Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Administrative Debarment Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Involving Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke, 52834-52835 [2022-18504]
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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 166 / Monday, August 29, 2022 / Notices
around flood risk in the basin. The
Board also recommended that
jurisdictions in the basin review their
floodplain management policies through
the lens of making these areas more
resilient for possible future floods.
The full study board report and
recommendations can be found at
www.ijc.org/lcrr.
The International Joint Commission
was established under the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 to help the United
States and Canada prevent and resolve
disputes over the use of the waters the
two countries share. The Commission’s
responsibilities include investigating
and reporting on issues of concern when
asked by the governments of the two
countries. For more information, visit
the IJC website at ijc.org.
Susan E. Daniel,
Secretary, U.S. Section, International Joint
Commission, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2022–18503 Filed 8–26–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710–14–P
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Public Notice: 11842]
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs;
Administrative Debarment Under the
International Traffic in Arms
Regulations Involving Ryan Adams,
Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke
ACTION:
Notice.
Notice is hereby given that
the Department of State has imposed
administrative debarment under the
International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) on Ryan Adams,
Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke.
DATES: Debarment imposed as of August
29, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jae
E. Shin, Director, Office of Defense
Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, Department of
State (202) 632–2107.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
127.7(c)(2) of the ITAR authorizes the
Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticalMilitary Affairs to debar any person
who has been found pursuant to part
128 of the ITAR to have committed a
violation of the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) or when such violation is of
such character as to provide a
reasonable basis for the Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls to believe that
the violator cannot be relied upon to
comply with the AECA or ITAR in the
future. Such debarment prohibits the
subject from participating directly or
indirectly in the export of defense
articles or defense services for which a
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SUMMARY:
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17:01 Aug 26, 2022
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license or other approval is required by
the ITAR.
Debarred persons are generally
ineligible to participate in activity
regulated under the ITAR (see, e.g.,
§ 120.1(c) and (d), § 126.7, § 127.1(c),
and § 127.11(a)). The Department of
State will not consider applications for
licenses or requests for approvals that
involve any debarred person.
Between January 2016 and November
2019, Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and
Daniel Gericke (‘‘Respondents’’) were
employed by DarkMatter Group
(DarkMatter), a privately held
technology and cyber services company
headquartered and organized in the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) that
furnished cyber services to the UAE
government. Prior to working at
DarkMatter, a foreign corporation
registered in the UAE, Respondents
were employed by CyberPoint
International LLC (CyberPoint) a U.S.based company that furnished cyber
services to the UAE government
pursuant to ITAR licenses or other
approvals, including technical
assistance agreements. CyberPoint and
DarkMatter were competitors, and in
late 2015 and early 2016, the UAE
government transitioned its contracts for
cyber services from CyberPoint to
DarkMatter. During this time period,
DarkMatter hired certain U.S.-person
former managers of CyberPoint,
including Respondents.
Respondents possessed computer
network exploitation (CNE) expertise
that included the development,
maintenance, deployment, and
operation of software and hardware
designed to obtain unauthorized access
to electronic devices and accounts.
Respondents used their CNE expertise
to provide and support CNE services to
persons and entities in the UAE and the
UAE government on behalf of
DarkMatter.
Among their other activities,
Respondents created certain zero-click
computer hacking and intelligence
gathering systems that Respondents
specially designed, developed,
maintained, and operated to allow its
users access to tens of millions of
devices for the UAE government’s
intelligence purposes. The services
Respondents performed in connection
with the relevant systems constituted
furnishing defense services under U.S.
Munitions List (USML) Category XI(d)
because: (a) the relevant systems were
electronic systems, equipment, or
software that were specially designed
for intelligence purposes that collect,
survey, monitor, exploit, analyze, or
produce information from the
electromagnetic spectrum as described
PO 00000
Frm 00098
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
in USML Category XI(b); and (b)
Respondents assisted foreign persons in
the use, design, development,
engineering, production, modification,
testing, maintenance, processing, or
operation of the relevant systems.
Respondents did not have a license or
other approval to furnish such ITARcontrolled defense services.
As a result of these violations, on July
7, 2022 (Adams and Baier) and August
5, 2022 (Gericke), the Department of
State and Respondents entered into
Consent Agreements that
administratively debarred Respondents
until July 7, 2025 and August 5, 2025,
respectively, and pursuant to order of
the Assistant Secretary for PoliticalMilitary Affairs they are
administratively debarred.
Reinstatement after July 7, 2025 and
August 5, 2025 is not automatic but
contingent on full compliance with the
terms of the July 7, 2022 and August 5,
2022, Consent Agreements and evidence
that the underlying problems that gave
rise to the violations have been
corrected. At the end of the debarment
period, Respondents may apply for
reinstatement. Until licensing privileges
are reinstated, Respondents will remain
administratively debarred.
This notice is provided to make the
public aware that the persons listed
above are prohibited from participating
directly or indirectly in any brokering
activities and in any export from or
temporary import into the United States
of defense articles, related technical
data, or defense services in all situations
covered by the ITAR.
Exceptions may be made to this
denial policy on a case-by-case basis at
the discretion of the Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls. However, such
an exception would be granted only
after a full review of all circumstances,
paying particular attention to the
following factors: whether an exception
is warranted by overriding U.S. foreign
policy or national security interests;
whether an exception would further law
enforcement concerns that are
consistent with foreign policy or
national security interests of the United
States; or whether other compelling
circumstances exist that are consistent
with the foreign policy or national
security interests of the United States,
and law enforcement concerns.
This notice involves a foreign affairs
function of the United States
encompassed within the meaning of the
military and foreign affairs exclusion of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
Because the exercise of this foreign
affairs function is highly discretionary,
E:\FR\FM\29AUN1.SGM
29AUN1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 166 / Monday, August 29, 2022 / Notices
it is excluded from review under the
Administrative Procedure Act.
Kevin E. Bryant,
Acting Director, Office of Directives
Management, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2022–18504 Filed 8–26–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710–25–P
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
[Docket No. FD 36622 (Sub-No. 1)]
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Evansville Western Railway, Inc.—
Temporary Trackage Rights
Exemption—Illinois Central Railroad
Company
On August 16, 2022, the Evansville
Western Railway, Inc. (EVWR), filed a
request under 49 CFR 1180.2(d)(8) for
an additional extension of the
temporary overhead trackage rights
previously granted in this docket over
an approximately 11.7-mile rail line
owned by Illinois Central Railroad
Company, between Sugar Camp, Ill., at
milepost 61.9, and Dial, Ill., at milepost
73.6 (the Line).
EVWR was authorized to acquire
these trackage rights over the Line by
notice of exemption served in Docket
No. FD 36622 on June 8, 2022, and
published in the Federal Register on
June 13, 2022 (87 FR 35,846). These
trackage rights were extended in a
decision served in this subdocket on
July 15, 2022, and published in the
Federal Register on July 20, 2022 (87 FR
43,369). The purpose of the trackage
rights is to allow EVWR to load unit
coal trains at the Pond Creek Mine near
Dial until EVWR’s service at the Sugar
Camp Mine can be restored following
the mine’s closure due to a mine fire
and the unrelated relocation of long
wall mining equipment. The rights were
scheduled to expire on the earlier of (i)
August 15, 2022, or (ii) the re-opening
of the Sugar Camp Mine ‘‘with sufficient
production to fulfill the required
requested loadings of unit trains of
coal.’’ Evansville W. Ry.—Temporary
Trackage Rights Exemption—Ill. Cent.
R.R., FD 36622 (Sub-No. 1), slip op. at
2 (STB served July 15, 2022). EVWR
now seeks to further extend the
temporary trackage rights until the
earlier of (i) August 31, 2022, or (ii) the
reopening of the Sugar Camp Mine
‘‘with sufficient production to fulfill the
required requested loadings of unit
trains of coal.’’ (August 16 Pleading 4.)
Under 49 CFR 1180.2(d)(8), the
parties may, prior to the expiration of
the relevant period, file a request for a
renewal of the temporary rights for an
additional period of up to one year,
including the reasons for the extension.
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17:01 Aug 26, 2022
Jkt 256001
Otherwise, no authorization from the
Board is necessary for carriers to
discontinue temporary trackage rights as
of the specified expiration date. EVWR
states that the Sugar Camp Mine is
expected to remain inoperable for
several more weeks and that an
extension of the temporary trackage
rights will allow it to continue service
to its shippers by loading unit coal
trains at the Pond Creek Mine until
EVWR’s service at the Sugar Camp Mine
can be restored. EVWR filed a copy of
an executed amendment to the
temporary trackage rights agreement
with its request for an extension.
EVWR did not request the extension
before the rights expired on August 15.
However, given the short period
between expiration of the rights and the
request for renewal, the emergency
nature of the trackage rights given the
fire at the Sugar Camp Mine, and the
need to minimize any interruption of
rail service, the Board finds good cause
to waive the provisions of 49 CFR
1180.2(d)(8) to the extent that they
would prohibit an extension of the
temporary trackage rights here, and to
permit EVWR to seek an extension after
the brief expiration of the temporary
trackage rights here.
Should EVWR require a further
extension, EVWR should make every
effort to account for the full period
EVWR anticipates will be needed for the
Sugar Camp Mine to reopen, so that still
further requests will not be necessary. In
addition, in light of the Board’s
regulations, and to ensure continued
service without interruption, EVWR is
reminded to submit any further
extension request before expiration of
the temporary trackage rights granted
here to allow for the Board’s timely
consideration of the request.
In accordance with 49 CFR
1180.2(d)(8), EVWR’s temporary
trackage rights over the Line will be
extended and will expire on or before
August 31, 2022, as explained above.
The employee protective conditions
imposed in the June 8, 2022 notice
remain in effect. Notice of the extension
will be published in the Federal
Register.
It is ordered:
1. EVWR’s temporary overhead
trackage rights are extended and will
expire on the earlier of (i) August 31,
2022, or (ii) the reopening of the Sugar
Camp Mine with sufficient production
to fulfill the required requested loadings
of unit trains of coal.
2. The provisions of 49 CFR
1180.2(d)(8) are waived to the extent
that they would prohibit an extension of
the temporary trackage rights here.
PO 00000
Frm 00099
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
52835
3. Notice will be published in the
Federal Register.
4. This decision is effective on its
service date.
Decided: August 23, 2022.
By the Board, Board Members Fuchs,
Hedlund, Oberman, Primus, and Schultz.
Tammy Lowery,
Clearance Clerk.
[FR Doc. 2022–18505 Filed 8–26–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915–01–P
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
[Docket Number USTR–2022–0012]
Request for Written Comments
Concerning China’s Compliance With
WTO Commitments
Office of the United States
Trade Representative.
ACTION: Request for written comments.
AGENCY:
The interagency Trade Policy
Staff Committee (TPSC) invites
interested persons to submit written
comments to assist the Office of the
United States Trade Representative
(USTR) in the preparation of its annual
report to the Congress on China’s
compliance with the commitments
made in connection with its accession
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Due to the COVID–19 situation, the
TPSC will foster public participation via
written questions and written responses
relating to the written comments
received by the TPSC rather than an inperson hearing. This notice includes the
schedule for submission of comments,
questions and responses.
DATES:
September 28, 2022 at 11:59 p.m.
EDT: Deadline for submission of written
comments.
October 12, 2022 at 11:59 p.m. EDT:
Deadline for the TPSC to pose written
questions on written comments.
October 26, 2022 at 11:59 p.m. EDT:
Deadline for submission of commenters’
responses to written questions from the
TPSC.
ADDRESSES: USTR strongly prefers
electronic submissions made through
the Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. (Regulations.gov)
The instructions for submitting written
submissions are in sections III and IV
below. The docket number is USTR–
2022–0012. For alternatives to online
submissions, contact Spencer Smith at
Spencer.L.Smith2@ustr.eop.gov or (202)
395–2974 before transmitting a
submission and in advance of the
relevant deadline.
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\29AUN1.SGM
29AUN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 166 (Monday, August 29, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52834-52835]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-18504]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Public Notice: 11842]
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Administrative Debarment
Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Involving Ryan
Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Department of State has
imposed administrative debarment under the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) on Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke.
DATES: Debarment imposed as of August 29, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jae E. Shin, Director, Office of
Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, Department of State (202) 632-2107.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 127.7(c)(2) of the ITAR authorizes
the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs to
debar any person who has been found pursuant to part 128 of the ITAR to
have committed a violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) or
when such violation is of such character as to provide a reasonable
basis for the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to believe that the
violator cannot be relied upon to comply with the AECA or ITAR in the
future. Such debarment prohibits the subject from participating
directly or indirectly in the export of defense articles or defense
services for which a license or other approval is required by the ITAR.
Debarred persons are generally ineligible to participate in
activity regulated under the ITAR (see, e.g., Sec. 120.1(c) and (d),
Sec. 126.7, Sec. 127.1(c), and Sec. 127.11(a)). The Department of
State will not consider applications for licenses or requests for
approvals that involve any debarred person.
Between January 2016 and November 2019, Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and
Daniel Gericke (``Respondents'') were employed by DarkMatter Group
(DarkMatter), a privately held technology and cyber services company
headquartered and organized in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that
furnished cyber services to the UAE government. Prior to working at
DarkMatter, a foreign corporation registered in the UAE, Respondents
were employed by CyberPoint International LLC (CyberPoint) a U.S.-based
company that furnished cyber services to the UAE government pursuant to
ITAR licenses or other approvals, including technical assistance
agreements. CyberPoint and DarkMatter were competitors, and in late
2015 and early 2016, the UAE government transitioned its contracts for
cyber services from CyberPoint to DarkMatter. During this time period,
DarkMatter hired certain U.S.-person former managers of CyberPoint,
including Respondents.
Respondents possessed computer network exploitation (CNE) expertise
that included the development, maintenance, deployment, and operation
of software and hardware designed to obtain unauthorized access to
electronic devices and accounts. Respondents used their CNE expertise
to provide and support CNE services to persons and entities in the UAE
and the UAE government on behalf of DarkMatter.
Among their other activities, Respondents created certain zero-
click computer hacking and intelligence gathering systems that
Respondents specially designed, developed, maintained, and operated to
allow its users access to tens of millions of devices for the UAE
government's intelligence purposes. The services Respondents performed
in connection with the relevant systems constituted furnishing defense
services under U.S. Munitions List (USML) Category XI(d) because: (a)
the relevant systems were electronic systems, equipment, or software
that were specially designed for intelligence purposes that collect,
survey, monitor, exploit, analyze, or produce information from the
electromagnetic spectrum as described in USML Category XI(b); and (b)
Respondents assisted foreign persons in the use, design, development,
engineering, production, modification, testing, maintenance,
processing, or operation of the relevant systems. Respondents did not
have a license or other approval to furnish such ITAR-controlled
defense services.
As a result of these violations, on July 7, 2022 (Adams and Baier)
and August 5, 2022 (Gericke), the Department of State and Respondents
entered into Consent Agreements that administratively debarred
Respondents until July 7, 2025 and August 5, 2025, respectively, and
pursuant to order of the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs they are administratively debarred. Reinstatement after July 7,
2025 and August 5, 2025 is not automatic but contingent on full
compliance with the terms of the July 7, 2022 and August 5, 2022,
Consent Agreements and evidence that the underlying problems that gave
rise to the violations have been corrected. At the end of the debarment
period, Respondents may apply for reinstatement. Until licensing
privileges are reinstated, Respondents will remain administratively
debarred.
This notice is provided to make the public aware that the persons
listed above are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly
in any brokering activities and in any export from or temporary import
into the United States of defense articles, related technical data, or
defense services in all situations covered by the ITAR.
Exceptions may be made to this denial policy on a case-by-case
basis at the discretion of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
However, such an exception would be granted only after a full review of
all circumstances, paying particular attention to the following
factors: whether an exception is warranted by overriding U.S. foreign
policy or national security interests; whether an exception would
further law enforcement concerns that are consistent with foreign
policy or national security interests of the United States; or whether
other compelling circumstances exist that are consistent with the
foreign policy or national security interests of the United States, and
law enforcement concerns.
This notice involves a foreign affairs function of the United
States encompassed within the meaning of the military and foreign
affairs exclusion of the Administrative Procedure Act. Because the
exercise of this foreign affairs function is highly discretionary,
[[Page 52835]]
it is excluded from review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Kevin E. Bryant,
Acting Director, Office of Directives Management, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2022-18504 Filed 8-26-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-25-P
