Role of Supervisory Guidance, 9261-9269 [2021-01524]
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 28 / Friday, February 12, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
documents on the same topic and will
generally limit such multiple issuances going
forward.
(vi) The OCC will continue efforts to make
the role of supervisory guidance clear in
communications to examiners and to
supervised financial institutions and
encourage supervised institutions with
questions about this statement or any
applicable supervisory guidance to discuss
the questions with their appropriate agency
contact.
occurrence of paragraph (c)(1)(v) as
paragraph (c)(1)(vii); and’’ is corrected
to read ‘‘Correctly designating the
second occurrence of paragraph (c)(1)(v)
as paragraph (c)(1)(vii) and revising it;
and’’
■ 3. In instruction 2.d., the text
‘‘Revising paragraph (c)(2).’’ is corrected
to read ‘‘Revising paragraph (c)(2)
heading, (c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii)
introductory text’’.
Blake J. Paulson,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency.
Ann Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2021–01499 Filed 2–11–21; 8:45 am]
[FR Doc. 2021–02911 Filed 2–11–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–33–P
BILLING CODE P
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
12 CFR Parts 217, 225, 238, and 252
12 CFR Part 1074
RIN 7100–AF95
Amendments to Capital Planning and
Stress Testing Requirements for Large
Bank Holding Companies, Intermediate
Holding Companies and Savings and
Loan Holding Companies
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Board).
ACTION: Technical correction.
AGENCY:
Correction
In final rule FR Doc. 2021–02182,
published on February 3, 2021, on page
7938, in the third column, make the
following corrections to instruction 2,
amending § 217.11:
[Corrected]
1. In instruction 2.b., the text
‘‘Revising the paragraph (c) subject
heading and paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (ii),
(c)(1)(iii) introductory text, and (c)(1)(iv)
introductory text, (c)(1)(v) introductory
text, and (c)(vi) introductory text; and’’
is corrected to read ‘‘Revising the
paragraph (c) heading and paragraphs
(c)(1)(i) and (ii), (c)(1)(iii) introductory
text, (c)(1)(iv) introductory text, (c)(1)(v)
introductory text, and (c)(1)(vi); and’’
■ 2. In instruction 2.c., the text
‘‘Correctly designating the second
■
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RIN 3710–AB02
Role of Supervisory Guidance
Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (Bureau) is
adopting a final rule that codifies the
Interagency Statement Clarifying the
Role of Supervisory Guidance, issued by
the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Board),
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), and the Bureau
(collectively, the agencies) on
September 11, 2018 (2018 Statement).
By codifying the 2018 Statement, with
amendments, the final rule confirms
that the Bureau will continue to follow
and respect the limits of administrative
law in carrying out its supervisory
responsibilities. The 2018 Statement
reiterated well-established law by
stating that, unlike a law or regulation,
supervisory guidance does not have the
force and effect of law. As such,
supervisory guidance does not create
binding legal obligations for the public.
Because it is incorporated into the final
rule, the 2018 Statement, as amended, is
binding on the Bureau. The final rule
adopts the rule as proposed without
substantive change.
DATES: This final rule is effective on
March 15, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Bradley Lipton or Christopher Shelton,
Senior Counsels, Legal Division, (202)
435–7700. If you require this document
in an alternative electronic format,
SUMMARY:
This document corrects an
error in amendatory instruction 2
affecting Part 217 of the Board’s
Regulation Q published in the Federal
Register on February 3, 2021.
DATES: Effective April 5, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Asad Kudiya, Senior Counsel, (202)
475–6358 or Jonah Kind, Counsel, (202)
452–2045. You may also contact any of
the named individuals in the final rule
document 86 FR 7927 (February 3,
2021).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
§ 217.11
[Docket No. CFPB–2020–0033]
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please contact CFPB_Accessibility@
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Bureau recognizes the important
distinction between issuances that serve
to implement acts of Congress (known
as ‘‘regulations’’ or legislative rules’’)
and non-binding supervisory guidance
documents.1 Regulations create binding
legal obligations. Supervisory guidance
is issued by an agency to ‘‘advise the
public prospectively of the manner in
which the agency proposes to exercise
a discretionary power’’ and does not
create binding legal obligations.2
In recognition of the important
distinction between rules and guidance,
on September 11, 2018, the agencies
issued the Interagency Statement
Clarifying the Role of Supervisory
Guidance (2018 Statement) to explain
the role of supervisory guidance and
describe the agencies’ approach to
supervisory guidance.3 As noted in the
2018 Statement, the agencies issue
various types of supervisory guidance to
their respective supervised institutions,
including, but not limited to,
interagency statements, advisories,
bulletins, policy statements, questions
and answers, and frequently asked
questions. Supervisory guidance
outlines the agencies’ supervisory
expectations or priorities and articulates
the agencies’ general views regarding
practices for a given subject area.
Supervisory guidance often provides
examples of practices that mitigate risks,
or that the agencies generally consider
to be consistent with safety-andsoundness standards or other applicable
laws and regulations, including those
designed to protect consumers.4 The
agencies noted in the 2018 Statement
that supervised institutions at times
request supervisory guidance and that
guidance is important to provide clarity
1 Regulations are commonly referred to as
legislative rules because regulations have the ‘‘force
and effect of law.’’ Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Association, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015).
2 See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979)
(quoting the Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act at 30 n.3 (1947)
(Attorney General’s Manual) and discussing the
distinctions between regulations and general
statements of policy, of which supervisory guidance
is one form).
3 See https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/
newsroom/agencies-issue-statement-reaffirmingrole-supervisory-guidance/.
4 While supervisory guidance offers guidance to
the public on the agencies’ approach to supervision
under statutes and regulations and safe and sound
practices, the issuance of guidance is discretionary
and is not a prerequisite to an agency’s exercise of
its statutory and regulatory authorities. This point
reflects the fact that statutes and legislative rules,
not statements of policy, set legal requirements.
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to these institutions, as well as
supervisory staff, in a transparent way
that helps to ensure consistency in the
supervisory approach.5
The 2018 Statement restated existing
law and reaffirmed the agencies’
understanding that supervisory
guidance does not create binding,
enforceable legal obligations. The 2018
Statement reaffirmed that the agencies
do not issue supervisory criticisms for
‘‘violations’’ of supervisory guidance
and described the appropriate use of
supervisory guidance by the agencies. In
the 2018 Statement, the agencies also
expressed their intention to (1) limit the
use of numerical thresholds in
guidance; (2) reduce the issuance of
multiple supervisory guidance
documents on the same topic; (3)
continue efforts to make the role of
supervisory guidance clear in
communications to examiners and
supervised institutions; and (4)
encourage supervised institutions to
discuss their concerns about
supervisory guidance with their agency
contact.
On November 5, 2018, the OCC,
Board, FDIC, and Bureau each received
a petition for a rulemaking (Petition), as
permitted under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),6 requesting that
the agencies codify the 2018 Statement.7
The Petition argued that a rule on
guidance is necessary to bind future
agency leadership and staff to the 2018
Statement’s terms. The Petition also
suggested there are ambiguities in the
2018 Statement concerning how
supervisory guidance is used in
5 The Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) has recognized the important role of
guidance documents and has stated that guidance
can ‘‘make agency decision-making more
predictable and uniform and shield regulated
parties from unequal treatment, unnecessary costs,
and unnecessary risk, while promoting compliance
with the law.’’ ACUS, Recommendation 2017–5,
Agency Guidance Through Policy Statements, 82
FR 61728, 61734 (Dec. 29, 2017). ACUS also
suggests that ‘‘policy statements are generally better
[than legislative rules] for dealing with conditions
of uncertainty and often for making agency policy
accessible.’’ Id. ACUS’s reference to ‘‘policy
statements’’ refers to the statutory text of the APA,
which provides that notice and comment is not
required for ‘‘general statements of policy.’’ The
phrase ‘‘general statements of policy’’ has
commonly been viewed by courts, agencies, and
administrative law commentators as including a
wide range of agency issuances, including guidance
documents.
6 5 U.S.C. 553(e).
7 See Petition for Rulemaking on the Role of
Supervisory Guidance, available at https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/petitionsrulemaking/bpi-aba-petition/. The Petitioners did
not submit a petition to the NCUA, which has no
supervisory authority over the financial institutions
that are represented by Petitioners. The NCUA
chose to join the Proposed Rule on its own
initiative. References in the preamble to ‘‘agencies’’
therefore include the NCUA.
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connection with matters requiring
attention, matters requiring immediate
attention (collectively, MRAs), as well
as in connection with other supervisory
actions that should be clarified through
a rulemaking. Finally, the Petition
called for the rulemaking to implement
changes in the agencies’ standards for
issuing MRAs. Specifically, the Petition
requested that the agencies limit the role
of MRAs to addressing circumstances in
which there is a violation of a statute,
regulation, or order, or demonstrably
unsafe or unsound practices.
II. The Proposed Rule
On November 5, 2020, the agencies
issued a proposed rule (Proposed Rule
or Proposal) that would have codified
the 2018 Statement, with clarifying
changes, as an appendix to proposed
rule text.8 The Proposed Rule would
have superseded the 2018 Statement.
The rule text would have provided that
an amended version of the 2018
Statement is binding on each respective
agency.
The Petition expressed support for the
2018 Statement and acknowledged that
it addresses many issues of concern for
the Petitioners relating to the use of
supervisory guidance. The Petition
expressed concern, however, that the
2018 Statement’s reference to not basing
‘‘criticisms’’ on violations of
supervisory guidance has led to
confusion about whether MRAs are
covered by the 2018 Statement.
Accordingly, the agencies proposed to
clarify in the Proposed Rule that the
term ‘‘criticize’’ includes the issuance of
MRAs and other supervisory criticisms,
including those communicated through
matters requiring board attention,
documents of resolution, and
supervisory recommendations
(collectively, supervisory criticisms).9
As such, the agencies reiterated that
examiners will not base supervisory
criticisms on a ‘‘violation’’ of or ‘‘noncompliance with’’ supervisory guidance.
The agencies noted that, in some
situations, examiners may reference
(including in writing) supervisory
guidance to provide examples of safe
and sound conduct, appropriate
consumer protection and risk
management practices, and other
actions for addressing compliance with
laws or regulations. The agencies also
reiterated that they will not issue an
enforcement action on the basis of a
8 85
FR 70512 (Nov. 5, 2020).
agencies use different terms to refer to
supervisory actions that are similar to MRAs and
Matters Requiring Immediate Attention (MRIAs),
including matters requiring board attention,
documents of resolution, and supervisory
recommendations.
9 The
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‘‘violation’’ of or ‘‘non-compliance’’
with supervisory guidance. The
Proposed Rule reflected these
clarifications.10
The Petition requested further that
these supervisory criticisms should not
include ‘‘generic’’ or ‘‘conclusory’’
references to safety and soundness. The
agencies agreed that supervisory
criticisms should continue to be specific
as to practices, operations, financial
conditions, or other matters that could
have a negative effect on the safety and
soundness of the financial institution,
could cause consumer harm, or could
cause violations of laws, regulations,
final agency orders, or other legally
enforceable conditions. Accordingly, the
agencies included language reflecting
this practice in the Proposed Rule.
The Petition also suggested that
MRAs, as well as memoranda of
understanding, examination
downgrades, and any other formal
examination mandate or sanction,
should be based only on a violation of
a statute, regulation, or order, including
a ‘‘demonstrably unsafe or unsound
practice.’’ As noted in the Proposed
Rule, examiners all take steps to identify
deficient practices before they rise to
violations of law or regulation or before
they constitute unsafe or unsound
banking practices. The agencies stated
that they continue to believe that early
identification of deficient practices
serves the interest of the public and of
supervised institutions. Early
identification protects the safety and
soundness of banks, promotes consumer
protection, and reduces the costs and
risk of deterioration of financial
condition from deficient practices
resulting in violations of laws or
regulations, unsafe or unsound
conditions, or unsafe or unsound
banking practices. The Proposed Rule
also noted that the agencies have
different supervisory processes,
including for issuing supervisory
criticisms. For these reasons, the
10 The 2018 Statement contains the following
sentence: ‘‘Examiners will not criticize a supervised
financial institution for a ‘‘violation’’ of supervisory
guidance.’’ 2018 Statement at 2. As revised in the
Proposed Rule, this sentence read as follows:
‘‘Examiners will not criticize (including through the
issuance of matters requiring attention, matters
requiring immediate attention, matters requiring
board attention, documents of resolution, and
supervisory recommendations) a supervised
financial institution for, and agencies will not issue
an enforcement action on the basis of, a ‘‘violation’’
of or ‘‘non-compliance’’ with supervisory
guidance.’’ Proposed Rule (emphasis added). As
discussed infra in footnote 11, the Proposed Rule
also removed the sentences in the 2018 Statement
that referred to ‘‘citation,’’ which the Petition
suggested had been confusing. These sentences
were also removed to clarify that the focus of the
Proposed Rule related to the use of guidance, not
the standards for MRAs.
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agencies did not propose revisions to
their respective supervisory practices
relating to supervisory criticisms.
The agencies also noted that the 2018
Statement was intended to focus on the
appropriate use of supervisory guidance
in the supervisory process, rather than
the standards for supervisory criticisms.
To address any confusion concerning
the scope of the 2018 Statement, the
Proposed Rule removed two sentences
from the 2018 Statement concerning
grounds for ‘‘citations’’ and the
handling of deficiencies that do not
constitute violations of law.11
III. Comments on the Proposed Rule
A. Overview
The five agencies received
approximately thirty unique comments
concerning the Proposed Rule.12 The
Bureau discusses below those comments
that are potentially relevant to the
Bureau, rather than those comments that
are only potentially relevant to other
agencies. As one example, the Bureau
notes that the Federal banking agencies
(the OCC, Board, and FDIC) received a
comment regarding their supervisory
authorities, but the Bureau did not.
Accordingly, the Bureau does not
discuss that subject here.
Commenters representing trade
associations for banking institutions and
other businesses, State bankers’
associations, individual financial
institutions, and one member of
Congress expressed general support for
the Proposed Rule. These commenters
supported codification of the 2018
Statement and the reiteration by the
agencies that guidance does not have
the force of law and cannot give rise to
binding, enforceable legal obligations.
One of these commenters stated that the
Proposal would serve the interests of
consumers and competition by
clarifying the law for institutions and
potentially removing ambiguities that
could deter the development of
innovative products that serve
11 The
following sentences from the 2018
Statement were not present in the Proposed Rule:
‘‘Rather, any citations will be for violations of law,
regulation, or non-compliance with enforcement
orders or other enforceable conditions. During
examinations and other supervisory activities,
examiners may identify unsafe or unsound
practices or other deficiencies in risk management,
including compliance risk management, or other
areas that do not constitute violations of law or
regulation.’’ 2018 Statement at 2. The agencies did
not intend these deletions to indicate a change in
supervisory policy.
12 Of the comments received, some comments
were not submitted to all agencies, and some
comments were identical. Note that this total
excludes comments that were directed at an
unrelated rulemaking by the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network of the Department of the
Treasury (FinCEN).
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consumers and business clients, without
uncertainty regarding potential
regulatory consequences. These
commenters expressed strong support as
well for the clarification in the Proposed
Rule that the agencies will not criticize,
including through the issuance of
‘‘matters requiring attention,’’ a
supervised financial institution for a
‘‘violation’’ of, or ‘‘non-compliance’’
with, supervisory guidance.
One commenter agreed with the
agencies that supervisory criticisms
should not be limited to violation of
statutes, regulations, or orders and that
supervisory guidance remains a
beneficial tool to communicate
supervisory expectations to the
industry. The commenter stated that the
proactive identification of supervisory
criticism or deficiencies that do not
constitute violations of law facilitates
forward-looking supervision, which
helps address problems before they
warrant a formal enforcement action.
The commenter noted as well that
supervisory guidance provides
important insight to industry and
ensures consistency in the supervisory
approach and that supervised
institutions frequently request
supervisory guidance. The commenter
observed that the COVID–19 pandemic
has amplified the requests for
supervisory guidance and
interpretation, and that it is apparent
institutions want clarity and guidance
from regulators.
Two commenters, both public interest
advocacy groups, opposed the Proposed
Rule, suggesting that codifying the 2018
Statement may undermine the
important role that supervisory
guidance can play by informing
supervisory criticism, rather than
merely clarifying that it will not serve
as the basis for enforcement actions.
One commenter stated that it is essential
for agencies to have the prophylactic
authority to base criticisms on
imprudent bank practices that may not
yet have ripened into violations of law
or significant safety and soundness
concerns. The commenter stated that
this is particularly important with
respect to large banks, where delay in
addressing concerns could lead to a
broader crisis. One commenter stated
that the agencies have not explained the
benefits that would result from the rule
or demonstrated how the rule will
promote safety and soundness or
consumer protection. The commenter
argued that supervision is different from
other forms of regulation and requires
supervisory discretion, which could be
constrained by the rule. One of these
commenters argued that the Proposal
would send a signal that banking
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institutions have wider discretion to
ignore supervisory guidance.
In a comment that was specifically
addressed to the Bureau, a veterans
advocacy group expressed concern that
the Bureau’s participation in the
interagency rule would bind the hands
of a future administration.
B. Scope of Rule
Several industry commenters
requested that the Proposed Rule cover
interpretive rules and clarify that
interpretive rules do not have the force
and effect of law. One commenter stated
that the agencies should clarify whether
they believe that interpretive rules can
be binding. The commenter argued that,
under established legal principles,
interpretive rules can be binding on the
agency that issues but not on the public.
Some commenters suggested that the
agencies follow Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS)
recommendations for issuing
interpretive rules and that the agencies
should clarify when particular guidance
documents are (or are not) interpretive
rules and allow the public to petition to
change an interpretation. A number of
commenters requested that the agencies
expand the statement to address the
standards that apply to MRAs and other
supervisory criticisms, a suggestion
made in the Petition.
One comment that specifically
pertained to the Bureau, which was
submitted by an association of
community banks, recommended that
the category of supervisory guidance be
expanded to include the ‘‘small entity
compliance guides’’ that the Bureau
provides for small entities, which the
commenter described as extremely
helpful. Another comment, from an
association in the debt-collection
industry, generally encouraged the
Bureau to issue small entity compliance
guides, frequently asked questions, and
advisory opinions to explain
compliance expectations.
C. Role of Guidance Documents
Several commenters recommended
that the agencies clarify that the
practices described in supervisory
guidance are merely examples of
conduct that may be consistent with
statutory and regulations, not
expectations that may form the basis for
supervisory criticism. One commenter
suggested that the agencies state that
when supervisory guidance or
interpretive rules offers examples of safe
and sound conduct, compliance with
consumer protection standards,
appropriate risk management practices,
or acceptable practices through
supervisory guidance, the agencies will
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treat adherence to that supervisory
guidance or interpretive rule as
providing a safe harbor. One commenter
also requested that the agencies make
clear that guidance that goes through
public comment, as well as any
examples used in guidance, are not
binding.13
One comment that was specifically
addressed to the Bureau, from an
association of credit unions, stated that
the Bureau should refrain from issuing
supervisory guidance that adds
requirements not explicitly stated in the
statute or regulation.
One commenter argued that guidance
provides valuable information to
supervisors about how their discretion
should be exercised and therefore plays
an important role in supervision.
D. Supervisory Criticisms
Several commenters addressed
supervisory criticisms and how they
relate to guidance. Some commenters
suggested that supervisory criticisms
should be specific as to practices,
operations, financial conditions, or
other matters that could have a negative
effect. These commenters suggested that
MRAs, memoranda of understanding
and any other formal written mandates
or sanctions should be based only on a
violation of a statute or regulation.
Similarly, these commenters argued that
there should be no references to
guidance in written formal actions and
that banking institutions should be
reassured that they will not be criticized
or cited for a violation of guidance when
no law or regulation is cited. One
commenter suggested that it would
instead be appropriate to discuss
supervisory guidance privately, rather
than publicly, potentially during the
pre-exam meetings or during
examination exit meetings. Another
commenter suggested that, while
referencing guidance in supervisory
criticism may be useful at times,
agencies should provide safeguards to
prevent such references from becoming
the de facto basis for supervisory
criticisms. One commenter stated that
examiners also should not criticize
community banks in their final written
examination reports for not complying
with ‘‘best practices’’ unless the
criticism involves a violation of bank
policy or regulation. The commenter
added that industry best practices
13 This commenter also requested that the
agencies affirm that they will apply statutory factors
while processing applications. The Bureau
construes this comment, in context, as referring to
the application processes that are common at the
Federal banking agencies; to the extent it may refer
to applications to the Bureau, the Bureau considers
it outside the scope of the Bureau’s rulemaking.
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should be transparent enough and
sufficiently known throughout the
industry before being cited in an
examination report. One commenter
requested that examiners should not
apply large bank practices to
community banks that have a different,
less complex and more conservative
business model.
Commenters that opposed the
Proposal did not support restricting
supervisory criticism or sanctions to
explicit violations of law or regulation.
One commenter expressed concern that
requiring supervisors to wait for an
explicit violation of law before issuing
criticism would effectively erase the
line between supervision and
enforcement. According to the
commenter, it would eliminate the
space for supervision as an intermediate
practice of oversight and cooperative
problem-solving between banks and the
regulators who support and manage the
banking system. One commenter
emphasized the importance of bank
supervisors basing their criticisms on
imprudent bank practices that may not
yet have ripened into violations of laws
or rules but which if left unaddressed
could pose harm to consumers.
One commenter argued that the
agencies should state clearly that
guidance can and will be used by
supervisors to inform their assessments
of banks’ practices and that it may be
cited as, and serve as the basis for,
criticisms. According to the commenter,
even under the legal principles
described in the Proposal, it is
permissible for guidance to be used as
a set of standards that may inform a
criticism, provided that application of
the guidance is used for corrective
purposes, if not to support an
enforcement action.
According to one commenter, the
Proposal makes fine conceptual
distinctions between, for example,
issuing supervisory criticisms ‘‘on the
basis of’’ guidance and issuing
supervisory criticisms that make
‘‘reference’’ to supervisory guidance.
The commenter suggested that is a
distinction that it may be difficult for
regulated entities to parse in practice.
According to the commenter, a rule that
makes such a distinction is likely to
have a chilling effect on supervisors
attempting to implement policy in the
field. According to another commenter,
the language allowing examiners to
reference supervisory guidance to
provide examples is too vague and
threatens to marginalize the role of
guidance and significantly reduce its
usefulness in the process of issuing
criticisms designed to correct deficient
bank practices.
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E. Issuance and Management of
Supervisory Guidance
Several commenters made suggestions
about how the agencies should issue
and manage supervisory guidance.
Some commenters suggested that the
agencies should delineate clearly
between regulations and supervisory
guidance. Commenters encouraged the
agencies to regularly review, update,
and potentially rescind outstanding
guidance. One commenter suggested
that the agencies rescind outstanding
guidance that functions as rule but has
not gone through notice and comment.
One commenter suggested that the
agencies memorialize their intent to
revisit and potentially rescind existing
guidance, as well as limit multiple
guidance documents on the same topic.
Commenters suggested that supervisory
guidance should be easy to find, readily
available, online, and in a format that is
user-friendly and searchable.
One commenter encouraged the
agencies to issue principles-based
guidance that avoids the kind of
granularity that could be misconstrued
as binding expectations. According to
this commenter, the agencies can issue
separate frequently asked questions
with more detailed information but
should clearly identify these as nonbinding illustrations. This commenter
also encouraged the agencies to publish
proposed guidance for comment when
circumstances allow. Another
commenter requested that the agencies
issue all ‘‘rules’’ as defined by the
Administrative Procedure Act through
the notice-and-comment process.
One commenter expressed concern
that the agencies will aim to reduce the
issuance of multiple supervisory
guidance documents and will thereby
reduce the availability of guidance in
circumstances where guidance would be
valuable.
F. Responses to Comments
As stated in the Proposed Rule, the
2018 Statement was intended to focus
on the appropriate use of supervisory
guidance in the supervisory process,
rather than the standards for
supervisory criticisms. The standards
for issuing MRAs and other supervisory
actions were, therefore, outside the
scope of this rulemaking. For this
reason, and for reasons discussed
earlier, the final rule does not address
the standards for MRAs or other
supervisory actions.
With respect to the comments on
coverage of interpretive rules, the
Bureau agrees with the commenter that
interpretive rules do not, alone, ‘‘have
the force and effect of law’’ and must be
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rooted in, and derived from, a statute or
regulation.14 While interpretive rules
and supervisory guidance are similar in
lacking the force and effect of law,
interpretive rules and supervisory
guidance are distinct under the APA
and its jurisprudence and are generally
issued for different purposes.15
Interpretive rules are typically issued by
an agency to advise the public of the
agency’s construction of the statutes and
rules that it administers,16 whereas
general statements of policy, such as
supervisory guidance, advise the public
of how an agency intends to exercise its
discretionary powers.17 To this end,
guidance generally reflects an agency’s
policy views, for example, on risk
management practices. On the other
hand, interpretive rules generally
resolve ambiguities regarding
requirements imposed by statutes and
regulations. Because supervisory
guidance and interpretive rules have
different characteristics and serve
different purposes, the Bureau has
decided that the final rule will continue
to cover supervisory guidance only.
With respect to the question of
whether to adopt ACUS’s procedures for
allowing the public to request
reconsideration or revision of an
interpretive rule, this rulemaking, again,
does not address interpretive rules. As
such, the Bureau is not adding
procedures for challenges to interpretive
rules through this rulemaking.
The Bureau is also not adopting the
comment from an association of
14 See
Mortgage Bankers Association, 575 U.S. at
96.
15 Questions
concerning the legal and supervisory
nature of interpretive rules are case-specific and
have engendered debate among courts and
administrative law commentators. The Bureau takes
no position in this rulemaking on those specific
debates. See, e.g., R. Levin, Rulemaking and the
Guidance Exemption, 70 Admin. L. Rev. 263 (2018)
(discussing the doctrinal differences concerning the
status of interpretive rules under the APA); see also
Nicholas R. Parillo, Federal Agency Guidance and
the Powder to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies
and Industries, 36 Yale J. Reg 165, 168 n.6 (2019)
(‘‘Whether interpretive rules are supposed to be
nonbinding is a question subject to much confusion
that is not fully settled.’’); see also ACUS,
Recommendation 2019–1: Agency Guidance
Through Interpretive Rules, 84 FR 38927 (Aug. 8,
2019) (noting that courts and commentators have
different views on whether interpretive rules bind
an agency and effectively bind the public through
the deference given to agencies’ interpretations of
their own rules under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997)).
16 Mortgage Bankers Association, 575 U.S. at 97
(citing Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514
U.S. 87, 99 (1995)); accord Attorney General’s
Manual at 30 n.3.
17 See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 302 n.31
(quoting Attorney General’s Manual at 30 n.3); see
also, e.g., American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety
& Health Administration, 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (outlining tests in the D.C. Circuit for
assessing whether an agency issuance is an
interpretive rule).
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community banks that the category of
supervisory guidance be expanded to
include the ‘‘small entity compliance
guides’’ that the Bureau provides for
small entities, which the commenter
described as extremely helpful. The
Bureau normally designates its small
entity compliance guides as
‘‘compliance aids,’’ pursuant to the its
Policy Statement on Compliance Aids.18
Compliance aids do not rise to the level
of supervisory guidance, because they
are not general statements of policy and
they do not concern the Bureau’s
supervisory powers—neither do they
rise to the level of interpretive rules,
because they are not interpretive.19
Instead, the Policy Statement on
Compliance Aids outlines how
compliance aids simply present the
requirements of rules and statutes in a
manner that is useful for compliance
professionals, other industry
stakeholders, and the public;
compliance aids also sometimes include
practical suggestions for how entities
might choose to go about complying
with those rules and statutes.20
Interested parties can consult the Policy
Statement on Compliance Aids for a
comprehensive explanation of how the
Bureau views its compliance aids.
The Bureau also notes the comment
from an association in the debtcollection industry that encouraged the
Bureau to issue small entity compliance
guides, frequently asked questions, and
advisory opinions to explain
compliance expectations. The Bureau
observes that these particular materials
are outside the scope of this particular
rulemaking. This is because the
Bureau’s small entity compliance guides
and frequently asked questions are
generally designated as compliance aids
and not supervisory guidance under the
Policy Statement on Compliance Aids,21
while the Bureau’s advisory opinions
are classified as interpretive rules under
the Bureau’s Advisory Opinion Policy.22
However, the Bureau agrees that the
appropriate Bureau use of compliance
aids and advisory opinions, like
supervisory guidance, is useful for
helping entities in the debt-collection
18 Policy Statement on Compliance Aids, 85 FR
4579 (Jan. 27, 2020).
19 Id. at 4579 n.4 (explaining that Bureau
compliance aids that satisfy the policy statement do
not rise to the level of ‘‘rules’’ as defined by the
Administrative Procedure Act and that general
statements of policy and interpretive rules are
examples of ‘‘rules’’).
20 Id. at 4579.
21 Id.
22 Advisory Opinions Policy, 85 FR 77987, 77988
(Dec. 3, 2020) (explaining that Bureau advisory
opinions are interpretive rules under the
Administrative Procedure Act and explaining
limitations on advisory opinions).
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and other industries to fully comply
with Federal consumer financial laws.
In response to the comment that the
agencies should treat examples in
guidance as ‘‘safe harbors,’’ the Bureau
agrees that examples offered in
supervisory guidance can provide
insight about practices that, in general,
may lead to compliance with
regulations and statutes. The examples
in guidance, however, are generalized.
When an institution chooses to
implement such examples, examiners
must consider the facts and
circumstances of that institution in
assessing the application of those
examples. In addition, the underlying
legal principle of supervisory guidance
is that it does not created binding legal
obligation for either the public or an
agency. As such, the Bureau does not
deem examples in supervisory guidance
to categorically establish safe harbors.
The Bureau has also considered the
comment that was specifically directed
to the Bureau, from an association of
credit unions, which stated that the
Bureau should refrain from issuing
supervisory guidance that adds
requirements not explicitly stated in the
statute or regulation. Although the
Bureau does not agree that it would be
appropriate to limit the Bureau’s efforts
to assist entities in complying with their
legal obligations to situations where the
law is already explicit, the Bureau fully
agrees that it is not the role of
supervisory guidance to create legal
requirements. Those must be located in
a statute or regulation.
In response to the comments that the
Proposal may undermine the important
role that supervisory guidance can play
in informing supervisory criticism and
in serving to address conditions before
those conditions lead to enforcement
actions, the Bureau agrees that the
appropriate use of supervisory guidance
generates a more collaborative and
constructive regulatory process that
supports compliance by institutions,
thereby diminishing the need for
enforcement actions. As noted by
ACUS, guidance can make agency
decision-making more predictable and
uniform and shield regulated parties
from unequal treatment, unnecessary
costs, and unnecessary risk, while
promoting compliance with the law.
The Bureau does not view the final rule
as weakening the role of guidance in the
supervisory process and the Bureau will
continue to use guidance in a robust
way to promote compliance by its
supervised institutions.
Further, the Bureau does not agree
with one commenter’s assertion that the
Proposal made an unclear distinction
between, on the one hand, inappropriate
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supervisory criticism for a ‘‘violation’’
of or ‘‘non-compliance’’ with
supervisory guidance, and, on the other
hand, Bureau examiners’ entirely
appropriate use of supervisory guidance
to reference examples of appropriate
consumer protection and risk
management practices and other actions
for addressing compliance with laws or
regulations. This approach
appropriately implements the principle
that institutions are not required to
follow supervisory guidance in itself but
may find such guidance useful. The
Bureau disagrees with the commenter
that institutions and examiners are
incapable of understanding this
important distinction.
As one example, Bureau examiners
regularly examine the compliance
management systems (CMS) at
supervised institutions. Where
examiners identify a deficiency in an
institution’s CMS, examiners may
provide a supervisory recommendation
or other supervisory criticism to the
institution to correct the deficiency at
that institution. It is also appropriate for
Bureau examiners to refer to relevant
supervisory guidance as an example of
appropriate CMS, if the examiners
believe that an institution would find
such guidance informative.
In response to the comments
regarding the role of public comment for
supervisory guidance, the Bureau notes
that it has made clear through the 2018
Statement and in this final rule that
supervisory guidance (including
guidance that goes through public
comment) does not create binding,
enforceable legal obligations. Rather, the
Bureau may issue supervisory guidance
for comment in order to improve its
understanding of an issue, gather
information, or seek ways to achieve a
supervisory objective most effectively.
Similarly, examples that are included in
supervisory guidance (including
guidance that goes through public
comment) are not binding on
institutions. Rather, these examples are
intended to be illustrative of ways a
supervised institution may implement
appropriate consumer protection,
prudent risk management, or other
actions in furtherance of compliance
with laws or regulations. Relatedly, the
Bureau does not agree with one
comment that it should use notice-andcomment procedures, without
exception, to issue all ‘‘rules’’ as defined
by the APA, which would include
supervisory guidance. Congress has
established longstanding exceptions in
the APA from the notice-and-comment
process for certain rules, including for
general statements of policy like
supervisory guidance and for
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interpretive rules. As one court has
explained, Congress intended to
‘‘accommodate situations where the
policies promoted by public
participation in rulemaking are
outweighed by the countervailing
considerations of effectiveness,
efficiency, expedition and reduction in
expense.’’ 23
In response to the question raised by
some commenters concerning potential
confusion between supervisory
guidance and interpretive rules, the
Bureau notes that interpretive rules are
outside the scope of the rulemaking. In
addition, as stated earlier, interpretative
rules do not, alone, ‘‘have the force and
effect of law’’ and must be rooted in,
and derived from, the statutes and
regulations those rules interpret. While
interpretive rules and supervisory
guidance are similar in lacking the force
and effect of law, interpretive rules and
supervisory guidance are distinct under
the APA and its jurisprudence and are
generally issued for different purposes.
The Bureau believes that when it issues
an interpretive rule, the fact that it is an
interpretive rule is generally clear. In
addition, these comments relate to
clarity in drafting, rather than a matter
that seems suitable for rulemaking.
In response to the two public interest
advocacy groups opposing the Proposal,
the Bureau does not believe that this
final rule would undermine any of the
Bureau’s authorities. Indeed, the final
rule is designed to support the Bureau’s
ability to supervise. In addition, the
Bureau notes the question of the role of
guidance has been one of interest to
regulated parties and other stakeholders
over the past few years. The Petition
and the numerous comments on the
Proposal are a sign of this interest. As
such, the Bureau believes it will serve
the public interest to reaffirm the
appropriate role of supervisory
guidance. There are inherent benefits to
the supervisory process whenever
institutions and examiners have a clear
understanding of their roles, including
how supervisory guidance can be used
effectively within legal limits. And in
response to the concern from the
veterans advocacy group that the
Bureau’s participation in the
interagency Proposed Rule would bind
the hands of a future administration, the
Bureau notes that it is the nature of
binding regulations that they bind an
agency over time across multiple
administrations. Most importantly, it
does not believe that there is anything
23 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045
(D.C. Cir. 1987). The specific contours of these
exceptions are the subject of an extensive body of
case law.
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in the final rule that would prevent the
Bureau from continuing to vigorously
carry out its statutory supervisory
functions in the interests of consumers,
while respecting legal limits. Therefore,
the Bureau is proceeding with the rule
as proposed.
In response to the commenter
expressing concern that language in the
Statement on reducing multiple
supervisory guidance documents on the
same topic will limit the Bureau’s
ability to provide valuable guidance, the
Bureau assures the commenter that this
language will not inhibit the Bureau
from issuing new supervisory guidance
when appropriate.
Finally, the Bureau appreciates the
other comments related to other aspects
of guidance or the supervisory process,
but the Bureau does not believe that
they are best addressed in this
rulemaking.
IV. The Final Rule
For the reasons discussed above, the
final rule adopts the Proposed Rule
without substantive change.
However, the Bureau has decided to
issue a final rule that is specifically
addressed to the Bureau and Bureausupervised institutions, rather than the
joint version that the five agencies
included in their joint Proposal.
Although many of the comments were
applicable to all of the agencies, some
comments were specific to particular
agencies or to groups of agencies.
Having separate final rules has enabled
agencies to better focus on explaining
any agency-specific issues to their
respective audiences of supervised
institutions and agency employees.
Relatedly, the Bureau has omitted
from the final rule those specific
phrases that are inapplicable to the
Bureau, because they pertain to the
safety-and-soundness responsibilities of
the Federal banking agencies and the
NCUA. The Bureau believes that this
will provide greater clarity about how
the rule applies to the Bureau’s
supervisory functions.
V. Administrative Law Matters
A. Dodd-Frank Act
The Bureau issues this final rule
based on the Bureau’s authorities under
sections 1012(a)(1) and 1022(b)(1) of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act).24 Section 1012(a)(1) authorizes the
Bureau to establish rules for conducting
the general business of the Bureau, in a
manner not inconsistent with title X of
the Dodd-Frank Act.25 Section
24 Public
25 12
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1022(b)(1) authorizes the Bureau to
issue rules as may be necessary or
appropriate to enable the Bureau to
administer and carry out the purposes
and objectives of the Federal consumer
financial laws.26 The Bureau determines
that the additional clarity regarding the
status of supervisory guidance provided
by the final rule will enable the Bureau
to carry out its supervisory
responsibilities under Federal consumer
financial law more effectively.
Consistent with section 1022(b)(2)(B)
of the Dodd-Frank Act, in developing
the final rule, the Bureau has consulted,
or offered to consult with, the
prudential regulators and the Federal
Trade Commission, including regarding
consistency with any prudential,
market, or systemic objectives
administered by those agencies.27
Additionally, consistent with section
1022(b)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
Bureau has considered the potential
benefits, costs, and impacts of the final
rule.28 The Bureau requested comment
on the preliminary analysis presented in
the proposal as well as submissions of
additional data that could inform the
Bureau’s analysis of the benefits, costs,
and impacts. Such comments as the
Bureau received on this subject are
discussed below.
Institutions Affected by the Final
Rule. The Bureau’s final rule applies to
supervisory guidance issued by the
Bureau, which is addressed to those
institutions that are subject to the
Bureau’s supervisory authority.
Accordingly, the final rule may affect
those nondepository institutions that are
subject to the Bureau’s supervisory
authority under section 1024 of the
Dodd-Frank Act.29 It may also affect
those insured depository institutions
and insured credit unions that have
more than $10 billion in total assets,
together with their affiliates, which are
subject to the Bureau’s supervisory
authority under section 1025 of the
Dodd-Frank Act.30 The final rule may
additionally affect service providers that
26 12
U.S.C. 5512(b)(1).
U.S.C. 5512(b)(2)(B). The prudential
regulators are the OCC, Board, FDIC, and NCUA.
See 12 U.S.C. 5481(24) (defining ‘‘prudential
regulators’’).
28 Section 1022(b)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act,
12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(2)(A), requires the Bureau to
consider the potential benefits and costs of the
regulation to consumers and covered persons,
including the potential reduction of access by
consumers to consumer financial products or
services; the impact of the proposed rule on insured
depository institutions and credit unions with no
more than $10 billion in total assets as described
in section 1026 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C.
5516; and the impact on consumers in rural areas.
29 12 U.S.C. 5514.
30 12 U.S.C. 5515.
27 12
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are subject to the Bureau’s supervisory
authority.31
Potential Benefits and Costs to
Consumers and Covered Persons. The
final rule reiterates the Interagency
Statement Clarifying the Role of
Supervisory Guidance (2018 Statement),
which is already the policy of the
Bureau, and makes it binding on the
Bureau. The Bureau evaluates the final
rule against a baseline in which no such
rule is adopted, and the Bureau is
therefore less definitively bound to
implement the 2018 Statement in all
supervisory activities. Accordingly, the
final rule provides the relevant
institutions with additional assurance
that the Bureau’s implementation of
current and future supervisory guidance
will follow the 2018 Statement.
The final rule should provide the
relevant institutions with greater
certainty about legal obligations that are
addressed in supervisory guidance. This
in turn may reduce compliance costs. It
is not feasible, however, to quantify or
monetize this benefit. The Bureau can
only speculate on the greater certainty
about legal obligations and the
reduction in compliance costs due to
the final rule. Further, the benefit from
the greater certainty about legal
obligations pertains to future as well as
current supervisory guidance. The
Bureau can only speculate on the
frequency of future supervisory
guidance. Supervisory guidance is
issued from time to time as the need
arises, and the Bureau cannot forecast
the volume and nature of future
supervisory guidance with sufficient
precision to quantify or monetize this
benefit.
The final rule may also indirectly
benefit those consumers that are
customers of the relevant institutions, if
reduced compliance costs translate into
better terms or availability of consumer
financial products and services. For the
reasons given above, this benefit cannot
be quantified or monetized.
A commenter criticized the benefits
discussed above and in the Proposal,
deeming them implausible and
speculative, and argued that there is no
link between reduced compliance costs
and consumer welfare. The Bureau
disagrees with this assessment. While
the Bureau does not have data to
quantify or monetize the benefit of
increased clarity, as a matter of logic
and economic theory increased legal
clarity can reduce compliance costs of
regulated entities. Where there is
uncertainty as to the requirements of the
law, firms subject to the Bureau’s
supervisory authority may undertake
31 12
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9267
excess costs to ensure compliance. To
the extent that the 2018 Statement has
prompted financial institutions to avoid
unnecessary compliance costs in cases
that comply with applicable laws and
regulations and do not harm consumers,
but technically contravene the Bureau’s
supervisory guidance, the final rule will
further lower those costs by reducing
the uncertainty. With respect to the
criticism that compliance costs are not
necessarily linked to consumer welfare,
the Bureau notes that its burden under
section 1022(b)(2)(A) is to consider costs
and benefits to covered persons as well
as to consumers. Moreover, as noted
above, a reduction in unnecessary
compliance costs can be passed through
to consumers in the form of lower costs
of credit.
Finally, the final rule does not impose
any new obligations on institutions.
Thus, the final rule should have no
costs for institutions. A consumer
advocate commenter asserted that the
rule would impose costs on consumers
by reducing the effectiveness of the
agencies’ supervision operations,
leading to potential consumer harm.
The commenter argued that ambiguities
in the Proposed Rule and the
accompanying Statement would make it
difficult for supervision staff at the
agencies to determine when to issue
supervisory criticisms, to the detriment
of consumers who may be affected by
practices that would otherwise be
subject to a supervisor’s criticism.
However, the Bureau notes that the 2018
Statement is already the policy of the
Bureau. Moreover, the rule is intended
to clarify at least some aspects of the
2018 Statement. To the extent that the
ambiguities the commenter identifies
exist and affect the Bureau’s supervision
operations, they already exist under the
baseline. Thus, as noted in the Proposal,
the effects of the rule, as described
above, impose no clear costs on any
consumers.
Impact on Depository Institutions and
Credit Unions With No More Than $10
Billion in Assets. Under section 1026 of
the Dodd-Frank Act, the Bureau has
only limited supervisory authority with
respect to those insured depository
institutions and insured credit unions
that have no more than $10 billion in
total assets,32 and so the Bureau does
not normally address supervisory
guidance to these institutions.
Accordingly, the Bureau does not expect
there to be any appreciable impact on
these institutions from the final rule.
Impact on Access to Credit. The
Bureau does not expect the final rule to
affect consumers’ access to credit,
32 12
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except to the extent that reduced
compliance costs and additional
assurance, relative to the baseline, that
the Bureau will follow the 2018
Statement in the future might indirectly
make some credit more available, as
discussed above.
Impact on Consumers in Rural Areas.
The Bureau does not believe that the
final rule would have any unique
impact on consumers in rural areas, and
so the impact on these consumers
should be similar to consumers
generally.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
generally requires an agency to conduct
an initial regulatory flexibility analysis
(IRFA) and a final regulatory flexibility
analysis (FRFA) of any rule subject to
notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements, unless the head of the
agency certifies that the rule will not, if
promulgated, have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.33 The Bureau
also is subject to certain additional
procedures under the RFA involving the
convening of a panel to consult with
small business representatives prior to
proposing a rule for which an IRFA is
required.34 In the Proposal, the Bureau
determined that an IRFA and small
business review panel was not required
because the Director of the Bureau
certified the Proposed Rule, if adopted,
would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The Bureau explained that the
Proposed Rule would not impose any
obligations on regulated entities, and
regulated entities would not need to
take any action in response to this
Proposed Rule. The Bureau did not
receive comments on its analysis of the
impact of the Proposal on small entities.
Accordingly, the Director of the Bureau
certifies that the final rule will not have
a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Bureau has determined that this
final rule does not impose any new or
revise any existing recordkeeping,
reporting, or disclosure requirements on
covered entities or members of the
public that would be collections of
information requiring approval by the
Office of Management and Budget under
the Paperwork Reduction Act.35
33 5
U.S.C. 601–612.
U.S.C. 609.
35 44 U.S.C. 3501–3521.
D. Congressional Review Act
Pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act 36 the Bureau will submit a report
containing this rule and other required
information to the United States Senate,
the United States House of
Representatives, and the Comptroller
General of the United States prior to the
rule taking effect. The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) has designated this rule as not
a ‘‘major rule’’ as defined by 5 U.S.C.
804(2).
E. Signing Authority
The Director of the Bureau, Kathleen
L. Kraninger, having reviewed and
approved this document, is delegating
the authority to electronically sign this
document to Grace Feola, a Bureau
Federal Register Liaison, for purposes of
publication in the Federal Register.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 1074
Administrative practice and
procedure.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth above, the
Bureau amends 12 CFR part 1074 as set
forth below:
PART 1074—RULEMAKING AND
GUIDANCE
1. The authority citation for part 1074
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 5492(a)(1), 5512(b).
2. The heading to part 1074 is revised
as set forth above.
■ 3. Add a heading for new subpart A
to read as follows:
■
Subpart A—Procedure for Issuance of
Bureau Rules
§ 1074.1
[Designated as Subpart A]
4. Designate § 1074.1 as new subpart
A.
■ 5. Add subpart B, consisting of
§§ 1074.2 and 1074.3, to read as follows:
■
Subpart B—Use of Supervisory
Guidance
Sec.
1074.2 Purpose.
1074.3 Implementation of the Statement
Clarifying the Role of Supervisory
Guidance.
§ 1074.2
Purpose.
The Bureau issues regulations and
guidance as part of its supervisory
function. This subpart reiterates the
distinctions between regulations and
guidance, as stated in the Statement
Clarifying the Role of Supervisory
34 5
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Guidance (appendix A to this part)
(Statement), and provides that the
Statement is binding on the Bureau.
§ 1074.3 Implementation of the Statement
Clarifying the Role of Supervisory
Guidance.
The Statement describes the official
policy of the Bureau with respect to the
use of supervisory guidance in the
supervisory process. The Statement is
binding on the Bureau.
■ 6. Appendix A to part 1074 is added
to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 1074—Statement
Clarifying the Role of Supervisory
Guidance
Statement Clarifying the Role of Supervisory
Guidance
The Bureau is issuing this statement to
explain the role of supervisory guidance and
to describe the Bureau’s approach to
supervisory guidance.
Difference Between Supervisory Guidance
and Laws or Regulations
Supervisory agencies like the Bureau issue
various types of supervisory guidance,
including interagency statements, advisories,
bulletins, policy statements, questions and
answers, or frequently asked questions, to
their respective supervised institutions. A
law or regulation has the force and effect of
law.1 Unlike a law or regulation, supervisory
guidance does not have the force and effect
of law, and the Bureau does not take
enforcement actions based on supervisory
guidance. Rather, supervisory guidance
outlines the Bureau’s supervisory
expectations or priorities and articulates the
Bureau’s general views regarding appropriate
practices for a given subject area. Supervisory
guidance often provides examples of
practices that the Bureau generally considers
consistent with applicable laws and
regulations, including those designed to
protect consumers. Supervised institutions at
times request supervisory guidance, and such
guidance is important to provide insight to
industry, as well as supervisory staff, in a
transparent way that helps to ensure
consistency in the supervisory approach.
Ongoing Efforts To Clarify the Role of
Supervisory Guidance
The Bureau is clarifying the following
policies and practices related to supervisory
guidance:
• The Bureau intends to limit the use of
numerical thresholds or other ‘‘bright-lines’’
in describing expectations in supervisory
guidance. Where numerical thresholds are
used, the Bureau intends to clarify that the
thresholds are exemplary only and not
suggestive of requirements. The Bureau will
continue to use numerical thresholds to
tailor, and otherwise make clear, the
applicability of supervisory guidance or
programs to supervised institutions, and as
required by statute.
• Examiners will not criticize (through the
issuance of matters requiring attention,
matters requiring immediate attention,
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matters requiring board attention, documents
of resolution, and supervisory
recommendations) a supervised financial
institution for, and the Bureau will not issue
an enforcement action on the basis of, a
‘‘violation’’ of or ‘‘non-compliance’’ with
supervisory guidance. In some situations,
examiners may reference (including in
writing) supervisory guidance to provide
examples of appropriate consumer protection
and risk management practices and other
actions for addressing compliance with laws
or regulations.
• Supervisory criticisms should continue
to be specific as to practices, operations or
other matters that could cause consumer
harm or could cause violations of laws,
regulations, final agency orders, or other
legally enforceable conditions.
• The Bureau may decide to seek public
comment on supervisory guidance. Seeking
public comment on supervisory guidance
does not mean that the guidance is intended
to be a regulation or have the force and effect
of law. The comment process helps the
Bureau to improve its understanding of an
issue, to gather information on institutions’
risk management practices, or to seek ways
to achieve a supervisory objective most
effectively and with the least burden on
institutions.
• The Bureau will aim to reduce the
issuance of multiple supervisory guidance
documents on the same topic and will
generally limit such multiple issuances going
forward.
• The Bureau will continue efforts to make
the role of supervisory guidance clear in
communications to examiners and to
supervised financial institutions and
encourages supervised institutions with
questions about this statement or any
applicable supervisory guidance to discuss
the questions with their appropriate agency
contact.
Dated: January 19, 2021.
Grace Feola,
Federal Register Liaison, Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection.
[FR Doc. 2021–01524 Filed 2–11–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AM–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2021–0027; Project
Identifier MCAI–2021–00048–R; Amendment
39–21425; AD 2021–04–04]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus
Helicopters
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
Examining the AD Docket
The FAA is superseding
Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020–19–
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:41 Feb 11, 2021
Jkt 253001
02, which applied to certain Airbus
Helicopters (previously Eurocopter
France) Model SA330J helicopters. AD
2020–19–02 required repetitively
inspecting affected tail rotor (T/R)
blades and depending on the inspection
results, repairing or replacing the T/R
blade. AD 2020–19–02 also prohibited
installing an affected T/R blade unless
it passed the inspections. This AD
retains the requirements of AD 2020–
19–02 and also clarifies the
applicability, clarifies the affected T/R
blades in the required actions, reduces
a compliance time, and corrects the
prohibition requirement. This AD was
prompted by the determination that
these corrections are necessary. The
FAA is issuing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective
March 1, 2021.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain document listed in this AD
as of October 7, 2020 (85 FR 59416,
September 22, 2020).
The FAA must receive comments on
this AD by March 29, 2021.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments,
using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail
address above between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this final rule, contact Airbus
Helicopters, 2701 N Forum Drive, Grand
Prairie, TX 75052; telephone 972–641–
0000 or 800–232–0323; fax 972–641–
3775; or at https://www.airbus.com/
helicopters/services/technicalsupport.html. You may view this service
information at the FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region,
10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N–321,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information
on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call (817) 222–5110. It is also
available at https://www.regulations.gov
by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA–2021–0027.
You may examine the AD docket at
https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No.
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
9269
FAA–2021–0027; or in person at Docket
Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this
final rule, the European Aviation Safety
Agency (now European Union Aviation
Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, any
comments received, and other
information. The street address for
Docket Operations is listed above.
Matt
Fuller, AD Program Manager, General
Aviation & Rotorcraft Unit,
Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, FAA, 10101
Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177;
telephone (817) 222–5110; email
matthew.fuller@faa.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued AD 2020–19–02,
Amendment 39–21243 (85 FR 59416,
September 22, 2020) (AD 2020–19–02),
for certain Airbus Helicopters
(previously Eurocopter France) Model
SA330J helicopters. AD 2020–19–02
required, for each T/R blade part
number (P/N) 330A12–0005–(all dash
numbers) and 330A12–0006–(all dash
numbers), repetitively accomplishing a
visual and in-depth inspection for
debonding and eddy current inspecting
for a crack. If there was debonding
within allowable limits, AD 2020–19–02
required repairing or replacing the T/R
blade. If there was debonding that
exceeded allowable limits or a crack,
AD 2020–19–02 required replacing the
T/R blade. AD 2020–19–02 also
prohibited installing an affected T/R
blade unless it passed the inspections.
AD 2020–19–02 was prompted by EASA
AD No. 2016–0059–E, dated March 22,
2016 (EASA AD 2016–0059–E), issued
by the EASA, which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the
European Union, to correct an unsafe
condition for Airbus Helicopters
(formerly Eurocopter, Eurocopter
France, Aerospatiale) Model SA 330 J
helicopters. EASA AD 2016–0059–E
retains the requirements of Direction
Ge´ne´rale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC)
France AD 87–032–052(B)R3, dated
January 23, 1991, which it supersedes,
and also mandates improved service
instructions. EASA advises of two
reports of cracked metal T/R blade skin,
which subsequently led to rotor blade
vibrations and forced landing of the
helicopter. According to EASA, this
condition, if not addressed, could result
in additional occurrences of T/R blade
structural damage, possibly resulting in
significant vibrations and reduced
control of the helicopter.
E:\FR\FM\12FER1.SGM
12FER1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 28 (Friday, February 12, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 9261-9269]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-01524]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
12 CFR Part 1074
[Docket No. CFPB-2020-0033]
RIN 3710-AB02
Role of Supervisory Guidance
AGENCY: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) is
adopting a final rule that codifies the Interagency Statement
Clarifying the Role of Supervisory Guidance, issued by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Board), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Bureau
(collectively, the agencies) on September 11, 2018 (2018 Statement). By
codifying the 2018 Statement, with amendments, the final rule confirms
that the Bureau will continue to follow and respect the limits of
administrative law in carrying out its supervisory responsibilities.
The 2018 Statement reiterated well-established law by stating that,
unlike a law or regulation, supervisory guidance does not have the
force and effect of law. As such, supervisory guidance does not create
binding legal obligations for the public. Because it is incorporated
into the final rule, the 2018 Statement, as amended, is binding on the
Bureau. The final rule adopts the rule as proposed without substantive
change.
DATES: This final rule is effective on March 15, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bradley Lipton or Christopher Shelton,
Senior Counsels, Legal Division, (202) 435-7700. If you require this
document in an alternative electronic format, please contact
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Bureau recognizes the important distinction between issuances
that serve to implement acts of Congress (known as ``regulations'' or
legislative rules'') and non-binding supervisory guidance documents.\1\
Regulations create binding legal obligations. Supervisory guidance is
issued by an agency to ``advise the public prospectively of the manner
in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power'' and
does not create binding legal obligations.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Regulations are commonly referred to as legislative rules
because regulations have the ``force and effect of law.'' Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Association, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015).
\2\ See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (quoting the
Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act at 30
n.3 (1947) (Attorney General's Manual) and discussing the
distinctions between regulations and general statements of policy,
of which supervisory guidance is one form).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recognition of the important distinction between rules and
guidance, on September 11, 2018, the agencies issued the Interagency
Statement Clarifying the Role of Supervisory Guidance (2018 Statement)
to explain the role of supervisory guidance and describe the agencies'
approach to supervisory guidance.\3\ As noted in the 2018 Statement,
the agencies issue various types of supervisory guidance to their
respective supervised institutions, including, but not limited to,
interagency statements, advisories, bulletins, policy statements,
questions and answers, and frequently asked questions. Supervisory
guidance outlines the agencies' supervisory expectations or priorities
and articulates the agencies' general views regarding practices for a
given subject area. Supervisory guidance often provides examples of
practices that mitigate risks, or that the agencies generally consider
to be consistent with safety-and-soundness standards or other
applicable laws and regulations, including those designed to protect
consumers.\4\ The agencies noted in the 2018 Statement that supervised
institutions at times request supervisory guidance and that guidance is
important to provide clarity
[[Page 9262]]
to these institutions, as well as supervisory staff, in a transparent
way that helps to ensure consistency in the supervisory approach.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/agencies-issue-statement-reaffirming-role-supervisory-guidance/.
\4\ While supervisory guidance offers guidance to the public on
the agencies' approach to supervision under statutes and regulations
and safe and sound practices, the issuance of guidance is
discretionary and is not a prerequisite to an agency's exercise of
its statutory and regulatory authorities. This point reflects the
fact that statutes and legislative rules, not statements of policy,
set legal requirements.
\5\ The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
has recognized the important role of guidance documents and has
stated that guidance can ``make agency decision-making more
predictable and uniform and shield regulated parties from unequal
treatment, unnecessary costs, and unnecessary risk, while promoting
compliance with the law.'' ACUS, Recommendation 2017-5, Agency
Guidance Through Policy Statements, 82 FR 61728, 61734 (Dec. 29,
2017). ACUS also suggests that ``policy statements are generally
better [than legislative rules] for dealing with conditions of
uncertainty and often for making agency policy accessible.'' Id.
ACUS's reference to ``policy statements'' refers to the statutory
text of the APA, which provides that notice and comment is not
required for ``general statements of policy.'' The phrase ``general
statements of policy'' has commonly been viewed by courts, agencies,
and administrative law commentators as including a wide range of
agency issuances, including guidance documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2018 Statement restated existing law and reaffirmed the
agencies' understanding that supervisory guidance does not create
binding, enforceable legal obligations. The 2018 Statement reaffirmed
that the agencies do not issue supervisory criticisms for
``violations'' of supervisory guidance and described the appropriate
use of supervisory guidance by the agencies. In the 2018 Statement, the
agencies also expressed their intention to (1) limit the use of
numerical thresholds in guidance; (2) reduce the issuance of multiple
supervisory guidance documents on the same topic; (3) continue efforts
to make the role of supervisory guidance clear in communications to
examiners and supervised institutions; and (4) encourage supervised
institutions to discuss their concerns about supervisory guidance with
their agency contact.
On November 5, 2018, the OCC, Board, FDIC, and Bureau each received
a petition for a rulemaking (Petition), as permitted under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),\6\ requesting that the agencies
codify the 2018 Statement.\7\ The Petition argued that a rule on
guidance is necessary to bind future agency leadership and staff to the
2018 Statement's terms. The Petition also suggested there are
ambiguities in the 2018 Statement concerning how supervisory guidance
is used in connection with matters requiring attention, matters
requiring immediate attention (collectively, MRAs), as well as in
connection with other supervisory actions that should be clarified
through a rulemaking. Finally, the Petition called for the rulemaking
to implement changes in the agencies' standards for issuing MRAs.
Specifically, the Petition requested that the agencies limit the role
of MRAs to addressing circumstances in which there is a violation of a
statute, regulation, or order, or demonstrably unsafe or unsound
practices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 5 U.S.C. 553(e).
\7\ See Petition for Rulemaking on the Role of Supervisory
Guidance, available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/petitions-rulemaking/bpi-aba-petition/. The Petitioners did not
submit a petition to the NCUA, which has no supervisory authority
over the financial institutions that are represented by Petitioners.
The NCUA chose to join the Proposed Rule on its own initiative.
References in the preamble to ``agencies'' therefore include the
NCUA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. The Proposed Rule
On November 5, 2020, the agencies issued a proposed rule (Proposed
Rule or Proposal) that would have codified the 2018 Statement, with
clarifying changes, as an appendix to proposed rule text.\8\ The
Proposed Rule would have superseded the 2018 Statement. The rule text
would have provided that an amended version of the 2018 Statement is
binding on each respective agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 85 FR 70512 (Nov. 5, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petition expressed support for the 2018 Statement and
acknowledged that it addresses many issues of concern for the
Petitioners relating to the use of supervisory guidance. The Petition
expressed concern, however, that the 2018 Statement's reference to not
basing ``criticisms'' on violations of supervisory guidance has led to
confusion about whether MRAs are covered by the 2018 Statement.
Accordingly, the agencies proposed to clarify in the Proposed Rule that
the term ``criticize'' includes the issuance of MRAs and other
supervisory criticisms, including those communicated through matters
requiring board attention, documents of resolution, and supervisory
recommendations (collectively, supervisory criticisms).\9\ As such, the
agencies reiterated that examiners will not base supervisory criticisms
on a ``violation'' of or ``non-compliance with'' supervisory guidance.
The agencies noted that, in some situations, examiners may reference
(including in writing) supervisory guidance to provide examples of safe
and sound conduct, appropriate consumer protection and risk management
practices, and other actions for addressing compliance with laws or
regulations. The agencies also reiterated that they will not issue an
enforcement action on the basis of a ``violation'' of or ``non-
compliance'' with supervisory guidance. The Proposed Rule reflected
these clarifications.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The agencies use different terms to refer to supervisory
actions that are similar to MRAs and Matters Requiring Immediate
Attention (MRIAs), including matters requiring board attention,
documents of resolution, and supervisory recommendations.
\10\ The 2018 Statement contains the following sentence:
``Examiners will not criticize a supervised financial institution
for a ``violation'' of supervisory guidance.'' 2018 Statement at 2.
As revised in the Proposed Rule, this sentence read as follows:
``Examiners will not criticize (including through the issuance of
matters requiring attention, matters requiring immediate attention,
matters requiring board attention, documents of resolution, and
supervisory recommendations) a supervised financial institution for,
and agencies will not issue an enforcement action on the basis of, a
``violation'' of or ``non-compliance'' with supervisory guidance.''
Proposed Rule (emphasis added). As discussed infra in footnote 11,
the Proposed Rule also removed the sentences in the 2018 Statement
that referred to ``citation,'' which the Petition suggested had been
confusing. These sentences were also removed to clarify that the
focus of the Proposed Rule related to the use of guidance, not the
standards for MRAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petition requested further that these supervisory criticisms
should not include ``generic'' or ``conclusory'' references to safety
and soundness. The agencies agreed that supervisory criticisms should
continue to be specific as to practices, operations, financial
conditions, or other matters that could have a negative effect on the
safety and soundness of the financial institution, could cause consumer
harm, or could cause violations of laws, regulations, final agency
orders, or other legally enforceable conditions. Accordingly, the
agencies included language reflecting this practice in the Proposed
Rule.
The Petition also suggested that MRAs, as well as memoranda of
understanding, examination downgrades, and any other formal examination
mandate or sanction, should be based only on a violation of a statute,
regulation, or order, including a ``demonstrably unsafe or unsound
practice.'' As noted in the Proposed Rule, examiners all take steps to
identify deficient practices before they rise to violations of law or
regulation or before they constitute unsafe or unsound banking
practices. The agencies stated that they continue to believe that early
identification of deficient practices serves the interest of the public
and of supervised institutions. Early identification protects the
safety and soundness of banks, promotes consumer protection, and
reduces the costs and risk of deterioration of financial condition from
deficient practices resulting in violations of laws or regulations,
unsafe or unsound conditions, or unsafe or unsound banking practices.
The Proposed Rule also noted that the agencies have different
supervisory processes, including for issuing supervisory criticisms.
For these reasons, the
[[Page 9263]]
agencies did not propose revisions to their respective supervisory
practices relating to supervisory criticisms.
The agencies also noted that the 2018 Statement was intended to
focus on the appropriate use of supervisory guidance in the supervisory
process, rather than the standards for supervisory criticisms. To
address any confusion concerning the scope of the 2018 Statement, the
Proposed Rule removed two sentences from the 2018 Statement concerning
grounds for ``citations'' and the handling of deficiencies that do not
constitute violations of law.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The following sentences from the 2018 Statement were not
present in the Proposed Rule: ``Rather, any citations will be for
violations of law, regulation, or non-compliance with enforcement
orders or other enforceable conditions. During examinations and
other supervisory activities, examiners may identify unsafe or
unsound practices or other deficiencies in risk management,
including compliance risk management, or other areas that do not
constitute violations of law or regulation.'' 2018 Statement at 2.
The agencies did not intend these deletions to indicate a change in
supervisory policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Comments on the Proposed Rule
A. Overview
The five agencies received approximately thirty unique comments
concerning the Proposed Rule.\12\ The Bureau discusses below those
comments that are potentially relevant to the Bureau, rather than those
comments that are only potentially relevant to other agencies. As one
example, the Bureau notes that the Federal banking agencies (the OCC,
Board, and FDIC) received a comment regarding their supervisory
authorities, but the Bureau did not. Accordingly, the Bureau does not
discuss that subject here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Of the comments received, some comments were not submitted
to all agencies, and some comments were identical. Note that this
total excludes comments that were directed at an unrelated
rulemaking by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the
Department of the Treasury (FinCEN).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters representing trade associations for banking institutions
and other businesses, State bankers' associations, individual financial
institutions, and one member of Congress expressed general support for
the Proposed Rule. These commenters supported codification of the 2018
Statement and the reiteration by the agencies that guidance does not
have the force of law and cannot give rise to binding, enforceable
legal obligations. One of these commenters stated that the Proposal
would serve the interests of consumers and competition by clarifying
the law for institutions and potentially removing ambiguities that
could deter the development of innovative products that serve consumers
and business clients, without uncertainty regarding potential
regulatory consequences. These commenters expressed strong support as
well for the clarification in the Proposed Rule that the agencies will
not criticize, including through the issuance of ``matters requiring
attention,'' a supervised financial institution for a ``violation'' of,
or ``non-compliance'' with, supervisory guidance.
One commenter agreed with the agencies that supervisory criticisms
should not be limited to violation of statutes, regulations, or orders
and that supervisory guidance remains a beneficial tool to communicate
supervisory expectations to the industry. The commenter stated that the
proactive identification of supervisory criticism or deficiencies that
do not constitute violations of law facilitates forward-looking
supervision, which helps address problems before they warrant a formal
enforcement action. The commenter noted as well that supervisory
guidance provides important insight to industry and ensures consistency
in the supervisory approach and that supervised institutions frequently
request supervisory guidance. The commenter observed that the COVID-19
pandemic has amplified the requests for supervisory guidance and
interpretation, and that it is apparent institutions want clarity and
guidance from regulators.
Two commenters, both public interest advocacy groups, opposed the
Proposed Rule, suggesting that codifying the 2018 Statement may
undermine the important role that supervisory guidance can play by
informing supervisory criticism, rather than merely clarifying that it
will not serve as the basis for enforcement actions. One commenter
stated that it is essential for agencies to have the prophylactic
authority to base criticisms on imprudent bank practices that may not
yet have ripened into violations of law or significant safety and
soundness concerns. The commenter stated that this is particularly
important with respect to large banks, where delay in addressing
concerns could lead to a broader crisis. One commenter stated that the
agencies have not explained the benefits that would result from the
rule or demonstrated how the rule will promote safety and soundness or
consumer protection. The commenter argued that supervision is different
from other forms of regulation and requires supervisory discretion,
which could be constrained by the rule. One of these commenters argued
that the Proposal would send a signal that banking institutions have
wider discretion to ignore supervisory guidance.
In a comment that was specifically addressed to the Bureau, a
veterans advocacy group expressed concern that the Bureau's
participation in the interagency rule would bind the hands of a future
administration.
B. Scope of Rule
Several industry commenters requested that the Proposed Rule cover
interpretive rules and clarify that interpretive rules do not have the
force and effect of law. One commenter stated that the agencies should
clarify whether they believe that interpretive rules can be binding.
The commenter argued that, under established legal principles,
interpretive rules can be binding on the agency that issues but not on
the public. Some commenters suggested that the agencies follow
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) recommendations
for issuing interpretive rules and that the agencies should clarify
when particular guidance documents are (or are not) interpretive rules
and allow the public to petition to change an interpretation. A number
of commenters requested that the agencies expand the statement to
address the standards that apply to MRAs and other supervisory
criticisms, a suggestion made in the Petition.
One comment that specifically pertained to the Bureau, which was
submitted by an association of community banks, recommended that the
category of supervisory guidance be expanded to include the ``small
entity compliance guides'' that the Bureau provides for small entities,
which the commenter described as extremely helpful. Another comment,
from an association in the debt-collection industry, generally
encouraged the Bureau to issue small entity compliance guides,
frequently asked questions, and advisory opinions to explain compliance
expectations.
C. Role of Guidance Documents
Several commenters recommended that the agencies clarify that the
practices described in supervisory guidance are merely examples of
conduct that may be consistent with statutory and regulations, not
expectations that may form the basis for supervisory criticism. One
commenter suggested that the agencies state that when supervisory
guidance or interpretive rules offers examples of safe and sound
conduct, compliance with consumer protection standards, appropriate
risk management practices, or acceptable practices through supervisory
guidance, the agencies will
[[Page 9264]]
treat adherence to that supervisory guidance or interpretive rule as
providing a safe harbor. One commenter also requested that the agencies
make clear that guidance that goes through public comment, as well as
any examples used in guidance, are not binding.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ This commenter also requested that the agencies affirm that
they will apply statutory factors while processing applications. The
Bureau construes this comment, in context, as referring to the
application processes that are common at the Federal banking
agencies; to the extent it may refer to applications to the Bureau,
the Bureau considers it outside the scope of the Bureau's
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One comment that was specifically addressed to the Bureau, from an
association of credit unions, stated that the Bureau should refrain
from issuing supervisory guidance that adds requirements not explicitly
stated in the statute or regulation.
One commenter argued that guidance provides valuable information to
supervisors about how their discretion should be exercised and
therefore plays an important role in supervision.
D. Supervisory Criticisms
Several commenters addressed supervisory criticisms and how they
relate to guidance. Some commenters suggested that supervisory
criticisms should be specific as to practices, operations, financial
conditions, or other matters that could have a negative effect. These
commenters suggested that MRAs, memoranda of understanding and any
other formal written mandates or sanctions should be based only on a
violation of a statute or regulation. Similarly, these commenters
argued that there should be no references to guidance in written formal
actions and that banking institutions should be reassured that they
will not be criticized or cited for a violation of guidance when no law
or regulation is cited. One commenter suggested that it would instead
be appropriate to discuss supervisory guidance privately, rather than
publicly, potentially during the pre-exam meetings or during
examination exit meetings. Another commenter suggested that, while
referencing guidance in supervisory criticism may be useful at times,
agencies should provide safeguards to prevent such references from
becoming the de facto basis for supervisory criticisms. One commenter
stated that examiners also should not criticize community banks in
their final written examination reports for not complying with ``best
practices'' unless the criticism involves a violation of bank policy or
regulation. The commenter added that industry best practices should be
transparent enough and sufficiently known throughout the industry
before being cited in an examination report. One commenter requested
that examiners should not apply large bank practices to community banks
that have a different, less complex and more conservative business
model.
Commenters that opposed the Proposal did not support restricting
supervisory criticism or sanctions to explicit violations of law or
regulation. One commenter expressed concern that requiring supervisors
to wait for an explicit violation of law before issuing criticism would
effectively erase the line between supervision and enforcement.
According to the commenter, it would eliminate the space for
supervision as an intermediate practice of oversight and cooperative
problem-solving between banks and the regulators who support and manage
the banking system. One commenter emphasized the importance of bank
supervisors basing their criticisms on imprudent bank practices that
may not yet have ripened into violations of laws or rules but which if
left unaddressed could pose harm to consumers.
One commenter argued that the agencies should state clearly that
guidance can and will be used by supervisors to inform their
assessments of banks' practices and that it may be cited as, and serve
as the basis for, criticisms. According to the commenter, even under
the legal principles described in the Proposal, it is permissible for
guidance to be used as a set of standards that may inform a criticism,
provided that application of the guidance is used for corrective
purposes, if not to support an enforcement action.
According to one commenter, the Proposal makes fine conceptual
distinctions between, for example, issuing supervisory criticisms ``on
the basis of'' guidance and issuing supervisory criticisms that make
``reference'' to supervisory guidance. The commenter suggested that is
a distinction that it may be difficult for regulated entities to parse
in practice. According to the commenter, a rule that makes such a
distinction is likely to have a chilling effect on supervisors
attempting to implement policy in the field. According to another
commenter, the language allowing examiners to reference supervisory
guidance to provide examples is too vague and threatens to marginalize
the role of guidance and significantly reduce its usefulness in the
process of issuing criticisms designed to correct deficient bank
practices.
E. Issuance and Management of Supervisory Guidance
Several commenters made suggestions about how the agencies should
issue and manage supervisory guidance. Some commenters suggested that
the agencies should delineate clearly between regulations and
supervisory guidance. Commenters encouraged the agencies to regularly
review, update, and potentially rescind outstanding guidance. One
commenter suggested that the agencies rescind outstanding guidance that
functions as rule but has not gone through notice and comment. One
commenter suggested that the agencies memorialize their intent to
revisit and potentially rescind existing guidance, as well as limit
multiple guidance documents on the same topic. Commenters suggested
that supervisory guidance should be easy to find, readily available,
online, and in a format that is user-friendly and searchable.
One commenter encouraged the agencies to issue principles-based
guidance that avoids the kind of granularity that could be misconstrued
as binding expectations. According to this commenter, the agencies can
issue separate frequently asked questions with more detailed
information but should clearly identify these as non-binding
illustrations. This commenter also encouraged the agencies to publish
proposed guidance for comment when circumstances allow. Another
commenter requested that the agencies issue all ``rules'' as defined by
the Administrative Procedure Act through the notice-and-comment
process.
One commenter expressed concern that the agencies will aim to
reduce the issuance of multiple supervisory guidance documents and will
thereby reduce the availability of guidance in circumstances where
guidance would be valuable.
F. Responses to Comments
As stated in the Proposed Rule, the 2018 Statement was intended to
focus on the appropriate use of supervisory guidance in the supervisory
process, rather than the standards for supervisory criticisms. The
standards for issuing MRAs and other supervisory actions were,
therefore, outside the scope of this rulemaking. For this reason, and
for reasons discussed earlier, the final rule does not address the
standards for MRAs or other supervisory actions.
With respect to the comments on coverage of interpretive rules, the
Bureau agrees with the commenter that interpretive rules do not, alone,
``have the force and effect of law'' and must be
[[Page 9265]]
rooted in, and derived from, a statute or regulation.\14\ While
interpretive rules and supervisory guidance are similar in lacking the
force and effect of law, interpretive rules and supervisory guidance
are distinct under the APA and its jurisprudence and are generally
issued for different purposes.\15\ Interpretive rules are typically
issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction
of the statutes and rules that it administers,\16\ whereas general
statements of policy, such as supervisory guidance, advise the public
of how an agency intends to exercise its discretionary powers.\17\ To
this end, guidance generally reflects an agency's policy views, for
example, on risk management practices. On the other hand, interpretive
rules generally resolve ambiguities regarding requirements imposed by
statutes and regulations. Because supervisory guidance and interpretive
rules have different characteristics and serve different purposes, the
Bureau has decided that the final rule will continue to cover
supervisory guidance only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Mortgage Bankers Association, 575 U.S. at 96.
\15\ Questions concerning the legal and supervisory nature of
interpretive rules are case-specific and have engendered debate
among courts and administrative law commentators. The Bureau takes
no position in this rulemaking on those specific debates. See, e.g.,
R. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 Admin. L. Rev.
263 (2018) (discussing the doctrinal differences concerning the
status of interpretive rules under the APA); see also Nicholas R.
Parillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Powder to Bind: An
Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 Yale J. Reg 165, 168
n.6 (2019) (``Whether interpretive rules are supposed to be
nonbinding is a question subject to much confusion that is not fully
settled.''); see also ACUS, Recommendation 2019-1: Agency Guidance
Through Interpretive Rules, 84 FR 38927 (Aug. 8, 2019) (noting that
courts and commentators have different views on whether interpretive
rules bind an agency and effectively bind the public through the
deference given to agencies' interpretations of their own rules
under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)).
\16\ Mortgage Bankers Association, 575 U.S. at 97 (citing
Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995));
accord Attorney General's Manual at 30 n.3.
\17\ See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 302 n.31 (quoting
Attorney General's Manual at 30 n.3); see also, e.g., American
Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 F.2d
1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (outlining tests in the D.C. Circuit for
assessing whether an agency issuance is an interpretive rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the question of whether to adopt ACUS's procedures
for allowing the public to request reconsideration or revision of an
interpretive rule, this rulemaking, again, does not address
interpretive rules. As such, the Bureau is not adding procedures for
challenges to interpretive rules through this rulemaking.
The Bureau is also not adopting the comment from an association of
community banks that the category of supervisory guidance be expanded
to include the ``small entity compliance guides'' that the Bureau
provides for small entities, which the commenter described as extremely
helpful. The Bureau normally designates its small entity compliance
guides as ``compliance aids,'' pursuant to the its Policy Statement on
Compliance Aids.\18\ Compliance aids do not rise to the level of
supervisory guidance, because they are not general statements of policy
and they do not concern the Bureau's supervisory powers--neither do
they rise to the level of interpretive rules, because they are not
interpretive.\19\ Instead, the Policy Statement on Compliance Aids
outlines how compliance aids simply present the requirements of rules
and statutes in a manner that is useful for compliance professionals,
other industry stakeholders, and the public; compliance aids also
sometimes include practical suggestions for how entities might choose
to go about complying with those rules and statutes.\20\ Interested
parties can consult the Policy Statement on Compliance Aids for a
comprehensive explanation of how the Bureau views its compliance aids.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Policy Statement on Compliance Aids, 85 FR 4579 (Jan. 27,
2020).
\19\ Id. at 4579 n.4 (explaining that Bureau compliance aids
that satisfy the policy statement do not rise to the level of
``rules'' as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act and that
general statements of policy and interpretive rules are examples of
``rules'').
\20\ Id. at 4579.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bureau also notes the comment from an association in the debt-
collection industry that encouraged the Bureau to issue small entity
compliance guides, frequently asked questions, and advisory opinions to
explain compliance expectations. The Bureau observes that these
particular materials are outside the scope of this particular
rulemaking. This is because the Bureau's small entity compliance guides
and frequently asked questions are generally designated as compliance
aids and not supervisory guidance under the Policy Statement on
Compliance Aids,\21\ while the Bureau's advisory opinions are
classified as interpretive rules under the Bureau's Advisory Opinion
Policy.\22\ However, the Bureau agrees that the appropriate Bureau use
of compliance aids and advisory opinions, like supervisory guidance, is
useful for helping entities in the debt-collection and other industries
to fully comply with Federal consumer financial laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Id.
\22\ Advisory Opinions Policy, 85 FR 77987, 77988 (Dec. 3, 2020)
(explaining that Bureau advisory opinions are interpretive rules
under the Administrative Procedure Act and explaining limitations on
advisory opinions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the comment that the agencies should treat examples
in guidance as ``safe harbors,'' the Bureau agrees that examples
offered in supervisory guidance can provide insight about practices
that, in general, may lead to compliance with regulations and statutes.
The examples in guidance, however, are generalized. When an institution
chooses to implement such examples, examiners must consider the facts
and circumstances of that institution in assessing the application of
those examples. In addition, the underlying legal principle of
supervisory guidance is that it does not created binding legal
obligation for either the public or an agency. As such, the Bureau does
not deem examples in supervisory guidance to categorically establish
safe harbors.
The Bureau has also considered the comment that was specifically
directed to the Bureau, from an association of credit unions, which
stated that the Bureau should refrain from issuing supervisory guidance
that adds requirements not explicitly stated in the statute or
regulation. Although the Bureau does not agree that it would be
appropriate to limit the Bureau's efforts to assist entities in
complying with their legal obligations to situations where the law is
already explicit, the Bureau fully agrees that it is not the role of
supervisory guidance to create legal requirements. Those must be
located in a statute or regulation.
In response to the comments that the Proposal may undermine the
important role that supervisory guidance can play in informing
supervisory criticism and in serving to address conditions before those
conditions lead to enforcement actions, the Bureau agrees that the
appropriate use of supervisory guidance generates a more collaborative
and constructive regulatory process that supports compliance by
institutions, thereby diminishing the need for enforcement actions. As
noted by ACUS, guidance can make agency decision-making more
predictable and uniform and shield regulated parties from unequal
treatment, unnecessary costs, and unnecessary risk, while promoting
compliance with the law. The Bureau does not view the final rule as
weakening the role of guidance in the supervisory process and the
Bureau will continue to use guidance in a robust way to promote
compliance by its supervised institutions.
Further, the Bureau does not agree with one commenter's assertion
that the Proposal made an unclear distinction between, on the one hand,
inappropriate
[[Page 9266]]
supervisory criticism for a ``violation'' of or ``non-compliance'' with
supervisory guidance, and, on the other hand, Bureau examiners'
entirely appropriate use of supervisory guidance to reference examples
of appropriate consumer protection and risk management practices and
other actions for addressing compliance with laws or regulations. This
approach appropriately implements the principle that institutions are
not required to follow supervisory guidance in itself but may find such
guidance useful. The Bureau disagrees with the commenter that
institutions and examiners are incapable of understanding this
important distinction.
As one example, Bureau examiners regularly examine the compliance
management systems (CMS) at supervised institutions. Where examiners
identify a deficiency in an institution's CMS, examiners may provide a
supervisory recommendation or other supervisory criticism to the
institution to correct the deficiency at that institution. It is also
appropriate for Bureau examiners to refer to relevant supervisory
guidance as an example of appropriate CMS, if the examiners believe
that an institution would find such guidance informative.
In response to the comments regarding the role of public comment
for supervisory guidance, the Bureau notes that it has made clear
through the 2018 Statement and in this final rule that supervisory
guidance (including guidance that goes through public comment) does not
create binding, enforceable legal obligations. Rather, the Bureau may
issue supervisory guidance for comment in order to improve its
understanding of an issue, gather information, or seek ways to achieve
a supervisory objective most effectively. Similarly, examples that are
included in supervisory guidance (including guidance that goes through
public comment) are not binding on institutions. Rather, these examples
are intended to be illustrative of ways a supervised institution may
implement appropriate consumer protection, prudent risk management, or
other actions in furtherance of compliance with laws or regulations.
Relatedly, the Bureau does not agree with one comment that it should
use notice-and-comment procedures, without exception, to issue all
``rules'' as defined by the APA, which would include supervisory
guidance. Congress has established longstanding exceptions in the APA
from the notice-and-comment process for certain rules, including for
general statements of policy like supervisory guidance and for
interpretive rules. As one court has explained, Congress intended to
``accommodate situations where the policies promoted by public
participation in rulemaking are outweighed by the countervailing
considerations of effectiveness, efficiency, expedition and reduction
in expense.'' \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1987). The specific contours of these exceptions are the subject of
an extensive body of case law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the question raised by some commenters concerning
potential confusion between supervisory guidance and interpretive
rules, the Bureau notes that interpretive rules are outside the scope
of the rulemaking. In addition, as stated earlier, interpretative rules
do not, alone, ``have the force and effect of law'' and must be rooted
in, and derived from, the statutes and regulations those rules
interpret. While interpretive rules and supervisory guidance are
similar in lacking the force and effect of law, interpretive rules and
supervisory guidance are distinct under the APA and its jurisprudence
and are generally issued for different purposes. The Bureau believes
that when it issues an interpretive rule, the fact that it is an
interpretive rule is generally clear. In addition, these comments
relate to clarity in drafting, rather than a matter that seems suitable
for rulemaking.
In response to the two public interest advocacy groups opposing the
Proposal, the Bureau does not believe that this final rule would
undermine any of the Bureau's authorities. Indeed, the final rule is
designed to support the Bureau's ability to supervise. In addition, the
Bureau notes the question of the role of guidance has been one of
interest to regulated parties and other stakeholders over the past few
years. The Petition and the numerous comments on the Proposal are a
sign of this interest. As such, the Bureau believes it will serve the
public interest to reaffirm the appropriate role of supervisory
guidance. There are inherent benefits to the supervisory process
whenever institutions and examiners have a clear understanding of their
roles, including how supervisory guidance can be used effectively
within legal limits. And in response to the concern from the veterans
advocacy group that the Bureau's participation in the interagency
Proposed Rule would bind the hands of a future administration, the
Bureau notes that it is the nature of binding regulations that they
bind an agency over time across multiple administrations. Most
importantly, it does not believe that there is anything in the final
rule that would prevent the Bureau from continuing to vigorously carry
out its statutory supervisory functions in the interests of consumers,
while respecting legal limits. Therefore, the Bureau is proceeding with
the rule as proposed.
In response to the commenter expressing concern that language in
the Statement on reducing multiple supervisory guidance documents on
the same topic will limit the Bureau's ability to provide valuable
guidance, the Bureau assures the commenter that this language will not
inhibit the Bureau from issuing new supervisory guidance when
appropriate.
Finally, the Bureau appreciates the other comments related to other
aspects of guidance or the supervisory process, but the Bureau does not
believe that they are best addressed in this rulemaking.
IV. The Final Rule
For the reasons discussed above, the final rule adopts the Proposed
Rule without substantive change.
However, the Bureau has decided to issue a final rule that is
specifically addressed to the Bureau and Bureau-supervised
institutions, rather than the joint version that the five agencies
included in their joint Proposal. Although many of the comments were
applicable to all of the agencies, some comments were specific to
particular agencies or to groups of agencies. Having separate final
rules has enabled agencies to better focus on explaining any agency-
specific issues to their respective audiences of supervised
institutions and agency employees.
Relatedly, the Bureau has omitted from the final rule those
specific phrases that are inapplicable to the Bureau, because they
pertain to the safety-and-soundness responsibilities of the Federal
banking agencies and the NCUA. The Bureau believes that this will
provide greater clarity about how the rule applies to the Bureau's
supervisory functions.
V. Administrative Law Matters
A. Dodd-Frank Act
The Bureau issues this final rule based on the Bureau's authorities
under sections 1012(a)(1) and 1022(b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).\24\ Section
1012(a)(1) authorizes the Bureau to establish rules for conducting the
general business of the Bureau, in a manner not inconsistent with title
X of the Dodd-Frank Act.\25\ Section
[[Page 9267]]
1022(b)(1) authorizes the Bureau to issue rules as may be necessary or
appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the
purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws.\26\ The
Bureau determines that the additional clarity regarding the status of
supervisory guidance provided by the final rule will enable the Bureau
to carry out its supervisory responsibilities under Federal consumer
financial law more effectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
\25\ 12 U.S.C. 5492(a)(1).
\26\ 12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with section 1022(b)(2)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Act, in
developing the final rule, the Bureau has consulted, or offered to
consult with, the prudential regulators and the Federal Trade
Commission, including regarding consistency with any prudential,
market, or systemic objectives administered by those agencies.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ 12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(2)(B). The prudential regulators are the
OCC, Board, FDIC, and NCUA. See 12 U.S.C. 5481(24) (defining
``prudential regulators'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, consistent with section 1022(b)(2)(A) of the Dodd-
Frank Act, the Bureau has considered the potential benefits, costs, and
impacts of the final rule.\28\ The Bureau requested comment on the
preliminary analysis presented in the proposal as well as submissions
of additional data that could inform the Bureau's analysis of the
benefits, costs, and impacts. Such comments as the Bureau received on
this subject are discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Section 1022(b)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C.
5512(b)(2)(A), requires the Bureau to consider the potential
benefits and costs of the regulation to consumers and covered
persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers to
consumer financial products or services; the impact of the proposed
rule on insured depository institutions and credit unions with no
more than $10 billion in total assets as described in section 1026
of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 5516; and the impact on consumers
in rural areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institutions Affected by the Final Rule. The Bureau's final rule
applies to supervisory guidance issued by the Bureau, which is
addressed to those institutions that are subject to the Bureau's
supervisory authority. Accordingly, the final rule may affect those
nondepository institutions that are subject to the Bureau's supervisory
authority under section 1024 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\29\ It may also
affect those insured depository institutions and insured credit unions
that have more than $10 billion in total assets, together with their
affiliates, which are subject to the Bureau's supervisory authority
under section 1025 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\30\ The final rule may
additionally affect service providers that are subject to the Bureau's
supervisory authority.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ 12 U.S.C. 5514.
\30\ 12 U.S.C. 5515.
\31\ 12 U.S.C. 5514(e), 5515(d), 5516(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential Benefits and Costs to Consumers and Covered Persons. The
final rule reiterates the Interagency Statement Clarifying the Role of
Supervisory Guidance (2018 Statement), which is already the policy of
the Bureau, and makes it binding on the Bureau. The Bureau evaluates
the final rule against a baseline in which no such rule is adopted, and
the Bureau is therefore less definitively bound to implement the 2018
Statement in all supervisory activities. Accordingly, the final rule
provides the relevant institutions with additional assurance that the
Bureau's implementation of current and future supervisory guidance will
follow the 2018 Statement.
The final rule should provide the relevant institutions with
greater certainty about legal obligations that are addressed in
supervisory guidance. This in turn may reduce compliance costs. It is
not feasible, however, to quantify or monetize this benefit. The Bureau
can only speculate on the greater certainty about legal obligations and
the reduction in compliance costs due to the final rule. Further, the
benefit from the greater certainty about legal obligations pertains to
future as well as current supervisory guidance. The Bureau can only
speculate on the frequency of future supervisory guidance. Supervisory
guidance is issued from time to time as the need arises, and the Bureau
cannot forecast the volume and nature of future supervisory guidance
with sufficient precision to quantify or monetize this benefit.
The final rule may also indirectly benefit those consumers that are
customers of the relevant institutions, if reduced compliance costs
translate into better terms or availability of consumer financial
products and services. For the reasons given above, this benefit cannot
be quantified or monetized.
A commenter criticized the benefits discussed above and in the
Proposal, deeming them implausible and speculative, and argued that
there is no link between reduced compliance costs and consumer welfare.
The Bureau disagrees with this assessment. While the Bureau does not
have data to quantify or monetize the benefit of increased clarity, as
a matter of logic and economic theory increased legal clarity can
reduce compliance costs of regulated entities. Where there is
uncertainty as to the requirements of the law, firms subject to the
Bureau's supervisory authority may undertake excess costs to ensure
compliance. To the extent that the 2018 Statement has prompted
financial institutions to avoid unnecessary compliance costs in cases
that comply with applicable laws and regulations and do not harm
consumers, but technically contravene the Bureau's supervisory
guidance, the final rule will further lower those costs by reducing the
uncertainty. With respect to the criticism that compliance costs are
not necessarily linked to consumer welfare, the Bureau notes that its
burden under section 1022(b)(2)(A) is to consider costs and benefits to
covered persons as well as to consumers. Moreover, as noted above, a
reduction in unnecessary compliance costs can be passed through to
consumers in the form of lower costs of credit.
Finally, the final rule does not impose any new obligations on
institutions. Thus, the final rule should have no costs for
institutions. A consumer advocate commenter asserted that the rule
would impose costs on consumers by reducing the effectiveness of the
agencies' supervision operations, leading to potential consumer harm.
The commenter argued that ambiguities in the Proposed Rule and the
accompanying Statement would make it difficult for supervision staff at
the agencies to determine when to issue supervisory criticisms, to the
detriment of consumers who may be affected by practices that would
otherwise be subject to a supervisor's criticism. However, the Bureau
notes that the 2018 Statement is already the policy of the Bureau.
Moreover, the rule is intended to clarify at least some aspects of the
2018 Statement. To the extent that the ambiguities the commenter
identifies exist and affect the Bureau's supervision operations, they
already exist under the baseline. Thus, as noted in the Proposal, the
effects of the rule, as described above, impose no clear costs on any
consumers.
Impact on Depository Institutions and Credit Unions With No More
Than $10 Billion in Assets. Under section 1026 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
the Bureau has only limited supervisory authority with respect to those
insured depository institutions and insured credit unions that have no
more than $10 billion in total assets,\32\ and so the Bureau does not
normally address supervisory guidance to these institutions.
Accordingly, the Bureau does not expect there to be any appreciable
impact on these institutions from the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ 12 U.S.C. 5516.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impact on Access to Credit. The Bureau does not expect the final
rule to affect consumers' access to credit,
[[Page 9268]]
except to the extent that reduced compliance costs and additional
assurance, relative to the baseline, that the Bureau will follow the
2018 Statement in the future might indirectly make some credit more
available, as discussed above.
Impact on Consumers in Rural Areas. The Bureau does not believe
that the final rule would have any unique impact on consumers in rural
areas, and so the impact on these consumers should be similar to
consumers generally.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires an agency
to conduct an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) and a
final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) of any rule subject to
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements, unless the head of the
agency certifies that the rule will not, if promulgated, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.\33\ The Bureau also is subject to certain additional
procedures under the RFA involving the convening of a panel to consult
with small business representatives prior to proposing a rule for which
an IRFA is required.\34\ In the Proposal, the Bureau determined that an
IRFA and small business review panel was not required because the
Director of the Bureau certified the Proposed Rule, if adopted, would
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The Bureau explained that the Proposed Rule would not impose
any obligations on regulated entities, and regulated entities would not
need to take any action in response to this Proposed Rule. The Bureau
did not receive comments on its analysis of the impact of the Proposal
on small entities. Accordingly, the Director of the Bureau certifies
that the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
\34\ 5 U.S.C. 609.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Bureau has determined that this final rule does not impose any
new or revise any existing recordkeeping, reporting, or disclosure
requirements on covered entities or members of the public that would be
collections of information requiring approval by the Office of
Management and Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-3521.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Congressional Review Act
Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act \36\ the Bureau will
submit a report containing this rule and other required information to
the United States Senate, the United States House of Representatives,
and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to the rule
taking effect. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
has designated this rule as not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C.
804(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Signing Authority
The Director of the Bureau, Kathleen L. Kraninger, having reviewed
and approved this document, is delegating the authority to
electronically sign this document to Grace Feola, a Bureau Federal
Register Liaison, for purposes of publication in the Federal Register.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 1074
Administrative practice and procedure.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth above, the Bureau amends 12 CFR part 1074
as set forth below:
PART 1074--RULEMAKING AND GUIDANCE
0
1. The authority citation for part 1074 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 5492(a)(1), 5512(b).
0
2. The heading to part 1074 is revised as set forth above.
0
3. Add a heading for new subpart A to read as follows:
Subpart A--Procedure for Issuance of Bureau Rules
Sec. 1074.1 [Designated as Subpart A]
0
4. Designate Sec. 1074.1 as new subpart A.
0
5. Add subpart B, consisting of Sec. Sec. 1074.2 and 1074.3, to read
as follows:
Subpart B--Use of Supervisory Guidance
Sec.
1074.2 Purpose.
1074.3 Implementation of the Statement Clarifying the Role of
Supervisory Guidance.
Sec. 1074.2 Purpose.
The Bureau issues regulations and guidance as part of its
supervisory function. This subpart reiterates the distinctions between
regulations and guidance, as stated in the Statement Clarifying the
Role of Supervisory Guidance (appendix A to this part) (Statement), and
provides that the Statement is binding on the Bureau.
Sec. 1074.3 Implementation of the Statement Clarifying the Role of
Supervisory Guidance.
The Statement describes the official policy of the Bureau with
respect to the use of supervisory guidance in the supervisory process.
The Statement is binding on the Bureau.
0
6. Appendix A to part 1074 is added to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 1074--Statement Clarifying the Role of Supervisory
Guidance
Statement Clarifying the Role of Supervisory Guidance
The Bureau is issuing this statement to explain the role of
supervisory guidance and to describe the Bureau's approach to
supervisory guidance.
Difference Between Supervisory Guidance and Laws or Regulations
Supervisory agencies like the Bureau issue various types of
supervisory guidance, including interagency statements, advisories,
bulletins, policy statements, questions and answers, or frequently
asked questions, to their respective supervised institutions. A law
or regulation has the force and effect of law.\1\ Unlike a law or
regulation, supervisory guidance does not have the force and effect
of law, and the Bureau does not take enforcement actions based on
supervisory guidance. Rather, supervisory guidance outlines the
Bureau's supervisory expectations or priorities and articulates the
Bureau's general views regarding appropriate practices for a given
subject area. Supervisory guidance often provides examples of
practices that the Bureau generally considers consistent with
applicable laws and regulations, including those designed to protect
consumers. Supervised institutions at times request supervisory
guidance, and such guidance is important to provide insight to
industry, as well as supervisory staff, in a transparent way that
helps to ensure consistency in the supervisory approach.
Ongoing Efforts To Clarify the Role of Supervisory Guidance
The Bureau is clarifying the following policies and practices
related to supervisory guidance:
The Bureau intends to limit the use of numerical
thresholds or other ``bright-lines'' in describing expectations in
supervisory guidance. Where numerical thresholds are used, the
Bureau intends to clarify that the thresholds are exemplary only and
not suggestive of requirements. The Bureau will continue to use
numerical thresholds to tailor, and otherwise make clear, the
applicability of supervisory guidance or programs to supervised
institutions, and as required by statute.
Examiners will not criticize (through the issuance of
matters requiring attention, matters requiring immediate attention,
[[Page 9269]]
matters requiring board attention, documents of resolution, and
supervisory recommendations) a supervised financial institution for,
and the Bureau will not issue an enforcement action on the basis of,
a ``violation'' of or ``non-compliance'' with supervisory guidance.
In some situations, examiners may reference (including in writing)
supervisory guidance to provide examples of appropriate consumer
protection and risk management practices and other actions for
addressing compliance with laws or regulations.
Supervisory criticisms should continue to be specific
as to practices, operations or other matters that could cause
consumer harm or could cause violations of laws, regulations, final
agency orders, or other legally enforceable conditions.
The Bureau may decide to seek public comment on
supervisory guidance. Seeking public comment on supervisory guidance
does not mean that the guidance is intended to be a regulation or
have the force and effect of law. The comment process helps the
Bureau to improve its understanding of an issue, to gather
information on institutions' risk management practices, or to seek
ways to achieve a supervisory objective most effectively and with
the least burden on institutions.
The Bureau will aim to reduce the issuance of multiple
supervisory guidance documents on the same topic and will generally
limit such multiple issuances going forward.
The Bureau will continue efforts to make the role of
supervisory guidance clear in communications to examiners and to
supervised financial institutions and encourages supervised
institutions with questions about this statement or any applicable
supervisory guidance to discuss the questions with their appropriate
agency contact.
Dated: January 19, 2021.
Grace Feola,
Federal Register Liaison, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
[FR Doc. 2021-01524 Filed 2-11-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-AM-P