Promoting the Deployment of 5G Open Radio Access Networks, 16349-16360 [2021-06430]

Agencies

• FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 58 (Monday, March 29, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16349-16360]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-06430]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[GN Docket No. 21-63; FCC 21-31; FRS 17848]


Promoting the Deployment of 5G Open Radio Access Networks

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Inquiry.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This Notice of Inquiry (NOI) examines the potential of open 
and virtualized Radio Access Networks in securing America's 
communications networks and the communications supply chain, and in 
driving 5G innovation. Specifically, this NOI seeks comment on what 
steps, if any, the Commission should take to accelerate the development 
and deployment of Open Radio Access Networks (Open RAN); any challenges 
or other considerations related to the testing, deployment, and 
integration of Open RAN systems and equipment; and the costs and 
benefits associated with Open RAN development and deployment.

DATES: Interested parties may file comments on or before April 28, 
2021; and reply comments on or before May 28, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may submit comments, identified by GN 
Docket No. 21-63, by any of the following methods:
    Federal Communications Commission's Website: https://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    People With Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request reasonable 
accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language 
interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: [email protected] or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
    For detailed instructions for submitting comments and additional 
information on the rulemaking process, see the Supplementary 
Information section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jaclyn Rosen, Mobility Division, 
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, at (202) 418-0154 or 
[email protected], or Mary Claire York, Mobility Division, Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau, at (202) 418-2205 or 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comment Filing Procedures

    Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 
CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply 
comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this 
document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic 
Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of Documents in 
Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
    Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the 
internet by accessing the ECFS: https://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/.
    Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an 
original and one copy of each filing. Paper filings can be sent by 
commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. 
Postal Service mail.
    Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the Commission 
no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings. This is a 
temporary measure taken to help protect the health

[[Page 16350]]

and safety of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-
19.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See FCC Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window 
and Change in Hand-Delivery Policy, Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2788 
(2020), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express 
Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis 
Junction, MD 20701.
    U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must be 
addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.

Ex Parte Rules

    This proceeding shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' 
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules.\2\ 
Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written 
presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within 
two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline 
applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex 
parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the 
presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise 
participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was 
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during 
the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of 
the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the 
presenter's written comments, memoranda, or other filings in the 
proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or 
arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings 
(specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data 
or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the 
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex 
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must 
be filed consistent with Rule 1.1206(b), 47 CFR 1.1206(b). Participants 
in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's 
ex parte rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ 47 CFR 1.1200(a). Although the Rules do not generally 
require ex parte presentations to be treated as ``permit but 
disclose'' in Notice of Inquiry proceedings, see 47 CFR 
1.1204(b)(1), we exercise our discretion in this instance, and find 
that the public interest is served by making ex parte presentations 
available to the public, in order to encourage a robust record. See 
id. Sec.  1.1200(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Synopsis

    In creating the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or 
Commission), Congress charged the agency with protecting the safety of 
life and property and promoting the national defense through wire and 
radio communication. Over the last decade, actions by Congress, the 
Executive Branch, and the Commission have repeatedly stressed and 
prioritized supply chain risk management and the deployment of secure 
and reliable networks in the United States. The Commission has worked 
closely with its federal partners on this critical issue and has acted 
decisively to secure our communications networks and the communications 
supply chain. Congress has also established that it is ``the policy of 
the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and 
services to the public.''
    Open and virtualized radio access networks have the potential to 
address national security and other concerns that the Commission and 
other federal stakeholders have raised in recent years about network 
integrity and supply chain reliability. New startups are entering the 
original equipment manufacturer marketplace, and many of these 
companies are located in trusted-partner countries that do not pose 
national security risks. Network function virtualization and tools like 
artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) have the potential 
to allow for smarter, more efficient network security monitoring. 
Below, we summarize recent federal actions taken to help secure the 
communications supply chain and communications networks, either before 
the emergence of Open RAN or in parallel with these efforts.

A. State of Development and Deployment of Open RAN Solutions

    Current Standards and Specifications. We seek comment on the 
current state of standards and specifications development for 5G and 
Open RAN. During the last few years, there has been a concerted effort 
among some organizations to advance the Open RAN model. For example, in 
2016 and 2018, respectively, several companies launched the Telecom 
Infra Project (TIP) and global carriers established the O-RAN Alliance 
to develop and promote Open RAN reference architectures and protocols 
that foster vendor interoperability. In May 2020, several major global 
companies formed the Open RAN Policy Coalition to promote government 
policies that advance the adoption of open and interoperable RAN 
technologies. In August 2020, the Open Networking Foundation (ONF), an 
operator-led consortium advancing innovation in network infrastructure 
and carrier business models, announced several new initiatives in the 
Open RAN domain. We seek comment on the state of Open RAN standards 
development generally and, specifically, on the challenges inherent in 
developing Open RAN standards and specifications. To what extent are 
these standard-setting efforts being driven by established large 
manufacturers, and to what extent are these efforts enabling 
participation by smaller equipment vendors, smaller mobile network 
operators, and newer entrants to the marketplace? Are specifications 
such as eCPRI, the Common Public Radio Interface, a sufficient 
alternative to Open RAN? Are there any known interoperable multivendor 
implementations of eCPRI? Are there substantive differences between the 
eCPRI and Open RAN approaches for disaggregating the network? What 
steps, if any, should be taken by the Commission to help resolve 
standard-setting challenges, bolster these efforts, and accelerate the 
timeline for Open RAN standards and specifications development?
    Open RAN Ecosystem. We seek comment on the current state of the 
Open RAN ecosystem. For example, which companies are offering baseband 
hardware, network virtualization, packet core functionality, or other 
network components? How large are each of these companies, in sales or 
revenues, in each of these applications? How scalable is manufacturing 
of each of these components to allow for ramp up in production? And how 
many companies are competing to supply each of the components and 
applications? What role (if any) will systems integrators play in 
advancing the deployment of Open RAN systems and what systems 
integrators are operating in the marketplace today? Will carriers 
execute their own integration, as Rakuten has done, or buy hosted 
solutions from other providers? Commenters should identify any gaps or 
potential bottlenecks in the Open RAN ecosystem. What factors 
incentivize or disincentivize vendors from developing Open RAN 
solutions? What are the financial capabilities and funding sources of 
current or potential vendors to develop such solutions? To what extent 
does the development of Open RAN solutions by one firm depend on the 
development of Open RAN by other firms? We seek comment on the current 
and future opportunities that Open RAN generates for the U.S. wireless 
infrastructure industry. While U.S. companies do not currently offer an 
integrated end-to-end network at scale, several U.S. companies supply 
critical

[[Page 16351]]

components of wireless networks, including semiconductors, end user 
devices, and core network elements. Does this suggest that U.S. 
companies are well positioned to compete in a modular market? More 
specifically, we seek comment and data on whether and, if so, how many 
U.S. companies or vendors can manufacture and/or supply Open RAN sub-
components, including radios, at the scale necessary to compete both 
domestically and internationally with traditional network equipment 
vendors. How many U.S. companies have the knowledge and resources to 
begin manufacturing Open RAN components and applications in the near 
future? What are the projected market shares of the U.S. companies at 
the aggregate level in the U.S. wireless network equipment market if 
Open RAN were widely adopted? Are there any components or applications 
for which there currently are no U.S. suppliers?
    Domestic Deployments. We seek comment on the current state of Open 
RAN deployments in the U.S. To what extent are these solutions 
commercially available today? While DISH has not announced a launch 
date, it is currently building the first nationwide cloud-native, Open 
RAN-based 5G broadband network. Inland Cellular, a rural mobile 
wireless service provider that serves more than 35,000 subscribers in 
Idaho and Washington, is reportedly deploying an Open RAN system that 
will cut per site cost by approximately 40 percent. Verizon Wireless 
has reportedly deployed vRAN equipment as part of its 5G network. What 
other U.S. companies are planning or otherwise participating in Open 
RAN deployments? How close is the U.S. to being ready for large-scale 
deployments? Has Open RAN delivered an integrated and truly 
interoperable end-to-end process in the United States yet? Commenters 
should discuss previous and current efforts to deploy Open RAN in the 
U.S., as well as any expected plans to deploy in the future, including 
information on the costs of any deployments considered. We seek comment 
on which mobile network operators or original equipment manufacturers 
are likely and not likely to adopt Open RAN. What factors are 
preventing, impeding, or discouraging Open RAN deployments? What steps 
should be taken by the Commission, other federal partners, industry, 
academia, or others to resolve these issues, address these concerns, 
and accelerate the timeline for Open RAN deployment?
    International Deployments. Similarly to the United States, several 
countries have stressed the importance of securing their communications 
networks and communications supply chains. The United Kingdom has 
established a 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy to ensure the 
telecom supply chain remains resilient to future trends and threats, 
and French suppliers are being prioritized to help the French 
government reduce its dependence on Huawei. Several countries believe 
that Open RAN can offer a solution to security issues affecting the 
communications network supply chain. The German government, for 
example, is expected to spend 2 billion euros to reduce dependency on 
Huawei and to prioritize Open RAN research, development, and 
deployments.
    In response to government policies and demand for more secure 
solutions, operators worldwide are developing and deploying Open RAN 
architectures at an increasing rate. For example, in Asia, Rakuten 
maintains it was one of the first companies to utilize Open RAN as part 
of its new fully virtualized cloud network in Japan, and Bharti Airtel 
and Vodafone Idea have been at the forefront of Open RAN deployments in 
India. In Europe, four major carriers--Vodafone Group Plc, Telefonica 
S.A., Deutsche Telekom AG, and Orange S.A.--signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding signaling their commitment to deploy Open RAN solutions 
across Europe. In Africa, Vodafone has conducted early field trials, 
and, in July 2020, Orange announced a multi-country program to extend 
their current coverage with Open RAN solutions, including to the 
Central African Republic. In Latin America, the TIP, Instituto Nacional 
de Telecomunicacoes (Inatel), and Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM) Brasil 
launched the Open Field program in Brazil to develop and test Open RAN 
solutions in the field.
    As countries and operators worldwide are beginning to coalesce 
around the Open RAN model, we seek comment on what lessons can be 
learned from successful deployments, previous failed deployments, and 
development efforts being undertaken in other countries. What has been 
learned about deploying Open RAN systems using existing generations of 
networks and in low-income and rural environments? What challenges have 
these operators faced in developing and deploying Open RAN systems? Is 
there anything about the U.S. wireless network industry, spectrum 
policies (e.g., availability of greenfield spectrum), or geographical 
or other factors that present unique challenges to Open RAN deployment? 
What steps can the Commission take to encourage timely and secure 
domestic deployments? What implications do international efforts like 
the European Memorandum of Understanding have for U.S. leadership in 
this area?

B. Potential Public Interest Benefits in Promoting Development and 
Deployment of Open RAN

    Increased Competition and Network Vendor Diversity. We seek comment 
generally on the effect of Open RAN on market entry, vendor diversity, 
and competition in the wireless network equipment industry. We seek 
comment on the current state of competition in the wireless network 
equipment industry generally and in the markets for various components 
and applications. In particular, we seek comment on whether and how the 
current market structure in the traditional RAN sector may impact or 
affect the deployment and adoption of Open RAN solutions. How many 
options are available to carriers in selecting equipment manufacturers? 
How interoperable is this RAN equipment, if at all, with other hardware 
and software? Is this equipment or software proprietary? What 
restrictions, if any, do equipment manufacturers place on wireless 
carriers' equipment choices or options? Similarly, do equipment 
manufacturers place any restrictions on their upstream suppliers in 
terms of dealing with Open RAN providers? What affect do such 
restrictions have on competition and Open RAN deployment and adoption?
    What are the effects of competition in the industry, and would 
transitioning to Open RAN resolve, ameliorate, or worsen these issues? 
Specifically, would increased competition in the wireless network 
equipment marketplace result in lower costs for operators? Commenters 
advocating this position should explain why and should estimate the 
likely cost reductions. For instance, does Open RAN eliminate or 
minimize the costs associated with developing a proprietary end-to-end 
network or deploying and maintaining single-vendor hardware? What 
benefits can be gained by access to interoperable networks? On the 
other hand, would there be any additional costs to operators from 
having to use Open RAN versus alternative technologies? For example, 
are there any additional costs required for integrating the Open RAN 
system?
    We also seek this information on the firms that supply various 
network components and applications of 5G RAN networks and their market 
shares in each of the segments. We seek comment on the relationships 
between and among firms in this industry, including but not limited to 
supplier

[[Page 16352]]

relationships, equity investments, and joint ventures or partnerships. 
Commenters should also describe the extent to which the cost, quality, 
and/or capabilities of competing components and applications differ. We 
seek comment on vertical supply chain relationships in the 
telecommunications networking equipment market, and on the potential 
effects of current market conditions on the demand for and deployment 
of Open RAN solutions. Commenters should identify barriers to entry or 
market conditions that may affect or impede the deployment and adoption 
of Open RAN solutions now or in the future. Do current market 
conditions or barriers to entry warrant specific regulatory 
intervention? If so, commenters should describe what measures the 
Commission should take, as well as the legal basis for Commission 
action.
    We seek comment on the current and projected demand for Open RAN 
and its expected market share, as a proxy for predicting the level of 
competition in the Open RAN supply chain. By some estimates, Open RAN 
currently captures 9.4% of the total 4G and 5G market. Is the current 
market share a reflection of actual demand, or is it the result of 
regulatory or other barriers that may be impeding or delaying 
widespread adoption and deployment? Is market share likely to change in 
the future? Is there a threshold for market share at which the 
effectiveness of diffusion of Open RAN would rapidly increase? What are 
the anticipated diffusion rates over the next 5 years under current 
market conditions? We seek comment on whether the pace of Open RAN 
adoption should influence policies the Commission adopts, or whether 
the Commission should adopt policies to accelerate the pace of 
adoption. We also seek comment on any adverse effects and costs of 
policies advocated by commenters, such as the extra burden on network 
operations that the policies may cause.
    What factors may incentivize or disincentivize operators from 
adopting Open RAN technologies? How would adoption by one firm impact 
adoption by other firms? To what extent does Open RAN technology 
exhibit economies of scale, network effects, or learning curves? If the 
benefits of Open RAN can only be realized by economies of scale, should 
the Commission provide funding or incentives to operators that choose 
to implement such systems in their wireless networks? To what extent 
might government-funded incentives or other regulatory intervention 
ease any of the costs or barriers to adopting Open RAN? For example, 
the Indian government is currently drafting procurement regulations for 
its next generation networks and is expected to offer preference to 
domestic suppliers. In Japan, the government is providing tax 
incentives to products with open and interoperable interfaces, and the 
UK government announced a 28 million euro investment in 5G products, 
with more than one-half utilizing Open RAN. Should we adopt similar 
regulatory measures or incentives? Are other actions necessary to level 
the playing field for new Open RAN suppliers that are competing against 
entrenched traditional vendors with decades of experience? For 
instance, should we amend, forbear from applying, or eliminate any of 
our rules that inadvertently support a single-vendor approach, a 
specific technology (e.g., closed radio access networks), or otherwise 
inhibit the development and adoption of Open RAN solutions? Are there 
any components or factors of an Open RAN system that are or could be 
hindered by a single or limited vendor supply? How can we facilitate a 
competitive marketplace where essential pieces of an Open RAN 
architecture are not controlled by a limited number of entities?
    We seek comment on whether Open RAN is likely to create 
opportunities for new entrants in the original equipment manufacturer 
markets. Specifically, we seek comment on whether and, if so, which 
aspects of, the Open RAN architecture promote vendor diversity and 
competition. Open RAN works by disaggregating software applications 
from the underlying hardware infrastructure and replacing proprietary 
interfaces between baseband components with open, standards-based 
interfaces. Would the disaggregated nature of Open RAN lower the costs 
of entry by allowing vendors to develop distinct components of the 
network (e.g., hardware, software, silicon), rather than having to 
build the integrated end-to-end system, which can be a costly 
undertaking? Does the interoperable nature of Open RAN facilitate 
market entry by allowing vendors to develop specific components of the 
network for use by multiple operators rather than creating unique one-
off solutions for specific operators? What specific firms or what kind 
of firms would be likely entrants, and how are they likely to perform 
as competitors against incumbents? Which segments are they likely to 
enter, and what kind of products are they likely to develop? Are there 
likely to be international entrants in addition to domestic entrants? 
Commenters should discuss other aspects of the Open RAN architecture 
that may lower the barriers to entry and otherwise facilitate market 
entry.
    We also seek comment on how Open RAN could encourage innovation by 
American companies, and how to anticipate, identify, and evaluate 
potential issues that might stifle innovation, manufacturing, and 
deployment. For example, is there a sufficient workforce in place with 
the training to safely and efficiently install Open RAN equipment? If 
not, how quickly could such workers be trained? Are there steps the 
Commission or other federal agencies should take to address an increase 
in the supply of trained workers needed to close such a gap? Under an 
open-source or open-interface model, will businesses be able to stay 
financially viable? How will access to intellectual property and 
patents influence the ability to innovate? Can U.S. operators continue 
to achieve the same level of features and performance at scale with 
Open RAN that customers currently enjoy with existing infrastructure? 
Will technological developments in Open RAN benefit innovation in other 
technologies? We seek comment on these questions as well as comment 
generally on whether the Commission or other entities could or should 
plan for and mitigate foreseeable roadblocks.
    Affordability of Services and Products for Consumers. We seek 
comment on the potential costs and benefits of Open RAN on consumers in 
the next-generation wireless network marketplace. If Open RAN lowers 
the overall hardware and deployment costs for operators, are those cost 
savings likely to pass through to consumers in the form of lower, more 
competitive prices for next-generation wireless services? How might 
Open RAN affect the price of services and products for consumers, if at 
all? If the federal government provides incentives for a transition in 
architecture, how can we ensure these cost savings find their way to 
the consumer? Commenters should discuss the potential effect of Open 
RAN on the affordability of end-user services and products. In 
particular, commenters should discuss how Open RAN might affect the 
affordability of services and products for the most vulnerable 
consumers, including rural and low-income Americans.
    Network Security and Public Safety. Several countries have 
recognized Open RAN as a potential solution to the increasing security 
threats posed to their nation's communications supply chains. For 
example, as previously discussed, the German government is expected to

[[Page 16353]]

spend two billion euros to reduce its dependency on Huawei by 
prioritizing Open RAN research, development, and deployments. France 
has adopted a similar policy. Through open disaggregation of the RAN, 
Open RAN is intended to enable the use of interchangeable modular 
technologies, as well as AI/ML, to promote, among other things, network 
security and public safety. O-RAN Alliance argues that the design of 
Open RAN, along with the potential for leveraging open-source software, 
should improve supply chain security.
    To what extent does Open RAN address supply chain risk management 
issues and enable the deployment of secure and reliable networks in the 
United States? Does the disaggregated nature of Open RAN facilitate 
market entry by additional vendors and therefore offer viable 
alternatives to the use of equipment from untrusted vendors in the 
telecommunications supply chain (e.g., Huawei and ZTE)? Would Open RAN 
mitigate operators' reliance on specific vendors, allowing them to 
secure a back-up supplier or otherwise eliminate lock-in problems 
resulting from a consolidated equipment marketplace? How would an 
increase in the number of vendors supplying components for Open RAN 
affect the 5G vendor management ecosystem? Would the use of Open RAN 
software facilitate the rapid removal of vendors' equipment when they 
were identified as untrusted? Would a supply chain of Open RAN software 
vendors that excludes untrusted entities obviate concerns of that 
software running over hardware of an untrusted vendor? Can additional 
criteria be defined to assist in identifying what is an untrusted 
vendor, beyond frameworks such as the Prague Proposals, EU Toolbox for 
5G Security, or the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Criteria? We seek information on the risk of security breaches, 
including the frequency of such breaches and the magnitude of potential 
economic damages on closed RAN networks, and how this security risk 
could be addressed by Open RAN. We seek comment on the potential impact 
of Open RAN on public safety communications. What potential benefits 
would Open RAN provide for public safety communications and emergency 
communications, such as 911 or wireless emergency alerting overall? To 
what extent would Open RAN impact the required location accuracy of 911 
calls? How and to what extent would Open RAN facilitate 
interoperability for public safety communications, especially as state 
and local 911 systems transition to IP-based networks, such as Next 
Generation 911 (NG 911)? Similarly, how would Open RAN enhance 
interoperability with respect to NG 911, the First Responder Network 
(FirstNet), or priority services, such as wireless priority services? 
How could Open RAN reduce the overall frequency and duration of 
communications outages on networks that carry 911 and other emergency 
communications? What impact, if any, will the deployment of Open RAN 
systems have on existing signal boosters used to ensure adequate in-
building coverage?
    Open-Source Software. Open-source software ``includes operating 
systems, applications, and programs in which the source code is 
published and made available to the public, enabling anyone to copy, 
modify and redistribute that code.'' Open RAN can leverage open-source 
software for network functions and network management. Open-source 
software draws from a larger and more diverse set of reviewers compared 
to that of a closed RAN architecture. What are the potential benefits 
or advantages associated with the use of open-source software in Open 
RAN environments? For instance, does open-source software result in a 
well-vetted, more secure finished product? How can these benefits be 
most effectively realized, and what role can the Commission play in 
maximizing these benefits? What are the disadvantages to using open-
source software in Open RAN environments and how can they be mitigated?
    Potential Technological Benefits of Open RAN Deployment. Proponents 
of Open RAN argue that features such as end-to-end network slicing, 
edge computing, and machine learning-based network optimization methods 
may be better enabled by standards-based architectures. Further, they 
contend that an open architecture could improve the controllability and 
overall performance of cellular networks that are increasingly 
heterogenous and distributed, aggregate spectrum in different frequency 
bands, and use small-cell architectures. We seek comment on these 
views, and specifically on quantifying the improvement in spectral 
efficiency and performance under the Open RAN architecture as compared 
with a closed system.
    One of the promised benefits of an Open RAN architecture is the 
ability to apply AI/ML techniques to optimizing radio resource 
management, since the interfaces between different elements of the 
network will be available for real-time control. Proponents argue this 
would be especially beneficial in network slicing to guarantee end-to-
end Quality-of-Service to disparate applications that are allocated 
resources over the network. The complexity of wireless networks makes 
manual control and optimization inefficient, leading to wasted 
resources along multiple axes--spectrum, computing, and infrastructure. 
Open RAN proponents claim that AI/ML algorithms are increasingly being 
used even in the current RAN, and that an Open RAN architecture may 
enable improved performance by offering improved visibility to 
intermediate nodes within the RAN.
    Advanced wireless networks, including 5G, may be used for 
``vertical'' applications outside of traditional telecommunications 
networking, such as smart cities, automotive, telehealth, and energy. 
The network slicing and other features of an Open RAN architecture 
could better enable very different application suites to run on the 
same hardware stack. We seek comment on the benefits outlined above and 
what role the Commission should play in facilitating these benefits. We 
also seek comment on the status and viability of these benefits and ask 
commenters to quantify the value of such benefits. Are they available 
now, and if not, how long until the various benefits outlined above 
become viable? Are these benefits primarily (or exclusively) the result 
of Open RAN architecture or will they also result from 5G or other 
advanced wireless networks deployed using traditional network 
equipment? What are the potential obstacles or disadvantages of the 
technologies and approaches discussed above?
    Radiofrequency spectrum is anticipated to be a key enabler for a 
variety of public ecosystems including aviation, marine, and land-based 
transportation infrastructure. Private sector initiatives are being 
organized that focus on advancing 5G innovation, such as MITRE 
Engenuity, which has created the Open Generation Consortium to drive 5G 
innovation, with an initial focus on 5G-equipped drones. The 
advancement of 5G use cases for drones and other applications may face 
technological and regulatory barriers, and we seek comment on the 
barriers to the emerging ecosystem of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) 
as it relates to network equipment and architecture. MITRE suggested at 
the FCC's September 2020 Forum on 5G Open Radio Access Networks that 
the UAS industry could be an attractive focus for Open RAN. 
Furthermore, the TAC has recommended a pilot program focused on the 
evolving UAS use case. We seek comment on what network

[[Page 16354]]

architecture issues need to be addressed to meet these challenges and 
how we might address any such challenges. We seek comment on this topic 
generally and, in particular, on the steps that the Commission could 
take to promote and advance the application of 5G Open RAN to the 
emerging UAS ecosystem.
    Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. Using Open RAN may 
also enable providers to take advantage of AI and ML from sources other 
than a proprietary RAN vendor. The O-RAN Alliance contends that AI and 
ML enable the optimization of RAN configurations in real-time based on 
learning technologies that accumulate information over time. We seek 
comment on what steps industry, the Commission, or other organizations 
can take to promote the development and use of AI and ML to support and 
enhance the security features of an Open RAN deployment. Can AI and ML 
be harnessed to identify and remediate malicious changes in 
configuration or otherwise detect intrusions and vulnerabilities in an 
Open RAN platform? Are additional standards and Application Layer 
Interfaces (API) needed to ensure the development of security-based AI/
ML features in Open RAN technologies? What other benefits and 
challenges exist regarding the use of AI and ML in our communications 
infrastructure and how do we balance those with potential privacy 
issues?
    Virtualized Operating Environment. Proponents argue that Open RAN's 
use of virtualized environments with containers offers additional 
operational and security advantages. Software virtualization could 
enable applications and operating environments to be isolated from each 
other. Containerization could allow multiple vendors to develop their 
products for the same Open RAN platform, and could encourage 
competition between vendors, thus driving down costs for the provider. 
Are there other advantages of virtualization in the context of security 
(e.g., data privacy, or protection of computer resources assigned to an 
Open RAN application)? What are the disadvantages and can they be 
addressed? We note that the Distributed Management Task Force is a 
standards body focusing on emerging IT infrastructures like cloud 
computing and virtualization. Are additional industry standards needed 
to facilitate various virtualization platforms for different hardware 
used to support Open RAN functionality and security?

C. Additional Considerations Regarding Open RAN Development and 
Deployment

    Disaggregation/Need for a System Integrator. If the flexibility 
created by disaggregation of the RAN has potential benefits, would it 
also make the deployment of the Open RAN more complex than deployment 
of a closed RAN because different components must be seamlessly 
integrated? Since the different Open RAN components may be supplied by 
different vendors, how would operators resolve compatibility problems 
that arise during deployment, in spite of standardized interfaces being 
specified?
    We seek information on the practical implications of the 
disaggregation of the components of the RAN. How difficult will it be 
to ensure that the components of the Open RAN seamlessly operate 
together? Will testing of the Open RAN deployment be a time-consuming 
and complicated process compared to a proprietary closed RAN? Have Open 
RAN deployments to date demonstrated comparable performance to 4G and 
5G systems employing a traditional RAN architecture? Is the performance 
of Open RAN systems likely to be impacted due to the multi-vendor 
environment? Will network operators have the resources to manage the 
deployment of Open RAN technology into their networks? Is this a task 
that smaller network operators can successfully manage? What 
institutional requirements and associated costs are required to support 
system integration? What role will system integrators perform in 
deployment of Open RAN technology?
    Network Security and Public Safety. Could Open RAN architecture 
expose new security vulnerabilities that might not otherwise exist in a 
more closed architecture? If open-source software fosters collaborative 
development among many stakeholders, does this enable a greater number 
of stakeholders to potentially discover vulnerabilities that might not 
otherwise be exposed and mitigated in closed systems? Or would the 
introduction of a greater number of stakeholders introduce 
vulnerabilities if appropriate care is not taken and software is not 
fully vetted by vendors or operators that choose to use open-software? 
Does Open RAN introduce further issues raised by compromised trusted 
vendors, such as those that occurred during the SolarWinds breach?
    Does Open RAN introduce any risks to the security and integrity of 
public safety communications? We seek comment on whether public facing 
infrastructures, like the RAN, are or may become an ideal target for 
bad actors to disrupt vital communications that rely on 
interoperability, such as 911, E-911, and NG 911 services (collectively 
referred to as 911). Similarly, is there a risk that prioritized public 
safety communications, such as those provided by FirstNet or the 
Wireless Priority Service, could also be subject to disruption from bad 
actors exploiting vulnerabilities in Open RAN that may not exist in a 
proprietary traditional RAN? Conversely, can Open RAN solutions 
remediate known vulnerabilities, such as False Base Stations, in 
proprietary RANs? We seek comment on whether and, if so, how the use of 
Open RAN may introduce new and heightened security risks to the 911 
system. Are these risks particularly heightened by the 911 system's 
interdependence with originating service providers, the continued 
operation of legacy public safety access points or emergency 
communications centers, and the ongoing migration of 911 services to NG 
911? For example, it is commonly understood that security functions 
(like data encryption) to protect data traversing through the IP-based 
networks do not function or are unavailable as the data travel through 
legacy network elements. Does the use of Open RAN exacerbate these 
concerns? Specifically, what other ways might the enhanced 
interconnectedness fostered by Open RAN increase the cyberthreat attack 
surface to 911 services? To what extent might Open RAN exacerbate the 
potential cyber threat from legacy public safety answering points that 
operate in hybrid environments? To the extent Open RAN introduces risks 
to public safety communications, what steps can be taken by 
stakeholders or the Commission to eliminate or mitigate these concerns? 
We also ask commenters to estimate the potential costs associated with 
the risk mitigation related to public safety arising from Open RAN 
development.
    Do the attributes of Open RAN that support its versatility to 
identify, isolate, and remediate security risks or threats in the 
service architecture also highlight its potential security 
vulnerabilities? To what extent could use of Open RAN make the network 
more vulnerable to cyberthreats or unanticipated failures compared to a 
traditional mobile networking approach? Is there a risk that Open RAN 
vendors may not yet have the processes in place to address quickly and 
efficiently possible gaps or bugs that could otherwise be exploited by 
bad actors? Are accountability and trust

[[Page 16355]]

reduced in environments with multiple vendors? What steps should we 
take to promote the diversity of vendors, while ensuring a high 
standard of security and trust similar to that provided by proprietary 
end-to-end solutions? Is there a heightened or new security risk 
introduced by relying on a few established and new suppliers with 
shorter track records? Technologies associated with Open RAN impact 
stakeholders across the supply chain, as well as in industries that 
rely on safe and reliable communications networks. What industry 
guidelines or standards are in place to ensure vendors remain 
accountable for their products and service? Beyond industry standards, 
what role, if any, does the Commission have in holding vendors 
accountable for their products, especially in systems with components 
sourced from multiple vendors? Are the Commission's existing equipment 
authorization rules sufficient to perform this role? We seek comment on 
these issues.
    Moreover, does the disaggregated nature of Open RAN emphasize the 
importance of adhering to 5G security specifications in both open and 
closed systems, since security considerations of these components 
already are defined in the 3GPP standards? Although use of open-source 
software may be a prominent feature of Open RAN, many 5G vendors and 
operators already rely on open-source software to accelerate delivery 
of digital innovation. We seek comment on the effects of open-source 
software on network security from entities that have already deployed 
some variation of open-source software.
    Open-Source Software Vulnerabilities. As noted earlier, the source 
code for open-source software is made available to the public, enabling 
anyone to copy, modify, or redistribute that code. Does this openness 
also introduce new risks to the network? Does the variety and diversity 
of open-source software options increase the possibility of 
incompatibilities in the system or make it more vulnerable to hacking 
or other vulnerabilities? To what extent are stakeholders applying 
inventory management of open-source components, code management 
systems, testing of open-source code, and security frameworks to 
mitigate open-source risks as recommended by CSRIC? We seek comment on 
whether the process for reviewing and accepting contributions to open-
source software platforms may affect the security of Open RAN. For 
example, who verifies the integrity of those who seek to change the 
code? Are there existing criteria or processes used to select 
reviewers, and what processes are there to ensure that contributions 
made to change or edit the source code comport with existing security 
standards? For example, to what extent are Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVEs) against open-source software components monitored? 
What safeguards and protocols are in place to thwart bad actors? To the 
extent that safeguards exist, are they implemented to meet the security 
standards expected by enterprises and service providers? Are there 
other risk factors we should be considering? An analysis of the 
benefits and challenges coupled with ideas on how the Commission can 
support more secure, efficient, and resilient architectures should be 
provided while addressing this topic.
    Risks of a Virtualized Operating Environment. Virtualization 
isolates applications from each other, thus minimizing or even 
eliminating their disruption on other applications running in other 
isolated containers. Is there a risk, however, that actors with 
unrestricted access to the operating system of the device, often 
referred to as root access, can bypass the intrinsic security 
virtualization and can access and/or alter any file, data, applications 
running on that hardware platform? We seek comment on the security 
vulnerabilities of the operating environment of virtualized software. 
Can vendors or providers protect against impermissible root access to 
the operating system if the hardware is produced by an untrusted 
source? What credentialing, safeguards, or general operating standards 
exist to ensure that an actor with root access cannot abuse root access 
for malicious means. Another attack vector created by virtualization is 
side-channel attacks, where one container can learn information from an 
unrelated container. Are there mitigations to side-channel attacks? Are 
these mitigations in common use? If not, what is inhibiting their use? 
We ask commenters to estimate the costs associated with risk mitigation 
related to commercial applicants arising from Open RAN deployment.
    Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. Some entities claim 
that using AI and ML in any product present the risk of false positives 
(i.e., an indication that a condition, such as a network intrusion or 
malware, exists when in fact it does not). Correcting false positives 
requires the input of time and human resources to investigate, and the 
remediation of a false problem or incorrectly configured optimization 
scheme might result in a service outage or other denial of service. 
Should AI/ML be leveraged to support and enhance the security features 
of an Open RAN deployment? If so, how?
    Barriers to Adoption by Established Operators. Are the potential 
benefits of Open RAN, described above, available only in a greenfield 
deployment? Commenters should discuss the relative and absolute costs 
of incorporating Open RAN components into an established network. How 
can established RANs incorporate elements of Open RAN without replacing 
the entire network? Are there any obstacles that overlaying an Open RAN 
network on top of an existing early-generation closed network create? 
How scalable is the Open RAN concept to multi-gigabit wireless 
networks, such as non-standalone, millimeter-wave 5G cellular networks 
deployed in the U.S. that rely upon legacy, 4G LTE components? Do the 
potential cost reductions and performance enhancements due to 
disaggregation disappear once the costs of end-to-end multi-vendor 
interoperability testing are accounted for? Will this innovation and 
flexibility also maintain the stable operating environment that 
suppliers and consumers expect and demand of the nation's 
communications infrastructure?
    Other Considerations. Are there any other factors to take into 
account when considering the viability and extent of open and 
virtualized RAN deployments? Will the fronthaul and midhaul between 
disaggregated units in the radio access network limit the deployment of 
Open RAN cell sites to areas where fiber or other high-capacity 
connections are available? Will the availability of fronthaul and 
midhaul options limit deployment of Open RAN networks to more densely 
populated areas? According to press reports, some original equipment 
manufacturers have expressed concerns regarding the energy efficiency 
of Open RAN equipment. Are these concerns valid? If so, what steps 
could potentially be taken to reduce the energy consumption associated 
with this equipment? Are there other issues associated with deployment 
of open and/or virtualized RAN equipment that we should be aware of?

D. Potential Commission Efforts To Promote Development and Deployment

    Identify Potential Barriers. Assuming we find that Open RAN could 
provide substantial public interest benefits, and subject to the cost-
benefit considerations outlined below, we seek comment on whether we 
should enact rules, consistent with the Commission's rulemaking 
authority under current statutes, to promote reliability, 
interoperability, and adoption of Open RAN systems. Are Commission 
actions

[[Page 16356]]

warranted to support the development of Open RAN standards? How can the 
Commission best harness industry experts to understand regulatory 
constraints impacting Open RAN deployments and the most appropriate 
regulatory approach moving forward? Commenters should identify aspects 
of the Open RAN system that require streamlined rules and a harmonized 
regulatory framework.
    We seek comment on whether any of our existing rules impede Open 
RAN investment and development. Commenters should identify existing 
regulatory barriers hindering the continued development and 
proliferation of Open RAN solutions. We ask commenters to identify 
regulations that are outdated or unnecessarily burdensome to the 
development and deployment of Open RAN technologies, and whether the 
Commission should update, forbear from applying, or eliminate any of 
our existing rules in order to best serve the public interest. We also 
seek comment on whether there are any market inefficiencies that could 
be addressed by changes to the Commission's rules.
    Testbeds and Demonstration Projects. In 2013, the Commission 
adopted rules creating the opportunity for expanded experimentation 
through Program experimental licenses and Innovation Zones. Under a 
Program experimental license, qualified institutions may conduct 
testing for multiple non-related experiments under a single 
authorization within a defined geographic area under control of the 
licensee and where the licensee has institutional processes to manage 
and oversee experiments. The Innovation Zone takes this concept a step 
further by effectively providing an extension of a Program Experimental 
License's authorized area of operation. Such licensees are permitted to 
operate within an Innovation Zone, under the parameters set for that 
particular Zone, without having to modify their licenses to cover the 
new location. Innovation Zones can be created in response to a 
particular request or on the Commission's own motion. The Commission 
has established two Innovation Zones--in New York City and Salt Lake 
City--to test new advanced technologies and prototype networks outside 
a traditional small campus or laboratory setting, including those that 
can support 5G technologies. These Innovation Zones permit 
experimentation across a wide variety of spectrum bands encompassing 
both non-federal and federal or shared allocations at power levels 
commensurate with commercial service. Could these Innovation Zones, 
either the two already created or new zones, provide opportunities to 
test and verify the security and operational benefits associated with 
Open RAN technology? Could Innovation Zones also be used to test and 
adjust various Open RAN parameters to optimize its implementation? We 
seek comment on these issues. Are there adjustments that we might need 
to make to these Innovation Zones to better enable Open RAN technology 
testing? Should other testbeds be established for this purpose? Should 
the Commission encourage or require the interconnection of testbeds to 
better simulate the challenges of actual network deployments? Are there 
other features of Open RAN technology that should be explored through 
such testbeds or demonstration projects? For example, can such testbeds 
be used to evaluate system integration issues in mixed vendor 
environments both in terms of different Open RAN vendor equipment and a 
mix of Open RAN and more traditional network equipment operating in 
close proximity? Are there funding mechanisms in place for researchers 
to conduct the testing needed to advance Open RAN technology to a 
maturity level sufficient for widespread commercial deployment? How can 
the Commission incentivize stakeholder participation in testbeds and/or 
demonstration projects? What features of such programs would attract 
stakeholder participation by increasing potential gains and reducing 
potential risks of participation? What other steps can the Commission 
take or programs can it establish to encourage and enable development 
and testing of Open RAN technology?
    Moreover, should the Commission have any role in promoting, 
developing, or testing of Open RAN equipment? Are there any actions 
that the Commission should take to facilitate the integration and 
testing of Open RAN technology? How can the Commission encourage the 
development of Open RAN security and reliability? Could this involve 
the adoption of performance standards or other rules for Open RAN 
equipment? Should the Commission support research and development of 
technologies useful for Open RAN development? If so, how? If the 
Commission were to support Open RAN research and development 
activities, what types of technologies would be most useful to 
facilitate Open RAN adoption? Should the Commission sponsor Open RAN 
plugfests, either on its own or in partnership with other 
organizations, to encourage the development of interoperable Open RAN 
equipment and demonstrate its capabilities? What other actions can the 
Commission take to demonstrate and test the functionality of Open RAN 
network equipment? Finally, what timeframes are realistic for the 
completion of any study or analysis conducted as part of Open RAN 
network equipment being deployed in a testbed environment?
    USF/Rip and Replace. The Supply Chain Second R&O created the 
Reimbursement Program, which will ``reimburse the costs reasonably 
incurred by providers of advanced communications services . . . to 
permanently remove, replace, and dispose of covered communications 
equipment and services from their networks.'' In adopting the 
Reimbursement Program, the Commission recognized that ``a certain level 
of technological upgrade is inevitable . . .'' when replacing older 
technology. Thus, the Commission's Reimbursement Program permits 
``participants to obtain reimbursement for reasonable costs incurred 
for replacing older mobile wireless networks with fourth generation 
Long Term Evolution (4G LTE) equipment or services that are 5G ready.'' 
While the Commission expected providers to ``obtain the lowest-cost 
equipment that most closely replaces their existing equipment . . . , 
'' it recognized that ``replacement of older legacy technology will 
inevitably require the use of newer equipment and services that have 
additional capabilities.'' This position is consistent with both 
Congressional intent, which ``expects there to be a transition from 3G 
to 4G or even 5G-ready equipment in instances where equipment being 
replaced was initially deployed several years ago,'' and with market 
developments which indicate ``new equipment supporting older, second- 
and third[-]generation wireless technology services is unavailable, and 
even acquiring such equipment and services on the secondary market is 
proving increasingly difficult and in some instances impossible.'' 
Thus, providers may have an opportunity to replace the non-secure 
equipment and services, consistent with the Supply Chain Second R&O, 
with Open RAN equipment and services that could work in a multi-vendor 
network and architecture. Given the potential advantages of Open RAN 
technology and virtualized components in a multi-vendor network 
solution, we seek comment on whether we should take additional steps to 
support this deployment.
    Section 4(d)(1) of the Secure Networks Act directs the Commission 
to

[[Page 16357]]

create a list of suggested replacements (Replacement List) for the 
equipment and services being removed, replaced, and destroyed. The 
Replacement List must include ``both physical and virtual 
communications equipment, applications and management software, and 
services or categories of replacements of both physical and virtual 
communications equipment, application and management software and 
services.'' Importantly, this list must be ``technology neutral.'' In 
the Secure Networks Act, Congress explicitly supported the potential 
inclusion of services such as Open RAN and virtualized network 
equipment on the Replacement List ``to the extent that the Commission 
determines that communications services can serve as an adequate 
substitute for the installation of communications equipment.'' The 
Commission made such a finding in the Supply Chain Second R&O. Thus, 
Open RAN and other services are eligible to be included on the 
Replacement List and the Commission encouraged ``providers 
participating in the Reimbursement Program to consider this promising 
technology'' along with other technologies as they make their 
procurement decisions.
    While the Replacement List is only a ``suggested'' list for the 
types of equipment and services providers may use to secure their 
networks, we believe including Open RAN and other virtualized equipment 
and services could help promote Open RAN development and deployment. 
Are there additional actions the Commission could take to encourage 
deployment and development of Open RAN through the Replacement List? If 
so, what precise actions should the Commission take? What would be the 
likely outcome? How can the Commission support and encourage the 
deployment and development of Open RAN through the Replacement List 
while also complying with the obligation in the Secure Networks Act 
that the Replacement List be technology neutral? Specifically, we seek 
comment on whether it is possible to comply with the requirement that 
the Replacement List be technologically neutral, while also supporting 
the growth and development of new technologies. In the event the 
Commission took additional steps to encourage the deployment and 
development of Open RAN through the Replacement List, what are the 
potential impacts to the Reimbursement Program? How would these steps 
impact the deployment and development of Open RAN?
    The Supply Chain Second R&O allowed providers of advanced 
communications service to begin removing non-secure equipment now while 
being reimbursed once the Reimbursement Program is ready to accept 
applications. We seek comment on whether providers of advanced 
communications services, especially small providers, are adopting Open 
RAN or virtualized solutions as they replace covered equipment in their 
networks. We also seek comment on whether providers that have not begun 
the remove and replace process are considering or deploying equipment 
that could support or be upgraded to support Open RAN or virtualized 
equipment in the future? We seek comment on what steps the Commission 
could take to encourage providers to deploy Open RAN technology. If 
providers are not considering Open RAN, or are hesitant to deploy Open 
RAN and virtualized technology, we seek comment on why and on what 
steps the Commission could and should take to encourage providers of 
advanced communications service, especially small providers, to 
consider or select Open RAN as part of the technological offerings 
available for replacement going forward. The Secure Networks Act 
imposes short deadlines to make certain the remove and replace process 
is completed expeditiously. However, the Secure Networks Act also 
allows for an individual extension of a provider's deadline in limited 
circumstances. Could the Commission grant an extension for providers 
seeking to deploy Open RAN or virtualized network equipment and 
services? Would such an extension incentivize providers to deploy Open 
RAN? We seek comment on whether granting extensions in this manner 
would be consistent with the Secure Networks Act. We also seek comment 
on whether the Reimbursement Program affords us any other opportunities 
to encourage the deployment or development of Open RAN technology 
beyond the Replacement List. The Secure Networks Act does not expressly 
prohibit the Commission from encouraging providers who choose to 
replace the covered equipment and services in their networks with any 
particular type of replacement equipment. The technological neutrality 
obligation is expressly limited to the items included in the 
Replacement List. Can the Commission offer any additional incentives to 
Reimbursement Program participants who choose to replace their covered 
equipment or services with Open RAN technology? If so, what types of 
incentives would most benefit such providers? Is the Open RAN 
technology sufficiently developed where providers of advanced 
communications services can purchase this equipment or services on the 
open market? Does the cost to providers make this equipment or these 
services competitive with other types of equipment or services? We 
expect that providers may incur increased upfront costs for this 
equipment. Would any increased upfront purchase costs be offset by 
reduced costs elsewhere, such as reduced maintenance costs needed to 
support a virtualized network? Are there other costs that could be 
covered by the Reimbursement Program? Can the Reimbursement Program 
cover the expenses for system integrators to configure the network 
infrastructure for many carriers? What other expenses will providers 
deploying Open RAN encounter? We also seek comment on whether this 
technology simply would replace the non-secure equipment and services 
being removed from communications networks, or whether it would require 
different infrastructure that would further burden providers or the 
Reimbursement Program.
    Finally, we seek comment on whether other Universal Service Fund 
support can be used to incentivize the development and deployment of 
Open RAN or virtualized systems. One of the Commission's central 
missions is to make ``available . . . to all the people of the United 
States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and 
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable 
charges.'' As the Commission has observed, with the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress ``directed the Commission and 
states to take steps necessary to establish support mechanisms to 
ensure delivery of affordable telecommunications services to all 
Americans, including low-income consumers, eligible schools and 
libraries, and rural health care providers.'' Specifically, Congress 
set forth certain specific principles for universal service 
advancement. The Commission has followed these principles in 
establishing and occasionally reforming its Universal Service policies, 
including efforts to ``ensure[ ] that all consumers . . . benefit from 
the historic transitions that are transforming our nation's 
communications services.'' How would supporting Open RAN further the 
section 254(b) principles, upon which the Commission must base its 
universal service policies? For example, would Open RAN technologies 
increase the

[[Page 16358]]

economic incentives for carriers to deploy 5G services in underserved 
communities, such as rural areas and low-income neighborhoods?
    Operational/Service Rules. We note that the Commission has 
traditionally adopted a policy of technology neutrality and we seek 
comment on whether changes are necessary to ensure our rules remain 
technologically and competitively neutral as Open RAN technologies are 
integrated into wireless networks. Commenters should identify whether 
any of our existing rules unfairly advantage or disadvantage one RAN 
technology over another. For example, do our rules favor or 
disadvantage either a single vendor or multi-vendor approach? We ask 
commenters to identify these rules and suggest changes that would 
address these concerns. What changes are necessary to ensure our rules 
remain technologically neutral?
    A Commission licensee is responsible for ensuring that its network 
complies with the Communications Act and Commission rules. Would a 
licensee that chooses to incorporate Open RAN technology, which is 
comprised of multiple components supplied by multiple vendors, into its 
network face different challenges than a licensee that has multiple 
vendors for non-RAN components or different RAN vendors today? We seek 
comment on ways to ensure that licensees maintain responsibility for 
each element of their network in accordance with the Communications Act 
and Commission rules. Does Open RAN present unique challenges in this 
regard? For example, does Open RAN present any unique challenges in 
identifying transmission sources (and their operators) compared to 
traditional RAN? If so, how should we account for those challenges in 
the service rules for each band?
    We also seek comment on how testing of Open RAN equipment for 
compliance with the Commission's technical rules could be accomplished 
as part of the equipment certification process. Are the Commission's 
existing equipment authorization rules that require manufacturers to 
test whether their products contribute to harmful interference 
sufficient in the context of Open RAN systems comprised of components 
from multiple vendors? If not, how should testing responsibilities be 
allocated between manufacturers and operators to ensure that specific 
combinations of equipment do not cause harmful interference to other 
spectrum users? Should the Commission or other Federal agencies have a 
role in evaluating, auditing, or ensuring that vendors purporting to 
offer Open RAN systems do actually provide an open and interoperable 
solution? Commenters should identify other challenges that entities 
deploying Open RAN technologies may face in complying with existing 
operational and service rules.
    Commission Outreach and Information Gathering. As discussed, the 
Commission has previously promoted industry and public involvement in 
Open RAN discussions. The Commission's Technological Advisory Committee 
provides technical advice to the Commission, and one of its four 
working groups recently studied virtualized radio access networks as 
well as 5G technology and the Internet of Things applications. We seek 
comment on the recommendations of this working group. We seek further 
comment on how best to harness the work of the TAC or other groups that 
the Commission could potentially establish, in order to engage 
government, industry, and academia stakeholders in developing and 
deploying Open RAN solutions.
    As discussed above, CSRIC has previously examined security issues 
in 5G networks. To what extent should potential future iterations of 
CSRIC be used to promote Open RAN technology without endorsing a 
particular technology or company? What other roles might CSRIC serve to 
foster Open RAN development and security?
    Relationship to Other Federal Agencies. The National Science 
Foundation has funded fundamental research on open architectures for 
many years. Its most recent program, Platforms for Advanced Wireless 
Research (PAWR), is a public-private partnership that seeks to develop 
experimental testbeds for innovative research into the next generation 
of wireless systems. One such testbed is the Platform for Open Wireless 
Data-driven Experimental Research (POWDER), a facility for Open RAN 
experimentation, by both academia and industry, in a city-scale 
``living laboratory'' run by the University of Utah in partnership with 
Salt Lake City and the Utah Education and Telehealth Network. POWDER 
will deploy and test both off-the-shelf equipment and radio hardware 
and software being developed by RENEW (Reconfigurable Eco-system for 
Next Generation End-to-end Wireless), a partnership of Rice University, 
University of Michigan, and Texas Southern University focused on 
developing a fully programmable and observable wireless radio network. 
Likewise, the Cloud Enhanced Open Software-Defined Mobile Wireless 
Testbed in New York City provides city-scale wireless experimentation 
for ultra-high bandwidth and low latency technologies and applications.
    The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recently 
started the Open, Programmable, Secure 5G (OPS-5G) program to address 
security challenges that will confront future wireless networks. OPS-5G 
aims to reduce reliance on potentially untrusted providers of 
technology by developing a secure-by-design stack for mobile, wireless 
networks using open-source software and interoperable, standard-
compliant hardware and software components. NTIA recently announced a 
5G Challenge Notice of Inquiry in collaboration with the Department of 
Defense (DoD) 5G initiative, seeking feedback on the creation of a 5G 
Challenge that will spur stakeholders into accelerating deployment of 
Open RAN architectures in the recently announced DoD 5G testbeds. The 
Notice of Inquiry is structured around three main categories of 
questions: (i) Challenge structure and goals, (ii) incentives and 
scope, and (iii) timeframe and infrastructure support.
    The DoD has awarded $600M in the first phase of funding (called 
Tranche 1) to 15 prime contractors to evaluate 5G technologies in five 
military installations across the United States. Each will investigate 
a specific application such as AR/VR based training, ``smart 
warehousing'' capability, and spectrum sharing between radar and 
cellular services. In addition, seven sites have been chosen for 
Tranche 2. The solicitation period for white papers for four of the 
sites in Tranche 2 closed on December 15, 2020, and the process of 
evaluating these has begun. Request for Proposals for all seven sites 
in Tranche 2 are expected in early 2021.
    Is there a role for the FCC in helping to advance the objectives of 
these various federal efforts to promote and streamline Open RAN 
development and deployment? How can the Commission ensure that it is 
not duplicating efforts of other federal agencies or contribute to 
these ongoing initiatives? Should the FCC help to facilitate industry 
engagement in these processes to ensure that the interests of non-
federal operators and equipment manufacturers are adequately 
represented?
    Role in International Open RAN Efforts. The Commission's regulatory 
counterparts around the world are exploring Open RAN within the context 
of their respective domestic regulatory policy. The United Kingdom, for 
example, is creating a SmartRAN Open Network Interoperability Centre as 
a part of its national 5G Diversification

[[Page 16359]]

Strategy. The center is a joint program between the UK regulator Ofcom 
and UK innovation agency Digital Catapult, and it will serve as a 
testbed for Open RAN solutions. Likewise, in Japan, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications has outlined plans to pursue 
international collaboration in order to promote the implementation and 
standardization of open architecture and network virtualization. 
Germany has begun to consider providing funding for Open RAN research 
and development, as the United States has done.
    International fora have also increasingly begun to engage in 
dialogue on Open RAN. For instance, in February 2021, the United States 
co-sponsored a workshop on open architectures and network 
virtualization within the Telecommunications & Information Working 
Group of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). The 
European Commission has also launched a study into the status of 5G 
supply markets and Open RAN and has held workshops with stakeholders to 
gather information.
    These initiatives lead us to ask broadly whether the experiences of 
other telecommunications regulators provide any best practices or 
lessons learned that the Commission should consider, especially keeping 
in mind the international nature of current and planned Open RAN 
deployments. Are there lessons we should learn from our counterparts 
abroad about how an independent regulator can best support national 
research and development efforts? With which specific organizations or 
events should the Commission consider participating in order to have 
productive international discussions on Open RAN? As one of many U.S. 
agencies working alongside the Department of State to engage with 
organizations like APEC and the OECD, what specific role can the 
Commission play to ensure any OECD principles or best practices 
identified by those organizations serve the public interest? Is there 
information that we should be gathering from, or sharing with, 
international stakeholders on Open RAN, and, if so, what is the most 
appropriate avenue by which we should gather or share this information? 
Finally, are there any steps the Commission can or should take to 
support industry-led efforts internationally and help avoid 
fragmentation or duplication? How can the Commission encourage U.S. 
stakeholders to participate in these fora?
    Role in Advancing Open-Architecture Network Solutions Generally. 
While this Notice of Inquiry primarily examines the potential of open 
and virtualized radio access networks in promoting U.S. network 
security and 5G leadership, we also seek comment on whether there is a 
similar need for or interest in advancing open-architecture network 
solutions generally (e.g., open and disaggregated optical and packet 
transport and open cloud-native core). How do RAN and non-RAN elements 
of the network differ in terms of their need for or feasibility of 
disaggregated, interoperable solutions? Are the issues and/or market 
conditions that prompted development of Open RAN solutions similarly 
prevalent in the market for other, non-RAN elements of the system? What 
efforts, if any, have been made to develop and deploy open-architecture 
network solutions for other elements of the system? What are the costs, 
benefits, and challenges of open-architecture network solutions 
generally (i.e., for non-RAN elements of the system). For example, open 
and disaggregated Transport requires more nodes for the orchestration 
layers to manage. Accordingly, we seek comment on challenges associated 
with open and disaggregated Transport specifically and other elements 
more generally. What, if any, actions can or should be taken by the 
Commission to advance open network solutions for non-RAN elements of 
the network?
    Legal Issues. The Commission has broad authority under Title III of 
the Act to manage the use of radio spectrum, to prescribe the nature of 
wireless services to be rendered, and to modify existing licenses when 
doing so would promote the public interest. We seek comment on what 
additional legal obligations may incentivize and support the 
development and deployment of more secure Open RAN. For example, in 
adopting the Commission's prohibition on the use of USF funds to 
purchase, operate, or maintain covered communications equipment and 
services, the Commission found that the rule implicated section 105 of 
CALEA. Section 105 requires every telecommunications provider to 
``ensure that any interception of communications or access to call-
identifying information effected within its switching premises can be 
activated only in accordance with a court order or other lawful 
authorization and with the affirmative intervention of an individual 
officer of employee of the carrier.'' The Commission found that, 
therefore, telecommunications carriers ``appear to have a duty'' to 
avoid the risk that an untrusted supplier could illegally intercept or 
provide remote unauthorized network access by the insertion of 
malicious hardware or software implants. We seek comment on the impact 
of virtualized and interoperable network components on a carrier's 
ability to comply with this statutory obligation. Would disaggregation 
of the RAN functionality and an enhanced ability to use network 
elements from different vendors help network operators ensure that 
carriers can prevent access to their networks by untrusted entities?
    In addition to the statutory obligation, the Commission is 
authorized to ``prescribe such rules as are necessary to implement the 
requirements of'' CALEA and to require carriers to establish policies 
to prevent unauthorized surveillance. When adopting section 54.9, the 
Commission found that that rule directly implements section 105 of 
CALEA by reducing the likelihood that ETCs use USF support to 
facilitate unauthorized surveillance. Can the Commission rely upon 
CALEA obligations and its associated rulemaking authority to encourage 
deployment of secure equipment, including Open RAN? We also seek 
comment on whether CALEA provides authority to support the development 
and deployment of Open RAN. For example, section 106 directs 
manufacturers to make available to carriers, ``on a reasonable and 
timely basis and at a reasonable charge, . . . such features or 
modifications as are necessary to permit such carriers to comply with 
the capability requirements'' of section 103; those capability 
requirements include the ability to facilitate authorized surveillance 
``in a manner that protects . . . the privacy and security of 
communications and call-identifying information not authorized to be 
intercepted'' and ``information regarding the government's interception 
of communications and access to call-identifying information.''
    Congress has directed the Commission to ``encourage the deployment 
on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications 
capability to all Americans . . . by utilizing, in a manner consistent 
with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap 
regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition 
in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods 
that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.'' What sources of 
authority could the Commission consider invoking to encourage or 
incentivize development and deployment of Open RAN and virtualized 
networks? In the Supply Chain Second Report and Order, the

[[Page 16360]]

Commission relied upon sections 201(b) and 254, among other sections, 
for authority to require USF recipients to remove and replace covered 
equipment. Do those sections provide the Commission with authority to 
encourage and incentivize development and deployment of Open RAN and 
virtualized networks? If so, should the Commission rely upon these 
sections to do so? Commenters should explain in detail why or why not 
they believe we have authority to act, if the Commission chooses to do 
so.

E. Costs and Benefits of Open RAN Deployment

    We seek comment on the likely costs and benefits of Open RAN 
deployment for mobile network operators. The Office of Economics and 
Analytics plans to undertake an economic study that would evaluate the 
likely benefits and costs of Open RAN deployment. In particular, we ask 
that commenters provide information and data that quantify both the 
potential costs and benefits of Open RAN deployment, and we seek 
comment on the issues that should be studied and likely promising 
methodologies to carry out such studies. For example, to what extent 
will mobile network operators benefit from open interfaces and 
standards? How would the Commission's actions impact the development of 
Open RAN and related technologies in comparison to what industry 
participants currently expect? Specifically, are there any obstacles 
preventing the industry from optimally investing in the Open RAN 
technologies that could be eliminated by Commission actions? Are there 
any spillover social benefits arising from the Open RAN deployment not 
internalized by the wireless network industry in its investment 
decisions? For example, does one firm's investment in the Open RAN 
system result in any spillover benefits to other Open RAN component 
vendors network operators, consumers, or public safety without such 
benefiting entities paying for the cost of development either directly 
or indirectly? We ask commenters to quantify the potential spillover 
social benefits that may be lost if the Open RAN development and 
deployment decisions are made by the wireless network firms, without 
Commission action.
    We seek comment on the relative and absolute costs of Open RAN 
deployment and interoperability. How do the costs of Open RAN equipment 
compare with the costs of equipment from proprietary equipment 
manufacturers? How do the operating expenses of an Open RAN network 
compare to those of a proprietary network? Are there any costs to using 
multiple equipment vendors in constructing networks, such as the costs 
of network design and integration? If so, we ask commenters to provide 
information on the magnitude of these costs, and the underlying 
methodology for quantifying these costs. We also seek information on 
how interoperability between the various equipment vendors can be 
ensured. In particular, does it require specific integration platforms 
or institutions to monitor and coordinate the development and 
maintenance of standards and integration of the Open RAN technologies? 
If such institutions exist, are there Commission rules that would 
affect their operations? If such institutions do not exist, what are 
the associated costs to set up and maintain such platforms and 
institutions? Further, we seek information on Open RAN performance 
compared to existing networks or potential alternative technologies, 
and how the cost of deployment and relative benefits of performance 
differ. Do such differences depend on market characteristics such as 
whether areas are sparsely or densely populated or whether expanding 
geographic coverage or expanding capacity in a fixed geography is the 
more important consideration? To the extent that performance differs, 
we ask commenters to quantify the effect of those performance 
differences on consumers.
    In addition, we seek comment on the likely costs and benefits of 
Open RAN for the broader economy. Could adopting Open RAN reduce the 
probability of security breaches compared with existing and alternative 
technologies? What are the economic costs of these breaches, including 
costs associated with breach prevention, that may vary across Open RAN 
and other technologies? How much additional consumer value and 
utilization of services would there be once networks implement Open 
RAN? How much would consumers value reduction in security risk from 
Open RAN deployment? How much would consumers value improvement in 
speed, additional capacity, or improvements in use cases such as drone 
operation? We seek comment on the costs of addressing security concerns 
raised elsewhere in this document.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-06430 Filed 3-26-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P