Tel-Pharmacy; Decision and Order, 2904-2905 [2022-00956]
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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 12 / Wednesday, January 19, 2022 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Tel-Pharmacy; Decision and Order
On August 3, 2017, the then Acting
Assistant Administrator, Diversion
Control Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration (hereinafter,
Government), issued an Order to Show
Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to TelPharmacy (hereinafter, Applicant) of
Coconut Creek, Florida. OSC, at 1. The
OSC proposed the denial of Applicant’s
application for DEA Certificate of
Registration No. W16006664A. It alleged
that Applicant ‘‘does not have authority
to operate a pharmacy in Florida, the
state for which it seeks a [DEA
registration].’’ Id. (citing 21 U.S.C.
823(f)). Specifically, the OSC alleged
that Applicant’s Florida pharmacy
permit expired on February 28, 2017,
and was not renewed. Id. at 2.
The OSC notified Applicant of the
right to request a hearing on the
allegations or to submit a written
statement, while waiving the right to a
hearing, the procedures for electing each
option, and the consequences for failing
to elect either option. Id. at 2 (citing 21
CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified
Applicant of the opportunity to submit
a corrective action plan. Id. at 2–3
(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)).
jspears on DSK121TN23PROD with NOTICES1
Adequacy of Service
In a Declaration dated December 6,
2021, a Diversion Investigator
(hereinafter, the DI) assigned to the
DEA’s Miami Field Division stated that
on August 4, 2017, a Special Agent and
Task Force Officer from DEA’s Miami
Field Division hand-delivered a copy of
the OSC to Applicant’s agent at the
agent’s residence. Request for Final
Agency Action (hereinafter, RFAA),
Exhibit (hereinafter, RFAAX) 1, at 1–2;
see also RFAAX 1, Appendix
(hereinafter, App.) B.
The Government forwarded its RFAA,
along with the evidentiary record, to
this office on December 8, 2021. In its
RFAA, the Government represents that
‘‘neither [Applicant] nor any attorney
representing [Applicant] has requested a
hearing’’ nor ‘‘has [Applicant] nor any
attorney for [Applicant] submitted a
written statement.’’ RFAA, at 2. The
Government ‘‘seeks to deny
[Applicant’s] application for a [DEA
registration] because [Applicant] lacks
authority to handle controlled
substances in [Florida], the state in
which it seeks registration with DEA.’’
Id. at 1. Accordingly, the Government
requests that the Administrator deny
Applicant’s application. Id. at 5.
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Based on the DI’s Declaration, the
Government’s written representations,
and my review of the record, I find that
the Government accomplished service
of the OSC on Applicant on August 4,
2017. I also find that more than thirty
days have now passed since the
Government accomplished service of
the OSC. Further, based on the
Government’s written representations, I
find that neither Applicant, nor anyone
purporting to represent the Applicant,
requested a hearing, submitted a written
statement while waiving Applicant’s
right to a hearing, or submitted a
corrective action plan. Accordingly, I
find that Applicant has waived the right
to a hearing and the right to submit a
written statement and corrective action
plan. 21 CFR 1301.43(d) and 21 U.S.C.
824(c)(2)(C). I, therefore, issue this
Decision and Order based on the record
submitted by the Government, which
constitutes the entire record before me.
21 CFR 1301.43(e).
Findings of Fact
Applicant’s Application for DEA
Registration
On or about January 27, 2016,
Applicant submitted an application for
a DEA Certificate of Registration as a
retail pharmacy in Schedules II through
V with a proposed registered address at
5489 Wiles Rd. 302, Coconut Creek, FL
33073. RFAAX 1, App. A, at 1.
Applicant’s application was assigned
Control No. W16006664A.1 Id.
The Status of Applicant’s State License
In her Declaration, the DI stated that
as of December 6, 2021, Applicant’s
state license was listed as ‘‘null and
void’’ on the Florida Department of
Health website. RFAAX 1, at 2; see also
RFAAX 1, App. C. According to the
Florida Department of Health’s online
records, of which I take official notice,
Applicant’s state pharmacy registration
PH29813 is ‘‘null and void.’’ 2 Florida
1 In spite of Applicant’s discontinuance of
business, its application remains pending and I will
continue to assess the application under 21 U.S.C.
823. See Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., 86 FR 15,257
(2021).
2 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an
agency ‘‘may take official notice of facts at any stage
in a proceeding—even in the final decision.’’
United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint
1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ‘‘[w]hen an
agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a
party is entitled, on timely request, to an
opportunity to show the contrary.’’ Accordingly,
Applicant may dispute my finding by filing a
properly supported motion for reconsideration of
finding of fact within fifteen calendar days of the
date of this Order. Any such motion and response
shall be filed and served by email to the other party
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Department of Health’s License
Verification, https://mqainternet.doh.state.fl.us/
MQASearchServices/Home (last visited
date of signature of this Order).
Accordingly, I find that Applicant is
not currently licensed to engage in the
practice of pharmacy in Florida, the
state in which Applicant applied for
registration with the DEA.
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the
Attorney General is authorized to
suspend or revoke a registration issued
under section 823 of the Controlled
Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA)
‘‘upon a finding that the registrant . . .
has had [its] State license or registration
suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by
competent State authority and is no
longer authorized by State law to engage
in the . . . dispensing of controlled
substances.’’ With respect to a
practitioner, the DEA has also long held
that the possession of authority to
dispense controlled substances under
the laws of the state in which a
practitioner engages in professional
practice is a fundamental condition for
obtaining and maintaining a
practitioner’s registration. See, e.g.,
James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71,371
(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App’x
826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh
Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27,616, 27,617
(1978).
This rule derives from the text of two
provisions of the CSA. First, Congress
defined the term ‘‘practitioner’’ to mean
‘‘a pharmacy . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in
which he practices . . . , to distribute,
dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a
controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.’’ 21 U.S.C.
802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a
practitioner’s registration, Congress
directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General
shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.’’ 21
U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has
clearly mandated that a practitioner
possess state authority in order to be
deemed a practitioner under the CSA,
the DEA has held repeatedly that
revocation of a practitioner’s registration
is the appropriate sanction whenever he
is no longer authorized to dispense
controlled substances under the laws of
the state in which he practices. See, e.g.,
and to Office of the Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Administration at
dea.addo.attorneys@dea.usdoj.gov.
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19JAN1
Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 12 / Wednesday, January 19, 2022 / Notices
James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71,371–72;
Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR
39,130, 39,131 (2006); Dominick A.
Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51,104, 51,105 (1993);
Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11,919, 11,920
(1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR
27,617.
According to Florida statute, ‘‘It is
unlawful for any person to own,
operate, maintain, open, establish,
conduct, or have charge of, either alone
or with another person or persons, a
pharmacy: (a) Which is not registered
under the provisions of this chapter.’’
Fla. Stat. Ann. 465.015(1). Further, ‘‘the
practice of the profession of pharmacy’’
definition ‘‘includes compounding,
dispensing, and consulting concerning
contents, therapeutic values, and uses of
any medicinal drug 3 . . . .’’ Fla. Stat.
Ann. 465.003(13) (West, 2021).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the
record is that Applicant currently lacks
authority to operate a pharmacy in
Florida. As already discussed, a
pharmacy must be a licensed to
dispense a medicinal drug, including a
controlled substance, in Florida. Thus,
because Applicant lacks authority to
practice pharmacy in Florida and,
therefore, is not authorized to dispense
controlled substances in Florida,
Applicant is not eligible to receive a
DEA registration. Accordingly, I will
order that Applicant’s application for a
DEA registration be denied.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(f), I hereby order that the pending
application for a Certificate of
Registration, Control Number
W16006664A, submitted by TelPharmacy, is denied, as well as any
other pending application of TelPharmacy for additional registration in
Florida. This Order is effective February
18, 2022.
Anne Milgram,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2022–00956 Filed 1–18–22; 8:45 am]
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BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
3 ‘‘Medicinal Drugs’’ or ‘‘Drugs’’ means ‘‘those
substances or preparations commonly known as
‘prescription’ or ‘legend’ drugs which are required
by federal or state law to be dispensed only on a
prescription . . . .’’ Fla. Stat. Ann. 465.003(8).
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 20–08]
AARRIC, Inc. d/b/a at Cost RX;
Decision and Order
On January 3, 2020, a former Acting
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (hereinafter, DEA or
Government), issued an Order to Show
Cause and Immediate Suspension of
Registration (hereinafter, OSC) to
AARRIC, Inc. d/b/a AT COST RX
(hereinafter, Respondent).
Administrative Law Judge Exhibit
(hereinafter, ALJ Ex.) 1, (OSC) at 1. The
OSC/ISO informed Respondent of the
immediate suspension of its DEA
Certificate of Registration Number
FA2125640 (hereinafter, registration or
COR) and proposed its revocation, the
denial of any pending applications for
renewal or modification of such
registration, and the denial of any
pending applications for additional DEA
registrations pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4) and 823(f), because
Respondent’s ‘‘continued registration is
inconsistent with the public interest.’’
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4) and
823(f)).
In response to the OSC, Respondent
timely requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge. ALJ Ex. 2.
The hearing in this matter was
conducted from November 16–20, 2020,
at the DEA Hearing Facility in
Arlington, Virginia, with the parties and
their witnesses participating through
video-teleconference.*A On April 7,
*A [This footnote has been relocated from RD n.5.]
At all times prior to and during the hearing, the
Respondent was represented by multiple, able
counsel. The Respondent’s (then) counsels raised
no issue during the proceedings or in the
Respondent’s closing brief regarding the fairness of
the proceedings. The day after its closing brief was
filed, the Respondent sought to discharge its
lawyers and opted to have itself represented by its
(non-lawyer) owner. ALJ Ex. 56. Acting as a nonattorney representative (see 21 CFR 1316.50), the
Respondent’s owner moved to disqualify the
Government’s expert and to recuse me [the Chief
ALJ]. ALJ Exs. 57, 58, 61. These motions have been
disposed of in separate orders issued
contemporaneously with this recommended
decision. ALJ Exs. 67, 68. A joint motion to be
excused from further representation of the
Respondent (ALJ Ex. 60) filed by his lawyers (at the
request of the tribunal) was granted for the reasons
stated therein. ALJ Ex. 62.
[I agree with the Chief ALJ’s procedural rulings
in this case, including his dismissal of
Respondent’s two recusal motions. In these
motions, Respondent argued that the Chief ALJ
‘‘den[ied] Respondent [the] right to a fair trial’’ by
‘‘creat[ing] an atmosphere of prejudice and lack of
impartiality.’’ ALJ Ex. 57, at 3. Respondent further
argued that the Chief ALJ ‘‘morphed [the
Government’s case] into a plausible case’’ by
‘‘w[earing] the hat of the Government’s lawyer
during most of the witness examination.’’ Id. at 2.
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2021, Chief Administrative Law Judge
John J. Mulrooney, II (hereinafter, Chief
ALJ) issued his Recommended Rulings,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decision (hereinafter,
Recommended Decision or RD). On
Respondent’s motions reference portions of the
record where the Chief ALJ assisted the
Government in authenticating documents and
questioning its witnesses. Although Respondent
acknowledged that ALJs are permitted to question
witnesses, Respondent argues that the Chief ALJ
used his questioning authority to buttress the
Government’s case and ‘‘patch[ ] up areas where
there were obvious gaps in the Government’s case,’’
while not ‘‘provid[ing] the same helping hand to
Respondent when Respondent was attempting to
authenticate documents that Respondent believes
were critical to its defense. Id. at 5, 10.
Additionally, Respondent alleged that it was
inappropriate for the Chief ALJ to ask Respondent’s
representative, Dr. Howard, whether he agreed with
certain testimony by Respondent’s expert, because
it ‘‘placed . . . Dr. Howard in an awkward position
to have to incriminate his own expert just to
appease the ALJ.’’ Id. at 26, 30.
I find that Respondent’s recusal motions are
without merit. As the Chief ALJ stated in his neutral
and carefully-reasoned dismissal order,
Respondent—the proponent of the recusal motion—
has the burden of demonstrating that the Chief ALJ
exhibited a ‘‘deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible.’’ Order
Denying the Respondent’s Recusal Motions, at 6.
Respondent did not identify any evidence of
favoritism or antagonism, much less the type of
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgment impossible. Rather, Respondent
identified instances where the Chief ALJ was
exercising his discretionary authority to regulate the
hearing, by asking clarifying questions of counsel
and witnesses and issuing evidentiary rulings. See
Order, at 7 (citing 5 U.S.C. 556(c)(5); 21 CFR
1316.52(e)). Courts have uniformly held that
judicial rulings issued during the course of
litigation rarely constitute evidence of cognizable
bias. Id. (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 555 (1994), Hamm v. Members of Bd. of
Regents, 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983), Dewey
C. Mackay, M.D., 75 FR 49,956, 49,958–59 (2010)).
Additionally, as the Chief ALJ highlighted in his
dismissal order, the Chief ALJ frequently clarified
the record for Respondent’s benefit and
overwhelmingly issued evidentiary rulings in
Respondent’s favor. Id. at 8–9. Furthermore,
Respondent’s recusal motions were untimely,
which is an independent basis for their dismissal.
Id. at 7, 15–16.
Beyond the substantive and procedural defects of
Respondent’s recusal motions, the motions convey
a contemptuous tone towards the Chief ALJ, which
supports my decision that Respondent’s registration
is inconsistent with the public interest. Respondent
was particularly outraged that the Chief ALJ
questioned Respondent’s representative about
whether he agreed with the Respondent’s expert’s
expressions of hostility towards DEA as a regulator.
Based on Respondent’s attitude towards DEA and
the Chief ALJ, I find it unlikely that Respondent
would modify its behavior and become a lawabiding, cooperative registrant. Certainly,
Respondent’s focus on repudiating the Chief ALJ
rather than acknowledging its own misconduct
shows that it falls far short of the ‘‘true remorse’’
that is required when a registrant has committed
acts that are inconsistent with the public interest.
Michael S. Moore, M.D., 76 FR 45,867, 45,877
(2011).
For the same reasons stated above, I find that
Respondent’s Exceptions to ALJ’s Denial of
Respondent’s Motions for Recusal and Request for
Expedited Ruling on the Order Denying Recusal are
without merit. ALJ Ex. 69 (dated April 27, 2021).]
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 12 (Wednesday, January 19, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2904-2905]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-00956]
[[Page 2904]]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Tel-Pharmacy; Decision and Order
On August 3, 2017, the then Acting Assistant Administrator,
Diversion Control Division, Drug Enforcement Administration
(hereinafter, Government), issued an Order to Show Cause (hereinafter,
OSC) to Tel-Pharmacy (hereinafter, Applicant) of Coconut Creek,
Florida. OSC, at 1. The OSC proposed the denial of Applicant's
application for DEA Certificate of Registration No. W16006664A. It
alleged that Applicant ``does not have authority to operate a pharmacy
in Florida, the state for which it seeks a [DEA registration].'' Id.
(citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f)). Specifically, the OSC alleged that
Applicant's Florida pharmacy permit expired on February 28, 2017, and
was not renewed. Id. at 2.
The OSC notified Applicant of the right to request a hearing on the
allegations or to submit a written statement, while waiving the right
to a hearing, the procedures for electing each option, and the
consequences for failing to elect either option. Id. at 2 (citing 21
CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified Applicant of the opportunity to
submit a corrective action plan. Id. at 2-3 (citing 21 U.S.C.
824(c)(2)(C)).
Adequacy of Service
In a Declaration dated December 6, 2021, a Diversion Investigator
(hereinafter, the DI) assigned to the DEA's Miami Field Division stated
that on August 4, 2017, a Special Agent and Task Force Officer from
DEA's Miami Field Division hand-delivered a copy of the OSC to
Applicant's agent at the agent's residence. Request for Final Agency
Action (hereinafter, RFAA), Exhibit (hereinafter, RFAAX) 1, at 1-2; see
also RFAAX 1, Appendix (hereinafter, App.) B.
The Government forwarded its RFAA, along with the evidentiary
record, to this office on December 8, 2021. In its RFAA, the Government
represents that ``neither [Applicant] nor any attorney representing
[Applicant] has requested a hearing'' nor ``has [Applicant] nor any
attorney for [Applicant] submitted a written statement.'' RFAA, at 2.
The Government ``seeks to deny [Applicant's] application for a [DEA
registration] because [Applicant] lacks authority to handle controlled
substances in [Florida], the state in which it seeks registration with
DEA.'' Id. at 1. Accordingly, the Government requests that the
Administrator deny Applicant's application. Id. at 5.
Based on the DI's Declaration, the Government's written
representations, and my review of the record, I find that the
Government accomplished service of the OSC on Applicant on August 4,
2017. I also find that more than thirty days have now passed since the
Government accomplished service of the OSC. Further, based on the
Government's written representations, I find that neither Applicant,
nor anyone purporting to represent the Applicant, requested a hearing,
submitted a written statement while waiving Applicant's right to a
hearing, or submitted a corrective action plan. Accordingly, I find
that Applicant has waived the right to a hearing and the right to
submit a written statement and corrective action plan. 21 CFR
1301.43(d) and 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C). I, therefore, issue this
Decision and Order based on the record submitted by the Government,
which constitutes the entire record before me. 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
Findings of Fact
Applicant's Application for DEA Registration
On or about January 27, 2016, Applicant submitted an application
for a DEA Certificate of Registration as a retail pharmacy in Schedules
II through V with a proposed registered address at 5489 Wiles Rd. 302,
Coconut Creek, FL 33073. RFAAX 1, App. A, at 1. Applicant's application
was assigned Control No. W16006664A.\1\ Id.
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\1\ In spite of Applicant's discontinuance of business, its
application remains pending and I will continue to assess the
application under 21 U.S.C. 823. See Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., 86
FR 15,257 (2021).
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The Status of Applicant's State License
In her Declaration, the DI stated that as of December 6, 2021,
Applicant's state license was listed as ``null and void'' on the
Florida Department of Health website. RFAAX 1, at 2; see also RFAAX 1,
App. C. According to the Florida Department of Health's online records,
of which I take official notice, Applicant's state pharmacy
registration PH29813 is ``null and void.'' \2\ Florida Department of
Health's License Verification, https://mqa-internet.doh.state.fl.us/MQASearchServices/Home (last visited date of signature of this Order).
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\2\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e),
``[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is
entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the
contrary.'' Accordingly, Applicant may dispute my finding by filing
a properly supported motion for reconsideration of finding of fact
within fifteen calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such
motion and response shall be filed and served by email to the other
party and to Office of the Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration at [email protected].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, I find that Applicant is not currently licensed to
engage in the practice of pharmacy in Florida, the state in which
Applicant applied for registration with the DEA.
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 823 of the
Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA) ``upon a finding that the
registrant . . . has had [its] State license or registration suspended
. . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is no longer
authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled
substances.'' With respect to a practitioner, the DEA has also long
held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances
under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages in
professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and
maintaining a practitioner's registration. See, e.g., James L. Hooper,
M.D., 76 FR 71,371 (2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th
Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27,616, 27,617 (1978).
This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the CSA.
First, Congress defined the term ``practitioner'' to mean ``a pharmacy
. . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by
. . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . , to distribute,
dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in
setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration,
Congress directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register
practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has clearly mandated
that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the CSA, the DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction whenever
he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the
laws of the state in which he practices. See, e.g.,
[[Page 2905]]
James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71,371-72; Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR
39,130, 39,131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51,104, 51,105
(1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11,919, 11,920 (1988); Frederick Marsh
Blanton, 43 FR 27,617.
According to Florida statute, ``It is unlawful for any person to
own, operate, maintain, open, establish, conduct, or have charge of,
either alone or with another person or persons, a pharmacy: (a) Which
is not registered under the provisions of this chapter.'' Fla. Stat.
Ann. 465.015(1). Further, ``the practice of the profession of
pharmacy'' definition ``includes compounding, dispensing, and
consulting concerning contents, therapeutic values, and uses of any
medicinal drug \3\ . . . .'' Fla. Stat. Ann. 465.003(13) (West, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Medicinal Drugs'' or ``Drugs'' means ``those substances or
preparations commonly known as `prescription' or `legend' drugs
which are required by federal or state law to be dispensed only on a
prescription . . . .'' Fla. Stat. Ann. 465.003(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Applicant
currently lacks authority to operate a pharmacy in Florida. As already
discussed, a pharmacy must be a licensed to dispense a medicinal drug,
including a controlled substance, in Florida. Thus, because Applicant
lacks authority to practice pharmacy in Florida and, therefore, is not
authorized to dispense controlled substances in Florida, Applicant is
not eligible to receive a DEA registration. Accordingly, I will order
that Applicant's application for a DEA registration be denied.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 823(f), I hereby order that the pending application for a
Certificate of Registration, Control Number W16006664A, submitted by
Tel-Pharmacy, is denied, as well as any other pending application of
Tel-Pharmacy for additional registration in Florida. This Order is
effective February 18, 2022.
Anne Milgram,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2022-00956 Filed 1-18-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
