Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity, 26633-26647 [2021-10460]

Agencies

• Executive Office of the President

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 93 (Monday, May 17, 2021)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 26633-26647]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-10460]




                        Presidential Documents 



Federal Register / Vol. 86 , No. 93 / Monday, May 17, 2021 / 
Presidential Documents

___________________________________________________________________

Title 3--
The President

[[Page 26633]]

                Executive Order 14028 of May 12, 2021

                
Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity

                By the authority vested in me as President by the 
                Constitution and the laws of the United States of 
                America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

                Section 1. Policy. The United States faces persistent 
                and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber 
                campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private 
                sector, and ultimately the American people's security 
                and privacy. The Federal Government must improve its 
                efforts to identify, deter, protect against, detect, 
                and respond to these actions and actors. The Federal 
                Government must also carefully examine what occurred 
                during any major cyber incident and apply lessons 
                learned. But cybersecurity requires more than 
                government action. Protecting our Nation from malicious 
                cyber actors requires the Federal Government to partner 
                with the private sector. The private sector must adapt 
                to the continuously changing threat environment, ensure 
                its products are built and operate securely, and 
                partner with the Federal Government to foster a more 
                secure cyberspace. In the end, the trust we place in 
                our digital infrastructure should be proportional to 
                how trustworthy and transparent that infrastructure is, 
                and to the consequences we will incur if that trust is 
                misplaced.

                Incremental improvements will not give us the security 
                we need; instead, the Federal Government needs to make 
                bold changes and significant investments in order to 
                defend the vital institutions that underpin the 
                American way of life. The Federal Government must bring 
                to bear the full scope of its authorities and resources 
                to protect and secure its computer systems, whether 
                they are cloud-based, on-premises, or hybrid. The scope 
                of protection and security must include systems that 
                process data (information technology (IT)) and those 
                that run the vital machinery that ensures our safety 
                (operational technology (OT)).

                It is the policy of my Administration that the 
                prevention, detection, assessment, and remediation of 
                cyber incidents is a top priority and essential to 
                national and economic security. The Federal Government 
                must lead by example. All Federal Information Systems 
                should meet or exceed the standards and requirements 
                for cybersecurity set forth in and issued pursuant to 
                this order.

                Sec. 2. Removing Barriers to Sharing Threat 
                Information. (a) The Federal Government contracts with 
                IT and OT service providers to conduct an array of day-
                to-day functions on Federal Information Systems. These 
                service providers, including cloud service providers, 
                have unique access to and insight into cyber threat and 
                incident information on Federal Information Systems. At 
                the same time, current contract terms or restrictions 
                may limit the sharing of such threat or incident 
                information with executive departments and agencies 
                (agencies) that are responsible for investigating or 
                remediating cyber incidents, such as the Cybersecurity 
                and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal 
                Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other elements of 
                the Intelligence Community (IC). Removing these 
                contractual barriers and increasing the sharing of 
                information about such threats, incidents, and risks 
                are necessary steps to accelerating incident 
                deterrence, prevention, and response efforts and to 
                enabling more effective defense of agencies' systems 
                and of information collected, processed, and maintained 
                by or for the Federal Government.

[[Page 26634]]

                    (b) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the 
                Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
                in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the 
                Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
                and the Director of National Intelligence, shall review 
                the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the 
                Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
                contract requirements and language for contracting with 
                IT and OT service providers and recommend updates to 
                such requirements and language to the FAR Council and 
                other appropriate agencies. The recommendations shall 
                include descriptions of contractors to be covered by 
                the proposed contract language.
                    (c) The recommended contract language and 
                requirements described in subsection (b) of this 
                section shall be designed to ensure that:

(i) service providers collect and preserve data, information, and reporting 
relevant to cybersecurity event prevention, detection, response, and 
investigation on all information systems over which they have control, 
including systems operated on behalf of agencies, consistent with agencies' 
requirements;

(ii) service providers share such data, information, and reporting, as they 
relate to cyber incidents or potential incidents relevant to any agency 
with which they have contracted, directly with such agency and any other 
agency that the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 
Director of National Intelligence, deems appropriate, consistent with 
applicable privacy laws, regulations, and policies;

(iii) service providers collaborate with Federal cybersecurity or 
investigative agencies in their investigations of and responses to 
incidents or potential incidents on Federal Information Systems, including 
by implementing technical capabilities, such as monitoring networks for 
threats in collaboration with agencies they support, as needed; and

(iv) service providers share cyber threat and incident information with 
agencies, doing so, where possible, in industry-recognized formats for 
incident response and remediation.

                    (d) Within 90 days of receipt of the 
                recommendations described in subsection (b) of this 
                section, the FAR Council shall review the proposed 
                contract language and conditions and, as appropriate, 
                shall publish for public comment proposed updates to 
                the FAR.
                    (e) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OMB 
                shall take appropriate steps to ensure to the greatest 
                extent possible that service providers share data with 
                agencies, CISA, and the FBI as may be necessary for the 
                Federal Government to respond to cyber threats, 
                incidents, and risks.
                    (f) It is the policy of the Federal Government 
                that:

(i) information and communications technology (ICT) service providers 
entering into contracts with agencies must promptly report to such agencies 
when they discover a cyber incident involving a software product or service 
provided to such agencies or involving a support system for a software 
product or service provided to such agencies;

(ii) ICT service providers must also directly report to CISA whenever they 
report under subsection (f)(i) of this section to Federal Civilian 
Executive Branch (FCEB) Agencies, and CISA must centrally collect and 
manage such information; and

(iii) reports pertaining to National Security Systems, as defined in 
section 10(h) of this order, must be received and managed by the 
appropriate agency as to be determined under subsection (g)(i)(E) of this 
section.

                    (g) To implement the policy set forth in subsection 
                (f) of this section:

(i) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense acting through the 
Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), the Attorney General,

[[Page 26635]]

and the Director of OMB, shall recommend to the FAR Council contract 
language that identifies:

  (A) the nature of cyber incidents that require reporting;

  (B) the types of information regarding cyber incidents that require 
reporting to facilitate effective cyber incident response and remediation;

  (C) appropriate and effective protections for privacy and civil 
liberties;

  (D) the time periods within which contractors must report cyber incidents 
based on a graduated scale of severity, with reporting on the most severe 
cyber incidents not to exceed 3 days after initial detection;

  (E) National Security Systems reporting requirements; and

  (F) the type of contractors and associated service providers to be 
covered by the proposed contract language.

(ii) Within 90 days of receipt of the recommendations described in 
subsection (g)(i) of this section, the FAR Council shall review the 
recommendations and publish for public comment proposed updates to the FAR.

(iii) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense 
acting through the Director of the NSA, the Attorney General, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence shall 
jointly develop procedures for ensuring that cyber incident reports are 
promptly and appropriately shared among agencies.

                    (h) Current cybersecurity requirements for 
                unclassified system contracts are largely implemented 
                through agency-specific policies and regulations, 
                including cloud-service cybersecurity requirements. 
                Standardizing common cybersecurity contractual 
                requirements across agencies will streamline and 
                improve compliance for vendors and the Federal 
                Government.
                    (i) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the 
                Director of CISA, in consultation with the Secretary of 
                Defense acting through the Director of the NSA, the 
                Director of OMB, and the Administrator of General 
                Services, shall review agency-specific cybersecurity 
                requirements that currently exist as a matter of law, 
                policy, or contract and recommend to the FAR Council 
                standardized contract language for appropriate 
                cybersecurity requirements. Such recommendations shall 
                include consideration of the scope of contractors and 
                associated service providers to be covered by the 
                proposed contract language.
                    (j) Within 60 days of receiving the recommended 
                contract language developed pursuant to subsection (i) 
                of this section, the FAR Council shall review the 
                recommended contract language and publish for public 
                comment proposed updates to the FAR.
                    (k) Following any updates to the FAR made by the 
                FAR Council after the public comment period described 
                in subsection (j) of this section, agencies shall 
                update their agency-specific cybersecurity requirements 
                to remove any requirements that are duplicative of such 
                FAR updates.
                    (l) The Director of OMB shall incorporate into the 
                annual budget process a cost analysis of all 
                recommendations developed under this section.

                Sec. 3. Modernizing Federal Government Cybersecurity. 
                (a) To keep pace with today's dynamic and increasingly 
                sophisticated cyber threat environment, the Federal 
                Government must take decisive steps to modernize its 
                approach to cybersecurity, including by increasing the 
                Federal Government's visibility into threats, while 
                protecting privacy and civil liberties. The Federal 
                Government must adopt security best practices; advance 
                toward Zero Trust Architecture; accelerate movement to 
                secure cloud services, including Software as a Service 
                (SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), and 
                Platform as a Service (PaaS); centralize and streamline 
                access to cybersecurity data to drive analytics for 
                identifying and managing cybersecurity risks; and 
                invest in both technology and personnel to match these 
                modernization goals.

                    (b) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the 
                head of each agency shall:

[[Page 26636]]

(i) update existing agency plans to prioritize resources for the adoption 
and use of cloud technology as outlined in relevant OMB guidance;

(ii) develop a plan to implement Zero Trust Architecture, which shall 
incorporate, as appropriate, the migration steps that the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) within the Department of 
Commerce has outlined in standards and guidance, describe any such steps 
that have already been completed, identify activities that will have the 
most immediate security impact, and include a schedule to implement them; 
and

(iii) provide a report to the Director of OMB and the Assistant to the 
President and National Security Advisor (APNSA) discussing the plans 
required pursuant to subsection (b)(i) and (ii) of this section.

                    (c) As agencies continue to use cloud technology, 
                they shall do so in a coordinated, deliberate way that 
                allows the Federal Government to prevent, detect, 
                assess, and remediate cyber incidents. To facilitate 
                this approach, the migration to cloud technology shall 
                adopt Zero Trust Architecture, as practicable. The CISA 
                shall modernize its current cybersecurity programs, 
                services, and capabilities to be fully functional with 
                cloud-computing environments with Zero Trust 
                Architecture. The Secretary of Homeland Security acting 
                through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the 
                Administrator of General Services acting through the 
                Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program 
                (FedRAMP) within the General Services Administration, 
                shall develop security principles governing Cloud 
                Service Providers (CSPs) for incorporation into agency 
                modernization efforts. To facilitate this work:

(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Director of OMB, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the 
Director of CISA, and the Administrator of General Services acting through 
FedRAMP, shall develop a Federal cloud-security strategy and provide 
guidance to agencies accordingly. Such guidance shall seek to ensure that 
risks to the FCEB from using cloud-based services are broadly understood 
and effectively addressed, and that FCEB Agencies move closer to Zero Trust 
Architecture.

(ii) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security acting through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the 
Director of OMB and the Administrator of General Services acting through 
FedRAMP, shall develop and issue, for the FCEB, cloud-security technical 
reference architecture documentation that illustrates recommended 
approaches to cloud migration and data protection for agency data 
collection and reporting.

(iii) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security acting through the Director of CISA shall develop and issue, for 
FCEB Agencies, a cloud-service governance framework. That framework shall 
identify a range of services and protections available to agencies based on 
incident severity. That framework shall also identify data and processing 
activities associated with those services and protections.

(iv) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the heads of FCEB Agencies, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the 
Director of CISA, shall evaluate the types and sensitivity of their 
respective agency's unclassified data, and shall provide to the Secretary 
of Homeland Security through the Director of CISA and to the Director of 
OMB a report based on such evaluation. The evaluation shall prioritize 
identification of the unclassified data considered by the agency to be the 
most sensitive and under the greatest threat, and appropriate processing 
and storage solutions for those data.

                    (d) Within 180 days of the date of this order, 
                agencies shall adopt multi-factor authentication and 
                encryption for data at rest and in transit, to the 
                maximum extent consistent with Federal records laws and 
                other applicable laws. To that end:

(i) Heads of FCEB Agencies shall provide reports to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security through the Director of CISA, the Director of OMB,

[[Page 26637]]

and the APNSA on their respective agency's progress in adopting multifactor 
authentication and encryption of data at rest and in transit. Such agencies 
shall provide such reports every 60 days after the date of this order until 
the agency has fully adopted, agency-wide, multi-factor authentication and 
data encryption.

(ii) Based on identified gaps in agency implementation, CISA shall take all 
appropriate steps to maximize adoption by FCEB Agencies of technologies and 
processes to implement multifactor authentication and encryption for data 
at rest and in transit.

(iii) Heads of FCEB Agencies that are unable to fully adopt multi-factor 
authentication and data encryption within 180 days of the date of this 
order shall, at the end of the 180-day period, provide a written rationale 
to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the Director of CISA, the 
Director of OMB, and the APNSA.

                    (e) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the 
                Director of CISA, in consultation with the Attorney 
                General, the Director of the FBI, and the Administrator 
                of General Services acting through the Director of 
                FedRAMP, shall establish a framework to collaborate on 
                cybersecurity and incident response activities related 
                to FCEB cloud technology, in order to ensure effective 
                information sharing among agencies and between agencies 
                and CSPs.
                    (f) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the 
                Administrator of General Services, in consultation with 
                the Director of OMB and the heads of other agencies as 
                the Administrator of General Services deems 
                appropriate, shall begin modernizing FedRAMP by:

(i) establishing a training program to ensure agencies are effectively 
trained and equipped to manage FedRAMP requests, and providing access to 
training materials, including videos-on-demand;

(ii) improving communication with CSPs through automation and 
standardization of messages at each stage of authorization. These 
communications may include status updates, requirements to complete a 
vendor's current stage, next steps, and points of contact for questions;

(iii) incorporating automation throughout the lifecycle of FedRAMP, 
including assessment, authorization, continuous monitoring, and compliance;

(iv) digitizing and streamlining documentation that vendors are required to 
complete, including through online accessibility and pre-populated forms; 
and

(v) identifying relevant compliance frameworks, mapping those frameworks 
onto requirements in the FedRAMP authorization process, and allowing those 
frameworks to be used as a substitute for the relevant portion of the 
authorization process, as appropriate.

                Sec. 4. Enhancing Software Supply Chain Security. (a) 
                The security of software used by the Federal Government 
                is vital to the Federal Government's ability to perform 
                its critical functions. The development of commercial 
                software often lacks transparency, sufficient focus on 
                the ability of the software to resist attack, and 
                adequate controls to prevent tampering by malicious 
                actors. There is a pressing need to implement more 
                rigorous and predictable mechanisms for ensuring that 
                products function securely, and as intended. The 
                security and integrity of ``critical software''--
                software that performs functions critical to trust 
                (such as affording or requiring elevated system 
                privileges or direct access to networking and computing 
                resources)--is a particular concern. Accordingly, the 
                Federal Government must take action to rapidly improve 
                the security and integrity of the software supply 
                chain, with a priority on addressing critical software.

                    (b) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of 
                NIST shall solicit input from the Federal Government, 
                private sector, academia, and other appropriate actors 
                to identify existing or develop new standards, tools, 
                and best practices for complying with the standards, 
                procedures, or criteria in subsection (e) of this 
                section.

[[Page 26638]]

                The guidelines shall include criteria that can be used 
                to evaluate software security, include criteria to 
                evaluate the security practices of the developers and 
                suppliers themselves, and identify innovative tools or 
                methods to demonstrate conformance with secure 
                practices.
                    (c) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the 
                Director of NIST shall publish preliminary guidelines, 
                based on the consultations described in subsection (b) 
                of this section and drawing on existing documents as 
                practicable, for enhancing software supply chain 
                security and meeting the requirements of this section.
                    (d) Within 360 days of the date of this order, the 
                Director of NIST shall publish additional guidelines 
                that include procedures for periodic review and 
                updating of the guidelines described in subsection (c) 
                of this section.
                    (e) Within 90 days of publication of the 
                preliminary guidelines pursuant to subsection (c) of 
                this section, the Secretary of Commerce acting through 
                the Director of NIST, in consultation with the heads of 
                such agencies as the Director of NIST deems 
                appropriate, shall issue guidance identifying practices 
                that enhance the security of the software supply chain. 
                Such guidance may incorporate the guidelines published 
                pursuant to subsections (c) and (i) of this section. 
                Such guidance shall include standards, procedures, or 
                criteria regarding:

(i) secure software development environments, including such actions as:

  (A) using administratively separate build environments;

  (B) auditing trust relationships;

  (C) establishing multi-factor, risk-based authentication and conditional 
access across the enterprise;

  (D) documenting and minimizing dependencies on enterprise products that 
are part of the environments used to develop, build, and edit software;

  (E) employing encryption for data; and

  (F) monitoring operations and alerts and responding to attempted and 
actual cyber incidents;

(ii) generating and, when requested by a purchaser, providing artifacts 
that demonstrate conformance to the processes set forth in subsection 
(e)(i) of this section;

(iii) employing automated tools, or comparable processes, to maintain 
trusted source code supply chains, thereby ensuring the integrity of the 
code;

(iv) employing automated tools, or comparable processes, that check for 
known and potential vulnerabilities and remediate them, which shall operate 
regularly, or at a minimum prior to product, version, or update release;

(v) providing, when requested by a purchaser, artifacts of the execution of 
the tools and processes described in subsection (e)(iii) and (iv) of this 
section, and making publicly available summary information on completion of 
these actions, to include a summary description of the risks assessed and 
mitigated;

(vi) maintaining accurate and up-to-date data, provenance (i.e., origin) of 
software code or components, and controls on internal and third-party 
software components, tools, and services present in software development 
processes, and performing audits and enforcement of these controls on a 
recurring basis;

(vii) providing a purchaser a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for each 
product directly or by publishing it on a public website;

(viii) participating in a vulnerability disclosure program that includes a 
reporting and disclosure process;

(ix) attesting to conformity with secure software development practices; 
and

[[Page 26639]]

(x) ensuring and attesting, to the extent practicable, to the integrity and 
provenance of open source software used within any portion of a product.

                    (f) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the 
                Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information 
                and the Administrator of the National 
                Telecommunications and Information Administration, 
                shall publish minimum elements for an SBOM.
                    (g) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of 
                NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense 
                acting through the Director of the NSA, the Secretary 
                of Homeland Security acting through the Director of 
                CISA, the Director of OMB, and the Director of National 
                Intelligence, shall publish a definition of the term 
                ``critical software'' for inclusion in the guidance 
                issued pursuant to subsection (e) of this section. That 
                definition shall reflect the level of privilege or 
                access required to function, integration and 
                dependencies with other software, direct access to 
                networking and computing resources, performance of a 
                function critical to trust, and potential for harm if 
                compromised.
                    (h) Within 30 days of the publication of the 
                definition required by subsection (g) of this section, 
                the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the 
                Director of CISA, in consultation with the Secretary of 
                Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, shall 
                identify and make available to agencies a list of 
                categories of software and software products in use or 
                in the acquisition process meeting the definition of 
                critical software issued pursuant to subsection (g) of 
                this section.
                    (i) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of 
                NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security acting through the Director of CISA and with 
                the Director of OMB, shall publish guidance outlining 
                security measures for critical software as defined in 
                subsection (g) of this section, including applying 
                practices of least privilege, network segmentation, and 
                proper configuration.
                    (j) Within 30 days of the issuance of the guidance 
                described in subsection (i) of this section, the 
                Director of OMB acting through the Administrator of the 
                Office of Electronic Government within OMB shall take 
                appropriate steps to require that agencies comply with 
                such guidance.
                    (k) Within 30 days of issuance of the guidance 
                described in subsection (e) of this section, the 
                Director of OMB acting through the Administrator of the 
                Office of Electronic Government within OMB shall take 
                appropriate steps to require that agencies comply with 
                such guidelines with respect to software procured after 
                the date of this order.
                    (l) Agencies may request an extension for complying 
                with any requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) 
                of this section. Any such request shall be considered 
                by the Director of OMB on a case-by-case basis, and 
                only if accompanied by a plan for meeting the 
                underlying requirements. The Director of OMB shall on a 
                quarterly basis provide a report to the APNSA 
                identifying and explaining all extensions granted.
                    (m) Agencies may request a waiver as to any 
                requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of this 
                section. Waivers shall be considered by the Director of 
                OMB, in consultation with the APNSA, on a case-by-case 
                basis, and shall be granted only in exceptional 
                circumstances and for limited duration, and only if 
                there is an accompanying plan for mitigating any 
                potential risks.
                    (n) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 
                the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the 
                Director of OMB, and the Administrator of the Office of 
                Electronic Government within OMB, shall recommend to 
                the FAR Council contract language requiring suppliers 
                of software available for purchase by agencies to 
                comply with, and attest to complying with, any 
                requirements issued pursuant to subsections (g) through 
                (k) of this section.

[[Page 26640]]

                    (o) After receiving the recommendations described 
                in subsection (n) of this section, the FAR Council 
                shall review the recommendations and, as appropriate 
                and consistent with applicable law, amend the FAR.
                    (p) Following the issuance of any final rule 
                amending the FAR as described in subsection (o) of this 
                section, agencies shall, as appropriate and consistent 
                with applicable law, remove software products that do 
                not meet the requirements of the amended FAR from all 
                indefinite delivery indefinite quantity contracts; 
                Federal Supply Schedules; Federal Government-wide 
                Acquisition Contracts; Blanket Purchase Agreements; and 
                Multiple Award Contracts.
                    (q) The Director of OMB, acting through the 
                Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government 
                within OMB, shall require agencies employing software 
                developed and procured prior to the date of this order 
                (legacy software) either to comply with any 
                requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of this 
                section or to provide a plan outlining actions to 
                remediate or meet those requirements, and shall further 
                require agencies seeking renewals of software 
                contracts, including legacy software, to comply with 
                any requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of 
                this section, unless an extension or waiver is granted 
                in accordance with subsection (l) or (m) of this 
                section.
                    (r) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of 
                NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense 
                acting through the Director of the NSA, shall publish 
                guidelines recommending minimum standards for vendors' 
                testing of their software source code, including 
                identifying recommended types of manual or automated 
                testing (such as code review tools, static and dynamic 
                analysis, software composition tools, and penetration 
                testing).
                    (s) The Secretary of Commerce acting through the 
                Director of NIST, in coordination with representatives 
                of other agencies as the Director of NIST deems 
                appropriate, shall initiate pilot programs informed by 
                existing consumer product labeling programs to educate 
                the public on the security capabilities of internet-of-
                Things (IoT) devices and software development 
                practices, and shall consider ways to incentivize 
                manufacturers and developers to participate in these 
                programs.
                    (t) Within 270 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of 
                NIST, in coordination with the Chair of the Federal 
                Trade Commission (FTC) and representatives of other 
                agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, 
                shall identify IoT cybersecurity criteria for a 
                consumer labeling program, and shall consider whether 
                such a consumer labeling program may be operated in 
                conjunction with or modeled after any similar existing 
                government programs consistent with applicable law. The 
                criteria shall reflect increasingly comprehensive 
                levels of testing and assessment that a product may 
                have undergone, and shall use or be compatible with 
                existing labeling schemes that manufacturers use to 
                inform consumers about the security of their products. 
                The Director of NIST shall examine all relevant 
                information, labeling, and incentive programs and 
                employ best practices. This review shall focus on ease 
                of use for consumers and a determination of what 
                measures can be taken to maximize manufacturer 
                participation.
                    (u) Within 270 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of 
                NIST, in coordination with the Chair of the FTC and 
                representatives from other agencies as the Director of 
                NIST deems appropriate, shall identify secure software 
                development practices or criteria for a consumer 
                software labeling program, and shall consider whether 
                such a consumer software labeling program may be 
                operated in conjunction with or modeled after any 
                similar existing government programs, consistent with 
                applicable law. The criteria shall reflect a baseline 
                level of secure practices, and if practicable, shall 
                reflect increasingly comprehensive levels of testing 
                and assessment that a product may have undergone. The 
                Director

[[Page 26641]]

                of NIST shall examine all relevant information, 
                labeling, and incentive programs, employ best 
                practices, and identify, modify, or develop a 
                recommended label or, if practicable, a tiered software 
                security rating system. This review shall focus on ease 
                of use for consumers and a determination of what 
                measures can be taken to maximize participation.
                    (v) These pilot programs shall be conducted in a 
                manner consistent with OMB Circular A-119 and NIST 
                Special Publication 2000-02 (Conformity Assessment 
                Considerations for Federal Agencies).
                    (w) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the 
                Director of NIST shall conduct a review of the pilot 
                programs, consult with the private sector and relevant 
                agencies to assess the effectiveness of the programs, 
                determine what improvements can be made going forward, 
                and submit a summary report to the APNSA.
                    (x) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads 
                of other agencies as the Secretary of Commerce deems 
                appropriate, shall provide to the President, through 
                the APNSA, a report that reviews the progress made 
                under this section and outlines additional steps needed 
                to secure the software supply chain.

                Sec. 5. Establishing a Cyber Safety Review Board. (a) 
                The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 
                with the Attorney General, shall establish the Cyber 
                Safety Review Board (Board), pursuant to section 871 of 
                the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451).

                    (b) The Board shall review and assess, with respect 
                to significant cyber incidents (as defined under 
                Presidential Policy Directive 41 of July 26, 2016 
                (United States Cyber Incident Coordination) (PPD-41)) 
                affecting FCEB Information Systems or non-Federal 
                systems, threat activity, vulnerabilities, mitigation 
                activities, and agency responses.
                    (c) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
                convene the Board following a significant cyber 
                incident triggering the establishment of a Cyber 
                Unified Coordination Group (UCG) as provided by section 
                V(B)(2) of PPD-41; at any time as directed by the 
                President acting through the APNSA; or at any time the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security deems necessary.
                    (d) The Board's initial review shall relate to the 
                cyber activities that prompted the establishment of a 
                UCG in December 2020, and the Board shall, within 90 
                days of the Board's establishment, provide 
                recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security 
                for improving cybersecurity and incident response 
                practices, as outlined in subsection (i) of this 
                section.
                    (e) The Board's membership shall include Federal 
                officials and representatives from private-sector 
                entities. The Board shall comprise representatives of 
                the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, 
                CISA, the NSA, and the FBI, as well as representatives 
                from appropriate private-sector cybersecurity or 
                software suppliers as determined by the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security. A representative from OMB shall 
                participate in Board activities when an incident under 
                review involves FCEB Information Systems, as determined 
                by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary of 
                Homeland Security may invite the participation of 
                others on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature 
                of the incident under review.
                    (f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
                biennially designate a Chair and Deputy Chair of the 
                Board from among the members of the Board, to include 
                one Federal and one private-sector member.
                    (g) The Board shall protect sensitive law 
                enforcement, operational, business, and other 
                confidential information that has been shared with it, 
                consistent with applicable law.
                    (h) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
                provide to the President through the APNSA any advice, 
                information, or recommendations of the Board for 
                improving cybersecurity and incident response practices 
                and policy upon completion of its review of an 
                applicable incident.

[[Page 26642]]

                    (i) Within 30 days of completion of the initial 
                review described in subsection (d) of this section, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide to the 
                President through the APNSA the recommendations of the 
                Board based on the initial review. These 
                recommendations shall describe:

(i) identified gaps in, and options for, the Board's composition or 
authorities;

(ii) the Board's proposed mission, scope, and responsibilities;

(iii) membership eligibility criteria for private-sector representatives;

(iv) Board governance structure including interaction with the executive 
branch and the Executive Office of the President;

(v) thresholds and criteria for the types of cyber incidents to be 
evaluated;

(vi) sources of information that should be made available to the Board, 
consistent with applicable law and policy;

(vii) an approach for protecting the information provided to the Board and 
securing the cooperation of affected United States individuals and entities 
for the purpose of the Board's review of incidents; and

(viii) administrative and budgetary considerations required for operation 
of the Board.

                    (j) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
                consultation with the Attorney General and the APNSA, 
                shall review the recommendations provided to the 
                President through the APNSA pursuant to subsection (i) 
                of this section and take steps to implement them as 
                appropriate.
                    (k) Unless otherwise directed by the President, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security shall extend the life of 
                the Board every 2 years as the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security deems appropriate, pursuant to section 871 of 
                the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
                    Sec. 6. Standardizing the Federal Government's 
                Playbook for Responding to Cybersecurity 
                Vulnerabilities and Incidents. (a) The cybersecurity 
                vulnerability and incident response procedures 
                currently used to identify, remediate, and recover from 
                vulnerabilities and incidents affecting their systems 
                vary across agencies, hindering the ability of lead 
                agencies to analyze vulnerabilities and incidents more 
                comprehensively across agencies. Standardized response 
                processes ensure a more coordinated and centralized 
                cataloging of incidents and tracking of agencies' 
                progress toward successful responses.
                    (b) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the 
                Director of CISA, in consultation with the Director of 
                OMB, the Federal Chief Information Officers Council, 
                and the Federal Chief Information Security Council, and 
                in coordination with the Secretary of Defense acting 
                through the Director of the NSA, the Attorney General, 
                and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
                develop a standard set of operational procedures 
                (playbook) to be used in planning and conducting a 
                cybersecurity vulnerability and incident response 
                activity respecting FCEB Information Systems. The 
                playbook shall:

(i) incorporate all appropriate NIST standards;

(ii) be used by FCEB Agencies; and

(iii) articulate progress and completion through all phases of an incident 
response, while allowing flexibility so it may be used in support of 
various response activities.

                    (c) The Director of OMB shall issue guidance on 
                agency use of the playbook.
                    (d) Agencies with cybersecurity vulnerability or 
                incident response procedures that deviate from the 
                playbook may use such procedures only after consulting 
                with the Director of OMB and the APNSA and 
                demonstrating that these procedures meet or exceed the 
                standards proposed in the playbook.

[[Page 26643]]

                    (e) The Director of CISA, in consultation with the 
                Director of the NSA, shall review and update the 
                playbook annually, and provide information to the 
                Director of OMB for incorporation in guidance updates.
                    (f) To ensure comprehensiveness of incident 
                response activities and build confidence that 
                unauthorized cyber actors no longer have access to FCEB 
                Information Systems, the playbook shall establish, 
                consistent with applicable law, a requirement that the 
                Director of CISA review and validate FCEB Agencies' 
                incident response and remediation results upon an 
                agency's completion of its incident response. The 
                Director of CISA may recommend use of another agency or 
                a third-party incident response team as appropriate.
                    (g) To ensure a common understanding of cyber 
                incidents and the cybersecurity status of an agency, 
                the playbook shall define key terms and use such terms 
                consistently with any statutory definitions of those 
                terms, to the extent practicable, thereby providing a 
                shared lexicon among agencies using the playbook.

                Sec. 7. Improving Detection of Cybersecurity 
                Vulnerabilities and Incidents on Federal Government 
                Networks. (a) The Federal Government shall employ all 
                appropriate resources and authorities to maximize the 
                early detection of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
                incidents on its networks. This approach shall include 
                increasing the Federal Government's visibility into and 
                detection of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats 
                to agency networks in order to bolster the Federal 
                Government's cybersecurity efforts.

                    (b) FCEB Agencies shall deploy an Endpoint 
                Detection and Response (EDR) initiative to support 
                proactive detection of cybersecurity incidents within 
                Federal Government infrastructure, active cyber 
                hunting, containment and remediation, and incident 
                response.
                    (c) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the 
                Director of CISA shall provide to the Director of OMB 
                recommendations on options for implementing an EDR 
                initiative, centrally located to support host-level 
                visibility, attribution, and response regarding FCEB 
                Information Systems.
                    (d) Within 90 days of receiving the recommendations 
                described in subsection (c) of this section, the 
                Director of OMB, in consultation with Secretary of 
                Homeland Security, shall issue requirements for FCEB 
                Agencies to adopt Federal Government-wide EDR 
                approaches. Those requirements shall support a 
                capability of the Secretary of Homeland Secretary, 
                acting through the Director of CISA, to engage in cyber 
                hunt, detection, and response activities.
                    (e) The Director of OMB shall work with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security and agency heads to 
                ensure that agencies have adequate resources to comply 
                with the requirements issued pursuant to subsection (d) 
                of this section.
                    (f) Defending FCEB Information Systems requires 
                that the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through 
                the Director of CISA have access to agency data that 
                are relevant to a threat and vulnerability analysis, as 
                well as for assessment and threat-hunting purposes. 
                Within 75 days of the date of this order, agencies 
                shall establish or update Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) 
                with CISA for the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation 
                Program to ensure object level data, as defined in the 
                MOA, are available and accessible to CISA, consistent 
                with applicable law.
                    (g) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the 
                Director of the NSA as the National Manager for 
                National Security Systems (National Manager) shall 
                recommend to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of 
                National Intelligence, and the Committee on National 
                Security Systems (CNSS) appropriate actions for 
                improving detection of cyber incidents affecting 
                National Security Systems, to the extent permitted by 
                applicable law, including recommendations concerning 
                EDR approaches and whether such measures should be 
                operated by agencies or through a centralized service 
                of common concern provided by the National Manager.

[[Page 26644]]

                    (h) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Defense, the Director of National 
                Intelligence, and the CNSS shall review the 
                recommendations submitted under subsection (g) of this 
                section and, as appropriate, establish policies that 
                effectuate those recommendations, consistent with 
                applicable law.
                    (i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the 
                Director of CISA shall provide to the Director of OMB 
                and the APNSA a report describing how authorities 
                granted under section 1705 of Public Law 116-283, to 
                conduct threat-hunting activities on FCEB networks 
                without prior authorization from agencies, are being 
                implemented. This report shall also recommend 
                procedures to ensure that mission-critical systems are 
                not disrupted, procedures for notifying system owners 
                of vulnerable government systems, and the range of 
                techniques that can be used during testing of FCEB 
                Information Systems. The Director of CISA shall provide 
                quarterly reports to the APNSA and the Director of OMB 
                regarding actions taken under section 1705 of Public 
                Law 116-283.
                    (j) To ensure alignment between Department of 
                Defense Information Network (DODIN) directives and FCEB 
                Information Systems directives, the Secretary of 
                Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
                consultation with the Director of OMB, shall:

(i) within 60 days of the date of this order, establish procedures for the 
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security to 
immediately share with each other Department of Defense Incident Response 
Orders or Department of Homeland Security Emergency Directives and Binding 
Operational Directives applying to their respective information networks;

(ii) evaluate whether to adopt any guidance contained in an Order or 
Directive issued by the other Department, consistent with regulations 
concerning sharing of classified information; and

(iii) within 7 days of receiving notice of an Order or Directive issued 
pursuant to the procedures established under subsection (j)(i) of this 
section, notify the APNSA and Administrator of the Office of Electronic 
Government within OMB of the evaluation described in subsection (j)(ii) of 
this section, including a determination whether to adopt guidance issued by 
the other Department, the rationale for that determination, and a timeline 
for application of the directive, if applicable.

                Sec. 8. Improving the Federal Government's 
                Investigative and Remediation Capabilities. (a) 
                Information from network and system logs on Federal 
                Information Systems (for both on-premises systems and 
                connections hosted by third parties, such as CSPs) is 
                invaluable for both investigation and remediation 
                purposes. It is essential that agencies and their IT 
                service providers collect and maintain such data and, 
                when necessary to address a cyber incident on FCEB 
                Information Systems, provide them upon request to the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security through the Director of 
                CISA and to the FBI, consistent with applicable law.

                    (b) Within 14 days of the date of this order, the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 
                the Attorney General and the Administrator of the 
                Office of Electronic Government within OMB, shall 
                provide to the Director of OMB recommendations on 
                requirements for logging events and retaining other 
                relevant data within an agency's systems and networks. 
                Such recommendations shall include the types of logs to 
                be maintained, the time periods to retain the logs and 
                other relevant data, the time periods for agencies to 
                enable recommended logging and security requirements, 
                and how to protect logs. Logs shall be protected by 
                cryptographic methods to ensure integrity once 
                collected and periodically verified against the hashes 
                throughout their retention. Data shall be retained in a 
                manner consistent with all applicable privacy laws and 
                regulations. Such recommendations shall also be 
                considered by the FAR Council when promulgating rules 
                pursuant to section 2 of this order.

[[Page 26645]]

                    (c) Within 90 days of receiving the recommendations 
                described in subsection (b) of this section, the 
                Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of 
                Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
                formulate policies for agencies to establish 
                requirements for logging, log retention, and log 
                management, which shall ensure centralized access and 
                visibility for the highest level security operations 
                center of each agency.
                    (d) The Director of OMB shall work with agency 
                heads to ensure that agencies have adequate resources 
                to comply with the requirements identified in 
                subsection (c) of this section.
                    (e) To address cyber risks or incidents, including 
                potential cyber risks or incidents, the proposed 
                recommendations issued pursuant to subsection (b) of 
                this section shall include requirements to ensure that, 
                upon request, agencies provide logs to the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security through the Director of CISA and to 
                the FBI, consistent with applicable law. These 
                requirements should be designed to permit agencies to 
                share log information, as needed and appropriate, with 
                other Federal agencies for cyber risks or incidents.

                Sec. 9. National Security Systems. (a) Within 60 days 
                of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense 
                acting through the National Manager, in coordination 
                with the Director of National Intelligence and the 
                CNSS, and in consultation with the APNSA, shall adopt 
                National Security Systems requirements that are 
                equivalent to or exceed the cybersecurity requirements 
                set forth in this order that are otherwise not 
                applicable to National Security Systems. Such 
                requirements may provide for exceptions in 
                circumstances necessitated by unique mission needs. 
                Such requirements shall be codified in a National 
                Security Memorandum (NSM). Until such time as that NSM 
                is issued, programs, standards, or requirements 
                established pursuant to this order shall not apply with 
                respect to National Security Systems.

                    (b) Nothing in this order shall alter the authority 
                of the National Manager with respect to National 
                Security Systems as defined in National Security 
                Directive 42 of July 5, 1990 (National Policy for the 
                Security of National Security Telecommunications and 
                Information Systems) (NSD-42). The FCEB network shall 
                continue to be within the authority of the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA.

                Sec. 10. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

                    (a) the term ``agency'' has the meaning ascribed to 
                it under 44 U.S.C. 3502.
                    (b) the term ``auditing trust relationship'' means 
                an agreed-upon relationship between two or more system 
                elements that is governed by criteria for secure 
                interaction, behavior, and outcomes relative to the 
                protection of assets.
                    (c) the term ``cyber incident'' has the meaning 
                ascribed to an ``incident'' under 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(2).
                    (d) the term ``Federal Civilian Executive Branch 
                Agencies'' or ``FCEB Agencies'' includes all agencies 
                except for the Department of Defense and agencies in 
                the Intelligence Community.
                    (e) the term ``Federal Civilian Executive Branch 
                Information Systems'' or ``FCEB Information Systems'' 
                means those information systems operated by Federal 
                Civilian Executive Branch Agencies, but excludes 
                National Security Systems.
                    (f) the term ``Federal Information Systems'' means 
                an information system used or operated by an agency or 
                by a contractor of an agency or by another organization 
                on behalf of an agency, including FCEB Information 
                Systems and National Security Systems.
                    (g) the term ``Intelligence Community'' or ``IC'' 
                has the meaning ascribed to it under 50 U.S.C. 3003(4).
                    (h) the term ``National Security Systems'' means 
                information systems as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(6), 
                3553(e)(2), and 3553(e)(3).

[[Page 26646]]

                    (i) the term ``logs'' means records of the events 
                occurring within an organization's systems and 
                networks. Logs are composed of log entries, and each 
                entry contains information related to a specific event 
                that has occurred within a system or network.
                    (j) the term ``Software Bill of Materials'' or 
                ``SBOM'' means a formal record containing the details 
                and supply chain relationships of various components 
                used in building software. Software developers and 
                vendors often create products by assembling existing 
                open source and commercial software components. The 
                SBOM enumerates these components in a product. It is 
                analogous to a list of ingredients on food packaging. 
                An SBOM is useful to those who develop or manufacture 
                software, those who select or purchase software, and 
                those who operate software. Developers often use 
                available open source and third-party software 
                components to create a product; an SBOM allows the 
                builder to make sure those components are up to date 
                and to respond quickly to new vulnerabilities. Buyers 
                can use an SBOM to perform vulnerability or license 
                analysis, both of which can be used to evaluate risk in 
                a product. Those who operate software can use SBOMs to 
                quickly and easily determine whether they are at 
                potential risk of a newly discovered vulnerability. A 
                widely used, machine-readable SBOM format allows for 
                greater benefits through automation and tool 
                integration. The SBOMs gain greater value when 
                collectively stored in a repository that can be easily 
                queried by other applications and systems. 
                Understanding the supply chain of software, obtaining 
                an SBOM, and using it to analyze known vulnerabilities 
                are crucial in managing risk.
                    (k) the term ``Zero Trust Architecture'' means a 
                security model, a set of system design principles, and 
                a coordinated cybersecurity and system management 
                strategy based on an acknowledgement that threats exist 
                both inside and outside traditional network boundaries. 
                The Zero Trust security model eliminates implicit trust 
                in any one element, node, or service and instead 
                requires continuous verification of the operational 
                picture via real-time information from multiple sources 
                to determine access and other system responses. In 
                essence, a Zero Trust Architecture allows users full 
                access but only to the bare minimum they need to 
                perform their jobs. If a device is compromised, zero 
                trust can ensure that the damage is contained. The Zero 
                Trust Architecture security model assumes that a breach 
                is inevitable or has likely already occurred, so it 
                constantly limits access to only what is needed and 
                looks for anomalous or malicious activity. Zero Trust 
                Architecture embeds comprehensive security monitoring; 
                granular risk-based access controls; and system 
                security automation in a coordinated manner throughout 
                all aspects of the infrastructure in order to focus on 
                protecting data in real-time within a dynamic threat 
                environment. This data-centric security model allows 
                the concept of least-privileged access to be applied 
                for every access decision, where the answers to the 
                questions of who, what, when, where, and how are 
                critical for appropriately allowing or denying access 
                to resources based on the combination of sever.

                Sec. 11. General Provisions. (a) Upon the appointment 
                of the National Cyber Director (NCD) and the 
                establishment of the related Office within the 
                Executive Office of the President, pursuant to section 
                1752 of Public Law 116-283, portions of this order may 
                be modified to enable the NCD to fully execute its 
                duties and responsibilities.

                    (b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to 
                impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or 
the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

                    (c) This order shall be implemented in a manner 
                consistent with applicable law and subject to the 
                availability of appropriations.
                    (d) This order is not intended to, and does not, 
                create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 
                enforceable at law or in equity by any

[[Page 26647]]

                party against the United States, its departments, 
                agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or 
                agents, or any other person.
                    (e) Nothing in this order confers authority to 
                interfere with or to direct a criminal or national 
                security investigation, arrest, search, seizure, or 
                disruption operation or to alter a legal restriction 
                that requires an agency to protect information learned 
                in the course of a criminal or national security 
                investigation.
                
                
                    (Presidential Sig.)

                 THE WHITE HOUSE,

                    May 12, 2021.

[FR Doc. 2021-10460
Filed 5-14-21; 8:45 am]
Billing code 3295-F1-P