full-pedal reversal and return to
neutral would not represent the
conditions resulting from multiple fullpedal reversals that may result in
injuries to occupants or a structural
failure that jeopardizes continued safe
flight and landing of the airplane. Data
from all manufacturers on the ARAC
FCHWG showed that after three fullpedal reversals, the maximum sideslip
angle does not increase significantly.
Maximum sideslip angle causes the
maximum loads on the vertical
stabilizer; therefore, three full-pedal
reversals result in a load condition that
accounts for most of the attainable
safety benefits.
Regarding the concern that the
proposed multiple reversal condition
could result in potential weight
penalties or detrimental system changes
in future designs, as discussed in the
NPRM preamble, the FAA expects that
most applicants will use control laws to
comply with this rule. Because
manufacturers typically implement
control laws through systems and
software, use of this solution to comply
would result in little to no incremental
cost in the form of weight, equipment,
maintenance, or training for those
airplanes with powered rudder control
surfaces.
Based on information from the 2006
survey, the FAA does not agree with
19 Report No. DOT/FAA/AM–10/14 at p. 14 (see
footnote 3).
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Textron and Airbus that enhanced flight
crew training would be more effective
than designing for multiple full-pedal
reversals. As described earlier in the
preamble, the FAA’s analysis of the
survey found that even after specific
training, many pilots are not aware that
they should not make full-pedal
reversals, even below VA. While training
and changes to airplane flight manuals
directed the pilot to avoid making cyclic
control inputs, the pedal reversals that
caused the AC190 incident in 2008 and
the Provincial Airlines Limited incident
in 2005 occurred despite these efforts.
Moreover, in transport category
airplanes, rudder inputs are generally
limited to aligning the airplane with the
runway during crosswind landings and
controlling engine-out situations, which
occur predominately at low speeds. At
high speeds, the pilot normally directly
rolls the airplane using the ailerons.20 If
the pilot does use the rudder to control
the airplane at high speeds, there will be
a significant phase lag between the
rudder input and the roll response
because the roll response is a secondary
effect of the yawing moment generated
by the rudder.21 The roll does not result
from the rudder input directly. Even if
the rudder is subsequently deflected in
the opposite direction (rudder reversal),
the airplane can continue to roll and
yaw in one direction before reversing
because of the phase lag. The
relationship between rudder inputs and
the roll and yaw response of the
airplane can become confusing to pilots,
particularly with the large yaw and roll
rates that would result from large rudder
inputs, causing the pilots to input
multiple rudder reversals.
For the foregoing reasons, the FAA
has determined that a three full-pedal
reversal condition is necessary to
account for the effects of multiple
rudder reversals that the FAA expects to
occur in service. The FAA adopts this
aspect of the proposal without change.
B. Applicability
Airbus requested that the rule apply
only to new aircraft designs; Bombardier
requested that the rule apply only to
new airplanes or to airplanes where the
rudder system has been significantly
modified. The FAA agrees in part with
the comments regarding applicability.
This final rule requires that new
airplane designs meet the new
standards. Where an applicant proposes
20 An aileron is a hinged control service on the
trailing edge of the wing of a fixed-wing aircraft,
one aileron per wing.
21 The yaw axis is defined to be perpendicular to
the wings and to the normal line of flight. A yaw
movement is a change in the direction of the aircraft
to the left or right around the yaw axis.
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a change to a previously approved type
design, § 21.101, ‘‘Designation of
applicable regulations,’’ requires an
assessment to determine the amendment
level (version) of each regulation to be
applied to that type design change. The
FAA would determine under the
provisions of § 21.101 whether this final
rule would be applied to a changed
airplane design.
Additionally, Airbus requested that
the rule apply to all transport category
airplanes, including those with
unpowered control surfaces. Similarly,
the corresponding and recently adopted
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) rule, CS 25.353, applies to all
airplanes, including those with
unpowered control surfaces. However,
in the NPRM, the FAA proposed to
apply this rule only to airplanes with a
powered control surface or surfaces.
A powered rudder control surface is
one in which the force required to
deflect the surface against the airstream
is generated or augmented by hydraulic
or electric systems. In contrast, an
unpowered rudder control surface is
one for which the force required to
deflect the surface against the airstream
is transmitted from the pilot’s rudder
pedal directly through mechanical
means, without any augmentation from
hydraulic or electrical systems. Powered
rudder control systems include fly-bywire (FBW) and hydro-mechanical
systems, while unpowered rudder
control systems are also known as
mechanical systems. Incorporation of a
powered yaw damper into an otherwise
unpowered rudder control system does
not constitute a powered rudder control
surface, for the purpose of this rule.
Small business jets that typically have
unpowered rudder control surfaces
provide immediate feedback to their
flightcrews in response to yaw inputs.
Those flightcrews are, therefore, less
likely to execute inappropriate rudder
pedal reversals. The FAA reviewed
accident and incident records and found
no events in which pilots commanded
inappropriate full-pedal reversals on
airplanes with unpowered rudder
control surfaces. Also, the use of
airplanes with unpowered rudder
control surfaces is diminishing in the
transport category fleet. The only
transport category airplane model in
U.S. production with an unpowered
rudder control surface also has a yaw
damper. The normal operation of the
yaw damper would be adequate to
reduce yaw overshoot loads from fullpedal reversals.
As explained in the NPRM and this
final rule, the safety benefit of
expanding this rule to airplanes with
unpowered control surfaces does not
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outweigh the potentially higher costs of
implementation. The FAA may consider
the requested change later if data or
information become available to
indicate that either the safety case has
changed or implementation costs have
decreased.
C. Load Condition Requirements
Airbus and Boeing requested the FAA
include in the rule the following text:
‘‘Flaps (or flaperons or any other
aerodynamic devices when used as
flaps) and slats extended configurations
are also to be considered if they are used
in en route conditions.’’ Including this
provision would require applicants to
evaluate the rudder reversal conditions
with flaps and other devices extended,
if the airplane uses those devices in en
route conditions.22 Airbus also
requested that the rule include the
following text: ‘‘Unbalanced
aerodynamic moments about the center
of gravity must be reacted in a rational
or conservative manner considering the
airplane inertia forces.’’ This language
specifies how the applicant sums the
various forces when analyzing the
rudder reversal conditions. Both
commenters requested the FAA include
these requirements in the final rule to be
consistent with the ARAC FCHWG
report and to harmonize with the EASA
regulation.
The FAA agrees that the additions
identified by commenters should be
included in the final rule because both
requirements harmonize with the EASA
rule (CS 25.353) and clarify how to
analyze the load conditions. The two
requirements are also found in other
part 25 regulations, including §§ 25.345
and 25.351. The FAA notes that the
requirement to consider the effect of
flaps and slats in en route conditions
has slightly different wording than the
EASA rule, but has the same meaning.
As these changes simply clarify how to
analyze the load conditions, they will
not add additional burdens.
Airbus also requested that the
airplane be able to withstand the
prescribed conditions at an uppermost
speed of VC, rather than VC/MC, as
proposed in the NPRM. The FAA
disagrees with the commenter. The
proposed rule included VC/MC because
airplanes have defined limitations for
both VC and MC. However, no
substantive difference between the two
exists because each value of VC has a
corresponding value of MC. As a result,
using VC/MC is appropriate in this rule.
22 En route conditions means the conditions
occurring during any phase of flight after initial
climb and before the final descent and landing
phase.
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D. Warning Monitors
Airbus requested that the rule allow
an applicant to show compliance via
implementing monitors that would
warn the pilot of inappropriate rudder
use. The FAA does not agree with this
comment. Pilot-commanded rudder
reversals have occurred during high
workload and conditions that are often
startling. Thus, depending on the pilot
to react appropriately to a warning
under such conditions would not
provide the equivalent safety benefit as
the load conditions in this final rule and
would be inconsistent with the EASA
regulation.
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E. Miscellaneous Modifications
As previously noted, EASA published
its regulation, CS 25.353, on November
5, 2018, a few months after the FAA
issued the NPRM upon which this final
rule is based. This final rule contains
minor modifications to harmonize with
the EASA standard. These modifications
are in addition to those described earlier
in the final rule (C. Load Condition
Requirements). These modifications
include:
(1) The proposed rule specified that
the applicant evaluate the rudder
reversal conditions ‘‘from VMC or the
highest airspeed for which it is possible
to achieve maximum rudder deflection
at zero sideslip, whichever is greater, up
to VC/MC.’’ This final rule establishes
the speed range as ‘‘VMC to VC/MC.’’
This is simpler to apply because it does
not require an additional calculation of
‘‘the highest speed for which it is
possible . . .’’ and it is consistent with
the current rudder maneuver condition
required by § 25.351. (Section 25.351
prescribes the speed range as VMC to
VD.)
(2) This final rule provides that any
permanent deformation resulting from
the specified ultimate load conditions
must not prevent continued safe flight
and landing. This requirement is
necessary because this final rule, unlike
most design load conditions codified in
part 25, contains only an ‘‘ultimate’’
load requirement, and does not contain
a ‘‘limit’’ load requirement. Design loads
are typically expressed in terms of limit
loads, which are then multiplied by a
factor of safety, usually 1.5, to
determine ultimate loads. The airplane
structure must be able to withstand
limit loads without detrimental
permanent deformation and ultimate
loads without failure in accordance with
§ 25.305. Because this rule does not
include a limit load requirement, it is
necessary to require that no detrimental
permanent deformation occur at
ultimate load (deformation that would
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prevent continued safe flight and
landing). This requirement is also in the
corresponding EASA regulation, CS
25.353.
(3) The proposed rule specified that
the ‘‘rudder control is suddenly
displaced’’ in evaluating the ultimate
loads that result from the yaw maneuver
conditions identified in the proposal.
This final rule, however, specifies that
the ‘‘rudder control is suddenly and
fully displaced as limited by the control
system or control surface stops.’’ The
term ‘‘fully’’ makes it clear that full
displacement of the rudder pedal is
required. The phrase ‘‘as limited by the
control system or control surface stops’’
further clarifies the requirement by
indicating that the conditions may be
conducted using rudder control system
limiting hardware to establish the
reversal loads. Furthermore, the
aforementioned requirements are
consistent with § 25.351.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
direct that each Federal agency shall
propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that the
benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354),
as codified in 5 U.S.C. 603 et seq.,
requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes
on small entities. Third, the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96–39),
19 U.S.C. Chapter 13, prohibits agencies
from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, the Trade
Agreements Act requires agencies to
consider international standards and,
where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104–4), as codified in 2 U.S.C. Chapter
25, requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995).
This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the
economic impacts of this final rule.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA
has determined that this final rule has
benefits that justify its costs and is not
a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as
defined in section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866. The final rule is also not
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71207
‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s
rulemaking procedures. The final rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities, will not create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States, and will not impose an
unfunded mandate on State, local, or
tribal governments, or on the private
sector by exceeding the threshold
identified previously.
A. Regulatory Evaluation
1. Background and Statement of Need
The genesis of this final rule is the
crash of American Airlines Flight 587
(AA587), near Queens, New York, on
November 12, 2001, resulting in the
death of all 260 passengers and crew
aboard, and the death of five persons on
the ground. The airplane was destroyed
by impact forces and a post-crash fire.
The NTSB found that the probable
cause of the accident was ‘‘the in-flight
separation of the vertical stabilizer
[airplane fin] as a result of loads above
ultimate design created by the first
officer’s unnecessary and excessive
rudder pedal inputs.’’ 23 Ultimate loads
on the airplane structure are the limit
loads (1.0) multiplied by a safety factor,
usually 1.5 (as for the vertical
stabilizer). An airplane is expected to
experience a limit load once in its
lifetime and is never expected to
experience an ultimate load.24 For the
AA587 accident, loads exceeding
ultimate loads ranged from 1.83 to 2.14
times the limit load on the vertical
stabilizer,25 as a result of four, full,
alternating rudder inputs known as
‘‘rudder reversals.’’
Significant rudder reversal events are
unusual in the history of commercial
airplane flight, having occurred during
five notable accidents and incidents,
with the AA587 accident being the only
catastrophic accident resulting from
rudder reversals.26 Ultimate loads were
exceeded in two of the other notable
rudder reversal events: an incident
involving Interflug (Moscow, February
23 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, ‘‘In-flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer,
American Airlines Flight 587, Airbus Industrie
A300–605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York,
November 12, 2001’’ at 160 (Oct. 26, 2004),
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf.
24 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, p. 31, n. 53.
25 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, p. 104.
26 FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee. Flight Controls Harmonization Working
Group. ‘‘Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal
Recommendation Report,’’ November 7, 2013.
(ARAC Rudder Reversal Report). This Report
identifies four notable rudder events to which the
FAA adds the Interflug incident discussed in the
NTSB AA587 Report.
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11, 1991) and an accident involving
American Airlines Flight 903 (AA903)
(near West Palm Beach, Florida, May 12,
1997).27 The Interflug incident involved
multiple rudder reversals, and loads of
1.55 and 1.35 times the limit load were
recorded. For the AA903 incident, eight
rudder reversals occurred, and a load of
1.53 times the limit load was
recorded.28 A catastrophe similar to
AA587 was averted in these two events
only because the vertical stabilizers
were stronger than required by design
standards.29 In a fourth event—Air
Canada Flight 190 (AC190) (over the
state of Washington, January 10, 2008)—
four rudder reversals occurred, and the
limit load was exceeded by 29
percent.30 The fifth event was a de
Havilland DHC–8–100 (Dash 8) (St.
John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador,
May 27, 2005) in which the pilot
commanded a pedal reversal during
climb-out, when the airplane entered an
aerodynamic stall.31 There were no
injuries, and the airplane was not
damaged. The ARAC FCHWG
determined the loads occurring during
this event were less than limit load, but
this incident is additional evidence that
pedal reversals occur in service.
In transport category airplanes, rudder
inputs are generally limited to aligning
the airplane with the runway during
crosswind landings and controlling
engine-out situations, which occur
predominately at low speeds. At high
speeds, the pilot normally directly rolls
the airplane using the ailerons.32 If the
pilot does use the rudder to control the
airplane at high speeds, there will be a
significant phase lag between the rudder
input and the roll response because the
27 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, pp. 106–109; see also NTSB Aircraft
Accident Report AA903 (NTSB DCA97MA049).
28 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, pp. 104; Report on the Investigation of the
Abnormal Behavior of an Airbus A310–304 Aircraft
on 11.02.199 at Moscow, Air Accident Investigation
Department of the German Federal Office of
Aviation, Reference 6X002–0/91.
29 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, pp. 38–39.
30 Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)
Aviation Investigation Report A08W0007,
‘‘Encounter with Wake Turbulence,’’ https://
www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/
2008/08W0007/A08W0007.html.
31 TSB Aviation Investigation Report A05A0059,
‘‘Stall and Loss of Control During Climb,’’ https://
www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/
2005/a05a0059/a05a0059.html.
32 An aileron is a hinged control service on the
trailing edge of the wing of a fixed-wing aircraft,
one aileron per wing.
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roll response is a secondary effect of the
yawing moment generated by the
rudder.33 The roll does not result from
the rudder input directly. Even if the
rudder is subsequently deflected in the
opposite direction (rudder reversal), the
airplane can continue to roll and yaw in
one direction before reversing because
of the phase lag. The relationship
between rudder inputs and the roll and
yaw response of the airplane can
become confusing to pilots, particularly
with the large yaw and roll rates that
would result from large rudder inputs,
causing the pilots to input multiple
rudder reversals.
Following the AA587 accident in
November 2004, the NTSB issued Safety
Recommendation A–04–56,
recommending that the FAA modify
part 25 ‘‘to include a certification
standard that will ensure safe handling
qualities in the yaw axis throughout the
flight envelope . . . .’’ 34 In 2011, the
FAA tasked ARAC to consider the need
for rulemaking to address the rudder
reversal issue. ARAC delegated this task
to the Transport Airplane and Engine
subcommittee, which assigned it to the
FCHWG. One of the recommendations
of the ARAC FCHWG Rudder Reversal
Report, issued on November 7, 2013,
was to require transport category
airplanes to be able to withstand safely
the loads imposed by three rudder
reversals. This final rule adopts that
recommendation. The ARAC report
indicates that requiring transport
category airplanes to operate safely with
the vertical stabilizer loads imposed by
three full-pedal reversals accounts for
most of the attainable safety benefits.
With more than three rudder reversals,
the FCHWG found little increase in
vertical stabilizer loads.
2. Impacts of This Final Rule
Since the catastrophic AA587
accident, the FAA has requested that
applicants for new type certificates
show that their designs are capable of
continued safe flight and landing after
experiencing repeated rudder reversals.
For airplanes with fly-by-wire (FBW)
systems, manufacturers have been able
to show capability by means of control
laws, incorporated through software
33 The yaw axis is defined to be perpendicular to
the wings and to the normal line of flight. A yaw
movement is a change in the direction of the aircraft
to the left or right around the yaw axis.
34 NTSB Safety Recommendation A–04–56 (Nov.
10, 2004), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/
safety-recs/RecLetters/A04_56_62.pdf.
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changes, adding no weight and
imposing no additional maintenance
cost to the airplanes. Many, if not all, of
these designs have demonstrated
tolerance to three or more rudder
reversals. Aside from converting to an
FBW or hydro-mechanical system,
alternatives available to manufacturers
specializing in airplane designs with
mechanical rudders include increasing
the reliability of the yaw damper and
strengthening the airplane vertical
stabilizer.
To estimate the cost of the final rule,
the FAA reviewed unit cost estimates
from U.S. airplane manufacturers and
incorporated these estimates into an
airplane life cycle model. The FAA
received one estimate for large part 25
airplanes and two estimates for small
part 25 airplanes (i.e., business jets).
A manufacturer specializing in
mechanical rather than FBW rudder
systems provided a business jet estimate
that reflects significantly higher
compliance costs. This manufacturer’s
most cost-efficient approach to
addressing the requirement—although
high in comparison to manufacturers
that use FBW systems exclusively—is to
comply with a strengthened vertical
stabilizer. The cost of complying with a
more reliable yaw damper was higher
than strengthening the vertical
stabilizer, and higher still if complying
by converting to an FBW rudder system
for new models.
As a result of these high costs and the
reasons set forth in the NPRM and the
preceding ‘‘Discussion of Comments
and Final Rule,’’ this final rule will not
apply to airplanes with unpowered
(mechanical) rudder control surfaces.
An unpowered rudder control surface is
one whose movement is affected
through mechanical means, without any
augmentation (for example, from
hydraulic or electrical systems).
Accordingly, the final rule does not
apply to models with mechanical
rudder control systems, but applies only
to models with FBW or hydromechanical rudder systems.
The FAA estimates the costs of the
final rule using unit cost per model
estimates from industry for FBW models
and the agency’s estimates of the
number of new large airplane and
business jet certifications with FBW
rudder systems in the ten years after the
effective date of the final rule. These
estimates are shown in Table 1.
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71209
TABLE 1—COST ESTIMATED FOR FINAL RULE ($ 2016)
Number of
new FBW
models
(10 yrs)
Cost per
model
Large Airplanes ............................................................................................................................
Business Jets ...............................................................................................................................
$300,000
235,000
2
2
$600,000
470,000
Total Costs ...........................................................................................................................
........................
........................
1,070,000
With these cost estimates, the FAA
concludes the final rule will entail
minimal cost, with expected net safety
benefits from the reduced risk of rudder
reversal accidents.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
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Costs
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a
principle of regulatory issuance that
agencies shall endeavor, consistent with
the objectives of the rule and of
applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and
informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and
governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation. To achieve this principle,
agencies are required to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals
and to explain the rationale for their
actions to assure that such proposals are
given serious consideration.’’ The RFA
covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to
determine whether a rule will have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. If
the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis as described in the
RFA. However, if an agency determines
that a rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the RFA provides that
the head of the agency may so certify
and a regulatory flexibility analysis is
not required. The certification must
include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and
the reasoning should be clear.
As noted above, because
manufacturers with FBW rudder
systems have been able to show
compliance by means of low-cost
changes to control laws incorporated
through software changes, the FAA
estimates the costs of this final rule to
be minimal. Therefore, pursuant to
section 605(b), the head of the FAA
certifies that this final rule will not have
a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
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C. International Trade Impact
Assessment
collection associated with this final
rule.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or
engaging in related activities that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States.
Pursuant to this Act, the establishment
of standards is not considered an
unnecessary obstacle to the foreign
commerce of the United States, so long
as the standard has a legitimate
domestic objective, such as the
protection of safety, and does not
operate in a manner that excludes
imports that meet this objective. The
statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for
U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the effect of
this final rule and determined that its
purpose is to protect the safety of U.S.
civil aviation. Therefore, the final rule is
in compliance with the Trade
Agreements Act.
F. International Compatibility
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4)
requires each Federal agency to prepare
a written statement assessing the effects
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or
final agency rule that may result in an
expenditure of $100 million or more (in
1995 dollars) in any one year by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector; such
a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant
regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of
$155.0 million in lieu of $100 million.
This final rule does not contain such
a mandate. Therefore, the requirements
of Title II of the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the
FAA consider the impact of paperwork
and other information collection
burdens imposed on the public. The
FAA has determined that there is no
new requirement for information
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In keeping with U.S. obligations
under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to
conform to International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the
maximum extent practicable. The FAA
has determined that there are no ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental
Impacts: Policies and Procedures,
identifies FAA actions that are
categorically excluded from preparation
of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under
the National Environmental Policy Act
in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances. The FAA has
determined this rulemaking action
qualifies for the categorical exclusion
identified in paragraph 5–6.6 for
regulations and involves no
extraordinary circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this final rule
under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The
agency determined that this action will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, or the relationship between
the Federal Government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, and, therefore,
does not have Federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations
that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this final rule
under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations that
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The
agency has determined that it is not a
‘‘significant energy action’’ under the
executive order and it is not likely to
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have a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, International
Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting
International Regulatory Cooperation,
(77 FR 26413, May 4, 2012) promotes
international regulatory cooperation to
meet shared challenges involving
health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and
reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements. The FAA has analyzed
this action under the policy and agency
responsibilities of Executive Order
13609. The agency has determined that
this action would eliminate differences
between U.S. aviation standards and
those of other civil aviation authorities
by harmonizing with the corresponding
EASA requirement. As noted above,
EASA published its corresponding
regulation, CS 25.353, on November 5,
2018. This final rule harmonizes with
that standard, with the exception that
this rule excludes airplanes that have an
unpowered rudder control surface(s).
VI. How to Obtain Additional
Information
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
amends chapter I of title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 25—AIRWORTHINESS
STANDARDS: TRANSPORT
CATEGORY AIRPLANES
1. The authority citation for part 25
continues to read as follows:
A. Rulemaking Documents
■
An electronic copy of a rulemaking
document may be obtained by using the
internet—
1. Search the Federal eRulemaking
Portal (https://www.regulations.gov);
2. Visit the FAA’s Regulations and
Policies web page at https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
3. Access the Government Printing
Office’s web page at https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
Copies may also be obtained by
sending a request (identified by notice,
amendment, or docket number of this
rulemaking) to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Rulemaking,
ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue SW,
Washington, DC 20591, or by calling
(202) 267–9680.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113,
44701, 44702 and 44704.
B. Comments Submitted to the Docket
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C. Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 (Pub. L. 104–121) (set forth as a
note to 5 U.S.C. 601) requires the FAA
to comply with small entity requests for
information or advice about compliance
with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. A small entity with
questions regarding this document may
contact its local FAA official or the
person listed under the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the
beginning of the preamble. To find out
more about SBREFA on the internet,
visit https://www.faa.gov/regulations_
policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.
Comments received may be viewed by
going to https://www.regulations.gov and
following the online instructions to
search the docket number for this
action. Anyone is able to search the
electronic form of all comments
received into any of the FAA’s dockets
by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
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2. Add § 25.353 under the
undesignated center heading ‘‘Flight
Maneuver and Gust Conditions’’ to read
as follows:
■
assumed to be zero. The applicant must
assume a pilot force of 200 pounds
when evaluating each of the following
conditions:
(a) With the airplane in unaccelerated
flight at zero yaw, the flightdeck rudder
control is suddenly and fully displaced
to achieve the resulting rudder
deflection, as limited by the control
system or the control surface stops.
(b) With the airplane yawed to the
overswing sideslip angle, the flightdeck
rudder control is suddenly and fully
displaced in the opposite direction, as
limited by the control system or control
surface stops.
(c) With the airplane yawed to the
opposite overswing sideslip angle, the
flightdeck rudder control is suddenly
and fully displaced in the opposite
direction, as limited by the control
system or control surface stops.
(d) With the airplane yawed to the
subsequent overswing sideslip angle,
the flightdeck rudder control is
suddenly and fully displaced in the
opposite direction, as limited by the
control system or control surface stops.
(e) With the airplane yawed to the
opposite overswing sideslip angle, the
flightdeck rudder control is suddenly
returned to neutral.
Issued under authority provided by 49
U.S.C. 106(f), and 44701(a) in Washington,
DC, on or about November 16, 2022.
Billy Nolen,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2022–25291 Filed 11–21–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
§ 25.353 Rudder control reversal
conditions.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Airplanes with a powered rudder
control surface or surfaces must be
designed for loads, considered to be
ultimate, resulting from the yaw
maneuver conditions specified in
paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section
at speeds from VMC to VC/MC. Any
permanent deformation resulting from
these ultimate load conditions must not
prevent continued safe flight and
landing. The applicant must evaluate
these conditions with the landing gear
retracted and speed brakes (and spoilers
when used as speed brakes) retracted.
The applicant must evaluate the effects
of flaps, flaperons, or any other
aerodynamic devices when used as
flaps, and slats-extended configurations,
if they are used in en route conditions.
Unbalanced aerodynamic moments
about the center of gravity must be
reacted in a rational or conservative
manner considering the airplane inertia
forces. In computing the loads on the
airplane, the yawing velocity may be
Federal Aviation Administration
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
14 CFR Part 47
[Docket No. FAA–2022–1514; Amdt. No. 47–
33]
RIN 2120–AL45
Increase the Duration of Aircraft
Registration
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Direct final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
The FAA is extending the
duration of aircraft registration
certificates from three years to seven
years. Initial Certificates of Aircraft
Registration will expire seven years
from the month issued. In addition, the
FAA is applying this amendment to all
aircraft currently registered under
existing FAA regulations governing
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\22NOR1.SGM
22NOR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 224 (Tuesday, November 22, 2022)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 71203-71210]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-25291]
========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 87 , No. 224 / Tuesday, November 22, 2022 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 71203]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No.: FAA-2018-0653; Amdt. No. 25-147]
RIN 2120-AK89
Yaw Maneuver Conditions--Rudder Reversals
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adding a new load condition to the design standards
for transport category airplanes. The new load condition requires such
airplanes to be designed to withstand the loads caused by rapid
reversals of the rudder pedals, and applies to transport category
airplanes that have a powered rudder control surface or surfaces. This
rule is necessary because accident and incident data show that pilots
sometimes make rudder reversals during flight, even though such
reversals are unnecessary and discouraged by flightcrew training
programs. The current design standards do not require the airplane
structure to withstand the loads that may result from such reversals.
If the loads on the airplane exceed those for which it is designed, the
airplane structure may fail, resulting in catastrophic loss of control
of the airplane. This final rule aims to prevent structural failure of
the rudder and vertical stabilizer that may result from these rudder
reversals.
DATES: Effective January 23, 2023.
ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking
documents and other information related to this final rule, see ``How
To Obtain Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action, contact Todd Martin, Materials and Structural Properties
Section, AIR-621, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft
Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 2200 South
216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax (206) 231-3210;
email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
Requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of
aircraft that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air
commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority. It
prescribes new safety standards for the design of transport-category
airplanes.
I. Overview of Final Rule
This rule adds a new load condition to the design standards in
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25, to require
transport category airplanes that have a powered rudder control surface
or surfaces to be designed to withstand the loads caused by rapid
reversals of the rudder pedals. Specifically, applicants for design
approval must show that their proposed airplane design can withstand an
initial full rudder pedal input, followed by three full-pedal reversals
at the maximum sideslip angle, followed by return of the rudder to
neutral. Due to the rarity of such multiple reversals, the rule
specifies the new load condition is an ultimate load condition rather
than a limit load condition. Consequently, the applicant does not have
to apply an additional factor of safety to the calculated load
levels.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The terms ``limit,'' ``ultimate,'' and ``factor of safety''
are addressed in Sec. Sec. 25.301, 25.303, and 25.305. To
summarize, design loads are typically expressed in terms of limit
loads, which are then multiplied by a factor of safety, usually 1.5,
to determine ultimate loads. In this final rule, the design loads
are expressed as ultimate loads and no additional safety factor is
applied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This final rule affects manufacturers of transport category
airplanes applying for a new type certificate after the effective date
of the final rule. The rule may also affect applicants applying for an
amended or supplemental type certificate as determined under 14 CFR
21.101, ``Designation of applicable regulations,'' after the effective
date of the final rule.
The final rule will entail minimal cost, with expected net safety
benefits from the reduced risk of rudder reversal accidents.
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
The rudder is a vertical control surface on the tail of most
airplanes that helps the airplane to turn. Rudder control systems are
either powered or unpowered.\2\ Accident and incident data show pilots
sometimes make multiple and unnecessary rudder reversals during flight.
In addition, FAA-sponsored research \3\ indicates that pilots use the
rudder more often than previously expected and often in ways not
recommended by manufacturers. Section 25.1583(a)(3)(ii) requires
manufacturers to provide documentation that warns pilots against making
large and rapid control reversals, as they may result in
[[Page 71204]]
structural failures at any speed, including airspeeds below the design
maneuvering speed (VA). Despite the Sec. 25.1583(a)(3)(ii)
requirement, and that such rudder reversals are unnecessary and
discouraged by flightcrew training programs, these events continue to
occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A powered rudder control surface is one in which the force
required to deflect the surface against the airstream is generated
or augmented by non-mechanical means, such as hydraulic or electric
systems. Powered rudder control systems include fly-by-wire and
hydro-mechanical systems. An unpowered rudder control surface is one
for which the force required to deflect the rudder control surface
is transmitted from the pilot's rudder pedal directly to the rudder
control surface through mechanical means. Unpowered rudder control
systems are also known as mechanical systems. Incorporation of a
powered yaw damper into an otherwise unpowered rudder control system
does not constitute a powered rudder control system. Other powered
systems, such as electrical, hydraulic, or pneumatic systems, may
aid in the reduction of pedal forces required for single engine-out
operations or to trim out pedal force to maintain a steady heading.
However, if such a powered systems does not contribute to hinge
moment generation (the twisting force on the rudder surface) during
maneuvering of a fully operational airplane, it is not a powered
rudder control system.
\3\ Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-10/14, ``An International Survey of
Transport Airplane Pilots' Experiences and Perspectives of Lateral/
Directional Control Events and Rudder Issues in Transport Airplanes
(Rudder Survey),'' dated October 2010, is available in the Docket
and at https://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/2010s/media/201014.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 25.351 (``Yaw maneuver conditions''), which sets forth the
standard for protecting the airplane's vertical stabilizer from pilot-
commanded maneuver loads, only addresses a single, full rudder input at
airspeeds up to the design diving speed (VD).\4\ This design
standard does not protect the airplane from the loads imposed by
repeated inputs in opposing directions, or rudder reversals.\5\ If the
loads on the vertical stabilizer exceed those for which it is designed,
the vertical stabilizer may fail, resulting in the catastrophic loss of
airplane control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ VD is the design diving speed: the maximum speed
at which the airplane is certified to fly. See 14 CFR 1.2 and
25.335.
\5\ A rudder ``reversal'' is a continuous, pilot-commanded
control movement starting from control displacement in one direction
followed by control displacement in the opposite direction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The primary example of this risk is the crash of American Airlines
Flight 587 (AA587), which occurred near Queens, New York, on November
12, 2001, and resulted in the death of all 260 passengers and crew
aboard and of five persons on the ground. The National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) found that the probable cause of the accident was
``the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer [airplane fin] as
a result of loads above ultimate design created by the first officer's
unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs.'' \6\ The NTSB also
noted that contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were
characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and
elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering
Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, ``In-flight
Separation of Vertical Stabilizer, American Airlines Flight 587,
Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York, November
12, 2001,'' dated October 26, 2004, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf, p. 160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the AA587 accident is the only catastrophic accident
resulting from rudder reversals, other notable accidents and incidents
involving airplanes that have a powered control ruder surface have
occurred.\7\ Ultimate loads were exceeded in two of the other notable
rudder reversal events: an incident involving Interflug (Moscow,
February 11, 1991) and an accident involving American Airlines Flight
903 (AA903) (near West Palm Beach, Florida, May 12, 1997).\8\ The
Interflug incident involved multiple rudder reversals, and loads of
1.55 and 1.35 times the limit load were recorded. For the AA903
incident, eight rudder reversals occurred, and a load of 1.53 times the
limit load was recorded.\9\ A catastrophe similar to AA587 was averted
in these two events only because the vertical stabilizers were stronger
than required by design standards.\10\ In another event, an incident
involving Air Canada Flight 190 (AC190) (over the state of Washington,
January 10, 2008), four rudder reversals occurred, and the limit load
was exceeded by 29 percent.\11\ Finally, in an incident involving
Provincial Airlines Limited (St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, May
27, 2005), the pilot commanded a pedal reversal during climb-out, when
the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall.\12\ The loads occurring
during this event were less than limit loads, but this incident is
additional evidence that pedal reversals occur in service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. Flight Controls
Harmonization Working Group. ``Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder
Reversal Recommendation Report,'' November 7, 2013. (ARAC Rudder
Reversal Report). This Report identifies four notable rudder events
to which the FAA adds the Interflug incident discussed in the NTSB
AA587 Report.
\8\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 106-109.
\9\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 104.
\10\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 38-39.
\11\ Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) Aviation
Investigation Report A08W0007, ``Encounter with Wake Turbulence,''
https://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/A08W0007/A08W0007.html.
\12\ TSB Aviation Investigation Report A05A0059, ``Stall and
Loss of Control During Climb,'' https://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2005/a05a0059/a05a0059.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2006, the FAA sponsored a survey \13\ to better comprehend
transport category pilots' understanding and use of the rudder. This
survey inquired of transport pilots from all over the world. The FAA's
analysis of the survey data found that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-10/14 (see footnote 3), OMB Control
No. 2120-0712.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilots use the rudder more than FAA experts previously
thought and often in ways not recommended by manufacturers.
Pilots make erroneous rudder pedal inputs, some of which
include rudder reversals.
Even after specific training, many pilots are not aware
that they should not make rudder reversals, even below VA.
Over the last several years, training and changes to airplane flight
manuals directed the pilot to avoid making cyclic control inputs. The
rudder reversals that caused the AC190 incident in 2008 and the
Provincial Airlines Limited incident in 2005 occurred despite these
efforts.
Pilots in airplane upset situations (e.g., wake vortex encounters)
may revert to prior training and make sequential rudder reversals.
Based on information from the survey, the FAA expects that repeated
rudder reversals will continue to occur despite flightcrew training,
because training alone cannot address all potential flightcrew
behaviors that can lead to such inputs. For example, the relationship
between rudder inputs and the roll and yaw responses of the airplane
can become confusing to pilots. This is particularly true with the
large yaw and roll rates that result from large rudder inputs, combined
with naturally-occurring delays between pedal input and airplane
response that result from transport airplane flight dynamics. Such
confusion might lead pilots to command repeated rudder reversals.
B. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Recommendation
Following the AA587 accident, the NTSB submitted safety
recommendations to the FAA. The NTSB stated, ``[f]or airplanes with
variable stop rudder travel limiter systems, protection from dangerous
structural loads resulting from sustained alternating large rudder
pedal inputs can be achieved by reducing the sensitivity of the rudder
control system (for example, by increasing the pedal forces), which
would make it harder for pilots to quickly perform alternating full
rudder inputs.'' \14\ In Safety Recommendation A-04-056,\15\ the NTSB
recommended the FAA modify part 25 to ``include a certification
standard that will ensure safe handling qualities in the yaw axis
throughout the flight envelope, including limits for rudder pedal
sensitivity.'' This final rule addresses this recommendation and will
reduce the likelihood of an event that would be similar to the AA587
accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ NTSB Safety Recommendation, November 10, 2004, at p. 2.
This document is available in the docket and at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A04_56_62.pdf.
\15\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-056, dated November 10,
2004, is available in the docket and at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A04_56_62.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Activity
In 2011, the FAA tasked the ARAC to consider the need to add a new
flight maneuver load condition to part 25, subpart C, that would
``ensure airplane structural capability in the presence of
[[Page 71205]]
rudder reversals'' and increasing sideslip angles (yaw angles) at
airspeeds up to VD. The FAA also tasked the ARAC to consider
whether other airworthiness standards would address this concern, such
as pedal characteristics that would discourage pilots from making
rudder reversals.\16\ The ARAC delegated this task to the Transport
Airplane and Engine subcommittee, which assigned it to the Flight
Controls Harmonization Working Group (FCHWG) of the subcommittee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The FAA published this notice of ARAC tasking in the
Federal Register on March 28, 2011. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee; Transport Airplane and Engine Issues--New Task, 76 FR
17183.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ARAC FCHWG completed its report in November 2013.\17\ ARAC
approved the report and submitted it to the FAA on December 30, 2013.
One of the recommendations of the ARAC FCHWG Rudder Reversal Report was
to require transport category airplanes to be able to withstand safely
the loads imposed by three rudder reversals.\18\ This final rule adopts
that recommendation. The ARAC report indicates that requiring transport
category airplanes to operate safely with the vertical stabilizer loads
imposed by three full-pedal reversals accounts for most of the
attainable safety benefits. With more than three rudder reversals, the
ARAC FCHWG found little increase in vertical stabilizer loads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ARAC FCHWG Recommendation Report, ``Rudder Pedal
Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal,'' dated November 7, 2013, is available
in the Docket and at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf.
\18\ One member of the ARAC FCHWG did not support any
rulemaking. The remaining members of the ARAC FCHWG found that a yaw
maneuver load condition would be the optimal way to protect the
airplane from the excessive loads that can result from multiple
rudder reversals because they found systems solutions, such as fly-
by-wire systems and manual systems with appropriate yaw dampers, to
be too design-prescriptive. The members of the ARAC FCHWG held
divided opinions, however, on what the load condition should be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report's findings and recommendations guided the formation of
the FAA's Yaw Maneuver Conditions--Rudder Reversals notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) (83 FR 32087, July 16, 2018) and this final rule.
D. Summary of the NPRM
On July 16, 2018, the FAA published an NPRM that proposed to add a
new regulation to address rudder reversal conditions on transport
category airplanes (83 FR 32087). The FAA intended that this new
requirement would prevent structural failure of the rudder and vertical
stabilizer caused by reversals of the rudder pedals. Thus, the FAA
proposed to require that airplanes be able to withstand the structural
loads caused by three full reversals (doublets) of the rudder pedals.
The FAA proposed to apply the requirement only to airplanes with
powered rudder control surfaces.
E. Rulemaking by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
On November 5, 2018, EASA published amendment 22 to Certification
Specifications 25 (CS-25). This amendment included a new regulation, CS
25.353, ``Rudder control reversal conditions,'' as well as Acceptable
Means of Compliance 25.353. EASA's new regulation is similar to this
final rule except that the final rule adopted by the FAA applies only
to airplanes that have a powered rudder control surface or surfaces.
F. Advisory Material
FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25.353-1, ``Rudder Control Reversal
Conditions,'' which accompanies this rule, provides guidance on
acceptable means, but not the only means, of showing compliance with
Sec. 25.353. AC 25.353-1 is available in the public docket for this
rulemaking.
III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule
The FAA received comments from the NTSB, Airline Pilots
Association, International (ALPA), ATR, Crew Systems, Textron Aviation,
Airbus, The Boeing Company, and Bombardier Aerospace. The NTSB, ALPA,
ATR, and Crew Systems supported the proposal and did not suggest
changes to it. Textron Aviation and Airbus requested that the rule
specify a single, full-pedal command followed by one rudder reversal
and return to neutral, rather than three rudder reversals as proposed
in the NPRM. Those two companies, along with Boeing, also requested
other changes, as described in this section of the preamble. Bombardier
Aerospace commented on the rule's cost, suggesting that the FAA issue
guidance to limit the rule's applicability.
A. Necessity of Three Reversals
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a design load condition that consists
of a single, full-pedal command followed by three full-pedal reversals
and return to neutral. Two airplane manufacturers, Textron Aviation and
Airbus, requested that the rule instead specify a single, full-pedal
command followed by one rudder reversal and return to neutral. These
companies believed this condition was more appropriate given the rarity
of rudder reversals and the uniqueness of the AA587 accident airplane.
They advocated that a single, full-pedal command followed by one rudder
reversal and return to neutral would cover all other known incidents,
stated their concern that the proposed criteria could result in weight
penalties or detrimental system changes, and proposed that enhanced
flightcrew training would be more effective than designing for multiple
rudder reversals.
The FAA emphasizes that while rudder reversals are rare, they can
lead to serious consequences. The AA587 accident and four other
accidents and incidents involved multiple rudder reversals, some of
which were full-pedal reversals. Since these accidents occurred, modern
airplane design requirements have not changed in a manner that would
deter pilots from making such multiple reversals. Additionally, based
on information received in response to the 2006 pilot survey, the FAA
found that some respondents reported making rudder pedal reversals
(cyclic rudder-pedal commands).\19\ Moreover, an analysis in the ARAC
report shows that loads would continue to increase upon subsequent
pedal reversals. Therefore, a single, full-pedal command followed by
one full-pedal reversal and return to neutral would not represent the
conditions resulting from multiple full-pedal reversals that may result
in injuries to occupants or a structural failure that jeopardizes
continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. Data from all
manufacturers on the ARAC FCHWG showed that after three full-pedal
reversals, the maximum sideslip angle does not increase significantly.
Maximum sideslip angle causes the maximum loads on the vertical
stabilizer; therefore, three full-pedal reversals result in a load
condition that accounts for most of the attainable safety benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-10/14 at p. 14 (see footnote 3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the concern that the proposed multiple reversal condition
could result in potential weight penalties or detrimental system
changes in future designs, as discussed in the NPRM preamble, the FAA
expects that most applicants will use control laws to comply with this
rule. Because manufacturers typically implement control laws through
systems and software, use of this solution to comply would result in
little to no incremental cost in the form of weight, equipment,
maintenance, or training for those airplanes with powered rudder
control surfaces.
Based on information from the 2006 survey, the FAA does not agree
with
[[Page 71206]]
Textron and Airbus that enhanced flight crew training would be more
effective than designing for multiple full-pedal reversals. As
described earlier in the preamble, the FAA's analysis of the survey
found that even after specific training, many pilots are not aware that
they should not make full-pedal reversals, even below VA.
While training and changes to airplane flight manuals directed the
pilot to avoid making cyclic control inputs, the pedal reversals that
caused the AC190 incident in 2008 and the Provincial Airlines Limited
incident in 2005 occurred despite these efforts.
Moreover, in transport category airplanes, rudder inputs are
generally limited to aligning the airplane with the runway during
crosswind landings and controlling engine-out situations, which occur
predominately at low speeds. At high speeds, the pilot normally
directly rolls the airplane using the ailerons.\20\ If the pilot does
use the rudder to control the airplane at high speeds, there will be a
significant phase lag between the rudder input and the roll response
because the roll response is a secondary effect of the yawing moment
generated by the rudder.\21\ The roll does not result from the rudder
input directly. Even if the rudder is subsequently deflected in the
opposite direction (rudder reversal), the airplane can continue to roll
and yaw in one direction before reversing because of the phase lag. The
relationship between rudder inputs and the roll and yaw response of the
airplane can become confusing to pilots, particularly with the large
yaw and roll rates that would result from large rudder inputs, causing
the pilots to input multiple rudder reversals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ An aileron is a hinged control service on the trailing edge
of the wing of a fixed-wing aircraft, one aileron per wing.
\21\ The yaw axis is defined to be perpendicular to the wings
and to the normal line of flight. A yaw movement is a change in the
direction of the aircraft to the left or right around the yaw axis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the foregoing reasons, the FAA has determined that a three
full-pedal reversal condition is necessary to account for the effects
of multiple rudder reversals that the FAA expects to occur in service.
The FAA adopts this aspect of the proposal without change.
B. Applicability
Airbus requested that the rule apply only to new aircraft designs;
Bombardier requested that the rule apply only to new airplanes or to
airplanes where the rudder system has been significantly modified. The
FAA agrees in part with the comments regarding applicability. This
final rule requires that new airplane designs meet the new standards.
Where an applicant proposes a change to a previously approved type
design, Sec. 21.101, ``Designation of applicable regulations,''
requires an assessment to determine the amendment level (version) of
each regulation to be applied to that type design change. The FAA would
determine under the provisions of Sec. 21.101 whether this final rule
would be applied to a changed airplane design.
Additionally, Airbus requested that the rule apply to all transport
category airplanes, including those with unpowered control surfaces.
Similarly, the corresponding and recently adopted European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) rule, CS 25.353, applies to all
airplanes, including those with unpowered control surfaces. However, in
the NPRM, the FAA proposed to apply this rule only to airplanes with a
powered control surface or surfaces.
A powered rudder control surface is one in which the force required
to deflect the surface against the airstream is generated or augmented
by hydraulic or electric systems. In contrast, an unpowered rudder
control surface is one for which the force required to deflect the
surface against the airstream is transmitted from the pilot's rudder
pedal directly through mechanical means, without any augmentation from
hydraulic or electrical systems. Powered rudder control systems include
fly-by-wire (FBW) and hydro-mechanical systems, while unpowered rudder
control systems are also known as mechanical systems. Incorporation of
a powered yaw damper into an otherwise unpowered rudder control system
does not constitute a powered rudder control surface, for the purpose
of this rule.
Small business jets that typically have unpowered rudder control
surfaces provide immediate feedback to their flightcrews in response to
yaw inputs. Those flightcrews are, therefore, less likely to execute
inappropriate rudder pedal reversals. The FAA reviewed accident and
incident records and found no events in which pilots commanded
inappropriate full-pedal reversals on airplanes with unpowered rudder
control surfaces. Also, the use of airplanes with unpowered rudder
control surfaces is diminishing in the transport category fleet. The
only transport category airplane model in U.S. production with an
unpowered rudder control surface also has a yaw damper. The normal
operation of the yaw damper would be adequate to reduce yaw overshoot
loads from full-pedal reversals.
As explained in the NPRM and this final rule, the safety benefit of
expanding this rule to airplanes with unpowered control surfaces does
not outweigh the potentially higher costs of implementation. The FAA
may consider the requested change later if data or information become
available to indicate that either the safety case has changed or
implementation costs have decreased.
C. Load Condition Requirements
Airbus and Boeing requested the FAA include in the rule the
following text: ``Flaps (or flaperons or any other aerodynamic devices
when used as flaps) and slats extended configurations are also to be
considered if they are used in en route conditions.'' Including this
provision would require applicants to evaluate the rudder reversal
conditions with flaps and other devices extended, if the airplane uses
those devices in en route conditions.\22\ Airbus also requested that
the rule include the following text: ``Unbalanced aerodynamic moments
about the center of gravity must be reacted in a rational or
conservative manner considering the airplane inertia forces.'' This
language specifies how the applicant sums the various forces when
analyzing the rudder reversal conditions. Both commenters requested the
FAA include these requirements in the final rule to be consistent with
the ARAC FCHWG report and to harmonize with the EASA regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ En route conditions means the conditions occurring during
any phase of flight after initial climb and before the final descent
and landing phase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA agrees that the additions identified by commenters should
be included in the final rule because both requirements harmonize with
the EASA rule (CS 25.353) and clarify how to analyze the load
conditions. The two requirements are also found in other part 25
regulations, including Sec. Sec. 25.345 and 25.351. The FAA notes that
the requirement to consider the effect of flaps and slats in en route
conditions has slightly different wording than the EASA rule, but has
the same meaning. As these changes simply clarify how to analyze the
load conditions, they will not add additional burdens.
Airbus also requested that the airplane be able to withstand the
prescribed conditions at an uppermost speed of VC, rather
than VC/MC, as proposed in the NPRM. The FAA
disagrees with the commenter. The proposed rule included VC/
MC because airplanes have defined limitations for both
VC and MC. However, no substantive difference
between the two exists because each value of VC has a
corresponding value of MC. As a result, using VC/
MC is appropriate in this rule.
[[Page 71207]]
D. Warning Monitors
Airbus requested that the rule allow an applicant to show
compliance via implementing monitors that would warn the pilot of
inappropriate rudder use. The FAA does not agree with this comment.
Pilot-commanded rudder reversals have occurred during high workload and
conditions that are often startling. Thus, depending on the pilot to
react appropriately to a warning under such conditions would not
provide the equivalent safety benefit as the load conditions in this
final rule and would be inconsistent with the EASA regulation.
E. Miscellaneous Modifications
As previously noted, EASA published its regulation, CS 25.353, on
November 5, 2018, a few months after the FAA issued the NPRM upon which
this final rule is based. This final rule contains minor modifications
to harmonize with the EASA standard. These modifications are in
addition to those described earlier in the final rule (C. Load
Condition Requirements). These modifications include:
(1) The proposed rule specified that the applicant evaluate the
rudder reversal conditions ``from VMC or the highest
airspeed for which it is possible to achieve maximum rudder deflection
at zero sideslip, whichever is greater, up to VC/
MC.'' This final rule establishes the speed range as
``VMC to VC/MC.'' This is simpler to
apply because it does not require an additional calculation of ``the
highest speed for which it is possible . . .'' and it is consistent
with the current rudder maneuver condition required by Sec. 25.351.
(Section 25.351 prescribes the speed range as VMC to
VD.)
(2) This final rule provides that any permanent deformation
resulting from the specified ultimate load conditions must not prevent
continued safe flight and landing. This requirement is necessary
because this final rule, unlike most design load conditions codified in
part 25, contains only an ``ultimate'' load requirement, and does not
contain a ``limit'' load requirement. Design loads are typically
expressed in terms of limit loads, which are then multiplied by a
factor of safety, usually 1.5, to determine ultimate loads. The
airplane structure must be able to withstand limit loads without
detrimental permanent deformation and ultimate loads without failure in
accordance with Sec. 25.305. Because this rule does not include a
limit load requirement, it is necessary to require that no detrimental
permanent deformation occur at ultimate load (deformation that would
prevent continued safe flight and landing). This requirement is also in
the corresponding EASA regulation, CS 25.353.
(3) The proposed rule specified that the ``rudder control is
suddenly displaced'' in evaluating the ultimate loads that result from
the yaw maneuver conditions identified in the proposal. This final
rule, however, specifies that the ``rudder control is suddenly and
fully displaced as limited by the control system or control surface
stops.'' The term ``fully'' makes it clear that full displacement of
the rudder pedal is required. The phrase ``as limited by the control
system or control surface stops'' further clarifies the requirement by
indicating that the conditions may be conducted using rudder control
system limiting hardware to establish the reversal loads. Furthermore,
the aforementioned requirements are consistent with Sec. 25.351.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct that each
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354),
as codified in 5 U.S.C. 603 et seq., requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), 19 U.S.C. Chapter 13,
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing
U.S. standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4), as codified in 2 U.S.C. Chapter 25, requires agencies
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of
the economic impacts of this final rule.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this
final rule has benefits that justify its costs and is not a
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866. The final rule is also not ``significant'' as
defined in DOT's rulemaking procedures. The final rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States, and will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local,
or tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the
threshold identified previously.
A. Regulatory Evaluation
1. Background and Statement of Need
The genesis of this final rule is the crash of American Airlines
Flight 587 (AA587), near Queens, New York, on November 12, 2001,
resulting in the death of all 260 passengers and crew aboard, and the
death of five persons on the ground. The airplane was destroyed by
impact forces and a post-crash fire.
The NTSB found that the probable cause of the accident was ``the
in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer [airplane fin] as a
result of loads above ultimate design created by the first officer's
unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs.'' \23\ Ultimate loads on
the airplane structure are the limit loads (1.0) multiplied by a safety
factor, usually 1.5 (as for the vertical stabilizer). An airplane is
expected to experience a limit load once in its lifetime and is never
expected to experience an ultimate load.\24\ For the AA587 accident,
loads exceeding ultimate loads ranged from 1.83 to 2.14 times the limit
load on the vertical stabilizer,\25\ as a result of four, full,
alternating rudder inputs known as ``rudder reversals.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, ``In-flight
Separation of Vertical Stabilizer, American Airlines Flight 587,
Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York, November
12, 2001'' at 160 (Oct. 26, 2004), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf.
\24\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 31, n. 53.
\25\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significant rudder reversal events are unusual in the history of
commercial airplane flight, having occurred during five notable
accidents and incidents, with the AA587 accident being the only
catastrophic accident resulting from rudder reversals.\26\ Ultimate
loads were exceeded in two of the other notable rudder reversal events:
an incident involving Interflug (Moscow, February
[[Page 71208]]
11, 1991) and an accident involving American Airlines Flight 903
(AA903) (near West Palm Beach, Florida, May 12, 1997).\27\ The
Interflug incident involved multiple rudder reversals, and loads of
1.55 and 1.35 times the limit load were recorded. For the AA903
incident, eight rudder reversals occurred, and a load of 1.53 times the
limit load was recorded.\28\ A catastrophe similar to AA587 was averted
in these two events only because the vertical stabilizers were stronger
than required by design standards.\29\ In a fourth event--Air Canada
Flight 190 (AC190) (over the state of Washington, January 10, 2008)--
four rudder reversals occurred, and the limit load was exceeded by 29
percent.\30\ The fifth event was a de Havilland DHC-8-100 (Dash 8) (St.
John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, May 27, 2005) in which the pilot
commanded a pedal reversal during climb-out, when the airplane entered
an aerodynamic stall.\31\ There were no injuries, and the airplane was
not damaged. The ARAC FCHWG determined the loads occurring during this
event were less than limit load, but this incident is additional
evidence that pedal reversals occur in service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. Flight Controls
Harmonization Working Group. ``Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder
Reversal Recommendation Report,'' November 7, 2013. (ARAC Rudder
Reversal Report). This Report identifies four notable rudder events
to which the FAA adds the Interflug incident discussed in the NTSB
AA587 Report.
\27\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 106-109;
see also NTSB Aircraft Accident Report AA903 (NTSB DCA97MA049).
\28\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 104;
Report on the Investigation of the Abnormal Behavior of an Airbus
A310-304 Aircraft on 11.02.199 at Moscow, Air Accident Investigation
Department of the German Federal Office of Aviation, Reference
6X002-0/91.
\29\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 38-39.
\30\ Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) Aviation
Investigation Report A08W0007, ``Encounter with Wake Turbulence,''
https://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/08W0007/A08W0007.html.
\31\ TSB Aviation Investigation Report A05A0059, ``Stall and
Loss of Control During Climb,'' https://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2005/a05a0059/a05a0059.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In transport category airplanes, rudder inputs are generally
limited to aligning the airplane with the runway during crosswind
landings and controlling engine-out situations, which occur
predominately at low speeds. At high speeds, the pilot normally
directly rolls the airplane using the ailerons.\32\ If the pilot does
use the rudder to control the airplane at high speeds, there will be a
significant phase lag between the rudder input and the roll response
because the roll response is a secondary effect of the yawing moment
generated by the rudder.\33\ The roll does not result from the rudder
input directly. Even if the rudder is subsequently deflected in the
opposite direction (rudder reversal), the airplane can continue to roll
and yaw in one direction before reversing because of the phase lag. The
relationship between rudder inputs and the roll and yaw response of the
airplane can become confusing to pilots, particularly with the large
yaw and roll rates that would result from large rudder inputs, causing
the pilots to input multiple rudder reversals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ An aileron is a hinged control service on the trailing edge
of the wing of a fixed-wing aircraft, one aileron per wing.
\33\ The yaw axis is defined to be perpendicular to the wings
and to the normal line of flight. A yaw movement is a change in the
direction of the aircraft to the left or right around the yaw axis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the AA587 accident in November 2004, the NTSB issued
Safety Recommendation A-04-56, recommending that the FAA modify part 25
``to include a certification standard that will ensure safe handling
qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope . . . .'' \34\
In 2011, the FAA tasked ARAC to consider the need for rulemaking to
address the rudder reversal issue. ARAC delegated this task to the
Transport Airplane and Engine subcommittee, which assigned it to the
FCHWG. One of the recommendations of the ARAC FCHWG Rudder Reversal
Report, issued on November 7, 2013, was to require transport category
airplanes to be able to withstand safely the loads imposed by three
rudder reversals. This final rule adopts that recommendation. The ARAC
report indicates that requiring transport category airplanes to operate
safely with the vertical stabilizer loads imposed by three full-pedal
reversals accounts for most of the attainable safety benefits. With
more than three rudder reversals, the FCHWG found little increase in
vertical stabilizer loads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-56 (Nov. 10, 2004),
available at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A04_56_62.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Impacts of This Final Rule
Since the catastrophic AA587 accident, the FAA has requested that
applicants for new type certificates show that their designs are
capable of continued safe flight and landing after experiencing
repeated rudder reversals. For airplanes with fly-by-wire (FBW)
systems, manufacturers have been able to show capability by means of
control laws, incorporated through software changes, adding no weight
and imposing no additional maintenance cost to the airplanes. Many, if
not all, of these designs have demonstrated tolerance to three or more
rudder reversals. Aside from converting to an FBW or hydro-mechanical
system, alternatives available to manufacturers specializing in
airplane designs with mechanical rudders include increasing the
reliability of the yaw damper and strengthening the airplane vertical
stabilizer.
To estimate the cost of the final rule, the FAA reviewed unit cost
estimates from U.S. airplane manufacturers and incorporated these
estimates into an airplane life cycle model. The FAA received one
estimate for large part 25 airplanes and two estimates for small part
25 airplanes (i.e., business jets).
A manufacturer specializing in mechanical rather than FBW rudder
systems provided a business jet estimate that reflects significantly
higher compliance costs. This manufacturer's most cost-efficient
approach to addressing the requirement--although high in comparison to
manufacturers that use FBW systems exclusively--is to comply with a
strengthened vertical stabilizer. The cost of complying with a more
reliable yaw damper was higher than strengthening the vertical
stabilizer, and higher still if complying by converting to an FBW
rudder system for new models.
As a result of these high costs and the reasons set forth in the
NPRM and the preceding ``Discussion of Comments and Final Rule,'' this
final rule will not apply to airplanes with unpowered (mechanical)
rudder control surfaces. An unpowered rudder control surface is one
whose movement is affected through mechanical means, without any
augmentation (for example, from hydraulic or electrical systems).
Accordingly, the final rule does not apply to models with mechanical
rudder control systems, but applies only to models with FBW or hydro-
mechanical rudder systems.
The FAA estimates the costs of the final rule using unit cost per
model estimates from industry for FBW models and the agency's estimates
of the number of new large airplane and business jet certifications
with FBW rudder systems in the ten years after the effective date of
the final rule. These estimates are shown in Table 1.
[[Page 71209]]
Table 1--Cost Estimated for Final Rule ($ 2016)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of new
Cost per model FBW models Costs
(10 yrs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Airplanes................................................. $300,000 2 $600,000
Business Jets................................................... 235,000 2 470,000
-----------------------------------------------
Total Costs................................................. .............. .............. 1,070,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
With these cost estimates, the FAA concludes the final rule will
entail minimal cost, with expected net safety benefits from the reduced
risk of rudder reversal accidents.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the agency may so
certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. The
certification must include a statement providing the factual basis for
this determination, and the reasoning should be clear.
As noted above, because manufacturers with FBW rudder systems have
been able to show compliance by means of low-cost changes to control
laws incorporated through software changes, the FAA estimates the costs
of this final rule to be minimal. Therefore, pursuant to section
605(b), the head of the FAA certifies that this final rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the effect of this final rule and determined
that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil aviation.
Therefore, the final rule is in compliance with the Trade Agreements
Act.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $155.0 million in lieu of $100
million.
This final rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there is no new requirement for information collection associated with
this final rule.
F. International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these regulations.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures,
identifies FAA actions that are categorically excluded from preparation
of an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under
the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances. The FAA has determined this rulemaking action qualifies
for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 5-6.6 for
regulations and involves no extraordinary circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency determined
that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the
States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government, and, therefore, does not have Federalism
implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
is not a ``significant energy action'' under the executive order and it
is not likely to
[[Page 71210]]
have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use
of energy.
C. Executive Order 13609, International Cooperation
Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation, (77 FR 26413, May 4, 2012) promotes international
regulatory cooperation to meet shared challenges involving health,
safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues and reduce,
eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory
requirements. The FAA has analyzed this action under the policy and
agency responsibilities of Executive Order 13609. The agency has
determined that this action would eliminate differences between U.S.
aviation standards and those of other civil aviation authorities by
harmonizing with the corresponding EASA requirement. As noted above,
EASA published its corresponding regulation, CS 25.353, on November 5,
2018. This final rule harmonizes with that standard, with the exception
that this rule excludes airplanes that have an unpowered rudder control
surface(s).
VI. How to Obtain Additional Information
A. Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of a rulemaking document may be obtained by
using the internet--
1. Search the Federal eRulemaking Portal (https://www.regulations.gov);
2. Visit the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
3. Access the Government Printing Office's web page at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by
notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.
B. Comments Submitted to the Docket
Comments received may be viewed by going to https://www.regulations.gov and following the online instructions to search the
docket number for this action. Anyone is able to search the electronic
form of all comments received into any of the FAA's dockets by the name
of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).
C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 (Pub. L. 104-121) (set forth as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601) requires
the FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice
about compliance with statutes and regulations within its jurisdiction.
A small entity with questions regarding this document may contact its
local FAA official or the person listed under the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. To find
out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and
44704.
0
2. Add Sec. 25.353 under the undesignated center heading ``Flight
Maneuver and Gust Conditions'' to read as follows:
Sec. 25.353 Rudder control reversal conditions.
Airplanes with a powered rudder control surface or surfaces must be
designed for loads, considered to be ultimate, resulting from the yaw
maneuver conditions specified in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this
section at speeds from VMC to VC/MC.
Any permanent deformation resulting from these ultimate load conditions
must not prevent continued safe flight and landing. The applicant must
evaluate these conditions with the landing gear retracted and speed
brakes (and spoilers when used as speed brakes) retracted. The
applicant must evaluate the effects of flaps, flaperons, or any other
aerodynamic devices when used as flaps, and slats-extended
configurations, if they are used in en route conditions. Unbalanced
aerodynamic moments about the center of gravity must be reacted in a
rational or conservative manner considering the airplane inertia
forces. In computing the loads on the airplane, the yawing velocity may
be assumed to be zero. The applicant must assume a pilot force of 200
pounds when evaluating each of the following conditions:
(a) With the airplane in unaccelerated flight at zero yaw, the
flightdeck rudder control is suddenly and fully displaced to achieve
the resulting rudder deflection, as limited by the control system or
the control surface stops.
(b) With the airplane yawed to the overswing sideslip angle, the
flightdeck rudder control is suddenly and fully displaced in the
opposite direction, as limited by the control system or control surface
stops.
(c) With the airplane yawed to the opposite overswing sideslip
angle, the flightdeck rudder control is suddenly and fully displaced in
the opposite direction, as limited by the control system or control
surface stops.
(d) With the airplane yawed to the subsequent overswing sideslip
angle, the flightdeck rudder control is suddenly and fully displaced in
the opposite direction, as limited by the control system or control
surface stops.
(e) With the airplane yawed to the opposite overswing sideslip
angle, the flightdeck rudder control is suddenly returned to neutral.
Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f), and
44701(a) in Washington, DC, on or about November 16, 2022.
Billy Nolen,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2022-25291 Filed 11-21-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
