Updating the Intercarrier Compensation Regime To Eliminate Access Arbitrage, 47673-47688 [2022-16237]
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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 149 / Thursday, August 4, 2022 / Proposed Rules
engage in other recreational shooting
including, but not limited to, plinking,
target shooting, or shooting varmints.
d. You must not bring an animal into
the area unless the animal is on a leash
that is not longer than 6 feet and is
secured to an object or under the control
of a person or is otherwise physically
restrained at all times.
e. You must not light or maintain a
fire except in designated fire rings
established by the government.
f. You must not smoke in the
buildings or within 10 feet of any
building.
9. Prohibited Acts within Blackfoot
Special Recreation Management Area
(SRMA)
a. You must not occupy the following
day-use sites between the hours of 10
p.m. and 5 a.m.: Daigles Eddy Day Use
Site, Sheep Flats Day Use Site,
Thibodeau Rapids Day Use Site,
Whitaker Bridge Day Use Site, Red Rock
Day Use Site, Belmont Day Use Site, and
River Bend Day Use Site.
b. You must not jump from any bridge
over the Blackfoot River.
10. Prohibited Acts within Limestone
Cliffs Area
a. You must not install new,
permanent climbing hardware for new
or existing routes unless approved by
the authorized officer.
b. You must not discharge a firearm
or projectile (except for legal game
hunting purposes as established by the
Montana Department of Fish and
Wildlife and Parks) or engage in other
recreational shooting including, but not
limited to, plinking, target shooting, or
shooting varmints.
c. You must not bring an animal into
the area unless the animal is on a leash
that is not longer than 6 feet and is
secured to an object or under the control
of a person or is otherwise physically
restrained at all times.
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Exemptions
The following persons are exempt
from this supplementary rule: any
Federal, State, local, or military
employees acting within the scope of
their official duties; members of any
organized rescue or fire fighting force
performing an official duty; and persons
who are expressly authorized or
approved by the BLM.
Enforcement
Any person who violates any part of
this supplementary rule may be tried
before a U.S. Magistrate and fined in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3571,
imprisoned for no more than 12 months
under 43 U.S.C. 1733(a) and 43 CFR
8360.0–7, or both. In accordance with
43 CFR 8365.1–7, State or local officials
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may also impose penalties for violations
of Montana law.
(Authority: 43 U.S.C. 1733(a), 1740; 43 CFR
8365.1–6)
Theresa M. Hanley,
Acting BLM Montana State Director.
[FR Doc. 2022–16295 Filed 8–3–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310–JB–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 51, 61, and 69
[WC Docket No. 18–155; FCC 22–54; FR
ID 98377]
Updating the Intercarrier
Compensation Regime To Eliminate
Access Arbitrage
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
The Commission seeks
comment on proposed amendments to
prevent companies from attempting to
evade its existing access stimulation
rules, harming customers, and imposing
unwarranted costs on America’s
telecommunications networks.
DATES: Comments filed in response to
this Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking are due September 6, 2022.
Reply comments are due October 3,
2022.
SUMMARY:
Federal Communications
Commission, 45 L St. NW, Washington,
DC 20554.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Lynne Engledow, FCC Wireline
Competition Bureau, at 202–418–1520
or via email at lynne.engledow@fcc.gov.
For additional information concerning
the proposed Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements
contained in this document, send an
email to PRA@fcc.gov or contact Nicole
Ongele at 202–418–2991.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Commission’s Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking adopted
on July 14, 2022, and released on July
15, 2022. A full-text copy of this
document may be obtained at the
following internet address: https://
www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposesupdated-rules-eliminate-accessarbitrage-0.
ADDRESSES:
Background
1. The access charge regime was
originally designed to compensate
carriers for the use of their networks by
other carriers. It also helped ensure that
people living in rural areas had access
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47673
to affordable telephone service through
a system of implicit subsidies. The key
to this system was the charges IXCs
were required to pay to LECs for access
to their networks—particularly the high
charges IXCs had to pay rural LECs to
terminate calls to rural customers. In
1996, Congress directed the Commission
to eliminate these implicit subsidies—a
process the Commission has pursued by
steadily moving access charges to a billand-keep framework. As part of the
ongoing transition to bill-and-keep, the
Commission has capped most access
charges and moved terminating endoffice charges and some tandem
switching and transport charges to billand-keep.
2. Arbitrage schemes take advantage
of relatively high access charges,
particularly for the remaining
terminating tandem switching and
transport services that have not yet
transitioned to bill-and-keep. Switched
access charges were originally
established based on the costs of
providing service and normal call
volumes. These rates were subsequently
capped and are no longer based on
actual costs or actual usage and
therefore no longer decrease when
traffic volumes increase. Some LECs
devised business plans to exploit this
fact by artificially stimulating
terminating call volumes through
arrangements with entities that offer
high-volume calling services. The
resulting high call volumes generate
revenues that far exceed the costs that
the terminating tandem switching and
tandem switched transport charges are
designed to cover.
3. ‘‘Free’’ conference calling, chat
lines, and certain other services
accessed by dialing a domestic
telephone number are all types of
calling services that can be, and are,
used to artificially increase call
volumes. The terminating switched
access charges, however, were intended
to allow LECs to recover the costs of
operating their networks, not to allow
LECs to subsidize ‘‘free’’ conference
calling, chat line, and similar ‘‘free’’
services offered by the LECs’ end-user
customers. IXCs nonetheless have no
choice but to carry traffic to these highvolume calling services and pay the
tariffed access charges to the
terminating LECs or the Intermediate
Access Providers the LECs choose,
inefficiently transferring revenues from
IXCs to the traffic stimulators that
greatly exceed the cost these
termination charges are intended to
cover. As a result, terminating tandem
switching and tandem switched
transport charges that these highvolume calls generate are shared by all
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of the IXC’s customers, who collectively
fund the ‘‘free’’ services offered by highvolume calling service providers,
whether the IXC customers use those
services or not.
4. In the 2011 USF/ICC
Transformation Order, the Commission
adopted rules identifying rate-of-return
LECs and competitive LECs engaged in
access stimulation and requiring that
such LECs lower their tariffed access
charges. The 2011 rules defined ‘‘access
stimulation’’ as occurring when two
conditions are satisfied: (1) the rate-ofreturn LEC or competitive LEC has
entered into an access revenue sharing
agreement that, ‘‘over the course of the
agreement, would directly or indirectly
result in a net payment to the other
party;’’ and (2) one of two traffic triggers
is met: either an interstate terminatingto-originating traffic ratio of at least 3:1
in a calendar month, or more than a 100
percent growth in interstate originating
and/or terminating switched access
minutes of use in a month, compared to
the same month in the preceding year.
At the same time, the Commission
began moving terminating, end-office
switched access charges to bill-andkeep.
5. Parties engaged in access
stimulation adapted to these rules by
taking advantage of tandem switching
and transport access charges that had
not yet transitioned to bill-and-keep,
namely, the terminating tandem charges
for rate-of-return and competitive LECs.
As a result, new access arbitrage
schemes forced IXCs to pay high tandem
switching and tandem switched
transport charges to access-stimulating
LECs or to Intermediate Access
Providers that may be chosen by those
access-stimulating LECs. And although
the direct cost to IXCs of access
stimulation dropped because of the
rules adopted in 2011, the number of
access-stimulated minutes did not.
Indeed, arbitrageurs openly promoted
‘‘opportunities to get paid for generating
minutes by dialing telephone numbers
owned by access stimulator LECs.’’
6. In 2019, the Commission responded
to the new access arbitrage schemes that
had sprung up after 2011 by broadening
the scope and reach of its Access
Stimulation Rules. Most significantly,
the Commission found that requiring
‘‘IXCs to pay the tandem switching and
tandem switched transport charges for
access-stimulation traffic is an unjust
and unreasonable practice’’ that was
prohibited pursuant to section 201(b) of
the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended (the Act). The Commission
then adopted rules making accessstimulating LECs—rather than IXCs—
financially responsible for the tandem
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switching and tandem switched
transport service access charges
associated with the delivery of traffic
from an IXC to an access-stimulating
LEC serving end users at its end office
or its equivalent. The Commission
adopted these changes to reduce
carriers’ incentives to artificially inflate
traffic volumes by routing traffic
inefficiently to maximize access charge
revenues. The Commission also found
that combatting such arbitrage reduces
call congestion and service disruptions.
The Commission recognized that
arbitrage may occur even when there is
no revenue sharing agreement, so it
modified the definition of access
stimulation to include two alternative
traffic ratio triggers (one applicable to
competitive LECs and one applicable to
rate-of-return LECs) that do not require
a revenue sharing component.
7. Since these rules took effect, parties
have advised Commission staff of new
efforts by access stimulators to evade
the updated rules by integrating into the
call flow IP enabled (IPES) Providers.
For example, some parties described
concerns that access stimulators are
‘‘converting traditional CLEC
[(competitive LEC)] phone numbers to
IPES numbers in order to claim that the
[Access Arbitrage Order] is
inapplicable’’ because the traffic is
bound for telephone numbers obtained
by IPES Providers and not bound for
LECs serving end users.
8. USTelecom and its members allege
that a substantial and growing portion of
traffic that previously terminated
through access-stimulating LECs now
terminates through IPES Providers.
AT&T and Verizon allege that certain
LECs are attempting to evade the
Commission’s Access Stimulation Rules
by, for example, having an IPES
Provider take the place of the LEC
delivering calls to an end user. As a
result, IXCs allege, certain LECs claim
the Access Stimulation Rules do not
apply because the IPES Provider—and
not the LEC—is responsible for
delivering calls to the end user. In such
a scenario, it is alleged that because the
call flow does not include an accessstimulating LEC serving end users, such
LECs continue to bill IXCs for the
termination of access-stimulated traffic.
Thus, IXCs and their long-distance
customers continue to bear the costs of
these calls to high-volume calling
services. Inteliquent and Lumen
describe a different call flow scheme in
which the traffic does not pass through
a LEC. In this call flow, an Intermediate
Access Provider (tandem service
provider) transmits long-distance traffic
directly to an IPES Provider. USTelecom
explains that some IPES Providers claim
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that the Access Stimulation Rules do
not apply to traffic terminating to ‘‘IPES
numbers,’’ and therefore the IPES
Providers are not responsible for the
costs of tandem switching and transport,
‘‘regardless that their traffic patterns
qualify as access stimulation under the
Commission’s rules.’’
Discussion
9. In this Further Notice, we propose
to eliminate perceived ambiguity in our
rules that the record shows companies
are seeking to leverage to force IXCs and
their long-distance customers to
continue to bear the costs of highvolume calling services by incorporating
IPES Providers into the call path. This
is an increasingly important issue
because IPES Providers are prevalent in
today’s networks. As a result, we
propose that when traffic is delivered to
an IPES Provider by a LEC or an
Intermediate Access Provider and the
terminating-to-originating traffic ratios
of the IPES Provider exceed the triggers
in the Access Stimulation Rules, the
IPES Provider will be deemed to be
engaged in access stimulation. In such
cases, we propose that the Intermediate
Access Provider would be prohibited
from imposing tariffed terminating
tandem switching and transport access
charges on IXCs sending traffic to the
IPES Provider or the IPES Provider’s
end-user customer.
10. The rules we propose will serve
the public interest by reducing carriers’
incentives and ability to send traffic
over the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) solely for the purpose
of collecting tariffed tandem switching
and transport access charges from IXCs
to subsidize high-volume calling
services, which the Commission has
found to be an unjust and unreasonable
practice. Consistent with the
Commission’s previous efforts to
eliminate this conduct, our proposals
seek to reduce the routing of artificially
high volumes of calls to places where
above-cost access charges continue to
exist. Our proposals will reduce the
ability to apply access charges to those
calls, the costs of which are ultimately
borne by consumers, most of whom do
not even use high-volume calling
services.
Proposed Rules When IPES Providers’
Traffic Ratios Exceed the Access
Stimulation Triggers
11. We seek comment on call paths
involving Intermediate Access
Providers, LECs, and IPES Providers. As
an initial matter, we seek comment on
whether the following diagram
accurately illustrates how calls are
delivered to high-volume calling service
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providers by IPES Providers that receive
those calls from LECs. If not, how
should the diagram be modified to make
it more accurate? We encourage
commenters to submit diagrams and
explanations in the record to provide a
more comprehensive and clearer
understanding of the flow of traffic to
high-volume calling service providers
when an IPES Provider is inserted into
the call flow. We strongly encourage
parties to submit simple diagrams
showing all providers in the call path to
illustrate and help clarify the various
calling scenarios that our proposals to
combat access stimulation should target.
12. We also seek information on the
providers’ services (tariffed and nontariffed) and the access charges involved
in routing these calls. When traffic is
routed from an Intermediate Access
Provider to a LEC as in Diagram 1, is
that LEC at times the same entity that
serves as the Intermediate Access
Provider? In what circumstances?
Commenters should enumerate each of
the services provided by the
Intermediate Access Provider, the LEC,
and IPES Provider along this call path
and which entities are charged for each
service. For instance, when the LEC
sends calls to the IPES Provider in the
call path, is the LEC providing transport
or other services? If the LEC delivers
these calls to the IPES Provider, is the
LEC providing any end-office
functionality? When traffic is exchanged
between the LEC and the IPES Provider,
how is compensation, if any, handled
between the two entities? What other
services does the LEC charge for? Does
the IPES Provider charge any entity in
the call path for any services? If so, what
services are provided by the IPES
Provider, and which entity does the
IPES Provider charge? Parties should
provide any additional information that
will enhance our understanding of how
calls are routed and billed for along the
hypothetical call path in Diagram 1, so
we can better assess whether entities are
meeting their financial responsibilities
when they route traffic in this manner.
13. The record suggests that there are
call flows that do not include a LEC
between the Intermediate Access
Provider and the IPES Provider (or the
end user), as pictured in Diagram 2
below. In this scenario, the Intermediate
Access Provider (tandem provider)
delivers calls directly to an IPES
Provider without an intermediate LEC.
We seek comment on the existence of
such call flows. Does Diagram 2 below
accurately depict such call flows? If not,
what adjustments need to be made to
the diagram to make it more accurate?
14. IPES Providers are not ‘‘LECs’’ and
thus parties may argue that our Access
Stimulation Rules do not apply to them,
whether traffic they terminate to highvolume calling service providers is
received directly from Intermediate
Access Providers or from LECs. This
argument, however, leaves IXCs, who
are captive to the routing decisions of
IPES Providers that may choose
Intermediate Access Providers solely to
receive traffic they then deliver to the
high-volume calling service provider,
having to bear the cost of those routing
decisions. These costs are ultimately
passed onto the IXCs’ customers. These
schemes are similar to those that existed
before the Access Arbitrage Order was
adopted, where access-stimulating LECs
had no incentive to make economical
routing decisions because the cost
implications of those decisions would
be borne by IXCs who would pass the
resultant inflated costs on to their
customer bases.
15. For example, in response to the
Access Arbitrage Order, one competitive
LEC, Wide Voice, modified its business
to no longer offer service to end users,
and instead only functions as a
competitive tandem provider and sends
call destined for a high-volume calling
service to HD Carrier (an IPES provider),
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which then terminates calls to the end
user. The Commission found that Wide
Voice’s actions resulted in it continuing
to unlawfully bill IXCs for tandem
services contrary to section 201(b) of the
Act. Commenters should describe
additional real-world examples of calls
being routed from an Intermediate
Access Provider directly to an IPES
Provider (or indirectly through a LEC)
that then terminates those calls to a
high-volume calling service provider.
Does this routing scheme impose
unlawful costs on IXCs? We seek
additional detail on this practice and
specific proposals as to how best it
should be addressed. Parties should
explain what charges are being assessed,
what entity is billing for what services,
and which parties are being charged in
these situations. Commenters should
likewise describe any other aspects of
this call flow that might provide
additional opportunities for arbitrage
and suggest ways our rules might be
revised to foreclose those opportunities.
16. Proposal. We propose to clarify
that an Intermediate Access Provider
shall not charge an IXC tariffed charges
for terminating switched access tandem
switching and switched access tandem
transport for traffic bound to an IPES
Provider whose traffic exceeds the ratios
in sections 61.3(bbb)(1)(i) or
61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) of our Access
Stimulation Rules. We seek comment on
this proposal, including the question of
whether it is appropriate to apply to
IPES Providers the 3:1 terminating-tooriginating traffic ratio plus revenue
sharing agreement trigger in section
61.3(bbb)(1)(i), and the 6:1 terminatingto-originating traffic ratio trigger, absent
a revenue sharing agreement, in section
61.3(bbb)(1)(ii). Commenters should
consider that although we intend to
reduce or eliminate arbitrage
opportunities, we do not want the
financial consequences of our Access
Stimulation Rules to apply to LECs or
IPES Providers that are not engaged in
harmful arbitrage schemes.
17. Under our proposal, the IPES
Provider would be responsible for
calculating its traffic ratios and for
making the required notifications to the
Commission and affected carriers, just
as LECs are responsible for these
activities under the current rules. This
proposal is consistent with other
reporting requirements imposed on
VoIP providers, such as the obligation to
report certain information on FCC
Forms 477 and 499. Similar to the
approach the Commission took in the
Access Arbitrage Order, we do not
propose a specific format for the
notification an access-stimulating IPES
Provider would provide to affected
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carriers and the Commission. After the
rules adopted in the Access Arbitrage
Order became effective, some carriers
satisfactorily notified the Commission
that they were stopping their access
stimulation activities by filing letters in
docket 18–155.
18. Under our proposal, if the IPES
Provider’s traffic ratios exceed the
applicable rule triggers, it would have to
notify the Intermediate Access Provider,
the Commission, and affected IXCs. The
Intermediate Access Provider would
then be prohibited from billing IXCs
tariffed rates for terminating switched
access tandem switching or terminating
switched access transport charges.
Instead, the Intermediate Access
Provider could recover the costs from
the IPES Provider, or the IPES
Provider’s LEC partner. Thus, the
entities choosing the call path—the IPES
Provider or its partner—should only be
willing to generate traffic that creates
more value than the costs these tariffed
access charges are intended to recover.
As a result, they would have an
economic incentive to make efficient
call routing decisions and little, if any,
incentive to artificially stimulate traffic.
Do commenters agree with our view that
this proposal, reflected in the amended
rules, will help ‘‘ensure that the entities
choosing what network to use . . . have
appropriate incentives to make efficient
decisions’’? If commenters disagree,
they should explain what other, or
additional, actions we should take to
ensure that service providers have the
proper incentives.
19. As an alternative to imposing a
requirement that the IPES Provider
calculate its traffic ratios for purposes of
our Access Stimulation Rules, we could
require that the Intermediate Access
Provider calculate the IPES Provider’s
traffic ratios. Under this alternative, if
the Intermediate Access Provider cannot
perform this calculation, or the IPES
Provider will not share relevant traffic
ratio information with the Intermediate
Access Provider, we would create a
presumption that the IPES Provider’s
traffic exceeds the Access Stimulation
Rule ratios. In that case, the
Intermediate Access Provider would not
be able to charge IXCs terminating
switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access transport
charges. Would such an approach be
more effective than the rule
modifications described above and
proposed? Commenters are encouraged
to propose possible rule language to
codify this presumption.
20. We propose to use the same
framework for determining when an
IPES Provider that was engaged in
access stimulation no longer is
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considered to be engaged in access
stimulation that we currently use for
competitive LECs that have engaged in
access stimulation. Thus, for example, if
an IPES Provider is engaged in access
stimulation because it exceeds the 6:1
traffic ratio in section 61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) of
the Commission’s rules, we propose that
it would no longer be considered to be
engaged in access stimulation if its
traffic ratio falls below 6:1 for six
consecutive months and it does not
engage in Access Stimulation as defined
in section 61.3(bbb)(1)(i). Additionally,
once such an IPES Provider no longer
meets those criteria, it would be
required to notify the Commission and
any affected Intermediate Access
Providers and IXCs that it is no longer
engaged in access stimulation. We seek
comment on these proposals. Do
commenters consider the proposals to
be over-inclusive or unnecessary? If so,
are there ways to moderate the
proposals to effect the same objective?
21. Calculations. We propose that
IPES Providers would be responsible for
calculating traffic ratios. Parties should
describe any possible challenges that
may affect the ability of an IPES
Provider to perform the calculations
needed to determine whether it meets
the triggers established by the Access
Stimulation Rules. Commenters should
also explain if any of those challenges
are so significant as to make our
proposal unworkable. If so, we ask those
commenters to propose alternatives that
pose fewer challenges but still achieve
our goals of removing the incentives for
entities to engage in wasteful arbitrage
and the imposition of unlawful charges
on IXCs and their customers.
22. The Access Stimulation Rules
currently require traffic ratios to be
calculated on the basis of traffic ‘‘in an
end office’’ for the purposes of
determining whether the 6:1 and 10:1
traffic ratios are exceeded. We propose
rule modifications to apply this same
method to the 3:1 traffic ratio and when
IPES Providers calculate traffic ratios for
purposes of the Access Stimulation
Rules. Would there be a benefit to
making the Access Stimulation Rules
uniform between LEC obligations and
IPES Provider obligations? For example,
does the inconsistent application of the
‘‘in an end office’’ requirement in the
current rules cause confusion or
opportunities for arbitrage? We also
propose that the traffic ratios in our
Access Stimulation Rules all be based
on terminating-to-originating traffic
measured ‘‘in an end office or
equivalent.’’ To apply these
requirements to an IPES Provider, what
guidance should we provide as to what
would be considered ‘‘equivalent’’ to a
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LEC’s end office? For example, when an
IPES Provider is inserted in the call
flow, should wherever the Intermediate
Access Provider sends traffic be
considered the ‘‘end office or
equivalent’’? Does the Commission’s
holding in the VoIP Symmetry
Declaratory Ruling that a VoIP provider
will be providing end office
functionality ‘‘equivalent’’ to a LEC
when it provides the physical
connection to the end user have any
application here?
23. Alternatively, should IPES
Providers be required to calculate their
traffic ratios based on the traffic the
IPES Provider terminates in a specific
state or to a specific end user? Is there
some other method of calculation that
would better aid us in identifying access
stimulation for the purposes of our
Access Stimulation Rules? Should IPES
Providers calculate their traffic ratios in
a manner that mirrors the geographic
area served by the LEC’s end office, or
by specific LATAs? Should we require
IPES Providers to calculate their traffic
ratios based on the traffic they receive
from a specific Intermediate Access
Provider? Are there other alternatives
we should consider? Which approach
would best support the effectiveness of
our Access Stimulation Rules, ensure
that all providers in a call flow have the
proper economic incentives to promote
efficiency, and eliminate harmful
arbitrage opportunities? Commenters
should submit any data they have that
support a particular approach or that
show the relative benefits of one
approach versus another.
24. We also seek comment on any
challenges related to our alternative
proposal of requiring that the
Intermediate Access Provider calculate
the IPES Providers’ traffic ratios. Would
an Intermediate Access Provider know,
or have access to, the information
necessary to determine the terminatingto-originating traffic ratios of IPES
Providers to which it delivers and from
which it receives traffic? Would tracking
the originating and terminating traffic of
individual IPES Providers be unduly
burdensome for Intermediate Access
Providers? What if the Intermediate
Access Provider delivers traffic along
multiple call paths and needs to
calculate the traffic ratios for an IPES
Provider for each call path? For
example, do providers send originating
and terminating traffic on different call
paths when they partner with multiple
LECs or other IPES Providers? Does an
IPES Provider designate different traffic
routes in the Local Exchange Routing
Guide (LERG), such that it may select
one LEC for the purposes of receiving
local traffic, but receives long-distance
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traffic from a different access tandem to
avoid having incoming long-distance
and local traffic traverse the same LEC’s
facilities? Are there reasons, other than
promoting access arbitrage, for an IPES
Provider to use more than one route for
terminating traffic? If so, we ask
commenters to explain those specific
reasons.
25. Implementation. What
implementation issues do our proposals
raise? How much time would providers
need to comply with the proposed rule
changes? In the Access Arbitrage Order,
the Commission gave carriers 45 days to
come into compliance with the newly
effective rules. Anticipating that IPES
Providers would not need longer to
comply than carriers did, we also
propose a 45-day period for compliance
after the effective date of the revised
rules. Is this sufficient? Do interested
parties foresee difficulties that would
affect the time it will take to comply
with the revised rules? Commenters
should include suggested timeframes for
implementation and an explanation of
any challenges or concerns relating to
coming into compliance with our
proposed rules within a 45-day period.
If 45 days are insufficient, how long
should the transition period last, what
steps would it include, and why is more
time necessary now than was needed at
the time the Commission adopted the
Access Arbitrage Order? If proposing an
alternative timeframe, we remind
interested parties to balance any
proposed implementation period with
the fact that the longer the
implementation period lasts, the longer
these forms of wasteful access arbitrage
continue.
26. Revenue Sharing. The reforms
adopted in the 2011 USF/ICC
Transformation Order focused on
revenue sharing agreements between the
terminating LEC and end users or other
providers along the call path that
provided incentives for improper
behavior. In the 2019 Access Arbitrage
Order, the Commission adopted rules to
identify and address access stimulation
arrangements that did not include a
revenue sharing component. As we
work to further strengthen our rules to
combat ongoing arbitrage, we seek
comment on whether revenue sharing
agreements exist in the call routing
scenarios described above. For example,
do IPES Providers share revenue with
common carriers that transmit traffic to
the IPES Providers or their customers?
Do Intermediate Access Providers share
their revenues with IPES Providers,
high-volume calling service providers,
or the high-volume calling service
providers’ end users?
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27. Conversely, do high-volume
calling service providers (or their end
users) share revenue with LECs,
Intermediate Access Providers, or IPES
Providers? In any alternative call paths
commenters describe in response to our
questions in this Further Notice, we ask
commenters to specify which entities, if
any, could be or are sharing revenues
with other entities. We are particularly
interested in what makes certain call
paths—or call path manipulations—
attractive to those involved. For
example, what entities are sharing
revenues right now? What functions do
those entities serve in completing calls,
and whose revenues are being shared
with others? We propose modifying the
existing definition of Access
Stimulation in section 61.3(bbb) to
include IPES Providers with or without
access revenue sharing agreements,
similar to the approach that currently
applies to competitive LECs. Are
ongoing revenue sharing arrangements
covered effectively by the current
Access Stimulation Rules? If not, what
additional rule revisions are needed to
capture today’s revenue sharing
arrangements? Is there specific rule
language commenters would propose to
address revenue sharing arrangements
that may not be covered by our current
rules?
Other Proposed Rule Changes
28. We seek comment on several
additional rule change proposals. Are
the proposed rule changes below
necessary, or helpful, to the goal of
eliminating harmful arbitrage? Would
they, in concert with the other rule
changes proposed in this Further
Notice, help to comprehensively
address arbitrage of our intercarrier
compensation system?
29. End User and End Office
Language. AT&T suggests that
clarifications to the ‘‘end user’’ and
‘‘end office’’ language in the existing
rules will prevent LECs from evading
financial responsibility for accessstimulation traffic when an IPES
Provider is inserted into the call path.
First, AT&T suggests that we clarify the
meaning of ‘‘end user’’ in section
61.3(bbb)(1) of our rules, which defines
when carriers engage in access
stimulation, by adding the italicized
language, as follows.
A Competitive Local Exchange Carrier
serving end user(s) engages in Access
Stimulation when it satisfies either
paragraph (bbb)(1)(i) or (ii) of this
section; and a rate-of-return local
exchange carrier serving end user(s)
engages in Access Stimulation when it
satisfies either paragraph (bbb)(1)(i) or
(iii) of this section. For purposes of this
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section, a Local Exchange Carrier is
serving end users when it provides
service to a called or calling party,
either directly or through arrangements
with one or more VoIP providers or
other entities that serve called or calling
parties. For purposes of this section, a
Local Exchange Carrier is not serving
end users when it is an Intermediate
Access Provider as defined in paragraph
(ccc) of this section, i.e., when it is not
the first or last LEC in the routing of a
call to a called or calling party.
30. We seek comment on this
proposed amendment to our existing
rule. Would the proposed language
effectively remedy any perceived
ambiguity that parties have sought to
exploit in our current rules? Would the
proposed language lead to any
potentially unintended consequences
that we should consider? Do
commenters propose any revisions to
this language? Would this rule
modification successfully prevent LECs
from avoiding financial responsibility
for access-stimulation traffic when IPES
Providers are in the call path? Are there
considerations that would weigh against
such a rule modification or in favor of
some other modification(s) to this rule?
Are the proposed rule modifications
sufficient to address the concerns that
AT&T intends to address with this
proposed rule change? Alternatively,
should we delete the ‘‘serving end
user(s)’’ phrase from section
61.3(bbb)(1) of our rules? Would doing
so be a simpler approach to address this
perceived ambiguity? Or, should we add
the phrase ‘‘serving end users’’ to
sections 61.3(bbb)(2) and 61.3(bbb)(3)?
Would there be a benefit to making the
rules consistent? Would there be any
detrimental effects from doing so?
31. Secondly, AT&T proposes that we
modify section 61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) of our
existing rules to remove the reference to
traffic calculations ‘‘in an end office’’
and revise how the access-stimulation
traffic ratio is computed for LECs that
provide numbers or interconnection to
IPES Providers, as follows. The
italicized language represents what
would be added.
A Competitive Local Exchange Carrier
has an interstate terminating-tooriginating traffic ratio of at least 6:1 in
a calendar month. For any Competitive
Local Exchange Carrier that provides
numbers or interconnection to a VoIP
provider, the LEC is engaged in access
stimulation for purposes of that VoIP
provider’s traffic when that VoIP
provider has an interstate terminatingto-originating traffic ratio of at least 6:1
in a calendar month.
32. Should we adopt this proposal?
Would removing the language ‘‘in an
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end office’’ better accomplish our goal
of providing clarity and understanding
of our rules? Does the deletion of ‘‘in an
end office’’ recognize, as AT&T suggests,
that arbitrage schemes no longer target
end office charges? Under this proposed
approach, should the LEC be
responsible for calculating the traffic
ratios of the IPES Provider? If the LEC
delivers traffic to multiple IPES
Providers, should the LEC calculate a
traffic ratio for each individual IPES
Provider separately? Alternatively,
should we maintain the ‘‘in the end
office’’ language in section
61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) and (iii), and add it to
section 61.3(bbb)(1)(i)? Would making
the rules consistent in this manner
reduce the opportunity for continued
arbitrage of the ICC system?
33. Treat IPES Providers as LECs for
Purposes of the Access Stimulation
Rules. We also seek comment on a
proposal submitted by Inteliquent and
Lumen, suggesting that the Commission
could, as an alternative to adopting new
rules, ‘‘issue a declaratory ruling
clarifying that IPES providers are treated
as LECs for the purpose of the access
stimulation rules.’’ Inteliquent and
Lumen argue that ‘‘[t]o the extent an
IPES provider’s ratio of terminating to
originating traffic meets the triggers, it
should be deemed to be engaged in
access stimulation just like a traditional
LEC,’’ because ‘‘the IPES provider both
functions like a LEC for the purposes of
the access stimulation rules and
necessarily has visibility into its own
access traffic.’’ According to Inteliquent,
a LEC that provides interconnection to
an IPES Provider serves only as a
conduit for delivery of local traffic and
has no insight into the IPES Provider’s
long-distance traffic volumes. Therefore,
Inteliquent contends, it would be
inappropriate to make the LEC
responsible for the IPES Provider’s
traffic volumes. We seek comment on
this suggestion. How relevant are other
situations in which the Commission has
applied certain regulations to VoIP
providers? IPES Providers have the
ability to obtain direct access to
numbers. Could the Commission
condition the ability of an IPES Provider
to obtain direct access to numbers on an
agreement by the provider to voluntarily
subject itself to our Access Stimulation
Rules? How would doing so affect our
efforts to eliminate access arbitrage?
34. What rule changes would be
necessary were we to decide to
implement the proposal to issue a
declaratory ruling to treat IPES
Providers as LECs for purposes of the
Access Stimulation Rules? For example,
would we need to add a definition of
‘‘LEC’’ to our Access Stimulation Rules
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that would include IPES Providers
solely for the purpose of compliance
with the Access Stimulation Rules? Are
the proposed rules sufficient to address
Inteliquent and Lumen’s concerns that
IPES Providers are being used to avoid
the application of the Access
Stimulation Rules and to allow the
continued unlawful charging of IXCs? If
not, what specific language do
commenters suggest to help address
these concerns or further the
Commission’s goal of eliminating
harmful access arbitrage?
35. As an addition or alternative to
their declaratory ruling proposal,
Inteliquent and Lumen suggest that ‘‘the
Commission could declare that it is an
inherently unjust and unreasonable
practice for a party to attempt to evade
the access arbitrage rules by moving
LEC end office traffic to an affiliated
IPES provider, where the traffic in
question otherwise would have caused
the LEC to be engaged in access
stimulation under the rules.’’ We seek
comment on this idea. What are the
relevant considerations of such an
approach? Would such an approach be
overly broad? Would this approach
efficiently capture improper behavior?
The Commission has repeatedly resisted
an outright ban on access stimulation.
Would doing as Inteliquent and Lumen
suggest effectively be a ban on access
stimulation?
36. Interstate/Intrastate Language.
The Commission made clear in the 2019
Access Arbitrage Order that the rules
adopted to combat access stimulation
were intended to prohibit accessstimulating entities from unlawfully
billing IXCs for intrastate terminating
switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access transport,
bound for access-stimulating LECs, in
addition to such interstate traffic.
However, that language was not
reflected in the text of the rules, only in
the text of the Order. We now propose
to codify, in sections 69.4(l), and 69.5(b)
of our rules that IXCs shall not be billed
for interstate or intrastate terminating
switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access transport.
Would making these amendments
facilitate enforcement of our Access
Stimulation Rules? Are there other
benefits in making these changes? Are
any other amendments to these or other
sections of our rules needed to fully and
accurately capture the text of the Access
Arbitrage Order?
37. IPES Provider Definition. We
propose to define an ‘‘IPES Provider,’’
for purposes of our Access Stimulation
Rules, as:
IPES Provider means, for purposes of
this part and §§ 51.914, 69.4(l) and
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69.5(b) of this chapter, a provider
offering a service that: (1) enables realtime, two-way voice communications;
(2) requires a broadband connection
from the user’s location or end to end;
(3) requires internet Protocol-compatible
customer premises equipment (CPE);
and (4) permits users to receive calls
that originate on the public switched
telephone network and to terminate
calls to the public switched telephone
network or that originate from an
internet Protocol service and terminate
to an internet Protocol service or an
internet Protocol application.
38. Parties have suggested using the
term ‘‘IPES Provider’’ when referring to
the provider being inserted in the place
of the ‘‘LEC serving end users’’ as used
in the Access Stimulation Rules. For
example, Inteliquent suggests that IPES
is ‘‘an industry term commonly used for
VoIP providers that have received direct
access to numbers, and it originates
from the company code (OCN) type
assigned to these providers by NECA
[(National Exchange Carrier
Association)].’’ AT&T suggests that
‘‘IPES providers are entities that, among
other things, provide or facilitate Over
the Top VoIP calling services, including
‘2-stage’ International calling services.’’
Do commenters agree with either of
these definitions? We also seek
comment on the definition proposed
above, which is limited in its
application to the Access Stimulation
Rules. USTelecom suggests that our
proposed ‘‘IPES Provider’’ definition not
require two-way calling or the
termination of calls. Do commenters
agree that we should modify the
proposed definition as USTelecom
suggests? Are there other alternative
definitions of ‘‘IPES Provider’’ that
commenters would suggest we use for
purposes of our Access Stimulation
Rules? What are the important functions
or concepts this definition should
capture? Would limiting our definition
of ‘‘IPES Providers’’ to providers that
have received direct access to numbers,
as Inteliquent suggests, limit the
effectiveness of the Access Stimulation
Rules? Would commenters suggest using
an existing definition to describe these
IPES Providers who are being inserted
into the call path, such as ‘‘IP-enabled
voice service’’ provider, as defined in
section 615b(8) of the Act?
39. Alternatively, should we refer to
these providers as ‘‘interconnected
VoIP’’ providers, as defined in section
9.3 of our rules? Are there meaningful
distinctions among these terms that
would make one defined term better
than another for purposes of the Access
Stimulation Rules? We propose a
definition of ‘‘IPES Provider’’ to be used
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solely in the context of our Access
Stimulation Rules. Despite our attempts
to limit the use of this defined term, do
we need to be concerned about potential
confusion with other, similar, terms
defined elsewhere in our rules? Will the
proposed definition capture all
providers that could be used to try to
circumvent the Access Stimulation
Rules?
40. Intermediate Access Provider
Definition. An Intermediate Access
Provider currently is defined in our
rules as ‘‘any entity that carries or
processes traffic at any point between
the final Interexchange Carrier in a call
path and a local exchange carrier
engaged in Access Stimulation.’’
Pursuant to our current Access
Stimulation Rules, neither the
Intermediate Access Provider nor the
access-stimulating LEC shall bill an IXC
for tariffed terminating switched access
tandem switching and terminating
switched access tandem transport
charges for traffic between the
Intermediate Access Provider and the
access-stimulating LEC. In keeping with
our other proposed rule modifications,
we propose to amend the definition of
Intermediate Access Provider to include
any entity that ‘‘provides terminating
switched access tandem switching and
terminating switched access tandem
transport services between the final
Interexchange Carrier in a call path and:
(1) a local exchange carrier engaged in
Access Stimulation, as defined in
paragraph (bbb) of this section; or (2) a
local exchange carrier delivering traffic
to an IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation, as defined in paragraph
(bbb) of this section; or (3) an IPES
Provider engaged in Access Stimulation,
as defined in paragraph (bbb) of this
section, where the Intermediate Access
Provider delivers calls directly to the
IPES Provider.’’
41. We seek comment on this
proposed change to our definition of
‘‘Intermediate Access Provider.’’
Inteliquent and Lumen state that ‘‘IPES
providers designate a Hosting LEC for
purposes of receiving local traffic’’ and
that ‘‘[t]his designation does not apply
to long distance traffic, which is the
traffic subject to the Access Arbitrage
Order.’’ Therefore, we seek input on
whether the part of our proposed
definition above that includes ‘‘a local
exchange carrier delivering traffic to an
IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation’’ is necessary or how this
part of the definition would otherwise
be affected by what Inteliquent and
Lumen describe in their filing. Do
commenters suggest any other
modifications to the definition? Are
there services, other than terminating
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switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access tandem
transport, that an Intermediate Access
Provider might provide? If so, what are
these services and who should be
financially responsible for them?
42. Conforming Edits to Our Rules.
Section 51.914(a)(2) of our rules
presently states that a LEC shall
designate, ‘‘if needed,’’ the Intermediate
Access Provider that will provide
certain terminating access services to
the LEC. This designation is applicable
in cases where an Intermediate Access
Provider is different than the end office
LEC. We therefore propose changing ‘‘if
needed’’ to ‘‘if any,’’ so that the rule
denotes a LEC shall designate an
Intermediate Access Provider when and
‘‘if any’’ such designation is required.
Not only is the ‘‘if any’’ language more
accurate, but removing the ‘‘if needed’’
provision prevents any misconception
that a LEC may otherwise subjectively
decide on its own when such
designation is needed. Regarding the
designation of an Intermediate Access
Provider by an IPES Provider, are there
any instances when an IPES Provider is
not required to designate an
Intermediate Access Provider or when
proposed sections 51.914(c)(1) and (d)
would not be necessary?
43. Section 69.4(l) of the
Commission’s rules requires that a LEC
engaged in access stimulation ‘‘may not
bill’’ IXCs terminating switched access
tandem switching or terminating
switched access tandem transport
charges for access-stimulation traffic.
Yet, in the Access Arbitrage Order, the
Commission made clear that it is
unlawful for a LEC engaged in access
stimulation to charge an IXC
terminating switched access tandem
switching or terminating switched
access tandem transport charges. We
propose edits to section 69.4(l) of our
rules to make this rule consistent with
the Commission’s intent adopted in the
Access Arbitrage Order; that a LEC
engaged in access stimulation ‘‘shall not
bill’’ IXCs for terminating switched
access tandem switching or terminating
switched access tandem transport
charges on access-stimulation traffic.
Similarly, we also propose to correct an
error in section 69.5(b)(2) of the
Commission’s rules that excluded the
word ‘‘not,’’ change the word ‘‘may’’ to
‘‘shall’’ to be consistent with other uses
in these rules, and make clear that it is
‘‘IXCs’’ and not ‘‘local exchange
carriers’’ that are not being charged.
44. We also seek comment on whether
any rule changes proposed in this
Further Notice introduce new
opportunities for unlawful arbitrage.
Would our proposed rule modifications
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accomplish our objectives of sending
accurate pricing signals to customers by
prohibiting Intermediate Access
Providers that deliver traffic to IPES
Providers that trigger the Access
Stimulation Rules from charging IXCs
for such calls? Would adopting our
proposed rule changes create
unintended consequences? For example,
would any of the proposals introduce
unnecessary complexity and present
practical implementation challenges? If
so, we seek comment on what exactly
are the perceived complexities and
implementation challenges related to
the proposals in this Further Notice. Are
there other types of access arbitrage
happening today that are not described
in this Further Notice? For example, are
services that allow consumers to make
long-distance calls to a domestic
number and listen to foreign radio
stations unfairly exploiting our access
charge regime, as USTelecom suggests?
Would these type of services be covered
by our proposed rules? Or are they
‘‘one-way,’’ as USTelecom argues? If so,
what additional actions, if any, should
we take to ensure our proposed rules
address these types of services? We ask
commenters to provide any other
proposed actions, alternatives, and rule
additions or modifications we should
consider. Are there any other
conforming rule changes that
commenters consider necessary? Are
there any conflicts or inconsistencies
between existing rules and those we
propose? Finally, we propose several
non-substantive edits, to, among other
things, enhance readability and ensure
compliance with rule drafting
guidelines applicable to the Code of
Federal Regulations.
Clarifying or Interpreting Current
Access Stimulation Rules
45. Applying the Existing Rules to
IPES Providers. As an alternative to
modifying our rules as proposed, we
seek comment on whether it would be
preferable for the Commission to issue
a Declaratory Ruling interpreting the
existing Access Stimulation Rules as
applying to traffic routed from the PSTN
through a LEC to an IPES Provider, or
directly to the IPES Provider or to the
end user, as parties have suggested since
the rules first became effective. In the
Access Arbitrage Order, the Commission
explained that the access-stimulation
traffic ratios are based on ‘‘the actual
minutes traversing the LEC switch.’’
Most relevant to the current discussion,
the Commission clarified that ‘‘all traffic
should be counted regardless of how it
is routed.’’ Indeed, the Commission
emphasized this point several times in
the Access Arbitrage Order. These
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explanations form the basis of
arguments that ‘‘the Access Arbitrage
Order already rejects’’ claims that traffic
routed by LECs through an IPES
Provider should not be counted for
determining access-stimulation ratios. Is
this a reasonable and accurate
interpretation of the Commission’s
decision? Would issuing a declaratory
ruling interpreting the Access
Stimulation Rules as requested above
adequately address any perceived lack
of clarity in the existing rules identified
in this Further Notice?
46. Traffic to Be Counted. AT&T
argues that the Commission should
clarify that, when calculating the traffic
ratios for the purposes of our Access
Stimulation Rules, a LEC ‘‘may not
include aggregated originating 8YY
traffic—particularly traffic that it
obtains from VoIP providers—as part of
its traffic ratio’’ because of the potential
for arbitrage and fraud associated with
the routing of 8YY traffic. The
Commission previously identified
certain forms of toll free or 8YY
aggregation as a form of originating
arbitrage and took steps to minimize
that arbitrage. AT&T suggests that if a
LEC ‘‘aggregate[s] 8YY traffic from VoIP
providers that have obtained numbering
authorization,’’ the LEC ‘‘could begin
routing access stimulation traffic from
VoIP providers in the hope that, by
engaging in both originating 8YY
aggregation schemes and terminating
access stimulation schemes, it could
balance its terminating access
stimulation traffic against its
longstanding originating 8YY traffic and
avoid hitting the Commission’s
triggers.’’ We seek greater detail on this
issue, as well as comment on the
validity of AT&T’s concerns. Is this
happening in the market now? If so, we
ask commenters to propose rule
revisions to address this issue. We also
seek comment on any other issues
regarding the treatment of originating
8YY traffic for purposes of calculating
the traffic ratios related to the triggers in
our Access Stimulation Rules. Would
excluding such traffic alter carriers’
ratios sufficiently so as to cause them to
trigger our Access Stimulation Rules
even though they are not engaging in
arbitrage? Should a significant increase
in a carrier’s 8YY originating traffic be
reported and treated as another trigger
for our Access Stimulation Rules?
Should 8YY traffic be included in those
ratios? Why or why not? Should
originating 8YY traffic be treated as
terminating traffic for purposes of our
Access Stimulation Rules?
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Legal Authority
47. We tentatively conclude that
sections 201, 251, 254 and 256 of the
Act provide us with the authority
needed to adopt the rule changes
proposed in this Further Notice. We
seek comment on this authority, our
ancillary authority in section 4(i) of the
Act, and any other statutory authority
that may support our proposed actions.
We also seek comment on any concerns
parties might have about our authority
to adopt any of the proposals made in
this Further Notice.
48. Section 201 of the Act. Our
primary authority to adopt our proposed
changes to the Access Stimulation Rules
is section 201(b) of the Act. In the
Access Arbitrage Order, the Commission
determined that the imposition of
tariffed tandem switching and tandem
switched transport access charges on
IXCs for terminating access-stimulation
traffic is an unjust and unreasonable
practice under section 201(b) of the Act.
In our view, providers’ attempts to
continue to assess tandem switching or
tandem switched transport access
charges on IXCs for delivering accessstimulation traffic to IPES Providers is
unjust and unreasonable pursuant to
section 201(b) of the Act, and virtually
indistinguishable from practices the
Commission has already found to be
unjust and unreasonable. We seek
comment on this view. Section 201(b) of
the Act gives us the authority to
‘‘prescribe such rules and regulations as
may be necessary in the public interest
to carry out the provisions of this Act.’’
We seek comment on whether this
language provides us with the authority
to require IPES Providers to designate
the Intermediate Access Provider(s) that
will provide terminating switched
access tandem switching and transport
services, to calculate their traffic ratios,
and to notify Intermediate Access
Providers, IXCs, and the Commission if
the IPES Provider is engaged in Access
Stimulation so that Intermediate Access
Providers can determine whether they
can lawfully charge IXCs for interstate
and intrastate tandem services (and
IXCs can determine if charges are
appropriate). We also seek comment on
our tentative conclusion that section
201(b) provides us the authority
necessary to prohibit Intermediate
Access Providers or other LECs from
charging IXCs for access stimulation
traffic routed through an IPES Provider,
rather than through a LEC.
49. Sections 251, 254, and 256 of the
Act. Our authority to take the actions
proposed in this Further Notice is also
rooted in other sections of the Act on
which the Commission relied in the
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Access Arbitrage Order. First, section
251(b)(5) of the Act applies because our
proposed new and modified rules apply,
in large part, to exchange access and
providers of exchange access that meet
the definition of a LEC. Second, section
251(g) of the Act provides us with the
authority to address problematic
conduct which is occurring while the
transition to bill-and-keep is not
complete. Third, section 254 of the Act
provides the Commission with the
authority to eliminate implicit
subsidies. Finally, section 256 of the Act
requires the Commission to oversee and
promote interconnection by providers of
telecommunications services that is
‘‘efficient.’’ We seek comment on the
applicability of sections 201, 251, 254,
and 256 of the Act to give us the
authority to take the actions proposed
herein.
50. Section 4(i) of the Act. Although
we propose to conclude that our direct
sources of authority identified above
provide the basis to adopt our proposed
rules, we also seek comment on whether
our ancillary authority in section 4(i) of
the Act provides an independent basis
to adopt limited rules with respect to
IPES Providers. We consider the
proposed requirements to be
‘‘reasonably ancillary to the
Commission’s effective performance of
[its] . . . responsibilities.’’ Specifically,
IPES Providers interconnected with the
PSTN and exchanging IP traffic clearly
constitutes ‘‘communication by wire or
radio.’’ We seek comment on whether
requiring IPES Providers to comply with
our proposed limited rules is reasonably
ancillary to the Commission’s effective
performance of its statutory
responsibilities under sections 201(b),
251, 254, and 256 as described above.
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Costs and Benefits of the Proposals
51. Our intercarrier compensation
regime continues to be an important
source of funding for certain rural
service providers, including providers
of tandem switching, to ensure all
Americans are connected. Access
arbitrage exploits our intercarrier
compensation regime to benefit
activities and providers that our policies
are not intended to benefit. This
encourages further exploitation of our
rules, threatening the basic goals of
connectivity at just and reasonable
prices, a cost that alone justifies our
action. The excess payments made due
to arbitrage also operate as an
unnecessary tax on end users, shrinking
the efficient use of telecommunications
services. Further, because the party that
chooses the call path does not pay that
tax, it has incentives to engage in
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wasteful actions. Examples of this waste
include:
• the pursuit of access arbitrage
opportunities by routing traffic along
more expensive call paths;
• artificial stimulation of traffic;
• disputes over questionable
demands for payment by access
stimulators;
• attempts by IXCs to identify the
sources of fraudulent traffic; and
• time and money spent by parties
seeking to protect against or reduce
access arbitrage opportunities, as in this
proceeding.
52. Costs incurred by these activities
are not fully paid for by the consumers
of high-volume calling services, who
often pay nothing for these services. If
consumers of these services were
charged prices that wholly recovered
the costs of arbitrage, then those who
value the service less than those prices
would decline to purchase the service.
This would reduce waste or
equivalently create value equal to the
difference between the cost-covering
prices and these consumers’ valuations
of the service.
53. We recognize that any action we
take to address ongoing access arbitrage
may affect the costs and benefits to
carriers and their customers and the
choices they make, as they provide and
receive telecommunications services.
Consumers who enjoy high-volume
calling services could be adversely
affected by regulatory adjustments
targeting arbitrage. Are there perceived
benefits to access arbitrage or access
stimulation? Would addressing access
arbitrage as we propose unfairly
advantage any competitor or class of
competitors? If so, are there alternative
means to address the arbitrage issues
described here and presented in the
record?
54. In the USF/ICC Transformation
Order, the Commission considered
direct costs imposed on consumers by
arbitrage schemes. The Commission also
found that access stimulation diverts
capital away from more productive uses,
such as broadband deployment. There is
also evidence that the staggering volume
of minutes generated by these schemes
can result in call blocking and dropped
calls. What has been the effect of the
2019 revisions to the Access
Stimulation Rules? Are there additional,
more-recent data available to estimate
the annual cost of arbitrage schemes to
companies, long-distance customers,
and consumers in general? Likewise, are
there data available to quantify the
resources being diverted from more
productive uses because of arbitrage
schemes? To what degree are consumers
indirectly affected by potentially
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inefficient networking or incorrect
pricing signals due to ongoing access
stimulation? Has competition been
negatively impacted because ‘‘accessstimulation revenues subsidize the costs
of high-volume calling services, granting
providers of those services a
competitive advantage over companies
that collect such costs directly from
their customers?’’ Are there other costs
or benefits to the proposals in this
Further Notice that we should consider?
Efforts To Promote Digital Equity and
Inclusion
55. The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to advance digital
equity for all, including people of color,
persons with disabilities, persons who
live in rural or Tribal areas, and others
who are or have been historically
underserved, marginalized, or adversely
affected by persistent poverty or
inequality, invites comment on any
equity-related considerations and
benefits (if any) that may be associated
with the proposals and issues discussed
herein. Specifically, we seek comment
on how our proposals may promote or
inhibit advances in diversity, equity,
inclusion, and accessibility, as well as
the scope of the Commission’s relevant
legal authority.
Procedural Matters
56. Filing Instructions. Pursuant to
sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.415,
1.419, interested parties may file
comments and reply comments on or
before the dates indicated on the first
page of this document. Comments may
be filed using the Commission’s
Electronic Comment Filing System
(ECFS). See Electronic Filing of
Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings,
63 FR 24121 (1998).
• Electronic Filers: Comments may be
filed electronically using the internet by
accessing the ECFS: https://
www.fcc.gov/ecfs/.
• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to
file by paper must file an original and
one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by commercial
overnight courier, or by first-class or
overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All
filings must be addressed to the
Commission’s Secretary, Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications
Commission.
• Commercial overnight mail (other
than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail
and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050
Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD
20701.
• U.S. Postal Service first-class,
Express, and Priority mail must be
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addressed to 45 L Street NE,
Washington, DC 20554.
• Effective March 19, 2020, and until
further notice, the Commission no
longer accepts any hand or messenger
delivered filings. This is a temporary
measure taken to help protect the health
and safety of individuals, and to
mitigate the transmission of COVID–19.
Æ During the time the Commission’s
building is closed to the general public
and until further notice, if more than
one docket or rulemaking number
appears in the caption of a proceeding,
paper filers need not submit two
additional copies for each additional
docket or rulemaking number; an
original and one copy are sufficient.
Æ After COVID–19 restrictions are
lifted, the Commission has established
that hand-carried documents are to be
filed at the Commission’s office located
at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. This will be the
only location where hand-carried paper
filings for the Commission will be
accepted.
57. People with Disabilities. To
request materials in accessible formats
for people with disabilities (braille,
large print, electronic files, audio
format), send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov
or call the Consumer & Governmental
Affairs Bureau at 202–418–0530 (voice),
202–418–0432 (TTY).
58. Ex Parte Requirements. This
proceeding shall be treated as a ‘‘permitbut-disclose’’ proceeding in accordance
with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
Persons making ex parte presentations
must file a copy of any written
presentation or a memorandum
summarizing any oral presentation
within two business days after the
presentation (unless a different deadline
applicable to the Sunshine period
applies). Persons making oral ex parte
presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the
presentation must: (1) list all persons
attending or otherwise participating in
the meeting at which the ex parte
presentation was made; and (2)
summarize all data presented and
arguments made during the
presentation. If the presentation
consisted in whole or in part of the
presentation of data or arguments
already reflected in the presenter’s
written comments, memoranda, or other
filings in the proceeding, the presenter
may provide citations to such data or
arguments in his or her prior comments,
memoranda, or other filings (specifying
the relevant page and/or paragraph
numbers where such data or arguments
can be found) in lieu of summarizing
them in the memorandum. Documents
shown or given to Commission staff
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during ex parte meetings are deemed to
be written ex parte presentations and
must be filed consistent with Rule
1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
Rule 1.49(f) or for which the
Commission has made available a
method of electronic filing, written ex
parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte
presentations, and all attachments
thereto, must be filed through the
electronic comment filing system
available for that proceeding, and must
be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc,
.xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants
in this proceeding should familiarize
themselves with the Commission’s ex
parte rules.
59. Paperwork Reduction Act
Analysis. This document contains
proposed new or modified information
collection requirements. The
Commission, as part of its continuing
effort to reduce paperwork burdens,
invites the general public and the Office
of Management and Budget to comment
on the information collection
requirements contained in this
document, as required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104–
13. In addition, pursuant to the Small
Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on
how we might further reduce the
information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25
employees.
60. Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis. As required by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA), the Commission has prepared
this Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA) of the possible
significant economic impact on small
entities by the policies and rules
proposed in this Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. The Commission
requests written public comments on
this IRFA. Comments must be identified
as responses to the IRFA and must be
filed by the deadlines for comments
provided on the first page of the Further
Notice. The Commission will send a
copy of the Further Notice, including
this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration (SBA). In addition, the
Further Notice and the IRFA (or
summaries thereof) will be published in
the Federal Register.
Need for, and Objectives of, the
Proposed Rules
61. For many years the Commission
has been fighting efforts to arbitrage its
system of intercarrier compensation. In
the 2011 USF/ICC Transformation
Order, the Commission adopted rules
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identifying local exchange carriers
(LECs) engaged in access stimulation
and requiring that such LECs lower their
tariffed access charges. In 2019, to
address access arbitrage schemes that
persisted despite prior Commission
action, the Commission adopted the
Access Arbitrage Order, in which it
revised its Access Stimulation Rules to
prohibit LECs and Intermediate Access
Providers from charging interexchange
carriers (IXCs) for terminating tandem
switching and transport services used to
deliver calls to access-stimulating LECs.
The revised rules were adopted to end
the ability of LECs to engage in arbitrage
of the intercarrier compensation system
by extracting artificially inflated tandem
switching and transport charges from
IXCs to subsidize ‘‘free’’ high-volume
calling services.
62. Since the 2019 rules took effect,
the Commission has received
information about new ways carriers are
manipulating their businesses to
continue their arbitrage schemes in the
wake of the new rules. In the Further
Notice, we seek comment on ways to
address perceived loopholes in our rules
that companies may be exploiting and to
eliminate these new arbitrage schemes
and the harms those schemes inflict on
consumers. The rules we propose will
serve the public interest by reducing
carriers’ incentives and ability to send
traffic over the Public Switched
Telephone Network solely for the
purpose of collecting tariffed tandem
switching and transport access charges
from IXCs to subsidize high-volume
calling services, which the Commission
has found to be an unjust and
unreasonable practice.
63. We propose to modify our Access
Stimulation Rules to address access
arbitrage that takes place when an
internet Protocol Enabled Service (IPES)
Provider is incorporated into the call
flow. We propose that when a LEC or
Intermediate Access Provider delivers
traffic to an IPES Provider and the
terminating-to-originating traffic ratios
of the IPES Provider exceed the triggers
in the Access Stimulation Rules, the
IPES Provider will be deemed to be
engaged in access stimulation. In such
cases, we propose prohibiting an
Intermediate Access Provider from
charging an IXC tariffed charges for
terminating switched access tandem
switching and switched access transport
for traffic bound to an IPES Provider
whose traffic exceeds the ratios in
sections 61.3(bbb)(1)(i) or
61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) of our Access
Stimulation Rules. We propose that the
IPES Provider be responsible for
calculating its traffic ratios and for
making the required notifications to the
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Intermediate Access Provider and the
Commission. We likewise propose
modifying the definition of Intermediate
Access Provider to include entities
delivering traffic to an IPES Provider.
64. We propose to use the same
framework for determining when an
IPES Provider that was engaged in
access stimulation no longer is
considered to be engaged in access
stimulation, that we currently use for
competitive LECs that have engaged in
access stimulation. The Access
Stimulation Rules currently require
traffic ratios to be calculated at the end
office. We propose rule modifications to
apply this manner of traffic calculations
to IPES Providers as well and that any
final rules that are adopted will be
effective 45 days after publication in the
Federal Register.
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Legal Basis
65. The legal basis for any action that
may be taken pursuant to the Further
Notice is contained in sections 1, 2, 4(i),
201, 251, 254, 256, 303(r), and 403 of
the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i),
201, 251, 254, 256, 303(r), and 403, and
section 1.1 of the Commission’s rules,
47 CFR 1.1.
Description and Estimate of the Number
of Small Entities to Which the Proposed
Rules Will Apply
66. The RFA directs agencies to
provide a description of, and where
feasible, an estimate of the number of
small entities that may be affected by
the proposed rule revisions, if adopted.
The RFA generally defines the term
‘‘small entity’’ as having the same
meaning as the terms ‘‘small business,’’
‘‘small organization,’’ and ‘‘small
governmental jurisdiction.’’ In addition,
the term ‘‘small business’’ has the same
meaning as the term ‘‘small-business
concern’’ under the Small Business Act.
A ‘‘small-business concern’’ is one
which: (1) is independently owned and
operated; (2) is not dominant in its field
of operation; and (3) satisfies any
additional criteria established by the
SBA.
67. Small Businesses, Small
Organizations, Small Governmental
Jurisdictions. Our actions, over time,
may affect small entities that are not
easily categorized at present. We
therefore describe here, at the outset,
three broad groups of small entities that
could be directly affected herein. First,
while there are industry specific size
standards for small businesses that are
used in the regulatory flexibility
analysis, according to data from the
SBA’s Office of Advocacy, in general a
small business is an independent
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business having fewer than 500
employees. These types of small
businesses represent 99.9% of all
businesses in the United States, which
translates to 32.5 million businesses.
68. Next, the type of small entity
described as a ‘‘small organization’’ is
generally ‘‘any not-for-profit enterprise
which is independently owned and
operated and is not dominant in its
field.’’ The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of
$50,000 or less to delineate its annual
electronic filing requirements for small
exempt organizations. Nationwide, for
tax year 2020, there were approximately
447,689 small exempt organizations in
the U.S. reporting revenues of $50,000
or less according to the registration and
tax data for exempt organizations
available from the IRS.
69. Finally, the small entity described
as a ‘‘small governmental jurisdiction’’
is defined generally as ‘‘governments of
cities, counties, towns, townships,
villages, school districts, or special
districts, with a population of less than
fifty thousand.’’ U.S. Census Bureau
data from the 2017 Census of
Governments indicate that there were
90,075 local governmental jurisdictions
consisting of general purpose
governments and special purpose
governments in the United States. Of
this number there were 36,931 general
purpose governments (county,
municipal and town or township) with
populations of less than 50,000 and
12,040 special purpose governments—
independent school districts with
enrollment populations of less than
50,000. Accordingly, based on the 2017
U.S. Census of Governments data, we
estimate that at least 48,971 entities fall
into the category of ‘‘small
governmental jurisdictions.’’
70. Wired Telecommunications
Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau
defines this industry as establishments
primarily engaged in operating and/or
providing access to transmission
facilities and infrastructure that they
own and/or lease for the transmission of
voice, data, text, sound, and video using
wired communications networks.
Transmission facilities may be based on
a single technology or a combination of
technologies. Establishments in this
industry use the wired
telecommunications network facilities
that they operate to provide a variety of
services, such as wired telephony
services, including VoIP services, wired
(cable) audio and video programming
distribution, and wired broadband
internet services. By exception,
establishments providing satellite
television distribution services using
facilities and infrastructure that they
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operate are included in this industry.
Wired Telecommunications Carriers are
also referred to as wireline carriers or
fixed local service providers.
71. The SBA small business size
standard for Wired Telecommunications
Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or
fewer employees as small. U.S. Census
Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms that operated in this
industry for the entire year. Of this
number, 2,964 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission
data in the 2021 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31,
2020, there were 5,183 providers that
reported they were engaged in the
provision of fixed local services. Of
these providers, the Commission
estimates that 4,737 providers have
1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA’s small
business size standard, most of these
providers can be considered small
entities.
72. Local Exchange Carriers (LECs).
Neither the Commission nor the SBA
has developed a size standard for small
businesses specifically applicable to
local exchange services. Providers of
these services include both incumbent
and competitive local exchange service
providers. Wired Telecommunications
Carriers is the closest industry with a
SBA small business size standard.
Wired Telecommunications Carriers are
also referred to as wireline carriers or
fixed local service providers. The SBA
small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees
as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for
2017 show that there were 3,054 firms
that operated in this industry for the
entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms
operated with fewer than 250
employees. Additionally, based on
Commission data in the 2021 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of
December 31, 2020, there were 5,183
providers that reported they were fixed
local exchange service providers. Of
these providers, the Commission
estimates that 4,737 providers have
1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA’s small
business size standard, most of these
providers can be considered small
entities.
73. Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA have
developed a small business size
standard specifically for incumbent
local exchange carriers. Wired
Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with a SBA small
business size standard. The SBA small
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business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees
as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for
2017 show that there were 3,054 firms
in this industry that operated for the
entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms
operated with fewer than 250
employees. Additionally, based on
Commission data in the 2021 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of
December 31, 2020, there were 1,227
providers that reported they were
incumbent local exchange service
providers. Of these providers, the
Commission estimates that 929
providers have 1,500 or fewer
employees. Consequently, using the
SBA’s small business size standard, the
Commission estimates that the majority
of incumbent local exchange carriers
can be considered small entities.
74. Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission
nor the SBA has developed a size
standard for small businesses
specifically applicable to local exchange
services. Providers of these services
include several types of competitive
local exchange service providers. Wired
Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with a SBA small
business size standard. The SBA small
business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees
as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for
2017 show that there were 3,054 firms
that operated in this industry for the
entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms
operated with fewer than 250
employees. Additionally, based on
Commission data in the 2021 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of
December 31, 2020, there were 3,956
providers that reported they were
competitive local exchange service
providers. Of these providers, the
Commission estimates that 3,808
providers have 1,500 or fewer
employees. Consequently, using the
SBA’s small business size standard,
most of these providers can be
considered small entities.
75. Interexchange Carriers (IXCs).
Neither the Commission nor the SBA
have developed a small business size
standard specifically for Interexchange
Carriers. Wired Telecommunications
Carriers is the closest industry with a
SBA small business size standard. The
SBA small business size standard for
Wired Telecommunications Carriers
classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau
data for 2017 show that there were 3,054
firms that operated in this industry for
the entire year. Of this number, 2,964
firms operated with fewer than 250
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employees. Additionally, based on
Commission data in the 2021 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of
December 31, 2020, there were 151
providers that reported they were
engaged in the provision of
interexchange services. Of these
providers, the Commission estimates
that 131 providers have 1,500 or fewer
employees. Consequently, using the
SBA’s small business size standard, the
Commission estimates that the majority
of providers in this industry can be
considered small entities.
76. Local Resellers. Neither the
Commission nor the SBA have
developed a small business size
standard specifically for Local Resellers.
Telecommunications Resellers is the
closest industry with a SBA small
business size standard. The
Telecommunications Resellers industry
comprises establishments engaged in
purchasing access and network capacity
from owners and operators of
telecommunications networks and
reselling wired and wireless
telecommunications services (except
satellite) to businesses and households.
Establishments in this industry resell
telecommunications; they do not
operate transmission facilities and
infrastructure. Mobile virtual network
operators (MVNOs) are included in this
industry. The SBA small business size
standard for Telecommunications
Resellers classifies a business as small if
it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S.
Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
1,386 firms in this industry provided
resale services for the entire year. Of
that number, 1,375 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission
data in the 2021 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31,
2020, there were 293 providers that
reported they were engaged in the
provision of local resale services. Of
these providers, the Commission
estimates that 289 providers have 1,500
or fewer employees. Consequently,
using the SBA’s small business size
standard, most of these providers can be
considered small entities.
77. Cable Companies and Systems
(Rate Regulation). The Commission has
developed its own small business size
standard for the purpose of cable rate
regulation. Under the Commission’s
rules, a ‘‘small cable company’’ is one
serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers
nationwide. Based on industry data,
there are about 420 cable companies in
the U.S. Of these, only five have more
than 400,000 subscribers. In addition,
under the Commission’s rules, a ‘‘small
system’’ is a cable system serving 15,000
or fewer subscribers. Based on industry
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data, there are about 4,139 cable systems
(headends) in the U.S. Of these, about
639 have more than 15,000 subscribers.
Accordingly, the Commission estimates
that the majority of cable companies and
cable systems are small.
78. Cable System Operators (Telecom
Act Standard). The Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, contains a size
standard for a ‘‘small cable operator,’’
which is ‘‘a cable operator that, directly
or through an affiliate, serves in the
aggregate fewer than one percent of all
subscribers in the United States and is
not affiliated with any entity or entities
whose gross annual revenues in the
aggregate exceed $250,000,000.’’ For
purposes of the Telecom Act Standard,
the Commission determined that a cable
system operator that serves fewer than
677,000 subscribers, either directly or
through affiliates, will meet the
definition of a small cable operator
based on the cable subscriber count
established in a 2001 Public Notice.
Based on industry data, only four cable
system operators have more than
677,000 subscribers. Accordingly, the
Commission estimates that the majority
of cable system operators are small
under this size standard. We note
however, that the Commission neither
requests nor collects information on
whether cable system operators are
affiliated with entities whose gross
annual revenues exceed $250 million.
Therefore, we are unable at this time to
estimate with greater precision the
number of cable system operators that
would qualify as small cable operators
under the definition in the
Communications Act.
79. All Other Telecommunications.
This industry is comprised of
establishments primarily engaged in
providing specialized
telecommunications services, such as
satellite tracking, communications
telemetry, and radar station operation.
This industry also includes
establishments primarily engaged in
providing satellite terminal stations and
associated facilities connected with one
or more terrestrial systems and capable
of transmitting telecommunications to,
and receiving telecommunications from,
satellite systems. Providers of internet
services (e.g., dial-up ISPs) or voice over
internet protocol (VoIP) services, via
client-supplied telecommunications
connections are also included in this
industry. The SBA small business size
standard for this industry classifies
firms with annual receipts of $35
million or less as small. U.S. Census
Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 1,079 firms in this industry that
operated for the entire year. Of those
firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than
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$25 million. Based on this data, the
Commission estimates that the majority
of ‘‘All Other Telecommunications’’
firms can be considered small.
Description of Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities
80. In the Further Notice, we propose
and seek comment on rule changes that
will affect LECs, Intermediate Access
Providers, and IPES Providers. We
propose to modify our Access
Stimulation Rules to address arbitrage
which takes place when an IPES
Provider is incorporated into the call
flow. In the Further Notice, we propose
rules to further limit or eliminate the
occurrence of access arbitrage, including
access stimulation, which could affect
potential reporting requirements. The
proposed rules also contain
recordkeeping, reporting and third-party
notification requirements for accessstimulating LECs and IPES Providers,
which may impact small entities. Some
of the proposed requirements may also
involve tariff changes.
81. We propose that when a LEC
delivers traffic to an IPES Provider and
the terminating-to-originating traffic
ratios of the IPES Provider exceed the
triggers in the Access Stimulation Rules,
the IPES Provider will be deemed to be
engaged in access stimulation. We
propose that the IPES Provider be
responsible for calculating its traffic
ratios and for making the required thirdparty notifications. As such, providers
may need to modify their in-house
recordkeeping to comply with the
proposed rules. Under our proposal, if
the IPES Provider’s ratios exceed the
applicable rule triggers, it would have to
notify the Intermediate Access Provider,
the Commission, and affected IXCs. The
Intermediate Access Provider would
then be prohibited from charging IXCs
tariffed rates for terminating switched
access tandem switching or terminating
switched access transport charges.
82. Our proposals may also require
affected LECs and Intermediate Access
Providers to file tariff revisions to
remove any tariff provisions they have
filed for terminating tandem switched
access or terminating switched access
transport charges. Although we decline
to opine on whether our proposals may
require carriers to file further tariff
revisions, affected carriers may
nonetheless choose to file additional
tariff revisions to add provisions
allowing them to charge accessstimulating LECs or access-stimulating
IPES Providers, rather than IXCs, for the
termination of traffic.
83. As an alternative to imposing a
measurement requirement on the IPES
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Provider, we seek comment on requiring
that the Intermediate Access Provider
calculate the IPES Provider’s traffic
ratios for purposes of our Access
Stimulation Rules. If adopted, this
proposal could impose recordkeeping,
reporting, and third-party notification
requirements on Intermediate Access
Providers. Under this alternative
proposal, if the Intermediate Access
Provider cannot perform this
calculation, or the IPES Provider will
not share relevant traffic ratio
information with the Intermediate
Access Provider, the Intermediate
Access Provider would not be able to
charge IXCs terminating switched access
tandem switching or terminating
switched access transport charges.
84. Our proposals may also
necessitate that affected carriers make
various revisions to their billing
systems. For example, Intermediate
Access Providers that serve LECs with
access-stimulating IPES Providers in the
call path (or that deliver traffic directly
to an IPES Provider when no LEC is in
the call path) will no longer be able to
charge IXCs terminating tandem
switched access rates and transport
charges. As Intermediate Access
Providers cease billing IXCs they will
likely need to make corresponding
adjustments to their billing systems.
85. In the Further Notice, we also seek
comment on other actions we could take
to further discourage or eliminate access
arbitrage activity. Rules which achieve
these objectives could potentially affect
recordkeeping, reporting, and thirdparty notification requirements.
Steps Taken To Minimize the
Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities and Significant Alternatives
Considered
86. The RFA requires an agency to
describe any significant alternatives that
it has considered in reaching its
proposed approach, which may include
the following four alternatives (among
others): (1) the establishment of
differing compliance or reporting
requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification,
consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements
under the rules for such small entities;
(3) the use of performance rather than
design standards; and (4) an exemption
from coverage of the rule, or any part
thereof, for such small entities. We
expect to consider all of these factors
when we receive substantive comment
from the public and potentially affected
entities.
87. In this Further Notice, we invite
comment on a number of proposals and
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alternatives to modify our Access
Stimulation Rules. The Commission has
found these arbitrage practices
inefficient and to ultimately increase
consumer telecommunications rates.
Therefore, in the Further Notice, we
propose rules to further limit or
eliminate the occurrence of access
stimulation in turn promoting the
efficient function of the nation’s
telecommunications network. We
believe that if companies are able to
operate with greater efficiency this will
benefit the communications network as
a whole, and its users, by allowing
companies to increase their investment
in broadband deployment.
88. Thus, we propose to adopt rules
to address arbitrage which takes place
when an IPES Provider is incorporated
into the call flow. We propose that
when a LEC delivers traffic to an IPES
Provider and the terminating-tooriginating traffic ratios of the IPES
Provider exceed the triggers in the
Access Stimulation Rules, the IPES
Provider will be deemed to be engaged
in access stimulation. In such cases, we
propose that the Intermediate Access
Provider would be prohibited from
imposing tariffed terminating tandem
switching and transport access charges
on IXCs sending traffic to an IPES
Provider or the IPES Provider’s end-user
customer. As an alternative to imposing
a measurement requirement on the IPES
Provider, we could require that the
Intermediate Access Provider calculate
the IPES Provider’s traffic ratios for
purposes of our Access Stimulation
Rules. Under this alternative proposal, if
the Intermediate Access Provider cannot
perform this calculation, or the IPES
Provider will not share relevant traffic
ratio information with the Intermediate
Access Provider, we would create a
presumption that the IPES Provider’s
traffic exceeds the Access Stimulation
Rule ratios. In that case, the
Intermediate Access Provider would not
be able to charge IXCs terminating
switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access transport
charges.
89. We also seek comment on whether
IPES Providers should be treated as
LECs for the purpose of our Access
Stimulation Rules. We received a
proposal in the record that the
Commission should ‘‘issue a declaratory
ruling clarifying that IPES Providers are
treated as LECs for the purpose of the
access stimulation rules.’’ We seek
interested parties’ opinion on whether
adopting such a proposal would be
more or less burdensome on small
businesses.
90. In the Further Notice, we also
propose to require carriers to comply
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with any adopted rules within 45 days.
We seek comment on this time period
and whether interested parties foresee
difficulties that would affect the time it
will take to comply with the revised
rules. We expect that time period will
allow even small entities adequate time
to amend their tariffs, if needed, and
meet the requirements in the proposed
rules.
91. Comment is sought on how best to
address access arbitrage activities. In the
Further Notice, we seek comment on the
costs and benefits of these proposals.
Providing carriers, especially small
carriers, with options will enable them
to best assess the financial effects on
their operations allowing them to
determine how best to respond. We
invite comment on how our proposals
may affect the costs and benefits to
carriers and their customers and the
choices they make, as they provide and
receive telecommunications services.
We invite commenters to quantify both
the costs and the benefits of our
proposals and of any alternative
approaches to reducing access
stimulation activities.
92. We expect to consider the
economic impact on small entities, as
identified in comments filed in response
to the Further Notice and this IRFA, in
reaching our final conclusions and
promulgating rules in this proceeding.
The proposals and questions laid out in
the Further Notice are designed to
ensure the Commission has a complete
understanding of the benefits and
potential burdens associated with the
different proposed actions.
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Federal Rules That May Duplicate,
Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed
Rules
93. None.
94. Contact Person. For further
information about this proceeding,
please contact Lynne Engledow, FCC
Wireline Competition Bureau, Pricing
Policy Division, 45 L Street NE,
Washington, DC 20554, 202–418–1520,
Lynne.Engledow@fcc.gov.
Ordering Clauses
95. Accordingly, it is ordered,
pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i), 201, 251,
254, 256, 303(r), and 403 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i),
201, 251, 254, 256, 303(r), and 403 and
section 1.1 of the Commission’s rules,
47 CFR 1.1, this Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking is adopted.
96. It is further ordered that pursuant
to applicable procedures set forth in
sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the
Commission’s Rules, 47 CFR 1.415,
1.419, interested parties may file
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comments on this Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on or before 30
days after publication of this Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the
Federal Register, and reply comments
on or before 60 days after publication of
this Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in the Federal Register.
97. It is further ordered that the
Commission’s Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference
Information Center, shall send a copy of
this Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, including the Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration.
List of Subjects
47 CFR Part 51
Interconnection; Communications;
Communication common carriers;
Telecommunications; Telephone.
47 CFR Part 61
Tariffs.
Communication Common Carriers;
Radio; Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements; Telegraph; Telephone.
47 CFR Part 69
Access Charges; Communications
common carriers; Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements; Telephone.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Proposed Rules
For the reasons set forth, the Federal
Communications Commission proposes
to amend 47 CFR parts 51, 61 and 69 as
shown below.
PART 51—INTERCONNECTION
1. The authority citation for part 51
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151–55, 201–05, 207–
09, 218, 225–27, 251–52, 271, 332 unless
otherwise noted.
2. Amend § 51.903 by adding
paragraph (q) to read as follows:
■
§ 51.903
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(q) IPES Provider has the same
meaning as that term is defined in
§ 61.3(eee) of this chapter.
■ 3. Amend § 51.914 by revising
paragraphs (a) through (e) and adding
paragraphs (f) and (g) as follows:
§ 51.914 Additional provisions applicable
to Access Stimulation traffic.
(a) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this part, if a local
exchange carrier is engaged in Access
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Stimulation, as defined in § 61.3(bbb) of
this chapter, it shall, within 45 days of
commencing Access Stimulation, or
within 45 days of September 6, 2022,
whichever is later:
(1) Not bill any Interexchange Carrier
for interstate or intrastate terminating
switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access transport
charges for any traffic between such
local exchange carrier’s terminating end
office or equivalent and the associated
access tandem switch; and
(2) Designate the Intermediate Access
Provider(s), if any, that will provide
terminating switched access tandem
switching and terminating switched
access tandem transport services to the
local exchange carrier engaged in
Access Stimulation; and
(3) Assume financial responsibility for
any applicable Intermediate Access
Provider’s charges for such services for
any traffic between such local exchange
carrier’s terminating end office or
equivalent and the associated access
tandem switch.
(b) Notwithstanding any other
provision of this part, if a local
exchange carrier is engaged in Access
Stimulation, as defined in § 61.3(bbb) of
this chapter, it shall, within 45 days of
commencing Access Stimulation, or
within 45 days of September 6, 2022,
whichever is later, notify in writing the
Commission, all Intermediate Access
Providers that it subtends, and
Interexchange Carriers with which it
does business of the following:
(1) That it is a local exchange carrier
engaged in Access Stimulation; and
(2) That it shall designate the
Intermediate Access Provider(s) that
will provide the terminating switched
access tandem switching and
terminating switched access tandem
transport services to the local exchange
carrier engaged in Access Stimulation;
and
(3) That the local exchange carrier
shall pay for those services as of that
date.
(c) Notwithstanding any other
provision of the Commission’s rules, if
an IPES Provider, as defined in
§ 61.3(eee) of this chapter, is engaged in
Access Stimulation, as defined in
§ 61.3(bbb) of this chapter, it shall,
within 45 days of commencing Access
Stimulation, or within 45 days of
September 6, 2022, whichever is later:
(1) Designate the Intermediate Access
Provider(s), if any, that will provide
terminating switched access tandem
switching and terminating switched
access tandem transport services to the
IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation; and further
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(2) The IPES Provider may assume
financial responsibility for any
applicable Intermediate Access
Provider’s charges for such services for
any traffic between such IPES Provider’s
terminating end office or equivalent and
the associated access tandem switch,
and
(3) The Intermediate Access Provider
shall not assess any charges for such
services to the Interexchange Carrier.
(d) Notwithstanding any other
provision of the Commission’s rules, if
an IPES Provider, as defined in
§ 61.3(eee) of this chapter, is engaged in
Access Stimulation, as defined in
§ 61.3(bbb) of this chapter, it shall,
within 45 days of commencing Access
Stimulation, or within 45 days of
September 6, 2022, whichever is later,
notify in writing the Commission, all
Intermediate Access Providers that it
subtends, and Interexchange Carriers
with which it does business of the
following:
(1) That it is an IPES Provider engaged
in Access Stimulation; and
(2) That it shall designate the
Intermediate Access Provider(s), if any,
that will provide the terminating
switched access tandem switching and
terminating switched access tandem
transport services directly, or indirectly
through a local exchange carrier, to the
IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation; and
(3) That the IPES Provider may pay
for those services as of that date.
(e) In the event that an Intermediate
Access Provider receives notice under
paragraphs (b) or (d) of this section that
it has been designated to provide
terminating switched access tandem
switching or terminating switched
access tandem transport services to a
local exchange carrier engaged in
Access Stimulation or to an IPES
Provider engaged in Access Stimulation,
directly, or indirectly through a local
exchange carrier, and that local
exchange carrier engaged in Access
Stimulation shall pay or the IPES
Provider engaged in Access Stimulation
may pay for such terminating access
service from such Intermediate Access
Provider, the Intermediate Access
Provider shall not bill Interexchange
Carriers for interstate or intrastate
terminating switched access tandem
switching or terminating switched
access tandem transport service for
traffic bound for such local exchange
carrier or IPES Provider but, instead,
shall bill such local exchange carrier or
may bill such IPES Provider for such
services.
(f) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section, any local
exchange carrier that is not itself
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engaged in Access Stimulation, as that
term is defined in § 61.3(bbb) of this
chapter, but serves as an Intermediate
Access Provider with respect to traffic
bound for a local exchange carrier
engaged in Access Stimulation or bound
for an IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation, or receives traffic from an
Intermediate Access Provider destined
for an IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation, shall not itself be deemed
a local exchange carrier engaged in
Access Stimulation or be affected by
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.
(g) Upon terminating its engagement
in Access Stimulation, as defined in
§ 61.3(bbb) of this chapter, the local
exchange carrier or IPES Provider
engaged in Access Stimulation shall
provide concurrent, written notification
to the Commission and any affected
Intermediate Access Provider(s) and
Interexchange Carrier(s) of such fact.
PART 61—TARIFFS
4. The authority citation for part 61
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j),
201–205, 403, unless otherwise noted.
5. Amend § 61.3 by revising
paragraphs (bbb) through (ddd), and
adding paragraph (eee) to read as
follows:
■
§ 61.3
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(bbb) Access Stimulation.
(1) A Competitive Local Exchange
Carrier or an IPES Provider serving end
user(s) engages in Access Stimulation
when it satisfies either paragraphs
(bbb)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section; and a
rate-of-return local exchange carrier
serving end user(s) engages in Access
Stimulation when it satisfies either
paragraphs (bbb)(1)(i) or (iii) of this
section.
(i) The rate-of-return local exchange
carrier, Competitive Local Exchange
Carrier, or IPES Provider:
(A) Has an access revenue sharing
agreement, whether express, implied,
written or oral, that, over the course of
the agreement, would directly or
indirectly result in a net payment to the
other party (including affiliates) to the
agreement, in which payment by the
rate-of-return local exchange carrier,
Competitive Local Exchange Carrier, or
IPES Provider is based on the billing or
collection of access charges from
interexchange carriers or wireless
carriers. When determining whether
there is a net payment under this rule,
all payments, discounts, credits,
services, features, functions, and other
items of value, regardless of form,
provided by the rate-of-return local
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47687
exchange carrier, Competitive Local
Exchange Carrier, or IPES Provider to
the other party to the agreement shall be
taken into account; and
(B) Has either an interstate
terminating-to-originating traffic ratio of
at least 3:1 in an end office or equivalent
in a calendar month, or has had more
than a 100 percent growth in interstate
originating and/or terminating switched
access minutes of use in a month
compared to the same month in the
preceding year for such end office or
equivalent.
(ii) A Competitive Local Exchange
Carrier or IPES Provider has an
interstate terminating-to-originating
traffic ratio of at least 6:1 in an end
office or equivalent in a calendar month.
(iii) A rate-of-return local exchange
carrier has an interstate terminating-tooriginating traffic ratio of at least 10:1 in
an end office or equivalent in a threecalendar month period and has 500,000
minutes or more of interstate
terminating minutes-of-use per month
in the same end office in the same threecalendar month period. These factors
will be measured as an average over the
three-calendar month period.
(2) A Competitive Local Exchange
Carrier serving end users or an IPES
Provider serving end users that has
engaged in Access Stimulation will
continue to be deemed to be engaged in
Access Stimulation until: For a carrier
or provider engaging in Access
Stimulation as defined in paragraph
(1)(i) of this section, it terminates all
revenue sharing agreements covered in
paragraph (1)(i) of this section and does
not engage in Access Stimulation as
defined in paragraph (1)(ii) of this
section; and for a carrier or provider
engaging in Access Stimulation as
defined in paragraph (1)(ii) of this
section, its interstate terminating-tooriginating traffic ratio for an end office
or equivalent falls below 6:1 for six
consecutive months, and it does not
engage in Access Stimulation as defined
in paragraph (1)(i) of this section.
(3) A rate-of-return local exchange
carrier serving end users that has
engaged in Access Stimulation will
continue to be deemed to be engaged in
Access Stimulation until: For a carrier
engaging in Access Stimulation as
defined in paragraph (1)(i) of this
section, it terminates all revenue sharing
agreements covered in paragraph (1)(i)
of this section and does not engage in
Access Stimulation as defined in
paragraph (1)(iii) of this section; and for
a carrier engaging in Access Stimulation
as defined in paragraph (1)(iii) of this
section, its interstate terminating-tooriginating traffic ratio falls below 10:1
for six consecutive months and its
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monthly interstate terminating minutesof-use in an end office or equivalent
falls below 500,000 for six consecutive
months, and it does not engage in
Access Stimulation as defined in
paragraph (1)(i) of this section.
(4) A local exchange carrier engaging
in Access Stimulation is subject to
revised interstate switched access
charge rules under § 61.26(g) (for
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers) or
§ 61.38 and § 69.3(e)(12) of this chapter
(for rate-of-return local exchange
carriers).
(ccc) Intermediate Access Provider.
The term means, for purposes of this
part and §§ 69.3(e)(12)(iv) and 69.5(b) of
this chapter, any entity that provides
terminating switched access tandem
switching and terminating switched
access tandem transport services
between the final Interexchange Carrier
in a call path and:
(1) A local exchange carrier engaged
in Access Stimulation, as defined in
paragraph (bbb) of this section; or
(2) A local exchange carrier delivering
traffic to an IPES Provider engaged in
Access Stimulation, as defined in
paragraph (bbb) of this section or;
(3) An IPES Provider engaged in
Access Stimulation, as defined in
paragraph (bbb) of this section where
the Intermediate Access Provider
delivers calls directly to the IPES
Provider.
(ddd) Interexchange Carrier. The term
means, for purposes of this part and
§§ 69.3(e)(12)(iv) and 69.5(b) of this
chapter, a retail or wholesale
telecommunications carrier that uses the
exchange access or information access
services of another telecommunications
carrier for the provision of
telecommunications.
(eee) IPES (internet Protocol Enabled
Service) Provider. The term means, for
purposes of this part and §§ 51.914,
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69.4(l) and 69.5(b) of this chapter, a
provider offering a service that: (1)
enables real-time, two-way voice
communications; (2) requires a
broadband connection from the user’s
location or end to end; (3) requires
internet Protocol-compatible customer
premises equipment (CPE); and (4)
permits users to receive calls that
originate on the public switched
telephone network and to terminate
calls to the public switched telephone
network or that originate from an
internet Protocol service and terminate
to an internet Protocol service or an
internet Protocol application.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 69—ACCESS CHARGES
6. The authority citation for part 69
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 201, 202, 203,
205, 218, 220, 254, 403.
7. Amend § 69.4 by revising paragraph
(l) to read as follows:
■
§ 69.4
Charges to be filed.
*
*
*
*
*
(l) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(5)
of this section, a local exchange carrier
engaged in Access Stimulation as
defined in § 61.3(bbb) of this chapter or
the Intermediate Access Provider it
subtends, or an Intermediate Access
Provider that delivers traffic directly or
indirectly to an IPES Provider engaged
in Access Stimulation as defined in
§ 61.3(bbb) of this chapter, shall not bill
an Interexchange Carrier as defined in
§ 61.3(bbb) of this chapter for interstate
or intrastate terminating switched
access tandem switching or terminating
switched access tandem transport
charges for any traffic between such
local exchange carrier’s or such IPES
Provider’s terminating end office or
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equivalent and the associated access
tandem switch.
■ 8. Amend § 69.5 by revising paragraph
(b) to read as follows:
§ 69.5
Persons to be assessed.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Carrier’s carrier charges shall be
computed and assessed upon all
Interexchange Carriers that use local
exchange switching facilities for the
provision of interstate or foreign
telecommunications services, except
that:
(1) Local exchange carriers shall not
assess terminating interstate or
intrastate switched access tandem
switching or terminating switched
access tandem transport charges
described in § 69.4(b)(5) of this chapter
on Interexchange Carriers when the
terminating traffic is destined for a local
exchange carrier or an IPES Provider
engaged in Access Stimulation, as that
term is defined in § 61.3(bbb) of this
chapter consistent with the provisions
of § 61.26(g)(3) of this chapter and
§ 69.3(e)(12)(iv).
(2) Intermediate Access Providers
shall not assess a terminating interstate
or intrastate switched access tandem
switching or terminating switched
access tandem transport charges
described in § 69.4(b)(5) of this chapter
on Interexchange Carriers when the
terminating traffic is destined for a local
exchange carrier engaged in Access
Stimulation, or is destined, directly or
indirectly, for an IPES Provider engaged
in Access Stimulation, as that term is
defined in § 61.3(bbb) of this chapter
consistent with the provisions of
§ 61.26(g)(3) of this chapter and
§ 69.3(e)(12)(iv).
*
*
*
*
*
[FR Doc. 2022–16237 Filed 8–3–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 149 (Thursday, August 4, 2022)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 47673-47688]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-16237]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 51, 61, and 69
[WC Docket No. 18-155; FCC 22-54; FR ID 98377]
Updating the Intercarrier Compensation Regime To Eliminate Access
Arbitrage
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Commission seeks comment on proposed amendments to prevent
companies from attempting to evade its existing access stimulation
rules, harming customers, and imposing unwarranted costs on America's
telecommunications networks.
DATES: Comments filed in response to this Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking are due September 6, 2022. Reply comments are due October 3,
2022.
ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 45 L St. NW, Washington,
DC 20554.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lynne Engledow, FCC Wireline
Competition Bureau, at 202-418-1520 or via email at
[email protected]. For additional information concerning the
proposed Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements
contained in this document, send an email to [email protected] or contact
Nicole Ongele at 202-418-2991.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking adopted on July 14, 2022, and
released on July 15, 2022. A full-text copy of this document may be
obtained at the following internet address: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-updated-rules-eliminate-access-arbitrage-0.
Background
1. The access charge regime was originally designed to compensate
carriers for the use of their networks by other carriers. It also
helped ensure that people living in rural areas had access to
affordable telephone service through a system of implicit subsidies.
The key to this system was the charges IXCs were required to pay to
LECs for access to their networks--particularly the high charges IXCs
had to pay rural LECs to terminate calls to rural customers. In 1996,
Congress directed the Commission to eliminate these implicit
subsidies--a process the Commission has pursued by steadily moving
access charges to a bill-and-keep framework. As part of the ongoing
transition to bill-and-keep, the Commission has capped most access
charges and moved terminating end-office charges and some tandem
switching and transport charges to bill-and-keep.
2. Arbitrage schemes take advantage of relatively high access
charges, particularly for the remaining terminating tandem switching
and transport services that have not yet transitioned to bill-and-keep.
Switched access charges were originally established based on the costs
of providing service and normal call volumes. These rates were
subsequently capped and are no longer based on actual costs or actual
usage and therefore no longer decrease when traffic volumes increase.
Some LECs devised business plans to exploit this fact by artificially
stimulating terminating call volumes through arrangements with entities
that offer high-volume calling services. The resulting high call
volumes generate revenues that far exceed the costs that the
terminating tandem switching and tandem switched transport charges are
designed to cover.
3. ``Free'' conference calling, chat lines, and certain other
services accessed by dialing a domestic telephone number are all types
of calling services that can be, and are, used to artificially increase
call volumes. The terminating switched access charges, however, were
intended to allow LECs to recover the costs of operating their
networks, not to allow LECs to subsidize ``free'' conference calling,
chat line, and similar ``free'' services offered by the LECs' end-user
customers. IXCs nonetheless have no choice but to carry traffic to
these high-volume calling services and pay the tariffed access charges
to the terminating LECs or the Intermediate Access Providers the LECs
choose, inefficiently transferring revenues from IXCs to the traffic
stimulators that greatly exceed the cost these termination charges are
intended to cover. As a result, terminating tandem switching and tandem
switched transport charges that these high-volume calls generate are
shared by all
[[Page 47674]]
of the IXC's customers, who collectively fund the ``free'' services
offered by high-volume calling service providers, whether the IXC
customers use those services or not.
4. In the 2011 USF/ICC Transformation Order, the Commission adopted
rules identifying rate-of-return LECs and competitive LECs engaged in
access stimulation and requiring that such LECs lower their tariffed
access charges. The 2011 rules defined ``access stimulation'' as
occurring when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the rate-of-return LEC
or competitive LEC has entered into an access revenue sharing agreement
that, ``over the course of the agreement, would directly or indirectly
result in a net payment to the other party;'' and (2) one of two
traffic triggers is met: either an interstate terminating-to-
originating traffic ratio of at least 3:1 in a calendar month, or more
than a 100 percent growth in interstate originating and/or terminating
switched access minutes of use in a month, compared to the same month
in the preceding year. At the same time, the Commission began moving
terminating, end-office switched access charges to bill-and-keep.
5. Parties engaged in access stimulation adapted to these rules by
taking advantage of tandem switching and transport access charges that
had not yet transitioned to bill-and-keep, namely, the terminating
tandem charges for rate-of-return and competitive LECs. As a result,
new access arbitrage schemes forced IXCs to pay high tandem switching
and tandem switched transport charges to access-stimulating LECs or to
Intermediate Access Providers that may be chosen by those access-
stimulating LECs. And although the direct cost to IXCs of access
stimulation dropped because of the rules adopted in 2011, the number of
access-stimulated minutes did not. Indeed, arbitrageurs openly promoted
``opportunities to get paid for generating minutes by dialing telephone
numbers owned by access stimulator LECs.''
6. In 2019, the Commission responded to the new access arbitrage
schemes that had sprung up after 2011 by broadening the scope and reach
of its Access Stimulation Rules. Most significantly, the Commission
found that requiring ``IXCs to pay the tandem switching and tandem
switched transport charges for access-stimulation traffic is an unjust
and unreasonable practice'' that was prohibited pursuant to section
201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act). The
Commission then adopted rules making access-stimulating LECs--rather
than IXCs--financially responsible for the tandem switching and tandem
switched transport service access charges associated with the delivery
of traffic from an IXC to an access-stimulating LEC serving end users
at its end office or its equivalent. The Commission adopted these
changes to reduce carriers' incentives to artificially inflate traffic
volumes by routing traffic inefficiently to maximize access charge
revenues. The Commission also found that combatting such arbitrage
reduces call congestion and service disruptions. The Commission
recognized that arbitrage may occur even when there is no revenue
sharing agreement, so it modified the definition of access stimulation
to include two alternative traffic ratio triggers (one applicable to
competitive LECs and one applicable to rate-of-return LECs) that do not
require a revenue sharing component.
7. Since these rules took effect, parties have advised Commission
staff of new efforts by access stimulators to evade the updated rules
by integrating into the call flow IP enabled (IPES) Providers. For
example, some parties described concerns that access stimulators are
``converting traditional CLEC [(competitive LEC)] phone numbers to IPES
numbers in order to claim that the [Access Arbitrage Order] is
inapplicable'' because the traffic is bound for telephone numbers
obtained by IPES Providers and not bound for LECs serving end users.
8. USTelecom and its members allege that a substantial and growing
portion of traffic that previously terminated through access-
stimulating LECs now terminates through IPES Providers. AT&T and
Verizon allege that certain LECs are attempting to evade the
Commission's Access Stimulation Rules by, for example, having an IPES
Provider take the place of the LEC delivering calls to an end user. As
a result, IXCs allege, certain LECs claim the Access Stimulation Rules
do not apply because the IPES Provider--and not the LEC--is responsible
for delivering calls to the end user. In such a scenario, it is alleged
that because the call flow does not include an access-stimulating LEC
serving end users, such LECs continue to bill IXCs for the termination
of access-stimulated traffic. Thus, IXCs and their long-distance
customers continue to bear the costs of these calls to high-volume
calling services. Inteliquent and Lumen describe a different call flow
scheme in which the traffic does not pass through a LEC. In this call
flow, an Intermediate Access Provider (tandem service provider)
transmits long-distance traffic directly to an IPES Provider. USTelecom
explains that some IPES Providers claim that the Access Stimulation
Rules do not apply to traffic terminating to ``IPES numbers,'' and
therefore the IPES Providers are not responsible for the costs of
tandem switching and transport, ``regardless that their traffic
patterns qualify as access stimulation under the Commission's rules.''
Discussion
9. In this Further Notice, we propose to eliminate perceived
ambiguity in our rules that the record shows companies are seeking to
leverage to force IXCs and their long-distance customers to continue to
bear the costs of high-volume calling services by incorporating IPES
Providers into the call path. This is an increasingly important issue
because IPES Providers are prevalent in today's networks. As a result,
we propose that when traffic is delivered to an IPES Provider by a LEC
or an Intermediate Access Provider and the terminating-to-originating
traffic ratios of the IPES Provider exceed the triggers in the Access
Stimulation Rules, the IPES Provider will be deemed to be engaged in
access stimulation. In such cases, we propose that the Intermediate
Access Provider would be prohibited from imposing tariffed terminating
tandem switching and transport access charges on IXCs sending traffic
to the IPES Provider or the IPES Provider's end-user customer.
10. The rules we propose will serve the public interest by reducing
carriers' incentives and ability to send traffic over the Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) solely for the purpose of collecting
tariffed tandem switching and transport access charges from IXCs to
subsidize high-volume calling services, which the Commission has found
to be an unjust and unreasonable practice. Consistent with the
Commission's previous efforts to eliminate this conduct, our proposals
seek to reduce the routing of artificially high volumes of calls to
places where above-cost access charges continue to exist. Our proposals
will reduce the ability to apply access charges to those calls, the
costs of which are ultimately borne by consumers, most of whom do not
even use high-volume calling services.
Proposed Rules When IPES Providers' Traffic Ratios Exceed the Access
Stimulation Triggers
11. We seek comment on call paths involving Intermediate Access
Providers, LECs, and IPES Providers. As an initial matter, we seek
comment on whether the following diagram accurately illustrates how
calls are delivered to high-volume calling service
[[Page 47675]]
providers by IPES Providers that receive those calls from LECs. If not,
how should the diagram be modified to make it more accurate? We
encourage commenters to submit diagrams and explanations in the record
to provide a more comprehensive and clearer understanding of the flow
of traffic to high-volume calling service providers when an IPES
Provider is inserted into the call flow. We strongly encourage parties
to submit simple diagrams showing all providers in the call path to
illustrate and help clarify the various calling scenarios that our
proposals to combat access stimulation should target.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP04AU22.020
12. We also seek information on the providers' services (tariffed
and non-tariffed) and the access charges involved in routing these
calls. When traffic is routed from an Intermediate Access Provider to a
LEC as in Diagram 1, is that LEC at times the same entity that serves
as the Intermediate Access Provider? In what circumstances? Commenters
should enumerate each of the services provided by the Intermediate
Access Provider, the LEC, and IPES Provider along this call path and
which entities are charged for each service. For instance, when the LEC
sends calls to the IPES Provider in the call path, is the LEC providing
transport or other services? If the LEC delivers these calls to the
IPES Provider, is the LEC providing any end-office functionality? When
traffic is exchanged between the LEC and the IPES Provider, how is
compensation, if any, handled between the two entities? What other
services does the LEC charge for? Does the IPES Provider charge any
entity in the call path for any services? If so, what services are
provided by the IPES Provider, and which entity does the IPES Provider
charge? Parties should provide any additional information that will
enhance our understanding of how calls are routed and billed for along
the hypothetical call path in Diagram 1, so we can better assess
whether entities are meeting their financial responsibilities when they
route traffic in this manner.
13. The record suggests that there are call flows that do not
include a LEC between the Intermediate Access Provider and the IPES
Provider (or the end user), as pictured in Diagram 2 below. In this
scenario, the Intermediate Access Provider (tandem provider) delivers
calls directly to an IPES Provider without an intermediate LEC. We seek
comment on the existence of such call flows. Does Diagram 2 below
accurately depict such call flows? If not, what adjustments need to be
made to the diagram to make it more accurate?
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP04AU22.021
14. IPES Providers are not ``LECs'' and thus parties may argue that
our Access Stimulation Rules do not apply to them, whether traffic they
terminate to high-volume calling service providers is received directly
from Intermediate Access Providers or from LECs. This argument,
however, leaves IXCs, who are captive to the routing decisions of IPES
Providers that may choose Intermediate Access Providers solely to
receive traffic they then deliver to the high-volume calling service
provider, having to bear the cost of those routing decisions. These
costs are ultimately passed onto the IXCs' customers. These schemes are
similar to those that existed before the Access Arbitrage Order was
adopted, where access-stimulating LECs had no incentive to make
economical routing decisions because the cost implications of those
decisions would be borne by IXCs who would pass the resultant inflated
costs on to their customer bases.
15. For example, in response to the Access Arbitrage Order, one
competitive LEC, Wide Voice, modified its business to no longer offer
service to end users, and instead only functions as a competitive
tandem provider and sends call destined for a high-volume calling
service to HD Carrier (an IPES provider),
[[Page 47676]]
which then terminates calls to the end user. The Commission found that
Wide Voice's actions resulted in it continuing to unlawfully bill IXCs
for tandem services contrary to section 201(b) of the Act. Commenters
should describe additional real-world examples of calls being routed
from an Intermediate Access Provider directly to an IPES Provider (or
indirectly through a LEC) that then terminates those calls to a high-
volume calling service provider. Does this routing scheme impose
unlawful costs on IXCs? We seek additional detail on this practice and
specific proposals as to how best it should be addressed. Parties
should explain what charges are being assessed, what entity is billing
for what services, and which parties are being charged in these
situations. Commenters should likewise describe any other aspects of
this call flow that might provide additional opportunities for
arbitrage and suggest ways our rules might be revised to foreclose
those opportunities.
16. Proposal. We propose to clarify that an Intermediate Access
Provider shall not charge an IXC tariffed charges for terminating
switched access tandem switching and switched access tandem transport
for traffic bound to an IPES Provider whose traffic exceeds the ratios
in sections 61.3(bbb)(1)(i) or 61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) of our Access
Stimulation Rules. We seek comment on this proposal, including the
question of whether it is appropriate to apply to IPES Providers the
3:1 terminating-to-originating traffic ratio plus revenue sharing
agreement trigger in section 61.3(bbb)(1)(i), and the 6:1 terminating-
to-originating traffic ratio trigger, absent a revenue sharing
agreement, in section 61.3(bbb)(1)(ii). Commenters should consider that
although we intend to reduce or eliminate arbitrage opportunities, we
do not want the financial consequences of our Access Stimulation Rules
to apply to LECs or IPES Providers that are not engaged in harmful
arbitrage schemes.
17. Under our proposal, the IPES Provider would be responsible for
calculating its traffic ratios and for making the required
notifications to the Commission and affected carriers, just as LECs are
responsible for these activities under the current rules. This proposal
is consistent with other reporting requirements imposed on VoIP
providers, such as the obligation to report certain information on FCC
Forms 477 and 499. Similar to the approach the Commission took in the
Access Arbitrage Order, we do not propose a specific format for the
notification an access-stimulating IPES Provider would provide to
affected carriers and the Commission. After the rules adopted in the
Access Arbitrage Order became effective, some carriers satisfactorily
notified the Commission that they were stopping their access
stimulation activities by filing letters in docket 18-155.
18. Under our proposal, if the IPES Provider's traffic ratios
exceed the applicable rule triggers, it would have to notify the
Intermediate Access Provider, the Commission, and affected IXCs. The
Intermediate Access Provider would then be prohibited from billing IXCs
tariffed rates for terminating switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access transport charges. Instead, the
Intermediate Access Provider could recover the costs from the IPES
Provider, or the IPES Provider's LEC partner. Thus, the entities
choosing the call path--the IPES Provider or its partner--should only
be willing to generate traffic that creates more value than the costs
these tariffed access charges are intended to recover. As a result,
they would have an economic incentive to make efficient call routing
decisions and little, if any, incentive to artificially stimulate
traffic. Do commenters agree with our view that this proposal,
reflected in the amended rules, will help ``ensure that the entities
choosing what network to use . . . have appropriate incentives to make
efficient decisions''? If commenters disagree, they should explain what
other, or additional, actions we should take to ensure that service
providers have the proper incentives.
19. As an alternative to imposing a requirement that the IPES
Provider calculate its traffic ratios for purposes of our Access
Stimulation Rules, we could require that the Intermediate Access
Provider calculate the IPES Provider's traffic ratios. Under this
alternative, if the Intermediate Access Provider cannot perform this
calculation, or the IPES Provider will not share relevant traffic ratio
information with the Intermediate Access Provider, we would create a
presumption that the IPES Provider's traffic exceeds the Access
Stimulation Rule ratios. In that case, the Intermediate Access Provider
would not be able to charge IXCs terminating switched access tandem
switching or terminating switched access transport charges. Would such
an approach be more effective than the rule modifications described
above and proposed? Commenters are encouraged to propose possible rule
language to codify this presumption.
20. We propose to use the same framework for determining when an
IPES Provider that was engaged in access stimulation no longer is
considered to be engaged in access stimulation that we currently use
for competitive LECs that have engaged in access stimulation. Thus, for
example, if an IPES Provider is engaged in access stimulation because
it exceeds the 6:1 traffic ratio in section 61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) of the
Commission's rules, we propose that it would no longer be considered to
be engaged in access stimulation if its traffic ratio falls below 6:1
for six consecutive months and it does not engage in Access Stimulation
as defined in section 61.3(bbb)(1)(i). Additionally, once such an IPES
Provider no longer meets those criteria, it would be required to notify
the Commission and any affected Intermediate Access Providers and IXCs
that it is no longer engaged in access stimulation. We seek comment on
these proposals. Do commenters consider the proposals to be over-
inclusive or unnecessary? If so, are there ways to moderate the
proposals to effect the same objective?
21. Calculations. We propose that IPES Providers would be
responsible for calculating traffic ratios. Parties should describe any
possible challenges that may affect the ability of an IPES Provider to
perform the calculations needed to determine whether it meets the
triggers established by the Access Stimulation Rules. Commenters should
also explain if any of those challenges are so significant as to make
our proposal unworkable. If so, we ask those commenters to propose
alternatives that pose fewer challenges but still achieve our goals of
removing the incentives for entities to engage in wasteful arbitrage
and the imposition of unlawful charges on IXCs and their customers.
22. The Access Stimulation Rules currently require traffic ratios
to be calculated on the basis of traffic ``in an end office'' for the
purposes of determining whether the 6:1 and 10:1 traffic ratios are
exceeded. We propose rule modifications to apply this same method to
the 3:1 traffic ratio and when IPES Providers calculate traffic ratios
for purposes of the Access Stimulation Rules. Would there be a benefit
to making the Access Stimulation Rules uniform between LEC obligations
and IPES Provider obligations? For example, does the inconsistent
application of the ``in an end office'' requirement in the current
rules cause confusion or opportunities for arbitrage? We also propose
that the traffic ratios in our Access Stimulation Rules all be based on
terminating-to-originating traffic measured ``in an end office or
equivalent.'' To apply these requirements to an IPES Provider, what
guidance should we provide as to what would be considered
``equivalent'' to a
[[Page 47677]]
LEC's end office? For example, when an IPES Provider is inserted in the
call flow, should wherever the Intermediate Access Provider sends
traffic be considered the ``end office or equivalent''? Does the
Commission's holding in the VoIP Symmetry Declaratory Ruling that a
VoIP provider will be providing end office functionality ``equivalent''
to a LEC when it provides the physical connection to the end user have
any application here?
23. Alternatively, should IPES Providers be required to calculate
their traffic ratios based on the traffic the IPES Provider terminates
in a specific state or to a specific end user? Is there some other
method of calculation that would better aid us in identifying access
stimulation for the purposes of our Access Stimulation Rules? Should
IPES Providers calculate their traffic ratios in a manner that mirrors
the geographic area served by the LEC's end office, or by specific
LATAs? Should we require IPES Providers to calculate their traffic
ratios based on the traffic they receive from a specific Intermediate
Access Provider? Are there other alternatives we should consider? Which
approach would best support the effectiveness of our Access Stimulation
Rules, ensure that all providers in a call flow have the proper
economic incentives to promote efficiency, and eliminate harmful
arbitrage opportunities? Commenters should submit any data they have
that support a particular approach or that show the relative benefits
of one approach versus another.
24. We also seek comment on any challenges related to our
alternative proposal of requiring that the Intermediate Access Provider
calculate the IPES Providers' traffic ratios. Would an Intermediate
Access Provider know, or have access to, the information necessary to
determine the terminating-to-originating traffic ratios of IPES
Providers to which it delivers and from which it receives traffic?
Would tracking the originating and terminating traffic of individual
IPES Providers be unduly burdensome for Intermediate Access Providers?
What if the Intermediate Access Provider delivers traffic along
multiple call paths and needs to calculate the traffic ratios for an
IPES Provider for each call path? For example, do providers send
originating and terminating traffic on different call paths when they
partner with multiple LECs or other IPES Providers? Does an IPES
Provider designate different traffic routes in the Local Exchange
Routing Guide (LERG), such that it may select one LEC for the purposes
of receiving local traffic, but receives long-distance traffic from a
different access tandem to avoid having incoming long-distance and
local traffic traverse the same LEC's facilities? Are there reasons,
other than promoting access arbitrage, for an IPES Provider to use more
than one route for terminating traffic? If so, we ask commenters to
explain those specific reasons.
25. Implementation. What implementation issues do our proposals
raise? How much time would providers need to comply with the proposed
rule changes? In the Access Arbitrage Order, the Commission gave
carriers 45 days to come into compliance with the newly effective
rules. Anticipating that IPES Providers would not need longer to comply
than carriers did, we also propose a 45-day period for compliance after
the effective date of the revised rules. Is this sufficient? Do
interested parties foresee difficulties that would affect the time it
will take to comply with the revised rules? Commenters should include
suggested timeframes for implementation and an explanation of any
challenges or concerns relating to coming into compliance with our
proposed rules within a 45-day period. If 45 days are insufficient, how
long should the transition period last, what steps would it include,
and why is more time necessary now than was needed at the time the
Commission adopted the Access Arbitrage Order? If proposing an
alternative timeframe, we remind interested parties to balance any
proposed implementation period with the fact that the longer the
implementation period lasts, the longer these forms of wasteful access
arbitrage continue.
26. Revenue Sharing. The reforms adopted in the 2011 USF/ICC
Transformation Order focused on revenue sharing agreements between the
terminating LEC and end users or other providers along the call path
that provided incentives for improper behavior. In the 2019 Access
Arbitrage Order, the Commission adopted rules to identify and address
access stimulation arrangements that did not include a revenue sharing
component. As we work to further strengthen our rules to combat ongoing
arbitrage, we seek comment on whether revenue sharing agreements exist
in the call routing scenarios described above. For example, do IPES
Providers share revenue with common carriers that transmit traffic to
the IPES Providers or their customers? Do Intermediate Access Providers
share their revenues with IPES Providers, high-volume calling service
providers, or the high-volume calling service providers' end users?
27. Conversely, do high-volume calling service providers (or their
end users) share revenue with LECs, Intermediate Access Providers, or
IPES Providers? In any alternative call paths commenters describe in
response to our questions in this Further Notice, we ask commenters to
specify which entities, if any, could be or are sharing revenues with
other entities. We are particularly interested in what makes certain
call paths--or call path manipulations--attractive to those involved.
For example, what entities are sharing revenues right now? What
functions do those entities serve in completing calls, and whose
revenues are being shared with others? We propose modifying the
existing definition of Access Stimulation in section 61.3(bbb) to
include IPES Providers with or without access revenue sharing
agreements, similar to the approach that currently applies to
competitive LECs. Are ongoing revenue sharing arrangements covered
effectively by the current Access Stimulation Rules? If not, what
additional rule revisions are needed to capture today's revenue sharing
arrangements? Is there specific rule language commenters would propose
to address revenue sharing arrangements that may not be covered by our
current rules?
Other Proposed Rule Changes
28. We seek comment on several additional rule change proposals.
Are the proposed rule changes below necessary, or helpful, to the goal
of eliminating harmful arbitrage? Would they, in concert with the other
rule changes proposed in this Further Notice, help to comprehensively
address arbitrage of our intercarrier compensation system?
29. End User and End Office Language. AT&T suggests that
clarifications to the ``end user'' and ``end office'' language in the
existing rules will prevent LECs from evading financial responsibility
for access-stimulation traffic when an IPES Provider is inserted into
the call path. First, AT&T suggests that we clarify the meaning of
``end user'' in section 61.3(bbb)(1) of our rules, which defines when
carriers engage in access stimulation, by adding the italicized
language, as follows.
A Competitive Local Exchange Carrier serving end user(s) engages in
Access Stimulation when it satisfies either paragraph (bbb)(1)(i) or
(ii) of this section; and a rate-of-return local exchange carrier
serving end user(s) engages in Access Stimulation when it satisfies
either paragraph (bbb)(1)(i) or (iii) of this section. For purposes of
this
[[Page 47678]]
section, a Local Exchange Carrier is serving end users when it provides
service to a called or calling party, either directly or through
arrangements with one or more VoIP providers or other entities that
serve called or calling parties. For purposes of this section, a Local
Exchange Carrier is not serving end users when it is an Intermediate
Access Provider as defined in paragraph (ccc) of this section, i.e.,
when it is not the first or last LEC in the routing of a call to a
called or calling party.
30. We seek comment on this proposed amendment to our existing
rule. Would the proposed language effectively remedy any perceived
ambiguity that parties have sought to exploit in our current rules?
Would the proposed language lead to any potentially unintended
consequences that we should consider? Do commenters propose any
revisions to this language? Would this rule modification successfully
prevent LECs from avoiding financial responsibility for access-
stimulation traffic when IPES Providers are in the call path? Are there
considerations that would weigh against such a rule modification or in
favor of some other modification(s) to this rule? Are the proposed rule
modifications sufficient to address the concerns that AT&T intends to
address with this proposed rule change? Alternatively, should we delete
the ``serving end user(s)'' phrase from section 61.3(bbb)(1) of our
rules? Would doing so be a simpler approach to address this perceived
ambiguity? Or, should we add the phrase ``serving end users'' to
sections 61.3(bbb)(2) and 61.3(bbb)(3)? Would there be a benefit to
making the rules consistent? Would there be any detrimental effects
from doing so?
31. Secondly, AT&T proposes that we modify section 61.3(bbb)(1)(ii)
of our existing rules to remove the reference to traffic calculations
``in an end office'' and revise how the access-stimulation traffic
ratio is computed for LECs that provide numbers or interconnection to
IPES Providers, as follows. The italicized language represents what
would be added.
A Competitive Local Exchange Carrier has an interstate terminating-
to-originating traffic ratio of at least 6:1 in a calendar month. For
any Competitive Local Exchange Carrier that provides numbers or
interconnection to a VoIP provider, the LEC is engaged in access
stimulation for purposes of that VoIP provider's traffic when that VoIP
provider has an interstate terminating-to-originating traffic ratio of
at least 6:1 in a calendar month.
32. Should we adopt this proposal? Would removing the language ``in
an end office'' better accomplish our goal of providing clarity and
understanding of our rules? Does the deletion of ``in an end office''
recognize, as AT&T suggests, that arbitrage schemes no longer target
end office charges? Under this proposed approach, should the LEC be
responsible for calculating the traffic ratios of the IPES Provider? If
the LEC delivers traffic to multiple IPES Providers, should the LEC
calculate a traffic ratio for each individual IPES Provider separately?
Alternatively, should we maintain the ``in the end office'' language in
section 61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) and (iii), and add it to section
61.3(bbb)(1)(i)? Would making the rules consistent in this manner
reduce the opportunity for continued arbitrage of the ICC system?
33. Treat IPES Providers as LECs for Purposes of the Access
Stimulation Rules. We also seek comment on a proposal submitted by
Inteliquent and Lumen, suggesting that the Commission could, as an
alternative to adopting new rules, ``issue a declaratory ruling
clarifying that IPES providers are treated as LECs for the purpose of
the access stimulation rules.'' Inteliquent and Lumen argue that ``[t]o
the extent an IPES provider's ratio of terminating to originating
traffic meets the triggers, it should be deemed to be engaged in access
stimulation just like a traditional LEC,'' because ``the IPES provider
both functions like a LEC for the purposes of the access stimulation
rules and necessarily has visibility into its own access traffic.''
According to Inteliquent, a LEC that provides interconnection to an
IPES Provider serves only as a conduit for delivery of local traffic
and has no insight into the IPES Provider's long-distance traffic
volumes. Therefore, Inteliquent contends, it would be inappropriate to
make the LEC responsible for the IPES Provider's traffic volumes. We
seek comment on this suggestion. How relevant are other situations in
which the Commission has applied certain regulations to VoIP providers?
IPES Providers have the ability to obtain direct access to numbers.
Could the Commission condition the ability of an IPES Provider to
obtain direct access to numbers on an agreement by the provider to
voluntarily subject itself to our Access Stimulation Rules? How would
doing so affect our efforts to eliminate access arbitrage?
34. What rule changes would be necessary were we to decide to
implement the proposal to issue a declaratory ruling to treat IPES
Providers as LECs for purposes of the Access Stimulation Rules? For
example, would we need to add a definition of ``LEC'' to our Access
Stimulation Rules that would include IPES Providers solely for the
purpose of compliance with the Access Stimulation Rules? Are the
proposed rules sufficient to address Inteliquent and Lumen's concerns
that IPES Providers are being used to avoid the application of the
Access Stimulation Rules and to allow the continued unlawful charging
of IXCs? If not, what specific language do commenters suggest to help
address these concerns or further the Commission's goal of eliminating
harmful access arbitrage?
35. As an addition or alternative to their declaratory ruling
proposal, Inteliquent and Lumen suggest that ``the Commission could
declare that it is an inherently unjust and unreasonable practice for a
party to attempt to evade the access arbitrage rules by moving LEC end
office traffic to an affiliated IPES provider, where the traffic in
question otherwise would have caused the LEC to be engaged in access
stimulation under the rules.'' We seek comment on this idea. What are
the relevant considerations of such an approach? Would such an approach
be overly broad? Would this approach efficiently capture improper
behavior? The Commission has repeatedly resisted an outright ban on
access stimulation. Would doing as Inteliquent and Lumen suggest
effectively be a ban on access stimulation?
36. Interstate/Intrastate Language. The Commission made clear in
the 2019 Access Arbitrage Order that the rules adopted to combat access
stimulation were intended to prohibit access-stimulating entities from
unlawfully billing IXCs for intrastate terminating switched access
tandem switching or terminating switched access transport, bound for
access-stimulating LECs, in addition to such interstate traffic.
However, that language was not reflected in the text of the rules, only
in the text of the Order. We now propose to codify, in sections
69.4(l), and 69.5(b) of our rules that IXCs shall not be billed for
interstate or intrastate terminating switched access tandem switching
or terminating switched access transport. Would making these amendments
facilitate enforcement of our Access Stimulation Rules? Are there other
benefits in making these changes? Are any other amendments to these or
other sections of our rules needed to fully and accurately capture the
text of the Access Arbitrage Order?
37. IPES Provider Definition. We propose to define an ``IPES
Provider,'' for purposes of our Access Stimulation Rules, as:
IPES Provider means, for purposes of this part and Sec. Sec.
51.914, 69.4(l) and
[[Page 47679]]
69.5(b) of this chapter, a provider offering a service that: (1)
enables real-time, two-way voice communications; (2) requires a
broadband connection from the user's location or end to end; (3)
requires internet Protocol-compatible customer premises equipment
(CPE); and (4) permits users to receive calls that originate on the
public switched telephone network and to terminate calls to the public
switched telephone network or that originate from an internet Protocol
service and terminate to an internet Protocol service or an internet
Protocol application.
38. Parties have suggested using the term ``IPES Provider'' when
referring to the provider being inserted in the place of the ``LEC
serving end users'' as used in the Access Stimulation Rules. For
example, Inteliquent suggests that IPES is ``an industry term commonly
used for VoIP providers that have received direct access to numbers,
and it originates from the company code (OCN) type assigned to these
providers by NECA [(National Exchange Carrier Association)].'' AT&T
suggests that ``IPES providers are entities that, among other things,
provide or facilitate Over the Top VoIP calling services, including `2-
stage' International calling services.'' Do commenters agree with
either of these definitions? We also seek comment on the definition
proposed above, which is limited in its application to the Access
Stimulation Rules. USTelecom suggests that our proposed ``IPES
Provider'' definition not require two-way calling or the termination of
calls. Do commenters agree that we should modify the proposed
definition as USTelecom suggests? Are there other alternative
definitions of ``IPES Provider'' that commenters would suggest we use
for purposes of our Access Stimulation Rules? What are the important
functions or concepts this definition should capture? Would limiting
our definition of ``IPES Providers'' to providers that have received
direct access to numbers, as Inteliquent suggests, limit the
effectiveness of the Access Stimulation Rules? Would commenters suggest
using an existing definition to describe these IPES Providers who are
being inserted into the call path, such as ``IP-enabled voice service''
provider, as defined in section 615b(8) of the Act?
39. Alternatively, should we refer to these providers as
``interconnected VoIP'' providers, as defined in section 9.3 of our
rules? Are there meaningful distinctions among these terms that would
make one defined term better than another for purposes of the Access
Stimulation Rules? We propose a definition of ``IPES Provider'' to be
used solely in the context of our Access Stimulation Rules. Despite our
attempts to limit the use of this defined term, do we need to be
concerned about potential confusion with other, similar, terms defined
elsewhere in our rules? Will the proposed definition capture all
providers that could be used to try to circumvent the Access
Stimulation Rules?
40. Intermediate Access Provider Definition. An Intermediate Access
Provider currently is defined in our rules as ``any entity that carries
or processes traffic at any point between the final Interexchange
Carrier in a call path and a local exchange carrier engaged in Access
Stimulation.'' Pursuant to our current Access Stimulation Rules,
neither the Intermediate Access Provider nor the access-stimulating LEC
shall bill an IXC for tariffed terminating switched access tandem
switching and terminating switched access tandem transport charges for
traffic between the Intermediate Access Provider and the access-
stimulating LEC. In keeping with our other proposed rule modifications,
we propose to amend the definition of Intermediate Access Provider to
include any entity that ``provides terminating switched access tandem
switching and terminating switched access tandem transport services
between the final Interexchange Carrier in a call path and: (1) a local
exchange carrier engaged in Access Stimulation, as defined in paragraph
(bbb) of this section; or (2) a local exchange carrier delivering
traffic to an IPES Provider engaged in Access Stimulation, as defined
in paragraph (bbb) of this section; or (3) an IPES Provider engaged in
Access Stimulation, as defined in paragraph (bbb) of this section,
where the Intermediate Access Provider delivers calls directly to the
IPES Provider.''
41. We seek comment on this proposed change to our definition of
``Intermediate Access Provider.'' Inteliquent and Lumen state that
``IPES providers designate a Hosting LEC for purposes of receiving
local traffic'' and that ``[t]his designation does not apply to long
distance traffic, which is the traffic subject to the Access Arbitrage
Order.'' Therefore, we seek input on whether the part of our proposed
definition above that includes ``a local exchange carrier delivering
traffic to an IPES Provider engaged in Access Stimulation'' is
necessary or how this part of the definition would otherwise be
affected by what Inteliquent and Lumen describe in their filing. Do
commenters suggest any other modifications to the definition? Are there
services, other than terminating switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access tandem transport, that an Intermediate
Access Provider might provide? If so, what are these services and who
should be financially responsible for them?
42. Conforming Edits to Our Rules. Section 51.914(a)(2) of our
rules presently states that a LEC shall designate, ``if needed,'' the
Intermediate Access Provider that will provide certain terminating
access services to the LEC. This designation is applicable in cases
where an Intermediate Access Provider is different than the end office
LEC. We therefore propose changing ``if needed'' to ``if any,'' so that
the rule denotes a LEC shall designate an Intermediate Access Provider
when and ``if any'' such designation is required. Not only is the ``if
any'' language more accurate, but removing the ``if needed'' provision
prevents any misconception that a LEC may otherwise subjectively decide
on its own when such designation is needed. Regarding the designation
of an Intermediate Access Provider by an IPES Provider, are there any
instances when an IPES Provider is not required to designate an
Intermediate Access Provider or when proposed sections 51.914(c)(1) and
(d) would not be necessary?
43. Section 69.4(l) of the Commission's rules requires that a LEC
engaged in access stimulation ``may not bill'' IXCs terminating
switched access tandem switching or terminating switched access tandem
transport charges for access-stimulation traffic. Yet, in the Access
Arbitrage Order, the Commission made clear that it is unlawful for a
LEC engaged in access stimulation to charge an IXC terminating switched
access tandem switching or terminating switched access tandem transport
charges. We propose edits to section 69.4(l) of our rules to make this
rule consistent with the Commission's intent adopted in the Access
Arbitrage Order; that a LEC engaged in access stimulation ``shall not
bill'' IXCs for terminating switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access tandem transport charges on access-
stimulation traffic. Similarly, we also propose to correct an error in
section 69.5(b)(2) of the Commission's rules that excluded the word
``not,'' change the word ``may'' to ``shall'' to be consistent with
other uses in these rules, and make clear that it is ``IXCs'' and not
``local exchange carriers'' that are not being charged.
44. We also seek comment on whether any rule changes proposed in
this Further Notice introduce new opportunities for unlawful arbitrage.
Would our proposed rule modifications
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accomplish our objectives of sending accurate pricing signals to
customers by prohibiting Intermediate Access Providers that deliver
traffic to IPES Providers that trigger the Access Stimulation Rules
from charging IXCs for such calls? Would adopting our proposed rule
changes create unintended consequences? For example, would any of the
proposals introduce unnecessary complexity and present practical
implementation challenges? If so, we seek comment on what exactly are
the perceived complexities and implementation challenges related to the
proposals in this Further Notice. Are there other types of access
arbitrage happening today that are not described in this Further
Notice? For example, are services that allow consumers to make long-
distance calls to a domestic number and listen to foreign radio
stations unfairly exploiting our access charge regime, as USTelecom
suggests? Would these type of services be covered by our proposed
rules? Or are they ``one-way,'' as USTelecom argues? If so, what
additional actions, if any, should we take to ensure our proposed rules
address these types of services? We ask commenters to provide any other
proposed actions, alternatives, and rule additions or modifications we
should consider. Are there any other conforming rule changes that
commenters consider necessary? Are there any conflicts or
inconsistencies between existing rules and those we propose? Finally,
we propose several non-substantive edits, to, among other things,
enhance readability and ensure compliance with rule drafting guidelines
applicable to the Code of Federal Regulations.
Clarifying or Interpreting Current Access Stimulation Rules
45. Applying the Existing Rules to IPES Providers. As an
alternative to modifying our rules as proposed, we seek comment on
whether it would be preferable for the Commission to issue a
Declaratory Ruling interpreting the existing Access Stimulation Rules
as applying to traffic routed from the PSTN through a LEC to an IPES
Provider, or directly to the IPES Provider or to the end user, as
parties have suggested since the rules first became effective. In the
Access Arbitrage Order, the Commission explained that the access-
stimulation traffic ratios are based on ``the actual minutes traversing
the LEC switch.'' Most relevant to the current discussion, the
Commission clarified that ``all traffic should be counted regardless of
how it is routed.'' Indeed, the Commission emphasized this point
several times in the Access Arbitrage Order. These explanations form
the basis of arguments that ``the Access Arbitrage Order already
rejects'' claims that traffic routed by LECs through an IPES Provider
should not be counted for determining access-stimulation ratios. Is
this a reasonable and accurate interpretation of the Commission's
decision? Would issuing a declaratory ruling interpreting the Access
Stimulation Rules as requested above adequately address any perceived
lack of clarity in the existing rules identified in this Further
Notice?
46. Traffic to Be Counted. AT&T argues that the Commission should
clarify that, when calculating the traffic ratios for the purposes of
our Access Stimulation Rules, a LEC ``may not include aggregated
originating 8YY traffic--particularly traffic that it obtains from VoIP
providers--as part of its traffic ratio'' because of the potential for
arbitrage and fraud associated with the routing of 8YY traffic. The
Commission previously identified certain forms of toll free or 8YY
aggregation as a form of originating arbitrage and took steps to
minimize that arbitrage. AT&T suggests that if a LEC ``aggregate[s] 8YY
traffic from VoIP providers that have obtained numbering
authorization,'' the LEC ``could begin routing access stimulation
traffic from VoIP providers in the hope that, by engaging in both
originating 8YY aggregation schemes and terminating access stimulation
schemes, it could balance its terminating access stimulation traffic
against its longstanding originating 8YY traffic and avoid hitting the
Commission's triggers.'' We seek greater detail on this issue, as well
as comment on the validity of AT&T's concerns. Is this happening in the
market now? If so, we ask commenters to propose rule revisions to
address this issue. We also seek comment on any other issues regarding
the treatment of originating 8YY traffic for purposes of calculating
the traffic ratios related to the triggers in our Access Stimulation
Rules. Would excluding such traffic alter carriers' ratios sufficiently
so as to cause them to trigger our Access Stimulation Rules even though
they are not engaging in arbitrage? Should a significant increase in a
carrier's 8YY originating traffic be reported and treated as another
trigger for our Access Stimulation Rules? Should 8YY traffic be
included in those ratios? Why or why not? Should originating 8YY
traffic be treated as terminating traffic for purposes of our Access
Stimulation Rules?
Legal Authority
47. We tentatively conclude that sections 201, 251, 254 and 256 of
the Act provide us with the authority needed to adopt the rule changes
proposed in this Further Notice. We seek comment on this authority, our
ancillary authority in section 4(i) of the Act, and any other statutory
authority that may support our proposed actions. We also seek comment
on any concerns parties might have about our authority to adopt any of
the proposals made in this Further Notice.
48. Section 201 of the Act. Our primary authority to adopt our
proposed changes to the Access Stimulation Rules is section 201(b) of
the Act. In the Access Arbitrage Order, the Commission determined that
the imposition of tariffed tandem switching and tandem switched
transport access charges on IXCs for terminating access-stimulation
traffic is an unjust and unreasonable practice under section 201(b) of
the Act. In our view, providers' attempts to continue to assess tandem
switching or tandem switched transport access charges on IXCs for
delivering access-stimulation traffic to IPES Providers is unjust and
unreasonable pursuant to section 201(b) of the Act, and virtually
indistinguishable from practices the Commission has already found to be
unjust and unreasonable. We seek comment on this view. Section 201(b)
of the Act gives us the authority to ``prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this Act.'' We seek comment on whether this language
provides us with the authority to require IPES Providers to designate
the Intermediate Access Provider(s) that will provide terminating
switched access tandem switching and transport services, to calculate
their traffic ratios, and to notify Intermediate Access Providers,
IXCs, and the Commission if the IPES Provider is engaged in Access
Stimulation so that Intermediate Access Providers can determine whether
they can lawfully charge IXCs for interstate and intrastate tandem
services (and IXCs can determine if charges are appropriate). We also
seek comment on our tentative conclusion that section 201(b) provides
us the authority necessary to prohibit Intermediate Access Providers or
other LECs from charging IXCs for access stimulation traffic routed
through an IPES Provider, rather than through a LEC.
49. Sections 251, 254, and 256 of the Act. Our authority to take
the actions proposed in this Further Notice is also rooted in other
sections of the Act on which the Commission relied in the
[[Page 47681]]
Access Arbitrage Order. First, section 251(b)(5) of the Act applies
because our proposed new and modified rules apply, in large part, to
exchange access and providers of exchange access that meet the
definition of a LEC. Second, section 251(g) of the Act provides us with
the authority to address problematic conduct which is occurring while
the transition to bill-and-keep is not complete. Third, section 254 of
the Act provides the Commission with the authority to eliminate
implicit subsidies. Finally, section 256 of the Act requires the
Commission to oversee and promote interconnection by providers of
telecommunications services that is ``efficient.'' We seek comment on
the applicability of sections 201, 251, 254, and 256 of the Act to give
us the authority to take the actions proposed herein.
50. Section 4(i) of the Act. Although we propose to conclude that
our direct sources of authority identified above provide the basis to
adopt our proposed rules, we also seek comment on whether our ancillary
authority in section 4(i) of the Act provides an independent basis to
adopt limited rules with respect to IPES Providers. We consider the
proposed requirements to be ``reasonably ancillary to the Commission's
effective performance of [its] . . . responsibilities.'' Specifically,
IPES Providers interconnected with the PSTN and exchanging IP traffic
clearly constitutes ``communication by wire or radio.'' We seek comment
on whether requiring IPES Providers to comply with our proposed limited
rules is reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective performance
of its statutory responsibilities under sections 201(b), 251, 254, and
256 as described above.
Costs and Benefits of the Proposals
51. Our intercarrier compensation regime continues to be an
important source of funding for certain rural service providers,
including providers of tandem switching, to ensure all Americans are
connected. Access arbitrage exploits our intercarrier compensation
regime to benefit activities and providers that our policies are not
intended to benefit. This encourages further exploitation of our rules,
threatening the basic goals of connectivity at just and reasonable
prices, a cost that alone justifies our action. The excess payments
made due to arbitrage also operate as an unnecessary tax on end users,
shrinking the efficient use of telecommunications services. Further,
because the party that chooses the call path does not pay that tax, it
has incentives to engage in wasteful actions. Examples of this waste
include:
the pursuit of access arbitrage opportunities by routing
traffic along more expensive call paths;
artificial stimulation of traffic;
disputes over questionable demands for payment by access
stimulators;
attempts by IXCs to identify the sources of fraudulent
traffic; and
time and money spent by parties seeking to protect against
or reduce access arbitrage opportunities, as in this proceeding.
52. Costs incurred by these activities are not fully paid for by
the consumers of high-volume calling services, who often pay nothing
for these services. If consumers of these services were charged prices
that wholly recovered the costs of arbitrage, then those who value the
service less than those prices would decline to purchase the service.
This would reduce waste or equivalently create value equal to the
difference between the cost-covering prices and these consumers'
valuations of the service.
53. We recognize that any action we take to address ongoing access
arbitrage may affect the costs and benefits to carriers and their
customers and the choices they make, as they provide and receive
telecommunications services. Consumers who enjoy high-volume calling
services could be adversely affected by regulatory adjustments
targeting arbitrage. Are there perceived benefits to access arbitrage
or access stimulation? Would addressing access arbitrage as we propose
unfairly advantage any competitor or class of competitors? If so, are
there alternative means to address the arbitrage issues described here
and presented in the record?
54. In the USF/ICC Transformation Order, the Commission considered
direct costs imposed on consumers by arbitrage schemes. The Commission
also found that access stimulation diverts capital away from more
productive uses, such as broadband deployment. There is also evidence
that the staggering volume of minutes generated by these schemes can
result in call blocking and dropped calls. What has been the effect of
the 2019 revisions to the Access Stimulation Rules? Are there
additional, more-recent data available to estimate the annual cost of
arbitrage schemes to companies, long-distance customers, and consumers
in general? Likewise, are there data available to quantify the
resources being diverted from more productive uses because of arbitrage
schemes? To what degree are consumers indirectly affected by
potentially inefficient networking or incorrect pricing signals due to
ongoing access stimulation? Has competition been negatively impacted
because ``access-stimulation revenues subsidize the costs of high-
volume calling services, granting providers of those services a
competitive advantage over companies that collect such costs directly
from their customers?'' Are there other costs or benefits to the
proposals in this Further Notice that we should consider?
Efforts To Promote Digital Equity and Inclusion
55. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to advance
digital equity for all, including people of color, persons with
disabilities, persons who live in rural or Tribal areas, and others who
are or have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely
affected by persistent poverty or inequality, invites comment on any
equity-related considerations and benefits (if any) that may be
associated with the proposals and issues discussed herein.
Specifically, we seek comment on how our proposals may promote or
inhibit advances in diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility, as
well as the scope of the Commission's relevant legal authority.
Procedural Matters
56. Filing Instructions. Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of
the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may
file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on
the first page of this document. Comments may be filed using the
Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic
Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by commercial overnight courier, or by first-
class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission.
Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive,
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority
mail must be
[[Page 47682]]
addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the
Commission no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings.
This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety
of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19.
[cir] During the time the Commission's building is closed to the
general public and until further notice, if more than one docket or
rulemaking number appears in the caption of a proceeding, paper filers
need not submit two additional copies for each additional docket or
rulemaking number; an original and one copy are sufficient.
[cir] After COVID-19 restrictions are lifted, the Commission has
established that hand-carried documents are to be filed at the
Commission's office located at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction,
MD 20701. This will be the only location where hand-carried paper
filings for the Commission will be accepted.
57. People with Disabilities. To request materials in accessible
formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic
files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or call the
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-
418-0432 (TTY).
58. Ex Parte Requirements. This proceeding shall be treated as a
``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's
ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy
of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral
presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a
different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentation must: (1) list all persons attending or
otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte
presentation was made; and (2) summarize all data presented and
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda, or other
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with Rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
Rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto,
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g.,
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
59. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis. This document contains
proposed new or modified information collection requirements. The
Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork
burdens, invites the general public and the Office of Management and
Budget to comment on the information collection requirements contained
in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Public Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might further reduce the
information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer
than 25 employees.
60. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), the Commission
has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the
possible significant economic impact on small entities by the policies
and rules proposed in this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The
Commission requests written public comments on this IRFA. Comments must
be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the
deadlines for comments provided on the first page of the Further
Notice. The Commission will send a copy of the Further Notice,
including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration (SBA). In addition, the Further Notice and the
IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.
Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
61. For many years the Commission has been fighting efforts to
arbitrage its system of intercarrier compensation. In the 2011 USF/ICC
Transformation Order, the Commission adopted rules identifying local
exchange carriers (LECs) engaged in access stimulation and requiring
that such LECs lower their tariffed access charges. In 2019, to address
access arbitrage schemes that persisted despite prior Commission
action, the Commission adopted the Access Arbitrage Order, in which it
revised its Access Stimulation Rules to prohibit LECs and Intermediate
Access Providers from charging interexchange carriers (IXCs) for
terminating tandem switching and transport services used to deliver
calls to access-stimulating LECs. The revised rules were adopted to end
the ability of LECs to engage in arbitrage of the intercarrier
compensation system by extracting artificially inflated tandem
switching and transport charges from IXCs to subsidize ``free'' high-
volume calling services.
62. Since the 2019 rules took effect, the Commission has received
information about new ways carriers are manipulating their businesses
to continue their arbitrage schemes in the wake of the new rules. In
the Further Notice, we seek comment on ways to address perceived
loopholes in our rules that companies may be exploiting and to
eliminate these new arbitrage schemes and the harms those schemes
inflict on consumers. The rules we propose will serve the public
interest by reducing carriers' incentives and ability to send traffic
over the Public Switched Telephone Network solely for the purpose of
collecting tariffed tandem switching and transport access charges from
IXCs to subsidize high-volume calling services, which the Commission
has found to be an unjust and unreasonable practice.
63. We propose to modify our Access Stimulation Rules to address
access arbitrage that takes place when an internet Protocol Enabled
Service (IPES) Provider is incorporated into the call flow. We propose
that when a LEC or Intermediate Access Provider delivers traffic to an
IPES Provider and the terminating-to-originating traffic ratios of the
IPES Provider exceed the triggers in the Access Stimulation Rules, the
IPES Provider will be deemed to be engaged in access stimulation. In
such cases, we propose prohibiting an Intermediate Access Provider from
charging an IXC tariffed charges for terminating switched access tandem
switching and switched access transport for traffic bound to an IPES
Provider whose traffic exceeds the ratios in sections 61.3(bbb)(1)(i)
or 61.3(bbb)(1)(ii) of our Access Stimulation Rules. We propose that
the IPES Provider be responsible for calculating its traffic ratios and
for making the required notifications to the
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Intermediate Access Provider and the Commission. We likewise propose
modifying the definition of Intermediate Access Provider to include
entities delivering traffic to an IPES Provider.
64. We propose to use the same framework for determining when an
IPES Provider that was engaged in access stimulation no longer is
considered to be engaged in access stimulation, that we currently use
for competitive LECs that have engaged in access stimulation. The
Access Stimulation Rules currently require traffic ratios to be
calculated at the end office. We propose rule modifications to apply
this manner of traffic calculations to IPES Providers as well and that
any final rules that are adopted will be effective 45 days after
publication in the Federal Register.
Legal Basis
65. The legal basis for any action that may be taken pursuant to
the Further Notice is contained in sections 1, 2, 4(i), 201, 251, 254,
256, 303(r), and 403 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i), 201, 251, 254, 256, 303(r), and 403, and
section 1.1 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.1.
Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the
Proposed Rules Will Apply
66. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rule revisions, if adopted. The RFA generally
defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the
terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small
governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business''
has the same meaning as the term ``small-business concern'' under the
Small Business Act. A ``small-business concern'' is one which: (1) is
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the
SBA.
67. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental
Jurisdictions. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that
are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe here, at
the outset, three broad groups of small entities that could be directly
affected herein. First, while there are industry specific size
standards for small businesses that are used in the regulatory
flexibility analysis, according to data from the SBA's Office of
Advocacy, in general a small business is an independent business having
fewer than 500 employees. These types of small businesses represent
99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 32.5
million businesses.
68. Next, the type of small entity described as a ``small
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.''
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of $50,000
or less to delineate its annual electronic filing requirements for
small exempt organizations. Nationwide, for tax year 2020, there were
approximately 447,689 small exempt organizations in the U.S. reporting
revenues of $50,000 or less according to the registration and tax data
for exempt organizations available from the IRS.
69. Finally, the small entity described as a ``small governmental
jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of cities,
counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' U.S. Census
Bureau data from the 2017 Census of Governments indicate that there
were 90,075 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general
purpose governments and special purpose governments in the United
States. Of this number there were 36,931 general purpose governments
(county, municipal and town or township) with populations of less than
50,000 and 12,040 special purpose governments--independent school
districts with enrollment populations of less than 50,000. Accordingly,
based on the 2017 U.S. Census of Governments data, we estimate that at
least 48,971 entities fall into the category of ``small governmental
jurisdictions.''
70. Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau
defines this industry as establishments primarily engaged in operating
and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure
that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text,
sound, and video using wired communications networks. Transmission
facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of
technologies. Establishments in this industry use the wired
telecommunications network facilities that they operate to provide a
variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP
services, wired (cable) audio and video programming distribution, and
wired broadband internet services. By exception, establishments
providing satellite television distribution services using facilities
and infrastructure that they operate are included in this industry.
Wired Telecommunications Carriers are also referred to as wireline
carriers or fixed local service providers.
71. The SBA small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 5,183 providers
that reported they were engaged in the provision of fixed local
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,737
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered
small entities.
72. Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission nor the
SBA has developed a size standard for small businesses specifically
applicable to local exchange services. Providers of these services
include both incumbent and competitive local exchange service
providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry
with a SBA small business size standard. Wired Telecommunications
Carriers are also referred to as wireline carriers or fixed local
service providers. The SBA small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 5,183 providers
that reported they were fixed local exchange service providers. Of
these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,737 providers have
1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business
size standard, most of these providers can be considered small
entities.
73. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard
specifically for incumbent local exchange carriers. Wired
Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with a SBA small
business size standard. The SBA small
[[Page 47684]]
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms in this industry that
operated for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the
2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020,
there were 1,227 providers that reported they were incumbent local
exchange service providers. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 929 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the
Commission estimates that the majority of incumbent local exchange
carriers can be considered small entities.
74. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA has developed a size standard for small
businesses specifically applicable to local exchange services.
Providers of these services include several types of competitive local
exchange service providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this
industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the
2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020,
there were 3,956 providers that reported they were competitive local
exchange service providers. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 3,808 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of
these providers can be considered small entities.
75. Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). Neither the Commission nor the
SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for
Interexchange Carriers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this
industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the
2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020,
there were 151 providers that reported they were engaged in the
provision of interexchange services. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 131 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the
Commission estimates that the majority of providers in this industry
can be considered small entities.
76. Local Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have
developed a small business size standard specifically for Local
Resellers. Telecommunications Resellers is the closest industry with a
SBA small business size standard. The Telecommunications Resellers
industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and
network capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications
networks and reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services
(except satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this
industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission
facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs)
are included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for
Telecommunications Resellers classifies a business as small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
1,386 firms in this industry provided resale services for the entire
year. Of that number, 1,375 firms operated with fewer than 250
employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 293
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of local
resale services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 289
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered
small entities.
77. Cable Companies and Systems (Rate Regulation). The Commission
has developed its own small business size standard for the purpose of
cable rate regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a ``small cable
company'' is one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers nationwide. Based
on industry data, there are about 420 cable companies in the U.S. Of
these, only five have more than 400,000 subscribers. In addition, under
the Commission's rules, a ``small system'' is a cable system serving
15,000 or fewer subscribers. Based on industry data, there are about
4,139 cable systems (headends) in the U.S. Of these, about 639 have
more than 15,000 subscribers. Accordingly, the Commission estimates
that the majority of cable companies and cable systems are small.
78. Cable System Operators (Telecom Act Standard). The
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, contains a size standard for a
``small cable operator,'' which is ``a cable operator that, directly or
through an affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than one percent of
all subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any
entity or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed
$250,000,000.'' For purposes of the Telecom Act Standard, the
Commission determined that a cable system operator that serves fewer
than 677,000 subscribers, either directly or through affiliates, will
meet the definition of a small cable operator based on the cable
subscriber count established in a 2001 Public Notice. Based on industry
data, only four cable system operators have more than 677,000
subscribers. Accordingly, the Commission estimates that the majority of
cable system operators are small under this size standard. We note
however, that the Commission neither requests nor collects information
on whether cable system operators are affiliated with entities whose
gross annual revenues exceed $250 million. Therefore, we are unable at
this time to estimate with greater precision the number of cable system
operators that would qualify as small cable operators under the
definition in the Communications Act.
79. All Other Telecommunications. This industry is comprised of
establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized
telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications
telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes
establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal
stations and associated facilities connected with one or more
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to,
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of
internet services (e.g., dial-up ISPs) or voice over internet protocol
(VoIP) services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are
also included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard
for this industry classifies firms with annual receipts of $35 million
or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were
1,079 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of
those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than
[[Page 47685]]
$25 million. Based on this data, the Commission estimates that the
majority of ``All Other Telecommunications'' firms can be considered
small.
Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities
80. In the Further Notice, we propose and seek comment on rule
changes that will affect LECs, Intermediate Access Providers, and IPES
Providers. We propose to modify our Access Stimulation Rules to address
arbitrage which takes place when an IPES Provider is incorporated into
the call flow. In the Further Notice, we propose rules to further limit
or eliminate the occurrence of access arbitrage, including access
stimulation, which could affect potential reporting requirements. The
proposed rules also contain recordkeeping, reporting and third-party
notification requirements for access-stimulating LECs and IPES
Providers, which may impact small entities. Some of the proposed
requirements may also involve tariff changes.
81. We propose that when a LEC delivers traffic to an IPES Provider
and the terminating-to-originating traffic ratios of the IPES Provider
exceed the triggers in the Access Stimulation Rules, the IPES Provider
will be deemed to be engaged in access stimulation. We propose that the
IPES Provider be responsible for calculating its traffic ratios and for
making the required third-party notifications. As such, providers may
need to modify their in-house recordkeeping to comply with the proposed
rules. Under our proposal, if the IPES Provider's ratios exceed the
applicable rule triggers, it would have to notify the Intermediate
Access Provider, the Commission, and affected IXCs. The Intermediate
Access Provider would then be prohibited from charging IXCs tariffed
rates for terminating switched access tandem switching or terminating
switched access transport charges.
82. Our proposals may also require affected LECs and Intermediate
Access Providers to file tariff revisions to remove any tariff
provisions they have filed for terminating tandem switched access or
terminating switched access transport charges. Although we decline to
opine on whether our proposals may require carriers to file further
tariff revisions, affected carriers may nonetheless choose to file
additional tariff revisions to add provisions allowing them to charge
access-stimulating LECs or access-stimulating IPES Providers, rather
than IXCs, for the termination of traffic.
83. As an alternative to imposing a measurement requirement on the
IPES Provider, we seek comment on requiring that the Intermediate
Access Provider calculate the IPES Provider's traffic ratios for
purposes of our Access Stimulation Rules. If adopted, this proposal
could impose recordkeeping, reporting, and third-party notification
requirements on Intermediate Access Providers. Under this alternative
proposal, if the Intermediate Access Provider cannot perform this
calculation, or the IPES Provider will not share relevant traffic ratio
information with the Intermediate Access Provider, the Intermediate
Access Provider would not be able to charge IXCs terminating switched
access tandem switching or terminating switched access transport
charges.
84. Our proposals may also necessitate that affected carriers make
various revisions to their billing systems. For example, Intermediate
Access Providers that serve LECs with access-stimulating IPES Providers
in the call path (or that deliver traffic directly to an IPES Provider
when no LEC is in the call path) will no longer be able to charge IXCs
terminating tandem switched access rates and transport charges. As
Intermediate Access Providers cease billing IXCs they will likely need
to make corresponding adjustments to their billing systems.
85. In the Further Notice, we also seek comment on other actions we
could take to further discourage or eliminate access arbitrage
activity. Rules which achieve these objectives could potentially affect
recordkeeping, reporting, and third-party notification requirements.
Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities and Significant Alternatives Considered
86. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach,
which may include the following four alternatives (among others): (1)
the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements under the rules for such small
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for
such small entities. We expect to consider all of these factors when we
receive substantive comment from the public and potentially affected
entities.
87. In this Further Notice, we invite comment on a number of
proposals and alternatives to modify our Access Stimulation Rules. The
Commission has found these arbitrage practices inefficient and to
ultimately increase consumer telecommunications rates. Therefore, in
the Further Notice, we propose rules to further limit or eliminate the
occurrence of access stimulation in turn promoting the efficient
function of the nation's telecommunications network. We believe that if
companies are able to operate with greater efficiency this will benefit
the communications network as a whole, and its users, by allowing
companies to increase their investment in broadband deployment.
88. Thus, we propose to adopt rules to address arbitrage which
takes place when an IPES Provider is incorporated into the call flow.
We propose that when a LEC delivers traffic to an IPES Provider and the
terminating-to-originating traffic ratios of the IPES Provider exceed
the triggers in the Access Stimulation Rules, the IPES Provider will be
deemed to be engaged in access stimulation. In such cases, we propose
that the Intermediate Access Provider would be prohibited from imposing
tariffed terminating tandem switching and transport access charges on
IXCs sending traffic to an IPES Provider or the IPES Provider's end-
user customer. As an alternative to imposing a measurement requirement
on the IPES Provider, we could require that the Intermediate Access
Provider calculate the IPES Provider's traffic ratios for purposes of
our Access Stimulation Rules. Under this alternative proposal, if the
Intermediate Access Provider cannot perform this calculation, or the
IPES Provider will not share relevant traffic ratio information with
the Intermediate Access Provider, we would create a presumption that
the IPES Provider's traffic exceeds the Access Stimulation Rule ratios.
In that case, the Intermediate Access Provider would not be able to
charge IXCs terminating switched access tandem switching or terminating
switched access transport charges.
89. We also seek comment on whether IPES Providers should be
treated as LECs for the purpose of our Access Stimulation Rules. We
received a proposal in the record that the Commission should ``issue a
declaratory ruling clarifying that IPES Providers are treated as LECs
for the purpose of the access stimulation rules.'' We seek interested
parties' opinion on whether adopting such a proposal would be more or
less burdensome on small businesses.
90. In the Further Notice, we also propose to require carriers to
comply
[[Page 47686]]
with any adopted rules within 45 days. We seek comment on this time
period and whether interested parties foresee difficulties that would
affect the time it will take to comply with the revised rules. We
expect that time period will allow even small entities adequate time to
amend their tariffs, if needed, and meet the requirements in the
proposed rules.
91. Comment is sought on how best to address access arbitrage
activities. In the Further Notice, we seek comment on the costs and
benefits of these proposals. Providing carriers, especially small
carriers, with options will enable them to best assess the financial
effects on their operations allowing them to determine how best to
respond. We invite comment on how our proposals may affect the costs
and benefits to carriers and their customers and the choices they make,
as they provide and receive telecommunications services. We invite
commenters to quantify both the costs and the benefits of our proposals
and of any alternative approaches to reducing access stimulation
activities.
92. We expect to consider the economic impact on small entities, as
identified in comments filed in response to the Further Notice and this
IRFA, in reaching our final conclusions and promulgating rules in this
proceeding. The proposals and questions laid out in the Further Notice
are designed to ensure the Commission has a complete understanding of
the benefits and potential burdens associated with the different
proposed actions.
Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
93. None.
94. Contact Person. For further information about this proceeding,
please contact Lynne Engledow, FCC Wireline Competition Bureau, Pricing
Policy Division, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554, 202-418-1520,
[email protected]
Ordering Clauses
95. Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i),
201, 251, 254, 256, 303(r), and 403 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i), 201, 251, 254, 256, 303(r), and
403 and section 1.1 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.1, this Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is adopted.
96. It is further ordered that pursuant to applicable procedures
set forth in sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's Rules, 47 CFR
1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on this Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on or before 30 days after publication of
this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register, and
reply comments on or before 60 days after publication of this Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register.
97. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a
copy of this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
List of Subjects
47 CFR Part 51
Interconnection; Communications; Communication common carriers;
Telecommunications; Telephone.
47 CFR Part 61
Tariffs.
Communication Common Carriers; Radio; Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements; Telegraph; Telephone.
47 CFR Part 69
Access Charges; Communications common carriers; Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements; Telephone.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Proposed Rules
For the reasons set forth, the Federal Communications Commission
proposes to amend 47 CFR parts 51, 61 and 69 as shown below.
PART 51--INTERCONNECTION
0
1. The authority citation for part 51 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151-55, 201-05, 207-09, 218, 225-27, 251-
52, 271, 332 unless otherwise noted.
0
2. Amend Sec. 51.903 by adding paragraph (q) to read as follows:
Sec. 51.903 Definitions.
* * * * *
(q) IPES Provider has the same meaning as that term is defined in
Sec. 61.3(eee) of this chapter.
0
3. Amend Sec. 51.914 by revising paragraphs (a) through (e) and adding
paragraphs (f) and (g) as follows:
Sec. 51.914 Additional provisions applicable to Access Stimulation
traffic.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, if a local
exchange carrier is engaged in Access Stimulation, as defined in Sec.
61.3(bbb) of this chapter, it shall, within 45 days of commencing
Access Stimulation, or within 45 days of September 6, 2022, whichever
is later:
(1) Not bill any Interexchange Carrier for interstate or intrastate
terminating switched access tandem switching or terminating switched
access transport charges for any traffic between such local exchange
carrier's terminating end office or equivalent and the associated
access tandem switch; and
(2) Designate the Intermediate Access Provider(s), if any, that
will provide terminating switched access tandem switching and
terminating switched access tandem transport services to the local
exchange carrier engaged in Access Stimulation; and
(3) Assume financial responsibility for any applicable Intermediate
Access Provider's charges for such services for any traffic between
such local exchange carrier's terminating end office or equivalent and
the associated access tandem switch.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, if a local
exchange carrier is engaged in Access Stimulation, as defined in Sec.
61.3(bbb) of this chapter, it shall, within 45 days of commencing
Access Stimulation, or within 45 days of September 6, 2022, whichever
is later, notify in writing the Commission, all Intermediate Access
Providers that it subtends, and Interexchange Carriers with which it
does business of the following:
(1) That it is a local exchange carrier engaged in Access
Stimulation; and
(2) That it shall designate the Intermediate Access Provider(s)
that will provide the terminating switched access tandem switching and
terminating switched access tandem transport services to the local
exchange carrier engaged in Access Stimulation; and
(3) That the local exchange carrier shall pay for those services as
of that date.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Commission's rules,
if an IPES Provider, as defined in Sec. 61.3(eee) of this chapter, is
engaged in Access Stimulation, as defined in Sec. 61.3(bbb) of this
chapter, it shall, within 45 days of commencing Access Stimulation, or
within 45 days of September 6, 2022, whichever is later:
(1) Designate the Intermediate Access Provider(s), if any, that
will provide terminating switched access tandem switching and
terminating switched access tandem transport services to the IPES
Provider engaged in Access Stimulation; and further
[[Page 47687]]
(2) The IPES Provider may assume financial responsibility for any
applicable Intermediate Access Provider's charges for such services for
any traffic between such IPES Provider's terminating end office or
equivalent and the associated access tandem switch, and
(3) The Intermediate Access Provider shall not assess any charges
for such services to the Interexchange Carrier.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Commission's rules,
if an IPES Provider, as defined in Sec. 61.3(eee) of this chapter, is
engaged in Access Stimulation, as defined in Sec. 61.3(bbb) of this
chapter, it shall, within 45 days of commencing Access Stimulation, or
within 45 days of September 6, 2022, whichever is later, notify in
writing the Commission, all Intermediate Access Providers that it
subtends, and Interexchange Carriers with which it does business of the
following:
(1) That it is an IPES Provider engaged in Access Stimulation; and
(2) That it shall designate the Intermediate Access Provider(s), if
any, that will provide the terminating switched access tandem switching
and terminating switched access tandem transport services directly, or
indirectly through a local exchange carrier, to the IPES Provider
engaged in Access Stimulation; and
(3) That the IPES Provider may pay for those services as of that
date.
(e) In the event that an Intermediate Access Provider receives
notice under paragraphs (b) or (d) of this section that it has been
designated to provide terminating switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access tandem transport services to a local
exchange carrier engaged in Access Stimulation or to an IPES Provider
engaged in Access Stimulation, directly, or indirectly through a local
exchange carrier, and that local exchange carrier engaged in Access
Stimulation shall pay or the IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation may pay for such terminating access service from such
Intermediate Access Provider, the Intermediate Access Provider shall
not bill Interexchange Carriers for interstate or intrastate
terminating switched access tandem switching or terminating switched
access tandem transport service for traffic bound for such local
exchange carrier or IPES Provider but, instead, shall bill such local
exchange carrier or may bill such IPES Provider for such services.
(f) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, any
local exchange carrier that is not itself engaged in Access
Stimulation, as that term is defined in Sec. 61.3(bbb) of this
chapter, but serves as an Intermediate Access Provider with respect to
traffic bound for a local exchange carrier engaged in Access
Stimulation or bound for an IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation, or receives traffic from an Intermediate Access Provider
destined for an IPES Provider engaged in Access Stimulation, shall not
itself be deemed a local exchange carrier engaged in Access Stimulation
or be affected by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.
(g) Upon terminating its engagement in Access Stimulation, as
defined in Sec. 61.3(bbb) of this chapter, the local exchange carrier
or IPES Provider engaged in Access Stimulation shall provide
concurrent, written notification to the Commission and any affected
Intermediate Access Provider(s) and Interexchange Carrier(s) of such
fact.
PART 61--TARIFFS
0
4. The authority citation for part 61 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201-205, 403, unless
otherwise noted.
0
5. Amend Sec. 61.3 by revising paragraphs (bbb) through (ddd), and
adding paragraph (eee) to read as follows:
Sec. 61.3 Definitions.
* * * * *
(bbb) Access Stimulation.
(1) A Competitive Local Exchange Carrier or an IPES Provider
serving end user(s) engages in Access Stimulation when it satisfies
either paragraphs (bbb)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section; and a rate-of-
return local exchange carrier serving end user(s) engages in Access
Stimulation when it satisfies either paragraphs (bbb)(1)(i) or (iii) of
this section.
(i) The rate-of-return local exchange carrier, Competitive Local
Exchange Carrier, or IPES Provider:
(A) Has an access revenue sharing agreement, whether express,
implied, written or oral, that, over the course of the agreement, would
directly or indirectly result in a net payment to the other party
(including affiliates) to the agreement, in which payment by the rate-
of-return local exchange carrier, Competitive Local Exchange Carrier,
or IPES Provider is based on the billing or collection of access
charges from interexchange carriers or wireless carriers. When
determining whether there is a net payment under this rule, all
payments, discounts, credits, services, features, functions, and other
items of value, regardless of form, provided by the rate-of-return
local exchange carrier, Competitive Local Exchange Carrier, or IPES
Provider to the other party to the agreement shall be taken into
account; and
(B) Has either an interstate terminating-to-originating traffic
ratio of at least 3:1 in an end office or equivalent in a calendar
month, or has had more than a 100 percent growth in interstate
originating and/or terminating switched access minutes of use in a
month compared to the same month in the preceding year for such end
office or equivalent.
(ii) A Competitive Local Exchange Carrier or IPES Provider has an
interstate terminating-to-originating traffic ratio of at least 6:1 in
an end office or equivalent in a calendar month.
(iii) A rate-of-return local exchange carrier has an interstate
terminating-to-originating traffic ratio of at least 10:1 in an end
office or equivalent in a three-calendar month period and has 500,000
minutes or more of interstate terminating minutes-of-use per month in
the same end office in the same three-calendar month period. These
factors will be measured as an average over the three-calendar month
period.
(2) A Competitive Local Exchange Carrier serving end users or an
IPES Provider serving end users that has engaged in Access Stimulation
will continue to be deemed to be engaged in Access Stimulation until:
For a carrier or provider engaging in Access Stimulation as defined in
paragraph (1)(i) of this section, it terminates all revenue sharing
agreements covered in paragraph (1)(i) of this section and does not
engage in Access Stimulation as defined in paragraph (1)(ii) of this
section; and for a carrier or provider engaging in Access Stimulation
as defined in paragraph (1)(ii) of this section, its interstate
terminating-to-originating traffic ratio for an end office or
equivalent falls below 6:1 for six consecutive months, and it does not
engage in Access Stimulation as defined in paragraph (1)(i) of this
section.
(3) A rate-of-return local exchange carrier serving end users that
has engaged in Access Stimulation will continue to be deemed to be
engaged in Access Stimulation until: For a carrier engaging in Access
Stimulation as defined in paragraph (1)(i) of this section, it
terminates all revenue sharing agreements covered in paragraph (1)(i)
of this section and does not engage in Access Stimulation as defined in
paragraph (1)(iii) of this section; and for a carrier engaging in
Access Stimulation as defined in paragraph (1)(iii) of this section,
its interstate terminating-to-originating traffic ratio falls below
10:1 for six consecutive months and its
[[Page 47688]]
monthly interstate terminating minutes-of-use in an end office or
equivalent falls below 500,000 for six consecutive months, and it does
not engage in Access Stimulation as defined in paragraph (1)(i) of this
section.
(4) A local exchange carrier engaging in Access Stimulation is
subject to revised interstate switched access charge rules under Sec.
61.26(g) (for Competitive Local Exchange Carriers) or Sec. 61.38 and
Sec. 69.3(e)(12) of this chapter (for rate-of-return local exchange
carriers).
(ccc) Intermediate Access Provider. The term means, for purposes of
this part and Sec. Sec. 69.3(e)(12)(iv) and 69.5(b) of this chapter,
any entity that provides terminating switched access tandem switching
and terminating switched access tandem transport services between the
final Interexchange Carrier in a call path and:
(1) A local exchange carrier engaged in Access Stimulation, as
defined in paragraph (bbb) of this section; or
(2) A local exchange carrier delivering traffic to an IPES Provider
engaged in Access Stimulation, as defined in paragraph (bbb) of this
section or;
(3) An IPES Provider engaged in Access Stimulation, as defined in
paragraph (bbb) of this section where the Intermediate Access Provider
delivers calls directly to the IPES Provider.
(ddd) Interexchange Carrier. The term means, for purposes of this
part and Sec. Sec. 69.3(e)(12)(iv) and 69.5(b) of this chapter, a
retail or wholesale telecommunications carrier that uses the exchange
access or information access services of another telecommunications
carrier for the provision of telecommunications.
(eee) IPES (internet Protocol Enabled Service) Provider. The term
means, for purposes of this part and Sec. Sec. 51.914, 69.4(l) and
69.5(b) of this chapter, a provider offering a service that: (1)
enables real-time, two-way voice communications; (2) requires a
broadband connection from the user's location or end to end; (3)
requires internet Protocol-compatible customer premises equipment
(CPE); and (4) permits users to receive calls that originate on the
public switched telephone network and to terminate calls to the public
switched telephone network or that originate from an internet Protocol
service and terminate to an internet Protocol service or an internet
Protocol application.
* * * * *
PART 69--ACCESS CHARGES
0
6. The authority citation for part 69 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 201, 202, 203, 205, 218, 220, 254,
403.
0
7. Amend Sec. 69.4 by revising paragraph (l) to read as follows:
Sec. 69.4 Charges to be filed.
* * * * *
(l) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(5) of this section, a local
exchange carrier engaged in Access Stimulation as defined in Sec.
61.3(bbb) of this chapter or the Intermediate Access Provider it
subtends, or an Intermediate Access Provider that delivers traffic
directly or indirectly to an IPES Provider engaged in Access
Stimulation as defined in Sec. 61.3(bbb) of this chapter, shall not
bill an Interexchange Carrier as defined in Sec. 61.3(bbb) of this
chapter for interstate or intrastate terminating switched access tandem
switching or terminating switched access tandem transport charges for
any traffic between such local exchange carrier's or such IPES
Provider's terminating end office or equivalent and the associated
access tandem switch.
0
8. Amend Sec. 69.5 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 69.5 Persons to be assessed.
* * * * *
(b) Carrier's carrier charges shall be computed and assessed upon
all Interexchange Carriers that use local exchange switching facilities
for the provision of interstate or foreign telecommunications services,
except that:
(1) Local exchange carriers shall not assess terminating interstate
or intrastate switched access tandem switching or terminating switched
access tandem transport charges described in Sec. 69.4(b)(5) of this
chapter on Interexchange Carriers when the terminating traffic is
destined for a local exchange carrier or an IPES Provider engaged in
Access Stimulation, as that term is defined in Sec. 61.3(bbb) of this
chapter consistent with the provisions of Sec. 61.26(g)(3) of this
chapter and Sec. 69.3(e)(12)(iv).
(2) Intermediate Access Providers shall not assess a terminating
interstate or intrastate switched access tandem switching or
terminating switched access tandem transport charges described in Sec.
69.4(b)(5) of this chapter on Interexchange Carriers when the
terminating traffic is destined for a local exchange carrier engaged in
Access Stimulation, or is destined, directly or indirectly, for an IPES
Provider engaged in Access Stimulation, as that term is defined in
Sec. 61.3(bbb) of this chapter consistent with the provisions of Sec.
61.26(g)(3) of this chapter and Sec. 69.3(e)(12)(iv).
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2022-16237 Filed 8-3-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P