TMI-2 Solutions, LLC; Three Mile Island Station, Unit No. 2, 51454-51463 [2022-18031]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 161 (Monday, August 22, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51454-51463]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-18031]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-0320; NRC-2022-0156]


TMI-2 Solutions, LLC; Three Mile Island Station, Unit No. 2

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: License amendment application; opportunity to comment, request 
a hearing, and to petition for leave to intervene; order imposing 
procedures.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
issuance of an amendment to Possession Only License (POL) No. DPR-73, 
issued to TMI-2 Solutions, LLC (TMI-2 Solutions) for Three Mile Island 
Station, Unit No. 2 (TMI-2). Pursuant to NRC regulations, TMI-2 
Solutions proposes an amendment to the POL for TMI-2. This proposed 
license amendment request (LAR), upon approval, would revise the POL 
and the associated Technical Specifications (TS) to support the 
transition of TMI-2 from Post Defueled Monitoring Storage (PDMS) to 
that of a facility undergoing decommissioning. The proposed amendment 
would revise the POL and TS to support Phase 1b and Phase 2 
decommissioning activities associated with achieving the removal of all 
debris material,\1\ its transfer to dry cask storage at an Independent 
Spent Fuel Storage Installation or to a suitable waste storage area, 
and the relocation of various requirements and the sealed sources TS to 
the TMI-2 Decommissioning Quality Assurance Plan (DQAP). For this 
amendment request, the NRC proposes to determine that it involves no 
significant hazards consideration (NSHC). Because the amendment request 
contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI), an 
order imposes procedures to obtain access to SUNSI for contention 
preparation by persons who file a hearing request or petition for leave 
to intervene.
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    \1\ Debris material is defined by the licensee as pieces of 
spent nuclear fuel, damaged core material, and high-level waste 
(collectively called, ``Debris Material'').

DATES: Submit comments by September 21, 2022. Requests for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene must be filed by October 21, 2022. Any 
potential party as defined in Section 2.4 of title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) who believes access to SUNSI is necessary 
to respond to this notice must request document access by September 1, 
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2022.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods; 
however, the NRC encourages electronic comment submission through the 
Federal rulemaking website:
     Federal rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0156. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
     Mail comments to: Office of Administration, Mail Stop: 
TWFN-7-A60M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff.
    For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting 
comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amy Snyder, Office of Nuclear Material 
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-6822, email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments

A. Obtaining Information

    Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2022-0156 when contacting the NRC 
about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain 
publicly available information related to this action by any of the 
following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0156.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select

[[Page 51455]]

``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please 
contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. For the 
convenience of the reader, instructions about obtaining materials 
referenced in this document are provided in the ``Availability of 
Documents'' section.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White 
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make 
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET), Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

B. Submitting Comments

    The NRC encourages electronic comment submission through the 
Federal rulemaking website (https://www.regulations.gov). Please 
include Docket ID NRC-2022-0156 in your comment submission.
    The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact 
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your 
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at 
https://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions 
into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to 
remove identifying or contact information.
    If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons 
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to 
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be 
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should 
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to 
remove such information before making the comment submissions available 
to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS.

II. Introduction

    The NRC is considering issuance of an amendment to POL No. DPR-73, 
issued to TMI-2 Solutions for TMI-2 located in Dauphin County, 
Pennsylvania.
    By letter dated February 19, 2021, as supplemented on May 5, 2021, 
January 7, 2022, March 23, 2022, April 7, 2022, and May 16, 2022, TMI-2 
Solutions, submitted a LAR seeking NRC review and approval of an 
amendment request to the POL and Appendix A, TS, of POL No. DPR-73 for 
TMI-2. In its application, TMI-2 Solutions states that the revised TMI-
2 POL and TS applicable during decommissioning are referred to as the 
Decommissioning TS. This amendment, if approved, would revise the POL 
and the associated TS to support the transition of TMI-2 from a PDMS 
condition to that of a facility undergoing radiological decommissioning 
using the DECON method pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7).
    The licensee proposes to eliminate those TS that are no longer 
applicable based on current plant radiological conditions and updated 
safe fuel mass limits. The licensee also proposes changes to TS 
limiting conditions for PDMS, definitions, surveillance requirements, 
and administrative controls, as well as several license conditions. 
Upon issuance, this proposed amendment will modify the 10 CFR part 50 
license and the TS to support entry into DECON. TMI-2 Solutions intends 
to complete decommissioning of TMI-2 and release the site by 2037, 
except for an area set aside, as may be required, for debris material 
storage facilities.
    TMI-2 Solutions also proposes to relocate administrative controls 
from Section 6, ``Administrative Controls,'' to the DQAP, and to 
subsequently control them in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a) pursuant 
to the criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.36 and in accordance with the 
recommendations, guidance, and purpose of NRC Administrative Letter 95-
06. TMI-2 Solutions proposes to relocate the content of these 
administrative controls into the DQAP verbatim except for TS sectional 
cross references.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the NRC will 
need to make the findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended, and NRC's regulations.
    The NRC has made a proposed determination that the LAR involves 
NSHC. Under the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' this means that operation of the facility in accordance 
with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 
50.91(a), the licensee provided an analysis of the issue of NSHC. The 
NRC staff reviewed this analysis and provided its preliminary 
evaluation of it below:
    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes would revise the TMI-2 POL and TS by deleting 
or modifying certain portions of the TS that are no longer applicable 
to TMI-2 as it transitions from PDMS to decommissioning. These changes 
are consistent with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36 for the 
contents of TS.
    Following Phase 1a of decommissioning, TMI-2 will enter Phase 1b 
and Phase 2 of decommissioning. During Phase 1b and Phase 2, major 
decommissioning activities as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 will be performed. 
Based on preliminarily evaluating the licensee's LAR, as supplemented, 
the NRC preliminarily concludes that none of the events evaluated would 
exceed the applicable limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) and that there 
are no postulated accidents that can occur at the TMI-2 facility during 
Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning that would result in the dose at 
the site boundary exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the EPA 
PAGs including such times as when the containment engineered access 
equipment hatch is open. The NRC staff has requested additional 
information (July 29, 2022) regarding the uncertainty in the licensee's 
accident analysis so that it can complete its safety review and make a 
final determination regarding NSHC.
    As part of the review of the LAR, as supplemented, the NRC staff 
preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions' conclusions that the 
deletion of TS 3/4.1, ``Containment'', does not cause a change in 
facility conditions, design function, or analysis that verifies the 
ability of System Structures and Components (SSCs) to perform a design 
function. During Phase 1b and Phase 2 of decommissioning, the Radiation 
Protection Program and associated implementing procedures will provide 
the controls necessary to manage residual contamination. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to preliminarily conclude that containment will continue 
to function as a contamination barrier. TMI-2 Solutions states in its 
February 19, 2021, application that airborne radiation monitoring will 
be provided at the engineered containment openings. Also, TMI-2 
Solutions states that procedures will be used to control routine 
containment access. Because TMI-2 Solutions commits to have engineered 
openings in containment, the reactor building breather (vent) would no 
longer provide a preferred

[[Page 51456]]

path to the atmosphere. TMI-2 Solutions states in its February 19, 
2021, application that it will not take any credit for the containment 
as a pressure containing boundary and therefore unfiltered leak rate 
testing of the containment is no longer applicable.
    Also, in its May 16, 2022, supplement, TMI-2 Solutions states that 
the basic changes in the reactor building in going from PDMS to DECON 
are removal of the Equipment Hatch, squaring off of the hole left from 
equipment hatch removal, and installation of a barrier at the interface 
between the reactor building and the outside structure. Further, TMI-2 
Solutions states in its May 16, 2022, supplement that credit is being 
taken for the reactor building as a passive radiological barrier to the 
extent that the door between the reactor building and the outside 
structure would only be open for the period of time necessary to allow 
passage of material or personnel between the two structures. TMI-2 
Solutions states in its May 16, 2022, supplement that during DECON, 
other openings may be made in the containment structure. For openings, 
TMI-2 Solutions states it will follow good ALARA practices by ensuring 
that these openings will also include passive radiological barriers. 
Additionally, TMI-2 Solutions explains that during normal operation, 
any air flow would be into containment due to operation of the Reactor 
Building Purge Exhaust System.
    In its May 16, 2022, supplement, TMI-2 Solutions states that the 
most limiting scenario is a reactor building fire, which is not based 
on any specific event. Its main purpose is to demonstrate that even if 
high efficiency particulate air [filter] (HEPA) filtration was 
bypassed, the event would not exceed 100 mrem to the maximally exposed 
individual, the standard for declaring a Site Area Emergency at an 
operating nuclear power plant. In its May 16, 2022, supplement, TMI-2 
Solutions states that it has reanalyzed the reactor building fire 
scenario to demonstrate the additional margin that exists. The 
calculation incorporated a more appropriate fractional airborne release 
factor as used in NUREG/CR-0130.
    The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the deletion of TS 3/
4.2, ``Reactor Vessel Fuel,'' does not cause a change in facility 
conditions, design function, or analysis that verifies the ability of 
SSCs to perform a design function and does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    TS 3/4.3, ``Crane Operations,'' prohibits loads over 50,000 lbs. 
from travel over the Reactor Vessel (RV). The licensee indicates in its 
NSHC (February 19, 2021, submittal) that the deletion of TS 3/4.3 does 
not cause a change in facility conditions, design function, or analysis 
that verifies the ability of SSCs to perform a design function. In its 
February 19, 2021, LAR, TMI-2 Solutions states that PDMS TS 
requirements associated with this TS are not applicable in Phase 1b and 
Phase 2 of decommissioning because there are no limiting conditions for 
the license. Also, TMI-2 Solutions explains in its LAR, as 
supplemented, that TS 3/4.3, ``Crane Operations,'' is not relevant 
because none of the four requirements in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) are 
applicable, based on its evaluation provided in Section 3.1, 
``Applicable Regulatory Requirement,'' of its LAR (February 19, 2022). 
The NRC staff reviewed this section of the application and 
preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions for the following reasons: 
(1) TMI-2 does not have a reactor coolant pressure boundary; therefore, 
the requirements of Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(A) are not 
applicable; (2) TMI-2 is no longer licensed to operate therefore the 
requirements of Criterion 2c of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(B) is not 
applicable; (3) TMI-2 cranes do not provide a function required to 
mitigate the effect of unanticipated occurrences such as fire; and (4) 
There are no TS associated with Phase 1b or Phase 2 other than annual 
effluent monitoring reporting, hence there are no limiting conditions 
for operation.
    In its LAR, TMI-2 Solutions states that the PDMS TS requirements 
associated with TS 3/4.3 ``Crane Operations,'' are not applicable in 
Phase 1b and Phase 2. TMI-2 Solutions also states that TS 3/4.3 does 
not satisfy any of the four requirements established in 10 CFR 
50.36(c)(2)(ii) and provides its reasons for its conclusions. Further, 
TMI-2 Solutions argues, because of the above, it is not required to 
have a hoisting and rigging program but has elected to develop one to 
address movement of loads at TMI-2 because it will provide a high 
degree of assurance that a load drop will not occur. The NRC staff 
preliminarily concludes that the hoisting and rigging program will 
serve the same purpose as the TS, as applicable to decommissioning. 
Further, TMI-2 Solutions commits to prepare lift plans for all non-
standard lifts, as directed by the hoisting and rigging program. TMI-2 
Solutions, in its LAR, as supplemented, explains that the purpose of 
the hoisting and rigging program is to define the minimum requirements 
for the safe operations of cranes and hoists. Also, TMI-2 Solution 
indicates that the hoisting and rigging program will provide detailed 
requirements for training and qualification of personnel, inspection 
and maintenance of cranes or hoists, the safe use of rigging equipment 
as well as direction for performing non-standard lifts to ensure that 
lifting operations are performed in a safe manner. Based on its review 
of the LAR, as supplemented, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees with 
TMI-2 Solutions' conclusion that the use of the hoisting and rigging 
program provides a defense-in-depth approach to preventing a load drop 
from occurring. TMI-2 Solutions states in its LAR that crane design 
features such as load cells, and travel stops will be used, as required 
by the hoisting and rigging program, to ensure safe travel paths and 
barriers will be provided as per the lift plan, as required, to 
preclude the effects of a load drop.
    TMI-2 Solutions submitted a calculation (Attachment 5 of its 
February 19, 2021, submittal, as supplemented on April 7, 2022) that 
assesses increasing the Safe Fuel Mass Limit (SFML) from 42 kg to 
approximately 1200 kg. The analysis states that it is not credible to 
have 1200 kg U in an idealized configuration for criticality to occur 
during Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning. TMI-2 Solutions explains 
that there are no credible operational upsets to realize the ideal 
configuration. TMI-2 Solutions concludes that even if the upset 
occurred, it would require fissile mass in excess of that analyzed, 
which is in excess of what could occur. The NRC staff reviewed this 
analysis, finds its assumptions reasonable, and therefore, 
preliminarily agrees with this conclusion. Therefore, based on its 
review described above, the NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the 
deletion of TS 3/4.3 ``Crane Operations'' does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    TMI-2 Solutions in its LAR proposes to delete TS definitions and 
rules of usage and application that will not be applicable during Phase 
1b and Phase 2 decommissioning and concludes that these changes have no 
impact on facility SSCs or the methods of operation of such SSCs. Based 
on the NRC staff's review of the LAR, the NRC staff preliminarily 
concludes that the proposed relocation of certain administrative 
requirements as allowed by Administrative Letter 95-06 (Reference 6) 
would not affect operating procedures or administrative controls

[[Page 51457]]

that have the function of ensuring the safe management of debris 
material or decommissioning of the facility. Therefore, the NRC staff 
preliminarily concludes that the proposed amendment would not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the proposed changes to 
delete and/or modify the TS would not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from that previously evaluated. The 
removal of the TS applicable in Phase 1a of decommissioning cannot 
result in different or more adverse accidents than previously evaluated 
because there are no new credible failure mechanisms, or accident 
initiators not considered in the design and licensing basis for Phase 
1b of decommissioning. Following Phase 1a of decommissioning, TMI-2 
will enter Phase 1b and Phase 2 of decommissioning. During Phase 1b and 
Phase 2, major decommissioning activities as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 
will be performed. As discussed in Attachment 1 to TMI-2 Solutions' May 
16, 2022, supplement, a reactor building fire has been evaluated and 
determined to be the accident that could occur during decommissioning 
that would maximize dose at the site boundary. TMI-2 Solutions states 
that the reactor building fire is the most limiting scenario and it is 
not based on any specific event. Its main purpose is to demonstrate 
that even if HEPA Filtration was bypassed, the event would not exceed 
100 mrem to the maximally exposed individual, the standard for 
declaring a Site Area Emergency at an operating nuclear power plant. In 
Attachment 2 of the May 16, 2022, supplement, TMI-2 has reanalyzed the 
reactor building fire scenario to demonstrate the additional margin 
that exists. TMI-2 Solutions states in its May 16, 2022, supplement 
that the calculation incorporated a more appropriate fractional 
airborne release factor as used in NUREG/CR-0130. TMI-2 states in its 
LAR, as supplemented, that there are no postulated accidents that can 
occur at the TMI-2 facility during Phase 1b or Phase 2 of 
decommissioning that would result in the dose at the site boundary 
exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the EPA PAGs including such 
times as when the containment engineered access equipment hatch is 
open. Further, the NRC staff notes that the TMI-2 Radiation Protection 
Program would identify the controls that will be implemented through 
procedures during decommissioning and decontamination activities 
occurring inside of the reactor building.
    The use of these Radiation Protection Program implementing 
procedures take into account detailed work planning and execution of 
the decommissioning and decontamination work and support activities, 
including measures to maintain occupational dose As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable and below the occupational dose limits in 10 CFR part 20 
during decommissioning. TMI-2 Solutions states in its LAR, as 
supplemented, that procedures associated with Phase 1b of 
decommissioning will be developed to retrieve the remaining core debris 
or debris material and decontaminate high radiation areas. TMI-2 
Solutions also commits that it will develop appropriate procedures for 
Phase 2.
    The NRC staff reviewed this analysis, finds its assumptions 
reasonable, and therefore, preliminarily agrees with the TMI-2 
Solutions conclusion that the deletion of TS 3/4.1 ``Containment'' does 
not cause a change in facility conditions, nor does it cause a change 
in design function. TMI-2 Solutions notes in its application that the 
function of the containment--to maintain the isolation of residual 
contamination during Phase 1a decommissioning--remains unchanged. The 
NRC staff preliminarily agrees that during Phase 1b and 2 of 
decommissioning, the Radiation Protection Program and associated 
implementing procedures will provide the controls necessary to manage 
residual contamination and that the containment would continue to 
function as a contamination barrier. TMI-2 Solutions states in its 
application that airborne radiation monitoring will be provided at the 
engineered containment openings (e.g., Equipment Hatch Opening) and 
that procedures will be used to control routine containment access. 
With the construction of the engineered openings in containment, the 
NRC staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that the reactor 
building breather (vent) no longer provides a preferred path to the 
atmosphere. TMI-2 Solutions explains in its February 19, 2021, 
application that no credit is taken for the containment as a pressure 
containing boundary and therefore unfiltered leak rate testing of the 
containment is no longer applicable.
    The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the dose at the site 
boundary associated with the events described in Attachment 1 to TMI-2 
February 19, 2021, LAR, as supplemented on May 16, 2022, does not 
exceed the requirements of 10 CFR 100.11, as well as the EPA PAGs. The 
NRC staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that the deletion 
of TS 3/4.1 ``Containment'' would not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated 
relative to Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning.
    TS 3/4.2 ``Reactor Vessel Fuel'' establishes a SFML for the PDMS 
condition, which ensures that the amount of core debris that may be 
removed from the RV or rearranged in the RV during PDMS does not exceed 
42kg. This SFML limit is specified to ensure subcriticality even after 
dual errors.
    The NRC preliminarily agrees that the deletion of TS 3/4.2 does not 
cause a change in facility conditions, nor does it cause a change in 
design function. TMI-2 Solutions provides a calculation in Attachment 5 
of its February 19, 2021, LAR, as supplemented on April 7, 2022, 
stating that this calculation provides the basis to increase the SFML 
from 42 kg to 1200 kg. Also, TMI-2 Solutions states that the result of 
this calculation demonstrates that the entire mass of the core debris 
material cannot be configured into an arrangement whereby a criticality 
event is possible and that Keff could not exceed 0.95. The 
NRC staff reviewed this analysis, finds its assumptions reasonable, and 
therefore, preliminarily agrees with this conclusion.
    Therefore, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees that the deletion of 
TS 3/4.2 ``Reactor Vessel Fuel'' does not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated relative to Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning.
    During PDMS, loads over 50,000 lbs. are prohibited from travel over 
the RV. The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the deletion of TS 
3/4.3 ``Crane Operations'' would not cause a change in facility 
conditions, nor does it cause a change in design function. As discussed 
in Section 2 ``Detailed Description and Basis for The Changes,'' of the 
February 19, 2021, submittal for Phase 1b and Phase 2 of 
decommissioning, TMI-2 Solutions states it will develop a hoisting and 
rigging program that addresses movement of loads at TMI-2. Also, TMI-2 
Solutions explains in its LAR that this program will define the minimum 
requirements for the safe operations of cranes and hoists. Also, TMI-2 
explains that this program will provide detailed requirements, as

[[Page 51458]]

applicable, for training and qualification of personnel, inspection and 
maintenance of cranes or hoists, the safe use of rigging equipment as 
well as direction for performing non-standard lifts to ensure that 
lifting operations are performed in a safe manner. TMI-2 Solutions 
indicates in its February 19, 2021, application that it will develop 
lift plans for all lifts as directed by the hoisting and rigging 
program where a load drop or load impingement could contribute to 
release or dispersal of radioactive material to the environment which 
could exceed threshold for an unusual event.
    The NRC staff preliminary agrees with TMI-2 Solutions statement 
that the hoisting and rigging program provides a defense in depth 
approach to preventing a load drop from occurring. TMI-2 Solutions 
commits to use, as required by the hoisting and rigging program, crane 
design features such as load cells, and travel stops, to ensure safe 
travel paths. TMI-2 Solutions commits to provide barriers as required 
to preclude the effects of a load drop.
    A calculation has been performed by TMI-2 Solutions (Attachment 5 
of the February 19, 2021, submittal and as supplemented on April 7, 
2022) that assesses increasing the SFML from 42 kg to approximately 
1200 kg. The analysis states that it is not credible to have 1200 kg U 
in an idealized configuration for criticality to occur during Phase 1b 
or Phase 2 of decommissioning and that there are no credible 
operational upsets to realize the ideal configuration but even in the 
event that the upset occurs, it would require fissile mass in excess of 
that analyzed, which is in excess of what could occur, in addition to a 
greatly reduced impurity concentration to present a criticality hazard. 
Therefore, NRC preliminarily concludes that the deletion of TS 3/4.3 
``Crane Operations'' does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated 
relative to Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning.
    The TMI-2 sealed sources are maintained at Three Mile Island 
Station, Unit No. 1 (TMl-1) and managed by Constellation Energy, LLC 
under a program compliant with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.39(c). 
Therefore, deleting TS 3/4.4 ``Sealed Sources'' from the TMI-2 TS and 
relocating the TS requirements to the DQAP, as noted in TMI-2 Solutions 
January 7, 2022, supplement, does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated 
relative to Phase 1b or Phase 2 decommissioning.
    Based on the above, the NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the 
proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident due to credible new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, 
or accident initiators not considered in the licensing bases documents. 
Further, the NRC preliminarily concludes that decommissioning 
operations in Phase 1b and Phase 2 decommissioning are bounded by the 
events described in Attachment 1 of the February 19, 2021, submittal, 
as supplemented on May 16, 2022.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes would revise the TMI-2 POL and TS by deleting 
or modifying certain portions of the TS that are no longer applicable 
to TMI-2 as it transitions from PDMS to decommissioning. These changes 
are consistent with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36 for the 
contents of TS.
    The Phase 1a decommissioning condition is a continuation of the 
PDMS condition. No major decommissioning activities will occur in Phase 
1a. During Phase 1a of decommissioning, containment isolation assures 
that the containment continues to perform as a contamination barrier 
preventing residual contamination from release from inside the 
containment.'' TMI-2 Solutions, explains in Section 2 ``Detailed 
Description and Basis for the Changes'' of its February 19, 2021, 
application, as supplemented on May 16, 2022, that the radiological 
consequences associated with the ``fire inside containment'' 
unanticipated event, does not exceed the applicable limits of 10 CFR 
100.11 and the EPA PAGs.
    Following Phase 1a, TMI-2 will enter Phase 1b and Phase 2 of 
decommissioning. During Phase 1b, major decommissioning activities as 
defined in 10 CFR 50.2 will be performed. Based on the consequences of 
the postulated events in Attachment 2 of TMI-2 Solutions February 19, 
2021, application, as supplemented on May 16, 2022, TMI-2 Solutions 
concludes that none of the events evaluated involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.
    TMI-2 Solutions states in its February 19, 2021, application that 
there are no postulated accidents that can occur inside of the reactor 
building during Phase 1b or Phase 2 that result in the dose at the site 
boundary exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the EPA PAGs 
including such times as when the containment engineered access 
equipment hatch is open.
    TMI-2 Solutions states in its LAR, that during Phase 1a of 
decommissioning, isolation assures that the containment continues to 
perform as a contamination barrier preventing residual contamination 
from release from inside the containment.TMI-2 states in its February 
19, 2021, application, as supplemented on May 16, 2022, that there are 
no postulated accidents that can occur inside of the reactor building 
during Phase 1b or Phase 2 of decommissioning that result in the dose 
at the site boundary exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100.11 and the EPA 
PAGs including such times as when the containment engineered access 
equipment hatch is open. Further, the NRC staff notes that the TMI-2 
Radiation Protection Program will identify the controls that will be 
implemented through procedures during decommissioning and 
decontamination activities occurring inside of the reactor building. 
The use of these Radiation Protection Program implementing procedures 
takes into account detailed work planning, and execution of the 
decommissioning and decontamination work and support activities, 
including measures to maintain occupational dose As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable and below the occupational dose limits in 10 CFR part 20 
during decommissioning. TMI-2 Solutions states in its LAR that 
procedures associated with Phase 1b of decommissioning will be 
developed to retrieve the remaining core debris and decontaminate high 
radiation areas. TMI-2 Solutions also commits that it will develop 
appropriate procedures for Phase 2.
    TMI-2 Solutions concludes that the deletion of TS 3/4.1 
``Containment'' does not exceed or alter a design basis or safety 
limit. The function of the containment is to confine residual 
radioactivity that otherwise might be released to the atmosphere during 
reactor building decommissioning. The NRC staff reviewed this analysis, 
finds its assumptions reasonable, and therefore, preliminarily agrees 
with TMI-2 Solutions' conclusions that the deletion of TS 3/4.1 
``Containment'' does not significantly reduce the margin of safety 
during Phase 1b and Phase 2.
    Also, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees that during Phase 1b and 2 
of decommissioning, the Radiation Protection Program and associated 
implementing procedures will provide the controls necessary to manage 
residual contamination and that the containment would continue to 
function as a contamination barrier. TMI-2

[[Page 51459]]

Solutions states in its application that airborne radiation monitoring 
will be provided at the engineered containment openings (e.g., 
Equipment Hatch Opening) and that procedures will be used to control 
routine containment access. With the construction of the engineered 
openings in containment, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 
Solutions that the reactor building breather (vent) no longer provides 
a preferred path to the atmosphere. TMI-2 Solutions explains in its 
February 19, 2021, application, as supplemented on May 26, 2022, that 
no credit is taken for the containment as a pressure containing 
boundary, and therefore, unfiltered leak rate testing of the 
containment is no longer applicable.
    The NRC staff preliminarily agrees with the licensee's NHSC 
conclusion in its LAR that the dose at the site boundary associated 
with the events described in Attachment 1 to TMI-2 February 19, 2021, 
application, as supplement on May 26, 2022, does not exceed the 
requirements of 10 CFR 100.11, as well as the EPA PAGs. The NRC staff 
preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that the deletion of TS 3/4.1 
``Containment'' is appropriate for the reasons stated above. Therefore, 
the NRC staff preliminarily concludes that deletion of TS 3/4.1 
``Containment'' does not significantly reduce the margin of safety 
during Phase 1b and Phase 2.
    TS 3/4.2 ``Reactor Vessel Fuel'' establishes a SFML for the PDMS 
condition, which ensures that the amount of core debris that may be 
removed from the RV or rearranged in the RV during PDMS does not exceed 
42 kg. This SFML limit is specified to ensure subcriticality even after 
dual errors. TMI-2 Solutions provides a calculation in Attachment 5 of 
its February 19, 2021, application, supplemented on April 7, 2022, 
which it states provides the basis to increase the SFML from 42 kg to 
1200 kg. TMI-2 Solutions states that the current SFML was developed 
based solely on credible upper bounds for input parameters as opposed 
to sample data or realistic conditions. TMI-2 Solutions based the 
proposed revision to the SFML upon existing data and known conditions. 
TMI-2 Solutions states that these inputs are still considered to be 
reasonably and sufficiently conservative for their use in development 
of the proposed 1200 kg SFML. Further, TMI-2 Solutions explains that 
the derived SFML bounds the entire expected fissile mass inventory 
throughout all physically separated areas within the reactor building.
    TMI-2 Solutions states that the bounding fissile mass used to 
produce the SFML is assembled in idealized conditions that cannot 
credibly exist during decommissioning operations. TMI-2 Solutions 
explains that even if the expected remaining fissile mass throughout 
the building, including hold up in all piping and cubicles were to be 
brought together, a criticality is not feasible. TMI-2 Solutions 
indicates that there are no credible operational upsets to realize the 
ideal configuration for criticality but even in the event that the 
upset occurs, it would require fissile mass in excess of that analyzed, 
which is in excess of what could occur. In addition, TMI-2 states that 
the SFML is based on a significantly reduced impurity concentration 
below that demonstrated to be present. The Keff for the new 
SFML in the idealized static conditions does not exceed 0.95. The 
calculation of the new SFML states that the entire mass of the core 
debris material cannot be configured into an arrangement whereby a 
criticality event is possible. Debris material removal operations will 
involve loading 12-14 storage casks with each cask containing less than 
the total SFML calculated for Phase 1b of decommissioning. The NRC 
staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that the overall 
subcritical nature, namely inherent elemental constituents, of the fuel 
debris remaining at the TMI-2 facility today is equivalent to that 
associated with the fuel debris at TMI-2 prior to defueling operations. 
TMI-2 Solutions states that the presence of some intact fuel, and the 
results of sampling campaigns conducted prior to defueling indicating 
slight impurity gradients through the RV did not easily allow the 
application of a representative fuel composition to the entirety of the 
core during the development of the previous SFML. Further, TMI-2 
Solutions explains that static and accident conditions analyzed after 
defueling merely credited the minimum concentration of impurities to 
ensure the facility was safe. In each of these scenarios, the applied 
conservatisms are different. TMI-2 believes that currently, core debris 
in the lower head region of the RV is most representative of what 
remains in the RV at the present time. Therefore, TMI-2 Solutions 
explains in its LAR that a reasonable representative impurity 
concentration can be applied to the homogenized mass in development of 
a new SFML for decontamination and decommissioning. NRC staff 
preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions that a conservative approach 
to adequately represent the inherent characteristics of the remaining 
fuel debris can be taken with respect to the development of an SFML for 
the remaining decommissioning activities. This approach would not 
necessarily be applicable for the previous defueling operations or the 
related SFML developed at that time. TMI-2 Solutions indicates in its 
LAR that the current SFML was conservatively derived and, coupled with 
the conservatively estimated masses and the planned decommissioning 
operations, provides significant and adequate margin of safety that 
ensures that the potential for a criticality is not credible.
    Also, TMI-2 Solutions explains in its LAR that the proposed change 
would not exceed or alter the SFML design basis as presented in the 
Final Safety Analysis Report and Keff for the new SFML does 
not exceed 0.95.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's NSHC in its LAR for the SFML 
analysis, and based on the above, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees 
with the licensee's analysis and finds its assumptions reasonable. 
Therefore, the NRC staff preliminarily agrees with TMI-2 Solutions' 
conclusions that the proposed amendment would not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, the NRC staff preliminarily 
concludes that deletion of PDMS TS 3/4.2 ``Reactor Vessel Fuel'' does 
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety during Phase 
1b and Phase 2.
    As part of the PDMS condition, loads over 50,000 lbs. are 
prohibited from travel over the RV. TMI-2 Solutions in its LAR, states 
that the deletion of TS 3/4.3 would not exceed or alter a design basis 
or safety limit because there are no limiting conditions on operations. 
Further TMI-2 states in its LAR that there are no SSCs that would 
prevent safe shut down of the reactor. The NRC staff notes that the 
reactor is no longer operating and has permanently ceased operations as 
documented on February 13, 2013. As discussed in Section 2 ``Detailed 
Description and Basis for The Changes,'' for Phase 1b and Phase 2 of 
decommissioning, TMI-2 Solutions committed to develop a hoisting and 
rigging program that addresses movement of loads at TMI-2. The purpose 
of the hoisting and rigging program is to define the minimum 
requirements for the safe operations of cranes and hoists. The hoisting 
and rigging program would provide as applicable, detailed requirements 
for training and qualification of personnel, inspection and maintenance 
of cranes or hoists, the safe use of rigging equipment as well as 
direction for performing non-standard lifts to ensure that lifting 
operations are performed in a safe manner. TMI-2 Solutions has

[[Page 51460]]

committed in its February 19, 2021, application to develop a lift plan 
for all lifts as directed by the hoisting and rigging program where a 
load drop or load impingement could contribute to release or dispersal 
of radioactive material to the environment could exceed the threshold 
for an unusual event.
    The NRC staff preliminarily concludes that implementation of the 
hoisting and rigging program provides a defense in depth approach to 
preventing a load drop from occurring. TMI-2 Solutions has committed to 
address crane design features such as load cells, and travel stops, as 
required, to ensure safe travel paths. Also, TMI-2 Solutions has 
committed that it will provide barriers as required to preclude the 
effects of a load drop. TMI-2 Solutions provided a calculation found in 
Attachment 5 of its February 19, 2021, application that assesses 
increasing the SFML from 42 kg to approximately 1200 kg. As stated in 
the calculation, it is not credible to have 1200 kg U in an idealized 
configuration for criticality to occur. There are no credible 
operational upsets to realize the ideal configuration but even if the 
upset occurs, it would require fissile mass in excess of that analyzed, 
which is in excess of what could occur in addition to a greatly reduced 
impurity concentration to present a criticality hazard. Therefore, the 
NRC staff preliminarily concludes that the deletion of TS 3/4.3 ``Crane 
Operations'' does not significantly reduce the margin of safety during 
Phase 1b and Phase 2.
    The TMI-2 sealed sources are maintained at TMI-1 and managed by 
Constellation Energy, LLC under a program compliant with the 
requirements of 10 CFR 70.39(c). Deleting TS 3/4.4 ``Sealed Sources'' 
from the TMI-2 TS and relocating the TS requirements to the DQAP, as 
noted in TMI-2 Solutions' January 7, 2022, supplement, does not involve 
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The proposed changes do not affect remaining plant operations, 
systems, or components supporting decommissioning activities. The 
proposed changes do not result in a change in initial conditions, or in 
any other parameter affecting the course of the remaining 
decommissioning activity accident analysis. Therefore, the NRC 
preliminarily concludes that the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Based on the above, NRC preliminarily concludes that the proposed 
amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under 
the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding 
of NSHC is justified.

III. Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Petition for Leave To 
Intervene

    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any 
persons (petitioner) whose interest may be affected by any of these 
actions may file a request for a hearing and petition for leave to 
intervene (petition) with respect to that action. Petitions shall be 
filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Agency Rules of Practice 
and Procedure'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a 
current copy of 10 CFR 2.309. If a petition is filed, the Commission or 
a presiding officer will rule on the petition and, if appropriate, a 
notice of a hearing will be issued.
    Petitions must be filed no later than 60 days from the date of 
publication of this notice in accordance with the filing instructions 
in the ``Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)'' section of this document. 
Petitions and motions for leave to file new or amended contentions that 
are filed after the deadline will not be entertained absent a 
determination by the presiding officer that the filing demonstrates 
good cause by satisfying the three factors in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i) 
through (iii).
    If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final 
determination on the issue of NSHC, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of NSHC. The final determination will serve 
to establish when the hearing is held. If the final determination is 
that the amendment request involves NSHC, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing would take place after issuance of 
the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment request 
involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing held 
would take place before the issuance of the amendment unless the 
Commission finds an imminent danger to the health or safety of the 
public, in which case it will issue an appropriate order or rule under 
10 CFR part 2.
    A State, local governmental body, Federally recognized Indian 
Tribe, or designated agency thereof, may submit a petition to the 
Commission to participate as a party under 10 CFR 2.309(h) no later 
than 60 days from the date of publication of this notice. 
Alternatively, a State, local governmental body, Federally recognized 
Indian Tribe, or agency thereof may participate as a non-party under 10 
CFR 2.315(c).
    For information about filing a petition and about participation by 
a person not a party under 10 CFR 2.315, see ADAMS Accession No. 
ML20340A053 (https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML20340A053) and on the NRC's public website 
at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/adjudicatory/hearing.html#participate.

IV. Electronic Submissions and E-Filing

    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings including 
documents filed by an interested State, local governmental body, 
Federally recognized Indian Tribe, or designated agency thereof that 
requests to participate under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302. The E-Filing process requires 
participants to submit and serve all adjudicatory documents over the 
internet, or in some cases, to mail copies on electronic storage media, 
unless an exemption permitting an alternative filing method, as further 
discussed, is granted. Detailed guidance on electronic submissions is 
located in the ``Guidance for Electronic Submissions to the NRC'' 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML13031A056) and on the NRC's public website at 
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by 
telephone at 301-415-1677, to (1) request a digital identification (ID) 
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign submissions and access the E-Filing 
system for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise 
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a petition or 
other adjudicatory document (even in instances in which the 
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the 
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the proceeding if the 
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/getting-started.html. After a digital ID certificate is 
obtained and a docket created, the participant must submit adjudicatory 
documents in Portable Document Format. Guidance on

[[Page 51461]]

submissions is available on the NRC's public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. A filing is 
considered complete at the time the document is submitted through the 
NRC's E-Filing system. To be timely, an electronic filing must be 
submitted to the E-Filing system no later than 11:59 p.m. ET on the due 
date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps 
the document and sends the submitter an email confirming receipt of the 
document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email that provides 
access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and 
any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish 
to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
document on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before adjudicatory documents are 
filed to obtain access to the documents via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC's Electronic 
Filing Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's 
public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by 
email to [email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-
7640. The NRC Electronic Filing Help Desk is available between 9:00 
a.m. and 6:00 p.m., ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
stating why there is good cause for not filing electronically and 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.302(b)-(d). Participants filing adjudicatory documents in this manner 
are responsible for serving their documents on all other participants. 
Participants granted an exemption under 10 CFR 2.302(g)(2) must still 
meet the electronic formatting requirement in 10 CFR 2.302(g)(1), 
unless the participant also seeks and is granted an exemption from 10 
CFR 2.302(g)(1).
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is publicly available at https://adams.nrc.gov/ehd, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
presiding officer. If you do not have an NRC-issued digital ID 
certificate as previously described, click ``cancel'' when the link 
requests certificates and you will be automatically directed to the 
NRC's electronic hearing dockets where you will be able to access any 
publicly available documents in a particular hearing docket. 
Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information 
such as social security numbers, home addresses, or personal phone 
numbers in their filings unless an NRC regulation or other law requires 
submission of such information. With respect to copyrighted works, 
except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory 
filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants 
should not include copyrighted materials in their submission.

V. Availability of Documents

    The documents identified in the following table are available to 
interested persons through ADAMS.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Document description                  ADAMS accession No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three Mile Island, Unit 2, License          ML21057A046.
 Amendment Request Decommissioning
 Technical Specifications, with No
 Significant Hazards Consideration, dated
 February 19, 2021.
21-003, Rev 00, ``Decommissioning           ML21057A045 (non-public,
 Radioactive Waste Handling Accident         withheld pursuant to 10 CFR
 Calculation For TMI-2``, dated February     2.390).
 11, 2021.
Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Supplemental     ML21133A263 (Package).
 Information to License Amendment Request
 Decommissioning Technical Specifications,
 dated May 5, 2021.
License Amendment Request--Three Mile       ML22013A177.
 Island, Unit 2, Decommissioning Technical
 Specifications, Supplemental Information,
 dated January 7, 2022.
Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Supplemental     ML22101A079.
 Information to License Amendment Request,
 Decommissioning Technical Specifications,
 dated March 23, 2022.
Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Supplemental     ML22101A080 (Package).
 Information to License Amendment Request,
 Decommissioning Technical Specifications,
 dated April 7, 2022.
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2   ML22138A285.
 (TMl-2)--License Amendment Request--Three
 Mile Island, Unit 2, Decommissioning
 Technical Specifications, Response to
 Questions, dated May 16, 2022.
NRC Administrative Letter 95-06,            ML20101P963.
 Relocation of TS Administrative Controls
 Related to QA, dated March 19, 1996, and
 December 12, 1995.
Camper, L.W. (NRC) to Pace, D.L. (GPU       ML12349A291.
 Nuclear) letter, ``Three Mile Island
 Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TM1-2)--Failure
 to Submit Post-Shutdown Decommissioning
 Activities Report--Non-cited Violation
 (Docket: 05000320),'' dated February 13,
 2013.
GPU Nuclear Calculation 4440-7380-90-017,   ML22138A287 (non-public,
 Revision 4, ``PDMS SAR Section 8.2.5 Fire   withheld pursuant to 10 CFR
 Analysis Source Terms``, dated May 16,      2.390).
 2022.
Requests for Addition Information for       ML22210A080.
 Proposed Decommissioning Tech Specs
 License Amendment Request, dated July 29,
 2022.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-
Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation

    A. This Order contains instructions regarding how potential parties 
to this proceeding may request access to documents containing SUNSI.
    B. Within 10 days after publication of this notice of hearing or 
opportunity for hearing, any potential party who believes access to 
SUNSI is necessary to respond to this notice may request access to 
SUNSI. A ``potential party'' is any person who intends to participate 
as a party by demonstrating standing and filing an admissible 
contention under 10 CFR 2.309. Requests for access to SUNSI submitted 
later than 10 days after publication of this notice will not be 
considered absent a showing of good cause for the late filing, 
addressing why the request could not have been filed earlier.
    C. The requestor shall submit a letter requesting permission to 
access SUNSI to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff,

[[Page 51462]]

and provide a copy to the Deputy General Counsel for Licensing, 
Hearings, and Enforcement, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. The expedited 
delivery or courier mail address for both offices is: U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 
The email addresses for the Office of the Secretary and the Office of 
the General Counsel are [email protected] and 
[email protected], respectively.\2\ The request must 
include the following information:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ While a request for hearing or petition to intervene in this 
proceeding must comply with the filing requirements of the NRC's 
``E-Filing Rule,'' the initial request to access SUNSI under these 
procedures should be submitted as described in this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) A description of the licensing action with a citation to this 
Federal Register notice;
    (2) The name and address of the potential party and a description 
of the potential party's particularized interest that could be harmed 
by the action identified in C.(1); and
    (3) The identity of the individual or entity requesting access to 
SUNSI and the requestor's basis for the need for the information in 
order to meaningfully participate in this adjudicatory proceeding. In 
particular, the request must explain why publicly available versions of 
the information requested would not be sufficient to provide the basis 
and specificity for a proffered contention.
    D. Based on an evaluation of the information submitted under 
paragraph C, the NRC staff will determine within 10 days of receipt of 
the request whether:
    (1) There is a reasonable basis to believe the petitioner is likely 
to establish standing to participate in this NRC proceeding; and
    (2) The requestor has established a legitimate need for access to 
SUNSI.
    E. If the NRC staff determines that the requestor satisfies both 
D.(1) and D.(2), the NRC staff will notify the requestor in writing 
that access to SUNSI has been granted. The written notification will 
contain instructions on how the requestor may obtain copies of the 
requested documents, and any other conditions that may apply to access 
to those documents. These conditions may include, but are not limited 
to, the signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement or Affidavit, or 
Protective Order \3\ setting forth terms and conditions to prevent the 
unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of SUNSI by each individual who 
will be granted access to SUNSI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Any motion for Protective Order or draft Non-Disclosure 
Affidavit or Agreement for SUNSI must be filed with the presiding 
officer or the Chief Administrative Judge if the presiding officer 
has not yet been designated, within 30 days of the deadline for the 
receipt of the written access request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    F. Filing of Contentions. Any contentions in these proceedings that 
are based upon the information received as a result of the request made 
for SUNSI must be filed by the requestor no later than 25 days after 
receipt of (or access to) that information. However, if more than 25 
days remain between the petitioner's receipt of (or access to) the 
information and the deadline for filing all other contentions (as 
established in the notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing), the 
petitioner may file its SUNSI contentions by that later deadline.
    G. Review of Denials of Access.
    (1) If the request for access to SUNSI is denied by the NRC staff 
after a determination on standing and requisite need, the NRC staff 
shall immediately notify the requestor in writing, briefly stating the 
reason or reasons for the denial.
    (2) The requestor may challenge the NRC staff's adverse 
determination by filing a challenge within 5 days of receipt of that 
determination with: (a) the presiding officer designated in this 
proceeding; (b) if no presiding officer has been appointed, the Chief 
Administrative Judge, or if this individual is unavailable, another 
administrative judge, or an Administrative Law Judge with jurisdiction 
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.318(a); or (c) if another officer has been 
designated to rule on information access issues, with that officer.
    (3) Further appeals of decisions under this paragraph must be made 
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.311.
    H. Review of Grants of Access. A party other than the requestor may 
challenge an NRC staff determination granting access to SUNSI whose 
release would harm that party's interest independent of the proceeding. 
Such a challenge must be filed within 5 days of the notification by the 
NRC staff of its grant of access and must be filed with: (a) the 
presiding officer designated in this proceeding; (b) if no presiding 
officer has been appointed, the Chief Administrative Judge, or if this 
individual is unavailable, another administrative judge, or an 
Administrative Law Judge with jurisdiction pursuant to 10 CFR 2.318(a); 
or (c) if another officer has been designated to rule on information 
access issues, with that officer.
    If challenges to the NRC staff determinations are filed, these 
procedures give way to the normal process for litigating disputes 
concerning access to information. The availability of interlocutory 
review by the Commission of orders ruling on such NRC staff 
determinations (whether granting or denying access) is governed by 10 
CFR 2.311.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Requestors should note that the filing requirements of the 
NRC's E-Filing Rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007, as amended at 77 
FR 46562; August 3, 2012, 78 FR 34247, June 7, 2013) apply to 
appeals of NRC staff determinations (because they must be served on 
a presiding officer or the Commission, as applicable), but not to 
the initial SUNSI request submitted to the NRC staff under these 
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I. The Commission expects that the NRC staff and presiding officers 
(and any other reviewing officers) will consider and resolve requests 
for access to SUNSI, and motions for protective orders, in a timely 
fashion in order to minimize any unnecessary delays in identifying 
those petitioners who have standing and who have propounded contentions 
meeting the specificity and basis requirements in 10 CFR part 2. The 
Attachment to this Order summarizes the general target schedule for 
processing and resolving requests under these procedures.
    It is so ordered.

    Dated: August 17, 2022.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brooke P. Clark,
Secretary of the Commission.

   Attachment 1--General Target Schedule for Processing and Resolving
Requests for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information
                           in This Proceeding
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Day                             Event/activity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0............................  Publication of Federal Register notice of
                                hearing or opportunity for hearing,
                                including order with instructions for
                                access requests.

[[Page 51463]]

 
10...........................  Deadline for submitting requests for
                                access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-
                                Safeguards Information (SUNSI) with
                                information: supporting the standing of
                                a potential party identified by name and
                                address; describing the need for the
                                information in order for the potential
                                party to participate meaningfully in an
                                adjudicatory proceeding.
60...........................  Deadline for submitting petition for
                                intervention containing: (i)
                                demonstration of standing; and (ii) all
                                contentions whose formulation does not
                                require access to SUNSI (+25 Answers to
                                petition for intervention; +7 petitioner/
                                requestor reply).
20...........................  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
                                staff informs the requestor of the
                                staff's determination whether the
                                request for access provides a reasonable
                                basis to believe standing can be
                                established and shows need for SUNSI.
                                (NRC staff also informs any party to the
                                proceeding whose interest independent of
                                the proceeding would be harmed by the
                                release of the information.) If NRC
                                staff makes the finding of need for
                                SUNSI and likelihood of standing, NRC
                                staff begins document processing
                                (preparation of redactions or review of
                                redacted documents).
25...........................  If NRC staff finds no ``need'' or no
                                likelihood of standing, the deadline for
                                petitioner/requestor to file a motion
                                seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC
                                staff's denial of access; NRC staff
                                files copy of access determination with
                                the presiding officer (or Chief
                                Administrative Judge or other designated
                                officer, as appropriate). If NRC staff
                                finds ``need'' for SUNSI, the deadline
                                for any party to the proceeding whose
                                interest independent of the proceeding
                                would be harmed by the release of the
                                information to file a motion seeking a
                                ruling to reverse the NRC staff's grant
                                of access.
30...........................  Deadline for NRC staff reply to motions
                                to reverse NRC staff determination(s).
40...........................  (Receipt +30) If NRC staff finds standing
                                and need for SUNSI, deadline for NRC
                                staff to complete information processing
                                and file motion for Protective Order and
                                draft Non-Disclosure Agreement or
                                Affidavit. Deadline for applicant/
                                licensee to file Non-Disclosure
                                Agreement or Affidavit for SUNSI.
A............................  If access granted: issuance of presiding
                                officer or other designated officer
                                decision on motion for protective order
                                for access to sensitive information
                                (including schedule for providing access
                                and submission of contentions) or
                                decision reversing a final adverse
                                determination by the NRC staff.
A + 3........................  Deadline for filing executed Non-
                                Disclosure Agreements or Affidavits.
                                Access provided to SUNSI consistent with
                                decision issuing the protective order.
A + 28.......................  Deadline for submission of contentions
                                whose development depends upon access to
                                SUNSI. However, if more than 25 days
                                remain between the petitioner's receipt
                                of (or access to) the information and
                                the deadline for filing all other
                                contentions (as established in the
                                notice of hearing or notice of
                                opportunity for hearing), the petitioner
                                may file its SUNSI contentions by that
                                later deadline.
A + 53.......................  (Contention receipt +25) Answers to
                                contentions whose development depends
                                upon access to SUNSI.
A + 60.......................  (Answer receipt +7) Petitioner/Intervenor
                                reply to answers.
>A + 60......................  Decision on contention admission.
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[FR Doc. 2022-18031 Filed 8-19-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P