NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center, 26946-26950 [2021-10406]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 94 (Tuesday, May 18, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26946-26950]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-10406]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2021-0104]


NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an 
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit 
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC to reduce the minimum coverage limit 
for onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million 
for the Duane Arnold Energy Center.

DATES: The exemption was issued on May 11, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0104 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0104. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each 
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first 
time that it is mentioned in this document.
     Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of public

[[Page 26947]]

documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request to the PDR 
via email at pdr.resour[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-
4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3178; email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: May 12, 2021.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of 
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket No. 50-331

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Exemption

I. Background

    By letter dated January 18, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196), NextEra Energy 
Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) that it planned to 
permanently cease power operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Enter 
(DAEC) in the fourth quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20062E489), NEDA updated its timeline and 
certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power 
operations at DAEC on October 30, 2020. By letter dated August 27, 2020 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the NRC that power 
operations permanently ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and in a 
letter dated October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317), that 
the fuel was permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and 
placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020.
    Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessel, as specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating 
license for DAEC (No. DPR-49) no longer authorizes operation of the 
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The 
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., 
spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the DAEC 
facility in the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage 
installation (ISFSI).

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated July 16, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20198M579), 
NEDA requested an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) concerning onsite 
liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit 
the licensee to reduce the required level of onsite property damage 
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for DAEC.
    The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have 
and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and 
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident. 
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever 
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources 
(whichever is less).
    The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently 
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an 
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no 
longer authorized at DAEC, there are no events that would require the 
stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly, the 
risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite 
contamination at DAEC is also much lower than the risk of such an event 
at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption 
from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage insurance 
from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the reduced risk 
of an incident at the permanently shutdown and defueled DAEC site.

III. Discussion

    Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any 
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized 
by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and 
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the 
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were 
established after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 
accident out of concern that licensees may be unable to financially 
cover onsite cleanup costs in the event of a major nuclear accident. 
The specified $1.06 billion coverage amount requirement was developed 
based on an analysis of an accident at a nuclear reactor operating at 
power, resulting in a large fission product release and requiring 
significant resource expenditures to stabilize the reactor and 
ultimately decontaminate and cleanup the site.
    These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of 
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were 
derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive material from 
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor 
is very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In 
an operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor 
coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an 
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at DAEC 
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such 
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor vessel, RCS, 
and supporting systems no longer operate and have no function related 
to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents 
involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting 
systems are no longer applicable.
    During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are 
associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption 
request dated July 16, 2020, the licensee discussed both design-basis 
and beyond design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the 
SFP. The licensee determined that there are no possible design-basis 
events at DAEC that could result in an offsite radiological release 
exceeding the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of 1 
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a way 
to demonstrate that any possible radiological releases would be minimal 
and would not require precautionary protective actions (e.g., 
sheltering in place or evacuation). The NRC staff evaluated the 
radiological consequences associated with various decommissioning 
activities and the design-basis accidents at DAEC, in consideration of 
the permanently shutdown and defueled condition. The possible design-
basis accident scenarios at DAEC have greatly reduced radiological 
consequences. Based on its

[[Page 26948]]

review, the NRC staff concluded that no reasonably conceivable design-
basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release greater than 
the EPA PAGs.
    The only incident that might lead to a significant radiological 
release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium 
fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond design-basis 
accident scenario that involves loss of water inventory from the SFP 
resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in 
substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The 
probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat 
of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a 
zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time 
since DAEC has been permanently shut down.
    The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite 
financial protection, based on this analysis of the zirconium fire 
risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements 
for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 
CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML15062A483), the NRC staff recommended changes to the power reactor 
financial protection regulations that would allow licensees to lower 
onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel 
stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements 
Memorandum to SECY-96-256, dated January 28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC staff's recommendation 
that, among other things, would allow permanently shutdown power 
reactor licensees to reduce commercial onsite property damage insurance 
coverage to $50 million when the licensee was able to demonstrate the 
technical criterion that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP 
was drained of water.
    The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar 
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic 
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999 
(64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal 
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station, 
published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638); 
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the Federal 
Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 
Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28, 2018 (83 FR 
67365); Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal 
Register on January 14, 2020 (85 FR 2153); and Three Mile Island 
Nuclear Station, Unit 1, published in the Federal Register on March 26, 
2021 (86 FR 16241)). These prior exemptions were based on these 
licensees demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent 
with the technical criterion discussed above.
    In its July 16, 2020, request, the licensee compared the DAEC fuel 
storage parameters with those used in NRC generic evaluations of fuel 
cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment 
of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized-Water 
Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 1997 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098). The analysis described in NUREG/CR-
6451 determined that natural air circulation would adequately cool fuel 
that has decayed for 7 months after operation in a typical BWR.
    In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, 
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession 
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff 
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at 
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for onsite 
property damage insurance. Providing an analysis of when the spent fuel 
stored in the SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure that can be 
used to demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium fire is 
exceedingly low.
    The NRC staff further evaluated the issue of zirconium fires and 
presented an independent evaluation of an SFP subject to a severe 
earthquake in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis 
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark l Boiling 
Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14255A365). The specific reference plant used for this study is a 
General Electric (GE) Type 4 BWR with a Mark I containment. The 
analysis postulates a severe earthquake and evaluates the potential for 
the SFP to lose inventory and potentially uncover the spent fuel. This 
evaluation concluded that, for the representative BWR, spent fuel 
stored in a dispersed high-density configuration would be adequately 
cooled by natural circulation air flow within several months after 
discharge from a reactor if the pool was drained of water during a 
severe earthquake scenario. Specifically, the NUREG-2161 analysis 
identified that 107 days after shutdown, the stored fuel would have 
decayed sufficiently and be in a configuration that allows for air 
cooling of the fuel during a severe earthquake. This would prevent 
radiological releases without the need for additional mitigation 
actions; therefore, no release as a result of a zirconium cladding fire 
would be expected.
    The NRC staff compared the DAEC facility with the reference plant 
in NUREG-2161 and identified that DAEC is also a GE Type 4 BWR with a 
Mark I containment. The staff also confirmed (see ADAMS Accession No. 
ML21089A207) that DAEC stores the spent fuel following a dispersed 
high-density loading pattern consistent with the dispersed high-density 
configuration assumed in NUREG-2161. Therefore, the NRC staff 
determined that the stored fuel in the DAEC SFP will remain in a 
coolable configuration following a design basis seismic event.
    Based on the evaluation in SECY-96-256, as well as DAEC's 
conformance with the analysis in NUREG-2161, the NRC staff determined 
$50 million to be an adequate level of onsite property damage insurance 
for a decommissioning reactor once the spent fuel in the SFP is no 
longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. However, the NRC staff has 
postulated that there is still a potential for other radiological 
incidents at a decommissioning reactor that could result in significant 
onsite contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC 
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank 
(~450,000 gallons) causing soil contamination and potential groundwater 
contamination as the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and 
remediate (other than an SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large 
liquid radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to 
have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million. 
Therefore, the NRC staff determined that the licensee's proposal to 
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be consistent 
with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in 
SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid 
radiological waste tank at the DAEC site, should such an event occur.
    The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction 
in onsite property damage insurance coverage to

[[Page 26949]]

a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256 and subsequent 
insurance considerations resulting from additional zirconium fire risks 
as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100, as well as NUREG/CR-6451 
and NUREG-2161. In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar 
exemptions have been granted to other permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors, upon demonstration that the criterion of the zirconium 
fire risks from the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible 
concern. The NRC staff concluded that 10 months after the permanent 
cessation of power operations on August 10, 2020, sufficient irradiated 
fuel decay time will have elapsed at DAEC to decrease the probability 
of an onsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire 
accident to negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to 
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with 
the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture 
of a large liquid radwaste storage tank.
    The NRC staff also notes that in accordance with Revision 1 of the 
DAEC Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) dated 
February 2, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21036A160), all spent fuel will 
be removed from the SFP and moved into dry storage at an onsite ISFSI 
by April 2022, and the probability of an initiating event that would 
threaten SFP integrity occurring before that time is extremely low, 
which further supports the conclusion that the zirconium fire risk is 
negligible

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow NEDA to 
reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property damage insurance. 
As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when the exemptions are authorized 
by law.
    As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the 
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance 
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256. 
Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 10 months after the permanent 
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time 
will have elapsed at DAEC to decrease the probability of an onsite and 
offsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident 
to negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce 
onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with the 
maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture of a 
large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed 
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, based on 
its review of the licensee's exemption request as discussed above, and 
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption 
is authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety

    The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that 
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be 
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for 
DAEC are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating. 
However, DAEC permanently shut down on August 10, 2020, and permanently 
defueled as of October 12, 2020. The permanently shutdown and defueled 
status of the facility results in a significant reduction in the number 
and severity of potential accidents and, correspondingly, a significant 
reduction in the potential for and severity of onsite property damage. 
The proposed reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does 
not impact the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The 
proposed level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the reduced 
consequences of potential nuclear accidents at DAEC. Therefore, the NRC 
staff concludes that granting the requested exemption will not present 
an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements 
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely 
affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect 
special nuclear material. Physical security measures at DAEC are not 
affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption 
is consistent with the common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
regulation.
    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide 
reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize 
reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site 
decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a 
significant amount of radiological material. Since DAEC permanently 
shut down on August 10, 2020, and permanently defueled as of October 
12, 2020, it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of 
design-basis accidents or other credible events at DAEC to exceed the 
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. The licensee has 
evaluated the consequences of highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis 
conditions involving a loss of coolant from the SFP. The analyses show 
that 10 months after the permanent cessation of power operations on 
August 10, 2020, the likelihood of such an event leading to a large 
radiological release is negligible. The NRC staff's evaluation of the 
licensee's analyses confirm this conclusion.
    The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million 
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and 
decontamination cost as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the 
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the 
DAEC site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff 
concludes that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is 
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the 
permanently shutdown and defueled DAEC reactor.
    Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present 
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that 
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation 
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by 
others similarly situated.
    The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to 
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the 
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary and 
commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the 
site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in 
excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been 
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
    The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would 
result in an

[[Page 26950]]

undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those 
contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are significantly in 
excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
    Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity 
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by 
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after 
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. 
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the 
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards 
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is 
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant 
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological 
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought 
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
    As the Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and 
Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, I 
have determined that approval of the exemption request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because 
reducing the licensee's onsite property damage insurance for DAEC does 
not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is 
unrelated to the operation of DAEC or site activities. Accordingly, 
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in 
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no 
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational 
radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with 
construction so there is no significant construction impact. The 
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential 
amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the 
site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for, 
or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would 
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic 
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the 
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The 
requirement for onsite property damage insurance involves surety, 
insurance, and indemnity matters only.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present as set 
forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
    Therefore, the Commission hereby grants NEDA an exemption from the 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for DAEC. DAEC permanently ceased 
power operations on August 10, 2020. The exemption permits DAEC to 
lower the minimum required onsite insurance to $50 million 10 months 
after permanent cessation of power operations.
    The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent 
cessation of power operations at DAEC, which is June 10, 2021.

    Dated: May 11, 2021.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

/RA/

Patricia K. Holahan,

Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 2021-10406 Filed 5-17-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P