Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Indian Point Energy Center, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, 68747-68752 [2022-24877]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 220 (Wednesday, November 16, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 68747-68752]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-24877]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 72-1014, 72-51, 50-247 and 50-286; NRC-2022-0152]


Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Indian Point Energy 
Center, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an 
exemption in response to a request submitted by Holtec Decommissioning 
International, LLC (HDI), on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC and 
Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC on March 24, 2022. This exemption would, if 
granted, permit HDI to load up to three MPC-32Ms, using Amendment No. 
15 of the Holtec International Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1014 
for the HI-STORM 100 storage system, with either up to 32 fuel 
assemblies each containing either a Californium-252 (Cf-252) or an 
Antimony-Beryllium (Sb-Be) neutron source assemblies (NSA) with 
sufficient cooling time, or a combination of up to five Plutonium-
Beryllium (Pu-Be) NSAs and up to all of the remaining basket locations 
with fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA 
with sufficient cooling time. Further, it would permit HDI to load the 
fuel assemblies containing either Cf-252 or Sb-Be NSAs in any location 
in the basket and the fuel assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs such that 
one is located in the center of the basket and no more than one NSA is 
located in each of the four basket quadrants.

DATES: The exemption was issued on November 7, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2022-0152 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0152. Address 
questions about Docket IDs to Stacy Schumann; telephone: 301-415-0624; 
email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact the 
individual listed in the For Further Information Contact section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader, 
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are 
provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White 
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make 
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
[email protected]

[[Page 68748]]

or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. 
Eastern Time (ET), Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chris Allen, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6877; email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), holds a general 
license for the Indian Point Energy Center Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installation (ISFSI) under provisions in part 72 of title 10 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Licensing Requirements for 
the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive 
Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste.'' Under 10 CFR 
72.212(a)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5)(i), (b)(11) and 72.214, a general licensee 
may store spent fuel in a cask, so long as it is one of the approved 
casks listed in 10 CFR 72.214 and the general licensee conforms to the 
terms, conditions, and specifications of the relevant certificate of 
compliance (CoC) or amended CoC. HDI has stated that it plans to use 
the HI-STORM 100 dry storage system, CoC No. 1014, Amendment No. 15 in 
an upcoming spent fuel loading campaign.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated March 24, 2022, as supplemented on June 17, 2022, 
HDI, on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC and Holtec Indian Point 3, 
LLC, requested an exemption under 10 CFR 72.7. HDI further clarified 
its request during a Microsoft Teams call on September 20, 2022. HDI 
specifically requested an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
72.212(b)(3), and the portion of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(11) that states 
``[t]he licensee shall comply with the terms, conditions, and 
specifications of the certificate of compliance (CoC).'' The exemption 
request would permit, if granted, HDI to load up to three MPC-32Ms, 
using Amendment No. 15 of the Holtec International Certificate of 
Compliance (CoC) No. 1014 for the HI-STORM 100 storage system, with 
either up to 32 fuel assemblies each containing either a Californium-
252 (Cf-252) or an Antimony-Beryllium (Sb-Be) NSA with sufficient 
cooling time, or a combination of up to five fuel assemblies each 
containing a Plutonium-Beryllium (Pu-Be) NSA and up to all of the 
remaining basket locations with fuel assemblies each containing either 
a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA with sufficient cooling time. Further, as 
discussed later, it would permit HDI to load the fuel assemblies 
containing either Cf-252 and Sb-Be NSAs in any location in the basket 
and the fuel assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs such that one is located 
in the center of the basket and no more than one is located in each of 
the four basket quadrants. Additionally, although HDI's analysis 
included information about polonium beryllium (Po-Be) NSAs, based on 
its September 20, 2022, Microsoft Teams call, HDI indicated that they 
only wanted to load Cf-252 and Sb-Be NSAs.
    Although HDI only requested exemptions from 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3) and 
(b)(11), to carry out this action, the NRC would also need to grant 
exemptions from 72.212(a)(2), (b)(5)(i), and 72.214. Consequently, in 
evaluating the request, the NRC also considered, pursuant to its 
authority in 10 CFR 72.7, exempting HDI from similar requirements in 10 
CFR 72.212(a)(2), 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5)(i); and 10 CFR 72.214, ``List of 
Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks.'' For clarity, when this Federal 
Register notice refers to HDI's requested exemption, it means both the 
two provisions from which HDI requested exemption and the additional 
provisions from which the NRC staff is considering exempting HDI on its 
own initiative.

III. Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions 
from the requirements of the regulations of 10 CFR part 72 as it 
determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property 
or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public 
interest.
    The NRC staff prepared a safety evaluation report to document its 
safety evaluation of the requested exemption. As summarized in this 
document, the NRC's safety review concluded that the requested 
exemption meets the requirements for issuance in 10 CFR 72.7.

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The Commission has the legal authority to issue exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 72 as provided in 10 CFR 72.7. Issuance of 
this exemption is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended, and is not otherwise inconsistent with NRC's regulations or 
other applicable laws. Therefore, issuance of the exemption is 
authorized by law.

B. Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common Defense and 
Security

    The staff reviewed HDI's exemption request and concludes, as 
discussed further, that the proposed exemption from certain 
requirements of 10 CFR part 72 will not cause the HI-STORM 100 storage 
cask to encounter conditions beyond those for which it has already been 
evaluated and demonstrated to meet the applicable safety requirements 
in 10 CFR part 72. The staff followed the guidance in NUREG-2215, 
``Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and 
Facilities,'' April 2020, to complete its safety evaluation.
Safety Review of the Requested Exemption
    HDI submitted an exemption request to deviate from the requirement 
in CoC No. 1014, Appendix D, table 2.1-1, section V, ``MPC MODEL: MPC-
32M,'' Item C of Amendment No. 15 for CoC No. 1014 only permits general 
licensees to load a single NSA per cask. Further, per Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR) table 2.II.1.1, Rev. 22, the single NSA must be 
located in a cell in the inner part of the basket (i.e., fuel storage 
location 13, 14, 19, or 20). The staff reviewed the exemption request 
and concluded that the proposed exemption from certain requirements of 
10 CFR part 72 will not cause the HI-STORM 100 storage system to 
encounter conditions beyond those for which it has been evaluated and 
demonstrated to meet the applicable safety requirements in 10 CFR part 
72.
    The staff determined that the presence of additional NSAs or the 
presence of those NSAs in different locations throughout the basket 
will not cause the bounding canister weight previously evaluated in 
approving Amendment No. 15 to be exceeded, making a structural 
evaluation unnecessary. Further, the staff determined that the decay 
heat contribution from activated metal associated with the NSAs at 
issue in the specified locations is negligible compared to the decay 
heat from the fuel assembly.
    Consequently, the staff determined that a thermal evaluation is 
unwarranted. Since the NSAs are located inside the confinement boundary 
of the multi-purpose canister (MPC) and changing the number of NSAs, or 
their locations, will not change that fact, a confinement evaluation is 
also not necessary. In addition, increasing the neutron source terms by 
adding NSAs in different locations does not increase the multiplication 
factor. Therefore, criticality safety is not affected, and a 
criticality evaluation is

[[Page 68749]]

unnecessary. Therefore, shielding is the only area potentially affected 
by the requested exemption.
Shielding
    The current CoC authorizes general licensees to load only a single 
fuel assembly containing an NSA per cask, and that fuel assembly must 
be loaded in a cell within the inner part of the basket (i.e., fuel 
storage location 13, 14, 19, or 20) because NSAs can have a significant 
neutron source term. The applicant developed a quantitative analysis 
that explicitly evaluated the neutron dose rates associated with 
storing more than one fuel assembly containing an NSA per cask to 
support new loading requirements. In its analysis, the applicant 
evaluated two possible high-level loading scenarios: a maximum of 32 
fuel assemblies each containing an NSA and a maximum of five fuel 
assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA.
    For both scenarios, the applicant considered three primary NSA 
types in its evaluation: Cf-252, Pu-Be, and Po-Be. During the September 
20, 2020, Microsoft Teams call, HDI indicated that they only wanted to 
load Cf-252 and Sb-Be NSAs. Consequently, the staff did not consider 
Po-Be NSAs in its evaluation of this exemption. Cf-252 and Pu-Be NSAs 
have half-lives of 2.646 years and 87.7 years, respectively. The 
applicant also considered a secondary NSA type, Sb-Be, with a half-life 
of 60.2 days. For Cf-252, which decays by neutron emission, the 
analysis identified that the neutron source strength will reduce 
gradually over time because the half-life is on the order of a few 
years; neither long enough for the source strength to remain relatively 
constant, nor short enough for the reduction to be quick. For Pu-Be, 
which generates neutrons when the beryllium absorbs an alpha particle 
emitted by the plutonium, the analysis identified that the neutron 
source strength will remain essentially the same as when the NSA was 
manufactured (i.e., it will not reduce significantly over time) because 
the half-life for plutonium is very long. For Sb-Be, which produces 
neutrons when the beryllium interacts with a high energy gamma emitted 
by activated antimony (i.e., antimony that has absorbed neutrons), the 
analysis identified that the neutron source strength will reduce very 
quickly over time because of the short half-life of the activated 
antimony.
    In evaluating the scenario of loading a maximum of 32 fuel 
assemblies containing NSAs, the applicant determined, using the initial 
source strength and the half-life values in the previous paragraph, 
that after seven half-lives the neutron source strength of a fuel 
assembly containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA is negligibly 
higher than the neutron source strength of a design basis fuel 
assembly. Therefore, the applicant asserted that, after seven half-
lives, the presence of either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA within a design 
basis fuel assembly will not significantly increase the dose rate from 
a design basis fuel assembly. Consequently, the applicant concluded 
that up to 32 fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-
Be NSA can be loaded per basket, and that they can be loaded into any 
basket location.
    Staff reviewed the applicant's approach. In reviewing this 
approach, staff found that the applicant could load up to 32 fuel 
assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA--with those 
32 fuel assemblies having any combination of Cf-252 and Sb-Be NSAs--and 
that the neutron source strength of each fuel assembly with either a 
Cf-252 NSA or an Sb-Be NSA increased by only a small amount, 
approximately 2 x 10-6 neutrons per second, after seven 
half-lives relative to a design basis fuel assembly. Because this 
increase is so small, after seven half-lives, the dose rate of a 
canister containing 32 fuel assemblies with either Cf-252 or Sb-Be NSAs 
that have undergone seven half-lives of decay will be very similar to 
the dose rate of a container containing 32 design basis fuel 
assemblies. More specifically, accounting for statistical 
uncertainties, dose rates would potentially increase a millirem/hr or 
less, if at all, under both normal and accident conditions. The NRC 
staff considers dose rate increases of this magnitude to be negligible 
relative to the dose rates from design basis fuel assemblies. 
Therefore, the staff determined that the analysis demonstrated that 
dose rates under both normal and accident conditions would increase 
negligibly by the addition of 32 fuel assemblies containing either Cf-
252 or Sb-Be NSAs after seven half-lives of decay time. Further, 
because a canister loaded with 32 fuel assemblies each containing 
either a Cf-252 or Sb-Be NSA would have an NSA loaded in every fuel 
loading location and because the effect on dose would be negligible, 
the NRC staff concludes that loading fuel assemblies containing either 
a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA in any location in the basket would have a 
negligible effect on dose.
    In evaluating loading a maximum of five fuel assemblies each 
containing a Pu-Be NSA the applicant performed dose rate calculations 
assuming each NSA had the design basis fuel assembly neutron source 
term in HI-STORM 100 FSAR table 5.2.15 rather than the actual source 
strength of an NSA. The applicant evaluated dose rates using the 
general-purpose, continuous-energy, generalized-geometry, time-
dependent Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code. The applicant used MCNP5 
version 1.41 to model the MPC-32M, with up to five NSAs per basket, in 
both the HI-TRAC Version MS and the HI-STORM 100S Version E overpack. 
The MCNP model located one NSA in the center of the MPC-32M (i.e., cell 
locations 13, 14, 19 and 20 of appendix D, figure 2.1-1). In addition, 
the model located the remaining four NSAs on the basket periphery with 
one NSA in each basket quadrant.
    The applicant calculated the maximum dose rate from the NSAs in the 
fuel assembly and not the maximum total dose rate from the fuel 
assembly and the NSA. The applicant asserted that this approach would 
result in conservative dose rates because the maximum dose rate due to 
the design basis fuel assembly may be in a different location (e.g., 
the midplane of the overpack radial surface) from the maximum dose rate 
due to the NSAs. The applicant calculated dose rates at the same 
surface and one-meter locations for design basis fuel under normal 
conditions as reported in HI-STORM 100 FSAR tables 5.II.1.1 and 
5.II.1.3. Additionally, the applicant evaluated the dose rate at 100 
meters for design basis fuel in the HI-TRAC under accident conditions 
at the same locations as reported in HI-STORM 100 FSAR table 5.II.1.4. 
The analysis determined the maximum dose rate increase under normal 
conditions due to adding four fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be 
NSA, in addition to the fuel assembly containing an NSA authorized by 
CoC No. 1014, at the following locations: the overpack surface, one 
meter from the overpack surface, the HI-TRAC surface, and one meter 
from the HI-TRAC surface. The analysis calculated the following dose 
rate increases at these locations: 3.44 millirem per hour (mrem/hr), 
0.78 mrem/hr, 1099.92 mrem/hr and 122.69 mrem/hr respectively. Finally, 
the analysis determined the maximum dose rate increase under accident 
conditions due to adding four NSAs, in addition to the NSA authorized 
by CoC No. 1014, at 100 meters from the HI-TRAC is 0.27 mrem/hr.
    In conducting its evaluation, the applicant assumed the Pu-Be NSA 
source strength equaled the design basis fuel assembly source strength 
of 1.4 x 10\9\ neutrons per second. The staff

[[Page 68750]]

determined that this approach is conservative because the initial 
source term of a Pu-Be NSA is approximately 1.5 x 10\6\ neutrons per 
second which is less than the value HDI used. Because the MCNP code is 
a standard tool in the nuclear industry for performing Monte Carlo 
criticality safety and radiation shielding calculations, the staff 
found MCNP an acceptable code for this application. Because the 
exemption request is limited to fuel stored in an MPC-32M, which can 
only be stored in the HI-STORM 100S Version E overpack, and because the 
HI-TRAC MS can only be used with the HI-STORM 100S Version E overpack, 
staff found it acceptable to limit the MCNP analyses to the HI-TRAC MS 
and the HI-STORM 100S Version E overpack. In addition, the applicant 
calculated the dose rates related to this exemption at the same 
locations at which it calculated the dose rates for HI-STORM Amendment 
No. 15. In issuing Amendment No. 15, staff determined the dose rates at 
these locations satisfied as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) 
principles, where relevant, and demonstrated compliance with 10 CFR 
72.104 and 10 CFR 72.106, as well as 10 CFR part 20, as documented in 
Section 6 of the SER staff prepared to support issuance of Amendment 
No. 15. Nothing about this exemption would affect, or in any way make 
inapplicable, the staff's previous finding that calculating the dose 
rate at those locations is acceptable. Therefore, staff finds these 
locations are appropriate for calculating dose rates associated with 
this exemption.
    Further, the staff reviewed the applicant's approach of only 
calculating the maximum dose rate caused by the NSAs in the fuel 
assemblies and not the overall maximum dose rate. The total dose rate 
from two different sources (i.e., the design basis fuel assembly and 
the NSA) is simply the sum of the individual dose rates. Consequently, 
by taking the dose rate caused by design basis fuel assemblies in the 
canister, which are found in FSAR tables 5.II.1.1, 5.II.1.3 and 
5.II.1.4 and adding them to the dose rate caused by the NSAs within 
fuel assemblies, the staff was able to evaluate the overall maximum 
dose rate as part of its review. Therefore, the staff also found 
acceptable the applicant's approach of only calculating the maximum 
dose rate due to fuel assemblies containing NSAs.
    When the staff approved the MPC-32M, the HI-TRAC MS and the HI-
STORM 100S Version E overpack, the staff identified two accident 
conditions that increased the dose at the controlled area boundary: (1) 
the draining of the neutron shield water jacket for the transfer cask 
and (2) a non-mechanistic tipover of the overpack which exposes the 
bottom of the cask. As discussed in the SER approving the HI-STORM 100S 
Version E overpack, staff found it very unlikely that the Version E 
overpack would tip over. Nothing about this exemption would affect that 
conclusion. Therefore, the staff found the applicant's approach of 
modeling the HI-TRAC with the assumed loss of the neutron absorber as 
the bounding accident acceptable for this evaluation.
    NRC staff concluded that the increased dose rates under normal 
conditions from the presence of up to five fuel assemblies containing 
Pu-Be NSAs are acceptable for the HI-STORM overpack because the dose 
rate increase is less than a mrem/hr for all locations except at the 
midplane of the radial surface on the overpack surface where it 
increased by less than four mrem/hr. Relative to the dose rates from 
loading the canister as already-approved, staff considers dose rate 
increases of this magnitude negligible. Additionally, the dose rate 
increases at a distance of one meter are even less than the dose rate 
increases at the surface. Thus, relative to the dose rates from loading 
the canister as already approved, the staff also considers these dose 
rate increases to be negligible. Further, the HI-TRAC MS dose rates 
increased by less than ten percent compared to the dose rates in HI-
STORM 100 FSAR table 5.II.1.3 at all locations both on the HI-TRAC MS 
surface and one meter from the HI-TRAC MS surface except at the HI-TRAC 
MS radial surface midplane where the dose rate increased by 28 percent 
(i.e., 1099.92 mrem/hr). Staff considers the dose rate increase at the 
HI-TRAC MS radial surface midplane a very localized effect due to the 
reduced neutron shielding capability of the HI-TRAC MS compared to the 
HI-STORM 100S Version E overpack. The staff considers the HI-TRAC MS 
dose rate increases, including the increase at the radial surface 
midplane, acceptable for the following reasons. First, radiological 
workers would only be exposed to these increased dose rates for 
relatively short periods of time. Second, members of the public will be 
exposed to even lower dose rates since 10 CFR 72.106(b) requires a 
minimum distance of 100 meters between spent fuel and members of the 
public and dose rates decrease as distance increases. NRC staff also 
determined that an increase in the HI-TRAC dose rates of less than ten 
percent compared to the dose rates in HI-STORM 100 FSAR table 5.II.1.4 
for the HI-TRAC MS accident condition dose rates due to the presence of 
up to five fuel assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs is acceptable because 
staff confirmed through hand calculations that the dose at 100 meters 
meets the 10 CFR 72.106 requirement assuming a 30-day duration. 
Finally, after adding the dose rates considered when issuing CoC 1014, 
Amendment No. 15 to the dose rate increases that would result from 
approving this exemption, staff finds that canisters loaded in 
accordance with this exemption will continue to satisfy overall dose 
limits of 10 CFR 72.104 for normal conditions, 10 CFR 72.106 for 
accident conditions, and the limits in 10 CFR part 20. These 
conclusions only apply, however, when the fuel assemblies containing 
the Pu-Be NSAs are loaded such that one is located in the center of the 
basket (i.e., fuel storage location 13, 14, 19, or 20) and no more than 
one is located in each of the four basket quadrants.
    As referenced earlier, if granted, this exemption would permit HDI 
to load a fuel canister with up to five fuel assemblies each containing 
a Pu-Be NSA and up to all of the remaining basket locations with fuel 
assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA that has 
decayed for at least seven half-lives. HDI did not provide an analysis 
of this specific configuration. That said, as discussed previously, 
staff has already analyzed a canister loaded with five fuel assemblies 
each containing a Pu-Be NSA and a canister loaded with 32 fuel 
assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA that has 
decayed for at least seven half-lives. Staff concluded that the neutron 
source strength of a fuel assembly with either a Cf-252 NSA or an Sb-Be 
NSA increased by only a small amount--approximately 2 x 10-6 
neutrons per second--after seven half-lives relative to a design basis 
fuel assembly. As discussed before, the staff concluded that that 
source strength increase was so small that the neutron dose rate 
increase, if any, associated with loading a canister with 32 fuel 
assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA would be 
negligible. As the dose rate increase from loading a canister with 32 
fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA would 
be negligible, it follows that adding 27 fuel assemblies each 
containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA that has undergone seven 
half-lives of decay, will have a similarly negligible effect on dose 
rate because the increase in neutron source strength will be even 
smaller than when loading 32 such fuel assemblies. Consequently, 
loading 27

[[Page 68751]]

fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA that 
has undergone seven half-lives of decay into a canister with five fuel 
assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA will negligibly increase the 
neutron dose rate, if at all, beyond the neutron dose rate associated 
with loading just five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA. 
Therefore, the staff determined that under this loading scenario--up to 
five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA and up to 27 fuel 
assemblies, each containing a Cf-252 of Sb-Be NSA--the dose rates under 
both normal and accident conditions will continue to satisfy overall 
dose limits of 10 CFR 72.104 for normal conditions, 10 CFR 72.106 for 
accident conditions, and the limits in 10 CFR part 20. Finally, the 
staff determined that this loading scenario, along with the scenario of 
loading 32 fuel assemblies each containing a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA 
bound all loading scenarios that this exemption, if granted, would 
permit because the other loading scenarios will be a version of these 
two scenarios with fewer fuel assemblies containing NSAs and, 
therefore, less dose.
    As a final note, the staff's analysis of a canister loaded with 
five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be NSA depends on HDI's dose 
rate analysis. As discussed previously, that analysis was based on a 
model with one NSA in the center of the MPC-32M (i.e., cell locations 
13, 14, 19 and 20 of appendix D, figure 2.1-1) and the remaining four 
NSAs on the basket periphery with one NSA in each basket quadrant.
    Consequently, the staff's analysis of and conclusions about this 
loading scenario--up to five fuel assemblies each containing a Pu-Be 
NSA and up to 27 fuel assemblies, each containing a Cf-252 of Sb-Be 
NSA--only apply when the fuel assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs are 
loaded with one in the center of the basket and a maximum of one in 
each of the remaining quadrants.
    Although the exemption request did not explicitly evaluate the 
gamma dose associated with storing more than one NSA, the applicant 
asserted that the additional gamma dose due to activation of the NSA 
components will remain within the limits of 10 CFR 72.104 for normal 
conditions and 10 CFR 72.106 for accident conditions. In evaluating 
this assertion, staff reviewed HI-STORM 100 FSAR sections 5.2.7.1 
submitted with Amendment No. 15 in which Holtec International stated 
that the total Burnable Poison Rod Assembly (BPRA) activation source 
term bounded the total NSA activation source term. In approving 
Amendment No. 15, in SER section 6.2.2.3, the staff found the use of 
the BPRA source term to represent all non-fuel hardware--including Pu-
Be, Cf-252, and Sb-Be NSAs--acceptable. Further, the SER approving 
Amendment No. 15 determined that a canister loaded with 32 fuel 
assemblies containing BPRAs would remain within the limits of 10 CFR 
72.104 for normal conditions and 10 CFR 72.106 for accident conditions. 
Because the staff found that the BPRA activation source term bounded 
the NSA activation source term in approving Amendment No. 15, and 
because this exemption does not change or affect that determination, 
the staff determined, for this exemption request, that the gamma source 
term associated with storing either five fuel assemblies each 
containing a Pu-Be NSA and up to 27 fuel assemblies each containing 
either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA or 32 fuel assemblies each containing 
either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA in an MPC-32M canister is bounded by 
the dose rates evaluated in Amendment No. 15. Therefore, because the 
dose rates evaluated in Amendment No. 15 met the applicable regulatory 
requirements, the staff finds that the dose due to activation of NSA 
components will remain within the limits of 10 CFR 72.104 for normal 
conditions, 10 CFR 72.106 for accident conditions, and the limits in 10 
CFR part 20.
    Finally, the staff reviewed the application from the perspective of 
dose rates remaining ALARA. Staff determined that the proposed 
exemption did not alter those aspects of the HI-STORM 100 system that 
the SER issued with CoC No. 1014 Amendment No. 15 had indicated 
contributed to a finding that ALARA had been satisfied (e.g., temporary 
shielding equipment utilized during loading operations). In addition, 
as explained in section 11.1.2 of the SER issued with Amendment No. 15 
to CoC No. 1014, the staff found reasonable assurance that the design 
of the HI-TRAC MS and the operational restrictions meet ALARA 
objectives for direct radiation levels because the estimated 
occupational exposure in FSAR table 10.II.3 was below the 10 CFR 
20.1202(a) dose limit for an individual. For this exemption request, 
staff increased the estimated occupational exposure in FSAR table 
10.II.3.1 by 3.3 percent, which was the greatest increase for locations 
where most operations occurred. The revised estimated occupational 
exposure remained below the 10 CFR 20.1201(a) dose limit. Therefore, 
consistent with these previous evaluations, the staff finds that for a 
canister loaded as permitted by this exemption, the occupational doses 
would remain ALARA despite the overall increase in dose.
Review of Common Defense and Security
    HDI's exemption request is not related to any aspect of the 
physical security or defense of the Indian Point Energy Center ISFSI. 
In addition, the number of NSAs stored within a multipurpose canister 
does not affect the Indian Point Energy Center ISFSI security plans. 
Therefore, granting the exemption would not result in any potential 
impacts to common defense and security.
    As discussed earlier, the staff has evaluated the effects this 
exemption would have, if granted, on shielding for the configurations 
that exist during the different stages of storage operations including 
under both normal and accident conditions. This evaluation includes 
dose rate results which lead the staff to conclude that the HI-STORM 
100 system will meet the limits in 10 CFR part 20, the 10 CFR 72.104 
and 72.106 radiation protection requirements, and that ALARA principles 
for occupational exposure are adequately considered and incorporated 
into the HI-STORM 100 system design and operations after implementing 
the exemption. The staff reached this finding based on a review that 
considered the regulations, appropriate regulatory guides, applicable 
codes and standards, accepted engineering practices, and the statements 
and representations in the application. Based on this evaluation, the 
staff concludes that granting this exemption will not endanger life, 
property or the common defense and security.

D. Otherwise in the Public Interest

    During a June 17, 2022, Microsoft Teams call with the NRC, the 
applicant indicated that granting the requested exemption would result 
in shorter operation of the spent fuel pool cleaning system. Shorter 
operation of the cleaning system would generate less waste of which the 
licensee would ultimately need to dispose. The staff reviewed the 
information provided by HDI, and based upon the earlier stated 
information, concludes that granting the requested exemption would be 
in the public interest because it would result in the generation of 
less low-level waste.

E. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC staff also considered whether there would be any 
significant environmental impacts associated with the exemption. For 
this proposed action,

[[Page 68752]]

the NRC staff performed an environmental assessment pursuant to 10 CFR 
51.30. The environmental assessment concluded that the proposed action 
would not significantly impact the quality of the human environment. 
The NRC staff concluded that the proposed action would not result in 
any changes in the types or quantities of effluents that may be 
released offsite, and there is no significant increase in occupational 
or public radiation exposure because of the proposed action. The 
environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact was 
published on October 31, 2022 (87 FR 65613).

IV. Conclusion

    Based on the statements and representations provided by HDI in its 
exemption request, the staff concludes that the proposed action is 
authorized by law and will not endanger life, property, or the common 
defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. As a 
result, the NRC staff concludes the requested exemption meets the 
requirements in 10 CFR 72.7. Therefore, the NRC staff hereby grants 
HDI, an exemption from 10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5)(i), (b)(11), 
and 72.214, pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, permitting HDI to load up to three 
MPC-32Ms, using Amendment No. 15 for CoC No. 1014, with either up to 32 
fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an Sb-Be NSA with 
sufficient cooling time, or a combination of up to five fuel assemblies 
each containing a Pu-Be NSA and up to all of the remaining basket 
locations with fuel assemblies each containing either a Cf-252 or an 
Sb-Be NSA with sufficient cooling time. Further, it permits HDI to load 
the fuel assemblies containing either Cf-252 or Sb-Be NSAs in any 
location in the basket and the fuel assemblies containing Pu-Be NSAs 
such that one is located in the center of the basket (i.e., fuel 
storage locations 13, 14, 19, or 20) and no more than one is located in 
each of the four basket quadrants.
    The exemption is effective upon issuance.

V. Availability of Documents

    The documents identified in the following table are available to 
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as 
indicated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Document description                 ADAMS accession No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issuance of Certificate of         ML21118A862 (package).
 Compliance No. 1014, Amendment
 No. 15 for the HI-STORM 100
 Multipurpose Canister Storage
 System, dated May 13, 2021.
Indian Point Energy Center--       ML22083A191.
 Request for Exemption from an
 Allowable Contents Requirement
 Contained in the Certificate of
 Compliance No. 1014 for the HI-
 STORM 100S Version E Cask, dated
 March 24, 2022.
Indian Point Exemption             ML22172A174
 Environmental Assessment
 Conversation Record (6-16-22),
 date of contact June 16, 2022.
Neutron Source Assembly Loading    ML22264A045.
 Clarification Call, date of
 contact September 20, 2022.
Safety Evaluation Report, dated    ML22217A017.
 November 7, 2022.
HI-2002444, Revision 22, Holtec    ML21221A329.
 International Final Safety
 Analysis Report for the HI-STORM
 100 Cask System, dated July 1,
 2021.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Dated: November 9, 2022.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Yoira K. Diaz-Sanabria,
Chief, Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch, Division of Fuel 
Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2022-24877 Filed 11-15-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P