Positive Train Control Interface Design Issue With Locomotive and Cab Car Braking Systems, 49410-49411 [2021-18997]
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49410
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 168 / Thursday, September 2, 2021 / Notices
By the Board, Scott M. Zimmerman, Acting
Director, Office of Proceedings.
Raina White,
Clearance Clerk.
[FR Doc. 2021–18972 Filed 9–1–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2021–01]
Positive Train Control Interface Design
Issue With Locomotive and Cab Car
Braking Systems
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
AGENCY:
FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2021–01 to make the rail
industry, including railroads and
railroad employees, aware of a recently
identified interface design issue relating
to how positive train control (PTC)
systems in use throughout the United
States interface with locomotive and cab
car braking systems. This recently
identified interface design issue allows
a train crewmember to circumvent a
PTC enforcement by manually cutting
out the pilot valve/brake stand,
commonly known as the cut-out valve,
prior to the PTC system initiating the
brakes. This interface design issue poses
a significant safety risk by allowing a
PTC system to be disabled and unable
to initiate the brakes to prevent a trainto-train collision, over-speed
derailment, incursion into an
established work zones, or the
movement of a train through a switch
left in the wrong position. This Safety
Advisory recommends that all railroads
operating with PTC systems
immediately remind crewmembers that
circumventing a PTC enforcement is
subject to civil penalty or
disqualification for the locomotive
engineer or conductor responsible; audit
the designs of PTC systems as
implemented on all types of
locomotives and cab cars; assess the
extent to which the design of the system
could allow a locomotive or cab car’s
PTC system to be circumvented by a
crewmember; develop and implement a
plan to mitigate and/or correct this
design issue; and provide FRA with a
schedule for completion of the
identified actions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Gabe Neal, Staff Director, Signal, Train
Control and Crossings Division, Office
of Railroad Systems and Technology, at
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:33 Sep 01, 2021
Jkt 253001
telephone: (816) 516–7168 or email:
gabe.neal@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Positive train control (PTC) systems
must be designed to prevent train-totrain collisions, over-speed derailments,
incursions into established work zones,
and the movement of a train through a
switch left in the wrong position.1 PTC
accomplishes this by using technology
to monitor train speed and train
locations, provide warnings for the
traincrew to take action, and
automatically initiate braking if the
traincrew does not take action.
FRA is aware of a recently identified
design issue relating to how PTC
systems in use throughout the United
States interface with locomotive and cab
car braking systems. This interface
design issue allows a crewmember to
circumvent a PTC enforcement by
manually cutting out the pilot valve/
brake stand, commonly known as the
cut-out valve, prior to the PTC system
initiating the brakes. If a PTC system is
allowed to be disabled by the actions of
a crewmember, the PTC system can no
longer prevent a train-to-train collision,
over-speed derailment, incursion into
an established work zone, or the
movement of a train through a switch
left in the wrong position.
Although FRA has found that all PTC
systems are potentially impacted by this
interface design issue, FRA notes that
only some interface designs between the
PTC system and the locomotive or cab
car braking system allow a PTC
enforcement to be disabled. FRA
believes that the interface designs of
most concern are limited to a number of
older locomotives equipped with
mechanical braking systems, and the
interface design is likely not an issue on
most newer locomotives equipped with
electronic braking systems. On PTCequipped locomotives and cab cars with
interface designs with this issue,
manually cutting out the pilot valve/
brake stand disables the PTC system
enforcement capability. FRA recognizes
that a locomotive or cab car PTC system
is considered a ‘‘safety device’’ under
FRA’s regulations 2 and that it is
unlawful for a railroad employee to
operate the equipment with such a
safety device disabled without
authorization. Accordingly, a system
that allows such interference in its
operation does not comply with the
applicable statutory or regulatory
requirements.3 In addition, a PTC
1 49
CFR 236.1005.
CFR part 218.
3 49 CFR 236.1005.
2 49
PO 00000
Frm 00124
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
system that allows such interference
presents a significant safety risk in that
it can no longer perform its required
functions.
FRA became aware of this issue
through three recent events:
• On May 27, 2021, during testing of
the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement
System II (ACSES II) PTC system aboard
a freight train, an FRA PTC Specialist
witnessed an engineer circumvent a
penalty brake application while
operating in an overspeed condition.
The engineer placed the pilot valve/
brake stand in the cut-out position prior
to PTC system enforcement of the
overspeed condition. When the
overspeed condition no longer existed,
the pilot valve/brake stand was returned
to the cut-in position, and the train
continued without a PTC system
penalty.
• On July 13, 2021, during testing of
the Interoperable Electronic Train
Management System (I–ETMS) PTC
system on a freight locomotive, FRA
conducted a test in which a zero speed
temporary speed restriction (TSR) was
issued to the train and the pilot valve/
brake stand was placed into the cut-out
position prior to PTC system
enforcement of the TSR. This action
allowed the train to circumvent PTC
system enforcement.
• On July 21, 2021, during testing of
the ACSES II PTC system on a passenger
train, FRA conducted a similar test in
which a zero speed temporary speed
restriction (TSR) was issued to the train
and the pilot valve/brake stand was
placed into the cut-out position prior to
PTC system enforcement of the TSR.
This action achieved similar results,
allowing the train to circumvent the
PTC system enforcement with one
exception; after placing the pilot valve/
brake stand back into the cut-in
position, the train encountered a PTC
penalty brake application.
Safety Advisory 2021–01
As shown by the incidents described
above, rail operations face a safety risk
due to the interface design issue that
allows PTC enforcement to be
circumvented by cutting out the pilot
valve/brake stand. Such risks must be
addressed to provide for the safety of
train operations, and thus FRA
recommends that railroads do the
following:
(1) Immediately remind railroad
crewmembers that, along with the
unauthorized disabling of a PTC system,
circumventing PTC enforcement by
manually cutting out the pilot valve/
brake stand when not authorized is a
revocable event for the locomotive
engineer or conductor responsible, and
E:\FR\FM\02SEN1.SGM
02SEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 168 / Thursday, September 2, 2021 / Notices
subjects any other crewmember
responsible to individual liability
proceedings, including disqualification
and/or civil penalties. See 49 CFR
240.117(e)(5), 240.305(a)(5), and
242.403(b) and (e)(5).
(2) Immediately conduct a complete
audit of the PTC onboard design of all
locomotives and cab cars equipped with
PTC to determine how the onboard PTC
equipment is integrated into each
railroad’s locomotive and cab car’s
braking system, to ascertain what
percentage of the locomotive and cab
car fleet is subject to the interface design
issue described above;
(3) Within ten (10) days of the
publication of this Safety Advisory,
provide FRA, via the SIR site, with a
report of the number and type of
locomotives and cab cars that have this
interface design issue;
(4) Upon completion of item (2)
above, determine the mitigating
measures and/or corrective actions
necessary to address the safety risk
presented by the design issue, and
provide FRA, via the SIR site, with a
report documenting the planned
measures and/or actions, including a
schedule for completion; and
(5) Immediately commence
implementation of the planned
measures and/or actions to address the
safety risk presented by the design issue
per the documented schedule, and
provide FRA, via the SIR site,
confirmation of completion.
Issued in Washington, DC.
John Karl Alexy,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety,
Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2021–18997 Filed 9–1–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA–2019–0132; Notice 2]
Hankook Tire America Corporation,
Grant of Petition for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Grant of petition.
AGENCY:
Hankook Tire America
Corporation (Hankook) has determined
that certain Hankook Ventus V2
Concept 2 tires manufactured by
Hankook’s indirect subsidiary, Hankook
Tire Manufacturing Tennessee, LP, do
not fully comply with Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No.
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:33 Sep 01, 2021
Jkt 253001
139, New Pneumatic Radial Tires for
Light Vehicles. Hankook filed a
noncompliance report dated November
19, 2019, and subsequently petitioned
NHTSA on December 5, 2019, for a
decision that the subject noncompliance
is inconsequential as it relates to motor
vehicle safety. This notice announces
and explains the grant of Hankook’s
petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Abraham Diaz, Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
telephone (202) 366–5310, facsimile
(202) 366–3081.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Overview: Hankook has determined
that certain Hankook Ventus V2
Concept 2 tires, do not fully comply
with paragraph S5.5.1(b) of FMVSS No.
139, New Pneumatic Radial Tires for
Light Vehicles (49 CFR 571.139).
Hankook filed a noncompliance
report dated November 19, 2019,
pursuant to 49 CFR part 573, Defect and
Noncompliance Responsibility and
Reports, and subsequently petitioned
NHTSA on December 5, 2019, for an
exemption from the notification and
remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C.
chapter 301 on the basis that this
noncompliance is inconsequential as it
relates to motor vehicle safety, pursuant
to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h) and
49 CFR part 556, Exemption for
Inconsequential Defect or
Noncompliance.
Notice of receipt of Hankook’s
petition was published with a 30-day
public comment period, on April 17,
2020, in the Federal Register (85 FR
21504). No comments were received. To
view the petition and all supporting
documents log onto the Federal Docket
Management System (FDMS) website at
https://www.regulations.gov/, and then
follow the online search instructions to
locate docket number ‘‘NHTSA–2019–
0132.’’
II. Tires Involved: Approximately 467
Hankook Ventus V2 Concept 2 tires, size
235/45R17V XL H457, manufactured
between October 7, 2019, and October
12, 2019, are potentially involved.
III. Noncompliance: Hankook
explains that the noncompliance is due
to a mold error in which the subject
tires, were marked with the date-code in
the Tire Identification Number (TIN)
inverted and; therefore, they do not
meet the requirements of paragraph
S5.5.1(b) of FMVSS No. 139.
Specifically, the date code was printed
upside down.
IV. Rule Requirements: Paragraph
S5.5.1(b) of FMVSS No. 139 includes
the requirements relevant to the
PO 00000
Frm 00125
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
49411
petition. Each tire must be labeled with
the TIN required by 49 CFR part 574.5
on the intended outboard sidewall of
the tire. Except for retreaded tires, if a
tire does not have an intended outboard
sidewall, the tire must be labeled with
the TIN required by 49 CFR part 574.5
on one sidewall and with either the TIN
or a partial TIN, containing all
characters in the TIN except for the date
code and, at the discretion of the
manufacturer, any optional code, on the
other sidewall. Each tire must be
marked on each sidewall with the TIN
required by 49 CFR part 574.5 as listed
in the documents and publications
specified in paragraph (b) TIN content
requirement.
V. Summary of Hankook’s Petition:
Hankook describes the subject
noncompliance and contends that the
noncompliance is inconsequential as it
relates to motor vehicle safety. In
support of its petition, Hankook offers
the following reasoning:
1. The purpose of the labeling
requirements in Part 574 is to ‘‘facilitate
notification to purchasers of defective or
nonconforming tires.’’ See Part 574.2.
The date code portion of the TIN is
required so that purchasers can identify
the week and year of the tire’s
manufacture in the event the tire is
subject to a safety recall.
2. The date-code characters reflect the
correct week and year of the tires’
manufacture, but the date code is
technically out of compliance because
the characters are inverted. Despite the
inversion, the date code meets the
character height requirements of Part
574 and is readily identifiable,
permitting tire owners to easily
determine the week and year of
manufacture.
3. NHTSA has previously granted a
petition for inconsequential
noncompliance for a similar issue. In
granting a petition from Cooper Tire &
Rubber Company, 81 FR 43708 (July 5,
2016), the Agency explained:
The Agency believes that in the case
of a tire labeling noncompliance, one
measure of its inconsequentiality to
motor vehicle safety is whether the
mislabeling would affect the
manufacturer’s or consumer’s ability to
identify the mislabeled tires properly,
should the tires be recalled for
performance-related noncompliance. In
this case, the nature of the labeling error
does not prevent the correct
identification of the affected tires. 49
CFR 574.5 requires the date code
portion of the tire identification number
to be placed in the last or correct
position. In Cooper’s case, it is in the
right-most position, however, the
manufacture date code is upside down.
E:\FR\FM\02SEN1.SGM
02SEN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 168 (Thursday, September 2, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49410-49411]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-18997]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2021-01]
Positive Train Control Interface Design Issue With Locomotive and
Cab Car Braking Systems
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2021-01 to make the rail
industry, including railroads and railroad employees, aware of a
recently identified interface design issue relating to how positive
train control (PTC) systems in use throughout the United States
interface with locomotive and cab car braking systems. This recently
identified interface design issue allows a train crewmember to
circumvent a PTC enforcement by manually cutting out the pilot valve/
brake stand, commonly known as the cut-out valve, prior to the PTC
system initiating the brakes. This interface design issue poses a
significant safety risk by allowing a PTC system to be disabled and
unable to initiate the brakes to prevent a train-to-train collision,
over-speed derailment, incursion into an established work zones, or the
movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position. This
Safety Advisory recommends that all railroads operating with PTC
systems immediately remind crewmembers that circumventing a PTC
enforcement is subject to civil penalty or disqualification for the
locomotive engineer or conductor responsible; audit the designs of PTC
systems as implemented on all types of locomotives and cab cars; assess
the extent to which the design of the system could allow a locomotive
or cab car's PTC system to be circumvented by a crewmember; develop and
implement a plan to mitigate and/or correct this design issue; and
provide FRA with a schedule for completion of the identified actions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gabe Neal, Staff Director, Signal,
Train Control and Crossings Division, Office of Railroad Systems and
Technology, at telephone: (816) 516-7168 or email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Positive train control (PTC) systems must be designed to prevent
train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into
established work zones, and the movement of a train through a switch
left in the wrong position.\1\ PTC accomplishes this by using
technology to monitor train speed and train locations, provide warnings
for the traincrew to take action, and automatically initiate braking if
the traincrew does not take action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 49 CFR 236.1005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA is aware of a recently identified design issue relating to how
PTC systems in use throughout the United States interface with
locomotive and cab car braking systems. This interface design issue
allows a crewmember to circumvent a PTC enforcement by manually cutting
out the pilot valve/brake stand, commonly known as the cut-out valve,
prior to the PTC system initiating the brakes. If a PTC system is
allowed to be disabled by the actions of a crewmember, the PTC system
can no longer prevent a train-to-train collision, over-speed
derailment, incursion into an established work zone, or the movement of
a train through a switch left in the wrong position.
Although FRA has found that all PTC systems are potentially
impacted by this interface design issue, FRA notes that only some
interface designs between the PTC system and the locomotive or cab car
braking system allow a PTC enforcement to be disabled. FRA believes
that the interface designs of most concern are limited to a number of
older locomotives equipped with mechanical braking systems, and the
interface design is likely not an issue on most newer locomotives
equipped with electronic braking systems. On PTC-equipped locomotives
and cab cars with interface designs with this issue, manually cutting
out the pilot valve/brake stand disables the PTC system enforcement
capability. FRA recognizes that a locomotive or cab car PTC system is
considered a ``safety device'' under FRA's regulations \2\ and that it
is unlawful for a railroad employee to operate the equipment with such
a safety device disabled without authorization. Accordingly, a system
that allows such interference in its operation does not comply with the
applicable statutory or regulatory requirements.\3\ In addition, a PTC
system that allows such interference presents a significant safety risk
in that it can no longer perform its required functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 49 CFR part 218.
\3\ 49 CFR 236.1005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA became aware of this issue through three recent events:
On May 27, 2021, during testing of the Advanced Civil
Speed Enforcement System II (ACSES II) PTC system aboard a freight
train, an FRA PTC Specialist witnessed an engineer circumvent a penalty
brake application while operating in an overspeed condition. The
engineer placed the pilot valve/brake stand in the cut-out position
prior to PTC system enforcement of the overspeed condition. When the
overspeed condition no longer existed, the pilot valve/brake stand was
returned to the cut-in position, and the train continued without a PTC
system penalty.
On July 13, 2021, during testing of the Interoperable
Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS) PTC system on a freight
locomotive, FRA conducted a test in which a zero speed temporary speed
restriction (TSR) was issued to the train and the pilot valve/brake
stand was placed into the cut-out position prior to PTC system
enforcement of the TSR. This action allowed the train to circumvent PTC
system enforcement.
On July 21, 2021, during testing of the ACSES II PTC
system on a passenger train, FRA conducted a similar test in which a
zero speed temporary speed restriction (TSR) was issued to the train
and the pilot valve/brake stand was placed into the cut-out position
prior to PTC system enforcement of the TSR. This action achieved
similar results, allowing the train to circumvent the PTC system
enforcement with one exception; after placing the pilot valve/brake
stand back into the cut-in position, the train encountered a PTC
penalty brake application.
Safety Advisory 2021-01
As shown by the incidents described above, rail operations face a
safety risk due to the interface design issue that allows PTC
enforcement to be circumvented by cutting out the pilot valve/brake
stand. Such risks must be addressed to provide for the safety of train
operations, and thus FRA recommends that railroads do the following:
(1) Immediately remind railroad crewmembers that, along with the
unauthorized disabling of a PTC system, circumventing PTC enforcement
by manually cutting out the pilot valve/brake stand when not authorized
is a revocable event for the locomotive engineer or conductor
responsible, and
[[Page 49411]]
subjects any other crewmember responsible to individual liability
proceedings, including disqualification and/or civil penalties. See 49
CFR 240.117(e)(5), 240.305(a)(5), and 242.403(b) and (e)(5).
(2) Immediately conduct a complete audit of the PTC onboard design
of all locomotives and cab cars equipped with PTC to determine how the
onboard PTC equipment is integrated into each railroad's locomotive and
cab car's braking system, to ascertain what percentage of the
locomotive and cab car fleet is subject to the interface design issue
described above;
(3) Within ten (10) days of the publication of this Safety
Advisory, provide FRA, via the SIR site, with a report of the number
and type of locomotives and cab cars that have this interface design
issue;
(4) Upon completion of item (2) above, determine the mitigating
measures and/or corrective actions necessary to address the safety risk
presented by the design issue, and provide FRA, via the SIR site, with
a report documenting the planned measures and/or actions, including a
schedule for completion; and
(5) Immediately commence implementation of the planned measures
and/or actions to address the safety risk presented by the design issue
per the documented schedule, and provide FRA, via the SIR site,
confirmation of completion.
Issued in Washington, DC.
John Karl Alexy,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2021-18997 Filed 9-1-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
