Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges, 66276-66284 [2021-25397]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
• Bureau of Industry and Security

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 222 (Monday, November 22, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66276-66284]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-25397]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security


Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. 
Way, Tehran, Iran;

[[Page 66277]]

Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard, P.O. Box 52404, 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahmoud Amini, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates; and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates; and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al 
Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation, 42 Avenue Montaigne 
75008, Paris, France;
Sirjanco Trading LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahan Air General Trading LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik 
Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates;
Mehdi Bahrami, Mahan Airways-Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil 
Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey;
Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a al-Naser Airlines, a/k/a Al Naser Wings 
Airline, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and Air Freight Ltd., Home 46, Al-
Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya 
Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq; and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, 
St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq; and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates; and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan;
Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay, 
Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al 
Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq; and Anak Street, Qatif, 
Saudi Arabia 61177;
Bahar Safwa General Trading, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-
5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and P.O. 
Box 8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Aviation, a/k/a Sky Blue 
Bird Ltd., a/k/a Sky Blue Bird FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah 
Trade Zone, United Arab Emirates;
Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam Muhammad Anwar Nur Shammout, a/
k/a Issam Anwar, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous Street, 
Damascus, Syria; and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515; and 17-18 
Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom; and 
Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A 
Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey

    Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration 
Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2021) (``EAR'' or ``the 
Regulations''), I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export 
Enforcement (``OEE'') to renew the temporary denial order issued in 
this matter on May 21, 2021. I find that renewal of this order, as 
modified, is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent 
violation of the Regulations.\1\
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    \1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774 
(2021), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act 
(50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015)) (``EAA''), which lapsed on 
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of 
August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by 
successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the President 
signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform 
Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While Section 1766 of 
ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections 
which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in 
pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms 
of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, 
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in 
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall 
continue in effect according to their terms until modified, 
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant 
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) 
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
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I. Procedural History

    On March 17, 2008, Darryl W. Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary 
of Commerce for Export Enforcement (``Assistant Secretary''), signed an 
order denying Mahan Airways' export privileges for a period of 180 days 
on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public 
interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order 
also named as denied persons Blue Airways, of Yerevan, Armenia (``Blue 
Airways of Armenia''), as well as the ``Balli Group Respondents,'' 
namely, Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid 
Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue 
Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky 
Six Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The order was issued ex parte 
pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations, and went into effect 
on March 21, 2008, the date it was published in the Federal Register.
    This temporary denial order (``TDO'') was renewed in accordance 
with Section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.\2\ Subsequent renewals also 
have issued pursuant to Section 766.24(d), including most recently on 
May 21, 2021.\3\ Some of the renewal orders and the modification orders 
that have issued between renewals have added certain parties as 
respondents or as related persons, or effected the removal of certain 
parties.\4\
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    \2\ Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a 
temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods, if it 
believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent 
an imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be made in writing no 
later than 20 days before the scheduled expiration date of a 
temporary denial order. Renewal requests may include discussion of 
any additional or changed circumstances, and may seek appropriate 
modifications to the order, including the addition of parties as 
respondents or related persons, or the removal of parties previously 
added as respondents or related persons. BIS is not required to seek 
renewal as to all parties, and a removal of a party can be effected 
if, without more, BIS does not seek renewal as to that party. Any 
party included or added to a temporary denial order as a respondent 
may oppose a renewal request as set forth in Section 766.24(d). 
Parties included or added as related persons can at any time appeal 
their inclusion as a related person, but cannot challenge the 
underlying temporary denial order, either as initially issued or 
subsequently renewed, and cannot oppose a renewal request. See also 
note 4, infra.
    \3\ The May 21, 2021 renewal order was effective upon issuance 
and published in the Federal Register on May 27, 2021 (86 FR 28540). 
Prior renewal orders issued on September 17, 2008, March 16, 2009, 
September 11, 2009, March 9, 2010, September 3, 2010, February 25, 
2011, August 24, 2011, February 15, 2012, August 9, 2012, February 
4, 2013, July 31, 2013, January 24, 2014, July 22, 2014, January 16, 
2015, July 13, 2015, January 7, 2016, July 7, 2016, December 30, 
2016, June 27, 2017, December 20, 2017, June 14, 2018, December 11, 
2018, June 5, 2019, May 29, 2020, November 24, 2020, and May 21, 
2021, respectively. The August 24, 2011 renewal followed the 
issuance of a modification order that issued on July 1, 2011 to add 
Zarand Aviation as a respondent. The July 13, 2015 renewal followed 
a modification order that issued May 21, 2015, and added Al Naser 
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as 
respondents. Each of the renewal orders and each of the modification 
orders referenced in this footnote or elsewhere in this order has 
been published in the Federal Register.
    \4\ Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 766.24(c) of the 
Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization 
related to a denied person by affiliation, ownership, control, or 
position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related 
services may be added as a ``related person'' to a temporary denial 
order to prevent evasion of the order.
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    The September 11, 2009 renewal order continued the denial order as 
to Mahan Airways, but not as to the Balli Group Respondents or Blue 
Airways of Armenia.\5\ As part of the February 25, 2011 renewal order, 
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard (a/k/a Kosarian Fard), Mahmoud Amini, and 
Gatewick LLC (a/k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo Services, a/k/a Gatewick 
Aviation Services) were added as related persons to prevent evasion of 
the TDO.\6\ A

[[Page 66278]]

modification order issued on July 1, 2011, adding Zarand Aviation as a 
respondent in order to prevent an imminent violation.\7\
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    \5\ Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation settled proposed BIS 
administrative charges as part of a settlement agreement that was 
approved by a settlement order issued on February 5, 2010. The 
sanctions imposed pursuant to that settlement and order included, 
inter alia, a $15 million civil penalty and a requirement to conduct 
five external audits and submit related audit reports. The Balli 
Group Respondents also settled related charges with the Department 
of Justice and the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control.
    \6\ See note 4, supra, concerning the addition of related 
persons to a temporary denial order. Kosarian Fard and Mahmoud Amini 
remain parties to the TDO. On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick 
resolved administrative charges against Gatewick, including a charge 
for acting contrary to the terms of a BIS denial order (15 CFR 
764.2(k)). In addition to the payment of a civil penalty, the 
settlement includes a seven-year denial order. The first two years 
of the denial period were active, with the remaining five years 
suspended conditioned upon Gatewick's full and timely payment of the 
civil penalty and its compliance with the Regulations during the 
seven-year denial order period. This denial order, in effect, 
superseded the TDO as to Gatewick, which was not included as part of 
the January 16, 2015 renewal order. The Gatewick LLC Final Order was 
published in the Federal Register on August 20, 2014. See 79 FR 
49283 (Aug. 20, 2014).
    \7\ Zarand Aviation's export privileges remained denied until 
July 22, 2014, when it was not included as part of the renewal order 
issued on that date.
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    As part of the August 24, 2011 renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco 
Trading LLC, and Ali Eslamian were added as related persons. Mahan Air 
General Trading LLC, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. were added 
as related persons by a modification order issued on April 9, 2012. 
Mehdi Bahrami was added as a related person as part of the February 4, 
2013 renewal order.
    On May 21, 2015, a modification order issued adding Al Naser 
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as 
respondents. As detailed in that order and discussed further infra, 
these respondents were added to the TDO based upon evidence that they 
were acting together to, inter alia, obtain aircraft subject to the 
Regulations for export or reexport to Mahan in violation of the 
Regulations and the TDO.
    Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief executive officer, Issam 
Shammout, were added as related persons as part of the July 13, 2015 
renewal order.\8\ On November 16, 2017, a modification order issued to 
remove Ali Eslamian, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. as related 
persons following a request by OEE for their removal.\9\
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    \8\ The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (``OFAC'') designated Sky Blue Bird and Issam 
Shammout as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (``SDGTs'') on 
May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for ``providing 
support to Iran's Mahan Air.'' See 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).
    \9\ The November 16, 2017 modification was published in the 
Federal Register on December 4, 2017. See 82 FR 57203 (Dec. 4, 
2017). On September 28, 2017, BIS and Ali Eslamian resolved an 
administrative charge for acting contrary to the terms of the denial 
order (15 CFR 764.2(k)) that was based upon Eslamian's violation of 
the TDO after his addition to the TDO on August 24, 2011. Equipco 
(UK) Ltd. and Skyco (UK) Ltd., two companies owned and operated by 
Eslamian, also were parties to the settlement agreement and were 
added to the settlement order as related persons. In addition to 
other sanctions, the settlement provides that Eslamian, Equipco, and 
Skyco shall be subject to a conditionally-suspended denial order for 
a period of four years from the date of the settlement order.
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    The December 11, 2018 renewal order continued the denial of the 
export privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, 
Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General 
Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, 
Bahar Safwa General Trading, Sky Blue Bird Group, and Issam Shammout.
    On October 26, 2021, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request 
for renewal of the TDO that issued on May 21, 2021. The written request 
was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration. 
Notice of the renewal request was provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser 
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading in 
accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No 
opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received. Furthermore, no 
appeal of the related person determinations made as part of the 
September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, April 9, 2012, 
February 4, 2013, and July 13, 2015 renewal or modification orders has 
been made by Kosarian Fard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco 
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue 
Bird Group, or Issam Shammout.\10\
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    \10\ A party named or added as a related person may not oppose 
the issuance or renewal of the underlying temporary denial order, 
but may file an appeal of the related person determination in 
accordance with Section 766.23(c). See also note 2, supra.
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II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

    Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue or renew an order 
temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing 
that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an 
``imminent violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 
766.24(d). ``A violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of 
likelihood.'' 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a 
violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the 
matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative 
charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the 
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under 
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent [.]'' Id. A 
``lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may 
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long 
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a 
violation.'' Id.

B. The TDO and BIS's Requests for Renewal

    OEE's request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the 
issuance of the initial TDO, and the renewal and modification orders 
subsequently issued in this matter, including the May 21, 2015 
modification order and the renewal order issued on May 21, 2021, and 
the evidence developed over the course of this investigation, which 
indicate a blatant disregard of U.S. export controls and the TDO. The 
initial TDO was issued as a result of evidence that showed that Mahan 
Airways and other parties engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by 
knowingly re-exporting to Iran three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically 
Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 1-3''), items subject to the EAR and classified 
under Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 9A991.b, without 
the required U.S. Government authorization. Further evidence submitted 
by BIS indicated that Mahan Airways was involved in the attempted re-
export of three additional U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 4-6'') 
to Iran.
    As discussed in the September 17, 2008 renewal order, evidence 
presented by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1-3 continued to be flown on 
Mahan Airways' routes after issuance of the TDO, in violation of the 
Regulations and the TDO itself.\11\ It also showed that Aircraft 1-3 
had been flown in further violation of the Regulations and the TDO on 
the routes of Iran Air, an Iranian Government airline. Moreover, as 
discussed in the March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009, and March 9, 2010 
renewal orders, Mahan Airways registered Aircraft 1-3 in Iran, obtained 
Iranian tail numbers for them (EP-MNA, EP-MNB, and EP-MNE, 
respectively), and continued to operate at least two of them in 
violation of the Regulations and the TDO,\12\ while also committing an 
additional knowing and willful violation when it negotiated for and 
acquired an additional U.S.-origin aircraft. The additional acquired 
aircraft was an MD-82 aircraft, which subsequently was painted in Mahan 
Airways' livery and flown on multiple Mahan Airways' routes under tail 
number TC-TUA.
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    \11\ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates 
the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).
    \12\ The third Boeing 747 appeared to have undergone significant 
service maintenance and may not have been operational at the time of 
the March 9, 2010 renewal order.
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    The March 9, 2010 renewal order also noted that a court in the 
United Kingdom (``U.K.'') had found Mahan

[[Page 66279]]

Airways in contempt of court on February 1, 2010, for failing to comply 
with that court's December 21, 2009 and January 12, 2010 orders 
compelling Mahan Airways to remove the Boeing 747s from Iran and ground 
them in the Netherlands. Mahan Airways and the Balli Group Respondents 
had been litigating before the U.K. court concerning ownership and 
control of Aircraft 1-3. In a letter to the U.K. court dated January 
12, 2010, Mahan Airways' Chairman indicated, inter alia, that Mahan 
Airways opposes U.S. Government actions against Iran, that it continued 
to operate the aircraft on its routes in and out of Tehran (and had 
158,000 ``forward bookings'' for these aircraft), and that it wished to 
continue to do so and would pay damages if required by that court, 
rather than ground the aircraft.
    The September 3, 2010 renewal order discussed the fact that Mahan 
Airways' violations of the TDO extended beyond operating U.S.-origin 
aircraft and attempting to acquire additional U.S.-origin aircraft. In 
February 2009, while subject to the TDO, Mahan Airways participated in 
the export of computer motherboards, items subject to the Regulations 
and designated as EAR99, from the United States to Iran, via the United 
Arab Emirates (``UAE''), in violation of both the TDO and the 
Regulations, by transporting and/or forwarding the computer 
motherboards from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airways' violations were 
facilitated by Gatewick LLC, which not only participated in the 
transaction, but also has stated to BIS that it acted as Mahan Airways' 
sole booking agent for cargo and freight forwarding services in the 
UAE.
    Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing in the U.K. court, Mahan 
Airways asserted that Aircraft 1-3 were not being used, but stated in 
pertinent part that the aircraft were being maintained in Iran ``in an 
airworthy condition'' and that, depending on the outcome of its U.K. 
court appeal, the aircraft ``could immediately go back into service . . 
. on international routes into and out of Iran.'' Mahan Airways' 
January 24, 2011 submission to U.K. Court of Appeal, at p. 25, ]] 108, 
110. This clearly stated intent, both on its own and in conjunction 
with Mahan Airways' prior misconduct and statements, demonstrated the 
need to renew the TDO in order to prevent imminent future violations. 
Two of these three 747s subsequently were removed from Iran and are no 
longer in Mahan Airways' possession. The third of these 747s remained 
in Iran under Mahan's control. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224, this 
747 was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (``SDGT'') 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (``OFAC'') on September 19, 2012.\13\ Furthermore, as discussed 
in the February 4, 2013 Order, open source information indicated that 
this 747, painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways, had been 
flown between Iran and Syria, and was suspected of ferrying weapons 
and/or other equipment to the Syrian Government from Iran's Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
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    \13\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx.
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    In addition, as first detailed in the July 1, 2011 and August 24, 
2011 orders, and discussed in subsequent renewal orders in this matter, 
Mahan Airways also continued to evade U.S. export control laws by 
operating two Airbus A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airways' livery and 
logo, on flights into and out of Iran.\14\ At the time of the July 1, 
2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, these Airbus A310s were registered in 
France, with tail numbers F-OJHH and F-OJHI, respectively.\15\ The 
August 2012 renewal order also found that Mahan Airways had acquired 
another Airbus A310 aircraft subject to the Regulations, with MSN 499 
and Iranian tail number EP-VIP, in violation of the Regulations.\16\ On 
September 19, 2012, all three Airbus A310 aircraft (tail numbers F-
OJHH, F-OJHI, and EP-VIP) were designated as SDGTs.\17\
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    \14\ The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin engines. The 
engines are subject to the Regulations and classified under Export 
Control Classification (``ECCN'') 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain 
controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the 
total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the 
Regulations. They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or 
reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government 
authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the 
Regulations.
    \15\ OEE subsequently presented evidence that after the August 
24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways worked along with Kerman Aviation 
and others to de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France and 
to register both aircraft in Iran (with, respectively, Iranian tail 
numbers EP-MHH and EP-MHI). It was determined subsequent to the 
February 15, 2012 renewal order that the registration switch for 
these A310s was cancelled and that Mahan Airways then continued to 
fly the aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F-OJHH and 
F-OJHI, respectively). Both aircraft apparently remain in Mahan 
Airways' possession.
    \16\ See note 14, supra.
    \17\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously 
designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18, 2011. 77 FR 64427 
(October 18, 2011).
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    The February 4, 2013 renewal order laid out further evidence of 
continued and additional efforts by Mahan Airways and other persons 
acting in concert with Mahan, including Kral Aviation and another 
Turkish company, to procure U.S.-origin engines--two GE CF6-50C2 
engines, with MSNs 517621 and 517738, respectively--and other aircraft 
parts in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.\18\ The February 4, 
2013 order also added Mehdi Bahrami as a related person in accordance 
with Section 766.23 of the Regulations. Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-President 
and the head of Mahan's Istanbul Office, also was involved in Mahan's 
acquisition of the original three Boeing 747s (Aircraft 1-3) that 
resulted in the original TDO, and has had a business relationship with 
Mahan dating back to 1997.
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    \18\ Kral Aviation was referenced in the February 4, 2013 
renewal order as ``Turkish Company No. 1.'' Kral Aviation purchased 
a GE CF6-50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in 
July 2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able to prevent this 
engine from reaching Mahan by issuing a redelivery order to the 
freight forwarder in accordance with Section 758.8 of the 
Regulations. OEE also issued Kral Aviation a redelivery order for 
the second CF6-50C2 engine (MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner 
of the second engine subsequently cancelled the item's sale to Kral 
Aviation. In September 2012, OEE was alerted by a U.S. exporter that 
another Turkish company (``Turkish Company No. 2'') was attempting 
to purchase aircraft spare parts intended for re-export by Turkish 
Company No. 2 to Mahan Airways. See February 4, 2013 renewal order.
    On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added to BIS's Entity 
List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. See 78 FR 
75458 (Dec. 12, 2013). Companies and individuals are added to the 
Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the national 
security or foreign policy interests of the United States. See 15 
CFR 744.11.
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    The July 31, 2013 renewal order detailed additional evidence 
obtained by OEE showing efforts by Mahan Airways to obtain another GE 
CF6-50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the United States via 
Turkey. Multiple Mahan employees, including Mehdi Bahrami, were 
involved in or aware of matters related to the engine's arrival in 
Turkey from the United States, plans to visually inspect the engine, 
and prepare it for shipment from Turkey.
    Mahan Airways sought to obtain this U.S.-origin engine through 
Pioneer Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yonetim Danismanlik (``Pioneer 
Logistics''), an aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey, and its 
director/operator, Gulnihal Yegane, a Turkish national who previously 
had conducted Mahan related business with Mehdi Bahrami and Ali 
Eslamian. Moreover, as referenced in the July 31, 2013 renewal order, a 
sworn affidavit by Kosol Surinanda, also known as Kosol Surinandha, 
Managing Director of Mahan's General Sales Agent in Thailand, stated 
that the shares of Pioneer Logistics for which he was the listed owner 
were ``actually the property of and owned by Mahan.'' He further

[[Page 66280]]

stated that he held ``legal title to the shares until otherwise 
required by Mahan'' but would ``exercise the rights granted to [him] 
exactly and only as instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/or decisions 
[would] only and exclusively reflect the wills and demands of 
Mahan[.]'' \19\
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    \19\ Pioneer Logistics, Gulnihal Yegane, and Kosol Surinanda 
also were added to the Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 
75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
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    The January 24, 2014 renewal order outlined OEE's continued 
investigation of Mahan Airways' activities and detailed an attempt by 
Mahan, which OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an Indonesian aircraft parts 
supplier, two U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF-502R-5 aircraft engines (MSNs 
LF5660 and LF5325), items subject to the Regulations, from a U.S. 
company located in Texas. An invoice of the Indonesian aircraft parts 
supplier dated March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways as the purchaser of 
the engines and included a Mahan ship-to address. OEE also obtained a 
Mahan air waybill dated March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.-origin 
aircraft parts subject to the Regulations--including, among other 
items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a transmitter, and a power 
control unit--being transported by Mahan from Turkey to Iran in 
violation of the TDO.
    The July 22, 2014 renewal order discussed open source evidence from 
the March-June 2014 time period regarding two BAE regional jets, items 
subject to the Regulations, that were painted in the livery and logo of 
Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP-MOI and EP-
MOK, respectively.\20\ In addition, aviation industry resources 
indicated that these aircraft were obtained by Mahan Airways in late 
November 2013 and June 2014, from Ukrainian Mediterranean Airline, a 
Ukrainian airline that was added to BIS's Entity List (Supplement No. 4 
to Part 744 of the Regulations) on August 15, 2011, for acting contrary 
to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United 
States.\21\ Open source information indicated that at least EP-MOI 
remained active in Mahan's fleet, and that the aircraft was being 
operated on multiple flights in July 2014.
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    \20\ The BAE regional jets are powered with U.S.-origin engines. 
The engines are subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 
9A991.d. These aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued 
at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a 
result are subject to the EAR. They are classified under ECCN 
9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires 
U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 
of the Regulations.
    \21\ See 76 FR 50407 (Aug. 15, 2011). The July 22, 2014 renewal 
order also referenced two Airbus A320 aircraft painted in the livery 
and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers 
EP-MMK and EP-MML, respectively. OEE's investigation also showed 
that Mahan obtained these aircraft in November 2013, from Khors Air 
Company, another Ukrainian airline that, like Ukrainian 
Mediterranean Airlines, was added to BIS's Entity List on August 15, 
2011. Open source evidence indicates the two Airbus A320 aircraft 
may have been transferred by Mahan Airways to another Iranian 
airline in October 2014, and issued Iranian tail numbers EP-APE and 
EP-APF, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The January 16, 2015 renewal order detailed evidence of additional 
attempts by Mahan Airways to acquire items subject the Regulations in 
further violation of the TDO. Specifically, in March 2014, OEE became 
aware of an inertial reference unit bearing serial number 1231 (``the 
IRU'') that had been sent to the United States for repair. The IRU is a 
U.S.-origin item, subject to the Regulations, classified under ECCN 
7A103, and controlled for missile technology reasons. Upon closer 
inspection, it was determined that IRU came from or had been installed 
on an Airbus A340 aircraft bearing MSN 056. Further investigation 
revealed that as of approximately February 2014, this aircraft was 
registered under Iranian tail number EP-MMB and had been painted in the 
livery and logo of Mahan Airways.
    The January 16, 2015 renewal order also described related efforts 
by the Departments of Justice and Treasury to further thwart Mahan's 
illicit procurement efforts. Specifically, on August 14, 2014, the 
United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland filed a 
civil forfeiture complaint for the IRU pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(b) 
that resulted in the court issuing an Order of Forfeiture on December 
2, 2014. EP-MMB remains listed as active in Mahan Airways' fleet and 
has been used on flights into and out of Iran as recently as December 
19, 2017.
    Additionally, on August 29, 2014, OFAC blocked the property and 
interests in property of Asian Aviation Logistics of Thailand, a Mahan 
Airways affiliate or front company, pursuant to Executive Order 13224. 
In doing so, OFAC described Mahan Airways' use of Asian Aviation 
Logistics to evade sanctions by making payments on behalf of Mahan for 
the purchase of engines and other equipment.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140829.aspx. See 79 FR 55073 (Sep. 15, 2014). 
OFAC also blocked the property and property interests of Pioneer 
Logistics of Turkey on August 29, 2014. Id. Mahan Airways' use of 
Pioneer Logistics in an effort to evade the TDO and the Regulations 
was discussed in a prior renewal order, as summarized, supra, at 14. 
BIS added both Asian Aviation Logistics and Pioneer Logistics to the 
Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The May 21, 2015 modification order detailed the acquisition of two 
aircraft, specifically an Airbus A340 bearing MSN 164 and an Airbus 
A321 bearing MSN 550, that were purchased by Al Naser Airlines in late 
2014/early 2015 and were under the possession, control, and/or 
ownership of Mahan Airways.\23\ The sales agreements for these two 
aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah Alhay for Al Naser Airlines.\24\ 
Payment information reveals that multiple electronic funds transfers 
(``EFT'') were made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General 
Trading in order to acquire MSNs 164 and 550.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Both of these aircraft are powered by U.S.-origin engines 
that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 
9A991.d. Both aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued 
at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a 
result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The 
aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export 
of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization 
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
    \24\ The evidence obtained by OEE showed Ali Abdullah Alhay as a 
25% owner of Al Naser Airlines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The May 21, 2015 modification order also laid out evidence showing 
the respondents' attempts to obtain other controlled aircraft, 
including aircraft physically located in the United States in 
similarly-patterned transactions during the same recent time period. 
Transactional documents involving two Airbus A320s bearing MSNs 82 and 
99, respectively, again showed Ali Abdullah Alhay signing sales 
agreements for Al Naser Airlines.\25\ A review of the payment 
information for these aircraft similarly revealed EFTs from Ali 
Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General Trading that follow the pattern 
described for MSNs 164 and 550, supra. MSNs 82 and 99 were detained by 
OEE Special Agents prior to their planned export from the United 
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Both aircraft were physically located in the United States 
and therefore are subject to the Regulations pursuant to Section 
734.3(a)(1). Moreover, these Airbus A320s are powered by U.S.-origin 
engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under 
Export Control Classification Number ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A320s 
contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent 
of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to 
the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified 
under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to 
Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 
742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The July 13, 2015 renewal order outlined evidence showing that Al 
Naser Airlines' attempts to acquire aircraft on behalf of Mahan Airways 
extended beyond MSNs 164 and 550 to

[[Page 66281]]

include a total of nine aircraft.\26\ Four of the aircraft, all of 
which are subject to the Regulations and were obtained by Mahan from Al 
Naser Airlines, had been issued the following Iranian tail numbers: EP-
MMD (MSN 164), EP-MMG (MSN 383), EP-MMH (MSN 391) and EP-MMR (MSN 416), 
respectively.\27\ Publicly available flight tracking information 
provided evidence that at the time of the July 13, 2015 renewal, both 
EP-MMH and EP-MMR were being actively flown on routes into and out of 
Iran in violation of the Regulations.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ This evidence included a press release dated May 9, 2015, 
that appeared on Mahan Airways' website and stated that Mahan 
``added 9 modern aircraft to its air fleet [,]'' and that the newly 
acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and one Airbus A321. 
See https://www.mahan.aero/en/mahan-air/press-room/44. The press 
release was subsequently removed from Mahan Airways' website. 
Publicly available aviation databases similarly showed that Mahan 
had obtained nine additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May 
2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also discussed in the July 13, 
2015 renewal order, Sky Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shammout, was 
actively involved in Al Naser Airlines' acquisition of MSNs 164 and 
550, and the attempted acquisition of MSNs 82 and 99 (which were 
detained by OEE).
    \27\ The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin engines that 
are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. 
The Airbus A340s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more 
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result 
are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft 
are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these 
aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to 
Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
    \28\ There is some publicly available information indicating 
that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying under Iranian tail number 
EP-MMR is now MSN 615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus 
A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Airlines in 
violation of the Regulations. Moreover, both aircraft were 
designated as SDGTs by OFAC on May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive 
Order 13224. See 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The January 7, 2016 renewal order discussed evidence that Mahan 
Airways had begun actively flying EP-MMD on international routes into 
and out of Iran. Additionally, the January 7, 2016 order described 
publicly available aviation database and flight tracking information 
indicating that Mahan Airways continued efforts to acquire Iranian tail 
numbers and press into active service under Mahan's livery and logo at 
least two more of the Airbus A340 aircraft it had obtained from or 
through Al Naser Airlines: EP-MME (MSN 371) and EP-MMF (MSN 376), 
respectively.
    The July 7, 2016 renewal order described Mahan Airways' acquisition 
of a BAE Avro RJ-85 aircraft (MSN 2392) in violation of the Regulations 
and its subsequent registration under Iranian tail number EP-MOR.\29\ 
This information was corroborated by publicly available information on 
the website of Iran's civil aviation authority. The July 7, 2016 order 
also outlined Mahan's continued operation of EP-MMF in violation of the 
Regulations on routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and Shanghai, 
China, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The BAE Avro RJ-85 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that 
are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. 
The BAE Avro RJ-85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at 
more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a 
result is subject to the EAR regardless of its location. The 
aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or re-
export to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to 
Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The December 30, 2016 renewal order outlined Mahan's continued 
operation of multiple Airbus aircraft, including EP-MMD (MSN 164), EP-
MMF (MSN 376), and EP-MMH (MSN 391), which were acquired from or 
through Al Naser Airlines, as previously detailed in pertinent part in 
the July 13, 2015 and January 7, 2016 renewal orders. Publicly 
available flight tracking information showed that the aircraft were 
operated on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Beijing, 
China, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Istanbul, Turkey.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Specifically, on December 22, 2016, EP-MMD (MSN 164) flew 
from Dubai, UAE to Tehran, Iran. Between December 20 and December 
22, 2016, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran to 
Beijing, China and Istanbul, Turkey, respectively. Between December 
26 and December 28, 2016, EP-MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes from 
Tehran, Iran to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The June 27, 2017 renewal order included similar evidence regarding 
Mahan Airways' operation of multiple Airbus aircraft subject to the 
Regulations, including, but not limited to, aircraft procured from or 
through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of Iran, including 
from/to Moscow, Russia, Shanghai, China and Kabul, Afghanistan. The 
June 27, 2017 order also detailed evidence concerning a suspected 
planned or attempted diversion to Mahan of an Airbus A340 subject to 
the Regulations that had first been mentioned in OEE's December 13, 
2016 renewal request.
    The December 20, 2017 renewal order presented evidence that a Mahan 
employee attempted to initiate negotiations with a U.S. company for the 
purchase of an aircraft subject to the Regulations and classified under 
ECCN 9A610. Moreover, the order highlighted Al Naser Airlines' 
acquisition, via lease, of at least possession and/or control of a 
Boeing 737 (MSN 25361), bearing tail number YR-SEB, and an Airbus A320 
(MSN 357), bearing tail number YR-SEA, from a Romanian company in 
violation of the TDO and the Regulations.\31\ Open source information 
indicates that after the December 20, 2017 renewal order publicly 
exposed Al Naser's acquisition of these two aircraft (MSNs 25361 and 
357), the leases were subsequently cancelled and the aircraft returned 
to their owner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The Airbus A320 is powered with U.S.-origin engines, which 
are subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control 
Classification (``ECCN'') 9A991.d. The engines are valued at more 
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft, which 
consequently is subject to the EAR. The aircraft is classified under 
ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or reexport to Iran would require U.S. 
Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the 
Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The December 20, 2017 renewal order also included evidence 
indicating that Mahan Airways was continuing to operate a number of 
aircraft subject to the Regulations, including aircraft originally 
procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of 
Iran, including from/to Lahore, Pakistan, Shanghai, China, Ankara, 
Turkey, Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq.
    The June 14, 2018 renewal order outlined evidence that Mahan began 
actively operating EP-MMT, an Airbus A340 aircraft (MSN 292) acquired 
in 2017 and previously registered in Kazakhstan under tail number UP-
A4003, on international flights into and out of Iran.\32\ It also 
discussed evidence that Mahan continued to operate a number of aircraft 
subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to, EP-MME, EP-
MMF, and EP-MMH, on international flights into and out of Iran, 
including from/to Beijing, China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ The Airbus A340 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are 
subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The 
Airbus A340 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more 
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result 
is subject to the Regulations regardless of its location. The 
aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export 
of this aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization 
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. On June 4, 
2018, EP-MMT (MSN 292) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The June 14, 2018 renewal order also noted OFAC's May 24, 2018 
designation of Otik Aviation, a/k/a Otik Havacilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret 
Limited Sirketi, of Turkey, as an SDGT pursuant to Executive Order 
13224, for providing material support to Mahan, as well as OFAC's 
designation as SDGTs of an additional twelve aircraft in which Mahan 
has an interest.\33\ The June 14,

[[Page 66282]]

2018 order also cited the April 2018 arrest and arraignment of a U.S. 
citizen on a three-count criminal information filed in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey involving the 
unlicensed exports of U.S.-origin aircraft parts valued at over $2 
million to Iran, including to Mahan Airways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See 83 FR 27828 (June 14, 2018). OFAC's related press 
release stated in part that ``[o]ver the last several years, Otik 
Aviation has procured and delivered millions of dollars in aviation-
related spare and replacement parts for Mahan Air, some of which are 
procured from the United States and the European Union. As recently 
as 2017, Otik Aviation continued to provide Mahan Air with 
replacement parts worth well over $100,000 per shipment, such as 
aircraft brakes.'' The twelve additional Mahan-related aircraft that 
were designated are: EP-MMA (MSN 20), EP-MMB (MSN 56), EP-MMC (MSN 
282), EP-MMJ (MSN 526), EP-MMV (MSN 2079), EP-MNF (MSN 547), EP-MOD 
(MSN 3162), EP-MOM (MSN 3165), EP-MOP (MSN 2257), EP-MOQ (MSN 2261), 
EP-MOR (MSN 2392), and EP-MOS (MSN 2347). See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0395. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180524.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The December 11, 2018 renewal order detailed publicly available 
information showing that Mahan Airways had continued operating a number 
of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP-MMB, 
EP-MME, EP-MMF, and EP-MMQ, on international flights into and out of 
Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, Guangzhou, China, Bangkok, Thailand, and 
Dubai, UAE.\34\ It also discussed that OEE's continued investigation of 
Mahan Airways and its affiliates and agents had resulted in an October 
2018 guilty plea by Arzu Sagsoz, a Turkish national, in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, stemming from her 
involvement in a conspiracy to export a U.S.-origin aircraft engine, 
valued at approximately $810,000, to Mahan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Flight tracking information showed that on December 10, 
2018, EP-MMB (MSN 56) flew from Istanbul, Turkey to Tehran, Iran, 
and EP-MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran. 
Additionally, on December 6, 2018, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew from 
Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran, and on December 9, 2018, EP-MMQ 
(MSN 449) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and 
Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The December 11, 2018 order also noted OFAC's September 14, 2018 
designation of Mahan-related entities as SDGTs pursuant to Executive 
Order 13224, namely, My Aviation Company Limited, of Thailand, and 
Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD, a/k/a Mahan Travel a/k/a Mihan Travel 
& Tourism SDN BHD, of Malaysia.\35\ As general sales agents for Mahan 
Airways, these companies sold cargo space aboard Mahan Airways' 
flights, including on flights to Iran, and provided other services to 
or for the benefit of Mahan Airways and its operations.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See 83 FR 34301 (July 19, 2018) (designation of Mahan 
Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on July 9, 2018), and 83 FR 53359 (Oct. 
22, 2018) (designation of My Aviation Company Limited and updating 
of entry for Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on September 14, 
2018).
    \36\ OFAC's press release concerning its designation of My 
Aviation Company Limited on September 14, 2018, states in part that 
``[t]his Thailand-based company has disregarded numerous U.S. 
warnings, issued publicly and delivered bilaterally to the Thai 
government, to sever ties with Mahan Air.'' My Aviation provides 
cargo services to Mahan Airways, including freight booking, and 
works with local freight forwarding entities to ship cargo on 
regularly-scheduled Mahan Airways' flights to Tehran, Iran. My 
Aviation has also provided Mahan Airways with passenger booking 
services. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm484.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The June 5, 2019 renewal order highlighted Mahan's continued 
violation of the TDO and the Regulations. An end-use check conducted by 
BIS in Malaysia in March 2019 uncovered evidence that, on approximately 
ten occasions, Mahan had caused, aided and/or abetted the unlicensed 
export of U.S.-origin items subject to the Regulations from the United 
States to Iran via Malaysia. The items included helicopter shafts, 
transmitters, and other aircraft parts, some of which are listed on the 
Commerce Control List and controlled on anti-terrorism grounds. The 
June 5, 2019 order also detailed publicly available flight tracking 
information showing that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number 
of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran, 
including on routes to and from Damascus, Syria. \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Specifically, on May 26, 2019, EP-MMJ (MSN 526) flew from 
Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran. In addition, on May 24, 2019, EP-
MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, and 
on May 23, 2019, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The June 5, 2019 order also described actions taken by both BIS and 
OFAC to thwart efforts by entities connected to or acting on behalf of 
Mahan Airways to violate U.S. export controls and sanctions related to 
Iran. On May 14, 2019, BIS added Manohar Nair, Basha Asmath Shaikh, and 
two co-located companies that they operate, Emirates Hermes General 
Trading and Presto Freight International, LLC, to the Entity List 
pursuant to Section 744.11 of the Regulations, including for engaging 
in activities to procure U.S.-origin items on Mahan's behalf.\38\ On 
January 24, 2019, OFAC designated as SDGTs Flight Travel LLC, which is 
Mahan's general service agent in Yerevan, Armenia, and Qeshm Fars Air, 
an Iranian airline which operates two U.S.-origin Boeing 747s \39\ and 
is owned or controlled by Mahan, and also linked to the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See 84 FR 21233 (May 14, 2019).
    \39\ These 747s are registered in Iran with tail numbers EP-FAA 
and EP-FAB, respectively.
    \40\ OFAC's press release concerning these designations states 
that Qeshm Fars Air was being designated for ``being owned or 
controlled by Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring, or 
providing financial, material or technological support for, or 
financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF,'' and 
that Flight Travel LLC was being designated for ``acting for or on 
behalf of Mahan Air.'' It further states, inter alia, that ``Mahan 
Air employees fill Qeshm Fars Air management positions, and Mahan 
Air provides technical and operational support for Qeshm Fars Air, 
facilitating the airline's illicit operations.'' See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm590. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190124.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The December 2, 2019 renewal order noted that OEE's on-going 
investigation revealed that U.S.-origin passenger flight and database 
management software subject to the Regulations was provided to a 
company in Turkey and subsequently used to facilitate and service 
Mahan's operations into and out of Turkey in further violation of the 
Regulations.
    Additionally, open source information, including flight tracking 
data and news articles published in October 2019, showed that Mahan 
Airways was now operating a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 on routes between 
Iranian airports in Tehran, Kish Island, and Mashhad. This aircraft, 
bearing Iranian tail number EP-MNB, appears to be one of the three 
aircraft that Mahan illegally acquired via Blue Airways of Armenia and 
U.K.-based Balli Group that resulted in the issuance of the original 
TDO.\41\ See supra at 10-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ The same open sources indicated this aircraft continued to 
operate on flights within Iran to include a May 11, 2020 flight from 
Tehran, Iran to Kerman, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Evidence was also described in the December 2, 2019 renewal order 
showing that on or about November 11, 2019, Mahan caused, aided and/or 
abetted the unlicensed export of a U.S.-origin atomic absorption 
spectrometer, an item subject to the Regulations, from the United 
States to Iran via the UAE. Finally, publicly available flight tracking 
information showed that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number 
of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran, 
including on routes to and from Guangzhou, China, Istanbul, Turkey, and 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that 
on November 23, 2019, EP-MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to 
Tehran, Iran, and on November 21, 2019, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew on 
routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on 
November 20, 2019, EP-MMQ (MSN 449) flew from Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, to Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The May 29, 2020 renewal order cited Mahan's operation of EP-MMD, 
EP-MMF, and EP-MMI, aircraft originally acquired from Al Naser 
Airlines, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to 
Bangkok, Thailand, Dubai, UAE, and Shanghai, China in violation of the

[[Page 66283]]

TDO and EAR.\43\ The May 29, 2020 renewal order also detailed the 
indictment of Ali Abdullah Alhay and Issam Shammout, parties added to 
the TDO in May and July 2015, respectively, in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia. Alhay and Shammout were 
charged with, among other violations, conspiring to export aircraft and 
parts to Mahan in violation of export control laws and the embargo on 
Iran beginning around August 2012 through May 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that 
on May 8, 2020, EP-MMD (MSN 164) flew on routes between Bangkok, 
Thailand and Tehran, Iran, and on May 10, 2020, EP-MMF (MSN 376) 
flew on routes between Dubai, UAE and Tehran. In addition, on May 9, 
2020, EP-MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Shanghai, China and 
Tehran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to detailing the operation of multiple aircraft in 
violation of the Regulations,\44\ the November 24, 2020 renewal order 
discussed a related TDO issued on August 19, 2020, denying for 180 days 
the export privileges of Indonesia-based PT MS Aero Support (``PTMS 
Aero''), PT Antasena Kreasi (``PTAK''), PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama 
(``PTKEU''), Sunarko Kuntjoro, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, and Satrio 
Wiharjo Sasmito based on their involvement in the unlicensed export of 
aircraft parts to Mahan Airways--often in coordination with Mustafa 
Ovieci, a Mahan executive.\45\ These parties also facilitated the 
shipment of damaged Mahan parts to the United States for repair and 
subsequent export back to Iran in further violation of U.S. laws. In 
both instances, the fact that the items were destined to Iran/Mahan was 
concealed from U.S. companies, shippers, and freight forwarders.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that 
on November 13, 2020, EP-MMQ (MSN 449) flew on routes between 
Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran, and on November 15, 2020, EP-MMI 
(MSN 416) flew on routes between Shenzhen, China and Tehran.
    \45\ See 85 FR 52321 (Aug. 25, 2020).
    \46\ PTMS Aero, PTAK, PTKEU, and Sunarko Kuntjoro were each 
indicted in December 2019 on multiple counts related to this 
conspiracy in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The November 24, 2020 renewal order also included actions taken by 
other U.S. government agencies such as OFAC's August 19, 2020 
designation of UAE-based Parthia Cargo, its CEO Amin Mahdavi, and Delta 
Parts Supply FZC as SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order 13224 for 
providing ``key parts and logistics services for Mahan Air. . . .'' The 
OFAC press release further states, in part, that Mahdavi ``has directly 
coordinated the shipment of parts on behalf of Mahan Air.'' \47\ In 
addition, Mahdavi and Parthia Cargo were indicted in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia for violating sanctions on 
Iran.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1098.
    \48\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-national-and-uae-business-organization-charged-criminal-conspiracy-violate-iranian.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, in October 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey sentenced Joyce Eliasbachus to 18 months of confinement 
based on her role in a conspiracy to export $2 million dollars' worth 
of aircraft parts from the United States to Iran, including to Mahan 
Airways.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Eliasbachus' arrest and arraignment were detailed in the 
June 14, 2018 renewal order, as described supra at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The May 21, 2021 renewal order outlined Mahan's continued operation 
of a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited 
to, EP-MMH, EP-MMI, and EP-MMQ, on international flights into and out 
of Iran from/to Shanghai, China, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and 
Guangzhou, China, respectively.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that 
on May 14, 2021, EP-MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes between Shanghai, 
China and Tehran, Iran, and on May 13, 2021, EP-MMI (MSN 416) flew 
on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran. In 
addition, on May 20, 2021, EP-MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between 
Guangzhou, China and Tehran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Open source news reporting also indicated that after five years of 
maintenance, Mahan Air is now operating EP-MNE, a Boeing 747 on 
domestic flights within Iran.\51\ In addition to this aircraft being 
one of the original three Boeing aircraft Mahan obtained in violation 
of the Regulations, any service or maintenance involving parts subject 
to the EAR would further violate the TDO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ https://simpleflying.com/mahan-air-747-300-flies-again/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OEE's on-going investigation since the May 21, 2021 renewal order 
further demonstrates the nature of Mahan's prior actions and its 
continued actions in violation of the TDO and the Regulations, both 
directly and through its widespread network of procurement agents, 
front companies, and intermediaries.
    Mahan continues to operate a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, 
including, but not limited to EP-MME, EP-MMJ, EP-MMQ, on flights into 
and out of Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, and Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates, and Shenzhen, China, respectively.\52\ Additionally, publicly 
available industry sources show that EP-MMG (MSN 383), an aircraft that 
Mahan acquired from Al Naser Air in violation of both the TDO and 
Regulations, is currently in a maintenance, repair, overhaul (``MRO'') 
status at Iran's Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran, Iran. 
Among, other restrictions, the TDO prohibits third parties from 
servicing items subject to the Regulations that are controlled by a 
denied party, which raises concerns of current and future violations 
absent the renewal of the TDO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that 
on November 7, 2021, EP-MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between 
Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran, and on November 9, 2021, EP-MMJ 
(MSN 526) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and 
Tehran, Iran. In addition, on November 8, 2021, EP-MMQ (MSN 346) 
flew on routes between Shenzhen, China and Tehran, Iran.
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    Through these prior and on-going investigative efforts, OEE and its 
law enforcement partners are working to disrupt Mahan's illicit 
acquisition of aircraft and parts as well as its role in transporting 
or forwarding such items.

C. Findings

    Under the applicable standard set forth in Section 766.24 of the 
Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the 
evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the denied 
persons have acted in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that 
such violations have been significant, deliberate and covert; and that 
given the foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation, 
there is a likelihood of imminent violations. Therefore, renewal of the 
TDO is necessary in the public interest to prevent imminent violation 
of the Regulations and to give notice to companies and individuals in 
the United States and abroad that they should continue to avoid dealing 
with Mahan Airways and Al Naser Airlines and the other denied persons, 
in connection with export and reexport transactions involving items 
subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity 
subject to the Regulations.

III. Order

    It is therefore ordered:
    First, that MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. 
Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN MAHMOOD KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/A 
KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHMOUD 
AMINI, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and 
Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga, Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates; KERMAN AVIATION A/K/A GIE KERMAN AVIATION, 42 
Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France; SIRJANCO TRADING LLC, P.O. Box 
8709, Dubai,

[[Page 66284]]

United Arab Emirates; MAHAN AIR GENERAL TRADING LLC, 19th Floor Al 
Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates; 
MEHDI BAHRAMI, Mahan Airways- Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil Apt 
No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey; AL NASER AIRLINES A/
K/A AL-NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL NASER WINGS AIRLINE A/K/A ALNASER 
AIRLINES AND AIR FREIGHT LTD., Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, 
District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, 
and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, 
Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 
911399, Amman 11191, Jordan; ALI ABDULLAH ALHAY A/K/A ALI ALHAY A/K/A 
ALI ABDULLAH AHMED ALHAY, Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 
929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak 
Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177; BAHAR SAFWA GENERAL TRADING, P.O. 
Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates; SKY BLUE BIRD GROUP A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD 
AVIATION A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD LTD A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD FZC, P.O. Box 
16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade Zone, United Arab Emirates; and ISSAM 
SHAMMOUT A/K/A MUHAMMAD ISAM MUHAMMAD ANWAR NUR SHAMMOUT A/K/A ISSAM 
ANWAR, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous Street, Damascus, Syria, 
and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17-18 Margaret Street, 4th 
Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San 
St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey, and when 
acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or 
employees (each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied 
Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in 
any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be 
exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any 
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license 
exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the EAR, or engaging in any other 
activity subject to the EAR; or
    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR.
    Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of a 
Denied Person any item subject to the EAR;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control 
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from 
the United States, including financing or other support activities 
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts 
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will 
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is 
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item, 
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied 
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes 
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, 
modification or testing.
    Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided 
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or 
business organization related to a Denied Person by ownership, control, 
position of responsibility, affiliation or other connection in the 
conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions 
of this Order.
    Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or 
other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that 
are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-
origin technology.
    In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, 
Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar 
Safwa General Trading may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a 
full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the 
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022. In accordance with 
the provisions of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR, 
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco 
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue 
Bird Group, and/or Issam Shammout may, at any time, appeal their 
inclusion as a related person by filing a full written statement in 
support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, 
U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 
Maryland 21202-4022.
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, 
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not 
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be 
opposed by Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or 
Bahar Safwa General Trading as provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing 
a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days 
before the expiration date of the Order.
    A copy of this Order shall be provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser 
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading and each 
related person, and shall be published in the Federal Register.
    This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for 
180 days.

    Dated: November 17, 2021.
Kevin Kurland,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2021-25397 Filed 11-19-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P