NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center, 26961-26966 [2021-10405]
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 94 / Tuesday, May 18, 2021 / Notices
For exigent circumstances, the
Commission has either issued a Federal
Register notice providing opportunity
for public comment or has used local
media to provide notice to the public in
the area surrounding a licensee’s facility
of the licensee’s application and of the
Commission’s proposed determination
of NSHC. The Commission has provided
a reasonable opportunity for the public
to comment, using its best efforts to
make available to the public means of
communication for the public to
respond quickly, and in the case of
telephone comments, the comments
have been recorded or transcribed as
appropriate and the licensee has been
informed of the public comments.
In circumstances where failure to act
in a timely way would have resulted, for
example, in derating or shutdown of a
nuclear power plant or in prevention of
either resumption of operation or of
increase in power output up to the
plant’s licensed power level, the
Commission may not have had an
opportunity to provide for public
comment on its NSHC determination. In
such case, the license amendment has
been issued without opportunity for
comment prior to issuance. If there has
been some time for public comment but
less than 30 days, the Commission may
provide an opportunity for public
comment. If comments have been
requested, it is so stated. In either event,
the State has been consulted by
telephone whenever possible.
Under its regulations, the Commission
may issue and make an amendment
immediately effective, notwithstanding
the pendency before it of a request for
a hearing from any person, in advance
of the holding and completion of any
required hearing, where it has
determined that NSHC is involved.
The Commission has applied the
standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has made
a final determination that the
amendment involves NSHC. The basis
for this determination is contained in
the documents related to each action.
Accordingly, the amendment has been
issued and made effective as indicated.
For those amendments that have not
been previously noticed in the Federal
Register, within 60 days after the date
of publication of this notice, any
persons (petitioner) whose interest may
be affected by this action may file a
request for a hearing and petition for
leave to intervene (petition) with respect
to the action. Petitions shall be filed in
accordance with the guidance
concerning the Commission’s ‘‘Agency
Rules of Practice and Procedure’’ in 10
26961
CFR part 2 as discussed in section II.A
of this document.
Unless otherwise indicated, the
Commission has determined that the
amendment satisfies the criteria for
categorical exclusion in accordance
with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant
to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental
impact statement or environmental
assessment need be prepared for this
amendment. If the Commission has
prepared an environmental assessment
under the special circumstances
provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has
made a determination based on that
assessment, it is so indicated in the
safety evaluation for the amendment.
For further details with respect to
these actions, see the amendment and
associated documents such as the
Commission’s letter and safety
evaluation, which may be obtained
using the ADAMS accession numbers
indicated in the table below. The safety
evaluation will provide the ADAMS
accession number(s) for the application
for amendment and the Federal Register
citation for any environmental
assessment. All of these items can be
accessed as described in the ‘‘Obtaining
Information and Submitting Comments’’
section of this document.
LICENSE AMENDMENT ISSUANCE(S)—EXIGENT/EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.; Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2; Appling County, GA
Docket No(s) ...................................
Amendment Date ............................
ADAMS Accession No ....................
Amendment No(s) ...........................
Brief Description of Amendment(s)
Local Media Notice (Yes/No) ..........
Public Comments Requested as to
Proposed NSHC (Yes/No).
50–366.
April 22, 2021.
ML21109A388.
254.
The one-time emergency amendment approved a revision to Edwin I. Hatch, Unit 2 Technical Specification
3.5.1, ‘‘ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System]—Operating,’’ to extend the Completion Time from 7
days to 15 days to effect repairs and testing of the 2D residual heat removal pump that failed during a
test on April 16, 2021. The amendment allows the unit to continue operating at full power with compensatory measures until May 1, 2021.
No.
No.
Dated: May 12, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Caroline L. Carusone,
Deputy Director, Division of Operating
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[Docket No. 50–331; NRC–2021–0105]
[FR Doc. 2021–10374 Filed 5–17–21; 8:45 am]
AGENCY:
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC;
Duane Arnold Energy Center
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from
the licensee that would permit NextEra
Energy Duane Arnold, LLC to reduce the
required level of primary offsite liability
insurance from $450 million to $100
SUMMARY:
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million and to eliminate the
requirement to carry secondary financial
protection for the Duane Arnold Energy
Center.
DATES: The exemption was issued on
May 11, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2021–0105 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2021–0105. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 94 / Tuesday, May 18, 2021 / Notices
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301–415–0624; email:
Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–
415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@
nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced (if it is
available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this
document.
• Attention: The PDR, where you may
examine and order copies of public
documents, is currently closed. You
may submit your request to the PDR via
email at pdr.resource@nrc.gov or call 1–
800–397–4209 or 301–415–4737,
between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST),
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–3178; email: Marlayna.Doell@
nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of
the exemption is attached.
Dated: May 12, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning
Branch, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
Attachment—Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50–331
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NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC;
Duane Arnold Energy Center;
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated January 18, 2019
Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML19023A196, NextEra
Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the
licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the
Commission) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at
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the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC)
in the fourth quarter of 2020. By letter
dated March 2, 2020 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML20062E489), NEDA
updated its timeline and certified to the
NRC that it planned to permanently
cease power operations at DAEC on
October 30, 2020. By letter dated August
27, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the
NRC that power operations permanently
ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and
in a letter dated October 12, 2020
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317),
that the fuel was permanently removed
from the DAEC reactor vessel and
placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) as of
October 12, 2020.
Based on the docketing of these
certifications for permanent cessation of
operations and permanent removal of
fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified
in Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) section 50.82(a)(2),
the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility
operating license for DAEC (No. DPR–
49) no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of
fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is
still authorized to possess and store
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel.
Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at
the DAEC facility in the SFP and in a
dry cask independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 16, 2020 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML20198M584), NEDA
requested an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) concerning offsite primary
and secondary liability insurance. The
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
would permit the licensee to reduce the
required level of primary offsite liability
insurance from $450 million to $100
million and to eliminate the
requirement to carry secondary financial
protection for DAEC.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
requires each licensee to have and
maintain primary financial protection in
an amount of $450 million. In addition,
the licensee is required to participate in
an industry retrospective rating plan
(secondary financial protection) that
commits each licensee to pay into an
insurance pool to be used for damages
that may exceed primary insurance
coverage. Participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan will subject the
licensee to deferred premium charges
up to a maximum total deferred
premium of $131,056,000 with respect
to any nuclear incident at any operating
nuclear power plant and up to a
maximum annual deferred premium of
$20,496,000 per incident.
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Many of the accident scenarios
postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power
reactors involve failures or malfunctions
of systems, which could affect the fuel
in the reactor core and, in the most
severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of large quantities of
fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at DAEC
and the permanent removal of the fuel
from the reactor vessel, many accidents
are no longer possible. Similarly, the
associated risk of offsite liability
damages that would require insurance
or indemnification is commensurately
lower for such plants. Therefore, the
licensee requested an exemption from
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to permit a
reduction in primary offsite liability
insurance and to withdraw from
participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ‘‘Specific
exemptions,’’ the Commission may,
upon application of any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
such exemptions from the requirements
of the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public
interest. The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s request for an exemption from
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) and has concluded
that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in
the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957
(PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to
compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident.
Specifically, the PAA requires licensees
of facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of
100,000 electrical kilowatts or more’’ to
maintain the maximum amount of
primary offsite liability insurance
commercially available (currently $450
million) and a specified amount of
secondary insurance coverage (currently
up to $131,056,000 per reactor). In the
event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each
licensee would be assessed a prorated
share of the excess damages, up to
$131,056,000 per reactor, for a total of
approximately $13 billion per nuclear
incident. The NRC’s regulations at 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA
insurance requirements and set forth the
amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee
must have.
As noted above, the PAA
requirements with respect to primary
and secondary insurance and the
implementing regulations at 10 CFR
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140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of
facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of
100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.’’ In
accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the
license for a power reactor no longer
authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel into
the reactor vessel upon the docketing of
the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel.
Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to
generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is
undergoing decommissioning has no
‘‘rated capacity.’’ Thus, the NRC may
take the reactor licensee out of the
category of reactor licensees that are
required to maintain the maximum
available insurance and to participate in
the secondary retrospective insurance
pool.
The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) were established to
require a licensee to maintain sufficient
insurance, as specified under the PAA,
to satisfy liability claims by members of
the public for personal injury, property
damage, and the legal cost associated
with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear
accident at an operating reactor with a
rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts
electric or greater. Thus, the insurance
levels established by this regulation, as
required by the PAA, were associated
with the risks and potential
consequences of an accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity
of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
The legal and associated technical
basis for granting exemptions from 10
CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY–93–
127, ‘‘Financial Protection Required of
Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants
During Decommissioning,’’ dated May
10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12257A628). The legal analysis
underlying SECY–93–127 concluded
that, upon a technical finding that lesser
potential hazards exist after permanent
cessation of power operations (and the
reactor having no ‘‘rated capacity’’), the
Commission has the discretion under
the PAA to reduce the amount of
insurance required of a licensee
undergoing decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a
reactor has permanently ceased power
operations is not itself determinative as
to whether a licensee may cease
providing the offsite liability coverage
required by the PAA and 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of
freshly discharged irradiated fuel in the
SFP at a recently shutdown reactor, the
potential for an offsite radiological
release from a zirconium fire with
consequences comparable in some
respects to an operating reactor accident
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remains. That risk is very low at the
time of reactor shutdown because of
design provisions that prevent a
significant reduction in coolant
inventory in the SFP under normal and
accident conditions, and becomes no
longer credible once the continual
reduction in decay heat provides ample
time to restore coolant inventory and
permits air cooling in a drained SFP.
After that time, the probability of a large
offsite radiological release from a
zirconium fire is negligible for
permanently shutdown reactors, but the
SFP is still operational and an inventory
of radioactive materials still exists
onsite. Therefore, an evaluation of the
potential for offsite damage is necessary
to determine the appropriate level of
offsite insurance post shutdown, in
accordance with the Commission’s
discretionary authority under the PAA
to establish an appropriate level of
required financial protection for such
permanently shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an
evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and
transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor, no
reasonably conceivable potential
accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During
normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the reactor
coolant system (RCS) removes heat
generated by the reactor. The RCS
transfers this heat away from the reactor
core by converting reactor feedwater to
steam, which then flows to the main
turbine generator to produce electricity.
Most of the accident scenarios
postulated for operating power reactors
involve failures or malfunctions of
systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe
postulated accidents would involve the
release of large quantities of fission
products. With the permanent cessation
of reactor operations at DAEC and the
permanent removal of the fuel from the
reactor core, such accidents are no
longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and
supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the
storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore,
postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or
supporting systems are no longer
applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the
principal radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel
onsite. On a case-by-case basis,
licensees undergoing decommissioning
have been granted permission to reduce
the required amount of primary offsite
liability insurance coverage from $450
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26963
million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One
of the technical criteria for granting the
exemption is that the possibility of a
design-basis event that could cause
significant offsite damage has been
significantly reduced.
The NRC staff performed an
evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for DAEC when permanently defueled
as part of SECY–21–0006, ‘‘Request by
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Duane
Arnold Energy Center,’’ dated January
15, 2021 (ADAMS Package Accession
No. ML20218A875).
NEDA has stated, and the NRC staff
agrees, that while spent fuel remains in
the SFP, the only postulated designbasis accident that would remain
applicable to DAEC in the permanently
defueled condition that could contribute
a significant dose is a fuel handling
accident (FHA) in the reactor building,
where the SFP is located. For
completeness, the NRC staff also
evaluated the applicability of other
design-basis accidents documented in
the DAEC Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS
Package Accession No. ML19100A055)
to ensure that these accidents would not
have consequences that could
potentially exceed the 10 CFR 50.67
dose limits and Regulatory Guide 1.183,
‘‘Alternative Radiological Source Terms
for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at
Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ dose
acceptance criteria or approach the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
early phase protective action guides
(PAGs).
In the DAEC UFSAR, the licensee has
determined that within 19 days after
shutdown (with open containment), the
FHA doses would decrease to a level
that would not warrant protective
actions under the EPA early phase PAG
framework, notwithstanding meeting
the dose limit requirements under 10
CFR 50.67 and dose acceptance criteria
under Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC
staff notes that the doses from an FHA
are dominated by the isotope Iodine131. DAEC permanently ceased power
operations on August 10, 2020. With 10
months of decay, the thyroid dose from
an FHA would be negligible. After 10
months of decay, the only isotope
remaining in significant amounts,
among those postulated to be released in
a design-basis FHA, would be Krypton85. Since Krypton-85 primarily decays
by beta emission, the calculated skin
dose from an FHA analysis would make
an insignificant contribution to the total
effective dose equivalent, which is the
parameter of interest in the
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determination of the EPA early phase
PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. The
NRC staff concludes that the dose
consequence from an FHA for the
permanently shutdown DAEC would
not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
Therefore, any offsite consequence from
a design-basis radiological release is
highly unlikely and, thus, a significant
amount of offsite liability insurance
coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event
that has the potential to lead to a
significant radiological release at a
permanently shutdown and defueled
reactor is a zirconium fire in the SFP.
The zirconium fire scenario is a
postulated, but highly unlikely, accident
scenario that involves the loss of water
inventory from the SFP resulting in a
significant heatup of the spent fuel and
culminating in substantial zirconium
cladding oxidation and fuel damage.
The probability of a zirconium fire
scenario is related to the decay heat of
the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium
fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time that DAEC has been
permanently shut down.
In SECY–93–127 the NRC staff
concluded that there was a low
likelihood and reduced short-term
public health consequences of a
zirconium fire once a decommissioning
plant’s spent fuel has sufficiently
decayed. In its Staff Requirements
Memorandum, ‘‘Financial Protection
Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear
Power Plants during Decommissioning,’’
dated July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML003760936), the Commission
approved a policy that authorized,
through the exemption process,
withdrawal from participation in the
secondary insurance layer and a
reduction in commercial liability
insurance coverage to $100 million
when a licensee is able to demonstrate
that the spent fuel could be air-cooled
if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical
criterion to grant similar exemptions to
other decommissioning reactors (e.g.,
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on
January 13, 2020 (85 FR 1827)).
Additional discussions of other
decommissioning reactor licensees that
have received exemptions to reduce
their primary insurance level to $100
million are provided in SECY–96–256,
‘‘Changes to the Financial Protection
Requirements for Permanently
Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10
CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,’’
dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15062A483). These
prior exemptions were based on the
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licensee demonstrating that the SFP
could be air-cooled consistent with the
technical criterion discussed above.
In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated
Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28,
2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy
Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance,
and Emergency Preparedness
Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in
Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June 4, 2001
(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML003721626
and ML011450420, respectively), the
NRC staff discussed additional
information concerning SFP zirconium
fire risks at decommissioning reactors
and associated implications for offsite
insurance. Analyzing when the spent
fuel stored in the SFP is capable of
adequate air-cooling is one measure that
demonstrates when the probability of a
zirconium fire would be exceedingly
low.
The NRC staff evaluated the issue of
zirconium fires and presented an
independent evaluation of an SFP
subject to a severe earthquake in
NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a
Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S.
Mark l Boiling Water Reactor,’’ dated
September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365). The specific reference
plant used for this study is a General
Electric (GE) Type 4 BWR with a Mark
I containment. The analysis postulates a
severe earthquake and evaluates the
potential for the SFP to lose inventory
and potentially uncover the spent fuel.
This evaluation concluded that, for the
representative BWR, spent fuel stored in
a dispersed high-density configuration
would be adequately cooled by natural
circulation air flow within several
months after discharge from a reactor if
the pool was drained of water during a
severe earthquake scenario. Specifically,
the NUREG–2161 analysis identified
that 107 days after shutdown, the stored
fuel would have decayed sufficiently
and be in a configuration that allows for
air cooling of the fuel during a severe
earthquake. This would prevent
radiological releases without the need
for additional mitigation actions;
therefore, no release as a result of a
zirconium cladding fire would be
expected.
The NRC staff compared the DAEC
facility with the reference plant in
NUREG–2161 and identified that DAEC
is also a GE Type 4 BWR with a Mark
I containment. The staff also confirmed
(see ADAMS Accession No.
ML21089A207) that DAEC stores the
spent fuel following a dispersed highdensity loading pattern consistent with
the dispersed high-density configuration
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assumed in NUREG–2161. Therefore,
the NRC staff determined that the stored
fuel in the DAEC SFP will remain in a
coolable configuration following a
design basis seismic event. Based on
DAEC’s conformance with the analysis
in NUREG–2161, the NRC staff finds
that there is reasonable assurance that
the fuel stored in the DAEC SFP is air
coolable 10 months after the permanent
shutdown of the reactor.
In addition, the licensee performed
adiabatic heatup analyses in which a
complete drainage of the SFP is
combined with rearrangement of spent
fuel rack geometry and/or the addition
of rubble to the SFP; this type of
analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via
conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. NEDA’s adiabatic
heatup analyses demonstrate that 10
months after the permanent cessation of
operations, there would be at least 10
hours after the loss of all means of
cooling (both air and/or water) before
the spent fuel cladding would reach a
temperature where the potential for a
significant offsite radiological release
could occur.
In the July 16, 2020, application,
NEDA furnished the following
information: ‘‘Because of the length of
time it would take for the adiabatic heat
up to occur, there is ample time to
respond to any partial drain down event
that might cause such an occurrence by
restoring cooling or makeup, or
providing spray. As a result, the
likelihood that such a scenario would
progress to a zirconium fire is deemed
not credible.’’
In the NRC staff’s evaluation
contained in SECY–21–0006, the NRC
staff assessed the NEDA accident
analyses associated with the
radiological risks from a zirconium fire
at a permanently shutdown and
defueled DAEC after 10 months of
decay. For the highly unlikely beyond
design-basis accident scenario where
the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such
a manner that all methods of heat
removal from the spent fuel are no
longer available, the NRC staff found
that there will be a minimum of 10
hours from the initiation of the accident
until the cladding reaches a temperature
where offsite radiological release might
occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours
is sufficient time to support deployment
of mitigation equipment, consistent
with plant conditions, to prevent the
zirconium cladding from reaching a
point of rapid oxidation.
The NRC staff has determined that the
licensee’s proposed reduction in
primary offsite liability coverage to a
level of $100 million and the licensee’s
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proposed withdrawal from participation
in the secondary insurance pool for
offsite financial protection are
consistent with the policy established in
SECY–93–127 and subsequent
insurance considerations resulting from
zirconium fire risks, as discussed in
SECY–00–0145 and SECY–01–0100.
The NRC has previously determined in
SECY–00–0145 that the minimum
offsite financial protection requirement
may be reduced to $100 million and that
secondary insurance is not required
once it is determined that the spent fuel
in the SFP is no longer thermalhydraulically capable of sustaining a
zirconium fire based on a plant-specific
analysis. In addition, the NRC staff
notes that similar exemptions from
these insurance requirements have been
granted to other permanently shutdown
and defueled power reactors upon
satisfactory demonstration that the
zirconium fire risk from the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible
concern.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing
regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that
have a rated capacity of 100,000
kilowatts electric or more to have and
maintain $450 million in primary
financial protection and to participate in
a secondary retrospective insurance
pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8,
the Commission may grant exemptions
from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are
authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting
exemptions from 10 CFR part 140 are set
forth in SECY–93–127. The legal
analysis underlying SECY–93–127
concluded that, upon a technical
finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of
operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the
amount of insurance required of a
licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption
request, the NRC staff concludes that the
technical criteria for relieving NEDA
from its existing primary and secondary
insurance obligations have been met. As
explained above, the NRC staff found
that no reasonably conceivable designbasis accident exists that could cause an
offsite release greater than the EPA
PAGs and, therefore, that any offsite
consequence from a design-basis
radiological release is highly unlikely
and the need for a significant amount of
offsite liability insurance coverage is
unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC
staff determined that, after 10 months
decay, the fuel stored in the DAEC SFP
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16:40 May 17, 2021
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will be capable of being adequately
cooled by air in the highly unlikely
event of pool drainage. Moreover, in the
highly unlikely beyond design-basis
accident scenario where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that
all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the
NRC staff has determined that at least 10
hours would be available and is
sufficient time to support deployment of
mitigation equipment, consistent with
plant conditions, to prevent the
zirconium cladding from reaching a
point of rapid oxidation. Thus, the NRC
staff concludes that the fuel stored in
the DEAC SFP will have decayed
sufficiently by the requested effective
date for the exemption of 10 months
after permanent cessation of power
operations to support a reduction in the
required offsite insurance consistent
with SECY–00–0145.
The NRC staff has determined that
granting the licensee’s proposed
exemption will not result in a violation
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
Section 170, or other laws, as amended,
which require licensees to maintain
adequate financial protection.
Accordingly, consistent with the legal
standard presented in SECY–93–127,
under which decommissioning reactor
licensees may be relieved of the
requirements to carry the maximum
amount of insurance available and to
participate in the secondary
retrospective premium pool where there
is sufficient technical justification, the
NRC staff concludes that the requested
exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the
Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 140.11 were established to require
licensees to maintain sufficient offsite
liability insurance to ensure adequate
funding for offsite liability claims
following an accident at an operating
reactor. However, the regulation does
not consider the reduced potential for
and consequence of nuclear incidents at
permanently shutdown and
decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY–93–127,
SECY–00–0145, and SECY–01–0100
allows licensees of decommissioning
plants to reduce their primary offsite
liability insurance and to withdraw
from participation in the retrospective
rating pool for deferred premium
charges. As discussed in these
documents, once the zirconium fire
concern is determined to be negligible,
possible accident scenario risks at
permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors are greatly reduced when
compared to the risks at operating
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26965
reactors, and the associated potential for
offsite financial liabilities from an
accident are commensurately less. The
licensee analyzed and the NRC staff
confirmed that the risks of accidents
that could result in an offsite
radiological release are minimal,
thereby justifying the proposed
reductions in offsite primary liability
insurance and withdrawal from
participation in the secondary
retrospective rating pool for deferred
premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the
secondary retrospective rating pool
could potentially have adverse
consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a
nuclear incident sufficient to trigger the
secondary insurance layer occurred at
another nuclear power plant, the
licensee could incur financial liability
of up to $131,056,000. However,
because DAEC is permanently shut
down, it cannot produce revenue from
electricity generation sales to cover such
a liability. Therefore, such liability if
subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the
facility to conduct and complete timely
radiological decontamination and
decommissioning activities. In addition,
as SECY–93–127 concluded, the shared
financial risk exposure to the licensee is
greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by DAEC when
compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public
at decommissioning power plants does
not warrant that the licensee be required
to carry full operating reactor insurance
coverage after the requisite spent fuel
cooling period has elapsed following
final reactor shutdown. The licensee’s
proposed financial protection limits will
maintain a level of liability insurance
coverage commensurate with the risk to
the public. These changes are consistent
with previous NRC policy as discussed
in SECY–00–0145 and exemptions
approved for other decommissioning
reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose
of the regulations will not be adversely
affected by the reductions in insurance
coverage. Accordingly, an exemption
from participation in the secondary
insurance pool and a reduction in the
primary insurance to $100 million, a
value more in line with the potential
consequences of accidents, would be in
the public interest in that this ensures
that there will be adequate funds to
address any of those consequences and
helps to ensure the safe and timely
decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has
concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit
NEDA to lower the DAEC primary
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jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
insurance levels and to withdraw from
the secondary retrospective premium
pool at the requested effective date of 10
months after the permanent cessation of
power operations, is in the public
interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC’s approval of an exemption
from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of
actions that the Commission, by rule or
regulation, has declared to be a
categorical exclusion after first finding
that the category of actions does not
individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded
from the requirement to prepare an
environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting
of an exemption from the requirements
of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR
is a categorical exclusion provided that:
(i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite; (iii) there is
no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no
significant construction impact; (v)
there is no significant increase in the
potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the
requirements from which an exemption
is sought involve surety, insurance, or
indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery,
and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, I have
determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because
reducing the licensee’s offsite liability
requirements for DAEC does not: (1)
Involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; (2) create
the possibility of a new or different kind
of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of
safety. The exempted financial
protection regulation is unrelated to the
operation of DAEC or site activities.
Accordingly, there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite and no
significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure. The exempted
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:40 May 17, 2021
Jkt 253001
regulation is not associated with
construction so there is no significant
construction impact. The exempted
regulation does not concern the source
term (i.e., potential amount of radiation
in an accident) or any activities
conducted at the site. Therefore, there is
no significant increase in the potential
for, or consequences of, a radiological
accident. In addition, there would be no
significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions
in the region resulting from issuance of
the requested exemption. The
requirement for offsite liability
insurance involves surety, insurance, or
indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR
51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by
law and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission
hereby grants NEDA an exemption from
the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
for DAEC. DAEC permanently ceased
power operations on August 10, 2020.
The exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) permits DAEC to reduce the
required level of primary financial
protection from $450 million to $100
million and to withdraw from
participation in the secondary layer of
financial protection 10 months after
permanent cessation of power
operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10
months after permanent cessation of
power operations at DAEC, which is
June 10, 2021.
Dated: May 11, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021–10405 Filed 5–17–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT
Submission for Review: Renewal
Without Change of an Existing
Information Collection, OPM Form
1655, Application for Senior
Administrative Law Judge, and OPM
Form 1655–A, Geographic Preference
Statement for Senior Administrative
Law Judge Applicant, OMB Control
Number 3206–0248
U.S. Office of Personnel
Management.
ACTION: 60-Day notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) offers the general
public and other Federal agencies the
opportunity to comment on a revised
information collection request (ICR)
3206–0248, OPM Form 1655,
Application for Senior Administrative
Law Judge, and OPM Form 1655–A,
Geographic Preference Statement for
Senior Administrative Law Judge
Applicant.
SUMMARY:
Comments are encouraged and
will be accepted until July 19, 2021.
This process is conducted in accordance
with 5 CFR 1320.8.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
invited to submit written comments on
the proposed information collection to
the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management, Administrative Law Judge
Program Office, 1900 E Street NW,
Washington, DC 20415, Attention: Ms.
Diane Hobbs, Administrative Law Judge
Program Manager or send via electronic
mail to diane.hobbs@opm.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A
copy of this ICR, with applicable
supporting documentation, may be
obtained by contacting the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, Administrative
Law Judge Program Office, 1900 E Street
NW, Washington, DC 20415, Attention:
Ms. Diane Hobbs. Administrative Law
Judge Program Manager, or by sending
a request via electronic mail to
diane.hobbs@opm.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As
required by 44 U.S.C. 3506, OPM is
soliciting comments for this collection.
OPM Form 1655, Application for Senior
Administrative Law Judge, and OPM
Form 1655–A, Geographic Preference
Statement for Senior Administrative
Law Judge Applicant, are used by
retired Administrative Law Judges
seeking reemployment on a temporary
and intermittent basis to complete
hearings of one or more specified case(s)
in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946. This revision
DATES:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 94 (Tuesday, May 18, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26961-26966]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-10405]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2021-0105]
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC to reduce the required level of
primary offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million
and to eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial
protection for the Duane Arnold Energy Center.
DATES: The exemption was issued on May 11, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0105 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0105. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
[[Page 26962]]
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; telephone: 301-415-0624; email:
[email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individual
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of public documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request
to the PDR via email at [email protected]c.gov or call 1-800-397-4209 or
301-415-4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3178; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: May 12, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50-331
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated January 18, 2019 Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196, NextEra Energy
Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Center
(DAEC) in the fourth quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20062E489), NEDA updated its timeline and
certified to the NRC that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at DAEC on October 30, 2020. By letter dated August 27, 2020
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the NRC that power
operations permanently ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and in a
letter dated October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317), that
the fuel was permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and
placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020.
Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel, as specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating
license for DAEC (No. DPR-49) no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e.,
spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the DAEC
facility in the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 16, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20198M584),
NEDA requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) concerning offsite
primary and secondary liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of
primary offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million
and to eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial
protection for DAEC.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to
have and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450
million. In addition, the licensee is required to participate in an
industry retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection)
that commits each licensee to pay into an insurance pool to be used for
damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage. Participation in
the industry retrospective rating plan will subject the licensee to
deferred premium charges up to a maximum total deferred premium of
$131,056,000 with respect to any nuclear incident at any operating
nuclear power plant and up to a maximum annual deferred premium of
$20,496,000 per incident.
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at DAEC and the permanent removal of the
fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible.
Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages that would
require insurance or indemnification is commensurately lower for such
plants. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction in primary offsite liability
insurance and to withdraw from participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations in 10 CFR part 140 when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC staff has
reviewed the licensee's request for an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite
liability insurance commercially available (currently $450 million) and
a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage (currently up to
$131,056,000 per reactor). In the event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each licensee would be assessed a
prorated share of the excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor,
for a total of approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The
NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and
secondary insurance and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR
[[Page 26963]]
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' In accordance with 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the license for a power reactor no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the
reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel. Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no
``rated capacity.'' Thus, the NRC may take the reactor licensee out of
the category of reactor licensees that are required to maintain the
maximum available insurance and to participate in the secondary
retrospective insurance pool.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance, as
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost
associated with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric
or greater. Thus, the insurance levels established by this regulation,
as required by the PAA, were associated with the risks and potential
consequences of an accident at an operating reactor with a rated
capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12257A628). The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 concluded that,
upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards exist after
permanent cessation of power operations (and the reactor having no
``rated capacity''), the Commission has the discretion under the PAA to
reduce the amount of insurance required of a licensee undergoing
decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently
ceased power operations is not itself determinative as to whether a
licensee may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by
the PAA and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly
discharged irradiated fuel in the SFP at a recently shutdown reactor,
the potential for an offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire
with consequences comparable in some respects to an operating reactor
accident remains. That risk is very low at the time of reactor shutdown
because of design provisions that prevent a significant reduction in
coolant inventory in the SFP under normal and accident conditions, and
becomes no longer credible once the continual reduction in decay heat
provides ample time to restore coolant inventory and permits air
cooling in a drained SFP. After that time, the probability of a large
offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire is negligible for
permanently shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still operational and an
inventory of radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an
evaluation of the potential for offsite damage is necessary to
determine the appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown, in
accordance with the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA
to establish an appropriate level of required financial protection for
such permanently shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor,
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam, which then
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at DAEC and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability
insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical criteria for
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event
that could cause significant offsite damage has been significantly
reduced.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for DAEC when permanently defueled as part of SECY-21-0006, ``Request
by NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements for the Duane Arnold Energy Center,''
dated January 15, 2021 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML20218A875).
NEDA has stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while spent fuel
remains in the SFP, the only postulated design-basis accident that
would remain applicable to DAEC in the permanently defueled condition
that could contribute a significant dose is a fuel handling accident
(FHA) in the reactor building, where the SFP is located. For
completeness, the NRC staff also evaluated the applicability of other
design-basis accidents documented in the DAEC Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML19100A055) to
ensure that these accidents would not have consequences that could
potentially exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory Guide
1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design
Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dose acceptance criteria
or approach the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase
protective action guides (PAGs).
In the DAEC UFSAR, the licensee has determined that within 19 days
after shutdown (with open containment), the FHA doses would decrease to
a level that would not warrant protective actions under the EPA early
phase PAG framework, notwithstanding meeting the dose limit
requirements under 10 CFR 50.67 and dose acceptance criteria under
Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC staff notes that the doses from an FHA
are dominated by the isotope Iodine-131. DAEC permanently ceased power
operations on August 10, 2020. With 10 months of decay, the thyroid
dose from an FHA would be negligible. After 10 months of decay, the
only isotope remaining in significant amounts, among those postulated
to be released in a design-basis FHA, would be Krypton-85. Since
Krypton-85 primarily decays by beta emission, the calculated skin dose
from an FHA analysis would make an insignificant contribution to the
total effective dose equivalent, which is the parameter of interest in
the
[[Page 26964]]
determination of the EPA early phase PAGs for sheltering or evacuation.
The NRC staff concludes that the dose consequence from an FHA for the
permanently shutdown DAEC would not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
Therefore, any offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological
release is highly unlikely and, thus, a significant amount of offsite
liability insurance coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor is a zirconium fire in the SFP. The zirconium fire
scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario that
involves the loss of water inventory from the SFP resulting in a
significant heatup of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial
zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a
zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire
scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time that DAEC has
been permanently shut down.
In SECY-93-127 the NRC staff concluded that there was a low
likelihood and reduced short-term public health consequences of a
zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's spent fuel has
sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants during
Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML003760936), the Commission approved a policy that authorized, through
the exemption process, withdrawal from participation in the secondary
insurance layer and a reduction in commercial liability insurance
coverage to $100 million when a licensee is able to demonstrate that
the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 13, 2020
(85 FR 1827)). Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor
licensees that have received exemptions to reduce their primary
insurance level to $100 million are provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes
to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown
Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated
December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). These prior
exemptions were based on the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could
be air-cooled consistent with the technical criterion discussed above.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for offsite
insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable
of adequate air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the
probability of a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
The NRC staff evaluated the issue of zirconium fires and presented
an independent evaluation of an SFP subject to a severe earthquake in
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark l Boiling Water
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365). The
specific reference plant used for this study is a General Electric (GE)
Type 4 BWR with a Mark I containment. The analysis postulates a severe
earthquake and evaluates the potential for the SFP to lose inventory
and potentially uncover the spent fuel. This evaluation concluded that,
for the representative BWR, spent fuel stored in a dispersed high-
density configuration would be adequately cooled by natural circulation
air flow within several months after discharge from a reactor if the
pool was drained of water during a severe earthquake scenario.
Specifically, the NUREG-2161 analysis identified that 107 days after
shutdown, the stored fuel would have decayed sufficiently and be in a
configuration that allows for air cooling of the fuel during a severe
earthquake. This would prevent radiological releases without the need
for additional mitigation actions; therefore, no release as a result of
a zirconium cladding fire would be expected.
The NRC staff compared the DAEC facility with the reference plant
in NUREG-2161 and identified that DAEC is also a GE Type 4 BWR with a
Mark I containment. The staff also confirmed (see ADAMS Accession No.
ML21089A207) that DAEC stores the spent fuel following a dispersed
high-density loading pattern consistent with the dispersed high-density
configuration assumed in NUREG-2161. Therefore, the NRC staff
determined that the stored fuel in the DAEC SFP will remain in a
coolable configuration following a design basis seismic event. Based on
DAEC's conformance with the analysis in NUREG-2161, the NRC staff finds
that there is reasonable assurance that the fuel stored in the DAEC SFP
is air coolable 10 months after the permanent shutdown of the reactor.
In addition, the licensee performed adiabatic heatup analyses in
which a complete drainage of the SFP is combined with rearrangement of
spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of rubble to the SFP; this
type of analysis postulates that decay heat transfer from the spent
fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation would be impeded. NEDA's
adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that 10 months after the
permanent cessation of operations, there would be at least 10 hours
after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or water) before
the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where the potential
for a significant offsite radiological release could occur.
In the July 16, 2020, application, NEDA furnished the following
information: ``Because of the length of time it would take for the
adiabatic heat up to occur, there is ample time to respond to any
partial drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by
restoring cooling or makeup, or providing spray. As a result, the
likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is
deemed not credible.''
In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-21-0006, the NRC
staff assessed the NEDA accident analyses associated with the
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shutdown and
defueled DAEC after 10 months of decay. For the highly unlikely beyond
design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost
in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel
are no longer available, the NRC staff found that there will be a
minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might
occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions,
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million and
the licensee's
[[Page 26965]]
proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance pool
for offsite financial protection are consistent with the policy
established in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance considerations
resulting from zirconium fire risks, as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and
SECY-01-0100. The NRC has previously determined in SECY-00-0145 that
the minimum offsite financial protection requirement may be reduced to
$100 million and that secondary insurance is not required once it is
determined that the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer thermal-
hydraulically capable of sustaining a zirconium fire based on a plant-
specific analysis. In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar
exemptions from these insurance requirements have been granted to other
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors upon satisfactory
demonstration that the zirconium fire risk from the irradiated fuel
stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $450 million in
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of insurance required of
a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving NEDA from its
existing primary and secondary insurance obligations have been met. As
explained above, the NRC staff found that no reasonably conceivable
design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release
greater than the EPA PAGs and, therefore, that any offsite consequence
from a design-basis radiological release is highly unlikely and the
need for a significant amount of offsite liability insurance coverage
is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff determined that, after 10
months decay, the fuel stored in the DAEC SFP will be capable of being
adequately cooled by air in the highly unlikely event of pool drainage.
Moreover, in the highly unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario
where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a manner that all
methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no longer available,
the NRC staff has determined that at least 10 hours would be available
and is sufficient time to support deployment of mitigation equipment,
consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff concludes
that the fuel stored in the DEAC SFP will have decayed sufficiently by
the requested effective date for the exemption of 10 months after
permanent cessation of power operations to support a reduction in the
required offsite insurance consistent with SECY-00-0145.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, Section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require licensees
to maintain adequate financial protection. Accordingly, consistent with
the legal standard presented in SECY-93-127, under which
decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved of the requirements
to carry the maximum amount of insurance available and to participate
in the secondary retrospective premium pool where there is sufficient
technical justification, the NRC staff concludes that the requested
exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims following an
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100
allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced when compared to the risks at
operating reactors, and the associated potential for offsite financial
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee
analyzed and the NRC staff confirmed that the risks of accidents that
could result in an offsite radiological release are minimal, thereby
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite primary liability
insurance and withdrawal from participation in the secondary
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to
$131,056,000. However, because DAEC is permanently shut down, it cannot
produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such a
liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial
risk exposure to the licensee is greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by DAEC when compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power
plants does not warrant that the licensee be required to carry full
operating reactor insurance coverage after the requisite spent fuel
cooling period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown. The
licensee's proposed financial protection limits will maintain a level
of liability insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the
public. These changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as
discussed in SECY-00-0145 and exemptions approved for other
decommissioning reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose of the
regulations will not be adversely affected by the reductions in
insurance coverage. Accordingly, an exemption from participation in the
secondary insurance pool and a reduction in the primary insurance to
$100 million, a value more in line with the potential consequences of
accidents, would be in the public interest in that this ensures that
there will be adequate funds to address any of those consequences and
helps to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit NEDA to lower the DAEC primary
[[Page 26966]]
insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary retrospective
premium pool at the requested effective date of 10 months after the
permanent cessation of power operations, is in the public interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and
Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, I
have determined that approval of the exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because
reducing the licensee's offsite liability requirements for DAEC does
not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of DAEC or site activities. Accordingly,
there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in
the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with
construction so there is no significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential
amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the
site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for,
or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would
be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic
properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the
region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption. The
requirement for offsite liability insurance involves surety, insurance,
or indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants NEDA an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for DAEC. DAEC
permanently ceased power operations on August 10, 2020. The exemption
from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits DAEC to reduce the required level of
primary financial protection from $450 million to $100 million and to
withdraw from participation in the secondary layer of financial
protection 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent
cessation of power operations at DAEC, which is June 10, 2021.
Dated: May 11, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021-10405 Filed 5-17-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P