Intent To Request Revision From OMB of One Current Public Collection of Information: Critical Facility Information of the Top 100 Most Critical Pipelines, 34775-34777 [2021-13884]

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Dated: June 24, 2021. Jeffrey Caine, Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. ACTION: BILLING CODE 9111–14–P DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Transportation Security Administration Intent To Request Revision From OMB of One Current Public Collection of Information: Critical Facility Information of the Top 100 Most Critical Pipelines Transportation Security Administration, DHS. AGENCY: VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:47 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 253001 Underpayments (percent) 093087 123187 033188 093088 033189 093089 033191 123191 033192 093092 063094 093094 033195 063095 033196 063096 033198 123198 033199 033100 033101 063001 123101 123102 093003 033104 063004 093004 033105 093005 063006 123107 033108 063008 093008 123108 033109 123110 033111 093011 033116 033118 123118 063019 063020 093021 60-Day notice. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) invites public comment on one currently approved Information Collection Request (ICR), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number 1652–0050, abstracted below that we will submit to OMB for a revision in compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The ICR addresses a statutory requirement for TSA to develop and implement a plan to inspect critical pipeline systems. On May 26, 2021, OMB approved TSA’s request for an emergency revision of this collection to address the ongoing cybersecurity threat to pipeline systems and associated infrastructure. TSA is now seeking to SUMMARY: [FR Doc. 2021–13924 Filed 6–29–21; 8:45 am] jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES Ending date PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Overpayments (percent) 9 10 11 10 11 12 11 10 9 8 7 8 9 10 9 8 9 8 7 8 9 8 7 6 5 4 5 4 5 6 7 8 7 6 5 6 5 4 3 4 3 4 5 6 5 3 8 9 10 9 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 7 8 9 8 7 8 7 7 8 9 8 7 6 5 4 5 4 5 6 7 8 7 6 5 6 5 4 3 4 3 4 5 6 5 3 Corporate overpayments (Eff. 1–1–99) (percent) .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... .......................... 6 7 8 7 6 5 4 3 4 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 5 4 3 2 3 2 3 4 5 4 2 renew and revise the collection as it expires on November 30, 2021. The ICR describes the nature of the information collection and its expected burden, which TSA is seeking to continue its collection of critical facility security information. Send your comments by August 30, 2021. ADDRESSES: Comments may be emailed to TSAPRA@dhs.gov or delivered to the TSA PRA Officer, Information Technology (IT), TSA–11, Transportation Security Administration, 6595 Springfield Center Drive, Springfield, VA 20598–6011 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christina A. Walsh at the above address, or by telephone (571) 227–2062. DATES: E:\FR\FM\30JNN1.SGM 30JNN1 34776 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 30, 2021 / Notices SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES Comments Invited In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. The ICR documentation will be available at http://www.reginfo.gov upon its submission to OMB. Therefore, in preparation for OMB review and approval of the following information collection, TSA is soliciting comments to— (1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden; (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including using appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology. Information Collection Requirement OMB Control Number 1652–0050; Critical Facility Information of the Top 100 Most Critical Pipelines: The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) specifically required TSA to develop and implement a plan for reviewing the pipeline security plans and inspecting the critical facilities of the 100 most critical pipeline systems.1 Pipeline owner/operators determine which facilities qualify as critical facilities based on guidance and criteria set forth in the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines published in December 2010 and 2011, with an update published in April 2021. To execute the 9/11 Act mandate, TSA visits critical pipeline facilities and collects site-specific information from pipeline owner/operators on facility security policies, procedures, and physical security measures. TSA collects facility security information during the site visits using a Critical Facility Security Review (CFSR) form. The CFSR looks at individual pipeline facility security measures and procedures.2 This 1 See sec. 1557 of the 9/11 Act, Public Law 110– 53 (121 Stat. 266, 475; Aug. 3, 2007), as codified at 6 U.S.C. 1207. 2 The CFSR differs from a Corporate Security Review (CSR) conducted by TSA in another information collection that looks at corporate or VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:47 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 253001 collection is voluntary. Information collected from the reviews is analyzed and used to determine strengths and weaknesses at the nation’s critical pipeline facilities, areas to target for risk reduction strategies, pipeline industry implementation of the voluntary guidelines, and the potential need for regulations in accordance with the 9/11 Act provision previously cited. TSA visits with pipeline owner/ operators to follow up on their implementation of security improvements and recommendations made during facility visits. During critical facility visits, TSA documents and provides recommendations to improve the security posture of the facility. TSA intends to continue to follow up with pipeline owner/ operators via email on their status toward implementation of the recommendations made during the critical facility visits. The follow up will be conducted at intervals of six, 12, and 18 months after the facility visit. TSA previously initiated the PRA approval process by publishing a notice on April 8, 2021, 86 FR 18291, announcing our intent to conduct this collection with a revision. Due to the emergency revision of the information collection, TSA is reinitiating the approval process. Revision TSA is revising the information collection to align the CFSR question set with the revised Pipeline Security Guidelines, and to capture additional criticality criteria. As a result, the question set has been edited by removing, adding and rewriting several questions, to meet the Pipeline Security Guidelines and criticality needs. Further, TSA is moving the collection instrument from a PDF format to an Excel Workbook format. Emergency Revision While the above listed collections are voluntary, on May 26, 2021, OMB approved TSA’s request for an emergency revision of this information collection, allowing for the institution of mandatory requirements. See ICR Reference Number: 202105–1652–002. The revision was necessary as a result of the recent ransomware attack on one of the Nation’s top pipeline supplies and other emerging threat information. In order to address the ongoing cybersecurity threat to pipeline systems and associated infrastructure, TSA company-wide security management plans and practices for pipeline operators. See OMB Control No. 1652–0056 at https://www.reginfo.gov for the PRA approval of information collection for these CSRs. PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 issued a Security Directive (SD) applicable to owner/operators of a hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline or liquefied natural gas facility notified by TSA that their pipeline system or facility is critical. These owner/operators are required to review Section 7 of TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines and assess current activities, using the TSA Pipeline Cybersecurity Self-Assessment form, to address cyber risk, and identify remediation measures that will be taken to fill those gaps and a timeframe for achieving those measures. The form provided is based on the instrument used for the CFSRs, limited to cybersecurity issues and augmented to address the scope of the SD. The critical pipeline owner/ operators are required to report the results of this assessment to TSA within 30 days of issuance of the SD. In cooperation with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, TSA will use this information to make a global assessment of the cyber risk posture of the industry. TSA is seeking renewal of this information collection for the maximum three-year approval period. To the extent information provided by operators for each information collection is Sensitive Security Information (SSI), TSA will protect in accordance with procedures meeting the transmission, handling, and storage requirements of SSI set forth in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. TSA estimates the annual hour burden for the information collection related to the voluntary collection of the CFSR form to be 320 hours. TSA will conduct a maximum of 80 facility reviews each year, with each review taking approximately 4 hours (320 = 80 × 4). TSA estimates the annual hour burden for the information collection related to TSA follow ups on the recommendations based on the above CFSRs made to facility owner/operators to be 480 hours. TSA estimates each owner/operator will spend approximately 2 hours to submit a response to TSA regarding its voluntary implementation of security recommendations made during each critical facility visit. If a maximum of 80 critical facilities are reviewed each year, and TSA follows up with each facility owner/operator every 6, 12, and 18 months following the visit, the total annual burden is 480 (80 × 2 x 3) hours. For the mandatory collection, TSA estimates 100 owner/operators will complete and submit the Pipeline Cybersecurity Self-Assessment form. It will take each owner/operator approximately 6 hours to complete and E:\FR\FM\30JNN1.SGM 30JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 30, 2021 / Notices submit this form, for a total of 600 hours (100 × 6). The total estimated burden for the entire information collection is 1,400 hours annually—320 hours for the CFSR form, 480 hours for the recommendations follow-up procedures, and 600 hours for the Pipeline Cybersecurity Self-Assessment form. Dated: June 24, 2021. Christina A. Walsh, TSA Paperwork Reduction Act Officer, Information Technology. [FR Doc. 2021–13884 Filed 6–29–21; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9110–05–P DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Transportation Security Administration Intent To Request Extension From OMB of One Current Public Collection of Information: Pipeline Operator Security Information Transportation Security Administration, DHS. ACTION: 60-Day notice. AGENCY: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) invites public comment on one currently approved Information Collection Request (ICR), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number 1652–0055, abstracted below that we will submit to OMB for an extension in compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). On May 26, 2021, OMB approved TSA’s request for an emergency revision of this collection to address the ongoing cybersecurity threat to pipeline systems and associated infrastructure. TSA is now seeking to renew the collection as it expires on November 30, 2021. The ICR describes the nature of the information collection and its expected burden. Specifically, the collection involves the submission of data concerning pipeline security incidents, appointment of cybersecurity coordinators, and coordinators’ contact information. SUMMARY: Send your comments by August 30, 2021. ADDRESSES: Comments may be emailed to TSAPRA@tsa.dhs.gov or delivered to the TSA PRA Officer, Information Technology (IT), TSA–11, Transportation Security Administration, 6595 Springfield Center Drive, Springfield, VA 20598–6011. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christina A. Walsh at the above address, or by telephone (571) 227–2062. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES DATES: VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:47 Jun 29, 2021 Jkt 253001 Comments Invited In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. The ICR documentation will be available at http://www.reginfo.gov upon its submission to OMB. Therefore, in preparation for OMB review and approval of the following information collection, TSA is soliciting comments to— (1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden; (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including using appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology. Information Collection Requirement OMB Control Number 1652–0055; Pipeline Operator Security Information. In addition to TSA’s broad responsibility and authority for ‘‘security in all modes of transportation . . . including security responsibilities . . . over modes of transportation [,]’’ see 49 U.S.C. 114, TSA is required to issue recommendations for pipeline security measures and conduct inspections to assess implementation of the recommendations. See sec. 1557 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110–53 (August 3, 2007). Consistent with these requirements, TSA produced Pipeline Security Guidelines in December 2010 and 2011, with an update published in April 2021. As the lead Federal agency for pipeline security and consistent with its statutory authorities, TSA needs to be notified of all (1) incidents that may indicate a deliberate attempt to disrupt pipeline operations and (2) activities that could be precursors to such an attempt. The Pipeline Security Guidelines encourage pipeline operators to notify the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) via phone or email as soon as possible if any of the following incidents occurs or if there is other reason to believe that a terrorist incident may be planned or may have occurred: PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 34777 • Explosions or fires of a suspicious nature affecting pipeline systems, facilities, or assets. • Actual or suspected attacks on pipeline systems, facilities, or assets. • Bomb threats or weapons of mass destruction threats to pipeline systems, facilities, or assets. • Theft of pipeline company vehicles, uniforms, or employee credentials. • Suspicious persons or vehicles around pipeline systems, facilities, assets, or right-of-way. • Suspicious photography or possible surveillance of pipeline systems, facilities, or assets. • Suspicious phone calls from people asking about the vulnerabilities or security practices of a pipeline system, facility, or asset operation. • Suspicious individuals applying for security-sensitive positions in the pipeline company. • Theft or loss of Sensitive Security Information (SSI) (detailed pipeline maps, security plans, etc.). When voluntarily contacting the TSOC, the Guidelines request pipeline operators to provide as much of the following information as possible: • Name and contact information (email address, telephone number). • The time and location of the incident, as specifically as possible. • A description of the incident or activity involved. • Who has been notified and what actions have been taken. • The names and/or descriptions of persons involved or suspicious parties and license plates as appropriate. On May 26, 2021, OMB approved TSA’s request for an emergency revision of this information collection. See ICR Reference Number: 202105–1652–002. The revision was required as a result of the recent ransomware attack on one of the Nation’s top pipeline supplies and other emerging threat information. TSA issued a Security Directive (SD) with requirements for TSA-specified critical pipeline owner/operators of hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas facilities. The SD included two new information collections. TSA now requires all owner/operators subject to the SD’s requirements to report cybersecurity incidents or potential cybersecurity incidents on their information and operational technology systems to the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within 12 hours of discovery using the CISA Reporting System. In addition, the SD requires critical pipeline owner/operators to appoint cybersecurity coordinators and to provide contact information for the coordinators to TSA. To ensure that E:\FR\FM\30JNN1.SGM 30JNN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 123 (Wednesday, June 30, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34775-34777]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-13884]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration


Intent To Request Revision From OMB of One Current Public 
Collection of Information: Critical Facility Information of the Top 100 
Most Critical Pipelines

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration, DHS.

ACTION: 60-Day notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) invites 
public comment on one currently approved Information Collection Request 
(ICR), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number 1652-0050, 
abstracted below that we will submit to OMB for a revision in 
compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The ICR addresses a 
statutory requirement for TSA to develop and implement a plan to 
inspect critical pipeline systems. On May 26, 2021, OMB approved TSA's 
request for an emergency revision of this collection to address the 
ongoing cybersecurity threat to pipeline systems and associated 
infrastructure. TSA is now seeking to renew and revise the collection 
as it expires on November 30, 2021. The ICR describes the nature of the 
information collection and its expected burden, which TSA is seeking to 
continue its collection of critical facility security information.

DATES: Send your comments by August 30, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be emailed to [email protected] or delivered to 
the TSA PRA Officer, Information Technology (IT), TSA-11, 
Transportation Security Administration, 6595 Springfield Center Drive, 
Springfield, VA 20598-6011

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christina A. Walsh at the above 
address, or by telephone (571) 227-2062.

[[Page 34776]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3501 et seq.), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is 
not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it 
displays a valid OMB control number. The ICR documentation will be 
available at http://www.reginfo.gov upon its submission to OMB. 
Therefore, in preparation for OMB review and approval of the following 
information collection, TSA is soliciting comments to--
    (1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
    (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to 
be collected; and
    (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those 
who are to respond, including using appropriate automated, electronic, 
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms 
of information technology.

Information Collection Requirement

    OMB Control Number 1652-0050; Critical Facility Information of the 
Top 100 Most Critical Pipelines: The Implementing Recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) specifically required TSA to 
develop and implement a plan for reviewing the pipeline security plans 
and inspecting the critical facilities of the 100 most critical 
pipeline systems.\1\ Pipeline owner/operators determine which 
facilities qualify as critical facilities based on guidance and 
criteria set forth in the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines published in 
December 2010 and 2011, with an update published in April 2021. To 
execute the 9/11 Act mandate, TSA visits critical pipeline facilities 
and collects site-specific information from pipeline owner/operators on 
facility security policies, procedures, and physical security measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See sec. 1557 of the 9/11 Act, Public Law 110-53 (121 Stat. 
266, 475; Aug. 3, 2007), as codified at 6 U.S.C. 1207.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA collects facility security information during the site visits 
using a Critical Facility Security Review (CFSR) form. The CFSR looks 
at individual pipeline facility security measures and procedures.\2\ 
This collection is voluntary. Information collected from the reviews is 
analyzed and used to determine strengths and weaknesses at the nation's 
critical pipeline facilities, areas to target for risk reduction 
strategies, pipeline industry implementation of the voluntary 
guidelines, and the potential need for regulations in accordance with 
the 9/11 Act provision previously cited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The CFSR differs from a Corporate Security Review (CSR) 
conducted by TSA in another information collection that looks at 
corporate or company-wide security management plans and practices 
for pipeline operators. See OMB Control No. 1652-0056 at https://www.reginfo.gov for the PRA approval of information collection for 
these CSRs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA visits with pipeline owner/operators to follow up on their 
implementation of security improvements and recommendations made during 
facility visits. During critical facility visits, TSA documents and 
provides recommendations to improve the security posture of the 
facility. TSA intends to continue to follow up with pipeline owner/
operators via email on their status toward implementation of the 
recommendations made during the critical facility visits. The follow up 
will be conducted at intervals of six, 12, and 18 months after the 
facility visit.
    TSA previously initiated the PRA approval process by publishing a 
notice on April 8, 2021, 86 FR 18291, announcing our intent to conduct 
this collection with a revision. Due to the emergency revision of the 
information collection, TSA is reinitiating the approval process.

Revision

    TSA is revising the information collection to align the CFSR 
question set with the revised Pipeline Security Guidelines, and to 
capture additional criticality criteria. As a result, the question set 
has been edited by removing, adding and rewriting several questions, to 
meet the Pipeline Security Guidelines and criticality needs. Further, 
TSA is moving the collection instrument from a PDF format to an Excel 
Workbook format.

Emergency Revision

    While the above listed collections are voluntary, on May 26, 2021, 
OMB approved TSA's request for an emergency revision of this 
information collection, allowing for the institution of mandatory 
requirements. See ICR Reference Number: 202105-1652-002. The revision 
was necessary as a result of the recent ransomware attack on one of the 
Nation's top pipeline supplies and other emerging threat information. 
In order to address the ongoing cybersecurity threat to pipeline 
systems and associated infrastructure, TSA issued a Security Directive 
(SD) applicable to owner/operators of a hazardous liquid and natural 
gas pipeline or liquefied natural gas facility notified by TSA that 
their pipeline system or facility is critical. These owner/operators 
are required to review Section 7 of TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines 
and assess current activities, using the TSA Pipeline Cybersecurity 
Self-Assessment form, to address cyber risk, and identify remediation 
measures that will be taken to fill those gaps and a timeframe for 
achieving those measures. The form provided is based on the instrument 
used for the CFSRs, limited to cybersecurity issues and augmented to 
address the scope of the SD. The critical pipeline owner/operators are 
required to report the results of this assessment to TSA within 30 days 
of issuance of the SD. In cooperation with the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, TSA will use this information to make a 
global assessment of the cyber risk posture of the industry.
    TSA is seeking renewal of this information collection for the 
maximum three-year approval period.
    To the extent information provided by operators for each 
information collection is Sensitive Security Information (SSI), TSA 
will protect in accordance with procedures meeting the transmission, 
handling, and storage requirements of SSI set forth in 49 CFR parts 15 
and 1520.
    TSA estimates the annual hour burden for the information collection 
related to the voluntary collection of the CFSR form to be 320 hours. 
TSA will conduct a maximum of 80 facility reviews each year, with each 
review taking approximately 4 hours (320 = 80 x 4).
    TSA estimates the annual hour burden for the information collection 
related to TSA follow ups on the recommendations based on the above 
CFSRs made to facility owner/operators to be 480 hours. TSA estimates 
each owner/operator will spend approximately 2 hours to submit a 
response to TSA regarding its voluntary implementation of security 
recommendations made during each critical facility visit. If a maximum 
of 80 critical facilities are reviewed each year, and TSA follows up 
with each facility owner/operator every 6, 12, and 18 months following 
the visit, the total annual burden is 480 (80 x 2 x 3) hours.
    For the mandatory collection, TSA estimates 100 owner/operators 
will complete and submit the Pipeline Cybersecurity Self-Assessment 
form. It will take each owner/operator approximately 6 hours to 
complete and

[[Page 34777]]

submit this form, for a total of 600 hours (100 x 6).
    The total estimated burden for the entire information collection is 
1,400 hours annually--320 hours for the CFSR form, 480 hours for the 
recommendations follow-up procedures, and 600 hours for the Pipeline 
Cybersecurity Self-Assessment form.

    Dated: June 24, 2021.
Christina A. Walsh,
TSA Paperwork Reduction Act Officer, Information Technology.
[FR Doc. 2021-13884 Filed 6-29-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-05-P