NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center, 20209-20213 [2021-07869]
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Appendix G, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis
Methods and Data for Nuclear Facilities
Other Than Power Reactors,’’
documents established approaches and
data considerations for use in
performing non-power reactor
regulatory analyses. This appendix
provides supplemental information for
performing a regulatory analysis for
non-power reactor facilities and
activities, including fuel fabrication
facilities, independent spent fuel storage
installations, irradiators, high-level
waste repositories, and uses of
byproduct material.
Appendix H, ‘‘Severe Accident Risk
Analysis,’’ provides guidance and best
practices recommended for use in
performing probabilistic risk
assessments and consequence analyses
as part of regulatory and backfit
analyses for nuclear power reactors.
This appendix expands upon guidance
regarding the safety goal evaluation and
valuation of public health (accident)
and economic consequences (offsite
property) attributes. It provides
references on sources of information
and an overview of the tools and
methods used to estimate changes in
core damage frequency, large early
release frequency, public health risk,
and offsite economic consequences risk.
Appendix I, ‘‘National Environmental
Policy Act Cost-Benefit Analysis,’’
describes the methods to be used in
preparing cost-benefit analyses in
support of the NRC’s regulatory and
licensing actions conducted under the
National Environmental Policy Act,
including evaluations of severe accident
mitigation alternatives and severe
accident mitigation design alternatives.
III. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the
following table are available to
interested persons as indicated.
Document
ADAMS
Accession No.
Draft NUREG/BR–0058, Revision 5, Appendix F, ‘‘Data Sources’’ ...................................................................................................
Draft NUREG/BR–0058, Revision 5, Appendix G, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Methods and Data for Nuclear Facilities Other Than
Power Reactors’’.
Draft NUREG/BR–0058, Revision 5, Appendix H, ‘‘Severe Accident Risk Analysis’’ ........................................................................
Draft NUREG/BR–0058, Revision 5, Appendix I, ‘‘National Environmental Policy Act Cost-Benefit Analysis’’ .................................
NUREG/BR–0058, Revision 5, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. NRC’’ .........................................................................
ML21096A292.
ML21096A293.
NUREG/BR–0184, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook’’ ......................................................................................
SECY–14–0143, ‘‘Regulatory Gap Analysis of the NRC’s Cost-Benefit Guidance and Practices,’’ December 16, 2014 .................
Dated: April 12, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Kevin A. Coyne,
Acting Director, Division of Rulemaking,
Environmental, and Financial Support, Office
of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021–07815 Filed 4–15–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–331; NRC–2021–0066]
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC;
Duane Arnold Energy Center
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued
exemptions in response to a request
from the licensee regarding certain
emergency planning (EP) requirements.
The exemptions eliminate the
requirements to maintain an offsite
radiological emergency preparedness
plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP
activities at the Duane Arnold Energy
Center, based on the reduced risks of
accidents that could result in an offsite
radiological release at a
decommissioning nuclear power
reactor.
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SUMMARY:
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The exemption was issued on
April 13, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2021–0066 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2021–0066. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301–415–0624; email:
Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–
415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@
nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced (if it is
available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this
document.
DATES:
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ML21096A294.
ML21096A295.
ML17101A355
(Package).
ML050190193.
ML14280A426
(Package).
• Attention: The PDR, where you may
examine and order copies of public
documents, is currently closed. You
may submit your request to the PDR via
email at pdr.resource@nrc.gov or call 1–
800–397–4209 or 301–415–4737,
between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST),
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–3178; email: Marlayna.Doell@
nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of
the exemption is attached.
Dated: April 13, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning
Branch, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
Attachment—Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50–331; NextEra Energy
Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold
Energy Center; Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated January 18, 2019
(Agencywide Documents Access and
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Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML19023A196), NextEra
Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the
licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it
planned to permanently cease power
operations at the Duane Arnold Energy
Enter (DAEC) in the fourth quarter of
2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20062E489),
NEDA updated its timeline and certified
to the NRC that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at
DAEC on October 30, 2020. By letter
dated August 27, 2020 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML20240A067), NEDA
certified to the NRC that power
operations permanently ceased at DAEC
on August 10, 2020, and in a letter dated
October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML20286A317), that the fuel was
permanently removed from the DAEC
reactor vessel and placed in the spent
fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020.
Based on the docketing of these
certifications for permanent cessation of
operations and permanent removal of
fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified
in Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed
facility operating license (DPR–49) for
DAEC no longer authorizes operation of
the reactor or emplacement or retention
of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility
is still authorized to possess and store
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel.
Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at
the DAEC facility in the SFP and in a
dry cask independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
Many of the accident scenarios
postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports (USARs) for operating
nuclear power reactors involve failures
or malfunctions of systems, which could
affect the fuel in the reactor core and, in
the most severe postulated accidents,
would involve the release of large
quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of power
operations at DAEC and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel,
many accidents are no longer possible.
The reactor, reactor coolant system, and
supporting systems are no longer in
operation and have no function related
to the storage of the spent fuel.
Therefore, the emergency planning (EP)
provisions for postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, reactor coolant system, or
supporting systems are no longer
applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47,
‘‘Emergency plans,’’ and Appendix E to
10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Emergency Planning
and Preparedness for Production and
Utilization Facilities,’’ continue to apply
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to nuclear power reactors that have
permanently ceased operation and have
permanently removed all fuel from the
reactor vessel. There are no explicit
regulatory provisions distinguishing EP
requirements for a power reactor that is
permanently shut down and defueled
from those for a reactor that is
authorized to operate. To reduce or
eliminate EP requirements that are no
longer necessary due to the
decommissioning status of the facility,
NEDA must obtain exemptions from
those EP regulations. Only then can
NEDA modify the DAEC emergency
plan to reflect the reduced risk
associated with the permanently
shutdown and defueled condition of
DAEC.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated April 2, 2020, as
supplemented by letter dated October 7,
2020 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML20101M779 and ML20282A595,
respectively), NEDA requested
exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR part 50 for
DAEC. Specifically, NEDA requested
exemptions from certain planning
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding
onsite and offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans for
nuclear power reactors; from certain
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that
require establishment of plume
exposure and ingestion pathway EP
zones for nuclear power reactors; and
from certain requirements in 10 CFR
part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, which
establish the elements that comprise the
content of emergency plans. In the letter
dated October 7, 2020, NEDA provided
supplemental information and
responses to the NRC staff’s requests for
additional information concerning the
proposed exemptions.
The information provided by the
licensee included justifications for each
exemption requested. The exemptions
requested by NEDA would eliminate the
requirements to maintain formal offsite
radiological emergency preparedness
plans reviewed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) under the requirements of 44
CFR, ‘‘Emergency Management and
Assistance,’’ Part 350, ‘‘Review and
Approval of State and Local
Radiological Emergency Plans and
Preparedness,’’ and would reduce the
scope of onsite EP activities at DAEC.
The licensee stated that the application
of all the standards and requirements in
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and
10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, are not
needed for adequate emergency
response capability, based on the
substantially lower onsite and offsite
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radiological consequences of accidents
still possible at the permanently
shutdown and defueled facility, as
compared to an operating facility. If
offsite protective actions were needed
for a highly unlikely beyond-designbasis accident that could challenge the
safe storage of spent fuel at DAEC,
provisions exist for offsite agencies to
take protective actions using a
comprehensive emergency management
plan (CEMP) under the National
Preparedness System to protect the
health and safety of the public. A CEMP
in this context, also referred to as an
emergency operations plan, is addressed
in FEMA’s Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101, ‘‘Developing
and Maintaining Emergency Operations
Plans,’’ which is publicly available at
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/
divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101
is the foundation for State, territorial,
Tribal, and local EP in the United
States. It promotes a common
understanding of the fundamentals of
risk-informed planning and decisionmaking and helps planners at all levels
of government in their efforts to develop
and maintain viable, all-hazards, allthreats emergency plans. An emergency
operations plan is flexible enough for
use in all emergencies. It describes how
people and property will be protected;
details who is responsible for carrying
out specific actions; identifies the
personnel, equipment, facilities,
supplies and other resources available;
and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to
as a synonym for ‘‘all-hazards
planning.’’
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12,
‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ the Commission
may, upon application by any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 when: (1) The exemptions
are authorized by law, will not present
an undue risk to public health and
safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2)
any of the special circumstances listed
in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These
special circumstances include, among
other things, that the application of the
regulation in the particular
circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule.
As noted previously, the EP
regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part
50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has
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consistently acknowledged that the risk
of an offsite radiological release at a
power reactor that has permanently
ceased operations and permanently
removed fuel from the reactor vessel is
significantly lower, and the types of
possible accidents are significantly
fewer, than at an operating power
reactor. However, the EP regulations do
not recognize that once a power reactor
permanently ceases operation, the risk
of a large radiological release from
credible emergency accident scenarios
is significantly reduced. The reduced
risk for any significant offsite
radiological release is based on two
factors. One factor is the elimination of
accidents applicable only to an
operating power reactor, resulting in
fewer credible accident scenarios. The
second factor is the reduced short-lived
radionuclide inventory and decay heat
production due to radioactive decay.
Due to the permanently defueled status
of the reactor, no new spent fuel will be
added to the DAEC SFP and the
radionuclides in the current spent fuel
will continue to decay as the spent fuel
ages. The spent fuel will produce less
heat due to radioactive decay,
increasing the available time to mitigate
a loss of water inventory from the SFP.
The NRC’s NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety
and Regulatory Assessment of Generic
BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR
[Pressurized Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ dated August 1997 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML082260098), and the
NRC’s NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study
of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ dated February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066),
confirmed that for permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors
that are bounded by the assumptions
and conditions in the report, the risk of
offsite radiological release is
significantly less than for an operating
nuclear power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to
those requested for DAEC, have been
granted to permanently shutdown and
defueled power reactor licensees.
However, the exemptions did not
relieve the licensees of all EP
requirements. Rather, the exemptions
allowed the licensees to modify their
emergency plans commensurate with
the credible site-specific risks that were
consistent with a permanently
shutdown and defueled status.
Specifically, the NRC’s approval of
these prior exemptions was based on the
licensee’s demonstration that: (1) The
radiological consequences of designbasis accidents would not exceed the
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limits of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) early phase
Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of one
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the
exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the
highly unlikely event of a beyonddesign-basis accident resulting in a loss
of all modes of heat transfer from the
fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient
time to initiate appropriate mitigating
actions, and if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement offsite
protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and
safety of the public.
With respect to design-basis accidents
at DAEC, the licensee provided analysis
demonstrating that 10 months following
permanent cessation of power
operations, the radiological
consequences of the only remaining
design-basis accident with potential for
offsite radiological release (a fuel
handling accident in the Reactor
Building, where the SFP is located) will
not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs
at the exclusion area boundary.
With respect to beyond-design-basis
accidents at DAEC, the licensee
analyzed a drain down of the SFP water
that would effectively impede any decay
heat removal. The analysis demonstrates
that at 10 months after permanent
cessation of power operations, there
would be at least 10 hours after the
assemblies have been uncovered until
the limiting fuel assembly (for decay
heat and adiabatic heatup analysis)
reaches 900 degrees Celsius (°C), the
temperature used to assess the potential
onset of fission product release. The
analysis conservatively assumed that
the heat up time starts when the SFP has
been completely drained, although it is
likely that site personnel will start to
respond to an incident when drain
down starts. The analysis also does not
consider the period of time from the
initiating event causing loss of SFP
water inventory until cooling is lost.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s
justification for the requested
exemptions against the criteria in 10
CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as
described below, that the criteria in 10
CFR 50.12(a) will be met, and that the
exemptions should be granted 10
months after DAEC has permanently
ceased power operations. An assessment
of the licensee’s EP exemptions is
described in SECY–21–0006, ‘‘Request
by NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC
for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Duane
Arnold Energy Center,’’ dated January
15, 2021 (ADAMS Package Accession
No. ML20218A875). The Commission
approved the NRC staff’s
recommendation to grant the
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exemptions in the staff requirements
memorandum to SECY–21–0006, dated
February 11, 2021 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML21042A030). Descriptions of the
specific exemptions requested by the
licensee and the NRC staff’s basis for
granting each exemption are provided in
SECY–21–0006. The NRC staff’s
detailed review and technical basis for
the approval of the specific EP
exemptions requested by the licensee
are provided in the NRC staff’s safety
evaluation dated April 13, 2021
(ADAMS Accession No. ML21097A141).
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed
exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10
CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV, that would
allow the licensee to revise the DAEC
Emergency Plan to reflect the
permanently shutdown and defueled
condition of the facility. As stated
above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12,
the Commission may, upon application
by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The
NRC staff has determined that granting
of the licensee’s proposed exemptions
will not result in a violation of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
or the NRC’s regulations. Therefore, the
exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue
Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, the licensee
provided analyses that show that the
radiological consequences of designbasis accidents will not exceed the
limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at
the exclusion area boundary. Therefore,
formal offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans required under 10
CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for
protection of the public beyond the
exclusion area boundary, based on the
radiological consequences of designbasis accidents still possible at DAEC 10
months after the plant has permanently
ceased power operations.
Although highly unlikely, there is one
postulated beyond-design-basis accident
that might result in significant offsite
radiological releases. However, NUREG–
1738 confirms that the risk of beyonddesign-basis accidents is greatly reduced
at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The NRC staff’s analyses in
NUREG–1738 conclude that the event
sequences important to risk at
permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors are limited to large
earthquakes and cask drop events. For
EP assessments, this is an important
difference relative to operating power
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reactors, where typically a large number
of different sequences make significant
contributions to risk. As described in
NUREG–1738, relaxation of offsite EP
requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few
months after shutdown resulted in only
a small change in risk. The report
further concludes that the change in risk
due to relaxation of offsite EP
requirements is small because the
overall risk is low, and because even
under current EP requirements for
operating power reactors, EP was judged
to have marginal impact on evacuation
effectiveness in the severe earthquake
event that dominates SFP risk. All other
sequences including cask drops (for
which offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans are expected to be
more effective) are too low in likelihood
to have a significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions to
eliminate the requirements of 10 CFR
part 50 to maintain offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans and to
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities
will not present an undue risk to the
public health and safety.
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C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the
Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by the
licensee only involve EP requirements
under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow the
licensee to revise the DAEC Emergency
Plan to reflect the permanently
shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. Physical security measures at
DAEC are not affected by the requested
EP exemptions. The discontinuation of
formal offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans and the reduction in
scope of the onsite EP activities at DAEC
will not adversely affect the licensee’s
ability to physically secure the site or
protect special nuclear material.
Therefore, the proposed exemptions are
consistent with common defense and
security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present
whenever application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule. The underlying
purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological
emergency, to establish plume exposure
and ingestion pathway emergency
planning zones for nuclear power
plants, and to ensure that licensees
maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency preparedness
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plans. The standards and requirements
in these regulations were developed by
considering the risks associated with
operation of a nuclear power reactor at
its licensed full-power level. These risks
include the potential for a reactor
accident with offsite radiological dose
consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III,
because DAEC is permanently shut
down and defueled, there will no longer
be a risk of a significant offsite
radiological release from a design-basis
accident exceeding EPA early phase
PAGs at the exclusion area boundary,
and the risk of a significant offsite
radiological release from a beyonddesign-basis accident is greatly reduced
when compared to an operating power
reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the
reduced risks at DAEC by comparing the
generic risk assumptions in the analyses
in NUREG–1738 to site-specific
conditions at DAEC and determined that
the risk values in NUREG–1738 bound
the risks presented for DAEC. As
indicated by the results of the research
conducted for NUREG–1738, and more
recently for NUREG–2161,
‘‘Consequence Study of a BeyondDesign-Basis Earthquake Affecting the
Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I
Boiling Water Reactor,’’ dated
September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365), while other
consequences can be extensive,
accidents from SFPs with significant
decay time have little potential to cause
offsite early fatalities, even if the formal
offsite radiological EP requirements
were relaxed. The licensee’s analysis of
a beyond-design-basis accident
involving a complete loss of SFP water
inventory, based on an adiabatic heatup
analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for
decay heat, shows that 10 months after
permanent cessation of power
operations at DAEC, the time for the
limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 °C
is at least 10 hours after the assemblies
have been uncovered assuming a loss of
all cooling means.
The only analyzed beyond-designbasis accident scenario that progresses
to a condition where a significant offsite
release might occur, involves the highly
unlikely event where the SFP drains in
such a way that all modes of cooling or
heat transfer are assumed to be
unavailable, which is referred to as an
adiabatic heatup of the spent fuel. The
licensee’s analysis of this beyonddesign-basis accident shows that 10
months after permanent cessation of
power operations, at least 10 hours
would be available between the time the
fuel is initially uncovered (at which
time adiabatic heatup is conservatively
assumed to begin), until the fuel
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cladding reaches a temperature of 900
°C, which is the temperature associated
with rapid cladding oxidation and the
potential for a significant radiological
release. This analysis conservatively
does not include the period of time from
the initiating event causing a loss of SFP
water inventory until all cooling means
are lost.
The NRC staff has verified the
licensee’s analyses and its calculations.
The analyses provide reasonable
assurance that in granting the requested
exemptions to the licensee, there is no
design-basis accident that will result in
an offsite radiological release exceeding
the EPA early phase PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In the highly
unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis
accident affecting the SFP that results in
a complete loss of heat removal via all
modes of heat transfer, there will be at
least 10 hours available before an offsite
release might occur and, therefore, at
least 10 hours to initiate appropriate
mitigating actions to restore a means of
heat removal to the spent fuel. If a
radiological release were projected to
occur under this highly unlikely
scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is
considered sufficient time for offsite
authorities to implement protective
actions using a CEMP approach to
protect the health and safety of the
public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP
requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC
when the site-specific analyses show
that at least 10 hours is available
following a loss of SFP coolant
inventory with no air cooling (or other
methods of removing decay heat) until
cladding of the hottest fuel assembly
reaches the rapid oxidation temperature.
The NRC staff concluded in its
previously granted exemptions, as it
does with the licensee’s requested EP
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10
hours is available to initiate mitigative
actions consistent with plant conditions
or, if needed, for offsite authorities to
implement protective actions using a
CEMP approach, then formal offsite
radiological emergency preparedness
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50,
are not necessary at permanently
shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, DAEC committed to
maintaining SFP makeup strategies in
its letters to the NRC dated April 2 and
October 7, 2020. The multiple strategies
for providing makeup to the SFP
include: Using various existing plant
systems for inventory makeup and an
internal strategy that relies on the fire
protection system with redundant
pumps (one diesel-driven and one
electric motor-driven) that can take
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 72 / Friday, April 16, 2021 / Notices
suction from the Cedar River. These
strategies will continue to be required as
License Condition 2.C.(9), ‘‘Mitigation
Strategy License Condition,’’ of
Renewed Facility License No. DPR–49
for DAEC. Considering the very low
probability of beyond-design-basis
accidents affecting the SFP, these
diverse strategies provide multiple
methods to obtain additional makeup or
spray to the SFP before the onset of any
postulated offsite radiological release.
For all of the reasons stated above, the
NRC staff finds that the licensee’s
requested exemptions meet the
underlying purpose of all of the
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as
the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2)
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and
satisfy the special circumstances
provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in
view of the greatly reduced risk of
offsite radiological consequences
associated with the permanently
shutdown and defueled state of the
DAEC facility 10 months after the
facility permanently ceases operation.
The NRC staff has concluded that the
exemptions being granted by this action
will maintain an acceptable level of
emergency preparedness at DAEC and,
if needed, that there is reasonable
assurance that adequate offsite
protective measures can and will be
taken by State and local government
agencies using a CEMP approach in the
highly unlikely event of a radiological
emergency at DAEC. Since the
underlying purpose of the rules, as
exempted, would continue to be
achieved, even with the elimination of
the requirements under 10 CFR part 50
to maintain formal offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans and the
reduction in the scope of the onsite EP
activities at DAEC, the special
circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a),
the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have
a significant effect on the quality of the
human environment as discussed in the
NRC staff’s Finding of No Significant
Impact and associated Environmental
Assessment published in the Federal
Register on March 19, 2021 (86 FR
14960).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the licensee’s request for
exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10
CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV, and as
summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY–
VerDate Sep<11>2014
21:13 Apr 15, 2021
Jkt 253001
21–0006, are authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to the public
health and safety, and are consistent
with the common defense and security.
Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants NEDA’s exemptions from certain
EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10
CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed
and evaluated in detail in the NRC
staff’s safety evaluation dated April 13,
2021. The exemptions are effective as of
10 months after permanent cessation of
power operations at DAEC, which is
June 10, 2021.
Dated this 13th day of April, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021–07869 Filed 4–15–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Investment Company Act Release No.
34241; 812–15189]
Azzad Funds and Azzad Asset
Management, Inc.; Notice of
Application
Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘Commission’’).
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
The following is a summary
of the application between Azzad Funds
and Azzad Asset Management, Inc.
DATES: The application was filed on
December 30, 2020, and amended on
March 26, 2021.
ADDRESSES: The Commission:
Secretarys-Office@sec.gov. The Trust
and the Initial Adviser: mfouz@
azzad.net (with a copy to
Cassandra.Borchers@
ThompsonHine.com).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Christine Y. Greenlees, Senior Counsel,
at (202) 551–6879, or Lisa Reid Ragen,
Branch Chief at (202) 551–6825
(Division of Investment Management,
Chief Counsel’s Office).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice of
an application under section 6(c) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940
(‘‘Act’’) for an exemption from section
15(a) of the Act, as well as from certain
disclosure requirements in rule 20a–1
under the Act, Item 19(a)(3) of Form N–
1A, Items 22(c)(1)(ii), 22(c)(1)(iii),
22(c)(8) and 22(c)(9) of Schedule 14A
under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (‘‘1934 Act’’), and sections 6–
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00100
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
20213
07(2)(a), (b), and (c) of Regulation S–X
(‘‘Disclosure Requirements’’).
Applicants: Azzad Funds (the
‘‘Trust’’), a Massachusetts business trust
registered under the Act as an open-end
management investment company with
multiple series, which include the
Azzad Wise Capital Fund and the Azzad
Ethical Fund (each a ‘‘Fund’’), and
Azzad Asset Management, Inc. (‘‘Initial
Adviser’’), a Delaware corporation
registered as an investment adviser
under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (‘‘Advisers Act’’) that serves as an
investment adviser to the Funds
(collectively with the Trust, the
‘‘Applicants’’).
Summary of Application: The
requested exemption would permit
Applicants to enter into and materially
amend subadvisory agreements with
subadvisers without shareholder
approval and would grant relief from
the Disclosure Requirements as they
relate to fees paid to the subadvisers.
Hearing or Notification of Hearing: An
order granting the requested relief will
be issued unless the Commission orders
a hearing. Interested persons may
request a hearing by emailing the
Commission’s Secretary at SecretarysOffice@sec.gov and serving applicants
with a copy of the request by email.
Hearing requests should be received by
the Commission by 5:30 p.m. on April
29, 2021, and should be accompanied
by proof of service on the applicants, in
the form of an affidavit, or, for lawyers,
a certificate of service. Pursuant to rule
0–5 under the Act, hearing requests
should state the nature of the writer’s
interest, any facts bearing upon the
desirability of a hearing on the matter,
the reason for the request, and the issues
contested. Persons who wish to be
notified of a hearing may request
notification by emailing the
Commission’s Secretary at SecretarysOffice@sec.gov.
The complete application may be
obtained via the Commission’s website
by searching for the file number or an
Applicant using the ‘‘Company’’ name
box, at https://www.sec.gov/search/
search.htm or by calling (202) 551–
8090.
I. Requested Exemptive Relief
1. Applicants request an order to
permit the Adviser,1 subject to the
1 The term ‘‘Adviser’’ means (i) the Initial
Adviser, (ii) its successors, and (iii) any entity
controlling, controlled by or under common control
with, the Initial Adviser or its successors that serves
as the primary adviser to a Subadvised Fund (as
defined below). For the purposes of the requested
E:\FR\FM\16APN1.SGM
Continued
16APN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 72 (Friday, April 16, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20209-20213]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-07869]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2021-0066]
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued
exemptions in response to a request from the licensee regarding certain
emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions eliminate the
requirements to maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at the Duane Arnold
Energy Center, based on the reduced risks of accidents that could
result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning nuclear
power reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on April 13, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2021-0066 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2021-0066. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of public documents, is currently closed. You may submit your request
to the PDR via email at [email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or
301-415-4737, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marlayna V. Doell, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3178; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: April 13, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket No. 50-331; NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold
Energy Center; Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated January 18, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and
[[Page 20210]]
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196), NextEra Energy
Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA, the licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at the Duane Arnold Energy Enter (DAEC) in the fourth
quarter of 2020. By letter dated March 2, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML20062E489), NEDA updated its timeline and certified to the NRC that
it planned to permanently cease power operations at DAEC on October 30,
2020. By letter dated August 27, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML20240A067), NEDA certified to the NRC that power operations
permanently ceased at DAEC on August 10, 2020, and in a letter dated
October 12, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20286A317), that the fuel was
permanently removed from the DAEC reactor vessel and placed in the
spent fuel pool (SFP) as of October 12, 2020. Based on the docketing of
these certifications for permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified in
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility operating license
(DPR-49) for DAEC no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is
still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear
fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the DAEC facility in the
SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation
(ISFSI).
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports (USARs) for operating nuclear power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the
reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC and permanent removal
of fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible.
The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems are no
longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the
spent fuel. Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) provisions for
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor,
reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a
power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning
status of the facility, NEDA must obtain exemptions from those EP
regulations. Only then can NEDA modify the DAEC emergency plan to
reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of DAEC.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated April 2, 2020, as supplemented by letter dated
October 7, 2020 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML20101M779 and ML20282A595,
respectively), NEDA requested exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR part 50 for DAEC. Specifically, NEDA requested exemptions
from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for nuclear power
reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require
establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway EP zones for
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, which establish the elements that comprise
the content of emergency plans. In the letter dated October 7, 2020,
NEDA provided supplemental information and responses to the NRC staff's
requests for additional information concerning the proposed exemptions.
The information provided by the licensee included justifications
for each exemption requested. The exemptions requested by NEDA would
eliminate the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plans reviewed by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR, ``Emergency
Management and Assistance,'' Part 350, ``Review and Approval of State
and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness,'' and would
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at DAEC. The licensee stated
that the application of all the standards and requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, are not
needed for adequate emergency response capability, based on the
substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of
accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown and defueled
facility, as compared to an operating facility. If offsite protective
actions were needed for a highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident
that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at DAEC, provisions
exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a
comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National
Preparedness System to protect the health and safety of the public. A
CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan,
is addressed in FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101,
``Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is
publicly available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation
for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It
promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed
planning and decision-making and helps planners at all levels of
government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-
hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is
flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people and
property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out
specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities,
supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions
will be coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for
``all-hazards planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule.
As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has
[[Page 20211]]
consistently acknowledged that the risk of an offsite radiological
release at a power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and
permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel is significantly
lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer,
than at an operating power reactor. However, the EP regulations do not
recognize that once a power reactor permanently ceases operation, the
risk of a large radiological release from credible emergency accident
scenarios is significantly reduced. The reduced risk for any
significant offsite radiological release is based on two factors. One
factor is the elimination of accidents applicable only to an operating
power reactor, resulting in fewer credible accident scenarios. The
second factor is the reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory and
decay heat production due to radioactive decay. Due to the permanently
defueled status of the reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the
DAEC SFP and the radionuclides in the current spent fuel will continue
to decay as the spent fuel ages. The spent fuel will produce less heat
due to radioactive decay, increasing the available time to mitigate a
loss of water inventory from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A
Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor]
and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098), and the
NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and
defueled power reactors that are bounded by the assumptions and
conditions in the report, the risk of offsite radiological release is
significantly less than for an operating nuclear power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested for DAEC,
have been granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor
licensees. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions was
based on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) The radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase Protective
Action Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the
exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a
beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat
transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to
initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
With respect to design-basis accidents at DAEC, the licensee
provided analysis demonstrating that 10 months following permanent
cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences of the
only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite
radiological release (a fuel handling accident in the Reactor Building,
where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at
the exclusion area boundary.
With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at DAEC, the licensee
analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively impede
any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 10 months
after permanent cessation of power operations, there would be at least
10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting
fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches
900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), the temperature used to assess the
potential onset of fission product release. The analysis conservatively
assumed that the heat up time starts when the SFP has been completely
drained, although it is likely that site personnel will start to
respond to an incident when drain down starts. The analysis also does
not consider the period of time from the initiating event causing loss
of SFP water inventory until cooling is lost.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a)
will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted 10 months after
DAEC has permanently ceased power operations. An assessment of the
licensee's EP exemptions is described in SECY-21-0006, ``Request by
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Duane Arnold Energy Center,'' dated
January 15, 2021 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML20218A875). The
Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the
exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-21-0006, dated
February 11, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21042A030). Descriptions of
the specific exemptions requested by the licensee and the NRC staff's
basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-21-0006. The NRC
staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the
specific EP exemptions requested by the licensee are provided in the
NRC staff's safety evaluation dated April 13, 2021 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML21097A141).
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, that would allow the licensee to revise the DAEC Emergency
Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's
proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the
exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, the licensee provided analyses that show that
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed
the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans
required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection
of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents still possible at
DAEC 10 months after the plant has permanently ceased power operations.
Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events.
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to
operating power
[[Page 20212]]
reactors, where typically a large number of different sequences make
significant contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738,
relaxation of offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few months
after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report
further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite
EP requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because
even under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was
judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the
severe earthquake event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences
including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in
likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present
an undue risk to the public health and safety.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by the licensee only involve EP
requirements under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow the licensee to revise
the DAEC Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and
defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at DAEC
are not affected by the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of
formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the
reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at DAEC will not
adversely affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site
or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions
are consistent with common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the
risks associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its
licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a
reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III, because DAEC is permanently
shut down and defueled, there will no longer be a risk of a significant
offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident exceeding EPA
early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary, and the risk of a
significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-basis
accident is greatly reduced when compared to an operating power
reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at DAEC by
comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to
site-specific conditions at DAEC and determined that the risk values in
NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented for DAEC. As indicated by the
results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more recently for
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365),
while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with
significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early
fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements
were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident
involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic
heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows
that 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC,
the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is at least
10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of
all cooling means.
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be
unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the spent
fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident
shows that 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations, at
least 10 hours would be available between the time the fuel is
initially uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is conservatively
assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 900
[deg]C, which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding
oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release.
This analysis conservatively does not include the period of time from
the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all
cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified the licensee's analyses and its
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in
granting the requested exemptions to the licensee, there is no design-
basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release
exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In
the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting
the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes
of heat transfer, there will be at least 10 hours available before an
offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to
initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat
removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to
occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is
considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement
protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and
safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory with no air cooling (or other methods of removing
decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the
rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously
granted exemptions, as it does with the licensee's requested EP
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently
shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, DAEC committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies
in its letters to the NRC dated April 2 and October 7, 2020. The
multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using
various existing plant systems for inventory makeup and an internal
strategy that relies on the fire protection system with redundant pumps
(one diesel-driven and one electric motor-driven) that can take
[[Page 20213]]
suction from the Cedar River. These strategies will continue to be
required as License Condition 2.C.(9), ``Mitigation Strategy License
Condition,'' of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-49 for DAEC.
Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents
affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide multiple methods to
obtain additional makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of any
postulated offsite radiological release.
For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy the special
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the DAEC facility
10 months after the facility permanently ceases operation.
The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness
at DAEC and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that
adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and
local government agencies using a CEMP approach in the highly unlikely
event of a radiological emergency at DAEC. Since the underlying purpose
of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the
elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in
the scope of the onsite EP activities at DAEC, the special
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental
Assessment published in the Federal Register on March 19, 2021 (86 FR
14960).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the licensee's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
21-0006, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants NEDA's exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's
safety evaluation dated April 13, 2021. The exemptions are effective as
of 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations at DAEC,
which is June 10, 2021.
Dated this 13th day of April, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021-07869 Filed 4-15-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
