Duty of Candor, 49784-49793 [2022-16608]
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49784
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 155 / Friday, August 12, 2022 / Proposed Rules
miles), as well as updating the airport’s
geographic coordinates to coincide with
the FAA’s database. In addition, the city
name would be removed from the
second line of the Class E descriptor
header, as per FAA Order 7400.2N.
Class D and Class E airspace
designations are published in
Paragraphs 5000, and 6005,
respectively, of FAA Order JO 7400.11F,
dated August 10, 2021, and effective
September 15, 2021, which is
incorporated by reference in 14 CFR
71.1. The Class D and E airspace
designations listed in this document
will be published subsequently in FAA
Order JO 7400.11F.
FAA Order JO 7400.11, Airspace
Designations and Reporting Points, is
published yearly and effective on
September 15.
Regulatory Notices and Analyses
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
1. The authority citation for part 71
continues to read as follows:
18 CFR Part 1d
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g); 40103,
40113, 40120; E.O. 10854, 24 FR 9565, 3 CFR,
1959–1963 Comp., p. 389.
§ 71.1
[Amended]
2. The incorporation by reference in
14 CFR 71.1 of Federal Aviation
Administration Order JO 7400.11F,
Airspace Designations and Reporting
Points, dated August 10, 2021, and
effective September 15, 2021, is
amended as follows:
■
Paragraph 5000
Class D Airspace
*
*
*
*
*
ASO AL D Selma, AL [Established]
The FAA has determined that this
proposed regulation only involves an
established body of technical
regulations for which frequent and
routine amendments are necessary to
keep them operationally current. It,
therefore: (1) is not a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ under Executive
Order 12866; (2) is not a ‘‘significant
rule’’ under DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February
26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant
preparation of a Regulatory Evaluation
as the anticipated impact is so minimal.
Since this is a routine matter that will
only affect air traffic procedures and air
navigation, it is certified that this
proposed rule, when promulgated, will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
Craig Field Airport, AL
(Lat. 32°20′38″ N, long. 86°59′16″ W)
That airspace extending upward from the
surface up to and including 3,000 feet MSL,
within a 4.3-mile radius of Craig Field
Airport, and within 1.2 miles each side of the
146° bearing, extending from the 4.3-mile
radius to 6.3 miles southeast of the airport;
and within 1-mile each side of the 326°
bearing, extending from the 4.3-mile radius
to 6.3 miles northwest of the airport. This
Class D airspace area is effective during the
specific days and times established in
advance by a Notice to Air Missions. The
effective days and times will thereafter be
continuously published in the Chart
Supplement.
Environmental Review
Craig Field Airport, AL
(Lat. 32°20′38″ N, long. 86°59′16″ W)
That airspace extending upward from 700
feet above the surface within a 10.2-mile
radius of Craig Field Airport.
This proposal will be subject to an
environmental analysis in accordance
with FAA Order 1050.1F,
‘‘Environmental Impacts: Policies and
Procedures,’’ prior to any FAA final
regulatory action.
Lists of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 71
Airspace, Incorporation by reference,
Navigation (air).
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PART 71—DESIGNATION OF CLASS A,
B, C, D, AND E AIRSPACE AREAS; AIR
TRAFFIC SERVICE ROUTES; AND
REPORTING POINTS
Paragraph 6005 Class E Airspace Areas
Extending Upward From 700 Feet or More
Above the Surface of the Earth
*
*
*
ASO AL E5
*
*
Selma, AL [Amended]
Issued in College Park, Georgia, on August
4, 2022.
Andreese C. Davis,
Manager, Airspace & Procedures Team South,
Eastern Service Center, Air Traffic
Organization.
[FR Doc. 2022–17129 Filed 8–11–22; 8:45 am]
The Proposed Amendment
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
proposes to amend 14 CFR part 71 as
follows:
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Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Docket No. RM22–20–000]
Duty of Candor
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (Commission)
proposes to add a requirement that all
entities communicating with the
Commission or other specified
organizations related to a matter subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission
submit accurate and factual information
and not submit false or misleading
information or omit material
information. An entity is shielded from
violation of the regulation if it has
exercised due diligence to prevent such
occurrences.
DATES: Comments are due October 11,
2022.
SUMMARY:
Comments, identified by
docket number, may be filed in the
following ways. Electronic filing
through https://www.ferc.gov, is
preferred.
• Electronic Filing: Documents must
be filed in acceptable native
applications and print-to-PDF, but not
in scanned or picture format.
• For those unable to file
electronically, comments may be filed
by U.S. Postal Service mail or by hand
(including courier) delivery.
Æ Mail via U.S. Postal Service only:
Addressed to: Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Office of the
Secretary, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426.
Æ For delivery via any other carrier
(including courier): Deliver to: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Office
of the Secretary, 12225 Wilkins Avenue,
Rockville, MD 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Gabe Sterling, Legal Information
Office of Enforcement, Division of
Investigations, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street
NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8891, gabriel.sterling@ferc.gov.
Andrea Cerbin, Legal Information
Office of Enforcement, Division of
Investigations, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street
NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–
8362, andrea.cerbin@ferc.gov.
ADDRESSES:
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49785
Table of Contents
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Paragraph Nos.
I. Background ..................................................................................................................................................................................
A. Existing Duties of Candor ..................................................................................................................................................
B. 18 CFR 35.41(b) ..................................................................................................................................................................
C. Limitations of the Existing Duty of Candor Rules ............................................................................................................
II. Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................................................
A. The Need for a Broad Duty of Candor ..............................................................................................................................
B. 18 CFR 35.41(b) Provides a Fair Basis for a Broader Duty of Candor .............................................................................
C. Authority for the Proposed Rule ........................................................................................................................................
D. Interpretive Guidance and Application of the Proposed Rule ........................................................................................
III. Information Collection Statement ............................................................................................................................................
IV. Environmental Analysis ...........................................................................................................................................................
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis ..........................................................................................................................................
VI. Comment Procedures ...............................................................................................................................................................
VII. Document Availability ............................................................................................................................................................
1. Pursuant to sections 206, 215, 307,
and 309 of the Federal Power Act
(FPA),1 sections 5, 14, and 16 of the
Natural Gas Act (NGA),2 sections
1(5)(a), 12(1)(a), 13, and 15 of the
Interstate Commerce Act (ICA),3
sections 311(c) and 501(a) of the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA),4 and
sections 402(a)(2) and 402(h) of the
Department of Energy Organization
Act,5 the Commission proposes to add
a new part 1d to title 18 of the Code of
Federal Regulations to require that any
entity communicating with the
Commission or other specified
organizations (as identified below)
related to a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission submit
accurate and factual information and
not submit false or misleading
information, or omit material
information.6 However, the Commission
proposes that exercising due diligence
to prevent such occurrences would be
an affirmative defense to violations of
the requirement.
2. A variety of current Commission
regulations prohibit, in defined
circumstances, inaccurate
communications to the Commission and
other organizations upon which the
Commission relies to carry out its
statutory obligations in the Commissionjurisdictional electric, natural gas, and
oil industries and markets. However,
these existing requirements cover only
certain communications and impose a
patchwork of different standards of care
for such communications.
1 16
U.S.C. 824e, 824o, 825f, 825h.
U.S.C. 717d, 717m, 717o.
3 49 U.S.C. app. 1(5)(a), 12(1)(a), 13, 15.
4 15 U.S.C. 3371(c), 3411(a).
5 42 U.S.C. 7172(a)(2), (h).
6 The dissent argues that the rule applies to a
‘‘lack of communication,’’ which is not accurate.
While a material omission in a communication
could violate the rule, a lack of communication
would not. As this notice of proposed rulemaking
(NOPR) explains, this proposal does not impose a
duty of disclosure.
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3. The Commission relies extensively
upon the accuracy of information
provided to it and to other organizations
for effective decision making. Reliance
on inaccurate information inhibits the
Commission’s regulatory oversight and
could lead to substantial harm, whether
it is communicated to the Commission
or to the other organizations upon
which the Commission relies to assist it
to carry out its regulatory
responsibilities. We are concerned that
the Commission has no explicit
requirement that communications
related to a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission be
accurate or even that they not include
intentional misrepresentations.
4. We believe that a broadly
applicable duty of candor will improve
the Commission’s ability to effectively
oversee jurisdictional markets by
ensuring the Commission and
organizations upon which the
Commission relies base decisions on
accurate information. Effective
Commission oversight depends on
entities’ use of due diligence to reduce
the possibility that false or inaccurate
information is communicated to the
Commission and other organizations
upon which it relies. Further,
intentional or reckless communication
of false or inaccurate information is
always unacceptable.
5. All persons appearing before the
Commission and entities
communicating with organizations
regulated by the Commission should
know that truthfulness is expected and
required, that communications should
be made following due diligence, and
that communications should never be
intentionally or recklessly misleading.
However, we understand that there is a
balance between ensuring accurate
communications and the burden
required to ensure that accuracy. By
adopting a flexible standard, ‘‘due
diligence,’’ and limiting the relevant
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7
8
16
20
23
26
32
35
39
45
46
47
49
52
communications to specific recipients
related to matters subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, we
expect that such additional burdens, if
any, would be minimal.
6. We seek comment on all aspects of
the proposed rule, including specifically
the following: the need for a broad duty
of candor rule; whether 18 CFR 35.41(b)
provides a reasonable foundation for the
proposed expanded duty of candor rule;
the Commission’s authority for the
proposed rule; whether there are
categories of entities or individuals that
should be exempted from the duty of
candor; the scope of the
communications covered by the rule;
and whether the regulation properly
identifies all organizations who assist
the Commission to carry out its
statutory obligations and
communications to whom should be
subject to a duty of candor.
I. Background
7. Among the existing patchwork of
Commission requirements imposing a
duty of candor applicable to some
Commission-regulated entities and
markets is 18 CFR 35.41(b), which
applies only to ‘‘Sellers’’ in electric
markets, defined as a person who has
either obtained or applied for marketbased rate authority under the auspices
of the FPA.7 The Commission proposes
here to adopt a broader regulation based
upon our significant experience with
§ 35.41(b). By way of background, we
first discuss some of the other duties of
candor applicable to entities within the
Commission’s jurisdiction. Then, we
7 A ‘‘Seller’’ is ‘‘any person that has authorization
to or seeks authorization to engage in sales for
resale of electric energy, capacity or ancillary
services at market-based rates under section 205 of
the Federal Power Act.’’ 18 CFR 35.36(a)(1).
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discuss 18 CFR 35.41(b) and its history
in greater detail. Then, we turn to the
limitations of these requirements.
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A. Existing Duties of Candor
8. The Commission has adopted
various regulations imposing a duty of
candor for specific types of
communications, and the vast majority
of these regulations involve
communications to the Commission or
Commission staff. In each instance, the
controlling regulation was adopted as
part of specific regulatory requirements
or procedures rather than as a broad
requirement applicable to all of the
Commission’s oversight responsibilities,
including areas where the Commission
relies on other organizations to assist it
in exercising its authorities. This
history, discussed in the paragraphs to
follow, has resulted in a limited set of
requirements that may fail to ensure that
the Commission can make decisions
based on accurate information.
9. For many decades, the
Commission’s governing statutes and
adopted regulations have required that
certain submissions to it be made under
oath and penalty of perjury. For
example, FPA 304 requires that entities
submit periodic or annual reports under
oath,8 FPA 307(a) requires that written
statements in investigations be under
oath,9 and FPA 4(b) allows the
Commission to require certain
hydroelectric-related filings to be
submitted under oath.10 The NGA
allows submissions under oath in
investigations,11 periodic forms must be
provided under oath,12 and 18 CFR
385.1907 requires compliance reports to
be under oath as well. The provision in
18 CFR 385.2005 (Rule 2005 of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure) requires that any filing with
the Commission must be signed and that
a signature constitutes a certificate that
the signer knows the contents are true
to the best of his/her knowledge and
belief.13 Testimony and evidence
submitted in proceedings before
Commission Administrative Law Judges
must be submitted under oath.14
10. While the authorities referenced
above require submissions to be made
under oath, other regulations impose
differing obligations for
communications. For example, the
Commission has interpreted 18 CFR
157.5 to require applicants under NGA
8 16
U.S.C. 825c.
U.S.C. 825f(a).
10 16 U.S.C. 797(b).
11 15 U.S.C. 717m(a).
12 15 U.S.C. 717i(a).
13 18 CFR 385.2005(a).
14 See, e.g., 18 CFR 385.506(b), 385.507(d).
9 16
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7 seeking pipeline certificates of public
convenience and necessity to disclose
‘‘fully and forthrightly . . . all
information relevant to the
application.’’ 15 NGA 7(d) requires that
applications for certificates shall be
made in writing to the Commission, be
verified under oath, and ‘‘shall be in
such form, contain such information,
and notice thereof shall be served upon
such interested parties and in such
manner as the Commissions shall, by
regulation, require.’’ 16 ICA 20(7)(b)
prohibits the knowing and willful filing
of any ‘‘false entry’’ in any annual or
other report required to be filed under
this section.17
11. The Commission also has adopted
amendments to blanket sales certificates
‘‘to ensure the integrity of the natural
gas market.’’ 18 Citing staff’s findings in
its Final Report on the Western Energy
Crisis,19 the Commission expressed
concerns about attempted manipulation
in the natural gas industry such as
‘‘reporting . . . false data’’ and as a
result agreed with staff’s
recommendation to ‘‘condition natural
gas companies’ blanket certificates on
providing accurate and honest
information to entities that publish
price indices.’’ 20 Acting under NGA 7,
the Commission also promulgated
Market Behavior Rules, including rules
specifically requiring Sellers that report
their trades to index publishers to
‘‘provide accurate and factual
information and not knowingly submit
false or misleading information or omit
material information to any such
publisher.’’ 21 As the Commission
stated, the candor requirement in the
amendments to natural gas blanket sales
certificates was simply to ‘‘be honest
and forthright with the Commission and
the institutions it has established to
implement open-access transportation
and entities publishing indices for the
purpose of price transparency.’’ 22 These
rules remain in place today.23
15 See Black Marlin Pipeline Co., 4 FERC
¶ 61,039, at 61,088 (1978).
16 15 U.S.C. 717f(d).
17 49 U.S.C. App. 20(7)(b).
18 Amendments to Blanket Sales Certificates,
Order No. 644, 68 FR 66323 (Nov. 26, 2003), 105
FERC ¶ 61,217, at P 109 (2003).
19 Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western
Markets: Fact-Finding Investigation of Potential
Manipulation of Electric and Gas Prices, Docket No.
PA02–2–000 (Mar. 2003).
20 Order No. 644, 105 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 13.
21 Id. P 70.
22 Id. P 44.
23 See 18 CFR 284.288(a), 284.403(a). These
provisions were originally adopted as 18 CFR
284.288(b) and 284.403(b), but were re-ordered
following revisions to those sections arising from
the Commission’s implementation of specific antimanipulation authority granted by the Energy
Policy Act of 2005’s creation of new NGA section
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12. For individuals, the Commission’s
Rules of Practice and Procedure impose
a duty of candor on those appearing
before it: ‘‘A person appearing before
the Commission or the presiding officer
must conform to the standards of ethical
conduct required of practitioners before
the Courts of the United States.’’ 24 The
minimum such standard is found in
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that any
submission to the court impliedly
certifies that factual or legal
representations made therein have a
reasonable basis in fact or law ‘‘to the
best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances.’’ 25 Practitioners before
the Courts of the United States are also
bound by the ethical rules of any bar of
which they are a member. The
American Bar Association’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, upon
which numerous state bar rules are
based, provide, among other things, that
‘‘a lawyer shall not knowingly make a
false statement of fact or law to a
tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer.’’ 26 In addition to the explicit
prohibition against ‘‘knowingly’’ making
false statements, the official comments
that accompany the Model Rules make
clear that the lawyer is required to
exercise due diligence to ensure, under
certain circumstances, that the
information provided is not false or
misleading.27
13. Under 18 CFR 1c.1(a)(2) and
1c.2(a)(2), it is unlawful, in connection
with jurisdictional natural gas and
electric transactions, ‘‘[t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not
4A. See Amends. to Codes of Conduct for
Unbundled Sales Srv. & for Persons Holding
Blanket Mktg. Certificates, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 70 FR 72090 (Dec. 1, 2005), 113 FERC
¶ 61,189 (2005); Amends. to Codes of Conduct for
Unbundled Sales Serv. & for Persons Holding
Blanket Mktg. Certificates, Order No. 673, 71 FR
9709 (Feb. 27, 2006), 114 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2006).
24 18 CFR 385.2101(c). ‘‘Person’’ in this context is
not confined to attorneys, as non-attorneys may also
appear before the Commission. 18 CFR 385.2101(a).
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
26 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1).
27 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 cmt. 3
(‘‘an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer’s own
knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in
a statement in open court, may properly be made
only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true
or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably
diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where
failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an
affirmative misrepresentation.’’).
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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 155 / Friday, August 12, 2022 / Proposed Rules
misleading.’’ 28 Order No. 670 explained
that these regulations did not adopt a
general affirmative duty of disclosure,
but applied to communications whether
they are voluntary or required.29
Moreover, false statements by
themselves are not actionable under the
regulation. Rather, there is a violation
only ‘‘if all of the other elements of a
violation are present’’ (including
scienter).30
14. Federal law, in fact, contemplates
criminal sanctions for intentionally false
statements made to any branch of the
United States Government, including
the Commission. Under 18 U.S.C.
1001(a), individuals who ‘‘in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the
Government . . . make any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement
or representation’’ can be fined or
imprisoned for up to five years.
However, the Commission has no
authority to prosecute such violations.
15. Taken as a whole, these statutory
and regulatory provisions create
obligations for candor in various
communications made to or before the
Commission in a variety of
circumstances. But these obligations are
individually limited.
B. 18 CFR 35.41(b)
16. We believe that existing § 35.41(b)
can form the basis for a broader rule that
applies to a wider range of
communications in the Commission’s
regulation of the electric, natural gas,
and oil industries and markets.31
Section 35.41(b) of the Commission’s
regulations prohibits false statements
made by entities who have sought or
obtained electric market-based rate
authority. The provision currently
provides that a Seller must provide
accurate and factual information and
not submit false or misleading
28 18
CFR 1c.1(a)(2), 1c.2(a)(2).
of Energy Mkt. Manipulation, Order
No. 670, 71 FR 4244 (Jan. 26, 2006), 114 FERC
¶ 61,047, at PP 35–37, 41–42 (2006).
30 Id. P 41.
31 In 2016, the Commission proposed a new rule
requiring virtual traders and financial transmission
rights (FTR) traders to report certain information
about their legal and financial connections to other
entities (i.e., connected entity information). The
Commission also proposed to extend the § 35.41(b)
duty of candor to these traders. See Data Collection
for Analytics & Surveillance & Mkt.-Based Rate
Purposes, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 81 FR
51726 (Aug. 4, 2016), 156 FERC ¶ 61,045, at PP 44–
48 (2016). The Commission ultimately declined to
adopt this part of the rule. See Data Collection for
Analytics & Surveillance & Mkt.-Based Rate
Purposes, Order No. 860, 84 FR 36390 (July 26,
2019), 168 FERC ¶ 61,039, at P 4 & Glick dissenting
at n.6 (2019). However, the Commission transferred
the record to Docket No. AD19–17–000 for possible
additional consideration in the future of a
requirement to provide connected entity
information to the Commission. Id. P 184.
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information, or omit material
information, in any communication
with the Commission, with
Commission-approved market monitors,
with Commission-approved regional
transmission organizations, with
Commission-approved independent
system operators, or with jurisdictional
transmission providers, unless the
Seller exercises due diligence to prevent
such occurrences.
17. In the aftermath of the Western
Energy Crisis, the Commission found
that dishonest and abusive practices by
Sellers with market-based rate authority
led to unjust and unreasonable rates.32
It also found that market-based rate
Sellers were under an implicit duty not
to engage in fraudulent or deceptive
conduct.33 When it instituted Market
Behavior Rule 3 (later codified as 18
CFR 35.41(b)), the Commission
explained that ‘‘[t]he integrity of the
processes established by the
Commission for open competitive
markets rely on the openness and
honesty of market participant
communications.’’ 34 The Commission
adopted the Market Behavior Rules for
Sellers with market-based rate authority
through its ratemaking authority under
FPA 206.35 The Commission found that
Sellers’ existing tariffs and
authorizations, without clearlydelineated rules of the road to govern
market participant conduct, were unjust
and unreasonable. Without such
behavioral prohibitions, the
Commission found that it would not be
able to ensure that rates are the product
32 See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of
Energy & Ancillary Servs., 65 FR 67040 (Nov. 8,
2000), 93 FERC ¶ 61,121, at 61,349 (2000) (finding
‘‘that the electric market structure and market rules
. . . are seriously flawed and that these structures
and rules . . . have caused, and continue to have
the potential to cause, unjust and unreasonable
rates . . . .’’); Ord. Establishing Refund Effective
Date and Proposing to Revise Mrkt.-Based Rate
Tariffs & Authorizations, 66 FR 59241 (Nov. 27,
2001), 97 FERC ¶ 61,220, at 61,974 (2001)
(instituting a proceeding under FPA section 206 ‘‘to
investigate the justness and reasonableness of the
terms and conditions of market-based rate tariffs
and authorizations’’ in the wake of market abuses);
Investigation of Terms & Conditions of Pub. Util.
Mkt.-Based Rate Authorizations, 68 FR 40924 (July
9, 2003), 103 FERC ¶ 61,349, at P 5 (2003)
(proposing to amend the requirements of marketbased rate authority ‘‘to provide clearly-delineated
‘rules of the road’ to market-based rate sellers while,
at the same time, not impairing the Commission’s
ability to provide remedies for market abuses whose
precise form and nature cannot be envisioned
today’’); Ord. Amending Mkt.-Based Rate Tariffs &
Authorizations, 68 FR 65902 (Nov. 24, 2003), 105
FERC ¶ 61,218 (2003) (amending requirements for
market-based rate authority by adding Market
Behavior Rules after notice and comment).
33 Enron Power Mktg, Inc., 102 FERC ¶ 61,316, at
P 8.
34 Ord. Amending Mkt.-Based Rate Tariffs &
Authorizations, 105 FERC ¶ 61,218 at P 107.
35 16 U.S.C. 824e.
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49787
of competitive forces and thus would
remain within a zone of reasonableness.
It further found that its Market Behavior
Rules ‘‘will help ensure that rates are
the product of competitive forces and
thus remain just and reasonable.’’ 36
18. The duty of candor adopted in 18
CFR 35.41(b) has been upheld by the
courts. For example, in Kourouma, the
D.C. Circuit upheld the provision’s
constitutionality against a challenge
based on alleged vagueness and lack of
fair notice.37 In Coaltrain, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio upheld the Commission’s
authority to promulgate § 35.41(b) under
FPA section 206 and found that the
Commission properly applied § 35.41(b)
to statements made in investigations.38
The court also rejected the argument
that, in adding section 221 to the FPA
related to false reports to index
publishers, Congress ‘‘intended to
narrowly circumscribe FERC’s authority
[to prohibit false statements], limiting it
to highly specific statements in the price
reporting area.’’ 39
19. Although § 35.41(b) has been an
effective tool to ensure the accuracy of
communications by Sellers (i.e., persons
which have sought or obtained
Commission-approved market-based
rate authority pursuant to FPA 205),
there are a number of limitations that
constrict its application and highlight
the inconsistent levels of accuracy
required of various entities in
connection with different activities
subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.
C. Limitations of the Existing Duty of
Candor Rules
20. As the above discussion
demonstrates, the Commission has
adopted a variety of duties of candor
regarding communications made to it as
well as to other entities, but it has not
adopted a standardized requirement
affecting all types of communications
related to matters subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.
21. Moreover, for many
communications made to the
Commission, and organizations upon
which the Commission relies in carrying
out its statutory responsibilities, there is
no explicit requirement that such
36 Ord. Amending Pub. Util. Mkt.-Based Rate
Tariffs & Authorizations, 68 FR 65902 (Nov. 24,
2003), 105 FERC ¶ 61,218, at P 3.
37 Kourouma v. FERC, 723 F.3d 274, 278–79 (D.C.
Cir. 2013). Kourouma also confirmed that the
regulation did not require that the communicating
entity have an intent to make a false statement. Id.
38 FERC v. Coaltrain Energy, L.P., No. 2:16–cv–
732, 2018 WL 7892222, at *24–27 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
30, 2018).
39 Id. at *26 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
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communications be accurate. For
example, the truth of statements made
in most filings to the Commission are
limited to the signing attorney’s
knowledge—not the underlying truth of
the statements made, or the care with
which they were determined to be
truthful. In many circumstances, there is
no requirement that care be taken that
communications to the Commission or
its staff are indeed truthful (e.g., in
filings, during investigations, in
procedural communications, and during
uncontested proceedings).
22. Similarly, absent a restriction
contained in a tariff provision, there
may be no explicit requirement of
candor for various important
communications fundamental to the
functioning of a market that produces
just and reasonable rates: for example,
communications from shippers to
interstate pipelines, from transmission
customers to transmission utilities, from
transmission utilities to independent
system operators (ISOs) or regional
transmission organizations (RTOs), and
from wholesale demand response
participants to ISOs, RTOs, or
transmission providers. Even
intentional miscommunications may not
be explicitly prohibited by our
regulations, unless made pursuant to a
violation of the Commission’s AntiManipulation Rule under part 1c of the
Commission’s regulations.
II. Discussion
23. The Commission proposes to
adopt a new part 1d within title 18 of
the Code of Federal Regulations to
require that entities ensure the accuracy
of communications related to a matter
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction
when communicating with the
following entities: the Commission,
Commission-approved market monitors,
Commission-approved RTOs,
Commission-approved ISOs,
jurisdictional transmission or
transportation providers, or the Electric
Reliability Organization and its
associated Regional Entities. Ensuring
the accuracy of such communications
will increase confidence in
Commission-jurisdictional industries
and markets and will improve the
Commission’s ability to meet its
statutory responsibilities. The integrity
and effectiveness of the Commission’s
regulatory oversight and decisionmaking authority rely on and require
accuracy in communications to each of
these entities.
24. To this end, the Commission
proposes to adopt a requirement that
every entity must provide accurate and
factual information and not submit false
or misleading information, or omit
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material information, in any
communication with the Commission or
with a range of other organizations
including Commission-approved market
monitors, Commission-approved RTOs
and ISOs, as well as jurisdictional
transmission or transportation
providers, or the Electric Reliability
Organization and its associated Regional
Entities, where such communication
relates to a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, unless
the entity exercises due diligence to
prevent such occurrences.
25. In the following sections, we
discuss: (A) why a broad duty of candor
requirement is needed to protect
Commission-jurisdictional industries
and markets; (B) the Commission’s,
Sellers’, and the courts’ favorable
experience with application of 18 CFR
35.41(b); (C) the statutory authorities
supporting the proposed rule; and (D)
interpretive guidance for the proposed
rule and how it will be applied.
A. The Need for a Broad Duty of Candor
26. It is indisputable that
communications related to matters
subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission should be complete,
honest, and accurate in order for the
Commission to effectively carry out its
regulatory responsibilities. The
Commission, and equally the
organizations upon which the
Commission relies to carry out its
statutory responsibilities, need
complete, honest, and accurate
information to make important policy
and economic decisions affecting the
fairness, competitiveness, and reliability
of markets. Submission of false or
misleading information, or omission of
material information—whether
intentionally or reckless—could lead the
Commission to reach decisions that it
otherwise would not have made, such as
erroneously approving or denying (1)
requests to construct and operate
infrastructure projects, (2) applications
for merger or consolidation of
jurisdictional electric facilities, (3)
applications for market-based rate
authority, or (4) requests to revise tariff
provisions. Likewise, submission of
false or misleading information, or
omission of material information could
inhibit the Commission’s ability to
ensure that the rates, terms, and
conditions of service of natural gas and
oil pipelines and public utilities are just
and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.
Similarly, it could lead the Commission
or its staff to close an investigation that
should continue, or to adopt policies
that are ineffective. The submission of
false or misleading information, or
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omission of material information could
lead an ISO or RTO to make decisions
that jeopardize competition, fairness,
and reliability of electric markets, and
that potentially harm market
participants and cause them to lose
confidence that markets are working
fairly and producing results consistent
with market rules and fundamentals.
False information could also result in an
interstate gas pipeline misallocating
capacity.
27. We recognize that
communications in markets as large,
complex, and active as those the
Commission regulates will sometimes
include inadvertent errors or oversights.
Identifying and punishing all mistaken
communications, or expending undue
resources to prevent every error, is both
impractical and unnecessary.
28. We believe, therefore, that a
balance must be struck between the
need for accurate information and the
burden of ensuring the accuracy of that
information. Based on the Commission’s
experience with its existing regulations
(especially 18 CFR 35.41(b)), we believe
that a duty of candor should apply to:
(1) all entities, including both
organizations and individuals; (2)
communications to the Commission and
to certain other specified organizations
that administer, participate in, or
operate markets and facilities subject to
the Commission’s jurisdiction; and (3)
communications related to a matter
subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission. However, no entity should
be penalized or otherwise sanctioned for
inaccurate communications where due
diligence has been exercised to ensure
the communications’ accuracy.40 In
addition, consistent with the need to
exercise due diligence, it should be
clear that intentional or reckless
miscommunications are never
permissible.
29. We believe that the duty of candor
rule proposed herein will provide
clarity that benefits the industries and
markets the Commission regulates. If an
entity communicates with the
Commission or one of the other
specified organizations identified in the
regulation, it will know or be on notice
that it must exercise due diligence in all
its communications related to a matter
subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.
40 It is the Commission’s expectation that any
entity providing inaccurate information would,
upon discovery, provide corrections as
expeditiously as possible, whether due diligence
had been previously exercised or not. However, in
the event such initiative were not exercised, the
Commission could require that corrective actions be
undertaken irrespective of whether it also pursues
sanctions for a duty of candor violation.
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30. Notwithstanding the potential
adoption of this proposed regulation, we
are not proposing to remove other duties
of candor from our existing regulations.
Those duties of candor and that
proposed here are not inconsistent.
Further, we note that the proposed rule,
if adopted, would not impose a general
affirmative duty of disclosure, but
would apply to communications
whether they are voluntary or
required.41
31. Providing inaccurate information
to entities not named in the proposed
regulation is also potentially
problematic and may be actionable
under other statutes and regulations in
certain circumstances (e.g., intentional
misrepresentations may form the basis
for enforcement action under 18 CFR
part 1c). We welcome comment on
whether the scope of communications
subject to the proposed duty of candor
is adequate or should be expanded.
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B. 18 CFR 35.41(b) Provides a Fair Basis
for a Broader Duty of Candor
32. We propose to adopt a duty of
candor rule that is based upon the
existing duty of candor rule in 18 CFR
35.41(b). Since adoption of the Market
Behavior Rules twenty years ago, the
accuracy of communications by Sellers
has improved substantially. While
§ 35.41(b) is likely not the only reason
for this improvement, we believe that
Sellers understand the regulation and
generally attempt to comply with it. The
Commission now has an abundance of
experience and precedent applying
§ 35.41(b), which has been upheld in
court as described above. We intend for
this experience to inform the
application of this proposed new rule,
which is substantially similar in form
and function, albeit broader in
application.
33. Although the Commission’s focus
in adopting § 35.41(b) was Sellers with
market-based rate authority, we find
that the rule’s underlying rationale—
that the Commission cannot rely on
market mechanisms to generate just and
reasonable outcomes if those
mechanisms have been undermined by
inaccurate information—applies more
broadly.
34. In fact, implicit in any
Commission order is the presumption
that representations made to the
Commission and others are complete,
accurate, and free of fraud, deception, or
misrepresentation. Similarly, actions
taken by market participants are taken
41 This clarification is similar to the clarification
the Commission adopted for the candor
requirements discussed in Order No. 670. See Order
No. 670, 114 FERC ¶ 61,047 at PP 35–37, 41–42.
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with the understanding that the
underlying information provided to
them is accurate. One court described
§ 35.41 as aimed at ‘‘ensur[ing] the
integrity and smooth functioning of the
markets.’’ 42 A broader requirement
imposing a duty of candor will serve the
same purpose across more of our
regulated industries and markets. The
Commission has explained that ‘‘[t]he
integrity of the processes established by
the Commission for open competitive
markets rely on the openness and
honesty of market participant
communications.’’ 43 The Commission
cannot exercise its regulatory authority
effectively and appropriately if entities
can provide the Commission, or other
organizations upon which the
Commission relies, with inaccurate
information with impunity.
C. Authority for the Proposed Rule
35. The Commission has broad
statutory authority, described below, to
issue rules and regulations to allow it to
effectively perform its regulatory
functions. This authority includes the
power to require accurate
communications from those who choose
to engage in Commission-jurisdictional
markets or who communicate to the
Commission about those markets. The
Commission has previously
implemented specific duty of candor
regulations under this broad authority
and it similarly has the authority to
adopt a more generally applicable duty
of candor.44
36. The Commission has the statutory
obligation under such statutes as the
FPA, NGA, ICA, NGPA, and the
Administrative Procedure Act to ensure
that wholesale rates, and rules or
practices directly affecting such rates,
42 Kourouma,
723 F.3d at 276.
Amending Mkt.-Based Rate Tariffs &
Authorizations, 105 FERC ¶ 61,218 at P 107.
44 If an agency can require communications or if
it acts as a gatekeeper to participation in matters
subject to the agency’s jurisdiction, it can require
candor in communications related to those matters.
See, e.g., SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1112–113
(9th Cir. 2016) (rule under Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requiring corporate officers to certify financial
statements includes implicit truthfulness
requirement; SEC may bring enforcement action for
certifying false financial statements); U.S. v.
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991)
(requirement under section 13(d)(1) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to file form disclosing stock
ownership creates duty to file truthfully and
completely; criminal penalties may be imposed for
violating duty); Completeness and Accuracy of
Information, 52 FR 49362 at 49365 (Dec. 1987)
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission stating ‘‘[i]t is
inconceivable that Congress would have established
the broad regulatory authority in the Atomic Energy
Act, which is considered unique, and not granted
sufficient authority for the Commission to require
communications, regardless of the format, to be
complete and accurate.’’ (citation omitted)).
43 Ord.
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49789
are just and reasonable,45 and that its
own actions are based on reasoned
decision-making. Introducing incorrect
or inaccurate information into the
Commission’s decision-making process
can lead to uneconomic, unfair, unjust,
unreasonable, or even dangerous
outcomes regarding many areas within
the Commission’s jurisdictional
authority, including transmission and
transportation decisions, hydroelectric
licensing and operations, pipeline
approval and operations, electric
reliability, and enforcement actions. The
current patchwork of requirements is
insufficient to encompass all the
situations in which the Commission
must be assured that it is receiving
accurate communications that are
necessary for it to adequately conduct
its regulatory oversight.
37. The following authorities support
the Commission’s issuance of the
proposed regulation:
• FPA 206, NGA 5, and ICA 13 and
15. As was the case with our adoption
of 18 CFR 35.41, we believe that FPA
206 and the parallel provisions in the
NGA and ICA provide a basis for
adoption of the proposed regulation
because information in our markets
must be accurate to ensure that
wholesale rates, and rules or practices
directly affecting such rates are just and
reasonable.
• FPA 307, NGA 14, and ICA 12(1)(a).
Section 307 of the FPA and parallel
section 14 of the NGA permit the
Commission to obtain information
needed to conduct investigations.
Section 12(1)(a) of the ICA similarly
permits the Commission to obtain
information about the management and
business of oil pipelines. Given the
Commission’s authority to obtain
information, it follows that the
Commission should be entitled to
receive accurate information.
• FPA 309, NGA 16, NGPA 501(a),
and Department of Energy Organization
Act 402(a)(2) and 402(h). These sections
give broad authority to the Commission
to adopt regulations that are necessary
or proper to effectuate its regulatory
obligations. The Commission and the
markets it regulates cannot function
properly without the submission of
accurate information.
• FPA 215. Section 215 conveys to
the Commission, the Electric Reliability
Organization, and Regional Entities the
duties to obtain information and act
upon that information. These
obligations cannot be fulfilled without
45 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 577 U.S.
260, 277–78 (2016).
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communication of accurate
information.46
• NGPA 311(c). Section 311(c)
permits the Commission to prescribe
terms and conditions to transportation
authorizations under NGPA 311. One
such condition can be to require that
section 311 pipelines provide accurate
information in their submissions to the
Commission.
• ICA 1(5)(a). Transportation charges
must be just and reasonable and charges
based upon incorrect information are
not just and reasonable.
38. We welcome comments on the
Commission’s authority to implement
the proposed regulation.
D. Interpretive Guidance and
Application of the Proposed Rule
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39. To facilitate comment on the
proposed regulation, we provide the
following clarifications and expand
upon some aspects of the proposed
regulation. We welcome comments and
requests for further clarification, as
needed, on these points.47
40. The proposed regulation utilizes
the term ‘‘entity’’ because we believe
that covered communications (i.e., those
that relate to a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission) from all
types of organizations, as well as from
individuals (or, where appropriate,
concurrently from both), should reflect
accurate and factual information, and
should not reflect false or misleading
information or omit material
information. The term ‘‘entity’’ applies
to both the entity making the
communication as well as the entity
responsible for the communication.
Thus, if an entity relies upon a nonemployee agent for the submission of a
communication, the principal would
not escape application of the regulation,
46 See Rules Concerning Certification of the Elec.
Reliability Org. & Procs. for the Establishment,
Approval, & Enforcement of Elec. Reliability
Standards, Order No. 672, 71 FR 8662 (Feb. 17,
2006), 114 FERC ¶ 61,104, at P 114, order on reh’g,
Order No. 672–A, 71 FR 19814 (Apr. 18, 2006), 114
FERC ¶ 61,328 (2006) (‘‘to fulfill its obligations
under this Final Rule, the ERO or a Regional Entity
will need access to certain data from users, owners
and operators of the Bulk-Power System. Further,
the Commission will need access to such
information as is necessary to fulfill its oversight
and enforcement roles under the statute’’); 18 CFR
39.2(d) (‘‘[e]ach user, owner or operator of the BulkPower System within the United States . . . shall
provide the Commission, the Electric Reliability
Organization and the applicable Regional Entity
such information as is necessary to implement
section 215 of the Federal Power Act’’).
47 We note that the dissent calls for comments on
multiple aspects of the proposed rule. We also
encourage such comments. We believe that our
consideration of the proposed rule, like all notice
and comment rulemakings, will be enhanced by
robust comments from a wide variety of interested
parties.
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absent a showing of due diligence.48
Although the rule as proposed applies
to all entities, we seek comment on
whether there are specific types of
organizations or individuals who should
be exempted from the proposed
regulation.
41. Further, we intend to interpret the
term ‘‘communication’’ broadly,
including informal and formal
communications, verbal or written, and
via any method that may be used for
transmission. We also intend to
interpret the term ‘‘Commission’’ under
this provision to include
communications to Commission staff.
Communications to the other listed
entities include communications to
individuals employed or acting on
behalf of those entities, including agents
and contractors of the covered entities.
42. The proposed regulation applies
to communications that relate to a
matter subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission. Communications that are
tangential or unrelated to matters
subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission are not covered by the
proposed regulation. For example, the
proposed regulation typically would not
apply to communications about
contracts for general services with
jurisdictional entities or employee/
employer disputes within a
jurisdictional entity.
43. The exercise of due diligence
would be a defense to an alleged
violation of the proposed regulation.
The concept of due diligence is well
developed in the context of duties of
candor and the Commission and courts
have precedent applying this defense.49
48 A
common example occurs in communications
to the Commission where a company submits a
document through its outside counsel. In such a
circumstance, both the company and counsel
should exercise ‘‘due diligence’’ to ensure the
accuracy. Of course, due diligence for counsel in
such circumstances likely will simply amount to
ensuring that it has no reason to believe the falsity
of the information provided. The responsible
company would bear a greater burden to ensure the
communication’s accuracy.
49 See, e.g., FERC v. Coaltrain, 501 F. Supp. 3d
503, 526 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (‘‘A Seller can avoid
liability for a violation if it shows it had a process
to ensure the accuracy of its responses.’’ (citation
omitted)); id. at 527 (‘‘Coaltrain can avoid liability
if it shows that it conducted a reasonable
investigation to make sure it produced the relevant
and material information and followed a process to
ensure the accuracy of its responses.’’); Kourouma,
723 F.3d at 278 (‘‘Contrary to Kourouma’s assertion,
so read, Market Behavior Rule 3 does not subject
filers like Kourouma to strict liability, but reserves
punishment for those who do not act with requisite
care when submitting information to FERC.’’);
Kourouma, 135 FERC ¶ 61,245, at P 21 (2011)
(‘‘submission of false or incomplete information on
behalf of a seller by an individual that did not
personally know it to be false or incomplete in the
absence of a process to insure data accuracy and
sufficiency will not excuse the seller’s conduct
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We intend for due diligence to include
all relevant facts related to whether
reasonable steps were taken by the
communicator(s) to ensure the accuracy
and completeness of a communication
in light of all of the circumstances.
Many facts will bear upon consideration
of a due diligence defense including,
but not limited to, whether a
communication had to be made without
sufficient time for additional diligence
to be undertaken, the importance and
materiality of the communication to the
recipient, the duration and consistency
of the communication at issue, whether
the communication was voluntary or
required, whether the communication
was in response to a specific request for
information or was unsolicited, the size
and sophistication of the
communicator(s), and the
communication’s effect on the
marketplace or the Commission’s
regulatory responsibilities.
44. We recognize that the bestintentioned entities may, and
occasionally will, inadvertently provide
inaccurate information. Even where due
diligence cannot be demonstrated, it is
not the Commission’s intention to
investigate or penalize all potential
violations of the proposed regulation.
As a general matter, we do not intend
to penalize inadvertent errors,
especially those of limited scope and
impact. The Commission retains
discretion not to pursue enforcement
actions in such instances and will
exercise that discretion, as appropriate,
in implementing the proposed
regulation, as the Commission does with
all other Commission regulations.
III. Information Collection Statement
45. Regulations of the Office and
Management and Budget (OMB)
implementing the Paperwork Reduction
Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 through
3520) require Federal agencies to obtain
approval from the OMB before
conducting or sponsoring certain
collections of information requirements
imposed by agency rule.50 This
proposed rule would not impose any
new or modified information
collections. Moreover, the substance of
the communications that would be
affected by the proposed rule has been
approved by OMB. Therefore, OMB
review of this proposed rule under the
PRA is not required.
IV. Environmental Analysis
46. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
under the rule.’’ (internal citations and quotations
omitted)).
50 See 5 CFR 1320.3(c)(4)(i).
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or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.51 The Commission has
categorically excluded certain actions
from this requirement as not having a
significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion
are rules that include information
collection or that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not
substantially change the effect of the
regulations being amended.52 The
actions proposed herein fall within
these categorical exclusions in the
Commission’s regulations.
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V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
47. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 53 generally requires a
description and analysis of proposed
rules that will have significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The
Commission intends to pose the least
possible burden on all entities both
large and small.
48. Although this NOPR applies to
many types of entities, including small
entities, the burden associated with
proposed regulation should be minimal.
We expect that almost all entities
regularly communicate with the
Commission and jurisdictional actors
with accuracy and honesty. We also
believe that such communications
already regularly occur with due
diligence exercised and, thus, there
should be no new burdens associated
with the proposed rule on small entities.
Further, due diligence for a small entity
will often be different than for an entity
with more resources and the proposed
regulation accommodates these
differences in resources. Therefore, the
proposed regulation does not appear to
pose a significant change to small
entities.
VI. Comment Procedures
49. The Commission invites interested
persons to submit comments on the
matters and issues proposed in this
notice to be adopted, including any
related matters or alternative proposals
that commenters may wish to discuss.
Comments are due October 11, 2022.
Comments must refer to Docket No.
RM22–20–000, and must include the
commenter’s name, the organization
they represent, if applicable, and
address in their comments. All
comments will be placed in the
51 Reguls. Implementing the Nat’l Env. Pol’y Act
of 1969, Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17,
1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987) (crossreferenced at 41 FERC ¶ 61,284).
52 18 CFR 380.4(a)(5) and (a)(2)(ii).
53 5 U.S.C. 601–12.
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Commission’s public files and may be
viewed, printed, or downloaded
remotely as described in the Document
Availability section below. Commenters
on this proposal are not required to
serve copies of their comments on other
commenters.
50. The Commission encourages
comments to be filed electronically via
the eFiling link on the Commission’s
website at https://www.ferc.gov. The
Commission accepts most standard
word processing formats. Documents
created electronically using word
processing software must be filed in
native applications or print-to-PDF
format and not in a scanned format.
Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
51. Commenters that are not able to
file comments electronically may file an
original of their comment by USPS mail
or by courier-or other delivery services.
For submission sent via USPS only,
filings should be mailed to: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Office
of the Secretary, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426. Submission of
filings other than by USPS should be
delivered to: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 12225 Wilkins Avenue,
Rockville, MD 20852.
VII. Document Availability
52. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the internet through the
Commission’s Home Page (https://
www.ferc.gov). At this time, the
Commission has suspended access to
the Commission’s Public Reference
Room due to the President’s March 13,
2020 proclamation declaring a National
Emergency concerning the Novel
Coronavirus Disease (COVID–19).
53. From the Commission’s Home
Page on the internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of
this document is available on eLibrary
in PDF and Microsoft Word format for
viewing, printing, and/or downloading.
To access this document in eLibrary,
type the docket number excluding the
last three digits of this document in the
docket number field.
User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the Commission’s website
during normal business hours from the
Commission’s Online Support at 202–
502–6652 (toll free at 1–866–208–3676)
or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov,
or the Public Reference Room at (202)
502–8371, TTY (202)502–8659. Email
the Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
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49791
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 1d
Administrative practice and
procedure.
By direction of the Commission.
Commissioner Danly is dissenting with a
separate statement attached.
Issued: July 28, 2022.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Commission proposes to add part 1d to
title 18 of the Code of Federal
Regulations to read as follows:
PART 1d—DUTY OF CANDOR
Sec.
1d.1
Accuracy of communications.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7101–7352; 5 U.S.C.
Ch. 5; E.O. 12009, 42 FR 46267, 3 CFR, 1978
Comp., p. 142.
§ 1d.1
Accuracy of communications.
Any entity must provide accurate and
factual information and not submit false
or misleading information, or omit
material information, in any
communication with the Commission,
Commission-approved market monitors,
Commission-approved regional
transmission organizations,
Commission-approved independent
system operators, jurisdictional
transmission or transportation
providers, or the Electric Reliability
Organization and its associated Regional
Entities, where such communication
relates to a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, unless
the entity exercises due diligence to
prevent such occurrences.
Note: The following appendix will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Appendix—Commissioner James P.
Danly’s Dissent
United States of America Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission
Duty of Candor
Docket No. RM22–20–000 (Issued July 28,
2022)
DANLY, Commissioner, dissenting:
1. I dissent from this notice of proposed
rulemaking seeking to extend the duty of
candor—which currently applies to ‘‘Sellers’’
in electric markets 1—to ‘‘any entity’’ in ‘‘any
communication’’—or lack of
communication—associated with any
‘‘matter subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.’’ 2 This expands the duty of
candor well beyond current Commission
1 18
CFR 35.41(b).
of Candor, 180 FERC ¶ 61,052, at proposed
1d.1 (2022) (NOPR).
2 Duty
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practices.3 Knowledge or intent does not
matter. The materiality of the erroneous
statement does not matter. The powers we
propose to grant ourselves in this rulemaking
are so broad and the standards so vague that,
if finalized, it would be a simple proposition
for the Commission to ‘‘find’’ that any
factually untrue statement, regardless of
context, violates the duty of candor, exposing
the speaker to sanctions. And rather than
establish guard rails or explicit limits to our
powers, we instead say ‘‘just trust us.’’ This
proposal is chillingly broad in its scope and,
by its plain terms, would encompass
constitutionally protected speech.
2. Much of what the Commission and our
jurisdictional entities routinely do involves
‘‘ ‘matter[s] of political, social, or other
concern to the community’ or . . . ‘is a
subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public.’ ’’ 4 Speech on such
matters ‘‘ ‘occupies the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is
entitled to special protection.’ ’’ 5 Precisely
because of the public import of the matters
subject to its jurisdiction, the Commission, at
the direction of Congress, is encouraging
greater public participation in its
proceedings. Unwary members of the public,
taking up our offer to engage the Commission
(or the listed jurisdictional entities) in a
manner they would doubtless believe is
civically virtuous, could—by the plain
language of this rulemaking—be subject to
liability. The very possibility of such
sanctions goes well beyond a reasonable
attempt to deter falsehoods and will instead
chill speech at the core of the First
Amendment’s protections.
3. The obvious question in response is
what is the harm in simply extending the
existing duty of candor? Would it not seem
to make sense that people should tell the
truth when conducting Commission-related
activities? Is it not true that no court has held
the existing duty of candor unlawful? 6 The
answer is that the proposed rule
encompasses a far greater range of activities
by a far greater number of speakers than the
existing duty of candor and does so without
3 See Prohibition of Energy Mkt. Manipulation,
Order No. 670, 114 FERC ¶ 61,047, at P 49, reh’g
denied, 114 FERC ¶ 61,300 (2006).
4 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011)
(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146
(1983); San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84
(2004)).
5 Id. at 452 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
at 145).
6 In Kourouma v. FERC, the court dismissed a
vagueness challenge to Market Behavior Rule 3,
which the court characterizes as ‘‘reserv[ing]
punishment for those who do not act with requisite
care when submitting information to FERC.’’ 723
F.3d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The current rule,
however, is distinguishable because of its much
broader scope. It applies to ‘‘any entity,’’ i.e., any
member of the public who engages in a FERCrelated communication with a covered entity, and
not just ‘‘sellers,’’ who could be presumed to be
relatively sophisticated actors, and applies far
beyond the scope of sharing information with FERC
in required filings. It is at least reasonable to put
the onus on sellers to engage in ‘‘due diligence,’’
when communicating with the Commission. The
Commission cannot, therefore, assume a similar
result should this rule, as broadly drafted as it is,
be reviewed in the courts.
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standards of materiality or intent, or a clearly
defined safe harbor to protect the unwary
from liability.
4. The proposed duty of candor provides
that:
Any entity must provide accurate and
factual information and not submit false or
misleading information, or omit material
information, in any communication with the
Commission, Commission-approved market
monitors, Commission-approved regional
transmission organizations, Commissionapproved independent system operators,
jurisdictional transmission or transportation
providers, or the Electric Reliability
Organization and its associated Regional
Entities, where such communication relates
to a matter subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, unless the entity exercises due
diligence to prevent such occurrences.7
5. So, for example, under the plain
language of this provision, the Commission
could find a violation of the duty of candor
if a landowner (‘‘entity’’) exaggerates a
complaint (‘‘submit[s] . . . misleading
information’’) in an email to the pipeline
developer with a right-of-way on her land
(‘‘in any communication with . . .
jurisdictional transmission or transportation
providers’’). What if the landowner is angry
about construction noise and says something
like ‘‘I’ve never heard such a racket,’’ but in
fact she had heard such a racket at a Poison
concert in 1988? Absurd? Yes. Duty of candor
violation? Also, yes.
6. In a recent generic proceeding, a
commenter called claims made in a petition
for rulemaking ‘‘largely defamatory.’’ 8 Were
they? Does the Commission propose to police
such accusations as enforcement matters
when political opponents or, even,
competitors file complaints against each
other?
7. Commission enforcement of such
violations may be unlikely, but the language
the majority uses to reassure the public is
quite alarming and amounts to ‘‘just trust
us’’:
[I]t is not the Commission’s intention to
investigate or penalize all potential violations
of the proposed regulation. As a general
matter, we do not intend to penalize
inadvertent errors, especially those of limited
scope and impact. The Commission retains
discretion not to pursue enforcement actions
in such instances and will exercise that
discretion, as appropriate, in implementing
the proposed regulation, as we do with all
other Commission regulations.9
So, are we to understand that it is the
Commission’s intention to penalize not all
potential violations? Not all leaves a lot of
potential violations. The Commission
promises as a general matter not to prosecute
inadvertent errors, but intent should be an
essential element of the claim. And, when
the Commission states that it ‘‘retains
discretion’’ not to pursue enforcement
actions, it necessarily means that the
Commission also retains discretion to pursue
7 NOPR,
180 FERC ¶ 61,052 at proposed § 1d.1.
Gas Association, Protest, Docket No.
RM21–15–000, at 9 (Apr. 26, 2021).
9 NOPR, 180 FERC ¶ 61,052 at P 44 (emphasis
added).
8 American
PO 00000
Frm 00020
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enforcement actions. Assurances like these
cannot save the proposed rule. For
constitutional purposes, what matters is the
text of the regulation. The Commission
cannot grant itself sweeping discretionary
powers and then tell the public to ‘‘trust us.’’
As the Supreme Court has put it, ‘‘the First
Amendment protects against the
Government; it does not leave us at the mercy
of noblesse oblige.’’ 10
8. In his concurrence in Alvarez, Justice
Breyer describes the danger inherent in an
unbounded authority to police false
statements:
[T]he pervasiveness of false statements,
made for better or for worse motives, made
thoughtlessly or deliberately, made with or
without accompanying harm, provides a
weapon to a government broadly empowered
to prosecute falsity without more. And those
who are unpopular may fear that the
government will use that weapon selectively
. . . .11
9. Given the absence of limiting principles,
this ‘‘duty of candor’’ risks ‘‘broadly
empowering’’ the Commission to turn itself
into a Ministry of Truth, policing the truth
or falsity of an enormous sweep of
communications. The rule is drafted so
broadly that enforcement staff are likely
subject to it. I am sure the subjects of
investigations will appreciate this
commitment to integrity.
10. Experience with the existing duty of
candor suggests that promises of
prosecutorial discretion are in the eye of the
beholder, or in this case, the prosecutor. In
practice, the Office of Enforcement frequently
finds duty of candor violations when it finds
any manipulative act or tariff violation. If a
company is charged with violating an RTO
tariff, duty of candor allegations appear
almost automatic.12
11. There is a sad irony to this rulemaking.
The actual ‘‘candor’’ of communications
within the industry will suffer. Employees at
one utility (‘‘transmission organization’’) will
hesitate to call or email counterparts at
another utility (‘‘transmission organization’’)
without first seeking the advice of counsel to
make sure they have done their ‘‘due
diligence’’ before engaging in ‘‘any
communication.’’ This will deter cooperation
within the industry and is not likely to be
good for anyone.
12. There remain a few obvious questions:
What about penalties? The NOPR says
nothing about what sanctions the
Commission plans to impose for this new
class of violation. Presumably, it will be left
to the Commission’s discretion under its
penalty guidelines 13 or on a ‘‘case-by-case’’
10 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480
(2010).
11 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734
(2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgement).
12 See, e.g., NRG Power Mktg. LLC, 174 FERC
¶ 61,016 (2021) (finding tariff violation and duty of
candor violation arising out of same bidding
behavior); see also id. (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting)
(opposing settlement in circumstances where target
company has little leverage or likelihood of success
against the Office of Enforcement in FERCadministered proceedings).
13 See Enforcement of Statutes, Orders, Rules, &
Regs., 132 FERC ¶ 61,216 (2010); Enforcement of
Statutes, Regs. & Orders, 123 FERC ¶ 61,156 (2008).
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basis as it often is with the existing duty of
candor, at least when other violations are
involved.14
13. As usual, I strongly encourage anyone
with the inclination or an interest in this
proceeding to comment on the issues it
raises.
14. In particular, I ask for comments on the
fundamental question whether the proposed
duty of candor creates Constitutional due
process concerns because it is impermissibly
vague. What conduct, exactly, is prohibited?
Is there any way to cure the void-forvagueness concerns?
15. How would a ‘‘due diligence’’ safe
harbor work for members of the public, like
the concert-going landowner who, in her
communications with one of the listed
entities, may be ‘‘prone to hyperbole’’? Will
the proposal chill public engagement with
FERC and the listed jurisdictional entities?
Should the Office of Public Participation
offer sessions on how to qualify for the safe
harbor when members of the public engage
with RTOs and Utilities? I particularly
encourage consumer advocates to comment
on what the implications of this rule might
be.
16. Further, does the Commission have the
statutory authority to extend the duty of
candor as far as proposed? Does the
Commission’s interest in protecting the
integrity of its proceedings really extend to
‘‘any entity’’ in ‘‘any communication’’
‘‘relate[d] to a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission’’ with the
rule’s range of listed entities?
17. It may be possible to narrow the
proposed duty of candor so that it would not
grant the Commission such sweeping
enforcement powers. I solicit comment on
whether an intent or materiality requirement
would allay concerns that the rule will
impermissibly encompass core First
Amendment protected speech.
18. Another irony: the Commission may be
unlikely to get much candor from the
regulated community in response to this
NOPR. Most companies will be reticent to
file comments in opposition to a proposed
rule of candor. But voicing opposition to an
impermissibly vague and broad rule that
exposes a company to sweeping liability does
not mean that the company supports lying to
the Commission. They should not be
hesitant. I strongly encourage industry
comments and would be particularly
interested in any experience with the
application of the current duty of candor to
the extent any entity is at liberty to discuss
them. I also welcome a thorough analysis of
our existing caselaw to fully judge how the
existing duty of candor has been applied.
19. I look forward to reviewing the full
record. My hope is that it will be sufficient
to persuade the majority not to finalize this
rule. We do not need rules for everything,
especially when they are as problematically
vague and broad as the proposal here.
14 See, e.g., Coaltrain Energy, L.P., 155 FERC
¶ 61,204, at P 292 (2016).
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For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
James P. Danly,
Commissioner.
[FR Doc. 2022–16608 Filed 8–11–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 117
[Docket No. USCG–2022–0299]
RIN 1625–AA09
Drawbridge Operation Regulation; Bay
St. Louis, Bay St. Louis, MS
Coast Guard, DHS.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Coast Guard proposes to
change how the CSX Transportation
railroad drawbridge across Bay St.
Louis, mile 0.5, Bay St. Louis, MS will
operate. The bridge will continue to
open according to the drawbridge
regulations but the bridge tender will
operate this bridge from a remote
location at the CSX railroad terminal in
Mobile, Alabama. We invite your
comments on this proposed rulemaking.
DATES: Comments and relate material
must reach the Coast Guard on or before
October 11, 2022.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
identified by docket number USCG–
2022–0299 using Federal Decision
Making Portal at https://
www.regulations.gov.
See the ‘‘Public Participation and
Request for Comments’’ portion of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section
below for instructions on submitting
comments.
SUMMARY:
If
you have questions on this proposed
rule, call or email Douglas Blakemore,
Eighth Coast Guard District Bridge
Administration Branch Chief at (504)
671–2128 or Douglas.A.Blakemore@
uscg.mil.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Table of Abbreviations
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FR Federal Register
OMB Office of Management and Budget
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(Advance, Supplemental)
§ Section
U.S.C. United States Code
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4702
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49793
II. Background, Purpose and Legal
Basis
The CSX Transportation railroad
drawbridge crosses Bay St. Louis, mile
0.5, Bay St. Louis, MS. The bridge will
continue to open according to the
drawbridge regulations but the bridge
tender will operate this bridge from a
remote location at the CSX railroad
terminal in Mobile, AL. This bridge has
a 13 foot vertical clearance at mean high
water, an unlimited vertical clearance in
the open to vessel position and a 100′
horizontal clearance. The bridge
operates according to 33 CFR 117.5.
CSX Transportation has requested to
operate this bridge remotely from their
railroad terminal in Mobile, AL. A copy
of the bridge owners request can be
found at https://regulations.gov in the
Docket USCG–2022–2099. CSX has
installed a remote operation system at
the bridge and a remote control center,
located in Mobile, AL. At the bridge,
CSX has installed infrared cameras,
closed circuit cameras and TVs,
communication systems and
information technology systems on the
bridge that allow an operator from
Mobile to monitor and control the
bridge.
This NPRM will run simultaneously
with a Test Deviation; under the same
name and docket number. Both
documents can be found at https://
www.regulations.gov and comments can
be to either document.
This CSX drawbridge is located on
Bay St. Louis, mile 0.5, Bay St. Louis,
MS. It has a vertical clearance of 13′ in
the closed to vessel position. The bridge
operates according to 33 CFR 117.5. Bay
St. Louis is used by commercial tows,
barges and recreational vessel. The
bridge opens for vessels about six times
per day and vessels that do not need the
bridge to open may pass.
III. Discussion of Proposed Rule
33 CFR 117.42 sets Coast Guard
drawbridge regulations. This regulation
authorizes the Coast Guard District
Commander to approve operations from
a remote site. The bridge opens on
signal for the passage of vessels in
accordance with 33 CFR 117.5. This
proposed rule will not change the
operating schedule nor will it change
how to request or signal for the bridge
to open. Mariners requiring an opening
may do so by contacting the CSX remote
control center on Channels 13/16 or by
the phone number posted at the bridge.
This proposed rule requires CSX to
have the capability, including resources
and manpower to return the operator to
the bridge location following any of the
below situations:
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[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 155 (Friday, August 12, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 49784-49793]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-16608]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 1d
[Docket No. RM22-20-000]
Duty of Candor
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes
to add a requirement that all entities communicating with the
Commission or other specified organizations related to a matter subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission submit accurate and factual
information and not submit false or misleading information or omit
material information. An entity is shielded from violation of the
regulation if it has exercised due diligence to prevent such
occurrences.
DATES: Comments are due October 11, 2022.
ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed in the
following ways. Electronic filing through https://www.ferc.gov, is
preferred.
Electronic Filing: Documents must be filed in acceptable
native applications and print-to-PDF, but not in scanned or picture
format.
For those unable to file electronically, comments may be
filed by U.S. Postal Service mail or by hand (including courier)
delivery.
[cir] Mail via U.S. Postal Service only: Addressed to: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the Secretary, 888 First Street
NE, Washington, DC 20426.
[cir] For delivery via any other carrier (including courier):
Deliver to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the
Secretary, 12225 Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, MD 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Gabe Sterling, Legal Information Office of Enforcement, Division of
Investigations, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street
NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8891, [email protected].
Andrea Cerbin, Legal Information Office of Enforcement, Division of
Investigations, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street
NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8362, [email protected].
[[Page 49785]]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
Paragraph Nos.
I. Background......................................... 7
A. Existing Duties of Candor...................... 8
B. 18 CFR 35.41(b)................................ 16
C. Limitations of the Existing Duty of Candor 20
Rules............................................
II. Discussion........................................ 23
A. The Need for a Broad Duty of Candor............ 26
B. 18 CFR 35.41(b) Provides a Fair Basis for a 32
Broader Duty of Candor...........................
C. Authority for the Proposed Rule................ 35
D. Interpretive Guidance and Application of the 39
Proposed Rule....................................
III. Information Collection Statement................. 45
IV. Environmental Analysis............................ 46
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis................ 47
VI. Comment Procedures................................ 49
VII. Document Availability............................ 52
1. Pursuant to sections 206, 215, 307, and 309 of the Federal Power
Act (FPA),\1\ sections 5, 14, and 16 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA),\2\
sections 1(5)(a), 12(1)(a), 13, and 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act
(ICA),\3\ sections 311(c) and 501(a) of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 (NGPA),\4\ and sections 402(a)(2) and 402(h) of the Department of
Energy Organization Act,\5\ the Commission proposes to add a new part
1d to title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations to require that any
entity communicating with the Commission or other specified
organizations (as identified below) related to a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission submit accurate and factual information
and not submit false or misleading information, or omit material
information.\6\ However, the Commission proposes that exercising due
diligence to prevent such occurrences would be an affirmative defense
to violations of the requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 16 U.S.C. 824e, 824o, 825f, 825h.
\2\ 15 U.S.C. 717d, 717m, 717o.
\3\ 49 U.S.C. app. 1(5)(a), 12(1)(a), 13, 15.
\4\ 15 U.S.C. 3371(c), 3411(a).
\5\ 42 U.S.C. 7172(a)(2), (h).
\6\ The dissent argues that the rule applies to a ``lack of
communication,'' which is not accurate. While a material omission in
a communication could violate the rule, a lack of communication
would not. As this notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR) explains,
this proposal does not impose a duty of disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. A variety of current Commission regulations prohibit, in defined
circumstances, inaccurate communications to the Commission and other
organizations upon which the Commission relies to carry out its
statutory obligations in the Commission-jurisdictional electric,
natural gas, and oil industries and markets. However, these existing
requirements cover only certain communications and impose a patchwork
of different standards of care for such communications.
3. The Commission relies extensively upon the accuracy of
information provided to it and to other organizations for effective
decision making. Reliance on inaccurate information inhibits the
Commission's regulatory oversight and could lead to substantial harm,
whether it is communicated to the Commission or to the other
organizations upon which the Commission relies to assist it to carry
out its regulatory responsibilities. We are concerned that the
Commission has no explicit requirement that communications related to a
matter subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission be accurate or
even that they not include intentional misrepresentations.
4. We believe that a broadly applicable duty of candor will improve
the Commission's ability to effectively oversee jurisdictional markets
by ensuring the Commission and organizations upon which the Commission
relies base decisions on accurate information. Effective Commission
oversight depends on entities' use of due diligence to reduce the
possibility that false or inaccurate information is communicated to the
Commission and other organizations upon which it relies. Further,
intentional or reckless communication of false or inaccurate
information is always unacceptable.
5. All persons appearing before the Commission and entities
communicating with organizations regulated by the Commission should
know that truthfulness is expected and required, that communications
should be made following due diligence, and that communications should
never be intentionally or recklessly misleading. However, we understand
that there is a balance between ensuring accurate communications and
the burden required to ensure that accuracy. By adopting a flexible
standard, ``due diligence,'' and limiting the relevant communications
to specific recipients related to matters subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission, we expect that such additional burdens, if any,
would be minimal.
6. We seek comment on all aspects of the proposed rule, including
specifically the following: the need for a broad duty of candor rule;
whether 18 CFR 35.41(b) provides a reasonable foundation for the
proposed expanded duty of candor rule; the Commission's authority for
the proposed rule; whether there are categories of entities or
individuals that should be exempted from the duty of candor; the scope
of the communications covered by the rule; and whether the regulation
properly identifies all organizations who assist the Commission to
carry out its statutory obligations and communications to whom should
be subject to a duty of candor.
I. Background
7. Among the existing patchwork of Commission requirements imposing
a duty of candor applicable to some Commission-regulated entities and
markets is 18 CFR 35.41(b), which applies only to ``Sellers'' in
electric markets, defined as a person who has either obtained or
applied for market-based rate authority under the auspices of the
FPA.\7\ The Commission proposes here to adopt a broader regulation
based upon our significant experience with Sec. 35.41(b). By way of
background, we first discuss some of the other duties of candor
applicable to entities within the Commission's jurisdiction. Then, we
[[Page 49786]]
discuss 18 CFR 35.41(b) and its history in greater detail. Then, we
turn to the limitations of these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ A ``Seller'' is ``any person that has authorization to or
seeks authorization to engage in sales for resale of electric
energy, capacity or ancillary services at market-based rates under
section 205 of the Federal Power Act.'' 18 CFR 35.36(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Existing Duties of Candor
8. The Commission has adopted various regulations imposing a duty
of candor for specific types of communications, and the vast majority
of these regulations involve communications to the Commission or
Commission staff. In each instance, the controlling regulation was
adopted as part of specific regulatory requirements or procedures
rather than as a broad requirement applicable to all of the
Commission's oversight responsibilities, including areas where the
Commission relies on other organizations to assist it in exercising its
authorities. This history, discussed in the paragraphs to follow, has
resulted in a limited set of requirements that may fail to ensure that
the Commission can make decisions based on accurate information.
9. For many decades, the Commission's governing statutes and
adopted regulations have required that certain submissions to it be
made under oath and penalty of perjury. For example, FPA 304 requires
that entities submit periodic or annual reports under oath,\8\ FPA
307(a) requires that written statements in investigations be under
oath,\9\ and FPA 4(b) allows the Commission to require certain
hydroelectric-related filings to be submitted under oath.\10\ The NGA
allows submissions under oath in investigations,\11\ periodic forms
must be provided under oath,\12\ and 18 CFR 385.1907 requires
compliance reports to be under oath as well. The provision in 18 CFR
385.2005 (Rule 2005 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedure) requires that any filing with the Commission must be signed
and that a signature constitutes a certificate that the signer knows
the contents are true to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.\13\
Testimony and evidence submitted in proceedings before Commission
Administrative Law Judges must be submitted under oath.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 16 U.S.C. 825c.
\9\ 16 U.S.C. 825f(a).
\10\ 16 U.S.C. 797(b).
\11\ 15 U.S.C. 717m(a).
\12\ 15 U.S.C. 717i(a).
\13\ 18 CFR 385.2005(a).
\14\ See, e.g., 18 CFR 385.506(b), 385.507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. While the authorities referenced above require submissions to
be made under oath, other regulations impose differing obligations for
communications. For example, the Commission has interpreted 18 CFR
157.5 to require applicants under NGA 7 seeking pipeline certificates
of public convenience and necessity to disclose ``fully and
forthrightly . . . all information relevant to the application.'' \15\
NGA 7(d) requires that applications for certificates shall be made in
writing to the Commission, be verified under oath, and ``shall be in
such form, contain such information, and notice thereof shall be served
upon such interested parties and in such manner as the Commissions
shall, by regulation, require.'' \16\ ICA 20(7)(b) prohibits the
knowing and willful filing of any ``false entry'' in any annual or
other report required to be filed under this section.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Black Marlin Pipeline Co., 4 FERC ] 61,039, at 61,088
(1978).
\16\ 15 U.S.C. 717f(d).
\17\ 49 U.S.C. App. 20(7)(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. The Commission also has adopted amendments to blanket sales
certificates ``to ensure the integrity of the natural gas market.''
\18\ Citing staff's findings in its Final Report on the Western Energy
Crisis,\19\ the Commission expressed concerns about attempted
manipulation in the natural gas industry such as ``reporting . . .
false data'' and as a result agreed with staff's recommendation to
``condition natural gas companies' blanket certificates on providing
accurate and honest information to entities that publish price
indices.'' \20\ Acting under NGA 7, the Commission also promulgated
Market Behavior Rules, including rules specifically requiring Sellers
that report their trades to index publishers to ``provide accurate and
factual information and not knowingly submit false or misleading
information or omit material information to any such publisher.'' \21\
As the Commission stated, the candor requirement in the amendments to
natural gas blanket sales certificates was simply to ``be honest and
forthright with the Commission and the institutions it has established
to implement open-access transportation and entities publishing indices
for the purpose of price transparency.'' \22\ These rules remain in
place today.\23\
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\18\ Amendments to Blanket Sales Certificates, Order No. 644, 68
FR 66323 (Nov. 26, 2003), 105 FERC ] 61,217, at P 109 (2003).
\19\ Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets:
Fact-Finding Investigation of Potential Manipulation of Electric and
Gas Prices, Docket No. PA02-2-000 (Mar. 2003).
\20\ Order No. 644, 105 FERC ] 61,217 at P 13.
\21\ Id. P 70.
\22\ Id. P 44.
\23\ See 18 CFR 284.288(a), 284.403(a). These provisions were
originally adopted as 18 CFR 284.288(b) and 284.403(b), but were re-
ordered following revisions to those sections arising from the
Commission's implementation of specific anti-manipulation authority
granted by the Energy Policy Act of 2005's creation of new NGA
section 4A. See Amends. to Codes of Conduct for Unbundled Sales Srv.
& for Persons Holding Blanket Mktg. Certificates, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 70 FR 72090 (Dec. 1, 2005), 113 FERC ] 61,189 (2005);
Amends. to Codes of Conduct for Unbundled Sales Serv. & for Persons
Holding Blanket Mktg. Certificates, Order No. 673, 71 FR 9709 (Feb.
27, 2006), 114 FERC ] 61,166 (2006).
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12. For individuals, the Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedure impose a duty of candor on those appearing before it: ``A
person appearing before the Commission or the presiding officer must
conform to the standards of ethical conduct required of practitioners
before the Courts of the United States.'' \24\ The minimum such
standard is found in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that any submission to the court impliedly certifies
that factual or legal representations made therein have a reasonable
basis in fact or law ``to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances.'' \25\ Practitioners before the Courts of the United
States are also bound by the ethical rules of any bar of which they are
a member. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, upon which numerous state bar rules are based, provide, among
other things, that ``a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by
the lawyer.'' \26\ In addition to the explicit prohibition against
``knowingly'' making false statements, the official comments that
accompany the Model Rules make clear that the lawyer is required to
exercise due diligence to ensure, under certain circumstances, that the
information provided is not false or misleading.\27\
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\24\ 18 CFR 385.2101(c). ``Person'' in this context is not
confined to attorneys, as non-attorneys may also appear before the
Commission. 18 CFR 385.2101(a).
\25\ Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
\26\ Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1).
\27\ Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (``an assertion
purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit
by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made
only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to
be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are
circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent
of an affirmative misrepresentation.'').
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13. Under 18 CFR 1c.1(a)(2) and 1c.2(a)(2), it is unlawful, in
connection with jurisdictional natural gas and electric transactions,
``[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
[[Page 49787]]
misleading.'' \28\ Order No. 670 explained that these regulations did
not adopt a general affirmative duty of disclosure, but applied to
communications whether they are voluntary or required.\29\ Moreover,
false statements by themselves are not actionable under the regulation.
Rather, there is a violation only ``if all of the other elements of a
violation are present'' (including scienter).\30\
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\28\ 18 CFR 1c.1(a)(2), 1c.2(a)(2).
\29\ Prohibition of Energy Mkt. Manipulation, Order No. 670, 71
FR 4244 (Jan. 26, 2006), 114 FERC ] 61,047, at PP 35-37, 41-42
(2006).
\30\ Id. P 41.
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14. Federal law, in fact, contemplates criminal sanctions for
intentionally false statements made to any branch of the United States
Government, including the Commission. Under 18 U.S.C. 1001(a),
individuals who ``in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
Government . . . make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation'' can be fined or imprisoned for up to five
years. However, the Commission has no authority to prosecute such
violations.
15. Taken as a whole, these statutory and regulatory provisions
create obligations for candor in various communications made to or
before the Commission in a variety of circumstances. But these
obligations are individually limited.
B. 18 CFR 35.41(b)
16. We believe that existing Sec. 35.41(b) can form the basis for
a broader rule that applies to a wider range of communications in the
Commission's regulation of the electric, natural gas, and oil
industries and markets.\31\ Section 35.41(b) of the Commission's
regulations prohibits false statements made by entities who have sought
or obtained electric market-based rate authority. The provision
currently provides that a Seller must provide accurate and factual
information and not submit false or misleading information, or omit
material information, in any communication with the Commission, with
Commission-approved market monitors, with Commission-approved regional
transmission organizations, with Commission-approved independent system
operators, or with jurisdictional transmission providers, unless the
Seller exercises due diligence to prevent such occurrences.
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\31\ In 2016, the Commission proposed a new rule requiring
virtual traders and financial transmission rights (FTR) traders to
report certain information about their legal and financial
connections to other entities (i.e., connected entity information).
The Commission also proposed to extend the Sec. 35.41(b) duty of
candor to these traders. See Data Collection for Analytics &
Surveillance & Mkt.-Based Rate Purposes, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 81 FR 51726 (Aug. 4, 2016), 156 FERC ] 61,045, at PP 44-
48 (2016). The Commission ultimately declined to adopt this part of
the rule. See Data Collection for Analytics & Surveillance & Mkt.-
Based Rate Purposes, Order No. 860, 84 FR 36390 (July 26, 2019), 168
FERC ] 61,039, at P 4 & Glick dissenting at n.6 (2019). However, the
Commission transferred the record to Docket No. AD19-17-000 for
possible additional consideration in the future of a requirement to
provide connected entity information to the Commission. Id. P 184.
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17. In the aftermath of the Western Energy Crisis, the Commission
found that dishonest and abusive practices by Sellers with market-based
rate authority led to unjust and unreasonable rates.\32\ It also found
that market-based rate Sellers were under an implicit duty not to
engage in fraudulent or deceptive conduct.\33\ When it instituted
Market Behavior Rule 3 (later codified as 18 CFR 35.41(b)), the
Commission explained that ``[t]he integrity of the processes
established by the Commission for open competitive markets rely on the
openness and honesty of market participant communications.'' \34\ The
Commission adopted the Market Behavior Rules for Sellers with market-
based rate authority through its ratemaking authority under FPA
206.\35\ The Commission found that Sellers' existing tariffs and
authorizations, without clearly-delineated rules of the road to govern
market participant conduct, were unjust and unreasonable. Without such
behavioral prohibitions, the Commission found that it would not be able
to ensure that rates are the product of competitive forces and thus
would remain within a zone of reasonableness. It further found that its
Market Behavior Rules ``will help ensure that rates are the product of
competitive forces and thus remain just and reasonable.'' \36\
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\32\ See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy &
Ancillary Servs., 65 FR 67040 (Nov. 8, 2000), 93 FERC ] 61,121, at
61,349 (2000) (finding ``that the electric market structure and
market rules . . . are seriously flawed and that these structures
and rules . . . have caused, and continue to have the potential to
cause, unjust and unreasonable rates . . . .''); Ord. Establishing
Refund Effective Date and Proposing to Revise Mrkt.-Based Rate
Tariffs & Authorizations, 66 FR 59241 (Nov. 27, 2001), 97 FERC ]
61,220, at 61,974 (2001) (instituting a proceeding under FPA section
206 ``to investigate the justness and reasonableness of the terms
and conditions of market-based rate tariffs and authorizations'' in
the wake of market abuses); Investigation of Terms & Conditions of
Pub. Util. Mkt.-Based Rate Authorizations, 68 FR 40924 (July 9,
2003), 103 FERC ] 61,349, at P 5 (2003) (proposing to amend the
requirements of market-based rate authority ``to provide clearly-
delineated `rules of the road' to market-based rate sellers while,
at the same time, not impairing the Commission's ability to provide
remedies for market abuses whose precise form and nature cannot be
envisioned today''); Ord. Amending Mkt.-Based Rate Tariffs &
Authorizations, 68 FR 65902 (Nov. 24, 2003), 105 FERC ] 61,218
(2003) (amending requirements for market-based rate authority by
adding Market Behavior Rules after notice and comment).
\33\ Enron Power Mktg, Inc., 102 FERC ] 61,316, at P 8.
\34\ Ord. Amending Mkt.-Based Rate Tariffs & Authorizations, 105
FERC ] 61,218 at P 107.
\35\ 16 U.S.C. 824e.
\36\ Ord. Amending Pub. Util. Mkt.-Based Rate Tariffs &
Authorizations, 68 FR 65902 (Nov. 24, 2003), 105 FERC ] 61,218, at P
3.
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18. The duty of candor adopted in 18 CFR 35.41(b) has been upheld
by the courts. For example, in Kourouma, the D.C. Circuit upheld the
provision's constitutionality against a challenge based on alleged
vagueness and lack of fair notice.\37\ In Coaltrain, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio upheld the Commission's
authority to promulgate Sec. 35.41(b) under FPA section 206 and found
that the Commission properly applied Sec. 35.41(b) to statements made
in investigations.\38\ The court also rejected the argument that, in
adding section 221 to the FPA related to false reports to index
publishers, Congress ``intended to narrowly circumscribe FERC's
authority [to prohibit false statements], limiting it to highly
specific statements in the price reporting area.'' \39\
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\37\ Kourouma v. FERC, 723 F.3d 274, 278-79 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Kourouma also confirmed that the regulation did not require that the
communicating entity have an intent to make a false statement. Id.
\38\ FERC v. Coaltrain Energy, L.P., No. 2:16-cv-732, 2018 WL
7892222, at *24-27 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2018).
\39\ Id. at *26 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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19. Although Sec. 35.41(b) has been an effective tool to ensure
the accuracy of communications by Sellers (i.e., persons which have
sought or obtained Commission-approved market-based rate authority
pursuant to FPA 205), there are a number of limitations that constrict
its application and highlight the inconsistent levels of accuracy
required of various entities in connection with different activities
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
C. Limitations of the Existing Duty of Candor Rules
20. As the above discussion demonstrates, the Commission has
adopted a variety of duties of candor regarding communications made to
it as well as to other entities, but it has not adopted a standardized
requirement affecting all types of communications related to matters
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
21. Moreover, for many communications made to the Commission, and
organizations upon which the Commission relies in carrying out its
statutory responsibilities, there is no explicit requirement that such
[[Page 49788]]
communications be accurate. For example, the truth of statements made
in most filings to the Commission are limited to the signing attorney's
knowledge--not the underlying truth of the statements made, or the care
with which they were determined to be truthful. In many circumstances,
there is no requirement that care be taken that communications to the
Commission or its staff are indeed truthful (e.g., in filings, during
investigations, in procedural communications, and during uncontested
proceedings).
22. Similarly, absent a restriction contained in a tariff
provision, there may be no explicit requirement of candor for various
important communications fundamental to the functioning of a market
that produces just and reasonable rates: for example, communications
from shippers to interstate pipelines, from transmission customers to
transmission utilities, from transmission utilities to independent
system operators (ISOs) or regional transmission organizations (RTOs),
and from wholesale demand response participants to ISOs, RTOs, or
transmission providers. Even intentional miscommunications may not be
explicitly prohibited by our regulations, unless made pursuant to a
violation of the Commission's Anti-Manipulation Rule under part 1c of
the Commission's regulations.
II. Discussion
23. The Commission proposes to adopt a new part 1d within title 18
of the Code of Federal Regulations to require that entities ensure the
accuracy of communications related to a matter subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction when communicating with the following
entities: the Commission, Commission-approved market monitors,
Commission-approved RTOs, Commission-approved ISOs, jurisdictional
transmission or transportation providers, or the Electric Reliability
Organization and its associated Regional Entities. Ensuring the
accuracy of such communications will increase confidence in Commission-
jurisdictional industries and markets and will improve the Commission's
ability to meet its statutory responsibilities. The integrity and
effectiveness of the Commission's regulatory oversight and decision-
making authority rely on and require accuracy in communications to each
of these entities.
24. To this end, the Commission proposes to adopt a requirement
that every entity must provide accurate and factual information and not
submit false or misleading information, or omit material information,
in any communication with the Commission or with a range of other
organizations including Commission-approved market monitors,
Commission-approved RTOs and ISOs, as well as jurisdictional
transmission or transportation providers, or the Electric Reliability
Organization and its associated Regional Entities, where such
communication relates to a matter subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, unless the entity exercises due diligence to prevent such
occurrences.
25. In the following sections, we discuss: (A) why a broad duty of
candor requirement is needed to protect Commission-jurisdictional
industries and markets; (B) the Commission's, Sellers', and the courts'
favorable experience with application of 18 CFR 35.41(b); (C) the
statutory authorities supporting the proposed rule; and (D)
interpretive guidance for the proposed rule and how it will be applied.
A. The Need for a Broad Duty of Candor
26. It is indisputable that communications related to matters
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission should be complete,
honest, and accurate in order for the Commission to effectively carry
out its regulatory responsibilities. The Commission, and equally the
organizations upon which the Commission relies to carry out its
statutory responsibilities, need complete, honest, and accurate
information to make important policy and economic decisions affecting
the fairness, competitiveness, and reliability of markets. Submission
of false or misleading information, or omission of material
information--whether intentionally or reckless--could lead the
Commission to reach decisions that it otherwise would not have made,
such as erroneously approving or denying (1) requests to construct and
operate infrastructure projects, (2) applications for merger or
consolidation of jurisdictional electric facilities, (3) applications
for market-based rate authority, or (4) requests to revise tariff
provisions. Likewise, submission of false or misleading information, or
omission of material information could inhibit the Commission's ability
to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of service of natural
gas and oil pipelines and public utilities are just and reasonable and
not unduly discriminatory or preferential. Similarly, it could lead the
Commission or its staff to close an investigation that should continue,
or to adopt policies that are ineffective. The submission of false or
misleading information, or omission of material information could lead
an ISO or RTO to make decisions that jeopardize competition, fairness,
and reliability of electric markets, and that potentially harm market
participants and cause them to lose confidence that markets are working
fairly and producing results consistent with market rules and
fundamentals. False information could also result in an interstate gas
pipeline misallocating capacity.
27. We recognize that communications in markets as large, complex,
and active as those the Commission regulates will sometimes include
inadvertent errors or oversights. Identifying and punishing all
mistaken communications, or expending undue resources to prevent every
error, is both impractical and unnecessary.
28. We believe, therefore, that a balance must be struck between
the need for accurate information and the burden of ensuring the
accuracy of that information. Based on the Commission's experience with
its existing regulations (especially 18 CFR 35.41(b)), we believe that
a duty of candor should apply to: (1) all entities, including both
organizations and individuals; (2) communications to the Commission and
to certain other specified organizations that administer, participate
in, or operate markets and facilities subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction; and (3) communications related to a matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission. However, no entity should be penalized
or otherwise sanctioned for inaccurate communications where due
diligence has been exercised to ensure the communications'
accuracy.\40\ In addition, consistent with the need to exercise due
diligence, it should be clear that intentional or reckless
miscommunications are never permissible.
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\40\ It is the Commission's expectation that any entity
providing inaccurate information would, upon discovery, provide
corrections as expeditiously as possible, whether due diligence had
been previously exercised or not. However, in the event such
initiative were not exercised, the Commission could require that
corrective actions be undertaken irrespective of whether it also
pursues sanctions for a duty of candor violation.
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29. We believe that the duty of candor rule proposed herein will
provide clarity that benefits the industries and markets the Commission
regulates. If an entity communicates with the Commission or one of the
other specified organizations identified in the regulation, it will
know or be on notice that it must exercise due diligence in all its
communications related to a matter subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.
[[Page 49789]]
30. Notwithstanding the potential adoption of this proposed
regulation, we are not proposing to remove other duties of candor from
our existing regulations. Those duties of candor and that proposed here
are not inconsistent. Further, we note that the proposed rule, if
adopted, would not impose a general affirmative duty of disclosure, but
would apply to communications whether they are voluntary or
required.\41\
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\41\ This clarification is similar to the clarification the
Commission adopted for the candor requirements discussed in Order
No. 670. See Order No. 670, 114 FERC ] 61,047 at PP 35-37, 41-42.
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31. Providing inaccurate information to entities not named in the
proposed regulation is also potentially problematic and may be
actionable under other statutes and regulations in certain
circumstances (e.g., intentional misrepresentations may form the basis
for enforcement action under 18 CFR part 1c). We welcome comment on
whether the scope of communications subject to the proposed duty of
candor is adequate or should be expanded.
B. 18 CFR 35.41(b) Provides a Fair Basis for a Broader Duty of Candor
32. We propose to adopt a duty of candor rule that is based upon
the existing duty of candor rule in 18 CFR 35.41(b). Since adoption of
the Market Behavior Rules twenty years ago, the accuracy of
communications by Sellers has improved substantially. While Sec.
35.41(b) is likely not the only reason for this improvement, we believe
that Sellers understand the regulation and generally attempt to comply
with it. The Commission now has an abundance of experience and
precedent applying Sec. 35.41(b), which has been upheld in court as
described above. We intend for this experience to inform the
application of this proposed new rule, which is substantially similar
in form and function, albeit broader in application.
33. Although the Commission's focus in adopting Sec. 35.41(b) was
Sellers with market-based rate authority, we find that the rule's
underlying rationale--that the Commission cannot rely on market
mechanisms to generate just and reasonable outcomes if those mechanisms
have been undermined by inaccurate information--applies more broadly.
34. In fact, implicit in any Commission order is the presumption
that representations made to the Commission and others are complete,
accurate, and free of fraud, deception, or misrepresentation.
Similarly, actions taken by market participants are taken with the
understanding that the underlying information provided to them is
accurate. One court described Sec. 35.41 as aimed at ``ensur[ing] the
integrity and smooth functioning of the markets.'' \42\ A broader
requirement imposing a duty of candor will serve the same purpose
across more of our regulated industries and markets. The Commission has
explained that ``[t]he integrity of the processes established by the
Commission for open competitive markets rely on the openness and
honesty of market participant communications.'' \43\ The Commission
cannot exercise its regulatory authority effectively and appropriately
if entities can provide the Commission, or other organizations upon
which the Commission relies, with inaccurate information with impunity.
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\42\ Kourouma, 723 F.3d at 276.
\43\ Ord. Amending Mkt.-Based Rate Tariffs & Authorizations, 105
FERC ] 61,218 at P 107.
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C. Authority for the Proposed Rule
35. The Commission has broad statutory authority, described below,
to issue rules and regulations to allow it to effectively perform its
regulatory functions. This authority includes the power to require
accurate communications from those who choose to engage in Commission-
jurisdictional markets or who communicate to the Commission about those
markets. The Commission has previously implemented specific duty of
candor regulations under this broad authority and it similarly has the
authority to adopt a more generally applicable duty of candor.\44\
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\44\ If an agency can require communications or if it acts as a
gatekeeper to participation in matters subject to the agency's
jurisdiction, it can require candor in communications related to
those matters. See, e.g., SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1112-113
(9th Cir. 2016) (rule under Sarbanes-Oxley Act requiring corporate
officers to certify financial statements includes implicit
truthfulness requirement; SEC may bring enforcement action for
certifying false financial statements); U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d
1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) (requirement under section 13(d)(1) of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to file form disclosing stock
ownership creates duty to file truthfully and completely; criminal
penalties may be imposed for violating duty); Completeness and
Accuracy of Information, 52 FR 49362 at 49365 (Dec. 1987) (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission stating ``[i]t is inconceivable that Congress
would have established the broad regulatory authority in the Atomic
Energy Act, which is considered unique, and not granted sufficient
authority for the Commission to require communications, regardless
of the format, to be complete and accurate.'' (citation omitted)).
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36. The Commission has the statutory obligation under such statutes
as the FPA, NGA, ICA, NGPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act to
ensure that wholesale rates, and rules or practices directly affecting
such rates, are just and reasonable,\45\ and that its own actions are
based on reasoned decision-making. Introducing incorrect or inaccurate
information into the Commission's decision-making process can lead to
uneconomic, unfair, unjust, unreasonable, or even dangerous outcomes
regarding many areas within the Commission's jurisdictional authority,
including transmission and transportation decisions, hydroelectric
licensing and operations, pipeline approval and operations, electric
reliability, and enforcement actions. The current patchwork of
requirements is insufficient to encompass all the situations in which
the Commission must be assured that it is receiving accurate
communications that are necessary for it to adequately conduct its
regulatory oversight.
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\45\ Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 577 U.S. 260, 277-78
(2016).
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37. The following authorities support the Commission's issuance of
the proposed regulation:
FPA 206, NGA 5, and ICA 13 and 15. As was the case with
our adoption of 18 CFR 35.41, we believe that FPA 206 and the parallel
provisions in the NGA and ICA provide a basis for adoption of the
proposed regulation because information in our markets must be accurate
to ensure that wholesale rates, and rules or practices directly
affecting such rates are just and reasonable.
FPA 307, NGA 14, and ICA 12(1)(a). Section 307 of the FPA
and parallel section 14 of the NGA permit the Commission to obtain
information needed to conduct investigations. Section 12(1)(a) of the
ICA similarly permits the Commission to obtain information about the
management and business of oil pipelines. Given the Commission's
authority to obtain information, it follows that the Commission should
be entitled to receive accurate information.
FPA 309, NGA 16, NGPA 501(a), and Department of Energy
Organization Act 402(a)(2) and 402(h). These sections give broad
authority to the Commission to adopt regulations that are necessary or
proper to effectuate its regulatory obligations. The Commission and the
markets it regulates cannot function properly without the submission of
accurate information.
FPA 215. Section 215 conveys to the Commission, the
Electric Reliability Organization, and Regional Entities the duties to
obtain information and act upon that information. These obligations
cannot be fulfilled without
[[Page 49790]]
communication of accurate information.\46\
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\46\ See Rules Concerning Certification of the Elec. Reliability
Org. & Procs. for the Establishment, Approval, & Enforcement of
Elec. Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, 71 FR 8662 (Feb. 17,
2006), 114 FERC ] 61,104, at P 114, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A,
71 FR 19814 (Apr. 18, 2006), 114 FERC ] 61,328 (2006) (``to fulfill
its obligations under this Final Rule, the ERO or a Regional Entity
will need access to certain data from users, owners and operators of
the Bulk-Power System. Further, the Commission will need access to
such information as is necessary to fulfill its oversight and
enforcement roles under the statute''); 18 CFR 39.2(d) (``[e]ach
user, owner or operator of the Bulk-Power System within the United
States . . . shall provide the Commission, the Electric Reliability
Organization and the applicable Regional Entity such information as
is necessary to implement section 215 of the Federal Power Act'').
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NGPA 311(c). Section 311(c) permits the Commission to
prescribe terms and conditions to transportation authorizations under
NGPA 311. One such condition can be to require that section 311
pipelines provide accurate information in their submissions to the
Commission.
ICA 1(5)(a). Transportation charges must be just and
reasonable and charges based upon incorrect information are not just
and reasonable.
38. We welcome comments on the Commission's authority to implement
the proposed regulation.
D. Interpretive Guidance and Application of the Proposed Rule
39. To facilitate comment on the proposed regulation, we provide
the following clarifications and expand upon some aspects of the
proposed regulation. We welcome comments and requests for further
clarification, as needed, on these points.\47\
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\47\ We note that the dissent calls for comments on multiple
aspects of the proposed rule. We also encourage such comments. We
believe that our consideration of the proposed rule, like all notice
and comment rulemakings, will be enhanced by robust comments from a
wide variety of interested parties.
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40. The proposed regulation utilizes the term ``entity'' because we
believe that covered communications (i.e., those that relate to a
matter subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission) from all types of
organizations, as well as from individuals (or, where appropriate,
concurrently from both), should reflect accurate and factual
information, and should not reflect false or misleading information or
omit material information. The term ``entity'' applies to both the
entity making the communication as well as the entity responsible for
the communication. Thus, if an entity relies upon a non-employee agent
for the submission of a communication, the principal would not escape
application of the regulation, absent a showing of due diligence.\48\
Although the rule as proposed applies to all entities, we seek comment
on whether there are specific types of organizations or individuals who
should be exempted from the proposed regulation.
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\48\ A common example occurs in communications to the Commission
where a company submits a document through its outside counsel. In
such a circumstance, both the company and counsel should exercise
``due diligence'' to ensure the accuracy. Of course, due diligence
for counsel in such circumstances likely will simply amount to
ensuring that it has no reason to believe the falsity of the
information provided. The responsible company would bear a greater
burden to ensure the communication's accuracy.
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41. Further, we intend to interpret the term ``communication''
broadly, including informal and formal communications, verbal or
written, and via any method that may be used for transmission. We also
intend to interpret the term ``Commission'' under this provision to
include communications to Commission staff. Communications to the other
listed entities include communications to individuals employed or
acting on behalf of those entities, including agents and contractors of
the covered entities.
42. The proposed regulation applies to communications that relate
to a matter subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Communications that are tangential or unrelated to matters subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission are not covered by the proposed
regulation. For example, the proposed regulation typically would not
apply to communications about contracts for general services with
jurisdictional entities or employee/employer disputes within a
jurisdictional entity.
43. The exercise of due diligence would be a defense to an alleged
violation of the proposed regulation. The concept of due diligence is
well developed in the context of duties of candor and the Commission
and courts have precedent applying this defense.\49\ We intend for due
diligence to include all relevant facts related to whether reasonable
steps were taken by the communicator(s) to ensure the accuracy and
completeness of a communication in light of all of the circumstances.
Many facts will bear upon consideration of a due diligence defense
including, but not limited to, whether a communication had to be made
without sufficient time for additional diligence to be undertaken, the
importance and materiality of the communication to the recipient, the
duration and consistency of the communication at issue, whether the
communication was voluntary or required, whether the communication was
in response to a specific request for information or was unsolicited,
the size and sophistication of the communicator(s), and the
communication's effect on the marketplace or the Commission's
regulatory responsibilities.
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\49\ See, e.g., FERC v. Coaltrain, 501 F. Supp. 3d 503, 526
(S.D. Ohio 2020) (``A Seller can avoid liability for a violation if
it shows it had a process to ensure the accuracy of its responses.''
(citation omitted)); id. at 527 (``Coaltrain can avoid liability if
it shows that it conducted a reasonable investigation to make sure
it produced the relevant and material information and followed a
process to ensure the accuracy of its responses.''); Kourouma, 723
F.3d at 278 (``Contrary to Kourouma's assertion, so read, Market
Behavior Rule 3 does not subject filers like Kourouma to strict
liability, but reserves punishment for those who do not act with
requisite care when submitting information to FERC.''); Kourouma,
135 FERC ] 61,245, at P 21 (2011) (``submission of false or
incomplete information on behalf of a seller by an individual that
did not personally know it to be false or incomplete in the absence
of a process to insure data accuracy and sufficiency will not excuse
the seller's conduct under the rule.'' (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
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44. We recognize that the best-intentioned entities may, and
occasionally will, inadvertently provide inaccurate information. Even
where due diligence cannot be demonstrated, it is not the Commission's
intention to investigate or penalize all potential violations of the
proposed regulation. As a general matter, we do not intend to penalize
inadvertent errors, especially those of limited scope and impact. The
Commission retains discretion not to pursue enforcement actions in such
instances and will exercise that discretion, as appropriate, in
implementing the proposed regulation, as the Commission does with all
other Commission regulations.
III. Information Collection Statement
45. Regulations of the Office and Management and Budget (OMB)
implementing the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 through
3520) require Federal agencies to obtain approval from the OMB before
conducting or sponsoring certain collections of information
requirements imposed by agency rule.\50\ This proposed rule would not
impose any new or modified information collections. Moreover, the
substance of the communications that would be affected by the proposed
rule has been approved by OMB. Therefore, OMB review of this proposed
rule under the PRA is not required.
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\50\ See 5 CFR 1320.3(c)(4)(i).
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IV. Environmental Analysis
46. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment
[[Page 49791]]
or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human environment.\51\ The Commission
has categorically excluded certain actions from this requirement as not
having a significant effect on the human environment. Included in the
exclusion are rules that include information collection or that are
clarifying, corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially
change the effect of the regulations being amended.\52\ The actions
proposed herein fall within these categorical exclusions in the
Commission's regulations.
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\51\ Reguls. Implementing the Nat'l Env. Pol'y Act of 1969,
Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
30,783 (1987) (cross-referenced at 41 FERC ] 61,284).
\52\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(5) and (a)(2)(ii).
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V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
47. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \53\ generally
requires a description and analysis of proposed rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The Commission intends to pose the least possible burden on all
entities both large and small.
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\53\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12.
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48. Although this NOPR applies to many types of entities, including
small entities, the burden associated with proposed regulation should
be minimal. We expect that almost all entities regularly communicate
with the Commission and jurisdictional actors with accuracy and
honesty. We also believe that such communications already regularly
occur with due diligence exercised and, thus, there should be no new
burdens associated with the proposed rule on small entities. Further,
due diligence for a small entity will often be different than for an
entity with more resources and the proposed regulation accommodates
these differences in resources. Therefore, the proposed regulation does
not appear to pose a significant change to small entities.
VI. Comment Procedures
49. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on
the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including
any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish
to discuss. Comments are due October 11, 2022. Comments must refer to
Docket No. RM22-20-000, and must include the commenter's name, the
organization they represent, if applicable, and address in their
comments. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files
and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the
Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are
not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters.
50. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically
via the eFiling link on the Commission's website at https://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard word processing
formats. Documents created electronically using word processing
software must be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format
and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not
need to make a paper filing.
51. Commenters that are not able to file comments electronically
may file an original of their comment by USPS mail or by courier-or
other delivery services. For submission sent via USPS only, filings
should be mailed to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of
the Secretary, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. Submission of
filings other than by USPS should be delivered to: Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 12225 Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, MD 20852.
VII. Document Availability
52. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through the Commission's Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov). At
this time, the Commission has suspended access to the Commission's
Public Reference Room due to the President's March 13, 2020
proclamation declaring a National Emergency concerning the Novel
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19).
53. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in
the docket number field.
User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's
website during normal business hours from the Commission's Online
Support at 202-502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202)502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 1d
Administrative practice and procedure.
By direction of the Commission.
Commissioner Danly is dissenting with a separate statement
attached.
Issued: July 28, 2022.
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary.
In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission proposes to add
part 1d to title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations to read as
follows:
PART 1d--DUTY OF CANDOR
Sec.
1d.1 Accuracy of communications.
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7101-7352; 5 U.S.C. Ch. 5; E.O. 12009, 42
FR 46267, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 142.
Sec. 1d.1 Accuracy of communications.
Any entity must provide accurate and factual information and not
submit false or misleading information, or omit material information,
in any communication with the Commission, Commission-approved market
monitors, Commission-approved regional transmission organizations,
Commission-approved independent system operators, jurisdictional
transmission or transportation providers, or the Electric Reliability
Organization and its associated Regional Entities, where such
communication relates to a matter subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, unless the entity exercises due diligence to prevent such
occurrences.
Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
Appendix--Commissioner James P. Danly's Dissent
United States of America Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Duty of Candor
Docket No. RM22-20-000 (Issued July 28, 2022)
DANLY, Commissioner, dissenting:
1. I dissent from this notice of proposed rulemaking seeking to
extend the duty of candor--which currently applies to ``Sellers'' in
electric markets \1\--to ``any entity'' in ``any communication''--or
lack of communication--associated with any ``matter subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.'' \2\ This expands the duty of
candor well beyond current Commission
[[Page 49792]]
practices.\3\ Knowledge or intent does not matter. The materiality
of the erroneous statement does not matter. The powers we propose to
grant ourselves in this rulemaking are so broad and the standards so
vague that, if finalized, it would be a simple proposition for the
Commission to ``find'' that any factually untrue statement,
regardless of context, violates the duty of candor, exposing the
speaker to sanctions. And rather than establish guard rails or
explicit limits to our powers, we instead say ``just trust us.''
This proposal is chillingly broad in its scope and, by its plain
terms, would encompass constitutionally protected speech.
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\1\ 18 CFR 35.41(b).
\2\ Duty of Candor, 180 FERC ] 61,052, at proposed 1d.1 (2022)
(NOPR).
\3\ See Prohibition of Energy Mkt. Manipulation, Order No. 670,
114 FERC ] 61,047, at P 49, reh'g denied, 114 FERC ] 61,300 (2006).
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2. Much of what the Commission and our jurisdictional entities
routinely do involves `` `matter[s] of political, social, or other
concern to the community' or . . . `is a subject of general interest
and of value and concern to the public.' '' \4\ Speech on such
matters `` `occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.' '' \5\
Precisely because of the public import of the matters subject to its
jurisdiction, the Commission, at the direction of Congress, is
encouraging greater public participation in its proceedings. Unwary
members of the public, taking up our offer to engage the Commission
(or the listed jurisdictional entities) in a manner they would
doubtless believe is civically virtuous, could--by the plain
language of this rulemaking--be subject to liability. The very
possibility of such sanctions goes well beyond a reasonable attempt
to deter falsehoods and will instead chill speech at the core of the
First Amendment's protections.
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\4\ Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (quoting Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77,
83-84 (2004)).
\5\ Id. at 452 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. at 145).
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3. The obvious question in response is what is the harm in
simply extending the existing duty of candor? Would it not seem to
make sense that people should tell the truth when conducting
Commission-related activities? Is it not true that no court has held
the existing duty of candor unlawful? \6\ The answer is that the
proposed rule encompasses a far greater range of activities by a far
greater number of speakers than the existing duty of candor and does
so without standards of materiality or intent, or a clearly defined
safe harbor to protect the unwary from liability.
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\6\ In Kourouma v. FERC, the court dismissed a vagueness
challenge to Market Behavior Rule 3, which the court characterizes
as ``reserv[ing] punishment for those who do not act with requisite
care when submitting information to FERC.'' 723 F.3d 274, 278 (D.C.
Cir. 2013). The current rule, however, is distinguishable because of
its much broader scope. It applies to ``any entity,'' i.e., any
member of the public who engages in a FERC-related communication
with a covered entity, and not just ``sellers,'' who could be
presumed to be relatively sophisticated actors, and applies far
beyond the scope of sharing information with FERC in required
filings. It is at least reasonable to put the onus on sellers to
engage in ``due diligence,'' when communicating with the Commission.
The Commission cannot, therefore, assume a similar result should
this rule, as broadly drafted as it is, be reviewed in the courts.
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4. The proposed duty of candor provides that:
Any entity must provide accurate and factual information and not
submit false or misleading information, or omit material
information, in any communication with the Commission, Commission-
approved market monitors, Commission-approved regional transmission
organizations, Commission-approved independent system operators,
jurisdictional transmission or transportation providers, or the
Electric Reliability Organization and its associated Regional
Entities, where such communication relates to a matter subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, unless the entity exercises due
diligence to prevent such occurrences.\7\
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\7\ NOPR, 180 FERC ] 61,052 at proposed Sec. 1d.1.
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5. So, for example, under the plain language of this provision,
the Commission could find a violation of the duty of candor if a
landowner (``entity'') exaggerates a complaint (``submit[s] . . .
misleading information'') in an email to the pipeline developer with
a right-of-way on her land (``in any communication with . . .
jurisdictional transmission or transportation providers''). What if
the landowner is angry about construction noise and says something
like ``I've never heard such a racket,'' but in fact she had heard
such a racket at a Poison concert in 1988? Absurd? Yes. Duty of
candor violation? Also, yes.
6. In a recent generic proceeding, a commenter called claims
made in a petition for rulemaking ``largely defamatory.'' \8\ Were
they? Does the Commission propose to police such accusations as
enforcement matters when political opponents or, even, competitors
file complaints against each other?
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\8\ American Gas Association, Protest, Docket No. RM21-15-000,
at 9 (Apr. 26, 2021).
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7. Commission enforcement of such violations may be unlikely,
but the language the majority uses to reassure the public is quite
alarming and amounts to ``just trust us'':
[I]t is not the Commission's intention to investigate or
penalize all potential violations of the proposed regulation. As a
general matter, we do not intend to penalize inadvertent errors,
especially those of limited scope and impact. The Commission retains
discretion not to pursue enforcement actions in such instances and
will exercise that discretion, as appropriate, in implementing the
proposed regulation, as we do with all other Commission
regulations.\9\
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\9\ NOPR, 180 FERC ] 61,052 at P 44 (emphasis added).
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So, are we to understand that it is the Commission's intention
to penalize not all potential violations? Not all leaves a lot of
potential violations. The Commission promises as a general matter
not to prosecute inadvertent errors, but intent should be an
essential element of the claim. And, when the Commission states that
it ``retains discretion'' not to pursue enforcement actions, it
necessarily means that the Commission also retains discretion to
pursue enforcement actions. Assurances like these cannot save the
proposed rule. For constitutional purposes, what matters is the text
of the regulation. The Commission cannot grant itself sweeping
discretionary powers and then tell the public to ``trust us.'' As
the Supreme Court has put it, ``the First Amendment protects against
the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse
oblige.'' \10\
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\10\ United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010).
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8. In his concurrence in Alvarez, Justice Breyer describes the
danger inherent in an unbounded authority to police false
statements:
[T]he pervasiveness of false statements, made for better or for
worse motives, made thoughtlessly or deliberately, made with or
without accompanying harm, provides a weapon to a government broadly
empowered to prosecute falsity without more. And those who are
unpopular may fear that the government will use that weapon
selectively . . . .\11\
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\11\ United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgement).
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9. Given the absence of limiting principles, this ``duty of
candor'' risks ``broadly empowering'' the Commission to turn itself
into a Ministry of Truth, policing the truth or falsity of an
enormous sweep of communications. The rule is drafted so broadly
that enforcement staff are likely subject to it. I am sure the
subjects of investigations will appreciate this commitment to
integrity.
10. Experience with the existing duty of candor suggests that
promises of prosecutorial discretion are in the eye of the beholder,
or in this case, the prosecutor. In practice, the Office of
Enforcement frequently finds duty of candor violations when it finds
any manipulative act or tariff violation. If a company is charged
with violating an RTO tariff, duty of candor allegations appear
almost automatic.\12\
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\12\ See, e.g., NRG Power Mktg. LLC, 174 FERC ] 61,016 (2021)
(finding tariff violation and duty of candor violation arising out
of same bidding behavior); see also id. (Danly, Comm'r, dissenting)
(opposing settlement in circumstances where target company has
little leverage or likelihood of success against the Office of
Enforcement in FERC-administered proceedings).
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11. There is a sad irony to this rulemaking. The actual
``candor'' of communications within the industry will suffer.
Employees at one utility (``transmission organization'') will
hesitate to call or email counterparts at another utility
(``transmission organization'') without first seeking the advice of
counsel to make sure they have done their ``due diligence'' before
engaging in ``any communication.'' This will deter cooperation
within the industry and is not likely to be good for anyone.
12. There remain a few obvious questions: What about penalties?
The NOPR says nothing about what sanctions the Commission plans to
impose for this new class of violation. Presumably, it will be left
to the Commission's discretion under its penalty guidelines \13\ or
on a ``case-by-case''
[[Page 49793]]
basis as it often is with the existing duty of candor, at least when
other violations are involved.\14\
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\13\ See Enforcement of Statutes, Orders, Rules, & Regs., 132
FERC ] 61,216 (2010); Enforcement of Statutes, Regs. & Orders, 123
FERC ] 61,156 (2008).
\14\ See, e.g., Coaltrain Energy, L.P., 155 FERC ] 61,204, at P
292 (2016).
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13. As usual, I strongly encourage anyone with the inclination
or an interest in this proceeding to comment on the issues it
raises.
14. In particular, I ask for comments on the fundamental
question whether the proposed duty of candor creates Constitutional
due process concerns because it is impermissibly vague. What
conduct, exactly, is prohibited? Is there any way to cure the void-
for-vagueness concerns?
15. How would a ``due diligence'' safe harbor work for members
of the public, like the concert-going landowner who, in her
communications with one of the listed entities, may be ``prone to
hyperbole''? Will the proposal chill public engagement with FERC and
the listed jurisdictional entities? Should the Office of Public
Participation offer sessions on how to qualify for the safe harbor
when members of the public engage with RTOs and Utilities? I
particularly encourage consumer advocates to comment on what the
implications of this rule might be.
16. Further, does the Commission have the statutory authority to
extend the duty of candor as far as proposed? Does the Commission's
interest in protecting the integrity of its proceedings really
extend to ``any entity'' in ``any communication'' ``relate[d] to a
matter subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission'' with the
rule's range of listed entities?
17. It may be possible to narrow the proposed duty of candor so
that it would not grant the Commission such sweeping enforcement
powers. I solicit comment on whether an intent or materiality
requirement would allay concerns that the rule will impermissibly
encompass core First Amendment protected speech.
18. Another irony: the Commission may be unlikely to get much
candor from the regulated community in response to this NOPR. Most
companies will be reticent to file comments in opposition to a
proposed rule of candor. But voicing opposition to an impermissibly
vague and broad rule that exposes a company to sweeping liability
does not mean that the company supports lying to the Commission.
They should not be hesitant. I strongly encourage industry comments
and would be particularly interested in any experience with the
application of the current duty of candor to the extent any entity
is at liberty to discuss them. I also welcome a thorough analysis of
our existing caselaw to fully judge how the existing duty of candor
has been applied.
19. I look forward to reviewing the full record. My hope is that
it will be sufficient to persuade the majority not to finalize this
rule. We do not need rules for everything, especially when they are
as problematically vague and broad as the proposal here.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
James P. Danly,
Commissioner.
[FR Doc. 2022-16608 Filed 8-11-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P