Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) Fire and Debris-Penetration Hazards; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments and Information, 25817-25830 [2021-09881]
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 11, 2021 / Proposed Rules
SEL–57–07, Revision 1, dated November 19,
2019 (SEL–57–07R1).
(2) You may take credit for the eddy
current inspection of the lower cap kick area
and all locations where corrosion was
removed on the carry-thru spar lower cap as
specified in paragraph (h) of this AD if you
performed the eddy current inspection before
the effective date of this AD using SEL–57–
08, SEL–57–08R1, SEL–57–06, SEL–57–06R1,
SEL–57–07, SEL–57–07R1, or SEL–57–09.
(3) You may take credit for the corrosion
protection required by paragraph (i) of this
AD if you performed those actions before the
effective date of this AD using SEL–57–08,
SEL–57–08R1, or SEL–57–09.
(4) If you can take credit for the visual and
eddy current inspections as specified in
paragraphs (l)(1) and (2) of this AD but you
did not apply protective coating and CIC to
the spar, you must apply protective coating
and CIC by following steps 9 and 10 of the
Accomplishment Instructions in SEL–57–
08R2 or SEL–57–09R1, as applicable to your
airplane model, within 24 months after the
date you completed the visual and eddy
current inspections or within 12 months after
the effective date of this AD, whichever
occurs first.
(5) To take credit for any previous action,
you must have provided a completed CarryThru Spar Inspection Report, an attachment
to SEL–57–06, SEL–57–06 R1, SEL–57–07,
SEL–57–07R1, SEL–57–08, SEL–57–08R1, or
SEL–57–09 to Textron Aviation Inc. before
the effective date of this AD, or you must
comply with paragraph (k) of this AD within
30 days after the effective date of this AD.
(m) Special Flight Permit
Special flight permits are prohibited.
(n) Paperwork Reduction Act Burden
Statement
A federal agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, nor shall a person be subject to
a penalty for failure to comply with a
collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction
Act unless that collection of information
displays a currently valid OMB Control
Number. The OMB Control Number for this
information collection is 2120–0056. Public
reporting for this collection of information is
estimated to be approximately 2 hours per
response, including the time for reviewing
instructions, searching existing data sources,
gathering and maintaining the data needed,
completing and reviewing the collection of
information. All responses to this collection
of information are mandatory. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or
any other aspect of this collection of
information, including suggestions for
reducing this burden to: Information
Collection Clearance Officer, Federal
Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood
Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177–1524.
(o) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Wichita ACO Branch,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs
for this AD, if requested using the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with
14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your
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principal inspector or local Flight Standards
District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the
certification office, send it to the attention of
the person identified in Related Information.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable
level of safety may be used for any repair,
modification, or alteration required by this
AD if it is approved by a Textron Aviation,
Inc. Unit Member (UM) of the Textron
Organization Designation Authorization
(ODA), that has been authorized by the
Manager, Wichita ACO Branch, to make
those findings. To be approved, the repair,
modification deviation, or alteration
deviation must meet the certification basis of
the airplane, and the approval must
specifically refer to this AD.
(p) Related Information
(1) For more information about this AD,
contact Bobbie Kroetch, Aviation Safety
Engineer, Wichita ACO Branch, FAA, 1801
Airport Rd., Wichita, KS 67209; phone: (316)
946–4155; fax: (316) 946–4107; email:
bobbie.kroetch@faa.gov or Wichita-COS@
faa.gov.
(2) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Textron Aviation Inc., One
Cessna Boulevard, Wichita, KS 67215; phone:
(316) 517–6061; email: structures@txtav.com;
website: https://support.cessna.com. You
may view this referenced service information
at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust,
Kansas City, MO 64106. For information on
the availability of this material at the FAA,
call (816) 329–4148.
Issued on April 16, 2021.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2021–09871 Filed 5–10–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION
16 CFR Chapter II
[Docket No. CPSC–2021–0014]
Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) Fire and
Debris-Penetration Hazards; Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking;
Request for Comments and
Information
Consumer Product Safety
Commission.
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed
rulemaking.
AGENCY:
The Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC or Commission) is
considering developing a rule to address
the risk of injury associated with fire
and debris-penetration hazards
SUMMARY:
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25817
associated with off-highway vehicles
(OHVs). This advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPR) initiates a
rulemaking proceeding under the
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).
We invite written comments from
interested persons concerning the risk of
injury associated with OHV fire and
debris-penetration hazards, the
regulatory alternatives discussed in this
notice, other possible means to address
this risk, and the economic impacts of
the various alternatives. We also invite
interested persons to submit an existing
standard, or a statement of intent to
modify or develop a voluntary standard,
to address the risks of injury described
in this ANPR.
DATES: Written comments and
submissions in response to this notice
must be received by July 12, 2021.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. CPSC–2021–
0014, by any of the following methods:
Electronic Submissions: Submit
electronic comments to the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at:
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
The Commission encourages you to
submit electronic comments by using
the Federal eRulemaking Portal, as
described above.
Written Submissions: Submit written
submissions by mail/hand delivery/
courier to: Division of the Secretariat,
Consumer Product Safety Commission,
Room 820, 4330 East West Highway,
Bethesda, MD 20814; telephone: (301)
504–7923. Alternatively, as a temporary
option during the COVID–19 pandemic,
you can email such submissions to:
cpsc-os@cpsc.gov.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the agency name and
docket number for this document. All
comments received may be posted
without change, including any personal
identifiers, contact information, or other
personal information provided, to
www.regulations.gov. Do not submit
confidential business information, trade
secret information, or other sensitive or
protected information that you do not
want to be available to the public. If
furnished at all, such information
should be submitted in writing.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to
www.regulations.gov, and insert the
docket number CPSC–2021–0014 into
the ‘‘Search’’ box, and follow the
prompts.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Han
Lim, Directorate for Engineering
Sciences, U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission, 5 Research Place,
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 11, 2021 / Proposed Rules
Rockville, MD 20850; telephone: (301)
987–2327; email: hlim@cpsc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Background
The CPSC is aware of numerous
injuries and deaths resulting from fire
hazards associated with all-terrain
vehicles (ATVs), recreational offhighway Vehicles (ROVs), and Utility
Terrain or Utility Task Vehicles (UTVs),
and from debris-penetration hazards
associated with ROVs and UTVs. For
the purposes of this rulemaking
proceeding, we collectively refer to
these three vehicle types as off-highway
vehicles, or OHVs.
CPSC staff’s review of incident data
from January 1, 2003 through December
31, 2020 in CPSC’s Consumer Product
Safety Risk Management System
(CPSRMS) identified 28 fatalities and
264 injuries from fire-related OHV
hazards, and 6 fatalities and 20 injuries 1
from debris-penetration OHV hazards.
From the National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System (NEISS) database,
CPSC staff estimates there were 14,200
emergency department-treated injuries
from 2007 to 2019 (based on a sample
size of 282) associated with OHV fire,
thermal, and burn hazards without
indication of a crash or related event.
The current voluntary standards for
the three OHV types are:
• ANSI/SVIA 1–2017 Four-Wheel AllTerrain Vehicles—Equipment,
Configurations, and Performance
Requirements developed by Specialty
Vehicle Institute of America (SVIA) for
ATVs and incorporated by reference as
a mandatory standard in 16 CFR 1420.3;
• ANSI/ROHVA 1–2016—
Recreational Off-Highway Vehicles; and
• ANSI/OPEI B71.9–2016—American
National Standard for Multipurpose OffHighway Utility Vehicles.
The current voluntary standards for
ROVs and UTVs, ANSI/ROHVA–1–2016
and ANSI/OPEI B71.9–2016,
respectively, do not have requirements
that address fire hazards or debrispenetration hazards. The current
voluntary standard for ATVs, ANSI/
SVIA 1–2017, does not include
requirements that address fire hazards.
CPSC staff has met with
representatives from ROHVA, SVIA, and
1 Note that two of the 20 injuries related to OHV
debris-penetration hazards came from the NEISS
data.
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OPEI on multiple occasions, beginning
in September 2018, to discuss the
development of requirements to address
the risk of fire and debris-penetration
hazards. CPSC staff believes that
significant progress has been made in
discussing possible fire preventative
standard requirements, but to date the
standard development organizations
have not proposed any fire preventative
standard requirements. In addition,
there has been no discussion on
possible debris-penetration mitigation
standard requirements.
The Commission is considering
developing a mandatory standard (or
standards) to reduce the risk of injury
associated with OHV fire and debrispenetration hazards. Commission staff
prepared a briefing package to describe
the products at issue, assess the relevant
incident data, describe the hazards,
examine relevant voluntary standards,
and discuss regulatory alternatives for
addressing the risk associated with OHV
fire and debris-penetration hazards.
That briefing package is available at:
https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/
Advance-Notice-of-ProposedRulemaking-Regarding-Off-HighwayVehicles.pdf.
B. Statutory Authority
A rulemaking addressing the fire and
debris-penetration hazards associated
with ROVs and UTVs falls under the
authority of the CPSA. 15 U.S.C. 2051–
2084. A rulemaking addressing the fire
hazards associated with ATVs is subject
to section 42(b)(3) of the CPSA. Section
42(b)(3) provides that for CPSC-initiated
changes to the mandatory standard for
ATVs, 15 U.S.C. 2089, the Commission
must make findings required by sections
7 and 9 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2056 and
2058. Thus, a Commission-initiated
rulemaking addressing the fire hazards
associated with ATVs would also fall
under sections 7 and 9 of the CPSA.
Because of the three vehicle types and
two different hazard patterns involved
in this rulemaking, it is possible the
Commission will divide this rulemaking
into separate rulemakings at the notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPR) stage.
Under section 7 of the CPSA, the
Commission may issue a consumer
product safety standard if the
requirements of the standard are
‘‘reasonably necessary to prevent or
reduce an unreasonable risk of injury
associated with [a] product.’’ 15 U.S.C.
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2056(a). The safety standard may consist
of performance requirements or
requirements for warnings and
instructions. Id. However, if there is a
voluntary standard that would
adequately reduce the risk of injury the
Commission seeks to address, and there
is likely to be substantial compliance
with that standard, then the
Commission must rely on the voluntary
standard, instead of issuing a mandatory
standard. 15 U.S.C. 2056(b)(1). To issue
a mandatory standard under section 7,
the Commission must follow the
procedural and substantive
requirements in section 9 of the CPSA.
15 U.S.C. 2056(a).
Under section 9 of the CPSA, the
Commission may begin rulemaking by
issuing an ANPR. 15 U.S.C. 2058(a). The
ANPR must identify the product and the
nature of the risk of injury associated
with it; summarize the regulatory
alternatives the Commission is
considering; and include information
about any relevant existing standards,
and why the Commission preliminarily
believes those standards would not
adequately reduce the risk of injury
associated with the product. The ANPR
must also invite comments concerning
the risk of injury and regulatory or other
possible alternatives for addressing the
risk, and invite the public to submit
existing standards or a statement of
intent to modify or develop a voluntary
standard to address the risk of injury. Id.
After publishing an ANPR, the
Commission may proceed with
rulemaking by reviewing the comments
received in response to the ANPR and
publishing an NPR. An NPR must
include the text of the proposed rule,
alternatives the Commission is
considering, a preliminary regulatory
analysis describing the costs and
benefits of the proposed rule and the
alternatives, and an assessment of any
submitted standards. 15 U.S.C. 2058(c).
The Commission would then review
comments on the NPR and decide
whether to issue a final rule, along with
a final regulatory analysis.
C. The Product
For purposes of this rulemaking,
OHVs include: ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs.
The scope of this rulemaking does not
include golf cars, personal transport
vehicles (PTVs), low-speed vehicles, or
dune buggies.
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 11, 2021 / Proposed Rules
1. All-Terrain Vehicles
An all-terrain vehicle (ATV) is a
motorized vehicle with three or four
broad, low-pressure tires (less than 10
pounds per square inch), a seat designed
to be straddled by the operator,
handlebars for steering, and designed
for off-highway use. Since the 1980s, the
CPSC has addressed ATV safety through
various activities, including rulemaking,
25819
recalls, consumer education, media
outreach, and litigation. These efforts
focused on stability and handling issues
related to ATV overturn and collisions.
Figure 1 shows an example of an ATV.
Currently, CPSC regulates ATVs
through the incorporation by reference
of ANSI/SVIA 1–2017 Four-Wheel AllTerrain Vehicles—Equipment,
Configuration, and Performance
Requirements as a mandatory standard
(16 CFR 1420.3(a)).
2. Recreational Off-Highway Vehicles
An ROV is a motorized vehicle having
four or more low-pressure tires designed
for off-highway use and intended by the
2 The NPR for ROVs is available at: 79 FR 68964
(Nov. 19, 2014); the accompanying briefing package
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Jkt 253001
manufacturer primarily for recreational
use by one or more persons. Other
characteristics of an ROV include: A
steering wheel for steering control, foot
controls for throttle and braking, bench
or bucket seats, rollover protective
structure (ROPS), restraint system, and
a maximum speed greater than 30 miles
per hour (mph). ROVs are intended to
be used on terrain similar to ATVs.
ROVs are distinguished from ATVs by
the presence of a steering wheel, instead
of a handle bar for steering; bench or
bucket seats for the driver and
passenger(s), instead of straddle seating;
foot controls for throttle and braking,
instead of levers located on the handle
bar; and ROPS and restraint systems
that are not present on ATVs. CPSC staff
has worked on stability, handling, and
occupant protection issues related to
ROVs since 2009.2 Figure 2 shows an
example of an ROV.
is available at: https://cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/pdfs/
foia_SafetyStandardforRecreationalOffHighwayVehicles-ProposedRule.pdf.
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Figure 1: Example of an ATV
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 11, 2021 / Proposed Rules
Figure 2: Example of an ROV
3. Utility Terrain Vehicles or Utility
Task Vehicles
low-pressure tires designed for offhighway use with the same
characteristics as ROVs (bench seating,
steering wheel, foot controls, ROPS, and
seat belts). However, UTVs are intended
For this rulemaking, a UTV is a
motorized vehicle having four or more
for utility use, have larger cargo beds to
accommodate hauling-type tasks, and
they generally have maximum speeds
between 25 and 30 mph. Figure 3 shows
an example of a UTV.
D. The Market
1. Market Size
ATV sales have varied over the last 15
years. U.S. ATV sales peaked in 2004,
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at an estimated 812,000 units. Since
2004, ATV sales have declined steadily.
The Commission estimates
approximately 205,000 ATVs were sold
in the United States in 2018: 177,000
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adult models and 77,000 youth models,
with sales revenue of approximately
$1.35 billion. The Commission
identified 13 manufacturers supplying
ATVs to the U.S. market in 2018, six
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Figure 3: Example of a UTV
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 11, 2021 / Proposed Rules
from the United States, five from
Taiwan, and one each from Japan and
Mexico. Nine manufacturers were
responsible for all ATVs distributed into
the U.S. market in 2018; four U.S.
manufacturers distributed ATVs
manufactured by Taiwanese firms, in
addition to their own. U.S.
manufacturers accounted for
approximately 63 percent of 2018 U.S.
ATV sales; all ATVs were manufactured
and/or distributed by current members
of the Specialty Vehicle Institute of
America (SVIA).
Except for 2009, annual U.S. ROV
sales have increased steadily, from an
estimated 2,700 units in 1998, to an
estimated 376,000 units in 2018. The
Commission estimates 2018 U.S. ROV
sales revenue at approximately $5.85
billion. The Commission identified 35
manufacturers known to have supplied
ROVs to the U.S. market in 2018, 20
from China (including Taiwan); 13 from
the United States, and 1 each from
Commission estimates U.S.
manufacturers accounted for
approximately 92 percent of 2018 U.S.
UTV sales. Current ROHVA and OPEI
members accounted for approximately
90 percent of U.S. 2018 UTV sales.
Total U.S. OHV unit sales peaked in
2004, at approximately 937,000. OHV
sales then declined, to approximately
475,000 by 2011, before beginning a
partial recovery. Figure 4 illustrates
ATV, ROV, UTV, and total OHV unit
sales from 1998 through 2018. The
Commission identified as many as 52
manufacturers and 68 distributors/
brands of OHVs supplying an estimated
657,000 OHVs to the U.S. market in
2018, with sales revenue exceeding
$7.87 billion. The Commission
estimates U.S. manufacturers accounted
for approximately 75 percent of 2018
U.S. OHV sales; SVIA, ROHVA, and
OPEI members accounted for
approximately 93 percent of 2018 U.S.
OHV sales.
Mexico and South Korea. The
Commission identified 53 distributers/
brands. CPSC staff estimates U.S.
manufacturers accounted for
approximately 79 percent of 2018 U.S.
ROV sales, and estimates approximately
90 percent of ROVs sold in the United
States in 2018 were manufactured by
current members of the Recreational
Off-highway Vehicle Association
(ROHVA) or the Outdoor Power
Equipment Institute (OPEI).
U.S. UTV sales peaked in 2007, at an
estimated 112,000 units, before
gradually declining. Approximately
76,000 UTVs were sold in the United
States in 2018, with sales revenue of
approximately $700 million. The
Commission identified 22
manufacturers known to have supplied
UTVs to the U.S. market in 2018, 14
from the United States, 6 from China
(including Taiwan), and 1 each from
Canada and South Korea; and 27
distributers/brands were identified. The
Figure 4. RV, ROV,UfV, and Total OHV Unit Sales, 1998-2018
~·
·c
.
';:r
lOO,t!OO
....
600,000
; t,l
:I
• !.:
500,000
400,000
30CJ,fl00 •·
200.,00&
11.iO,mo ·
2005
200, 2001 2ma 1009 2011 2011 2012. 2m 2014
YW
• •.. . • • • • • • . ·• •
2. Retail Prices
The Commission identified 115
different ATV model variants and
configurations in two product segments
sold in the United States in 2018: Youth
and adult. Youth ATV manufacturer
suggested retail prices (MSRPs) ranged
from a minimum of $1,999, to a
maximum of $3,799, with an average of
approximately $2,650. Adult ATV
model MSRPs ranged from a minimum
of $3,799, to a maximum of $15,349,
with a mean of approximately $7,400.
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3 Unless otherwise noted, OHV product and
market information is based upon CPSC staff
analysis of 1998–2018 sales data provided by Power
Products Marketing, Minneapolis, MN.
Frm 00013
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.-.•.v.. - ..• • ~.~.-.-~•.•..
The mean MSRP for all U.S. ATV sales
in 2018 was approximately $6,750.3
As with ATVs, there is significant
variation in ROV design, weight, engine
displacement, and other characteristics
and accessories. The Commission
identified 396 different ROV model
variants and configurations that were
sold in the United States in 2018. ROV
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ms 201, 2017: ams
~
r .... •--...-,-.-.- ..- ..-.-.-•• , ' -
MSRPs ranged from a minimum of
$3,299, to a maximum of $53,700, with
an average of approximately $15,400.
The Commission identified 138
different UTV model variants and
configurations that were sold in the
United States in 2018. UTV MSRPs
ranged from a minimum of $3,499 to a
maximum of $49,900, with an average of
approximately $12,000.
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1"a 1"f 2wo 2001. l(JOi 2001 •
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 11, 2021 / Proposed Rules
3. Number of Off-Highway Vehicles in
Use
The Commission is unable to provide
an accurate estimate of the number of
OHVs currently in use, due to a lack of
reliable estimates of ATV, ROV, and
with shape = 5 and b = 1, applied to
1998–2018 OHV sales data. Table 1
provides estimates for ATVs, ROVs,
UTVs, and total OHVs under three
product-life assumptions (10, 15, and 20
years).4
UTV product life. Table 1 illustrates a
range of estimates possible under
different assumptions of product life. In
each case, the estimate is constructed
using a gamma distribution, a common
distribution for estimating failure rates,
TABLE 1—ESTIMATES OF OHVS IN USE
[Gamma distribution w/shape = 5 and beta = 1]
Life expectancy
10 Years
15 Years
20 Years
ATV ............................................................................................................................
ROV ...........................................................................................................................
UTV ............................................................................................................................
3,217,376
2,419,854
895,474
5,782,667
2,725,373
1,226,299
7,467,359
2,853,372
1,417,666
Total ....................................................................................................................
6,532,704
9,734,340
11,738,397
4. Small Businesses Subject to
Rulemaking
OHV manufacturers might be
classified in the North American
Industrial Classification System
(NAICS) category 336999 (All Other
Transportation Equipment
Manufacturing), or possibly, 336112
(Light Truck and Utility Vehicle
Manufacturing), 333111 (Farm
Machinery and Equipment), 333112
(Lawn and Garden Tractor and Home
Lawn and Garden Equipment
Manufacturing), and 333120
(Construction Machinery
Manufacturing). According to size
standards established by the U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA) for these
NAICS, firms with fewer than 1,000,
1,500, 1,250, 1,500, and 1,250
employees, respectively, are considered
to be small firms. OHV distributers may
be classified in NAICS categories
423110 (Automobile and Other Motor
Vehicle Merchant Wholesalers) or
441228 (Motorcycle, ATV, and All
Other Motor Vehicle Dealers). The SBA
size standard for these NAICS
classifications is 500 employees. The
Commission identified eight U.S. OHV
manufacturers that meet these SBA size
standards, nine that do not, and four for
which a determination could not be
made. CPSC staff also identified 27 OHV
distributors that meet these SBA size
standards, 24 that do not, and 17 for
which a determination could not be
made.
E. Risk of Injury
1. Incident Data
CPSC staff conducted a review of
incidents, injuries, and fatalities
associated with OHV fire and debris-
penetration hazards. The reported
incidents from CPSC’s Consumer
Product Safety Risk Management
System (CPSRMS) are from January 1,
2003 through December 31, 2020; the
National Electronic Injury Surveillance
System (NEISS)-based injury estimates
are from January 1, 2007 to December
31, 2019.
Fire and debris-penetration hazards
are generally unrelated to one another.
Out of the 4,792 incidents staff
identified as related to debrispenetration or fire hazards, only two
exhibited both debris-penetration and
fire-related hazards. Table 2 shows the
breakout of hazards by data sources and
severity of incidents.
TABLE 2—INCIDENT RECORDS RELEVANT TO DEBRIS-PENETRATION AND/OR FIRE HAZARDS AS PRESENTED IN THIS
REPORT
CPSRMS
(2003–2020)
Total records
reviewed
Relevant hazards
Fatal reported
incidents
Injury reported
incidents
NEISS
(2007–2019)
No injury
reported
incidents
Injury cases
in sample
Debris Penetration ...............................................................
Fire Hazard (fire, thermal, leaks) .........................................
Both hazard of Debris-Penetration and Thermal, Fuel, or
Fire-Related Hazards .......................................................
107
4,683
6
28
18
264
81
4,109
2
282
2
0
1
1
0
Total ..............................................................................
4,792
34
283
4,191
284
Sources: CPSRMS and NEISS.
(a) Fire Hazard Incidents
CPSC staff’s assessment of the fire
hazard incidents excludes fires ignited
by external sources (e.g., overtaken by a
controlled burn or bonfire, even if the
4 Implied in the total OHV estimates is the
assumption that ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs have the
same expected product life. This assumption likely
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OHV ignites) refueling incidents, and
incidents in which it is ambiguous
about whether the source of the fire may
have come from a source outside the
OHV. The analysis of reported incidents
in CPSRMS with incident dates from
2003 through 2020 is detailed below.
does not hold, because product life is dependent
upon annual mileage, terrain driven upon, and
other usage characteristics, which are not
homogenous across OHV categories.
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CPSRMS Incident Data (2003–2020)
CPSC staff categorized reports in
CPSRMS with incident dates from 2003
through 2020 into one of several
mutually exclusive categories.
Sometimes OHV fires occur after a
crash, and because these events may
involve multiple complicating factors,
they are set aside in their own category.
It is very plausible that in some of these
instances, occupants may still have been
injured or killed from the crash, even if
the vehicle had not ignited. For
instances of a fire igniting before or
without a crash, it is generally clearer to
attribute resulting injuries or deaths
specifically to the fire. In many other
instances, there may be thermal events
that do not involve actual ignition of
fire; but such events can still be harmful
or hazardous. Leaks or spraying of oil or
fuel do not necessarily constitute a
thermal event, because these flammable
liquids not only have the potential to
ignite and release thermal energy; but
even without ignitions, such leaks can
present a hazard.
Table 3 presents the fire hazard
subtypes by the severity of the outcome
as seen in the CPSRMS incident data.
TABLE 3—REPORTED INCIDENTS BY FIRE HAZARD SUBTYPE AND SEVERITY; 2003–2020
Reported
incidents
Type of fire, thermal, or leak hazard
Reported incident severity
Fatal
Injury
No injury
Post-Crash Fire Ignition ...................................................................................
Fire Ignited (without/prior to crash) ..................................................................
Thermal Event or burn (without Fire Ignition) ..................................................
Leak or spray of oil or fuel (without other burn, thermal event, or fire) ..........
51
1,626
2,451
273
28
0
0
0
18
129
105
12
5
1,497
2,346
261
Total ..........................................................................................................
4,401
28
264
4,109
Source: CPSRMS.
NEISS-Based National Injury Estimates
(2007–2019)
There are an estimated 14,200 (sample
size = 282) emergency departmenttreated injuries from 2007 to 2019,
associated with OHV fire, thermal, and
burn hazards without indication of a
crash or related event. ‘‘Crash-type
events’’ are defined in this review to
include vehicle wrecks, rollovers,
entrapments, traffic collisions, and
victims falling or jumping from the
vehicle, for example.
Although crash-type events
coinciding with burns and other
thermal-, fuel- and fire-related hazards
are of concern, such cases were already
considered and discussed among the
reported incidents. For the assessment
of NEISS injury cases, they are excluded
to focus on injuries more directly
attributable to heat and thermal events.
This narrowing of scope is not intended
to suggest that overheating or other
malfunctioning of the OHV occurred, or
even that other additional factors were
not involved, but simply to indicate that
a burn, or other thermal-related event
occurred without a crash-type event.
Staff is unable to present the annual
estimates of the injuries over the period
from 2007 through 2019, because
estimates for many of the individual
years fall below the NEISS publication
criteria.5 However, staff did not see any
increasing or decreasing trend in the
data.
The 14,200 estimated thermal-, fuel-,
and fire-related injuries are based on a
sample size of 282 cases. The vast
majority of these estimated injuries
indicate burns (as the primary
diagnosis), without necessarily
involving the ignition of any fire or
flame. Of the injuries involving burns,
around 12,800 injuries (about 91
percent) were classified as thermal
burns, while the remainder consisted of
scald burns, chemical burns, or burns
that were not specified. None of the
incidents reviewed involved any
fatalities. Only around 3 percent of
estimated injuries mentioned any sort of
fire ignition. Less than 2 percent of
estimated injuries did not mention
burns, but instead involved exploding
projectiles lacerating or penetrating the
body, or a gasoline explosion.
Most of the injuries were suffered in
the lower body, with an estimated 5,900
(42%) of injuries affecting the lower leg
in particular. About 1,800 (13%) of the
injuries affected the ankle, foot, or toe,
and about 1,500 (11%) involved the
knee, upper leg and/or lower trunk.
Many of these injuries suffered at the leg
and neighboring body parts were
described as involving burns from the
muffler, exhaust pipe, and/or hot
exhaust. It was not always clear whether
the burns were suffered due to direct
contact or proximity. An estimated
3,200 (23%) of the injuries involved
hands and fingers. Injuries between the
shoulders and wrists (including arms
and elbows) were attributed to an
estimated 1,300 (9%) of the injuries.
Several reported injuries also occurred
on or near the eyes and face, but the
sample size is too small to project an
estimate specific to that region of the
body. Table 4 presents the estimated
injuries by body parts grouped as
described above.
TABLE 4—U.S. EMERGENCY ROOM-TREATED INJURIES RELATED TO FIRE/THERMAL/FUEL HAZARDS WITHOUT INDICATION
OF CRASH-TYPE EVENTS BY BODY PARTS; 2007–2019
Body parts
group estimate
Body part
Leg, lower *** ...................................................................................................................................................
Ankle;*** Foot; Toe ..........................................................................................................................................
Trunk, lower; Leg, upper; Knee .......................................................................................................................
5 According to the NEISS publication criteria, an
estimate must be 1,200 or greater, the sample size
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5,900
1,800
1,500
must be 20 or greater, and the coefficient of
variation must be 33 percent or smaller.
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Percentage of
estimated
injuries for
body part group
(percent)
42
13
11
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TABLE 4—U.S. EMERGENCY ROOM-TREATED INJURIES RELATED TO FIRE/THERMAL/FUEL HAZARDS WITHOUT INDICATION
OF CRASH-TYPE EVENTS BY BODY PARTS; 2007–2019—Continued
Body parts
group estimate
Body part
Percentage of
estimated
injuries for
body part group
(percent)
Hand; Finger ....................................................................................................................................................
Shoulder; Arm, upper; Elbow; Arm, lower; Wrist ............................................................................................
Eyeball; Face * .................................................................................................................................................
3,200
1,300
(**)
23
9
(**)
Total ..........................................................................................................................................................
14,200
100
Source: NEISS.
* ‘‘Face’’ includes eyelid, eye area, nose, and forehead.
** Sample size is too small to report estimate specific to this group of body parts.
*** Almost all injuries in this dataset are classified under a single primary (e.g., most severely injured) body part. Only one injury is counted
only as a lower leg injury (and not as an ankle injury) which also involved a burn at the lower leg in combination with a ‘‘popped’’ ankle when the
vehicle ‘‘blew out.’’
An overwhelming majority of the
emergency room patients (94%, or an
estimated 13,500) were treated and
released, or released without treatment.
The remainder were treated and
admitted for hospitalization, held for
observation, or left without treatment or
being seen.
Although the majority of these
injuries appear to have involved burns
due simply to proximity or contact with
heat sources, some other relevant
hazards are observed among the NEISS
cases. There were several incidents
relating to fuel or gasoline, battery or
some form of ‘‘explosion’’; and as
previously mentioned, there were a few
incidents in which ignition or fire was
mentioned. Staff does not have data
about which burn cases resulted from
overheating, as compared to
components operating at normal hot
temperatures. However, given that many
of the injuries involving the hand and
fingers appear to have involved contact
with components that are expected to be
heated at normal operational conditions,
staff infers that many of the hand burns
likely occurred without the OHV
overheating, or otherwise functioning
outside of normal design parameters.
(b) Debris-Penetration Incidents
Debris penetration involves debris
(usually a tree branch or stick)
penetrating an OHV (usually the
floorboard of underside of an ROV or
UTV). When such penetration occurs,
there is a potential hazard of the branch
or other debris to penetrate not only the
floor or body of the OHV, but also
occupants of the OHV. None of the
incidents staff identified were found to
involve ATV debris-penetration
incidents. Given that ATVs lack
floorboards, this result was not
unexpected; but staff did search OHV
incidents for this hazard, regardless of
whether it was indicated to involve an
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ATV, ROV, UTV, or unknown type of
OHV.
In the NEISS data, staff identified
only two cases with sufficient
descriptive information to conclude that
the injuries were specifically associated
with a debris-penetration hazard. Due to
this small sample size, staff cannot
report any estimate of injuries. Instead,
for the debris-penetration-hazard
scenario, staff counted the two injuries
from NEISS with the other reported
injuries from CPSRMS.
For the six fatal incidents, two
involved a passenger’s death, while the
other four involved the driver’s death.
Four involved a tree branch, one a large
stick, and the other a 2-inch to 3-inch
piece of wood. At least three involved
penetration of the chest.
The list below paraphrases text
written by the respective CPSC
investigators for each of the six fatal
incidents:
• Tree limb penetrated the floor board
and struck passenger in chest (driven in
water);
• tire over tree limb that pierces
fender, nylon mesh door, and left side
of driver (driven in woods);
• passed over a large stick that was
sticking up in the ground, which passed
through brake pedal arm through bottom
edge of seat and into lower abdomen of
driver (driven in power line clearing);
• impaled by a 2- to 3-inch-size piece
of wood in upper right thigh, causing
exsanguination of driver (driven on
heavily forested public land);
• branch penetrated UTV bottom and
struck passenger in chest (driven along
trail);
• ran over large tree branch that
struck driver in chest (driven in
mountains).
Table 2 presents the severity of the 20
nonfatal injury incidents from debris
penetration.
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TABLE 5—DEBRIS PENETRATION BY
INJURY SEVERITY: 2003–2020
Injury severity
Incidents
Hospital Admission ..................................
Emergency Department Treatment Received ..................................................
First Aid Received by Non-Medical Professional ...............................................
No First Aid or Medical Attention Received ..................................................
Level of care not known ..........................
4
2
10
Total Injury Incidents ...........................
20
3
1
Sources: CPSRMS and NEISS.
2. Hazard Patterns and Analysis of InDepth Investigations
(a) Fire Hazard Review and Assessment
Since 2018, CPSC staff has
collaborated with the three standards
development organizations (SDOs):
ROHVA, OPEI, and SVIA, to examine
fire hazard causations of OHV-related
incidents investigated by CPSC staff and
reported as in-depth investigations
(IDIs). All three vehicle types, ROVs,
UTVs, and ATVs, were associated with
fire hazards. Staff provided the SDOs
with 121 redacted IDIs related to fire
hazards in OHVs for review and
analysis. These 121 redacted IDIs are a
subset of the more comprehensive list of
IDI data analyzed by the CPSC
Epidemiology staff and detailed in
section E.1 of this preamble. Of the 121
redacted IDIs, CPSC staff and the SDOs
concluded that 84 IDIs contained
sufficient information to determine
cause of fire origin, and they agreed to
categorize these IDIs. This discussion
provides staff’s insight into this subset
of 121 incidents discussed by and the
SDOs. When cause or categorization of
incidents are discussed here, we discuss
only the 84 incidents for which CPSC
staff and SDOs agreed there was
sufficient information for categorization.
Fuel leaks are considered fire hazards
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because ignition of flammable fluids
contributes to the severity of an
incident. The fire and fuel leak origins
identified in the 84 IDIs include a
breach in the fuel system, electrical
component failure, exhaust overheat,
and debris (grass/dry vegetation)
ignition.
The majority (44 of the 84) of the
causations involved fuel system
components (29) and exhaust overheat
(15). The others involved specific
electronic components (voltage
regulator, wiring harness, electronic
control module, or battery), debris (grass
or dry vegetation) ignition from
contacting exhaust heat, oil leaks, and
unknown causes. Those that were
deemed unknown involved either two
or more possible combined causations
or instances where causations could not
be determined due to insufficient
information from particular IDIs.
Twenty-seven of the 121 IDIs involved
burn injuries when consumers
contacted hot surfaces or suffered burns
from open flames. Neither CPSC staff,
nor the SDOs, identified any fires due
to the lack of a spark arrester.
Of the 37 IDIs that had unknown fire
causations, 20 involved total-OHV
losses. A total loss fire refers to an OHV
that has been completely consumed by
the fire, leaving only a metal frame and
other non-combustible metal parts. A
total loss can occur when a smaller fire
25825
spreads into a fuel-fed fire, so that the
entire vehicle becomes engulfed in
flames. This often makes it difficult to
determine the origin of the fire. The
smaller fire can originate from various
sources, such as an overheating exhaust
that burns a plastic body panel, a fuel
leak fire, or a fire from an electrical
short, where a portion of a plastic body
panel may catch fire, then that fire can
spread to the entire vehicle because the
majority of the OHV body panels are
generally made of flammable plastics.
Total loss incidents, as shown in Figure
5, represent the most severe fire hazard
of an OHV.
Figure 5: ROV Prior to the Fire Incident (Left), ROV on Fire (Middle), and ROV PostTotal Loss Fire (Right)
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fuel leak and pose a risk of fire. A
breach can be a crack/hole in the fuel
tank, damaged fuel hose, crack/hole in
a fuel filter, or unsecured fuel
connection to a fuel rail. For example,
in one IDI involving an ATV, a
passenger received second- and thirddegree burns to the right wrist and right
leg when the ATV burst into flames
from an overheated gasoline line that
melted and spilled fuel onto the hot
engine.
Other fuel-related fire hazards can be
due to over-pressurization of the fuel
system and inadequate ventilation.
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Inadequate ventilation and overpressurization of the fuel system can
result in boiling gasoline, which can
expel abruptly when opening the fuel
cap, potentially splashing hot gasoline
onto consumers. Figure 6 shows an
example from an IDI of an overpressurization scenario with an ROV.
Unbeknownst to the consumer, opening
the fuel cap released pressurized
gasoline and a brief fire resulted. Black
soot can be seen surrounding the fuel
cap.
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Each OHV is equipped with
subsystems that have combustible or
flammable sources that can lead to fires
and/or fire hazards (i.e., fuel leaks).
These subsystems are the fuel system
(fuel tank, fuel pump, fuel rail, fuel
filter, hoses, shutoff valves, and fuel
caps), electrical system (voltage
regulator, wire harnesses, battery, fuse
boxes, and alternator), and the exhaust
system (exhaust piping, catalytic
converter, muffler, and all surrounding
componentry).
With respect to the fuel system, a
breach in the fuel system can cause a
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Figure 6- Soot on the Frame of the ROV (Red Arrows) Resulted from Flames
that Shot Out from the Fuel Tank When the Consumer Opened the Gas Cap
An electrical failure, such as an
electrical short or an electronic
component overheating, can lead to
fires. Figure 7 illustrates a fire that
started due to an overheated electronic
control module (ECM), which ignited
the ECM and wiring.
Figure 7 - Example of Burned ATV ECM; Left Photo - Top View, Right Photo Side View
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exhaust pipes and plastic paneling can
cause the plastic to melt. Figure 8
illustrates a fire that ignited when
melted plastic paneling dripped onto
the exhaust pipe and burned a hole
through the panel.
Of the 121 IDIs examined, 27 IDIs
involved burned victims. Of these 27
IDIs, 10 specified first-, second-, and/or
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third-degree burn injuries. The other 17
IDIs did not specify the severity of the
burn injuries. These burn injuries
occurred when victims had direct
contact with a hot surface or when an
open flame burned the victims.
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Excessive exhaust heat near
flammable plastics can cause melting
and subsequently fires, if the exhaust
systems do not manage the exhaust heat
sufficiently, via heat shielding and/or
adequate ventilation. It is not
uncommon for modern ROV exhaust
surface temperatures to exceed 800 °F.
Insufficient heat shielding between the
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25827
Figure 8 - Example of Fire Damage Caused by Excessive Exham Heat
(b) Debris-Penetration Hazard Review
and Assessment
Debris-penetration hazards are unique
to ROVs and UTVs because the wheelwell areas on these vehicles are
generally larger and more open,
compared to ATVs. The larger space
exposes more floorboard and wheel-well
surface to branches that can and do
penetrate into the occupant
compartment. Debris penetration
through the floorboard or wheel well
can impale the occupants of the vehicle
and has caused severe injuries and
deaths. An example of debris
penetration is shown in Figure 9. CPSC
staff did not find any ATV-related
debris-penetration incidents in the
injury/death data searches or debrispenetration recalls.
CPSC staff shared eight redacted IDIs
involving debris penetration, which is a
subset of the more comprehensive list of
IDI data analyzed by the CPSC
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Epidemiology staff, with the SDOs for
review and analysis. CPSC staff’s review
revealed four IDIs involved fatal
impalement of the occupant. A
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summary of the IDI data shown in Table
6 suggests the debris penetrations
occurred at relatively low speeds, i.e.,
25 mph or less.
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Figure 9: Example of Tree Branch (Yellow Arrows) Penetrating ROV floorboard; Left
Photograph Shows View from the Cabin (Passenger Seat); Right Photograph Shows
Front View of ROV
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TABLE 6—SUMMARIES OF EIGHT DEBRIS-PENETRATION IDIS
Vehicle
Injury type
Estimated
speed, mph
Injured body part(s)
Description
A .....................
Death ......................
25 .....................
heart ........................
B * ...................
No Injury .................
5 .......................
none ........................
C .....................
Death ......................
10 .....................
viscera ....................
D ** ..................
E .....................
Death ......................
Contusion/No Medical Attention.
Not available .....
20 .....................
no information .........
abdomen .................
F .....................
Abrasions ................
25 .....................
ankle .......................
G .....................
H .....................
Death ......................
Abdomen impaled ...
Not available .....
25 .....................
thigh ........................
Liver, stomach,
spleen, pancreas.
Consumer drove into a creek when water splashed onto the
windshield; tree limb broke through the floor and struck
passenger who died as a result of the impalement.
Consumer was driving on a slight hill; rocks punctured the
floorboard.
Consumer drove on a wooded trail (dirt road) with various debris (rocks and limbs); tree limb pierced fender and nylon
mesh door and impaled the driver.
Not available.
Consumer drove in the dark (12:30 a.m.) on a leaf covered
trail; tree branch punctured driver’s side floor, struck his abdomen, but did not impale the driver due to the driver
wearing thick clothing.
IDI involved 2 occasions—on one occasion snow was on
ground, could not see branches thus a debris penetration
occurred; other occasion ROV traveled on paved road and
a tree branch punctured rear passenger floor.
Not available.
Consumer drove on dirt/gravel road lined with 3-foot-tall grass
on both sides; when attempting to avoid debris from a
downed tree, a branch penetrated passenger side floor,
struck passenger and impaled the driver.
*All vehicles are ROVs, except vehicle B, which is a UTV. Vehicle B involved rocks penetrating the floorboard; all other vehicles involved tree
branches penetrating the floorboards.
** It is unknown whether vehicle D is an ROV or UTV due to the lack of model information.
There were four deaths and three
injuries associated with debris
penetration. Many of these incidents
occurred when there was reduced
visibility or the driver was unable to see
the debris (e.g., driving in the dark,
snow-covered terrain), but overall the
incidents occurred during what staff
considers reasonably foreseeable,
normal use of the vehicles.
3. OHV Recalls
From 2002 to 2019, there were 68
OHV fire and debris-penetration hazard
recalls. The fire hazard recalls involved
ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs. The debrispenetration recalls involved ROVs.
CPSC recall data include the number
of affected vehicles, number of
incidents, and injuries associated with
the recalls. An incident is considered a
penetration through the floorboard, an
actual fire, a fuel leak, or other thermal
event (e.g., melted plastic, overheated
component).
There have been 26 ATV fire hazard
recalls, of which 18 involved fuel
system components; 4 involved
electronic control modules; 2 involved
oil leaks; 1 involved brake fires due to
friction; and 1 involved inadequate heat
shielding. Collectively, there were
462,372 recalled vehicles, 3,325
incidents, 83 fires, and 24 injuries
associated with 26 recalls from 2002 to
2018. There were no deaths associated
with ATV fire hazard recalls.
With respect to ROVs, there were 33
ROV fire hazard recalls, of which 9
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involved fuel system components; 3
involved electrical wiring/electrical
components; 10 involved exhaust heatinadequate heat shielding; 3 involved
grass/dry vegetation debris ignition; 5
involved oil leaks; 1 involved improper
throttle body installation; and 2
involved multiple sources (engine
misfire, brake fires). Collectively, there
were 709,886 recalled vehicles, 1,022
incidents, 327 fires, and 32 injuries
associated with 33 recalls from 2008 to
2019. There was one death associated
with one fire hazard recall.
There were 6 UTV fire hazard recalls;
1 involved grass/dry vegetation debris
ignition; and 5 involved fuel system
components. Collectively, there were
43,340 recalled vehicles, 144 incidents,
and 11 fires associated with 6 recalls
from 2008 to 2017. There were no
injuries or deaths associated with UTV
fire hazard recalls.
There were 3 ROV debris penetration
hazard recalls. Collectively, there were
44,500 recalled vehicles, 630 incidents,
and 9 injuries associated with three
recalls from 2014 to 2016. There were
no deaths associated with ROV debris
penetration hazard recalls.
F. Existing Standards
1. ATVs
SVIA developed the voluntary
standard for ATVs, ANSI/SVIA 1 FourWheel All-Terrain Vehicles—
Equipment, Configuration, and
Performance Requirements standard.
SVIA published ANSI/SVIA 1 in 1990,
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and revised the standard in 2001, 2007,
2010, and 2017. In 2008, the Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act
(CPSIA) required the Commission to
make mandatory the voluntary standard
for ATVs, ANSI/SVIA 1–2007. The
Commission adopted the voluntary
standard as a mandatory standard; the
standard is codified in 16 CFR part
1420. The Commission amended 16 CFR
part 1420 in 2011 and 2018, to reference
the latest revision of ANSI/SVIA 1–2010
and ANSI/SVIA 1–2017, respectively.
The requirements ANSI/SVIA 1–2017
include warning label requirements,
various mechanical requirements, such
as static stability, braking distances,
maximum speeds for the various age
group ATVs, and various component
construction requirements such as those
for handlebars, foot rests, suspension,
and most recently, lights.
2. ROVs
The Recreational Off-Highway
Vehicle Association (ROHVA)
developed ANSI/ROHVA 1 American
National Standard for Recreational OffHighway Vehicles for recreationoriented ROVs. The Outdoor Power
Equipment Institute (OPEI) developed
ANSI/OPEI B71.9 American National
Standard for Multipurpose Off-Highway
Utility Vehicles for utility-oriented
vehicles; ANSI/OPEI B71.9 includes
requirements for vehicles that exceed 30
mph (and thus meet CPSC’s definition
of ‘‘ROVs’’).
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The ROV requirements in ANSI/
ROHVA 1–2016 and ANSI/OPEI B71.9–
2016 include static and dynamic
stability, vehicle handling, ROPS, speed
limiter function when seat belts are not
fastened, and various component
construction requirements such as for
steering, brakes, and seat belts.
3. UTVs
OPEI developed ANSI/OPEI B71.9
American National Standard for utilityoriented vehicles; ANSI/OPEI B71.9
includes requirements for vehicles that
exceed 30 mph (and thus meet CPSC
definition of ‘‘ROVs’’). For this
rulemaking, the Commission defines
‘‘UTVs’’ to have maximum speeds
below 30 mph. The UTV requirements
in ANSI/OPEI B71.9–2016 for vehicles
with maximum speed below 30 mph
include minimum static stability,
rollover protection structure (ROPS),
brake configuration and performance,
and lighting.
All three of these standards reference
the U.S. Forest Service standard,
USDA–FS 5100–1, which requires
OHVs to be equipped with spark
arrestors. A spark arrestor is a metal
screen installed in the exhaust tail pipe
to mitigate sparks exiting the tail pipe
to reduce the risk of forest fires. This
requirement does not address other
sources of fire hazards to riders and
passengers of OHVs; and thus, the
Commission views this requirement as
ineffective to address OHV fire hazards
to consumers.
In addition, the ANSI/OPEI B71.9–
2016 standard has a general requirement
that ‘‘all fuel system components shall
be located, routed, and contained in
such a manner as to provide clearance
to heat-generating components and to
avoid damage from obstacles or
projections that may be encountered
during normal operation.’’ This
requirement lacks specificity, and thus,
the Commission views this requirement
as ineffective.
The Commission does not believe the
two preceding requirements adequately
address the fire hazards associated with
OHVs. The incident data and recall data
suggest OHV fires due to fire sources,
such as electrical shorts, exhaust
overheat, and fuel leaks cannot be
addressed by the spark arrestor
requirement or the general ANSI/OPEI
B71.9–2016 statement regarding fuel
system component location. None of the
aforementioned standards contain
requirements to mitigate the debris
penetration hazard. Thus, the
Commission believes additional
requirements are needed to address
OHV fire and debris penetration
hazards.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:39 May 10, 2021
Jkt 253001
CPSC staff met with representatives of
the three SDOs, ROHVA, SVIA, and
OPEI on multiple occasions to discuss
recall data, categorizing IDIs fire
causations, and possible requirements
for fuel system, electrical, and exhaust
system requirements to reduce the risk
of fire hazards. After discussing and
categorizing fire causations of IDIs,
CPSC staff and SDOs initiated
discussions of possible fire preventative
standards requirements starting with the
fuel system component examination.
However, to date, there have been no
proposed fire and debris-penetration
requirements to update the current
ANSI/ROHVA 1–2016, ANSI/SVIA 1–
2017, and ANSI/OPEI B71.9–2016
standards to address fire and debris
penetration hazards. Thus, the
Commission concludes that the current
OHV standards will not adequately
address the deaths and injuries
associated with OHV fire and debrispenetration hazards.
G. Regulatory Alternatives
The Commission could proceed with
rulemaking under the CPSA establishing
performance requirements and/or
warnings and instructions for OHVs to
address the risks of injury associated
with OHV fire and debris-penetration
hazards. Alternatively, the Commission
could continue to address the hazards
through the voluntary standards, and
continue to work to develop more
effective voluntary standard
requirements to address the identified
hazards, instead of issuing a mandatory
rule. However, as previously discussed,
the Commission preliminarily believes
that the existing standards do not
adequately address the risk of injury
associated with fire and debrispenetration hazards in OHVs. The
Commission has recalled OHVs for fire
and debris penetration hazards. The fire
hazard recalls involved ATVs, ROVs,
and UTVs. The debris-penetration
recalls involved ROVs. The Commission
could continue to conduct recalls, both
voluntary and mandatory, instead of
promulgating a mandatory rule.
However, recalls are not likely to be as
effective at reducing the risk of injury as
a mandatory standard. Recalls only
apply to an individual manufacturer
and product and do not extend to
similar products. Product recalls occur
only after consumers have purchased
and used such products and have been
exposed to the hazard to be remedied by
the recall. Additionally, recalls can only
address products that are already on the
market, and cannot prevent unsafe
products from entering the market.
Finally, the Commission could issue
news releases warning consumers about
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
25829
the fire and debris-penetration hazards
association with OHVs. As with recalls,
this alternative is not likely to be as
effective at reducing the risk of injury as
a mandatory standard.
H. Request for Information and
Comments
This ANPR is the first step in a
proceeding that could result in a
mandatory safety standard(s) to address
fire and debris-penetration hazards
associated with OHVs. The Commission
requests comments on all aspects of this
ANPR, but specifically requests
comments regarding:
1. The risk of injury identified by the
Commission, the regulatory alternatives
being considered, and other possible
alternatives for addressing the risk;
2. Any existing standard or portion of
a standard that could be issued as a
proposed regulation;
3. A statement of intention to modify
or develop a voluntary standard to
address the risk of injury discussed in
this notice, along with a description of
a plan (including a schedule) to do so;
4. Studies, tests, or surveys performed
to analyze fire and/or debris penetration
hazard injuries, including severity and
costs associated with injury;
5. Studies, tests, or descriptions of
technologies or design changes that
address OHV fire and/or debris
penetration hazard, and estimates of
costs associated with incorporation of
the technologies and their impact on
wholesale or retail prices;
6. Information on ATV, ROV, and
UTV expected lifespans and/or the
number of ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs in
use;
7. Information on the number of hours
driven, miles driven, and/or other
exposure metrics for OHVs;
8. Studies, test, or surveys performed
to analyze use of aftermarket products
that address OHV fire and/or debrispenetration hazards, and their
effectiveness at reducing OHV fire and/
or debris-penetration hazard injuries,
and means by which their use by
consumers could be increased;
9. Information on the expected impact
of technologies or design changes that
address OHV fire and/or debrispenetration hazard injuries on
manufacturing costs or wholesale
prices;
10. Information on the potential
impact of technologies or design
changes to address OHV fire and/or
debris-penetration hazards on consumer
utility.
Comments and other submissions
should be identified by identified by
Docket No. CPSC–2021–0014 and
submitted in accordance with the
E:\FR\FM\11MYP1.SGM
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25830
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 89 / Tuesday, May 11, 2021 / Proposed Rules
instructions provided above. All
comments and other submissions must
be received by July 12, 2021.
Alberta A. Mills,
Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission.
[FR Doc. 2021–09881 Filed 5–10–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6355–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 165
[Docket Number USCG–2021–0272]
RIN 1625–AA00
Safety Zone; Recurring Safety Zone in
Captain of the Port Sault Sainte Marie
Zone
Coast Guard, DHS.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Coast Guard is proposing
to amend its recurring safety zone
regulations in the Captain of the Port
Sault Sainte Marie Zone. This proposed
rule would update one safety zone
location and dates. This proposed
amendment action is necessary to
provide for the safety of life associated
with annual marine events and firework
displays on these navigable waters near
Mackinaw City, MI. This proposed
rulemaking would prohibit persons and
vessels from being in the safety zone
unless authorized by the Captain of the
Port Sault Sainte Marie or a designated
representative. We invite your
comments on this proposed rulemaking.
DATES: Comments and related material
must be received by the Coast Guard on
or before August 9, 2021.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
identified by docket number USCG–
2021–0272 using the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.regulations.gov. See the ‘‘Public
Participation and Request for
Comments’’ portion of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for
further instructions on submitting
comments.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If
you have questions about this proposed
rulemaking, call or email LT Deaven
Palenzuela, Chief of Waterways
Management, U.S. Coast Guard;
telephone 906–635–3223, email
ssmprevention@uscg.mil.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Table of Abbreviations
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:39 May 10, 2021
Jkt 253001
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FR Federal Register
NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking
§ Section
U.S.C. United States Code
II. Background, Purpose, and Legal
Basis
On March 21, 2018 the Coast Guard
published an NPRM in the Federal
Register (83 FR 12307) entitled ‘‘Safety
Zones; Recurring Safety Zones in
Captain of the Port Sault Sainte Marie
Zone.’’ The NPRM proposed to amend
21 permanent safety zones for annually
recurring events in the Captain of the
Port Sault Sainte Marie Zone under
§ 165.918. The NPRM was open for
comment for 30 days.
On April 20, 2018 the Coast Guard
published the Final Rule in the Federal
Register (83 FR 12307), after receiving
no comments on the NPRM. Since that
time there have been changes to the
events that were listed in the Final Rule.
Through this proposed rule the Coast
Guard seeks to update § 165.918 to
reflect the current status of a recurring
marine event in the Captain of the Port
Sault Sainte Marie Zone.
The purpose of this rulemaking is to
ensure the safety of vessels and the
navigable waters within a 1000-yard
radius of the fireworks barge before,
during, and after the scheduled event.
The Coast Guard is proposing this
rulemaking under authority in 46 U.S.C.
70034 (previously 33 U.S.C. 1231).
III. Discussion of Proposed Rule
The COTP determines that an
amendment to the recurring safety zones
list as published in 33 CFR 165.918 is
necessary to: Update the location and
date of three existing safety zones:
Mackinaw Area Visitors Bureau Friday
Night Fireworks, Festivals of Fireworks
Celebration Fireworks, and Mackinac
Island Fourth of July Celebration
Fireworks. The purpose of this rule is to
ensure safety of vessels and the
navigable waters in the safety zone
before, during, and after the scheduled
event and to improve the overall clarity
and readability of the rule. The
regulatory text we are proposing appears
at the end of this document.
The amendment to this proposed rule
is necessary to ensure the safety of
vessels and people during annual events
taking place on or near federally
maintained waterways in the Captain of
the Port Sault Sainte Marie Zone.
Although this proposed rule will be in
effect year-round, the specific safety
zones listed in Table 165.918 will only
be enforced during a specified period of
time.
When a Notice of Enforcement for a
particular safety zone is published,
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
entry into, transiting through, or
anchoring within the safety zone is
prohibited unless authorized by the
Captain of the Port Sault Sainte Marie,
or his or her designated representative.
The Captain of the Port Sault Sainte
Marie or his or her designated
representative may be contacted via
VHF Channel 16 or telephone at 906–
635–3319. No vessel or person will be
permitted to enter the safety zone
without obtaining permission from the
COTP or a designated representative.
IV. Regulatory Analyses
We developed this proposed rule after
considering numerous statutes and
Executive orders related to rulemaking.
Below we summarize our analyses
based on a number of these statutes and
Executive orders, and we discuss First
Amendment rights of protestors.
A. Regulatory Planning and Review
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
direct agencies to assess the costs and
benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, if regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits.
This NPRM has not been designated a
‘‘significant regulatory action,’’ under
Executive Order 12866. Accordingly,
the NPRM has not been reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB).
This regulatory action determination
is based on the size, location, duration,
and time-of-day for each safety zone.
Vessel traffic will be able to safely
transit around all safety zones which
will impact small designated areas
within the COTP zone for short
durations of time. Moreover, the Coast
Guard will issue Broadcast Notice to
Mariners via VHF channel 16 about the
zone and the rule allows vessels to seek
permission to enter the zone.
B. Impact on Small Entities
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980, 5 U.S.C. 601–612, as amended,
requires Federal agencies to consider
the potential impact of regulations on
small entities during rulemaking. The
term ‘‘small entities’’ comprises small
businesses, not-for-profit organizations
that are independently owned and
operated and are not dominant in their
fields, and governmental jurisdictions
with populations of less than 50,000.
The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C.
605(b) that this proposed rule would not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
While some owners or operators of
vessels intending to transit the safety
zone may be small entities, for the
reasons stated in section IV.A above,
E:\FR\FM\11MYP1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 89 (Tuesday, May 11, 2021)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 25817-25830]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-09881]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
16 CFR Chapter II
[Docket No. CPSC-2021-0014]
Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) Fire and Debris-Penetration Hazards;
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments and
Information
AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety Commission.
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC or Commission) is
considering developing a rule to address the risk of injury associated
with fire and debris-penetration hazards associated with off-highway
vehicles (OHVs). This advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR)
initiates a rulemaking proceeding under the Consumer Product Safety Act
(CPSA). We invite written comments from interested persons concerning
the risk of injury associated with OHV fire and debris-penetration
hazards, the regulatory alternatives discussed in this notice, other
possible means to address this risk, and the economic impacts of the
various alternatives. We also invite interested persons to submit an
existing standard, or a statement of intent to modify or develop a
voluntary standard, to address the risks of injury described in this
ANPR.
DATES: Written comments and submissions in response to this notice must
be received by July 12, 2021.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. CPSC-2021-
0014, by any of the following methods:
Electronic Submissions: Submit electronic comments to the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at: www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for
submitting comments. The Commission encourages you to submit electronic
comments by using the Federal eRulemaking Portal, as described above.
Written Submissions: Submit written submissions by mail/hand
delivery/courier to: Division of the Secretariat, Consumer Product
Safety Commission, Room 820, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, MD
20814; telephone: (301) 504-7923. Alternatively, as a temporary option
during the COVID-19 pandemic, you can email such submissions to: [email protected].
Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name
and docket number for this document. All comments received may be
posted without change, including any personal identifiers, contact
information, or other personal information provided, to
www.regulations.gov. Do not submit confidential business information,
trade secret information, or other sensitive or protected information
that you do not want to be available to the public. If furnished at
all, such information should be submitted in writing.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to www.regulations.gov, and insert the docket
number CPSC-2021-0014 into the ``Search'' box, and follow the prompts.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Han Lim, Directorate for Engineering
Sciences, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 5 Research Place,
[[Page 25818]]
Rockville, MD 20850; telephone: (301) 987-2327; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Background
The CPSC is aware of numerous injuries and deaths resulting from
fire hazards associated with all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), recreational
off-highway Vehicles (ROVs), and Utility Terrain or Utility Task
Vehicles (UTVs), and from debris-penetration hazards associated with
ROVs and UTVs. For the purposes of this rulemaking proceeding, we
collectively refer to these three vehicle types as off-highway
vehicles, or OHVs.
CPSC staff's review of incident data from January 1, 2003 through
December 31, 2020 in CPSC's Consumer Product Safety Risk Management
System (CPSRMS) identified 28 fatalities and 264 injuries from fire-
related OHV hazards, and 6 fatalities and 20 injuries \1\ from debris-
penetration OHV hazards. From the National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System (NEISS) database, CPSC staff estimates there were
14,200 emergency department-treated injuries from 2007 to 2019 (based
on a sample size of 282) associated with OHV fire, thermal, and burn
hazards without indication of a crash or related event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note that two of the 20 injuries related to OHV debris-
penetration hazards came from the NEISS data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current voluntary standards for the three OHV types are:
ANSI/SVIA 1-2017 Four-Wheel All-Terrain Vehicles--
Equipment, Configurations, and Performance Requirements developed by
Specialty Vehicle Institute of America (SVIA) for ATVs and incorporated
by reference as a mandatory standard in 16 CFR 1420.3;
ANSI/ROHVA 1-2016--Recreational Off-Highway Vehicles; and
ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016--American National Standard for
Multipurpose Off-Highway Utility Vehicles.
The current voluntary standards for ROVs and UTVs, ANSI/ROHVA-1-
2016 and ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016, respectively, do not have requirements
that address fire hazards or debris-penetration hazards. The current
voluntary standard for ATVs, ANSI/SVIA 1-2017, does not include
requirements that address fire hazards.
CPSC staff has met with representatives from ROHVA, SVIA, and OPEI
on multiple occasions, beginning in September 2018, to discuss the
development of requirements to address the risk of fire and debris-
penetration hazards. CPSC staff believes that significant progress has
been made in discussing possible fire preventative standard
requirements, but to date the standard development organizations have
not proposed any fire preventative standard requirements. In addition,
there has been no discussion on possible debris-penetration mitigation
standard requirements.
The Commission is considering developing a mandatory standard (or
standards) to reduce the risk of injury associated with OHV fire and
debris-penetration hazards. Commission staff prepared a briefing
package to describe the products at issue, assess the relevant incident
data, describe the hazards, examine relevant voluntary standards, and
discuss regulatory alternatives for addressing the risk associated with
OHV fire and debris-penetration hazards. That briefing package is
available at: https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/Advance-Notice-of-Proposed-Rulemaking-Regarding-Off-Highway-Vehicles.pdf.
B. Statutory Authority
A rulemaking addressing the fire and debris-penetration hazards
associated with ROVs and UTVs falls under the authority of the CPSA. 15
U.S.C. 2051-2084. A rulemaking addressing the fire hazards associated
with ATVs is subject to section 42(b)(3) of the CPSA. Section 42(b)(3)
provides that for CPSC-initiated changes to the mandatory standard for
ATVs, 15 U.S.C. 2089, the Commission must make findings required by
sections 7 and 9 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2056 and 2058. Thus, a
Commission-initiated rulemaking addressing the fire hazards associated
with ATVs would also fall under sections 7 and 9 of the CPSA. Because
of the three vehicle types and two different hazard patterns involved
in this rulemaking, it is possible the Commission will divide this
rulemaking into separate rulemakings at the notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPR) stage.
Under section 7 of the CPSA, the Commission may issue a consumer
product safety standard if the requirements of the standard are
``reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of
injury associated with [a] product.'' 15 U.S.C. 2056(a). The safety
standard may consist of performance requirements or requirements for
warnings and instructions. Id. However, if there is a voluntary
standard that would adequately reduce the risk of injury the Commission
seeks to address, and there is likely to be substantial compliance with
that standard, then the Commission must rely on the voluntary standard,
instead of issuing a mandatory standard. 15 U.S.C. 2056(b)(1). To issue
a mandatory standard under section 7, the Commission must follow the
procedural and substantive requirements in section 9 of the CPSA. 15
U.S.C. 2056(a).
Under section 9 of the CPSA, the Commission may begin rulemaking by
issuing an ANPR. 15 U.S.C. 2058(a). The ANPR must identify the product
and the nature of the risk of injury associated with it; summarize the
regulatory alternatives the Commission is considering; and include
information about any relevant existing standards, and why the
Commission preliminarily believes those standards would not adequately
reduce the risk of injury associated with the product. The ANPR must
also invite comments concerning the risk of injury and regulatory or
other possible alternatives for addressing the risk, and invite the
public to submit existing standards or a statement of intent to modify
or develop a voluntary standard to address the risk of injury. Id.
After publishing an ANPR, the Commission may proceed with
rulemaking by reviewing the comments received in response to the ANPR
and publishing an NPR. An NPR must include the text of the proposed
rule, alternatives the Commission is considering, a preliminary
regulatory analysis describing the costs and benefits of the proposed
rule and the alternatives, and an assessment of any submitted
standards. 15 U.S.C. 2058(c). The Commission would then review comments
on the NPR and decide whether to issue a final rule, along with a final
regulatory analysis.
C. The Product
For purposes of this rulemaking, OHVs include: ATVs, ROVs, and
UTVs. The scope of this rulemaking does not include golf cars, personal
transport vehicles (PTVs), low-speed vehicles, or dune buggies.
[[Page 25819]]
1. All-Terrain Vehicles
An all-terrain vehicle (ATV) is a motorized vehicle with three or
four broad, low-pressure tires (less than 10 pounds per square inch), a
seat designed to be straddled by the operator, handlebars for steering,
and designed for off-highway use. Since the 1980s, the CPSC has
addressed ATV safety through various activities, including rulemaking,
recalls, consumer education, media outreach, and litigation. These
efforts focused on stability and handling issues related to ATV
overturn and collisions. Figure 1 shows an example of an ATV.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.000
Currently, CPSC regulates ATVs through the incorporation by
reference of ANSI/SVIA 1-2017 Four-Wheel All-Terrain Vehicles--
Equipment, Configuration, and Performance Requirements as a mandatory
standard (16 CFR 1420.3(a)).
2. Recreational Off-Highway Vehicles
An ROV is a motorized vehicle having four or more low-pressure
tires designed for off-highway use and intended by the manufacturer
primarily for recreational use by one or more persons. Other
characteristics of an ROV include: A steering wheel for steering
control, foot controls for throttle and braking, bench or bucket seats,
rollover protective structure (ROPS), restraint system, and a maximum
speed greater than 30 miles per hour (mph). ROVs are intended to be
used on terrain similar to ATVs. ROVs are distinguished from ATVs by
the presence of a steering wheel, instead of a handle bar for steering;
bench or bucket seats for the driver and passenger(s), instead of
straddle seating; foot controls for throttle and braking, instead of
levers located on the handle bar; and ROPS and restraint systems that
are not present on ATVs. CPSC staff has worked on stability, handling,
and occupant protection issues related to ROVs since 2009.\2\ Figure 2
shows an example of an ROV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The NPR for ROVs is available at: 79 FR 68964 (Nov. 19,
2014); the accompanying briefing package is available at: https://cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/pdfs/foia_SafetyStandardforRecreationalOff-HighwayVehicles-ProposedRule.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 25820]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.001
3. Utility Terrain Vehicles or Utility Task Vehicles
For this rulemaking, a UTV is a motorized vehicle having four or
more low-pressure tires designed for off-highway use with the same
characteristics as ROVs (bench seating, steering wheel, foot controls,
ROPS, and seat belts). However, UTVs are intended for utility use, have
larger cargo beds to accommodate hauling-type tasks, and they generally
have maximum speeds between 25 and 30 mph. Figure 3 shows an example of
a UTV.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.002
D. The Market
1. Market Size
ATV sales have varied over the last 15 years. U.S. ATV sales peaked
in 2004, at an estimated 812,000 units. Since 2004, ATV sales have
declined steadily. The Commission estimates approximately 205,000 ATVs
were sold in the United States in 2018: 177,000 adult models and 77,000
youth models, with sales revenue of approximately $1.35 billion. The
Commission identified 13 manufacturers supplying ATVs to the U.S.
market in 2018, six
[[Page 25821]]
from the United States, five from Taiwan, and one each from Japan and
Mexico. Nine manufacturers were responsible for all ATVs distributed
into the U.S. market in 2018; four U.S. manufacturers distributed ATVs
manufactured by Taiwanese firms, in addition to their own. U.S.
manufacturers accounted for approximately 63 percent of 2018 U.S. ATV
sales; all ATVs were manufactured and/or distributed by current members
of the Specialty Vehicle Institute of America (SVIA).
Except for 2009, annual U.S. ROV sales have increased steadily,
from an estimated 2,700 units in 1998, to an estimated 376,000 units in
2018. The Commission estimates 2018 U.S. ROV sales revenue at
approximately $5.85 billion. The Commission identified 35 manufacturers
known to have supplied ROVs to the U.S. market in 2018, 20 from China
(including Taiwan); 13 from the United States, and 1 each from Mexico
and South Korea. The Commission identified 53 distributers/brands. CPSC
staff estimates U.S. manufacturers accounted for approximately 79
percent of 2018 U.S. ROV sales, and estimates approximately 90 percent
of ROVs sold in the United States in 2018 were manufactured by current
members of the Recreational Off-highway Vehicle Association (ROHVA) or
the Outdoor Power Equipment Institute (OPEI).
U.S. UTV sales peaked in 2007, at an estimated 112,000 units,
before gradually declining. Approximately 76,000 UTVs were sold in the
United States in 2018, with sales revenue of approximately $700
million. The Commission identified 22 manufacturers known to have
supplied UTVs to the U.S. market in 2018, 14 from the United States, 6
from China (including Taiwan), and 1 each from Canada and South Korea;
and 27 distributers/brands were identified. The Commission estimates
U.S. manufacturers accounted for approximately 92 percent of 2018 U.S.
UTV sales. Current ROHVA and OPEI members accounted for approximately
90 percent of U.S. 2018 UTV sales.
Total U.S. OHV unit sales peaked in 2004, at approximately 937,000.
OHV sales then declined, to approximately 475,000 by 2011, before
beginning a partial recovery. Figure 4 illustrates ATV, ROV, UTV, and
total OHV unit sales from 1998 through 2018. The Commission identified
as many as 52 manufacturers and 68 distributors/brands of OHVs
supplying an estimated 657,000 OHVs to the U.S. market in 2018, with
sales revenue exceeding $7.87 billion. The Commission estimates U.S.
manufacturers accounted for approximately 75 percent of 2018 U.S. OHV
sales; SVIA, ROHVA, and OPEI members accounted for approximately 93
percent of 2018 U.S. OHV sales.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.003
2. Retail Prices
The Commission identified 115 different ATV model variants and
configurations in two product segments sold in the United States in
2018: Youth and adult. Youth ATV manufacturer suggested retail prices
(MSRPs) ranged from a minimum of $1,999, to a maximum of $3,799, with
an average of approximately $2,650. Adult ATV model MSRPs ranged from a
minimum of $3,799, to a maximum of $15,349, with a mean of
approximately $7,400. The mean MSRP for all U.S. ATV sales in 2018 was
approximately $6,750.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Unless otherwise noted, OHV product and market information
is based upon CPSC staff analysis of 1998-2018 sales data provided
by Power Products Marketing, Minneapolis, MN.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with ATVs, there is significant variation in ROV design, weight,
engine displacement, and other characteristics and accessories. The
Commission identified 396 different ROV model variants and
configurations that were sold in the United States in 2018. ROV MSRPs
ranged from a minimum of $3,299, to a maximum of $53,700, with an
average of approximately $15,400.
The Commission identified 138 different UTV model variants and
configurations that were sold in the United States in 2018. UTV MSRPs
ranged from a minimum of $3,499 to a maximum of $49,900, with an
average of approximately $12,000.
[[Page 25822]]
3. Number of Off-Highway Vehicles in Use
The Commission is unable to provide an accurate estimate of the
number of OHVs currently in use, due to a lack of reliable estimates of
ATV, ROV, and UTV product life. Table 1 illustrates a range of
estimates possible under different assumptions of product life. In each
case, the estimate is constructed using a gamma distribution, a common
distribution for estimating failure rates, with shape = 5 and [beta] =
1, applied to 1998-2018 OHV sales data. Table 1 provides estimates for
ATVs, ROVs, UTVs, and total OHVs under three product-life assumptions
(10, 15, and 20 years).\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Implied in the total OHV estimates is the assumption that
ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs have the same expected product life. This
assumption likely does not hold, because product life is dependent
upon annual mileage, terrain driven upon, and other usage
characteristics, which are not homogenous across OHV categories.
Table 1--Estimates of OHVs in Use
[Gamma distribution w/shape = 5 and beta = 1]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Life expectancy 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATV.................................................... 3,217,376 5,782,667 7,467,359
ROV.................................................... 2,419,854 2,725,373 2,853,372
UTV.................................................... 895,474 1,226,299 1,417,666
--------------------------------------------------------
Total.............................................. 6,532,704 9,734,340 11,738,397
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Small Businesses Subject to Rulemaking
OHV manufacturers might be classified in the North American
Industrial Classification System (NAICS) category 336999 (All Other
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing), or possibly, 336112 (Light
Truck and Utility Vehicle Manufacturing), 333111 (Farm Machinery and
Equipment), 333112 (Lawn and Garden Tractor and Home Lawn and Garden
Equipment Manufacturing), and 333120 (Construction Machinery
Manufacturing). According to size standards established by the U.S.
Small Business Administration (SBA) for these NAICS, firms with fewer
than 1,000, 1,500, 1,250, 1,500, and 1,250 employees, respectively, are
considered to be small firms. OHV distributers may be classified in
NAICS categories 423110 (Automobile and Other Motor Vehicle Merchant
Wholesalers) or 441228 (Motorcycle, ATV, and All Other Motor Vehicle
Dealers). The SBA size standard for these NAICS classifications is 500
employees. The Commission identified eight U.S. OHV manufacturers that
meet these SBA size standards, nine that do not, and four for which a
determination could not be made. CPSC staff also identified 27 OHV
distributors that meet these SBA size standards, 24 that do not, and 17
for which a determination could not be made.
E. Risk of Injury
1. Incident Data
CPSC staff conducted a review of incidents, injuries, and
fatalities associated with OHV fire and debris-penetration hazards. The
reported incidents from CPSC's Consumer Product Safety Risk Management
System (CPSRMS) are from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2020; the
National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS)-based injury
estimates are from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2019.
Fire and debris-penetration hazards are generally unrelated to one
another. Out of the 4,792 incidents staff identified as related to
debris-penetration or fire hazards, only two exhibited both debris-
penetration and fire-related hazards. Table 2 shows the breakout of
hazards by data sources and severity of incidents.
Table 2--Incident Records Relevant to Debris-Penetration and/or Fire Hazards as Presented in This Report
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CPSRMS (2003-2020) NEISS (2007-
------------------------------------------------ 2019)
Relevant hazards Total records Injury No injury ---------------
reviewed Fatal reported reported reported Injury cases
incidents incidents incidents in sample
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debris Penetration.............. 107 6 18 81 2
Fire Hazard (fire, thermal, 4,683 28 264 4,109 282
leaks).........................
Both hazard of Debris- 2 0 1 1 0
Penetration and Thermal, Fuel,
or Fire-Related Hazards........
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total....................... 4,792 34 283 4,191 284
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: CPSRMS and NEISS.
(a) Fire Hazard Incidents
CPSC staff's assessment of the fire hazard incidents excludes fires
ignited by external sources (e.g., overtaken by a controlled burn or
bonfire, even if the OHV ignites) refueling incidents, and incidents in
which it is ambiguous about whether the source of the fire may have
come from a source outside the OHV. The analysis of reported incidents
in CPSRMS with incident dates from 2003 through 2020 is detailed below.
[[Page 25823]]
CPSRMS Incident Data (2003-2020)
CPSC staff categorized reports in CPSRMS with incident dates from
2003 through 2020 into one of several mutually exclusive categories.
Sometimes OHV fires occur after a crash, and because these events
may involve multiple complicating factors, they are set aside in their
own category. It is very plausible that in some of these instances,
occupants may still have been injured or killed from the crash, even if
the vehicle had not ignited. For instances of a fire igniting before or
without a crash, it is generally clearer to attribute resulting
injuries or deaths specifically to the fire. In many other instances,
there may be thermal events that do not involve actual ignition of
fire; but such events can still be harmful or hazardous. Leaks or
spraying of oil or fuel do not necessarily constitute a thermal event,
because these flammable liquids not only have the potential to ignite
and release thermal energy; but even without ignitions, such leaks can
present a hazard.
Table 3 presents the fire hazard subtypes by the severity of the
outcome as seen in the CPSRMS incident data.
Table 3--Reported Incidents by Fire Hazard Subtype and Severity; 2003-2020
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reported incident severity
Type of fire, thermal, or leak hazard Reported -----------------------------------------------
incidents Fatal Injury No injury
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Post-Crash Fire Ignition........................ 51 28 18 5
Fire Ignited (without/prior to crash)........... 1,626 0 129 1,497
Thermal Event or burn (without Fire Ignition)... 2,451 0 105 2,346
Leak or spray of oil or fuel (without other 273 0 12 261
burn, thermal event, or fire)..................
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total....................................... 4,401 28 264 4,109
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CPSRMS.
NEISS-Based National Injury Estimates (2007-2019)
There are an estimated 14,200 (sample size = 282) emergency
department-treated injuries from 2007 to 2019, associated with OHV
fire, thermal, and burn hazards without indication of a crash or
related event. ``Crash-type events'' are defined in this review to
include vehicle wrecks, rollovers, entrapments, traffic collisions, and
victims falling or jumping from the vehicle, for example.
Although crash-type events coinciding with burns and other thermal-
, fuel- and fire-related hazards are of concern, such cases were
already considered and discussed among the reported incidents. For the
assessment of NEISS injury cases, they are excluded to focus on
injuries more directly attributable to heat and thermal events. This
narrowing of scope is not intended to suggest that overheating or other
malfunctioning of the OHV occurred, or even that other additional
factors were not involved, but simply to indicate that a burn, or other
thermal-related event occurred without a crash-type event.
Staff is unable to present the annual estimates of the injuries
over the period from 2007 through 2019, because estimates for many of
the individual years fall below the NEISS publication criteria.\5\
However, staff did not see any increasing or decreasing trend in the
data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ According to the NEISS publication criteria, an estimate
must be 1,200 or greater, the sample size must be 20 or greater, and
the coefficient of variation must be 33 percent or smaller.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 14,200 estimated thermal-, fuel-, and fire-related injuries are
based on a sample size of 282 cases. The vast majority of these
estimated injuries indicate burns (as the primary diagnosis), without
necessarily involving the ignition of any fire or flame. Of the
injuries involving burns, around 12,800 injuries (about 91 percent)
were classified as thermal burns, while the remainder consisted of
scald burns, chemical burns, or burns that were not specified. None of
the incidents reviewed involved any fatalities. Only around 3 percent
of estimated injuries mentioned any sort of fire ignition. Less than 2
percent of estimated injuries did not mention burns, but instead
involved exploding projectiles lacerating or penetrating the body, or a
gasoline explosion.
Most of the injuries were suffered in the lower body, with an
estimated 5,900 (42%) of injuries affecting the lower leg in
particular. About 1,800 (13%) of the injuries affected the ankle, foot,
or toe, and about 1,500 (11%) involved the knee, upper leg and/or lower
trunk. Many of these injuries suffered at the leg and neighboring body
parts were described as involving burns from the muffler, exhaust pipe,
and/or hot exhaust. It was not always clear whether the burns were
suffered due to direct contact or proximity. An estimated 3,200 (23%)
of the injuries involved hands and fingers. Injuries between the
shoulders and wrists (including arms and elbows) were attributed to an
estimated 1,300 (9%) of the injuries. Several reported injuries also
occurred on or near the eyes and face, but the sample size is too small
to project an estimate specific to that region of the body. Table 4
presents the estimated injuries by body parts grouped as described
above.
Table 4--U.S. Emergency Room-Treated Injuries Related to Fire/Thermal/
Fuel Hazards Without Indication of Crash-Type Events by Body Parts; 2007-
2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of
estimated
Body part Body parts injuries for
group estimate body part group
(percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leg, lower ***...................... 5,900 42
Ankle;*** Foot; Toe................. 1,800 13
Trunk, lower; Leg, upper; Knee...... 1,500 11
[[Page 25824]]
Hand; Finger........................ 3,200 23
Shoulder; Arm, upper; Elbow; Arm, 1,300 9
lower; Wrist.......................
Eyeball; Face *..................... (**) (**)
-----------------------------------
Total........................... 14,200 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: NEISS.
* ``Face'' includes eyelid, eye area, nose, and forehead.
** Sample size is too small to report estimate specific to this group of
body parts.
*** Almost all injuries in this dataset are classified under a single
primary (e.g., most severely injured) body part. Only one injury is
counted only as a lower leg injury (and not as an ankle injury) which
also involved a burn at the lower leg in combination with a ``popped''
ankle when the vehicle ``blew out.''
An overwhelming majority of the emergency room patients (94%, or an
estimated 13,500) were treated and released, or released without
treatment. The remainder were treated and admitted for hospitalization,
held for observation, or left without treatment or being seen.
Although the majority of these injuries appear to have involved
burns due simply to proximity or contact with heat sources, some other
relevant hazards are observed among the NEISS cases. There were several
incidents relating to fuel or gasoline, battery or some form of
``explosion''; and as previously mentioned, there were a few incidents
in which ignition or fire was mentioned. Staff does not have data about
which burn cases resulted from overheating, as compared to components
operating at normal hot temperatures. However, given that many of the
injuries involving the hand and fingers appear to have involved contact
with components that are expected to be heated at normal operational
conditions, staff infers that many of the hand burns likely occurred
without the OHV overheating, or otherwise functioning outside of normal
design parameters.
(b) Debris-Penetration Incidents
Debris penetration involves debris (usually a tree branch or stick)
penetrating an OHV (usually the floorboard of underside of an ROV or
UTV). When such penetration occurs, there is a potential hazard of the
branch or other debris to penetrate not only the floor or body of the
OHV, but also occupants of the OHV. None of the incidents staff
identified were found to involve ATV debris-penetration incidents.
Given that ATVs lack floorboards, this result was not unexpected; but
staff did search OHV incidents for this hazard, regardless of whether
it was indicated to involve an ATV, ROV, UTV, or unknown type of OHV.
In the NEISS data, staff identified only two cases with sufficient
descriptive information to conclude that the injuries were specifically
associated with a debris-penetration hazard. Due to this small sample
size, staff cannot report any estimate of injuries. Instead, for the
debris-penetration-hazard scenario, staff counted the two injuries from
NEISS with the other reported injuries from CPSRMS.
For the six fatal incidents, two involved a passenger's death,
while the other four involved the driver's death. Four involved a tree
branch, one a large stick, and the other a 2-inch to 3-inch piece of
wood. At least three involved penetration of the chest.
The list below paraphrases text written by the respective CPSC
investigators for each of the six fatal incidents:
Tree limb penetrated the floor board and struck passenger
in chest (driven in water);
tire over tree limb that pierces fender, nylon mesh door,
and left side of driver (driven in woods);
passed over a large stick that was sticking up in the
ground, which passed through brake pedal arm through bottom edge of
seat and into lower abdomen of driver (driven in power line clearing);
impaled by a 2- to 3-inch-size piece of wood in upper
right thigh, causing exsanguination of driver (driven on heavily
forested public land);
branch penetrated UTV bottom and struck passenger in chest
(driven along trail);
ran over large tree branch that struck driver in chest
(driven in mountains).
Table 2 presents the severity of the 20 nonfatal injury incidents
from debris penetration.
Table 5--Debris Penetration by Injury Severity: 2003-2020
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Injury severity Incidents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hospital Admission........................................... 4
Emergency Department Treatment Received...................... 3
First Aid Received by Non-Medical Professional............... 1
No First Aid or Medical Attention Received................... 2
Level of care not known...................................... 10
----------
Total Injury Incidents..................................... 20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: CPSRMS and NEISS.
2. Hazard Patterns and Analysis of In-Depth Investigations
(a) Fire Hazard Review and Assessment
Since 2018, CPSC staff has collaborated with the three standards
development organizations (SDOs): ROHVA, OPEI, and SVIA, to examine
fire hazard causations of OHV-related incidents investigated by CPSC
staff and reported as in-depth investigations (IDIs). All three vehicle
types, ROVs, UTVs, and ATVs, were associated with fire hazards. Staff
provided the SDOs with 121 redacted IDIs related to fire hazards in
OHVs for review and analysis. These 121 redacted IDIs are a subset of
the more comprehensive list of IDI data analyzed by the CPSC
Epidemiology staff and detailed in section E.1 of this preamble. Of the
121 redacted IDIs, CPSC staff and the SDOs concluded that 84 IDIs
contained sufficient information to determine cause of fire origin, and
they agreed to categorize these IDIs. This discussion provides staff's
insight into this subset of 121 incidents discussed by and the SDOs.
When cause or categorization of incidents are discussed here, we
discuss only the 84 incidents for which CPSC staff and SDOs agreed
there was sufficient information for categorization. Fuel leaks are
considered fire hazards
[[Page 25825]]
because ignition of flammable fluids contributes to the severity of an
incident. The fire and fuel leak origins identified in the 84 IDIs
include a breach in the fuel system, electrical component failure,
exhaust overheat, and debris (grass/dry vegetation) ignition.
The majority (44 of the 84) of the causations involved fuel system
components (29) and exhaust overheat (15). The others involved specific
electronic components (voltage regulator, wiring harness, electronic
control module, or battery), debris (grass or dry vegetation) ignition
from contacting exhaust heat, oil leaks, and unknown causes. Those that
were deemed unknown involved either two or more possible combined
causations or instances where causations could not be determined due to
insufficient information from particular IDIs. Twenty-seven of the 121
IDIs involved burn injuries when consumers contacted hot surfaces or
suffered burns from open flames. Neither CPSC staff, nor the SDOs,
identified any fires due to the lack of a spark arrester.
Of the 37 IDIs that had unknown fire causations, 20 involved total-
OHV losses. A total loss fire refers to an OHV that has been completely
consumed by the fire, leaving only a metal frame and other non-
combustible metal parts. A total loss can occur when a smaller fire
spreads into a fuel-fed fire, so that the entire vehicle becomes
engulfed in flames. This often makes it difficult to determine the
origin of the fire. The smaller fire can originate from various
sources, such as an overheating exhaust that burns a plastic body
panel, a fuel leak fire, or a fire from an electrical short, where a
portion of a plastic body panel may catch fire, then that fire can
spread to the entire vehicle because the majority of the OHV body
panels are generally made of flammable plastics. Total loss incidents,
as shown in Figure 5, represent the most severe fire hazard of an OHV.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.004
Each OHV is equipped with subsystems that have combustible or
flammable sources that can lead to fires and/or fire hazards (i.e.,
fuel leaks). These subsystems are the fuel system (fuel tank, fuel
pump, fuel rail, fuel filter, hoses, shutoff valves, and fuel caps),
electrical system (voltage regulator, wire harnesses, battery, fuse
boxes, and alternator), and the exhaust system (exhaust piping,
catalytic converter, muffler, and all surrounding componentry).
With respect to the fuel system, a breach in the fuel system can
cause a fuel leak and pose a risk of fire. A breach can be a crack/hole
in the fuel tank, damaged fuel hose, crack/hole in a fuel filter, or
unsecured fuel connection to a fuel rail. For example, in one IDI
involving an ATV, a passenger received second- and third-degree burns
to the right wrist and right leg when the ATV burst into flames from an
overheated gasoline line that melted and spilled fuel onto the hot
engine.
Other fuel-related fire hazards can be due to over-pressurization
of the fuel system and inadequate ventilation. Inadequate ventilation
and over-pressurization of the fuel system can result in boiling
gasoline, which can expel abruptly when opening the fuel cap,
potentially splashing hot gasoline onto consumers. Figure 6 shows an
example from an IDI of an over-pressurization scenario with an ROV.
Unbeknownst to the consumer, opening the fuel cap released pressurized
gasoline and a brief fire resulted. Black soot can be seen surrounding
the fuel cap.
[[Page 25826]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.005
An electrical failure, such as an electrical short or an electronic
component overheating, can lead to fires. Figure 7 illustrates a fire
that started due to an overheated electronic control module (ECM),
which ignited the ECM and wiring.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.006
Excessive exhaust heat near flammable plastics can cause melting
and subsequently fires, if the exhaust systems do not manage the
exhaust heat sufficiently, via heat shielding and/or adequate
ventilation. It is not uncommon for modern ROV exhaust surface
temperatures to exceed 800 [deg]F. Insufficient heat shielding between
the exhaust pipes and plastic paneling can cause the plastic to melt.
Figure 8 illustrates a fire that ignited when melted plastic paneling
dripped onto the exhaust pipe and burned a hole through the panel.
Of the 121 IDIs examined, 27 IDIs involved burned victims. Of these
27 IDIs, 10 specified first-, second-, and/or third-degree burn
injuries. The other 17 IDIs did not specify the severity of the burn
injuries. These burn injuries occurred when victims had direct contact
with a hot surface or when an open flame burned the victims.
[[Page 25827]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.007
(b) Debris-Penetration Hazard Review and Assessment
Debris-penetration hazards are unique to ROVs and UTVs because the
wheel-well areas on these vehicles are generally larger and more open,
compared to ATVs. The larger space exposes more floorboard and wheel-
well surface to branches that can and do penetrate into the occupant
compartment. Debris penetration through the floorboard or wheel well
can impale the occupants of the vehicle and has caused severe injuries
and deaths. An example of debris penetration is shown in Figure 9. CPSC
staff did not find any ATV-related debris-penetration incidents in the
injury/death data searches or debris-penetration recalls.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.008
CPSC staff shared eight redacted IDIs involving debris penetration,
which is a subset of the more comprehensive list of IDI data analyzed
by the CPSC Epidemiology staff, with the SDOs for review and analysis.
CPSC staff's review revealed four IDIs involved fatal impalement of the
occupant. A summary of the IDI data shown in Table 6 suggests the
debris penetrations occurred at relatively low speeds, i.e., 25 mph or
less.
[[Page 25828]]
Table 6--Summaries of Eight Debris-Penetration IDIs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Injured body
Vehicle Injury type Estimated speed, mph part(s) Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A................... Death........... 25................... heart........... Consumer drove into a creek
when water splashed onto the
windshield; tree limb broke
through the floor and struck
passenger who died as a result
of the impalement.
B *................. No Injury....... 5.................... none............ Consumer was driving on a
slight hill; rocks punctured
the floorboard.
C................... Death........... 10................... viscera......... Consumer drove on a wooded
trail (dirt road) with various
debris (rocks and limbs); tree
limb pierced fender and nylon
mesh door and impaled the
driver.
D **................ Death........... Not available........ no information.. Not available.
E................... Contusion/No 20................... abdomen......... Consumer drove in the dark
Medical (12:30 a.m.) on a leaf covered
Attention. trail; tree branch punctured
driver's side floor, struck
his abdomen, but did not
impale the driver due to the
driver wearing thick clothing.
F................... Abrasions....... 25................... ankle........... IDI involved 2 occasions--on
one occasion snow was on
ground, could not see branches
thus a debris penetration
occurred; other occasion ROV
traveled on paved road and a
tree branch punctured rear
passenger floor.
G................... Death........... Not available........ thigh........... Not available.
H................... Abdomen impaled. 25................... Liver, stomach, Consumer drove on dirt/gravel
spleen, road lined with 3-foot-tall
pancreas. grass on both sides; when
attempting to avoid debris
from a downed tree, a branch
penetrated passenger side
floor, struck passenger and
impaled the driver.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*All vehicles are ROVs, except vehicle B, which is a UTV. Vehicle B involved rocks penetrating the floorboard;
all other vehicles involved tree branches penetrating the floorboards.
** It is unknown whether vehicle D is an ROV or UTV due to the lack of model information.
There were four deaths and three injuries associated with debris
penetration. Many of these incidents occurred when there was reduced
visibility or the driver was unable to see the debris (e.g., driving in
the dark, snow-covered terrain), but overall the incidents occurred
during what staff considers reasonably foreseeable, normal use of the
vehicles.
3. OHV Recalls
From 2002 to 2019, there were 68 OHV fire and debris-penetration
hazard recalls. The fire hazard recalls involved ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs.
The debris-penetration recalls involved ROVs.
CPSC recall data include the number of affected vehicles, number of
incidents, and injuries associated with the recalls. An incident is
considered a penetration through the floorboard, an actual fire, a fuel
leak, or other thermal event (e.g., melted plastic, overheated
component).
There have been 26 ATV fire hazard recalls, of which 18 involved
fuel system components; 4 involved electronic control modules; 2
involved oil leaks; 1 involved brake fires due to friction; and 1
involved inadequate heat shielding. Collectively, there were 462,372
recalled vehicles, 3,325 incidents, 83 fires, and 24 injuries
associated with 26 recalls from 2002 to 2018. There were no deaths
associated with ATV fire hazard recalls.
With respect to ROVs, there were 33 ROV fire hazard recalls, of
which 9 involved fuel system components; 3 involved electrical wiring/
electrical components; 10 involved exhaust heat-inadequate heat
shielding; 3 involved grass/dry vegetation debris ignition; 5 involved
oil leaks; 1 involved improper throttle body installation; and 2
involved multiple sources (engine misfire, brake fires). Collectively,
there were 709,886 recalled vehicles, 1,022 incidents, 327 fires, and
32 injuries associated with 33 recalls from 2008 to 2019. There was one
death associated with one fire hazard recall.
There were 6 UTV fire hazard recalls; 1 involved grass/dry
vegetation debris ignition; and 5 involved fuel system components.
Collectively, there were 43,340 recalled vehicles, 144 incidents, and
11 fires associated with 6 recalls from 2008 to 2017. There were no
injuries or deaths associated with UTV fire hazard recalls.
There were 3 ROV debris penetration hazard recalls. Collectively,
there were 44,500 recalled vehicles, 630 incidents, and 9 injuries
associated with three recalls from 2014 to 2016. There were no deaths
associated with ROV debris penetration hazard recalls.
F. Existing Standards
1. ATVs
SVIA developed the voluntary standard for ATVs, ANSI/SVIA 1 Four-
Wheel All-Terrain Vehicles--Equipment, Configuration, and Performance
Requirements standard. SVIA published ANSI/SVIA 1 in 1990, and revised
the standard in 2001, 2007, 2010, and 2017. In 2008, the Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) required the Commission to make
mandatory the voluntary standard for ATVs, ANSI/SVIA 1-2007. The
Commission adopted the voluntary standard as a mandatory standard; the
standard is codified in 16 CFR part 1420. The Commission amended 16 CFR
part 1420 in 2011 and 2018, to reference the latest revision of ANSI/
SVIA 1-2010 and ANSI/SVIA 1-2017, respectively.
The requirements ANSI/SVIA 1-2017 include warning label
requirements, various mechanical requirements, such as static
stability, braking distances, maximum speeds for the various age group
ATVs, and various component construction requirements such as those for
handlebars, foot rests, suspension, and most recently, lights.
2. ROVs
The Recreational Off-Highway Vehicle Association (ROHVA) developed
ANSI/ROHVA 1 American National Standard for Recreational Off-Highway
Vehicles for recreation-oriented ROVs. The Outdoor Power Equipment
Institute (OPEI) developed ANSI/OPEI B71.9 American National Standard
for Multipurpose Off-Highway Utility Vehicles for utility-oriented
vehicles; ANSI/OPEI B71.9 includes requirements for vehicles that
exceed 30 mph (and thus meet CPSC's definition of ``ROVs'').
[[Page 25829]]
The ROV requirements in ANSI/ROHVA 1-2016 and ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016
include static and dynamic stability, vehicle handling, ROPS, speed
limiter function when seat belts are not fastened, and various
component construction requirements such as for steering, brakes, and
seat belts.
3. UTVs
OPEI developed ANSI/OPEI B71.9 American National Standard for
utility-oriented vehicles; ANSI/OPEI B71.9 includes requirements for
vehicles that exceed 30 mph (and thus meet CPSC definition of
``ROVs''). For this rulemaking, the Commission defines ``UTVs'' to have
maximum speeds below 30 mph. The UTV requirements in ANSI/OPEI B71.9-
2016 for vehicles with maximum speed below 30 mph include minimum
static stability, rollover protection structure (ROPS), brake
configuration and performance, and lighting.
All three of these standards reference the U.S. Forest Service
standard, USDA-FS 5100-1, which requires OHVs to be equipped with spark
arrestors. A spark arrestor is a metal screen installed in the exhaust
tail pipe to mitigate sparks exiting the tail pipe to reduce the risk
of forest fires. This requirement does not address other sources of
fire hazards to riders and passengers of OHVs; and thus, the Commission
views this requirement as ineffective to address OHV fire hazards to
consumers.
In addition, the ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016 standard has a general
requirement that ``all fuel system components shall be located, routed,
and contained in such a manner as to provide clearance to heat-
generating components and to avoid damage from obstacles or projections
that may be encountered during normal operation.'' This requirement
lacks specificity, and thus, the Commission views this requirement as
ineffective.
The Commission does not believe the two preceding requirements
adequately address the fire hazards associated with OHVs. The incident
data and recall data suggest OHV fires due to fire sources, such as
electrical shorts, exhaust overheat, and fuel leaks cannot be addressed
by the spark arrestor requirement or the general ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016
statement regarding fuel system component location. None of the
aforementioned standards contain requirements to mitigate the debris
penetration hazard. Thus, the Commission believes additional
requirements are needed to address OHV fire and debris penetration
hazards.
CPSC staff met with representatives of the three SDOs, ROHVA, SVIA,
and OPEI on multiple occasions to discuss recall data, categorizing
IDIs fire causations, and possible requirements for fuel system,
electrical, and exhaust system requirements to reduce the risk of fire
hazards. After discussing and categorizing fire causations of IDIs,
CPSC staff and SDOs initiated discussions of possible fire preventative
standards requirements starting with the fuel system component
examination. However, to date, there have been no proposed fire and
debris-penetration requirements to update the current ANSI/ROHVA 1-
2016, ANSI/SVIA 1-2017, and ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016 standards to address
fire and debris penetration hazards. Thus, the Commission concludes
that the current OHV standards will not adequately address the deaths
and injuries associated with OHV fire and debris-penetration hazards.
G. Regulatory Alternatives
The Commission could proceed with rulemaking under the CPSA
establishing performance requirements and/or warnings and instructions
for OHVs to address the risks of injury associated with OHV fire and
debris-penetration hazards. Alternatively, the Commission could
continue to address the hazards through the voluntary standards, and
continue to work to develop more effective voluntary standard
requirements to address the identified hazards, instead of issuing a
mandatory rule. However, as previously discussed, the Commission
preliminarily believes that the existing standards do not adequately
address the risk of injury associated with fire and debris-penetration
hazards in OHVs. The Commission has recalled OHVs for fire and debris
penetration hazards. The fire hazard recalls involved ATVs, ROVs, and
UTVs. The debris-penetration recalls involved ROVs. The Commission
could continue to conduct recalls, both voluntary and mandatory,
instead of promulgating a mandatory rule. However, recalls are not
likely to be as effective at reducing the risk of injury as a mandatory
standard. Recalls only apply to an individual manufacturer and product
and do not extend to similar products. Product recalls occur only after
consumers have purchased and used such products and have been exposed
to the hazard to be remedied by the recall. Additionally, recalls can
only address products that are already on the market, and cannot
prevent unsafe products from entering the market. Finally, the
Commission could issue news releases warning consumers about the fire
and debris-penetration hazards association with OHVs. As with recalls,
this alternative is not likely to be as effective at reducing the risk
of injury as a mandatory standard.
H. Request for Information and Comments
This ANPR is the first step in a proceeding that could result in a
mandatory safety standard(s) to address fire and debris-penetration
hazards associated with OHVs. The Commission requests comments on all
aspects of this ANPR, but specifically requests comments regarding:
1. The risk of injury identified by the Commission, the regulatory
alternatives being considered, and other possible alternatives for
addressing the risk;
2. Any existing standard or portion of a standard that could be
issued as a proposed regulation;
3. A statement of intention to modify or develop a voluntary
standard to address the risk of injury discussed in this notice, along
with a description of a plan (including a schedule) to do so;
4. Studies, tests, or surveys performed to analyze fire and/or
debris penetration hazard injuries, including severity and costs
associated with injury;
5. Studies, tests, or descriptions of technologies or design
changes that address OHV fire and/or debris penetration hazard, and
estimates of costs associated with incorporation of the technologies
and their impact on wholesale or retail prices;
6. Information on ATV, ROV, and UTV expected lifespans and/or the
number of ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs in use;
7. Information on the number of hours driven, miles driven, and/or
other exposure metrics for OHVs;
8. Studies, test, or surveys performed to analyze use of
aftermarket products that address OHV fire and/or debris-penetration
hazards, and their effectiveness at reducing OHV fire and/or debris-
penetration hazard injuries, and means by which their use by consumers
could be increased;
9. Information on the expected impact of technologies or design
changes that address OHV fire and/or debris-penetration hazard injuries
on manufacturing costs or wholesale prices;
10. Information on the potential impact of technologies or design
changes to address OHV fire and/or debris-penetration hazards on
consumer utility.
Comments and other submissions should be identified by identified
by Docket No. CPSC-2021-0014 and submitted in accordance with the
[[Page 25830]]
instructions provided above. All comments and other submissions must be
received by July 12, 2021.
Alberta A. Mills,
Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.
[FR Doc. 2021-09881 Filed 5-10-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P