Special Conditions: Mitsubishi Aircraft Corporation Model MRJ-200 Airplane; Use of Automatic Power Reserve for Go-Around Performance Credit, 15780-15784 [2021-06027]
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 56 / Thursday, March 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
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(i) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies)
to the extent that the system is exempt from
other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
*
*
*
*
*
James Holzer,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2021–05941 Filed 3–24–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–10–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. FAA–2020–0721; Special
Conditions No. 25–785–SC]
Special Conditions: Mitsubishi Aircraft
Corporation Model MRJ–200 Airplane;
Use of Automatic Power Reserve for
Go-Around Performance Credit
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
for comments.
AGENCY:
These special conditions are
issued for the Mitsubishi Aircraft
Corporation (MITAC) Model MRJ–200
airplane. This airplane will have a novel
or unusual design feature when
compared to the state of technology
envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport-category
airplanes. This design feature is an
Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control
System (ATTCS), referred to as an
Automatic Power Reserve (APR), to set
the performance level for approachclimb operation after an engine failure.
The applicable airworthiness
regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for this
design feature. These special conditions
contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers
necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the
existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: This action is effective on
MITAC on March 25, 2021. Send
comments on or before May 10, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
by Docket No. FAA–2020–0721 using
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov/ and follow
the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
• Mail: Send comments to Docket
Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
20590–0001.
SUMMARY:
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• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
comments to Docket Operations in
Room W12–140 of the West Building
Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Fax: Fax comments to Docket
Operations at 202–493–2251.
• Privacy: Except for Confidential
Business Information (CBI) as described
in the following paragraph, and other
information as described in 14 CFR
11.35, the FAA will post all comments
received without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov/, including any
personal information you provide. The
FAA will also post a report
summarizing each substantive verbal
contact received about this proposal.
• Confidential Business Information:
Confidential Business Information (CBI)
is commercial or financial information
that is both customarily and actually
treated as private by its owner. Under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
(5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from
public disclosure. If your comments
responsive to this Notice contain
commercial or financial information
that is customarily treated as private,
that you actually treat as private, and
that is relevant or responsive to this
Notice, it is important that you clearly
designate the submitted comments as
CBI. Please mark each page of your
submission containing CBI as
‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA will treat such
marked submissions as confidential
under the FOIA, and the indicated
comments will not be placed in the
public docket of this Notice. Send
submissions containing CBI to the
person indicated in the Contact section
below. Comments the FAA receives,
which are not specifically designated as
CBI, will be placed in the public docket
for this rulemaking.
• Docket: Background documents or
comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov/ at any time.
Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to Docket
Operations in Room W12–140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe
Jacobsen, Performance and Environment
Section, AIR–625, Technical Innovation
Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation
Division, Aircraft Certification Service,
Federal Aviation Administration, 2200
South 216th Street, Des Moines,
Washington 98198; telephone and fax
206–231–3158; email joe.jacobsen@
faa.gov.
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 56 / Thursday, March 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
The
substance of these special conditions
has been published in the Federal
Register for public comment in several
prior instances with no substantive
comments received. Therefore, the FAA
has determined that prior public notice
and comment are unnecessary, and
finds that, for the same reason, good
cause exists for adopting these special
conditions upon publication in the
Federal Register.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested people to
take part in this rulemaking by sending
written comments, data, or views. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the special
conditions, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data.
The FAA will consider all comments
received by the closing date for
comments. The FAA may change these
special conditions based on the
comments received.
Background
On March 3, 2015, MITAC applied for
a type certificate for their new Model
MRJ–200 airplane. This airplane is a
twin-engine, transport-category airplane
with seating for 92 passengers and a
maximum takeoff weight of 98,767
pounds.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17,
the applicant must show that the
airplane meets the applicable provisions
of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by
amendments 25–1 through 25–141.
If the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness regulations
(e.g., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for the MITAC Model MRJ–200 airplane
because of a novel or unusual design
feature, special conditions are
prescribed under the provisions of
§ 21.16.
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
are issued. Should the type certificate
for that model be amended later to
include any other model that
incorporates the same novel or unusual
design feature, these special conditions
would also apply to the other model
under § 21.101.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the MITAC Model MRJ–200
airplane must comply with the fuel-vent
and exhaust-emission requirements of
14 CFR part 34, and the noise-
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certification requirements of 14 CFR
part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance
with § 11.38, and they become part of
the type certification basis under
§ 21.17(a)(2).
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The MITAC Model MRJ–200 airplane
will incorporate the following novel or
unusual design feature:
An Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control
System, referred to as an Automatic
Power Reserve, to set the performance
level for approach-climb operation after
an engine failure.
Discussion
MITAC included an APR system (an
ATTCS) in the Model MRJ–200 airplane
and proposed using the APR function
during go-around. They also requested
approach-climb performance credit for
the use of additional thrust set by the
APR system. The MITAC Model MRJ–
200 powerplant control system
comprises a Full Authority Digital
Engine Control (FADEC) for the engine.
The engine FADEC system utilizes the
APR function during the takeoff and goaround phases of the flight when
additional thrust is needed from an
operating engine following a single
engine failure. The APR system is
available at all times, without any
additional action from the pilot. It
allows the pilot to use the same powersetting procedure during a go-around
regardless of whether or not an engine
fails. Because the APR system is always
armed, it will function automatically
following an engine failure, and
advance the remaining engine to a
higher thrust level.
The part 25 standards for ATTCS,
contained in § 25.904, and appendix I to
part 25, specifically restrict performance
credit for ATTCS to takeoff. Expanding
the standards to include other phases of
flight, including go-around, was
considered at the time the standards
were issued, but flightcrew workload
issues precluded further consideration.
As the preamble of amendment 25–62
states:
In regard to ATTCS credit for
approach-climb and go-around
maneuvers, current regulations preclude
a higher power for the approach climb
(§ 25.121(d)) than for the landing climb
(§ 25.119). The workload required for
the flightcrew to monitor and select
from multiple in-flight power settings in
the event of an engine failure during a
critical point in the approach, landing,
or go-around operations is excessive.
Therefore, the amendment should not
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15781
include the use of ATTCS for anything
except the takeoff phase.
Because the airworthiness regulations
do not contain appropriate safety
standards to allow approach-climb
performance credit for ATTCS, special
conditions are required to ensure a level
of safety equivalent to that established
in the regulations. The definition of a
critical time interval for the approachclimb case, during which time it must
be extremely improbable to violate a
flight path based on the § 25.121(d)
gradient requirement, is of primary
importance. In the event of a
simultaneous failure of both an engine
and the APR function, falling below the
minimum flight path defined by the 2.5degree approach, decision height, and
climb gradient required by § 25.121(d)
must be shown to be an extremely
improbable event during this critical
time interval. The § 25.121(d) gradient
requirement implies a minimum oneengine-inoperative flight path capability
with the airplane in the approach
configuration. The engine may have
been inoperative before initiating the goaround, or it may become inoperative
during the go-around. The definition of
the critical time interval must consider
both possibilities.
These special conditions contain the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions are applicable to the MITAC
Model MRJ–200 airplane. Should
MITAC apply at a later date for a change
to the type certificate to include another
model incorporating the same novel or
unusual design feature, these special
conditions would apply to that model as
well.
Conclusion
This action affects only a certain
novel or unusual design feature on one
model of airplanes. It is not a rule of
general applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
Authority Citation
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113,
44701, 44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority delegated to me by the
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 56 / Thursday, March 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
Administrator, the following special
conditions are issued as part of the type
certification basis for MITAC Model
MRJ–200 airplanes.
1. The MITAC Model MRJ–200
airplane must comply with the
requirements of 14 CFR 25.904, and
appendix I, and the following
requirements for the go-around phase of
flight:
2. Definitions
a. Takeoff/go-around (TOGA):
Throttle lever in takeoff or go-around
position.
b. Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control
System: The ATTCS in MITAC Model
MRJ–200 airplanes is defined as the
entire automatic system available during
takeoff and in go-around mode,
including all devices, both mechanical
and electrical, that sense engine failure,
transmit signals, actuate fuel controls or
power levers (or increase engine power
by other means on operating engines to
achieve scheduled thrust or power
increase), and furnish cockpit
information on system operation.
c. Critical time interval:
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(1) When conducting an approach for
landing using ATTCS, the critical time
interval is defined as follows:
(i) The critical time interval begins at
a point on a 2.5-degree approach glide
path from which, assuming a
simultaneous engine and ATTCS
failure, the resulting approach-climb
flight path intersects a flight path
originating at a later point on the same
approach path that corresponds to the
part 25 one-engine-inoperative
approach-climb gradient. The period of
time from the point of simultaneous
engine and ATTCS failure, to the
intersection of these flight paths, must
be no shorter than the time interval used
in evaluating the critical time interval
for takeoff, beginning from the point of
simultaneous engine and ATTCS failure
and ending upon reaching a height of
400 feet.
(ii) The critical time interval ends at
the point on a minimum performance,
all-engines-operating go-around flight
path from which, assuming a
simultaneous engine and ATTCS
failure, the resulting minimum
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approach-climb flight path intersects a
flight path corresponding to the part 25
minimum one-engine-inoperative
approach-climb gradient. The allengines-operating go-around flight path,
and the part 25 one-engine-inoperative
approach-climb gradient flight path,
originate from a common point on a 2.5degree approach path. The period of
time from the point of simultaneous
engine and ATTCS failure, to the
intersection of these flight paths, must
be no shorter than the time interval used
in evaluating the critical time interval
for the takeoff, beginning from the point
of simultaneous engine and ATTCS
failure and ending upon reaching a
height of 400 feet.
(2) The critical time interval must be
determined at the altitude resulting in
the longest critical time interval for
which one-engine-inoperative approachclimb performance data are presented in
the airplane flight manual.
(3) The critical time interval is
illustrated in Figure 1:
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 56 / Thursday, March 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
15783
,.._____ •-------1~
Engine failed, ATTCS operating
25.121 (d) Gradient Requirement
" The engine and ATTCS failed time Interval muat be no lhorter than the time
lnteival from the point or simultaneous engine and ATTCS falure to a height or
400 feet used to comply with 125.2(b) fOr A TICS use during takeoff.
Figure 1: Go-around ATTCS
r 1
125,Z(b) Tim•
Interval
FG
lleliht
above
nmway
.urla«i
(ft.)
.• ..•
.
•
•
--.;1secr"'I:•. .
.:• ..•
Critical time
bltenal
BILLING CODE 4910–13–C
The all-engines-operating go-around
flight path, and the part 25 one-engineinoperative approach-climb gradient
flight path (engine failed, ATTCS
operating path in Figure 1), originate
from a common point, point C, on a 2.5-
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degree approach path. The period of
time, ‘‘time interval DE,’’ from the point
of simultaneous engine and ATTCS
failure, point D, to the intersection of
these flight paths, point E, must be no
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shorter than the corresponding time in
Figure 2, above.
d. The ‘‘critical time interval AD’’ is
illustrated in Figure 1.
3. Performance and system reliability
requirements: The applicant must
comply with the performance and
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ER25MR21.002</GPH>
Figure 2: Appendix I25.2(b), "Critical Time Interval" (ATTCS takeoff)
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 56 / Thursday, March 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
ATTCS reliability requirements as
follows:
a. An ATTCS failure or a combination
of failures in the ATTCS during the
critical time interval (Figure 1):
(1) Must not prevent the insertion of
the maximum approved go-around
thrust or power, or must be shown to be
a remote event.
(2) Must not result in a significant loss
or reduction in thrust or power, or must
be shown to be an extremely improbable
event.
b. The concurrent existence of an
ATTCS failure and an engine failure
during the critical time interval must be
shown to be extremely improbable.
c. All applicable performance
requirements of part 25 must be met
with an engine failure occurring at the
most critical point during go-around
with the ATTCS functioning.
d. The probability analysis must
include consideration of ATTCS failure
occurring after the time at which the
flightcrew last verifies that the ATTCS
is in a condition to operate until the
beginning of the critical time interval.
e. The propulsive thrust obtained
from the operating engine, after failure
of the critical engine during a go-around
used to show compliance with the oneengine-inoperative climb requirements
of § 25.121(d), may not be greater than
the lesser of:
(1) The actual propulsive thrust
resulting from the initial setting of
power or thrust controls with the
ATTCS functioning, or
(2) 111 percent of the propulsive
thrust resulting from the initial setting
of power or thrust controls with the
ATTCS failing to reset thrust or power,
and without any action by the
flightcrew to reset thrust or power.
4. Thrust setting
a. The initial go-around thrust setting
on each engine at the beginning of the
go-around phase may not be less than
any of the following:
(1) That required to permit normal
operation of all safety-related systems
and equipment dependent upon engine
thrust or power lever position; or
(2) That are shown to be free of
hazardous engine-response
characteristics, and not to result in any
unsafe airplane operating or handling
characteristics when thrust or power is
advanced from the initial go-around
position to the maximum approved
power setting.
b. For approval to use an ATTCS for
go-arounds, the thrust-setting procedure
must be the same for go-arounds
initiated with all engines operating as
for go-around initiated with one engine
inoperative.
5. Powerplant controls
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a. In addition to the requirements of
§ 25.1141, no single failure or
malfunction, or probable combination
thereof, of the ATTCS, including
associated systems, may cause the
failure of any powerplant function
necessary for safety.
b. The ATTCS must be designed to:
(1) Apply thrust or power to the
operating engine(s), following any oneengine failure during a go-around, to
achieve the maximum approved goaround thrust without exceeding the
engine operating limits;
(2) Permit manual decrease or
increase in thrust or power up to the
maximum go-around thrust approved
for the airplane, under the existing
conditions, through the use of the power
lever. For airplanes equipped with
limiters that automatically prevent the
engine operating limits from being
exceeded under existing ambient
conditions, other means may be used to
increase the thrust in the event of an
ATTCS failure, provided that the means:
(i) Is located on or forward of the
power levers;
(ii) Is easily identified and operated
under all operating conditions by a
single action of either pilot with the
hand that is normally used to actuate
the power levers; and
(iii) Meets the requirements of
§ 25.777(a), (b), and (c).
(3) Provide a means to verify to the
flightcrew, before beginning an
approach for landing, that the ATTCS is
in a condition to operate (unless it can
be demonstrated that an ATTCS failure,
combined with an engine failure during
an entire flight, is extremely
improbable).
6. Powerplant instruments: In
addition to the requirements of
§ 25.1305:
a. A means must be provided to
indicate when the ATTCS is in the
armed or ready condition; and
b. If the inherent flight characteristics
of the airplane do not provide adequate
warning that an engine has failed, a
warning system that is independent of
the ATTCS must be provided to give the
pilot a clear warning of any engine
failure during a go-around.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on March
17, 2021.
Patrick R. Mullen,
Manager, Technical Innovation Policy
Branch, Policy and Innovation Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
You may examine the AD docket at
https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA–2020–0710; or in person at Docket
Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this
final rule, any comments received, and
[FR Doc. 2021–06027 Filed 3–24–21; 8:45 am]
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Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2020–0710; Project
Identifier 2019–CE–037–AD; Amendment
39–21457; AD 2021–05–14]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Air Tractor,
Inc., Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The FAA is adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all Air
Tractor, Inc., (Air Tractor) Models AT–
250, AT–300, AT–301, AT–302, AT–
400, AT–400A, AT–401, AT–401A, AT–
401B, AT–402, AT–402A, AT–402B,
AT–501, AT–502, AT–502A, AT–502B,
AT–503, AT–503A, AT–504, AT–602,
AT–802, and AT–802A airplanes. This
AD was prompted by reports of cracks
in the flap torque tube actuator
attachment brackets that may cause the
flap actuator to detach from the flap
torque tube. This AD requires repetitive
visual and dye penetrant inspections of
the flap actuator attachment bracket
welds for cracks and replacement if
cracks are identified. The FAA is
issuing this AD to address the unsafe
condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective April 29,
2021.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain publication listed in this AD
as of April 29, 2021.
ADDRESSES: For service information
identified in this final rule, contact Air
Tractor, P.O. Box 485, Olney, TX 76374:
phone: (940) 564–5616: email: info@
airtractor.com: website: https://
airtractor.com/. You may view this
service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust,
Kansas City, MO 64106. For information
on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 816–329–4148. It is also
available at https://www.regulations.gov
by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA–2020–0710.
SUMMARY:
Examining the AD Docket
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 56 (Thursday, March 25, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 15780-15784]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-06027]
=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. FAA-2020-0721; Special Conditions No. 25-785-SC]
Special Conditions: Mitsubishi Aircraft Corporation Model MRJ-200
Airplane; Use of Automatic Power Reserve for Go-Around Performance
Credit
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Mitsubishi
Aircraft Corporation (MITAC) Model MRJ-200 airplane. This airplane will
have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of
technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport-
category airplanes. This design feature is an Automatic Takeoff Thrust
Control System (ATTCS), referred to as an Automatic Power Reserve
(APR), to set the performance level for approach-climb operation after
an engine failure. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not
contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design
feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a
level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
DATES: This action is effective on MITAC on March 25, 2021. Send
comments on or before May 10, 2021.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by Docket No. FAA-2020-0721 using
any of the following methods:
Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov/ and follow the online instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: Except for Confidential Business Information
(CBI) as described in the following paragraph, and other information as
described in 14 CFR 11.35, the FAA will post all comments received
without change, to https://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal
information you provide. The FAA will also post a report summarizing
each substantive verbal contact received about this proposal.
Confidential Business Information: Confidential Business
Information (CBI) is commercial or financial information that is both
customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from
public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this Notice contain
commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as
private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or
responsive to this Notice, it is important that you clearly designate
the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission
containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked
submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and the indicated comments
will not be placed in the public docket of this Notice. Send
submissions containing CBI to the person indicated in the Contact
section below. Comments the FAA receives, which are not specifically
designated as CBI, will be placed in the public docket for this
rulemaking.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be
read at https://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online
instructions for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in
Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe Jacobsen, Performance and
Environment Section, AIR-625, Technical Innovation Policy Branch,
Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal
Aviation Administration, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines,
Washington 98198; telephone and fax 206-231-3158; email
[email protected].
[[Page 15781]]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The substance of these special conditions
has been published in the Federal Register for public comment in
several prior instances with no substantive comments received.
Therefore, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment
are unnecessary, and finds that, for the same reason, good cause exists
for adopting these special conditions upon publication in the Federal
Register.
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested people to take part in this rulemaking
by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date for
comments. The FAA may change these special conditions based on the
comments received.
Background
On March 3, 2015, MITAC applied for a type certificate for their
new Model MRJ-200 airplane. This airplane is a twin-engine, transport-
category airplane with seating for 92 passengers and a maximum takeoff
weight of 98,767 pounds.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) 21.17, the applicant must show that the airplane meets the
applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by amendments 25-1
through 25-141.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (e.g., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the MITAC Model MRJ-200 airplane
because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are
prescribed under the provisions of Sec. 21.16.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or
unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to
the other model under Sec. 21.101.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the MITAC Model MRJ-200 airplane must comply with the fuel-
vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the
noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in
accordance with Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type
certification basis under Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The MITAC Model MRJ-200 airplane will incorporate the following
novel or unusual design feature:
An Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System, referred to as an
Automatic Power Reserve, to set the performance level for approach-
climb operation after an engine failure.
Discussion
MITAC included an APR system (an ATTCS) in the Model MRJ-200
airplane and proposed using the APR function during go-around. They
also requested approach-climb performance credit for the use of
additional thrust set by the APR system. The MITAC Model MRJ-200
powerplant control system comprises a Full Authority Digital Engine
Control (FADEC) for the engine. The engine FADEC system utilizes the
APR function during the takeoff and go-around phases of the flight when
additional thrust is needed from an operating engine following a single
engine failure. The APR system is available at all times, without any
additional action from the pilot. It allows the pilot to use the same
power-setting procedure during a go-around regardless of whether or not
an engine fails. Because the APR system is always armed, it will
function automatically following an engine failure, and advance the
remaining engine to a higher thrust level.
The part 25 standards for ATTCS, contained in Sec. 25.904, and
appendix I to part 25, specifically restrict performance credit for
ATTCS to takeoff. Expanding the standards to include other phases of
flight, including go-around, was considered at the time the standards
were issued, but flightcrew workload issues precluded further
consideration. As the preamble of amendment 25-62 states:
In regard to ATTCS credit for approach-climb and go-around
maneuvers, current regulations preclude a higher power for the approach
climb (Sec. 25.121(d)) than for the landing climb (Sec. 25.119). The
workload required for the flightcrew to monitor and select from
multiple in-flight power settings in the event of an engine failure
during a critical point in the approach, landing, or go-around
operations is excessive. Therefore, the amendment should not include
the use of ATTCS for anything except the takeoff phase.
Because the airworthiness regulations do not contain appropriate
safety standards to allow approach-climb performance credit for ATTCS,
special conditions are required to ensure a level of safety equivalent
to that established in the regulations. The definition of a critical
time interval for the approach-climb case, during which time it must be
extremely improbable to violate a flight path based on the Sec.
25.121(d) gradient requirement, is of primary importance. In the event
of a simultaneous failure of both an engine and the APR function,
falling below the minimum flight path defined by the 2.5-degree
approach, decision height, and climb gradient required by Sec.
25.121(d) must be shown to be an extremely improbable event during this
critical time interval. The Sec. 25.121(d) gradient requirement
implies a minimum one-engine-inoperative flight path capability with
the airplane in the approach configuration. The engine may have been
inoperative before initiating the go-around, or it may become
inoperative during the go-around. The definition of the critical time
interval must consider both possibilities.
These special conditions contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness
standards.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
MITAC Model MRJ-200 airplane. Should MITAC apply at a later date for a
change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating
the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions
would apply to that model as well.
Conclusion
This action affects only a certain novel or unusual design feature
on one model of airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Authority Citation
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
[[Page 15782]]
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for MITAC Model MRJ-200 airplanes.
1. The MITAC Model MRJ-200 airplane must comply with the
requirements of 14 CFR 25.904, and appendix I, and the following
requirements for the go-around phase of flight:
2. Definitions
a. Takeoff/go-around (TOGA): Throttle lever in takeoff or go-around
position.
b. Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System: The ATTCS in MITAC
Model MRJ-200 airplanes is defined as the entire automatic system
available during takeoff and in go-around mode, including all devices,
both mechanical and electrical, that sense engine failure, transmit
signals, actuate fuel controls or power levers (or increase engine
power by other means on operating engines to achieve scheduled thrust
or power increase), and furnish cockpit information on system
operation.
c. Critical time interval:
(1) When conducting an approach for landing using ATTCS, the
critical time interval is defined as follows:
(i) The critical time interval begins at a point on a 2.5-degree
approach glide path from which, assuming a simultaneous engine and
ATTCS failure, the resulting approach-climb flight path intersects a
flight path originating at a later point on the same approach path that
corresponds to the part 25 one-engine-inoperative approach-climb
gradient. The period of time from the point of simultaneous engine and
ATTCS failure, to the intersection of these flight paths, must be no
shorter than the time interval used in evaluating the critical time
interval for takeoff, beginning from the point of simultaneous engine
and ATTCS failure and ending upon reaching a height of 400 feet.
(ii) The critical time interval ends at the point on a minimum
performance, all-engines-operating go-around flight path from which,
assuming a simultaneous engine and ATTCS failure, the resulting minimum
approach-climb flight path intersects a flight path corresponding to
the part 25 minimum one-engine-inoperative approach-climb gradient. The
all-engines-operating go-around flight path, and the part 25 one-
engine-inoperative approach-climb gradient flight path, originate from
a common point on a 2.5-degree approach path. The period of time from
the point of simultaneous engine and ATTCS failure, to the intersection
of these flight paths, must be no shorter than the time interval used
in evaluating the critical time interval for the takeoff, beginning
from the point of simultaneous engine and ATTCS failure and ending upon
reaching a height of 400 feet.
(2) The critical time interval must be determined at the altitude
resulting in the longest critical time interval for which one-engine-
inoperative approach-climb performance data are presented in the
airplane flight manual.
(3) The critical time interval is illustrated in Figure 1:
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR25MR21.002
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The all-engines-operating go-around flight path, and the part 25
one-engine-inoperative approach-climb gradient flight path (engine
failed, ATTCS operating path in Figure 1), originate from a common
point, point C, on a 2.5-degree approach path. The period of time,
``time interval DE,'' from the point of simultaneous engine and ATTCS
failure, point D, to the intersection of these flight paths, point E,
must be no shorter than the corresponding time in Figure 2, above.
d. The ``critical time interval AD'' is illustrated in Figure 1.
3. Performance and system reliability requirements: The applicant
must comply with the performance and
[[Page 15784]]
ATTCS reliability requirements as follows:
a. An ATTCS failure or a combination of failures in the ATTCS
during the critical time interval (Figure 1):
(1) Must not prevent the insertion of the maximum approved go-
around thrust or power, or must be shown to be a remote event.
(2) Must not result in a significant loss or reduction in thrust or
power, or must be shown to be an extremely improbable event.
b. The concurrent existence of an ATTCS failure and an engine
failure during the critical time interval must be shown to be extremely
improbable.
c. All applicable performance requirements of part 25 must be met
with an engine failure occurring at the most critical point during go-
around with the ATTCS functioning.
d. The probability analysis must include consideration of ATTCS
failure occurring after the time at which the flightcrew last verifies
that the ATTCS is in a condition to operate until the beginning of the
critical time interval.
e. The propulsive thrust obtained from the operating engine, after
failure of the critical engine during a go-around used to show
compliance with the one-engine-inoperative climb requirements of Sec.
25.121(d), may not be greater than the lesser of:
(1) The actual propulsive thrust resulting from the initial setting
of power or thrust controls with the ATTCS functioning, or
(2) 111 percent of the propulsive thrust resulting from the initial
setting of power or thrust controls with the ATTCS failing to reset
thrust or power, and without any action by the flightcrew to reset
thrust or power.
4. Thrust setting
a. The initial go-around thrust setting on each engine at the
beginning of the go-around phase may not be less than any of the
following:
(1) That required to permit normal operation of all safety-related
systems and equipment dependent upon engine thrust or power lever
position; or
(2) That are shown to be free of hazardous engine-response
characteristics, and not to result in any unsafe airplane operating or
handling characteristics when thrust or power is advanced from the
initial go-around position to the maximum approved power setting.
b. For approval to use an ATTCS for go-arounds, the thrust-setting
procedure must be the same for go-arounds initiated with all engines
operating as for go-around initiated with one engine inoperative.
5. Powerplant controls
a. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 25.1141, no single
failure or malfunction, or probable combination thereof, of the ATTCS,
including associated systems, may cause the failure of any powerplant
function necessary for safety.
b. The ATTCS must be designed to:
(1) Apply thrust or power to the operating engine(s), following any
one-engine failure during a go-around, to achieve the maximum approved
go-around thrust without exceeding the engine operating limits;
(2) Permit manual decrease or increase in thrust or power up to the
maximum go-around thrust approved for the airplane, under the existing
conditions, through the use of the power lever. For airplanes equipped
with limiters that automatically prevent the engine operating limits
from being exceeded under existing ambient conditions, other means may
be used to increase the thrust in the event of an ATTCS failure,
provided that the means:
(i) Is located on or forward of the power levers;
(ii) Is easily identified and operated under all operating
conditions by a single action of either pilot with the hand that is
normally used to actuate the power levers; and
(iii) Meets the requirements of Sec. 25.777(a), (b), and (c).
(3) Provide a means to verify to the flightcrew, before beginning
an approach for landing, that the ATTCS is in a condition to operate
(unless it can be demonstrated that an ATTCS failure, combined with an
engine failure during an entire flight, is extremely improbable).
6. Powerplant instruments: In addition to the requirements of Sec.
25.1305:
a. A means must be provided to indicate when the ATTCS is in the
armed or ready condition; and
b. If the inherent flight characteristics of the airplane do not
provide adequate warning that an engine has failed, a warning system
that is independent of the ATTCS must be provided to give the pilot a
clear warning of any engine failure during a go-around.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on March 17, 2021.
Patrick R. Mullen,
Manager, Technical Innovation Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2021-06027 Filed 3-24-21; 8:45 am]
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