Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Energy Sector Supply Chain Review, 67695-67703 [2021-25898]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 226 (Monday, November 29, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67695-67703]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-25898]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Energy Sector Supply 
Chain Review

AGENCY: Undersecretary for Science and Energy and Office of Policy 
(OP); Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Request for information.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Undersecretary for Science 
and Energy and Office of Policy (OP) request information on energy 
sector supply chains. This request for information (RFI) seeks input 
from all stakeholders involved directly and indirectly in the supply 
chains of energy, energy systems and technologies, and energy 
efficiency technologies from raw materials, processed materials, 
subcomponents, final products, to end-of-life material recovery and 
recycling--including but not limited to U.S. industry, researchers, 
academia, local governments, and civil society. This stakeholder input 
will inform the Department's efforts in building an energy sector 
industrial base that is diverse, resilient, and competitive while 
meeting economic, national security, and climate objectives.

DATES: Responses will be reviewed and considered on a rolling basis but 
are due no later than 5 p.m. (ET) on January 15, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties are to submit comments online (Strongly 
Preferred): Submit all electronic public comments to 
www.regulations.gov/docket/DOE-HQ-2021-0020. Click on the ``Comment'' 
icon, complete the required fields, and enter or attach your comments. 
If you are unable to submit online, you may submit by email to 
[email protected] and include ``RFI: Supply Chain Review'' in the 
subject line of the email. Email attachments can be provided as a 
Microsoft Word (.docx) file or an Adobe PDF (.pdf) file, prepared in 
accordance with the detailed instructions in the RFI. Documents 
submitted electronically should clearly indicate which topic areas and 
specific questions are being addressed and should be limited to no more 
than 25MB in size. The complete RFI document is located at 
www.energy.gov/policy. Please refer to the Disclaimer and Important 
Note section at the end of this RFI on how to submit business sensitive 
and/or confidential information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Questions may be addressed to 
Tsisilile Igogo at 202-586-0048. Please direct media inquiries to 
Jennifer Mosley through [email protected]. Further 
instructions can be found in the RFI document posted at www.energy.gov/policy.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Executive Order 14017 ``America's Supply Chains'' directs the 
Secretary of Energy to ``submit a report on supply chains for the 
energy sector industrial base (as determined by the Secretary of 
Energy)'' within one year of the date of the order 86 FR 11849 
(February 24, 2021). This RFI seeks public input to inform DOE on 
approaches and actions needed to build resilient supply chains for the 
energy sector. Resilient supply chains as defined by the Executive 
Order 14017 means ``supply chains that are secure and diverse--
facilitating greater domestic production, a range of supply, built-in 
redundancies, adequate stockpiles, safe and secure digital networks, 
and a world-class American manufacturing base and workforce.''
    DOE recognizes that meeting U.S. jobs, economic, and emissions 
goals (which include a 50-52% reduction in emissions by 2030 from a 
2005 baseline and net zero greenhouse gas emissions economy-wide by no 
later than 2050), will require a significant number of clean energy 
(and clean energy enabling) technologies to be deployed at a 
dramatically increasing scale at a time when other countries are 
expanding their clean energy sectors. DOE has identified technologies 
and crosscutting topics for analysis in the timeframe set by the 
Executive Order. The list of the selected technology sectors includes 
solar photovoltaic (PV); wind; electric grid, including transformers 
and high-voltage direct current (HVDC); energy storage; hydropower, 
including pumped

[[Page 67696]]

storage hydropower (PSH); nuclear energy; fuel cells and electrolyzers; 
semiconductors; neodymium magnets; platinum group metals and other 
catalysts; and carbon capture materials. Crosscutting topics include 
cybersecurity and digital components, and commercialization and 
competitiveness. DOE has additional ongoing supply chain analysis on 
other technologies and topics as well. For this effort, DOE is 
reviewing the full supply chain--from raw materials, processed 
materials, subcomponents, final products, to end-of-life material 
recovery and recycling--for each technology. DOE is taking an in-depth 
assessment in each of the selected technologies, including:
    [cir] Mapping the supply chains;
    [cir] Identifying existing and future threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities;
    [cir] Identifying major barriers, including financial and 
commercial, scientific, technical, regulatory and market;
    [cir] Identifying conditions needed to help incentivize energy 
sector companies and communities to both transfer energy manufacturing 
back to and scale up supply chains in the United States.
    [cir] Identifying areas where collaboration between the government 
and private sector, as well as between government entities (federal, 
state, local, and Tribal), is necessary to expand the energy industrial 
base, what private sector leadership might look like in this area, and 
where or how government can help; and
    [cir] Identifying specific actions to address threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities and help build resilient supply chains.
    This RFI seeks input from all stakeholders involved directly and 
indirectly in the supply chains of energy and energy efficiency 
technologies--including but not limited to U.S. industry, researchers, 
academia, local governments, labor organizations, and civil society. 
This stakeholder input will inform the Department's efforts to build an 
energy sector industrial base that is diverse, resilient, and 
competitive while meeting economic, national security, and climate 
objectives.
    This RFI seeks responses on the energy sector industrial base and 
individual technologies as well as crosscutting topics. Specifically, 
DOE is interested in gathering information relevant to the following 
topic areas:

1. Crosscutting topics relating to the energy sector industrial base
2. Solar PV Technology
3. Wind Energy Technology
4. Energy Storage Technology
5. Electric Grid--Transformers and HVDC
6. Hydropower and Pumped Storage Technology
7. Nuclear Energy Technology
8. Fuel Cells and Electrolyzers
9. Semiconductors
10. Neodymium Magnets
11. Platinum Group Metals and other materials used as Catalysts
12. Carbon Capture, Storage, and Transportation Materials
13. Cybersecurity and Digital Components
14. Commercialization and Competitiveness

Questions for Input

    This RFI is an initial step in improving DOE understanding of 
interests, concerns, challenges, and policy needs of the private sector 
and communities at large, with respect to manufacturing supply chains 
of the evolving energy sector industrial base. This RFI is a general 
solicitation for public input, which sets forth topics for discussion 
and comment. Specific questions to which responses are requested for 
each focus area are listed below. Respondents may provide input 
regarding any or all the topic areas and may address any or all the 
questions.

Area 1: Crosscutting Topics Relating to the Energy Sector Industrial 
Base

    The concept of the ``energy sector industrial base'' as a defined 
group of critical industry partners does not currently exist in the 
same way that it does for the Defense Industrial Base. The one-year 
reports responding to Executive Order 14017 present an opportunity to 
define the energy sector industrial base.
    This section targets crosscutting/technology neutral input; for 
technology specific comments, please respond in the respective 
technology in Area 2 to Area 13.
    1. How would you define the energy sector industrial base? For the 
purposes of informing comprehensive supply chain policies--including 
promoting supply chain resilience--what entities are included or not 
included in the energy sector industrial base?
    2. For adoption of clean energy technologies in the United States, 
what are the crosscutting vulnerabilities and gaps in the supply chain 
and manufacturing capabilities given the likely ramp-up in demand for 
these technologies?
    3. What are opportunities to expand domestic energy-related 
manufacturing in the United States? What conditions will lead 
manufacturers to reshore or expand domestic clean energy manufacturing?
    4. How can the government partner with the private sector and 
communities to build domestic energy manufacturing capabilities? What 
investments and other policy mechanisms are needed to enable these 
partnerships?
    5. How can policies and programs that support domestic energy 
manufacturing also support workforce opportunities and the creation of 
competitive, long-term manufacturing careers, especially for 
communities impacted by energy transition?

Area 2: Solar PV Technology

    1. What are the current and future supply chain gaps and 
vulnerabilities as we scale up the adoption and use of solar PV 
technologies? Of these gaps and vulnerabilities, which are the most 
crucial for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
    2. Where in the solar PV supply chain does it make sense for the 
U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and the 
long-term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities 
for the U.S. to build durable domestic capabilities of solar PV 
manufacturing? For areas in the supply chain where U.S. opportunities 
to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited, which foreign 
countries or regions should the U.S. government prioritize for 
engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships, and what actions 
should the government take to help ensure resilience in these areas of 
the supply chain?
    3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize 
opportunities to build domestic solar PV manufacturing? What conditions 
are needed to help incentivize companies involved in the solar PV 
supply chains to build and expand domestic manufacturing capabilities?
    4. How can government (federal, state, local, and Tribal) help the 
private sector and communities involved in solar PV manufacturing build 
and expand domestic solar PV manufacturing in the U.S.? What investment 
and policy actions are needed to support domestic manufacturing of 
solar PV?
    5. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the 
solar PV manufacturing supply chain? Of those skills, which ones are 
lacking in current education/training programs? What resources 
(including time) and structures would be needed to train the solar PV 
workforce? What worker groups, secondary education facilities, and 
other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these training

[[Page 67697]]

activities? What new education programs should be included (developed?) 
to prepare the workforce?
    6. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 3: Wind Energy Technology

    The following questions may have different applicability to land-
based wind and offshore wind. In your response, please note whether the 
response is applicable to land-based wind, offshore wind, or both.
    1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as 
we scale up the adoption and use of wind energy technologies? Of these 
vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial for the U.S. to address and 
focus on and why?
    2. Where in the wind energy technology supply chain does it make 
sense for the U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in the 
short-term and the long-term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you 
see opportunities for the U.S to build domestic capabilities of wind 
energy technology manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should 
the U.S. not prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic 
manufacturing capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain 
where U.S. opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities 
are limited, which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. 
government prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable 
partnerships, and what actions should the government take to help 
ensure resilience in these areas of the supply chain?
    3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these 
opportunities to attract or expand land-based or offshore wind energy 
technology manufacturing in the U.S.? What conditions are needed to 
help incentivize companies involved in the wind energy technology 
supply chains to both attract and expand wind energy technology 
manufacturing in the U.S.?
    4. How can the federal government help the private sector and 
interested communities attract and expand land-based or offshore wind 
energy technology manufacturing in U.S.? What investment and policy 
actions are needed to support domestic manufacturing of wind energy 
technologies?
    5. In implementing policy to support expansion of the domestic wind 
energy technology supply chain, how should the federal government 
prioritize tier 1 (major components such as nacelles, blades, towers, 
or offshore foundations) and lower-tier (other components, 
subcomponents, raw and processed material inputs) manufacturing? Do you 
agree with this tiering? If not, why?
    6. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support 
wind (onshore and offshore) energy technology manufacturing supply 
chains? Of those skills, which ones are lacking in current education/
training programs? What resources (including time) and structures would 
be needed to train the wind energy workforce? What worker groups, 
secondary education facilities, and other stakeholders could be 
valuable partners in these training activities? What new education 
programs should be included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
    7. How can the federal government most effectively expand and 
improve logistics networks for large wind energy technology components, 
both land-based and offshore? For land-based wind energy technology, 
how could the federal government ease transportation of large 
components across jurisdictions (e.g., R&D to modularize components, 
funding for permit harmonization, funding for specific infrastructure 
improvements to allow for greater throughput and/or movement of larger 
components)? For offshore wind energy technology, how can the federal 
government best support the development of Jones Act-compliant vessels 
and necessary port infrastructure?
    8. How can the federal government most effectively support 
increasing circularity (collection and reuse, remanufacturing or 
refurbishing, and recycling) in wind energy technologies and supply 
chains, especially for rare-earth element magnets and hard-to-recycle 
components such as blades?
    9. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 4: Energy Storage Technology

    1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as 
we scale up the adoption and use of energy storage technologies? Of 
these vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial for the U.S. to 
address and focus on and why?
    2. Which storage technologies have the greatest chance of achieving 
long-duration storage targets (>10 hours) and what specific supply 
chain vulnerabilities are present for these technologies?
    3. Where in the energy storage technology supply chain does it make 
sense for the U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in the 
short-term and long-term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you see 
opportunities for the U.S to build domestic capabilities of energy 
storage technology manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should 
the U.S. not prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic 
manufacturing capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain 
where U.S. opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities 
are limited, which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. 
government prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable 
partnerships, and what actions should the government take to help 
ensure resilience in these areas of the supply chain?
    4. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these 
opportunities to build domestic energy storage technology 
manufacturing? What conditions are needed to help incentivize companies 
involved in the energy storage technology supply chains to build and 
expand domestic manufacturing capabilities?
    5. How can government help the private sector and communities 
involved in energy storage technology manufacturing build and expand 
domestic manufacturing? What investment and policy actions are needed 
to support domestic manufacturing of energy storage technologies?
    6. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the 
energy storage technology manufacturing supply chain? Of those skills, 
which ones are lacking in current education/training programs? What 
resources (including time) and structures would be needed to train the 
energy storage technology workforce? What worker groups, secondary 
education facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners 
in these training activities? What new education programs should be 
included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
    7. How can the government help increase the market demand for 
responsibly sourced materials (e.g., sustainable or recycled) for 
energy storage technologies? What mechanisms exist to encourage the use 
of these materials and recycling/reuse solutions? How can the federal 
government most effectively support increasing circularity (collection, 
reuse or processing, and recycling) in energy storage technologies and 
supply chains?
    8. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

[[Page 67698]]

Topic Area 5: Electric Grid--Transformers and HVDC

    1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities 
given the anticipated growth in demand for electric grid technologies 
to support decarbonization, particularly large power transformers (LPT) 
and high-voltage, direct current technology (HVDC)? Of the 
vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial for the U.S. to address and 
focus on and why?
    2. Where in the supply chain does it make sense for the U.S to 
focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and the long-
term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities for 
the U.S to build domestic capabilities of LPT and HVDC manufacturing? 
What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. not prioritize for 
attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing capabilities, and 
why? For areas in the supply chain where U.S. opportunities to build 
domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited, which foreign 
countries or regions should the U.S. government prioritize for 
engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships, and what actions 
should the government take to help ensure resilience in these areas of 
the supply chain?
    3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these 
opportunities to build domestic LPT and HVDC manufacturing? What 
conditions are needed to help incentivize companies involved in the LPT 
and HVDC supply chains to build and expand domestic manufacturing 
capabilities?
    4. How can government help the private sector and communities 
involved in energy storage manufacturing build and expand domestic 
manufacturing capabilities? What investment and policy actions are 
needed to support domestic manufacturing of LPT and HVDC?
    5. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the 
LPT and HVDC manufacturing supply chain? Of those skills, which ones 
are lacking in current education/training programs? What resources 
(including time) and structures would be needed to train the LPT and 
HVDC workforce? What worker groups, secondary education facilities, and 
other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these training 
activities? What new education programs should be included (developed?) 
to prepare the workforce?
    6. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 6: Hydropower and Pumped Storage Technology

    * Hydropower refers to hydropower and pumped storage hydropower.
    1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities 
given the anticipated growth in demand for hydropower technology to 
support decarbonization? Of these vulnerabilities, which are the most 
crucial for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
    2. Are there any hydropower generation plant components that are 
critical to operations and depend on extended supply chains (e.g., long 
time needed to procure a replacement for the component)? Do any of the 
critical-to-operation components with extended supply chains have a 
high risk of failure or the potential to negatively impact entire plant 
operations? Which components are harder to procure domestically 
(meaning domestically manufactured) and typically need to be imported?
    3. Do you have concerns about ``extinct'' supply chains where 
components need to be produced on an ad hoc basis from bespoke 
component developers? Are there components that have a long lead time 
because they have to be fabricated? Are components (e.g., programmable 
logic controllers (PLCs)) being replaced before the end of their useful 
life because of supply chain risks (e.g., manufacturers no longer 
supporting certain legacy equipment, not producing replacement parts 
for it anymore)?
    4. For components that are not unique to hydropower plants (e.g., 
batteries, transformers), have there been shortages or difficulties for 
hydropower plants to secure the components due to competition from 
other uses within the electric generation sector (e.g., wind and solar 
generation, batteries for grid storage)?
    5. Where in the supply chain does it make sense for the U.S to 
focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and long-term, 
and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities for the 
U.S. to build the domestic supply chain of hydropower technology 
component manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. 
not prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing 
capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain where U.S. 
opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited, 
which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. government 
prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships, 
and what actions should the government take to help ensure resilience 
in these areas of the supply chain?
    6. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these 
opportunities for domestic hydropower technology component 
manufacturing in the U.S.? What conditions are needed to help 
incentivize companies involved in the hydropower technology components 
manufacturing to build and expand operations in the U.S.?
    7. How can government help the private sector and communities 
involved in hydropower components manufacturing onshore and scale up 
hydropower components manufacturing in the U.S.? What investment and 
policy actions are needed to support domestic manufacturing of 
hydropower technology component manufacturing?
    8. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the 
hydropower technology manufacturing supply chain? Of those skills, 
which ones are lacking in current education/training programs? What 
resources (including time) and structures would be needed to train the 
hydropower workforce? What worker groups, secondary education 
facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these 
training activities? What new education programs should be included 
(developed?) to prepare the workforce?
    9. How are hydropower plant components disposed of at the end of 
their operational life? Are there practices already in place or being 
considered to contribute to a circular economy \1\ approach involving 
recycling? What barriers are associated with recycling and reuse of 
hydropower components? How can the federal government most effectively 
support increasing circularity (collection, reuse or processing, and 
recycling) of hydropower components?
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    \1\ ``Circular economy--is an industrial system that is 
restorative or regenerative by intention and design.'' Circular 
economy aims to reduce waste of resources by maximizing use, 
recovery, reuse, and recycling of products. https://reports.weforum.org/toward-the-circular-economy-accelerating-the-scale-up-across-global-supply-chains/from-linear-to-circular-accelerating-a-proven-concept/.
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    10. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 7: Nuclear Energy Technology

    1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as 
we continue operation of existing commercial nuclear reactors and 
accelerate the deployment of new reactor technologies? Of these 
vulnerabilities, which are the most

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crucial for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
    2. Where in the supply chain does it make sense for the U.S. to 
focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and long-term, 
and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities for the 
U.S. to build domestic capabilities of nuclear energy technology 
manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. not 
prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing 
capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain where 
opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited, 
which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. government 
prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships, 
and what actions should the government take to help ensure resilience 
in these areas of the supply chain?
    3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these 
opportunities to build the domestic nuclear energy technology supply 
chain? What conditions are needed to help incentivize companies 
involved in the nuclear energy technology supply chain to build and 
expand domestic manufacturing capabilities?
    4. How can government help the private sector and communities 
involved in nuclear energy technology manufacturing build and expand 
domestic manufacturing? What investment and policy actions are needed 
to support onshoring the nuclear energy supply chain?
    5. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the 
nuclear energy technology supply chain? Of those skills, which ones are 
lacking in current education/training programs? What resources 
(including time) and structures would be needed to train the nuclear 
energy technology workforce? What worker groups, secondary education 
facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these 
training activities? What new education programs should be included 
(developed?) to prepare the workforce?
    6. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 8: Fuel Cells & Electrolyzers

    1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities for 
fuel cells and electrolyzers? Of these vulnerabilities, which are the 
most crucial for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
    2. Where in the fuel cell and electrolyzer supply chain does it 
make sense for the U.S to focus and prioritize its efforts in the 
short-, medium-, and long-term and why? Where in the supply chain do 
you see opportunities for the U.S. to build domestic capabilities of 
fuel cell and electrolyzer manufacturing? What areas of the supply 
chain should the U.S. not prioritize for attraction or expansion of 
domestic manufacturing capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply 
chain where U.S. opportunities to build domestic manufacturing 
capabilities are limited, which foreign countries or regions should the 
U.S. government prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable 
partnerships, and what actions should the government take to help 
ensure resilience in these areas of the supply chain?
    3. What challenges limit the ability to expand domestic fuel cell 
and electrolyzer manufacturing capacity?
    4. What conditions (economic drivers, policies, or investment) are 
needed to help incentivize companies involved in the fuel cell and 
electrolyzer supply chains to build and expand domestic manufacturing 
capabilities? What will be needed to double and eventually increase 
manufacturing capacity by an order of magnitude?
    5. What conditions (economic drivers, policies, or investment) are 
needed to ensure the long-term health of domestic fuel cell and 
electrolyzer supply chains? What will be needed to prevent future 
issues in that supply chain?
    6. How can the U.S. government help the fuel cell and electrolyzer 
industry build and expand domestic manufacturing capabilities? What 
economic drivers, investment, and policy actions will help accelerate 
domestic fuel cell and electrolyzer manufacturing?
    7. What conditions (economic drivers, policies, or investment) are 
needed to increase recycling/re-use of critical materials and 
components for fuel cells and electrolyzers and minimize supply 
disruptions? How can the U.S. government facilitate the reduction of 
critical material requirements and increase recyclability at end-of-
life for fuel cells and electrolyzers?
    8. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support the 
fuel cell and electrolyzer supply chain? Of those skills, which ones 
are lacking in current education/training programs? What resources 
(including time) and structures would be needed to train the fuel cell 
and electrolyzer technology workforce? What worker groups, secondary 
education facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners 
in these training activities? What new education programs should be 
included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
    9. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 9: Semiconductors

    1. What is the current state of U.S. and global supply chains for 
both conventional semiconductors used in data and sensor applications 
related to the energy sector and wide bandgap semiconductors used for 
controlling power flow in power electronics applications? What are the 
current and future semiconductor supply chain vulnerabilities as we 
scale up our efforts to transform the energy sector (energy supply, 
energy efficiency, demand technologies, grid, fuels, etc.) to support 
decarbonization? Of these vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial 
for the U.S. to address and focus on and why?
    2. For both conventional and wide bandgap semiconductors used in 
the energy sector, where in the supply chain does it make sense for the 
U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and the 
long-term, and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities 
for the U.S. to build domestic capabilities for semiconductors 
manufacturing? What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. not 
prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing 
capabilities, and why? For areas in the supply chain where U.S. 
opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited, 
which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. government 
prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships, 
and what actions should the government take to help ensure resilience 
in these areas of the supply chain?
    3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize 
opportunities to build domestic semiconductor manufacturing? What 
conditions are needed to help incentivize companies involved in the 
semiconductor supply chains to build domestic manufacturing 
capabilities and scale up manufacturing? How do these challenges and 
conditions differ between conventional and wide bandgap semiconductors?
    4. How can government help private sector and communities involved 
in semiconductor manufacturing build domestic manufacturing 
capabilities and scale up semiconductor manufacturing? What specific 
government policies or investments will be most important in supporting 
semiconductor manufacturing and supply chain resilience?

[[Page 67700]]

    5. What are opportunities for improving energy efficiency in 
semiconductors? How can the government help the private sector achieve 
competitive advantages in domestic manufacturing of more energy 
efficient semiconductors?
    6. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support 
semiconductor manufacturing? Of those skills, which ones are lacking in 
current education/training programs? What resources (including time) 
and structures would be needed to train the semiconductor technology 
workforce? What worker groups, secondary education facilities, and 
other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these training 
activities? What new education programs should be included (developed?) 
to prepare the workforce?
    7. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 10: Neodymium Magnets

    1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as 
we scale up our efforts to the transform the energy sector to support 
decarbonization (such as significant increases in demand for magnets in 
direct drive or hybrid wind turbines and traction motors for electric 
vehicles)? Of these vulnerabilities, which are the most crucial for the 
U.S. to address and focus on and why? Are there supply chain 
vulnerabilities associated with manufacturing equipment, and, if so, 
what are they?
    2. Where in the supply chain does it make sense for the U.S. to 
focus and prioritize its efforts both in the short-term and long-term 
and why? Where in the supply chain do you see opportunities for the 
U.S. to build domestic capabilities for manufacturing neodymium 
magnets--with an emphasis on the manufacturing of sintered neodymium-
iron-boron magnets used in electric vehicle traction motors and wind 
turbine drives? What areas of the supply chain should the U.S. not 
prioritize for attraction or expansion of domestic manufacturing 
capabilities, and why? For areas in supply chain where U.S. 
opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capabilities are limited, 
which foreign countries or regions should the U.S. government 
prioritize for engagement to strengthen/build reliable partnerships, 
and what actions should the government take to help ensure resilience 
in these areas of the supply chain?
    3. What challenges limit the U.S.'s ability to realize these 
opportunities to build domestic neodymium magnets manufacturing? What 
conditions are needed to help incentivize companies involved in the 
neodymium magnets supply chains to build and expand domestic 
manufacturing capabilities?
    4. What factors are necessary to promote resiliency in different 
stages of the magnet supply chain for neodymium magnets, and how can 
the U.S. government incentivize these factors?
    5. How can government help the private sector and communities 
involved in neodymium magnet manufacturing build and expand domestic 
manufacturing capabilities? What specific government policies or 
investments will be most important in supporting neodymium magnets 
manufacturing and supply chain resilience?
    6. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support 
magnet manufacturing? How long does it take to train this workforce? Of 
those skills, which ones are lacking in current education/training 
programs? What resources (including time) and structures would be 
needed to train the magnet technology workforce? What worker groups, 
secondary education facilities, and other stakeholders could be 
valuable partners in these training activities? What new education 
programs should be included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
    7. What happens to neodymium magnets when associated end products 
reach the end-of-life? What barriers, if any, exist in collection of 
magnets containing products for eventual recycling or recovery? How can 
the federal government most effectively support increasing circularity 
(collection, reuse or processing, and recycling) of neodymium magnets?
    8. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 11: Platinum Group Metals Catalysts

    1. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities of 
platinum group metals (PGM) catalysts as we scale up the adoption and 
use of industrial decarbonization technologies and energy storage 
technologies, including fuel cell, electrolyzer, and chemical 
manufacturing technologies?
    2. Where in the PGM catalysts supply chain does it make sense for 
the U.S. to focus and prioritize its efforts both in short-term and 
long-term and why?
    3. If the U.S. had domestic PGM separation capacity, to what extent 
would this improve the ability of domestic mines (or secondary 
producers) to be competitive? To what extent would this improve the 
ability of domestic catalyst producers to be more competitive?
    4. How can government help private sector and communities scale up 
the production of PGM catalysts needed for manufacturing in the U.S.? 
What specific government policies or investments will be most important 
in supporting PGM catalysts manufacturing for industrial 
decarbonization technologies, energy storage applications, and supply 
chain resilience?
    5. How do the compositions and manufacturing processes of PGM 
catalysts for fuel cells and electrolyzers differ from those of PGM 
catalysts used in catalytic converters? How difficult is it for 
catalyst manufacturing facilities to produce multiple types of 
catalysts?
    6. What is the recovery and reuse potential of PGM used in 
catalytic converter, fuel cell, electrolyzer, and chemical 
manufacturing technologies? What technological challenges exist to 
recover PGM from catalysts and incorporate PGM into different 
applications of catalysts? What are the areas of opportunities for the 
U.S. to onshore the supply chain of PGM manufacturing for catalytic 
applications, including catalytic converters, fuel cells, electrolyzer 
technologies, and chemical manufacturing?
    7. What happens to PGM catalysts when fuel cells and electrolyzers 
reach the end-of-life? Are there any known barriers to recycling 
materials from electrolyzers and fuel cells at the end-of-life? How 
does recycling of PGM from electrolyzers and fuel cells differ from 
recycling PGM from catalytic converters? How can the federal government 
most effectively support increasing circularity (collection, reuse or 
processing, and recycling) of PGM catalysts?
    8. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support PGM 
catalyst manufacturing? Of those skills, which ones are lacking in 
current education/training programs? What resources (including time) 
and structures would be needed to train the PGM catalyst workforce? 
What worker groups, secondary education facilities, and other 
stakeholders could be valuable partners in these training activities? 
What new education programs should be included (developed?) to prepare 
the workforce?
    9. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

[[Page 67701]]

Area 12: Carbon Capture, Conversion, Transport, and Storage Materials

    1. Which materials do you consider critical for carbon capture, 
conversion, transport, and storage technologies? Will this change as 
the U.S. scales up deployment over the next 30 years? Are there 
substitutes for these materials, and can they be ready for large scale 
deployment in 10, 20 years? What policies or government actions can 
help incentivize domestic production of these critical materials as 
well as production of substitutes?
    2. For carbon capture, what materials are needed for the commercial 
and emerging separation process and balance of plant? What is the 
current domestic and global capacity to manufacture these materials, 
and is growth reasonable to meet demand in the next 10 to 20 years?
    3. For carbon conversion, what materials are necessary for the 
transformation of CO2 into other products? Are catalysts and 
reactants readily available in the market? Are there known barriers to 
the availability or scaling up for the market to provide the materials 
if adopted at scales necessary to decarbonize?
    4. For transport, are there specific critical materials necessary 
for the coating and compressors for pipeline infrastructure systems? 
Are there supply chain issues related to obtaining these materials?
    5. For carbon storage, what are the specific critical materials 
necessary for non-reactive cements and well bore casings necessary to 
meet the existing underground injection control regulations? Are there 
barriers to increasing supply and manufacturing capacity for rapid 
deployment of carbon capture and storage?
    6. What are the current and future supply chain vulnerabilities as 
the U.S. scales up the adoption and use of the carbon capture and 
conversion technologies needed to transform the energy and 
manufacturing sectors to a low carbon future? Of these vulnerabilities, 
which are the most crucial for the U.S. to address and why?
    7. Which carbon capture, conversion, transport, and storage 
materials should the government focus and prioritize its efforts on 
both in the short-term and the long-term, and why?
    8. What specific skills are needed for the workforce to support 
production of carbon capture, conversion, transport, and storage 
materials or critical materials production in general? Of those skills, 
which ones are lacking in current education/training programs? What 
resources (including time) and structures would be needed to train the 
carbon capture and utilization technology workforce? What worker 
groups, secondary education facilities, and other stakeholders could be 
valuable partners in these training activities? What new education 
programs should be included (developed?) to prepare the workforce?
    9. What other input should the federal government be aware of to 
support a resilient supply chain of this technology?

Area 13: Cybersecurity and Digital Components

    For purposes of this supply chain review, digital components in the 
energy sector industrial base include firmware, software, virtual 
platforms and service, data, and industrial control systems. Please 
include any comments on this scoping in your response.
    1. How should the government approach hardening of digital 
component supply chains for the energy sector industrial base against 
physical and virtual tampering and national security threats? How 
should the federal government prioritize protection of digital 
component supply chains?
    2. Cyber threats to the critical infrastructure, including an 
explosion in Ransomware attacks, is a growing national security concern 
that can be enabled through digital component supply chain 
vulnerabilities, and there are several national initiatives underway to 
counter this threat. Are there energy sector-specific considerations or 
priorities the government should consider to support hardening of 
digital component supply chains against cyber threats including the use 
of ransomware?
    3. What steps should the government take to improve the 
trustworthiness of digital components in the energy sector industrial 
base and reduce reliance on untrusted software suppliers, integrators, 
and maintenance?
    4. Global digital component supply chains are highly dynamic and 
complex. What policies should the government pursue to illuminate 
provenance of digital components in energy sector systems? For example, 
who developed software, or hosts digital platforms, or curated data 
sets, and in what country? Who maintains these digital assets (if 
anyone) and who may have continuing access for maintenance? How should 
the government approach prioritizing digital components and/or systems 
to illuminate or examine components to manage supply chain risk?
    5. Providers of digital components may not have the same supply 
chain security requirements as asset owners in the energy sector. Given 
the interconnected nature and transitive risk among different digital 
components that comprise energy sector systems, how should the 
government address gaps and/or ensure consistency for supply chain 
security requirements for digital components?
    6. An increasing trend in the energy sector is remote operation of 
systems. What policy steps should the government take to ensure the 
supply chain security of platforms and services used to operate 
critical functions in the energy sector?
    7. Aggregated and curated data has become a valuable global 
commodity (e.g., data as a service) and is now a critical part of 
global digital supply chains. Data presents a cyber supply chain risk 
similar to that posed by software; specifically, malicious manipulation 
can cause significant and nearly impossible-to-detect system failures. 
With the increasing application of artificial intelligence/machine 
learning capabilities to energy sector systems, what policy steps could 
the government take to manage the cyber supply chain risk of data?
    8. How can the government encourage and/or incentivize private 
sector owners and operators of energy sector critical infrastructure to 
include more national security risk considerations in their business 
risk decisions?
    9. What specific skills are needed to develop and increase the 
workforce to support building, operating, and maintaining secure 
digital components for the energy sector industrial base? For example, 
is there a skills gap and/or supply gap in the workforce that develops 
and maintains software for industrial control systems? Of those skills, 
which ones are lacking in current education/training programs? What 
resources (including time) and structures would be needed to train the 
cybersecurity workforce? What worker groups, secondary education 
facilities, and other stakeholders could be valuable partners in these 
training activities? What new education programs should be included 
(developed?) to prepare the workforce?
    10. What other input the should the federal government be aware of 
to support a resilient supply chain of cybersecurity and digital 
components?

Area 14: Commercialization and Competitiveness

    1. What data, methodologies, and metrics can help assess current 
and future competitive advantages for clean energy technologies?
    2. What existing economic and market analysis do you rely on to 
assess current

[[Page 67702]]

and projected technology market demand?
    3. Where do you see opportunities for government actions to shift 
business-as-usual investment and market trends in a way that is 
supportive of resilient domestic supply chains?
    4. For what clean technologies and applications does the U.S. 
currently have a competitive advantage over other countries?
    5. For what clean technologies and applications is the U.S. 
significantly at a disadvantage over other countries? What moves are 
other governments making to increase their advantage over the U.S.?
    6. Where might additional federal investment or policy support U.S. 
leadership in particular clean technology categories or sectors in the 
next ten years? What specific investment or policy action will be 
needed to support these technologies?
    7. What frameworks can help assess the relative competitiveness and 
commercialization potential of various clean technologies?
    8. What do you see as important nascent markets and technologies 
that may see significant growth in the next 10-15 years? What specific 
policies can help support U.S. leadership in these technologies and 
sectors?
    9. Given the complexity of global supply chains, how do you assess 
the costs and benefits of various global supply chain patterns and 
dynamics, including concentrations of supply and demand?
    10. How do U.S. trade policies impact the commercialization and 
competitiveness of clean technologies in the U.S.? Where might changes 
to trade policy positively impact U.S. competitiveness in clean tech 
sectors?
    11. What new and innovative actions can the government take to 
encourage commercialization of U.S. innovation and increase U.S. 
competitiveness?
    12. What non-economic and non-financial factors are most 
significant in determining U.S. competitiveness in a given clean 
technology sector?

Response Preparation and Transmittal Instructions

    Submit all electronic public comments to this RFI to 
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icon, complete the required fields, and enter or attach your comments. 
If you are unable to submit online, you may submit by email to 
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Disclaimer and Important Note

    This RFI is not a Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA), prize, or 
any other type of solicitation; therefore, DOE is not accepting 
applications at this time. DOE may issue a FOA or other solicitation in 
the future based on or related to the content and responses to this 
RFI; however, DOE may also elect not to issue a FOA or solicitation. 
There is no guarantee that a FOA or solicitation will be issued as a 
result of this RFI. Responding to this RFI does not provide any 
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issue a FOA regarding the subject matter. Final details, including the 
anticipated award size, quantity, and timing of DOE funded awards, will 
be subject to Congressional appropriations and direction.
    Any information obtained as a result of this RFI is intended to be 
used by the Government on a non-attribution basis for planning and 
strategy development. This RFI does not constitute a formal 
solicitation for proposals or abstracts. Your response to this notice 
will be treated as information only. DOE will review and consider all 
responses in its formulation of program strategies for the identified 
materials of interest that are the subject of this request. DOE will 
not provide reimbursement for costs incurred in responding to this RFI.

[[Page 67703]]

Respondents are advised that DOE is under no obligation to acknowledge 
receipt of the information received or provide feedback to respondents 
with respect to any information submitted under this RFI. Responses to 
this RFI do not bind DOE to any further actions related to this topic.
    Confidential Business Information: Pursuant to 10 CFR 1004.11, any 
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    It is DOE's policy that all comments may be included in the public 
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Signing Authority

    This document of the Department of Energy was signed on November 
18, 2021, by Carla Frisch, Acting Executive Director and Principal 
Deputy Director, Office of Policy, pursuant to delegated authority from 
the Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature and 
date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in 
compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the 
undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to 
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as 
an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative 
process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon 
publication in the Federal Register.

    Signed in Washington, DC, on November 23, 2021.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2021-25898 Filed 11-26-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P