Privacy Act; Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery, 35396-35399 [2021-14213]
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35396
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 126 / Tuesday, July 6, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
procedure for the public to request
withdrawal or modification of a
guidance document. Removal of these
procedures imposes no significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Therefore, the
undersigned certifies that this rule will
not have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Executive Order 13132, Federalism
E.O. 13132 (entitled ‘‘Federalism’’)
prohibits an agency from publishing any
rule that has federalism implications if
the rule either: (1) Imposes substantial
direct compliance costs on State and
local governments and is not required
by statute, or (2) preempts State law,
unless the agency meets the
consultation and funding requirements
of Section 6 of the E.O. This Interim
final rule does not have federalism
implications and does not impose
substantial direct compliance costs on
State and local governments nor
preempt state law within the meaning of
the E.O.
List of Subjects in 24 CFR Part 11
Administrative practice and
procedure.
PART 11 [REMOVED]
Accordingly, for the reasons described
in the preamble and under the authority
of 42 U.S.C. 3535(d), the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban
Development removes 24 CFR part 11.
■
Dated: June 24, 2021.
Marcia L. Fudge,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021–14019 Filed 7–2–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4210–67–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Secretary
31 CFR Part 1
RIN 1505–AC73
Privacy Act; Special Inspector General
for Pandemic Recovery
Departmental Offices,
Department of the Treasury.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974,
as amended, the Department of the
Treasury, Departmental Offices (DO), is
issuing a final rule to amend its
regulations to exempt portion of the
following new systems of records
maintained by the Special Inspector
General for Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR)
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SUMMARY:
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from certain provisions of the Privacy
Act. The exemption is intended to
comply with the legal prohibitions
against the disclosure of certain kinds of
information and to protect certain
information maintained in this system
of records.
DATES: Effective July 6, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
questions about this notice and privacy
issues, contact: Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Privacy, Transparency, and
Records at U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue
NW, Washington, DC 20220; telephone:
(202) 622–5710.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
SIGPR was established by the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act of 2020. SIGPR
has the duty to conduct, supervise, and
coordinate audits, evaluations, and
investigations of the making, purchase,
management, and sale of loans, loan
guarantees, and other investments made
by the Secretary of the Treasury under
programs established by the Secretary,
as authorized by Section 4018(c) of the
CARES Act, and the management by the
Secretary of programs, as authorized by
Section 4018(c) of the CARES Act.
SIGPR’s duties and responsibilities are
set forth in Section 4018 of the CARES
Act, and in the Inspector General Act of
1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3. SIGPR plans to
create these systems of records to
facilitate SIGPR’s audits, evaluations,
investigations, and other operations to
(1) promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of
such programs; (2) prevent and detect
fraud and abuse in the programs and
operations within its jurisdiction; and
(3) keep the head of the establishment
and the Congress fully informed about
problems and deficiencies relating to
the administration of such programs and
operations and the necessity for and
progress of corrective action. Treasury is
publishing separately the notice of the
new system of records to be maintained
by SIGPR.
Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2),
the head of a federal agency may
promulgate rules to exempt a system of
records from certain provisions of 5
U.S.C. 552a if the system of records
contains investigatory materials
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
Pursuant to these provisions, Treasury
exempts the following system of records
from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (c)(4), (d)(1),
(d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8),
(f), and (g) of the Privacy Act:
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SIGPR .420—Audit and Evaluations
Records
SIGPR .421—Case Management System
and Investigative Records
SIGPR .423—Legal Records
The following are the reasons the
investigatory materials contained in the
above-referenced systems of records
maintained by SIGPR may be exempted
from various provisions of the Privacy
Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and
(k)(2):
(1) Exempted from 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) (Agency
Requirements and Rules) because
release would give individuals an
opportunity to learn whether they have
been identified as suspects or subjects of
investigation. As further described in
the following paragraph, access to such
knowledge may impair the ability of the
Department of the Treasury and SIGPR
(the Department/SIGPR) to carry out its
respective missions, since individuals
could:
(i) Take steps to avoid detection;
(ii) Inform associates that an
investigation is in progress;
(iii) Learn the nature of the
investigation;
(iv) Learn whether they are suspects
or, instead, have been identified as
alleged law violators;
(v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal
conduct upon learning that they are not
identified in the system of records; or
(vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove
the violation.
(2) Exempted from 5 U.S.C.
552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3) and
(5) (Access to Records and Agency
Requirements and Rules) because
release might compromise the
Department’s/SIGPR’s ability to provide
useful tactical and strategic information
to law enforcement agencies by:
(i) Permitting access to records
contained in the systems of records such
that it might provide information
concerning the nature of current
investigations and enable possible
violators to avoid detection or
apprehension by:
(A) Allowing the discovery of facts
that could form the basis for violators’
arrests;
(B) Enabling violators to destroy or
alter evidence of alleged criminal
conduct that could form the basis for
arrest; and
(C) Using knowledge of the status of
criminal investigations to delay the
commission of a crime or commit a
crime at a location that might not be
under surveillance.
(ii) Permitting access to either ongoing or closed investigative files might
also reveal investigative techniques and
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procedures, the knowledge of which
could enable individuals planning
crimes to structure their operations to
avoid detection or apprehension.
(iii) Permitting access to investigative
files and records also could disclose the
identity of confidential sources and
informants and the nature of the
information supplied, and thereby
endanger the physical safety of those
sources by exposing them to possible
reprisals for having provided the
information. In addition, confidential
sources and informants might refuse to
provide criminal investigators with
valuable information if they fear their
identities may be revealed through
disclosure of their names or the nature
of the information they supplied. Loss
of access to such sources would
seriously impair the Department’s/
SIGPR’s ability to carry out its
respective mandate.
(iv) Furthermore, providing access to
information contained in the systems of
records could reveal the identities of
undercover law enforcement officers
who compiled information regarding the
individual’s alleged criminal activities
and thereby endanger the physical
safety of those undercover officers or
their families by exposing them to
possible reprisals.
(v) By compromising the law
enforcement value of the systems of
records for the reasons outlined in
paragraph (2), subsections (i) through
(iv), permitting access in keeping with
these provisions would discourage other
law enforcement and regulatory
agencies, foreign and domestic, from
freely sharing information with the
Department/SIGPR and thus would
restrict the Department’s/SIGPR’s access
to information necessary to accomplish
its respective mission most effectively.
(vi) Finally, the dissemination of
certain information that the
Department/SIGPR maintains in the
systems of records is restricted by law.
(3) Exempted from 5 U.S.C.
552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and
(f)(4) (Access to Records) because these
provisions pertain to requesting an
amendment or noting a dispute to
records that are exempt from access for
the reasons set forth in paragraph (2)
above.
(4) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures
of the records in this system could
impair the ability of law enforcement
agencies outside the Department/SIGPR
from making effective use of
information provided by the
Department/SIGPR. Making accountings
of disclosures available to the subjects
of an investigation could alert them to
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the fact that another agency is
conducting an investigation into their
alleged criminal activities and could
reveal the geographic location of the
other agency’s investigation, the nature
and purpose of that investigation, and
the dates on which that investigation
was active. Individuals possessing such
knowledge could take measures to avoid
detection or apprehension by altering
their operations, transferring their
alleged criminal activities to other
geographical areas, or destroying or
concealing evidence that would form
the basis for arrest. In the case of a
delinquent account, such release might
enable the subject of the investigation to
dissipate assets before levy.
(ii) Moreover, providing accountings
to the subjects of investigations would
alert them to the fact that the
Department/SIGPR has information
regarding their alleged criminal
activities and could inform them of the
general nature of that information.
Access to such information could reveal
the operations of the Department/
SIGPR’s information-gathering and
analysis systems and permit individuals
to take steps to avoid detection or
apprehension.
(5) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(4)
(Accounting of Disclosures/Notice of
Record Correction or Dispute) because
this provision depends on an
individual’s having access to and an
opportunity to request amendment of
records that are exempt from access for
the reasons set out above, this provision
should not apply to the systems of
records.
(6) Exempted from 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements/
Publication of the Categories of Records)
because it could compromise the
Department/SIGPR’s ability to provide
useful information to law enforcement
agencies, since revealing sources for the
information could:
(i) Disclose investigative techniques
and procedures;
(ii) Result in threats or reprisals
against informants by the subjects of
investigations; and
(iii) Cause informants to refuse to give
full information to criminal
investigators for fear of having their
identities as sources disclosed.
(7) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1)
(Agency Requirements/Maintaining
Records) because the term ‘‘maintain’’
includes ‘‘collect’’ and ‘‘disseminate,’’
and application of this provision to the
systems of records could impair the
Department/SIGPR’s ability to collect
and disseminate valuable law
enforcement information in the
following ways:
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35397
(i) In many cases, especially in the
early stages of an investigation, it may
be impossible to immediately determine
whether information collected is
relevant and necessary, and information
that initially appears irrelevant and
unnecessary often may, upon further
evaluation or upon collation with
information developed subsequently,
prove particularly relevant to a law
enforcement program.
(ii) Not all violations of law
discovered by the Department/SIGPR
fall within the investigative jurisdiction
of the Department or SIGPR. To promote
effective law enforcement, the
Department/SIGPR may disclose such
violations to other law enforcement
agencies, including state, local and
foreign agencies, that have jurisdiction
over the offenses to which the
information relates. Otherwise, the
Department/SIGPR might be placed in
the position of having to ignore
information relating to violations of law
not within the jurisdiction of the
Department or SIGPR when that
information comes to the Department/
SIGPR’s attention during the collation
and analysis of information in its
respective records.
(8) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2)
(Agency Requirements/Collection from
an Individual) because it could impair
the Department’s ability to collate,
analyze, and disseminate investigative,
intelligence, and enforcement
information. In addition:
(i) Most information collected about
an individual under criminal
investigation is obtained from third
parties, such as witnesses and
informants. It is usually not feasible to
rely upon the subject of the
investigation as a source for information
regarding his or her alleged criminal
activities.
(ii) An attempt to obtain information
from the subject of a criminal
investigation will often alert that
individual to the existence of an
investigation, thereby affording the
individual an opportunity to attempt to
conceal his or her alleged criminal
activities and thus avoid apprehension.
(iii) In certain instances, the subject of
a criminal investigation may assert his
or her constitutional right to remain
silent and refuse to supply information
to criminal investigators upon request.
(iv) During criminal investigations, it
is often a matter of sound investigative
procedure to obtain information from a
variety of sources to verify information
already obtained from the subject of a
criminal investigation or other sources.
(9) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3)
(Agency Requirements/Informing
Individuals) because it could impair the
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Department/SIGPR’s ability to collect
and collate investigative, intelligence,
and enforcement data. In addition:
(i) Confidential sources or undercover
law enforcement officers often obtain
information under circumstances in
which it is necessary to keep the true
purpose of their actions secret so as not
to let the subject of the investigation, or
his or her associates, know that a
criminal investigation is in progress.
(ii) If it became known that the
undercover officer was assisting in a
criminal investigation, that officer’s
physical safety could be endangered
through reprisal, and that officer may
not be able to continue working on the
investigation.
(iii) Individuals often feel inhibited
talking to a person representing a
criminal law enforcement agency but
are willing to talk to a confidential
source or undercover officer whom they
believe is not involved in law
enforcement activities.
(iv) Providing a confidential source of
information with written evidence that
he or she was a source, as required by
this provision, could increase the
likelihood that the source of information
would be subject to retaliation by the
subject of the investigation.
(v) Individuals may be contacted
during preliminary information
gathering, surveys, or compliance
projects concerning the administration
of the internal revenue laws before any
individual is identified as the subject of
an investigation. Informing the
individual of the matters required by
this provision could impede or
compromise subsequent investigations.
(10) Exempted from 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(5) (Agency Requirements/
Record Maintenance). Because the
definition of ‘‘maintain’’ includes
‘‘collect’’ and ‘‘disseminate,’’ this
provision could hinder the initial
collection of any information that might
not be determined or determinable, at
the moment of collection, to be accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete.
Similarly, application of this provision
could seriously restrict the Department/
SIGPR’s ability to disseminate
information pertaining to a possible
violation of law to law enforcement and
regulatory agencies. In collecting
information during a criminal
investigation, it is often impossible or
unfeasible to determine accuracy,
relevance, timeliness, or completeness
prior to collection of the information. In
disseminating information to law
enforcement and regulatory agencies, it
is often impossible to determine
accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or
completeness prior to dissemination
because the Department/SIGPR may not
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have the expertise with which to make
such determinations. Information that
may initially appear inaccurate,
irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete may,
when collated and analyzed with other
available information, become more
pertinent as an investigation progresses.
In addition, application of this
provision could seriously impede
criminal investigators and intelligence
analysts in the exercise of their
judgment in reporting results obtained
during criminal investigations.
(11) Exempted from 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(8) (Agency Requirements/
Notice) because it could reveal
investigative techniques and procedures
outlined in those records and to prevent
revelation of the existence of an ongoing
investigation where there is need to
keep the existence of the investigation
secret.
(12) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)
(Civil Remedies) because, if the civil
remedies relate to provisions of 5 U.S.C.
552a from which these rules exempt the
systems of records, there should be no
civil remedies for failure to comply with
provisions from which the Department/
SIGPR is exempted. Exemption from
this provision will also protect the
Department/SIGPR from baseless civil
court actions that might hamper its
ability to collate, analyze, and
disseminate investigative, intelligence,
and law enforcement data.
Any information from a system of
records for which an exemption is
claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) or 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), which is also
included in another system of records,
retains the same exempt status such
information has in the system of records
for which such exemption is claimed.
This rule is not a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’’ under Executive
Order 12866.
Pursuant to the requirements of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5
U.S.C. 601–612, it is hereby certified
that this rule will not have significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The term
‘‘small entity’’ is defined to have the
same meaning as the terms ‘‘small
business,’’ ‘‘small organization,’’ and
‘‘small governmental jurisdiction’’ as
defined in the RFA.
The regulation, issued under sections
(j)(2) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act, is to
exempt certain information maintained
by the Department/SIGPR in the abovereferenced systems of records from
certain Privacy Act requirements in this
system of records by individuals who
are United States citizens or aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. In as much as the Privacy Act
rights are personal and apply only to
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U.S. citizens or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, small
entities, as defined in the RFA, are not
provided rights under the Privacy Act
and are outside the scope of this
regulation.
Public Comments
Treasury received no comment on the
notice of proposed rulemaking. No
comment was received on the system of
records notice. Treasury will implement
the rulemaking as proposed.
List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 1
Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, part 1, subpart C of Title 31
of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended as follows:
PART 1—[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 1
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 31 U.S.C. 321.
Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552, as
amended. Subpart C also issued under 5
U.S.C. 552a, as amended.
2. Section 1.36 is amended by adding
entries for ‘‘SIGPR .420’’, ‘‘SIGPR .421’’,
and ‘‘SIGPR .423’’ in alphanumeric
order to the tables in paragraphs
(c)(1)(ii) and (g)(1)(ii) to read as follows:
■
§ 1.36 Systems exempt in whole or in part
from provisions of 5 U.S.C. 522a and this
part.
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) * * *
*
Number
*
System name
*
*
*
*
*
SIGPR .420—Audit and Evaluations
Records.
SIGPR .421—Case Management System
and Investigative Records.
SIGPR .423—Legal Records.
*
*
*
(g) * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) * * *
Number
*
*
System name
*
*
*
*
*
SIGPR .420—Audit and Evaluations
Records.
SIGPR .421—Case Management System
and Investigative Records.
SIGPR .423—Legal Records.
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*
*
*
*
*
Ryan Law,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Privacy,
Transparency, and Records.
[FR Doc. 2021–14213 Filed 7–2–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AK–P?≤
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Foreign Assets Control
31 CFR Part 520
International Criminal Court-Related
Sanctions Regulations
Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Treasury.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) is removing from the
Code of Federal Regulations the
International Criminal Court-Related
Sanctions Regulations as a result of the
termination of the national emergency
on which the regulations were based.
DATES: This rule is effective July 6,
2021.
SUMMARY:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OFAC: Assistant Director for Licensing,
202–622–2480; Assistant Director for
Regulatory Affairs, 202–622–4855; or
Assistant Director for Sanctions
Compliance & Evaluation, 202–622–
2490.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Electronic Availability
This document and additional
information concerning OFAC are
available on OFAC’s website:
www.treasury.gov/ofac.
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Background
On June 11, 2020, the President,
invoking the authority of, inter alia, the
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706)
(IEEPA), issued Executive Order (E.O.)
13928 (85 FR 36139, June 15, 2020),
‘‘Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Associated With the International
Criminal Court.’’ In E.O. 13928, the
President found that the International
Criminal Court’s (ICC) assertions of
jurisdiction over personnel of the
United States and certain of its allies
threatened to subject current and former
United States Government and allied
officials to harassment, abuse, and
possible arrest, and that these actions on
the part of the ICC, in turn, threatened
to infringe upon the sovereignty of the
United States. The President therefore
determined that any attempt by the ICC
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to investigate, arrest, detain, or
prosecute any United States personnel
without the consent of the United
States, or of personnel of countries that
are United States allies and who are not
parties to the Rome Statute or have not
otherwise consented to ICC jurisdiction,
constituted an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United
States and declared a national
emergency to deal with that threat.
On October 1, 2020, OFAC issued the
International Criminal Court-Related
Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 520
(85 FR 61816, October 1, 2020) (the
‘‘Regulations’’), as a final rule to
implement E.O. 13928. The Regulations
were issued in abbreviated form for the
purpose of providing immediate
guidance to the public.
On April 1, 2021, the President issued
E.O. 14022, ‘‘Termination of Emergency
With Respect to the International
Criminal Court’’ (86 FR 17895, April 7,
2021). In E.O. 14022, the President
found that, although the United States
continues to object to the ICC’s
assertions of jurisdiction over personnel
of such non-States Parties as the United
States and its allies absent their consent
or referral by the United Nations
Security Council, the threat and
imposition of financial sanctions against
the ICC, its personnel, and those who
assist it are not an effective or
appropriate strategy for addressing the
United States’ concerns with the ICC.
Accordingly, the President terminated
the national emergency declared in E.O.
13928 and revoked that order.
As a result, OFAC is removing the
Regulations from the Code of Federal
Regulations. Pursuant to section 202(a)
of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1622(a)) and section 2 of E.O.
14022, termination of the national
emergency declared in E.O. 13928 shall
not affect any action taken or
proceeding pending not finally
concluded or determined as of April 1,
2021 (the date of E.O. 14022), any action
or proceeding based on any act
committed prior to the date of E.O.
14022, or any rights or duties that
matured or penalties that were incurred
prior to the date of E.O. 14022.
Public Participation
Because the Regulations involve a
foreign affairs function, the provisions
of E.O. 12866 of September 30, 1993,
‘‘Regulatory Planning and Review’’ (58
FR 51735, October 4, 1993), and the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
553) requiring notice of proposed
rulemaking, opportunity for public
participation, and delay in effective date
are inapplicable. Because no notice of
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35399
proposed rulemaking is required for this
rule, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601–612) does not apply.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act does
not apply because this rule does not
impose information collection
requirements that would require the
approval of the Office of Management
and Budget under 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 520
Administrative practice and
procedure, Banks, Banking, Blocking of
assets, International criminal court,
Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Sanctions.
PART 520—[REMOVED]
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, and pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
1601–1651 and E.O. 14022 (86 FR
17895, April 7, 2021), OFAC amends 31
CFR chapter V by removing part 520.
■
Dated: June 30, 2021.
Bradley T. Smith,
Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets
Control.
[FR Doc. 2021–14337 Filed 7–2–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 100
[Docket Number USCG–2021–0266]
RIN 1625–AA08
Special Local Regulation; Back River,
Baltimore County, MD
Coast Guard, DHS.
Temporary final rule.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Coast Guard is
establishing a temporary special local
regulation for certain waters of Back
River. This action is necessary to
provide for the safety of life on these
navigable waters located in Baltimore
County, MD, during a high-speed power
boat event on July 10, 2021, and July 11,
2021. This regulation prohibits persons
and vessels from entering the regulated
area unless authorized by the Captain of
the Port Maryland-National Capital
Region or the Coast Guard Event Patrol
Commander.
DATES: This rule is effective from 9 a.m.
on July 10, 2021, through 6 p.m. on July
11, 2021.
ADDRESSES: To view documents
mentioned in this preamble as being
SUMMARY:
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 126 (Tuesday, July 6, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 35396-35399]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-14213]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Secretary
31 CFR Part 1
RIN 1505-AC73
Privacy Act; Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
AGENCY: Departmental Offices, Department of the Treasury.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: In accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act of
1974, as amended, the Department of the Treasury, Departmental Offices
(DO), is issuing a final rule to amend its regulations to exempt
portion of the following new systems of records maintained by the
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR) from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act. The exemption is intended to comply with
the legal prohibitions against the disclosure of certain kinds of
information and to protect certain information maintained in this
system of records.
DATES: Effective July 6, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions about this notice and
privacy issues, contact: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Privacy,
Transparency, and Records at U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500
Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20220; telephone: (202) 622-
5710.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
SIGPR was established by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act of 2020. SIGPR has the duty to conduct, supervise,
and coordinate audits, evaluations, and investigations of the making,
purchase, management, and sale of loans, loan guarantees, and other
investments made by the Secretary of the Treasury under programs
established by the Secretary, as authorized by Section 4018(c) of the
CARES Act, and the management by the Secretary of programs, as
authorized by Section 4018(c) of the CARES Act. SIGPR's duties and
responsibilities are set forth in Section 4018 of the CARES Act, and in
the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3. SIGPR plans to
create these systems of records to facilitate SIGPR's audits,
evaluations, investigations, and other operations to (1) promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such
programs; (2) prevent and detect fraud and abuse in the programs and
operations within its jurisdiction; and (3) keep the head of the
establishment and the Congress fully informed about problems and
deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and
operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.
Treasury is publishing separately the notice of the new system of
records to be maintained by SIGPR.
Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2), the head of a federal agency
may promulgate rules to exempt a system of records from certain
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a if the system of records contains
investigatory materials compiled for law enforcement purposes. Pursuant
to these provisions, Treasury exempts the following system of records
from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (c)(4), (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4),
(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5),
(e)(8), (f), and (g) of the Privacy Act:
SIGPR .420--Audit and Evaluations Records
SIGPR .421--Case Management System and Investigative Records
SIGPR .423--Legal Records
The following are the reasons the investigatory materials contained
in the above-referenced systems of records maintained by SIGPR may be
exempted from various provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2):
(1) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) (Agency
Requirements and Rules) because release would give individuals an
opportunity to learn whether they have been identified as suspects or
subjects of investigation. As further described in the following
paragraph, access to such knowledge may impair the ability of the
Department of the Treasury and SIGPR (the Department/SIGPR) to carry
out its respective missions, since individuals could:
(i) Take steps to avoid detection;
(ii) Inform associates that an investigation is in progress;
(iii) Learn the nature of the investigation;
(iv) Learn whether they are suspects or, instead, have been
identified as alleged law violators;
(v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal conduct upon learning that
they are not identified in the system of records; or
(vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove the violation.
(2) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3)
and (5) (Access to Records and Agency Requirements and Rules) because
release might compromise the Department's/SIGPR's ability to provide
useful tactical and strategic information to law enforcement agencies
by:
(i) Permitting access to records contained in the systems of
records such that it might provide information concerning the nature of
current investigations and enable possible violators to avoid detection
or apprehension by:
(A) Allowing the discovery of facts that could form the basis for
violators' arrests;
(B) Enabling violators to destroy or alter evidence of alleged
criminal conduct that could form the basis for arrest; and
(C) Using knowledge of the status of criminal investigations to
delay the commission of a crime or commit a crime at a location that
might not be under surveillance.
(ii) Permitting access to either on-going or closed investigative
files might also reveal investigative techniques and
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procedures, the knowledge of which could enable individuals planning
crimes to structure their operations to avoid detection or
apprehension.
(iii) Permitting access to investigative files and records also
could disclose the identity of confidential sources and informants and
the nature of the information supplied, and thereby endanger the
physical safety of those sources by exposing them to possible reprisals
for having provided the information. In addition, confidential sources
and informants might refuse to provide criminal investigators with
valuable information if they fear their identities may be revealed
through disclosure of their names or the nature of the information they
supplied. Loss of access to such sources would seriously impair the
Department's/SIGPR's ability to carry out its respective mandate.
(iv) Furthermore, providing access to information contained in the
systems of records could reveal the identities of undercover law
enforcement officers who compiled information regarding the
individual's alleged criminal activities and thereby endanger the
physical safety of those undercover officers or their families by
exposing them to possible reprisals.
(v) By compromising the law enforcement value of the systems of
records for the reasons outlined in paragraph (2), subsections (i)
through (iv), permitting access in keeping with these provisions would
discourage other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, foreign and
domestic, from freely sharing information with the Department/SIGPR and
thus would restrict the Department's/SIGPR's access to information
necessary to accomplish its respective mission most effectively.
(vi) Finally, the dissemination of certain information that the
Department/SIGPR maintains in the systems of records is restricted by
law.
(3) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and
(f)(4) (Access to Records) because these provisions pertain to
requesting an amendment or noting a dispute to records that are exempt
from access for the reasons set forth in paragraph (2) above.
(4) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures of the records in this
system could impair the ability of law enforcement agencies outside the
Department/SIGPR from making effective use of information provided by
the Department/SIGPR. Making accountings of disclosures available to
the subjects of an investigation could alert them to the fact that
another agency is conducting an investigation into their alleged
criminal activities and could reveal the geographic location of the
other agency's investigation, the nature and purpose of that
investigation, and the dates on which that investigation was active.
Individuals possessing such knowledge could take measures to avoid
detection or apprehension by altering their operations, transferring
their alleged criminal activities to other geographical areas, or
destroying or concealing evidence that would form the basis for arrest.
In the case of a delinquent account, such release might enable the
subject of the investigation to dissipate assets before levy.
(ii) Moreover, providing accountings to the subjects of
investigations would alert them to the fact that the Department/SIGPR
has information regarding their alleged criminal activities and could
inform them of the general nature of that information. Access to such
information could reveal the operations of the Department/SIGPR's
information-gathering and analysis systems and permit individuals to
take steps to avoid detection or apprehension.
(5) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(4) (Accounting of Disclosures/
Notice of Record Correction or Dispute) because this provision depends
on an individual's having access to and an opportunity to request
amendment of records that are exempt from access for the reasons set
out above, this provision should not apply to the systems of records.
(6) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements/
Publication of the Categories of Records) because it could compromise
the Department/SIGPR's ability to provide useful information to law
enforcement agencies, since revealing sources for the information
could:
(i) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures;
(ii) Result in threats or reprisals against informants by the
subjects of investigations; and
(iii) Cause informants to refuse to give full information to
criminal investigators for fear of having their identities as sources
disclosed.
(7) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) (Agency Requirements/
Maintaining Records) because the term ``maintain'' includes ``collect''
and ``disseminate,'' and application of this provision to the systems
of records could impair the Department/SIGPR's ability to collect and
disseminate valuable law enforcement information in the following ways:
(i) In many cases, especially in the early stages of an
investigation, it may be impossible to immediately determine whether
information collected is relevant and necessary, and information that
initially appears irrelevant and unnecessary often may, upon further
evaluation or upon collation with information developed subsequently,
prove particularly relevant to a law enforcement program.
(ii) Not all violations of law discovered by the Department/SIGPR
fall within the investigative jurisdiction of the Department or SIGPR.
To promote effective law enforcement, the Department/SIGPR may disclose
such violations to other law enforcement agencies, including state,
local and foreign agencies, that have jurisdiction over the offenses to
which the information relates. Otherwise, the Department/SIGPR might be
placed in the position of having to ignore information relating to
violations of law not within the jurisdiction of the Department or
SIGPR when that information comes to the Department/SIGPR's attention
during the collation and analysis of information in its respective
records.
(8) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2) (Agency Requirements/
Collection from an Individual) because it could impair the Department's
ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate investigative,
intelligence, and enforcement information. In addition:
(i) Most information collected about an individual under criminal
investigation is obtained from third parties, such as witnesses and
informants. It is usually not feasible to rely upon the subject of the
investigation as a source for information regarding his or her alleged
criminal activities.
(ii) An attempt to obtain information from the subject of a
criminal investigation will often alert that individual to the
existence of an investigation, thereby affording the individual an
opportunity to attempt to conceal his or her alleged criminal
activities and thus avoid apprehension.
(iii) In certain instances, the subject of a criminal investigation
may assert his or her constitutional right to remain silent and refuse
to supply information to criminal investigators upon request.
(iv) During criminal investigations, it is often a matter of sound
investigative procedure to obtain information from a variety of sources
to verify information already obtained from the subject of a criminal
investigation or other sources.
(9) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) (Agency Requirements/
Informing Individuals) because it could impair the
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Department/SIGPR's ability to collect and collate investigative,
intelligence, and enforcement data. In addition:
(i) Confidential sources or undercover law enforcement officers
often obtain information under circumstances in which it is necessary
to keep the true purpose of their actions secret so as not to let the
subject of the investigation, or his or her associates, know that a
criminal investigation is in progress.
(ii) If it became known that the undercover officer was assisting
in a criminal investigation, that officer's physical safety could be
endangered through reprisal, and that officer may not be able to
continue working on the investigation.
(iii) Individuals often feel inhibited talking to a person
representing a criminal law enforcement agency but are willing to talk
to a confidential source or undercover officer whom they believe is not
involved in law enforcement activities.
(iv) Providing a confidential source of information with written
evidence that he or she was a source, as required by this provision,
could increase the likelihood that the source of information would be
subject to retaliation by the subject of the investigation.
(v) Individuals may be contacted during preliminary information
gathering, surveys, or compliance projects concerning the
administration of the internal revenue laws before any individual is
identified as the subject of an investigation. Informing the individual
of the matters required by this provision could impede or compromise
subsequent investigations.
(10) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) (Agency Requirements/Record
Maintenance). Because the definition of ``maintain'' includes
``collect'' and ``disseminate,'' this provision could hinder the
initial collection of any information that might not be determined or
determinable, at the moment of collection, to be accurate, relevant,
timely, and complete. Similarly, application of this provision could
seriously restrict the Department/SIGPR's ability to disseminate
information pertaining to a possible violation of law to law
enforcement and regulatory agencies. In collecting information during a
criminal investigation, it is often impossible or unfeasible to
determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to
collection of the information. In disseminating information to law
enforcement and regulatory agencies, it is often impossible to
determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to
dissemination because the Department/SIGPR may not have the expertise
with which to make such determinations. Information that may initially
appear inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete may, when
collated and analyzed with other available information, become more
pertinent as an investigation progresses. In addition, application of
this provision could seriously impede criminal investigators and
intelligence analysts in the exercise of their judgment in reporting
results obtained during criminal investigations.
(11) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(8) (Agency Requirements/Notice)
because it could reveal investigative techniques and procedures
outlined in those records and to prevent revelation of the existence of
an ongoing investigation where there is need to keep the existence of
the investigation secret.
(12) Exempted from 5 U.S.C. 552a(g) (Civil Remedies) because, if
the civil remedies relate to provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which
these rules exempt the systems of records, there should be no civil
remedies for failure to comply with provisions from which the
Department/SIGPR is exempted. Exemption from this provision will also
protect the Department/SIGPR from baseless civil court actions that
might hamper its ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate
investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement data.
Any information from a system of records for which an exemption is
claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) or 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), which is also
included in another system of records, retains the same exempt status
such information has in the system of records for which such exemption
is claimed.
This rule is not a ``significant regulatory action''' under
Executive Order 12866.
Pursuant to the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, it is hereby certified that this rule will not
have significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The term ``small entity'' is defined to have the same meaning
as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small
governmental jurisdiction'' as defined in the RFA.
The regulation, issued under sections (j)(2) and (k)(2) of the
Privacy Act, is to exempt certain information maintained by the
Department/SIGPR in the above-referenced systems of records from
certain Privacy Act requirements in this system of records by
individuals who are United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted
for permanent residence. In as much as the Privacy Act rights are
personal and apply only to U.S. citizens or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, small entities, as defined in the RFA, are not
provided rights under the Privacy Act and are outside the scope of this
regulation.
Public Comments
Treasury received no comment on the notice of proposed rulemaking.
No comment was received on the system of records notice. Treasury will
implement the rulemaking as proposed.
List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 1
Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, part 1, subpart C of Title
31 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
PART 1--[AMENDED]
0
1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 31 U.S.C. 321. Subpart A also issued
under 5 U.S.C. 552, as amended. Subpart C also issued under 5 U.S.C.
552a, as amended.
0
2. Section 1.36 is amended by adding entries for ``SIGPR .420'',
``SIGPR .421'', and ``SIGPR .423'' in alphanumeric order to the tables
in paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) and (g)(1)(ii) to read as follows:
Sec. 1.36 Systems exempt in whole or in part from provisions of 5
U.S.C. 522a and this part.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) * * *
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Number System name
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
SIGPR .420--Audit and Evaluations Records.
SIGPR .421--Case Management System and Investigative Records.
SIGPR .423--Legal Records.
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* * * * *
(g) * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) * * *
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Number System name
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
SIGPR .420--Audit and Evaluations Records.
SIGPR .421--Case Management System and Investigative Records.
SIGPR .423--Legal Records.
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[[Page 35399]]
* * * * *
Ryan Law,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Privacy, Transparency, and Records.
[FR Doc. 2021-14213 Filed 7-2-21; 8:45 am]
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