Resilient Networks; Disruptions to Communications; Disruptions to Communications, 61103-61112 [2021-23811]

Agencies

• FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 212 (Friday, November 5, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 61103-61112]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-23811]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 4

[PS Docket Nos. 21-346, 15-80; ET Docket No. 04-35; FCC 21-99; FR ID 
55366]


Resilient Networks; Disruptions to Communications; Disruptions to 
Communications

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission seeks comment on: potential 
improvements to the voluntary Wireless Network Resiliency Cooperative 
Framework (Framework), including evaluating what triggers its 
activation, its scope of participants, whether existing Framework 
elements can be strengthened, any gaps that need to be addressed, and 
whether the public would benefit from codifying some or all of the 
Framework; ways to enhance the information available to the Commission 
through the Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) and Disaster 
Information Reporting System (DIRS) during disasters and network 
outages to improve situational awareness; and communications resiliency 
strategies for power outages, including improved coordination between 
communications service providers and power companies and deploying 
onsite backup power or other alternative measures to reduce the 
frequency, duration, or severity of power-related disruptions to 
communications services.

DATES: Submit comments on or before December 6, 2021, and reply 
comments on or before January 4, 2022.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by PS Docket Nos. 21-346 
and 15-80; ET Docket No. 04-35, by any of the following methods:
     Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically 
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: https://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/.
     Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must 
file an original and one copy of each filing.
    Filings can be sent by commercial overnight courier, or by first-
class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be 
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 
Federal Communications Commission.
     Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service 
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, 
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
     U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority 
mail must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
     Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the 
Commission no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings. 
This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety 
of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC 
Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-
Delivery Policy, Public Notice, DA 20-304 (March 19, 2020). https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy.
    People with disabilities: To request materials in accessible 
formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic 
files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or calling the 
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-
418-0432 (TTY).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, contact 
Saswat Misra, Attorney-Advisor, Cybersecurity and Communications 
Reliability Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 
418-0944 or via email at [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), in PS Docket Nos. 21-346 and 15-80; ET 
Docket No. 04-35; FCC 21-99, adopted on September 30, 2021 and released 
on October 1, 2021. The full text of this document is available by 
downloading the text from the Commission's website at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-21-99A1.pdf. When the FCC 
Headquarters reopens to the public, the full text of this document will 
also be available for public inspection and copying during regular 
business hours in the FCC Reference Center, 45 L Street NE, Washington, 
DC 20554.

Synopsis

I. Introduction

    1. With this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), we propose steps 
to improve the reliability and resiliency of communications networks 
during emergencies. We address these matters against the backdrop of 
Hurricane Ida, which hit the United States as a Category 4 hurricane 
and caused significant flooding and damage in several states along the 
Gulf Coast and the northeastern corridor of the United States. 
Hurricane Ida demonstrated that, while service providers' ability to 
restore communications in the aftermath of a devastating storm has 
improved, more can be done to help ensure that communications networks 
are sufficiently survivable to provide some continuity of service 
during major emergencies and to enhance the ability of service 
providers to restore communications when they fail.
    2. Specifically, we consolidate several lines of prior inquiry to 
initiate this rulemaking regarding the reliability, resiliency, and 
continuity of communications networks. Hurricane Ida is only the most 
recent disaster that resulted in failures precisely when Americans most 
need to communicate. Recent hurricane and wildfire seasons, earthquakes 
in Puerto Rico, and severe winter storms in Texas demonstrate that 
America's communications infrastructure remains susceptible to 
disruption during disasters. These disruptions can prevent or delay the 
transmission of 911 calls, first responder communications, Emergency 
Alert System (EAS) and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) messages, and 
other potentially life-saving information. They also can have cascading 
detrimental effects on the economy and other critical infrastructures 
due to

[[Page 61104]]

interdependencies among sectors, including the transportation, medical, 
and financial sectors. These disruptions may involve many or all 
communications networks--including wireline, wireless, cable, 
satellite, or broadcast facilities.
    3. Accordingly, in this NPRM, we seek comment on measures to help 
ensure that communications services remain operational when disasters 
strike. We consider whether elements of the Wireless Network Resiliency 
Cooperative Framework (Framework)--a voluntary agreement developed by 
the wireless industry in 2016 to provide mutual aid in the event of a 
disaster--could be improved to enhance the reliability of communication 
networks. 31 FCC Rcd 13745 (2016) (Framework Order). We also ask 
whether the public would benefit from codifying some or all of the 
Framework into our rules. Next, we seek comment on how the Commission 
can better promote situational awareness during disasters through its 
Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) and Network Outage 
Reporting System (NORS). Finally, we explore communications resilience 
strategies to address one of the primary reasons for service 
disruptions: Electric power outages.

II. Background

    4. Resilient communications networks are critical to economic 
growth, national security, emergency response, and nearly every facet 
of modern life. The Commission has long been concerned with enhancing 
the reliability and resiliency of the Nation's communications 
infrastructure. In 2004, the Commission adopted rules that require 
certain communications providers to supply the Commission with outage 
reports to address ``the critical need for rapid, complete, and 
accurate information on service disruptions that could affect homeland 
security, public health or safety, and the economic well-being of our 
Nation, especially in view of the increasing importance of non-wireline 
communications in the Nation's communications networks and critical 
infrastructure.'' 69 FR 68859 (Nov. 26, 2004) (2004 Part 4 Report and 
Order). Under these rules, service providers must submit outage reports 
to the Commission through NORS for outages that exceed specified 
duration and magnitude thresholds. 47 CFR 4.9. The Commission analyzes 
NORS outage reports to, in the short term, assess the magnitude of 
major outages, and in the long-term, identify network reliability 
trends and determine whether the outages likely could have been 
prevented or mitigated had the service providers followed certain 
network reliability best practices.
    5. In 2007, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Commission 
established DIRS as a web-based means for service providers, including 
wireless, wireline, broadcast, and cable providers, to voluntarily 
report to the Commission their communications infrastructure status, 
restoration information, and situational awareness information 
specifically during times of crisis. The Commission recently required a 
subset of service providers that receive Stage 2 funding from the 
Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund or the Connect USVI Fund to report in DIRS 
when it is activated in their respective territories. 34 FCC Rcd 9109, 
9174, 9176-77, paras. 133, 138-140 (2019) (Puerto Rico & USVI USF Fund 
Report and Order). The Commission typically activates DIRS for affected 
counties in the event of major emergencies. These announcements often 
note that the Commission is suspending its rules on network outage 
reporting for DIRS participants during the activation period.
    6. DIRS data have provided critical situational awareness during 
communications outages, even when information is shared only on an 
aggregated or limited basis. The Commission's analysis informs 
restoration efforts by federal partners and the agency's own 
assessments of communications reliability during disasters. For 
example, the Commission prepares and provides aggregated DIRS 
information, without company-identifying information, to the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), which then distributes the information to a 
DHS-led group of federal agencies tasked with coordinating disaster 
response efforts, including other units in DHS, during incidents. This 
DHS-led group is the Emergency Support Function #2 (ESF-2), which is 
composed of other participants including the Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, General Services 
Administration, Department of Interior, and the Federal Communications 
Commission. Agencies use the analyses for their situational awareness 
and for determining restoration priorities for communications services 
and infrastructure in affected areas. The Commission also provides 
aggregated data, without company-identifying information, to the public 
during disasters. Recently, the Commission established a framework to 
provide additional federal, state, Tribal, and territorial partners 
with access to the critical NORS and DIRS information they need to 
ensure the public's safety while preserving the presumptive 
confidentiality of the information.
    7. Also following Hurricane Katrina in 2007, the Commission adopted 
backup power obligations in limited contexts. In 2007, the Commission 
adopted a rule requiring Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) 
providers and local exchange carriers to maintain emergency backup 
power for a minimum of 24 hours for assets inside central offices and 
eight hours for cell sites, remote switches, and digital loop carrier 
system remote terminals. After observing the severe impact on 911 
networks across the Midwest caused by the 2012 derecho storm, the 
Commission took steps to promote 911 network reliability and resiliency 
by requiring covered 911 service providers to take reasonable measures 
to provide reliable 911 service, including through providing for 
central office backup power. 47 CFR 9.19(a)(4) (defining a ``covered 
911 service provider'' as an entity that provides 911, E911, or [Next 
Generation 911 (NG911)] capabilities such as call routing, automatic 
location information (ALI), automatic number identification (ANI), or 
the functional equivalent of those capabilities, directly to a [Public 
Safety Answering Point (PSAP)], statewide default answering point, or 
appropriate local emergency authority, or an entity that operates one 
or more central offices that directly serve a PSAP). Covered 911 
service providers must annually certify to the Commission that they 
have taken ``reasonable measures to provide reliable 911 service with 
respect to 911 circuit diversity, availability of central office backup 
power, and diverse network monitoring,'' or they must certify to taking 
alternative measures that ``are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the 
risk of failure or that one or more certification elements are not 
applicable to its network.'' 47 CFR 9.19(b). Covered 911 service 
providers must certify their compliance with backup power standards of 
24 hours for central offices that provide administrative lines for 
Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) and 72 hours for central offices 
that have a selective router that directs 911 calls. 47 CFR 9.19. 
Further, the Commission has adopted rules requiring that providers of 
facilities-based, fixed voice service offered as a residential service 
provide their subscribers the options to purchase, at the point of 
sale, solutions that provide 8 and 24 hours of backup power for the 
service. 47 CFR 9.20.
    8. In 2013, in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, the Commission again 
took up

[[Page 61105]]

the issue of communications infrastructure resiliency, particularly 
that of wireless resiliency; specifically, the Commission proposed to 
require facilities-based Commercial Mobile Radio Service providers to 
submit to the Commission for public disclosure, on a daily basis during 
and immediately after major disasters, the percentage of cell sites 
within their networks that are providing service. On December 14, 2016, 
in lieu of adopting this proposal, the Commission adopted an Order 
supporting the voluntary Framework, intended to promote resilient 
communications and situational awareness during disasters. Framework 
Order, 31 FCC Rcd at 13745-46, paras. 1-2. The Framework commits its 
participants to five prongs: providing for reasonable roaming 
arrangements during disasters when technically feasible; fostering 
mutual aid during emergencies; enhancing municipal preparedness and 
restoration; increasing consumer readiness and preparation; and 
improving public awareness and stakeholder communications on service 
and restoration status. An emergency or disaster activates the 
Framework where the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
activates ESF-2 and the Commission activates DIRS. ESFs provide the 
structure for coordinating Federal interagency support for a Federal 
response to an incident. ESF-2 coordinates Federal actions to assist 
industry in restoring the public communications infrastructure and to 
assist State, tribal, and local governments with emergency 
communications and restoration of public safety communications systems 
and first responder networks.
    9. In 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in 
conjunction with its review of federal efforts to improve the 
resiliency of wireless networks during natural disasters and other 
physical incidents, released a report recommending that the Commission 
should improve its monitoring of industry efforts to strengthen 
wireless network resiliency. The GAO found that the number of wireless 
outages attributed to a physical incident--a natural disaster, 
accident, or other manmade event, such as vandalism--increased from 189 
in 2009 to 1,079 in 2016. The GAO concluded that more robust measures 
and a better plan to monitor the Framework would help the FCC collect 
information on the Framework and evaluate its effectiveness, and that 
such steps could help the FCC decide if further action is needed. In 
light of prolonged outages during several emergency events in 2017 and 
2018, and in parallel with the GAO recommendations, the Public Safety 
and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) conducted several inquiries and 
investigations to better understand and track the output and 
effectiveness of the Framework and other voluntary coordination efforts 
that promote wireless network resiliency and situational awareness 
during and after these hurricanes and other emergencies. In February 
2020, following a series of PSHSB staff coordination meetings with 
wireless, backhaul and electric service providers to discuss the gaps 
identified in the above record, CTIA and the Edison Electric Institute 
formed the Cross-Sector Resiliency Forum on February 27, 2020 and 
released a 12-step action plan to improving wireless resiliency.
    10. In the days leading up to landfall of Hurricane Ida on August 
29, 2021, the FCC had begun coordinating response activities with the 
State of Louisiana, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and members of the 
Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Comm-ISAC) and 
to determine potential impacts, challenges, and mutual aid resources. 
The Commission had already deployed agents to support the Louisiana 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and to conduct baseline surveys of 
communications as well as to provide coordination and spectrum 
management support. Communications companies had also begun pre-
positioning mobile communications assets in safe zones just outside the 
potential impact areas in order to rapidly deploy much-needed services, 
post landfall. Ida had significant physical impacts on both power and 
communications infrastructure, which had cascading consequences on 
interdependent public safety communications infrastructure and services 
such as PSAPs and Louisiana's land mobile radio public safety 
communications network.
    11. Following Hurricane Ida's departure, the Commission began 
supporting recovery work in earnest. The Commission reminded 
communications industry of its commitments in the Framework and 
encouraged wireless providers, specifically, to activate roaming in 
areas where cellular communications were hardest hit. Even after 
roaming had been activated in limited areas, communications remained 
diminished as communications companies were working to repair, replace, 
and restore communications infrastructure. Immediately after the storm, 
28.1 percent of cell sites were down across the affected counties. 
Louisiana was hardest hit in this respect, with more than 50 percent of 
sites down in the affected counties on August 30. At its peak, 
Louisiana had three PSAPs offline due to damaged power and 
communications infrastructure, and other PSAPs were impacted and 
rerouted calls as generators began to fail. Commission personnel 
communicated with the Louisiana Association of Broadcasters to 
determine unmet fuel, communications, and power needs of state 
broadcasters and to facilitate the provision of much needed resources 
and services.
    12. Commission staff also conducted on-the-ground assessments of 
communications infrastructure to provide emergency management officials 
intelligence and to assist with the identification of critical 
communications infrastructure, including responding to additional 
unintentional damage occurring during repairs to the communications and 
power infrastructure. The Commission also issued special temporary 
authorizations (STAs) and, sua sponte, numerous orders to provide 
regulatory relief in support of providers' restoration efforts, 
including waivers of deadlines and technical requirements, as well as 
providing relief to impacted consumers. This work remains ongoing as 
recovery continues.

III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

A. Improving the Wireless Network Resiliency Cooperative Framework

    13. The voluntary Framework plays a central role in how wireless 
providers prepare for and respond to emergencies. Over the years, the 
Commission has examined and re-examined the efficacy of the Framework 
for purposes of restoring communications during and following 
disasters. These inquiries suggest that providers take a multifaceted 
approach to disaster readiness and response, with the aim of improving 
the public's safety during natural disasters. Wireless provider efforts 
have included investments in network resiliency, reinforcing network 
coverage and capacity, conducting site-based preparatory work, and 
making plans to mitigate commercial power failures, as well as 
utilizing commercial roaming agreements, working with government 
partners, and educating consumers on preparedness. These initiatives 
have helped to keep more Americans connected and informed even during 
major disasters.
    14. However, these inquiries also show that there are both gaps in 
the

[[Page 61106]]

Framework's coverage and, during some recent disasters, delays in its 
implementation, including technical challenges associated with roaming 
implementation among signatory companies. Further, as explained below, 
there are some disaster situations where the Framework, by its owns 
terms, would not go into effect. These findings from our prior 
inquiries suggest there may be targeted opportunities to improve the 
voluntary Framework and network resiliency--not just of wireless 
networks, but of communications networks as a whole. We seek comment on 
those opportunities below. We also seek comment on whether the 
Commission should revisit the voluntary nature of the Framework.
    15. Framework Activation. Currently, the Framework only applies 
when both ESF-2 and DIRS are activated. As a result, there may be 
circumstances where the Framework is not activated but where mutual aid 
or other support obligations are warranted. For example, the Framework 
has not been operational during the California power shutoffs and 
wildfires because ESF-2 was not activated. To address this gap, should 
we work with carriers to revisit the prerequisites, e.g., the types of 
emergencies or other declarations (ESF-2 and DIRS activation) that 
trigger the Framework or that govern the duration of its obligations? 
If so, what should those triggers and durations be?
    16. Scope of Framework Participants. We seek comment on whether 
expanding the scope of the Framework participants could enhance its 
effectiveness. Currently, signatories to the Framework include only 
AT&T Mobility, CTIA, GCI, Southern Linc, T-Mobile, U.S. Cellular, and 
Verizon Wireless. Additionally, the Competitive Carriers Association 
filed a letter supporting the Framework. As the list of signatories 
demonstrates, there are a number of wireless providers who are not 
signatories to the Framework. Further, the Framework signatories only 
include wireless providers. Would greater participation in the 
Framework enhance its effectiveness? Are there steps the Commission can 
take to encourage voluntary participation beyond the scope of the 
existing signatories, such as to include smaller wireless providers, or 
entities beyond the mobile-wireless industry, such as facilities-based 
backhaul providers, covered 911 service providers, cable, wireline, 
broadcast, satellite, or interconnected VoIP providers? Should the 
Framework or portions of the Framework be expanded to include any other 
stakeholders or organizations?
    17. Improving Wireless Roaming. The Framework commits its 
signatories to provide reasonable roaming in situations where: ``(i) A 
requesting carrier's network has become inoperable and the requesting 
carrier has taken all appropriate steps to attempt to restore its own 
network, and (ii) the home carrier has determined that roaming is 
technically feasible and will not adversely affect service to the home 
carrier's own subscribers,'' with such roaming arrangements ``limited 
in duration and contingent on the requesting carrier taking all 
possible steps to restore service on its own network as quickly as 
possible.'' Framework Order, 31 FCC at 13752-53, para 19.
    18. Recent events suggest that roaming during disaster contexts can 
be improved. As the Hurricane Michael Report found, ``at least some 
wireless providers did not take advantage of the types of disaster-
related roaming agreements envisioned in the Framework, allowing their 
customers to remain in the dark rather than roam on a competitor's 
network.'' FCC, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, October 
2018 Hurricane Michael's Impact on Communications: Preparation, Effect, 
and Recovery, PS Docket No. 18-339, Report and Recommendations at 6 
(PSHSB 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-357387A1.pdf 
(Hurricane Michael Report). During Hurricane Ida, there was limited 
transparency, and therefore understanding, regarding the status of 
roaming, including where it was available and where it was not, and 
which network technologies were utilized. We seek comment on how best 
to address these issues through the voluntary Framework. Are the 
current Framework pre-requisites to triggering disaster roaming too 
restrictive, to the detriment of consumers? In particular, we seek 
comment on improvements to the Framework to ensure roaming is 
operational prior to an event and seamless during emergencies--
addressing both resiliency and restoration--such as annual testing of 
roaming capabilities and coordination processes. Are there other 
improvements that can be made to ensure that roaming is made available 
in a timely manner and for the benefit of the maximum population 
possible? For example, should there be minimum timeframes by which a 
provider must respond to a disaster roaming request? Are there 
conditions or other criteria that could be incorporated into the 
Framework to determine that, once met, roaming should be available 
automatically in qualifying disaster areas? If a roaming request is 
deemed technically infeasible, how should that determination be 
conveyed? What criteria should be used to determine whether roaming is 
technically feasible? Have there been instances where roaming requests 
have been unreasonably denied or responses to such requests have been 
unreasonably delayed, or where the roaming-related provisions of the 
Framework did not work as intended? During Hurricane Ida, we understand 
that initial requests for roaming under the Framework focused on access 
to 3G networks. Are there benefits to encouraging roaming access to 
newer generations of network technology and, if so, how can the 
Commission best support such arrangements? To what extent do capacity 
challenges or network configuration issues also hinder effective 
roaming, and how should any improvements to the Framework account for 
this concern? Should there be any improvement in the standards or their 
implementations to ensure the emergency roaming is automatically and 
seamlessly accessible to user devices without requiring any action from 
the user? Can providers' readiness to execute such disaster-triggered 
roaming be verified and tested? What are the public safety benefits and 
costs associated with these improvements in wireless roaming?
    19. Fostering Mutual Aid. The Framework commits its signatories to 
foster mutual aid during disasters. Nevertheless, we observed prolonged 
outages during Hurricane Ida. We seek comment on how signatories 
fostered mutual aid, such as through sharing physical assets, during 
Hurricane Ida and other recent disasters, and how effective this mutual 
aid has been in ensuring continuity of communications. Are there 
instances in which reasonable requests for mutual aid were denied by 
wireless providers? Should the Framework do more to strengthen the 
effectiveness of mutual aid? What benefits would accrue if other 
segments of the communications industry--such as cable, wireline, and 
broadcast--agreed to foster mutual aid during disasters?
    20. Enhancing Municipal Preparedness and Restoration. Framework 
signatories convened with local government representatives' public 
safety subject matter experts and developed best practices to 
facilitate coordination before, during, and after emergencies and 
disasters in order to maintain and restore wireless service continuity. 
Were these best practices

[[Page 61107]]

utilized in Hurricane Ida and other disasters, and how effective were 
these best practices in real-world conditions? Should they be updated 
in light of lessons learned from these disasters? Are there additional 
actions that wireless providers and other stakeholders (e.g., backhaul 
service, wireline service providers) can take to ensure appropriate and 
effective coordination with local agencies to mitigate the impact of 
service disruptions? What are the respective costs and benefits? For 
example, should providers establish processes for sharing real-time 
restoration efforts? Should the Framework include coordination 
obligations and particular coordination activities or best practices? 
Are there are other steps that the Commission can take to improve 
coordination? The Commission also seeks comment on the recommendations 
of the Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee's Disaster Response and 
Recovery Working Group pertaining to coordination with local 
governments and building and maintaining formal relationships across 
industry and government stakeholders, and coordination and information 
sharing between stakeholders during the disaster planning and recovery 
phases.
    21. Increasing Local Preparedness and Consumer Readiness. The 
Framework commits signatories to increase consumer readiness and 
preparation through the development and dissemination with consumer 
groups of a Consumer Readiness Checklist. Is there evidence that the 
public is aware of this checklist? How is it promoted? Are there other 
steps that wireless providers should take to foster local preparedness 
and consumer readiness in the face of natural disasters, such as public 
service announcements? What are the benefits and costs associated with 
those steps? Should the Commission explore additional consumer 
awareness and preparedness activities?
    22. What measures are in place to ensure that information is 
accessible to all Americans? Consumer groups note that the deaf and 
hard-of-hearing communities often rely on multiple forms of 
communications before and during emergencies, and recommend that 
signatories work with these communities to ensure information is 
accessible. Should the Framework require signatories to conduct 
outreach through multiple forms of communication, such as public 
service announcements on television, radio, and social media that is 
accessible to both hard-of-hearing and non-English speaking 
communities? Verizon suggests providers can maintain a dedicated 
website for a specific disaster event. Should the Framework require 
signatories to meet with groups representing persons with disabilities 
to provide information on emergency planning and resources? Are there 
other steps the Commission should take to improve communications with 
these and other communities?
    23. Improving Public Awareness. Finally, the Framework commits 
signatories to improve public awareness and stakeholder communications 
on service and restoration status, through sharing DIRS data on cell 
site outages on an aggregated, county-by-county basis in the relevant 
geographic area. Since the Framework was released, signatories have 
agreed to share additional data with the public, including more 
granular data on the cause of cell site outages and the number of in-
service cell sites operating on backup power. The Commission has also 
requested comment on whether other outage data, e.g., whether the 
service disruption extends to 911 service, should be disclosed to the 
public. See Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning 
Disruptions to Communications, et al., Third Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FCC 21-45, 2021 WL 1603461, at *13-16, paras. 36-46 (Apr. 
22, 2021). Would public disclosure of additional information regarding 
service disruptions promote public safety? If so, what additional 
information should be disclosed? What are the benefits and costs 
associated with releasing this information directly to the public? What 
mechanisms are in place in communities to impart awareness about 
recovery planning and long term-term resiliency, and are those 
mechanisms accessible to persons with disabilities? How might those 
mechanisms differ across communities or geographic areas, and how can 
those differences be accommodated by Framework signatories?
    24. Scope of Framework Obligations. We seek comment on the scope of 
the Framework's obligations. Should we expand the scope of what is 
expected in the event of a disaster? What additional or revised 
measures are warranted to address gaps in promoting resiliency and what 
are their costs and benefits? For example, should the voluntary 
Framework include provisions regarding the placement of back-up 
systems, such as Cells on Light Trucks, so that they are ready to 
deploy for vulnerable infrastructure to improve service restoration 
time? Should the Framework include requirements for restoration or 
prioritization of text-to-911 capability in areas where the PSAP is 
text-capable, as text-to-911 can be an important communications 
solution in emergencies, particularly for individuals with 
disabilities? Should the Framework include provisions that address 
backhaul redundancy and resiliency? For example, could the Framework 
address a limit on the number of cell sites operating on a single 
backhaul fiber link? What other steps would promote backhaul resiliency 
during disasters?
    25. Framework-Related Reporting. We seek comment on whether we 
should require wireless providers to submit reports to the Commission 
detailing implementation of the voluntary Framework in real time or in 
the aftermath of a disaster. What are the benefits and costs associated 
with such a reporting requirement? We seek comment on what information 
these reports should include, such as specific information related to 
the way the provider adhered to any roaming, mutual aid, consumer 
outreach, or related provisions of the Framework suggested above. For 
example, should the Commission be notified when roaming has been 
activated or refused, including information on which generational 
technologies it has been activated, and as to which providers are 
roaming on which networks? Should the Commission be notified when 
resources or services are shared through mutual aid? How soon after 
wireless provider action should such notifications be made and how 
should they be made?
    26. Codifying the Framework. In response to our prior inquiries, 
some commenters have urged the Commission to reexamine the voluntary 
nature of the Framework. Some of these commenters highlight the 
Commission's Hurricane Michael Report to suggest that existing 
voluntary coordination efforts, including the Framework, may not be 
sufficient to promote wireless network resiliency and situational 
awareness during and immediately after emergencies. Accordingly, we 
seek comment on whether some or all of the existing or a modified 
Framework should be mandatory, and for whom. What are the costs and 
benefits of doing so? We also seek comment on our legal authority to 
mandate disaster-based obligations in line with the existing or an 
expanded Framework. Would the aggregate of these solutions address the 
failures highlighted by the Hurricane Michael Report or should 
additional measures be considered? Finally, we seek comment on how the 
Commission should enforce any mandatory obligations that are not met.

[[Page 61108]]

B. Promoting Situational Awareness During Disasters

    27. Over the years, our experience has shown that DIRS and NORS are 
vital public safety tools that equip the Commission and its federal and 
local partners with actionable situational awareness information for 
identifying and resolving threats to 911 and other emergency service 
communications. DIRS focuses on infrastructure status information 
rather than service outage information, as in NORS. NORS thus draws a 
distinction between service outages that affect just 911 and other 
types of service outages. Currently, there is limited visibility on how 
disasters impact 911 service specifically. Requiring DIRS reporting in 
the event of disaster-related outages would help to close this 
information gap. Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules 
Concerning Disruptions to Communications, PS Docket No. 15-80, Second 
Report and Order, 36 FCC Rcd 6136, 6139, paras. 8, 9 (2021). DIRS 
broadly collects infrastructure status information about the nation's 
communications networks, but participation is voluntary for the 
nation's service providers. While DIRS is voluntary, the Commission 
recently required a subset of service providers that choose to accept 
Stage 2 funding from the Uniendo a Puerto Rico Fund or the Connect USVI 
Fund to report in DIRS when it is activated in their respective 
territories. Puerto Rico & USVI USF Fund Report and Order, 34 FCC Rcd 
at 9174, 9176-77, paras. 133, 138-140.
    28. The Commission initially grounded its voluntary approach on 
observations that a voluntary paradigm worked well during Hurricane 
Katrina and that a mandatory reporting process would likely not be 
adaptable to unique aspects of each particular crisis. Recommendations 
of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks, EB Docket No. 06-119 et al., Order, 22 FCC Rcd 
10541, 10549, para. 22 (2007). Since that time, the Commission has 
observed that, while the nation's large providers typically elect to 
voluntarily report in DIRS, smaller providers often do not. This not 
only reduces the total number of DIRS filings available to inform the 
Commission's analysis of network reliability, but also reduces the 
Commission's situational awareness, including awareness of the state of 
911 and other emergency services, in locations served by smaller 
providers, which are often vulnerable rural or other hard to access 
areas. This also creates ambiguity about whether a provider's lack of 
DIRS filings means that its network infrastructure actually remains 
undamaged, it is choosing not to voluntarily participate in DIRS, or it 
is unable to file, e.g., because it cannot access DIRS due to 
disruption of its internet access.
    29. Meanwhile, NORS participation is mandatory, but it is centered 
on disruptions to voice telephony. Under our rules, certain service 
providers--wireline, cable, satellite, wireless, interconnected VoIP, 
and Signaling System 7 providers--must submit outage reports to NORS 
for voice and other outages that exceed specified duration and 
magnitude thresholds. 47 CFR 4.9. Service providers are required to 
submit a preliminary notification within two hours after determining 
that an outage is reportable, followed by an initial outage report 
within three calendar days, and a final report no later than 30 days 
after discovering the outage. 47 CFR 4.9. These reports are intended to 
address ``the critical need for rapid, complete, and accurate 
information on service disruptions that could affect homeland security, 
public health or safety, and the economic well-being of our Nation . . 
. .'' 2004 Part 4 Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 16833, para. 1. The 
Bureau analyzes NORS data to assess the magnitude of major outages, 
identify trends, and promote network reliability. However, these outage 
reporting requirements do not collect information about disruptions 
specifically to broadband service. This means the Commission has 
limited situational awareness about outages involving broadband 
service.
    30. We seek comment on steps the Commission can take to address 
these issues and encourage better situational awareness through DIRS 
and NORS. Starting with DIRS, are there steps the Commission can take 
to encourage broader voluntary participation during disasters, 
including from smaller providers? Alternatively, should the Commission 
consider requiring the nation's service providers, i.e., cable 
providers, Direct Broadcast Satellite providers, Satellite Digital 
Audio Radio Service, TV and radio broadcasters, Commercial Mobile Radio 
Service and other wireless service providers, wireline providers, and 
VoIP providers, to report their infrastructure status information in 
DIRS when the Commission activates DIRS in geographic areas in which 
they broadcast or otherwise provide service? We recognize that a 
proposed requirement to file in DIRS must be balanced against 
additional burdens on service providers, particularly as DIRS reports 
are filed in the midst of disasters and other emergencies. If we were 
to explore requiring DIRS filing, we seek comment on our legal 
authority to do so, the costs and benefits associated with mandatory 
reporting, and how the Commission should enforce any failure to file 
DIRS information.
    31. With respect to NORS, we seek comment on the public interest 
benefits and the costs of reporting of broadband service outages. Would 
such reporting likewise improve emergency managers' situational 
awareness during disasters? Or do public safety officials and others 
currently have access to broadband service outage data through other 
means? Could this data be leveraged to help identify broadband outage 
trends, and if so, how could this knowledge support first response and 
network reliability efforts?
    32. We seek comment on suspension of NORS reporting requirements 
during disasters. Under our current voluntary DIRS reporting approach, 
the Bureau suspends NORS reporting obligations, via public notice, for 
providers who elect to report in DIRS for the duration of its 
activation period. Formally codifying this practice in our rules may 
give providers more clarity on their obligations and streamline and 
formalize existing practices. We therefore seek comment on whether to 
codify in our part 4 rules the Commission's typical practice of 
granting to providers a waiver of their NORS reporting requirements 
when they report the outage in DIRS. Are there needs of public safety 
officials or others that are not being met by the current reporting 
practices? If so, will such gaps remain when our NORS and DIRS 
information sharing rules become effective? Amendments to Part 4 of the 
Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications, PS Docket 
No. 15-80, Second Report and Order, 36 FCC Rcd 6136 (2021).
    33. We note that there may be instances in which DIRS is 
deactivated but some providers have not yet fully restored service, 
resulting in limited continuing outages. In these instances, the 
Commission no longer has situational awareness as to the status of 
those providers' services, because updates are no longer being filed in 
DIRS and the outage was never filed in NORS. We seek comment on how to 
best address this gap and ensure that the Commission maintains 
situational awareness of outages. Should providers with ongoing outages 
at the time of DIRS deactivation be required to report those outages in 
NORS?
    34. In light of the concerns noted above, we also seek comment on 
steps

[[Page 61109]]

the Commission can take to increase its situational awareness of the 
state of 911 and other emergency services.

C. Addressing Power Outages

    35. The recent devastation wrought by Hurricane Ida, which left 
hundreds of thousands of Louisianans without power, water, and other 
basic utilities, also extended to the region's communications 
infrastructure. Data compiled by the Commission shows that 
approximately half of all cellular sites in New Orleans and the 
surrounding disaster area remained out of service nearly two days after 
the worst effects of Ida had passed, with no clear timetable for the 
restoration of these networks. NORS and DIRS data collected by the 
Commission in the aftermath of Hurricane Ida and other recent disaster 
events reveal that a lack of commercial power at key equipment and 
facilities is the single biggest reason why communications networks 
transmitting 911 service and related emergency information fail in the 
aftermath of disaster events. For example, the Commission's DIRS data 
show that the majority of cell site outages in the immediate aftermath 
of Hurricane Ida's central disaster region were due to a lack of 
commercial power availability. Communications Status Report for Areas 
Impacted by Hurricane Ida at 5-6 (August 31, 2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-375367A1.pdf.
    36. More generally, Commission analysis of DIRS data shows that 
over 50% of cell site outages that occurred during major 2020 
earthquakes, hurricanes, and storms were due to power failures. The 
Commission's NORS outage data similarly reveal that the number of 
outages caused by power failures has been steadily increasing for the 
past several years and that power failures are currently driving a 
nationwide trend in the increase of outages. The Commission received 
9,158 outage reports in 2020 alone for communications disruptions 
caused by power failures, potentially affecting 63,097,389 customers. 
Of those customers, 4.3 million potentially experienced service 
disruptions on a single day.
    37. Without power to support providers' network operations in the 
aftermath of disasters, the public is unable to place potentially life-
saving 911 calls, local emergency management officials are unable to 
transmit EAS and WEA messages, evacuation orders, and other public 
safety-related information, and first responders are unable to 
coordinate effectively to save lives and property. Conversely, with 
backup power in place, providers are able to bring their networks 
online and, if necessary, immediately begin diagnosing and addressing 
damage that their networks may have sustained.
    38. Hurricane Ida thus continues an unfortunate (though potentially 
addressable) trend, demonstrating that the nation's communications 
infrastructure remains highly prone to failure due to disruptions to 
commercial power in the face of disasters. This reinforces observations 
that we have made during recent hurricane and wildfire seasons, 
earthquakes in Puerto Rico, and this year's severe winter storms in 
Texas. If the current trend continues without corrective action, the 
frequency of outages will worsen in coming years as the nation 
experiences disaster events of increasing severity, duration, and 
impact, including hurricanes, flooding, and wildfires.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP05NO21.037

    This figure depicts the number of monthly final outage reports in 
NORS with power failure as a reported cause over time. The red dots 
represent the numbers of outage reports in 2Q21 months and blue dots 
represent months prior to 2Q21. The green line shows the expected 
number of outages in each month without taking seasonality effects into 
account; as such, it represents the general overall trend in the three-
year window immediately preceding 2Q21 (April 2018 through March 2021). 
The shaded gray area indicates a 99% confidence interval for each 
month. This confidence interval is defined by the expected number of 
outages in each month based on the trend and seasonality effects. These 
data do not include outages caused by power failures that were reported 
in DIRS. They also do not include outages that are not service 
affecting (e.g., outages of transport facilities with diverse routes)

[[Page 61110]]

or special facility outages (outages of single circuits with 
Telecommunications Service Priority Level 1 or 2).
    39. In view of this context, we now seek to explore communications 
resilience strategies for power outages. As part of this review, we 
seek to identify actions the Commission, communications providers, and 
power companies can cooperatively take to encourage and increase 
coordination in the power and communications sectors before, during, 
and after an emergency or disaster. We also seek to better understand 
how changing circumstances since the Commission's last broad 
consideration of backup power (including trends showing increasingly 
severe storms, wildfires, and other disasters, and advances in power 
technology) may bear on whether and how backup power or alternative 
measures may help promote continuity of power, including for PSAPs and 
emergency services. We seek comment on this issue.
    40. As an initial matter, we seek comment on communications service 
provider coordination with power companies before, during, and after 
disasters, including efforts of the Cross-Sector Resiliency Forum. Are 
existing coordination efforts effective at minimizing communications 
service outages that are caused by power outages? Are there 
coordination activities that communications service provider and power 
companies could potentially take that have not yet been formalized or 
operationalized? If so, what steps could the Commission take to 
encourage this coordination? For example, should the Commission convene 
stakeholders from the electric industry, telecommunications sector, and 
public safety agencies to take part in regional coordination events to 
encourage greater cross-sector coordination in preparing for and in 
response to disasters? Should the Commission coordinate with 
gubernatorial offices and state emergency management agencies to 
encourage integrating communications providers and power companies into 
response planning, execution, and exercises?
    41. Next, we seek comment on how backup power or alternative 
measures may help promote the continuity of service during or after 
disasters. We seek comment on the current state of providers' backup 
power implementations. For example, how many hours of backup power do 
providers typically maintain, what technologies do they use to meet 
their requirements, and how readily deployable are those technologies 
when needed? Does the amount or type of backup power solution differ 
depending upon the facility or type of infrastructure? What are the 
benefits and challenges of maintaining backup power on-site? If not 
maintained on-site, how could providers ensure that they can move 
backup power resources on-site with minimal delay when disaster 
strikes? What steps do providers take to adequately mitigate the risk 
that a disaster event that disrupts primary power would also knock out 
any on-site backup power resources (e.g., fuel generators)? What types 
of backup power solutions are available for the various elements of 
infrastructure that may require it?
    42. We seek comment on what steps service providers would need to 
take with respect to backup power deployment to significantly reduce 
the number of communications disruptions caused by power outages. How 
many hours of on-site backup power would be appropriate at their 
facilities to significantly reduce the frequency of power-related 
service disruptions? Are there events or geographic areas in which more 
hours of backup power are needed than others? To maximize the 
effectiveness of backup power solutions, should backup power be 
provisioned at certain critical points in communications 
infrastructure, and if so, at which points? In general, how should the 
Commission define or otherwise identify facilities and equipment that 
are critical to ensuring that emergency communications can be 
transmitted in the aftermath of a disaster? Are there differences 
across different types of communications networks or geographies where 
they are located that are relevant to deployment of backup power 
solutions or performance during power outages more generally? Is the 
deployment of on-site backup power sufficient to keep networks online 
in view of other potentially independent factors that may cause a 
network to fail during a disaster, e.g., lack of hardened and resilient 
network equipment? If it is not sufficient, what other steps should 
service providers take to avoid service disruptions? What are the 
associated costs and benefits?
    43. As we explore the potential for wider backup power 
implementation, we seek comment on service providers' experiences with 
any state-specific backup power requirements as well as the potential 
cost of implementation.
    44. We also seek comment on any alternatives to on-site backup 
power that have also proven successful or have the potential to reduce 
the frequency, duration, or severity of disruptions to communications 
services caused by power outages. Are there other technical solutions 
for preventing service disruptions caused by power outages or other 
efforts to reduce the number of service disruptions that we have not 
raised here?
    45. We also seek comment on the Commission's existing requirements 
for covered 911 service providers to implement reasonable central-
office backup power measures to ensure 911 reliability. 47 CFR 9.19(b). 
The Commission adopted these and other requirements for covered 911 
service providers to promote 911 network resiliency. 47 CFR 9.19. As 
noted above, Louisiana had three PSAPs offline due to damaged power and 
communications infrastructure in the aftermath of Hurricane Ida. Other 
PSAPs were also impacted as generators began to fail. Are there steps 
the Commission can take, such as revisions to our resiliency rules 
(see, e.g., 47 CFR parts 4, 9) or encouraging of voluntary measures, to 
make it more likely that PSAPs will have the necessary resources to 
continue service during and after disasters? Are there other 
considerations pertaining to 911 outages and access to emergency 
services in the wake of a disaster?
    46. Digital Equity and Inclusion. Finally, the Commission, as part 
of its continuing effort to advance digital equity for all, including 
people of color, persons with disabilities, persons who live in rural 
or Tribal areas, and others who are or have been historically 
underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by persistent poverty 
or inequality, invites comment on any equity-related considerations and 
benefits (if any) that may be associated with the proposals and issues 
discussed herein. Specifically, we seek comment on how our proposals 
may promote or inhibit advances in diversity, equity, inclusion, and 
accessibility, as well the scope of the Commission's relevant legal 
authority.

IV. Procedural Matters

    47. Paperwork Reduction Act. This document contains proposed new 
and modified information collection requirements. The Commission, as 
part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the 
general public and the OMB to comment on the information collection 
requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the 
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 
U.S.C. 3506(c)(4),

[[Page 61111]]

we seek specific comment on how we might further reduce the information 
collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 
employees.
    48. Ex Parte Rules--Permit-But-Disclose. This proceeding shall be 
treated as ``permit-but-disclose'' proceedings in accordance with the 
Commission's ex parte rules. 47 CFR 1.1200-1.1216. Persons making ex 
parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a 
memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days 
after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the 
Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations 
are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must: (1) List 
all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at 
which the ex parte presentation was made; and (2) summarize all data 
presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the 
presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data 
or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, 
memoranda, or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may 
provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior 
comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page 
and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in 
lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to 
Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex 
parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). 
In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has 
made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte 
presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, 
and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic 
comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed 
in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). 
Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the 
Commission's ex parte rules.
    49. Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 
1980, as amended (RFA), requires that a regulatory flexibility analysis 
be prepared for notice and comment rulemaking proceedings, unless the 
agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated, have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.'' 5 U.S.C. 605(b). Accordingly, the Commission has prepared 
an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning potential 
rule and policy changes contained in this Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking.

V. Legal Basis

    50. Authority for the actions proposed in this Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking may be found in sections 1, 4(i) through (j), 4(n) through 
(o), 201, 202, 214, 218, 251(e)(3), 254, 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 
307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332 and 403, of the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i) through (j), 154(n) through 
(o), 201, 202, 214, 218, 251(e)(3), 254, 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 
307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403; sections 2, 3(b), and 6 and 7 of 
the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. 
615 note, 615, 615a-1, 615b, section 106 of the Twenty First Century 
Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, 47 U.S.C. 615c, and 
section 506(a) of the Repack Airways Yielding Better Access for Users 
of Modern Services Act of 2018 (RAY BAUM's Act).

VI. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    51. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), the Commission has prepared this Initial Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities by the policies and rules 
proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in this proceeding. 
Written public comments are requested on this IRFA, including comments 
on any alternatives. Comments must be identified as responses to the 
IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments as specified in 
the NPRM.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

    52. The NPRM proposes steps to safeguard and improve transmission 
of life-saving 911, Emergency Alert System (EAS), Wireless Emergency 
Alert (WEA) messages and other life-saving information during 
emergencies by improving the reliability, resiliency, and continuity of 
associated communications networks. More specifically, the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking:
     Considers whether elements of the Wireless Network 
Resiliency Cooperative Framework (Framework)--a voluntary agreement 
developed by the wireless industry in 2016 to provide mutual aid in the 
event of a disaster--could be improved to enhance the reliability of 
communication networks, including by inquiring into whether the public 
would benefit from codifying some or all of the Framework into the 
Commission's rules.
     Seeks comment on how the Commission can better promote 
situational awareness during disasters through its Disaster Information 
Reporting System (DIRS) and Network Outage Reporting System (NORS). 
(Henceforth, the term ``nation's service providers'' will refer 
collectively to this group of entities.).
     Explores communications resilience strategies to address 
one of the primary reasons for service disruptions: Electric power 
outages, including through an exploration of backup power 
implementations.
    53. These proposals are made against the backdrop of Hurricane Ida, 
which hit the United States as a Category 4 hurricane in August 2021 
and caused significant flooding and damage in several states along the 
southern and northeastern corridors of the United States. Hurricane 
Ida, as well as recent hurricane and wildfire seasons, earthquakes in 
Puerto Rico, and severe winter storms in Texas demonstrate that 
America's communications infrastructure remains susceptible to 
disruption during disasters. These disruptions can prevent the 
transmission of 911 calls, first responder communications, EAS and WEA 
messages, and other potentially life-saving information. They also can 
have cascading detrimental effects on the economy and other critical 
infrastructures due to interdependencies among sectors, including the 
transportation, medical, and financial sectors, among others. 
Importantly, these disruptions may involve any or all communications 
networks--including wireline, wireless, cable, satellite, or broadcast 
facilities.

B. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
the Proposed Rules Will Apply

    54. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where 
feasible, and estimate of the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally defines 
the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms 
``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business 
Act. A small business concern is one that: (1) Is independently owned 
and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) 
satisfies any additional criteria

[[Page 61112]]

established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Below is a list 
of such entities.
     Interconnected VoIP services;
     Wireline Providers;
     Wireless Providers--Fixed and Mobile;
     Satellite Service Providers; and
     Cable Service Providers.

C. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

    55. We expect the potential rules in the NPRM will impose new or 
additional reporting or recordkeeping and/or other compliance 
obligations on service providers in the following ways:
     Wireless Resiliency Framework. Any providers that are 
required to participate in elements of the Framework who do not already 
do so, potentially including smaller wireless providers and entities 
beyond the mobile-wireless industry, such as facilities-based backhaul 
providers, covered 911 service providers, cable, wireline, broadcast, 
satellite, or interconnected VoIP providers would potentially need to 
keep records related to roaming agreements, mutual aid agreements, 
preparedness and restoration plans, improving consumer readiness and 
preparation and improving public awareness and stakeholder 
communications on service and restoration status. These providers would 
potentially have to submit reports to the Commission detailing 
implementation of the Framework in real time or in the aftermath of a 
disaster.
     NORS and DIRS. Any providers subject to DIRS reporting and 
new requirements related to NORS reporting, potentially including cable 
providers, Direct Broadcast Satellite providers, Satellite Digital 
Audio Radio Service, TV and radio broadcasters, Commercial Mobile Radio 
Service and other wireless service providers, wireline providers, VoIP 
providers, and broadband service providers, would report their 
communications outage information in NORS when their outages exceed 
thresholds specified in the Commission's Part 4 rules and 
infrastructure status information in DIRS when the Commission activates 
DIRS in geographic areas in which they broadcast or otherwise provide 
service.
     Backup Power. To the extent that the Commission were to 
adopt backup power requirements, any Public Safety Answering Points 
(PSAPs) or providers subject to them, potentially including cable 
providers, Direct Broadcast Satellite providers, Satellite Digital 
Audio Radio Service, TV and radio broadcasters, Commercial Mobile Radio 
Service and other wireless service providers, wireline providers, and 
VoIP providers, could potentially be required to take steps to make 
their networks more resilient to power outages, as discussed in the 
NPRM.
    56. The NPRM seeks comment on a number of aspects of these 
proposals, including which providers should be subject to them, the 
public safety benefits and costs associated with a provider's 
implementation of the Framework, DIRS and NORS reporting, and backup 
power resiliency improvements. Given that these elements are currently 
unknown pending comment, the Commission is presently unable to quantify 
the costs of compliance with rules associated with these proposals, and 
whether small entities will need to hire professionals to comply. 
However, given that each proposal would make more reliable the 
transmission of 911 calls, first responder communications, EAS and WEA 
messages, and other potentially life-saving information, we tentatively 
conclude that the benefits exceed the costs of implementing any of 
these proposals. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion and urge 
commenters to provide detailed information in support of their 
comments.

D. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Proposed Rules

    57. None.

Federal Communications Commission.
Katura Jackson,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-23811 Filed 11-4-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P