Confirmatory Order Modifying License of National Institute of Standards and Technology, Center for Neutron Research, 48203-48211 [2022-16949]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 151 (Monday, August 8, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48203-48211]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-16949]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 05000184; EA-21-148; NRC-2022-0150]


Confirmatory Order Modifying License of National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, Center for Neutron Research

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Confirmatory Order; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing a 
Confirmatory Order to the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Center for Neutron Research, as a result of a successful 
alternative dispute resolution mediation session. The commitments 
outlined in the

[[Page 48204]]

Confirmatory Order were made as a part of a settlement agreement 
concerning violations of NRC requirements related to an event involving 
the exceedance of a safety limit for fuel cladding temperature.

DATES: The Confirmatory Order became effective on August 1, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2022-0150 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2022-0150. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information 
Contact section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. The Confirmatory Order Modifying 
License of National Institute of Standards and Technology, Center for 
Neutron Research, is available in ADAMS under Accession No. 
ML22206A213.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White 
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make 
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET), Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Jones, Office of Enforcement, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, 
telephone: 301-415-9525, email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the Order is attached.

    Dated: August 3, 2022.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tania Mart[iacute]nez Navedo,
Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement.

Attachment--Confirmatory Order

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Center for Neutron Research
U.S. Department of Commerce
Docket No.: 05000184
License No.: TR-5
EA-21-148

CONFIRMATORY ORDER MODIFYING LICENSE

EFFECTIVE UPON ISSUANCE

    The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Center 
for Neutron Research (NCNR or licensee), U.S. Department of Commerce 
(DOC) is the holder of License No. TR-5, issued by the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to Part 50 of Title 
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). NIST refers to the 
larger National Institute of Standards and Technology organization 
while NCNR refers specifically to the licensee and operator of the 
National Bureau of Standards Test Reactor (NBSR or reactor). The 
license authorizes the operation of the NBSR in accordance with 
conditions specified therein. The facility is located on the NIST 
campus in Gaithersburg, Maryland.
    This Confirmatory Order (CO) is the result of an agreement reached 
during an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session 
conducted on May 10, 2022, May 19, 2022, and June 2, 2022, to address 
seven apparent violations.

II

    The NBSR is a heavy-water (D2O)-moderated-and-cooled, enriched-
fuel, tank-type reactor designed to operate at 20 megawatts thermal 
(MW(t)) power. The facility operates continuously during a 7-week 
operational cycle that consists of approximately 38 days of operation, 
followed by 10-day refueling and maintenance outages.
    On December 20, 2020, operators shut down the reactor for a 
refueling outage. During the refueling outage on January 4, 2021, fuel 
elements were shuffled within the reactor vessel during day shift. 
After the fuel elements were placed in each core position, height 
verification was performed using a height gauge to ensure that the fuel 
elements were fully latched in the lower grid plate. Following the 
February 3, 2021, event discussed below, the NRC inspectors reviewed 
video footage of the placement of fuel element S-1175 in the J-7 core 
position and determined that the fuel element was initially latched 
after placement. However, the inspectors observed that operators had 
difficulty lowering the tool to fuel element S-1175 during the 
subsequent height verification. Performance of this height verification 
likely contributed to fuel element S-1175 becoming unlatched. Further, 
the inspectors observed that the operators improperly performed the 
latch verification rotation checks on the evening shift. Through post-
event interviews and observation of the video footage of the refueling 
and latch verification evolutions, the inspectors determined that fuel 
element S-1175 was likely not fully latched in the J-7 core position at 
the end of fuel handling operations on January 4, 2021.
    On February 3, 2021, following the refueling outage, NCNR reactor 
operators were performing a normal reactor startup when the reactor 
automatically shut down in response to indications of high confinement 
exhaust stack radiation. Once the reactor was placed in a safe 
condition, all personnel evacuated the control room and reactor 
confinement. The reactor was then monitored by operators from the 
remote Emergency Control Station. NCNR subsequently declared an alert 
in accordance with the facility emergency plan and procedures. During 
the event, six NCNR reactor personnel became externally contaminated 
and were monitored for internal exposure to radioactive materials. 
Following the event, NCNR personnel performed environmental monitoring 
at the confinement exhaust stack and at the 400-meter emergency 
planning site boundary, which is located within the fence line of the 
NIST Gaithersburg campus. Environmental sampling for radioactive 
material releases, as well as radiological surveys, confirmed that 
release amounts were a small fraction of the alert and notification of 
unusual event criteria in the emergency procedures, which led to event 
termination by NCNR later that day.
    On March 2, 2021, NCNR submitted a related event notification (EN 
55120) to inform the NRC that it had violated the fuel cladding 
temperature safety limit for damaged fuel element S-1175. During 
subsequent visual inspection activities where NCNR moved fuel elements 
from the reactor core to the fuel storage pool, the NRC inspectors 
observed melted material deposited on the lower grid plate. The 
inspectors also observed that the damaged fuel element

[[Page 48205]]

S-1175 nozzle was almost completely blocked by melted material. The 
inspectors noted that additional tests would need to be performed to 
determine the exact composition of the melted material. The damaged 
fuel element S-1175 is currently in a container located within the fuel 
storage pool awaiting shipment for further analysis. The licensee has 
contracted with Framatome to clean up the reactor vessel and remove the 
melted material from the lower grid plate, vessel, and primary piping. 
Framatome is assisting with various operations during this recovery.
    On March 16, 2022, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 
Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization 
Facilities, issued a special inspection report to the licensee. The 
inspection report included the following seven apparent violations, 
five of which NCNR identified in its own review and reported to NRC 
staff:
    1. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 2.1, ``Safety 
Limit,'' which states that the reactor fuel cladding temperature shall 
not exceed 842 [deg]F (420 [deg]C) for any operating conditions of 
power and flow. The NRC inspectors observed once-molten material in and 
around the fuel element nozzle of element S-1175 in the J-7 grid 
position indicating that the licensee exceeded the fuel temperature 
safety limit.
    2. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 3.1.3, ``Core 
Configuration,'' which states that ``[t]he reactor shall not operate 
unless all grid positions are filled with full length fuel elements or 
thimbles, except during subcritical and critical startup testing with 
natural convection flow.'' The NRC inspectors observed that the fuel 
element S-1175 was not latched, was raised approximately 3-4 inches 
above the upper grid plate, and was angled out of its proper position, 
causing it to rest on the lower grid plate surface.
    3. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4, 
``Procedures,'' which states, in part, that ``[w]ritten procedures 
shall be prepared, reviewed and approved prior to initiating any of the 
activities listed in this section [including] . . . [f]uel loading, 
unloading, and fuel movement within the reactor vessel.'' The NRC 
inspectors determined that the procedure for fuel handling activities 
was not suitable for the circumstances and did not contain necessary 
information to ensure that the fuel elements were latched prior to 
startup. As a result, the inspectors determined that the fuel handling 
procedure was inadequate to ensure that the fuel element in question 
was latched during refueling activities on January 4, 2021.
    4. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4, 
``Procedures,'' which states, in part, that ``[w]ritten procedures 
shall be prepared, reviewed and approved prior to initiating any of the 
activities listed in this section [including] . . . [s]tartup, 
operation, and shutdown of the reactor.'' The reactor startup procedure 
instructs the operators to monitor for abnormal fluctuations or 
oscillations on nuclear channel indications. However, the NRC 
inspectors found that the procedure does not provide amplifying 
guidance for operators to use when conducting this monitoring.
    5. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 6.4, 
``Procedures,'' which states, in part, that ``[w]ritten procedures 
shall be prepared, reviewed and approved prior to initiating any of the 
activities listed in this section [including] . . . [i]mplementation of 
required plans such as emergency or security plans.'' The NRC 
inspectors determined that NCNR emergency response procedures were not 
suitable for the circumstances and caused NCNR to unnecessarily 
(although still within the required timeframe) delay their response to 
the event.
    6. Apparent Violation of Technical Specification 3.9.2.1, ``Fuel 
Handling; Within the Reactor Vessel,'' which states that ``[f]ollowing 
handling of fuel within the reactor vessel, the reactor shall not be 
operated until all fuel elements that have been handled are inspected 
to determine that they are locked in their proper positions in the core 
grid structure. This shall be accomplished by one of the following 
methods: (1) Elevation check of the fuel element with main pump flow. 
(2) Rotational check of the element head in the latching direction 
only. (3) Visual inspection of the fuel element head or latching bar.'' 
The NRC inspectors determined that NCNR operators failed to implement 
one of the methods required by the technical specifications to ensure 
that fuel element S-1175 was adequately latched.
    7. Apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.59, ``Changes, tests and 
experiments,'' paragraph (c)(1), which states, in part, that a licensee 
may make changes in the facility without obtaining a license amendment 
only if a change to the technical specifications is not required. The 
NRC inspectors determined that NCNR made changes to the refueling 
tooling that should have required a change to the technical 
specifications because dimensional differences of the new tooling 
invalidated the capability of operators to verify that a fuel element 
was adequately latched.
    For the seven apparent violations, the NRC offered NCNR an 
opportunity to (1) attend a pre-decisional enforcement conference or 
(2) to participate in an ADR mediation session to resolve this concern. 
In response to the NRC's offer, NCNR requested the use of the NRC's ADR 
process to resolve the seven apparent violations. On May 10, 2022, the 
NRC and NCNR conducted an ADR session mediated by a professional 
mediator, arranged through Cornell University's Scheinman Institute on 
Conflict Resolution. The ADR process is one in which a neutral 
mediator, with no decision-making authority, assists the parties in 
reaching an agreement to resolve any differences regarding the dispute. 
This CO is issued pursuant to the agreement reached as a result of the 
full-day mediation session that occurred on May 10, 2022, and two 
subsequent virtual meetings that occurred on May 17, 2022, and June 2, 
2022. The NRC and NCNR signed the agreement in principle (AIP) for the 
mediation session on June 3, 2022.

III

    NCNR and the NRC reached a preliminary settlement agreement during 
mediations. The elements of the agreement included (1) corrective 
actions completed by NCNR, (2) corrective actions planned by NCNR, (3) 
additional agreed upon future actions by NCNR, and (4) general 
provisions. Additionally, the NRC and NCNR agreed that the apparent 
violations described in Section II of this Order were violations of 
regulatory requirements. The NRC and NCNR agreed that the safety 
significance of these violations is normally characterized at Severity 
Level 1 in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. Additionally, 
the NRC concluded that a civil penalty of up to $432,000 would normally 
be proposed for this violation, as assessed in accordance with the 
civil penalty assessment process discussed in Section 2.3.4 of the NRC 
Enforcement Policy. However, due to the robust nature of corrective 
actions taken and planned by NCNR as documented in Sections III and V, 
the NRC determined that waiving a civil penalty is appropriate in this 
case.
    The parties agreed in the AIP to refine the language of the AIP to 
reflect the appropriate level of detail when included in Section III of 
the CO. The following is the refined language:
    1. Based on a review of the incident, NCNR completed corrective 
actions and enhancements to preclude recurrence of

[[Page 48206]]

the violation, including but not limited to the following:
a. NIST/NCNR Safety Culture
    i. NCNR staff secured additional funds for the Nuclear Safety 
Culture Improvement Program (NSCIP), with additional funds included in 
current budget proposals.
    ii. NCNR staff has drafted the NSCIP program documents addressing 
problem identification and resolution, root cause investigations, 
training, procedures, and oversight. These will be used to develop a 
request for proposals to assist the NCNR in program development and 
implementation.
    iii. NCNR has identified comparable reactor facilities for purposes 
of benchmarking various safety culture programs, with in-person visits 
planned or completed. Results from these benchmarking visits will be 
used to inform further development of the NSCIP.
    iv. NCNR staff reevaluated the root cause analysis with an emphasis 
on nuclear safety culture and is using this evaluation to develop the 
NSCIP plan.
b. Management
    i. NCNR leadership has engaged the NIST Director and Department of 
Commerce leadership for oversight and secured additional funding for 
corrective actions (including additional operations personnel) and 
reactor recovery and clean-up.
    ii. NCNR currently staffs four rotating shifts during normal 
operation and is challenged to complete additional work such as 
training, employee development, and emergent maintenance. NCNR 
leadership has initiated hiring actions to establish a fifth operating 
shift dedicated to training and maintenance.
    iii. Elevated Enterprise Risk Management of NCNR to institutional 
(NIST) level through the chartered NIST Enterprise Risk Management 
Council. The Council, which includes NIST Senior Executives, identifies 
NIST enterprise-level risks, tracks those risks and their impacts, and 
reviews risk mitigation progress and strategy.
    iv. NCNR leadership appointed a permanent Chief of Reactor 
Operations to provide more continuity and stability.
    v. NCNR hired a new Chief of the Aging Reactor Management (ARM) 
program. This position will provide oversight of communications between 
engineering and operations to help ensure that identified issues are 
resolved.
    vi. NCNR confirmed or updated management Performance Plans to 
ensure that expectations for procedure use and adherence with 
consequences for failure to follow required procedures is part of 
employee reviews.
    vii. Licensee staff including Reactor Operations and Engineering 
leadership took part in safety culture training given by NCNR staff 
experienced in safety culture training. The training covered the 
following topics:

1. Human Performance Tools
2. Procedure Use and Adherence
3. Procedure Writing and Routing Guides
4. SharePoint Use
5. Procedure Theory
6. Hazard Review
7. Risk Assessment
8. Mitigation Actions
9. Pre-Job Brief and Post-Job Critique

    viii. NCNR conducted leadership training for reactor supervisors. 
The training was led by the Chief of Reactor Operations and included 
the following modules of leadership training for the Commerce Learning 
Center:

1. Accountable Leadership
2. Influencing and Persuading Others
3. Becoming an Emotionally Intelligent Leader
4. Networking to Improve Leadership Effectiveness
5. New Leadership Transitions
6. Leading Others through Conflict
c. Corrective Action Program
    i. NCNR implemented ``Safety Good Catch/Good Idea'' program to 
incentivize staff to identify, raise, and address safety concerns in 
April 2021.
    ii. Established Safety Evaluation Committee (SEC) subcommittee to 
track and oversee corrective actions.
    iii. Established the Engineering Change Management Program to 
provide an administrative gate for 50.59 screening and execution for 
facility and procedure modifications.
d. Procedures
    i. NCNR modified Administrative Requirement (AR) 5.0, ``Procedure 
Use and Adherence,'' which guides conduct of operations, to strengthen 
the oversight role supervisors must play and to require that all 
personnel be trained. The required procedure use and adherence training 
has been completed.
    ii. Drafted and approved AR 5.1, ``Procedure Writer's Guide,'' 
related to procedure writing, which includes addressing improvements to 
writing quality.
    iii. Identified procedures that will be updated according to new 
guidance in AR 5.1 prior to reactor startup.
    iv. Updated procedure standards to comply with PPA AP-907-005, 
``Procedure Writers' Manual.''
    v. Implemented AR 1.1, ``Human Performance Tools,'' related to 
improving training on a continuous basis.
    vi. Modified Operating Instruction (OI) 1.1, ``Reactor Startup,'' 
to provide detailed guidance on evaluation of abnormal fluctuations in 
nuclear instrumentation.
e. Technical
    i. NCNR conducted 40 hours of proficiency training for all 
Operations Staff, emphasizing the importance of latching and procedural 
compliance.
    ii. Established proficiency requirements for operators performing 
fuel handling, including core loading, shuffle, rotational latch 
checks, and visual latch checks.
    iii. Created Emergency Instructions (EI) 3.8, ``Recovery 
Operations,'' and 3.9 ``Confinement Re-entry,'' to provide detailed 
guidance on building reoccupation. In addition, EI 0.4, ``Control Room 
Evacuation,'' and EI 0.5, ``Post-evacuation Checklist,'' were created 
to include an evacuation checklist required to be used during an 
evacuation to ensure confinement is safe for operator re-entry.
    iv. Performed Latch Improvement Safety Analysis to document that 
improved latching and latch check processes provide adequate defense 
against unlatching.
    v. Assessed the efficacy of all tools used in refueling to 
determine whether improvements are needed and concluded that, given the 
discontinuation of height checks, the tools are adequate to meet all 
new refueling and latch check requirements.
    vi. Conducted analysis as to whether no-flow height checks should 
be continued and concluded that the equipment does not support height 
checks with sufficient precision; height-related latch checks are no 
longer prescribed.
    vii. Reinstituted requirement for latch checks prior to final pump 
restart and modified OI 2.1.1, ``Startup of the Primary System for 
Criticality,'' and OI 1.1.0, ``Reactor Startup Checklist.''
    viii. Instituted a required rotation latch check, performed by a 
second individual and modified OI 6.1, ``Fueling and Defueling.''
    ix. Instituted a redundant Technical Specifications required method 
of visual checks (using a digital camera plus image analysis software) 
and modified Operating Instruction (OI) 6.1.
    x. Verified that the index plate is consistently positioned by the 
use of alignment pins and that rotational fiduciary marks are clear to 
ensure fuel

[[Page 48207]]

movement evolutions are performed properly.
    xi. Modified OI 6.1 series and OI 1.1A CL to ensure that there will 
be no tool contact with fuel head following final visual latch 
verification prior to reactor startup.
    xii. Submitted License Amendment Request to NRC to modify Technical 
Specification 3.9.2.1 to require latch verification through both 
mechanical rotational and visual methods.
    2. Based on a review of the incident, NCNR plans to complete 
additional corrective actions, including but not limited to the 
following:
a. Management Systems
    i. Conduct regular briefings of NIST and DOC leadership regarding 
the progress of operational safety and corrective actions, and review 
of safety culture.
    ii. Participate in Enterprise Risk Management reviews twice a year 
to assess elevated risk impact of NCNR for NIST.
    iii. Develop and implement a change management framework to 
evaluate sufficiency of existing change management processes and 
identify gaps and areas for improvement.
    iv. Develop a system for knowledge and skills management in the 
presence of personnel attrition.
    v. Develop a plan for involving staff in continuous improvement of 
reactor operations, through participation in a preventive action 
program that encourages and rewards proactive efforts to improve 
quality, safety, and efficiency of operations.
    vi. Hire a Deputy Chief of Reactor Operations to provide additional 
oversight and consistent leadership.
    vii. Increase management engagement by implementing AR 5.4, 
``Observation Program,'' which details requirements for management and 
others to perform observations with documentation of findings and 
suggested improvements.
    viii. Define requirements for qualification as Crew Chief and 
implement Crew Chief leadership and development training.
b. Qualification and Training
    i. Develop a technical training program for robust qualification 
and training of supervisors, operators, and candidates for: moving and 
handling fuel; proficiency checks on key refueling tasks; and 
proficiency checks for core loading, shuffle, rotational latch checks 
and visual latch checks. The program will include training materials 
(e.g., qualification cards) and practical experience with the use of 
the fuel handling stand, reflecting stated learning objectives.
    ii. Provide consistent and structured training and immediate and 
continual feedback to Non-Licensed Operators (NLO) during on-the-job 
training to ensure comprehension of performance expectations.
    iii. Develop consistent standard by which all supervisors evaluate 
qualifications.
    iv. Develop a continuous formal operator training program to 
provide ongoing training through rotating assignments of operators to a 
``fifth shift'' dedicated to training, procedure development, and 
maintenance.
    v. Implement mandatory oversight training for supervisors.
    vi. Require additional training in leadership training and reactor 
supervisor leadership training.
    vii. Conduct proficiency training prior to all future refueling 
events.
c. Procedures
    i. Rewrite Operating Instruction (OI) series 6.1, ``Fueling and 
Defueling,'' and OI 6.2, ``Operation of the Fuel Transfer System,'' to 
capture detail of fuel and latch movements to align with training.
    ii. Revise procedures necessary prior to any reactor restart to be 
consistent with INPO 11-003, ``Guideline for Excellence in Procedure 
and Work Instruction Use and Adherence,'' and conducted training on 
procedure protocols.
    iii. Complete revision to procedures required for startup.
    iv. Design, test, and install noise gates on selected nuclear 
instrumentation channels to alert operator of abnormal signal in 
progress.
d. Event Response
    i. Develop guidelines that outline methods for making measurements, 
interpreting results, performing calculations, and making dose 
projections (e.g., dose projections that are used as basis for 10 
radiological protective action recommendations and those used to 
upgrade and downgrade emergency classes).
    ii. Develop a process to communicate and track deficiencies in 
emergency drills and exercises identified during follow-up critiques; 
ensure corrective and preventive actions are assigned appropriately and 
tracked for timely resolution.
    iii. Implement an ethernet-based data display for the emergency 
control station, post-reactor startup to improve remote monitoring and 
control capabilities.
    3. Based on NCNR's review of the incident and NRC's concerns with 
respect to precluding recurrence of the violation, NCNR agrees to 
implement corrective actions and enhancements in the following areas:
a. Communications
    b. Nuclear safety program assessments to include:

i. Nuclear safety culture assessment
ii. Nuclear program assessment(s)
iii. Problem Identification and Resolution program
iv. Employee concerns
v. Safety Culture Monitoring Panel

c. Training
d. Procedures
e. Benchmarking
f. Employee engagement
g. Leadership accountability
h. Technical issues

    4. Based on the completed and planned actions described above, and 
the commitments described in Section V of this Order, the NRC agrees to 
reduce the civil penalty to $0, refrain from issuing a cited notice of 
violation, and not pursue any further enforcement action based on the 
seven apparent violations identified in the NRC's March 16, 2022, 
letter.
    5. The NRC will consider the Confirmatory Order an escalated 
enforcement action with respect to any future enforcement actions.
    6. On July 21, 2022, NCNR consented to the issuance of this 
Confirmatory Order with the requirements, as described in Section V 
below. NCNR further agreed that this Confirmatory Order is to be 
effective upon issuance, the agreement memorialized in this 
Confirmatory Order settles the matter between the parties, and that the 
licensee has waived its right to a hearing.

IV

    Any decision of the NRC to approve restart under 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1) 
would be informed by but not solely reliant upon this CO.
    I find that the actions completed by NCNR, as described in Section 
III above, combined with the commitments as set forth in Section V are 
acceptable and necessary, and conclude that with these completed 
actions and commitments the public health and safety are reasonably 
assured. In view of the foregoing, I have determined that public health 
and safety require that NCNR's commitments be confirmed by this Order. 
Based on the above and NCNR's consent, this Confirmatory Order is 
effective upon issuance.

V

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 104b, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and 
186 of

[[Page 48208]]

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's 
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR part 50 as applicable, it is 
hereby ordered, effective upon issuance, that license No. TR-5 is 
modified as follows:

1. Communications

    a. Within 3 months of issuance of the Confirmatory Order, the NIST 
Director will issue a statement to NIST employees communicating the 
specific strategy to improve NCNR's nuclear safety culture. The 
communication will include (1) a summary regarding the Nuclear Safety 
Culture Improvement Program, (2) the NRC's concerns expressed in its 
Special Inspection Report, (3) specific lessons learned from previously 
applied corrective actions, and (4) corrective actions both taken and 
planned. At least 30 days prior to issuing the statement, NIST will 
provide the statement for NRC staff review. Within 15 days of receiving 
the statement, the NRC staff will provide feedback to NIST. NIST will 
incorporate NRC staff feedback and notify the NRC when the statement is 
issued.
    b. Within 2 months of the NIST Director's statement, the NCNR 
Director will hold an all-hands meeting with NCNR employees for 
management to discuss the importance of the above communication. NCNR 
will require and document attendance for the all-hands meeting and 
maintain that documentation in the NCNR employees training records.

2. Nuclear Safety Program Assessments

a. Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment
    i. Within 6 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will hire a third-
party, independent nuclear consultant (consultant) to conduct an 
independent third-party nuclear safety culture assessment. The contract 
will specify that the consultant will assist NCNR in the implementation 
of the recommendations and corrective actions identified in the 
assessment to prevent recurrence of the February 3, 2021, event or 
similar events at the NBSR.
    ii. Prior to issuance of the Request for Quotations, NCNR will 
include criteria equivalent to the those described in Section 
03.02.c.1, c.2, and c.3 of Inspection Procedure 95003, ``Supplemental 
Inspection for Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded 
Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs or One Red Input,'' dated June 7, 
2022, to ensure a consultant with the appropriate qualifications is 
identified.
    iii. Within 6 months of contract award to the consultant, NCNR will 
submit a copy of the safety assessment report and NCNR's written 
response to the assessment report to the NRC. NCNR's written response 
will either address how it will implement the recommendations and 
corrective actions of the assessment report, including a proposed 
timeline; or provide an explanation and justification for why the 
recommendation(s) and corrective action(s) will not be implemented.
    iv. Within 2 months of submitting the assessment report to the NRC, 
the NCNR Director shall issue written and verbal communications 
providing the results of the assessment, recommendations, and 
corrective actions to the NCNR staff. At least 30 days prior to issuing 
the written communication, NCNR will provide the statement for NRC 
staff review. Within 15 days of receiving the statement, the NRC staff 
will provide feedback to NCNR staff. NCNR will notify the NRC when the 
statement is issued.
    v. The assessment will include employee surveys, the review of 
anonymous reports, and contractor-conducted interviews and focus groups 
to assess the effectiveness of the programs.
    vi. NCNR will ensure this consultant is provided with all necessary 
materials, reports, and access to personnel to complete its assessment. 
The reports shall include the NRC special inspection report dated March 
16, 2022, future NRC inspections reports regarding the February 3, 
2021, event, and NCNR safety evaluation committee and safety assessment 
committee (SEC/SAC) reports.
    vii. Within 12 months of completing the initial assessment, the 
consultant will perform a second assessment to ensure the 
sustainability and effectiveness of the corrective actions within the 
identified areas. Within 30 days of receiving the report, NCNR will 
submit a copy of the second assessment report to the NRC.
    viii. Within 12 months of completing the second assessment, the 
consultant will conduct a third assessment to ensure long term 
sustainability and effectiveness of the identified recommendations and 
corrective actions. Within 30 days of receiving the report, NCNR will 
submit a copy of the third assessment report to the NRC.
b. Nuclear Program Assessment(s)
    i. Within 12 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will hire one 
or more third-party, independent nuclear consultant(s) to conduct an 
independent third-party assessment(s) and notify the NRC of the 
timeline for the completion of the assessment(s). The contract will 
specify that the nuclear consultant(s) will assist NCNR in the 
implementation of the recommendations and corrective actions identified 
in the assessment(s) to prevent recurrence of the February 3, 2021, 
event or similar events at the NBSR. The consultant's (or consultants') 
assessment(s) will include recommended corrective actions in the 
following areas:

1. Problem Identification and Resolution
2. Event Root Cause
3. Training
4. Procedures
5. Safety Assessment Committee
6. Safety Evaluation Committee independence and effective oversight

    ii. Within 3 months of issuance of the assessment report(s) (or 
within 3 months of the issuance of the last report, if multiple 
contracts are awarded), NCNR will submit a copy of the safety 
assessment report(s) and NCNR's written response to the assessment 
report(s) to the NRC. NCNR's written response will either address how 
it will implement the recommendations and corrective actions of the 
assessment report(s), including a proposed timeline; or provide an 
explanation and justification for why the recommendation(s) and 
corrective action(s) will not be implemented.
    iii. Within 2 months of submitting the assessment report(s) to the 
NRC, the NCNR Director shall issue written and verbal communications 
providing the results of the assessment, recommendations, and 
corrective actions to the NCNR staff. At least 30 days prior to issuing 
the written communication, NCNR will provide the statement for NRC 
staff review. Within 15 days of receiving the statement, the NRC staff 
will provide feedback to NCNR staff. NCNR will notify the NRC when the 
statement is issued.
    iv. NCNR will ensure this consultant is provided with all necessary 
materials and access to personnel to complete its assessment, including 
NRC inspection reports, SEC/SAC reports, and the interim and final 
special inspection reports.
c. Problem Identification and Resolution Program
    i. By September 30, 2022, NCNR will develop an Observation program 
with program goals to provide for periodic management oversight of 
procedures and procedure adherence.
    ii. By September 30, 2022, NCNR will develop a System Review Team 
program with program goals of reviewing system changes, including but 
not limited to components and procedures, and generating reports for 
the Aging Reactor Management review.

[[Page 48209]]

    iii. By October 31, 2022, NCNR will develop and implement the Level 
3 Corrective Action Program.
    iv. By December 31, 2022, NCNR will develop and implement the Level 
2 Corrective Action Program.
    v. By March 31, 2023, NCNR will develop and implement the Level 1 
Corrective Action Program.
    vi. Within 1 month of program finalization, NCNR will submit 
program documentation to the NRC for review and comment.
    vii. Within 3 months of NRC comment, NCNR will incorporate NRC 
staff feedback.
    viii. The NCNR will maintain these programs to track, trend, and 
correct failures and deficiencies to prevent recurrence.
d. Employee Concerns
    i. Within 6 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will develop a 
formal program for NCNR employees to raise concerns. The program will 
describe and include methods to address the following types of 
concerns:

1. anonymous employee concerns
2. employee protection
3. nuclear safety culture
4. chilling effect

    ii. Within 1 month of program development, NCNR will submit program 
documentation to the NRC for review and comment.
    iii. Within 2 months of NRC comment, NCNR will incorporate NRC 
staff feedback and implement and maintain the program.
e. Safety Culture Monitoring Panel
    i. Within 9 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will develop a 
formal program to monitor the nuclear safety culture informed by the 
elements of NEI 09-07, ``Fostering a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture,'' 
Revision 1.
    ii. Within 1 month of program development, NCNR will submit program 
documentation to the NRC for review and comment.
    iii. Within 2 months of NRC comment, NCNR will incorporate NRC 
staff feedback and implement and maintain the program.

3. Training

    In addition to the recommendations and corrective actions related 
to training identified during the above assessment (see Provision 
2.b.i):
    a. Prior to any restart, NCNR will conduct training of all licensed 
operators on the performance of fuel loading and latch checking 
procedures in accordance with ANSI/ANS-15.4-2016, ``American National 
Standard Selection and Training of Personnel for Research Reactors.'' 
NCNR will maintain records of training completion for all licensed 
operators.
    b. Within 3 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will modify its 
requalification plan to specify that every ``reactor operating test or 
evaluation'' portion of NCNR licensed operator requalification training 
must include ``other reactivity tasks including fuel movements, 
insertion and removal of experiments, and rod exchange or movements 
without power change'' as one of the five tasks selected from Section 
5.4 (as specified in Section 6.2.5) of ANSI/ANS-15.4-2016, ``American 
National Standard Selection and Training of Personnel for Research 
Reactors.''

4. Procedures

    a. Prior to any restart, NCNR will develop, implement, and maintain 
a written procedure that covers procedural use and adherence in 
accordance with the most recent version of INPO 11-003, ``Guideline for 
Excellence in Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence.''
    b. Procedures referenced in paragraph 1.d of Section III of this CO 
will be subject to inspection prior to any restart.
    c. Within 30 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will develop, 
implement, and maintain all procedures involving reactor operations 
activities in accordance with the most recent version of PPA AP-907-
005, ``Procedure Writers' Manual.''

5. Benchmarking

    a. Starting 12 months after CO issuance, NCNR will benchmark one 
program (e.g., training, procedure process, corrective action program, 
configuration control/change management etc.) each calendar year, to 
include site visits and observations at another facility. Because NCNR 
is much larger in both thermal output and staffing than most research 
and test reactors (RTRs) and operates at a cadence similar to 
commercial power reactors, NCNR will not solely benchmark RTRs. 
Conversely, the NCNR is a much smaller organization than a commercial 
power reactor, so NCNR will also not solely benchmark power reactors. 
NCNR shall be strategic when deciding the appropriate facility to 
benchmark, selecting a facility with a program commensurate to the one 
NCNR is benchmarking. NCNR should also consider input from the nuclear 
consultants identified in Provisions 2.a and 2.b on the appropriate 
facility programs to benchmark (i.e., a commercial power reactor's 
safety culture program; Advanced Test Reactor's problem identification 
and resolution program, etc.). Furthermore, benchmarking shall include 
multiple levels of NCNR staff and shall not be limited to NCNR senior 
management. NCNR will document this activity, observations, and 
decisions regarding changes to NCNR's programs.
    b. For 3 years following issuance of the CO, at least one NCNR 
staff member shall attend 2 of the following relevant industry 
conferences per calendar year:

i. National Organization of Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR)
ii. National Association of Employee Concerns Professionals (NAECP)
iii. NRC's Regulatory Information Conference (RIC)
iv. American Nuclear Society (ANS)
v. Department of Energy (DOE), if applicable

6. Employee Engagement

    Within 6 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will establish and 
maintain a rewards and recognition program to encourage employees to 
raise concerns and will incorporate a safety recognition program into 
the performance evaluation process. The program will include the 
following:
    a. encourage informal recognition of safety achievements;
    b. establish a formal recognition program with tangible rewards;
    c. encourage the staff to seek advice and to proceed with caution;
    d. communicate expectations and ensure that safety correspondence 
such as near misses, good catches, operating experience, and safety 
flash communications are developed and communicated to the workforce.

7. Leadership Accountability

    a. Within 12 months of consultant contract award, NCNR will provide 
the NRC with documentation of any revisions to the Safety Evaluation 
Committee charter as informed by the nuclear consultant(s) selected 
under item 2.b.
    b. Within 12 months of the contract award discussed in Provision 
2.b, NCNR will conduct training for all senior leaders, with support of 
the nuclear consultant selected under Provision 2.b, and which will 
include training on NUREG-2165, ``Safety Culture Common Language'' 
(INPO 12-012, ``Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture,'' Revision 
1). NCNR will incorporate this leadership training into an annual 
required safety culture refresher training for senior leaders.
    c. By the beginning of fiscal year 2023, NCNR will develop and 
maintain performance appraisal assessment

[[Page 48210]]

criteria for periodic annual evaluations of NCNR supervisors and 
managers to assess their performance regarding nuclear safety culture.
    d. Within 12 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will present at 
a publicly attended annual conference (such as TRTR, NAECP, ANS). If 
asked by the NRC, NCNR will also present at the RIC. The presentation 
will address the cause of the February 3, 2021, event and corrective 
actions taken by NCNR and will include a discussion of the NRC's 
findings. Two months prior to the conference, NCNR will submit the 
presentation to the NRC for review and comment, and NCNR will 
incorporate any comments from the NRC staff into the final 
presentation.
    e. Within 3 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will provide a 
timeline to address staffing challenges to the NRC for review.

8. Technical Issues

    a. Within 3 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will provide an 
assessment of options to replace NCNR's reliance upon administrative 
controls/actions to ensure that fuel assemblies are adequately latched.
    b. Within 6 months of any restart of regular reactor operations 
(defined as the return to 24 hour/day operations at 20 MW), NCNR will 
implement the condition-based monitoring systems for nuclear 
instrumentation that could provide a very early warning to control room 
operators of mechanical anomalies during reactor startup.
    c. Within 12 months of the issuance of the CO, NCNR will develop an 
engineered solution to automatically secure carbon dioxide following a 
major SCRAM. NCNR will implement the proposed solution using the 
appropriate regulatory process or provide the NRC with an engineering 
analysis that includes a justification for not implementing a design 
change.
    d. Within 12 months of issuance of the CO, NCNR will provide an 
assessment of the configuration management process and how it is 
incorporated with problem identification and resolution processes.
    9. Upon completion of the terms of items of the CO, NCNR will 
provide the NRC with a letter discussing its basis for concluding that 
the requirements of this Order have been adequately implemented.
    In the event of the transfer of the license of NCNR to another 
entity, the terms and conditions set forth hereunder shall continue to 
apply to the new entity and accordingly survive any transfer of 
ownership or license.
    The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax, 
rescind, or withdraw any of the above conditions upon demonstration by 
NCNR or its successors of good cause.

VI

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR 2.309, any person 
adversely affected by this CO, other than NIST/NCNR, may request a 
hearing within 30 calendar days of the date of issuance of this CO. 
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the 
time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made 
in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of 
good cause for the extension.
    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene (petition), any 
motion or other document filed in the proceeding prior to the 
submission of a petition, and documents filed by interested 
governmental entities that request to participate under 10 CFR 
2.315(c), must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 
FR 49139; August 28, 2007, as amended at 77 FR 46562; August 3, 2012). 
The E-Filing process requires participants to submit and serve all 
adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some cases to mail 
copies on electronic storage media. Detailed guidance on making 
electronic submissions may be found in the Guidance for Electronic 
Submissions to the NRC and on the NRC website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. Participants may not submit paper copies of 
their filings unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the 
procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by 
telephone at 301-415-1677, to (1) request a digital identification (ID) 
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign submissions and access the E-Filing 
system for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise 
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a petition or 
other adjudicatory document (even in instances in which the 
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the 
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this 
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic 
docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/getting-started.html. Once a participant has obtained a 
digital ID certificate and a docket has been created, the participant 
can then submit adjudicatory documents. Submissions must be in Portable 
Document Format (PDF). Additional guidance on PDF submissions is 
available on the NRC's public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. A filing is considered complete at the 
time the document is submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any 
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
document on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before adjudicatory documents are 
filed so that they can obtain access to the documents via the E-Filing 
system.
    A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC's Electronic 
Filing Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's 
public website at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by 
email to [email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-
7640. The NRC Electronic Filing Help Desk is available between 9 a.m. 
and 6 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government 
holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
stating why there is good cause for not filing electronically and 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by (1) first class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear

[[Page 48211]]

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking 
and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited 
delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, 11555 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications 
Staff. Participants filing adjudicatory documents in this manner are 
responsible for serving the document on all other participants. Filing 
is considered complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in 
the mail, or by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service 
upon depositing the document with the provider of the service. A 
presiding officer, having granted an exemption request from using E-
Filing, may require a participant or party to use E-Filing if the 
presiding officer subsequently determines that the reason for granting 
the exemption from use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
https://adams.nrc.gov/ehd, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission or the presiding officer. If you do not have an NRC-issued 
digital ID certificate as described above, click ``cancel'' when the 
link requests certificates and you will be automatically directed to 
the NRC's electronic hearing dockets where you will be able to access 
any publicly available documents in a particular hearing docket. 
Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information, 
such as social security numbers, home addresses, or personal phone 
numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law 
requires submission of such information. For example, in some 
instances, individuals provide home addresses in order to demonstrate 
proximity to a facility or site. With respect to copyrighted works, 
except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory 
filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are 
requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission.
    The Commission will issue a notice or order granting or denying a 
petition, designating the issues for any hearing that will be held, and 
designating the Presiding Officer. A notice granting a hearing will be 
published in the Federal Register and served on the parties to the 
hearing.
    If a person (other than NIST/NCNR) requests a hearing, that person 
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is 
adversely affected by this CO and shall address the criteria set forth 
in 10 CFR 2.309(d) and (f). If a hearing is requested by a person whose 
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an order 
designating the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held, 
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this CO 
should be sustained.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section V above shall be final 30 days from the date of 
this CO without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time 
for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in 
Section V shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing 
request has not been received.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated this 1st day of August 2022.
Mark D. Lombard,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2022-16949 Filed 8-5-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P